Category: France

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Hold Half Day of General Discussion on Reparations for the Injustices from the Transatlantic Trade of Enslaved Africans

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination this afternoon held a half day of general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.  The half-day consisted of opening statements two panel discussions, hearing from Committee members, experts in international law, representative from the diplomatic corps, and political and civil society leaders.

    Speaking in the first panel discussion on “Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement” were Pela Boker-Wilson, Committee Expert; Joshua Castellino, Executive Dean, College of Arts, Law & Social Sciences, Brunel University of London; Patricia Sellers, former Special Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Britta Redwood, Assistant Professor, Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and Seton Hall Law School; Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, former Investigator at the International Criminal Court; and Bernard Duhaime, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

    Speaking in the second panel discussion on “The Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability” were Tendayi Achiume, former Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Matthew Anthony Wilson, Permanent Representative of Barbados to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Eric Phillips, Vice-Chairperson of the Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission; Ibrahima Guissé, Committee Expert; and Dennis O’Brien, Founder of the Repair Campaign.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Monday, 28 April at 3 p.m. to begin its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth periodic reports of Mauritius (CERD/C/MUS/24-25).

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, welcomed participants to the half-day of general discussion to advance the development of a general recommendation on reparations for the historical injustices rooted in the chattel enslavement of Africans and the enduring harms experienced by people of African descent.  The proposed general recommendation sought to clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law and address the harms caused by the forced capture and transatlantic transport of Africans, their enslavement as chattel, and the lasting consequences of these crimes. 

    To inform this process, the Committee had issued a public call for input on 14 February 2025 and had been encouraged by the engagement, with 56 submissions received from a wide range of stakeholders.  Today’s discussion provided a space to reflect on the submissions received, deepen the collective understanding of applicable international legal standards, and further examine the contemporary legacy of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans.  In the coming months, the Committee would prepare a draft text of the general recommendation, which would be made publicly available for input from all stakeholders prior to finalisation. 

    MAHAMANE CISSÉ-GOURO, Director, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said today’s topic addressed a matter of deep historical significance and urgent contemporary relevance: reparatory justice for the injustices arising from the trade in enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the continuing harms and crimes suffered by people of African descent.  In 2001, at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, States adopted by consensus the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which recognised slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, and among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.  Contemporary structures and systems, such as racial profiling, police brutality, unequal access to education and employment, disparities in health and housing, and the denial of political participation and justice were rooted in these enduring harms.

    International human rights law and political commitments by States provided a clear framework for attaining substantive racial justice and equality.  A central element of dismantling systemic racism was addressing the past and redressing its legacies through reparatory justice, to transform the present and secure a just and equitable future.  The High Commissioner had called for reparatory justice to transform structures and systems which were designed and shaped by enslavement, colonialism and successive racially discriminatory policies and systems. States and others that had benefited and continued to benefit from these legacies should make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination through wide-ranging and meaningful initiatives, including through formal apologies, truth-telling processes, and reparations in various forms.  This called for political leadership, and creative, effective and comprehensive responses to legacies of the past.  Since the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the international community had taken important steps; however, as the Convention commemorated its sixtieth anniversary, it was evident that these commitments and recommendations had not resulted in durable, transformative change. 

    The development of this general recommendation was timely and necessary.  It would clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations for historical injustices under international human rights law and provide States with guidance to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.  Mr. Cissé-Gouro encouraged all participants to engage and emphasised that the Office of the High Commissioner supported the process. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, said this year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which remained the normative centre of international efforts to end racism. In commemoration of the anniversary year, the Committee had decided to prepare a general recommendation on reparations to clarify and elaborate the legal obligations of States to repair the harms inflicted by the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by them and their descendants.  The transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans constituted the largest and most concentrated forced deportation of human beings ever recorded, implicating several regions of the world during more than four centuries. Between 12 to 13 million Africans were violently uprooted from Africa for sale and enslavement. 

    The system of colonial rule had enabled and facilitated the development of the uniquely brutal system of chattel enslavement, and the resulting massive gross abuses of human rights that followed for centuries.  The transatlantic slave trade was inextricably tied to European colonial domination of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and parts of Asia.  It was a system that enriched Europe, and the institutions in power, and it existed today in many contemporary forms.  Now it was widely agreed that all forms of slavery were violations of international law and most domestic laws gave rise to the responsibility to ensure reparations.  However, the harms inflicted by these events had never been addressed, including how they negatively impacted the economic, social, political, civic and cultural rights of countries around the world.   The Committee’s proposed general recommendation would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law. 

    Panel Discussion One on Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement

    Opening Remarks by the Moderator of the Panel

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert and Panel Moderator, said the chattel enslavement of Africans was a human rights violation, and victims had a right to reparations based on their right to a remedy.  At the same time, today the legacies of chattel enslavement could be seen in daily lives.  Chattel enslavement and its legacies were the foundation on which systematic racism permeated and the history which drove discriminatory laws and policies based on race. Several legal challenges remained which would be discussed during the panel. 

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, noted that the trade in enslaved Africans began in the fifteenth century, when Portuguese traders established sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands of Madeira, the Azores, and São Tomé.  At the time, the justification for the enslaved status of African labourers was based on the notion that these labourers had been enslaved because they had been taken captive in just wars.  The slave trade was the reduction of a free person to the status of being enslaved, by whatever means, including kidnap, capture, transfer, or sale.  Slave trading comprised not only the initial transatlantic passages, but internal acts of trade in enslaved persons throughout the Americas and the Caribbean.  These two prongs of the slave trade, trans-Atlantic and internal or domestic slave trading, had occurred for centuries. 

    One speaker said the photograph of a South African billionaire of European descent, arm raised in a Nazi salute, was perhaps the most apt icon for that particular civilization.  It epitomised success in generating wealth by extraction, disregarding surroundings in constructing systems where some had an inherent sense of entitlement to everything, even if it devastated others.  Another speaker said an immeasurable toll of sexual, reproductive and gendered practices and institutions had persisted throughout the hundreds of years of slavery and of slave trading in North and South America and in the Caribbean. 

    A speaker underscored that the transatlantic chattel slavery had created and entrenched anti-Black racism. Although slavery had been abolished, the persistence of the social, psychological, and economic harms of racial discrimination persisted until today.  Another speaker noted that the racial hierarchy that was at the root of the slave trade and slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.  One speaker said reparations for people of African descent were not only a matter of justice for the past, but also a foundation for a more equitable and peaceful future.

    Reparations were vital in seeking justice for colonial crimes, but also to eliminate the root cause of historic and continuing colonial existence.  States must ensure that reparations were not merely symbolic, but concrete and enforceable, through judicial rulings as well as administrative or legislative reparation programmes.  These programmes could be supported by national or international funding and must be accessible, gender-sensitive, victim-centred, and rights-based.  In line with established standards, reparations needed to be comprehensive, encompassing restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.  States should establish robust legal and institutional frameworks and ensure stable financial allocations that were protected from political or economic fluctuations.  Crucially, reparation measures must be proportional to the gravity of the harm and address the full scope of the violations.  It was also important to ensure that victims participated in the reparations process. 

    Successful reparations had stemmed from attempts to seek victim-oriented justice. These included local revolutions achieving regime change and victims’ framing of legal arguments to hold power to account.  The dismissal of reparations as solely pertaining to the past needed to be confronted; reparations appeared to be about the past but they were also about the present.  Redress by reparations required recognition that sexual abuse was omnipresent in the lives of the enslaved.  The quest for reparations needed to be achieved through evidence-based reasoning. They had to be shaped to show how the few, irrespective of race, had benefitted from the exploitation of the many, irrespective of race. 

    The Convention was a power instrument for redress.  Under article 11, States could bring complaints against other States for violations of the Convention.  Article 14 allowed individuals and groups to submit petitions directly to the Committee provided that the respondent State had recognised the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive individual petitions.  The Basic Principles on Reparations, a United Nations resolution from 2005, established five aspects of reparations that must follow a significant human rights violation, including the need to guarantee the non-recurrence of the human rights violation at issue. 

    The Convention and subsequent jurisprudence of the Committee required material compensation and policy changes to address the legacy of transatlantic chattel slavery and the system of racial discrimination that was created to entrench it. 

    Structural discrimination that arose from anti-Black racism was an ongoing human rights violation and needed to be addressed by States parties to the Convention.   The Committee was urged to recognise the gendered injustices intrinsic of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery and to include them as germane to the redress considered in the forthcoming general recommendation on reparations. 

    Discussion 

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker welcomed the Committee’s initiative to develop a general recommendation on reparations, which was a vital step towards accountability.  Reparations were grounded in international law, carrying legal consequences which could not be erased by time.  Another speaker said that at the minimum, States parties were required to provide reparations for their failure to eliminate the systemic racism and inequality arising from their inadequate remediation of chattel slavery and its legacies.  The Committee was urged to adopt a comprehensive and transformative approach to address both systemic racism and structural economic inequalities arising from chattel slavery and colonialism in the general recommendation.  A speaker said the time had come to move from rhetoric to concrete measures for reparations for historical and cultural monuments destroyed and looted during centuries of colonialism and slavery. One speaker said reparations were not a favour, but were moral and political obligations of States. 

    Panel Discussion Two on the Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, commended the Committee for the draft general recommendation, which dealt with a vital issue and was long overdue.  The Committee should be applauded for its work and the call for input, and those who had answered the call were thanked.  The call for input document prepared by the Committee did an excellent job of highlighting the history, global responses and objectives, while pointing out the milestones along the way. 

    Chattel slavery was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism, speakers said.  The laws that built it had been dismantled in name, but never in consequence.  The transatlantic slave trade was not just a chapter in history, but was a crime against humanity.  Slavery had funded the economic development of colonial countries, particularly the industrial revolution, and put Britain in the wealthy position that it was in today. The European Union and its members, particularly France, Holland and Spain, and other countries like Germany and Denmark had also participated in this genocide as well. 

    Racism was not a relic of the past; it was present, global, systemic and was still taking lives.  Yet Europe had yet to fully confront this issue.  One speaker commented that Black communities across Europe were too often overlooked, marginalised and ignored by those in power; this must change.   

    There was a painful trail of historical legal construction of racial hierarchy that had occurred during chattel slavery.  This included the British Board of Trade that codified economic enslavement through slave codes and land seizure laws; and France’s Code Noir that created racialised personhood in law.  Portugal and Spain had used religious sanction known as Papal Bulls to erase African legal identity, while the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 insulated colonial laws from challenge.  Today, these laws had mutated into many forms of structural, perceptual and institutional racism, including through education exclusion, Afrophobia, epistemicide and religious erasure.  These laws must be named, acknowledged, and formally repudiated by the United Kingdom and France as a first step in reparatory processes.

    Some speakers noted that chattel slavery was not just a legal and economic construct, it was also a social construct.  When the laws had changed and the cost benefit of slavery was eroded, what remained was institutional racism and structural racism – global inequalities caused by historical injustices.  Those who were descendants of the enslaved lived with the emotional scars of a society that kept ancestors as slaves for longer than people had equal rights under the law.  Chattel slaves were still impacted in deep and wide-ranging ways, with effects spanning economic, social, psychological, and cultural dimensions.  The descendants of the slave owners and the perpetrators of slavery should live with generational repentance. 

    One speaker noted that the 2013 Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission continued to lead the call for reparations.  The Commission recognised that the persistent harm and suffering experienced today by victims of slavery and colonialism was the primary cause of development failure in the Caribbean.  Through its Ten-Point Reparations Plan, it sought to reposition reparations not in terms of a simple transfer of funds, but rather through a plurality of actions such as debt cancellation, education programmes and technology transfer, amongst other elements.

    The call for reparations and restorative justice did not come from a void; it had always been part of decolonisation.  The need for reparations was a pressing and current issue across all parts of the world affected by the African slave trade.  Reparations should be accessible in the form of compensation, addressing the deficits in equity and opportunity.  Reparations were about transforming systems, narratives and institutions, and creating a Europe where black lives were not just tolerated but celebrated and empowered. 

    Some speakers noted that the Convention needed to be more concertedly mobilised as a framework which was central to achieving reparations directly, including through article 6.  The Committee needed to underscore that reparations were required under the Convention.  It was recommended that European governments begin with a sincere formal apology.  However, apologies without material or structural redress were merely symbolic and could never compensate for the wealth extraction, trauma, or the ongoing inequalities faced by African descendants.  Reparations were about reforming entire legal, economic and social structures that still had forms of racism at their core in the present.  It was not just about addressing harms in the past, but also dealing with those in the present.  The Durban Declaration and Programme for Action and its framework provided for combatting racism and should be powerful guidance for the Committee as it prepared the general recommendation. 

    A speaker said the European Union and its Member States should ensure that the European Union’s anti-racism action plan was renewed, with a focus on reparatory justice.  The European Union and the United Kingdom should jointly fund a reparations programme on an intergenerational basis.  This was not a development issue; it was a justice issue. The United Kingdom and the European Union should start engaging with the political leadership of the Caribbean Community to achieve reparatory justice. 

    Discussion

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker said during the Second International Decade for People of African Descent, the international community should act to acknowledge and rectify longstanding economic and social inequities, which had economically stagnated the region and resulted in protracted inter-generational trauma.  Another speaker reiterated strong support for the general recommendation.  The sixtieth anniversary of the Convention should also be used as an opportunity to acknowledge the victories of civil society led by African people, including the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Racism was a disease, and the actions by the Committee to combat all forms of racism were appreciated.  A speaker said that according to research, stakeholders across the region in all 15 Caribbean Community countries had emphasised the connection between the transatlantic slave trade and unequal access to land ownership, which constituted a continuation of historical injustice. 

    Closing Remarks

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chairperson, in closing remarks, thanked everyone for the amazing discussion which was a social justice exercise that would hopefully reset global relations.  Racism and racial discrimination were creatures of colonialism and many States parties to the Convention still suffered from the legacies of colonialism, especially those that suffered the ravages of the transatlantic trafficking in enslaved Africans, chattel enslavement, and socio-economic underdevelopment in the post-slavery period.  The interventions this afternoon had raised awareness on the racialised nature of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans and the ways in which, along with chattel enslavement and unjust enrichment, race and racism were attached to people from Africa and skin shade discrimination was further used to deny them rights.

    There had been several key takeaways from the discussion, including that African chattel enslavement was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism.  Chattel enslavement, an invention of Europeans, was an organised and intentional system based on the legal determination that enslaved Africans were non-human.   

    Chattel enslavement was not gender neutral.  Racism was a direct legacy of the institution of transatlantic chattel slavery, and was an ongoing harm to all who experienced it.  Another takeaway issue was that as chattel enslavement ended, new anti-Black institutions were developed to maintain racial hierarchies, creating persistent economic and social disadvantages for Africans and people of African descent that continued to this present day.  Chattel slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.

    However, as some of the legal experts on the panels had shown, there were legal tools which made reparations unavoidable.  The law could now be rightfully and effectively applied to deliver justice for the profound and continuing harms caused by the trafficking in Africans, chattel enslavement, and the colonisation of Africa.

    It was time that such an injustice be reversed by the payment of reparations to the descendants of those harmed, to ensure the development of areas exploited for the development of Europe. This must start with restitution of the ransom extracted from Haiti and the modern equivalent of the 20 million pounds paid by Britain to enslavers.

    Ms. Shepherd thanked all those who had made the discussion possible and pledged her support to the general recommendation. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, thanked all those who had been involved in the panel discussions and those who had made the half day of general discussion possible. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, thanked everyone who had been involved in the discussion, which would help inform the work of the Committee. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.004E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Supporting international language instruction | Appuyer l’enseignement des langues étrangères

    Alberta’s International Language Teacher Bursary is awarded annually to teachers who want to develop their skills by taking a language, culture or teaching summer course outside of Canada. This year, bursaries of $4,200 have been awarded to 10 public school teachers. This money will support teachers participating in language and culture programs in Spain, France, Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico.

    “Learning a new language opens doors to new experiences and opportunities for Alberta students and is a rewarding part of any student’s educational journey. This money is helping teachers develop their language skills and cultural knowledge which will translate directly into tremendously rewarding learning experiences for Alberta students. Congratulations to this year’s recipients.”

    Demetrios Nicolaides, Minister of Education

    Alberta’s government established the International Language Teacher Bursary in 2003. The program is funded through the Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund. An Alberta Education committee chooses the successful applicants based on defined requirements, including a statement of intent from the applicant about how the summer course will help them improve their language instruction skills. 

    “Alberta School Boards Association welcomes this investment in international language education, which supports the efforts of Alberta’s locally elected school boards to offer rich programming that reflects the diversity of our communities. Our member boards are committed to equipping students with the skills they need to succeed in a global society.” 

    Marilyn Dennis, president, Alberta School Boards Association

    This year’s recipients are employed by school boards across the province, including the Calgary Board of Education, Elk Island Public, Lethbridge School Division, Edmonton Public Schools and Red Deer Public Schools. Up to $42,000 was available for the 2025-26 program year.

    Quick facts

    • Ten Albertans received the International Language Teacher Bursary in 2024.
    • In addition to the International Language Teacher Bursary, Alberta Education offers a First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary, which awards bursaries of up to $4,200 and has its own application and selection processes.
    • Certificated French language educators within Alberta can apply for up to $4,000 through the Individual Teacher Bursary to receive funding for eligible courses and professional development within Canada.
    • The Individual Teacher Bursary is funded by the federal government as part of the Canada-Alberta Agreement on Minority-Language Education and Second-Language Instruction.

    Related information

    • International Language Teacher Bursary
    • First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary
    • Individual Teacher Bursary Program

    Alberta Education remet 42 000 dollars en bourses d’études à des enseignants afin qu’ils puissent acquérir des compétences en langues étrangères qui serviront dans les salles de classe de l’Alberta. 

    La bourse albertaine International Language Teacher Bursary est décernée chaque année à des enseignants qui souhaitent se perfectionner en suivant, pendant l’été, un cours de langue, de culture ou de pédagogie à l’extérieur du Canada. Cette année, des bourses de 4 200 dollars ont été attribuées à dix enseignants des écoles publiques. Ce financement permettra aux enseignants de participer à des programmes de perfectionnement linguistique et culturel en Espagne, en France, en Équateur, au Brésil et au Mexique. 

    « L’apprentissage d’une nouvelle langue offre de nouvelles expériences et possibilités aux élèves albertains, en plus d’être une composante motivante du parcours scolaire de tout élève. Ce financement aide les enseignants à améliorer leurs compétences linguistiques et leurs connaissances culturelles, ce qui se traduira directement en des expériences d’apprentissage extrêmement enrichissantes pour les élèves albertains. Félicitations aux boursiers de cette année. »

    Demetrios Nicolaides, ministre de l’Éducation

    Le gouvernement de l’Alberta a créé la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary en 2003. Ce programme est financé par l’Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund. Un comité d’Alberta Education choisit les boursiers en fonction de critères définis, incluant une déclaration d’intention dans laquelle le candidat décrit la façon dont le cours d’été l’aidera à améliorer ses compétences en enseignement des langues.

    « L’Alberta School Boards Association se réjouit de cet investissement dans l’enseignement des langues étrangères qui vient appuyer les efforts déployés par les conseils scolaires élus localement de l’Alberta pour offrir de riches programmes reflétant la diversité de nos communautés. Les conseils scolaires membres de notre association se sont engagés à doter les élèves des compétences dont ils ont besoin pour réussir dans une société mondiale. »

    Marilyn Dennis, présidente, Alberta School Boards Association 

    Les boursiers de cette année sont employés par des autorités scolaires de partout dans la province, dont le Calgary Board of Education, Elk Island Public, Lethbridge School Division, Edmonton Public Schools et Red Deer Public Schools. Jusqu’à 42 000 dollars en bourses d’études étaient disponibles pour l’année 2025-2026. 

    En bref

    • Dix Albertains et Albertaines ont reçu la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary en 2024.
    • En plus d’offrir la bourse International Language Teacher Bursary, Alberta Education remet des bourses d’une valeur maximale de 4 200 dollars dans le cadre de la First Nations, Métis and Inuit Languages Teacher Bursary (bourse pour les enseignants des langues des Premières Nations, des Métis et des Inuits). Ce programme a ses propres processus de candidature et de sélection.
    • En Alberta, les éducateurs de français qui sont brevetés peuvent obtenir une bourse d’une valeur maximale de 4 000 dollars dans le cadre du Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignants afin de couvrir les dépenses admissibles associées à des cours et du perfectionnement professionnel offerts au Canada.
    • Le Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignants est financé par le gouvernement fédéral dans le cadre de l’Entente Canada-Alberta relative à l’enseignement dans la langue de la minorité et à l’enseignement de la langue seconde. 

    Renseignements connexes

    • Programme de bourses pour les enseignants des langues internationales (en anglais seulement)
    • Programme de bourses pour les enseignants des langues des Premières Nations, de Métis et des Inuits (en anglais seulement)
    • Programme de bourse individuelle pour enseignant

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Cannes Film Festival Martine Frossard’s animated short Hypersensitive (NFB) in Official Competition 

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    April 25, 2025 – Montreal – National Film Board of Canada (NFB)

    The National Film Board of Canada will be at the prestigious Cannes Film Festival with the animated film Hypersensitive, directed by France-born, Montreal-based filmmaker Martine Frossard. The film is part of the Official Selection – Short Film Competition at this year’s edition, which runs from May 13 to 24.

    The film recounts the turbulent, surrealistic journey of a young woman struggling to rebuild her self, in defiance of social norms that tell us to repress our emotions—and reminding us that to be sensitive is to be alive.

    The animated short Bread Will Walk (Le pain se lève) by Alex Boya, produced by the NFB, has been selected for the Directors’ Fortnight sidebar section of the Cannes Film Festival, taking place May 14 to 24, 2025.

    Quotes

    “I was deeply moved to learn that Hypersensitive has been selected for the Cannes Film Festival. There are no words to describe what an honour this is. I share this overwhelming joy with the entire team at the National Film Board of Canada, including my producer, Marc Bertrand, who was on board right from the very first sketches, and the rest of the team with the French Animation Unit, whose support was invaluable. My deepest hope is that Hypersensitive will open up a dialogue on vulnerability and resilience, so that people everywhere take greater heed of our emotions, even the most painful ones.”
    – Martine Frossard, filmmaker

    “Seeing the talent of an emerging director acknowledged at Cannes is such a source of pride for us at the NFB. Discovering and supporting next-generation filmmakers is integral to our mandate. With Hypersensitive, Martine Frossard has made an affecting film of outstanding visual quality. It’s a stunning example of the creative vitality and distinctive signature of our animation units and our artists. Congratulations to the director and everyone at the NFB who played a part in this great success!”
    – Suzanne Guèvremont, Government Film Commissioner and Chairperson of the NFB

    Quick Facts

    About the film

    Hypersensible (Hypersensitive) by Martine Frossard (6 min 44 s)
    An NFB production (Marc Bertrand)
    Press kit: mediaspace.nfb.ca/epk/hypersensitive

    • For her first collaboration with the NFB, this self-taught filmmaker continues to explore themes that have marked her work thus far: the quest for identity, the realm of perception and memory—but also grief, trauma and resilience.
    • The artist illustrates how heightened sensitivity is all too often interpreted as some kind of resistance to conformity with social and relationship norms. Since most people will encounter hypersensitivity, in others or in themselves, at some point in their lives, Martine Frossard’s film is a heartfelt plea for us all to take greater heed of our emotions, even the most painful ones.
    • The film was edited by filmmaker and editor Oana Suteu Khintirian (Beyond Paper).
    • After its Cannes premiere, Hypersensitive will be shown in the Canadian Competition of the Sommets du cinéma d’animation, which runs from May 26 to 31, in Montreal.

    About the director

    Martine Frossard is a multidisciplinary artist who works in illustration, animation and participatory installations. Born in Strasbourg, France, she moved to Montreal in 2005, where she earned a master’s degree in design project creation and management. Her first short film, Thirty Masks (2015), was named a Vimeo Staff Pick. Her works have since been shown in Canada, the United States and Europe.

    – 30 –

    Stay Connected

    Online Screening Room: NFB.ca
    NFB Facebook | NFB Twitter | NFB Instagram | NFB Blog | NFB YouTube | NFB Vimeo
    Curator’s perspective | Director’s notes

    About the NFB

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chair’s Statement: Fifty-First Meeting of the IMFC – Mr. Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister for Finance of Saudi Arabia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    In the context of the Fifty-First Meeting of the IMFC that took place in Washington, D.C. on 24th and 25th April, IMFC members welcomed the ongoing efforts to end wars and conflicts, recognizing that peace is essential to restoring stability and fostering sustainable growth. IMFC members underscored that all states must act in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in its entirety. They acknowledged, however, that the IMFC is not a forum to resolve geopolitical and security issues which are discussed in other fora.

    The world economy is at a pivotal juncture. Following several years of rising concerns over trade, trade tensions have abruptly soared, fueling elevated uncertainty, market volatility, and risks to growth and financial stability. Near-term growth is projected to slow and intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook. We will step up our efforts to strengthen economic resilience and build a more prosperous future. We underline the critical role of the IMF in helping us navigate this challenging environment, as a trusted advisor and champion of strong policy frameworks. We thank our Deputies for discussing the medium-term direction of the IMF during their meeting in Diriyah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025, and we agree on the annexed Diriyah Declaration.

     

    1. The world economy is at a pivotal juncture. Following several years of rising concerns over trade, trade tensions have abruptly soared, fueling elevated uncertainty, market volatility, and risks to growth and financial stability. Near-term growth is projected to slow, while disinflation is expected to continue but at a slower pace. Intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook, in an already challenging context of weak growth and high public debt. Wars and conflicts impose a heavy humanitarian and economic toll. Transformative forces, such as digitalization/artificial intelligence, demographic shifts, and climate transitions are creating opportunities, but also challenges.
    1. We will step up our efforts to strengthen economic resilience and break from the low-growth, high-debt path, while harnessing transformative forces, to build a more prosperous future. Comprehensive and well calibrated, well sequenced, and well communicated reforms and policy actions are needed to boost private sector-led growth, productivity, and job creation. We will pursue sound macroeconomic policies and advance structural reforms to improve the business environment, streamline excessive regulation, fight corruption, and mobilize innovation and technology adoption. We will deepen our pivot toward growth-friendly fiscal adjustments to ensure debt sustainability and rebuild buffers where needed. Fiscal adjustments should be mindful of distributional impacts and underpinned by a credible medium-term consolidation plan, while strengthening the efficiency of public spending, protecting the vulnerable, and supporting growth-enhancing public and private investments, taking into account country circumstances. Central banks remain strongly committed to maintaining price stability, in line with their respective mandates, and will continue to adjust their policies in a data dependent and well-communicated manner. We will continue to closely monitor and, as necessary, tackle financial vulnerabilities and risks to financial stability, while harnessing the benefits of innovation. We will work together to improve the resilience of the world economy and build prosperity and ensure the stability and effective functioning of the international monetary system. We will also work together to address excessive global imbalances, support an open, fair and rules-based international economic order, and reinforce supply chain resilience. We reaffirm our April 2021 exchange rate commitments.
    1. We will continue to support countries as they undertake reforms and address debt vulnerabilities and debt service challenges. We acknowledge the specific challenges faced by low-income and vulnerable countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) and small developing states (SDS), which are further compounded by recent decrease in official development assistance. We underline the importance of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. We welcome the progress made on debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework (CF) and beyond. We remain committed to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systematic manner, including further stepping up the CF’s implementation in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, and enhancing debt transparency. We look forward to further work at the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable on ways to address debt vulnerabilities and restructuring challenges. We encourage the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the 3-pillar approach to address debt service pressures in countries with sustainable debt, including through supporting them to implement growth-enhancing reforms, mobilize domestic resources, and attract private capital. We look forward to the review of the Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF).
    1. We welcome the Managing Director’s Global Policy Agenda.
    1. We support further sharpening the focus of surveillance based on analytical rigor, evenhandedness, and tailored policy advice. We welcome a strong focus on helping countries strengthen their economic resilience and achieve macroeconomic and financial stability and sustainable growth by increasing productivity, addressing macro-critical risks, reducing excessive imbalances, achieving debt sustainability, and mitigating disruptive capital flows and exchange rate volatility. We look forward to the Comprehensive Surveillance Review that will set future surveillance priorities and modalities; and the Review of Financial Sector Assessment Programs to keep financial surveillance in step with evolving financial stability risks.
    1. We look forward to the Review of Program Design and Conditionality to strengthen further the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs and to the Review of the Short-Term Liquidity Line. We also look forward to the assessment of the Global Financial Safety Net, including the role of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), and its ability to safeguard global financial stability.
    1. We support efforts to further strengthen capacity development and to ensure the sustainability of financing. We welcome the IMF’s ongoing work with the World Bank on the Joint Domestic Resource Mobilization Initiative. We welcome a more flexible and tailored delivery, better integrated with policy advice and program design, as set out in the 2024 Capacity Development Strategy Review.
    1. We reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the center of the GFSN. We have advanced the domestic approvals for our consent to the quota increase under the 16th General Review of Quotas and we look forward to the finalization of this process as soon as possible. We recognize that realignment in quota shares should aim at better reflecting members’ relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the voice of the poorest members. We acknowledge, however, that building consensus among members on quota and governance reforms will require progress in stages. In this regard, we agree on the annexed Diriyah Declaration on the way forward.
    1. We underline the critical role of the IMF in helping us navigate the current challenging environment, as a trusted advisor and champion of strong policy frameworks. We reaffirm our commitment to the institution and look forward to discussing further ways to ensure the Fund remains agile and focused, working in collaboration with partners and other IFIs. We reiterate our appreciation for staff’s high-quality work and dedication to support the membership and continue to encourage further efforts to improve regional and women’s representation within staff positions, and women’s representation at the Executive Board and in Board leadership positions.
    1. Our next meeting is expected to be held in October 2025.

    Annexed Diriyah Declaration

    Recalling the October 2024 IMFC Chair’s Statement, which stated: “We reiterate our strong commitment to the Fund on its 80th anniversary and look forward to further discussing at our next meeting ways to ensure the Fund remains well-equipped to meet future challenges, in line with its mandate, and in collaboration with partners and other IFIs. We ask our Deputies to prepare for this discussion.”; and

    Drawing on the work advanced by our Deputies, who met in the historic town of Diriyah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025, to prepare for this discussion;

    We thank our Deputies and agree on the following Diriyah Declaration on the way forward with regard to IMFC processes and IMF quota and governance reforms.

    *****

    Enhancing IMFC Processes

    We agree that the IMFC plays a key role in the IMF’s governance structure, offering the IMF Board of Governors trusted advice and providing strategic direction to the work and policies of the Fund through structured, high-level, and consensus-driven policy guidance on all relevant issues.

    To enhance its effectiveness as a forum for effective engagement and consensus-building on complex challenges, we agree to further strengthen IMFC processes. To this end, we welcome recent improvements to the format of the Introductory IMFC session and the use of concise, accessible communiqués to effectively convey key IMFC messages to a broader audience. Moreover, we agree that deputy-level meetings focused on strategic rather than routine issues could support the work of IMFC principals.

    We appreciate the value of engagement across the international financial architecture, including with Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), to enhance cooperation and strengthen the resilience of the international monetary system.

     

    Strengthening IMF Governance

    We note that the world economy currently faces significant challenges and agree that the IMF makes a vital contribution to international cooperation, providing a long-established and trusted institution for policy discussions informed by rigorous analysis. We stress that the IMF’s mandate to promote macroeconomic and financial stability remains as relevant as ever, and its role to support members in addressing macroeconomic challenges through analysis and policy advice, capacity development, and financing where relevant, is key. We agree on the need to ensure that the institution remains strong, quota-based, adequately resourced, and efficiently managed to fulfil its mandate at the center of the global financial safety net.

    We agree that a strong, inclusive, and representative governance framework is fundamental to maintaining the Fund’s credibility and legitimacy among its diverse membership. Strengthening IMF governance will support its continued ability to effectively promote consensus among the membership in addressing global challenges. These efforts are also essential to fostering multilateralism and international cooperation.

    Given the strategic importance of governance reforms, we recognize that progress toward consensus should be made in stages. In this context, we agree to develop as a first step a set of general principles to guide future discussions and help foster convergence of views. Work on these principles should be completed in a timely manner to help ensure the efficient progression of future General Reviews of Quotas (GRQs), including under the 17th GRQ. Establishing these guiding principles would help ensure that governance changes are gradual, widely acceptable, and reflective of the interests of the entire membership, as well as maintain the Fund’s financial soundness.

    The Way Forward

    We agree that implementation of the 16th GRQ remains a priority. We recognize that realignment in quota shares should aim at better reflecting members’ relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the voice of the poorest members. To build consensus on future governance reforms, including under the 17th GRQ, we call on the Executive Board to develop, by the 2026 Spring Meetings, a set of principles to guide future discussions on IMF quotas and governance, drawing from the deliberations by IMFC Deputies during their meeting in Diriyah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025. We look forward to a discussion of the status of advancement of this work at our next meeting. We ask our Deputies to prepare for this discussion.

    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

     ATTENDANCE 

    Chair

    Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

    Managing Director

    Kristalina Georgieva

    Members or Alternates

    Ayman Alsayari, Governor of the Saudi Central Bank, Saudi Arabia (Alternate for Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia)

    Mohammed bin Hadi Al Hussaini, Minister of State for Financial Affairs, United Arab Emirates

    Edgar Amador Zamora, Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico

    Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury, United States

    Edouard Normand Bigendako, Governor, Bank of the Republic of Burundi

    Luis Caputo, Minister of Economy, Argentina

    Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada (Alternate for Francois-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Finance, Canada)

    Sang Mok Choi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea

    Giancarlo Giorgetti, Minister of Economy and Finance, Italy

    Gabriel Galipolo, Governor, Central Bank of Brazil (Alternate for Fernando Haddad, Minister of Finance, Brazil)

    Jan Jambon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Pensions, National Lottery and Federal Culture Institutions, Belgium

    Katsunobu Kato, Minister of Finance, Japan

    Daniela Stoffel, State Secretary for International Finance, Federal Department of Finance, Switzerland (Alternate for Karin Keller-Sutter, Minister of Finance, Switzerland)

    Lesetja Kganyago, Governor, South African Reserve Bank, South Africa

    Jörg Kukies, Federal Minister of the Ministry of Finance, Germany

    François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France (Alternate for Eric Lombard, Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, France)

    Adebayo Olawale Edun, Minister of Finance and the Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Nigeria

    Gongsheng Pan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China

    Rachel Reeves, Chancellor of the Exchequer, H.M. Treasury, United Kingdom

    Pavel Snisorenko, Director, Department of International Financial Relations (Alternate for Anton Siluanov, Minister of Finance, Russian Federation)

    Sanjay Malhotra, Governor, Reserve Bank of India (Alternate for Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister of Finance, India)

    Mehmet Simsek, Minister of Treasury and Finance, Republic of Türkiye

    Salah-Eddine Taleb, Governor, Bank of Algeria

    Perry Warjiyo, Governor, Bank of Indonesia

    Ida Wolden Bache, Governor, Bank of Norway

    Observers

    Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

    Elisabeth Svantesson, Chair, Development Committee (DC) and Minister for Finance, Sweden

    Christine Lagarde, President, European Central Bank (ECB)

    Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, European Commission (EC)

    Klaas Knot, Chair, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and President of De Nederlandsche Bank

    Celeste Drake, Deputy Director-General, International Labour Organization (ILO)

    Mathias Cormann, Secretary-General, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

    Mohannad Alsuwaidan, Economic Analyst, Petroleum Studies Department, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

    Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator, United Nations (UN)

    Rebeca Grynspan, Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

    Ajay Banga, President of the World Bank Group, The World Bank (WB)

    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General, World Trade Organization (WTO)

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/pr-123-imfc-chairs-statement-fifty-first-meeting-of-the-imfc

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump can’t decide who to blame for a failing peace deal that would only lead to further conflict

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    After a second consecutive night of deadly Russian air attacks – against the capital Kyiv on April 23 and the eastern Ukrainian city of Pavlohrad on April 24 – a ceasefire in Ukraine seems as unrealistic as ever.

    With Russian commitment to a deal clearly lacking, the situation is not helped by US president Donald Trump. He can’t quite seem to decide who he will ultimately blame if his efforts to agree a ceasefire fall apart.

    Before the strikes on Kyiv, Trump blamed Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, for holding up a deal by refusing to recognise Crimea as Russian. The following day, he chided Vladimir Putin for the attacks, calling them “not necessary, and very bad timing” and imploring Putin to stop.

    The main stumbling bloc on the path to a ceasefire is what a final peace agreement might look like and what concessions Kyiv – and its European allies – will accept. Ukraine’s and Europe’s position on this is unequivocal: no recognition of the illegal Russian annexation.

    This position is also backed by opinion polls in Ukraine, which indicate only limited support for some, temporary concessions to Russia. The mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, also suggested that temporarily giving up territory “can be a solution”.

    The deal that Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff apparently negotiated over three rounds of talks in Russia was roundly rejected by Ukraine and Britain, France and Germany, who lead the “coalition of the willing” of countries pledging support for Ukraine.




    Read more:
    Could Trump be leading the world into recession?


    This prompted Witkoff and US secretary of state Marco Rubio to pull out of follow-up talks in London on April 24. These ended with a fairly vacuous statement about a commitment to continuing “close coordination and … further talks soon”.

    And even this now appears as quite a stretch. Coinciding with Witkoff’s fourth trip to see Putin on April 25, European and Ukrainian counterproposals were released that reject most of the terms offered by Trump or at least defer their negotiation until after a ceasefire is in place.

    Why is it failing?

    The impasse is unsurprising. Washington’s proposal included a US commitment to recognise Crimea as Russian, a promise that Ukraine would not join Nato and accept Moscow’s control of the territories in eastern Ukraine that it currently illegally occupies. It also included lifting all sanctions against Russia.

    In other words, Ukraine would give up large parts of territory and receive no security guarantees, while Russia is rewarded with reintegration into the global economy.

    It is the territorial concessions asked of Kyiv which are especially problematic. Quite apart from the fact that they are in fundamental breach of basic principles of international law – the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states – they are unlikely to provide solid foundations for a durable peace.

    Much like the idea of Trump’s Ukraine envoy, Keith Kellogg, to divide Ukraine like post-1945 Berlin, it betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of what, and who, drives this war.

    Recent London peace talks in April failed to make progress.

    Kellogg later clarified that he was not suggesting a partition of Ukraine, but his proposal would have exactly the same effect as Trump’s most recent offer.

    Both proposals accept the permanent loss to Ukraine of territory that Russia currently controls. Where they differ is that Kellogg wants to introduce a European-led reassurance force west of the river Dnipro, while leaving the defence of remaining Ukrainian-controlled territory to Kyiv’s armed forces.

    If accepted by Russia – unlikely as this is given Russia’s repeated and unequivocal rejection of European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine – it would provide at best a minimal security guarantee for a part of Ukrainian territory.

    What it would almost inevitably mean, however, is a repeat of the permanent ceasefire violations along the disengagement zone in eastern Ukraine where Russian and Ukrainian forces would continue to face each other.

    This is what happened after the ill-fated Minsk accords of 2014 and 2015, which were meant to settle the conflict after Russia’s invasion of Donbas in 2014. A further Russian invasion could be just around the corner once the Kremlin felt that it had sufficiently recovered from the current war.




    Read more:
    Ukraine deal: Europe has learned from the failed 2015 Minsk accords with Putin. Trump has not


    The lack of a credible deterrent is one key difference between the situation in Ukraine as envisaged by Washington and other historical and contemporary parallels, including Korea and Cyprus.

    Korea was partitioned in 1945 and has been protected by a large US military presence since the Korean war in 1953. After the Turkish invasion of 1974, Cyprus was divided between Greek and Turkish Cypriots along a partition line secured by an armed UN peacekeeping mission.

    Trump has ruled out any US troop commitment as part of securing a ceasefire in Ukraine. And the idea of a UN force in Ukraine, briefly floated during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko between 2014 and 2019, never got any traction, and is not likely to be accepted by Putin now.

    The assumed parallels with the situation in Germany after the second world war are even more tenuous. Not only did Nazi Germany unconditionally surrender in May 1945 but its division into allied zones of occupation was formally and unanimously agreed by the victorious allies in Potsdam in August 1945.

    Muddling up Potsdam and Munich?

    By the time two separate German states of East and West Germany were established in 1949, the western allies had fallen out with Stalin but remained firmly united in Nato and western Europe. So the west German state was firmly protected under the US nuclear umbrella.

    The agreements made in Potsdam didn’t have the same implication of permanence as the US suggestion to formally recognise Crimea as Russian territory. The suggestion was always that the allied forces would pull out of Germany at some stage, and restore the country’s sovereignty.

    Most importantly, the allies did not reward the aggressor in the war or create the conditions for merely a brief interruption for an aggressor’s revisionist agenda.

    After all, what has driven Putin’s war against Ukraine is his conviction that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”.

    The Trump administration deludes itself that it is applying the lessons of Potsdam by recognising Russia’s territorial conquests in Ukraine and handing them over. Instead it is falling into the trap of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Negotiators in Munich tried, but failed, to avoid the second world war by appeasing and not deterring an insatiable aggressor – a historical lesson that doesn’t need repeating.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump can’t decide who to blame for a failing peace deal that would only lead to further conflict – https://theconversation.com/trump-cant-decide-who-to-blame-for-a-failing-peace-deal-that-would-only-lead-to-further-conflict-254841

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Credit Agricole Nord de France – Resultats Financiers au 31 Mars 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

             Lille, le 25 avril 2025

    Résultats financiers au 31 Mars 2025
     du Crédit Agricole Mutuel Nord de France

      Mars 2025 Mars 2024 Variation

                                             

    Activité :      
    Encours de collecte globale 38 929 M€  37 777 M€ 3,05%
    Encours de crédit* 28 728 M€  28 703 M€ 0,09%
           
    Résultats sociaux* :      
    Produit Net Bancaire 136,7 M€  141,4 M€ -3,36%
    Résultat Brut d’Exploitation  32,5 M€ 42,9 M€ -24,15%
    Résultat Net  20,6 M€  22,9 M€ -9,88%
           
    Résultats consolidés IFRS :      
    Produit Net Bancaire 153,1 M€  149,4 M€ 2,46%
    Résultat Brut d’Exploitation  36,0 M€  38,0 M€ -5,27%
    Résultat Net Part du Groupe 17,2 M€  13,9 M€ 23,70%
                     
    Structure financière :      
    Bilan consolidé 38 558 M€  38 235 M€** 0,84%
    Ratio CET1 Bâle 3 28,80%*** 28,62% 0,18 pts
    Ratio de liquidité LCR 1 mois**** 123,14% 136,62%  -13,48 pts
    Ratio Crédit Collecte (yc Greenlease) 124,07% 125,60% -1,53 pts

    Le Conseil d’Administration a arrêté, lors de sa séance du 25 Avril 2025, les Comptes sociaux et consolidés du Crédit Agricole Nord de France au 31 Mars 2025.

    • Activité commerciale

    Depuis le 1er janvier, près de 17 800 clients ont rejoint la Caisse Régionale, portant le total de clients à plus d’1,15 million.

    Les réalisations de crédit progressent de 9,5 % par rapport à 2024, pour s’établir à 0,9 Mrd€ sur le 1er trimestre 2025. Les encours de crédit s’établissent ainsi à 28,7 Mrds€, en légère progression de 0,1% avec des réalisations de crédits habitat qui progressent de façon marquée de 50,2 % par rapport à 2024.

    L’encours d’épargne progresse de 3,1 % sur 12 mois, pour s’établir à 38,9 Mrds€. Cette épargne continue à être portée par la hausse des livrets A (+9,1%) et des dépôts à terme (+9,3%) qui s’élèvent désormais respectivement à 3,9 Mrds€ et à 4,3 Mrds€. Le coût global de la collecte se stabilise alors que le rendement des encours de crédit progresse, permettant un redressement de la marge d’intermédiation après deux années de dégradation liée à la forte hausse des taux de 2022 et 2023.

    L’activité Assurances se maintient à un niveau élevé, avec un nombre de contrats d’assurance de biens et de personnes qui progresse de 38 000 contrats, soit une hausse de 5,8% sur un an.

    • Résultat social

    Le Produit Net Bancaire de la Caisse Régionale, à 136,7 M€, est en baisse de -3,4%. Ce résultat est impacté par des opérations de restructuration de dettes et de gestion d’excédents de liquidité ayant pour objectif d’optimiser la structure financière de la Caisse régionale pour les prochaines années. Hormis ces effets exceptionnels, la marge d’intermédiation continue de se redresser et la dynamique de l’activité commerciale permet une progression de 8 % de nos commissions.

    Les charges générales d’exploitation affichent une hausse de 5,7%. Cette évolution est directement liée à la progression de nos activités et au développement des outils digitaux. La poursuite de l’optimisation de nos process doit permettre une compensation progressive de ces hausses durant l’année 2025.

    La Caisse Régionale affiche un coût du risque en baisse de 10,1 M€, à -8,1 M€. Après une année 2024 qui a vu une hausse sensible du risque sur le marché des entreprises et des professionnels, la banque reste vigilante sur le niveau de provisionnement de ses encours.

    Le résultat net social intègre une reprise du FRBG (Fonds pour Risques Bancaires Généraux) de 4 M€ comme en 2024.

    Il s’établit à 20,6 M€, stable sur un an hormis la comptabilisation d’une anticipation de la surtaxe d’impôt sur les sociétés à hauteur de 2,5 M€ à fin mars.

    • Résultat consolidé

    Le résultat net consolidé du Groupe Crédit Agricole Nord de France s’élève à 17,2 M€, en hausse de 23,7% sur un an, en lien principalement avec l’évolution du coût du risque de la Caisse Régionale et la neutralisation du FRBG.

    La contribution des Pôles métiers au résultat net consolidé s’établit comme suit : 

    • Pôle Bancassurance : 17,3 M€ contre 12,7 M€ au 31 Mars 2024,
    • Pôle Capital Investissement : – 0,8 M€ contre 1,0 M€ au 31 Mars 2024,
    • Pôle Foncière : 1,1 M€ contre 1,2 M€ au 31 Mars 2024,
    • Pôle Immobilier : – 0,4 M€ contre – 0,6 M€ au 31 Mars 2024,
    • Pôle Innovation : 0 M€ contre – 0,4 M€ au 31 Mars 2024.
    • CCI Nord de France

    Le Certificat coopératif d’investissement a clôturé à 17,25 € au 31 mars 2025, en hausse de 42,5% depuis le 31 mars 2024.

    Perspectives

    Le début d’année 2025 est marqué par une montée des incertitudes économiques et géopolitiques impactant l’évolution des taux. Cette situation pourrait affecter le coût de la collecte et le rendement de nos crédits mais les fondamentaux de la marge d’intermédiation restent aujourd’hui bien orientés. Malgré cet environnement incertain, la région affiche une reprise économique sur la fin du trimestre : le Crédit Agricole Nord de France accompagne ce développement tout en restant vigilant sur la maitrise de son niveau de risque. L’ambition de trajectoire de résultat de la Caisse Régionale est maintenue.

    * Encours intégrant les titrisations de crédits habitat. Résultats financiers Comptes sociaux hors véhicules de titrisation.
    ** Bilan d’ouverture au 31 décembre 2024
    ***Ratio CET1 au 31 Décembre 2024

    *** *Ratio Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) : moyennes sur 12 mois glissants des ratios LCR fin de mois       

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s ‘Garden of American Heroes’ is a monument to celebrity and achievement – paid for with humanities funding that benefits everyday Americans

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jennifer Tucker, Professor of History, Wesleyan University

    Donald Trump speaks in front of a wax statue of John Wayne at the John Wayne Museum in Winterset, Iowa, during the 2016 GOP primaries. Al Drago/CQ Roll Call via Getty Images

    Donald Trump first came up with his plan for a “National Garden of American Heroes” at the end of his first term, before President Joe Biden quietly tabled it upon replacing Trump in the White House.

    Now, with Trump back in the Oval Office – and with the country’s 250th anniversary fast approaching – the project is back. The National Endowment for the Humanities is seeking to commission 250 statues of famous Americans from a predetermined list, to be displayed at a location yet to be determined.

    It isn’t clear who compiled the list of 250 to be honored. It includes names that are largely recognizable and whose accomplishments are well-known: politicians like Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy; jurists Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia; activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Harriet Tubman; celebrities such as John Wayne and Julia Child; and sports stars like Kobe Bryant and Babe Ruth.

    Donald Trump announces some famous Black Americans he plans to include in his ‘National Garden of American Heroes’ during a Black History Month event on Feb. 20, 2025, at the White House.

    The statue garden coincides with an executive order from March 2025 in which the Trump administration denounced what it saw as historical revisionism that had recast the country’s “unparalleled legacy of advancing liberty, individual rights, and human happiness.” Instead, it had constructed a story of the nation that portrayed it “as inherently racist, sexist, oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed,” which “fosters a sense of national shame.”

    “We don’t need to overemphasize the negative,” explained Lindsey Halligan, a 35-year-old insurance lawyer who is named in the order as one of the people tasked with reforming museums that receive government funds.

    Trump often casts himself as a man of the people. But as historians, we don’t see a garden of heroes as a populist effort. To us, it represents a top-down approach to U.S. history, akin to the hagiography that Americans already regularly get from movies, television and professional sports.

    And it comes at a cost: It’s going to be paid for with funds that had been previously allotted to tell stories about people and places that may be less familiar than the proposed figures for Trump’s garden. But they’re nonetheless meaningful to countless communities across the nation.

    Only the movers and shakers matter

    Trump’s fixation on America’s luminaries is adjacent to the “great man” theory of history.

    In 1840, Scottish philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle published “On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History,” in which he argued that “The History of the world is but the Biography of great men.”

    American biologist and eugenicist Frederick Adams Woods embraced the great man theory in his 1913 work, “The Influence of Monarchs: Steps in a New Science of History.” In it, he investigated 386 rulers in Western Europe from the 12th century until the French Revolution. He proposed a scientific measurement to quantify the relative impact these rulers had on the course of civilization.

    Then and now, many other historians and sociologists have pushed back, arguing that the “Great Man” view of history oversimplifies the past by attributing major historical events to the actions of a few influential individuals, while ignoring broader social, economic and cultural forces.

    Nonetheless, it continues to have broad appeal. It’s very popular among corporate leaders, for example, many of whom like to portray themselves as visionaries, with their business successes proof of their genius.

    Trump’s garden of heroes reflects his penchant for celebrating wealth, champions and successes, akin to what Walt Disney tried to capture with his Disney World ride Carousel of Progress, which highlights American technological advances.

    A national redundancy?

    However, the U.S. already has a national statuary hall, which opened in the U.S. Capitol in 1870. Each state has contributed two statues; for example, Massachusetts honors Samuel Adams and John Winthrop, while Ohio celebrates James Garfield and Thomas Edison.

    Today there are 102 statutes, though just 14 women.

    Importantly, the roster is fluid – not set in stone – and reflects debates over whom the nation ought to celebrate.

    Over time, the representation has become slightly more inclusive. The first woman, Illinois educator Frances Willard, was added in 1905. Only in 2022 did a Black American appear, when educator Mary Bethune replaced a Confederate general from Florida. And in 2024, Johnny Cash replaced James Paul Clarke, a former governor and senator from Arkansas with Confederate sympathies.

    Family members and elected officials attend the unveiling of the statue of Johnny Cash at the U.S. Capitol on Sept. 24, 2024.
    Kent Nishimura/Getty Images

    What about everyday Americans?

    We don’t think there’s anything wrong with celebrating and honoring popular figures in American history. But we do think there’s an issue when it comes at the expense of other historical and archival projects.

    The New York Times reported that US$34 million for the project would come from funds formerly allocated to the National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities, whose budget has been cut by 85%.

    Many of the grants that have been slashed explore, celebrate and preserve history in ways that stand in stark contrast to a statue garden. They involve, as Gal Beckerman writes in the Atlantic, efforts that “are about asking questions, about uncovering hidden or overlooked experiences, about closely examining texts or adding to the public record.”

    They include one that supports the digitization of local newspapers and archival records; another to collect and preserve oral histories of local communities; a grant that funds the production of documentaries and podcasts about local communities; traveling exhibitions that bring items from the Smithsonian’s collection to small towns and rural areas; and a grant to fund the collection of first-person accounts of Native Americans who attended U.S. government-run boarding schools.

    These and countless similar history projects serve millions of people far from Washington, and they have broad support from lawmakers and citizens of all political stripes.

    In 1938, as forces of fascism gathered in Europe, a Connecticut high school social science teacher said, “The greatest need of America, on the threshold of the greatest epoch of its history, is citizens who understand the past out of which the nation has grown. … Let us look into the souls of the leaders and the common people who have made America great.”

    In his 2016 campaign, Trump promised to work on behalf of everyday Americans – the “forgotten man and woman.” But the proposed statue garden of famous figures cuts out the common people from America’s story – not just as subjects of history, but as its stewards for future generations.

    With funds slashed from organizations dedicated to local history, we wonder how many more stories will go untold.

    Jennifer Tucker has received funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities for research that examines the social and cultural role of modern technology, such as facial recognition, through a historical lens.

    Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump’s ‘Garden of American Heroes’ is a monument to celebrity and achievement – paid for with humanities funding that benefits everyday Americans – https://theconversation.com/trumps-garden-of-american-heroes-is-a-monument-to-celebrity-and-achievement-paid-for-with-humanities-funding-that-benefits-everyday-americans-254564

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s ‘Garden of American Heroes’ is a monument to celebrity and achievement – paid for with history funding that benefits everyday Americans

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jennifer Tucker, Professor of History, Wesleyan University

    Donald Trump speaks in front of a wax statue of John Wayne at the John Wayne Museum in Winterset, Iowa, during the 2016 GOP primaries. Al Drago/CQ Roll Call via Getty Images

    Donald Trump first came up with his plan for a “National Garden of American Heroes” at the end of his first term, before President Joe Biden quietly tabled it upon replacing Trump in the White House.

    Now, with Trump back in the Oval Office – and with the country’s 250th anniversary fast approaching – the project is back. The National Endowment for the Humanities is seeking to commission 250 statues of famous Americans from a predetermined list, to be displayed at a location yet to be determined.

    It isn’t clear who compiled the list of 250 to be honored. It includes names that are largely recognizable and whose accomplishments are well-known: politicians like Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy; jurists Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia; activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Harriet Tubman; celebrities such as John Wayne and Julia Child; and sports stars like Kobe Bryant and Babe Ruth.

    Donald Trump announces some famous Black Americans he plans to include in his ‘National Garden of American Heroes’ during a Black History Month event on Feb. 20, 2025, at the White House.

    The statue garden coincides with an executive order from March 2025 in which the Trump administration denounced what it saw as historical revisionism that had recast the country’s “unparalleled legacy of advancing liberty, individual rights, and human happiness.” Instead, it had constructed a story of the nation that portrayed it “as inherently racist, sexist, oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed,” which “fosters a sense of national shame.”

    “We don’t need to overemphasize the negative,” explained Lindsey Halligan, a 35-year-old insurance lawyer who is named in the order as one of the people tasked with reforming museums that receive government funds.

    Trump often casts himself as a man of the people. But as historians, we don’t see a garden of heroes as a populist effort. To us, it represents a top-down approach to U.S. history, akin to the hagiography that Americans already regularly get from movies, television and professional sports.

    And it comes at a cost: It’s going to be paid for with funds that had been previously allotted to tell stories about people and places that may be less familiar than the proposed figures for Trump’s garden. But they’re nonetheless meaningful to countless communities across the nation.

    Only the movers and shakers matter

    Trump’s fixation on America’s luminaries is adjacent to the “great man” theory of history.

    In 1840, Scottish philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle published “On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History,” in which he argued that “The History of the world is but the Biography of great men.”

    American biologist and eugenicist Frederick Adams Woods embraced the great man theory in his 1913 work, “The Influence of Monarchs: Steps in a New Science of History.” In it, he investigated 386 rulers in Western Europe from the 12th century until the French Revolution. He proposed a scientific measurement to quantify the relative impact these rulers had on the course of civilization.

    Then and now, many other historians and sociologists have pushed back, arguing that the “Great Man” view of history oversimplifies the past by attributing major historical events to the actions of a few influential individuals, while ignoring broader social, economic and cultural forces.

    Nonetheless, it continues to have broad appeal. It’s very popular among corporate leaders, for example, many of whom like to portray themselves as visionaries, with their business successes proof of their genius.

    Trump’s garden of heroes reflects his penchant for celebrating wealth, champions and successes, akin to what Walt Disney tried to capture with his Disney World ride Carousel of Progress, which highlights American technological advances.

    A national redundancy?

    However, the U.S. already has a national statuary hall, which opened in the U.S. Capitol in 1870. Each state has contributed two statues; for example, Massachusetts honors Samuel Adams and John Winthrop, while Ohio celebrates James Garfield and Thomas Edison.

    Today there are 102 statutes, though just 14 women.

    Importantly, the roster is fluid – not set in stone – and reflects debates over whom the nation ought to celebrate.

    Over time, the representation has become slightly more inclusive. The first woman, Illinois educator Frances Willard, was added in 1905. Only in 2022 did a Black American appear, when educator Mary Bethune replaced a Confederate general from Florida. And in 2024, Johnny Cash replaced James Paul Clarke, a former governor and senator from Arkansas with Confederate sympathies.

    Family members and elected officials attend the unveiling of the statue of Johnny Cash at the U.S. Capitol on Sept. 24, 2024.
    Kent Nishimura/Getty Images

    What about everyday Americans?

    We don’t think there’s anything wrong with celebrating and honoring popular figures in American history. But we do think there’s an issue when it comes at the expense of other historical and archival projects.

    The New York Times reported that US$34 million for the project would come from funds formerly allocated to the National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities, whose budget has been cut by 85%.

    Many of the grants that have been slashed explore, celebrate and preserve history in ways that stand in stark contrast to a statue garden. They involve, as Gal Beckerman writes in the Atlantic, efforts that “are about asking questions, about uncovering hidden or overlooked experiences, about closely examining texts or adding to the public record.”

    They include one that supports the digitization of local newspapers and archival records; another to collect and preserve oral histories of local communities; a grant that funds the production of documentaries and podcasts about local communities; traveling exhibitions that bring items from the Smithsonian’s collection to small towns and rural areas; and a grant to fund the collection of first-person accounts of Native Americans who attended U.S. government-run boarding schools.

    These and countless similar history projects serve millions of people far from Washington, and they have broad support from lawmakers and citizens of all political stripes.

    In 1938, as forces of fascism gathered in Europe, a Connecticut high school social science teacher said, “The greatest need of America, on the threshold of the greatest epoch of its history, is citizens who understand the past out of which the nation has grown. … Let us look into the souls of the leaders and the common people who have made America great.”

    In his 2016 campaign, Trump promised to work on behalf of everyday Americans – the “forgotten man and woman.” But the proposed statue garden of famous figures cuts out the common people from America’s story – not just as subjects of history, but as its stewards for future generations.

    With funds slashed from organizations dedicated to local history, we wonder how many more stories will go untold.

    Jennifer Tucker has received funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities for research that examines the social and cultural role of modern technology, such as facial recognition, through a historical lens.

    Peter Rutland does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump’s ‘Garden of American Heroes’ is a monument to celebrity and achievement – paid for with history funding that benefits everyday Americans – https://theconversation.com/trumps-garden-of-american-heroes-is-a-monument-to-celebrity-and-achievement-paid-for-with-history-funding-that-benefits-everyday-americans-254564

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI China: China deepens international collaboration to push forward deep-space exploration

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SHANGHAI, April 25 — China, with an open stance, is collaborating with the international community to drive breakthroughs in deep-space exploration and foster resource sharing, striving to build a shared future in space.

    On the occasion of Space Day of China, which is celebrated annually on April 24, the China National Space Administration (CNSA) announced a series of international collaboration initiatives to advance deep-space exploration.

    Seven institutions from six countries — France, Germany, Japan, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States — have been authorized to borrow the lunar samples collected by China’s Chang’e-5 mission for scientific research.

    In 2020, the Chang’e-5 mission retrieved samples from the moon weighing about 1,731 grams, which were the first lunar samples in the world in over 40 years, helping advance humanity’s knowledge about the moon.

    Shan Zhongde, head of the CNSA, said China’s lunar exploration program has always adhered to the principles of equality, mutual benefits, peaceful utilization and win-win cooperation, sharing achievements with the international community.

    He added that CNSA will continue to accept international applications for lunar sample research, expressing hope that global scientists will make new discoveries that expand human knowledge and benefit humanity.

    With the advancement of China’s lunar exploration program, international cooperation continues to deepen. The CNSA announced that the Chang’e-8 mission, which is scheduled for launch around 2029, will carry payloads from 11 countries and regions and one international organization.

    Developers of the instruments to be aboard the Chang’e-8 are from Asia, Europe, Africa and South America.

    The Chang’e-8 mission will target the Leibnitz-Beta Plateau near the lunar south pole region, working with the earlier Chang’e-7 mission to conduct scientific exploration and in-situ resource utilization experiments. These efforts will lay the groundwork for the future International Lunar Research Station (ILRS).

    The ILRS, initiated by China, is a scientific experimental facility consisting of sections on the lunar surface and in lunar orbit, and is projected to be built in two phases: a basic model to be built by 2035 in the lunar south pole region, and an extended model to be built in the 2040s.

    A total of 17 countries and international organizations, and more than 50 international research institutions, have joined the ILRS, according to Bian Zhigang, deputy director of the CNSA.

    Bian stressed that the ILRS will offer new opportunities and platforms for fostering global cooperation, technological innovation and shared development.

    China welcomes international partners to participate in various stages of the ILRS and at all levels of the mission. This will promote the use of space technology to benefit humanity and advance the building of a community with a shared future for humanity in the field of outer space, he said.

    Amjad Ali, a senior official with the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) of Pakistan, said that the CNSA leads in inclusive space exploration, enabling emerging space nations like Pakistan to rise.

    The Chang’e-8 mission will carry a 30-kilogram lunar rover developed by SUPARCO, contributing to terrain mapping and regolith analysis.

    “The CNSA-SUPARCO partnership strengthens intercultural dialogue, diplomacy and peaceful collaboration, proving that shared dreams can unite nations among the stars,” he added.

    Humanity can reach deeper space through collaboration from lunar soil to Martian surface.

    China aims to launch the Tianwen-3 Mars sample-return mission around 2028, with the primary scientific goal of searching for signs of life. The retrieval of samples from Mars is the most technically challenging space exploration mission since the Apollo program, and no such retrieval has ever been accomplished, said Liu Jizhong, chief designer of the mission.

    Despite this mission’s considerable challenges and limited resources, China still plans to allocate 20 kilograms of resources for international collaboration.

    China invites global partners to jointly advance Mars exploration and research, thereby expanding humanity’s understanding of the red planet, said CNSA.

    Joining hands, humanity can unlock mysteries beyond the stars.

    An astronomical satellite jointly developed by China and France has detected a gamma-ray burst dating back 13 billion years, likely originating from the collapse of an early star forming a black hole or a neutron star. This discovery offers humanity a glimpse into the universe’s infancy.

    The discovery made by the Space-based multi-band Variable Object Monitor (SVOM) was also released on the Space Day of China.

    The SVOM project, a major bilateral space collaboration between China and France spanning nearly two decades, is a contribution that Chinese and French scientists and engineers have made to the international astronomy community through years of cooperation, integrating high-tech resources from both countries.

    “Together, we will pool efforts to promote the development of the world’s space industry, ensuring that space innovations serve and enhance human well-being across broader domains, at deeper levels, and to higher standards,” Shan emphasized at the opening ceremony for the Space Day of China.

    At the invitation of the Permanent Mission of China in Vienna, the Permanent Representatives of Kenya and South Africa to Vienna, along with diplomats from the Permanent Missions of Venezuela, Belarus, Egypt, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan to Vienna, made a special trip to China to participate in the series of activities for the Space Day.

    Award-winning paintings created by Chinese children, depicting their space dreams, were presented to these diplomats.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Endometriosis: our research shows changing your diet may reduce pain symptoms

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philippa Saunders, Professor of Reproductive Health, University of Edinburgh

    In our study, the majority of participants had tried changing their diet to improve endometriosis pain. Perfect Wave/ Shutterstock

    Endometriosis affects nearly 200 million people worldwide. This chronic condition is characterised by tissue resembling the lining of the womb growing outside of the uterus.

    This common condition has devastating impacts on patients’ wellbeing. It causes chronic pain (particularly during their periods), infertility and symptoms similar to irritable bowel syndrome, including bloating, constipation, diarrhoea and pain during bowel movements.

    While there are ways of managing endometriosis, these treatments can be invasive and often don’t work for everyone. This is why many patients seek out their own ways of managing their symptoms.

    A frequent question we get from patients is, “Can you recommend a diet that will help me manage my pain and gut symptoms?” While ample advice exists online, there’s little information from clinical studies to adequately answer whether or not diet can have an effect on endometriosis symptoms.

    So, we conducted an international online survey, inviting people with endometriosis to share their experiences of how diet has affected their endometriosis pain symptoms.

    Diet and pain

    Before publishing the survey online, we collaborated with a local Scottish endometriosis patient support group to come up with appropriate questions.

    The final survey included multiple-choice and free-text questions about the participant’s demographics, their pain, their use of diet in managing symptoms and their sources of dietary advice. It was promoted online through social media and patient support groups. The survey received 2,599 responses from 51 countries. The age of participants ranged from 16-71.

    Most respondents reported experiencing pelvic pain (97%) and frequent abdominal bloating (91%). This highlighted how common these symptoms are in people with endometriosis.

    Participants were also asked to rate the average level of their abdominal and pelvic pain over the past month, on a scale from zero to ten. The responses highlighted a wide range of pain experiences, though the majority of respondents either rated their average pain a four (can mostly be ignored but with difficulty) or a seven (makes it difficult to concentrate, interferes with sleep and takes effort to function as normal).

    The majority (83%) of respondents also reported making dietary changes to control symptoms. Around 67% noted this had a positive effect on pain.

    The survey listed 20 different diets (plus “other”), allowing participants to select all the diets they’d tried and explain which had affected their pain symptoms. Some of the most popular diets patients had tried included: reducing alcohol intake, going gluten-free, going dairy-free, drinking less caffeine and reducing intake of processed foods and sugar.

    Giving up processed and sugary foods was a common diet change many women with endometriosis made.
    Tatjana Baibakova/ Shutterstock

    Around half of participants reported improvements in their pain after adopting at least one of these diets. For the most popular diets, a reduction in pain was reported by 53% who reduced alcohol consumption, 45% who went gluten-free and dairy-free and 43% who reduced caffeine intake.

    Reducing inflammation

    This survey, which was the largest of its kind to date, was only conducted in English. This might have limited participation. Additionally, the observed changes were all self-reported, meaning we cannot confirm that the dietary modifications directly caused the changes in pain.

    Still, our findings show diet may be an important tool in managing the pain caused by endometriosis. Importantly, no specific diet benefits everyone, so it may take some trial and error to figure out what works best. It’s also worth noting that diet changes appeared to be less beneficial for those with the most severe symptoms.

    Research into why people with endometriosis experience pain has identified excess inflammation as a key factor. Inflammation is the body’s mechanism for fighting off an infection or recovering from an injury. In people with endometriosis, it’s thought that the inflammatory response is overstimulated – triggering sensitisation of nerves and amplifying the perception of pain.

    Certain foods may also promote inflammation in the body. For instance, it’s thought that gluten and dairy could promote inflammation due to the way they interact with the cells lining the gut and the by-products they produce when broken down by the gut microbes. These by-products have the potential to move around the body and cause more widespread inflammation. Alcohol is also known to be pro-inflammatory.

    Reducing intake of certain foods may therefore help reduce overall inflammation levels in people with endometriosis. This may explain why the participants in our study, and others, reported seeing improvements in their symptoms as a result of cutting out inflammatory foods.

    Moving forward, we need properly controlled clinical studies that monitor food intake, real-time recording of pain and IBS-like symptoms, and precise measurement of inflammation in the body, in order to understand the reasons why diet may help people with endometriosis.

    This is something our research team is already working on. We’re launching a large-scale study with more than 1,000 people who have endometriosis. Each participant will donate stool and blood samples, record food intake details and report on the use of pain medications, supplements, prebiotics, probiotics and dietary modifications. The long-term goal with this project is to support a more holistic and personalized approach to caring for people with endometriosis.

    Philippa Saunders has received funding from The Medical Research Council. She is a Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences and sits on the Scientific Advisory Group of the Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology.

    Andrew Horne reports receiving grants from the National Institute for Health and Care Research, Chief Scientist Office, Wellbeing of Women, Roche Diagnostics, and European Union, receiving consultancy and lecture fees from Theramex, Roche Diagnostics and Gedeon Richter, and having patents issued for a UK patent application No. 2217921.2 and international patent application No. PCT/GB2023/053076 outside the submitted work. He is President-elect of the World Endometriosis Society and Trustee to Endometriosis UK. He is Specialty Advisor to the Scottish Government’s Chief Medical Officer for Obstetrics and Gynaecology.

    Francesca Hearn-Yeates does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Endometriosis: our research shows changing your diet may reduce pain symptoms – https://theconversation.com/endometriosis-our-research-shows-changing-your-diet-may-reduce-pain-symptoms-254424

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘Piracy’ to legitimacy: how companies like French ride-hailing platform Heetch can make their mark

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Maxime Massey, Docteur en Sciences de Gestion & Innovation – Chercheur affilié à la Chaire Improbable, ESCP Business School

    The 2024 arrest and subsequent release of activist Paul Watson, the founder of the NGO Sea Shepherd that fights to protect ocean biodiversity, highlighted a division between two opposing camps. There are those who want to stay true to the NGO’s DNA by continuing to practice strong activism against poaching states, and those who believe there is too much at stake in remaining confrontational and advocate instead for more measured actions to institutionalize the NGO. This opposition reflects the dilemma faced by many “pirate organizations”, a concept introduced by scholars Rudolph Durand and Jean-Philippe Vergne.

    What are pirate organizations?

    Pirate organizations are defined by three key characteristics.

    • they develop innovative activities by exploiting legal loopholes

    • they defend a “public cause” to support neglected communities, who in turn support them

    • by introducing innovations that address specific social needs, they disrupt monopolies and contribute to transforming economic and social systems



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    However, to do these things effectively, pirate organizations must become legitimate. An organization is considered legitimate when its various audiences (customers, media, the state, etc.) perceive its actions as desirable according to prevailing values, norms and laws. Legitimacy is built through a process known as legitimation. For pirate organizations, this is particularly challenging, as they are often viewed as both illegal and illegitimate by the state and established industry players. These actors apply pressure to hinder legitimation. So how do pirate organizations build their legitimacy? We examined this question through the emblematic case of Heetch.

    A case study of a pirate organization

    Heetch is a French urban transport start-up launched in 2013 when its founders observed that “young people in Paris and its suburbs struggle to travel at night due to a lack of suitable options”. They decided to create a ride-hailing platform connecting private drivers with passengers.

    This business model, based on the principles of the “sharing economy”, encroached on the monopoly of taxis and the regulated sector of professional chauffeur-driven vehicles (VTCs). Despite challenges, Heetch gradually built its legitimacy through three distinct phases, responding to pressures in different ways.

    Stage 1: ‘clandestine pragmatism’ (2013-2015)

    When Heetch launched in 2013, a conflict was brewing in the urban transport sector. On one side, there were new applications for VTC services (such as Uber) and for private driver platforms (such as UberPop and Heetch); on the other, there were traditional taxis and their booking departments (such as G7). The latter, along with government authorities, began exerting pressure to shut down the apps, with Uber receiving most of the media attention.

    During this phase, Heetch adopted a strategy of “clandestine pragmatism”. The start-up avoided direct confrontations and stayed “under the radar” of the media. This approach is similar to “bootlegging” – concealing an innovative activity during its early stages. Heetch built a pragmatic legitimacy among its immediate audience using informal techniques such as word-of-mouth. However, its legitimacy remained limited, because it operated outside media scrutiny and without state approval.

    Stage 2: ‘subversive activism’ (2015-2017)

    In June 2015, taxi drivers organized massive protests against the “unfair competition” posed by new ride-hailing apps. The Paris police issued a ban on UberPop-like applications, including Heetch’s.

    While Uber shut down UberPop, Heetch exploited a legal loophole – its name was not explicitly mentioned in the ban – and continued operations. In response, the state cracked down on Heetch: around 100 drivers were placed in police custody and the founders were summoned to court, facing charges of “illegal facilitation of contact” with drivers, “complicity in unlawful taxi operations” and “misleading commercial practices”.

    Heetch reacted by engaging in “subversive activism”. The founders spoke out in the media to defend their service, emphasizing its public utility, particularly for young suburban residents needing nighttime mobility. The start-up generated buzz by releasing a satirical video featuring altered images of political figures in their youth. Heetch leveraged its pragmatic legitimacy, already established within its community, to gain media legitimacy among a broader audience of people, including journalists and policymakers. The organization gained public recognition, but also faced increasing legal battles.

    Stage 3: ‘tempered radicalism’ (2017-present)

    In March 2017, a court ruled against Heetch, deeming its operations illegal. Heetch temporarily suspended its service but relaunched two weeks later with a new business model employing professional drivers. Two months later, Heetch attempted to reintroduce private drivers, but, after facing additional legal action, it abandoned this approach after six months to focus exclusively on legal transportation services.

    During this phase, Heetch practised “tempered radicalism”. The company integrated into the system while continuing its “fight” in a more moderate manner, avoiding direct confrontation with the state and industry players. It adopted three key strategies:

    • compliance – respecting the law

    • compromise – balancing its transportation service with its public mission

    • manipulation – lobbying to influence regulations

    Through this approach, Heetch secured regulatory legitimacy while strengthening its existing pragmatic and media legitimacy. The company was recognized by the French government and included in the French Tech 120 and Next 40 programmes for the country’s most promising start-ups. It also became the first ride-hailing platform to attain “mission-driven company” status.

    Is ‘piracy’ a growth accelerator?

    Ultimately, our study highlights the value of piracy as a strategy for kickstarting the growth of an organization that serves a public cause. By embracing this approach, a pirate organization can drive systemic change to address social or environmental challenges.

    That said, piracy carries an inherent risk: at some point, it will likely face a legitimacy crisis triggered by resistance from monopolies or public authorities. The recent struggles of Paul Watson serve as testament. As he aptly puts it: “You can’t change the world without making waves”.

    Les auteurs ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur organisme de recherche.

    ref. ‘Piracy’ to legitimacy: how companies like French ride-hailing platform Heetch can make their mark – https://theconversation.com/piracy-to-legitimacy-how-companies-like-french-ride-hailing-platform-heetch-can-make-their-mark-253079

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Turkmenistan, Experts of the Committee against Torture Commend Turkmenistan on Installing Cameras in Places of Detention, Ask about Measures to Prevent Torture in Prisons and the Treatment of Homosexual Persons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Turkmenistan, with Committee Experts commending the State for installing cameras in places of detention, while raising questions about measures taken to prevent torture in prisons and the treatment of homosexual persons.

    Liu Huawen, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed that Turkmenistan said it placed high value on human beings, protecting their liberty and fundamental freedoms, and that it had adopted national action plans for protecting human rights, gender equality and children’s rights, and implemented measures to prevent child labour.  It was also commendable that video cameras had been installed in places of detention. Mr. Liu asked questions relating to the operation of these cameras.

    Todd Buchwald, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, asked what measures were in place to ensure that legal safeguards against torture were implemented in practice?  Did the State’s laws ensure that medical examinations were independent and conducted within 24 hours of admission into detention centres?  Did all detained persons have the right to challenge their detention? Were all detentions recorded in registers and were there limitations on access to registers?  What measures were in place to ensure that detained persons were informed about the reasons for their arrest promptly in a language they understood both orally and in writing? 

    Mr. Liu said homosexuality remained criminalised in the State party, with up to two years in prison for consensual same sex relations.  Were there any investigations or prosecutions for consensual same sex conduct?  United Nations treaty bodies had repeatedly recommended that the State party repeal this legislation; had any action been taken to implement these recommendations? There had been reports that people who spoke out about issues relating to homosexuality were at risk of being arrested and tortured and that homosexual prisoners were subject to humiliating anal examinations.  Could the delegation comment on these reports?  What measures would be taken to guarantee the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons? 

    The delegation said Turkmenistan took measures to prevent acts of torture and harsh treatment across its territory.  Over the reporting period, it had invested around 14 million United States dollars in construction and repair work for prisons, medical equipment, and training for staff.  In 2023, the number of convicts fell by 4.5 per cent compared to the previous year, and by a further three per cent in 2024, facilitated by measures taken to provide alternatives to custodial sentences, including parole and commuted sentences.  The occupancy rate in the State’s prisons was 83 per cent.  Food, medical and hygiene supplies were provided to inmates to ensure their health at the cost of the State. 

    The delegation said the State recognised human rights but there were certain specific aspects on which they would follow their own line.  Regarding the allegations of torture and ill-treatment against homosexuals, there had been no such allegations recorded.  If specific details could be provided, more specific information could be provided. 

    Introducing the report, Vepa Hajiyev, Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, said a new edition of the Criminal Code, which entered into force in January 2023, included a definition of torture that was fully aligned with article 1 of the Convention.  The Code established criminal liability for acts of torture and explicitly excluded any justification for such acts, including references to orders, exceptional circumstances, or threats to security. Turkmenistan had established the absolute prohibition of torture, as required by international law.

    In closing remarks, Claude Heller, Committee Chair, said the Committee would highlight several priority recommendations within the concluding observations.  The Committee hoped to continue an open, ongoing dialogue with the State party.   

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Hajiyev expressed gratitude to the Committee for having the opportunity to present the report. Thanks to the open dialogue over the last two days, members of the delegation had identified priority areas to focus on.  There was a need to review the State’s legislation to ensure it was fully aligned with the main provisions of the Convention. 

    The delegation of Turkmenistan consisted of representatives from the Supreme Court; Prosecutor General’s Office; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Institute of State, Law and Democracy of Turkmenistan; and the Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Turkmenistan at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 25 April at 3 p.m. to continue its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/7).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Turkmenistan (CAT/C/TKM/3).

    Presentation of Report

    VEPA HAJIYEV, Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, said that following the review of Turkmenistan’s second periodic report by the Committee, the State party had developed an action plan for the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations.  Some 50 subparagraphs of the Committee’s concluding observations had been fully or partially implemented; and 16 were currently being implemented.

    State, law enforcement, and civil society institutions were carrying out practical efforts to prevent conditions that could lead to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.  The State was implementing national action plans on human rights, gender equality and children’s rights, and against corruption and trafficking, which had specific goals and objectives and indicators for evaluating the results attained.

    A new edition of the Criminal Code, which entered into force in January 2023, included a definition of torture that was fully aligned with article 1 of the Convention.  The Code established criminal liability for acts of torture and explicitly excluded any justification for such acts, including references to orders, exceptional circumstances, or threats to security. Turkmenistan had established the absolute prohibition of torture, as required by international law.

    In recent years, Turkmenistan had been implementing measures to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ombudsman.  In 2024, new departments were created within the Ombudsman’s Office and the number of staff increased.  Amendments made in 2024 to the law on the Ombudsman enhanced the Ombudsman’s ability to restore violated rights and broadened the scope for applying preventive measures.  The Ombudsman’s Office continued to closely cooperate with international organizations to bring its mandate fully in line with the Paris Principles and was developing a roadmap for upgrading its status to category “A”.

    Turkmenistan had undertaken a comprehensive set of reforms aimed at improving the judicial system and enhancing the quality of justice.  The State Concept for the Development of the Judicial System for 2022-2028 aimed to improve the legislative framework governing the functioning of the courts, the qualifications of judicial system personnel, and the material and technical infrastructure of the courts, as well as expand international legal cooperation.  In April 2025, a new edition of the law on the judiciary was adopted, which incorporated key international standards related to the independence and competence of judges, as well as measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the courts.

    To modernise and standardise the process of professional development for judges and judicial staff, a new procedure for organising and conducting relevant training activities was approved in 2023.  Turkmenistan was also implementing a phased digitalisation of its judiciary to enhance transparency, facilitating video and audio recording of court proceedings and digital access to judicial information and services.  Between 2020 and 2025, lawyers provided legal assistance in 530 cases of detention where unlawful actions falling under the scope of the Convention were identified.

    In line with the Committee’s concluding observations, internal regulations governing conditions of detention had been introduced.  These rules covered living conditions, medical care, and the rights to phone calls, visits, walks, and to receive parcels.  Particular attention was paid to medical supervision and the documentation of physical injuries.  Every individual admitted to a penitentiary facility underwent a mandatory medical examination.  Any injuries discovered were documented, and in cases where violence was suspected, an additional investigation was carried out. 

    Between 2020 and 2023, large-scale reconstruction and capital repairs were carried out in 12 penitentiary institutions.  These efforts aimed to bring detention conditions in line with the Mandela Rules. Monitoring visits by the Ombudsman and Public Monitoring Commissions were regularly organised – a total of 20 visits to places of detention were conducted in 2023-2024 alone.

    Criminal procedural legislation explicitly prohibited the use of evidence obtained through torture, threats, deception, or cruel treatment.  All institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had implemented the practice of video recording interrogations to ensure transparency and help prevent potential abuses.

    The Criminal Code provided for liability for violent acts within the household.  A national survey was conducted in cooperation with the United Nations Population Fund on domestic violence against women, and based on its findings, a roadmap for the prevention of domestic violence for 2022–2025 was developed.  The State aimed to introduce clear definitions, establish penalties, and create comprehensive protection mechanisms for vulnerable groups, including conducting awareness-raising campaigns.  Human rights education and the prevention of torture were integral components of the training of law enforcement personnel.

    A cooperation plan between the Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross Representation for 2025 had been approved, which included seminars and lectures on international standards of law enforcement for relevant agency personnel, and awareness-raising initiatives on international norms related to the treatment of persons deprived of liberty and to penitentiary standards. Discussions were ongoing on the possible organization of visits to places of detention by the International Committee of the Red Cross.  Direct contact had also been established since 2024 with Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    TODD BUCHWALD, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said there were reports of numerous enforced disappearances in Turkmenistan, the victims of which remained behind bars without access to family members.  There were 162 reports of such disappearances by the Prove-They-Are-Alive campaign, including 29 persons who had died in custody. There were also reports of cruel treatment of detainees, lack of independence of the judiciary, harassment of journalists and human rights defenders, and a culture of impunity. Did the State have sufficient mechanisms to identify torture and ill-treatment?  What had the State party done to investigate the 162 reported cases of enforced disappearance?

    What measures were in place to ensure that legal safeguards against torture were implemented in practice? Did the State’s laws ensure that medical examinations were independent and conducted within 24 hours of admission into detention centres?  Did all detained persons have the right to challenge their detention?  Were all detentions recorded in registers and were there limitations on access to registers?  What measures were in place to ensure that detained persons were informed about the reasons for their arrest promptly in a language they understood both orally and in writing? 

    In which circumstances did the right to free legal assistance for accused persons apply?  There were cases in which accused persons had reportedly struggled to obtain legal representation.  How did the State ensure that lawyers were not dissuaded from representing clients seen as controversial, and that lawyers were well-trained and independent?  There were reports of closed trials; what legal rules governed such trials?  Was the right to immediately inform family members of detention provided in law and in practice?  Were officers that failed to provide these safeguards punished? How many complaints had been received related to the lack of provision of safeguards and what investigations had been carried out in response?

    Turkmenistan remained largely closed to international scrutiny.  It had issued a standing invitation to special procedures in 2018 but had not accepted all but one of the 15 requests for visits received since, and the one visit that was accepted had not yet been carried out.  How would the State party improve cooperation with special procedures? Did the International Committee of the Red Cross have access to places of deprivation of liberty?  How many meetings between representatives of international organizations and detained persons had been held in the last three years, and how were such persons protected from reprisals?

    What was the Government doing to ratify the Optional Protocol and to accept the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive individual communications?  What awareness raising campaigns was the State party carrying out regarding the Committee’s concluding observations?  Were translated versions of the concluding observations published online?  The State had not provided data in response to several of the questions posed by the Committee in the list of issues.  What measures were in place to develop the State’s capacities in data collection?

    There were concerns that the Ombudsman’s Office lacked independence and had not taken steps to address torture and ill-treatment.  Its reports failed to adequately address human rights violations, and it had not submitted a report to the Committee before the dialogue.  What was the State party doing to strengthen the mandate of the Ombudsman’s Office to investigate human rights violations?  The Office had no mandate to conduct visits to places of detention; would such a mandate be established?  Did the Ombudsman require prior permission to conduct such visits? 

    Complaints from individuals could only be considered by the Ombudsman within one year, eliminating the possibility of investigating historical crimes.  Would this rule be eliminated?  What measures were in place to ensure that complaints submitted to the Ombudsman were kept confidential?  There had been few appeals to the Ombudsman’s Office by persons deprived of liberty; why was this?  Had the Office recommended ratifying international human rights treaties and facilitating visits by special procedures?  How many times had the Ombudsman concluded that there had been a human rights violation and what actions were taken in response?

    Turkmenistan had not granted asylum to any person since 2005.  How was the State party strengthening its asylum procedures?  Did it cooperate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees?  Persons unable to document their lack of nationality were denied statelessness status. Was the State party working to address this issue?

    Mr. Buchwald cited reports of prison staff torturing prisoners, including by beating a man to death with a soldering iron, denying an ill prisoner medical treatment, and torturing a man with an electric current.  How did the State party prevent torture in detention and investigate all reported cases? There were also reports of forcible transfers of critics of the State living abroad to Turkmenistan, where they were subjected to abuse and enforced disappearance, and of travel bans imposed on activists who opposed the Government.  How would the State party guarantee activists’ safety and right to travel?

    LIU HUAWEN, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed that the State said it placed high value on human beings, protecting their liberty and fundamental freedoms, and that it had adopted national action plans for protecting human rights, gender equality and children’s rights, and implemented measures to prevent child labour. 

    The Committee also welcomed the training activities carried out for the police.  However, there was no mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of this training.  Was training mandatory and how many personnel had participated?  It was commendable that annual training was provided for judges of the Supreme Court.  What training was provided for judicial personnel in other courts and medical personnel involved in the treatment of detainees?  Did such training address the revised Istanbul Protocol? 

    The Committee was concerned by the absence of guidelines on the prohibition of torture in the healthcare sector?  Would such guidelines be developed?  Were there ongoing training programmes on the prohibition of torture for police officers and prison staff?  Were international personnel involved in the design and presentation of this training?

    It was commendable that video cameras had been installed in places of detention.  What percentage of places of deprivation of liberty had been equipped? Were all interrogations recorded? Were there consequences for failing to record interrogations?  Were there limitations on access to recordings by detained persons and their lawyers?

    How many persons were detained in Turkmenistan’s prisons and for what period of time?  What efforts were underway to expand alternatives to detention? There were reports that prisons held nearly three times their capacity, and that Turkmenistan had the fourth highest incarceration rate globally.  What steps had been taken to reduce occupancy rates?

    There were reports of failures to provide timely medical examinations and delays in isolating prisoners with tuberculosis, which increased the risk of spread of the disease.  Prisoners reportedly needed to pay for medications that should be provided for free.  Some detainees went months without being provided access to leisure facilities within prisons.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Persons could reportedly be placed in solitary confinement for up to three months, left in total darkness with a lack of access to water or basic hygiene.  How was the use of solitary confinement documented and regulated? Had measures been taken to gradually end the use of prolonged solitary confinement, which was reportedly used as a tool of repression against political prisoners?  What rules governed visitation rights and phone calls for persons in solitary confinement?

    How did the State party ensure that meetings between lawyers and remand prisoners were private?  Were there provisions prohibiting the interrogation of suspects before lawyers were present?  Could refusals to give testimony be used against detainees in court?

    The Committee called for data on inter-prisoner violence and deaths in custody, and investigations into such cases. How did the State party ensure that family members could request independent autopsies of deaths in custody and that victims of violence in prisons could report the incident? Police officers had the right to use physical force to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens and prevent “socially dangerous acts” under State law.  This law seemed exceedingly broad.  Did it apply to the use of firearms?  Were there more specific rules governing the use of force?  What investigations had been carried out into excessive use of force by the police and what were their outcomes?

    There were reports that patients in psychiatric facilities were abused by staff.  What measures were in place to improve complaints mechanisms in such facilities?  How did the State party oversee involuntary hospitalisations?  In how many cases had restraints been used in psychiatric facilities, and what types of restraints were used?

    How did the State party ensure that appropriate support services were provided to victims of torture?  What measures were in place to provide redress, compensation and rehabilitation to victims?

    The Committee welcomed the criminalisation of corporal punishment in all settings and measures taken to protect children from violence, including the appointment of inspectors specialising in violence against children.  How many cases had they investigated?  The Committee also welcomed the establishment of juvenile courts.  How many cases had they assessed?  What measures were in place to prevent the detention of juveniles?

    Gender-based violence had not been established as a separate crime in the Criminal Code, though there were many cases of gender-based violence in the State.  Had the roadmap developed to prevent gender-based violence been published online?  What progress had been made in implementing it?  What were the obstacles to adopting a law on gender-based violence?  How did the State party evaluate its awareness raising activities on gender-based violence?  Were victims support services in place?  How many shelters for victims and hotlines for reporting violence had been established? 

    High school girls were reportedly subjected to forced virginity tests, and information on girls found to have had sexual relations was reportedly passed to police.  How did the State party prevent this practice?

    Other Committee Experts asked questions on the national action plan on countering terrorism and the international organizations the State party partnered with to implement the plan; how legal safeguards were ensured for persons suspected of terrorism; the number of convictions imposed under anti-terrorism legislation; reforms adopted to align the legislative framework on terrorism with the State’s international obligations; the number of juveniles, particularly girls, currently in detention and the conditions in which they were held; measures to prevent overcrowding and ensure access to healthcare in prisons; and complaints and monitoring mechanisms in place for juvenile detention.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Turkmenistan took measures to prevent acts of torture and harsh treatment across its territory.  Over the reporting period, it had invested around 14 million United States dollars in construction and repair work for prisons, bought medical equipment, and ensured training for staff.  In 2023, the number of convicts fell by four and a half per cent compared to the previous year, and by a further three per cent in 2024, facilitated by measures taken to provide alternatives to custodial sentences, including parole and commuted sentences. 

    The occupancy rate in the State’s prisons was 83 per cent.  Food, medical and hygiene supplies were provided to inmates to ensure their health at the cost of the State.  Allegations of infected inmates not being separated from other inmates were unfounded; such inmates were transferred to prison hospitals for treatment.  The State had examined eight complaints from prisoners in 2023 and five in 2024, finding no wrongdoing by State officials in each case.  Regular training sessions were organised for prison staff, which addressed basic standards for treating inmates.  Over 2,000 training sessions were carried out between 2022 and 2024.

    Turkmenistan had continued to develop its legislation on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  Between 2022 and 2024, orders were issued on strengthening supervisory work on places of deprivation of liberty and on creating a special body for regulating medical examinations in prisons.

    The Ombudsman’s Office had access to all places of deprivation of liberty and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.  It verified the sanitary norms of establishments, the right to food and healthcare, and the right to visits and to receive parcels from family members. The Office had issued recommendations on improving detention facilities and healthcare services in prisons that the Government was working to implement.  No complaints had been received by the Ombudsman on the lack of provision of parole, or from inmates in detention centres for women or juveniles.

    Work had been undertaken to ensure that police stations and remand prisons were equipped with audio-visual recording devices.  Access to recordings was given to the Ombudsman and legal counsel.

    The national action plan on gender equality for 2021-2025 included measures to combat gender-based violence against women and girls, including domestic violence.  A survey conducted by the State showed that some 12 per cent of women in Turkmenistan had been subjected to domestic violence.  A roadmap to implement the survey’s recommendations had been developed, which included plans to develop a rapid response mechanism for domestic violence. 

    The State had established a pilot system of family support centres where social workers provided support for victims of violence; this would soon be expanded.  There were also hotlines that victims could use to report violence.  The Government was studying legislation on domestic violence in other countries with a view to developing such legislation domestically.

    The delegation said Turkmenistan regularly provided information on individual cases to various United Nations structures.  Turkmenistan had given information concerning individuals to certain countries, and special procedures had closed these cases.  The State would continue to provide information to the special procedures and other interested parties.  There was no special complaints mechanism for cases of cruel or inhumane treatment, but a complaint could be submitted to authorities of law enforcement via writing or in person.  The Special Prosecutor visited places of detention to monitor the work of the penitentiary institutions. 

    According to the Criminal Code, the diagnosis of an illness could be a ground for early release, and a decision would be taken by a court.  The delegation cited several cases, including one prisoner who in 2017 was convicted of smuggling psychoactive substances, and was pardoned in 2020.  Three years later, another criminal case was initiated against him, after which he was placed on a wanted list.  He hid in a mountainous area for some time without food and medication, surviving on psychoactive substances.  When he was detained, he already had multiple forms of bodily harm, developed during his time in the mountains, and he died three days after he was detained due to an overdose from psychoactive substances. Evidence that his cause of death was bodily harm due to torture was not true and this had been confirmed by the forensic investigation.  Turkmenistan’s actions throughout all cases had been aimed at protecting its citizens.

    The memorandum on humanitarian visits had not yet been signed, as negotiations had been interrupted six years ago.  In 2024, the Turkmen side took the initiative to discuss the text again and was waiting to hear from the International Criminal Court.  The State was ready to consider requests from the International Criminal Court to visit places of detention. 

    Immediately after the appeal of the High Commissioner for Refugees to grant asylum to citizens of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan as a neighbouring country expressed willingness to make all resources available to facilitate transport to third countries.  About 150 Afghan citizens received temporary visas while they awaited permission to move to other countries.  A person had the right to continue to stay in the country until their status was determined officially, whether this was a stateless person, or an individual of another country.  During the COVID-19 pandemic, amendments were made to the law on migration which provided for the option to extend the validity of passports in emergency situations.  A passport could only be renewed twice and only in extraordinary legal circumstances.

    Not all countries of the world had the practice of issuing passports abroad, as this required significant resources and would become an additional burden on the State.  Primary requests to obtain a passport abroad could be submitted electronically.  The Government was looking to simplify the procedure for issuing passports. 

    Solitary confinement was only meted out to prisoners for intentional violations and measures.  Training courses regarding torture and solitary confinement were provided to the Ministry of Interior staff.  A learning course had been started for the doctors working in the penitentiary system to update their knowledge of tuberculosis and treatment.  Medical units were present within each penitentiary establishment.  The treatment plan for the multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis was fully functioning.  Work was ongoing to deal with cases of tuberculosis, and penitentiary administrations were responsible for ensuring the good health of convicts.

    Last month, a monitoring visit had been conducted to see seven Turkish prisoners serving sentences in Turkmenistan. There was only one establishment for juvenile offenders, and the occupancy rate was 22 per cent of its total capacity.  Juvenile female offenders were held separately from male offenders. 

    Turkmenistan had successfully implemented a national strategy to prevent violent extremism and combat terrorism and was preparing the new strategy for 2025-2030.   

    Around 94 court rooms had audio and video cameras, representing more than 90 per cent of courtrooms in the country. This work on the digitalisation of courts was continuing.  The accused had the right to view all documents related to the case, including documents and video recordings.  Relevant work was carried out to implement the provisions of the Convention.  The new version of the Criminal Code entered into force in January 2023 and punishment for certain crimes had been reduced. 

    All courts in Turkmenistan had special rooms for minors, increasing their protection.  A new provision had been introduced, in which a minor committing an offence for the first time, providing it was a medium offence or below, would not be imprisoned.  There had been a drop in the numbers of minors imprisoned by 35 per cent in 2024, compared to 2020, as a result. 

    According to the Criminal Code, data should not be considered admissible in court if acquired through violations of the law, including torture, violence or threat.  Courts now had specialised judges on family matters to ensure the best interests of children.  A lawyer was available from the moment of detention or indictment.  In the event of remand of a minor, or a person with a disability, there were specific provisions.  Use of an interpreter could be requested. 

    In each case of detention, a notification was sent in writing to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, within 24 hours from the moment of detention.  The Office of the Public Prosecutor had the right to cancel an unlawful detention.  Without the authorisation of the Public Prosecutor, a detainee needed to be released after 24 hours, with the arrest communicated to close relatives. 

    Disciplinary measures were taken against staff and other officials who breached guaranteed safeguards.  The Code of Criminal Procedure was in keeping with international treaties, which meant there were guarantees to safeguard the rights of the accused. 

    To date, Turkmenistan had two national action plans on combatting human trafficking.  The penalty for this crime had been strengthened to between 15 to 20 years in prison.  A Commission on Combatting Human Trafficking had been established in Turkmenistan, which included 13 State bodies working on this issue.  In July 2024, the first meeting of the Commission was held.  The Commission was tasked with ensuring the implementation of the national action plan, including through prevention, protection, and prosecution, providing assistance to victims, and carrying out awareness raising events.  The national action plan 2020-2025 was adopted by a decree. 

    The Ministry of Justice provided support to the Bar Association of the country.  There were six associations of lawyers in Turkmenistan.  Over the last four years, lawyers in Turkmenistan had participated in 48 training sessions on human rights and had carried out more than 3,000 visits to places to detention.  A conference had taken place where participants from many countries exchanged views on how to better protect lawyers.  The State stood ready to continue work in the legal area, promote a legal culture, and strengthen international cooperation.

    There had been no complaints recorded about forced virginity tests, but the delegation would look into any case if information was provided.  In certain cases, law enforcement bodies could ask for medical tests to be carried out in the framework of existing legislation.  A roadmap had been developed for the ratification of the Optional Protocol and work was ongoing in this respect. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    TODD BUCHWALD, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said many bodies and individuals had made allegations, which the State party had denied.  The bodies making these allegations were highly credible.  The Committee recommended the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention as a critical step for the State party, as well as having a regular relationship with the International Criminal Court.  Were the recommendations from Committees made available in all major newspapers? 

    The Ombudsman had not received any complaints which was concerning.  Did this suggest a need to deal more assertively with the problem?  It was positive that the Ombudsman had access to all places of deprivation of liberty; however, it was inferred that she had not visited some facilities.  Was this correct?  Was it possible to share the data responsive to the Committee’s list of issues?  There was data available on overcrowding, so it would be helpful to provide disaggregated data split by facility. 

    How was it determined whether information published by journalists was true, accurate or impartial?  What were the penalties for publishing information which was determined not to fall under this category?  What were the prospects for revising the law so there would be no statute of limitations for the crime of torture? 

    LIU HUAWEN, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said there had been progress in the field of family law.  Today, domestic violence was not a matter of private law, but a focus of public law.  Marriage and family membership should not deprive any person of her or his basic human rights. 

    Turkmenistan’s strict abortion restrictions could create a cruel, inhumane or degrading environment for women, with abortion banned after five weeks, which was before many women realised they were pregnant.  Reproductive health care was limited, forcing women towards unsafe methods which endangered their health and lives.  These laws contributed to preventable maternal deaths and increased health risks. It was regretful that Turkmenistan did not provide access to emergency contraceptives. 

    The Committee suggested that the State party align its legal framework with international standards.  Would the State party take concrete steps to ensure access to safe abortion nation-wide and to reduce teenage pregnancies, including by providing access to contraceptives and reproductive services? Would the State ensure that doctors and medical professionals provided safe abortions for women whose lives were at risk due to pregnancy? 

    Homosexuality remained criminalised in the State party, with up to two years in prison for consensual same sex relations.  Were there any investigations or prosecutions for consensual same sex conduct?  United Nations treaty bodies had repeatedly recommended that the State party repeal this legislation; had any action been taken to implement these recommendations?  There had been reports that people who spoke out about issues relating to homosexuality were at risk of being arrested and tortured and that homosexual prisoners were subject to humiliating anal examinations.  Could the delegation comment on these reports? 

    What measures would be taken to guarantee the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons?  Would the State party provide systematic training for law enforcement officers, police officers and members of the judiciary on human rights standards for gender and sexual identity orientation?

    As a neutral country, Turkmenistan could play a more constructive and unique role in international cooperation. It was hoped Turkmenistan would make a greater contribution to global governance, including through the effective implementation of the Convention. 

    A Committee Expert asked if there was monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty where minors were held? Who carried out this monitoring activity? 

    Another Expert asked about the legislation to combat terrorism; could more specific information be provided? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said cooperation was something which Turkmenistan needed to improve.  The State party worked with various international organizations and human rights committees in Geneva.  All decisions and conclusions voiced within the Committee needed to be based on established and recognised standards.  Often the opinions of law enforcement bodies were interpreted objectively, and the State was trying to bridge the gap by involving representatives of civil society to enable human rights organizations to better understand the individual cases. There was a clear imbalance of information, and the State was doing its best to address this.  The State did not plan the official publication of results of the Committee’s recommendations, but if others wished to publish them, they could do so.

    The Ombudsperson visited prisons, but it was important to enhance the capacities of the institution to ensure it had greater access to places of detention.  The State recognised human rights but there were certain specific aspects on which they would follow their own line.  Regarding the allegations of torture and ill-treatment against homosexuals, there had been no such allegations recorded.  If specific details could be provided, more specific information could be provided. 

    As a neutral state, Turkmenistan was working to advocate for the values of peace and trust to ensure the Sustainable Development Goals were met.   

    Currently, Turkmenistan was a party to the 19 legal instruments combatting terrorism.  The law on combatting terrorism included legal protection of citizens for their participation in combatting terrorism. The State had extensive levels of cooperation in this area.  There were no issues of overcrowding in prisons.  The State rejected allegations that there had been an increase in the number of minors detained.  There had been single cases, which did not represent a serious problem in the country. Institutions for minors serving sentences functioning under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior were monitored by the Ombudsman and other institutions. 

    Turkmenistan worked closely with the counterterrorism mechanism of the United Nations.  A seminar had been held in Doha about the spread of terrorist ideas through the internet. 

    Women had the permission to interrupt pregnancies after the established timeframe, but this was based on an individual approach, relating to specific circumstances.  Having abortions outside of medical institutions involved serious risks to the health of women.  To prevent illegal abortions, there were special provisions in the law of responsibility.  Written agreement was required from parents only if the girl was under the age of 18. 

    In 2023, the General Prosecutor’s Office of Turkmenistan, in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme, organised special seminars attended by over 100 participants from law enforcement agencies.  Such events, relating to refresher training, took place all over the world, including in the United States, Europe and Asia.  In March this year, Turkmenistan held a briefing relating to the presentation of a national plan on combatting trafficking. 

    Turkmenistan had ratified a significant number of legal instruments and it received bilateral requests on extradition related to criminal prosecutions, including for crimes of torture.  When a person was extradited, Turkmenistan took into account all guarantees provided in relevant United Nations Conventions. In each case, the situation of the person was reviewed to ensure the person would not be subject to torture in the country to which the person was extradited.  It was necessary to receive a written confirmation from the State that torture would not be used against those individuals. 

    Closing Remarks 

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chairperson, said the delegation had 48 hours to provide the Committee with additional information.  The Committee would highlight several priority recommendations within the concluding observations.  The Committee hoped to continue an open, ongoing dialogue with the State party.   

    VEPA HAJIYEV, Permanent Representative of Turkmenistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for having the opportunity to present the report.  Thanks to the open dialogue over the last two days, members of the delegation had identified priority areas to focus on.  The Committee’s recommendations would be thoroughly reviewed.  There was a need to review the State’s legislation to ensure it was fully aligned with the main provisions of the Convention.  Any progress required work and readiness to move forward. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT25.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

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    • Generous Welcome Bonus: 325% match bonus up to 5 BTC and 250 free spins on your first four deposits.
    • Crypto Payments: Apart from traditional payment methods like Visa, Mastercard, and Maestro, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ethereum are accepted. 7Bit best online casino Canada stands out as a crypto casino due to its wide variety of crypto payment options.
    • User-friendly interface and 24/7 Customer Support: With an intuitive and well-designed interface, players can enjoy a stress-free gambling experience on both mobile and desktop devices. Offering players assistance on gaming and transaction processes, 7Bit’s customer support is responsive and excellent.

    Cons:

    • Require KYC Verification for Withdrawal above $2,000: Though KYC verification enhances player security, it requires submitting players’ personal information, which can sometimes be exploited. In addition, the KYC process is time-consuming, and players have to wait a bit more time to complete the registration process, causing inconvenience.
    • Restricted in Some Countries: Due to regulatory and legal restrictions, 7Bit best casino online Canada is prohibited in countries like Spain, Ukraine, and Israel.
    • Limited Language Availability: 7Bit is less efficient when it comes to language. The site supports only the main languages like English, German, French, and Russian, making it difficult for players who are less familiar with these languages to interact with the casino.
    • $10 Withdrawal Fee on all Payments: Whether you are paying using cryptocurrency, e-wallet, or debit card, you have to pay a $10 withdrawal fee.
    • 40x Wagering Requirement: To claim the bonus offers, players have to complete the 40x wagering requirement, a bit higher compared to other online casinos in Canada.

    What Makes 7Bit the Best Online Casino in Canada?

    Reviewing many online casinos, including their bonus policies, game varieties, encryption technologies, customer support, and many other factors, we concluded 7Bit as the best online casino in Canada. Below, we discuss the features of this casino that contributed to its wide popularity and acceptance among Canadian players.

    • License and Reputation

    7Bit Casino is licensed under the regulation of Curacao, a renowned regulator in the online gambling industry. Operating under the Curacao eGaming Control Board, 7Bit, the best online casino Canada, ensures fairness, security, and privacy to users.

    All games utilize a random number generator or provably fair algorithms, assuring players that no games are biased and there is an equal probability of winning and losing in every game they play. Not only fairness in games, this license also guarantees players’ regulated deposit and withdrawal process and prevents casinos from offering bonuses with hidden wagering conditions.

    Since its launch in 2014, 7Bit Ontario online casino has established itself as a trustworthy and reliable casino, delivering players with an enjoyable and safe gambling experience. Solving every complaint, though not rising often, as soon as possible, this best online casino Canada stands out from its competitors for its reputation and transparency. 7Bit uses 128-bit SSL encryption for all data transactions.

    • Bonus and Promotions

    With most features being the same at online casinos in Canada, the variations and uniqueness in bonuses and promotions attract players. 7Bit Ontario online casino’s bonus offers are promising and capable of boosting player confidence. On registering for the account, players receive an impressive 325% match deposit bonus of up to 5 BTC and 250 free spins. This bonus is applied to your first four deposits, increasing your probability of winning at your favorite games.

    Only new registrants can claim the welcome bonus, sign up for 7Bit, and make the minimum required deposit, and you will be qualified for the bonus. One major advantage of the welcome bonus at 7Bit Ontario online casino is that you don’t have a maximum limit on what you can win from the bonus; whatever you win goes to your profits. However, it is important to read the terms and conditions to know the rules and measures you have to follow to claim the bonus. Most bonuses come with a 40x wagering requirement.

    Here is how the welcome deposit bonuses are allocated,

    • 1st deposit: 100% match bonus along with 100 free spins.
    • 2nd deposit: 75& match bonus along with 100 free spins.
    • 3rd deposit: 50% match bonus
    • 4th deposit: 100% match bonus along with 50 free spins.

    In order to keep players retained, apart from welcome bonuses, 7Bit, the best online casino Canada, offers some exciting promotions and VIP programs. Promotions contain reload bonuses, cashbacks, and free spins, while VIP offerings trigger new bonuses as players complete each level of the 12-level program.

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    Below are some promotions offered by 7Bit.

    • Monday reload bonuses
    • Free Spin Wednesday
    • Daily Cashback
    • Weekly Cashback
    • Game Library

    With more than 5,000 games, including games from renowned iGaming providers like NetEnt, Pragmatic Play, and BetSoft, 7Bit Ontario online casino offers an impressive game library. Apart from traditional slots and table games like roulette, blackjack, and poker, players can find a variety of live dealer games and crypto games at 7Bit Casino. Based on players’ preferences and choices, there’s at least one game for everyone.

    Navigating to the slot category, players could see some amazing collections that suit their style. With immersive graphics and ravishing bonus offers, players can spin the reels on luck-based slots to win huge prizes. Apart from popular traditional slots like 7Bit Hot&Hot Fruits, 7Bit Bonanza, and Throne of Camelot Hold and Win, players can try BTC slots such as Mega Moolah, Johnny Cash, Elvis Frog in Vegas, Wild Spin, and Raging Lion at 7Bit.

    Combining the game of chance with elements of skill, blackjack has become a popular genre of games at online casinos. Trying to beat the dealer by making a hand worth 21 or close to it, players aim to win great prizes at the blackjack table. 7Bit online casino Canada offers many variety of blackjack games, from Classic blackjack to Multihand and American blackjack, players get a wide range of options to choose from.

    Trying their luck at casinos, roulette has become a favorite game of seasonal players. Offering a gameplay that relies more on luck rather than skill, roulette has a huge fan base all over the world. Multiple variants of roulette are available at 7Bit, the best online casino in Canada, including American and European roulette. The gameplay is almost similar in all variants, only basic principles differ, making it easy to switch from one variant to another.

    • Video Poker

    Playing against the dealer to get a strong hand from the best possible cards, Poker delivers a skill-based gambling adventure. With different variants including Jacks or Better, Tens or Better, Deuces Wild, Aces and Eights, 7Bit, the best online casino Canada offers a wide video poker collection to choose from. The basic rules, betting options, and payout percentage vary in different variants, however, the basic gameplay is the same.

    • Live Dealer Games

    Live dealer games are similar to slots and table games, but they offer a real-time gambling experience as that in a brick-and-mortar casino. Players compete against the dealer and win huge prizes at live dealer tables. 7Bit live dealer collection includes live blackjack, roulette, and baccarat tables, offering players an immersive gameplay.

    • Exclusive Crypto Games

    A standalone feature of 7Bit best casino online Canada is its inclusion of crypto games. The Bitcoin games at 7Bit Casino allow players to make bets directly using Bitcoins, promoting it as a Bitcoin casino. Best Bitcoin games at 7Bit include BTC Blackjack, BTC Baccarat, Keno, and Bitcoin Roulette.

    Payment

    Funding at a casino involves security and privacy risks, but 7Bit online casino Ontario makes it convenient and safe. Offering both traditional and digital payment, players can choose the payment option they are comfortable with.

    • Payment Options

    Different payment options are available at 7Bit, the best online casino in Canada. Visa, MasterCard, and Maestro are suitable payment options for players who prefer traditional payment methods, while cryptocurrency payments are ideal for players who wish to transact through a digital interface.

    Supported Cryptocurrencies

    • Bitcoin (BTC)
    • Ethereum (ETH)
    • Litecoin (LTC)
    • Dogecoin (DOGE)
    • Bitcoin Cash (BCH)
    • Ripple (XRP)
    • Tether (USDT)

    Supported Fiat Currencies

    • EUR
    • USD
    • AUD
    • CAD
    • NOK
    • PLN
    • NZD

    Deposit and Withdrawal Limit

    7Bit has a straightforward deposit process. The minimum deposit limit varies depending on the type of payment method chosen. All deposits are processed immediately, eliminating the cumbersome waiting time.This lets players focus more on games without getting interrupted. Similar to depositing, the minimum and maximum limits of withdrawal depend on your chosen payment option.

    Payment Speed

    Payments are pretty fast at 7Bit online casino Ontario. Crypto and e-wallet payments are processed instantly, while bank transfers take some time to process. The detailed processing time for different payment options at 7Bit casino is given below.

    • Cryptocurrency: Instant / Max 1 hour
    • Visa/MasterCard: Instant / 1-3 days
    • Skrill: Instant
    • Neteller: Instant
    • Bank Transfer: 3-5 business days

    Responsible Gambling Practices

    7Bit online casino Ontario is licensed under the Curacao government and adheres to its strict laws and regulations. Promoting responsible gambling, 7Bit includes various tools that ensure players are gambling responsibly. Tools like deposit limits, loss limits, self-exclusion tools, and wagering limits prevent players from uncontrolled gambling.

    • Deposit Limits: Limits the amount a player deposits for gambling.
    • Loss Limits: Restricts players’ ability to lose over a specific period of time.
    • Wagering Limits: Limits the amount of money a player wagers within a set timeframe.
    • Self-exclusion Tools: Temporarily deactivates a player’s account to prevent them from over-gambling or addiction.

    Customer Support and User Experience
    7Bit offers 24/7 customer support, solving all the queries of players with utmost diligence and accuracy. Customer assistance options include email and live chat with a quick response time. Generally, queries are solved within minutes in live chats and within 24 hours for emails. A detailed FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section is also available at 7Bit, solving all the fundamental queries within no time.

    Evaluating the user experience, 7Bit, the best online casino in Ontario, delivers a mobile-friendly gambling experience, allowing players to gamble wherever they go. Players can navigate to the platform easily and locate their favorite games seamlessly. This best casino online Canada stands out for its top-notch graphics; the combined dark and light color theme mimics the real-time casinos, giving players a conventional gambling experience. The responsive design works well on both iOS and Android devices.

    Final Verdict on 7Bit Casino: Best Online Casino Canada

    7Bit Casino is a great option for players looking for a crypto-friendly gambling experience. With its generous bonus offers, massive game collection, and a smooth user experience, it stands out as one of the best online casinos in Canada, especially for those who enjoy both traditional and blockchain-based gaming. The 325% welcome bonus up to 5 BTC, 250 free spins, and additional reload bonuses and cashbacks make it an appealing choice for many players.

    This casino doesn’t just offer amazing bonuses, but also boasts a wide variety of games, from classic slots to the latest crypto games, ensuring there’s something for everyone. The versatile payment options, including both crypto and fiat, make for seamless deposits and withdrawals, allowing for an uninterrupted gameplay experience.

    The customer service at 7Bit Casino is top-notch, providing helpful support through live chat and email, ensuring players can feel confident and well-assisted throughout their time on the site. While the KYC requirement for withdrawals over $2,000 and geographical restrictions can be a slight inconvenience, these don’t overshadow the overall experience.

    For players in Ontario and across Canada, 7Bit Casino offers a balanced blend of traditional and modern gambling features. If you’re searching for a reliable, rewarding, and user-friendly online casino, 7Bit is one of the best online casinos in Canada. Log in and enjoy the advantages—just make sure to read the terms and conditions for a smoother experience!

    Unlock Your 325% Welcome Bonus and 250 Free Spins at 7Bit Casino!

    Frequently Asked Questions

    • Is 7Bit Casino Legit?

    Yes, 7Bit is a legitimate casino operating under a Curacao eGaming License.

    • Does 7Bit require KYC?

    KYC is mandatory for withdrawals above $2,000 at 7Bit.

    • What are the different types of payment methods included in 7Bit, the best online casino in Canada?

    Along with crypto payments, 7Bit supports credit/debit cards, e-wallets, and bank transfers.

    • Why should I play at 7Bit Casino in Canada?

    7Bit offers you an impressive game library, attractive bonuses, wide payment options, an engaging interface, and efficient customer support, making it the best gambling platform in Canada.

    • How to claim the welcome bonus at 7Bit Casino?

    New registrants can claim their welcome bonus by making the required initial deposits.

    EmailSupport@7bitCasino.com

    Disclaimer and Affiliate Disclosure
    General Disclaimer
    This article is for informational and entertainment purposes only, not legal or financial advice. Content is based on research and user reviews as of writing. No warranties are made, and users must verify information before acting.

    Casino and Gambling Disclaimer
    Online gambling carries risks and isn’t for everyone. Confirm you’re of legal gambling age in your jurisdiction. Gambling laws vary, and compliance is your responsibility. We don’t promote gambling; participation is at your risk. 7Bit Casino is a third-party platform, and we’re not liable for losses or disputes.

    Affiliate Disclosure
    This article may include affiliate links, earning us a commission at no cost to you for qualifying actions. These support our content. Our reviews are unbiased, and we recommend only valuable products. Do your own research before signing up.

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Best Crypto Casinos 2025: JACKBIT, Rated as Best Bitcoin Casino Without Verification & Fast Payout

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LARNACA, Cyprus, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Crypto casinos will thrive in 2025, but not every platform will deliver the same experience. After evaluating dozens of online casino sites, JACKBIT rises above the rest with its generous bonuses, cutting-edge games, lightning-fast registration, and no-KYC requirement.

    In this guide, we’ll break down its key strengths and weaknesses, welcome bonuses, and why it’s one of the top crypto casinos of the year.

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    A Closer Look at the Best Online Crypto Casino: JACKBIT Casino

    What sets JACKBIT apart from the competition? It’s not just the sleek design or the massive collection of 7,000+ casino games and free spins—it’s the complete crypto gambling experience. JACKBIT offers instant deposits and withdrawals, a strict no-KYC policy, and a rewarding VIP program with up to 30% rakeback.

    As one of the top-rated Bitcoin casinos in 2025, JACKBIT prioritizes player security and delivers a seamless, responsible gaming environment. Add in $10,000 in weekly giveaways, 10,000 free spins every week, BTC 10 cashback every week, and a cutting-edge crypto sportsbook, and it’s clear: JACKBIT isn’t just another online casino—it’s a full-scale crypto entertainment destination.

    CLICK HERE TO GET 30% RAKEBACK BONUS + 100 FREE SPINS + NO KYC

    Why We Chose JACKBIT as the Best Crypto Casino

    Integrating an intuitive game interface with an extensive gaming library, comprising more than 7000 games, along with an irreplaceable crypto-friendly environment, offering players a privacy-oriented, low-cost, and high-speed gambling experience, JACKBIT casino has quickly gained popularity since its launch in 2022. Licensed under the Curacao Gaming Control Board, this casino boasts a variety of games, including classic brick-and-mortar games to high-performance games from well-known developers like Pragmatic Play, NetEnt, and Microgaming.

    Supporting different cryptocurrencies, JACKBIT casino streamlines its withdrawal and deposit process, making it easy for players to claim their winnings without hassles. Offering a secure platform for gambling while ensuring a unique and tangible reward system through bonuses and promotions, this crypto casino gives players a top-notch gameplay experience; once you log in, rare are the chances to get away.

    Licensing & Regulation at JACKBIT Crypto Casino

    • Operates with a legitimate license under the Curacao Gaming Control Board

    JACKBIT casino is licensed under the renowned licensing body for crypto casinos, the Curacao eGaming License. Unlike crypto casinos that prefer less stringent regulators, adhering to one of the strong and well-known regulatory bodies highlights JACKBIT’s commitment towards players, ensuring protection and compliance with law.

    Integrating SSL encryption technology with its security system, the platform offers provably fair games, ensuring all games are fair and not manipulated by the casino. Eliminating the need for KYC verification, where players are required to provide their personal and financial information to enable gambling, JACKBIT promotes private and anonymous gambling.

    JACKBIT Casino Game Library
    A wide collection of games from popular and established game developers, such as roulette, poker, baccarat, blackjack, live dealer games, and progressive slots. JACKBIT casino is known for its extensive game library, offering more than 7,000 games, including games from over 80 renowned developers such as Pragmatic Play. This casino gives players a wide selection to choose from.

    The fast and sleek interface delivers a unique gaming experience, irrespective of whether you play on desktop or mobile devices. From traditional slots to live dealer games and exclusive crypto games, JACKBIT has at least one game for every crypto enthusiast.

    Game Category Popular Games
    Slots 7,000 slots, including retro-3 reel fruit slots to modern 5 reel video slots. Book of the Dead and Gates of Olympus are two popular slots available.
    Blackjack Multiple blackjack variants from popular providers covering classic blackjack, multi-hand, and VIP blackjack tables.
    Roulette European and American roulette, along with French and Auto roulette variants.
    Poker Caribbean Stud, Three-card poker, and Jacks or Better.
    Live Casino Games Live games from Pragmatic Live and Evolution Ezugi
    Crash and Instant Games Plinko, Aviator, Mines, Dice, and more
    Jackpot games Progressive jackpots

    JACKBIT Bonus and Promotions

    Whether you are a seasonal player or a high roller, JACKBIT Casino’s exciting bonuses and promotions meet your demands. With a unique rakeback system, delivering up to 30% for player losses, it boosts players’ confidence to play the game even after a loss. While some renowned slots offer free spins, sports betting players can make use of free bets; there’s a variety of bonuses tailored to every player’s needs.

    CLAIM WELCOME BONUS OF 100 FREE SPINS, ALONG WITH 30% RAKEBACK

    In addition to welcome bonuses and free spins, loyal players are rewarded with up to $10,000 in cash prizes and 10,000 free spins every week. The VIP players also get access to VIP tier levels, exclusive events, and perks, providing an enhanced reward opportunity.

    The withdrawal speed and limits are high for VIP players compared to other random players. The transparent and generous rakeback system puts the player’s money back into their pocket, daily, weekly, or monthly, based on their activities.

    Payment Options at JACKBIT Casino

    JACKBIT consists of multiple payment options, including cryptocurrency transactions and fiat payments. JACKBIT casino is not just a crypto casino; players can choose modern transactions like crypto or utilize traditional banking methods.

    Traditional payment methods include MasterCard, while crypto transactions include BTC, ETH, XRP, LTC, USDT, BNB, DASH, BCH, DOGE, XMR, TRX, MATIC, DAI, SHIBA, LINK, CARDANO, USDC, SOL, and BUSD.

    Maximum Payout and Payout Speed

    Instant deposits and faster withdrawals, with low fees and no KYC requirement.

    Lining up with the player sentiments to not lose their portion of winnings on transaction fees, JACKBIT sets the payout fees at a minimum, giving players their maximum winnings from the game.

    Cryptocurrencies being the main medium of transactions, JACKBIT casino promotes instant deposits and withdrawals, enhancing the overall gameplay without interruptions and delayed waiting time. Under the terms and conditions, the average withdrawal time is 1 to 10 minutes.

    User Experience at JACKBIT Casino

    • Mobile-friendly user interface with sleek design and faster loading times.

    The design and appearance of JACKBIT casino are incredible, from vibrant graphics to attractive tables and captivating color themes, everything adds to the engaging gambling adventure. The JACKBIT casino has a mobile-friendly interface, giving players seamless navigation and faster loading times. The casino operates on all iOS and Android devices, letting players play their favorite casino games from every corner of the world.

    Also, the instant transaction process and minimal transaction fees relieve the players and let them focus completely on games without interruptions or the stress of high costs. The immersive gaming environment takes players to a new world, making them forget their daily life problems and issues.

    JACKBIT Casino Customer Service

    • 24/7 efficient customer service through emails, chat, and telephonic communications.

    The customer support team at JACKBIT casino deserves appreciation; they deliver users crisp and clear information within a few seconds or minutes, depending on the rarity of the queries. The customer service agents are well-informed about their duties, and whether the question is about the game, deposit features, VIP programs, or anti-money laundering policies of the casino, the team has the answers. Offering a smooth and enjoyable customer service, through mail, chat, and live telephonic conversions, JACKBIT clears all your queries precisely and accurately in no time.

    Responsible Gambling Tools at JACKBIT Casino

    Exclusive responsible gambling tools, including self-exclusion programs like cooling-off periods, to prevent players from gambling addiction. Casino games can be addictive at times, preventing players from staying away from the game even if they want to.

    Being one of the reputable and trusted casinos, JACKBIT offers players unique responsible gambling tools, putting a boundary on their gambling thirst, helping them to quit from their game when they can’t afford to lose.

    Responsible gambling tools Uses
    Deposit limits Prevents players from gambling outside their budgets
    Loss limits Controls how much a player is willing to lose over a specific period of time
    Session time limits Puts a limit on the time a player remains active
    Wagering limits Determines how much a player can bet over a specific timeframe
    Cooling-off periods Let players take a break from gambling by temporarily inactivating their accounts.
    Reality checks Reminds players how long they have been playing through pop-up messages

    Countries Restricted

    JACKBIT is available in most countries; however, restricted in some countries with strict gambling rules. With different gambling laws in different countries aligned with their cultural, economic, and social factors, JACKBIT casino is available in some countries while restricted in others.

    The casino delivers its services to most countries; however is restricted in Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Curacao, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Netherlands, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe.

    • However, by using VPN services, players from these restricted countries can access the platform.

    Pros and Cons of JACKBIT Casinos
    Like every coin has two sides, JACKBIT casino has both pros and cons, players have to effectively balance these two attributes to make a maximum profit out of their winnings.

    ✅Pros ❌Cons
    Mobile-friendly design No traditional fiat payment available
    Support multiple cryptocurrencies Restricted to some countries
    Impressive rakebacks on every deposit  
    Wide collection of games  
    Attractive bonuses, including 100 free spins on first deposit  
    No KYC requirement  
    Fast withdrawal and low transaction fees  
    A wide range of betting options is available  

    How to Sign Up for the JACKBIT Crypto Casino? Step By Step

    Signing up for JACKBIT Casino is easy, safe, and hassle-free. Since players don’t have to verify KYC documents, the process gets completed in a few steps with less time involved. Below is the step-by-step guide to get signed up for the JACKBIT Crypto casino.

    • Visit the official website

    To start playing at the JACKBIT casino, players have to navigate to the official website and complete the signup process. Signup includes entering the name, email address, and area of residence. Secure your account with a strong password and choose your preferred currency for gambling.

    • Make the first deposit

    Once the signup is completed, go to the wallet section. Select your preferred deposit methods from the collection of deposit methods available, including Bitcoin, Tether, USDT, or any other crypto. Follow the instructions and complete the deposit process. Also, don’t forget to claim the 30% rakeback and 100 free spins first deposit bonuses.

    • Play your favorite games

    After the deposit is confirmed, players can choose the games from the gaming library. Whether slots, table games, or live dealer games, select the game of your preference and enjoy a safe and secure gaming experience at JACKBIT.

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    Tips for an Enjoyable and Safe Gambling Experience at JACKBIT Casino

    Online casinos are indeed an advantage, from travelling miles to play their favorite casino games, now players can enjoy games at their fingertips, all with a network connection and a compatible device. The rise of crypto casinos has even eased the gambling process, allowing players to stay anonymous while taking part in instant and low-cost gambling transactions.

    However, there are certain things players have to keep in mind while gambling at crypto casinos.

    • Protect your personal and financial data

    Though crypto casinos don’t ask for personal information, being a platform prone to scams and risks, the chances are high that your data can be manipulated. Players have to protect their information with strong passwords and encryption technologies like two-factor authentication, preventing hackers from accessing their accounts. Never share private keys or recovery phrases of your custodial wallets with anyone.

    • Diversify Assets

    Cryptocurrencies are highly volatile assets; their price fluctuates within minutes, sometimes resulting in significant losses. To mitigate the impact of losses, players are instructed to diversify their deposits, ie, instead of sticking only on one cryptocurrency, utilize different cryptocurrencies for their gambling needs, so that players can avoid the huge losses from price volatility.

    • Secure your account from Phishing and other scams

    Crypto casinos are widely exploited by hackers. Stop responding to unauthorized and uninvited emails that ask for personal or financial information. It is important to note that reliable and trustworthy casinos never ask for personal information through illegitimate sources. If you have suspicions about scams, contact your casino customer service and take adequate steps to prevent losing money.

    • Responsible gambling is the key to success

    The chances are high that players get into the allure of casino games and fail to go back even if they wanted to. Gambling causes addiction, and players have to practice responsible gambling for long-term wins and profits. Chasing losses is the act of desperados, and it is advised not to gamble money that you can’t afford a lose.

    Also, make use of the responsible gambling tools at JACKBIT casino, like deposit limits, loss limits, reality checks, and cooling-off periods, to get rid of the addictive nature of gambling.

    Conclusion: Why JACKBIT Casino is the Best Crypto Casino in 2025?

    Offering players a wide collection of games, robust security, mobile-friendly design, exclusive bonuses, and promotions, along with instant and low-cost payments through cryptocurrency transactions, JACKBIT casino stands at the top of the best crypto casinos. Perfectly blending privacy, security, game varieties, and bonus features in a way many other casinos fail to line up, JACKBIT casino delivers players a unique and thrilling gambling experience.

    Whether to hit the casino table, spin the wheel, or take part in live dealer games, JACKBIT casino is your go-to game hub, irrespective of your game experience. Sign up for the JACKBIT casino and explore the games and bonuses for your best gambling adventure in 2025.

    Frequently Asked Questions

    1. Is JACKBIT a legit gambling platform?
    Yes. JACKBIT is a legal crypto casino licensed under the Curacao eGaming License. Players can gamble safely, securely, and anonymously at JACKBIT casino, making it one of the best crypto casinos to play in 2025.

    2. What are the games available at JACKBIT crypto casino?
    From classic table games like baccarat, roulette, blackjack, and poker to live dealer games and progressive slots, there is at least one game for everyone.

    3. Can I play at JACKBIT crypto casino without KYC documents?
    Yes, you can play at JACKBIT casino without KYC, helping you stay anonymous while gambling.

    4. What are the different bonuses available at JACKBIT casino?
    100 free spins are received as welcome bonuses, and every player gets a 30% rakeback along with weekly $10,000 bonuses and 10,000 free spins.

    5. Is JACKBIT available in all countries?
    JACKBIT casino service is available in most countries; however is restricted to Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Curacao, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Netherlands, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe players. You can use any VPN to address some sort of connection problems in some countries.

    Emailsupport@jackbit.com

    Disclaimers and Affiliate Disclosure

    1. General Disclaimer
      This content is for informational purposes only and not legal or financial advice. Information is based on research available at the time of writing. Verify details independently before acting.
    2. Gambling Disclaimer
      Online gambling involves risk and may not be suitable for everyone. Ensure you meet the legal age and follow your local laws. We do not promote gambling, and participation is at your own risk. JACKBIT is a third-party site; we are not responsible for any issues.
    3. Affiliate Disclosure
      We may earn a commission through affiliate links at no extra cost to you. Our reviews remain unbiased, and we only recommend services we trust. Please do your own research before making any decisions.

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Leicester’s newest free festival brings Romans, St George and a giant forum to the city!

    Source: City of Leicester

    MEET a fire-breathing dragon, learn to march like a Centurion and help to recreate the entrance to a Roman Forum by taking part in Leicester’s newest free festival this weekend!

    The Old Town Festival on 26 & 27 April will incorporate traditional festivities for St George’s Day and a celebration of the city’s fascinating Roman heritage.

    Centring on Jubilee Square and the Old Town area of the city centre, the free festival will also feature an urban mosaic workshop at the Guildhall, a living history Roman camp, an artisan craft market and themed storytelling aboard the children’s bookbus.

    Hands-on archaeology, Roman theatre, craft activities and Morris dancing will also be on offer, along with face-painting and a dress-up booth so that young festival-goers can become gallant knights, fearsome dragons or magical maidens!

    A fire-breathing dragon will be on the loose in Cathedral Gardens, alongside stilt-walking jesters, magical wizards and a trio of clumsy knights taking on daring quests. Over at Jubilee Square, you can take part in Roman warrior training, where you can learn to march like a legionnaire, wield a sword like a true centurion, or raise a shield to victory.

    Assistant city mayor for leisure and culture Cllr Vi Dempster said: “The Old Town Festival is a new event for 2025, bringing together our traditional St George’s Day celebrations and Leicester’s rich 2,000-year history and Roman heritage.

    “There are lots of great free activities to take part in, and it’s all taking place in our historic Old Town.

    “As well as activities for kids and families, there is also a fantastic programme of trails, talks and debates about the Roman world, meaning that this promises to be a really inclusive and exciting festival with something for everyone.”

    People have been getting involved in the week running up to the festival, too. The Haymarket shopping centre hosted a day of free fun on Thursday 24 April, with a dragon on the loose, mosaic and toga making, and fun arts and craft activities.

    And there will be something never before seen in Leicester!  At Highcross from 21-25 April, renowned French artist Olivier Grossetête is recreating a huge life-size construction of a lost piece of the city’s history using just cardboard and tape.

    St George and the dragon

    Image: A. Lyleire

    Image: Tynesight media

    Graham Callister, head of festivals and events at Leicester City Council said: “With your help, we’ll rebuild the grand entrance to the Roman Forum as it may have looked in the 2nd and 3rd centuries. This monumental and unique project combines history, art, and community spirit.

    “Over five days, there will be 10 hands-on workshops at the Highcross Shopping Centre. Then, from 10am on Saturday 26 April, participants and passers-by will come together to assemble the structure at Jubilee Square, the site of the original Roman Forum. At 3pm the following day, Sunday, 27 April, festival-goers will help bring the project to a dramatic close by dismantling it. We’re inviting everyone to participate in the workshops, build and demolition!”

    Support for the Old Town festival has come from the council’s partners BID Leicester, Global Streets, Arts Council England, Highcross Leicester, Haymarket Shopping Centre and Hidden Histories.

    Simon Jenner from BID Leicester said: “The Old Town Festival is a fantastic opportunity to celebrate Leicester’s rich history while bringing exciting, free experiences to the city centre. Events like this create a real buzz, attracting visitors and benefiting local businesses. The festival will shine a spotlight on the city’s Roman past, with an incredible recreation of Leicester’s historic Roman Forum by renowned artist Olivier Grossetête, built entirely from cardboard with the help of the public. We’re proud to support a festival that brings our heritage to life in such an engaging and interactive way.”

    To find out more, see www.visitleicester.info

    Festival brochures are from the Visit Leicester information centre, within the KRIII Visitor Centre at 4A St Martins, Leicester, LE1 5DB.

    ENDS 

    Main image: Artist Olivier Grossetête’s creation at NOVUM Newcastle Summer Festival 2023, photo by Tynesite Media

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New Chair of the Parole Board announced – Alexandra Marks CBE

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    News story

    New Chair of the Parole Board announced – Alexandra Marks CBE

    Alexandra Marks CBE has been announced as the new Chair of the Parole Board by the Secretary of State for Justice.

    The Secretary of State has announced today that Alexandra Marks CBE has been confirmed as the Chair of the Parole Board. 

    We are delighted that Alexandra will be commencing her role as Chair of the Parole Board from 18 July 2025. 

    We would like to take the opportunity to thank Caroline for her exemplary leadership over the last seven years.  

    Cecilia French, CEO of the Parole Board, said: “I am very much looking forward to working with Alexandra and would also like to extend my thanks to Caroline for her commitment, hard work and energy in her role as Chair of the Parole Board over the last 7 years. During this period, she has been instrumental in steering the Parole Board through a period of significant change and growth, resulting in a more transparent and improved parole system. We wish her the very best for the future.” 

    Notes to editors 

    Alexandra Marks CBE has been the Chair of RICS’ Regulatory Tribunal since 2023. A Recorder since 2002 and Deputy High Court Judge since 2010, she has also served as a First Tier Tribunal Judge of the General Regulatory Chamber since 2018. 

    Alexandra was previously a Commissioner at the Criminal Cases Review Commission (2013-2018) and a Judicial Appointments Commissioner (2012-2018). She was also previously Chair of Prisoners’ Education Trust (2012-2018).

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 24, 2025

    Speaker: Mr.Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF

    Moderator: Ms. Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF

    MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Thank you for joining us in this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. My name is Angham Al Shami, from the Communications Department here at the IMF. 

    If you’re joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations that you can access on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook webpage and the IMF Press Center as well.  And for those of you in the room, you also have equipment to access that. 

    Today I’m joined by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the outlook of the region, and then we will open the floor for your questions. With that, over to you, Jihad.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF 2025 Spring Meetings. Before answering your questions, I will briefly outline the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Let me first start with a few words on the recent developments.

    The global economy stands at a delicate crossroads.  The global recovery of recent years faces new risks as governments reorder their policy priorities.  The recent escalation in trade tensions has already damaged global growth prospects while triggering intense financial volatility.  More broadly, the extraordinary increase in global uncertainty associated with trade policy and increased geopolitical fragmentation will continue to erode confidence for quite some time and represents a serious downside risk to global growth.

    For MENA and CCA economies, these developments are adding to existing regional source of uncertainty, including ongoing conflicts, pockets of political instability and climate vulnerability.  We continue to assess the impact of recently announced U.S. tariffs on MENA and CCA economies.  While the direct effects are expected to be modest, giving limited trade exposure and exemptions for energy products, the indirect effects could be more pronounced.  Slower growth will weaken external demand and remittances, while tighter financial conditions may challenge countries with elevated public debts.  Oil exporting economies could also see fiscal and external positions deteriorate due to the lower oil prices.  Some countries may benefit from trade diversion, but such gains could be short lived in a broader environment of trade contraction. 

    Let me now turn to the Middle East and North Africa.  Last year was particularly challenging for the region.  Conflict caused severe human and economic costs.  Regional growth in 2024 reached 1.8 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.2 percentage point from the October World Economic Outlook forecast.  Conflicts weigh on growth in some oil importing countries and extended OPEC+ voluntary production cuts continue to dampen activity in oil exporting economies.  For GCC countries, strong non-oil growth and diversification efforts were largely offset by oil production cuts. 

    Despite these challenges and high uncertainty, growth is projected to pick up in 2025 and 2026, assuming oil output rebounds, conflict related impacts stabilize, progress is made on structural reform and implementation.  However, expectations have been revised down compared to the October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook, reflecting weaker global growth and more modest effect of these drivers.  We now project growth at 2.6 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026, a downward revision of 1.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively.  Inflation is projected to continue declining across MENA economies, remaining elevated only in few cases. 

    Let me now turn to the outlook for the Caucuses and Central Asia.  In contrast, economic activity in the CCA exceeded expectations in 2024, growing by 5.4 percent, driven by spillover effects from the war in Ukraine, which boosted domestic demand.  However, as these temporary effects normalize over the next few years, growth is expected to moderate due to weaker external demand, plateauing growth of hydrocarbon production, and reduced fiscal stimulus.  Despite the moderation in overall growth, inflation is expected to increase somewhat across the region and remain elevated in a few cases, reflecting still strong domestic demand. 

    Let me now turn to the risks to the outlook.  These projections are subject to extraordinary uncertainty and the risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside.  Four key risks stand out.  First, trade tension as a further escalation could dampen global demand, delay in oil production recovery, and tighten financial conditions.  Our analysis shows that persistence spikes in uncertainty triggered by global shocks are associated with large output losses both in MENA and CCA.  The second risk is geopolitical conflict.  The third one is climate shocks.  And the last one is the reduction in official development assistance.  This could further exacerbate food insecurity and humanitarian conditions in low-income and conflict-affected economies.  However, upside risks also exist.  The swift resolution of conflict and accelerated implementation of structural reforms could substantially improve regional growth prospects.  The implications of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the CCA region also remain uncertain. 

    Now the question is what are the policies that we recommend for countries and how they should prioritize them.  In the face of extraordinary uncertainty, MENA and CCA economies should respond along two key dimensions, manage short term instability, and use the opportunity to advance structural reforms for long-term growth.  The first priority is adapt to the new environment.  Countries must take steps to shield their economies from the impact of worst-case scenarios and prioritize safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability.  The appropriate policy response will vary depending on each country’s initial conditions and vulnerability to risk. 

    Turning to more the long-term, countries should transform their economies.  Recent developments underscore the urgent need to accelerate the long-discussed structural reforms agenda across the region.  To reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and seize opportunities arising from the evolving global trade and financial landscape, it is essential to enhance governance, invest in human capital, advance digitalization, and foster a dynamic private sector.  Establishing strategic trade and investment corridors with other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as within the region, including between GCC and Central Asia or GCC and North Africa, can help mitigate exposure to external uncertainty, enable greater risk sharing, and drive sustainable economic development. 

    We will delve into these policy priorities at the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook in Dubai next week and in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, where on May 3 we are organizing jointly with the Uzbek government a GCC-CCA Economic Conference where Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks from both regions, as well as representatives of IFIs and private sectors, will discuss deepening economic ties between these two regions.  We also invite you to join us tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. at the Atrium for a public panel discussion on the economic consequences of the high uncertainty in the MENA and CCA regions. 

    Before I open the floor to questions, I want to underscore the IMF’s deep commitment to supporting countries throughout the region with policy advice, technical assistance, and, in many cases, financial support.  Since early 2020, we have approved almost $50 billion in financing to countries across the MENA region, Pakistan, and the CCA, of which 14.8 have been approved since early 2024. 

    In closing, I want to highlight our engagement to post-conflict economies.  Strengthening economic fundamentals and rebuilding institutions will be essential to successful recovery.  The IMF, in coordination with the World Bank and regional partners, has established an informal coordination group to support recovery in conflict-affected states in the Middle East.  Our focus will be on capacity building, policy guidance, and financial assistance.  We are also working closely with authorities to help stabilize their economies, restore confidence, and lay foundations for sustainable growth. 

    Again, thank you very much for joining us this morning, and now I would like to welcome your questions.               

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad, and now we will take your questions. And let’s start with the gentleman here in the first row, please.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham and Jihad.  I’m Amir Goumaa from Asharq Bloomberg.  IMF raised the gross forecasting for Egypt dispIte the regional downgrade.  Why is that?  And how can the MENA region turn the country trade disputes into opportunities? 

    MR. AZOUR: Excuse me?

    QUESTIONER: How can the MENA region turn the current trade disputes and tariffs into opportunities?  Like how can they make the best use of it? 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much for your question.

    MS. AL SHAMI: Should we take more questions on Egypt? Perhaps should we take more questions on Egypt. We’ll start with this gentleman and then the gentleman in the back.  This one first. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello everyone.  My name is Ahmad Yaqub.  I’m the managing editor of Al Youm Al-Sabah Egyptian Newspaper.  I have two questions about Egypt.  The first one is about the expected exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar by the end of 2026, the next year, and the expected inflation rate and the economic growth rate of Egypt.  The second question is the next trench of the program, current program with the Egyptian authorities.  What is the timing of the next trench and the total amount of it?  Thank you so much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: And then the gentleman here.

    QUESTIONER: Ramy Gabr from Al-Qahera News.  The global economic outlook carries good news.  Maybe for Egypt in terms of the economic growth in 2025.  How do you see that and what’s the facts and numbers led to this outlook?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Over to you.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, please.

    QUESTIONER: I’m Lauren Holtmeier from S&P Global.  I wanted to ask about the fiscal break-even prices for oil production, specifically for the countries with high fiscal break-even prices like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.  And how will the lowered expectations for oil prices over the next couple of years affect their ability and their economic outlook?  And I recognize that the answer for those two countries might be very different. 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. I had three sets of questions. One on trade and the impact of the recent trade developments on the region and how those could be turned into an opportunity.  The second set of questions were on Egypt, and the third one was on the GCC and the oil market.  Let me start with the first one. 

    Countries of the region have limited trade dependence on the U.S., and therefore the recent trade and tariff decisions will have limited direct impact on those economies.  Yet it’s important also to highlight that there would be indirect impact.  And also those indirect impact may take different channels.  One impact is the impact that this could have on financial stability and capital flows.  We saw widening of spreads over the last few years, which is an issue that could affect the capacity of emerging economies and middle-income countries who have high levels of debt.  The second potential impact is impact on oil market.  We saw some softening in the oil price, as well as the forwards of oil price are showing a certain extension of those softening over the year.  And the third type of effect is the second-round impact due to trade diversion. 

    I will maybe go into more details about what are the policies that we recommend for countries to address those challenges.  Few countries have more exposure to the U.S. trade like Pakistan or Jordan, and those are specific cases.  I can address those.  Opportunities, of course, in any change there are opportunities, and over the last few years we saw successive shocks and transformation on the geopolitical front and the geoeconomic front, and those have affected the region.  The region stands at the crossroads between East and West, and therefore trade routes, connectivity, as well as also opportunities go through this region.  This would require, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, for countries in the region to seek new opportunities in terms of strengthening their economic relationships and trade ties with regions close to them, as well as also within countries in the region, which will call for new way of increasing connectivity and cooperation in the region. 

    The second set of questions is on Egypt.  Over the last year, growth in Egypt has improved, and we expect growth for the fiscal year 2025 to reach 3.8 percent.  For comparison, in 2024 it was 2.4 percent, and we expect that the growth will keep improving in 2026 and reach 4.3 percent.  Also, inflation went down from 33 percent on average for fiscal year 2024 to 19.7 percent in 2025, and we expect it to reach 12 percent in 2026, despite the various shocks.  Those positive developments reflect the implementation of the reform program that was supported by the IMF and was augmented back in March last year in order also to help Egypt address some of the external shocks, in particular the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal. 

    As you remember, the program is based on four pillars.  One, macroeconomic stability by addressing inflation that constitutes the main issue for economic stability through tightening the monetary policy.  The second is to address the debt issue by improving the primary surplus and also through an active debt management strategy and strengthening debt management organization to reduce gradually the debt and the weight of the debt through the debt service on the economy.  The third important pillar is to preserve the economy from external shocks, and this is the role of the flexibility in the exchange rate.  Flexibility in the exchange rate in a time of high level of uncertainty plays an important way to protect the Egyptian economy from external shocks, and its flexibility has proven to be beneficial to the stability of the Egyptian economy.  The fourth pillar is growing the economy and give a bigger weight to the private sector, and we encourage the authorities to strengthen and accelerate the reinvestment strategy that would allow more investment to come to the Egyptian economy, would give more space to the private sector, and will help the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian people get better opportunities in a time where those international changes would require an acceleration of economic transformation.  The review has been completed in March, and as you know, we had also another facility that was provided to Egypt to help Egypt deal with climate issues, and our engagement with the authorities remain very active.  Shall I move to GCC? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes.

    MR. AZOUR: The next trench will be with the next review. On the GCC, well, of course the direct impact of the trade shock on the region has been limited except that with the prospect of the decline in oil price, it comes at a time where we see a resumption of increase of oil production with the implementation of what has been agreed, though at a slower pace, of the December decision of the OPEC+ agreement.

    As you know, countries of the GCC have different fundamentals and different level of buffers, and therefore there is no one break-even point for all countries.  Our estimates are showing, though, that a decline in oil price of $10 would weaken the fiscal situation by somewhat between 2.3 to 2.7 percent of GDP, and it also, it has similar impact on the external account between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of GDP. 

    I would like to highlight two additional points that some countries have used the opportunity of their diversification strategy to both reduce their dependence on oil as a source of income, but also to diversify fiscally and reduce the impact of oil revenues, which we encourage other countries to follow suit. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. So we’ll take another round of questions from the room, and then we will turn to online. The lady in the first row, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Dr. Jihad, thank you for taking my question.  Nour Amache from Asharq Bloomberg.  I wanted to ask about Lebanon and Syria and to follow up on what my colleagues here asked about Egypt.  They were asking about the next review, if it’s in June, and the next tranche in June, if we can elaborate on that.  Now, regarding Lebanon, today the parliament passed the law of lifting bank secrecy.  Will this make or will this make the program with the IMF faster?  Will this increase the prospects of a program with Lebanon anytime soon, especially since I know the Lebanese authorities represented by the Finance Minister, the Economy Minister, and the Central Bank Governor are all here in Washington, and a lot of meetings have been undergoing?  That’s regarding Lebanon.  And regarding Syria, also a big Syrian delegation is here.  What has been reached so far with the Syrian counterparts?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. One more question. Maybe we’ll go to the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Mohammad Al-Lubani from Jordan Al-Mamlaka TV.  I’d like to ask in Arabic.  In light of our dependence on American exports, [ESQUAH] said that 25 percent of the exports go to the United States.  How would the tariffs affect Jordan, and are there any estimates of these losses by the Fund?  And what are the recommendations of the Fund in order to face these challenges? 

    MR. AZOUR: The discussions are, you know, continuing, and the engagement with the authorities is taking place during the Spring Meetings. As I mentioned earlier, we look forward to the next review to see an acceleration of the divestment strategy that is one of the key priorities because of its critical impact on sustaining growth in Egypt, providing opportunities to the private sector, and also helping in the effort that Egypt is pursuing in reducing the debt. In the context of high interest rate, it’s very important to address debt service issue, and this would be accelerated by reducing the debt.  Therefore, we look forward to see progress on the authorities’ plan in terms of divestment.

    On Lebanon, the Fund has been supportive of Lebanon, and a staff-level agreement has been reached in 2022.  Lebanon staff, Lebanon team, is and remained actively engaged with the authorities, providing technical assistance.  And recently, we had two staff visits to Lebanon and the authorities have engaged with our team in order to reactivate a potential program.  They have expressed their interest for that.  The Lebanese economic and financial situation has been made

    more challenging with the recent implications of the war and the massive destruction that in addition to the need to address the financial and economic situation, Lebanon is also facing the need to deal with the reconstruction. 

    The pillars of the program will remain valid as they were negotiated.  Macroeconomic stability, based on addressing the legacy of the financial sector.  The legacy of debt, address the debt issue.  Second pillar is to deal with the macroeconomic stability through fiscal consolidation.  Third pillar is to strengthen governance by reforming SOEs and also increasing and improving the confidence factor.  And third is to address social issues, especially now with issues related to the reconstructions.  Discussions are taking place and staff is on active dialogue with the Lebanese authorities. 

    We are in discussion and therefore I think the discussions that we are having during the Spring Meetings are giving the opportunity for us to understand what are the reform priorities of the Lebanese government.  As you know, staff had a couple of visits in the last few weeks, and we will keep our active engagement with the Lebanese authorities.

    On Syria.  Of course, Syria has been absent for the last 15 years due to the war, and their engagement with the institution has been fairly limited since 2011.  The last Article IV consultation with Syria took place in 2009.  The international community and the regional community has been actively engaged in order to see how we could help Syria recover from a long period of war. 

    We had a preparatory meeting preparatory meeting in AlUla back in February where regional institutions and the international community have agreed to have another follow-up coordination meeting that took place last Tuesday where representatives from international institutions, bilaterals, have convened in order to assess the needs of Syria and also to develop a framework of coordination.  The Fund is engaged to support the international community in its engagement with Syria.  We have already started our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, the institutional capacity, and we look forward to continue our engagement with the Syrian authorities. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Then you have one more question on Jordan.

    MR. AZOUR: Yes, Jordan. In Arabic?  Okay.  Jordan is one of the countries that have been affected by the tariffs, but this is still limited because of the kind of exports or the relationship between Jordan and the United States.  And Jordan managed to overcome, in the recent years, to overcome several shocks, including shocks related to the variability and volatility and the effect of the Gaza issues on the economy of Jordan.  And the latest reviews emphasized the need for Jordan to keep stability and also, despite the external shocks, to take the needed measures in order to improve the macroeconomic situation and to reinforce the economy.  And there has been discussions about supporting Jordan through a new mechanism, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, in order to help Jordan in the measures that would help it improve adaptation with the climate change and other shocks and other pandemics.  There is actually progress in this regard.  And there will be a review next month by the Executive Board of the Fund about Jordan. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: We’ll turn to Dania, who’s on Webex online. Dania, please go ahead. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, you can hear you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi.  Hello Dr. Jihad, I just have a follow-up question on the break-even oil prices for the Gulf.  In the October report, countries like Saudi Arabia had a very high break-even price of around 90.  I think it was the second biggest highest in the GCC after Bahrain.  I just wanted to see, this figure is likely to increase given the high expenditures, the lower oil prices.  How will the lower oil prices — you mentioned about the impact on GDP, but the prices, I think, since the beginning of the year have dropped by more than $10.00.  So, the impact has it been considered in the Regional Economic Report?  And especially because I don’t know the report, did it include the impact of the tariffs and the impact of the increase in OPEC production from May, which is accelerated?  And just one clarification, with regards to Saudi break-even, some analysts include the expenditure of the Public Investment Fund.  Is that part of the IMF estimates for the break-even?  What’s included in the break-even?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any additional questions on GCC? Okay, let’s take the gentleman in the middle. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello Mr. Azour, Madame Al Shami, thank you for the opportunity.  Philippe Hage Boutros from L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.  How does the IMF assess the potential impact of declining oil revenues stemming from a possible drop in prices amid the tariff crisis on the capacity and willingness of the Gulf countries to fund international aid, particularly for countries like Lebanon and Syria that urgently need reconstruction financing?  Does it anticipate a significant or relatively limited effect?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we had one more question on Saudi that we received online. In light of the global trade repercussions, what is the effect on the Saudi market, especially on inflation and growth?  This question comes from Mohammed Al Sulami from Al Akhbariyah in Saudi Arabia. 

    MR. AZOUR: Let me start with Dania’s question. Dania, let me start by saying that over the last few years from a fiscal perspective, Saudi has made a significant improvement through various reforms in order to diversify revenues outside oil and also reduce certain expenditures, including on the subsidy side. And this effort to diversify revenues has led to an increase of non-oil revenues in the GDP for Saudi.  Of course, the last couple of years have been beneficial in terms of providing Saudi and other GCC countries with surplus in the fiscal as well as also in the current account, which have led to increase in buffers.  Of course, still the oil sector represent an important source of revenue and it’s still also an important source of foreign currencies. 

    Coming to the fiscal strategy, Saudi has established a medium-term fiscal framework that anchors policies and also help them deal with the volatility in oil price and become less pro cyclicals.  Of course, the increase in oil price, sorry, the decline in oil price will have impact on the fiscal and will lead to a potential additional drop in fiscal situation. 

    As I mentioned earlier, a decline of $10.00 per barrel or a decline of $1 million of production will have an impact on the fiscal between 2 to 3 percent.  The decline in oil price is accompanied with a recovery in oil production and Saudi was one of the largest, I would say, contributor to the voluntary drop in oil export. 

    When it comes to the link between fiscal and the investment strategy, the investment strategy has been also put in the medium-term framework in the context of the Vision 2030 and regularly there are updates, recalibration and also phasing, based on the capacity to implement and the priorities.

    In our projections, although developments were taking place almost at the time when we were releasing our outlook, we took into consideration the new assumptions on the oil price for this year as well as also on the growth projections. 

    The second question related to Saudi.  The impact of the latest developments on the Saudi economy.  Undoubtedly, the trade relations regarding the non-oil sector is limited with the United States and therefore the impact will also be limited on trade related to tariffs, especially as oil and gas are exempt from the increase in tariffs.  But there will be an indirect impact, as we’ve said.  Saudi Arabia also has a dollarized economy, whether on the side of exports or imports, and therefore the impact will be limited. 

    On the other hand, the reduction or the depreciation of the dollar will affect services, especially tourism.  And this is a sector that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop by establishing new expansion for tourism in Saudi Arabia.

    The other related question on support to the reconstruction in the region.  Let me first say two things.  One, ODA has declined over the last few years, and more recently with the decisions to stop some of the international assistance by USAID and others.  This will have an important impact, especially on countries in fragility who depend heavily on aid.  Countries like Somalia, Sudan, countries like Yemen.  And this represents a risk not only on the fiscal side, but also on the humanitarian side on food security.  This is the first point. 

    The second point is the region is, we’re talking here about the Levant, is going through an important prospect of post-conflict recovery.  Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and hopefully, Yemen, and Sudan.  This would require strong international and financial assistance.  Of course, this also would require to accelerate certain number of reforms that will allow the private sector to provide financing.  Those countries have strong diasporas, and the recovery could also be co-led by international assistance, also by private sector support.  And some of the reforms, be it in Lebanon or in Syria, are very important to regain confidence and will allow private sector to play its key role in recovering those economies. 

    The region has been very supportive.  And when we look at the official assistance and the interest that is being shown by several countries in the region, be it in the recent meeting that took place in Saudi Arabia, in Al Ula, where ministers of finance from the GCC and regional institutions convened in order to explore opportunities to provide more assistance to those countries. 

    Again, I think it’s very important also to highlight that assistance has to accompany reform programs that will lay the ground to strong institutions will provide confidence for both citizens and also international, private and public community, in order to accelerate the recovery. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We’ll take one more round of questions.  The lady on the second row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Hello, I’m Mariam Ali from Dawn News Pakistan.  My question is how will the global tariff war uniquely impact Pakistan?  Any need of buffers in place to mitigate risks to the country?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Let’s take maybe one more question. The gentleman here sitting in the front. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, , Director Azour.  My question is on Yemen.  Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, D.C. Bureau.  So, last week U.S. struck Ras Isa fuel part in Yemen.  I would like to ask you to outline what repercussions this strike will have on energy security and economic situation in Yemen and broadly in region?  And if you could, provide any details how the IMF — what is the IMF view on longer-term risks for the region as U.S. operation on Yemen continues to unfold?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We’ll take one more question from the gentleman here in the –.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Magnus Sherman.  I wanted to return to Lebanon.  The new Prime Minister has pledged to not touch the hard currency deposits.  Does the IMF support that position? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we have an online question from Camille Faris Abu Rafael. How can low- and middle-income countries in MENA balance urgent social needs with long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising debt and global uncertainty and persistently high interest rates?  We’ll take these questions, and we’ll take another round.  Thank you. 

    MR. AZOUR: On Pakistan. Pakistan made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over the last 18 months and the numbers are, for Pakistan, are showing improvement both in terms of growth as well as also in inflation that dropped from 12.6 percent last year in 2024 fiscal year to 6.5 percent this year, expected to stay at this level for next year.  Debt is also stabilizing in the case of Pakistan, and recently Pakistan has been upgraded by rating agencies. 

    Of course, trade tensions will affect relatively Pakistan maybe more than the average in the region.  But I would say the impact on Pakistan directly can be offset by other measures that would allow the Pakistani economy to reposition itself in a world that is in the midst of one of the largest transformation in terms of trade, economic opportunities, and to reposition itself in order to address any risks, but also to potentially benefit from change in the trade routes. 

    The question on Yemen the situation on Yemen is extremely preoccupying at the humanitarian level, both in terms of food security as well as also in terms of human suffering.  And this situation has been inflicting heavy toll on the Yemeni people for a long period of time.  Of course, broadly speaking, instability has been one of the main issues that the region is dealing with.  Instability is one of the key sources of uncertainty for the region.  Addressing this instability is key in providing security for people to improve their living conditions, providing stability for the trade routes, and also provide opportunities for people to rebuild and reconstruct.  The Fund is engaged to (A) keep a very strong contacts with Yemen, provide technical assistance at a time where we cannot provide because of the security situation, financial assistance.  Therefore, we are actively supporting through technical assistance.  And we are also in regular engagement with the authorities. 

    Our next plan is to reengage through Article IV in order to assess the economic situation in Yemen, help the internationally recognized government assess the overall debt situation and the debt liabilities in order, later on, to help Yemen deal with the debt situation, and provide right assessment for the donor community to provide assistance. 

    Political stabilization security is very important to preserve human and social conditions, and the Fund stands ready to help Yemen as well as also other countries facing fragility and conflicts in the region.  And this is something that we are increasing our resources to provide support to those countries. 

    Lebanon.  Lebanon problems are complex in terms of how to address the overall financial challenge.  The solution has to deal through a comprehensive approach with all the financial issues that Lebanon is facing.  A piecemeal approach is not what Lebanon needs today.  A reform package that restores confidence, addresses the legacy of the past, provides opportunities for the economy to recover, by also promoting the capacity of the financial system to finance the recovery, mobilize international assistance to help Lebanon dealing with the reconstruction needs, and also support the reforms are priorities that our team is currently discussing with the Lebanese authorities. 

    The question related to balancing short-term and medium-term.  I think it’s a very important question.  We live currently in a world of high uncertainty and in our outlook this spring we have — and I would encourage you to read it,  it’s very interesting piece — we have tried to assess the impact of uncertainty on the region and the uncertainty is of multiple layers.  A global uncertainty, regional, geopolitical and conflict situation, but also internal or local uncertainties.  Those are important issues for countries to address. 

    In very brief, countries need to in the short term to preserve stability and that would require to increase their buffers.  And for those who have limited buffers to accelerate fiscal consolidations to reduce the risk, address some of their financing issues, especially countries who have high level of debt and for those who have buffers, preserve those and use them when they need.  But I think what is really important, especially given the lasting negative impact of uncertainties on countries, is to address the medium-term issues.  And addressing the medium-term issues will help unlock growth, accelerating structural reforms, improving economic conditions, provide stronger social protection framework by moving from untargeted subsidies to something that is more meaningful in terms of social support would be extremely beneficial for countries in the region. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad and I’m afraid we have run out of time. Thank you all for participating with us today and as always, we will be posting the transcript online.  But just a reminder that we will be launching our report next week on May 1 so stay tuned for that.  And as Jihad mentioned, please join us tomorrow at 2:30 for the seminar on how countries can navigate uncertainties.  Jihad, any last words? 

    MR. AZOUR: Only to say thank you. And thanks to our friends here, the journalists. We look forward to provide you with more details in Dubai next week with all the details, as well as also country-specific information on our Regional Economic Outlook.  And two days after that, in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, on the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia.  Thank you very much. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 24, 2025

    Speaker: Mr.Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF

    Moderator: Ms. Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF

    MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Thank you for joining us in this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. My name is Angham Al Shami, from the Communications Department here at the IMF. 

    If you’re joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations that you can access on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook webpage and the IMF Press Center as well.  And for those of you in the room, you also have equipment to access that. 

    Today I’m joined by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the outlook of the region, and then we will open the floor for your questions. With that, over to you, Jihad.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF 2025 Spring Meetings. Before answering your questions, I will briefly outline the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Let me first start with a few words on the recent developments.

    The global economy stands at a delicate crossroads.  The global recovery of recent years faces new risks as governments reorder their policy priorities.  The recent escalation in trade tensions has already damaged global growth prospects while triggering intense financial volatility.  More broadly, the extraordinary increase in global uncertainty associated with trade policy and increased geopolitical fragmentation will continue to erode confidence for quite some time and represents a serious downside risk to global growth.

    For MENA and CCA economies, these developments are adding to existing regional source of uncertainty, including ongoing conflicts, pockets of political instability and climate vulnerability.  We continue to assess the impact of recently announced U.S. tariffs on MENA and CCA economies.  While the direct effects are expected to be modest, giving limited trade exposure and exemptions for energy products, the indirect effects could be more pronounced.  Slower growth will weaken external demand and remittances, while tighter financial conditions may challenge countries with elevated public debts.  Oil exporting economies could also see fiscal and external positions deteriorate due to the lower oil prices.  Some countries may benefit from trade diversion, but such gains could be short lived in a broader environment of trade contraction. 

    Let me now turn to the Middle East and North Africa.  Last year was particularly challenging for the region.  Conflict caused severe human and economic costs.  Regional growth in 2024 reached 1.8 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.2 percentage point from the October World Economic Outlook forecast.  Conflicts weigh on growth in some oil importing countries and extended OPEC+ voluntary production cuts continue to dampen activity in oil exporting economies.  For GCC countries, strong non-oil growth and diversification efforts were largely offset by oil production cuts. 

    Despite these challenges and high uncertainty, growth is projected to pick up in 2025 and 2026, assuming oil output rebounds, conflict related impacts stabilize, progress is made on structural reform and implementation.  However, expectations have been revised down compared to the October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook, reflecting weaker global growth and more modest effect of these drivers.  We now project growth at 2.6 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026, a downward revision of 1.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively.  Inflation is projected to continue declining across MENA economies, remaining elevated only in few cases. 

    Let me now turn to the outlook for the Caucuses and Central Asia.  In contrast, economic activity in the CCA exceeded expectations in 2024, growing by 5.4 percent, driven by spillover effects from the war in Ukraine, which boosted domestic demand.  However, as these temporary effects normalize over the next few years, growth is expected to moderate due to weaker external demand, plateauing growth of hydrocarbon production, and reduced fiscal stimulus.  Despite the moderation in overall growth, inflation is expected to increase somewhat across the region and remain elevated in a few cases, reflecting still strong domestic demand. 

    Let me now turn to the risks to the outlook.  These projections are subject to extraordinary uncertainty and the risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside.  Four key risks stand out.  First, trade tension as a further escalation could dampen global demand, delay in oil production recovery, and tighten financial conditions.  Our analysis shows that persistence spikes in uncertainty triggered by global shocks are associated with large output losses both in MENA and CCA.  The second risk is geopolitical conflict.  The third one is climate shocks.  And the last one is the reduction in official development assistance.  This could further exacerbate food insecurity and humanitarian conditions in low-income and conflict-affected economies.  However, upside risks also exist.  The swift resolution of conflict and accelerated implementation of structural reforms could substantially improve regional growth prospects.  The implications of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the CCA region also remain uncertain. 

    Now the question is what are the policies that we recommend for countries and how they should prioritize them.  In the face of extraordinary uncertainty, MENA and CCA economies should respond along two key dimensions, manage short term instability, and use the opportunity to advance structural reforms for long-term growth.  The first priority is adapt to the new environment.  Countries must take steps to shield their economies from the impact of worst-case scenarios and prioritize safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability.  The appropriate policy response will vary depending on each country’s initial conditions and vulnerability to risk. 

    Turning to more the long-term, countries should transform their economies.  Recent developments underscore the urgent need to accelerate the long-discussed structural reforms agenda across the region.  To reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and seize opportunities arising from the evolving global trade and financial landscape, it is essential to enhance governance, invest in human capital, advance digitalization, and foster a dynamic private sector.  Establishing strategic trade and investment corridors with other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as within the region, including between GCC and Central Asia or GCC and North Africa, can help mitigate exposure to external uncertainty, enable greater risk sharing, and drive sustainable economic development. 

    We will delve into these policy priorities at the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook in Dubai next week and in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, where on May 3 we are organizing jointly with the Uzbek government a GCC-CCA Economic Conference where Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks from both regions, as well as representatives of IFIs and private sectors, will discuss deepening economic ties between these two regions.  We also invite you to join us tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. at the Atrium for a public panel discussion on the economic consequences of the high uncertainty in the MENA and CCA regions. 

    Before I open the floor to questions, I want to underscore the IMF’s deep commitment to supporting countries throughout the region with policy advice, technical assistance, and, in many cases, financial support.  Since early 2020, we have approved almost $50 billion in financing to countries across the MENA region, Pakistan, and the CCA, of which 14.8 have been approved since early 2024. 

    In closing, I want to highlight our engagement to post-conflict economies.  Strengthening economic fundamentals and rebuilding institutions will be essential to successful recovery.  The IMF, in coordination with the World Bank and regional partners, has established an informal coordination group to support recovery in conflict-affected states in the Middle East.  Our focus will be on capacity building, policy guidance, and financial assistance.  We are also working closely with authorities to help stabilize their economies, restore confidence, and lay foundations for sustainable growth. 

    Again, thank you very much for joining us this morning, and now I would like to welcome your questions.               

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad, and now we will take your questions. And let’s start with the gentleman here in the first row, please.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham and Jihad.  I’m Amir Goumaa from Asharq Bloomberg.  IMF raised the gross forecasting for Egypt dispIte the regional downgrade.  Why is that?  And how can the MENA region turn the country trade disputes into opportunities? 

    MR. AZOUR: Excuse me?

    QUESTIONER: How can the MENA region turn the current trade disputes and tariffs into opportunities?  Like how can they make the best use of it? 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much for your question.

    MS. AL SHAMI: Should we take more questions on Egypt? Perhaps should we take more questions on Egypt. We’ll start with this gentleman and then the gentleman in the back.  This one first. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello everyone.  My name is Ahmad Yaqub.  I’m the managing editor of Al Youm Al-Sabah Egyptian Newspaper.  I have two questions about Egypt.  The first one is about the expected exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar by the end of 2026, the next year, and the expected inflation rate and the economic growth rate of Egypt.  The second question is the next trench of the program, current program with the Egyptian authorities.  What is the timing of the next trench and the total amount of it?  Thank you so much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: And then the gentleman here.

    QUESTIONER: Ramy Gabr from Al-Qahera News.  The global economic outlook carries good news.  Maybe for Egypt in terms of the economic growth in 2025.  How do you see that and what’s the facts and numbers led to this outlook?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Over to you.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, please.

    QUESTIONER: I’m Lauren Holtmeier from S&P Global.  I wanted to ask about the fiscal break-even prices for oil production, specifically for the countries with high fiscal break-even prices like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.  And how will the lowered expectations for oil prices over the next couple of years affect their ability and their economic outlook?  And I recognize that the answer for those two countries might be very different. 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. I had three sets of questions. One on trade and the impact of the recent trade developments on the region and how those could be turned into an opportunity.  The second set of questions were on Egypt, and the third one was on the GCC and the oil market.  Let me start with the first one. 

    Countries of the region have limited trade dependence on the U.S., and therefore the recent trade and tariff decisions will have limited direct impact on those economies.  Yet it’s important also to highlight that there would be indirect impact.  And also those indirect impact may take different channels.  One impact is the impact that this could have on financial stability and capital flows.  We saw widening of spreads over the last few years, which is an issue that could affect the capacity of emerging economies and middle-income countries who have high levels of debt.  The second potential impact is impact on oil market.  We saw some softening in the oil price, as well as the forwards of oil price are showing a certain extension of those softening over the year.  And the third type of effect is the second-round impact due to trade diversion. 

    I will maybe go into more details about what are the policies that we recommend for countries to address those challenges.  Few countries have more exposure to the U.S. trade like Pakistan or Jordan, and those are specific cases.  I can address those.  Opportunities, of course, in any change there are opportunities, and over the last few years we saw successive shocks and transformation on the geopolitical front and the geoeconomic front, and those have affected the region.  The region stands at the crossroads between East and West, and therefore trade routes, connectivity, as well as also opportunities go through this region.  This would require, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, for countries in the region to seek new opportunities in terms of strengthening their economic relationships and trade ties with regions close to them, as well as also within countries in the region, which will call for new way of increasing connectivity and cooperation in the region. 

    The second set of questions is on Egypt.  Over the last year, growth in Egypt has improved, and we expect growth for the fiscal year 2025 to reach 3.8 percent.  For comparison, in 2024 it was 2.4 percent, and we expect that the growth will keep improving in 2026 and reach 4.3 percent.  Also, inflation went down from 33 percent on average for fiscal year 2024 to 19.7 percent in 2025, and we expect it to reach 12 percent in 2026, despite the various shocks.  Those positive developments reflect the implementation of the reform program that was supported by the IMF and was augmented back in March last year in order also to help Egypt address some of the external shocks, in particular the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal. 

    As you remember, the program is based on four pillars.  One, macroeconomic stability by addressing inflation that constitutes the main issue for economic stability through tightening the monetary policy.  The second is to address the debt issue by improving the primary surplus and also through an active debt management strategy and strengthening debt management organization to reduce gradually the debt and the weight of the debt through the debt service on the economy.  The third important pillar is to preserve the economy from external shocks, and this is the role of the flexibility in the exchange rate.  Flexibility in the exchange rate in a time of high level of uncertainty plays an important way to protect the Egyptian economy from external shocks, and its flexibility has proven to be beneficial to the stability of the Egyptian economy.  The fourth pillar is growing the economy and give a bigger weight to the private sector, and we encourage the authorities to strengthen and accelerate the reinvestment strategy that would allow more investment to come to the Egyptian economy, would give more space to the private sector, and will help the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian people get better opportunities in a time where those international changes would require an acceleration of economic transformation.  The review has been completed in March, and as you know, we had also another facility that was provided to Egypt to help Egypt deal with climate issues, and our engagement with the authorities remain very active.  Shall I move to GCC? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes.

    MR. AZOUR: The next trench will be with the next review. On the GCC, well, of course the direct impact of the trade shock on the region has been limited except that with the prospect of the decline in oil price, it comes at a time where we see a resumption of increase of oil production with the implementation of what has been agreed, though at a slower pace, of the December decision of the OPEC+ agreement.

    As you know, countries of the GCC have different fundamentals and different level of buffers, and therefore there is no one break-even point for all countries.  Our estimates are showing, though, that a decline in oil price of $10 would weaken the fiscal situation by somewhat between 2.3 to 2.7 percent of GDP, and it also, it has similar impact on the external account between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of GDP. 

    I would like to highlight two additional points that some countries have used the opportunity of their diversification strategy to both reduce their dependence on oil as a source of income, but also to diversify fiscally and reduce the impact of oil revenues, which we encourage other countries to follow suit. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. So we’ll take another round of questions from the room, and then we will turn to online. The lady in the first row, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Dr. Jihad, thank you for taking my question.  Nour Amache from Asharq Bloomberg.  I wanted to ask about Lebanon and Syria and to follow up on what my colleagues here asked about Egypt.  They were asking about the next review, if it’s in June, and the next tranche in June, if we can elaborate on that.  Now, regarding Lebanon, today the parliament passed the law of lifting bank secrecy.  Will this make or will this make the program with the IMF faster?  Will this increase the prospects of a program with Lebanon anytime soon, especially since I know the Lebanese authorities represented by the Finance Minister, the Economy Minister, and the Central Bank Governor are all here in Washington, and a lot of meetings have been undergoing?  That’s regarding Lebanon.  And regarding Syria, also a big Syrian delegation is here.  What has been reached so far with the Syrian counterparts?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. One more question. Maybe we’ll go to the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Mohammad Al-Lubani from Jordan Al-Mamlaka TV.  I’d like to ask in Arabic.  In light of our dependence on American exports, [ESQUAH] said that 25 percent of the exports go to the United States.  How would the tariffs affect Jordan, and are there any estimates of these losses by the Fund?  And what are the recommendations of the Fund in order to face these challenges? 

    MR. AZOUR: The discussions are, you know, continuing, and the engagement with the authorities is taking place during the Spring Meetings. As I mentioned earlier, we look forward to the next review to see an acceleration of the divestment strategy that is one of the key priorities because of its critical impact on sustaining growth in Egypt, providing opportunities to the private sector, and also helping in the effort that Egypt is pursuing in reducing the debt. In the context of high interest rate, it’s very important to address debt service issue, and this would be accelerated by reducing the debt.  Therefore, we look forward to see progress on the authorities’ plan in terms of divestment.

    On Lebanon, the Fund has been supportive of Lebanon, and a staff-level agreement has been reached in 2022.  Lebanon staff, Lebanon team, is and remained actively engaged with the authorities, providing technical assistance.  And recently, we had two staff visits to Lebanon and the authorities have engaged with our team in order to reactivate a potential program.  They have expressed their interest for that.  The Lebanese economic and financial situation has been made

    more challenging with the recent implications of the war and the massive destruction that in addition to the need to address the financial and economic situation, Lebanon is also facing the need to deal with the reconstruction. 

    The pillars of the program will remain valid as they were negotiated.  Macroeconomic stability, based on addressing the legacy of the financial sector.  The legacy of debt, address the debt issue.  Second pillar is to deal with the macroeconomic stability through fiscal consolidation.  Third pillar is to strengthen governance by reforming SOEs and also increasing and improving the confidence factor.  And third is to address social issues, especially now with issues related to the reconstructions.  Discussions are taking place and staff is on active dialogue with the Lebanese authorities. 

    We are in discussion and therefore I think the discussions that we are having during the Spring Meetings are giving the opportunity for us to understand what are the reform priorities of the Lebanese government.  As you know, staff had a couple of visits in the last few weeks, and we will keep our active engagement with the Lebanese authorities.

    On Syria.  Of course, Syria has been absent for the last 15 years due to the war, and their engagement with the institution has been fairly limited since 2011.  The last Article IV consultation with Syria took place in 2009.  The international community and the regional community has been actively engaged in order to see how we could help Syria recover from a long period of war. 

    We had a preparatory meeting preparatory meeting in AlUla back in February where regional institutions and the international community have agreed to have another follow-up coordination meeting that took place last Tuesday where representatives from international institutions, bilaterals, have convened in order to assess the needs of Syria and also to develop a framework of coordination.  The Fund is engaged to support the international community in its engagement with Syria.  We have already started our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, the institutional capacity, and we look forward to continue our engagement with the Syrian authorities. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Then you have one more question on Jordan.

    MR. AZOUR: Yes, Jordan. In Arabic?  Okay.  Jordan is one of the countries that have been affected by the tariffs, but this is still limited because of the kind of exports or the relationship between Jordan and the United States.  And Jordan managed to overcome, in the recent years, to overcome several shocks, including shocks related to the variability and volatility and the effect of the Gaza issues on the economy of Jordan.  And the latest reviews emphasized the need for Jordan to keep stability and also, despite the external shocks, to take the needed measures in order to improve the macroeconomic situation and to reinforce the economy.  And there has been discussions about supporting Jordan through a new mechanism, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, in order to help Jordan in the measures that would help it improve adaptation with the climate change and other shocks and other pandemics.  There is actually progress in this regard.  And there will be a review next month by the Executive Board of the Fund about Jordan. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: We’ll turn to Dania, who’s on Webex online. Dania, please go ahead. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, you can hear you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi.  Hello Dr. Jihad, I just have a follow-up question on the break-even oil prices for the Gulf.  In the October report, countries like Saudi Arabia had a very high break-even price of around 90.  I think it was the second biggest highest in the GCC after Bahrain.  I just wanted to see, this figure is likely to increase given the high expenditures, the lower oil prices.  How will the lower oil prices — you mentioned about the impact on GDP, but the prices, I think, since the beginning of the year have dropped by more than $10.00.  So, the impact has it been considered in the Regional Economic Report?  And especially because I don’t know the report, did it include the impact of the tariffs and the impact of the increase in OPEC production from May, which is accelerated?  And just one clarification, with regards to Saudi break-even, some analysts include the expenditure of the Public Investment Fund.  Is that part of the IMF estimates for the break-even?  What’s included in the break-even?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any additional questions on GCC? Okay, let’s take the gentleman in the middle. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello Mr. Azour, Madame Al Shami, thank you for the opportunity.  Philippe Hage Boutros from L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.  How does the IMF assess the potential impact of declining oil revenues stemming from a possible drop in prices amid the tariff crisis on the capacity and willingness of the Gulf countries to fund international aid, particularly for countries like Lebanon and Syria that urgently need reconstruction financing?  Does it anticipate a significant or relatively limited effect?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we had one more question on Saudi that we received online. In light of the global trade repercussions, what is the effect on the Saudi market, especially on inflation and growth?  This question comes from Mohammed Al Sulami from Al Akhbariyah in Saudi Arabia. 

    MR. AZOUR: Let me start with Dania’s question. Dania, let me start by saying that over the last few years from a fiscal perspective, Saudi has made a significant improvement through various reforms in order to diversify revenues outside oil and also reduce certain expenditures, including on the subsidy side. And this effort to diversify revenues has led to an increase of non-oil revenues in the GDP for Saudi.  Of course, the last couple of years have been beneficial in terms of providing Saudi and other GCC countries with surplus in the fiscal as well as also in the current account, which have led to increase in buffers.  Of course, still the oil sector represent an important source of revenue and it’s still also an important source of foreign currencies. 

    Coming to the fiscal strategy, Saudi has established a medium-term fiscal framework that anchors policies and also help them deal with the volatility in oil price and become less pro cyclicals.  Of course, the increase in oil price, sorry, the decline in oil price will have impact on the fiscal and will lead to a potential additional drop in fiscal situation. 

    As I mentioned earlier, a decline of $10.00 per barrel or a decline of $1 million of production will have an impact on the fiscal between 2 to 3 percent.  The decline in oil price is accompanied with a recovery in oil production and Saudi was one of the largest, I would say, contributor to the voluntary drop in oil export. 

    When it comes to the link between fiscal and the investment strategy, the investment strategy has been also put in the medium-term framework in the context of the Vision 2030 and regularly there are updates, recalibration and also phasing, based on the capacity to implement and the priorities.

    In our projections, although developments were taking place almost at the time when we were releasing our outlook, we took into consideration the new assumptions on the oil price for this year as well as also on the growth projections. 

    The second question related to Saudi.  The impact of the latest developments on the Saudi economy.  Undoubtedly, the trade relations regarding the non-oil sector is limited with the United States and therefore the impact will also be limited on trade related to tariffs, especially as oil and gas are exempt from the increase in tariffs.  But there will be an indirect impact, as we’ve said.  Saudi Arabia also has a dollarized economy, whether on the side of exports or imports, and therefore the impact will be limited. 

    On the other hand, the reduction or the depreciation of the dollar will affect services, especially tourism.  And this is a sector that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop by establishing new expansion for tourism in Saudi Arabia.

    The other related question on support to the reconstruction in the region.  Let me first say two things.  One, ODA has declined over the last few years, and more recently with the decisions to stop some of the international assistance by USAID and others.  This will have an important impact, especially on countries in fragility who depend heavily on aid.  Countries like Somalia, Sudan, countries like Yemen.  And this represents a risk not only on the fiscal side, but also on the humanitarian side on food security.  This is the first point. 

    The second point is the region is, we’re talking here about the Levant, is going through an important prospect of post-conflict recovery.  Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and hopefully, Yemen, and Sudan.  This would require strong international and financial assistance.  Of course, this also would require to accelerate certain number of reforms that will allow the private sector to provide financing.  Those countries have strong diasporas, and the recovery could also be co-led by international assistance, also by private sector support.  And some of the reforms, be it in Lebanon or in Syria, are very important to regain confidence and will allow private sector to play its key role in recovering those economies. 

    The region has been very supportive.  And when we look at the official assistance and the interest that is being shown by several countries in the region, be it in the recent meeting that took place in Saudi Arabia, in Al Ula, where ministers of finance from the GCC and regional institutions convened in order to explore opportunities to provide more assistance to those countries. 

    Again, I think it’s very important also to highlight that assistance has to accompany reform programs that will lay the ground to strong institutions will provide confidence for both citizens and also international, private and public community, in order to accelerate the recovery. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We’ll take one more round of questions.  The lady on the second row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Hello, I’m Mariam Ali from Dawn News Pakistan.  My question is how will the global tariff war uniquely impact Pakistan?  Any need of buffers in place to mitigate risks to the country?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Let’s take maybe one more question. The gentleman here sitting in the front. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, , Director Azour.  My question is on Yemen.  Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, D.C. Bureau.  So, last week U.S. struck Ras Isa fuel part in Yemen.  I would like to ask you to outline what repercussions this strike will have on energy security and economic situation in Yemen and broadly in region?  And if you could, provide any details how the IMF — what is the IMF view on longer-term risks for the region as U.S. operation on Yemen continues to unfold?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We’ll take one more question from the gentleman here in the –.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Magnus Sherman.  I wanted to return to Lebanon.  The new Prime Minister has pledged to not touch the hard currency deposits.  Does the IMF support that position? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we have an online question from Camille Faris Abu Rafael. How can low- and middle-income countries in MENA balance urgent social needs with long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising debt and global uncertainty and persistently high interest rates?  We’ll take these questions, and we’ll take another round.  Thank you. 

    MR. AZOUR: On Pakistan. Pakistan made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over the last 18 months and the numbers are, for Pakistan, are showing improvement both in terms of growth as well as also in inflation that dropped from 12.6 percent last year in 2024 fiscal year to 6.5 percent this year, expected to stay at this level for next year.  Debt is also stabilizing in the case of Pakistan, and recently Pakistan has been upgraded by rating agencies. 

    Of course, trade tensions will affect relatively Pakistan maybe more than the average in the region.  But I would say the impact on Pakistan directly can be offset by other measures that would allow the Pakistani economy to reposition itself in a world that is in the midst of one of the largest transformation in terms of trade, economic opportunities, and to reposition itself in order to address any risks, but also to potentially benefit from change in the trade routes. 

    The question on Yemen the situation on Yemen is extremely preoccupying at the humanitarian level, both in terms of food security as well as also in terms of human suffering.  And this situation has been inflicting heavy toll on the Yemeni people for a long period of time.  Of course, broadly speaking, instability has been one of the main issues that the region is dealing with.  Instability is one of the key sources of uncertainty for the region.  Addressing this instability is key in providing security for people to improve their living conditions, providing stability for the trade routes, and also provide opportunities for people to rebuild and reconstruct.  The Fund is engaged to (A) keep a very strong contacts with Yemen, provide technical assistance at a time where we cannot provide because of the security situation, financial assistance.  Therefore, we are actively supporting through technical assistance.  And we are also in regular engagement with the authorities. 

    Our next plan is to reengage through Article IV in order to assess the economic situation in Yemen, help the internationally recognized government assess the overall debt situation and the debt liabilities in order, later on, to help Yemen deal with the debt situation, and provide right assessment for the donor community to provide assistance. 

    Political stabilization security is very important to preserve human and social conditions, and the Fund stands ready to help Yemen as well as also other countries facing fragility and conflicts in the region.  And this is something that we are increasing our resources to provide support to those countries. 

    Lebanon.  Lebanon problems are complex in terms of how to address the overall financial challenge.  The solution has to deal through a comprehensive approach with all the financial issues that Lebanon is facing.  A piecemeal approach is not what Lebanon needs today.  A reform package that restores confidence, addresses the legacy of the past, provides opportunities for the economy to recover, by also promoting the capacity of the financial system to finance the recovery, mobilize international assistance to help Lebanon dealing with the reconstruction needs, and also support the reforms are priorities that our team is currently discussing with the Lebanese authorities. 

    The question related to balancing short-term and medium-term.  I think it’s a very important question.  We live currently in a world of high uncertainty and in our outlook this spring we have — and I would encourage you to read it,  it’s very interesting piece — we have tried to assess the impact of uncertainty on the region and the uncertainty is of multiple layers.  A global uncertainty, regional, geopolitical and conflict situation, but also internal or local uncertainties.  Those are important issues for countries to address. 

    In very brief, countries need to in the short term to preserve stability and that would require to increase their buffers.  And for those who have limited buffers to accelerate fiscal consolidations to reduce the risk, address some of their financing issues, especially countries who have high level of debt and for those who have buffers, preserve those and use them when they need.  But I think what is really important, especially given the lasting negative impact of uncertainties on countries, is to address the medium-term issues.  And addressing the medium-term issues will help unlock growth, accelerating structural reforms, improving economic conditions, provide stronger social protection framework by moving from untargeted subsidies to something that is more meaningful in terms of social support would be extremely beneficial for countries in the region. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad and I’m afraid we have run out of time. Thank you all for participating with us today and as always, we will be posting the transcript online.  But just a reminder that we will be launching our report next week on May 1 so stay tuned for that.  And as Jihad mentioned, please join us tomorrow at 2:30 for the seminar on how countries can navigate uncertainties.  Jihad, any last words? 

    MR. AZOUR: Only to say thank you. And thanks to our friends here, the journalists. We look forward to provide you with more details in Dubai next week with all the details, as well as also country-specific information on our Regional Economic Outlook.  And two days after that, in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, on the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia.  Thank you very much. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/24/tr-04242025-mcd-press-briefing-sms-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: British satellite to map Earth’s forests in 3D for the first time to help combat climate change

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    British satellite to map Earth’s forests in 3D for the first time to help combat climate change

    Satellite developed by British academics and engineers set to become the first in the world to measure condition of the Earth’s forests from space.

    • World’s first mission to map the world’s forests in 3D from space will use cutting edge tech to inform climate change policies and protect future generations.  

    • Supports UK sector worth around £18.9 billion and likely to attract further investment that can grow the economy and help drive our Plan for Change.  

    • Project has supported around 250 highly skilled jobs in Stevenage, bolstering UK’s 52,000 strong space workforce.

    A satellite developed by British academics and engineers is set to become the first in the world to measure the condition of the Earth’s forests from space.   

    This work will be crucial to helping us understand how tropical forests are changing so we can protect future generations from climate breakdown and accelerate the transition to net zero under our Plan for Change.   

    From conception to construction, the satellite – called Biomass – has been built in the UK, capitalising on our industrial and academic expertise in space technology while opening up new opportunities to attract future backing from global investors watching its landmark launch on 29 April.  

    Throughout construction, it has supported approximately 250 highly skilled jobs at Airbus UK, in Stevenage, where it was manufactured, supporting the local economy and bolstering the UK’s 52,000 strong space workforce.  

    The Biomass satellite will launch from Europe’s spaceport in Kourou, French Guiana. Since 2016, the UK has won almost 91 million Euros in contracts for Biomass through its membership of the European Space Agency (ESA). 

    Conceived by University of Sheffield academic Professor Shaun Quegan, it is a hallmark of British innovation, facilitating jobs in everything from design and development to assembly integration and test. The satellite will create a 3D map of tropical forests after 17 months, then new (non-3D) maps every 9 months for the rest of the 5-year mission,  providing insights normally hidden from human sight because of the difficulty in accessing these environments.   

    Its revolutionary technology will help scientists capture vital data on the changes to carbon in forests as ecosystems are increasingly impacted by deforestation.    

    Minister for Space Sir Chris Bryant said:

    The Biomass mission showcases British ingenuity at its very best, from conception in Sheffield to construction in Stevenage.      

    Britain is not only stepping to the forefront of the space industry, but of global climate action too.     

    Contributing to such great extent to a European mission set to deliver vital global results is testament to the UK’s industrial and academic expertise in space technology and will attract global investment into our vibrant space ecosystem, helping us boost growth and deliver our Plan for Change. 

    Both deforestation, which releases carbon dioxide, and forest growth, which soaks up CO2 from the atmosphere, are crucial parts of climate change.   

    Data on the biomass of tropical forests is very limited because they are difficult to access.      

    The Biomass satellite will be able to penetrate cloud cover and measure forest biomass more accurately than any current technology, which only see the top of the canopy. By providing better data it will help create a more accurate global carbon budget and better understanding of carbon sinks and sources which will help in developing and implementing effective strategies to achieve net-zero goals.   

    Observations will also lead to better insight into the rates of habitat loss and, as a result, the effect this may have on biodiversity in the forest environment.    

    Shaun Quegan, University of Sheffield’s Professor and lead proposer of the mission concept to the European Space Agency, said:

    It’s been a privilege to have led the team in the development of a pioneering mission that will revolutionise our understanding of the volume of carbon held in the most impenetrable tropical rainforests on the planet and, crucially, how this is changing over time. Our research has solved critical operational scientific problems in constructing the Biomass satellite.    

    Conceived and built in the UK, Biomass is a brilliant example of what we can achieve in collaboration with our partners in industry and academia. The mission is the culmination of decades of highly innovative work in partnership with some of the best scientists in Europe and the US.

    Dr Paul Bate, CEO of the UK Space Agency said:

    The Biomass satellite represents a major leap forward in our ability to understand Earth’s carbon cycle. By mapping the world’s forests from space in unprecedented detail, it will provide critical insights into how our planet is responding to climate change — helping scientists, policymakers, and conservationists take informed action. We’re proud of the leading role the UK has played in this important mission.  

    Kata Escott, Managing Director of Airbus Defence and Space in the UK, said:

    Biomass is a groundbreaking mission that will advance our understanding of how carbon is stored in the world’s forests – delivering crucial data in the fight against climate change. With more than 50 companies involved across 20 nations, the team in Stevenage has shown exceptional leadership in delivering this flagship ESA mission.    

    Climate Minister, Kerry McCarthy, said:

    The UK is back in the business of climate leadership and protecting the world’s forests through emerging and cutting-edge technologies is crucial to tackling the climate crisis. 

    This innovative tool shows how climate action attract investment in the UK, driving growth as part of our Plan for Change.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: ANZAC Day – Governor-General’s Anzac Day Dawn Service Address

    Source: Government House

    MEDIA RELEASE – EMBARGOED until 6.15am FRIDAY 25 April
    The Rt Hon Dame Cindy Kiro, GNZM, QSO
    Governor-General of New Zealand
    Anzac Day Dawn Service Address 2025
    Auckland War Memorial Museum
    Takiri ko te ata, haehaetia te pō
    E koro mā i te pō!
    Nga Toa a Tūmatauenga!
    Ngā Toa a Ranginui
    Ngā toa a Tangaroa
    Hoki wairua mai, ki runga i ō koutou marae
    Ki o koutou maunga karangaranga.
    E okioki mai nā i nga taumata, nga kahurangi
    Tirohia mai ra ki ō koutou uri
    E hāpai nei i ngā kupu ōhākī
    Tangihia, mihia nga aitua
    Huihuia mai ki tēnei marae
    Te hunga ora
    Tēnā koutou
    Tēnā koutou
    Tēnā tātou katoa
    I specifically acknowledge:
    The Rt Hon Winston Peters, Deputy Prime Minister
    Brad Williams, Consul General for the Commonwealth of Australia
    Air Vice Marshal Darryn Webb, Chief of Air Force
    His Worship Wayne Brown, Mayor of Auckland
    Frédéric Leturque, Mayor of Arras, France
    Sir Wayne Shelford, National President of the RNZRSA
    Sir Graham Lowe, Patron of the Auckland RSA
    Graham Gibson, President of the Auckland RSA
    Brad Hodgson, Auckland RSA
    Dr David Reeves, Chief Executive of the Auckland War Memorial Museum
    Mr Keutekarakia Mataroa, Dean of the Auckland Consular Corps
    A special welcome to people who have served – or are currently serving in our Defence Force.
    This Anzac Day marks 110 years since the Gallipoli landings by soldiers in the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps – the ANZACS. It signalled the beginning of a campaign that was to take the lives of so many of our young men – and would devastate the communities they left behind at home. One year later, in 1916, grieving New Zealanders gathered to express their sorrow at the first Anzac Day commemoration.
    Today, in our towns, cities and hamlets across the length and breadth of Aotearoa – your comrades have gathered in the chill light of dawn, alongside their families and communities, to commemorate Anzac Day.
    This morning, your thoughts may be turning to your experience of military service – and to those who are missing from among your ranks.
    It’s an honour to join you and the people of Tamaki Makaurau Auckland, at our nation’s preeminent site of remembrance – to show our aroha and respect for the many hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders in our history who have answered the call to arms – and to express our deep sorrow for those who never returned from the field of battle, or who subsequently died of their wounds.
    This year we mark another significant anniversary in our nation’s military history. Eighty years ago, after nearly six long years, the Second World War finally came to an end. An astonishing 140,000 New Zealanders had served in the European, North African and the Pacific theatres of war, and almost 12,000 lost their lives as a result of their war service. Around one third of those casualties were from Auckland.
    Once again, our families and communities experienced the terrible pain of sacrifice and loss, and the impacts of that trauma lingered for generations.
    Eighty years ago, New Zealanders also played a role in establishing the United Nations, which many people fervently hoped would ensure that the horrors of the First and Second World Wars could never be repeated.
    In the years since, conflict on that scale has indeed been avoided, but securing peaceful resolution to geopolitical tensions has remained elusive.
    New Zealand has regularly been called upon to support our allies – from the Korean War in the 1950s – through to the conflict in Afghanistan in the 2000s. Our service personnel have also served in many peace-keeping operations around the globe, and frequently assist people in need in the aftermath of natural disasters – both here in Aotearoa, and in the Pacific.
    To those of you who are currently serving in our Defence Force, I sincerely thank you, on behalf of your fellow citizens. We recognise that your lives, and the lives of your families are affected by the demands of military service – and we salute your courage and readiness to serve in support of collective security efforts with our allies.
    This Anzac Day – when we reflect on the sobering realities of war, and the current state of the world, we see the ideals embodied in the United Nations being routinely ignored, and coercive power being used to threaten human rights and the territorial sovereignty of others.
    In these volatile and uncertain times – New Zealand continues to subscribe to the ideal of peaceful resolution of geopolitical tensions – while also acknowledging the role our nation’s defence personnel have played – and will continue to play in defending freedom, justice and the rule of law.
    In this way, they contribute to efforts to maintain and extend the blessings of peace, security and stability in the world.
    On this Anzac Day, and the Anzac Days to come, we remain committed to honour their service.
    Ka maumahara tonu tātou ki a rātou.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Pope Francis became a climate change influencer

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Will de Freitas, Environment + Energy Editor, UK edition

    “The Earth, our home, is beginning to look more and more like an immense pile of filth.” These aren’t the words of a radical sociologist or rogue climate scientist. They aren’t the words of a Conversation editor either. Nor are these:

    “A selfish and boundless thirst for power and material prosperity leads both to the misuse of available natural resources and to the exclusion of the weak and disadvantaged.”

    These are in fact quotes from Pope Francis, who died last weekend.


    This roundup of The Conversation’s climate coverage comes from our award-winning weekly climate action newsletter. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed.


    I never thought this job would have me writing newsletters in praise of a papal climate influencer, but here we are. You can read various obits and interesting takes on Pope Francis and what’s next for the Catholic church elsewhere on The Conversation. But here I want to focus on his thoughts on climate change and the impact he had.

    Our common home

    In 2015, two years after becoming pope, Francis published Laudato Si (Praise Be to You), a 183-page papal letter sent to all Catholic bishops on “care for our common home”. It was a significant intervention made just a few months before the climate summit that led to the Paris agreement.

    Writing at the time, sustainability professor Steffen Böhm said that what made it so radical “isn’t just [Pope Francis’s] call to urgently tackle climate change. It’s the fact he openly and unashamedly goes against the grain of dominant social, economic and environment policies.”

    For Böhm, who was then at the University of Essex but now works at Exeter, this radical message “puts him on a confrontation course with global powerbrokers and leaders of national governments, international institutions and multinational corporations”.

    He quotes a section where the Pope says “those who possess more resources [and] power seem seem mostly to be concerned with masking the problems or concealing their symptoms, simply making efforts to reduce some of the negative impacts of climate change”. The Pope warns that “such effects will continue to worsen if we continue with current models of production and consumption”.

    Böhm points out the Pope “might be the only person with both the clout and the desire to meaningfully deliver a message like this”.




    Read more:
    Pope’s climate letter is a radical attack on the logic of the market


    Bernard Laurent of EM Business School in Lyon, says that in France the Pope’s message “managed to bring together both conservative currents – such as the Courant pour une Écologie Humaine (Movement for a Human Ecology), created in 2013 – and more open-minded Catholic intellectuals such as Gaël Giraud, a Jesuit and author of Produire Plus, Polluer Moins : l’Impossible Découplage? (Produce more, Pollute Less: the Impossible Decoupling?)”




    Read more:
    Pope Francis and Laudato Si’: an ecological turning point for the Catholic Church


    Clearly, this was a unique figure able to reach people who might not listen to a Greta Thunberg or an Al Gore.

    But, while it’s great the Paris agreement was signed, it was still filled with the exact sort of market logic and buck-passing – carbon credits, “emit now, clean up later”, and so on – the Pope had criticised a few months previously. And climate change itself only got worse. In the years following, Pope Francis spoke at the UN and published a series of other “exhortations” related to climate change.

    Did any of this make any difference?

    Celia Deane-Drummond is a theology professor at the University of Oxford and director of a research institute named after the 2015 papal letter. In a piece published the same day Pope Francis’s death was announced, she looked at his influence on the global climate movement.

    Deane-Drummond notes Pope Francis’s emphasis on listening to Indigenous people for instance in his lesser-known exhortation Querida Amazonia, which means “beloved Amazonia”, from February 2020.

    “This exhortation resulted from his conversations with Amazonian communities and helped put Indigenous perspectives on the map. Those perspectives helped shape Catholic social teaching in the [papal letter] Fratelli Tutti, which means ‘all brothers and sisters’, published on October 3 2020.”

    A key influencer

    Perhaps the Pope’s biggest influence was on activists rather than policymakers. Deane-Drummond says he was often mentioned by participants in a research project on religion, theology and climate change she was part of.

    “When we asked more than 300 [religious] activists representing six different activist groups who most influenced them to get involved in climate action, 61% named Pope Francis as a key influencer.”

    The 2015 papal letter also gave rise to the Laudato Si movement which Deane-Drummond points out “coordinates climate activism across the globe. It has 900 Catholic organisations as well as 10,000 of what are known as Laudato Si ‘animators’, who are all ambassadors and leaders in their respective communities.”




    Read more:
    Three ways Pope Francis influenced the global climate movement


    There are specific religious arguments he was able to make to appeal to these groups, note Joel Hodge and Antonia Pizzy of Australian Catholic University.

    They write that: “Francis argued combating climate change relied on the ‘ecological conversion’ of the human heart, so that people may recognise the God-given nature of our planet and the fundamental call to care for it. Without this conversion, pragmatic and political measures wouldn’t be able to counter the forces of consumerism, exploitation and selfishness.”




    Read more:
    Pope Francis has died, aged 88. These were his greatest reforms – and controversies


    It’s not an argument that will particularly work on me. But then addressing the climate crisis will require all sorts of people to be persuaded of the need for serious action, including policy wonks, tech bros, radical activists, worried parents and, yes, people motivated by their religion.

    The last pope didn’t have to say anything about the climate crisis. It’s not necessarily in the job description. But it’s a good thing that Pope Francis did speak about it and, as Deane-Drummond says: “We can only hope [the next pope] will build on his legacy and influence political change for the good, from the grassroots frontline right up to the highest global ambitions.”

    ref. How Pope Francis became a climate change influencer – https://theconversation.com/how-pope-francis-became-a-climate-change-influencer-255086

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Holds Informal Meeting with States Parties to the Convention

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination today held an informal meeting with States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

    Opening the meeting, Michal Balcerzak, Committee Chair, said this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention.  This was a moment of reflection, not only on past achievements, but also on the current and future viability of the treaty body system. The Committee was facing turbulent times, and many challenges were undermining the realisation of human rights and racial equality.

    Mr. Balcerzak called on States parties to renew commitment to fully respect and effectively implement obligations under international human rights law, including the Convention.  Prompt action was needed to end current conflicts, address the root causes of racial discrimination, and prevent further human rights violations targeting people based on their national or ethnic origin and identity.

    Régine Esseneme, Committee Vice-Chair, said the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.  It covered all areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms and had been ratified by 182 countries.  For several years, States parties had submitted fewer reports to the Committee, often choosing to combine reports over longer periods. 

    The discussion with States parties addressed topics including the liquidity crisis facing the Committee and the United Nations treaty body system, cooperation with the Committee, commemoration of the Convention’s sixtieth anniversary, the Committee’s simplified reporting and individual communications procedures, hybrid dialogues, and measures to prevent racial discrimination.

    Speaking in the discussion were Mexico, Finland, Belgium, Bolivia, Spain, Brazil, Venezuela, China and Cuba.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the Committee’s one hundred and fifteenth session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 25 April at 3 p.m. to hold a half-day general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  This was a moment of reflection, not only on past achievements, but also on the current and future viability of the treaty body system. The Committee was facing turbulent times, and many challenges were undermining the realisation of human rights and racial equality.

    In the last 60 years, there had been progress in the fight against racial discrimination.  However, progress had not occurred at the pace and to the extent needed and expected by marginalised groups and victims of racial discrimination, and today, there were serious risks of backsliding.  The Committee called on States parties to renew commitment to fully respect and effectively implement obligations under international human rights law, including the Convention.  Prompt action was needed to end current conflicts, address the root causes of racial discrimination, and prevent further human rights violations targeting people based on their national or ethnic origin and identity.

    The United Nations treaty body system was faced by an unprecedented crisis marked by acute financial and liquidity constraints.  These challenges struck at the very core of the Committee’s ability to carry out its mandate effectively.  The downsizing of resources had already begun to significantly impair the Committee’s work. Under the Convention, the expenses of the Committee were required to be borne by State parties.  The current situation raised serious concerns about the sustainability of this obligation.  The Committee was facing the real risk of reducing its activities, and, in a worst-case scenario, cancelling sessions due to lack of resources.  This year, the second and third sessions of the Committee were not yet confirmed.  Weakening of the Committee would not only weaken international human rights oversight but also send a troubling signal about the collective will to combat racial discrimination globally. 

    In addition, the Committee was increasingly impacted by a drop in timely reporting by States parties – a trend that undermined its ability to plan and hold dialogue sessions, notably for the years 2026 and 2027.  But despite these challenges, the Committee remained steadfast.  On average, it reviewed 18 State party reports per year, consistently worked to refine its methods of work, and continued to engage in meaningful, forward-looking initiatives in line with its mandate.

    This year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which was adopted on 21 December 1965.  To mark this auspicious occasion, the Committee and its Secretariat were working in collaboration with partners on a year-long campaign throughout 2025.  The campaign highlighted the foundational importance of the Convention for the fight against racial discrimination, and focused attention on its continued relevance today.  It would stimulate discussions on effective practices to address structural and emerging challenges in preventing and combatting racial discrimination and aimed to renew the commitment for the effective implementation of the Convention. 

    The Committee encouraged all States parties to the Convention to contribute to the anniversary by taking concrete action to implement the Convention, including jointly with other States and stakeholders, at the local, national, regional or international levels. The Committee would hold a high-level commemorative event, tentatively scheduled to take place on 4 December 2025. The active support of States parties and all stakeholders in the organization of this event was crucial for its success.

    The Committee had adopted general recommendation 37 in 2024 on equality and freedom from racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to health.  This general recommendation clarified the obligations undertaken under the Convention regarding the right to health and provided guidance on measures to address concerns in line with the Convention. 

    Currently, the Committee was working with the Committee on Migrant Workers on a joint general recommendation on xenophobia; regional consultations were held last year to inform the drafting. It was also elaborating a general recommendation on reparations, which would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law, particularly concerning the harms of the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by their descendants.

    The Committee called on States parties to provide advice on how to address the unprecedented crisis affecting the treaty body system.

    RÉGINE ESSENEME, Committee Vice-Chair, said the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.  It covered all areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms and had been ratified by 182 countries.  These States parties had committed to engaging in the Committee’s periodic review process, under which each State party was obliged to submit an initial report after one year of ratification and subsequent periodic reports every two years.  For several years however, States parties had submitted fewer reports to the Committee, often choosing to combine reports over longer periods. 

    Most States had submitted to the Committee’s simplified reporting procedure, but given its resource limitations, the Committee prioritised States with reports overdue by more than 10 years for this procedure.  Currently, 78 States parties had significant delays in the submission of reports.  The Committee sought States’ views on this issue and on methods of fostering collaboration with States parties to ensure that they honoured their commitments under the Convention.

    Discussion with States Parties

    In the ensuing discussion, representatives of States parties said, among other things, that the Convention, the first fundamental human rights treaty, was an essential tool for combatting racial discrimination.  Speakers expressed commitment to fulfilling their obligations under the Convention and eliminating racial discrimination, xenophobia and social exclusion, and to cooperating with the Committee.  They thanked the Committee for its work in eliminating racial discrimination. Cooperating with the Committee gave States the ability to ensure the highest possible implementation of the Convention.

    Many speakers said they would join in the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which offered an opportunity for renewing commitments under the Convention and addressing modern challenges related to racial discrimination, including hate speech, discrimination and xenophobic practices.  They expressed concern about the United Nations’ liquidity crisis, which impacted the Committee’s work.

    Speakers presented measures to prevent racial discrimination and promote racial equality; recognise the status and promote the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as their participation in policy development; and participate in the Committee’s reporting procedure and follow-up on the recommendations of the Committee.

    Some speakers proposed that the Committee held hybrid meetings with States when necessary to promote the participation of civil servants with specific knowledge and civil society in States with limited resources.  One speaker called for the hybrid meeting tools used by the United Nations to guarantee the equal participation of all States.  Some speakers called on the Committee to strengthen its cooperation with regional mechanisms and other international bodies, including the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.

    One speaker said that individual communications needed to be handled effectively.  How did the Committee monitor the implementation of its decision on individual communications?

    Some speakers noted that the Committee had decided to extend the simplified reporting procedure to all States parties, but at the same time requested many States to continue using the regular reporting procedure as their reports were not overdue by 10 years. Why had the Committee decided to do this?  The simplified reporting procedure would ease States’ reporting burden.  Without this procedure, future report submissions could be delayed, they said.  Other speakers, however, said that there were disadvantages to the simplified procedure, expressing support for the regular reporting procedure.  One speaker said that efforts to simplify reporting procedures needed to be balanced with efforts to establish a predictable reporting calendar.

    One speaker expressed concern regarding unilateral coercive measures and human rights violations against migrants, including their illegal deportation to other States.  Another speaker raised the issue of trans-Atlantic slavery, expressing support for a new United Nations instrument on the rights of people of African descent.

    Statements and Responses by Committee Experts

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, thanked States for the proposals they had put forward.  He said that the Committee offered the possibility of hybrid dialogues, which were not currently shortened compared to regular dialogues.  The Committee regretted that it did not have the possibility to hold hybrid meetings with other stakeholders.

    The simplified reporting procedure was a crucial issue.  There was a problem with this procedure in that it was not, in fact, simple from the perspective of the Committee and its secretariat.  If the Committee had more capacity to prepare lists of issues prior to reporting, it would have done so.

    The Chair encouraged States parties to engage in events to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, information on which was available online.  He also called for further dialogue between the Committee and regional bodies.

    NOUREDDIN AMIR, Committee Expert, said that Committee Experts were elected by States every two years on a rolling basis.  They sought to achieve States’ aspirations to better fulfil their human rights obligations. The Committee was committed to combatting racism and injustice, which was everywhere.  It needed to promote discussions between belligerents in the wars that were currently raging.  Women and children were being killed in Palestine.  States needed to take responsibility for these issues, stop criminals, and seek justice for those whose voices were not heard.  The International Court of Justice needed to be able to condemn States that carried out forbidden acts against international law.

    STAMATIA STAVRINAKI, Committee Expert, said that the Committee’s individual communications procedure had not yet reached its full potential, as around one-third of States parties to the Convention had not accepted the procedure.  Last year, the Committee adopted decisions on 48 complaints and found violations in 27 of them.  The Committee advocated for this procedure, which created an opportunity to remedy harms caused by racial discrimination and to prevent future violations.  States parties could deploy junior professionals to support the Working Group on individual communications.  The Committee invited States to accept the individual communications procedure, which would reenforce their efforts to combat racial discrimination effectively.

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert, said that the Committee had strengthened its relationship with regional human rights mechanisms, contacting relevant regional bodies regarding their assessment of follow-up efforts to the Committee’s concluding observations.  The concluding observations contained recommendations for improving the implementation of the Convention, which were to be implemented within one year. States parties were required to submit follow-up reports on the implementation of these recommendations, but only one-third of States parties submitted reports, which often did not demonstrate sufficient implementation of the recommendations.  The Committee called on all States to submit these reports.

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chair, expressed pleasure that several States parties from the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean region were attending the meeting. She was the only Expert on the Committee from this region.  She called on these States to promote the appointment of more Experts from the region. It was regrettable that some countries had difficulty in using hybrid tools offered for participation in dialogue, and that some non-governmental organizations could not attend meetings with the Committee.  The Committee would address these issues.

    Ms. Shepherd said that a second International Decade for People of African Descent had been established by the General Assembly.  She called on all States to participate in commemorations of the Decade.  The Committee used an intersectional lens when addressing racial discrimination to address issues such as gender.  In closing, she called on States to financially support the Committee to address its liquidity crisis.

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chair, said that the Committee had issued general recommendation 25 on gender, in which it committed to taking an intersectional approach to gender.  The Committee was also committed to assessing the relationship between racial discrimination and economic marginalisation. It was assessing opportunities for decent work for ethnic minorities, as well as access to education and other social services.

    The Committee was concerned by its shrinking resources and capacity to do its work.  It was in the worst situation of any treaty body in terms of resources.  Although it had one of the most ratified treaties, the Committee received among the lowest number of reports.  Why was this?

    RÉGINE ESSENEME, Committee Vice-Chair, said the legal basis for the presentation of reports was article nine, paragraph one of the Convention.  The purpose of the simplified reporting procedure was to encourage States to submit reports.  However, it had not led to an increase in the number of reports that the Committee received. The Committee was affected by a lack of human and financial resources.  The simplified reporting procedure was not simple for the Committee; it was thus the exception and not the rule.  States needed to respect their reporting obligations under the Convention.

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert, said the Committee and all nine treaty bodies had inter-State communications procedures.  The Committee had received and considered three inter-State communications, and amicable solutions to two of these complaints had been found.  A third communication had been received from the State of Palestine against Israel in 2018.  The Committee had issued six recommendations in relation to this communication.  What steps could the Committee take to ensure that its recommendations would be implemented? Ms. Chung encouraged States to cooperate with the inter-State communications procedure.

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert, said that the Committee had set up an early warning mechanism to prevent existing issues from becoming conflicts.  The mechanism could intervene if there was a lack of legislation or mechanisms to prevent racial discrimination, or to react to discriminatory statements or actions.  The Committee had recently adopted decisions under this procedure related to Sudan and the State of Palestine, which had been cited by the International Court of Justice.  Most conflicts in the world stemmed from racial or religious issues.  The Committee could be a major force to prevent such crises, but it needed the support of States in this regard.

    BAKARI SIDIKI DIABY, Committee Expert, commended the efforts of States parties to engage in dialogue with the Committee.  Some States had not come before the Committee for more than 20 years.  The simplified procedure was set up to assist such States. The Committee also had the power to examine States parties in the absence of a report if necessary and it had done so in the past.  It called on all States to help victims protected by the Convention and to engage in dialogue with the Committee.  States also needed to cooperate with civil society in preparation for dialogues. Some members of civil society who had cooperated with the Committee had been subjected to reprisals; the United Nations had no tolerance for this.

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert, said that reviews of some States parties showed a lack of collection of disaggregated data that allowed for a comparison of population groups. This entailed moving away from traditional data collection practices.  States parties were encouraged to collect data on sex, age, ethnicity, migration status, disability, religion and other distinctions.

    GÜN KUT, Committee Expert, thanked representatives of States parties for engaging with the Committee and expressing support for the Committee’s work.  The Committee was sensitive to States’ questions, demands and criticisms.  The success of the Committee depended on States parties’ will and contributions. The Committee needed regularity in the submission of reports and sufficient follow-up to the Committee’s recommendations, including through follow-up and periodic reports.  The Committee sought to improve its work, but this depended on securing sufficient meeting time and support for the Committee’s secretariat.  States needed to commit to sending reports on time and supporting the financial situation of treaty bodies.

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert, called on States to support the functioning of the Committee.

    YEUNG KAM JOHN YEUNG SIK YUEN, Committee Expert, said many States parties had not taken steps to criminalise hate speech.  Was this done deliberately to protect politicians?  When the Committee issued a decision on an individual communication, it left it to States parties involved to implement it.  The Committee took up implementation of these decisions in dialogues with States parties.

    Closing Remarks

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, thanked States parties for attending the meeting.  The Committee would do its best to address the issues raised in the dialogue.  It would work efficiently with States and ensure that it did not disappoint victims of racial discrimination.  The Chair called on States to encourage the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention across the world.  The Committee looked forward to further engagement with States in future.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CERD25.003E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Commend Ukraine’s Presence Despite the Prevailing Circumstances, Raise Questions on the Treatment of Ukraine’s Indigenous Peoples and the Roma Population

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination today concluded its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Ukraine.  Committee Experts congratulated the State party for appearing before the Committee despite prevailing circumstances, while raising questions on the treatment of Ukraine’s indigenous peoples and the Roma population. 

    A Committee Expert congratulated the Ukrainian delegation for making a laudable effort to assess the implementation of the Convention in the country, despite prevailing circumstances. Ukraine should be praised for this effort. 

    Chinsung Chung, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee noted that the State party adopted the law on indigenous peoples in 2021.  However, according to information before the Committee, the law only recognised Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples in Ukraine, while excluding other groups, such as Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples.  Could the delegation provide clarifications on the law on indigenous peoples and how it aligned with international standards? What measures were in place to preserve and promote the identity, language and culture of all indigenous people under the jurisdiction of the State party?

    Ms. Chung also said that according to the representative of the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine, around 100,000 Roma became refugees, and around the same number of Ukrainian Roma became internally displaced persons.  Were accurate statistics available?  Did the State party find durable solutions for internally displaced Roma and take measures to ensure that they benefitted from assistance?  What were the State’s plans to include Roma people in recovery and reconstruction programmes?

    The delegation said in 2021, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law on indigenous peoples in Ukraine, which was developed through extensive consultations with indigenous groups and civil society, and represented the aspirations of these groups.  In addition, a draft law was developed on the status of the Crimean Tartar people which would be registered in Parliament in the near future. 

    Officially, Ukraine recognised three indigenous groups of peoples, including Crimean Tartars, Karaims and Krymchaks.  The Lemkos people were not considered a national minority group, but rather a cultural group.  The public broadcaster of Ukraine produced programmes for national minorities in their national languages, across broadcast, radio and digital formats. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said in 2021, the Ukrainian Government approved the Roma strategy, and every two years action plans were prepared for its implementation.  The Roma community was a young community, one of the youngest among the national minorities in Ukraine.  It would be beneficial to use their innovation and abilities in the process of renovating Ukraine when the war was over.  The State was working on providing the Roma with more education. There were many grants provided to Roma for studying in universities. 

     

    Introducing the report, Ihor Lossovskyi, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said during the reporting period from 2014 to 2019, fundamental tragic changes took place in Ukraine, in particular the beginning of the Russian aggression.  At the height of the Russian invasion, in April 2022, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, and in June 2022, it received candidate status along with seven relevant recommendations in all spheres of human activity, including recommendation no. 7 on completion of the reform of legislation in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations. 

    To implement these recommendations, Ukraine developed and approved three laws, including the new law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine, as well as 16 subordinate regulatory legal acts (bylaws) approved by the Government.

    In concluding remarks, Ibrahima Guisse, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, thanked the delegation for the dialogue held, particularly given the context.  War was ended through negotiation and diplomacy, not capitulation. It was hoped this would happen with Ukraine.  The fact that Ukraine was here before the Committee was an example of the State’s willingness to cooperate.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Lossovskyi thanked the Committee for their time and interest in the situation in Ukraine.  The Committee’s recommendations were very much appreciated. 

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience; the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine; and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue its concluding observations on the report of Ukraine after the conclusion of its one hundred and fifteenth session on 9 May 2025.  The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 25 April at 3.p.m for a half day general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Ukraine (CERD/C/UKR/24-26).

    Presentation of Report

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said during the reporting period from 2014 to 2019, fundamental tragic changes took place in Ukraine, in particular the beginning of the Russian aggression, Russia’s brazen destruction of international law, the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the occupation by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and terrorist organizations supported by it of certain parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the financing by the Russian Federation of terrorist organizations of the occupation administrations. 

    Due to these circumstances, collecting information in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine was difficult. As a result of the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, and the aggression of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine, ensuring the rights of minorities in these areas, especially Crimea, had sharply deteriorated.  Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and those who adhered to pro-Ukrainian views, were subject to discrimination in Crimea. 

    During the reporting period, important changes also took place in the religious sphere in Ukraine.  On 15 December 2018, the Unification Council was held, at which representatives of the three Orthodox Churches of Ukraine united into a single church structure, which was called the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”, and the Metropolitan Epiphany of Kyiv and All Ukraine was elected as its primate.  As of the beginning of 2021, this church jurisdiction had 7,097 religious organizations on the territory of Ukraine, handled by 4,537 clergy. 

    The principles of preventing and combatting discrimination were defined by the 2012 law on the principles of preventing and combatting discrimination in Ukraine.  In May 2014, amendments were made to the law, which improved the legislative definition of discrimination.  In 2019, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience was established to deal with State policy in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations, freedom of conscience, and freedom of religion. 

    At the height of the Russian invasion, in April 2022, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, and in June 2022, it received candidate status along with seven relevant recommendations in all spheres of human activity, including recommendation no. 7 on completion of the reform of legislation in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations.  To implement these recommendations, Ukraine developed and approved three laws, including the new law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine, as well as 16 subordinate regulatory legal acts (bylaws) approved by the Government. 

    The first stages of the negotiation process with the European Commission regarding Ukraine’s membership in the European Union took place, in particular, the screening of Ukrainian legislation for its compliance with European legislation.  The screening was provided under four subsections on judiciary and fundamental rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of religion; racism, xenophobia, hate speech; racial and ethnic discrimination, including Roma; and rights of national minorities. 

    Based on the results, the European Commission prepared a positive report on the state of Ukrainian legislation and its compliance with European legislation in October 2024.  The next stage of the negotiation process was the preparation of strategic documents, including an action plan to ensure the rights of national minorities in Ukraine, which were in the final stage of preparation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, welcomed that Ukraine had a diverse and high-level delegation.  Ukraine’s presence before the Committee despite the difficult context in the country highlighted the country’s commitment to appear before the treaty bodies. Mr. Guisse then paid tribute to Pope Francis who had been a man of peace. 

    During the period under review, Ukraine had experienced deep upheavals, including the large-scale invasion in 2022, which had given rise to large-scale destruction, human loss and mass displacement. According to information before the Committee, the last census conducted in 2001 showed that the main minority groups included Russians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars and Bulgarians. Ukraine also has smaller populations of Poles, Romanians, Armenians, Hungarians, Roma and other nationalities.  A subsequent census was supposed to be conducted in 2011, which was postponed until 2020, and had not taken place until now. 

    Other data was also not provided, and the Committee emphasised that the lack of statistics limited the ability to evaluate the enjoyment of different groups of their economic, social and cultural rights.  Were there plans to conduct the census based on the principle of self-identification? What were the measures planned to collect data on the enjoyment of economic and social rights by the different groups under the jurisdiction of the State party? 

    The Committee noted that the legal framework, particularly on principles of preventing and combatting discrimination in Ukraine, did not prohibit discrimination based on all grounds listed in the Convention, particularly national origin and descent.  Were there plans to amend and align the national legislation framework with article 1 of the Convention?  What measures were taken to ensure that the legislative framework prohibited intersecting forms of discrimination? 

    Could the delegation inform the Committee on the implementation of the national human rights strategy for 2015–2020 in 2015 and its action plan?  Was there a timeframe for developing and adopting a strategy on combatting racial discrimination?

    Could the delegation provide information on the mandate and activities of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience?  What were the measures to ensure the consultation and participation of groups vulnerable to racial discrimination in the work of the State Service?  Was the State party planning to establish a central mechanism to coordinate and monitor the implementation of measures designed to combat racial discrimination?

     

    The Committee was concerned that the legislative framework, including the Criminal Code, did not include a definition of all forms of discrimination, or a specific definition of hate speech or sanction for hate speech and crimes.  What measures were being undertaken to review and amend the legislative framework to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes in accordance with the Convention? 

    Was the State party planning to amend its Criminal Code, particularly article 161, to remove the requirements and restrictive approach as recommended by the Committee in 2016?  What was the status of the draft law no. 5488 before the Parliament?  How were its provisions in line with the Convention?   

    Could information be provided on the legislative framework on combatting racial discrimination in political discourse, as well as information on complaints received, investigations initiated, and imposed sanctions in this field?  The Committee noted that the law on media included provisions on discrimination and incitement to hatred.  Could clarifications on the law and how its provisions aligned with the Convention be provided?  Could the delegation inform the Committee about measures taken to combat hate speech in the media and over the Internet?  Was there a designated entity to monitor hate speech or avenues to submit complaints by victims? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said unfortunately, the last census of Ukraine had taken place in 2001, which was 24 years ago.  There were several reasons for this, including two Ukrainian political revolutions during this time and the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014. The next census had been planned for 2023, but this had been postponed due to the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation in 2022.  It was impossible in current circumstances to hold another census. 

    Significant work in combatting racial discrimination had been undertaken in the past three to four years.  The State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience was established in 2019 and began its work in 2020. The institute directly dealt with issues of national minorities and ethnic policies and consisted of around 40 people. 

    Over the past couple of years, three laws had been adopted by the parliament, including the new law on national minority communities of Ukraine.  This new law was revolutionary, as it described the ethnic policy for Ukraine and prescribed tasks for the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience. According to the law, all those who considered themselves to be national minorities would be recognised by the State as such.  Ukraine had 130 national minorities, and the State took responsibility for all these communities. 

    There was a lack of strict definitions in Ukrainian laws around hate speech and hate crimes.  Ukrainian institutions were working hard to integrate these into Ukrainian legislation.  There was an interagency working group dealing with issues of discrimination, hate speech and hate crime. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, appreciated the answers given, noting the circumstances within the country.

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked for more details on the interagency working group to be provided?  Could more information on the national human rights institution be provided? 

    A Committee Expert said Ukraine’s non-compliance with article 4 was an ongoing issue.  It was strongly recommended that the State follow up on this. 

    Another Expert asked how effective the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience had been in protecting minority rights in Ukraine?  What was the level of participation of national minorities in consultations on State decisions?  Had there been any improvements based on these discussions? 

    A Committee Expert said the situation in Ukraine was incomprehensible.  What could be done about hate speech?  Did Russian people hate Ukrainian people?  Personally, the Expert did not feel this was the case. How could this explain why not everyone opposed the war which continued to take more lives?  While there was hatred, men would continue to wage war. 

     

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, expressed gratitude to the State party for responding to the Committee’s request in the one-year time frame, however, many questions by the Committee were not addressed, nor were they provided in the current State report.  Could the State party provide the Committee with the previously requested information in paragraph 16 of the concluding observations? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said the questions about the war were philosophical.  This was an existential war for the Ukrainian nation. According to the Russian dictator, Ukrainians did not exist and needed to be re-educated.  To stop the war, the Russian dictator should provide a decree to forces to stop the fight and withdraw from the territory of Ukraine. 

    The Commissioner of Human Rights had a special department focusing on discrimination.  After the screening exercise with the European Union, Ukraine understood there were some gaps in its legislation, particularly when it came to definitions.  Many new laws and bylaws had been approved to fill these gaps, and this was a key focus of the State Service for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience. Communication with national minorities was a key step in this regard. 

    Around seven million Ukrainians had left Ukraine as refugees or moved around Ukraine as internally displaced persons. Many people treated the Roma community differently.  The national action plan for the Roma strategy to 2030 was evaluated every two years. Every year, many different roundtables and conferences were organised by the State on the Roma community. 

    Two forums had been organised for the different minorities to discuss any issues they had and how to address them. A forum was organised in Kiev with Polish national minorities, and another one with Greek national minorities. There was a strategy on the development of the Crimea Tartare language.  This year, work had also been finished on the new spelling of the Crimean Tartare language. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked about concrete cases of racially motivated violence and racial profiling, and the measures taken to respond to these cases?  What measures had been taken for increasing public awareness-raising campaigns and other measures to counter incitement to hatred and hate crimes?  The Committee would also like to receive information on measures to prevent discriminatory violence by the police and other law enforcement officers; measures to ensure accountability for incidents of discriminatory violence; and data on these kinds of incidents?

    The Committee was concerned about racist hate speech and discriminatory statements in the public discourse, including by public and political figures and in the media.  How did these victims address their cases, and how effectively were these cases treated?  How many complaints had been received in the last five years, and what was the number of investigations initiated, cases considered before courts, and sanctions imposed on perpetrators?  Could detailed information be provided on complaints registered with the courts, or any other national institution, including the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, concerning acts of racial discrimination, racist hate speech and racist hate crimes?

    According to information before the Committee, there were gaps in the implementation of the legal framework, including the lack of specialisation among law enforcement officials and lack of operational standards to handle, register and investigate complaints of racial discrimination and hate crimes.  What measures were being taken to address these concerns, particularly to enhance the capacity of law enforcement officials in handling and investigating complaints related to racial discrimination and hate speech? 

    Information before the Committee indicated that there was a lack of awareness on the rights of victims of racial discrimination and fear of approaching law enforcement officials on this topic.  What measures were being taken to address these issues?  Could a reason be provided for the low rate of complaints at the National Human Rights Commission?  What measures were being taken to enable victims to make complaints more effectively? 

    The Committee welcomed the adoption of amendments in 2024 on the law on free legal aid to allow victims of hate crimes on specific grounds to benefit from secondary legal aid.  However, the information before the Committee indicated that the victims were only entitled to the legal aid at the secondary stage and not to initiate a complaint.  In addition, the implementation of the amendment was postponed until one year after the martial law was abolished.  Could the delegation provide information on these two concerns? 

    Could disaggregated data be provided on complaints by ethnic origin such as by Roma, Jews, Africans and other minorities, as well as by national origin and gender?  Had the complaints changed during the armed conflict, in terms of quantity, nature and results?  What measures were being taken to promote human rights education, including on racial discrimination, in university programmes and teacher training?

    What measures were being taken to raise awareness of the public, civil servants, and law enforcement officials in order to combat societal prejudice against certain minority groups, including the Roma?

    Could accurate statistics of ethnic minorities, including Roma, be provided?  The Committee remained concerned at the persistence of discrimination, stereotypes and prejudices against Roma, including reports of physical attacks and killings. 

    Recent research also demonstrated that the level of antigypsyism in Ukraine was still very high.  According to the social cohesion study, 35 per cent of the Ukrainian population did not want Roma to be in their community at all. What measures had the Government of Ukraine taken to fight antigypsyism? 

    Could data on the education conditions of Roma be provided?  What measures had been taken for improving the situation of education for Roma children? Were they educated in their mother tongue without discrimination?

    The Committee noted the various measures taken by the State party to improve the situation of Roma, including the strategy for the protection and integration of the Roma national minority to 2020 and its action plan.  Could information on the progress and results of strategies and programmes directed at the Roma be provided, particularly the allocated resources to ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and action plan and monitoring of its implementation?  How were members of the Roma ethnic minorities involved in the implementation and monitoring of these policies?  Had the Government consulted with Roma communities when planning and implementing such integration measures, including at the local level?  How were the low levels of funding for these plans being addressed? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the issues affecting the Roma community were a problem, not just for Ukraine but for all European countries.  Prejudices still existed, however, during the war, many Roma men had served in the Ukrainian armed forces and in some cases sacrificed their lives, which had changed the attitude of Ukrainians towards Roma people.  A unity and diversity programme was implemented last year, which was a Ukrainian national cultural programme, with training for Ukrainian police officers. 

    The lack of documents in Roma communities was an issue but this was being addressed through regular visits to regions where the Roma community lived.  Thousands of Roma people had been provided with new documents.

    In 2023, around 60 consultations were organised with different national minority groups.  Permanent consultations and meetings were held with Roma communities. The consultations included members of all relevant ministries.  The next meeting had been planned for the end of April.  April 8 was International Roma Day and a large event had been organised in Kiev, including a roundtable and an all-day conference with the participation of ambassadors and the diplomatic corps.  On the same day, several regions also organised International Roma Day celebrations with different events. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations were lacking.  How were the stakeholders in the consultations selected? The Expert expressed hope that the war would end soon with a fair and sustainable solution.  It was important to remember that the unity towards Roma people should be sustained after the war, and that the stereotypes did not return. 

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, said the Committee’s recommendations regarding measures taken to conduct training to raise awareness on the amendments to article 161 of the Criminal Code had not been addressed, and urged the State party to provide this information. 

    Another Expert asked what existing mechanisms were in place to receive complaints from victims of hate crimes? Were they user friendly?

    A Committee Expert asked whether the education system in the State party allowed for the type of education help to prevent hate crimes and racial intolerance for children?  Were there any significant numbers of people of African descent in the State party?  Would Ukraine support the Second Decade for People of African Descent? 

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if Ukraine’s desire to align itself with the European Union’s legislation on hate speech was to address hate speech, or to bring its legislation into line with that of the European Union? 

    An Expert asked if the outcome of today’s dialogue would be brought to the attention of the media?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said if the Committee approved, Ukraine would provide information to the media about the meeting. Regardless of the ethnicity or culture of any citizen, they could contact the police and make a complaint. There were special school curricula on tolerance and education.  There should be more education in schools, from the youngest level possible. 

    There was an African community in Ukraine; it was not very big but its members were consulted on many issues. The African community had never informed the Government about any issues when dealing with the Ukrainian community. 

    The legal aid system of Ukraine provided several services, including primary and secondary legal aid and access to alternative dispute resolutions.  Regular targeted information campaigns were conducted on the right to legal aid, to provide empowerment for vulnerable groups and build trust in the legal aid system in Ukraine.  There had been only 91 cases of requests for legal aid during the past three years.  There were 500 legal aid centres across Ukraine, as well as an online service. 

    Six months ago, the Government adopted the list of the languages of the national minorities of Ukraine which were under threat of disappearance, and this included the Roma language. Currently, there was a special working group of experts who were familiar with these languages working on initiatives in this regard.

    In a brief comment at the end of the first meeting, MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said the dialogue was public and it was up to Ukraine if it wished to produce information on the discussion. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if measures were planned to assess and review the law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine that aimed to eliminate all discriminatory provisions?  What measures had been taken to consult and ensure the participation of all ethnic and national minority groups in the process of developing and drafting the law and its amendments? 

    While noting the measures taken by the State party to protect Crimean Tatars, in particular those who fled Crimea after 2014, the Committee remained concerned about reports that Crimean Tatars in regions under the authority of the State party faced difficulties in accessing employment, social services and education, and did not receive assistance. What mechanisms had been developed to ensure consultations with ethnic minority groups? 

    Did the State party have information concerning the National Council for Interethnic Harmony?  What measures had been taken by the State party to support women belonging to ethnic or national minority groups in exercising their political rights, including participation in public affairs and raising awareness on their rights and the vital impact of their participation?  What measures were being taken to mitigate the impact of the ongoing conflict on the participation of women in politics?   

     

    According to information received, legislative amendments relating to religious organizations entered into force on 23 September 2024, invoking “national security” as a ground for restricting freedom of religion or belief and freedom of religious association. However, this was not considered a permissible grounds for restriction of freedom of religion under the Convention. What were the measures restricting freedom of religion and belief and their impact on the ethno-religious communities concerned?  Information received referred to practices tending to prohibit the activities of religious organizations, specifically the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Could information be provided on the necessity and proportionality of such punitive measures?

    The situation of migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons in Ukraine had been significantly impacted by recent legal and practical developments, particularly since the introduction of martial law in February 2022.  The current legal framework and its implementation presented several challenges that were inconsistent with the Convention. 

    The refugee status determination process in Ukraine did not align with international standards, leading to inconsistent application of legal interpretations and time limits for lodging asylum applications.  This often resulted in the rejection of asylum claims.  New practices had restricted access to asylum and statelessness determination procedures, especially for individuals with ties to the Russian Federation and Belarus.  The State Migration Service often issued oral refusals for asylum applications without official decisions, citing martial law as a reason.  This practice had been recognised by courts as illegal, yet it persisted, leaving applicants in legal limbo.

    How would Ukraine address the inconsistencies in the asylum procedures to ensure alignment with international standards and the Convention?  What legal amendments were introduced under martial law and what was their impact on the rights of refugees and stateless persons?  What procedural safeguards were in place to protect individuals from forcible deportation?  What steps were being taken to improve access to the asylum and statelessness determination procedures, particularly for individuals with ties to the Russian Federation and Belarus? 

    How was the Government addressing the challenges posed by the suspension of diplomatic relations with Russia in verifying nationality in statelessness determination procedures?  What plans did the Ukrainian Government have to develop an integration strategy for refugees and improve reception conditions for asylum seekers?  What steps were being taken to address the unlawful practice of issuing verbal refusals for asylum applications and ensure that applicants received official decisions?

    The Government of Ukraine had made significant strides in addressing statelessness since 2020, including the introduction of a statelessness determination procedure. Despite these efforts, several challenges remained, particularly in the implementation of the procedure and the accessibility of necessary documentation for applicants, which was further exacerbated by the conflict. 

    On 22 January 2024, draft law no. 11469, titled “on amendments to certain laws of Ukraine on ensuring the right to acquire and preserve Ukrainian citizenship” was registered in the Ukrainian Parliament.  The draft law, if passed, could result in the loss of Ukrainian citizenship for residents in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, who often had to obtain Russian passports to access basic services, employment, and social benefits. How did the Ukrainian Government plan to address the potential risk of stripping Ukrainian citizenship from residents of occupied territories who acquired Russian citizenship under duress or due to essential needs, such as access to basic services and employment?

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said Kiev had been under attack the night before and there had been casualties.  This was a serious and sad situation.  The Committee understood the situation and was very concerned about these tragic events. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said many members of the delegation had barely slept the night before. Russia had launched missiles from the Black Sea and inside Russia and had bombed Kiev.  Up to now, there were 10 citizens who had been killed and 100 wounded, including children.  Every day, there were peaceful victims of this tragic and bloody war.  The delegation in Ukraine had lost contact with the Committee at the beginning of the session and missed some questions.

    Regarding the law on ethnic minorities, several meetings had been organised with national minorities during the development of the law, predominantly online due to the war.  In December 2022, Parliament adopted the law. At the request of some national minority organizations, the State used the term “communities” instead of minorities. The law encompassed all groups of ethnic peoples, which was around 130 according to the most recent census. 

    Ukraine did not have many new asylum seekers as the situation in the country was not sustainable for a peaceful life. 

    The Ombudsman’s Office was referred to as the Parliamentary Commission of Human Rights.  The independence of this Office was guaranteed, ensuring it could function without undue influence from any external entities.  This enabled the Office to effectively address human rights and issues of non-discrimination.  Its annual report outlined steps taken to combat discrimination. It was a large institution with around 500 employees.  There were branches located across 24 regions of Ukraine.  In 2024, there were 454 complaints received by the Office.  The Office monitored all issues of non-discrimination.  All reports of the Office were public and could be found online.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, expressed sorrow at the recent shocking events which had wracked the Ukrainian capital.  What was the impact of martial law on asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons? 

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked about the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons belonging to minority groups, as well as the situation of elderly people belonging to these groups?  What was the situation of migrant workers, particularly in this situation of armed conflict?

    A Committee Expert asked how far Ukraine had gone in implementing the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on a case versus Ukraine?   

    Another Committee Expert congratulated the Ukrainian delegation for making a laudable effort to assess the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine, despite prevailing circumstances. Ukraine should be praised for this effort.  The Expert was concerned about allegations of racism at the Ukrainian Polish border. Had there been any follow-up on such reports?  How many cases had been brought to court? 

    There had been allegations of racism in sport, including with a Brazilian footballer who was banned for one game after reacting to crowds calling him monkey.  How had this case been handled?  Ukraine should be congratulated for adopting the law on stateless in 2021.  How many individuals had benefitted from the enforcement of that law?  How did the State party plan to provide Roma with national documents? 

    Another Expert said African nationals had been facing discrimination at the borders. 

    What measures were being taken by the State party to ensure the protection, safety and security of all persons living in its jurisdiction? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said Ukrainian legislation underscored equal rights for men and women. Half of the ministers of the Government were women.  Many women in Ukrainian society occupied high-level positions.  Women from Roma communities were among the most vulnerable. The State had organised several events, including roundtables, which assisted Roma women to find their place in society. 

    Due to the war, Ukraine no longer had many migrant workers.  It was hoped that this would change after the war.  The country would need many workers for innovation and to help rebuild Ukraine. It was hoped workers from many countries would come to Ukraine after the war and help rebuild the hundreds of cities which had been destroyed or partially destroyed. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said he had not heard of cases of discrimination on the border between Ukraine and Poland.  The case of discrimination regarding the Brazilian football player was an awful occurrence which was not typical for Ukraine. There had been a police investigation, but he could not recall the exact outcome. 

    The delegation said the aggression by the Russian federation had led to a huge influx across Ukraine’s borders. The Government took all accounts of discriminatory treatment very seriously.  Despite difficult conditions, the Government had managed to keep all checkpoints on the borders open. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said in 2022, a pilot project was launched to provide documents to Roma people in a more effective way.  This was organised in a region where the majority of Roma people lived.  Every year, the State continued this work and made several visits to these places. 

    The delegation said the draft law 5488 was being considered before parliament.  It was hoped the law would be adopted during the current session of Parliament.  The draft law provided for the term “intolerance” and addressed issues under this topic.  All law enforcement agencies were currently working together to introduce the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code.  Police officers had completed specialised human rights training.  Outreach activities, including in schools, were carried out to combat negative stereotypes on the Roma population. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee believed in the necessity of investigating and documenting all human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict and invasion initiated by the Russian Federation against the State party on 24 February 2022.  What measures had been taken to ensure prompt and impartial investigations?  Could the delegation provide information on investigations and prosecutions into allegations of human rights violations and abuses during the armed conflict with the Russian Federation?

     

    On 11 October 2018, the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarchate granted autocephaly to a new church, the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”.  This led to tensions with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.  The Church was formerly linked to the Russian Orthodox Church under the Patriarch in Moscow, but stated that it severed those ties in May 2022, following the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation. 

    It was reported that on 23 September 2024 in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, new legal provisions regarding religious organizations entered into force, prohibiting the activities of foreign religious organizations based in a State responsible for armed aggression against Ukraine or occupation of its territory, and specifically prohibiting the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Could detailed explanations be provided on this and on measures to ensure the respect of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion?

    According to media reports in January 2025, the State party announced the capturing in Russia of two soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and indicated that they were detained and provided with medical care.  Could the delegation provide information on the situation of these two prisoners of war? What were the legal measures taken against them?  Were there more prisoners of war captured by the State party from other nationalities, including mercenaries? 

    The Committee noted that the State party adopted the law on indigenous peoples in 2021.  However, according to information before the Committee, the law only recognised Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples in Ukraine, while excluding other groups, such as Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples.  Could the delegation provide clarifications on the law on indigenous peoples and how it aligned with international standards?

    Were there plans to assess and review the law?  What was the situation of the Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples?  What measures were in place to preserve and promote the identity, language and culture of all indigenous people under the jurisdiction of the State party?  Could information be provided on the situation of internally displaced Crimean Tatars, and measures to ensure their access to education, housing, employment, healthcare services and humanitarian assistance?  Was the State party taking measures in consultation with the Crimean Tatar community to find durable solutions for an appropriate settlement of Crimean Tatars in Ukraine?

    The Committee was concerned that during the war, persons belonging to minorities, such as Roma, had difficulties in registering as internally displaced persons and having access to social assistance.  According to the representative of the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine, around 100,000 Roma became refugees, and around the same number of Ukrainian Roma became internally displaced persons.  Were accurate statistics available on the Roma?  Did the State party find durable solutions for internally displaced Roma and take measures to ensure that they benefitted from assistance?  What were the State’s plans to include Roma people in recovery and reconstruction programmes?

    What efforts were being made to restore linkages between displaced children and their families?  What efforts were being made to ensure access to education and basic services for displaced children?

    Ukraine’s inadequate response to hate crimes against migrants, African and Asian students and other foreigners had previously attracted international criticism.  What was the situation of non-citizens, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and people of African and/or Asian descent during the armed conflict?  Could the delegation provide clarification on the situation of detained undocumented migrants and non-citizens?  Could the delegation also please provide information on measures to ensure their access to education, housing, employment, healthcare services and humanitarian assistance?

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said Ukraine did not refer to what was going on in Ukraine as conflict. This was a bloody, existential, colonial war with Russia, not simply a conflict.  In 2018, the Ukrainian Church received independence from the Patriarchal Eastern Christianity Church based in Istanbul, Türkiye.  This was a revolutionary decision, as Ukraine was a big country and did not have an orthodox church.  Now there was an independent church of Ukraine, like all other Christian Orthodox countries.  No other activities of other churches were forbidden in Ukraine.  The only restrictions were for the Russian Orthodox Church, which had restricted activity on the territory of Ukraine. This was because it was an accompaniment of the Russian aggression which had destroyed the country and killed hundreds of thousands of people. 

    Ukraine provided the international standard for prisoners of war in their prison facilities, which were regularly visited by the Ukrainian Ombudsman.  In 2021, Ukraine adopted the law on indigenous peoples and consulted with many minorities on this law.  Indigenous peoples were defined as those who lived on the territory of Ukraine and did not have a mother country.  The Lemkos people were not considered a national minority group, but rather a cultural group. 

    In 2021, the Ukrainian Government approved the Roma strategy, and every two years action plans were prepared for its implementation.  The Roma community was a young community, one of the youngest among the national minorities in Ukraine.  It would be beneficial to use their innovation and abilities in the process of renovating Ukraine when the war was over.  The State was working on providing the Roma with more education.  There were many grants provided to Roma for studying in universities. 

    The delegation said in 2021, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law on indigenous people in Ukraine, which was developed through extensive consultations with indigenous groups and civil society, and represented the aspirations of these groups.  In addition, a draft law was developed on the status of the Crimean Tartar people which would be registered in Parliament in the near future. 

    To ensure prisoners of war were not tortured, relevant legislation and policies had been developed.  Three legislative acts had been produced to regulate these affairs. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if there were representative bodies of minorities inside the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine?  How did the State party ensure consultations with all indigenous peoples under the framework of this law? 

    Another Expert said 10 to 20 per cent of Ukrainian Roma did not have identity documents?  Was there a provision for determining statelessness in the act on statelessness?  Did the Roma community benefit from universal birth registration? 

    A Committee Expert asked how many of the ethnic and national minorities participated in the relevant bodies in the Government?  How many Roma, indigenous, or migrant women had been hired or granted responsibility positions, or were integrated in the responsibility of the work? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said when the law on indigenous peoples was adopted, several bylaws were prepared for the implementation of the law.  According to one of the bylaws, Crimean Tatars regularly consulted with the Government.  Only during the population census could the Government request information about the ethnic groups.  Sometimes women with high-ranking positions did not disclose their ethnicity.  It was up to people to declare this. 

    The delegation said due to the Russian full-scale invasion, there were problems preparing full statistical information on ethnic minorities.  The legal aid system in Ukraine had provided legal assistance to more than 1,000 Roma people over the past three years.  Most of these related to the processing of identity documents.  Secondary legal aid had been provided for 27,000 internally displaced people over the past three years, due to the full-scale invasion. 

    Officially, Ukraine recognised three indigenous groups of peoples, including Crimean Tartars, Karaims and Krymchaks.  Crimean Tartars were represented by an executive body; the spiritual administration of Ukraine represented the Karaim people; and there was no official information regarding a body for the Krymchaks, although they had the full rights to establish such a body under law. 

    Currently, there was no definition of hate speech under Ukrainian law.  The Government of Ukraine had prepared a draft roadmap covering this issue. In Ukraine, a working group made up of State authorities and public organizations was working on a definition of hate speech and establishing administrative and criminal liability depending on the severity of the crime. 

    The public broadcaster of Ukraine continued to create a single information space for minorities.  The broadcaster produced programmes for national minorities in their national languages, across broadcast, radio and digital formats.  The State bodies would do their best to cover all the information needs of the national minorities in Ukraine. 

    Closing Remarks

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, said the Committee would send Ukraine concluding observations after the dialogue, with specific recommendations to be enacted within a period of one year. 

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, thanked the delegation for the dialogue held, particularly given the context.  War was ended through negotiation and diplomacy, not capitulation.  It was hoped this would happen with Ukraine. The fact that Ukraine was here before the Committee was an example of the State’s willingness to cooperate. Ukraine was also meeting with the Committee against Torture at the same time, which may have weakened Ukraine’s ability to provide comprehensive answers. 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, thanked the Committee members for their time and interest in the situation in Ukraine.  The Committee’s recommendations were very much appreciated. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said racial discrimination was about ethnic and national origin.  The Committee was concerned when ethnic minorities were denied their identity.  This led to wars.  It was now the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, and the first composition of the Committee had included an expert of Ukrainian origin.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

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    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Foot-and-mouth disease – urgent action to protect the Italian livestock industry – E-001501/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001501/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Paolo Inselvini (ECR), Carlo Fidanza (ECR), Francesco Ventola (ECR), Nicola Procaccini (ECR), Sergio Berlato (ECR)

    The spread of foot-and-mouth disease in Slovakia and Hungary, with some cases even being reported on the border with Austria, constitutes a real risk for Italy. Although the disease is not dangerous to humans, it is highly contagious among farm animals and can cause serious economic damage.

    In 2024, Italy imported tens of thousands of live animals from countries now affected by the outbreaks. With the arrival of Easter, which is a key period for sheep and goat imports, there is a heightened risk of the virus spreading.

    Given the alarm among farmers, and bearing in mind their legitimate concerns, can the Commission answer the following questions:

    • 1.What preventive measures will it take, in this and other similar cases, to limit the spread of these diseases and the ensuing economic damage?
    • 2.Is it envisaging a tightening-up of border controls and a review of the European rules on animal biosafety and traceability in the light of the increasing frequency of these health emergencies?
    • 3.Has financial support been envisaged for livestock farms which suffer direct or indirect damage linked with the spread of the virus?

    Submitted: 11.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – MEPs push for a more ambitious European defence industry programme

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, MEPs backed a draft law designed to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, ramp up defence product manufacturing and provide more support for Ukraine.

    The Committees on Industry, Research and Energy and Security and Defence have adopted their position on the proposed creation of a European defence industry programme (EDIP). More specifically, MEPs backed measures to boost the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), to strengthen EU defence and further integrate the EU defence industry. These measures include a significant increase in member states’ financial contributions to the EDIP, more aggregation of orders for the development of defence products, and enhanced use of joint procurement.

    MEPs want the new programme to focus on improving the supply of weapons, ammunition and other crisis-relevant products, boosting manufacturing capacities or ensuring their ramp-up, reducing lead times for production and delivery, and increasing stockpiling.

    Other principles agreed by MEPs to strengthen Europe’s defence capacity include the following:

    • Introducing a “buy European” principle by which the EDIP should only fund products where the cost of components originating in the EU or associated countries represents at least the 70% of the estimated end product value.
    • To be eligible for funds, European defence projects of common interest should involve at least six member states, or at least four that are facing high exposure to the risk of conventional military threats; MEPs want also Ukraine to participate.
    • A European ‘military sales mechanism’ would work as a centralised catalogue of defence products and services to bolster EU-wide demand.
    • A new, voluntary, Structure for European Armament Programme would scale up member states’ cooperation throughout the defence equipment lifecycle.
    • An EU security of supply regime should gradually guarantee continuous access to essential defence products to tackle future supply crises; the regime would be managed by a Defence Industrial Readiness Board.


    Military support for Ukraine

    As part of the new EDIP regulation, MEPs also backed a Ukraine Support Instrument (USI) to ensure the Ukrainian defence industry’s modernisation and integration within the EDTIB. This EU funding would scale up direct investment in Ukraine’s defence industry, facilitate partnerships between EU and Ukrainian defence actors and increase EU procurement of defence capacities produced in Ukraine, including for Ukraine itself.

    Quotes

    “Our position on the EDIP sends a strong message to the Council to finalise its own position in order to start interinstitutional negotiations. The European Parliament will insist on establishing a strong regulation that will incentivise EU member states to boost joint procurement in order to build common European defence capabilities – stronger, strategic, efficient and united,” said Marie‑Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (Renew Europe, Germany), Chair of the Committee on Security and Defence.

    “Today, Parliament has come together with an unprecedented sense of urgency and purpose. In record time, we’ve forged a broad and determined majority in support of strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base – because this is no longer just an option, it’s a strategic imperative. Europe stands at a historic crossroads. Faced with Russia’s threats, we must act with unity, ambition and resolve. Investing together, developing critical military capabilities jointly, and aligning our spending efforts at EU level is the only way forward. It’s time to end our dependence on external actors. A sovereign Europe is a stronger and safer Europe, and this vote on the EDIP is a clear step in that direction”, said Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France), co-rapporteur from the Committee on Security and Defence.

    “The adoption of the EDIP report by a large majority today marks a major step for the security of the European continent and the strengthening of our defence industry. With this vote, the European Parliament is setting the bar high for the EU to enhance the sovereignty and resilience of our countries, build an effective governance framework, and design an ambitious and realistic financing solution. Our committees’ work in accelerated procedure means Parliament is ready to tackle the upcoming trilogue stage as soon as the Council has determined its position. This outcome, both in substance and pace, seemed impossible to achieve just a few weeks ago; with this important step, we have shown that our institution is rising to the challenge on this crucial issue for the future of Europe”, said François-Xavier Bellamy (EPP, France), co-rapporteur from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.

    Next steps

    The report was adopted by 70 votes to 46 with 8 abstentions. MEPs also decided to open negotiations with the Council to finalise the law, with 90 votes in favour, 20 against and with 5 abstentions. Parliament as a whole will be notified of this decision during the May plenary session.

    Background

    The European Commission put forward a proposal for a European defence industry programme (EDIP) regulation on 5 March 2024. The EDIP – with a proposed budget of €1.5 billion – seeks to achieve defence industrial readiness by bridging the gap between short-term emergency measures, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), that have been implemented since 2023 and will end in 2025, and a more structural, long-term approach.

    The EDTIB comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, with an estimated combined annual turnover of €70 billion.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Regulated tariffs for the sale of electricity: a force for stability and social justice in Europe – E-001358/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001358/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Thomas Pellerin-Carlin (S&D)

    The recent energy crisis has demonstrated the importance of a tariff framework that guarantees stable and predictable prices for consumers. In France, regulated tariffs for the sale of electricity (TRVEs) play this essential role, protecting 60% of households and many very small businesses against market volatility.

    Refuting the argument that TRVEs constitute a barrier to competition, the French Energy Regulatory Commission has demonstrated that these tariffs are compatible with a balanced market and provide direct benefits to consumers. By extending the TRVEs until 2030, France is opting for the path of protection and economic stability.

    At a time when the EU is promoting the electrification of uses and the energy transition, it is time to draw inspiration from this type of mechanism to guarantee affordable electricity for all Europeans.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to promote mechanisms inspired by the TRVEs to guarantee fair and stable prices at the European level?
    • 2.What tools does it propose to ensure effective consumer protection in the face of market volatility, based on the principles of social justice and ecological transition?

    Submitted: 2.4.2025

    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: What 2,000 years of Chinese history reveals about today’s AI-driven technology panic – and the future of inequality

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Peng Zhou, Professor of Economics, Cardiff University

    In the sweltering summer of AD18, a desperate chant echoed across China’s sun-scorched plains: “Heaven has gone blind!” Thousands of starving farmers, their faces smeared with ox blood, marched toward the opulent vaults held by the Han dynasty’s elite rulers.

    As recorded in the ancient text Han Shu (the book of Han), these farmers’ calloused hands held bamboo scrolls – ancient “tweets” accusing the bureaucrats of hoarding grain while the farmers’ children gnawed tree bark. The rebellion’s firebrand warlord leader, Chong Fan, roared: “Drain the paddies!”

    Within weeks, the Red Eyebrows, as the protesters became known, had toppled local regimes, raided granaries and – for a fleeting moment – shattered the empire’s rigid hierarchy.

    The Han dynasty of China (202BC-AD220) was one of the most developed civilisations of its time, alongside the Roman empire. Its development of cheaper and sharper iron ploughs enabled the gathering of unprecedented harvests of grain.

    But instead of uplifting the farmers, this technological revolution gave rise to agrarian oligarchs who hired ever-more officials to govern their expanding empire. Soon, bureaucrats earned 30 times more than those tilling the soil.

    Revolutionary iron ploughs from the Han dynasty.
    Windmemories via Wikimedia, CC BY-NC-SA

    And when droughts struck, the farmers and their families starved while the empire’s elites maintained their opulence. As a famous poem from the subsequent Tang dynasty put it: “While meat and wine go to waste behind vermilion gates, the bones of the frozen dead lie by the roadside.”

    Two millennia later, the role of technology in increasing inequality around the world remains a major political and societal issue. AI-driven “technology panic” – exacerbated by the disruptive efforts of Donald Trump’s new administration in the US – gives the feeling that everything has been upended. New tech is destroying old certainties; populist revolt is shredding the political consensus.

    And yet, as we stand at the edge of this technological cliff, seemingly peering into a future of AI-induced job apocalypses, history whispers: “Calm down. You’ve been here before.”

    The link between technology and inequality

    Technology is humanity’s cheat code to break free from scarcity. The Han dynasty’s iron plough didn’t just till soil; it doubled crop yields, enriching landlords and swelling tax coffers for emperors while – initially, at least – leaving peasants further behind. Similarly, Britain’s steam engine didn’t just spin cotton; it built coal barons and factory slums. Today, AI isn’t just automating tasks; it’s creating trillion-dollar tech fiefdoms while destroying myriads of routine jobs.

    Technology amplifies productivity by doing more with less. Over centuries, these gains compound, raising economic output and increasing incomes and lifespans. But each innovation reshapes who holds power, who gets rich – and who gets left behind.

    As the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter warned during the second world war, technological progress is never a benign rising tide that lifts all boats. It’s more like a tsunami that drowns some and deposits others on golden shores, amid a process he called “creative destruction”.

    The Kuznets curve.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    A decade later, Russian-born US economist Simon Kuznets proposed his “inverted-U of inequality”, the Kuznets curve. For decades, this offered a reassuring narrative for citizens of democratic nations seeking greater fairness: inequality was an inevitable – but temporary – price of technological progress and the economic growth that comes with it.

    In recent years, however, this analysis has been sharply questioned. Most notably, French economist Thomas Piketty, in a reappraisal of more than three centuries of data, argued in 2013 that Kuznets had been misled by historical fluke. The postwar fall in inequality he had observed was not a general law of capitalism, but a product of exceptional events: two world wars, economic depression, and massive political reforms.

    In normal times, Piketty warned, the forces of capitalism will always tend to make the rich richer, pushing inequality ever higher unless checked by aggressive redistribution.

    So, who’s correct? And where does this leave us as we ponder the future in this latest, AI-driven industrial revolution? In fact, both Kuznets and Piketty were working off quite narrow timeframes in modern human history. Another country, China, offers the chance to chart patterns of growth and inequality over a much longer period – due to its historical continuity, cultural stability, and ethnic uniformity.


    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.


    Unlike other ancient civilisations such as the Egyptians and Mayans, China has maintained a unified identity and unique language for more than 5,000 years, allowing modern scholars to trace thousand-year-old economic records. So, with colleagues Qiang Wu and Guangyu Tong, I set out to reconcile the ideas of Kuznets and Piketty by studying technological growth and wage inequality in imperial China over 2,000 years – back beyond the birth of Jesus.

    To do this, we scoured China’s extraordinarily detailed dynastic archives, including the Book of Han (AD111) and Tang Huiyao (AD961), in which meticulous scribes recorded the salaries of different ranking officials. And here is what we learned about the forces – good and bad, corrupt and selfless – that most influenced the rise and fall of inequality in China over the past two millennia.

    Chinese dynasties and their most influential technologies:

    Black text denotes historical events in the west; grey text denotes important interactions between China and the west.
    Peng Zhou, CC BY-NC-SA

    China’s cycles of growth and inequality

    One of the challenges of assessing wage inequality over thousands of years is that people were paid different things at different times – such as grain, silk, silver and even labourers.

    The Book of Han records that “a governor’s annual grain salary could fill 20 oxcarts”. Another entry describes how a mid-ranking Han official’s salary included ten servants tasked solely with polishing his ceremonial armour. Ming dynasty officials had their meagre wages supplemented with gifts of silver, while Qing elites hid their wealth in land deals.

    Map of the Han dynasty in AD2.
    Yeu Ninje via Wikimedia, CC BY-NC-SA

    To enable comparison over two millennia, we invented a “rice standard” – akin to the gold standard that was the basis of the international monetary system for a century from the 1870s. Rice is not just a staple of Chinese diets, it has been a stable measure of economic life for thousands of years.

    While rice’s dominion began around 7,000BC in the Yangtze river’s fertile marshes, it was not until the Han dynasty that it became the soul of Chinese life. Farmers prayed to the “Divine Farmer” for bountiful harvests, and emperors performed elaborate ploughing rituals to ensure cosmic harmony. A Tang dynasty proverb warned: “No rice in the bowl, bones in the soil.”

    Using price records, we converted every recorded salary – whether paid in silk, silver, rent or servants – into its rice equivalent. We could then compare the “real rice wages” of two categories of people we called either “officials” or “peasants” (including farmers), as a way of tracking levels of inequality over the two millennia since the start of the Han dynasty in 202BC. This chart shows how real-wage inequality in China rose and fell over the past 2,000 years, according to our rice-based analysis.

    Official-peasant wage ratio in imperial China over 2,000 years:

    The ratio describes the multiple by which the ‘real rice wage’ of the average ‘official’ exceeds that of the average ‘peasant’, giving an indication of changing inequality levels over two millennia.
    Peng Zhou, CC BY-SA

    The chart’s black line describes a tug-of-war between growth and inequality over the past two millennia. We found that, across each major dynasty, there were four key factors driving levels of inequality in China: technology (T), institutions (I), politics (P), and social norms (S). These followed the following cycle with remarkable regularity.

    1. Technology triggers an explosion of growth and inequality

    During the Han dynasty, new iron-working techniques led to better ploughs and irrigation tools. Harvests boomed, enabling the Chinese empire to balloon in both territory and population. But this bounty mostly went to those at the top of society. Landlords grabbed fields, bureaucrats gained privileges, while ordinary farmers saw precious little reward. The empire grew richer – but so did the gap between high officials and the peasant majority.

    Even when the Han fell around AD220, the rise of wage inequality was barely interrupted. By the time of the Tang dynasty (AD618–907), China was enjoying a golden age. Silk Road trade flourished as two more technological leaps had a profound impact on the country’s fortunes: block printing and refined steelmaking.

    Block printing enabled the mass production of books – Buddhist texts, imperial exam guides, poetry anthologies – at unprecedented speed and scale. This helped spread literacy and standardise administration, as well as sparking a bustling market in bookselling.

    Meanwhile, refined steelmaking boosted everything from agricultural tools to weaponry and architectural hardware, lowering costs and raising productivity. With a more literate populace and an abundance of stronger metal goods, China’s economy hit new heights. Chang’an, then China’s cosmopolitan capital, boasted exotic markets, lavish temples, and a swirl of foreign merchants enjoying the Tang dynasty’s prosperity.

    While the Tang dynasty marked the high-water mark for levels of inequality in Chinese history, subsequent dynasties would continue to wrestle with the same core dilemma: how do you reap the benefits of growth without allowing an overly privileged – and increasingly corrupt – bureaucratic class to push everyone else into peril?

    2. Institutions slow the rise of inequality

    Throughout the two millennia, some institutions played an important role in stabilising the empire after each burst of growth. For example, to alleviate tensions between emperors, officials and peasants, imperial exams known as “Ke Ju” were introduced during the Sui dynasty (AD581-618). And by the time of the Song dynasty (AD960-1279) that followed the demise of the Tang, these exams played a dominant role in society.

    They addressed high levels of inequality by promoting social mobility: ordinary civilians were granted greater opportunities to ascend the income ladder by achieving top marks. This induced greater competition among officials – and strengthened emperors’ authority over them in the later dynasties. As a result, both the wages of officials and wage inequality went down as their bargaining power gradually diminished.

    However, the rise of each new dynasty was also marked by a growth of bureaucracy that led to inefficiencies, favouritism and bribery. Over time, corrupt practices took root, eroding trust in officialdom and heightening wage inequality as many officials commanded informal fees or outright bribes to sustain their lifestyles.

    As a result, while the emergence of certain institutions was able to put a break on rising inequality, it typically took another powerful – and sometimes highly destructive – factor to start reducing it.

    3. Political infighting and external wars reduce inequality

    Eventually, the rampant rise in inequality seen in almost every major Chinese dynasty bred deep tensions – not only between the upper and lower classes, but even between the emperor and their officials.

    These pressures were heightened by the pressures of external conflict, as each dynasty waged wars in pursuit of further growth. The Tang’s three century-rule featured conflicts such as the Eastern Turkic-Tang war (AD626), the Baekje-Goguryeo-Silla war (666), and the Arab-Tang battle of Talas (751).

    The resulting demand for more military spending drained imperial coffers, forcing salary cuts for soldiers and tax hikes on the peasants – breeding resentment among both that sometimes led to popular uprisings. In a desperate bid for survival, the imperial court then slashed officials’ pay and stripped away their bureaucratic perks.

    The result? Inequality plummeted during these times of war and rebellion – but so did stability. Famine was rife, frontier garrisons mutinied, and for decades, warlords carved out territories while the imperial centre floundered.

    So, this shrinking wage gap cannot be said to have resulted in a happier, more stable society. Rather, it reflected the fact that everyone – rich and poor – was worse off in the chaos. During the final imperial dynasty, the Qing (from the end of the 17th century), real-terms GDP per person was dropping to levels that had last been seen at the start of the Han dynasty, 2,000 years earlier.

    4. Social norms emphasise harmony, preserve privilege

    One other common factor influencing the rise and fall of inequality across China’s dynasties was the shared rules and expectations that developed within each society.

    A striking example is the social norms rooted in the philosophy of Neo-Confucianism, which emerged in the Song dynasty at the end of the first millennium – a period sometimes described as China’s version of the Renaissance. It blended the moral philosophy of classical Confucianism – created by the philosopher and political theorist Confucius during the Zhou dynasty (1046-256BC) – with metaphysical elements drawn from both Buddhism and Daoism.

    Neo-Confucianism emphasised social harmony, hierarchical order and personal virtue – values that reinforced imperial authority and bureaucratic discipline. Unsurprisingly, it quickly gained the support of emperors keen to ensure control of their people, and became the mainstream school of thought in the Ming and Qing dynasties.

    However, Neo-Confucianist thinking proved a double-edged sword. Local gentry hijacked this moral authority to fortify their own power. Clan leaders set up Confucian schools and performed elaborate ancestral rites, projecting themselves as guardians of tradition.

    Over time, these social norms became rigid. What had once fostered order and legitimacy became brittle dogma, more useful for preserving privilege than guiding reform. Neo-Confucian ideals evolved into a protective veil for entrenched elites. When the weight of crisis eventually came, they offered little resilience.

    The last dynasty

    China’s final imperial dynasty, the Qing, collapsed under the weight of multiple uprisings both from within and without. Despite achieving impressive economic growth during the 18th century – fuelled by agricultural innovation, a population boom, and the roaring global trade in tea and porcelain – levels of inequality exploded, in part due to widespread corruption.

    The infamous government official Heshen, widely regarded as the most corrupt figure in the Qing dynasty, amassed a personal fortune reckoned to exceed the empire’s entire annual revenue (one estimate suggests he amassed 1.1 billion taels of silver, equivalent to around US$270 billion (£200bn), during his lucrative career).

    Imperial institutions failed to restrain the inequality and moral decay that the Qing’s growth had initially masked. The mechanisms that once spurred prosperity – technological advances, centralised bureaucracy and Confucian moral authority – eventually ossified, serving entrenched power rather than adaptive reform.

    When shocks like natural disasters and foreign invasions struck, the system could no longer respond. The collapse of the empire became inevitable – and this time there was no groundbreaking technology to enable a new dynasty to take the Qing’s place. Nor were there fresh social ideals or revitalised institutions capable of rebooting the imperial model. As foreign powers surged ahead with their own technological breakthroughs, China’s imperial system collapsed under its own weight. The age of emperors was over.

    The world had turned. As China embarked on two centuries of technological and economic stagnation – and political humiliation at the hands of Great Britain and Japan – other nations, led first by Britain and then the US, would step up to build global empires on the back of new technological leaps.

    In these modern empires, we see the same four key influences on their cycles of growth and inequality – technology, institutions, politics and social norms – but playing out at an ever-faster rate. As the saying goes: history does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.

    Rule Britannia

    If imperial China’s inequality saga was written in rice and rebellions, Britain’s industrial revolution featured steam and strikes. In Lancashire’s “satanic mills”, steam engines and mechanised looms created industrialists so rich that their fortunes dwarfed small nations.

    In 1835, social observer Andrew Ure enthused: “Machinery is the grand agent of civilisation.” Yet for many decades, the steam engines, spinning jennies and railways disproportionately enriched the new industrial class, just as in the Han dynasty of China 2,000 years earlier. The workers? They inhaled soot, lived in slums – and staged Europe’s first symbolic protest when the Luddites began smashing their looms in 1811.

    A spinning jenny.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    During the 19th century, Britain’s richest 1% hoarded as much as 70% of the nation’s wealth, while labourers toiled 16-hour days in mills. In cities like Manchester, child workers earned pennies while industrialists built palaces.

    But as inequality peaked in Britain, the backlash brewed. Trade unions formed (and became legal in 1824) to demand fair wages. Reforms such as the Factory Acts (1833–1878) banned child labour and capped working hours.

    Although government forces intervened to suppress the uprisings, unrest such as the 1830 Swing Riots and 1842 General Strike exposed deep social and economic inequalities. By 1900, child labour was banned and pensions had been introduced. The 1900 Labour Representation Committee (later the Labour Party) vowed to “promote legislation in the direct interests of labour” – a striking echo of how China’s imperial exams had attempted to open paths to power.

    Slowly, the working class saw some improvement: real wages for Britain’s poorest workers gradually increased over the latter half of the 19th century, as mass production lowered the cost of goods and expanding factory employment provided a more stable livelihood than subsistence farming.

    And then, two world wars flattened Britain’s elite – the Blitz didn’t discriminate between rich and poor neighbourhoods. When peace finally returned, the Beveridge Report gave rise to the welfare state: the NHS, social housing, and pensions.

    Income inequality plummeted as a result. The top 1%’s share fell from 70% to 15% by 1979. While China’s inequality fell via dynastic collapse, Britain’s decline resulted from war-driven destruction, progressive taxation, and expansive social reforms.

    Wealth share of top 1% in the UK

    Evidence for UK inequality before 1895 is not well documented; dotted curve is conjectured based on Kuznets curve. Sources: Alvaredo et al (2018), World Inequality Database.
    Peng Zhou, CC BY-SA

    However, from the 1980s onwards, inequality in Britain has begun to rise again. This new cycle of inequality has coincided with another technological revolution: the emergence of personal computers and information technology — innovations that fundamentally transformed how wealth was created and distributed.

    The era was accelerated by deregulation, deindustrialisation and privatisation — policies associated with former prime minister Margaret Thatcher, that favoured capital over labour. Trade unions were weakened, income taxes on the highest earners were slashed, and financial markets were unleashed. Today, the richest 1% of UK adults own more 20% of the country’s total wealth.

    The UK now appears to be in the worst of both worlds – wrestling with low growth and rising inequality. Yet renewal is still within reach. The current UK government’s pledge to streamline regulation and harness AI could spark fresh growth – provided it is coupled with serious investment in skills, modern infrastructure, and inclusive institutions geared to benefit all workers.

    At the same time, history reminds us that technology is a lever, not a panacea. Sustained prosperity comes only when institutional reform and social attitudes evolve in step with innovation.

    The American century

    While China’s growth-and-inequality cycles unfolded over millennia and Britain’s over centuries, America’s story is a fast-forward drama of cycles lasting mere decades. In the early 20th century, several waves of new technology widened the gap between rich and poor dramatically.

    By 1929, as the world teetered on the edge of the Great Depression, John D. Rockefeller had amassed such a vast fortune – valued at roughly 1.5% of America’s entire GDP – that newspapers hailed him the world’s first billionaire. His wealth stemmed largely from pioneering petroleum and petrochemical ventures including Standard Oil, which dominated oil refining in an age when cars and mechanised transport were exploding in popularity.

    Yet this period of unprecedented riches for a handful of magnates coincided with severe imbalances in the broader US economy. The “roaring Twenties” had boosted consumerism and stock speculation, but wage growth for many workers lagged behind skyrocketing corporate profits. By 1929, the top 1% of Americans owned more than a third of the nation’s income, creating a precariously narrow base of prosperity.

    When the US stock market crashed in October 1929, it laid bare how vulnerable the system was to the fortunes of a tiny elite. Millions of everyday Americans – living without adequate savings or safeguards – faced immediate hardship, ushering in the Great Depression. Breadlines snaked through city streets, and banks collapsed under waves of withdrawals they could not meet.

    Unemployed men queued outside a Great Depression soup kitchen in Chicago, 1931.
    National Archives at College Park via Wikimedia

    In response, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal reshaped American institutions. It introduced unemployment insurance, minimum wages, and public works programmes to support struggling workers, while progressive taxation – with top rates exceeding 90% during the second world war. Roosevelt declared: “The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much – it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little.”

    In a different way to the UK, the second world war proved a great leveller for the US – generating millions of jobs and drawing women and minorities into industries they’d long been excluded from. After 1945, the GI Bill expanded education and home ownership for veterans, helping to build a robust middle class. Although access remained unequal, especially along racial lines, the era marked a shift toward the norm that prosperity should be shared.

    Meanwhile, grassroots movements led by figures like Martin Luther King Jr. reshaped social norms about justice. In his lesser-quoted speeches, King warned that “a dream deferred is a dream denied” and launched the Poor People’s Campaign, which demanded jobs, healthcare and housing for all Americans. This narrowing of income distribution during the post-war era was dubbed the “Great Compression” – but it did not last.

    As oil crises of the 1970s marked the end of the preceding cycle of inequality, another cycle began with the full-scale emergence of the third industrial revolution, powered by computers, digital networks and information technology.

    The first personal computer, made by IBM.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-ND

    As digitalisation transformed business models and labour markets, wealth flowed to those who owned the algorithms, patents and platforms – not those operating the machines. Hi-tech entrepreneurs and Wall Street financiers became the new oligarchs. Stock options replaced salaries as the true measure of success, and companies increasingly rewarded capital over labour.

    By the 2000s, the wealth share of the richest 1% climbed to 30% in the US. The gap between the elite minority and working majority widened with every company stock market launch, hedge fund bonus and quarterly report tailored to shareholder returns.

    But this wasn’t just a market phenomenon – it was institutionally engineered. The 1980s ushered in the age of (Ronald) Reaganomics, driven by the conviction that “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”. Following this neoliberalist philosophy, taxes on high incomes were slashed, capital gains were shielded, and labour unions were weakened.

    Deregulation gave Wall Street free rein to innovate and speculate, while public investment in housing, healthcare and education was curtailed. The consequences came to a head in 2008 when the US housing market collapsed and the financial system imploded.

    The Global Financial Crisis that followed exposed the fragility of a deregulated economy built on credit bubbles and concentrated risk. Millions of people lost their homes and jobs, while banks were rescued with public money. It marked an economic rupture and a moral reckoning – proof that decades of pro-market policies had produced a system that privatised gain and socialised loss.

    Inequality, long growing in the background, now became a glaring, undeniable fault line in American life – and it has remained that way ever since.

    Fig 5. Wealth share and income share of top 1% in the US

    Sources: wealth inequality: World Inequality Database; income share: Picketty & Saez (2003). Dotted curves are conjectured based on Kuznets curve.
    Peng Zhou, CC BY-SA

    So is the US proof that the Kuznets model of inequality is indeed wrong? While the chart above shows inequality has flattened in the US since the 2008 financial crisis, there is little evidence of it actually declining. And in the short term, while Donald Trump’s tariffs are unlikely to do much for growth in the US, his low-tax policies won’t do anything to raise working-class incomes either.

    The story of “the American century” is a dizzying sequence of technological revolutions – from transport and manufacturing to the internet and now AI – crashing one atop the other before institutions, politics or social norms could catch up. In my view, the result is not a broken cycle but an interrupted one. Like a wheel that never completes its turn, inequality rises, reform stutters – and a new wave of disruption begins.

    Our unequal AI future?

    Like any technological explosion, AI’s potential is dual-edged. Like the Tang dynasty’s bureaucrats hoarding grain, today’s tech giants monopolise data, algorithms and computing power. Management consultant firm McKinsey has predicted that algorithms could automate 30% of jobs by 2030, from lorry drivers to radiologists.

    Yet AI also democratises: ChatGPT tutors students in Africa while open-source models such as DeepSeek empower worldwide startups to challenge Silicon Valley’s oligarchy.

    The rise of AI isn’t just a technological revolution – it’s a political battleground. History’s empires collapsed when elites hoarded power; today’s fight over AI mirrors the same stakes. Will it become a tool for collective uplift like Britain’s post-war welfare state? Or a weapon of control akin to Han China’s grain-hoarding bureaucrats?

    The answer hinges on who wins these political battles. In 19th-century Britain, factory owners bribed MPs to block child labour laws. Today, Big Tech spends billions lobbying to neuter AI regulation.

    Meanwhile, grassroots movements like the Algorithmic Justice League demand bans on facial recognition in policing, echoing the Luddites who smashed looms not out of technophobia but to protest exploitation. The question is not if AI will be regulated but who will write the rules: corporate lobbyists or citizen coalitions.

    The real threat has never been the technology itself, but the concentration of its spoils. When elites hoard tech-driven wealth, social fault-lines crack wide open – as happened more than 2,000 years ago when the Red Eyebrows marched against Han China’s agricultural monopolies.

    To be human is to grow – and to innovate. Technological progress raises inequality faster than incomes, but the response depends on how people band together. Initiatives like “Responsible AI” and “Data for All” reframe digital ethics as a civil right, much like Occupy Wall Street exposed wealth gaps. Even memes – like TikTok skits mocking ChatGPT’s biases – shape public sentiment.

    There is no simple path between growth and inequality. But history shows our AI future isn’t preordained in code: it’s written, as always, by us.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

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    Peng Zhou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What 2,000 years of Chinese history reveals about today’s AI-driven technology panic – and the future of inequality – https://theconversation.com/what-2-000-years-of-chinese-history-reveals-about-todays-ai-driven-technology-panic-and-the-future-of-inequality-254505

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Belgium’s euthanasia trends dispute ‘slippery slope’ argument – new study

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jacques Wels, Principal Investigator, Unit for Lifelong Health & Ageing, UCL

    Euthanasia has been legal in Belgium since mid-2002, and in the past two decades, the number of reported cases has risen sharply. In 2003, only 236 cases were recorded, but by 2023, this had increased to 3,423. This means that euthanasia now accounts for around 3% of all deaths. But what explains this increase? And does it suggest a worrying trend, as some critics fear?

    In a new study published in Jama Network Open, my colleagues and I analysed trends in all reported euthanasia cases between 2002 and 2023. Our findings show that the rise in euthanasia cases can be attributed to two factors: “regulatory onset” (the time required for both the medical community to adapt its practices and protocols to the new law, and for the public to become informed about its availability and implications) and demographic change, including population ageing.

    We saw a sharp rise in cases during the 15 years following the law being introduced, followed by a period of stabilisation. About one-third of the increase can be explained by demographic changes – mainly population ageing. Euthanasia is indeed most common among people in their 70s and 80s, who often suffer from terminal cancer or several conditions. The number of people in those age categories has steadily increased.

    A common point of contention in the euthanasia debate is the inclusion of psychiatric disorders as a valid reason. In Belgium, euthanasia for psychiatric conditions has been permitted since the law was first introduced. However, despite concerns that this might lead to a rapid expansion of cases, our study finds that psychiatric euthanasia remains extremely rare.

    Between 2002 and 2023, psychiatric conditions accounted for just 1.3% of all euthanasia cases, and this figure has remained stable over time. The strict criteria mean that these cases typically involve long-standing conditions where all treatment options failed. In all cases, the person seeking to end their life underwent an extensive assessment before euthanasia was approved.

    Euthanasia for dementia, however, has increased slightly in recent years. While cases remain low – under 1% of total euthanasia cases – there has been a gradual rise, partially reflecting the ageing of Belgium’s population.

    There are also regional differences. Historically, euthanasia rates have been higher in the Flemish region than in French-speaking Wallonia and Brussels. However, our study shows that this gap has narrowed in recent years. This may reflect shifting cultural attitudes or changes in access to end-of-life care, but, overall, the trend points to a growing alignment in practices across the country.

    One of the biggest concerns around euthanasia laws is the so-called slippery slope argument – the idea that legalisation could lead to a broadening of criteria, eventually allowing euthanasia for non-terminal conditions, mental health issues or even socioeconomic reasons. However, our study finds no evidence to support this claim.

    Slippery slope argument explained.

    The increase in euthanasia cases has largely followed demographic trends and legislation implementation, rather than any broadening of legal criteria or changes in medical practice. Over time, both the regional and gender gaps have decreased, showing a more consistent pattern across the population rather than diverging trends.

    Belgium’s approach differs significantly from the assisted dying bill currently being debated in the UK. With assisted dying, the patient ends their own life but a doctor prescribes the life-ending medication. With euthanasia, a doctor administers the life-ending medication. The proposed UK legislation would allow assisted dying only for terminally ill patients with a short life expectancy, whereas Belgium’s law permits euthanasia even when death is not expected in the near future.

    This is particularly relevant for patients with psychiatric disorders or dementia, who may suffer unbearably for years before meeting the UK’s proposed eligibility criteria. Another key distinction is decision-making: in Belgium, the final decision is made by doctors, whereas the UK is mooting judicial oversight.

    Data gaps

    One thing that countries allowing assisted dying need to think about is how to track and collect euthanasia data. Belgium has a national system for reporting, but there are still gaps – especially in connecting euthanasia data with people’s social and economic backgrounds. It’s important to understand who asks for euthanasia and why, to assess the long-term effects of the law.

    As more countries consider assisted dying laws, Belgium’s experience offers valuable lessons – not only on regulation but also on the importance of robust data monitoring from the outset.

    Jacques Wels receives funding from the Belgian National Scientific Fund (FNRS) and the European Research Council (ERC).

    Natasia Hamarat reports participating in the Federal Commission for the Control and Evaluation of Euthanasia (FCCEE).

    ref. Belgium’s euthanasia trends dispute ‘slippery slope’ argument – new study – https://theconversation.com/belgiums-euthanasia-trends-dispute-slippery-slope-argument-new-study-252323

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Lectra: Q1 2025 financial report available

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Q1 2025 financial report available

    Paris, April 24, 2025 – Lectra informs its shareholders, in compliance with Article 221-4-IV of the General Regulation of the Autorité des marchés financiers, that the Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the first quarter 2025 is available on the company’s website: www.lectra.com

    It is also available, upon request, by email: investor.relations@lectra.com

            .

    About Lectra :

    At the forefront of innovation since its founding in 1973, Lectra provides industrial intelligence technology solutions—combining software in SaaS mode, cutting equipment, data, and associated services—to players in the fashion, automotive and furniture industries. With boldness and passion, Lectra accelerates the transformation and success of its customers in a world in perpetual motion thanks to the key technologies of Industry 4.0: AI, big data, cloud and the Internet of Things. 

    The Group is present in more than one hundred countries. It operates three production sites for its cutting equipment, located in France, China and the United States. Lectra’s 3,000 employees are driven by three core values: being open-minded thinkers, trusted partners and passionate innovators. They all share the same concern for social responsibility, which is one of the pillars of Lectra’s strategy to ensure its sustainable growth and that of its customers.

    Lectra reported revenues of €527 million in 2024, including €77 million coming from its SaaS offerings. The company is listed on Euronext, and is included in the CAC All Shares, CAC Technology, EN Tech Leaders and ENT PEA-PME 150 indices.

    For more information, please visit lectra.com

    Lectra – World Headquarters et siège social : 16–18, rue Chalgrin • 75016 Paris • France
    Tél. +33 (0)1 53 64 42 00 – lectra.com
    Société anonyme au capital de 37 966 274 €. RCS Paris B 300 702 305

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