NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: France

  • MIL-OSI Banking: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: CSO-3 optical Earth-observation satellite successfully launched

    • The CSO system comprises three defense and security satellites
    • This trio has two distinct missions: reconnaissance for CSO-1 and CSO-3, and identification for CSO-2, affording higher resolution and refined analysis
    • The very-high-resolution optical instrument flying on each satellite is a marvel of technology built by prime contractor Thales Alenia Space

    Cannes, March  6th, 2025 – The CSO-3 military observation satellite has been successfully launched by Arianespace atop an Ariane 6 from Europe’s spaceport in French Guiana. Carrying a very-high-resolution optical instrument built by Thales Alenia Space, the joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), the satellite was developed by prime contractor Airbus Defence & Space for the French defense procurement agency DGA on behalf of the French Air and Space Force’s Space Command, with delegated oversight from the French space agency CNES.

    CSO © CNES

    The third and last component in the CSO system for France’s MUSIS* military program, CSO-3 will provide increased coverage and revisit capabilities to enable more effective conduct of military operations and faster crisis response.

    Designed to the most stringent intelligence and defense requirements, CSO-3 is equipped with a cutting-edge instrument developed by Thales Alenia Space. This instrument is the core of the mission, affording exceptional resolution and detail of Earth’s surface. Its unrivaled performance enables it to acquire imagery at extremely high resolution, even in low-light conditions and at night thanks to its infrared capabilities. Its advanced technologies include latest-generation optical systems and ultra-sensitive sensors. 

    CSO © CNES

    Like for the previous Helios 1, Helios 2 and Pleiades satellites, Thales Alenia Space designed strategic equipment for the CSO system, including the solar arrays, very-high-throughput image telemetry systems, and encryption/decryption modules to ensure data security and confidentiality. The company also supplied the system’s telemetry, tracking and control transponders.

    “The launch of CSO-3 is a major milestone for French sovereignty in space, both in terms of launch capabilities and satellite technology,” said Hervé Derrey, Thales Alenia Space CEO. “With the completion of this system, France is leading the way in optical space reconnaissance. The CSO system’s exceptional performance is based in particular on the optical instrument built by the teams at Thales Alenia Space and our industry partners. These unique skills in Europe are strategically important and demonstrate our ability to meet the new challenges facing French and European sovereignty.”

    *Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Observation

    About THALES ALENIA SPACE

    Drawing on over 40 years of experience and a unique combination of skills, expertise and cultures, Thales Alenia Space delivers innovative solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental management, exploration, science and orbital infrastructures. Governments and private industry alike count on Thales Alenia Space to design and build satellite-based systems that provide anytime, anywhere connections and positioning, monitor our planet, enhance management of its resources and explore our Solar System and beyond. Thales Alenia Space sees space as a new horizon, helping to build a better, more sustainable life on Earth. A joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), Thales Alenia Space also teams up with Telespazio to form the parent companies’ Space Alliance, which offers a complete range of services. Thales Alenia Space posted consolidated revenues of approximately €2.2 billion in 2023 and has around 8,600 employees in 8 countries, with 16 sites in Europe.
     

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Leveraging South-South and triangular cooperation: inclusive and technological innovations for urban health and disaster risk reduction

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Time: 8:00 New York | 13:00 Geneva | 19:00 Bangkok | 21:00 Incheon 
    Date: 12, 19, 26 March 2025 (Wednesdays)
    (Three 120-minute online sessions and one post-course survey)
    Workshop Language: English with simultaneous interpretation in Arabic, Chinese, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and International Sign Language.

    Background

    Resilient and inclusive cities are key to achieving global commitments such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. These cities ensure no one is left behind by actively involving all community members, particularly marginalized groups like persons with disabilities, older persons, among others in resilience planning and decision-making. The Sendai Framework emphasizes that inclusive disaster risk reduction (DRR) is essential for effective risk management, while the 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of inclusivity in achieving Sustainable Development Goal 11, which aims to make cities inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable. The Pact for the Future (2024) further underscores the need to empower all individuals, regardless of their background, to contribute meaningfully to the design and implementation of urban resilience strategies.

    Technological solutions play a crucial role in disaster risk reduction and management by enhancing early warning systems, real-time monitoring, and rapid response capabilities. Countries and cities are increasingly adopting and sharing innovative solutions, such as satellite-based remote sensing, AI-powered predictive analytics, and IoT-enabled sensors, to detect hazards and improve disaster preparedness. Collaborative initiatives, including joint research, technology transfers, and capacity-building programs, enable developing countries to leverage cost-effective, context-specific innovations. Mobile applications, digital communication platforms, and drone technology—often co-developed through South-South and Triangular Cooperation—enhance response efforts, fostering resilience and data-driven decision-making across at-risk regions.

    In addition to these principles, South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) offers valuable opportunities to foster knowledge sharing, capacity building, and technology exchange among countries in the Global South. The Buenos Aires outcome document of BAPA+40 (2019) underscores the role of local authorities, women, and youth in advancing South-South and Triangular Cooperation and promoting inclusive societies to achieve sustainable development. By leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation, cities can adopt innovative solutions to address disaster risks, including the use of technology for early warning systems, data analytics, and inclusive infrastructure design. This approach aligns with global efforts, such as WHO’s Healthy Cities initiative, which integrates public health into urban planning to enhance resilience, inclusivity, and well-being. Through South-South and Triangular Cooperation, the use of technology, and a focus on inclusivity, cities can strengthen their disaster risk reduction capacities and better prepare for challenges such as climate change, urbanization, and other emerging risks.

    Since 2020, UNOSSC, UNDRR GETI, PAHO/WHO have jointly organized four certificate online training programmes. These programs focused on leveraging South-South and Triangular Cooperation, disaster risk reduction, and integrating health emergency response and preparedness into building resilient cities and societies, addressing various phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, including outbreak response, emergency management, and recovery. The training series has been highly successful, attracting over 9,800 live session participants and over 6,500 self-paced learners from 155 countries and territories.

    Building on its success, the fifth joint training will be held in March 2025 by UNDRR, UNOSSC and PAHO/WHO, aiming to provide a foundation for engaging multi-level governments and diverse stakeholders, particularly the most at-risk groups—such as women, older persons, and person with disabilities—in disaster risk reduction, health emergency, and disaster risk management. The course will emphasize the importance of a whole-of-society approach, the use of technology, and the facilitation of South-South and Triangular Cooperation in creating inclusive, resilient and healthy cities, featuring practical tools and examples.  

    Course Objective:

    This training serves as an introductory training for urban leaders, planners, and practitioners, aiming to:

    • Increase awareness and understanding for managing complex urban disaster risks, health emergencies, and disaster risk management, leveraging technology, and facilitating South-South and Triangular Cooperation;
    • Introduce useful concepts and tools to strengthen inclusion, especially the inclusion of persons with disabilities and older persons in urban disaster risk management;
    • Better prepare city stakeholders and engage them in making cities resilient and inclusive for future crises, health and non-health emergencies and uncertainties;
    • Facilitate learning through South-South and Triangular Cooperation and sharing of experience; 
    • Inspire and motivate whole-of-society to play a key and active role in securing resilient, inclusive and sustainable urban futures.

    Expected outcome:

    By the end of this training, participants shall be able to:

    • Describe disaster risk reduction, health emergency and disaster risk management, South-South and Triangular Cooperation, use of technology, and the whole-of-society approach for creating inclusive, resilient and healthy cities;
    • Apply concepts and tools such as the Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities – Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities, the Disability Inclusion in Hospital Disaster Risk Management Tool (INGRID-H), and health facilities strategic risk assessment;
    • Provide examples of good practices and relevant solutions by local government authorities and diverse stakeholders in inclusive and technology-driven disaster risk reduction, health emergency response preparedness, and South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

    Targeted Audience

    Local and national government officials in charge of disaster risk reduction and management, urban development and planning and public health emergency preparedness, national associations of municipalities, urban resilience and development practitioners, as well as civil society, private sector, and academia.

    The course is open to all participants from both developed and developing countries. Participants from Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDs) are highly encouraged.

    No. of Trainees: 

    Maximum 1,000 participants can attend the live training sessions, on a first come first served basis. 

    Facilitators:

    Experts from UNDRR, UNOSSC, and PAHO with guest speakers representing various stakeholder groups, e.g., older persons, youth, women, person with disabilities, local and national governments, and academic network.

    Post-course Survey

    To enable evidence-based course evaluation, a post-course survey will be disseminated to participants to collect feedback on the course content and organization, as well as understanding participants’ development needs for follow-up and to facilitate future programmatic designing.

    Certificate:

    Certificate of participation will be given only to participants who attend all three training sessions live and complete a post-course survey. 

    Programme

    Date Program

    Wed, 12 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 1: Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Disaster Risk Reduction (led by UNDRR)

    • Welcome Remarks by UNOSSC, PAHO and UNDRR
    • Course introduction
    • Introduction to Disaster risk reduction (DRR), urban resilience and Making Cities Resilient 2030 (MCR2030)
    • Disability Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction (DiDRR)
    • Practical tool for strengthening meaningful participation and accessibility of persons with disabilities in DRR
    • Case examples and experience sharing from local governments and stakeholders
    • Mini quiz

    Wed, 19 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 2: Older Persons and Disability Inclusive Urban Health Emergencies and Disaster Risk Management (led by PAHO/WHO)

    • Welcome & introduction
    • Mini quiz
    • Resilient Cities for All: Addressing Health Emergencies and Disaster Risks for the older persons
    • Disability Inclusion in Health Facilities Disaster Risk Management

    Wed, 26 Mar 2025

    8 AM NY EST

    9 PM KST

    (120 minutes)

    Session 3: Leveraging Technological Innovation for Urban Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (led by UNOSSC)

    • Welcome & introduction
    • Panel Presentations
    • Q&A and Panel conclusion
    • Training Wrap-up
    • Closing Remarks by UNOSSC, PAHO and UNDRR

    Organizers

    The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Global Education and Training Institute (GETI) was established in 2010 to develop a new cadre of professionals in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation to build disaster resilient societies. GETI has a global mandate to provide capacity building support to mainstream disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation into sustainable development; convene and support inter-city learning to strengthen resilience (Making Cities Resilient); and to provide capacity building and best practice sharing support to national training institutions working on resilience issues. Based in Incheon, the Republic of Korea, UNDRR GETI is also the global secretariat of the Making Cities Resilient 2030 (MCR2030).

    The United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) was established to promote, coordinate and support South-South and triangular cooperation (SSTC) globally and within the United Nations system. UNOSSC initiated the “Global South-South Development Center Phase II” (2025-2030), with full funding support from the Government of China, which aims to facilitate practical SSTC initiatives globally in advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

    Pan American Health Organization (PAHO/WHO) Health Emergencies Department works with countries of the American Region to increase the health sector resilience to emergencies and disasters. PAHO’s priority is to deliver rapid, predictable, and comprehensive support to Member States in terms of prevention, risk reduction, preparedness, surveillance, response, and early recovery in case of any threat to human health, including outbreaks or disasters caused by natural phenomena, biological, chemical or radiological agent, human activities, conflicts or any other hazard. When national capacities are overwhelmed, PAHO is ready to lead and coordinate the international health response to contain disasters, including outbreaks, and to provide effective relief and recovery to affected populations. 

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Burkina Faso, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend Electoral Quotas for Women, Raise Issues Concerning Alleged Human Rights Violations by Homeland Defence Volunteers and Potential Reinstatement of the Death Penalty

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the second periodic report of Burkina Faso on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending electoral quotas promoting women’s representation, while raising issues concerning impunity for alleged human rights violations committed by the Homeland Defence Volunteers, and the potential reinstatement of the death penalty.

    A Committee Expert welcomed the 2009 law on electoral quotas, which increased the quota for the representation of women in legislative and municipal elections from 30 to 50 per cent.  However, a 2020 law retained a 30 per cent quota; were there plans to amend it?

    A Committee Expert said there seemed to be impunity for violations committed by the special forces and Homeland Defence Volunteers.  How was the State party pursuing accountability?  Another Expert said State legislation granted self-defence militia a role in overseeing security and questioning suspects.  How was the State party preventing self-defence militia from carrying out law enforcement activities?

    One Expert said the Committee was deeply concerned by reported plans to reintroduce the death penalty in Burkina Faso.  Could the delegation clarify whether Burkina Faso was committed to abolishing the death penalty?  How was the potential reinstatement of the death penalty aligned with the State’s Covenant obligations?

    Responding to questions, the delegation said a law was implemented in 2020 that regulated quotas for women’s representation in elections, but it had since been revised.  Some 23 per cent of Government staff were women and there were five women ministers out of 23, while 27 per cent of Governors and 33 per cent of embassy staff and ambassadors were women.

    The State party did not agree with the Committee’s use of the term “self-defence militia”, the delegation said, which was not in line with reality.  Burkina Faso was facing an extraordinary security situation; security forces were reacting to neutralise terrorists.  There were no militias, only Homeland Defence Volunteers, who were under the aegis of the security forces.  State officials were not involved in the disappearances of persons; only terrorists were.  Persons who committed violations were brought before the justice system.

    The delegation said Burkina Faso had a sovereign right to decide on the imposition of the death penalty.  As the country most affected by terrorism worldwide, the State was most concerned with restoring peace and defending citizens’ rights. The death penalty existed in State legislation, such as in the military code, but there was a de facto moratorium on it.  There were plans to restore the death penalty to deter crimes of terrorism.

    Edasso Rodrigue Bayala, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, said Burkina Faso was determined to implement civil and political rights, despite the terrorist attacks faced by the country.  The State had undertaken several institutional and legislative reforms to ensure citizens could better enjoy their rights, strengthening public institutions and structures responsible for promoting human rights.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Bayala thanked the Committee for the high-quality dialogue.  The Government remained deeply committed to the respect of human rights and would closely heed any recommendations made by the Committee. The stabilisation undertaken by Burkina Faso was essential to bringing about lasting peace and development, and international partners were called on to support these efforts.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed appreciation for the constructive dialogue, and thanked all those who had contributed.  The discussions had covered a range of topics related to the Covenant, he said.

    The delegation of Burkina Faso was made up of representatives of the Presidency of Burkina Faso; Ministry of Justice and Human Rights; Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity; Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs; Ministry of Security; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Cooperation and Burkinabe Abroad; and the Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-third session is being held from 3 to 28 March 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. this afternoon, Thursday 6 March to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Zimbabwe (CCPR/C/ZWE/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the second periodic report of Burkina Faso (CCPR/C/BFA/2).

    Presentation of the Report

    SABINE BAKYONO KANZIE, Permanent Representative of Burkina Faso to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said through the dialogue with the Committee, Burkina Faso sought to renew its commitments to the rules and principles embodied in the Covenant.  The delegation would tackle key issues, focusing on what the Government had done to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework.

    EDASSO RODRIGUE BAYALA, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, said Burkina Faso was determined to implement civil and political rights, despite the terrorist attacks faced by the country.  The State had undertaken several institutional and legislative reforms to ensure citizens could better enjoy their rights.  Over the reporting period, the normative framework for the protection of civil and political rights had evolved, with the adoption of laws on the functioning of the High Council for Communication, the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners on national territory, the administration of community service, and the Homeland Defence Volunteers, as well as the 2024 amendment to the Constitution.

    The Government had strengthened public institutions and structures responsible for promoting and protecting human rights. The staff and budget of the National Human Rights Commission had been strengthened, and the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture was operationalised.  In 2023, the Government created a framework for consultation, monitoring and early warning of cases of alleged human rights violations and abuses, relating to the fight against terrorism, and an interministerial working group to implement the framework.  Judicial units specialised in economic and financial crimes and organised crime were created within the Ouaga 1 and Bobo Dioulasso High Courts, and a unit specialised in terrorism cases was created within the Ouaga II High Court.

    Burkina Faso attached great importance to the contribution of civil society organizations.  It adopted Law No. 039 on the protection of human rights defenders in 2017, which guaranteed the right of individuals and associations to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.  More than 500 young human rights defenders from areas affected by the security crisis were trained between 2020 and 2022. 

    After the report was tabled, the State party had trained 627 supervisors and trainers of the Homeland Defence Volunteers, and sensitised more than 32,000 volunteers and armed force members on the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism.  It had also held trials of terrorism cases in 2023 and 2024, in which 151 people were convicted and 95 acquitted, and held empty case files operations in January 2025, which made it possible to adjudicate 4,200 cases that had been pending for several years.

    To effectively combat terrorism, major legislative, institutional and operational reforms of the armed forces had been carried out.  Legal advisers had been established within each armed forces unit.  To guarantee the protection of the population and their property against the terrorist threat, the Government established a “state of ready alert” for a period of 12 months in April 2023, duly notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    A trial to establish responsibility regarding the death of former President Thomas Sankara was concluded in 2022 with the conviction of 14 people and  compensation for the beneficiaries.  Regarding the Norbert Zongo case, the Government had implemented the judgment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on reparations to family members and others, providing 233,135,409 CFA francs in compensation.

    To combat prison overcrowding, several measures had been adopted, including a 2024 law on community service, and the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to improve the efficiency of the Burkinabe justice system.

    Regarding the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Burkina Faso had developed a new strategy with an action plan for 2021-2025.  Structures such as the Supreme Authority for State Control and the Fight against Corruption had strengthened awareness-raising on corruption and internal controls of public structures.  From 2022 to 2024, the Supreme Authority had sent 141 cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, 31 of which had already been tried.

    The Government had undertaken a review of the Code of Persons and the Family, aiming to harmonising the minimum legal age of marriage for men and women.  The draft Code had been transmitted to the Transitional Legislative Assembly for adoption.

    Burkina Faso was committed to freedom of the press and of opinion, freedom of assembly and the right to information.  However, these freedoms were not absolute and needed to be exercised in compliance with the law.  Restrictions could be imposed by the Government on the exercise of these freedoms in accordance with international commitments.  To enable journalists and media outlets to adapt to the security context, the Government was providing training, information and awareness-raising activities on crisis-sensitive journalism.

    Despite the progress made, the security and humanitarian challenges that Burkina Faso had been facing for several years were a major concern.  Citizens were fighting with bravery and dignity for the total eradication of terrorism. The State was calling for more solidarity and support from the international community.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert noted the State party’s substantial legislative and institutional machinery, set up despite the challenges faced in the State.  What measures were in place to ensure respect for the State’s human rights commitments and implementation of the Committee’s recommendations?  Since the last review, the security and humanitarian situation had deteriorated considerably in the State party.  According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index report, “for the first time, Burkina Faso had become the country most affected by terrorism globally”.

    The Committee noted with satisfaction that the Constitution conferred on international treaties and agreements that the State party had ratified or approved a binding nature and supra-legislative authority.  Efforts had been made by the Government to disseminate the provisions of the Covenant. Could the State party provide examples of cases where national courts had invoked the provisions of the Covenant? What legislation had been harmonised with the Covenant and relevant recommendations in the previous concluding observations?  Did Constitutional revisions strengthen civil and political rights?

    A trial had been held regarding the death of former President Thomas Sankara.  Could the State party provide information on this trial and the designation of an official burial site?

    Why had the national preventive mechanism against torture been included within the National Human Rights Commission?  What were the outcomes of its activities? Could data be provided on complaints received by the Commission?  What sanctions were issued to the perpetrators of violations?  What had the Commission done to ensure proper implementation of the law on the protection of human rights defenders?  What measures had the State party taken to ensure that the Commission could recover its accreditation with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions?

    Another Committee Expert requested more information on measures taken to ensure accountability for all persons who committed violations against former President Thomas Sankara and Norbert Zongo. Why had the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity, which had investigated historic human rights violations occurring since the 1960s, been disestablished?  Had all its investigations been closed and did they lead to criminal sanctions?

    There had been an upsurge in human rights violations committed in the State since 2019 by different actors, including terrorist groups, non-State and military actors.  What measures were in place to raise awareness of human rights and international humanitarian law?  There seemed to be impunity for violations committed by the special forces and the Homeland Defence Volunteers.  How was the State party pursuing accountability?  What transitional justice measures and human rights education measures were in place?

    The State party had not withdrawn or renewed the state of emergency established in 2019.  Such states of emergency needed to respect basic rights; the right to individual freedoms could not be subject to exemptions.  Serious violations had occurred in the context of the fight against terrorism, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance and torture. How could the derogatory legal framework in place today be reconciled with the Covenant?  When would the state of emergency be ended?

    Martial rape was prohibited in the State party. Were there any awareness raising campaigns in place to inform the public of the prohibition, and to prevent patriarchal stereotypes and violence against women?  There was an environment of impunity for violence against women in the State party.  What investigations had been carried out into violence against women, including sexual violence against displaced women?

    One Committee Expert said Burkina Faso had acceded to the United Nations Convention on Corruption in 2006, and to the African Union Convention on Corruption in 2005.  In 2017, the State adopted a law on the prevention of corruption.  Despite the efforts of the State party, however, Burkina Faso had high rankings on global corruption indices.  What measures were in place to investigate and prevent corruption?  What support did the State provide to the national committee monitoring corruption, which was reportedly encountering financial difficulties?

    The Expert welcomed the 2009 law on electoral quotas, which increased the quota for the representation of women in legislative and municipal elections from 30 to 50 per cent.  However, a 2020 law retained a 30 per cent quota; were there plans to amend it?  What measures were in place to increase the representation of women in leadership positions in public and private institutions?  There were customary practices that were discriminatory to women in Burkina Faso.  How did legislation prevent these practices?

    Parliament was reportedly yet to adopt draft legislation that would establish the legal minimum age for marriage of men and women at 18 years, and to prohibit polygamy.  When would this be adopted?  What measures were in place to prevent polygamy and raise awareness of its harms? The Committee was concerned by the continued prevalence of female genital mutilation, despite its prohibition in 1996.  What measures were in place to implement the prohibition and to combat stigmatisation and violence against women who were accused of witchcraft?

    State legislation granted self-defence militia a role in overseeing security and questioning suspects.  How was the State party strengthening the presence of security forces across the country and preventing self-defence militia from carrying out law enforcement activities?  Was the State party investigating violations by these militia?

    Another Committee Expert said that the Committee welcomed that the State party had adopted legislation prohibiting discrimination, but certain vulnerable groups were not offered protection.  Was the State party planning to adopt a comprehensive legal framework that clearly defined direct and indirect discrimination, and discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity and disability? What measures were in place to provide reparations for victims of discrimination, sanction discriminatory speech in the online space, and prevent discrimination against persons with albinism? Could the delegation provide information on reforms to the law on the family and their impact on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    One Committee Expert welcomed recent amendments to the Criminal Code, which allowed for abortion up to 14 weeks of pregnancy, in cases of rape or incest.  However, social and cultural attitudes stigmatised women who sought abortions and there were barriers to obtaining legal abortions, pushing women to seek unsafe, clandestine abortions.  How was the State party addressing these issues?  The Expert welcomed the marked increase in free family planning services and contraception, but noted that cultural and other barriers continued to prevent access to contraception and family planning services.  How would these issues be addressed?

    The Committee was deeply concerned by reported plans to reintroduce the death penalty in Burkina Faso.  Could the delegation clarify whether Burkina Faso was committed to abolishing the death penalty?  The State party had not taken substantial steps to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.  What was the status of the ratification process?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party did not agree with the Committee’s use of the terms “armed non-State groups” and “self-defence militia”, which were not in line with reality.  Burkina Faso was facing an extraordinary security situation. There were no non-State armed groups, only terrorist groups.  There were also no militias, only Homeland Defence Volunteers, who were under the aegis of the security forces.  State officials were not involved in the disappearances of persons; only terrorists were.  Security forces were reacting to neutralise terrorists.  In some cases, persons reported as having been disappeared were in fact terrorists.  Persons who committed violations were brought before the justice system.

    The death penalty existed in State legislation, such as in the military code, but there was a de facto moratorium on it. There were plans to restore the death penalty to deter crimes of terrorism.

    Reform of the Constitution had been stalled due to the security situation, with work to resume when the security situation had improved.

    The Government had strengthened protection against human rights violations in 2023.  Victims of such violations had the right to report them to competent State bodies and the National Human Rights Commission.  Legislation adopted in 2016 and 2017 defined the Commission’s mandate. Since 2022, the Commission had had its own budget, and its staff had recently been increased.  It was aligned with the Paris Principles. 

    Legal amendments in 2021 appointed the National Human Rights Commission as the national preventive mechanism for torture; it was currently operational and conducting activities across the country. The mechanism had been conducting awareness raising campaigns and workshops on preventing torture and had held commemorations for the victims of torture.

    The State party planned to raise the legal age of marriage to 18 years for men and women.  All citizens were equal before the law in Burkina Faso.  The State party had conducted awareness raising activities to boost social cohesion and prevent discrimination.

    In 2023, the State party submitted a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General notifying him of the state of emergency. The state of emergency provided for no exemptions to basic individual freedoms.  The Constitution stated that all citizens could invoke all international treaties ratified by Burkina Faso before the courts.  Several members of the judiciary had received training on international treaties ratified by the State party, including the Covenant.

    The remains of former President Thomas Sankara and his murdered colleagues had been buried and these persons had been given the status of “national heroes”.  Compensation had been granted related to the case of Norbert Zongo, although this case was still before the courts.

    All forms of discrimination were prohibited under State law and victims of discrimination could plead their cases with the competent authorities.  The Penal Code stipulated that discrimination based on specific characteristics was prohibited, when it aimed to infringe on rights.  Public speech inciting violence or hatred against a person or group on any grounds could be punished with up to three years imprisonment.  There were legal provisions prohibiting discrimination by employers in relation to hiring and dismissals, and defamation against any group by the press.  There was also legislation protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination. Employers could not reject applications from persons with disabilities on the grounds of their disability.

    A law was implemented in 2020 that regulated quotas for women’s representation in elections, but it had since been revised. Some 23 per cent of Government staff were women, while 33 per cent of embassy staff were women, and 27 per cent of Governors were women.

    Burkina Faso had comprehensive care shelters for women victims of violence in three locations.  The Penal Code issued penalties of imprisonment and fines for persons who accused women of witchcraft.  The State party had assisted around 30 women accused of witchcraft to return to their family environment in 2024.  There was a national strategy and action plan for eliminating female genital mutilation; close to 250 persons had been prosecuted for the crime of female genital mutilation in recent years.  Various projects had been financed throughout the country to promote women’s access to land; these had helped to increase the share of land held by women.

    Burkina Faso provided food aid, shelter and psychosocial support for internally displaced persons.  The State had established a plan spanning 2023 to 2027 for supporting internally displaced persons.

    Abortions could be carried out by authorised doctors if there was a threat to the life of the mother.  The State party had established a national action plan on family planning, which sought to increase access to contraception.

    The High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity had been abolished and another body had been established to continue its mission.

    Volunteer forces were military personnel, and therefore needed to abide by State legislation and all international treaties to which Burkina Faso was a party.  They did not enjoy impunity.  When they committed violations, they could be expelled from the security forces.  Legal texts regulated the mobilisation of volunteer forces, which were helping to recover land nationwide and put an end to terrorist attacks.  Reforms were being implemented to promote better coverage of the territory by security forces.  The State could not overcome terrorism without the help of citizens.  From 2016 to 2024, over 285 members of self-defence forces were prosecuted and issued with sanctions.

    There were State bodies that were working to prevent corruption and investigate complaints of corruption, including corruption within the security forces.  Legislation on money laundering, financing terrorism and proliferating weapons of mass destruction had been implemented.  In 2024, 81 cases of violations under this legislation had been investigated.

    The state of emergency was not in force as of October 2023, demonstrating that the security situation in the country had improved. The state of emergency had been implemented to combat the upsurge in terrorist acts and to bring back peace in the country.

    Burkina Faso attached great importance to the contributions of human rights defenders and had implemented several initiatives to create an enabling environment for them.  The law on human rights defenders mandated the State to set up a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and their family members; this was now operational.

    The Government was committed to freedom of the press.  However, hate speech and incitement to violence was not acceptable and some members of the press had been sanctioned for such activities.

    Persons with albinism had preferential access to State health and educational services.

    Burkina Faso was committed to combatting and ending female genital mutilation both within and outside its territory.  In the Human Rights Council, the State promoted resolution 50/16, which addressed female genital mutilation internationally.

    The State party was waging a complex battle against terrorists and their accomplices, who sometimes sought to hijack human rights issues. These persons could have given the Committee unreliable information.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    One Committee Expert called on the State party to prove that the information submitted by civil society lacked substantiation.  The Expert said that the only official notification received by the Secretary-General related to the state of emergency dated back to 2019.  Had a letter been sent concerning the most recent state of emergency?  The powers granted to the military in this state of emergency seemed to still be in force; was this the case?

    Other Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on the membership of the national preventive mechanism against torture, the resources available to it, and its powers to visit places of depravation of liberty; measures to ensure that existing laws were consistent with the Covenant; how human rights defenders were involved in the drafting of treaty body reports and whether there was a dedicated mechanism for the drafting of reports.

    Questions were also asked on measures to ensure that informal counter-terrorism actors did not abuse their powers; how the State party implemented anti-discrimination legislation to protect the rights of vulnerable persons; how the State party would guarantee access to justice for persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups who were discriminated against; the number of discrimination complaints investigated by the State party; the State party’s legal stance on same-sex relations; measures to prevent marital rape; how the potential reinstatement of the death penalty aligned with the State’s Covenant obligations; and plans to remove administrative barriers to accessing abortions.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said it could not provide information about issues that did not exist, such as self-defence militias. The Homeland Defence Volunteers had a legal basis, and volunteers were recruited according to specific moral criteria. They were overseen by the military police and other defence forces.

    Burkina Faso had a sovereign right to decide on the imposition of the death penalty, which could act as a deterrent to terrorism crimes.  Burkina Faso had a duty to uphold the Covenant but was facing an existential crisis. It was the country most affected by terrorism worldwide.  The State was most concerned with escaping this situation, restoring peace and defending citizens’ rights.  It had eliminated the death penalty within common law.

    The Constitutional Court had invoked the Covenant in two cases.  The national preventive mechanism against torture was established in 2014 but had faced financial difficulties.  In 2021, the decision was made to incorporate the mechanism within the National Human Rights Commission to ensure its access to financing.  It worked separately from the Commission, overseeing prisons, police holding facilities and other places of detention.  It had also held workshops throughout the country to inform the public about its activities.

    The state of emergency was no longer in force, but the State party still needed to ensure security across the country.  Thus, following advice from the Constitutional Court, the State party had declared a “state of ready alert”, which gave the State the power to control the supply of resources and restrict certain rights, pursuant to the law.

    There was a plan of action in place for the promotion of human rights education and civic duty.  A study had been conducted into the alignment of the State’s legislation with Covenant provisions; the recommendations of this study were currently being implemented.  There was a specialised body established within the State party to draft reports for the treaty bodies and oversee implementation of their recommendations.

    In cases of rape or incest, if public prosecutors granted permission, women could conduct abortions within the first 14 weeks of pregnancy.  In cases of repeated marital rape, fines were imposed on the perpetrator.  The Government was conducting an awareness raising campaign on preventing marital rape.

    In March 2020, a decree was adopted for an action plan up to 2024 for human rights education within school syllabuses and educational training centres.  This action plan made it possible to provide training, awareness raising and information session to the public, civil society organisations and defence forces. Some 232 courses in human rights were organised.  An action plan for 2025-2029 was currently being developed to continue this work. 

    Burkina Faso had established traditional dispute mechanisms, including mediation.  There had been more than 4,000 complaints of violence against women in 2023 and more than 5,000 in 2024.  Access to justice was guaranteed for everybody, including those with disabilities.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked how the mechanism for the prevention of torture worked in practice.  Could it visit places of deprivation of liberty unannounced and meet detainees without the presence of a police officer or guard?  Were requests from the authorities followed up?  Was the Human Rights Commission’s annual report widely disseminated to the authorities concerned?  Torture was prohibited, as was the use of confessions under torture, however accused officials had told the courts that confessions had been extracted from them by police.  Could the delegation provide examples of cases in which the rule of exclusion of evidence obtained under torture had been applied by the courts?

    The judicial reforms of 2023 and 2024 had significant effects on the functioning of the justice system, some of which were potentially problematic, even dangerous, including the modification of the High Council of the Judiciary to increase the share of non-magistrate members to 50 per cent, and the submission of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to the authority of the Minister of Justice.  It appeared that it was up to the Minister, in practice, to appoint, assign and sanction judges, which risked undermining the independence of judges.  There also seemed to be significant judicial backlogs and unexecuted decisions.  What strategy was envisaged to reduce those backlogs and strengthen the implementation of court decisions?  Were the reforms compatible with the impartiality and independence of justice, as enshrined in the Covenant?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the capacity of the judiciary?  How was the selection of judges organised?

    The Committee was concerned that certain magistrates who had issued decisions unfavourable to Homeland Defence Volunteers or the Executive had been forcibly conscripted.  Information had also been received regarding an instruction note from the Prosecutor General in October 2024, which reportedly gave an injunction to all prosecutors not to prosecute certain persons until they had received his prior authorisation.  Could the delegation comment on this information?  Were the Homeland Defence Volunteers subject to civilian courts when they committed crimes, or did they fall under the jurisdiction of military courts?

    Another Committee Expert asked about the steps taken to finalise the investigations relating to alleged violations committed during the 2014-2015 period of unrest , in particular regarding excessive use of force resulting in bodily harm, death and obstruction of peaceful assemblies? If State officers were found guilty, would the State party ensure that the penalties issued were proportionate to the seriousness of the crime?  Could the Committee be updated on developments relating to the National Observatory for the Prevention of Torture, with regard to its mandate, composition, financing, and data collection system, and the choice of its members?

    Another Expert said that while the Committee took note of efforts made by the State party to improve the conditions of detention, information received indicated several shortcomings in this area.  For example, the Ouagadougou prison had just one nurse.  In 2021, the State party adopted a strategic plan for the development of the prison administration with a view to humanising the conditions of detention in prisons; how had implementation of the plan been assessed?  What were the outcomes and impacts of the visits of the judicial authorities, the competent inspection bodies and non-governmental organizations to places of deprivation of liberty on the conditions of detainees?

    Burkina Faso had asserted that there were no minority groups within its population, and that the Peuhl and Tuareg communities were not minorities.  Could more information on this be provided?  According to information received over the past five years, members of the indigenous Fulani community had reported cases of being stigmatised, treated inhumanely and accused of terrorism based on their ethnicity.  What measures were being taken to ensure that the rights of all citizens were respected without discrimination?  Did the State party plan to open secure corridors to allow the population to withdraw from dangerous areas and secure their property?  The national human rights institution had made recommendations for the State party to strengthen actions to combat hate speech and incitement to violence; could the State party comment on this?

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the progress made in the 2019 Code of Criminal Procedure, which guaranteed the right to a medical examination and legal assistance from the beginning of police custody.  However, it was concerning that these guarantees were not automatic or unconditional. Did the State intend to amend its regulations to ensure that all detained persons had immediate and automatic access to a medical examination without the need for prior authorisation or a 72-hour waiting period?  What measures had been taken to ensure that these examinations were carried out by independent doctors, guaranteeing their impartiality and confidentiality?  Would the State consider reducing the maximum period of detention without judicial control to 48 hours? 

    The Committee was aware of the enormous challenge facing Burkina Faso in the face of one of the largest humanitarian crises in its history, with more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons due to insecurity and armed violence.  In addition, the country had welcomed a significant number of refugees, mainly from Mali, who faced difficulties in accessing protection, legal documentation and basic services.  The Committee took note of Act No. 042-2008/AN on the Status of Refugees, which recognised the principle of non-refoulement and granted rights to refugees and asylum-seekers but was concerned about its implementation.  The absence of a clear procedure for determining stateless status remained a challenge, particularly affecting children born in refugee camps, despite the State’s efforts to improve birth registration and the issuance of identity documents.

    Regarding internally displaced persons, the Committee recognised the State’s efforts in humanitarian assistance, including access to food, health, education, and economic support.  However, concerns remained about camp security, gender-based violence, child exploitation and the lack of durable solutions that allowed access to sustainable livelihoods. 

    What measures had the State taken to ensure the effective application of the principle of non-refoulement and to prevent undue expulsions?  Could updated data on the number of asylum applications lodged and granted in recent years be provided?  What actions were being implemented to strengthen refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to basic services?  Did the State intend to revise the Nationality and Civil Status Act to address gaps and establish a clear procedure for determining statelessness?  What efforts had been made to ensure timely birth registration and the free issuance of birth certificates, especially in camps for refugees and internally displaced children?  What strategies had the State implemented to guarantee the safety of internally displaced persons, in the face of risks of gender-based violence and child exploitation?

    The Committee took note of Burkina Faso’s legal framework guaranteeing freedom of peaceful assembly and association, but concerns remained about restrictions in practice, including allegations of obstruction of demonstrations by security forces and sanctions against protesters. What measures had the State taken to ensure that the intervention of security forces in demonstrations was governed by the principles of necessity and proportionality?  What independent monitoring mechanisms existed to investigate allegations of excessive use of force?  What provisions were in place to authorise or restrict demonstrations? How was it ensured that they were compatible with international standards?  What measures had been put in place to enable human rights organizations to register and operate without obstacles?  How was the safety of journalists and human rights defenders covering demonstrations guaranteed?

    The Committee noted the 2018 revision of the Electoral Code, however, concerns remained about restrictions on the exercise of the right to vote, particularly for certain groups.  What had been done to increase the political participation of women and marginalised groups in the country?  How was the independence of the institutions responsible for monitoring the electoral process guaranteed?  When would the next elections be held?

    Another Expert said the State Party had undertaken several positive initiatives to combat trafficking, including the national action plan against trafficking for 2023 to 2026, however challenges remained in implementation.  What progress had been made in implementing the national action plan?  Were there mechanisms to access its effectiveness? What measures were being taken to improve data collection?  A significant proportion of convicted traffickers continued to receive fully or partially suspended sentences, raising concerns about the deterrent effect of the legislation.  Could updated figures be provided on trafficking cases investigated, prosecutions initiated, and convictions secured?  What concrete steps were being taken to ensure that anti-trafficking laws were enforced rigorously?  How did the State Party ensure that law enforcement agencies and judicial officials received adequate training on victim-centred approaches in handling trafficking cases?  What actions was the State Party taking to address deficiencies in victim support, including limited shelter capacities and support services?

    Reports indicated that a significant number of children remained engaged in dangerous labour, particularly in small-scale gold mining and agricultural fields.  Could the delegation provide updated statistics on the number of children identified and removed from hazardous work, as well as data on their reintegration in society?  What was the anticipated timeline for adoption of the draft child protection code? Wha steps were being taken to improve the long-term reintegration of child victims of forced labour?  What measures were in place to expand shelter capacity, improve service quality, and ensure sustainable funding for victim support programmes?

    The Committee noted with concern that a review of legislation that imposed content-based restrictions to safeguard defence and security forces had not been envisaged, despite potential limitations on freedom of expression.  How did the State Party ensure that the law did not restrict freedom of expression? Had consultations on this issue been held with civil society and media representatives?  What safeguards were in place to prevent the misuse of digital restrictions?

    The Expert was also concerned by reports of escalating repression against journalists and human rights defenders, including threats, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, physical assaults, enforced disappearances, and forced conscription into security forces.  What steps had the State Party taken to investigate attacks on journalists, including the case of Atiana Serge Oulon?  How many cases of threats, arbitrary detention, and disappearances had been investigated, and what were the outcomes?  Had State agents been held accountable?  What independent mechanisms existed to prevent the abuse of security laws and conscription orders to silence dissent?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national prevention mechanism had three commissioners from the national human rights institution. The mechanism had carried out 12 monitoring missions to places of deprivation of liberty.  It could either inform authorities of a visit or carry out a visit unannounced.  Its report was sent to the highest authorities, including the head of State.

    A demonstration was lawful when the organisers notified the competent authorities within the conditions provided for. Media suspension occurred when the journalism ethics code had been breached.  The Government had decided to close the cases of certain journalists in the national interest. These journalists had chosen to proliferate misinformation, which would not be tolerated.

    Burkina Faso had a mix of ethnic groups.  In the fight against terrorism, terrorists, rather than ethnic groups, were targeted.  There could not be stigmatisation of any ethnic group, as all ethnic groups were represented within the armed forces.  The Supreme Council had organised an awareness raising campaign on hate speech, which was launched nationwide.  If confessions were extracted under duress, judges reserved the right to discard this evidence.  There was no category of persons whose civic rights were restricted, including the right to vote, unless they had been convicted in court and denied their voting rights.

    The State had increased magistrate, prison and notary staff significantly in the past few years.  To combat corruption in the judiciary, activities were taken as part of the disciplinary council, including the anti-corruption commission. The independence of the judiciary was expressly enshrined in the Constitution.  A specific law set up in 2024 to remove the High Council of the Judiciary from the Presidency and make it an independent body.  As a guarantee of impartiality, judges could be removed during a procedure if there was any suspicion that they were connected to the parties in a case.  The Minister of Justice did not interfere in the appointment procedure.  The State needed to ensure there was better implementation of the justice policy.

    Internally displaced persons were dealt with in an inclusive manner, with no discrimination on any grounds.  More than two million people had been returned to their places of origin.  Health centres had been opened at schools and basic services had been supplied.  The Penal Code sanctioned trafficking, including exploitation and the worst forms of child labour.  In 2022, 125 cases of child abduction were prosecuted, and eight for trafficking.  A plan had been adopted to tackle child labour, resulting in more than one million stakeholders, including 41,300 children, being made aware of the worst forms of child labour and being withdrawn from these practices.  More than 26,000 children had been reintegrated into society.

    There was a plan on trafficking up to 2021 and the State had been able to intersect trafficking networks.  A code for children was currently in the process of being adopted.

    Following the 2014 popular uprise, the prosecution service and the High Court began an investigation, and judicial proceedings were initiated.  A commission of inquiry had been put in place to identify those responsible for the violations committed during this time.  The investigation was still underway.  Some 84 persons had appeared before the military court, and 145 persons overall who had been wounded had received compensation.

    Atiana Serge Oulon had not been subjected to an enforced disappearance but had been held under state of ready alert measures. As per the Constitution, any citizen had the duty to contribute to the defence and maintaining of Burkina Faso’s integrity.  Homeland Defence Volunteers were considered auxiliaries of the defence forces and were subject to military court provisions.  When they committed offences, they fell within the scope of military jurisdiction.

    Meetings and public demonstrations could freely be held in Burkina Faso, pursuant to the law.  Freedom to demonstrate was subject to prior notification to the civilian administration.  Demonstrations could only be restricted when there was an attack against public order.

    There were no longer any obstacles for Burkina Faso nationals abroad exercising their right to vote.  The prison administration had a 2021-2025 strategic plan and plan of action, and implementation of this plan was being assessed.  Under the strategy, personnel had been trained, new prisons had been constructed, significantly reducing overcrowding, and 22 prisons had benefitted from refurbishment.

    The law on asylum application ensured all applications were dealt with in a fair manner, and all protections were offered to the applicant during the procedure.  As of August 2024, there were more than 38,000 refugees and 2,000 asylum seekers.

    The Code for the Family contained a special chapter on statelessness, dealing with conditions for determining statelessness. The Government had made significant efforts to improve birth registration and provide free birth certificates.  Campaigns had been rolled out, with more than 50,000 birth certificates being issued. Sessions had been held to provide free birth certificates, which had benefitted thousands of women and internally displaced persons.

    Detained persons had the right to request a medical examination after 72 hours of their detention.  The current length of police custody for cases linked to terrorism was 15 days maximum, with the possibility to expand for an additional 10 days. Detained people had the right to receive assistance from a lawyer, and those who could not afford to pay a lawyer were entitled to judicial assistance from the State.

    The penitentiary administration had a strategic plan for 2021 to 2025.  A steering committee had been created to assess the implementation of the plan.

    The terms “militia” or “enforced disappearances” in the context of countering terrorism were totally inappropriate.  A report had been submitted to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances in this regard.  A terrorist carried no identification card.  Their strength was to blend within the public.  While security did not prevail, rights could not be enjoyed.  It was often hard to differentiate between a terrorist and civilian, and this needed to be considered.  Burkina Faso was making many efforts to promote and protect human rights. Homeland Defense Volunteers should not be referred to as militia.

    Burkina Faso’s judiciary was still independent. The reforms which were implemented were designed to make the justice system more accessible and credible. There were 384 media organizations in the country, with over 80 per cent being privately owned.  Burkina Faso did not accept apologism for acts of terrorism; if the media contributed to propagating acts of terrorism, they were failing in their ethic duty.  The State allowed for associations to be created freely if their purpose was not contrary to public order.

    If the security situation allowed the State to organise elections, this would be done straight away.  Before elections could be organised, it needed to be ensured that all candidates and members of the public could exercise their right to vote. The State needed to be given assurances that if they organised elections, they would be safe.  All terrorists would be targeted by the State regardless of what ethnic group they belonged to.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on topics including on the status of investigations into cases of torture; the difference between the national observatory on torture and the national preventive mechanism; the financial and logistical means available to the national preventive mechanism, its reports, and its ability to carry out announced and unannounced visits; efforts being made to reconcile combatting terrorism and respecting human rights; judges’ right to consider evidence obtained under duress, and what consequence this had on trials; the independence of the judiciary; denials of demonstrations; the involvement of women in different sectors, and how their political participation was being organised; when the next elections would be held and the proceedings put in place to ensure citizens’ participation in the elections; support services for victims of trafficking; and revisions of the Penal Code to implement the death penalty for crimes such as terrorism.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the decision to reintroduce the death penalty had been taken due to the fight against terrorism. Terrorists were increasingly recruiting children, who were then forced to become combatants.  The more regions affected, the more people did not have access to basic rights.  The priority for Burkina Faso was to put an end to terrorism as soon as possible and restore security throughout the whole country, before meeting international obligations.  There was no death penalty for homosexuality.

    Elections were organised in November 2015, and just after these there was a terrorist attack in January 2016.  The situation had continued to get worse, despite the elections.  Elections had been organised twice in 2015 and 2020 and the situation had not changed; the State needed to find an alternative solution.

    Prosecutors had always been subject to the hierarchy of the prosecuting magistracy.  Judges remained entirely independent.

    The national preventive mechanism used the resources provided to the National Human Rights Commission.  It was up to the discretion of the mechanism to decide on whether visits were announced or unannounced.  State authorities and civil society carried out visits to places of detention. 

    Typically, evidence obtained under duress could not be admitted in court, however if such an act was key to a trial, then the evidence could be admitted.  Public officials responsible for acts of torture could be criminally prosecuted and victims could ask for reparations for damage suffered.

    No human rights organisation had been refused registration or accreditation.  They often received technical and material support from the State.  Women were fully involved in public affairs and held many decision-making positions.  Within the Government, there were five women ministers out of 23, and 33 per cent of ambassadors were women.

    Preventing a demonstration was an exception in the country; this was only done in exceptional circumstances.  If the competent authorities prohibited demonstrations, there was always a reason provided.

    Burkina Faso was trying to find a balance between combatting terrorism and protecting human rights to achieve results.  There were specialised judicial systems to combat terrorism.

    Closing Statements

    EDASSO RODRIGUE BAYALA, Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Keeper of the Seals and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the high-quality dialogue.  The Committee should be commended for its commitment to civil and political rights.  Mr. Bayala thanked all those who had made the dialogue a success.  The Government remained deeply committed to the respect of human rights and would closely heed any recommendations made by the Committee. Burkina Faso renewed its commitment to consolidate with the Committee in the context of the fight against terrorism. The stabilisation undertaken by Burkina Faso was essential to bringing about lasting peace and development, and international partners were called on to support these efforts.

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.003E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0144/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

    – having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

    – having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

    – having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

    – having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

    B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

    C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

    D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

    E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

    F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

    G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

    H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

    I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

    J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

    K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

    L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

    M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

    N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

    O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

    P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

    Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

    R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

    S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

    T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

    U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

    V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

    W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

    X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

    Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

    Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

    AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

    AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

    AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

    Towards a European collective security architecture

    1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

    2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

    3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

    4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

    5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

    6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

    7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

    8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

    9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

    10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

    11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

    12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

    13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

    14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

    Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

    16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

    18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

    19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

    20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

    21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

    Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

    22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

    23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

    24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

    25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

    26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

    Defence expenditure

    27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

    28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

    29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

    30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

    31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

    32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

    33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

    34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

    35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

    Defence industry

    36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

    37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

    38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

    39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

    40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

    41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

    42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

    43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

    44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

    45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

    46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

    47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

    48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

    49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

    Reprioritising public services and social spending

    50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

    51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

    52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

    53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

    °

    ° °

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Pledge to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Joint statement of the Security Council members signatories of the Joint Pledges related to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen read by Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen, PR of Denmark. Other participants – Slovenia, Guyana, Republic of Korea, Panama, Greece, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, France.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_A-7c0wnM

    MIL OSI Video –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Non-compliance with the European Social Charter in the overseas territories – E-000881/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000881/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rody Tolassy (PfE), Séverine Werbrouck (PfE), France Jamet (PfE)

    In a Republic that claims to be united and indivisible, it is unacceptable for our overseas compatriots to be treated as second-class citizens. The exclusion of the overseas territories from the European Social Charter constitutes a profound injustice and a flagrant breach of the principle of equal rights.

    This situation reflects a persistent contempt on the part of the elites towards these territories, which are already facing serious economic, social and environmental inequalities: wages are much lower than in mainland France, access to drinking water is still precarious and the issue of chlordecone poisoning has not been properly addressed.

    Against this backdrop, the inaction of the European and national authorities is unacceptable. It is time to mobilise all parliamentary bodies to demand justice and compensation. The ratification of the European Social Charter for Overseas France would be a major step forward in guaranteeing these citizens the same rights and protections as those in mainland France.

    • 1.In light of the foregoing, how can the Commission justify this discriminatory exclusion?
    • 2.What concrete commitments will it make to guarantee the genuine equality of social rights for overseas citizens?
    • 3.Will it finally recognise that this situation violates the fundamental principles of justice and human dignity?

    Submitted: 28.2.2025

    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Camilla Nelson, Associate Professor in Media and Journalism, University of Notre Dame Australia

    Owen Franken/Corbis via Getty Images

    In our feminist classics series we revisit influential works.


    Shere Hite’s The Hite Report was quickly dubbed a “sexual revolution in 600 pages”. It did something nobody had considered worth doing: investigating women’s sexuality by asking them to share their thoughts and feelings, then relaying those reflections to readers in women’s own words.

    This might not sound unusual today. But in 1976, it was incendiary.

    Based on a survey of 3,000 women distributed by the New York Chapter of the National Organisation for Women (the feminist group co-founded by Betty Friedan), more than 75% of the book comprises narrative responses to open ended survey questions.

    It includes a plethora of startlingly frank – for its time – and explicitly detailed opinions, anecdotes, complaints and criticisms about sex, masturbation and orgasm. The book is an extraordinarily rich cultural artefact in the archive of human intimacy.

    Unsurprisingly, the women who responded to Hite’s survey thoroughly enjoyed sex. “Orgasm is the ultimate pleasure – which women often deny themselves, but men never do,” claimed one. “Orgasms are a marvellous happiness”, added another. “Orgasm cancels out rage and longing for at least 48 hours,” said yet another.

    But it was the manner in which Hite’s respondents got their orgasms that made the book a scandal. “I think masturbation is essential to one’s health,” said one respondent. “[A]s I learned in my marriage – a partner is not always good sexually, though he may be wonderful in other ways.”

    Masturbation is better than “bad sex with an incompatible partner”, explained another respondent. “The only way I can have an orgasm is by masturbating,” said another.

    ‘A complex nature’

    The Hite Report did not attempt to define a sexual norm, or produce a representative survey sample, or pretend its data could be generalised to an entire population. But it did contain some statistical findings.

    The most significant of these – the source of the book’s notoriety – was that only 30% of women surveyed reported being able to regularly or reliably reach orgasm through heterosexual intercourse. And yet, 80% reported they could easily and regularly reach orgasm through clitoral stimulation, which was frequently obtained through masturbation, either alone, or with their partner.

    In her preface Hite argued that the canonical sexological works of the past 100 years – including the works of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Kinsey, and William Masters and Virginia Johnson – had constructed female sexuality “as essentially a response to male sexuality and intercourse”. She set out to demonstrate that “female sexuality might have a complex nature of its own”.

    Hite argued sex was a cultural institution, not a biological one. Historically, men had defined sex in terms of their own needs and preferences, then mandated their preferences as biological.

    Freud, for example, knew female orgasm could be reliably obtained through clitoral stimulation, but defined clitoral orgasm as an “immature orgasm” and orgasm arising from heterosexual intercourse as a “mature orgasm”. He then labelled women who could not achieve orgasm in the required way “frigid” and “hysterical”.

    The Hite Report is organised into eight chapters or themes, starting with “Masturbation”, followed by “Orgasm”, “Intercourse”, “Clitoral Stimulation”, “Lesbianism”, “Sexual Slavery”, “The Sexual Revolution” and “Older Women”. In a concluding chapter, Hite reflects on the issues raised by survey participants.

    In the chapter “Lesbianism”, a significant number of heterosexual-identified women confess same sex attraction, or else identify as bisexual. They also describe lesbian sexuality as “more variable”, and the “physical actions more mutual”.

    “The basic difference with a woman is that there’s no end,” claimed one respondent, “[…] it’s like a circle, it goes on and on.”

    “Lesbianism” sits in stark contrast to the chapter on “Sexual Slavery”, where Hite seeks to investigate why women pursue unequal sexual relationships, especially where respondents claim to receive little or no sexual pleasure.

    “Having a man love me and want to have sex with me is necessary to my happiness,” claimed one respondent. “Sex makes me feel I am a woman to my husband instead of just a live-in maid,” added another.

    “I’ve never heard a word of praise from my husband in 21 years except while having intercourse,” claimed yet another. “While I resent this, I still love him […] ”

    Wildly successful

    Many women applauded the book. Author Erica Jong, writing in The New York Times, called it a “revelation”. Others warned of a possible male backlash. “It seems that women are finally reporting the facts of their own sex,” wrote journalist Ellen Willis in the Washington Post, “and men are putting on the earmuffs of fear and retreating to deeper fantasies.”

    This backlash was not long in coming. Playboy apocryphally dubbed it “The Hate Report”, a label regularly recycled in media outlets around the world, including by female journalists. One male journalist, writing in the Miami Herald, argued women could not be regarded as truthful or reliable witnesses to their own lives. “What annoys me about The Hite Report,” he wrote, “is its smug assumption that just because women made these comments, they’re true”.

    Despite – or perhaps because of – this controversy, the book was wildly successful. It was translated into ten different languages – including French, Spanish, German, Italian, Hebrew and Japanese – and sold over 2 million copies within the first 12 months.

    It remains the 30th bestselling book of all time, with 50 million copies sold in 45 countries, including two recently translated editions in China, where it sparked conversations among intellectuals interested in formerly taboo western culture.

    Faking orgasms

    Born in smalltown Missouri, Hite gained a masters degree in social history and in 1967 moved to New York to enrol in a PhD program at Columbia University. She left when conservative faculty members refused to allow her to complete her dissertation on female sexuality. Hite worked as a model to pay her tuition fees. She joined the National Organisation for Women when they protested the sexism of the Olivetti advertising campaigns, after Hite was cast as an “Olivetti girl” for the typewriter company.

    Increasingly tagged as a “man-basher” after the publication of her book, Hite’s public persona was conventionally, almost theatrically feminine. She revelled in a contemporary Baroque aesthetic; a mirage of red lipstick, froufrou dresses, pancake-style makeup and tousled orange or platinum curls. And she spoke about sex in explicit detail, in a voice that was earnest, articulate and unembarrassed.

    Hite did not “discover” the clitoral orgasm. Instead, by centring women’s experiences, and taking their reflections seriously, her work threw into question centuries of sexological studies. These studies had either pathologised normal female sexual functioning or else insisted any pleasure women derived from sex had to be a by-product of conventional heterosexual intercourse.

    Even Masters and Johnson, who, in their reports from 1966 onwards, clinically proved all female orgasms were the result of clitoral stimulation, had insisted on the centrality of coitus.

    As Hite told television show host Geraldo in 1977,

    Masters and Johnson made a tremendous step forward in that they studied, and showed clinically, for the first time, that all orgasms are caused by clitoral stimulation, and we really have them to thank for that. However, when they described how it’s done – the thrusting of the penis causes the vaginal lips to move, which causes the skin that’s connected to the clitoris to move, which causes the glands to move over the clitoris, which supposedly gives you orgasm. But that doesn’t work for most women.

    And yet, although the participants in Hite’s study were overwhelmingly educated and politically progressive, many confessed they felt compelled to fake an orgasm during intercourse to please a man.

    “I ‘perform’ and boost his ego and confidence,” claimed one. “I do not like to think of myself as a performer but I feel judged and also judge myself when I don’t have an orgasm.” “[M]en do expect it, so I often force myself […],” said another.

    Participants also claimed how a woman was seen to orgasm mattered. “I don’t show the signs you’re supposed to,” worried one. “They think because I don’t pant, scream and claw I haven’t had one,” said another. “I used to go out of my way to offer all the mythical Hollywood signs,” revealed another.

    One participant even suggested the whole issue of sex was so politically fraught that, “Maybe sex would be better if we’d never heard of orgasm”.

    Respondents also told Hite the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s had intensified, rather than reduced, gender prejudices and double standards.

    Sexual violence

    Another breathtaking aspect of the book is the way participants’ answers are shot through with sexual violence. On the issue of sexual coercion, for example, one participant replied, “I’m not supposed to say ‘no’ since I’m legally married”.

    On a question about the use of force in sex, another replied, “Only with my husband.” (In 1976, marital rape was legal and “acceptable” in most western nations.)

    Rape myths are also common. “I define as rape someone you don’t know who attacks you,” said one respondent. “I never defined it as […] someone you know. If you define rape that way, every woman has been raped over and over.”

    Another suggested rape wasn’t rape if a victim gave up fighting. “He really raped me, but not in the legal way. I couldn’t prevent him, in other words.”

    Hite identified toxic gender stereotypes as the major driver of sexual violence, especially the belief that “a man’s need for ‘sex’ is a strong and urgent ‘drive’” which women were obligated to satisfy. “Women aren’t always free to not have sex,” explained one respondent.

    Archival insights

    The Hite archive is housed in the Schlesinger Library of the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard University. It comprises over 250 filing boxes and folios, occupying more than 30 metres of shelf space. Most of the material relates to Hite’s public career as a sex researcher, with a small scattering of personal papers.

    I was at Harvard doing research for a book on Hite’s contemporary Andrea Dworkin. Although the two feminists exist as polar opposites in the public imagination, they thoroughly agreed with one another, and enjoyed a supportive working relationship. And so I wanted to take a look.

    Among the publishing agreements, speaking invitations, publicity material and the copies of the edited and revised questionnaires that formed the basis of the 1976 report – which are printed in vermillion – an occasional note flips out.

    One, a seemingly unpublished open letter titled “Dear Women”, bears the traces of the intense, frequently misogynistic and overtly hostile media scrutiny that marked Hite’s wild catapult to fame.

    “Sometimes I feel I am dying here in the midst of all this,” she writes, “without the support of anyone”.

    Another, scrawled in a flamboyant purple felt tip pen in the midst of her 1977 book tour of France, reads, “I know that I have done something good – but somehow I feel evil […] When did that start?”

    There are also letters from readers. One, sent from Milan in the wake of the controversy that accompanied the Italian edition of the book, bears the typewritten subject line “Personal”. It reads:

    Dear Ms Hite,
    I am 43 years old and have never written a fan letter in my life until today. But I feel a moral obligation to tell you that your ‘Report’ has rehabilitated me in my own eyes. After years of thinking there was something wrong with me, your book has shown me I’m normal.

    Hite’s “Dear Women” letter describes the extraordinary challenges, including the financial challenges, she faced both before and after the book was published.

    Macmillan, after purchasing the rights to the book, went cold on the project when the commissioning editor resigned or, as Hite phrases it, “quit/was fired depending on your point of view”. The publisher made no plan to promote the book and assigned a 22-year-old man to answer any media queries.

    Hite decided to step in, when, working in the publisher’s offices late one evening, she found a letter from her male publicist declining an invitation to discuss The Hite Report on TV as “he thought my book/subject might be too ‘ticklish’ for television”.

    Hite’s contract with Macmillan gave her little or no control over international editions of the book (and severely limited the income she could take from royalties, before it was ruled unconscionable by a court). In 1978, she “flew around the world twice” attempting to stop the book from being sensationalised.

    In France, the publisher had promised Hite a plain print cover, but was overruled by an all-male advertising department who “printed a cover with a nude woman”. In the second printing, the publisher agreed to revert to plain text.

    In Israel, entire sections of the first edition text were censored. Protests by local journalists led to the publisher engaging an Israeli feminist to re-translate the work.

    In Japan, the male translator produced a translation that was “so embarrassed and vague that it made absolutely no sense”. But on this occasion, a sympathetic female editor stepped in to rewrite entire sections of the manuscript.

    Hite’s Australian reception ranked among the most hostile. Her research assistant described the trip as “hideous”, alleging Hite had “never before encountered” such “vicious attitudes” as those exhibited by male journalists.

    Hite’s research assistant revealed in a separate letter that Hite’s doctors had “absolutely forbid her to do anything but rest for the next few months” after the Australian trip.

    Later life

    In her preface, Hite writes that she hoped to start a conversation through which men and women might “begin to devise more kind, generous, and personal ways of relating”.

    Sadly, this was not what happened. Hite went on to release four major reports on human sexuality, including a report on male sexuality, one on women and love, and one on the family. Then in 1996, she revoked her US citizenship and moved to Germany, saying the media’s hostility towards her made it impossible to continue working.

    Living in Germany, and later in Paris and London, she published her autobiography, The Hite Report on Shere Hite, and The Hite Reader, containing a selection of her published work. She died in 2020, aged 77.

    What marks the Hite Report as an artefact from another era is less the peculiar patois of the “Age of Aquarius”, than the way in which Hite’s respondents so often defined their identities through their husband’s, whether as a wife, former wife, or woman destined to be a wife. “Wifedom” is the default state.

    Equally, what makes the book disturbing, is the reality of sexual violence and coercion that lurks in so many answers, even when respondents are not being questioned about violence or coercion directly.

    With shocked recognition, the reader realises society has not changed nearly as much as some would like to think. The fact it has changed at all is partly due to the second sexual revolution ignited by Hite’s work.

    Camilla Nelson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. ‘Orgasms are a marvellous happiness’. Shere Hite gave voice to female sexuality in a landmark book – but the backlash was fierce – https://theconversation.com/orgasms-are-a-marvellous-happiness-shere-hite-gave-voice-to-female-sexuality-in-a-landmark-book-but-the-backlash-was-fierce-246150

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Sajjan announces funding to British Columbia for 2024 wildfires

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    From Public Safety Canada: https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2025/03/minister-sajjan-announces-funding-to-british-columbia-for-2024-wildfires.html

    French version: https://www.canada.ca/fr/securite-publique-canada/nouvelles/2025/03/le-ministre-sajjan-annonce-loctroi-dun-financement-a-la-colombiebritannique-pour-les-feux-de-foret-survenus-en-2024.html

    In 2024, British Columbia saw over 1,600 wildfires burn approximately one million hectares of land. Between April 21 and October 7, 2024, over seven thousand residents were evacuated from their homes. Multiple residences, provincial infrastructure, provincial recreation sites and trails, and range fencing were destroyed.

    Today, the Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness and Minister responsible for the Pacific Economic Development Agency of Canada, announced payments of over $35 million to British Columbia through the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program, to assist with response and recovery costs resulting from the wildfires in 2024.

    When a large-scale natural disaster happens, the Government of Canada can provide financial assistance to provinces and territories through the DFAA program. Through this support, the Government of Canada covers eligible disaster response and recovery expenses that have been submitted by the province or territory and that exceed what they could reasonably be expected to bear on their own.

    Extreme weather events and natural disasters are a growing threat to the safety and economic stability of Canadian communities. The Government of Canada has and will continue to work closely with the Government of British Columbia to respond to and recover from disastrous events such as the recent wildfires.

    Quotes:

    “In the last few years, we have seen the effects of climate change increase the frequency of disasters. This funding will help support British Columbia with their recovery and rebuilding efforts, as we work together to adapt to the impacts of climate change. Prioritizing our resiliency towards recurring disasters will help strengthen our adaptability and our ability to better recover.”

    – The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness and Minister responsible for the Pacific Economic Development Agency of Canada

    “Wildfires last summer impacted many people and communities throughout British Columbia. This funding from the Government of Canada for damage to uninsurable infrastructure from large-scale climate emergencies is critical to helping support B.C.’s response and recovery and our ongoing work to build more resilient communities.”

    – The Honourable Kelly Greene, Minister of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness for British Columbia

    Quick Facts:

    • In Canada, emergencies are managed first at the municipal level and if assistance is needed, the municipality requests it from the province or territory. If the emergency escalates further, provinces or territories can get help from the federal government.
    • Eligible expenses under the DFAA include, but are not limited to, evacuation operations, restoring public works and infrastructure to their pre-disaster condition, as well as restoration or replacement of individuals’ uninsurable principal dwellings, restoration of small businesses, and farmsteads and mitigation measures to reduce the future vulnerability of repaired or replaced infrastructure.
    • Federal government payments are calculated on a per capita basis and cost-shared with the province or territory. Under the current DFAA program, the amount cost-shared is determined by an established formula and ranges from 50 to 90 percent of the costs of eligible expenses.
    • Under the DFAA, provinces and territories have six months following the end of a disaster event to request financial assistance from the federal government. Once an event has been designated under the DFAA, provinces and territories have up to five years to submit their final claim.
    • A request for payment under the DFAA is processed immediately following receipt of the required documentation of provincial and territorial expenditures and a review by federal auditors. Advance payments or interim payments, up to 50 or 60 percent of the projected federal share, can also be requested within the five-year timeframe.
    • On January 29, 2025, Minister Sajjan announced additional details on the upcoming modernization of the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program, which is anticipated to come into effect on April 1, 2025. 
    • For eligible disasters occurring on or after April 1, 2025, the modernized DFAA program ensures that in the face of increasing disaster costs and impacts to Canadians and all levels of government, financial assistance to provinces and territories will not only be delivered quickly and efficiently in the aftermath of a disaster, but also provide:
      • Increased investments in strategic disaster mitigation and building back better to minimize disaster impacts on communities and the risk of future disasters;
      • Incentives for risk reduction, pre-disaster planning, and improved hazard awareness to reduce the risks and impacts of disasters;
      • Expanded support for people hardest hit by the impacts of significant disasters.
    • The DFAA Guidelines for the modernized program are now posted, along with the DFAA Guidelines for eligible disasters occurring before April 1, 2025 (the former program). Since it can take a number of years after a disaster for final payments under the DFAA to be processed, the former program Guidelines will remain active until those events are fully closed and finalized. The DFAA Guidelines for the modernized program will be finalized when they come into effect on April 1, 2025. 
    • Since the inception of the program in 1970, the DFAA has been a reliable source of support for provinces and territories. As of November 2024, the Government of Canada has provided over $9 billion in post disaster assistance to help provinces and territories with the costs of response and returning infrastructure and property to pre-disaster condition.

    Associated links:

    Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-fnncl-ssstnc-rrngmnts/index-en.aspx

    Modernizing the DFAA: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-fnncl-ssstnc-rrngmnts/dfaa-mdrnzng-en.aspx

    Contacts:

    Emily Heffernan
    Director of Communications
    Office of the President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness and Minister responsible for the Pacific Economic Development Agency of Canada
    Emily.Heffernan@kpc-cpr.gc.ca

    Public Safety Canada
    Media Relations
    media@ps-sp.gc.ca
    613 991-0657

    B.C. Ministry of Emergency Management and Climate Readiness
    Media Relations
    Ashley.1.Taylor@gov.bc.ca
    250 880-6430

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Viridien: Publication of the 2024 Universal Registration Document

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Publication of the 2024 Universal Registration Document

    Paris, France – March 6, 2025

    Viridien announces the publication of its 2024 Universal Registration Document, the original version of which was filed with the French Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF) on March 6, 2025.

    The Universal Registration Document was submitted in European Single Electronic Format (ESEF), as established by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/815. It includes in particular:

    •     the 2024 annual financial report;

    •     the Board of Directors’ report on corporate governance;

    •     the description of the share buyback program;

    •     the reports from the statutory auditors;

    •     the management report including the information related to Sustainability ; and

    •     the certification report on information related to Sustainability and Taxonomy.

    The 2024 Universal Registration Document is available to the public as per the applicable regulatory conditions. It is also available on Viridien’s website (www.viridiengroup.com/investors/regulated-information) and on the AMF’s website (amf-france.org).

    About Viridien:

    Viridien (www.viridiengroup.com) is an advanced technology, digital and Earth data company that pushes the boundaries of science for a more prosperous and sustainable future. With our ingenuity, drive and deep curiosity we discover new insights, innovations, and solutions that efficiently and responsibly resolve complex natural resource, digital, energy transition and infrastructure challenges. Viridien employs around 3,400 people worldwide and is listed as VIRI on the Euronext Paris SA (FR001400PVN6).

    Contacts

    Attachment

    • Communiqué MAD URD 2024 – ENG – vF

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Assembly President calls for just and lasting peace in Ukraine

    Source: United Nations 4

    6 March 2025 Peace and Security

    The President of the General Assembly on Thursday renewed his call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and Russia, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

    The meeting, held under the Assembly’s veto initiative, followed Russia’s use of its Security Council veto on 24 February to block amendments to a United States-led draft resolution on the conflict in Ukraine.

    The two amendments were proposed by the Council’s European members – France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia. A third amendment introduced by Russia also failed to pass having failed to garner enough support.

    As a result, the US-led resolution passed in its original form, marking the first Security Council resolution since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ten Council members voted in favour, while the five European sponsors of the amendments abstained.

    Earlier that day, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions – one introduced by Ukraine and the other by the United States, mirroring the text later submitted in the Security Council.

    The US-led resolution only passed after EU-led amendments were added, prompting the US to abstain on its own motion and vote on the same side as Russia, Belarus and the DPR Korea, more commonly known as North Korea.

    Promote peaceful and inclusive dialogue

    Opening the General Assembly debate on Thursday, President Philémon Yang underscored that the body must remain “steadfast in promoting peaceful solutions and inclusive dialogue.”

    He recalled the two resolutions adopted on 24 February, when the Assembly met in an emergency session on the situation in Ukraine.

    “In both, the General Assembly reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,” Mr. Yang said.

    “Moreover, the Assembly was unequivocal in its call for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation – a peace that aligns with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity,” he added.

    Mutually reinforcing

    President Yang emphasised that the General Assembly and Security Council must work together in the pursuit of peace.

    “While the Security Council bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly plays a crucial role in responding to conflicts and crises,” he said.

    However, he expressed regret over the growing use of Security Council vetoes.

    “It is regrettable that we must convene under these circumstances, as the frequency of vetoes has continued to rise since 2022,” he added, urging Member States to reflect on how to make deliberations on the veto initiative more binding.

    Broadcast of the General Assembly meeting.

    Russia upheld its responsibility: Ambassador

    Taking the floor as the first speaker, Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative, Dmitry Polyanskiy, said that his country’s votes against the draft amendments were to “disrupt” the plans of Western Countries that would have undermined the mandate of the Security Council.

    “We highly value the US initiative, and we see the text that was ultimately adopted as a step in the right direction and grounds for further efforts for a peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis,” he said.

    He noted that the change in tack in Washington following President Trump’s inauguration in January “caught European pseudo peacekeepers off guard.”

    “The American draft resolution is particularly in sharp contrast with the [General Assembly] draft put forward by Ukraine and the European backers, which promoted a new, more polished form of the futile elements of the infamous Zelensky formula,” he added.

    Ambassador Polyanskiy stated that his country takes a responsible attitude towards the use of veto and its actions on 24 February were to give peace a chance, rather than push it away.

    “Let us not delude ourselves, the hawks that call for continuing an armed conflict in Ukraine and in European countries are capitalizing on war and the suffering of civilians, and they do not plan on dropping their intention to interfere with peace between Russia and Ukraine.”

    No equivalence between aggressor and victim: EU

    Hedda Samson, Deputy Head of Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the UN, said Russia’s vetoes blocked the reference to the Security Council’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the call for a just and lasting peace in line with the UN Charter.

    The two proposals by Council’s European members received nine and 11 positive votes respectively, she said.

    “Let it be clear, Russia is abusing its veto power to block references to the principle of territorial integrity and to peace in line with the UN Charter,” she added, stating that Russia is undermining the core principles of the multilateral system.

    “Aggression is aggression wherever it occurs We cannot accept an equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. We cannot accept a world where might is right, where the power of law is replaced by the power of guns,” she noted.

    She stated that her delegation believes in a world based on rules, adding, “the time for peace is now. The EU supports all meaningful efforts to bring an end to Russia’s war of aggression.”

    US committed to ending Russia-Ukraine war: Ambassador

    Speaking for the United States, Acting Representative Dorothy Shea said her country is committed to ending the Russia-Ukraine war, which it demonstrated in the Security Council on 24 February.

    “Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians have died. The longer the war continues, the greater the suffering for both nations. The war must end now, and the peace must be durable and lasting,” she said.

    With the adoption of resolution 2774, she continued, the Security Council showed that the United Nations can still live up to the purposes and principles of its charter, mainly to maintain international peace and security, including through the peaceful settlement of disputes.

    “We reminded the world that there is common ground that we can all agree on. All UN Member States can agree that the war is a tragedy and that it must end. Security Council resolution 2774 does not end the war, but it has put us on a path to peace,” she added.

    Russia is abusing its veto: Ukraine

    Ukrainian Chargé d’affaires Khrystyna Hayovyshyn said that Russia’s behaviour in the Security Council following its aggression against her country is the “most vivid example” of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be for the Council’s ability to respond effectively.

    “All draft resolutions that the UN Security Council attempted to adopt in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 to 2024 were vetoed by the Russian Federation,” she said.

    She noted that the amendments proposed by Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and UK would have contributed to bringing Council resolution 2774 in line with the UN Charter and reaffirming the commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

    The adopted resolution, Ms. Hayovyshyn continued, lacked essential elements, especially those regarding the classification of the war as an act of aggression and failing to reflect the principles of the UN Charter.

    “The Russian Federation abuses its veto rights either to block the Security Council decision designed to address its aggression or, as we have seen recently, block those proposals that contribute to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter,” she added.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Meet Maria Clementina Sobieska, the defiant queen who pulled off a jailbreak to secure the Jacobite legacy

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Darius von Guttner Sporzynski, Historian, Australian Catholic University

    Wikimedia

    Maria Clementina Sobieski is one of only three women buried in the famous St Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City, alongside an estimated 100 or so popes. She lived a life of extraordinary defiance and determination.

    Born in 1701 in Oława, Poland, Maria Clementina was the granddaughter of King John III Sobieski of Poland, who was famous for his victory in the 1683 Battle of Vienna against the forces of the Ottoman Empire.

    While this ancestry provided Maria Clementina her status as a princess, it also came with significant challenges, by placing her at the centre of 18th century European dynastic politics.

    At just 17 years old, she was betrothed to James Stuart, the Jacobite claimant to the British throne. This match, which held immense political and religious significance, was agreed to by her father, Jakub, after negotiations with Stuart.

    But her journey to marriage wouldn’t simple. It required a daring escape from imprisonment in Innsbruck, where she was held by Emperor Charles VI in a bid to prevent her union with Stuart.

    Francesco Bertosi’s painting, ‘Princess Maria Clementina Sobieska, 1701–1735. Wife of Prince James Francis Edward Stuart’, 1719.
    National Galleries of Scotland

    A high-stakes abduction

    The marriage between Maria Clementina and James Stuart was a direct challenge to the Protestant king George I of Great Britain.

    James Stuart, also known as the Old Pretender, was living in exile and sought to reclaim the British throne that was his by birthright. His marriage to Maria Clementina, which was endorsed by Pope Clement XI, would symbolise Catholic unity against growing Protestant dominance.

    Recognising this political threat, George I asked Emperor Charles VI, his ally, to order Maria Clementina’s detention in Innsbruck while she was en route to her wedding.

    Her confinement was intended to coerce her family into annulling the engagement. However, Maria Clementina, bolstered by her unwavering faith and determination, refused to capitulate.

    Anton Raphael Mengs’s painting, ‘Prince James Francis Edward Stuart’, circa 1740s.
    Wikimedia

    The perilous escape

    Maria Clementina’s imprisonment at the hands of Charles VI lasted six months. During this time, she kept her spirits high through correspondence with James Stuart and her father, Jakub. Meanwhile, plans for her escape were set in motion by Charles Wogan, an Irish Jacobite loyal to Stuart.

    The princess disguised herself by switching clothes with the servant of one of her rescuers, Eleanor Misset. She then slipped past imperial guards with a small group posing as a travelling family.

    The escape involved avoiding imperial agents and enduring significant physical hardship, including traversing the harsh and mountainous Brenner Pass in the Alps.

    In one instance, after a carriage axle broke, Maria Clementina and Eleanor Misset were forced to walk a considerable distance to find shelter. Despite the gruelling journey, Maria Clementina demonstrated remarkable resolve, earning the admiration of her companions.

    Reaching safety and marriage

    After crossing into Italy, the group arrived in Bologna, where Maria Clementina rested and prepared for her new role as James Stuart’s wife. Her wedding took place on May 9 1719 in a modest ceremony.

    Although James Stuart was absent (not unusual for high-profile dynastic alliances at the time), the marriage formalised their union and reinforced the Jacobite claim to the British throne.

    Maria Clementina wore a white dress to symbolise mourning for James Stuart’s late mother, Maria Beatrice d’Este. The ceremony was attended by Jacobite activist Charles Wogan and other members of the escape team, including Eleanor Misset.

    And so Maria Clementina became the titular Catholic queen of England, Scotland and Ireland.

    Agostino Masucci’s ‘The Solemnisation of the Marriage of James III and Maria Clementina Sobieska’, circa 1735.
    National Galleries of Scotland

    Motherhood and family challenges

    Maria Clementina’s bold actions ensured the continuity of the Jacobite line. On December 31 1720 she gave birth to her first son, Charles Edward Stuart, later known as Bonnie Prince Charlie.

    He was baptised within the hour by Father Lawrence Mayes, the same bishop who officiated his parents’ wedding, and his birth was widely celebrated by Jacobite supporters.

    Maria Clementina’s second son, Henry Benedict Stuart, was born on March 6 1725 and was later made Duke of York.

    A monument in St Peter’s Basilica dedicated to the royal Stuarts, James and his sons, Charles and Henry.
    Wikimedia, CC BY-SA

    While the birth of her sons brought joy and hope to the Jacobite cause, Maria Clementina’s relationship with James Stuart grew strained.

    As one household observer remarked:

    their tempers are so very different that though in the greatest trifles they are never of the same opinion, the one won’t yield an inch to the other.

    James neglected Maria Clementina. The pair also clashed over their sons’ education, further straining the marriage.

    The later years

    By the end of 1725, Maria Clementina’s frustrations with her marriage reached a breaking point. She left James and took up residence at the convent of St Cecilia in Trastevere, Rome, leaving her young sons behind.

    For two years she embraced a devout lifestyle, focusing on her own welfare. Her return to James in 1728 was marked by a withdrawal from court life, and she spent much of her time in seclusion at Rome’s Palazzo Muti.

    John Pettie (1834-93), ‘Bonnie Prince Charlie Entering the Ballroom at Holyroodhouse’, before April 1892.
    Royal Collection Trust, CC BY-NC-SA

    Despite her struggles, Maria Clementina’s legacy as a mother was significant. Charles Edward Stuart and Henry Benedict Stuart carried the Jacobite cause forward, their lives shaped by the resilience and determination demonstrated by their mother. Her commitment to their futures ensured the Jacobite line endured, even as political realities shifted.

    Maria Clementina died on January 18 1735 at the age of 32. She was given a royal funeral in St Peter’s Basilica, where she was interred with honours befitting her status as queen. Her heart was enshrined separately in the church of the Twelve Holy Apostles in Rome.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Meet Maria Clementina Sobieska, the defiant queen who pulled off a jailbreak to secure the Jacobite legacy – https://theconversation.com/meet-maria-clementina-sobieska-the-defiant-queen-who-pulled-off-a-jailbreak-to-secure-the-jacobite-legacy-247211

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: LECTRA: Monthly declaration of the total number of shares and voting rights composing the company’s capital (at February 28th, 2025)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Monthly declaration of the total number of shares and voting rights composing the company’s capital (at February 28th, 2025)

    This declaration is established in accordance with Article L.233-8 II of the French Code de Commerce and of Article 223-11 of the Règlement Général of the Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

    Date:

    February 28th, 2025

    Total number of shares composing the capital:

    38,028,866

    Total number of voting rights, gross (1):

    38,221,016

    Total number of voting rights, net (2):

    38,188,374

    (1) In accordance with the second paragraph of article 223-11 of the Règlement Général of the AMF, the gross total of voting rights is based on the total number of shares composing the company’s capital which have voting rights, including shares deprived of their voting rights

    (2) The net total of voting rights is equal to the gross total, minus the number of shares deprived of their voting rights (treasury shares)

    Other than the legal notification requirements for crossing the thresholds established by French law, there is no special statutory obligation.

    Attachment

    • Monthly_declaration_shares_votingrights_february 2025

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: INTERPOL agreement with CEMAC to promote border security in Central Africa

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    12 November 2013

    LYON, France – An agreement to extend access to INTERPOL’s tools and services to key border points in six Central African countries has been concluded by INTERPOL and the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC).

    Signed by CEMAC President Pierre Moussa and INTERPOL Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, the agreement provides a framework for linking 40 border points in the CEMAC countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) to I-24/7, INTERPOL’s secure police communications system.

    In addition to updating the I-24/7 access at the INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs) in each of the six countries, the two organizations will collaborate to establish access at remote sites including international airports, sea ports and strategic border crossing points.

    “This agreement comes at a time when the CEMAC member countries are preparing to implement, as of 1 January 2014, the free movement of people within their borders. Therefore it is crucial that we ensure the highest level of security possible within these common boundaries, particularly with the support of INTERPOL,” said CEMAC President Moussa, who visited INTERPOL’s General Secretariat headquarters in Lyon, France to sign the accord.

    He added that the agreement between the two organizations ‘offers a fundamental and indispensable support in this time of globalization, which permits us to access INTERPOL’s tools and services, in particular its nominal and Stolen and Lost Travel Documents databases at our airports, ports and land borders.’

    INTERPOL Chief Noble hailed the agreement as a critical step towards enhancing security in the Central African region.

    “By ensuring that law enforcement officers on the ground have instant access to INTERPOL’s databases and other tools, this agreement represents the commitment of CEMAC and its member countries to safeguarding their borders against all types of transnational threats,” said Secretary General Noble.

    CEMAC is a regional organization established in 1994 to promote cooperation and exchange among its member countries, as well as to create a common market and effective customs union.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: First INTERPOL iARMS ‘hit’ on stolen firearm links previously unrelated cases in Costa Rica and Panama

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    20 November 2013

    LYON, France – The INTERPOL illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) has recorded its first ‘hit’, matching a firearm seized by police in Panama to one stolen in Costa Rica 18 months earlier.

    Launched at the start of 2013, iARMS which currently contains more than 288,000 records provided by nearly 100 countries, provides a centralized system for the reporting and querying of lost, stolen, trafficked and smuggled firearms by all 190 INTERPOL member countries.

    In January 2012, a cache of 216 firearms were reported stolen by the Costa Rican authorities. To alert other countries of the possible threat posed by the missing firearms, INTERPOL issued an Orange Notice warning that the weapons could potentially be smuggled into other countries in the region.

    When Costa Rica joined iARMS in April 2013, its authorities recorded details of the missing firearms for inclusion in the database. It was one of the first countries from the region to add its records into the iARMS system.

    In a separate case, in August 2013 police in Panama seized a handgun during a raid on a residence in relation to suspected drug crimes. A check against the iARMS database revealed that the weapon recovered in the raid was a match to one of those stolen in Costa Rica in 2012.

    “This first hit in iARMS demonstrates the importance of this tool for uncovering links between cases which at first appear unrelated,” said Jeffrey Stirling, Head of INTERPOL’s Firearms Programme.

    “We hope this example of the success of iARMS encourages more member countries to add their records of stolen, lost, trafficked, smuggled and crime-related firearms to the database, making it an even stronger tool for law enforcement,” concluded Mr Stirling.

    Authorities in Costa Rica and Panama are now working closely to share information, identify potential firearm trafficking and smuggling routes between the two countries, and the organizations which could be involved.

    In addition to assisting countries match illicit firearms, iARMS also enables law enforcement to check when and where a weapon was manufactured which can assist in tracing its movements from initial circulation to seizure.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Countries unite to identify illegal fishing vessel via INTERPOL

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    LYON, France – A joint effort by New Zealand, Australia and Norway to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing has led to the publication of an INTERPOL Purple Notice to assist in identifying its location.

    An INTERPOL Purple Notice has been issued to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing. Pictured is ‘Thunder’ as Wuhan N 4 in Singapore, October 2012.

    Thunder as Wuhan N 4 – bow view – Singapore October 2012

    Circulated to all 190 INTERPOL member countries the Notice, requested by New Zealand supported by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, also seeks information about the individuals and networks which own, operate and profit from the suspected illegal activities of the vessel, currently believed to be called ‘Thunder’.

    During the past two years, the vessel has operated under at least three different names and under several flags, in order to avoid detection of illegal fishing activities.

    In July 2012, Mongolian registration papers for a vessel called ‘Wuhan 4’ were issued; however in August 2012 the vessel was sighted in the North Indian Ocean under the name ‘Kuko’. In October 2012, the vessel was spotted at a Singapore shipyard under the name ‘Wuhan N 4’ and under a Mongolian flag.

    In April 2013, the same vessel requested access to a port in Malaysia under the name ‘Wuhan 4’ but when inspected a few days later in Indonesia, it was using the name ‘Thunder’ and with the Nigerian flag.

    “Thunder has been operating under a number of names and flags over several years and we believe this is being done to avoid been caught violating international laws and conventions,” said Gary Orr, Manager, Operational Coordination with New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries.

    “Fisheries crime is not constrained by borders and is commonly carried out by transnational organized networks. Norway is deeply concerned about its global effects. We need an international, coordinated response to effectively tackle these networks, and I welcome the good cooperation we have established with Australia and New Zealand via INTERPOL,” said Norway’s Minister of Fisheries, Elisabeth Aspaker.

    AFMA’s Fisheries Operations General Manager Peter Venslovas said illegal fishing activities seriously undermine the sustainability of fisheries: “Ongoing cooperation between countries across the globe to combat illegal fishing is having a real impact and making it harder for these operators to make a profit.”

    It is possible that the owners of ‘Thunder’ have earned more than USD 60 million from its illegal fishing activities since it was blacklisted by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in February 2006.

    The vessel is currently believed to be operating in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica where it may be fishing illegally for Patagonian toothfish, also known as Chilean Sea Bass, a highly sought after protected species.

    This is the third INTERPOL Purple Notice issued in connection with illegal fishing activities, with the first published in September this year at the request of Norwegian authorities for a vessel named ‘Snake’.

    INTERPOL’s Purple Notices are used to seek or provide information on modi operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods used by criminals.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Customs and police operation targets cocaine trafficking routes into Europe

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    5 December 2013

    An operation targeting cocaine trafficking routes from South America and Africa into Europe has led to the seizure of more than 1.7 tonnes of drugs, some EUR 1.4 million in cash and 91 arrests.

    Secret panels had been created inside the suitcase to smuggle drugs.

    Customs officers in Nigeria found 2.5 kilogrammes of methamphetamine hidden in a suitcase.

    Counterfeit medicines seized from an air freight container in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In total more than 10 tonnes of fake medicines were recovered during Operation Cocair IV.

    More than five kilogrammes of cocaine were discovered hidden inside motor cylinders at Niamey airport in Niger.

    Operation COCAIR IV, led by the World Customs Organization (WCO), and supported by INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), also resulted in the recovery of more than 10 tonnes of counterfeit medical products and around 35 kilogrammes of illicit wildlife products, including rough and worked ivory.

    During the nine-day operation (26 October – 3 November) nearly 100 seizures were made at 30 international airports across Africa with 181 kg of cocaine 1,700 kg of cannabis and 40 kg of methamphetamine recovered.

    In addition to intelligence-led controls, including profiling passenger lists, law enforcement officers also carried out additional checks on postal items, freight, aircraft and crew members.

    The operation comes under the umbrella of Project AIRCOP, an European Commission and Canada funded initiative to improve controls at international airports by enhancing cooperation between drug enforcement services through communication via WCO’s CENcomm and INTERPOL’s I-24/7 secure systems.

    Prior to the operational phase, a training session was held in Libreville, Gabon where INTERPOL and WCO provided specialist training to nearly 50 officers from the participating countries on a range of issues including risk analysis and product identification.

    Countries which took part in Operation COCAIR IV: Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominican Republic, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Trilateral Maritime Exercise Supports Allied Interoperability

    Source: United States SOUTHERN COMMAND

    CARIBBEAN SEA  –  

    Showing the benefits of maritime presence in the Caribbean, three warships and one aircraft from three allies conducted a passing exercise (PASSEX) on Mar. 3 designed to increase interoperability and enhance capability.

    The U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG-60) and Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG-116) joined the United Kingdom (U.K.) Royal Navy River-class offshore patrol vessel HMS Medway (P223) and a NH90 Neptune helicopter assigned to the Royal Netherlands Navy Holland-class offshore patrol vessel HNLMS Groningen (P843) for the PASSEX.

    The trilateral maritime PASSEX is part of U.S. and allied collaboration in the Western Hemisphere. Adopted in 2023, allies and partners from the U.K., Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United States committed to more frequently share information and work more closely together on aligned strategic interests, specifically in the U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). The collaboration includes maritime operations and exercises at sea and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) port visits designed to meet that commitment.

    “One of the best ways to address today’s security challenges is with shared maritime presence in our region, operating at sea with our allies and partners,” said Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet, the operational commander of the trilateral maritime exercise. “We know that through operations and exercises like this one in coordination with committed allies, we strengthen U.S. and regional security.”

    A PASSEX is an exercise conducted between two or more navies to ensure best practices for communicate and cooperation and normally include communication and maneuvering drills. This trilateral maritime PASSEX also included an air defense event, a low-slow flyer event, and Sailor crossdecks among the four warships.

    “We always look forward to any opportunity to operate alongside partners and allies like the Royal Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy,” said Capt. Nathan Diaz, USS Normandy Commanding Officer. “Maritime exercises such as these provide a great opportunity for Normandy Sailors to improve their skills and work closely with their counterparts from partnered and allied naval forces.”

    “We relish at sea exercises as they allow us to build our team as we operate with allies and partners,” said Cmdr. Cameron Ingram, USS Thomas Hudner Commanding Officer. “It was an honor to meet, operate and collaborate with the other commands’ leadership and teams, and a reassurance of our collaborative capabilities and resolve.”

    U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet serves as a trusted maritime partner for Caribbean, Central and South American maritime forces, promoting unity, security, and stability in the region.

    MIL Security OSI –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: ReviewsBlender.com Launches AI Powerhouse, Slashes Hotel Review Management by 80%, Unveils ITB Berlin 2025 Special Offers

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    READING, United Kingdom, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In a landscape where 81% of travellers rely on online reviews, ReviewsBlender.com, by Naxtech, revolutionizes hospitality with its AI-powered platform, cutting multilingual review management time by a staggering 80%. Just in time for ITB Berlin 2025, the world’s leading travel trade show, ReviewsBlender.com announces a limited-time March 2025 price reduction and the integration of Expedia and Agoda into its supported channels.

    “Hotels are drowning in a sea of multilingual reviews,” states Denis Kondopoulos, Project Director at ReviewsBlender.com. “Our platform empowers them to transform feedback into bookings, providing actionable insights across diverse languages.”

    A recent Economist Intelligence Unit report highlights that brands neglecting customer feedback face a 30% trust reduction annually. ReviewsBlender.com addresses this, offering AI-driven sentiment analysis and culturally nuanced responses.

    Success Story: Loizos Stylish Residences Sees Star Rating Rise and Time Savings

    Loizos Stylish Residences, a Santorini-based luxury stay, tackled a deluge of reviews in English, Spanish, French, and Mandarin. “Before ReviewsBlender.com, we were overwhelmed,” says Lefteris Anapliotis, Head of Guest Experience. “Now, we engage globally, identifying concerns and boosting our reputation.” The residence saw a 0.5% increase in their star rating and 80% time savings.

    Key Features & Benefits:

    • Multilingual AI Summarization: 98% accurate sentiment analysis via advanced neural networks.
    • AI-Generated, Culturally Sensitive Responses: Authentic, language-specific replies.
    • Automated Weekly Reports: Actionable insights, saving 5 hours weekly.
    • Competitor Analysis: Benchmark against rivals and track trends.
    • Sentiment Analysis Reports: Quickly pinpoint areas for improvement.
    • Drive Bookings: Proactively address concerns, enhancing online reputation.
    • Intuitive Interface: User-friendly design, no IT skills needed.

    “ReviewsBlender.com goes beyond basic sentiment scores,” Kondopoulos emphasizes. “We deliver actionable insights to enhance guest experiences.”

    Experience the Future:

    Try the free Reviews Response Generator at www.ReviewsBlender.com.

    Media Contact:

    Denis Kondopoulos

    Project Director

    contact@reviewsblender.com

    Tel. +447712255379

    About ReviewsBlender.com:

    ReviewsBlender.com simplifies multilingual review management using AI, delivering 98% accurate sentiment analysis and culturally sensitive responses. Tailored for hospitality, it drives bookings and strengthens online reputations.

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Six days after the infamous shouting match between the US president and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president is scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.

    Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.

    But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.

    Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

    So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe. On Sunday March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

    This “coalition of the willing”“ has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey. Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.

    The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion.

    Europe responds

    In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the “Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilise around €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence.

    This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.

    Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.

    This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.




    Read more:
    Europe will need thousands more tanks and troops to mount a credible military defence without the US


    Donald Trump reads a letter from Volodymyr Zelensky during his speech to Congress, March 4.

    These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.

    The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.

    The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.

    Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.

    But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.




    Read more:
    French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?


    Tectonic shift

    A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defence spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.

    In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon treaty on European Union.

    This so-called mutual defence clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defences is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.

    With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.

    Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?”

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin – https://theconversation.com/europe-nato-coalition-of-the-willing-scrambles-for-collective-response-to-hostility-from-trump-and-threat-from-putin-251332

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

    Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry: RUSI/IFRI Speech “Enhancing UK-France Defence Industrial cooperation”

    Esteemed colleagues. Distinguished Guests. Chers amis.

    I’m sure I speak for us all in thanking RUSI and IFRI for bringing us together at this pivotal moment for European security. And for all they do to advance Defence in our countries. As Putin continues to wage his unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine amidst fierce debate about how best to end the conflict the common refrain coming from both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic is that Europe needs to step-up and take more responsibility for its own security. As our Prime Minister did again last week, by setting a path that will lift our defence spending from 2.3%,  to 2.5% by 2027,  and 3% in the next parliament.

    Amidst the uncertainty surrounding European security the one thing that is certain and that’s a fighting force is only as strong as the industrial base that stands behind it. So transforming European defence industrial capabilities and boosting capacity are going to be integral to this defining mission of our time. And I hope we all leave here today agreeing that as Europe’s most powerful military forces with two of its most advanced defence sectors the UK and France must spearhead this mission. Strengthening an alliance that has achieved so much since we struck the Entente Cordiale back in 1904.

    A military alliance that’s twice been pivotal in securing European freedoms. And an industrial alliance that has connected our electricity grids…

    shrunk our skies and tunnelled under the channel. Making it possible to enjoy a late morning croissant in Paris followed almost seamlessly, by mid-afternoon tea in London and more easily done than getting back to my constituency in Liverpool and faster most of the time.

    For the last fifteen years the Lancaster House Treaties have been our guiding light as our Armed Forces and our nations have again stood united in support of democracy and against the common threats of terrorism, tyranny, and hybrid warfare both in Europe and further afield.  And as we gather today to discuss the next chapter of our Defence industrial partnership I believe that the overwhelming majority of not just British and French people but the vast majority of Europeans are looking to our respective governments to provide leadership by doing more together in recognition that our combined military capabilities are the most significant stabilising force in European security.

    And as we step forward to help Europe step-up to the challenge we will be building on solid foundations. Our combined nuclear deterrents underpin Europe’s security. Our Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is on stand-by to respond swiftly to crises giving us a level of interoperability with the French Armed Forces, beyond anything we have with any other European allies. And our Industrial sector is also increasingly integrated.

    Through ‘One MBDA’ we’ve help safeguard European missile production capabilities and delivered innovative defensive and offensive systems…

    including Meteor and SCALP/Storm Shadow. Together we are co-developing powerful Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapons a sovereign capability that boosts our industrial resilience and will deliver the most advanced deep-strike weapons in Europe. And as part of our Maritime Mine Counter-Measures Project with Thales the UK will soon take delivery of our first set of autonomous mine hunting equipment marking an important new phase in that particular programme.

    But if we are to re-establish security across the European continent and dissuade Putin from coming back again to invade one of his sovereign neighbours we need to use our Summit in June to broaden our defence industrial collaboration beyond complex weapons. Putting something of an ‘Entente Industrielle’ at the heart to the UK-France Defence partnership that delivers more from our existing programmes that intensifies our cooperation in the most decisive domains and capabilities – including space, AI, and defeating hybrid grey-zone warfare and provides leadership to European Partners, including within NATO.

    For both our countries the need to significantly strengthen European deterrence represents a significant economic opportunity.

    And it can be a virtuous circle of enhanced capabilities, stronger deterrence, and economic growth that I believe can be mutually beneficial as we expand the range of our cooperation supporting a growing number of Defence jobs in both France and the UK.

    Last week marked the end of our public consultation on the UK’s forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy I am glad to say because I was visiting every corner of the UK speaking to people about it, so I get a little bit of rest from travel. But that strategy will guide our approach to the sector.

    It is a strategy that will set out our wish to create new research and industrial ventures with international allies like France in order to broaden our capabilities, enhance standardisation, and boost interoperability whilst supporting our respective strengths across the defence value chain.

    We know the EU has a role to play in building a larger, more innovative, and more responsive European defence sector. And we would welcome French support as we seek an ambitious new UK-EU security pact. Continued coordination through NATO is also crucially important,

    in setting capability targets and standards, and making our collective defence industrial bases more coherent. We also know, a more resilient and responsive industrial base, requires a fundamentally closer relationship between governments and industry, hence adding that “industry” to the end of my title. I am not just in charge with procurement I am in charge of our relationship with defence industries as well. And we are recruiting a National Armaments Director, who will be held accountable for delivering that, alongside procurement reform.

    At the last UK-France Summit, our countries signed up to a closer industrial relationship. We agreed to strengthen supply chains and industrial resilience and facilitate reciprocal market access and exports. I think that recent geopolitical developments, have injected urgency into that work…

    and the need to strengthen European and NATO industrial and procurement initiatives is also apparent and that includes: the European Long-Range Strike Approach the DIAMOND integrated air and missile defence initiative and NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan and Multinational Procurement initiatives. Collective procurement will deliver more of the capabilities we need across the continent to deter Putin…

    and deliver more bang for our Pounds and Euros.

    Whilst UK and French visions for Europe’s security architecture haven’t always aligned during the Entente Cordiale era, UK and French values and interests overwhelmingly have and it is vital for European Security that we talk, and build on that unity.

    Our cooperation has long been a powerful force-for-good that has brought our people closer together and helped overcome tyranny and preserve freedoms. And we can do it again.

    So I will work closely with my counterpart Délégué Emmanuel Chiva…who I am going to be seeing tomorrow at the High-Level UK-France Working Group to put our defence capabilities and industrial cooperation at the top of the agenda of our Summit in June at the heart of our Lancaster House Treaties refresh and at the centre of our shared mission to bolster European security

    Because like our predecessors who built the Entente Cordiale to secure peace in their time we must now build an Entente Industrielle to guarantee European security in ours.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Dassault Systèmes: declaration of the number of outstanding shares and voting rights as of February 28, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release
    VELIZY-VILLACOUBLAY, France — March 6, 2025

    Declaration of the number of outstanding shares and
    voting rights as of February 28, 2025

    Dassault Systèmes (Euronext Paris: FR0014003TT8, DSY.PA) today announced below the total number of its outstanding shares and voting rights as of February 28, 2025, according to articles 223-16 and 221-3 of the General Regulation of the Autorité des marchés financiers.

    Number of outstanding shares: 1,340,433,125

    Number of voting rights*: 2,011,423,108

    *The total number of voting rights is calculated on the basis of the total number of outstanding shares, even if the voting rights attached thereto are suspended, pursuant to Article 223-11 of the General Regulation of the Autorité des marchés financiers relating to the method for calculating the percentages of holdings in shares and in voting rights. We invite our shareholders to refer to this article should they need to declare crossing of thresholds.

    Declarations related to crossing of threshold must be sent to:
    Dassault Systèmes, Investor Relations Service, 10, rue Marcel Dassault, CS 40501, 78946 Vélizy-Villacoublay Cedex (France). E-mail address: Investors@3ds.com  

    ###

    ABOUT DASSAULT SYSTÈMES

    Dassault Systèmes is a catalyst for human progress. Since 1981, the company has pioneered virtual worlds to improve real life for consumers, patients and citizens. With Dassault Systèmes’ 3DEXPERIENCE platform, 350 000 customers of all sizes, in all industries, can collaborate, imagine and create sustainable innovations that drive meaningful impact. For more information, visit www.3ds.com.

    Dassault Systèmes Investor Relations Team                FTI Consulting
    Béatrix Martinez :                                        Arnaud de Cheffontaines: +33 1 47 03 69 48
    +33 1 61 62 40 73                                        Jamie Ricketts : +44 20 3727 1600
    investors@3ds.com                                        

    Dassault Systèmes Press Contacts
    Corporate / France        
    Arnaud Malherbe: +33 1 61 62 87 73
    arnaud.malherbe@3ds.com        

    © Dassault Systèmes. All rights reserved. 3DEXPERIENCE, the 3DS logo, the Compass icon, IFWE, 3DEXCITE, 3DVIA, BIOVIA, CATIA, CENTRIC PLM, DELMIA, ENOVIA, GEOVIA, MEDIDATA, NETVIBES, OUTSCALE, SIMULIA and SOLIDWORKS are commercial trademarks or registered trademarks of Dassault Systèmes, a European company (Societas Europaea) incorporated under French law, and registered with the Versailles trade and companies registry under number 322 306 440, or its subsidiaries in the United States and/or other countries. All other trademarks are owned by their respective owners. Use of any Dassault Systèmes or its subsidiaries trademarks is subject to their express written approval

    Attachment

    • Dassault Systèmes: declaration of the number of outstanding shares and voting rights as of February 28, 2025

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: York school students get taste of construction careers

    Source: City of York

    Fifteen Year 11 students from across York got the chance to get a real-world insight into the construction industry.

    Their industry taster day began with a tour of the York Central construction site, where students learned about ongoing work on one of England’s largest brownfield development, and future career opportunities represented by this landmark project.

    Back at Sisk’s on-site office, the students met with eight employees from four construction businesses and quizzed them about their roles and career paths, learning about the huge range of careers available, from bricklaying to project management and from civil engineering to plastering.

    The students learned about the wide range of avenues open to them to get into a construction career, from T-Levels to degree apprenticeships.

    The group also heard from Paul Brown, CEO of Sisk, the infrastructure contractors appointed by Homes England and Network Rail to complete the civil engineering and infrastructure works phase of the project.

    Paul reflected on his own journey from a working-class childhood to becoming the leader of an international construction firm, and highlighted the benefits of choosing a skilled, in-demand construction career.

    After lunch, the students tried their hands at practical problem-solving challenges, working in small teams alongside industry professionals to create a tetrahedron structure using dowels and string, and build weight-bearing mini bridges.

    The session was organised by York’s Construction Skills Partners, including City of York Council, CITB, York College, Sisk, Simpson, Caddick, Equans and NYBEP.

    Cllr Pete Kilbane, Executive Member for Economy and Culture at City of York Council, said:

    “York is embarking on some exciting developments like York Central and our Passivhaus building programme, which will make our city a greener, more prosperous and better place to live.

    “This opens up great opportunities for our young people with a wide variety of skilled, well-paid jobs available in the construction sector.

    “Getting a real-world insight into the huge range of career paths offered by this industry is so valuable for young people at this crucial point in their education, and I’d like to thank all our construction partners for hosting this session and taking the time to inspire the next generation.”

    Richard France from York Construction Skills Partnership said:

    “We’re committed to ensuring that York’s future workforce has the skills needed to deliver on many exciting and varied projects around the city, whilst connecting residents to rewarding work with local employers.

    “The success of this taster day with a fantastic group of young people is a great example of how we’re putting this mission into action by helping students understand the many benefits that a career in construction can bring, and showcasing the wide variety of ways into an exciting career within our industry.

    “A huge thanks goes to all the organisations and construction employees who helped organise such a full and inspiring day for the students, and to those who came along to share their own career journeys. Lastly, I’d like to thank the students who took part in the day as it’s very encouraging to see young people engaging with the industry.

    “With the enthusiasm of those who attended it’s clear that the future of construction in York is bright.”

    Watch the video about the taster day.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

    As monarch, King Charles III is bound by constitutional convention to remain politically neutral. But that hasn’t stopped the UK government from deploying the king to advance its foreign policy agenda.

    During their inaugural meeting, Keir Starmer presented Donald Trump with a letter from the king, inviting the president for a “truly historic” and “unprecedented” second state visit to the UK and a visit to the monarch’s private Balmoral residence.

    Later that week, the government arranged for the king to meet Volodymyr Zelensky at the royal countryside retreat of Sandringham, to show support for the Ukrainian leader following his disastrous meeting with Trump.

    The government is walking a tightrope: it wants to avoid tariffs from Trump, while continuing to support Zelensky and Ukraine. And it is using the king to help it do so.


    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.


    It is not unusual for governments to use monarchs to boost international relations, particularly through state visits. The monarch has a huge amount of soft power and the pomp and ceremony of a state visit can help governments achieve their foreign affairs aims.

    State visits differ from regular diplomatic visits: they are the most formal way in which a foreign head of state can come to the UK, and happen just once or twice a year.

    Visitors are greeted by the king and other members of the royal family with a ceremonial welcome accompanied by gun salutes on the Horse Guards Parade ground in London. They then travel back to Buckingham Palace in a carriage procession, where they enjoy a formal state banquet at which the monarch toasts the visiting head of state.

    State visits are not cheap: Trump’s first visit cost £3.5 million in policing alone. But they can play a key role in diplomacy.

    A state visit to France by Queen Elizabeth II in 1972 helped seal the deal on the UK’s third attempt at joining the the European Economic Community. And in 2024, the UK’s defence partnership with Qatar was “strengthened” following the state visit of the Qatari emir.

    There is a danger that the monarch’s reputation is affected by hosting controversial heads of state. No doubt the palace PR team is less than enthused about the prospect of Charles being seen wining and dining Trump. The optics of hosting Trump during his first state visit reportedly put the late Queen Elizabeth in a “very difficult position”.

    But monarchs have little (if any) influence over who they host for a state visit. Charles will have been advised by the government to invite Trump in accordance with the cardinal convention. This fundamental constitutional principle requires the monarch to act on the advice of the government.

    Constitutional conventions are not legally binding. But in the UK’s constitutional monarchy, the monarch reigns but does not rule and power is exercised by democratically-elected ministers rather than the sovereign. Failure by the monarch to follow convention could spark a constitutional crisis, as fictional plays and dramas have long imagined.

    A royal invitation.
    Number 10 Flickr, CC BY-ND

    This is why the late queen had to host some controversial and less-than-democratic figures. It even once led her to hide in a bush to avoid encountering Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu in the Buckingham Palace gardens.

    And it is why Charles, on the government’s advice, will host Trump.

    Laying on the royal charm

    Usually, the public doesn’t see invitations for state visits, but we did see this particular letter. Signed “Yours most sincerely, Charles”, it feels particularly personal and designed to charm Trump, whose love of the British royal family is well known. The offer of an additional visit to Balmoral is a nod to the president’s mother, who was born in Scotland.

    The king’s invitation seems to have done the diplomatic trick. Trump ended his meeting with Starmer by stating: “I think we could very well end up with a real trade deal where the tariffs wouldn’t be necessary”.

    But the visit won’t be without controversy. In the days since, a petition asking for Trump’s invitation to be withdrawn has reached nearly 200,000 signatures. But Starmer has publicly dismissed calls to withdraw the invitation.

    No doubt Charles himself is less than thrilled to invite the president, both after his recent behaviour towards Zelensky and his decision to pull the US from the Paris agreement, given the king’s advocacy on environmental issues.

    Could the king raise such issues with Trump? Charles is bound by the doctrine of political neutrality: he must refrain from acting on political opinions. But that doesn’t mean there won’t be room for other senior royals not bound by the convention, like William, from doing so.

    Indeed, as prince of wales, Charles himself showed opposition to controversial leaders, effectively boycotting Chinese state visits in 1999 and 2015 allegedly in support for the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama.

    The monarch plays an important diplomatic role, especially during state visits. While the leaders they host may be controversial, the monarch must respect constitutional boundaries. Nevertheless, with an outspoken king and heir, this visit could prove to be even more unprecedented than it already is.

    Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit – https://theconversation.com/the-king-has-a-tricky-diplomatic-role-to-play-in-inviting-trump-for-a-state-visit-251308

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: FMQs: Greens call for government action to tackle broken energy market

    Source: Scottish Greens

    06 Mar 2025 Housing

    We need to fix the broken energy market and cuts bills.

    More in Housing

    The Scottish Government must take action to deliver the overdue Heat in Buildings Bill to tackle the climate crisis and reduce bills, says Scottish Green Co-leader Patrick Harvie.

    In his first question to the First Minister, Mr Harvie said:

    “In April, energy bills are set to rise for the third time in less than a year.

    “People across Scotland are worrying about those bills, and at the same time energy companies are raking in vast profits at the expense of people and the planet.

    “Our energy markets are broken. No doubt we could both say what we think the UK government should do to fix those markets, but the Scottish Government has also promised action which hasn’t happened.

    “My last question to the FM was nearly three months ago. I asked him about his promise of a new law to end our reliance on gas for home heating – which is vital to tackling the climate emergency, and cutting people’s bills too.

    “It was already overdue, without explanation, back in December. Now here we are in March; there’s still no legislation, and no explanation. Where is it?”

    In his response the First Minister agreed with the principles of the Bill but did not confirm a timeline for its publication.

    Asking his second question, Mr Harvie said:

    “The government was already considering the consultation a year ago. The real concern is that they have been spending that time watering it down. That’s the fear that I have and that the industry has.

    “The reality is that Scotland is already behind many other European countries on this. France and Germany have been accelerating their action dramatically in recent years. Scandinavian countries are decades ahead of us.

    “The only way to catch up, and to give Scottish households the benefit of affordable, reliable heat and cutting the pollution that is destroying our environment, is for the government to act decisively and show clear leadership.

    “But just as the Scottish Government has slowed down on other green measures, by hiking rail fares and watering down rent controls, progress on clean heat has stalled.

    “Will the FM commit now to get this overdue legislation published this month, to give the clarity and leadership that has been lacking?”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Cloud Computing Expert Kelsey Hightower to Speak at HAProxyConf 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEWTON, Mass. and SAN FRANCISCO, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — HAProxy Technologies, the company behind HAProxy One, the world’s fastest application delivery and security platform, announced today that Kelsey Hightower will deliver a keynote address at HAProxyConf 2025. Attendees can register now to book tickets at the limited early bird price of $350, and secure their place at the global HAProxy community event. This marks the first time in the conference’s history that the event will be held in the United States, having previously been in The Netherlands and France.

    “HAProxy showcases community at its best,” said Kelsey Hightower. “They’ve been dedicated to open source for more than two decades – longer than some of us have been in this field! I’ve watched them grow and adapt over the years as an active member of the broader ecosystem and this project is the very definition of sustainability.”

    Kelsey Hightower, a well-known technologist and contributor to cloud computing, open source software, and Kubernetes, will deliver the opening keynote to kick off two days of expert speakers from across the open source and enterprise landscape.

    “HAProxy users are creative, dedicated, and possess incredible community spirit, which shines through every time at HAProxyConf,” said Dujko Radovnikovic, CEO, HAProxy Technologies. “The conference attracts world leaders in application delivery and security, and Kelsey is a perfect example – his unique voice has helped shape the cloud-native systems that have transformed the way we build and deploy applications over the last decade. You won’t want to miss it.”

    Kelsey Hightower’s cloud-native expertise aligns with the interests, challenges, and goals of the HAProxy user community. Over half of HAProxy users reported using Kubernetes in a 2022 user survey, demonstrating its rapid growth as a deployment method for modern containerized applications. HAProxy plays a key role in this environment by ensuring performance, reliability, and security at the edge. In the last 12 months, the company achieved several notable milestones in the Kubernetes market segment:

    • HAProxy became a G2 category leader in Container Networking
    • HAProxy Fusion 1.3 added near-instant configuration generation from service discovery registries, with minimal overhead
    • HAProxy Technologies became a Gold Member of the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) and is a Diamond Sponsor of KubeCon London 2025
    • HAProxy Technologies became a Docker Verified Publisher, providing an authoritative source for HAProxy’s Docker images.

    “Kelsey’s presence at HAProxyConf underscores the company’s explosive growth over the last few years,” said Tim Bertrand, President of HAProxy Technologies. “As organizations of all types and sizes navigate the evolving challenges of security, AI, Kubernetes, and more, HAProxy Technologies is delivering the technology leadership and world-class experience needed to stay ahead. If you want to see it for yourself, make sure you’re at HAProxyConf this June.”

    About HAProxyConf

    HAProxyConf celebrates the thriving user community that’s made HAProxy the world’s fastest and most widely used software load balancer. Over two-plus days, expert speakers will share best practices and real-world use cases that highlight HAProxy’s next-gen approach to high-performance application delivery and security. Attendees will explore how to master their application traffic with next-gen solutions to the challenges of multi-layered security, observability, performance, and the complexities of Kubernetes and multi-cloud deployments.

    Registration and the Call for Papers are open for HAProxyConf 2025. Early bird tickets are $350, regular tickets are $450, and workshop add-ons are $100.

    For more information, visit www.haproxyconf.com or review the best HAProxyConf presentations from prior years in the HAProxy User Spotlight Series.

    About HAProxy Technologies

    HAProxy Technologies is the company behind HAProxy One, the world’s fastest application delivery and security platform, and HAProxy, the most widely used software load balancer. Leading companies and cloud providers trust HAProxy to simplify, scale, and secure modern applications, APIs, and AI services in any environment. HAProxy Technologies is headquartered in Newton, MA, with multiple offices across the US and Europe. Learn more at HAProxy.com.

    For questions or comments, please contact press@haproxy.com.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/d384ec8c-c41f-4942-8554-e4d4f5410d3a

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: ZOOZ Power Reports H2 and Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tel-Aviv, Israel, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ZOOZ Power (Nasdaq and TASE: ZOOZ), a leading provider of flywheel-based power boosters and energy management systems for enabling ultra-fast EV charging solutions, announced today its second half and full year 2024 financial results and provided a corporate update.

    ZOOZ Power’s revenue increased in 2024, doubling the number of systems sold in 2023. Revenue increased by 36% from $0.76 million in 2023 to $1.04 million in 2024. While revenue in 2023 included related installations services provided only in 2023 as part of early penetration, in 2024 revenue relates to systems only.

    “As the EV market continues to evolve, ZOOZ Power remains dedicated to delivering innovative power-boosting and energy management solutions that enhance the accessibility and efficiency of ultra-fast charging stations worldwide. I am excited to lead ZOOZ Power and focus on global expansion”, said Erez Zimerman, ZOOZ Power’s CEO.

    “With our unique flywheel-based power boosting technology and recent deployments in key global markets, we are uniquely positioned to grow our presence globally. We are currently scaling operations in Germany and France and advancing partnerships with leading charge point operators. These steps underscore our commitment to enhance infrastructure efficiency and empower the EV ecosystem. I look forward to our success in 2025 as we shape the future of sustainable, high-performance charging solutions”, concluded Erez Zimerman.

    Operational Highlights for the Six Months Ended December 31, 2024

      ● In July 2024, ZOOZ Power expanded its presence in Germany, with its power boosters now operational at four sites, leading charge point operators. A fifth purchase order and deployment, currently underway, is a strong testament to the customer’s trust in ZOOZ’s technology. These successful deployments demonstrate ZOOZ Power’s role as a key enabler of sustainable, high-performance EV charging solutions and a trusted operating partner.
      ● Following a successful pilot of the ZOOZTER™-100 system at the Dor-Alon gas station along Highway 6 (one of Israel’s main transportation corridors), which led to a significant increase in charging sessions per day and demonstrated a relatively short ROI. Dor-Alon decided to adopt the ZOOZ solution and purchased the system.
      ● In August, ZOOZ Power appointed Erez Zimerman as its new Chief Executive Officer, effective September 17th. Zimerman brings extensive experience across hardware and software, with a proven track record in company turnarounds, IPOs, acquisitions, and scaling global sales.
      ● To further accelerate growth, ZOOZ Power expanded its sales team in Germany and France, two of Europe’s most dynamic and fast-growing electric vehicle markets. This strategic move enhances the company’s capacity to meet the increasing demand for efficient and sustainable EV charging infrastructure throughout the region.
      ● In October 2024, ZOOZ deployed it’s ZOOZTER™-100 system at NYPA (New York Power Authority). New York Power Authority President and CEO Justin E. Driscoll said, “Innovation is a priority for the Power Authority, and partnerships like the one with ZOOZ are integral to our work to decarbonize our economy and support transportation electrification in New York State.”
      ● In November 2024, ZOOZ Power entered into a Standby Equity Purchase Agreement (SEPA) securing access to up to $12 million in flexible financing over a two-year period. This financing option provides the company with greater flexibility to raise capital strategically, ensuring support for its growth initiatives while maintaining control over the timing and volume of equity sales.

    Financial Highlights:

    Six Months Ended December 31, 2024

      ● Revenue: ZOOZ reported approximately $498 thousand in revenue for the six months ended December 31, 2024, compared to no revenue for the six months ended December 31, 2023. The revenue reported reflects sale of ZOOZTER™-100 systems,
      ● Cost of revenues: Cost of revenues for the six months ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $776 thousand, compared with approximately $888 thousand for the six months ended December 31, 2023. Cost of revenues for the six months ended December 2023 is mainly attributed to fair value adjustments and raw material write-offs.
      ● Research and Development Expenses, Net: Research and development expenses, net for the six months ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $2,633 thousand, compared with approximately $2,563 thousand for the six months ended December 31, 2023.
      ● Sales and Marketing Expenses: Sales and marketing expenses for the six months ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $494 thousand, compared with approximately $1,710 thousand for the six months ended December 31, 2023. The decrease is mainly attributed to the recognition of grants received as part of the NYPA (New York Power Authority) Cooperation Agreement, following the successful installation of ZOOZTER™-100 system, which effectively offset Sales and Marketing expenses in 2024.
      ● General and Administrative Expenses: General and administrative expenses for the six months ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $1,872 thousand, compared with approximately $1,322 thousand for the six months ended December 31, 2023. The increase is mainly attributed to D&O insurance costs and other expenses related to the Company’s listing for trading on the Nasdaq following the consummation of the Business Combination, effective as of April 4, 2024.
      ● Net loss: Net loss for the six months ended December 31, 2024, was approximately $5,753 thousand, or $0.50 per basic and diluted share, compared with a net loss of approximately $6,353 thousand, or $1.07 per basic and diluted share, for the six months ended December 31, 2023.

    Full Year Ended December 31, 2024

      ● Cash: As of December 31, 2024, ZOOZ had approximately $7,532 thousand in cash, cash equivalents and short-term deposit, compared with approximately $6,672 thousand as of December 31, 2023. Since ZOOZ has just started commercial sales of its products and considering ZOOZ’s expected cash usage, early this year ZOOZ initiated certain measures designed to reduce its operation cost, such as workforce reduction where it deemed appropriate and has continued its sales and marketing efforts. In addition, ZOOZ expects that it will need to obtain additional funding in 2025 in connection with its continuing operations.
      ● Revenue: ZOOZ reported approximately $1,041 thousand in revenue for the full year ended December 31, 2024, compared with approximately $764 thousand for the full year ended December 31, 2023. The revenue reported reflects sales of ZOOZTER™-100 systems.
      ● Cost of revenues: Cost of revenues for the full year ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $1,527 thousand, compared with approximately $1,869 thousand for the full year ended December 31, 2023. Please refer to “Six Months Ended December 31, 2024” for the description of this decrease.
      ● Research and Development Expenses, Net: Research and development expenses, net for the full year ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $5,062 thousand, compared with approximately $5,215 thousand for the full year ended December 31, 2023.
      ● Sales and Marketing Expenses: Sales and marketing expenses for the full year ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $1,324 thousand, compared with approximately $3,041 thousand for the full year ended December 31, 2023. Please refer to “Six Months Ended December 31, 2024” for the description of this decrease.
      ● General and Administrative Expenses: General and administrative expenses for the full year ended December 31, 2024, were approximately $3,664 thousand, compared with approximately $2,850 thousand for the full year ended December 31, 2023. Please refer to “Six Months Ended December 31, 2024” for the description of this increase.
      ● Net loss: Net loss for the full year ended December 31, 2024, was approximately $10,990 thousand, or $1.09 per basic and diluted share, compared with a net loss of approximately $11,755 thousand, or $1.99 per basic and diluted share, for the full year ended December 31, 2023.

    Results (K)

        H2 2024
    Unaudited
        H2 2023
    Unaudited
        FY 2024
    Audited
        FY 2023
    Audited
     
    Revenues   $ 498       –     $ 1,041     $ 764  
    Net Loss   $ 5,753     $ 6,353     $ 10,990     $ 11,755  
    Loss per diluted share   $ 0.50     $ 1.07     $ 1.09     $ 1.99  

    Full financial tables are included below

    About ZOOZ Power

    ZOOZ is the leading provider of flywheel-based power boosting and energy management solutions, enabling the widespread deployment of ultra-fast charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) while overcoming existing grid limitations.

    ZOOZ pioneers its unique flywheel-based power-boosting technology, enabling efficient utilization and power management of a power-limited grid at an EV charging site. Its Flywheel technology allows high-performance, reliable, and cost-effective ultra-fast charging infrastructure.

    ZOOZ Power’s sustainable, power-boosting solutions are built with longevity and the environment in mind, helping its customers and partners accelerate the deployment of fast-charging infrastructure, thus facilitating improved utilization rates, better efficiency, greater flexibility, and faster revenues and profitability growth. ZOOZ is publicly traded on NASDAQ and TASE under the ticker ZOOZ

    For more information, please visit: www.zoozpower.com/

    Investor Contact:

    Miri Segal – CEO
    MS-IR LLC
    msegal@ms-ir.com

    Media enquiries:
    Media@zoozpower.com

      
    Forward-Looking Statement

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the safe-harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements are based on the current beliefs, expectations, and assumptions of ZOOZ Power. All statements other than statements of historical facts contained in this press release, including statements regarding ZOOZ Power, and any of ZOOZ Power’s strategy, future operations and statements related to the collaboration between ZOOZ Power and “ON” charging network (including any plans to implement ZOOZ Power’s solution and upgrade an additional site of “ON” on Route 6) are forward-looking statements. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause ZOOZ Power’s actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. These risks and other risks and uncertainties are more fully discussed in the “Risk Factors” section of ZOOZ’s most recent Annual Report on Form 20-F as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as well as other documents that may be subsequently filed by the Company from time to time with the SEC. The words “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “target,” “will,” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements relating to the limited operating history and evolving business model that make it difficult for investors to evaluate ZOOZ Power’s business and future prospects, material weaknesses identified in ZOOZ Power’s internal control over financial reporting and the potential results of ZOOZ Power being unable to remediate these material weaknesses, or identify additional material weaknesses in the future or otherwise failure to maintain an effective system of internal control over financial reporting, ZOOZ Power’s management’s determination that substantial doubt exists about the continued existence of ZOOZ Power as a “going concern”, changes to fuel economy standards or changes to governments’ regulations and policies in relation to environment or the success of alternative fuels which may negatively impact the EVs market and thus the demand for ZOOZ Power’s products, delays in deployment of public ultra-fast charging infrastructure which may limit the need and urgency for ZOOZ Power’s products, the potential outcome of ZOOZ Power’s collaborations with third parties for installation of its flywheel-based power boosting solution, and conditions in Israel and in the Middle East, including the effect of the evolving nature of the ongoing “Swords of Iron” war, may adversely affect ZOOZ Power’s operations. These forward-looking statements are only estimations, and ZOOZ Power may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in any forward-looking statements, so you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. Actual results or events could differ materially from the plans, intentions and expectations disclosed in forward-looking statements made in this Press Release. Management of ZOOZ Power has based these forward-looking statements largely on current expectations and projections about future events and trends that such persons believe may affect ZOOZ Power’s business, financial condition and operating results. Forward-looking statements contained in this Press Release are made as of the date hereof, and none of ZOOZ Power or any of its representatives or any other person undertakes any duty to update such information except as may be expressly required under applicable law.

      
    ZOOZ POWER LTD
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands) – (Unaudited)

        December 31  
        2024     2023  
    ASSETS                
    CURRENT ASSETS:                
    Cash     7,532       6,672  
    Restricted bank deposits     34       –  
    Prepaid expenses     370       203  
    Other current assets     397       549  
    Inventory     2,320       2,848  
    TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS     10,653       10,272  
    NON-CURRENT ASSETS:                
    Restricted bank deposits     192       224  
    Prepaid expenses     91       79  
    Operating lease right of use assets     974       1,309  
    Property and equipment, net     927       1,593  
    TOTAL NON-CURRENT ASSETS     2,184       3,205  
    TOTAL ASSETS     12,837       13,477  
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY                
    CURRENT LIABILITIES:                
    Accounts payable     297       536  
    Other payables and accrued expenses     870       1,387  
    Short term employee benefits     668       788  
    Share based payment liabilities     –       232  
    Promissory note     890       –  
    Promissory note – Related party     2,151       –  
    Current maturities of operating lease liabilities     314       309  
    TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES     5,190       3,252  
                     
    NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES:                
    Warrants liability     331       –  
    Operating lease liabilities     598       1,035  
    TOTAL NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES     929       1,035  
                     
    TOTAL LIABILITIES     6,119       4,287  
                     
    TOTAL EQUITY     6,718       9,190  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY     12,837       13,477  

    ZOOZ POWER LTD
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands, except share and per share data) – (Unaudited)

        Year ended December 31  
        2024     2023     2022  
                       
    Revenue     1,041       764       –  
    Cost of revenue     1,527       1,869       178  
    Gross loss     (486 )     (1,105 )     (178 )
                             
    Research and development, net     5,062       5,215       4,163  
    Sales and marketing     1,324       3,041       1,672  
    General and administrative     3,664       2,850       2,189  
                             
    Operating loss     (10,536 )     (12,211 )     (8,202 )
                             
    Interest expenses     171       –       –  
    Other finance expenses (income), net     283       (456 )     (377 )
    Net loss     (10,990 )     (11,755 )     (7,825 )
                             
    Net loss per ordinary share attributable to shareholders – basic and diluted     (1.09 )     (1.99 )     (1.51 )
    Weighted average ordinary shares outstanding – basic and diluted     10,070       5,912       5,166  

    ZOOZ POWER LTD
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands) – (Unaudited)

        June 30     December 31  
        2024     2023  
    ASSETS                
    CURRENT ASSETS:                
    Cash and cash equivalents     7,721       6,672  
    Short term deposits     3,507       –  
    Prepaid expenses     838       203  
    Other current assets     611       549  
    Inventory     2,470       2,848  
    TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS     15,147       10,272  
                     
    NON-CURRENT ASSETS:                
    Restricted bank deposits     219       224  
    Prepaid expenses     104       79  
    Operating lease right of use assets     1,133       1,309  
    Property and equipment, net     1,411       1,593  
    TOTAL NON-CURRENT ASSETS     2,867       3,205  
    TOTAL ASSETS     18, 014       13,477  
                     
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY                
    CURRENT LIABILITIES:                
    Accounts payable     303       536  
    Other payables and accrued expenses     912       1,387  
    Short term employee benefits     662       788  
    Share based payment liabilities     –       232  
    Promissory note     856       –  
    Promissory note – Related party     2,069       –  
    Current maturities of operating lease liabilities     313       309  
    TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES     5,115       3,252  
                     
    NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES:                
    Warrants liability     181       –  
    Operating lease liabilities     824       1,035  
    TOTAL NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES     1,005       1,035  
                     
    TOTAL LIABILITIES     6,120       4,287  
                     
    TOTAL EQUITY     11,894       9,190  
    TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY     18,014       13,477  

    ZOOZ POWER LTD
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands, except share and per share data) – (Unaudited)

        Six months ended June 30,  
        2024     2023  
                 
    Revenues     543       784  
    Cost of revenue     751       981  
                     
    Gross loss     (208 )     (197 )
                     
    Research and development, net     2,429       2,652  
    Sales and marketing, net     830       1,331  
    General and administrative     1,792       1,528  
                     
    Operating loss     (5,259 )     (5,708 )
                     
    Finance income, net     22       306  
    Net loss     (5,237 )     (5,402 )
                     
    Net loss per ordinary share attributable to shareholders – basic and diluted     (0.59 )     (0.91 )
    Weighted average ordinary shares outstanding – basic and diluted     8,854       5,912  

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Meloni meets with Unione delle Camere Penali Italiane

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    A meeting was held at Palazzo Chigi this morning between the Government and representatives from the National Union of Italian Criminal Bar Associations (‘Unione delle Camere Penali Italiane’, ‘UCPI’), chaired by the President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni. The meeting was also attended by Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers Alfredo Mantovano, Minister of Justice Carlo Nordio, UCPI President Francesco Petrelli, UCPI Secretary Rinaldo Romanelli and, via video link, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani.

    President Meloni expressed her gratitude to the lawyers for the great work they do every day to support justice and outlined the main characteristics of the constitutional reform in the process of being examined by Parliament, the aim of which is the separation of careers between judges and public prosecutors in order to ensure equality of arms between prosecution and defence.

    Minister Nordio and Undersecretary of State Mantovano also talked about the measures that have already been adopted and the actions taken by the Government to bring an end to prison overcrowding, which remains one of the Government’s goals.

    The Government will meet with Italian Criminal Bar Associations again in the future, in order to maintain a stable forum for discussion aimed at modernising the administration of justice.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, January 2025

    Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

    The U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis announced today that the goods and services deficit was $131.4 billion in January, up $33.3 billion from $98.1 billion in December, revised.

    U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services Deficit
    Deficit: $131.4 Billion  +34.0%°
    Exports: $269.8 Billion  +1.2%°
    Imports: $401.2 Billion  +10.0%°

    Next release: Thursday, April 3, 2025

    (°) Statistical significance is not applicable or not measurable. Data adjusted for seasonality but not price changes

    Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, March 6, 2025

    Exports, Imports, and Balance (exhibit 1)

    January exports were $269.8 billion, $3.3 billion more than December exports. January imports were $401.2 billion, $36.6 billion more than December imports.

    The January increase in the goods and services deficit reflected an increase in the goods deficit of $33.5 billion to $156.8 billion and an increase in the services surplus of $0.2 billion to $25.4 billion.

    Year-over-year, the goods and services deficit increased $64.5 billion, or 96.5 percent, from January 2024. Exports increased $10.6 billion or 4.1 percent. Imports increased $75.2 billion or 23.1 percent.

    Three-Month Moving Averages (exhibit 2)

    The average goods and services deficit increased $19.2 billion to $102.6 billion for the three months ending in January.

    • Average exports increased $1.2 billion to $270.0 billion in January.
    • Average imports increased $20.4 billion to $372.5 billion in January.

    Year-over-year, the average goods and services deficit increased $37.1 billion from the three months ending in January 2024.

    • Average exports increased $11.4 billion from January 2024.
    • Average imports increased $48.5 billion from January 2024.

    Exports (exhibits 3, 6, and 7)

    Exports of goods increased $2.7 billion to $172.8 billion in January.

      Exports of goods on a Census basis increased $2.8 billion.

    • Capital goods increased $4.2 billion.
      • Civilian aircraft increased $1.1 billion.
      • Semiconductors increased $0.7 billion.
      • Computers increased $0.5 billion.
      • Civilian aircraft engines increased $0.5 billion.
    • Consumer goods increased $1.7 billion.
      • Pharmaceutical preparations increased $0.8 billion.
      • Jewelry increased $0.6 billion.
    • Other goods decreased $1.3 billion. (See the “Notice” for more information.)
    • Foods, feeds, and beverages decreased $1.0 billion.
      • Soybeans decreased $0.8 billion.

      Net balance of payments adjustments decreased $0.1 billion.

    Exports of services increased $0.6 billion to $97.0 billion in January.

    • Financial services increased $0.2 billion.
    • Telecommunications, computer, and information services increased $0.1 billion.
    • Other business services increased $0.1 billion.
    • Transport increased $0.1 billion.
    • Maintenance and repair services increased $0.1 billion.
    • Government goods and services decreased $0.3 billion.

    Imports (exhibits 4, 6, and 8)

    Imports of goods increased $36.2 billion to $329.5 billion in January.

      Imports of goods on a Census basis increased $36.2 billion.

    • Industrial supplies and materials increased $23.1 billion.
      • Finished metal shapes increased $20.5 billion.
    • Consumer goods increased $6.0 billion.
      • Pharmaceutical preparations increased $5.2 billion.
      • Cell phones and other household goods increased $1.2 billion.
    • Capital goods increased $4.6 billion.
      • Computers increased $3.0 billion.
      • Computer accessories increased $1.2 billion.
      • Telecommunications equipment increased $1.1 billion.

      Net balance of payments adjustments decreased $0.1 billion.

    Imports of services increased $0.4 billion to $71.7 billion in January.

    • Charges for the use of intellectual property increased $0.2 billion.
    • Other business services increased $0.1 billion.
    • Travel decreased $0.1 billion.

    Real Goods in 2017 Dollars – Census Basis (exhibit 11)

    The real goods deficit increased $30.8 billion, or 27.5 percent, to $142.9 billion in January, compared to a 27.4 percent increase in the nominal deficit.

    • Real exports of goods increased $0.6 billion, or 0.4 percent, to $142.3 billion, compared to a 1.6 percent increase in nominal exports.
    • Real imports of goods increased $31.4 billion, or 12.4 percent, to $285.2 billion, compared to a 12.5 percent increase in nominal imports.

    Revisions

    Exports and imports of goods and services were revised for July through December 2024 to incorporate more comprehensive and updated quarterly and monthly data. In addition to these revisions, seasonally adjusted data for all months of 2024 were revised so that the totals of the seasonally adjusted months equal the annual totals.

    Revisions to December exports

    • Exports of goods were revised down $0.1 billion.
    • Exports of services were revised up $0.1 billion.

    Revisions to December imports

    • Imports of goods were revised up $0.2 billion.
    • Imports of services were revised down $0.6 billion.

    Goods by Selected Countries and Areas: Monthly – Census Basis (exhibit 19)

    The January figures show surpluses, in billions of dollars, with Netherlands ($4.3), South and Central America ($4.3), Belgium ($0.6), and Brazil ($0.6). Deficits were recorded, in billions of dollars, with China ($29.7), European Union ($25.5), Switzerland ($22.8), Mexico ($15.5), Ireland ($12.4), Vietnam ($11.9), Canada ($11.3), Germany ($7.6), Taiwan ($7.5), Japan ($7.4), South Korea ($5.4), India ($4.2), Italy ($3.5), Malaysia ($2.5), Australia ($2.0), Hong Kong ($1.4), France ($1.0), Singapore ($1.0), Israel ($0.6), United Kingdom ($0.5), and Saudi Arabia ($0.1).

    • The deficit with Switzerland increased $9.8 billion to $22.8 billion in January. Exports increased $0.6 billion to $1.8 billion and imports increased $10.3 billion to $24.6 billion.
    • The deficit with Ireland increased $6.2 billion to $12.4 billion in January. Exports increased less than $0.1 billion to $1.2 billion and imports increased $6.2 billion to $13.6 billion.
    • The surplus with South and Central America increased $0.7 billion to $4.3 billion in January. Exports increased $0.3 billion to $18.0 billion and imports decreased $0.5 billion to $13.7 billion.

    Goods and Services by Selected Countries and Areas: Quarterly – Balance of Payments Basis (exhibit 20)

    Statistics on trade in goods and services by country and area are only available quarterly, with a one-month lag. With this release, fourth-quarter figures are now available.

    The fourth-quarter figures show surpluses, in billions of dollars, with South and Central America ($19.1), Netherlands ($18.6), Australia ($7.1), Singapore ($7.0), Brazil ($7.0), United Kingdom ($4.9), Hong Kong ($4.3), Saudi Arabia ($3.4), and Belgium ($1.5). Deficits were recorded, in billions of dollars, with China ($68.8), Mexico ($48.0), European Union ($38.5), Vietnam ($32.7), Germany ($21.1), Taiwan ($18.9), Japan ($17.0), Switzerland ($15.7), India ($13.2), South Korea ($12.5), Italy ($11.1), Canada ($10.5), Ireland ($7.8), Malaysia ($7.4), France ($4.5), and Israel ($2.1).

    • The deficit with Switzerland increased $12.1 billion to $15.7 billion in the fourth quarter. Exports decreased $1.6 billion to $18.8 billion and imports increased $10.6 billion to $34.5 billion.
    • The deficit with India increased $3.4 billion to $13.2 billion in the fourth quarter. Exports decreased $0.2 billion to $20.6 billion and imports increased $3.2 billion to $33.8 billion.
    • The deficit with the European Union decreased $5.8 billion to $38.5 billion in the fourth quarter. Exports decreased $0.9 billion to $164.8 billion and imports decreased $6.7 billion to $203.3 billion.

    All statistics referenced are seasonally adjusted; statistics are on a balance of payments basis unless otherwise specified. Additional statistics, including not seasonally adjusted statistics and details for goods on a Census basis, are available in exhibits 1-20b of this release. For information on data sources, definitions, and revision procedures, see the explanatory notes in this release. The full release can be found at www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/index.html or www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/international-trade-goods-and-services. The full schedule is available in the Census Bureau’s Economic Briefing Room at www.census.gov/economic-indicators/ or on BEA’s website at www.bea.gov/news/schedule.

    Next release: April 3, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. EDT
    U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, February 2025

    Notice

    Impact of Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) Release of CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM)

    The CBSA introduced a new accounting system (CARM) on October 21, 2024. As a result, importers in Canada have experienced delays in filing shipment information. These delays affected the compilation of statistics on U.S. exports of goods to Canada for September 2024 through January 2025, which are derived from data compiled by Canada through the United States – Canada Data Exchange. A dollar estimate of the filing backlog is included in estimates for late receipts and, following the U.S. Census Bureau’s customary practice for late receipt estimates, is included in the export end-use category “Other goods” as well as in exports to Canada. This estimate will be replaced with the actual transactions reported by the Harmonized System classification in June 2025 with the release of “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, Annual Revision.” Until then, please refer to the supplemental spreadsheet “CARM Exports to Canada Corrections,” which provides a breakdown of the late receipts by 1-digit end-use category for statistics through 2024. This spreadsheet will be updated as late export transactions are received to reflect reassignments from the initial “Other goods” category to the appropriate 1-digit end-use category. Any 2025 impacts will be revised in June 2026.

    If you have questions or need additional information, please contact the Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division, International Trade Macro Analysis Branch, on 800-549-0595, option 4, or at eid.international.trade.data@census.gov.

    Upcoming Changes to the Real (Chained-Dollar) Series

    Effective with the release of the February 2025 statistics on April 3, 2025, the Census Bureau will continue to use the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) U.S. Import and Export Price Indexes to calculate the chained-dollar series (exhibits 10 and 11). The BLS will be implementing changes to the indexes with the release of the February 2025 U.S. Import and Export Price Indexes on March 18, 2025. The changes to the indexes could impact the chained-dollar values. Please refer to the BLS notice for additional information on the Upcoming Change to Data Source for Import and Export Price Indexes: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

    If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the Census Bureau, Economic Statistical Methods Division, International Trade Statistical Methods Branch, on 301-763-3080.

    Upcoming Updates to Goods and Services

    With the releases of the “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services” report (FT-900) and the FT-900 Annual Revision on June 5, 2025, statistics on trade in goods, on both a Census basis and a balance of payments (BOP) basis, will be revised beginning with 2020 and statistics on trade in services will be revised beginning with 1999. The revised statistics for goods on a BOP basis and for services will also be included in the “U.S. International Transactions, 1st Quarter 2025 and Annual Update” report and in the international transactions interactive database, both to be released by BEA on June 24, 2025.

    Revised statistics on trade in goods will reflect:

    • Corrections and adjustments to previously published not seasonally adjusted statistics for goods on a Census basis.
    • End-use reclassifications of several commodities.
    • Recalculated seasonal and trading-day adjustments.
    • Newly available and revised source data on BOP adjustments, which are adjustments that BEA applies to goods on a Census basis to convert them to a BOP basis. See the “Goods (balance of payments basis)” section in the explanatory notes for more information.

    Revised statistics on trade in services will reflect:

    • Newly available and revised source data, primarily from BEA surveys of international services.
    • Corrections and adjustments to previously published not seasonally adjusted statistics.
    • Recalculated seasonal adjustments.
    • Revised temporal distributions of quarterly source data to monthly statistics. See the “Services” section in the explanatory notes for more information.

    A preview of BEA’s 2025 annual update of the International Transactions Accounts will be available in the Survey of Current Business in April 2025.

    If you have questions or need additional information, please contact the Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division, International Trade Macro Analysis Branch, on (800) 549-0595, option 4, or at eid.international.trade.data@census.gov or BEA, Balance of Payments Division, at InternationalAccounts@bea.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: South Beach, Miami is not the most popular beach destination in the world but ranks 2nd according to the Travel App, Visited

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The travel map app, Visited, publishes the most popular beach destinations as per international beach goers.

    The popular travel app, Visited, which is published by Arriving In High Heels Corporation, has published a list of the top 10 most popular beach destinations in the world. Based on popular beaches, the most popular locations are in Mexico and the Mediterranean. The popular beach destinations around the world include:

    1. Cancun, Mexico
    2. South Beach, Miami, USA
    3. Majorca, Spain
    4. Cannes, France
    5. Tenerife, Spain

    Of the US beach destinations, only South Beach, Miami and Venice Beach made it to the top 20. In the top 50 there is also Waikiki Beach, Santa Monica, Clearwater Beach, Panama City Beach, Atlantic City, Na Pali Coast and Virginia Beach.

    The full beach destination list ranked by popularity is available in the travel map app, Visited, which can be downloaded for free on iOS or Android. The app which once started as a simple way to color in the places users have been on a map, has expanded to include the popular travel list feature. Users can select ‘where I’ve been’ or add it to their ‘bucketlist’ to see personalized travel stats and to help plan future travels. There are over 175 travel lists available including national parks, cruise ports, snorkeling destinations, ski destinations, golf locations and even festivals around the world. The apps other features include a personalized travel map, ability to print a personalized travel poster, see regional information on a map by states visited and see personalized travel stats.

    To learn more about the Visited Map App, visit https://visitedapp.com.

    About Visited Travel App
    Popular travel map app Visited was designed to keep track of all countries, regions and cities that you have been to or want to visit in the future. A new feature of the app allows users to receive professionally printed posts of their travels. To help keep track of all the unique places and experiences users had, they can select destinations by travel categories. There are over 175 travel lists to choose from including ski destinations, golf destinations, national parks and more. For those that have a hard time choosing where to go next, Visited displays countries based on the total places of interest and experiences they want to do in that country, taking away the guess work of where to next. It is the ultimate travel bucket list and travel tracking app.

    About Arriving In High Heels Corporation
    Arriving In High Heels Corporation is a mobile app company with apps including Pay Off Debt, X-Walk and Visited, their most popular app.

    Contact:
    Anna Kayfitz
    anna@arrivinginhighheels.com

    The MIL Network –

    March 7, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Train. Fight. WIN!

    Source: US Army (video statements)

    by Capt. Jennifer French

    About the U.S. Army:
    The Army Mission – our purpose – remains constant: To deploy, fight and win our nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt & sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force.

    Interested in joining the U.S. Army?
    Visit: spr.ly/6001igl5L

    Connect with the U.S. Army online:
    Web: https://www.army.mil
    Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/USarmy/
    X: https://www.twitter.com/USArmy
    Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/usarmy/
    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/us-army
    #USArmy #Soldiers #NATO #JustifiedAccord #StrongerTogether

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=besf8d0Ey6s

    MIL OSI Video –

    March 7, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 143 144 145 146 147 … 225
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress