Category: Germany

  • MIL-OSI China: ‘Ne Zha 2’ storms into global box office top 5, cementing it as a cultural phenomenon

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Cultural creative products of Chinese animated film Ne Zha 2 are pictured in a toy store in Chengdu, southwest China’s Sichuan Province, March 4, 2025. (Xinhua/Lu Youyi)

    Chinese animated blockbuster “Ne Zha 2” has soared past Disney’s “Star Wars: The Force Awakens” to claim the fifth spot on the all-time global box office charts, further solidifying its status as both a cultural and commercial phenomenon.

    According to data from ticketing platform Maoyan as of Saturday, the film’s global earnings — including presales — have surpassed 15.019 billion yuan (about 2.09 billion U.S. dollars), a milestone reached just 45 days after its release during the Chinese New Year on Jan. 29.

    This latest feat adds to an impressive list of records for the film, which became the first film to gross 1 billion U.S. dollars in a single market, the first non-Hollywood title to enter the billion-dollar club, and the highest-grossing animated movie of all time worldwide.

    MILESTONE FOR CHINESE CINEMA

    Directed by Yang Yu, known as Jiaozi, the sequel to 2019’s “Ne Zha” — which grossed 5 billion yuan and topped the Chinese box office that year — has redefined the ceiling for single-film earnings in Chinese cinema. Over 98 percent of its revenue has come from the Chinese mainland, according to Maoyan data.

    “This success has not only boosted the confidence of creators but also showcased the resilience and immense growth potential of the Chinese market,” said Lai Li, a Maoyan analyst.

    The film’s roots run deep in Chinese mythology, continuing the story of the boy god Nezha as he and his ally Aobing struggle to rebuild their physical forms. With the help of the immortal Taiyi Zhenren, they navigate a journey of self-discovery, fate and defiance.

    The story’s rich mythology, dazzling animation and universal themes have struck a chord with audiences. “‘Ne Zha 2’ is a miracle and a peak in Chinese cinema, a record that may remain unbroken for a long time,” said Chen Xuguang, director of the Institute of Film, Television and Theatre at Peking University.

    EXPANDING GLOBAL REACH WITH ACCLAIM

    The film’s technical achievements are just as remarkable. With nearly 2,000 visual effects shots and contributions from 138 animation studios, “Ne Zha 2” exemplifies the growing strength of China’s creative industry.

    Since its international rollout began on Feb. 13 in Australia and New Zealand, “Ne Zha 2” has steadily expanded its global footprint. It opened in North America the following day, shattering the region’s 20-year-old opening weekend record for a Chinese-language film.

    Sheila Sofian, a professor at the University of Southern California and a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, praised the film’s production design, sound design, and music, calling it “mind-blowing” in a video interview shared by China Media Group.

    After debuting in Singapore on March 6, “Ne Zha 2” launched this week in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, with further Southeast Asian rollouts planned in the coming weeks.

    Its European expansion is also underway. On Friday, the film held preview screenings in Britain and Ireland ahead of its official March 21 release in both countries, with further European rollouts to follow.

    Cedric Behrel, managing director of Trinity CineAsia, which holds theatrical distribution rights for “Ne Zha 2” across 37 territories, including the UK, Ireland, Germany, France and Spain, described the film’s European launch as “unprecedented in scope.”

    INDUSTRY-WIDE, CULTURAL IMPACT

    “Ne Zha 2” has struck a deep emotional chord with audiences. One Maoyan user reflected on the film’s themes of prejudice and resilience, writing, “The line ‘prejudice in people’s hearts is like an unmovable mountain’ rings true… Even I, from a humble background, used to judge others based on their family background.”

    Another viewer, a high school student preparing for China’s tough college entrance exams, found personal inspiration: “With 100 days left until the exam, ‘Ne Zha 2’ reminded me that my potential is limitless. If there’s no path ahead, I’ll carve one out myself!”

    Largely driven by “Ne Zha 2,” China’s box office revenue during the 2025 Spring Festival holiday hit a record high, injecting much-needed optimism into the country’s film industry, which saw earnings fall by 23 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, and by 34 percent from the pre-pandemic peak in 2019.

    Dong Wenxin, a film critic and manager of a cinema in Jinan, Shandong Province, emphasized the film’s industry-wide impact. “‘Ne Zha 2’ hasn’t drained the market but expanded it. More people are paying attention to theatrical releases and are willing to support quality content,” she told Xinhua. “We owe a lot to ‘Ne Zha 2’ — it’s proof that great commercial blockbusters can sustain a healthy market cycle.”

    Beyond its domestic success, “Ne Zha 2” is poised to serve as a cultural bridge, offering global audiences a window into China’s rich mythology and traditions.

    Yin Hong, vice chairman of the China Film Association and a professor at Tsinghua University, told Xinhua that the success of “Ne Zha 2” reflects the dynamism of China’s creative industries, the enduring appeal of its traditional culture, and the potential for Chinese stories to captivate audiences all over the world.

    In a video interview, Jiaozi reflected on the personal journey the “Ne Zha” films have taken him on, revealing how the series has evolved from his own passion into a broad cultural phenomenon. “The first step was creating something I loved, and domestic audiences loved it too,” he said. “Over time, I’ve worked to improve it, to refine my craft. I believe that one day, new ideas, deeper meanings, and a new soul will emerge from it, and the whole world will be able to appreciate it.”

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Fear of ‘Trumpcession’ mounting in Europe

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Flags of the European Union fly outside the Berlaymont Building, the European Commission headquarters, in Brussels, Belgium, Jan. 29, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    European shares dropped this week as a broad sell-off took hold, fueled by mounting concerns over the fallout of “Trumpcession,” a term coined by economists to describe the turbulence triggered by “erratic” trade and economic policies of U.S. President Donald Trump.

    The escalating strain in transatlantic trade relations has sparked fears that the European Union (EU) may not escape unscathed if “Trumpcession” comes to pass.

    SPIRALING ESCALATION

    Earlier this week, the EU said it would retaliate against Trump’s 25-percent tariffs on steel and aluminum with countermeasures on 26 billion euros (28 billion U.S. dollars) worth of U.S. imports, including boats, bourbon and motorbikes.

    “As the United States is applying tariffs worth 28 billion dollars, we are responding with countermeasures worth 26 billion euros,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in a statement, noting that the U.S. tariffs affect approximately 5 percent of total EU goods exports to the United States.

    Trump quickly hit back, threatening to slap a 200-percent tariff on EU wine and other alcohol products.

    “If this tariff is not removed immediately, the United States will shortly place a 200-percent tariff on all wines, champagnes and alcoholic products coming out of France and other EU-represented countries,” Trump wrote on his social media platform Truth Social.

    Samina Sultan, an economist at the German Economic Institute, said the resulting uncertainty harms corporate investments and the broader economy. “This could also put jobs at risk on both sides of the Atlantic.”

    Thomas Gitzel, chief economist at VP Bank in Liechtenstein, warned that the current U.S. tariffs are just the start of escalating trade barriers. “A global trade war is steadily gaining momentum, with growing risks of further intensification,” he said.

    ADDING FUEL

    Although U.S. tariffs impact just 5 percent of EU exports, they will hit the steel and automotive industries hard, which are already grappling with high costs and weak demand.

    The U.S. steel tariffs will “hit on various levels, at a time already challenging enough,” said Gunnar Groebler, president of the German Steel Association. According to the association, up to 20 percent of the EU’s steel exports go to the United States, the second-biggest export market for EU steel producers.

    Trump’s 25-percent tariffs on autos are “no small issue for the EU,” according to a study by Oxford Economics. Citing its estimates that exports from German and Italian automakers to the United States can drop by 7.1 percent and 6.6 percent due to the auto tariff, the study warned that the EU automotive industry is “highly vulnerable” to U.S. tariff threats.

    David Bahnsen, chief investment officer at the Bahnsen Group, highlighted that “tariff talk, reversal, speculation and chaos only foster uncertainty.”

    Echoing this view, Angel Gavilan, director of economy at the Bank of Spain, said uncertainty can significantly slow down the economy as people and businesses may delay consumption and investments, which lowers overall demand and slows economic growth.

    DEBT CRISIS

    Desmond Lachman, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former IMF official, warned that Trump’s tariffs could trigger a Europe-wide recession and another debt crisis in the eurozone.

    He said the German economy is in a prolonged downturn, while Italy and France face severe sovereign debt issues, citing data that shows their public debt-to-GDP ratios are now higher than during the 2010-2012 eurozone debt crisis.

    Eurozone countries are bound by a unified monetary policy from the European Central Bank. This means countries like Italy and France cannot set independent interest rates or exchange rate policies to boost domestic exports and consumption.

    Additionally, these high-debt countries are struggling to reduce their debt burden by boosting exports to Germany. But the German economy is in a weak growth phase and import demand is declining.

    Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank, said it was “impossible” to guarantee that policymakers would meet the 2-percent inflation target in the short term, citing global volatility. She added that tariffs “are not good at all and are net negative on pretty much all accounts.”

    “When the magnitude and distribution of shocks become highly unpredictable, we cannot provide certainty by committing to a specific (interest) rate trajectory,” she noted. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Electronics Earns ‘Product Carbon Reduction’ and ‘Product Carbon Footprint’ Certifications for Neo QLED 8K and Neo QLED for Fifth Consecutive Year

    Source: Samsung

     
    Samsung Electronics today announced that approximately 80 models in its 2025 TV, monitor and soundbar lineups have received Product Carbon Reduction1 and Product Carbon Footprint2 certifications from TÜV Rheinland, a globally recognized certification organization based in Germany. This marks the fifth consecutive year that the premium lineups, Neo QLED 8K and Neo QLED, have received certifications, reinforcing the company’s continued efforts in carbon reduction.
     
    “Samsung Electronics is committed to driving technological innovation for a sustainable future,” said Taeyong Son, Executive Vice President of Visual Display Business at Samsung Electronics. “As the world’s leading TV manufacturer, we will continue to be at the forefront of establishing a more energy-efficient ecosystem that benefits consumers.”
     
    Following last year’s certification of 60 models across the Neo QLED, OLED and Lifestyle TV categories, Samsung has further increased its number of certified products in 2025 to include QLED TVs. In addition, the company is also working towards obtaining certification for its Color E-Paper lineup later this year.
     

     
    The certifications from TÜV Rheinland are awarded following a rigorous evaluation of a product’s entire lifecycle — including manufacturing, transportation, usage and disposal — based on internationally recognized sustainability standards. By assessing and verifying carbon emissions at each stage, these certifications highlight Samsung’s efforts to reduce environmental impact across its product lineup.
     
    In particular, the Product Carbon Reduction certification is granted to products that have already received a Product Carbon Footprint certification and further demonstrate a measurable reduction in carbon emissions compared to their predecessors.
     
    Samsung’s leadership in energy-efficient display technology dates back to 2021, when the Neo QLED became the first 4K and higher-resolution TV to earn the Reducing CO2 certification. Since then, Samsung has continually expanded its portfolio of environmentally certified products, including QLED, Crystal UHD, Lifestyle TVs, OLED TVs and a wide range of monitors and digital signage products.
     
    For more information on Samsung’s 2025 TV lineup, please visit www.samsung.com.
     
     
    1 38 Certified models include Neo QLED 8K(QN990F, QN950F), Neo QLED 4K(QN90F, QN85F), OLED(S95F 55”/65”, S90F, S85F 77”/83”), The Frame Pro(LS03FW), LCD Signage(QMC 43”, 50”, 55”, 75”), and Soundbar(Q930F, Q800F, QS700F) products.1 42 Certified models include Neo QLED 8K(QN900F), Neo QLED 4K(QN80F, QN70F), OLED(S95F 77”/83”, S85F 55”/65”), The Frame(LS03F), QLED(Q8F, Q7F), Viewfinity S80UD, S80D, QMC 65’’/85’’, Soundbar(Q990F), EMDX 32″.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Risk of Venous Thromboembolism During Spaceflight

    Source: NASA

    In October 2024, NASA’s Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) initiated a working group to review the status and progress of research and clinical activities intended to mitigate the risk of venous thromboembolism (VTE) during spaceflight. The working group took place over two days at NASA’s Johnson Space Center; a second meeting on the topic was held in December 2024 at the European Space Agency (ESA) facility in Cologne, Germany.

    The working group was assembled from internal NASA subject matter experts (SMEs), the NASA OCHMO Standards Team, NASA and ESA stakeholders, and external SMEs, including physicians and medical professionals from leading universities and medical centers in the United States and Canada.

    Spaceflight Venous Thrombosis (SVT)
    Spaceflight Venous Thrombosis (SVT) refers to a phenomenon experienced during spaceflight in which a thrombus (blood clot) forms in the internal jugular vein (and/or associated vasculature) that may be symptomatic (thrombus accompanied by, but not limited to, visible internal jugular vein swelling, facial edema beyond “nominal” spaceflight adaptation, eyelid edema, and/or headache) or asymptomatic. Obstructive thrombi have been identified in a very small number of crewmembers, as shown in the figure below.
    Note that the figure below is for illustrative purposes only; locations are approximate, and size is not to scale.

    With treatment, crewmembers were able to complete their mission, and anticoagulants were discontinued several days prior to landing to minimize the risk of bleeding in the event of a traumatic injury. Some thromboses completely resolved post landing, and some required additional treatment.
    Pathophysiology of Venous Thromboembolism (VTE)
    The proposed pathogenesis of VTE is referred to as Virchow’s triad and suggests that VTE occurs as the result of:

    Alterations in blood flow (i.e., stasis),
    Vascular endothelial injury/changes, and/or,
    Alterations in the constituents of the blood leading to hypercoagulability (i.e., hereditary predisposition or acquired hypercoagulability).

    Note: pathophysiology are the changes that occur during a disease process; hypercoagulability is the increased tendency to develop blood to clots.

    Blood stasis, or venous stasis, refers to a condition in which the blood flow in the veins slows down which leads to pooling in the veins. This slowing of the blood may be due to vein valves becoming damaged or weak, immobility, and/or the absence of muscular contractions. Associated symptoms include swelling, skin changes, varicose veins, and slow-healing sores or ulcers. In terrestrial medicine, venous thrombosis is typically caused by damaged or weakened vein valves, which can be due to many factors, including aging, blood clots, varicose veins, obesity, pregnancy, sedentary lifestyle, estrogen use, and hereditary predisposition.

    Altered Venous Blood Flow and Spaceflight Associated Neuro-ocular Syndrome
    In addition to the terrestrial risk factors of VTE, there are physiological changes associated with spaceflight that are hypothesized to potentially play a role in the development of VTE in weightlessness. Specifically, researchers have explored the effects of the microgravity environment and subsequent observed headward fluid shifts that occur, and the potential impact on blood flow. Crewmembers onboard the International Space Station (ISS) experience weightlessness due to the microgravity environment and thus experience a sustained redistribution of bodily fluids from the legs toward the head. The prolonged headward fluid shifts during weightlessness results in facial puffiness, decreased leg volume, increased cardiac stroke volume, and decreased plasma volume.
    Crewmembers have also experienced altered blood flow during spaceflight, including retrograde venous blood flow (RVBF) (the backflow of venous blood towards the brain) or stasis (a stoppage or slowdown in the flow of blood). While the causes of the observed stasis and retrograde blood flow in spaceflight participants is not well understood, the potential clinical significance of the role it may have in the development of thrombus formation warrants further investigation.

    Other physiological concerns affected by fluid shifts are being studied to consider if any relation to VTE exists. Chronic weightlessness can cause bodily fluids such as blood and cerebrospinal fluid to move toward the head, which can lead to optic nerve swelling, folds in the retina, flattening of the back of the eye, and swelling in the brain. This collection of eye and brain changes is called “spaceflight associated neuro-ocular syndrome,” or SANS. Some astronauts only experience mild changes in space, while others have clinically significant outcomes. The long-term health outcome from these changes is unknown but actively being investigated. The risk of developing SANS is higher during longer-duration missions and remains a top research priority for scientists ahead of a Mars mission.

    Based on expert opinion and the assessment of the risk factors for thrombosis, an algorithm was developed to provide guidance for in-mission assessment and treatment of thrombus formation in weightlessness. The algorithm is based on early in-flight ultrasound testing to determine the flow characteristic of the left internal jugular vein and associated vasculature.

    Working Group Recommendations
    The working group recommended several areas for further investigation to assess feasibility and potential to mitigate the risk of thrombosis in spaceflight:

    Improved detection capabilities to identify when a thrombus has formed in-flight,
    Pathophysiology/factors leading to thrombi formation during spaceflight,
    Countermeasures and treatment

    For more information on the working group meeting and a complete list of references, please see the Risk of Venous Thromboembolism (VTE) During Spaceflight Summary Report.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: CLG Workshop at Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF) 2025 to Address Legal and Strategic Solutions in Congo

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    BRAZZAVILLE, Congo (Republic of the), March 14, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum (CEIF), taking place from March 24-26 in Brazzaville, will feature a workshop led by legal firm CLG (formerly Centurion Law Group) that aims to address the unique challenges faced in Congo’s energy investment sector. As part of a strategy to spur energy investment and socioeconomic development, the Republic of Congo has initiated a number of strategies to drive resource monetization, project development and local capacity building.

    As such, the Mastering Business in Congo: Legal Challenges and Strategic Solutions for Success session will take place on 24 March, offering an understanding of the legal structures underpinning corporate law, taxation, immigration, labor law and regulatory compliance. During the session, a panel of legal experts from CLG will delve into all aspects of growing investments in the African energy sector, offering insights into the legal nuances that can directly influence investments decisions. 

    Set to showcase how Congo’s investment landscape can accelerate monetization of the country’s natural resources, CLG’s experience in the African market has the potential to empower businesses with effective management skills and knowledge for participating in Congo’s energy sector. The country is set to release its Gas Master Plan (https://apo-opa.co/3DF5fSI) and new Gas Code (https://apo-opa.co/3Fsijey) at CEIF 2025, with a promise to reducing energy imports in the country and raising electricity access for its population, which currently stands at 50%.

    Meanwhile, Congo is also preparing to launch an international oil and gas licensing round (https://apo-opa.co/4bu0dF8) at CEIF 2025, aiming to attract investment in both marginal and deepwater blocks. This initiative is part of the country’s strategy to increase oil production from the current 274,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 500,000 bpd by 2027. These major developments align with Congo’s broader national goals to mitigate production declines and stimulate further exploration on- and offshore. are expected to usher in a new wave of investment in sub-Saharan Africa’s fourth largest oil producing market.

    The Mastering Business in Congo: Legal Challenges and Strategic Solutions for Success will offer attendees the opportunity to master the complex regulatory landscape and learn how it affects various investment types within the energy sector. During the session, CLG will provide delegates with knowledge to develop actionable strategies to mitigate legal risks and safeguard investments from future potential strategies.

    “At CEIF 2025, we recognize that navigating the complex legal and regulatory landscape is crucial for successful investment in Congo’s growing energy sector. This workshop, led by CLG, is a pivotal opportunity for investors and stakeholders to gain valuable insights into the legal frameworks that underpin the energy market. By addressing key challenges and offering strategic solutions, we aim to empower businesses with the knowledge to unlock the full potential of Congo’s energy resources,” states Daoudou Mohammad, Tax and Legal Director, CLG.

    CLG is a leading provider of specialized legal and tax advisory services, catering to a diverse portfolio of multinational companies operating globally. With a team of experts boasting extensive experience and knowledge across multiple sectors and with offices in Germany, South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia and South Sudan; CLG delivers bespoke solutions tailored to address the unique challenges and complexities faced by clients in various industries.

    CLG’s expertise spans a wide range of industries – including energy, infrastructure, mining, agriculture, and ESG to name a few –  enabling the firm to provide comprehensive guidance and support to clients navigating Africa’s dynamic business landscape. By combining technical excellence with a deep understanding of local markets and regulatory environments, CLG helps clients achieve their business objectives and capitalize on opportunities for growth and expansion.

    Registration (https://apo-opa.co/3FspgMZ) for the workshop is now open.

    The inaugural Congo Energy & Investment Forum, set for March 24-26, in Brazzaville, under the patronage of President Denis Sassou Nguesso and supported by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Société Natioanle des Pétroles du Congo, will bring together international investors and local stakeholders to explore national and regional energy and infrastructure opportunities. The event will explore the latest gas-to-power projects and provide updates on ongoing expansions across the country.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: SA’s narrative therapist nominated for Women Changing the World Awards

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    South Africa’s world-renowned Narrative Therapist and Psychosocial Specialist, Ncazelo Mlilo, has been nominated in the prestigious Women Changing the World Awards.

    The awards, according to a statement by psychosocial organisation, Phola, are like the Grammy Awards for recognising women across the world who are doing incredible work, making a positive difference in various industries and areas, including business, sustainability, leadership, health, education, product development, innovation, and technology.

    Mlilo, who is based in Johannesburg, has been selected for two categories, the People’s Choice Award for Non-Profit and Social Enterprise, and the Women in Therapy and Counselling Services Award.

    This recognition celebrates the groundbreaking work in mental health, her development of Afrocentric, culturally sensitive narrative-based methodologies, and her dedication to empowering communities worldwide.

    The awards ceremony will take place during a summit in London, in the United Kingdom on 2-3 April 2025.

    Mlilo has over 25 years’ experience in trauma counselling.

    She has worked with children, youth, women, families, and communities to address the effects of HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence (GBV), poverty, conflict, and other hardships.

    Mlilo co-created the Tree of Life (ToL) Methodology, currently used in over 60 countries including the USA, Brazil, Australia, Canada, Iran, India, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and across Africa.

    She has developed other methodologies like COURRAGE, the Narratives in the Suitcase Project, O.U.T.R.R.A.G.E.D. for GBV prevention.

    Mlilo trains over 1 000 mental health practitioners worldwide every year, with her work reaching an estimated 100 000 people, annually.

    She is also a prominent keynote speaker at international conferences, including the Trust’s Collective Narrative Practices Conference, held in 2024 in Australia, the Narrative Therapy Centre Conference, where she spoke about the Narratives in the Suitcase, held in Australia in 2023, among others.

    As a result, her work is the intervention of choice in these global institutions, like the Dulwich Centre Foundation in Australia and NHS Foundation Trust in the UK. – SAnews.gov.za
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Adapting organic crop production conditions – E-000557/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has set out a comprehensive organic action plan for the EU[1]. Through it, the Commission will aim to achieve the European Green Deal target of 25% of agricultural land under organic farming by 2030.

    Regulation (EU) 2018/848 on organic production and labelling of organic products[2] sets the rules and the criteria under which organic production can be maintained and further developed.

    It also provides for a number of derogations that may be applied, such as the possibilities to derogate to the link to the soil to produce sprouted seeds[3], chicory heads[4], ornamentals plants and herbs in pots [5], or crops in demarcated beds[6]. Additional derogations may also apply in case of catastrophic circumstances[7].

    The criteria and procedure to authorise or not the use of potassium phosphonates in organic viticulture as an active substance to be used as a plant protection product are laid down in Article 24 of the same Regulation. Germany submitted a dossier asking for the re-examination of this active substance that will be assessed by the Expert Group on Organic Production (EGTOP)[8] in March 2025.

    Once the EGTOP recommendations are published, the re-examination of the potential authorisation of potassium phosphonates will be discussed with the Member States in the Organic Production Committee.

    • [1] COM/2021/141 final/2.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2018/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, OJ L 150, 14.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/848/2024-12-01
    • [3] Point 1.3 (a )of Annex II Part I of Regulation (EU) 2018/848.
    • [4] Point 1.3 (b )of Annex II Part I of Regulation (EU) 2018/848.
    • [5] Point 1.4 (a ) of Annex II Part I of Regulation (EU) 2018/848.
    • [6] Point 1.5 of Annex II Part I of Regulation (EU) 2018/848.
    • [7] Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2018/848.
    • [8] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/farming/organic-farming/cooperation-and-expert-advice_en
    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Migration policy and the TFEU – E-000970/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000970/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marcin Sypniewski (ESN)

    Germany has been carrying out border controls for several months now in order to limit the influx of illegal migrants. Incidents have also been reported in which the German authorities have transported migrants they had expelled to the Polish border.

    Pursuant to Article 72 TFEU, Member States have the right to take unilateral decisions regarding the maintenance of law and order and internal security.

    In light of the foregoing:

    • 1.Does the Commission consider the interpretation of Article 72 TFEU to be in line with EU law, and therefore, can each country unilaterally adapt its migration policy to address security threats?
    • 2.Given the provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, would the Commission accept a possible Polish policy of turning back or refusing entry to migrants on the basis of the aforementioned article of the TFEU?
    • 3.Does the Commission condone the actions of the German authorities in transporting migrants to the Polish border, and if not, what measures does it plan to take against such actions?

    Submitted: 6.3.2025

    Last updated: 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Prime Minister to tell world leaders: ‘The ball is in Russia’s court, Putin must stop delaying tactics’

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Prime Minister to tell world leaders: ‘The ball is in Russia’s court, Putin must stop delaying tactics’

    The Coalition of the Willing will meet tomorrow as world leaders drive forward action to support a just and enduring peace for Ukraine.

    • Prime Minister Keir Starmer to host around 25 leaders for virtual call in further push for peace
    • Comes as President Putin tries to play games with President Trump’s peace plan
    • Keir Starmer will say countries need to strain every sinew to further ramp up economic pressure on Russia and force Putin into negotiations

    The Coalition of the Willing will meet tomorrow as world leaders drive forward action to support a just and enduring peace for Ukraine.

    Around 25 countries, including European partners, the EU Commission, NATO, Canada, Ukraine, Australia and New Zealand are expected to join the virtual meeting tomorrow morning. 

    The Prime Minister will tell leaders that now is the time for concrete commitments as President Putin tries to play pointless games with President Trump’s peace plan.

    He will say that countries need to ratchet up economic pressure on Russia, to force Putin into negotiations, in the short term and be prepared to support a just and enduring peace in Ukraine over the long term and continue to ramp up our military support to Ukraine to defend themselves against increasing Russian attacks.

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: 

    We can’t allow President Putin to play games with President Trump’s deal. The Kremlin’s complete disregard for President Trump’s ceasefire proposal only serves to demonstrate that Putin is not serious about peace.

    If Russia finally comes to the table, then we must be ready to monitor a ceasefire to ensure it is a serious, and enduring peace, if they don’t, then we need to strain every sinew to ramp up economic pressure on Russia to secure an end to this war. 

    Putin is trying to delay, saying there must be a painstaking study before a ceasefire can take place, but the world needs to see action, not a study or empty words and pointless conditions. 

    My message to the Kremlin could not be clearer: stop the barbaric attacks on Ukraine, once and for all, and agree to a ceasefire now. Until then we will keep working around the clock to deliver peace.

    The call is expected to delve further into how countries plan to contribute to the Coalition of the Willing, ahead of a military planning session being held next week.

    During the session tomorrow morning, leaders are expected to receive an update on progress made at a Chiefs of Defence meeting held in Paris on Tuesday, and updates from countries on efforts to unlock further military aid for Ukraine. The Prime Minister will also pay tribute to the collective European efforts to step up.

    The call follows a week of intensive diplomacy by UK ministers after the Defence Secretary travelled to Paris to meet counterparts from Germany, France, Poland and Italy, and the Foreign Secretary travelled to Canada for G7 Foreign Ministers.

    It also follows the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House Summit held a fortnight ago, where he again made clear that we must protect our country in a dangerous new era, and deliver on the foundation of security in the government’s Plan for Change.

    The government has already accelerated that work, announcing an increase in defence spending to 2.5% of GDP from 2027, with an ambition to reach 3% in the next parliament.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression – P10_TA(2025)0033 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,

    –  having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),

    –  having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part(1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

    –  having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),

    –  having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility(2), and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament of 24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,

    –  having regard to the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council of 6 March 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

    B.  whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past three years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;

    C.  whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties, along with the attacks on residential areas, destruction of civilian and public infrastructure – particularly that providing water and energy – and of the natural environment and cultural heritage, forced deportations, disappearances and illegal adoptions of deported children, illegal imprisonments, mass killings, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, torture and the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war and altering the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country; whereas the United Nations has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 20 000 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas the Russian Federation attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied territories; whereas the brave people of Ukraine were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize as a tribute to their courage and resilience;

    D.  whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;

    E.  whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, arrest warrants for Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov for crimes against humanity including the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects and the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;

    F.  whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine which amounts to an act of aggression under international law; whereas North Korean troops have been deployed on the battlefield and are fighting alongside the Russian army; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy and its defence industrial base, and by supplying dual-use equipment;

    G.  whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report estimates that, as of December 2024, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 506 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times the estimated nominal gross domestic product of Ukraine for 2024; whereas a total financing gap of EUR 9,62 billion for recovery and reconstruction needs remains for 2025;

    H.  whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;

    I.  whereas the EU and its Member States have provided the most substantial cumulative support for Ukraine in all areas since the start of the full-scale invasion, and have provided financial support amounting to close to EUR 140 billion, including over EUR 67 billion of support to Ukraine in the form of humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support and macro-financial assistance and over EUR 48 billion of military aid; whereas approximately EUR 300 billion of Russian sovereign assets were frozen in different jurisdictions; whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts;

    J.  whereas many EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels from Russia, including liquefied natural gas, imports of which are rising, as well as uranium, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion;

    K.  whereas the EU has welcomed more than four million refugees from Ukraine and has expressed its support for the people of Ukraine and their leadership by launching negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU;

    L.  whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission; whereas the first intergovernmental conference took place on 25 June 2024, launching the negotiation process and adopting the negotiating framework;

    M.  whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas President Trump is making demands towards Ukraine but has not expressed any demands towards the Russian side, moreover he has downplayed Moscow’s responsibility for starting the war and possibly envisages granting Russia sanctions relief in the short term; whereas between the time of the meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025 and 9 March 2025 alone, Russia carried out over 2 100 aerial assaults, including 1 200 guided bomb strikes and nearly 870 drone attacks;

    N.  whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against a UN General Assembly resolution of 24 February 2025 condemning Russia’s aggression; whereas the American U-turn on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s aggression, makes clear that Washington’s commitment to hold Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;

    O.  whereas on 3 March 2025 the United States suspended its military assistance to Ukraine, including that approved by the previous US administration, as well as intelligence sharing with Ukraine; whereas it then cut off Ukraine’s access to commercial satellite imagery collected by the US government system on 7 March 2025;

    P.  whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles and Ukraine’s constitution, elections cannot be held during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced; whereas martial law was declared and continues to be in effect in Ukraine solely because of Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the EU continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;

    Q.  whereas President Donald Trump ordered a sweeping freeze on US foreign aid, halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, humanitarian aid, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives, investigations into Russian war crimes, but also those bolstering Ukraine’s telecommunications networks against Russian cyberattacks;

    R.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its imperialistic attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state pursuing revisionist policies, it remains a threat to security on the European continent; whereas the Russian war of aggression is part of a broader set of objectives against the West and its interests and values, the international rules-based order, democracy and security, as openly declared by Vladimir Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism;

    S.  whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for Russia as the aggressor, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have a ripple effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;

    T.  whereas a Special European Council took place on 6 March 2025 dedicated to the situation in Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence; whereas the European Council endorsed the defence package put forward by the Commission on strengthening European Defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion, and reiterated its support for Ukraine, highlighting in particular that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that there can be no negotiations that affect European security without Europe’s involvement, and furthermore that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    U.  whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russian and Chinese-linked actors;

    1.  Pays tribute, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, to the thousands who have sacrificed their lives for a free and democratic Ukraine; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter;

    2.  Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of Belarus, North Korea and Iran; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately completely and unconditionally cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, terminate all military action in Ukraine and withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including but not limited to Crimea; demands that the Russian Federation permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; condemns the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population by the Russian invading force and the indiscriminate destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure; demands the end of forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, and the release and return of all detained Ukrainians, especially children;

    3.  Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine as an existential threat to European security and stability; emphasises that the crime of aggression against Ukraine is a grave violation of international law and the UN Charter; underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and beyond, and threatens its security architecture, and that in response this calls for bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; believes that a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of a stable and predictable European security landscape;

    4.  Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;

    5.  Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and into making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and must maintain their role as the largest donor to Ukraine and significantly increase the much-needed assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and step in, as far as possible, to replace suspended USAID funding, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;

    6.  Reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition, as well as training, in response to pressing needs (inter alia long range weapons systems, air defence systems, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, anti-drone capabilities and engineering equipment); urges Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to maximise the full potential of its production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient manner following the Danish and Dutch examples; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; calls on the EU and its Member States to utilise their satellite imagery infrastructure for Ukraine; recalls that the military support to Ukraine must be sufficient to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; notes in this context that a number of EU Member States are non-aligned and urges them to increase their support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

    7.  Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and includes the building blocks of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, Russian reparations for the massive damage caused in Ukraine, full accountability for those responsible, and exclusion of any future aggressions by Russia; urges the EU and its Member States to work with like-minded partners to ensure that peace negotiations take place in a way that respects the above mentioned principles;

    8.  Underlines that any genuine peace negotiations must be conducted in good faith and include Ukraine; recalls that any settlement that excludes Ukraine or undermines its legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees for Ukraine that contribute to deterring future Russian aggression, will be neither just nor viable;

    9.  Insists that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; underlines that Ukraine must be empowered to resist and prevent further Russian attacks and reject hasty deals that weaken its security in the mid to long term and risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; underlines that Russia’s war economy is not sustainable and coupling orchestrated economic pressure with accelerated military support to Ukraine would enable Ukrainian forces to improve their positions while simultaneously harming Russia’s economy to ensure Ukraine has a stronger negotiating position for Ukraine when it agrees to engage in peace talks;

    10.  Strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrender to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called ‘peace deal’; considers that the current attempts by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European states, in which the latter are confronted with the outcome without their meaningful participation, as counterproductive and dangerous, as it leads to empowering the belligerent state, thus showing that an aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; concludes that, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements and fundamental principles of international law, such a peace can only be reached through strength, including effective security guarantees;

    11.  Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any other country, reflecting the Union’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine and consequently to the security of Europe; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the European Union at the table; welcomes efforts by France’s President Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Starmer to host European emergency summits in Paris and London; welcomes the launch of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to enable a European-led enforcement of an eventual peace agreement;

    12.  Expresses dismay concerning the policy of the US administration of appeasing Russia and targeting its allies; warns that this policy undermines the trust of traditional US allies around the world and can have devastating consequences for the transatlantic bond, peace and stability in Europe and beyond;

    13.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in the US-Ukraine relations as the final wakeup call for them to step in as Ukraine’s leading partner and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded partners globally to support Ukraine and increase pressure on Russia;

    14.  Welcomes the joint statement by Ukraine and the United States following their meeting in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 11 March 2025, including the resumption of US military assistance and intelligence sharing as well as a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspension of hostilities, only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects therefore Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory;

    15.  Expresses concern about the increased tensions in the Baltic Sea with actions of hybrid warfare against critical infrastructure and considers closer cooperation between the Nordic states, Baltic states, Poland and Germany crucial;

    16.  Welcomes the conclusions of the Special European Council of 6 March 2025 and its support for a rapid strengthening of European defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan and reiterating its support for Ukraine following the ‘peace through strength’ approach, highlighting in particular that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;

    17.  Reiterates that Russia’s deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine, destruction of civilian infrastructure, use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law all constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;

    18.  Emphasises that all those responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine must be held accountable and stresses that no peace will be sustainable without justice; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia and its allies and underlines the need for the jurisdiction of this tribunal to cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;

    19.  Emphasises its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025; in this context, expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    20.  Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; underscores the importance of continued EU financial assistance, linked to concrete reform, as a key instrument to sustain and accelerate Ukraine’s transformation in line with European standards; underlines that the Copenhagen criteria and the required reforms, in particular concerning the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, are fundamental to the merit-based process of accession; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision;

    21.  Recalls NATO’s commitments to admit Ukraine to the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;

    22.  Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen internal political unity in Ukraine, uphold parliamentary pluralism and engage in constructive cooperation with the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada; calls on Ukrainian political stakeholders to continue strengthening political unity and parliamentary pluralism and to engage in constructive cooperation within the Verkhovna Rada; calls for due regard to be given to the powers and rights of local self-governing bodies; calls for media pluralism to be guaranteed in line with the democratic principles and values that Ukrainians are so resolutely and bravely defending; suggests in light of the EU accession process to end all limitations of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

    23.  Commends Ukrainian, European and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war, and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;

    24.  Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the EU to prepare for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide comprehensive and coordinated political, economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to support the sustainable and inclusive post-war reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and therefore calls for the Russian sovereign assets immobilised under EU sanctions to be confiscated for the purpose of supporting Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction;

    25.  Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other European countries; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers as well as raw materials including steel, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and all types of oil and gas; calls on the Council to maintain, mirror where possible and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and all the enabling states, such as Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities suppling dual-use goods and military items, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all packages of sanctions and to strengthen cooperation among Member States; asks the Commission for an impact assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions in hindering the Russian war effort and on the effectiveness of measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

    26.  Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agriculture sectors, raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as for anti-circumvention measures against all countries and entities that provide Russia with military and dual-use goods and technologies; calls for further actions against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, in the light of sanctions circumvention, sabotage of critical infrastructure and environmental risks; calls on the Commission to jointly engage with flag and port states outside of the EU and take action against owners, operators and insurance operators in third countries that enable Russia’s shadow fleet; urges the Member States to further coordinate operational cooperation between coast guard agencies in order to increase the overall capacity for maritime surveillance; highlights that Russia is increasing its reliance on gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a growing source of revenue, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; expects the EU to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability is achieved;

    27.  Calls for the next EU sanctions package to sanction all known shadow fleet tankers and their owners, while also introducing sanctions on any oil tanker breaching the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and enforcing strict implementation by all Member States of the measures prohibiting vessels, irrespective of flag, from sailing in European waters or into any EU Member State port if they have not followed the international rules regarding ship-to-ship transfers (STS) at sea or have illegally turned off their automatic identification system; urges the Commission and the Member States to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters;

    28.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop broader sanctions on Russian and Belarusian wood, including specifically prohibiting the import or purchase of wood products processed in non-EU countries that incorporate wood, particularly birch plywood, originating in Russia or Belarus, to support the enforcement of current sanctions;

    29.  Strongly condemns the Hungarian Government for threatening to block the renewal of the EU’s sanctions framework as well as to limit an appropriate EU response commensurate with the gravity of the situation; calls on the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking;

    30.  Calls for further limitations on Russian and Belarusian citizens entering the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process, notwithstanding the need to issue humanitarian visas;

    31.  Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;

    32.  Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;

    33.  Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war;

    34.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine – especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution – to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to combat Russian disinformation about the war, by strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based narratives and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act(3);

    35.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    (1) OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The need for EU support towards a just transition and reconstruction in Syria – P10_TA(2025)0035 – Wednesday, 12 March 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) of 18 December 2015,

    –  having regard to the establishment of the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic, under UN General Assembly Resolution 77/301 of 29 June 2023,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 28 February 2024 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the situation in Syria(1),

    –  having regard to the statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the orders of the Paris Judicial Court of 14 November 2023 and 21 January 2025 issuing international arrest warrants for Bashar al-Assad and members of his family, and to universal jurisdiction cases in European courts,

    –  having regard to the joint statement by the Governments of France, Syria, Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, the Secretary General of the League of Arab States and the Secretary General of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf of 13 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/406 of 24 February 2025 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria(2),

    –  having regard to the statement issued following Syria’s National Dialogue Conference, held in Damascus on 25 February 2025,

    –  having regard to the statement of 8 March 2025 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the latest developments in Syria,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas in December 2024 Syria witnessed momentous change, as a rebel coalition spearheaded by the armed group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Southern Operations Room (formerly Southern Front) and several other opposition forces toppled Bashar al-Assad’s murderous regime; whereas the historic collapse of the Assad dynasty marked the end of half of a century of suffering for the Syrian people, with unprecedented tyranny and chaos unfolding after Bashar al-Assad brutally repressed the 2011 uprising and led the country into civil war, as well as the beginning of a new chapter for the Syrian people and the broader Middle East;

    B.  whereas the fallen Assad regime engaged in systematic repression, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions and other grave human rights violations, and is responsible for documented war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the deliberate targeting of civilians, siege warfare leading to mass starvation, the use of barrel bombs and the deployment of chemical weapons, in violation of international law; whereas since 2011, at least half a million Syrians have died and 14 million have been forced to flee their homes, of which roughly 7 million have been internally displaced, as a result of the fierce repression and demographic engineering by the Assad regime and his allies, as well as at the hands of terrorist groups; whereas the fates and whereabouts of tens of thousands of people remain unknown;

    C.  whereas Russia and Iran, under the guise of strategic alliances, were both enablers and active players in the war waged by the bloody Assad regime against its own people and used Syria as a geopolitical battleground for destabilising the region, as a hub for arms and drug trafficking, as well as a testing ground for military capabilities and tactics, systematically targeting civilian infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys in clear violation of international law; whereas Assad’s power relied on Russia and Iran’s continued support and their supply of manpower and weapons, as well as that of their proxies, including the Wagner Group, the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Afghan mercenaries; whereas his sudden fall is a clear geostrategic defeat for both countries;

    D.  whereas after assuming a leading role in overthrowing the regime, former HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa was designated caretaker President and launched a political transition process, entailing plans for a new constitution and the holding of elections in four to five years from now; whereas the caretaker president was tasked with forming a temporary legislative council, appointed a caretaker government and pledged to establish, by early March 2025, a new non-sectarian, comprehensive, credible and inclusive government reflecting Syria’s ethnic and religious diversity; whereas on 24 and 25 February 2025, the Syrian interim government held the announced National Dialogue Conference; whereas the Syrian constitution of 2012 was nullified and the People’s Assembly and the Baath Party dissolved; whereas many armed groups also formally agreed to dissolve and be integrated into the Syrian army;

    E.  whereas the EU rightly refused to normalise its ties with the Assad regime right through to its demise and played a significant role as a major humanitarian donor to Syrian civilians and as host to 1,3 million refugees fleeing the conflicts; whereas since 2011, the EU and its Member States have mobilised more than EUR 33,3 billion in humanitarian, development, economic and stabilisation assistance focusing on life-saving aid, resilience programmes and the political implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015); whereas in December 2024 the EU launched a humanitarian air bridge to deliver emergency healthcare and other essential supplies; whereas in the aftermath of the fall of the Assad regime, some Member States announced a suspension of pending asylum applications by Syrians; whereas the EU has suspended sanctions on key economic sectors to facilitate engagement with Syria and its reconstruction;

    F.  whereas the caretaker government authorities control most but not all of Syrian territory, with the overall security situation in Syria remaining fragmented and volatile; whereas violent events, including revenge killings, sectarian violence and criminal activities, are seen to be increasing, particularly in the coastal and rural areas; whereas pro-Assad armed groups and, allegedly, others have conducted coordinated attacks starting on 6 March 2025 in the Latakia, Tartus and Homs governorates, leading to deadly clashes with Syrian security forces; whereas in return, members of the Syrian security forces and the SNA, foreign fighters and jihadists reportedly participated in unjustifiable retaliations and executions targeting Alawite civilians on the basis of their ethno-religious affiliation; deplores also the confirmed killings of at least 10 Christians; whereas, despite the statement delivered by de facto President al-Sharaa, the fighting lasted several days and has so far caused over 1 000 casualties; whereas de facto President al-Shaara has announced the creation of a ‘fact-finding committee’ and of a ‘higher committee’;

    G.  whereas north-eastern Syria is still currently administered by the self-proclaimed Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and controlled militarily by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); whereas on 10 March 2025 an agreement towards their integration within all institutions of the Syrian state was jointly signed by de facto President al-Sharaa and Commander in Chief of the SDF Mazloum Abdi; whereas since December 2024, the Turkish-backed SNA militias, some of which have not been included in the transitional government, and Türkiye itself, have intensified attacks and incursions within northern Syrian territory, including attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in the Manbij and Kobani areas, which may amount to war crimes;

    H.  whereas Israel has occupied a part of the Syrian territory in the Golan Heights since 1967; whereas following the overthrow of the Assad regime, Israel has further seized the UN-patrolled demilitarised zone beyond the Golan Heights and repeatedly carried out strikes on military targets in Syria; whereas the Israeli Minister of Defence has declared that ‘the IDF will remain at the summit of Mount Hermon and the security zone indefinitely’;

    I.  whereas Russia seeks to retain its military bases in Syria, particularly the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim military airfield; whereas Bashar al-Assad and his family fled the country and have been granted political asylum in Russia; whereas diplomatic contact has been made between Russia and the new Syrian authorities;

    J.  whereas the Assad regime supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and recognised the occupied Luhansk and Donetsk regions in Ukraine, as well as the Abkhazia region in Georgia; whereas Ukraine’s military intelligence service systematically reported that Russia was training mercenaries recruited in Syria to support Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas the ‘Grain from Ukraine’ initiative was deployed in Syria after the suspension of Russian food exports;

    K.  whereas Daesh has caused tremendous suffering in Syria, triggered numerous terrorist attacks worldwide and continues to operate within and from Syria, relying on its centre for external operational planning in the Badia region; whereas approximately 10 000 Daesh fighters and 40 000 Daesh family members are currently being detained in the Al-Hol and Roj detention facilities, primarily guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF; whereas Syrian security forces may reportedly take over the management of the detention facilities following the agreement of 10 March 2025 made between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi;

    L.  whereas Syria’s Christian population has steeply declined since 2011 due to its targeting by both the Assad regime, as well as by Daesh and other terrorist groups;

    M.  whereas the situation in Syria remains one of the world’s most acute humanitarian crises, with nine out of ten Syrians below the poverty line and almost 17 million people – 70 % of the population – requiring humanitarian assistance because of widespread food insecurity and a lack of basic infrastructure and public services;

    N.  whereas, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian response for Syria is significantly underfunded, having secured less than 10 % of the USD 1.2 billion needed until March 2025; whereas the executive order issued by US President Donald Trump’s administration, enacting a 90-day suspension of all foreign assistance programmes, including those administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has and will have an impact on the humanitarian programmes and non-governmental organisations that operate on the ground in Syria; whereas the UK and several EU Member States have also announced significant decreases in their global aid budgets;

    O.  whereas Syria finds itself in a tremendously dire economic situation, with soaring inflation in the country reaching a record high level of 40,2 % in 2024, electricity shortages and rising commodity prices; whereas the collapse of the Syrian economy was exacerbated by regime corruption, predatory economic policies and reliance on illicit activities, including the production and trafficking of Captagon; whereas a colossal reconstruction effort must be undertaken while navigating the shift to an open market economy, with exports having dramatically decreased compared to pre-war levels;

    P.  whereas 5,5 million Syrian refugees live in the five countries neighbouring Syria, namely Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, with the EU providing financial assistance to help shoulder the associated costs; whereas approximately 500 000 internally displaced persons and 300 000 external refugees have returned to their areas of origin since the collapse of the Assad regime, with inadequate services, limited livelihoods and damaged infrastructure hindering their sustainable reintegration;

    1.  Praises the bravery, dignity and resilience of the Syrian people, who finally succeeded in overthrowing the cruel Assad dictatorship; pays tribute to the countless victims of the regime; calls for the EU to seize this historic opportunity to support a Syrian-led political transition in order to unite and rebuild the country, and to assist Syria in implementing its reconstruction and achieving a just and inclusive political transition; remains concerned, however, by the high degree of instability, both in Syria and in the region; underlines that a stable and peaceful Syria is in the interests of the Middle East, the EU’s southern neighbourhood and the EU itself;

    2.  Welcomes the fresh start in EU-Syria relations, manifested by the appointment of an EU Chargé d’affaires in Damascus, diplomatic engagement and high-level meetings undertaken by Member States and EU leaders, as well as the anticipated organisation of the Ninth Brussels Conference set to take place on 17 March 2025; encourages the EU and all its Member States to cooperate with Syria’s interim authorities in a transparent, coordinated and responsible manner, and to convey readiness to provide state-building assistance if and as needed; welcomes dialogue held alongside regional partners in the so-called ‘Aqaba’ format;

    3.  Strongly believes that stability in Syria will come from a pluralistic political transition that includes credible representatives of all components of Syrian society and of all geographical areas, that is to say all religious and ethnic communities, women, civil society and peaceful opposition forces; welcomes the caretaker president’s acknowledgement of Syria’s diversity while taking note that the composition of the current interim government is lacking in this regard; underlines the importance of the future government reflecting this plurality and for a future constitutional framework guaranteeing equal rights and access to opportunities for all Syrians, in line with democratic principles, the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms, including religious freedom, as upheld by international law, as well as clear and concrete evidence that these rights are respected in national and local decisions;

    4.  Acknowledges in this regard, the National Dialogue Conference that took place on 25 February 2025 as a starting point for establishing a culture of dialogue for all Syrians; expresses its concern about the exclusion of Kurdish political representatives, as well as the failure to ensure the participation of all segments of Syrian civil society, particularly women; recalls, further, that this dialogue ought to be upheld in order to prevent deepening societal divisions and discord within key segments of Syrian society and further destabilising an already fragile security situation; calls on the interim government to craft a roadmap setting out its plan for carrying out the political transition process and improve transparency in respect of Syrian citizens;

    5.  Notes with concern the violent past of factions that toppled the Assad regime and are now participating in government; takes good note of the caretaker President’s declarations of intent, while pledging to monitor the actions of national and local authorities when evaluating further engagement; expresses cautious optimism regarding the behaviour of the caretaker authorities regarding freedom of religion and encourages them to implement further confidence-building measures; calls on the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consistently speak out against any possible violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights in Syria by the interim government or other groups;

    6.  Is deeply worried by the fragile security situation across Syria, particularly the coastal area, and firmly condemns the retaliatory targeting of the Alawite community based on its perceived association with the Assad regime; calls on the caretaker authorities to rein in all violent factions, including those set to be incorporated within the Syrian army and security forces, protect all civilian citizens from violence and ensure their right to live in safety; calls for prompt, transparent and impartial investigations into all killings and other violations and for those responsible to be held to account, in line with international legal norms and standards; urges the caretaker government to ensure that all military and security appointments are based strictly on professional qualifications, respect for international human rights and humanitarian law, and a commitment to combating terrorism; expresses concern regarding the presence of foreign extremist fighters, including European citizens, among the forces that overthrew the Assad regime, and cautions against integrating them permanently into the Syrian security apparatus; recognises the challenge for orderly state-building linked to the risk of insurgency by armed groups loyal to the former regime; encourages caretaker authorities to organise paramilitary and civilian disarmament;

    7.  Praises the invaluable contribution of civil society, in Syria and abroad, as the legitimate repository and defender of the aspirations of the Syrian people during years of brutal oppression; pays particular tribute to the White Helmets, target of a regime-orchestrated and Russia-backed smear campaign; calls for the EU to increase financial support, especially for Syrian civil society organisations as they adapt to shifting operating conditions, with a focus on promoting civic dialogue, notably between ethnic, cultural and religious communities, to foster pluralism, peaceful coexistence and trust within Syrian society;

    8.  Stresses the importance of recognising the role of sexualised and gender-based violence in justice and accountability processes, as well as of policies to ensure women’s full participation and representation in political life, as well as their economic empowerment; calls, further, to address specifically the suffering inflicted on children;

    9.  Is concerned by the exponential rise of disinformation originating both within Syria and from abroad; warns of the risk of instrumentalisation of communities also by foreign actors; stresses the need for a pluralistic media landscape to flourish and operate free of censorship and under a legally protected freedom of the press; calls for the EU and its Member States to provide funding and capacity-building in this regard;

    10.  Strongly believes that the success of the Syrian political transition, notably the safeguarding of civil peace and the building of trust in state institutions, hinges on transitional justice and reconciliation as a path to fighting the impunity of all parties responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses; calls for judicial reform to be made an urgent political priority; encourages the caretaker Syrian Government to establish an independent transitional justice committee to ensure accountability for past human rights violations committed by all factions, emphasising that military unification cannot be achieved without a credible justice mechanism to build trust among armed groups, including representatives from the southern factions, the SDF and former regime officers;

    11.  Calls on caretaker authorities to fully cooperate with competent international instances, including UN mechanisms established specifically for investigating serious crimes in Syria, such as the UN International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and facilitate their on-site operations; encourages Syria to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and align national legislation accordingly, as well as give the ICC retroactive jurisdiction through a declaration; recognises the irreplaceable contribution of Fareed al-Madhhan (‘Caesar’) to documenting regime crimes, as well as the Syrian Network of Human Rights’ work in tracking disappearances; stresses the importance of these processes now being completed; calls for the EU to support the renewal of the mandate of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria and increase funding for all relevant mechanisms, notably in light of US disinvestment;

    12.  Commends the steps taken to fight impunity through universal jurisdiction cases in Germany, France and other Member States, of individuals linked to the Assad regime and Daesh; encourages courts to continue such prosecutions and expects newfound evidence and fruitful cooperation with Syrian authorities to lead to leaps in investigations and convictions;

    13.  Stresses the need for Syria’s transitional authorities to urgently take all steps to secure and preserve physical evidence of serious international crimes across the country, including through cooperation and engagement with international experts and current international mechanisms, and to grant all competent organisations access to archival documents; encourages the EU to provide support for timely evidence collection on the ground, including forensic equipment and expertise to identify and analyse mass graves, as well as the collection of survivors’ testimonies;

    14.  Highlights that Syria is among the most heavily mine-contaminated countries; is alarmed by the rising number of victims, including children, who have been killed or injured by mines and other explosives, a problem that is further increasing as people start to return; commends efforts by international and local organisations in identifying, marking and clearing explosive ordnance, and calls for the EU to urgently support demining efforts jointly with specialised actors and Syrian authorities;

    15.  Reiterates its strongest condemnation of the appalling use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians by the Assad regime; welcomes the announcement by Syria’s interim government to destroy any remaining stockpiles of chemical weapons in Syria and its openness to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

    16.  Appreciates the determination demonstrated by caretaker authorities in discontinuing the production and trafficking of drugs, in particular Captagon, which have negatively affected the whole region for years; encourages international cooperation against the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings;

    17.  Highlights the importance of protecting Syria’s cultural heritage and calls for international collaboration to restore historical sites and religious landmarks and to prevent the illicit trade in looted artefacts; urges the EU to support Syria in efforts to restore areas and places of cultural significance to the Syrian public and the world, including the UNESCO site of Palmyra after its revolting partial destruction by Daesh in 2015;

    18.  Acknowledges that the Syrian economy is shattered, with considerable investment gaps towards achieving price stability and sustained job creation; calls for all necessary steps to be taken in order to incentivise and facilitate foreign direct investment in accordance with international standards, as well as for reforms addressing housing, land and property rights and policies balancing development across urban and rural areas to reduce regional disparities; encourages economic disentanglement from Russia and Iran after both countries have profited from Syria’s economic collapse to extract resources and control strategic industries;

    19.  Welcomes the gradual and conditional suspension of sanctions on a range of economic sectors and the indefinite extension of humanitarian exemptions; underlines that despite recent adjustments, the EU, US and UK sanctions policies towards Syria are an obstacle to reconstruction efforts; calls on the Commission and the Council to reach out to other countries imposing sanctions on Syria, notably the US and the UK; supports a full yet reversible lifting of all sectoral sanctions, with a focus on the financial sector, so as to provide the Syrian economy a much-needed lifeline, while closely monitoring the political transition process; expects over-compliance to remain an issue as long as extensive US and UK sanctions remain in place, notably due to the former’s extraterritorial dimension; calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide European businesses and banks with legal assurances to counteract over-compliance; calls, nevertheless, for individual sanctions against military personnel, officials, business entities and individuals associated with the Assad family to be maintained; expects the yearly update of the EU sanction regime ahead of its expiration on 1 June 2025 to adequately assess the relevance of all renewed sanctions, allowing for much-needed clarity, and asks the European Council to define and clearly communicate clear steps that Syria’s authorities must carry out, to secure further sanctions easing or prevent the activation of a snapback;

    20.  Welcomes the announcement by the Commission to allocate EUR 235 million in new humanitarian support to Syrians and calls for the EU and its Member States to sustain humanitarian and development aid efforts and to maintain financial support for neighbouring countries hosting Syrian refugees; invites the EU to explore pathways to use frozen assets of the Assad regime for a trust fund for Syrian reconstruction, rehabilitation and compensation of victims; is extremely concerned by the suspension of all USAID funding related to Syria or Syrian refugees and by the foreseen non-participation of the US in the next Brussels conference;

    21.  Calls for the EU to strategically extend its focus from humanitarian aid to accelerated and early economic recovery and reconstruction in key sectors such as energy, water supply, healthcare and education, in order to reach tangible results while ensuring that programming is accompanied by due diligence and independent monitoring; urges the European Union and its Members States to agree on the joint provision of sustainable funding at the forthcoming Ninth Brussels Conference;

    22.  Welcomes the decision taken, for example, by France to allow refugees to return to Syria and participate in its reconstruction without jeopardising their status, including for ‘go-and-see’ visits to Syria; calls on the Member States and third countries to urgently replicate this initiative; calls on the Commission to encourage and provide the Member States with guidance and best practice on the implementation of EU law on this issue, including as regards the difference between ‘travel’ and ‘re-establishment’; insists that all asylum status claims and renewals must be assessed individually and thoroughly; stresses the importance of balanced participation in the political transition process of the Syrian diaspora as a key asset for the country’s transition and reconstruction; recognises the importance of remittances alongside official development assistance and urges the Member States to lift any restrictions placed on sending remittances to Syria; recalls, moreover, that according to the UN Refugee Convention, conditions for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees can only be met following fundamental and durable changes in Syria;

    23.  Recalls the presence of over 400 000 Palestinian refugees residing in Syria, some of them displaced multiple times, and the role of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in assisting its needs; remembers the siege of the Yarmouk camp by Assadist factions between 2013 and 2015;

    24.  Calls on Syria to break free from its notorious long-standing alliances with Tehran and Moscow, which have brought suffering to the Syrian people and destabilisation to the Middle East and beyond; calls, further, on the caretaker Syrian authorities to bring the Russian military presence in Syria to an end; condemns Russia for hosting Bashar al-Assad and his family and shielding them from justice, after having obstructed justice by actively interfering in international investigations and vetoing UN Security Council resolutions aimed at addressing the regime’s war crimes and their own;

    25.  Calls on neighbouring countries to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and to immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law;

    26.  Firmly believes that the unification of all segments of Syria, including the integration of all armed factions within a national army, require a Syrian-led political solution; calls for the EU and the Member States to use all diplomatic channels to advocate the stabilisation of Syria, which is in the interest of most countries in the region, and support discussions towards a peaceful and stable solution and ensure that the well-being and preservation of fundamental freedoms, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the gender equality of all Syrians, notably those living in north-eastern Syria, remain at the centre of decisions; welcomes, in this regard, the agreement of 10 March 2025 between de facto President al-Sharaa and SDF Commander in Chief Mazloum Abdi and hopes for its smooth implementation; takes note of the positive result of recent negotiations between Kurdish armed groups in Türkiye and the Turkish Government towards disarmament;

    27.  Insists that different ethnic and religious groups must be protected in order to create a peaceful Syria; therefore calls for the European Union and the Member States to support the implementation process of the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF, in order to guarantee the Kurdish community full recognition and political participation in Syria;

    28.  Stresses the importance of the fight led by the international coalition against Daesh, with the invaluable support of Kurdish fighters, and calls for it to cooperate with the Syrian interim government to prevent Daesh and other jihadist groups from reorganising; expresses deep concerns as attacks led or supported by Türkiye in north-eastern Syria not only cause civilian casualties and increase the number of internally displaced persons, but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; urges the caretaker authorities to demonstrate clear commitment to the fight against terrorism and to cooperate with international partners both to fight remaining active cells in Syria and to investigate past crimes, notably against the Yazidi community;

    29.  Urgently calls for a lasting solution to be found among all the parties concerned as these camps continue to be breeding grounds for radicalisation and constitute a dormant threat to both Syrian and European security; warns against the serious international security risk a sudden disengagement of the United States in the region would cause in this uncertain context; reiterates its call on the Member States to repatriate all their nationals, especially children, from Al-Hol and Roj and to bring adults to justice in fair trials;

    30.  Calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to cease all activities aimed at torpedoing the Syrian caretaker government’s political and economic efforts and forcedly altering the status quo; commends the interim authorities for intercepting Iranian weapon shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon and welcomes the complete collapse of Iran’s extensive infrastructure and networks in Syria;

    31.  Welcomes de facto President al-Sharaa’s pledge to seek peaceful relations with all of Syria’s neighbours; calls on the caretaker Syrian authorities to ensure this commitment is turned into concrete action to prevent and refrain from taking any security-threatening measures against neighbouring countries and beyond;

    32.  Condemns those European politicians, including current and former MEPs, who have repeatedly spread pro-Assad narratives and actively engaged in whitewashing the bloody dictatorship; expresses deep concern regarding the recent invitation by Parliament’s Intergroup on Christians in the Middle East of organisations closely linked to EU-sanctioned Assadists;

    33.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the relevant EU institutions, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the caretaker Syrian government, and to have it translated and published in Arabic.

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6749, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6749/oj.
    (2) OJ L, 2025/406, 25.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2025/406/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION calling for an investigation into the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline – B10-0142/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0142/2025

    Motion for a European Parliament resolution calling for an investigation into the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Rule 149 of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas EU Member States Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have launched the NATO military operation Baltic Sentry to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea;

    B. whereas the proposed actions of Baltic Sentry are based on the unproven assumption that Russia is behind acts of sabotage, including the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline;

    C. whereas the Council of the EU stated on 28 September 2022, ‘We will support any investigation aimed at getting full clarity on what happened and why, and will take further steps to increase our resilience in energy security’;

    1. Stresses that responding to a criminal act without first conducting a thorough, impartial and evidence-based investigation to determine responsibility is inconsistent with the EU’s fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law;

    2. Calls for an investigation into all forms of suspected sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, beginning with the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline on 26 September 2022.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Thales Delivers the World’s First Autonomous Mine Hunting System to the Royal Navy

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Thales Delivers the World’s First Autonomous Mine Hunting System to the Royal Navy

    • Thales has reached a historic milestone by delivering the first end-to-end autonomous maritime mine hunting system to the Royal Navy. This achievement comes under the aegis of the Joint Armament Cooperation Organization (OCCAr) and within the framework of the Franco-British MMCM (Maritime Mine Counter Measures) project.
    • This cutting-edge system places the UK and France at the forefront of naval innovation. Utilising cyber-secured autonomous drones equipped with Artificial Intelligence (AI), Thales is revolutionising mine countermeasures operations with unprecedented precision and safety.
    • Thales relies on 200 skilled jobs, thereby contributing to the dynamism of the British defence industry.
    ©Thales/Shaun Roster” id=”image-5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f” data-id=”5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f” data-original=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f/-/inline/no/image.png” data-mfp-src=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/5327e472-2cc6-4f7d-ac56-e0a4d5fad37f/-/format/auto/” alt=”©Thales/Shaun Roster”/>
    ©Thales/Shaun Roster

    Marking a technological breakthrough in the conduct of mine countermeasure missions, this system drastically reduces the exposure risk for personnel on board ships while contributing to the safety of maritime routes, the backbone of the global economy.

    The Royal Navy will receive its first four systems over the course of the year. Each system includes several integrated pieces of equipment and subsystems, enabling the accomplishment of highly complex missions: an Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV)[1], an advanced towed sonar (TSAM) with a cutting-edge multivision sonar (SAMDIS), a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), and a lightweight operations centre (e-POC), all supported by a secure command and control system.

    Thanks to its expertise in sensors, data analysis, and machine learning, Thales has developed a sonar analysis application, Mi-Map, which processes sonar data up to four times faster, allowing even more precise detection and classification of sea floor mines.

    Deployed and operated from a mother ship and coastal bases, the platforms can handle vast volumes of data, enabling operators to expedite the process of identifying and neutralising mines. This innovative system aligns with the British government’s ambitious policy to position the UK as a global leader in autonomous maritime technologies.

    Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry, Rt Hon Maria Eagle MP, said: “This delivery marks a significant milestone in our mine-hunting capabilities and the autonomous technology will keep Britain and our Royal Navy sailors safer by identifiying & removing them from mines. It has also supported hundreds of skilled jobs across UK industry – a clear demonstration that defence is an engine for economic growth.”

    Rebecca Smith, Member of Parliament for South West Devon, attended the ceremony at the Thales Maritime Autonomy Centre in Plymouth, officially marking the delivery of this cutting-edge technology capable of detecting and neutralising the growing threat of naval mines.

    “I welcome today’s announcement by Thales regarding the delivery to the Royal Navy of the world’s first end-to-end autonomous mine hunting system. I am pleased to see that a city with such a prestigious naval history as Plymouth now finds itself at the heart of a future rich in innovations for the Royal Navy. I hope we continue to see new activities develop, resulting in new local jobs in high-tech maritime areas. In the current climate, it is important to ensure strong military and industrial cooperation across Europe, and I am proud to see Plymouth playing a key role in effectively supporting the relationship between the UK and France”, declared Rebecca Smith, MP South West Devon

    Phil Siveter, CEO of Thales in the UK, stated, “We are extremely proud to deliver the world’s first end-to-end autonomous mine hunting system to the Royal Navy. With the introduction of AI and advanced sensor technology, this innovation marks a new era in naval defence and underlines our unwavering commitment to providing cutting-edge solutions that enhance the capabilities of our armed forces. The Royal Navy will now have a powerful tool to protect its national interests and maintain safety at sea.”

    A historic partner of the Royal Navy for over a century, Thales has long contributed to the advanced technologies that equip its sonar and mine hunting systems. The Franco-British MMCM program highlights Thales’s determination to provide world-class capabilities in these areas. Significant investments made by the UK have maintained over 200 skilled jobs, particularly at Thales sites in Somerset and Plymouth, strengthening the entire ecosystem of suppliers and partners.

    About OCCAR

    OCCAR is an International Organisation for the management of complex, cooperative defence equipment programmes. France, Germany, Italy and the UK created the OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement / Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation) on the basis of a ratified treaty known as the OCAR Convention, with the intent to increase their armaments cooperation in order to improve efficiency and reduce costs.

    www.occar.int

    About Thales

    Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) is a global leader in advanced technologies for the Defence, Aerospace, and Cyber & Digital sectors. Its portfolio of innovative products and services addresses several major challenges: sovereignty, security, sustainability and inclusion.

    The Group invests more than €4 billion per year in Research & Development in key areas, particularly for critical environments, such as Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum and cloud technologies.

    Thales has more than 83,000 employees in 68 countries. In 2024, the Group generated sales of €20.6 billion.

    1Royal Navy Motor Boat (RNMB) ARIADNE

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Press release

    Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    A joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    1. We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025. 

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    1. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    2. We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    3. We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    4. We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    5. We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    6. We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.   

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East  

    1. We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    2. We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    3. We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    4. We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific  

    1. We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    2. We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.  

    3. We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    4. We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.

    5. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    6. We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately. 

    7. We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access. 

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    1. We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    2. We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    1. We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict. 

    2. We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    1. We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix (14 Mar. 2025)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025.

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East

    We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific

    We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.

    We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.16. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately.

    We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access.

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict.

    We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic advances ammunition stockpile management with OSCE support

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic advances ammunition stockpile management with OSCE support

    Technical specialists from the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic evaluating the stability of nitrocellulose-based propellants, Bishkek, 14 March 2025. (OSCE) Photo details

    From 3 to 14 March 2025, eight technical specialists from the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic completed a training course on propellant stability assessment. The course was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, in collaboration with the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic and with support from the Austrian Armed Forces.
    Participants gained hands-on experience operating specialized mobile laboratories equipped with QPAK and QPAK+ systems to evaluate the stability of nitrocellulose-based propellants, which is crucial for preventing accidental explosions at ammunition storage sites.
    With the tools and knowledge acquired, Ministry staff will be able to more effectively test and monitor propellant stability, contributing to risk mitigation and enhancing the overall security of ammunition stockpiles.
    “Arms control is one of our Organization’s priorities. By advancing Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Conventional Ammunition (CA) through-life management, we take a step forward in ensuring security across the broader OSCE area,” noted Konstantin Bedarev, Head of the Politico-Military Department of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.
    This initiative is part of an ongoing series of activities within the extra-budgetary project “Improvement of SALW and CA Life-Cycle Management Capacity of the Ministry of Defense of the Kyrgyz Republic,” supported by Austria, France, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: As Mark Carney is sworn in, America’s democratic decline has critical lessons for Canadian voters

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Matthew Lebo, Professor, Department of Political Science, Western University

    Prime Minister Mark Carney and his cabinet have been sworn in, ending Justin Trudeau’s time in office and paving the way for a spring election. Canadians are soon heading to the polls as they watch American democracy crumble.

    United States President Donald Trump recently argued “he who saves his country does not violate any Law” as he ignores Congress and the courts, governs by executive order and threatens international laws and treaties.




    Read more:
    Is Donald Trump on a constitutional collision course over NATO?


    Once stable democratic institutions are failing to hold an authoritarian president in check.

    What lessons are there to protect Canadian democracy as the federal election approaches?

    Elites lead the way

    First, it’s important to delve into how so many Americans have become tolerant of undemocratic actions and politics in the first place. It’s not that Republican voters first became more extreme and then chose a representative leader. Rather, public opinion and polarization are led by elites.

    Republican leaders moved dramatically to the right, and the primary system allowed the choice of an extremist. Republican voters then aligned their opinions with his. Trump’s disdain for democratic fundamentals spread quickly. Partisans defending their team slid away from democratic values.

    Canada’s more centrist ideological spectrum is not foolproof against this type of extremism. Public opinion can be moved when our leaders take us there.

    Decline can start slowly and then accelerate. America’s democratic backsliding in the first weeks of Trump’s second presidency follows the erosion of democratic norms over decades. Republican attacks on institutions, the opposition, the media and higher education corrosively undermined public faith in the truth, including election results.

    Trust in government is holding steady in Canada, however. That provides an important guardrail for Canadian democracy.

    The dangers of courting the far right

    There are also lessons for our political parties. To maximize their seats, Republicans accepted extremists like Marjorie Taylor Greene, but soon needed those types of politicians for key votes.

    The so-called Freedom Caucus, made up of MAGA adherents, forced the choice of a new, more extreme, leader of the House of Representatives. This provides a clear lesson that history has shown many times: it is dangerous for the party on the political right to accommodate the far right, which can quickly take control.

    Once established within the ruling party, extremists can hold their party hostage.

    At a recent meeting of the Munich Security Conference, Vice-President JD Vance pushed European parties to include far-right parties, and Elon Musk outright endorsed the far-right Alternative for Germany party.

    Austria recently avoided the inclusion of the far right in its new coalition, and now Germany is working to do the same. As Canada’s Conservatives look for every vote, courting far-right voters and candidates risks destabilizing the system.

    Can it happen in Canada?

    How safe is Canada’s Westminster-style parliamentary democracy?

    The fusion of legislative and executive power in parliamentary systems like Canada’s seems prone to tyranny. America’s Constitutional framers thought so when they designed a system with separate legislative, executive and judicial branches that could check each other’s power.

    They clearly did not imagine party loyalty negating the safeguards that protect democracy from an authoritarian-minded president. The Constitution gives Congress the power to legislate and impeach, limits the executive’s power to spend and make appointments, gives the judiciary power to hold an executive accountable and contains the 25th amendment allowing cabinet to remove a president.

    But when one party controls the legislative and executive branches during a time of hyper-partisanship, these mechanisms may not constrain an authoritarian. Today, Republican loyalty has eroded these checks and balances and American courts are struggling to step up to their heightened role.

    Although counter-intuitive, parliamentary systems like Canada’s are usually less susceptible to authoritarianism than presidential ones because the cabinet or the House of Commons can turn against a lawless leader.

    Still, if popular, authoritarian leaders can still retain their party’s support — and then things can slide quickly. The rightward pull of extremists seen in the U.S. House would be more dangerous here since the Canadian House of Commons includes our executive.

    Guarding against xenophobia

    Lastly, Canada should be wary of xenophobic rhetoric.

    America First” is not simply shopping advice. It began as an isolationist slogan during the First World War but was soon adopted by pro-fascists, American Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. These entities questioned who is really American and wanted not only isolationism, but racist policies, immigration restrictions and eugenics.

    Trump did not revive the phrase accidentally. It’s a call to America’s fringes. Alienating domestic groups is a sure sign of democratic decline.

    “Canada First” mimics that century-long dark theme in America. In combination with contempt for the opposition, it questions the right of other parties to legitimately hold power if used as a message by one party.

    Also, asserting that “Canada is broken” — as Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre often does — mimics Trump’s talk of American carnage, language and imagery he uses to justify extraordinary presidential authority.

    Such language erodes citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and primes voters to support undemocratic practices in the name of patriotism. Canadian parties and politicians should exit that road.

    Ultimately, institutions alone do not protect a country from the rise of authoritarianism. Democracy can be fragile. As a federal election approaches in Canada, it’s important to know the warning signs of extremism and anti-democratic practices that are creeping into our politics.

    Matthew Lebo does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. As Mark Carney is sworn in, America’s democratic decline has critical lessons for Canadian voters – https://theconversation.com/as-mark-carney-is-sworn-in-americas-democratic-decline-has-critical-lessons-for-canadian-voters-251544

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Joint statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix

    Source: Government of Canada News

    March 14, 2025 – Charlevoix, Quebec – Global Affairs Canada

    1. We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in Charlevoix on March 12 to 14, 2025.

    Ukraine’s long-term prosperity and security

    2. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.

    3. We welcomed ongoing efforts to achieve a ceasefire, and in particular the meeting on March 11 between the U.S. and Ukraine in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We applauded Ukraine’s commitment to an immediate ceasefire, which is an essential step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in line with the Charter of the United Nations.

    4. We called for Russia to reciprocate by agreeing to a ceasefire on equal terms and implementing it fully. We discussed imposing further costs on Russia in case such a ceasefire is not agreed, including through further sanctions, caps on oil prices, as well as additional support for Ukraine, and other means. This includes the use of extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilized Russian Sovereign Assets. We underlined the importance of confidence-building measures under a ceasefire including the release of prisoners of war and detainees—both military and civilian—and the return of Ukrainian children.

    5. We emphasized that any ceasefire must be respected and underscored the need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against any renewed acts of aggression. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.

    6. We condemned the provision to Russia of military assistance by DPRK and Iran, and the provision of weapons and dual-use components by China, a decisive enabler of Russia’s war and of the reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

    7. We expressed alarm about the impacts of the war, especially on civilians and on civilian infrastructure. We discussed the importance of accountability and reaffirmed our commitment to work together to achieve a durable peace and to ensure that Ukraine remains democratic, free, strong and prosperous.   

    Regional peace and stability in the Middle East  

    8. We called for the release of all hostages and for the hostages’ remains held by Hamas in Gaza to be returned to their loved ones. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire. We underscored the imperative of a political horizon for the Palestinian people, achieved through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that meets the legitimate needs and aspirations of both peoples and advances comprehensive Middle East peace, stability and prosperity. We noted serious concern over the growing tensions and hostilities in the West Bank and calls for de-escalation.

    9. We recognized Israel’s inherent right to defend itself consistent with international law. We unequivocally condemned Hamas, including for its brutal and unjustified terror attacks on October 7, 2023, and the harm inflicted on the hostages during their captivity and the violation of their dignity through the use of ‘handover ceremonies’ during their release. We reiterated that Hamas can have no role in Gaza’s future and must never again be a threat to Israel. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.

    10. We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures. At this critical juncture, we reiterated the importance of Syria’s and Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We called unequivocally for the rejection of terrorism in Syria. We condemned strongly the recent escalation of violence in the coastal regions of Syria, and called for the protection of civilians and for perpetrators of atrocities to be held accountable. We stressed the critical importance of an inclusive and Syrian-led political process. We welcomed the commitment by the Syrian interim government to work with the OPCW in eliminating all remaining chemical weapons.

    11. We stressed that Iran is the principal source of regional instability and must never be allowed to develop and acquire a nuclear weapon. We emphasized that Iran must now change course, de-escalate and choose diplomacy. We underscored the threat of Iran’s growing use of arbitrary detention and foreign assassination attempts as a tool of coercion.

    Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific  

    12. We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.

    13. We remain seriously concerned by the situations in the East China Sea as well as the South China Sea and continue to oppose strongly unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force and coercion. We expressed concern over the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines and Vietnamese vessels as well as efforts to restrict freedom of navigation and overflight through militarization and coercion in the South China Sea, in violation of international law. We emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues and reiterated our opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.  

    14. We remain concerned with China’s military build-up and the continued, rapid increase in China’s nuclear weapons arsenal. We called on China to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.

    15. We emphasized that China should not conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions.16. We expressed concerns about China’s non-market policies and practices that are leading to harmful overcapacity and market distortions. We further called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures that could lead to significant supply chain disruptions. We reiterated that we are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic growth, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest.

    16. We demanded that the DPRK abandon all its nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction as well as ballistic missile programs in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We expressed our serious concerns over, and the need to address together, the DPRK’s cryptocurrency thefts. We called on DPRK to resolve the abductions issue immediately.

    17. We denounced the brutal repression of the people of Myanmar by the military regime and called for an end to all violence and for unhindered humanitarian access.

    Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

    18. We strongly denounced the ongoing horrifying violence that continues to be perpetrated by gangs in Haiti in their efforts to seize control of the government. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

    19. We reiterated our call for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela in line with the aspirations of the Venezuelan people who peacefully voted on July 28, 2024, for change, the cessation of repression and arbitrary or unjust detentions of peaceful protestors including youth by Nicolas Maduro’s regime, as well as the unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners. We also agreed Venezuelan naval vessels threatening Guyana’s commercial vessels is unacceptable and an infringement of Guyana’s internationally recognized sovereign rights. We reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations as an enduring value.

    Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    20. We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict.

    21. We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.

    Strengthening sanctions and countering hybrid warfare and sabotage

    22. We welcomed efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement. We also welcomed discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group, and of a Latin America Working Group.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: Government of Canada News

    March 14, 2025 – Charlevoix, Québec – Global Affairs Canada

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.

    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest. 

    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.

    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    5. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.

    6. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.

    7. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry to mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

    8. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.

    9. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    10. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability.  We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea. Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthening our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.

    11. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.

    12. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors.  Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis. 

    13. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defence and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.

    14. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    15. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.

    16. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    17. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.

    18. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    [14] March 2025

    Charlevoix, Canada

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Picturing the Pandemic

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    A new exhibit of words, images, and audio collected from around the world during the COVID-19 pandemic now on display at Homer Babbidge Library offers a rare glimpse at how people captured history even as it was being made.

    Picturing the Pandemic, created by the Pandemic Journaling Project (PJP) and Seeing Truth: Art, Science, Museums, and Making Knowledge, opened at UConn Storrs on Thursday, Mar. 6.  

    Anthropologists Sarah Willen (UConn) and Katherine Mason (Brown University) started the PJP five years ago to collect people’s reflections on how the pandemic was affecting their lives as it happened.

    “We cared about giving people a space to reflect and we cared about documenting, chronicling, and preserving people’s real-time record of their experiences during a time that none of us understood,” said Willen, a professor of anthropology at UConn and co-director the Research Program on Global Health and Human Rights at the Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute.

    From May 2020 to May 2022, the PJP collected weekly journal entries that allowed people to chronicle the countless ways the pandemic and its attendant disruptions manifested in their lives. In its first wave, the project collected nearly 27,000 entries from 1,800 people around the world. 

    Sarah Willen, co- creator of the Pandemic Journaling Project, describes the new exhibit at Homer Babbidge Library (Danielle Faipler / UConn Photo)

    The goal was to create an archive that would exist into the future so people could better understand how the pandemic was experienced by people living through it. 

    “We wanted to make an archive that would last and that would be useful to other people in the future, and we made a promise that people would be able to keep everything that they contributed,” said Willen. 

    The exhibit at Babbidge Library consists of panels featuring photographs and excerpts from journal submissions, highlighting a key component of the project: the variety of ways participants were able to express themselves and document their lives.  

    “We wanted ‘journaling’ to be defined as broadly as possible. People could write, they could upload audio journal entries, or they could upload photographs,” said Willen. 

    At the opening ceremony, Willen and other members of the UConn community who supported the development of the project spoke about its growth since the start of the pandemic. 

    Willen thanked the University and other sponsors for supporting the project, including the Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute, the Humanities Institute, and the Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy (InCHIP). 

    “Documents, diaries, letters, drawings and memoirs created by those who participated in or witnessed events of the past tell us something that even the best written article or book may not convey,” said Anne Langley, Dean of UConn Library. 

    “Its global dimension is really critical; The multiple languages which were used, the fact that you could audio journal or video journal,” said Kathryn Libal, professor of social work and human rights and director of the Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute. “It opens up a new way for us to think about collective archiving in the present for future commemoration and scholarly works.”

    Kathryn Libal, director of the Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute, speaks at the opening of the new Pandemic Journaling Project exhibit at Homer Babbidge library (Danielle Faipler / UConn Photo)

    The exhibition was curated by Willen, Mason, and Alexis Boylan, professor of art and art history at UConn, along with PJP postdoctoral fellow Heather Wurtz and a large team of students and curation partners.

    “The images will not let us forget. They remind us of feelings that we had that we maybe put away, of ideas of things and people that we wanted to be but maybe did not work out in that moment, but that we still remember and hold on to,” said Boylan.  

    With the exhibit located in the middle of a heavily visited area at UConn, many students, faculty, staff, and visitors will have a chance to reflect on their lives in the five years since the pandemic. 

    Globally, as well as in the United States, people are repressing a lot about the impact the pandemic had, and continues to have, on our lives, said Willen. By offering visitors a chance to look back on this time, the exhibition invites people to consider how their own lives, and the broader world, have changed. 

    Before coming to Storrs, the exhibition made earlier stops in Hartford, Providence, Heidelberg (Germany), Mexico City and Toronto. For this new iteration, the curators added a new center panel that recognizes the importance of science and of having an infrastructure for knowledge building and social interaction.  

    “If we pull apart the components of that infrastructure, a lot of things fall apart,” said Willen. “Our capacity to do science falls apart. Our capacity to prepare people for their careers falls apart. Our capacity to provide public spaces in which we can come together and interact with each other – like libraries and museums – falls apart.”

    “We’re hoping that this will be a chance for people to see the structures we’ve built in our society to support, connect with, and nurture each other, and to help each other understand who we are in the world, will only exist if we protect them,” said Willen. 

    Willen especially urges student visitors to the exhibit to think deeply about how their majors, fields, and research can help us collectively confront the problems that society is facing.  

    “Let’s not lose sight of those values, of how we can put our tools to work to grapple with real-life problems using data and our capacities for analysis and reflection,” said Willen. 

    The Pandemic Journaling Project and the Picturing the Pandemic exhibition were only possible because UConn believed in them, said Willen. 

    “We brought our skills to the table, and our students brought theirs, and many different institutes and departments at the university said, yes, this is worthwhile, and they gave us the resources to start collecting people’s narratives and experiences,” said Willen. “Bringing the exhibit to Babbidge Library is our thank you note to UConn.” 

     

    Picturing the Pandemic: Images from the Pandemic Journaling Project will be on display in the entryway to the Homer Babbidge Library from March 5 to March 20.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between Hong Kong and Bahrain to enter into force on March 21

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (IPPA) signed between Hong Kong and Bahrain in March last year will enter into force on March 21, following the completion of the two sides’ respective internal procedures required.

    Under the IPPA, the two governments undertake to provide investors of the other side with fair, equitable and non-discriminatory treatment of their investments, compensation in the event of expropriation of investments, and the right to free transfers abroad of investments and returns. The IPPA also provides for settlement of investment disputes under internationally accepted rules, including arbitration.

    The Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Mr Algernon Yau, said, “By enabling investors of Hong Kong and Bahrain to enjoy corresponding protection of their investments in the host economies, the IPPA will enhance confidence of investors, expand investment flows and further strengthen the economic and trade ties between the two places.

    “The Government has been actively seeking to expand Hong Kong’s global economic and trade networks with a view to assisting enterprises and investors in opening up markets. We are exploring the signing of IPPAs with Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt and Peru, as well as exploring IPPAs or free trade agreements with emerging markets including potential partners in the Middle East and other regions along the Belt and Road,” he added.

    The IPPA with Bahrain is the second of its kind signed by the current-term Government, following the IPPA signed with Türkiye. It is also the 24th investment agreement that Hong Kong has signed with a foreign economy.

    The other foreign economies that have signed IPPAs with Hong Kong are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Australia, Austria, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Dual Russian And Israeli National Extradited To The United States For His Role In The LockBit Ransomware Conspiracy

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEWARK, N.J. – A dual Russian and Israeli national was extradited to the United States on charges that he was a developer of the LockBit ransomware group, United States Attorney John Giordano announced.

    In August, Rostislav Panev, 51, was arrested in Israel pursuant to a U.S. provisional arrest request.  Today, Panev was extradited to the United States and had an initial appearance before U.S. Magistrate Judge André M. Espinosa where Panev was detained pending trial.

    “Rostislav Panev’s extradition to the District of New Jersey makes it clear: if you are a member of the LockBit ransomware conspiracy, the United States will find you and bring you to justice,” said United States Attorney John Giordano. “Even as the means and methods of cybercriminals become more sophisticated, my Office and our FBI, Criminal Division, and international law enforcement partners are more committed than ever to prosecuting these criminals.”

    “No one is safe from ransomware attacks, from individuals to institutions. Along with our international partners, the FBI continues to leave no stone unturned when it comes to following LockBit’s trail of destruction. We will continue to work tirelessly to prevent actors, such as Panev, from hacking their way to financial gain,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Newark Division Terence G. Reilly.

    According to the superseding complaint, documents filed in this and related cases, and statements made in court, Panev acted as a developer of the LockBit ransomware group from its inception in or around 2019 through at least February 2024. During that time, Panev and his LockBit coconspirators grew LockBit into what was, at times, the most active and destructive ransomware group in the world. The LockBit group attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries around the world, including 1,800 in the United States. Their victims ranged from individuals and small businesses to multinational corporations, including hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies. LockBit’s members extracted at least $500 million in ransom payments from their victims and caused billions of dollars in other losses, including lost revenue and costs from incident response and recovery.

    LockBit’s members were comprised of “developers,” like Panev, who designed the LockBit malware code and maintained the infrastructure on which LockBit operated. LockBit’s other members, called “affiliates,” carried out LockBit attacks and extorted ransom payments from LockBit victims. LockBit’s developers and affiliates would then split the ransom payments which were extorted from victims.

    As alleged in the superseding complaint, at the time of Panev’s arrest in Israel in August, law enforcement discovered on Panev’s computer administrator credentials for an online repository that was hosted on the dark web and stored source code for multiple versions of the LockBit builder, which allowed LockBit’s affiliates to generate custom builds of the LockBit ransomware malware for particular victims. On that repository, law enforcement also discovered source code for LockBit’s StealBit tool, which helped LockBit affiliates exfiltrate data stolen through LockBit attacks. Law enforcement also discovered access credentials for the LockBit control panel, an online dashboard maintained by LockBit developers for LockBit’s affiliates and hosted by those developers on the dark web.

    The superseding complaint also alleges that Panev exchanged direct messages through a cybercriminal forum with LockBit’s primary administrator, who, in an indictment unsealed in the District of New Jersey in May, the United States alleged to be Dimitry Yuryevich Khoroshev (Дмитрий Юрьевич Хорошев), also known as LockBitSupp, LockBit, and putinkrab. In those messages, Panev and the LockBit primary administrator discussed work that needed to be done on the LockBit builder and control panel.

    Court documents further indicate that, between June 2022 and February 2024, the primary LockBit administrator made a series of transfers of cryptocurrency, laundered through one or more illicit cryptocurrency mixing services, of approximately $10,000 per month to a cryptocurrency wallet owned by Panev. Those transfers amounted to over $230,000 during that period.

    In interviews with Israeli authorities following his arrest in August, Panev admitted to having performed coding, development, and consulting work for the LockBit group and to having received regular payments in cryptocurrency for that work, consistent with the transfers identified by U.S. authorities. Among the work that Panev admitted to having completed for the LockBit group was the development of code to disable antivirus software; to deploy malware to multiple computers connected to a victim network; and to print the LockBit ransom note to all printers connected to a victim network. Panev also admitted to having written and maintained LockBit malware code and to having provided technical guidance to the LockBit group.

    The LockBit Investigation

    The superseding complaint against, and apprehension of, Panev follows a disruption of LockBit ransomware in February 2024 by the U.K. National Crime Agency (NCA)’s Cyber Division, which worked in cooperation with the Justice Department, FBI, and other international law enforcement partners. As previously announced by the Department, authorities disrupted LockBit by seizing numerous public-facing websites used by LockBit to connect to the organization’s infrastructure and by seizing control of servers used by LockBit administrators, thereby disrupting the ability of LockBit actors to attack and encrypt networks and extort victims by threatening to publish stolen data. That disruption succeeded in greatly diminishing LockBit’s reputation and its ability to attack further victims, as alleged by documents filed in this case.

    The superseding complaint against Panev also follows charges brought in the District of New Jersey against other LockBit members, including its alleged primary creator, developer, and administrator, Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. An indictment against Khoroshev unsealed in May alleges that Khoroshev began developing LockBit as early as September 2019, continued acting as the group’s administrator through 2024, a role in which Khoroshev recruited new affiliate members, spoke for the group publicly under the alias “LockBitSupp,” and developed and maintained the infrastructure used by affiliates to deploy LockBit attacks. Khoroshev is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.

    A total of seven LockBit members have now been charged in the District of New Jersey. Beyond Panev and Khoroshev, other previously charged LockBit defendants include:

    • In July, two LockBit affiliate members, Mikhail Vasiliev, also known as Ghostrider, Free, Digitalocean90, Digitalocean99, Digitalwaters99, and Newwave110, and Ruslan Astamirov, also known as BETTERPAY, offtitan, and Eastfarmer, pleaded guilty in the District of New Jersey for their participation in the LockBit ransomware group and admitted deploying multiple LockBit attacks against U.S. and foreign victims. Vasiliev and Astamirov are presently in custody awaiting sentencing.
    • In February 2024, in parallel with the disruption operation described above, an indictment was unsealed in the District of New Jersey charging Russian nationals Artur Sungatov and Ivan Kondratyev, also known as Bassterlord, with deploying LockBit against numerous victims throughout the United States, including businesses nationwide in the manufacturing and other industries, as well as victims around the world in the semiconductor and other industries. Sungatov and Kondratyev remain at large.
    • In May 2023, two indictments were unsealed in Washington, D.C., and the District of New Jersey charging Mikhail Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, m1x, Boriselcin, and Uhodiransomwar, with using different ransomware variants, including LockBit, to attack numerous victims throughout the United States, including the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department. Matveev remains at large and is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s TOC Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.

    The U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program is offering rewards of:

    Information is accepted through the FBI tip website at tips.fbi.gov.

    Khoroshev, Matveev, Sungatov, and Kondratyev have also been designated for sanctions by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for their roles in launching cyberattacks.

    Victim Assistance

    LockBit victims are encouraged to contact the FBI and submit information at www.ic3.gov. As announced by the Department in February, law enforcement, through its disruption efforts, has developed decryption capabilities that may enable hundreds of victims around the world to restore systems encrypted using the LockBit ransomware variant. Submitting information at the IC3 site will enable law enforcement to determine whether affected systems can be successfully decrypted.

    LockBit victims are also encouraged to visit www.justice.gov/usao-nj/lockbit for case updates and information regarding their rights under U.S. law, including the right to submit victim impact statements and request restitution, in the criminal litigation against Panev, Astamirov, and Vasiliev.

    The FBI Newark Field Office, under the supervision of Acting Special Agent in Charge Terence G. Reilly, is investigating the LockBit ransomware variant. Israel’s Office of the State Attorney, Department of International Affairs, and Israel National Police; France’s Gendarmerie Nationale Cyberspace Command, Paris Prosecution Office — Cyber Division, and judicial authorities at the Tribunal Judiciare of Paris; Europol; Eurojust; the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency; Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Schleswig-Holstein, Bundeskriminalamt, and the Central Cybercrime Department North Rhine-Westphalia; Switzerland’s Federal Office of Justice, Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Canton of Zurich, and Zurich Cantonal Police; Spain’s Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil; authorities in Japan; Australian Federal Police; Sweden’s Polismyndighetens; Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Politie Dienst Regionale Recherche Oost-Brabant of the Netherlands; and Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation have provided significant assistance and coordination in these matters and in the LockBit investigation generally.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrew M. Trombly, David E. Malagold, and Vinay Limbachia for the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorneys Debra Ireland and Jorge Gonzalez of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) are prosecuting the charges against Panev and the other previously charged LockBit defendants in the District of New Jersey.

    The Justice Department’s former Cybercrime Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust, Office of International Affairs, and National Security Division also provided significant assistance.

    Additional details on protecting networks against LockBit ransomware are available at StopRansomware.gov. These include Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Advisories AA23-325A, AA23-165A, and AA23-075A. 

    The charges and allegations contained in the superseding complaint and above-named Indictments are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

    ###

    Defense counsel: Frank Arleo, Esq.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Foreign Ministers Statement: Arab Plan For Reconstruction of Gaza

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Foreign Ministers Statement: Arab Plan For Reconstruction of Gaza

    Joint Statement on behalf of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK

    “We, the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom welcome the Arab initiative of a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza. The plan shows a realistic path to the reconstruction of Gaza and promises – if implemented – swift and sustainable improvement of the catastrophic living conditions for the Palestinians living in Gaza. Recovery and reconstruction efforts must be based upon a solid political and security framework acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians, which provides long term peace and security for both Israelis and Palestinians alike. We are clear that Hamas must neither govern Gaza nor be a threat to Israel any more. We explicitly support the central role for the Palestinian Authority and the implementation of its reform agenda. 

    We commend the serious efforts of all involved stakeholders and appreciate the important signal the Arab states have sent by jointly developing this recovery and reconstruction plan. We are committed to working with the Arab initiative, the Palestinians and Israel to address those issues together, including security and governance. We urge all parties to build on the plan’s merits as a starting point.

    Updates to this page

    Published 8 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: S&P Global Ratings affirms Iceland at ‘A+/A-1’, Outlook Stable

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    S&P Global Ratings has affirmed ‘A+/A-1’ long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Iceland. The outlook is stable.

    S&P´s ratings on Iceland reflect the country’s very high GDP per capita and strong growth track record, which has been higher than most sovereigns S&P rates in Western Europe, as well as Iceland’s robust institutional framework and sound economic and fiscal policies. The ratings remain constrained by the volatile nature of Iceland’s small, open economy, which, in S&P’s view, is vulnerable to natural events, including volcanic activity, as well as adverse external developments outside of its control, such as geopolitical risks, trade and tariff tensions, and fluctuating terms-of-trade. The small size of Iceland’s economy also somewhat limits economic and monetary policy effectiveness, due to the influence of external factors largely outside the country’s control.

    The stable outlook reflects S&P´s view that, beyond the temporary slowdown in 2024, Iceland’s growth will rebound over the next few years while fiscal and external deficits will remain contained. The outlook also reflects the assumption that neither volcanic activity nor global trade tensions will have a significant sustained adverse effect on the country’s economic, fiscal, and balance-of-payments performance. Iceland’s key aluminium exports are mostly sold to European markets, particularly the Netherlands and Germany, mitigating current direct tariff-related risks.

    The ratings could be raised if Iceland’s public finances strengthened significantly more than S&P anticipates. The ratings could also be raised if, in S&P´s view, increasing diversification made the economy more resilient to external shocks while current global trade tensions eased without a sustained negative economic impact.

    S&P could lower the ratings if Iceland’s fiscal or balance-of-payments performance proved materially weaker than in its baseline forecasts. This could happen, for example, if persistently disruptive volcanic activity hampered the country’s tourism sector and growth performance; or Iceland was more significantly affected by global trade tensions or forced to sharply increase defence-related expenditure.

    Further information on www.government.is

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Import ban of cattle, pigs, sheep and deer from Hungary and Slovakia to protect farmers after foot and mouth case

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Import ban of cattle, pigs, sheep and deer from Hungary and Slovakia to protect farmers after foot and mouth case

    Import ban introduced to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease.

    The government has stepped up measures to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease (FMD), following a confirmed case in Hungary. 

    The Government has acted immediately to prevent the commercial import from Hungary and Slovakia of cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and other non- domestic ruminants and porcines such as deer and their untreated products, such as fresh meat and dairy. This will protect farmers and their livestock. 

    The case has been found on a cattle farm in the North West of Hungary, near the border with Slovakia. Observed clinical signs were reported to national authorities who have now formally confirmed infection with FMD following testing.   

    Action is already underway with local authorities and traders to address possible risks from goods on the way to GB. Such goods must be pre-notified and wider border systems in place will prevent consignments entering GB. This is in addition to restrictions already in place for equivalent exports from Germany, following an outbreak in a water buffalo herd in Brandenburg on 10 January 2025.   

    In addition, as of 8 March, travellers will no longer be able to bring meat, meat products, milk and dairy products, certain composite products and animal by products of pigs and ruminants from Hungary and Slovakia to Great Britain.    

    The UK Chief Veterinary Officer is urging livestock keepers to remain vigilant to the clinical signs of FMD following the recent outbreaks in Hungary and Germany. There are no cases in the UK currently.  

    FMD poses no risk to human or food safety, but is a highly contagious viral disease of cattle, sheep, pigs and other cloven-hoofed animals such as deer, llamas and alpacas. Rodents can also be affected. Livestock keepers should therefore be absolutely rigorous about their biosecurity.  

    FMD causes significant economic losses due to production losses in the affected animals as well as loss of access to foreign markets for animals, meat and milk for affected countries.  

    UK Chief Veterinary Officer Dr Christine Middlemiss said:  

    We remain in contact with our Hungarian counterparts to understand the latest situation following their confirmation of a single case of foot and mouth disease, measures are now being taken to contain and eradicate the outbreak.

    I would urge livestock keepers to exercise the upmost vigilance for signs of disease, follow scrupulous biosecurity and report any suspicion of disease immediately to the Animal and Plant Health Agency.  

    Farming Minister Daniel Zeichner said:  

    The government will do whatever it takes to protect our nation’s farmers from the risk posed by foot and mouth disease.  

    That is why restrictions have immediately been brought in on animal products from Hungary and Slovakia to prevent an outbreak. We will not hesitate to add additional countries to the list if the disease spreads. We will continue to keep the situation under review working closely with the Hungarian and Slovakian authorities.

    Action is already underway with local authorities and traders to address possible risks from goods on the way to GB. Such goods must be pre-notified and wider border systems in place will prevent consignments entering GB. This is in addition to restrictions already in place for equivalent exports from Germany, following an outbreak in a water buffalo herd in Brandenburg on 10 January 2025.   

    This comes as the government announced a £200 million investment in the UK’s main research and laboratory testing facilities at Weybridge to bolster protection against animal disease.  

    What you can do  

    If you’re an animal keeper, read about how to spot foot and mouth disease and report it.  

    If you’re an importer or exporter, read about the import restrictions for foot and mouth disease.   

    Clinical signs to be aware of vary depending on the animals, but in cattle the main signs are sores and blisters on the feet, mouth and tongue with potentially a fever, lameness and a reluctance to feed. In sheep and pigs, signs tend to manifest with lameness with potential for blistering.    

    Maintaining good biosecurity is essential to protecting the health and welfare of herds and critical to preventing the spread of diseases such as FMD and preventing an outbreak spreading.  

    Foot and mouth disease is a notifiable disease and must be reported. If you suspect foot and mouth disease in your animals, you must report it immediately by calling:  

    • 03000 200 301 in England   

    • 0300 303 8268 in Wales   

    • your local  Field Services Office in Scotland  

    For more information, visit: Imports, exports and EU trade of animals and animal products: topical issues – GOV.UK

    Updates to this page

    Published 7 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: S&P Global Ratings affirms Iceland at ‘A+/A-1’, Outlook Stable

    Source: Government of Iceland

    S&P Global Ratings has affirmed ‘A+/A-1’ long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Iceland. The outlook is stable.

    S&P´s ratings on Iceland reflect the country’s very high GDP per capita and strong growth track record, which has been higher than most sovereigns S&P rates in Western Europe, as well as Iceland’s robust institutional framework and sound economic and fiscal policies. The ratings remain constrained by the volatile nature of Iceland’s small, open economy, which, in S&P’s view, is vulnerable to natural events, including volcanic activity, as well as adverse external developments outside of its control, such as geopolitical risks, trade and tariff tensions, and fluctuating terms-of-trade. The small size of Iceland’s economy also somewhat limits economic and monetary policy effectiveness, due to the influence of external factors largely outside the country’s control.

    The stable outlook reflects S&P´s view that, beyond the temporary slowdown in 2024, Iceland’s growth will rebound over the next few years while fiscal and external deficits will remain contained. The outlook also reflects the assumption that neither volcanic activity nor global trade tensions will have a significant sustained adverse effect on the country’s economic, fiscal, and balance-of-payments performance. Iceland’s key aluminium exports are mostly sold to European markets, particularly the Netherlands and Germany, mitigating current direct tariff-related risks.

    The ratings could be raised if Iceland’s public finances strengthened significantly more than S&P anticipates. The ratings could also be raised if, in S&P´s view, increasing diversification made the economy more resilient to external shocks while current global trade tensions eased without a sustained negative economic impact.

    S&P could lower the ratings if Iceland’s fiscal or balance-of-payments performance proved materially weaker than in its baseline forecasts. This could happen, for example, if persistently disruptive volcanic activity hampered the country’s tourism sector and growth performance; or Iceland was more significantly affected by global trade tensions or forced to sharply increase defence-related expenditure.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: PDF Solutions Completes Acquisition of secureWISE, LLC

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SANTA CLARA, Calif., March 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PDF Solutions, Inc. (NASDAQ: PDFS), today announced it has closed the acquisition of secureWISE, LLC, a widely used secure, remote connectivity solution in the semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry, from Telit IOT Solutions Inc.

    By acquiring secureWISE, PDF Solutions expects to extend its leadership in data, analytics, and connectivity for the semiconductor industry ecosystem by significantly expanding PDF Solutions’ manufacturing connectivity network to include most of the 300mm fabs in the world. PDF’s footprint in the outsourced semiconductor assembly and test market is expected to accelerate the rate at which secureWISE moves into that part of the supply chain as well.

    “We are pleased to welcome secureWISE to the PDF Solutions team,” said Dr. John Kibarian, President, CEO, and co-founder of PDF Solutions. “We provide a leading analytics platform for the semiconductor industry, which, with secureWISE, we believe will further support the type of secure integration and collaboration needed across the industry.”

    Forward-Looking Statements

    The statements in this press release contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements related to the Company’s expectations regarding the expected benefits of the secureWISE LLC acquisition and other statements identified by words such as “could,” “expects,” “intends,” “may,” “plans,” “potential,” “should,” “will,” “would,” or similar expressions and the negatives of those terms, that are subject to future events and circumstances. Risks and uncertainties that could cause results to differ materially include risks associated with: the effectiveness of the PDF Solutions’ business and technology strategies; current semiconductor industry trends and competition; rates of adoption of PDF Solutions’ solutions by new and existing customers; project milestones or delays and performance criteria achieved; cost and schedule of new product development and investments in research and development; the continuing impact of macroeconomic conditions, including inflation, changing interest rates and tariffs, the evolving trade regulatory environment and geopolitical tensions, and other trends impacting the semiconductor industry, PDF Solutions’ customers, operations, and supply and demand for its products; supply chain disruptions; the success of PDF Solutions’ strategic growth opportunities and partnerships; recent and future acquisitions, strategic alliances and relationships and PDF Solutions’ ability to successfully integrate acquired businesses and technologies, including secureWISE LLC and its business; whether PDF Solutions can successfully convert backlog into revenue; customers’ production volumes under contracts that provide Gainshare; the sufficiency of PDF Solutions’ cash resources and anticipated funds from operations; PDF Solutions’ ability to obtain additional financing if needed; PDF Solutions’ ability to use support and updates for certain open-source software; and other risks and uncertainties discussed in PDF Solutions’ periodic public filings with the SEC, including, without limitation, its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024. All forward-looking statements and information included herein is given as of the filing date of this press release and based on information available to PDF Solutions at the time of this press release and future events or circumstances could differ significantly from these forward-looking statements. Unless required by law, PDF Solutions undertakes no obligation to update publicly any such forward-looking statements.

    About PDF Solutions 

    PDF Solutions (Nasdaq: PDFS) provides comprehensive data solutions designed to empower organizations across the semiconductor and electronics industry ecosystem to improve the yield and quality of their products and operational efficiency for increased profitability. The Company’s products and services are used by Fortune 500 companies across the semiconductor and electronics ecosystem to achieve smart manufacturing goals by connecting and controlling equipment, collecting data generated during manufacturing and test operations, and performing advanced analytics and machine learning to enable profitable, high-volume manufacturing. 

    Founded in 1991, PDF Solutions is headquartered in Santa Clara, California, with operations across North America, Europe, and Asia. The Company (directly or through one or more subsidiaries) is an active member of SEMI, INEMI, TPCA, IPC, the OPC Foundation, and DMDII. For the latest news and information about PDF Solutions or to find office locations, visit https://www.pdf.com. 

    Headquartered in Santa Clara, California, PDF Solutions also operates worldwide in Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Sweden, and Taiwan. For the Company’s latest news and information, visit https://www.pdf.com. 

    About secureWISE 

    The secureWISE platform is designed to enable secure and controlled remote connectivity, collaboration and service enablement in the semiconductor industry. The secureWISE suite of products and services is designed to give OEM suppliers role-based, real-time and on-demand access to their equipment that is installed at the production facilities of their customers, to deliver valuable operational insights, mission-critical performance, substantial time and cost savings, and new service revenue opportunities. As a remote access tool built around the ISMI guidelines, secureWISE is installed in over 90% of the world’s 300mm semiconductor fabs and also numerous solar and chemical plants across the globe.

    PDF Solutions, secureWISE, and the PDF Solutions logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of PDF Solutions, Inc. and/or its subsidiaries in the United States and other countries. Telit is a trademark or registered trademark of Telit. Other trademarks used herein are the property of their owners. 

    Company Contacts:      
    Adnan Raza    Sonia Segovia 
    Chief Financial Officer    Investor Relations 
    Tel: (408) 516-0237    Tel: (408) 938-6491 
    Email: adnan.raza@pdf.com    Email: sonia.segovia@pdf.com 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Ministry of Tourism participated in ITB Berlin 2025

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 07 MAR 2025 6:44PM by PIB Delhi

    The Ministry of Tourism, Government of India, participated at ITB Berlin 2025, held from 4th – 6th March at Messe Berlin. ITB Berlin (Internationale Tourismus-Börse Berlin) is a major meeting point for the global industry including tour operators, travel agencies, hoteliers, transport companies, destinations, and tech companies. It offers unparalleled networking opportunities, facilitating partnerships and collaborations that help businesses grow and expand into new markets.

    The India pavilion was inaugurated by the Ambassador of India in Federal Republic of Germany H.E Ajit Gupte in the presence of Mr Kandula Durgesh, Minister of Tourism, Andhra Pradesh and Mr Dharmendra Bhav Singh Lodhi, Minister of Tourism, Madhya Pradesh.

    Germany continues to be one of the top ten source markets for inbound tourists to India, with 0.20 million Germans visiting India in 2023. State Governments of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala amongst other States are participating at ITB to showcase their new destinations and products for the global market.  Ministry of Tourism is leading a delegation of almost 40 stakeholders from the Indian travel industry to showcase India’s vibrant cultural diversity and the vast range of tourism products and immersive experiences. This initiative aligns with India’s strategic goal to enhance inbound tourism and position the country as a premier 365 days global travel destination. The participation of the Ministry of Tourism at ITB Berlin provides a significant opportunity to the private stakeholders to reconnect and establish business connections with their counterparts and also promote new itineraries and immersive experiences.  

    The India Pavilion at ITB 2025 showcased the India’s rich kaleidoscope of cultures, languages, and traditions, each contributing to its rich tourism landscape but also the gamut of niche tourism experiences such as spiritual & wellness, wedding, adventure and ecotourism and gourmet. The theme of the Pavilion revolves around sustainable tourism. The co-exhibitors at the India Pavilion included travel Agents, State Tourism departments from Andhra Pradesh & Chandigarh, IRCTC and other Tourism service providers.

    Recently, gratis e tourist visa for foreigners travelling to India under the Chalo India initiative was announced, which is valid till 31st March 2025. The Chalo India initiative was launched by the Prime Minister of India to engage the Indian diaspora for promoting India to their non-Indian friends. As part of this initiative, the Indian diaspora can invite their non-Indian friends to explore the grandeur of Incredible India, to visit the country on gratis e tourist visa.

    A revamped Incredible India digital portal www.incredibelindia.gov.in has also been launched recently along with the Incredible India Content Hub. The Incredible India Content Hub is a comprehensive digital repository for the use of diverse range of stakeholders and travellers. The Incredible India Digital Portal is a tourist-centric one stop digital solution designed to enhance the travel experience for visitors to India.

    The Mahakumbh, which is one of the largest and breath-taking religious congregations in the world, recently concluded at Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh. The sacred event, which lasted about 44 days, reaffirmed India’s stature as a global spiritual destination.

    For more details on ITB Berlin click here: – https://www.itb.com/en/itb-berlin-for-visitors/itb-convention/

    *****

    Sunil Kumar Tiwari

    tourism4pib[at]gmail[dot]com

    (Release ID: 2109193) Visitor Counter : 47

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE removes Romanian fugitive wanted for identity theft, fraud in France

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    NEWARK, N.J. – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed foreign fugitive Torsten Ew Torz, 31, a native of Germany and citizen of Romania, March 6.

    Torz is wanted by law enforcement authorities in France for identity theft and credit card fraud.

    “We continue to work closely with our international law enforcement partners to ensure foreign fugitives are held accountable for their crimes overseas,” said ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Newark Field Office Director John Tsoukaris. “Removing criminal aliens like Torz keep our American communities safe.”

    Torz entered the United States without admission or parole by an immigration official on an unknown date and at an unknown location.

    The Garden City Police Department in New York arrested Torz on Dec. 19, 2023, for grand larceny, possession of a forged instrument and criminal possession of a forgery device.

    The Paris Judicial Court in France issued an arrest warrant for Torz on March 25, 2024, on charges of “swindling carried out by an organized gang” and’ “involvement in a criminal conspiracy for the purpose of conceiving an offense punishable by 10 years of imprisonment.”

    ICE arrested Torz on Oct. 16, 2024, and issued him a notice to appear. He was detained at the Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, without bond, pending removal proceedings.

    An immigration judge in Elizabeth, New Jersey, ordered Torz removed from the United States on Nov. 19, 2024.

    Torz was turned over to Suffolk County Sheriff’s Office on Jan. 21, on an outstanding warrant. The District Court of New York in Suffolk County convicted Torz for unlawful possession of a skimmer device intended for use in identity theft and sentenced him to time served. Torz returned to ICE custody Jan. 29, where he remained until his removal from the U.S.

    Members of the public with information can report crimes or suspicious activity by dialing the ICE Tip Line at 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

    Learn more about ICE Newark’s mission to increase public safety in our New Jersey communities on X: @ERONewark.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – German version of Russia Today back on X despite EU sanctions – P-000391/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    German edition of Russia’s leading propaganda outlet, Russia Today (RT), had re-established its presence on X as a part of a broader pro-Kremlin strategy to interfere with Europe’s democratic processes. As of now, the RT Germany account on X has been suspended[1].

    Since 1st March 2022, the EU has imposed restrictive measures on RT Germany for its role in systematically spreading disinformation justifying and in support of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

    Its broadcasting license has been suspended and it is prohibited for operators in the EU to broadcast, enable or facilitate the broadcasting of any content by RT Germany by any means[2].

    It is the responsibility of national competent authorities to implement these measures and ensure that any breach is investigated. The Commission closely monitors compliance.

    On 18 December 2023, the Commission opened formal proceedings[3] to assess whether X may have breached the Digital Services Act (DSA)[4] including in relation to the dissemination of illegal content in the EU and the effectiveness of measures taken to combat information manipulation on the platform.

    On 12 July 2024, the platform was informed of the Commission’s preliminary view that it is in breach of the DSA[5]. On 17 January 2025, the Commission addressed further technical investigatory measures to X[6], including a request for access to certain of X’s commercial Application Programming Interfaces, technical interfaces to its content that allow direct fact-finding on content moderation and virality of accounts.

    These steps will allow the Commission services to take all relevant facts into account in the complex assessment under the DSA of systemic risks and their mitigation by X.

    • [1] https://x.com/RTDE_OFFIZIELL
    • [2] Article 2f(2) of Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_679
    • [4] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (Text with EEA relevance).
    • [5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3761
    • [6] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-addresses-additional-investigatory-measures-x-ongoing-proceedings-under-digital-services
    Last updated: 7 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News