Category: housing

  • MIL-OSI Video: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Paris Agreement & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (28 January)

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Briefings
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Paris Agreement
    Deputy Secretary-General/Travels
    UNRWA
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Syria
    Sudan
    Honour Roll

    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Turning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This morning the Secretary-General spoke to the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Félix Tshisekedi, as well as with the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame. During his conversation with the President of Rwanda, they discussed the situation in the DRC, with an emphasis on the protection of civilians.
    This afternoon, at 3pm, the Security Council will meet to discuss the situation in the country. Vivian van de Perre, the Deputy Special Representative for Protection and Operations for the UN peacekeeping operations – MONUSCO – is expected to brief from Goma.
    On the ground, in Goma, the security situation remains extremely volatile. M23 forces are inside the city and UN peacekeeping personnel and troops have largely been forced to take shelter in bunkers.
    Medical facilities in Goma are reportedly overwhelmed, and essential services are disrupted.
    Currently, M23 forces control the airport and there are real risks of breakdown of law and order in the city. The Mission has also seen credible reports of prisoners who have escaped from the Goma prison, as well as looting by civilians. Non-essential UN personnel have been temporarily relocated from Goma and the surrounding area.
    The movement of essential supplies and personnel is an urgent concern. Armed clashes continue in multiple regions, including Masisi, Rutshuru, and Nyiragongo, further displacing civilians and complicating humanitarian efforts.
    Peacekeepers also report that protests in Kinshasa over the ongoing situation in eastern DRC have turned violent, with demonstrators setting fires outside UN premises [MONUSCO and UN agencies] and targeting several embassies. Looting has also been reported in Kinshasa.
    For its part, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tells us that the humanitarian situation in and around Goma remains worrying. Hospitals in Goma continue to be overwhelmed, struggling to manage the influx of wounded people.
    Two ambulances from a local NGO were targeted in the city of Goma today while attempting to evacuate wounded people.
    According to humanitarian partners, there are also reports of gender-based violence; the looting of property, including several humanitarian warehouses; and humanitarian and health facilities being struck in the fighting.
    Electricity and water supplies are still disrupted. The phone network is operational, but the Internet is not.
    OCHA reiterates that all parties must do all they can to spare civilians in military operations. Schools, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure must be protected.
    If the situation remains calm tomorrow, aid workers are planning to resume their efforts to respond to the enormous humanitarian needs.
    WFP tells us that access to food in Goma has been impacted. They remain focused on supporting the 7.1 million most vulnerable women, men, and children and also aim to resume delivering assistance as soon as circumstances allow.

    Paris Agreement
    The United States of America notified the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary, of its withdrawal, on 27 January 2025, from the Paris Agreement of 12 December 2015.
    The United States had signed the Paris Agreement on 22 April 2016 and expressed its consent to be bound by the Agreement by acceptance on 3 September 2016.
    It then withdrew from the Agreement effective on 4 November 2020, before accepting it again as of 19 February 2021.
    According to Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, the withdrawal of the United States will take effect on 27 January 2026.
    The UN reaffirms its commitment to the Paris Agreement and to support all efforts to limit the rise in global temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

    Deputy Secretary-General/Travels
    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed, attended the second and final day of the Africa Energy Summit in Tanzania today. In her opening remarks, she called on the African leaders present to advance energy access by 2030. To realize this vision, the Deputy Secretary-General stressed the need for strong institutions, effective multilateral cooperation and investments from the public and private sectors to scale up implementation of energy projects.
    The Deputy Secretary-General engaged with Heads of State and Government, ministers, and other high-level representatives to discuss cooperation with the United Nations towards achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement.
    She will return to New York on Wednesday.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=28%20January%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxsVYtU2DEg

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta Files Lawsuit, Seeks Immediate Court Order to Block Sweeping OMB Directive Freezing up to $3 Trillion in Vital Federal Funding

    Source: US State of California Department of Justice

    New OMB directive would pause funding for disaster recovery, as well as public health, education, and public safety programs 

    SACRAMENTO — California Attorney General Rob Bonta today, along with New York Attorney General Letitia James, led a coalition of 23 attorneys general in filing a lawsuit to block implementation of a memo by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) threatening to freeze up to $3 trillion in federal assistance funding effective at 2pm PT / 5pm ET today. The attorneys general are seeking a temporary restraining order to block the memo from taking effect, citing immediate harms to their states, which stand to lose billions in funding essential for the administration of vital programs that support the health and safety of their residents. Already, the order has thrown state programs into chaos and created uncertainty around their administration. Impacted programs include disaster-relief funding necessary for Los Angeles’ recovery from recent wildfires, as well as public health, education, public safety, and government programs.

    “The Trump Administration is recklessly disregarding the health, wellbeing, and public safety of the people it is supposed to serve,” said Attorney General Bonta. “This directive is unprecedented in scope and would be devastating if implemented. Already, it has created chaos and confusion among our residents. I will not stand by while the President attempts to disrupt vital programs that feed our kids, provide medical care to our families, and support housing and education in our communities. Instead of learning from the defeats of his first Administration, President Trump is once again plowing ahead with a damaging – and most importantly, unlawful – agenda. I’m proud to co-lead a coalition of attorneys general in taking him to court.” 

    The OMB directive freezing federal funding less than 24 hours after it was announced will cause immediate and irreparable harm to the states every day that it is in effect — in the form of millions of dollars in funds and mass regulatory chaos. Many states could face immediate cash shortfalls, making it difficult to administer basic programs like funding for healthcare and food for children and to address their most pressing emergency needs. This will result in devastating consequences for California in particular, given the uncertainty around continued disbursement of FEMA funding that is essential for recovery from the Los Angeles wildfires, which have caused an estimated $150 billion in economic losses.

    In the lawsuit, the attorneys general argue that the OMB directive violates the U.S. Constitution, violates the Administrative Procedure Act, and is arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the attorneys general argue that Congress has not delegated any unilateral authority to OMB to indefinitely pause all federal financial assistance under any circumstance, irrespective of the federal statutes and contractual terms governing those grants, and without even considering them. The directive also violates the “separation of powers” between Congress and the Executive Branch because the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives the power of the purse exclusively to Congress. The attorneys general seek a temporary restraining order to block the directive from being implemented.   

    Attorney General Bonta is joined by the attorneys general of New York, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia in filing the lawsuit.  

    A copy of the lawsuit and TRO will become available here.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: RI Delegation Works to Ensure Trump’s Directive Doesn’t Cause Delay on Washington Bridge Funding

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC — A recent directive from President Donald Trump may delay hundreds of millions of dollars in federal grants intended for infrastructure upgrades across the state.  Trump’s order pauses billions of dollars in already awarded grant money for projects nationwide.

    In an effort to ensure the pause doesn’t negatively impact Rhode Island or hold up work, U.S. Senators Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse and Congressmen Seth Magaziner and Gabe Amo sent a letter to the Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) urging him to confirm that the law will be upheld and the funds will be released to the state.

    Legal experts have noted that if the Trump Administration fails to adhere to the law, then lawsuits would ensue and courts would likely overturn the President’s attempt to undo the law, delaying work and costing U.S. taxpayers untold sums of wasted money.

    Text of the letter follows:

    January 25, 2025

    Mr. Matthew Vaeth

    Acting Director

    Office of Management and Budget

    725 17th St, NW

    Washington, DC 20500

    Dear Acting Director Vaeth:

    As you know, the Trump Administration has needlessly halted work to advance the release of funding appropriated by Congress and competitively awarded for projects in the State of Rhode Island and elsewhere. In particular, we are alarmed that the Administration is blocking the release of over $600 million in competitive grant funding for more than ten Rhode Island transportation projects. These grants include over $220 million for the Interstate-195 Washington Bridge, which has been partially closed since December 2023 due to a catastrophic failure, and more than $250 million to address 15 bridges along Rhode Island’s busy I-95 corridor, which span critical rail and roadway infrastructure.

    These are essential projects that have already been evaluated and selected in a competitive process for funding.

    Lingering uncertainty about the status of funding threatens to disrupt work on these essential infrastructure projects, which could have negative ramifications for state and local budgets, preventing projects from being completed on time, threatening good-paying jobs, and

    harming our economy. We ask that you promptly confirm that all of these funds, as well as others being held for review, will be released to the State.

    Thank you for your attention to this critical matter.

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen Statement on Trump Administration’s Order to Pause All Federal Grants and Loans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, released the following statement on the Trump administration’s far-reaching decision to freeze grants and loans disbursed by the federal government beginning at 5pm today: 

    “The administration’s staggering and unprecedented decision to stop programs and services that families and small businesses rely on is a direct affront to Granite Staters and Americans across the country. By taking this extreme action, programs to help families afford food and health care, ensure affordable and reliable energy, invest in critical infrastructure, grow our small businesses, keep our veterans housed, support law enforcement, bolster our national defense and so much more will immediately stop operations. 

    “The Trump administration has provided little guidance to the federal agencies tasked with carrying out this unlawful freeze, causing confusion and panic. My office has heard from countless Granite Staters who are concerned about what this action will mean for them, including counties and towns that are waiting on promised funding for work that has already been completed. Let’s be clear: Congress controls the purse strings, not the Executive Branch, and Congress must fight back against this unconstitutional action that jeopardizes the health and wellbeing of families and communities.” 

    The Trump administration’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced a sweeping executive order pausing almost all forms of federal assistance to states, nonprofits, non-governmental organizations and more. The full list that agencies are directed to review encompasses over 2,600 assistance programs, including Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP), Women, Infants and Children (WIC), community health centers, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), transportation and highway funding, energy assistance programs, water infrastructure funding, State Opioid Targeted Response grants, GI Bill, veteran compensation for service connected disabilities, Section 8 vouchers, school breakfast and lunch, Title I education grants, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Head Start. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin: The Anti-Immigrant Executive Action Taken By President Trump Do Nothing To Make America Safer

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    January 28, 2025

    WASHINGTON – In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, spoke out against executive actions taken by President Donald Trump during his first week in office, including cracking down on immigrant communities, that, among other things, suspend refugee resettlement and attempt to deprive U.S.-born children of citizenship.

    “We can all agree that the border of the United States should be secure. And, of course, we must deport any dangerous individuals who are here unlawfully. But the executive orders that President Trump signed this past week don’t target criminals. In fact, President Trump terminated a Biden administration policy that required immigration officials to prioritize for arrest and deportation individuals who threaten public safety or national security,” Durbin said. “Instead, President Trump has authorized Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers, known as ICE officers, to make arrests in schools, churches, and courthouses across the country. The President has reportedly even directed ICE to set quotas for arrests, ramping up from a few hundred a day to more than 1,500 per day. These kinds of arbitrary quotas will ensure that essential workers, family members of U.S. citizens, and so many others who are no threat to this country and are not criminals, are caught up in the mass deportations.”

    Durbin went on to explain how President Trump’s actions—like many of the President’s decisions on immigration—have nothing to do with protecting public safety or national security. 

    Instead, he decided to suspend a life-saving legal immigration program—the refugee admissions program, which provides safe haven for those fleeing oppressive regimes around the world, including Afghan women, Uyghurs fleeing Chinese persecution, and the Rohingya fleeing Myanmar’s military dictatorship.

    “President Trump has also suspended the refugee admissions program. Why is that important? Well because when American soldiers go overseas to represent this country and to risk their lives for the country that they have sworn allegiance to, the United States, many times they rely on local citizens in those countries to help them. That’s what happened in Afghanistan,” Durbin said. “Men and women risked their lives to step forward and to help our troops… they included families of Afghans who are now facing persecution for that political decision to help the United States. We’ve offered to them, after going through extensive background checks, an opportunity to come to the United States.”

    Durbin continued, “But the President canceled flights for approximately 10,000 refugees who have been approved to travel to the United States after waiting for long periods of time and going through extensive background checks. This includes nearly 1,600 Afghans who had been cleared for resettlement, many of them risked their lives for the United States’ cause and we were giving them safety and security… Stopping these flights makes America less safe. It is needlessly cruel to American families waiting to be reunited with loved ones. It also sends a message to allies supporting our troops around the world that we will not protect them if they face retribution for helping the United States.”

    Durbin then criticized President Trump’s attempt to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States if their parents are not citizens or lawful permanent residents. Durbin noted that this move is a clear violation of the Constitution and our values as a nation, and it does nothing to make our country safer.

    “Additionally, President Trump is attempting to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States if their parents are not citizens or lawful permanent residents. This is a clear violation of the Constitution,” said Durbin. “The order by President Trump has been blocked by a judge who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan. Listen to what he said about the lawsuit challenging birthright citizenship and the 14th Amendment’s explicit language, ‘I’ve been on the bench for over four decades. I can’t remember another case where the question presented was as clear as this one is… This is a blatantly unconstitutional order.’”

    Finally, Durbin called out the Trump administration’s mass deportation raids in Chicago over the weekend.

    “I was disappointed to see the White House border czar, Tom Homan, come to Chicago recently with ICE agents arresting immigrants… I am concerned these sweeping executive actions will leave those arrested by ICE, including those with lawful status and U.S. citizenship, with little opportunity to even state their case and show that they belong in this country. Let’s be clear, 90 percent of undocumented immigrants have no criminal convictions—90 percent,” Durbin said. “Immigrants are a key part of America’s success story. I do not want a single dangerous person to remain in this country or to be allowed to seek permanent residence here, period. But there are many who have been here for periods of time, have paid their taxes, followed the law, and should be part of America’s future. Our nation needs immigrants in many important places.”

    Durbin concluded, “There is no room in this country for dangerous people, but there is plenty of room for those who aspire to make this a better nation. We should be fair in making a distinction and realizing the difference is significant.”

    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the floor is available here.

    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the floor is available here.

    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the floor is available here for TV Stations.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Publication of the report on the investigation into TikTok under the DSA ahead of the May 2025 presidential election campaign in Romania – P-000253/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000253/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Andi Cristea (S&D)

    The presidential elections in Romania have been rescheduled for 4 May 2025 (first round) and 18 May 2025 (second round). The Commission opened formal proceedings in respect of the TikTok platform on 17 December 2024 in relation to the alleged violation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) during the presidential elections held in Romania on 24 November 2024.

    The Commission asked TikTok to provide detailed information on the measures it has taken to prevent interference in electoral processes by 13 December 2024.

    The Commission has confirmed that it has received replies from TikTok and has indicated that it is in the process of assessing these.

    With the presidential election campaign in Romania soon to start, can the Commission state whether it will wrap up and present the conclusions of its investigation into TikTok prior to the start of that election campaign for the upcoming presidential elections?

    Submitted: 21.1.2025

    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Reconstruction fund for Gaza – E-000202/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000202/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Pär Holmgren (Verts/ALE)

    With a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel approaching, it is of paramount importance that the international community mobilises to secure funding for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip to rebuild the homes, hospitals, roads, schools and critical infrastructure that have been destroyed. The EU clearly has a critical role, as a humanitarian actor, to ensure the rebuilding of Gaza. The Commission is therefore asked to specify the following:

    Does the Commission intend to create a Gaza facility in order to mobilise and coordinate the desperately needed financing for the reconstruction of Gaza?

    Submitted: 17.1.2025

    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – NRRP funds and university housing – E-000211/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000211/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    The Italian NRRP funds earmarked for the creation of university housing – amounting to EUR 1.2 billion – are at risk of being withdrawn due to a lack of adequate applications and the fact that it would be impossible to complete the works by June 2026.

    Furthermore, the decision of the Minister for Universities and Research to eliminate single rooms in university halls of residence financed as mentioned above by the NRRP, not only raises concerns about the possible withdrawal of funds, but could also affect the psychological well-being of students.

    Considering that the change in the characteristics of the projects funded (such as the elimination of single rooms) could be interpreted as a deviation from the commitments made by Italy and that the EU has placed mental health as a priority in its policies, and has called on the Member States to take measures to promote it (such as providing a suitable proportion of single and shared rooms), can the Commission answer the following questions:

    • 1.Does the Commission consider the proposal approved by the Italian Government to completely eliminate single rooms to be appropriate, especially in light of the principles of inclusion and psychological well-being of students?
    • 2.Does the approved change comply with the established guidelines for the use of funds?
    • 3.What measures are foreseen to monitor these changes to projects that are already funded?

    Submitted: 20.1.2025

    Last updated: 28 January 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – DANA in Spain and the risk of medicine and vaccine shortages – E-002481/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Medicines Agency (EMA), together with the Member States, continuously monitors and investigates signals of potential supply disruptions escalated to EU level by national competent authorities to prevent their occurrence and mitigate their effects as far as possible.

    The potential impact of the situation in Spain on the supply of medicinal products is closely monitored. Thus far, no critical shortage requiring EU coordination actions has been identified in this context.

    In the context of the flood emergency and upon request from the Spanish authorities, the EU Copernicus satellite mapping system[1] was activated on 29 October 2024, and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism[2], on 8 November 2024.

    As a result, 83 maps were produced, and several Member States offered in-kind assistance, in the form of heavy vehicles and pumps. The Commission deployed two liaison officers to help coordinate the assistance. The EU’s strategic reserve, rescEU,[3] was not mobilised as the requests were fulfilled by the offers of Member States.

    A virtual warehouse for data on vaccine needs and stocks has not been set up yet, apart from the existing IT tool CECIS 2.0, in the area of civil protection.

    As part of the implementation of EMA’s extended mandate[4], the European Shortages Monitoring Platform, launched in November 2024, will be used to report shortages and monitor supply, demand, and stock levels of medicinal products for preparedness activities, and during a public health emergency or major event.

    As part of the pharmaceutical reform[5], the Commission has proposed to further expand the platform to cover structural shortages and security of supply of critical medicines.

    • [1] https://emergency.copernicus.eu/mapping/#zoom=2&lat=13.56036&lon=33.82273&layers=0BT00
    • [2] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en
    • [3] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/resceu_en
    • [4] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/123/oj
    • [5] https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/pharmaceutical-strategy-europe/reform-eu-pharmaceutical-legislation_en

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Provision of assistance to Syria in 2024 under the NDICI-Global Europe programme – E-002442/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission’s programming of 2024 non-humanitarian assistance aligned with the Council conclusions of 16 April 2018[1], emphasising that EU aid must benefit Syrian population without benefits accruing to the Syrian regime.

    The fall of the regime reshaped the situation, making a Syrian-led, inclusive political process in the spirit of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2254[2] a priority for an inclusive and peaceful political transition.

    The EU support initiatives pipeline is guided by commitment to inclusiveness, respect of human rights, including women’s rights, protection of religious and ethnic minorities and fostering peaceful transition.

    On 13 December 2024, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations announced[3] that the Commission mobilised EUR 4 million in additional aid to address the most urgent humanitarian needs of people, bringing total support to EUR 163 million in 2024.

    The special measure for 2024[4] allocates EUR 36 million to critical areas like health, education, civil documentation, housing, property rights, civil society and justice.

    Assistance targets areas with acute needs and significant numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as on the creation of conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees, as defined by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

    The EU collaborates with UN agencies, Member State agencies, Syrian-led and international non-governmental organisations, maintaining regular dialogue with civil society across Syria and in the diaspora.

    As the situation evolves, the EU will adjust its approach, if needed, in response to the actions and policies of the new authorities, with the overarching aim of supporting the Syrian people and ensuring an inclusive transition and sustainable peace and stability.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7956-2018-INIT/en/pdf
    • [2] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/814715/?v=pdf
    • [3] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-launches-humanitarian-air-bridge-operation-syria-deliver-emergency-supplies-and-boosts-2024-12-13_en
    • [4] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/commission-implementing-decision-29112024-financing-special-measure-favour-syria-2024_en?prefLang=pt

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Presidential Inauguration Security and Support | CBP

    Source: United States of America – Federal Government Departments (video statements)

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provided security and support for the 60th presidential inauguration on January 20, 2025.

    On Saturday January 18, 2025, Chief of the United States Capitol Police John Thomas Manger swore in more than 500 CBP officers and agents to perform the duties and responsibilities as Capitol Police officers for the 60th presidential inauguration security.

    Instagram ➤ https://instagram.com/CBPgov
    Facebook ➤ https://facebook.com/CBPgov
    Twitter ➤ https://twitter.com/CBP
    Official Website ➤ https://www.cbp.gov

    #cbp
    #inauguration
    #lawenforcement
    #president

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1O68cumBXus

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-Evening Report: As the Black Summer megafires neared, people rallied to save wildlife and domestic animals. But it came at a real cost

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Danielle Celermajer, Professor of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney

    As the 2019-2020 megafires took hold across eastern Australia, many of us reeled at the sight of animals trying and often failing to flee. Our screens filled up with images of koalas with burned paws and possums in firefighter helmets.

    The death toll was staggering, estimated at up to three billion wild animals killed or displaced. Millions more were severely injured. Tens of thousands of domesticated animals were killed or had to be euthanised.

    In fighting these fires, authorities focused almost entirely on protecting human lives and property, other than targeted rescue efforts for the last remaining wild stand of Wollemi pine. The role of rescuing and caring for domesticated and wild animals fell almost entirely to community groups and individual carers, who stepped up to fill the gap at significant cost to themselves – financially, emotionally and sometimes even at a risk to their safety.

    Our new research draws on more than 60 interviews with wildlife carers and groups in the Shoalhaven region south of Wollongong in New South Wales. These people spontaneously organised themselves to care for thousands of domesticated, farm and wild animals, from evacuating them from fire zones to giving them shelter, food, water and healthcare.

    The lengths our interviewees went to were extraordinary. But these rescue efforts were largely invisible to authorities – and, as our interviewees told us, sometimes even condemned as irresponsible.

    What did our interviews tell us?

    The standard view in Australia is that only humans matter in the face of bushfires. But the way affected communities reached out to save as many animals as they could shows many people think we ought to be acting differently.

    One interviewee told about screaming for “her babies” as Rural Fire Service firefighters evacuated her. In response, the firies searched the house for human babies to no avail. When they found out she meant her wombat joeys, they laughed in relief. But to our interviewee, the joeys were like her babies. The joeys were safe inside her house.

    People cared for a wide range of species, from horses, chickens, bees and cows to native birds, possums, wombats and wallabies. Despite this, we found common themes.

    Many people felt the system had let them down when it came to protecting animals. This is why many of them felt they had to take matters into their own hands to ensure that animals survived.

    As one interviewee told us:

    one thing that you have to realise, is people’s animals are their children, and they are their life. If you let someone think that their animal isn’t safe, they will put themselves in danger to try and get to that animal or save that animal […] That’s one thing the firies — you know, if they’re not an animal compassionate person, they don’t get that.

    While some guidance on disaster preparation talks about how to protect pets such as cats and dogs, wildlife carers, farmers and horse owners often found themselves facing incoming fires with little or no information or support.

    People also told us about a lack of information on how to care for different types of animals during disasters. Information was often nonexistent or hard to locate, making decision-making during the crisis very difficult.

    As one farmer told us:

    there’s not any information on realistically what you do with your animals in a case of […] a massive disaster. I mean, it’s like someone said about cutting the fences. But now you’ve got stocking cattle running through the bush and they don’t know where the fire’s going to turn or what’s going to happen.

    The needs of animals differ significantly. It’s harder to find shelter for a horse than a smaller animal, for instance. Wildlife being cared for already need assistance, due to being orphaned, injured or ill. It’s harder to evacuate injured animals or joeys who need regular feeding than it is to evacuate healthy adult animals.

    Our interviewees reported price spikes for transport, food, temporary fencing and medicines during the 2019-2020 emergency season. Caring for animals always comes with costs, but the cost burden intensified over the Black Summer and afterwards.

    Caring for animals came with another cost too, to mental health. Many of our interviewees told us they still felt traumatised, even though our interviews were two or three years after the fires.

    As one interviewee told us:

    the people at Lake Conjola […] said it was like an apocalypse. They said there was dead birds dropping out of the sky. Kangaroos would come hopping out of the bush on fire […] I know it really heavily affected most people on the beach, the horrific things that they saw.

    Despite facing a lack of formal support and with limited information, people organised themselves very quickly into networks to share access to safe land, transport, food, labour and information. Dedicated people set up social media groups to allocate tasks, call for help and so on. This unsung animal rescue effort was almost entirely driven by volunteers.

    What should we do before the next megafires?

    Australia will inevitably be hit by more megafires, as climate change brings more hot, dry fire weather and humidity falls over land.

    What would it mean to include animals in our planning? To start with, more and better information for wildlife carers, farmers, pet owners and the wider community. It would mean directing more funds to animal care, both during and after disasters, and including animal care in local, state and federal disaster planning. It would mean improving communication networks so people know where to go.

    To this end, we developed a new guide for communities wanting to be better prepared to help animals in the next disaster. We prototyped an app designed to help communities organise themselves in order to help animals during disasters.

    The scale of the Black Summer fires found governments and communities largely
    unprepared. But we are now in a position to learn from what happened.

    As authorities prepare for the next fires, they should broaden how they think about disaster preparation. Our research suggests disaster planning needs to take place at a community level, rather than a focus on individual households. And vitally, authorities need to think of communities as made up of both humans and animals, rather than just humans.

    This research project was funded by the Australian government via a Bushfire Recovery Grant from the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources. It was conducted in partnership with the Shoalhaven City Council. This article was prepared solely by the University of Sydney research team and reflects our research and analysis only.

    This research project was funded by the Australian government via a Bushfire Recovery Grant from the Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources. It was conducted in partnership with the Shoalhaven City Council.

    ref. As the Black Summer megafires neared, people rallied to save wildlife and domestic animals. But it came at a real cost – https://theconversation.com/as-the-black-summer-megafires-neared-people-rallied-to-save-wildlife-and-domestic-animals-but-it-came-at-a-real-cost-248432

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: As the Myanmar junta’s hold on power weakens, could the devastating war be nearing a conclusion?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adam Simpson, Senior Lecturer, International Studies, University of South Australia

    It has now been four years since the Myanmar military launched its cataclysmic coup against the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi on February 1 2021, starting a civil war that has devastated the country.

    Suu Kyi remains locked up, as do countless other activists and regime opponents. There is no easy resolution in sight.

    Indeed, the country is at a nadir. The war has sparked an economic crisis that has destroyed Myanmar’s health and education systems. Half the population now lives in poverty, double the rate from before the coup. The deteriorating electricity network causes widespread blackouts.

    According to the United Nations, more than 5,000 civilians have been killed and 3.3 million people have been displaced by the fighting. More than 27,000 people have also been arrested, with reports of sexual violence and torture rife.

    Nevertheless, opposition forces – including ethnic armies and the People’s Defence Force militias drawn from the civilian population – have been gathering strength, with a string of victories against the junta’s army.

    The regime now controls less than half the country. And recent strategic losses are weighing heavily on the military leaders, raising questions about whether the government could suddenly collapse like the Assad regime in Syria late last year.

    As the war enters a fifth year, there are two significant things to watch that could determine the country’s future – the battleground gains made by the opposition forces and the state of the failing economy.

    Junta under pressure on the battlefield

    Following the opposition Three Brotherhood Alliance’s battleground successes in late 2023, China brokered a ceasefire between the junta and alliance in northern Shan State.

    When that ceasefire ended last June, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), one of the members of the alliance, captured the key trading town of Lashio, as well as the junta’s nearby Northeast Regional Military Command. It was the first time one of the 14 regional military commands had fallen to an opposition group in more than 50 years of military rule.

    China has recently brokered another ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military, according to the Chinese foreign ministry. The terms have not been made public, but unless the insurgents relinquish Lashio and the military command – which is unlikely – it won’t alter the balance of power.

    In December, the military lost another command centre in Rakhine State in western Myanmar to the Arakan Army, another member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The Arakan Army now controls 14 of that state’s 17 townships.

    The Arakan Army, too, said recently it is open to political dialogue to potentially end the fighting. But it, too, is only likely to stop its military offensives for extremely favourable terms.

    In a major study undertaken in late 2024, the BBC assessed the junta only had full control of 21% of Myanmar’s territory. Ethnic armies and other opposition forces controlled 42% of the country, while the remaining areas were contested.

    In response, the junta has intensified its “scorched earth” tactics in areas outside its control, including indiscriminate and deliberate strikes against civilians. With dwindling reserves of willing fighters, air power is the main combat advantage it holds over the opposition forces.

    Economic woes

    Myanmar’s economic situation four years after the coup shows, starkly, just how much has been lost.

    Myanmar is now experiencing a full-blown economic and currency crisis.

    The incremental gains in economic development, education, nutrition and health care of recent decades have been reversed very quickly. Three-quarters of the population is now living a subsistence existence.

    Many young people are fleeing abroad, joining resistance groups, or eking out dangerous livelihoods on the margins. To make matters worse, the junta activated a longstanding but dormant conscription law last February to boost its dwindling forces. Those who refuse the draft face five years in prison.

    In response to the Arakan Army’s successes, the junta is also isolating much of Rakhine State. This is contributing to widespread poverty and a looming famine, which could affect two million people.

    And in an attempt to control the digital space, the junta enacted a sweeping new cybersecurity law earlier this month. People can now be imprisoned for using a virtual private network or sharing information from banned websites, among many other offences.

    Could Myanmar fall apart?

    The ASEAN regional bloc, chaired by Malaysia this year, has done little to solve the crisis, although it hasn’t accepted the junta’s hollow plans to hold elections this year.

    Disagreements among the ASEAN members over strategy have ensured that little progress has been made. Thailand recently broke ranks to invite the junta’s foreign minister to regional talks about border security, even though the junta currently controls few of the country’s borders.

    An accelerated economic deterioration could contribute to further unrest and drive even more migrants to neighbouring countries. Already, the millions of Myanmar migrants living in Thailand have precipitated anti-migrant protests and mass arrests.

    So, given the combustible state of the country, could the junta’s hold on power suddenly collapse like the Assad regime in Syria last year?

    It’s not likely. Unlike Syria, the opposition in Myanmar is not heavily backed by major international players. China’s support for various insurgent actors comes and goes depending on political calculations, while the United States and European Union have provided little material support.

    In addition, the military has been effectively running Myanmar for 60 years and is well practised in counterinsurgency strategies. Although defections from the military continue, the conscription law is bolstering its numbers of – mostly reluctant – soldiers.

    However, the fall of Syria’s oppressive government – as well as the government in Myanmar’s neighbour, Bangladesh – demonstrates how fragile long-standing regimes can be, particularly when faced with persistent challenges from armed groups and a motivated population.

    And as in Syria, there are fears – particularly within China – that Myanmar could splinter along ethnic lines. The deteriorating security situation has led China to send its own private security corporations to secure its strategic investments in the country and become an active ceasefire deal-maker.

    Even if the junta can be ousted, creating a workable federal system that involves power-sharing among the complex patchwork of ethnic groups will be a difficult task. The question of how to reintegrate nearly a million Rohingya displaced across the border in Bangladesh is another daunting challenge.

    However, for the first time in years, there is optimism that opposition forces could eventually succeed in vanquishing the junta. Then begins the arduous task of rebuilding a shattered nation.

    As a pro vice-chancellor at the University of Tasmania, Nicholas Farrelly engages with a wide range of organisations and stakeholders on educational, cultural and political issues, including at the ASEAN-Australia interface. He has previously received funding from the Australian government for Southeast Asia-related projects and from the Australian Research Council. Nicholas is on the advisory board of the ASEAN-Australia Centre, which is a new Australian government body, and also deputy chair of the board of NAATI, Australia’s government-owned accreditation authority for translators and interpreters. He writes in his personal capacity.

    Adam Simpson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. As the Myanmar junta’s hold on power weakens, could the devastating war be nearing a conclusion? – https://theconversation.com/as-the-myanmar-juntas-hold-on-power-weakens-could-the-devastating-war-be-nearing-a-conclusion-247987

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Babies as young as 4 months can tell how the sounds of different languages are made – new research

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Eylem Altuntas, Postdoctoral Researcher, Speech & Language Development, The MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour and Development, Western Sydney University

    Colin Maynard/Unsplash

    Babies are like little detectives, constantly piecing together clues about the world around them. If you’ve ever noticed your baby staring at you while you talk, it’s because they’re picking up on more than just sounds — they’re learning how those sounds are made.

    Our recent study, published in Developmental Science, shows this amazing process starts as early as four months old, shaking up the old belief that babies learn these patterns only after tuning in to their native language between 6 and 12 months of age.

    It also gives us an earlier window to help children who might be at risk of speech or language delays.

    Sorting through a buffet of sounds

    By their first birthday, babies are already fine-tuning their ears to the sounds of their native language in a process called perceptual attunement. Think of it like their brain sorting through a buffet of sounds to focus on the ones that matter most.

    But in their first six months, babies can tell apart sounds from languages they’ve never even heard. For example, they might distinguish certain Hindi contrasts that are challenging for adult English speakers or identify unique tones in Mandarin, even if they’re growing up in an English-speaking household.

    This incredible ability doesn’t last forever. Between six and 12 months, babies start narrowing their focus to the sounds they hear most often. For vowels, this fine-tuning kicks in at around six months while consonants follow at closer to ten months.

    Think of it as babies zooming in on the sounds that matter, such as the difference between the “r” and “l” in English, while losing sensitivity to sounds they don’t hear regularly.

    Until now, researchers thought this narrowing process was needed for babies to start learning more complex language skills, such as figuring out that the “b” in “bin” and the “d” in “din” differ because one is made with the lips and the other with the tongue tip.

    But our study found babies as young as four months are already learning how sounds are physically made, long before this narrowing begins.

    In their first six months, babies can tell apart sounds from languages they’ve never even heard.
    Mila Supinskaya Glashchenko/Shutterstock

    Learning mini-languages

    Here’s an example to picture this. Imagine you’re listening to someone speak a language you don’t know. Even if you don’t understand the words, you might notice how their lips or tongue move to make sounds. Four-month-old babies can do this too.

    To demonstrate this, we conducted an experiment with 34 babies, aged four to six months, whose parents had provided consent to participate. We created a “match-the-pattern” game using two made up mini-languages.

    One language had words with lip sounds like “b” and “v”, while the other used tongue-tip sounds like “d” and “z”. Each word, like “bivawo” or “dizalo”, was paired with a cartoon image — a jellyfish for lip words and a crab for tongue-tip words. A recording of a word was played at the same time its paired image was shown.

    Why cartoons? Because babies can’t exactly tell us what they’re thinking, but they can form associations in their brains. These images helped us see if the babies could link each mini-language to the correct picture.

    After the babies learned these mini-languages and their picture pairings, we mixed things up.

    Instead of hearing the words, they watched silent videos of a person’s face saying new words from the same mini-languages.

    In some videos, the face matched the cartoon they had learned earlier. In others, it didn’t. We then tracked how long the babies looked at the videos — a common method researchers use to see what grabs their attention. Babies tend to look longer at things that surprise or interest them and shorter at things they find familiar, helping us understand how they process and recognise what they see.

    The results were clear: babies looked significantly longer at the videos where the face matched what they’d learned. This showed they weren’t just passively listening earlier — they were actively learning the rules of the mini-languages and linking that knowledge to what they saw.

    The experiment involved pairing certain words with a cartoon image of a jellyfish and a crab.
    Eylem Altuntas

    Connecting the dots

    In simple terms, this means four-month-old babies can connect the dots between sound and sight. This early ability to spot patterns in how sounds are made is the foundation for learning language later on. It’s like their brains are already laying the groundwork for saying their first words.

    This discovery changes what we thought we knew about babies’ early language learning. It suggests babies start figuring out patterns at four months, well before they begin perceptually attuning to the sounds of their native language between six and 12 months.

    That opens up exciting new possibilities for helping children who might struggle with speech or language. If we can help earlier, we might make a big difference.

    These findings raise several interesting questions. For example, can babies learn other differences such as voicing – whether a sound is made with a buzzing vibration, like the difference between “b” (buzzing) and “p” (no buzzing) – as early as four months? How does growing up in a bilingual home affect this ability? Could babies use this skill to learn patterns in entirely new languages?

    By exploring these questions, we’ll keep uncovering the amazing ways babies’ brains set the stage for learning one of the most complex human skills: language.

    Eylem Altuntas is a researcher at the BabyLab within the MARCS Institute for Brain, Behaviour, and Development at Western Sydney University.

    ref. Babies as young as 4 months can tell how the sounds of different languages are made – new research – https://theconversation.com/babies-as-young-as-4-months-can-tell-how-the-sounds-of-different-languages-are-made-new-research-248225

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI: C&F Financial Corporation Announces Net Income for 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TOANO, Va., Jan. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — C&F Financial Corporation (the Corporation) (NASDAQ: CFFI), the holding company for C&F Bank, today reported consolidated net income of $6.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $5.1 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. The Corporation reported consolidated net income of $19.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $23.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The following table presents selected financial performance highlights for the periods indicated:

                                   
        For The Quarter Ended   For the Year Ended  
    Consolidated Financial Highlights (unaudited)   12/31/2024     12/31/2023   12/31/2024     12/31/2023  
    Consolidated net income (000’s)   $ 6,029     $ 5,088   $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
                                   
    Earnings per share – basic and diluted   $ 1.87     $ 1.50   $ 6.01     $ 6.92  
                                   
    Annualized return on average equity     10.60 %     10.06 %   9.02 %     11.68 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity1     12.17 %     11.74 %   10.37 %     13.58 %
    Annualized return on average assets     0.94 %     0.85 %   0.80 %     0.99 %

    _________________
    1 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, which are not calculated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” below.

    “While the past year’s financial performance reflected the challenges of a dynamic interest rate environment, our fourth quarter earnings were solid, and we are optimistic of earnings momentum heading into the coming year,” commented Tom Cherry, President and Chief Executive Officer of C&F Financial Corporation. “Our net interest margin was down for 2024, however, it stabilized in the fourth quarter, and we are cautiously optimistic about margin performance in 2025. The community banking segment delivered solid loan and deposit growth across all markets. Despite facing headwinds from higher mortgage rates and a low inventory of homes for sale, the mortgage banking segment increased its loan production and net income over 2023. While higher charge-offs weighed on profitability at the consumer finance segment, we were able to achieve significant operational efficiencies during 2024. Despite obstacles and adversities that continually confront the banking industry in general, we believe C&F is well-positioned for the future.”

    Key highlights for the fourth quarter and the year ended December 31, 2024 are as follows.

    • Community banking segment loans grew $21.5 million, or 6.0 percent annualized, and $180.0 million, or 14.1 percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Consumer finance segment loans decreased $10.5 million, or 8.8 percent annualized, and $1.7 million, or less than one percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Deposits increased $35.0 million, or 6.6 percent annualized, and $104.7 million, or 5.1 percent, compared to September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively;
    • Consolidated annualized net interest margin was 4.13 percent for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to 4.17 percent for the fourth quarter of 2023 and 4.13 percent in the third quarter of 2024. Consolidated net interest margin was 4.12 percent for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to 4.31 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023;
    • The community banking segment recorded no provision for credit losses for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $75,000 for the fourth quarter of 2023, and recorded provision for credit losses of $1.7 million and $1.6 million for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively;
    • The consumer finance segment recorded provision for credit losses of $3.5 million and $2.4 million for the fourth quarters of 2024 and 2023, respectively, and recorded provision for credit losses of $11.6 million and $6.7 million for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively;
    • The consumer finance segment experienced net charge-offs at an annualized rate of 3.40 percent of average total loans for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to 2.72 percent for the fourth quarter of 2023. Net charge-offs as a percentage of average total loans were 2.62 percent for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to 1.99 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023; and
    • Mortgage banking segment loan originations increased $32.2 million, or 32.8 percent, to $130.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023 and increased $29.0 million, or 5.8 percent, to $527.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the year ended December 31, 2023.

    Community Banking Segment. The community banking segment reported net income of $6.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $5.2 million for the same period of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher interest income resulting from higher average balances of loans and the effects of higher interest rates on asset yields, offset in part by lower average balances of securities;
    • higher other income from bank owned life insurance policies; and
    • lower salaries and employee benefits expense due primarily to a reduction in headcount through attrition;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest expense due primarily to higher rates on deposits and higher average balances of interest-bearing deposits, offset in part by lower average balances of borrowings.

    The community banking segment reported net income of $20.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $22.9 million for the same period of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher interest expense resulting from higher rates on deposits and higher average balances of interest-bearing deposits, partially offset by lower average balances of borrowings;
    • higher data processing and consulting costs related to investments in operational technology to improve resilience, efficiency and customer experience;
    • higher occupancy expense related to branch network improvements, including the relocation of a branch and the opening of a new branch; and
    • higher salaries and employee benefits expense, which have generally increased in line with market conditions, offset in part by a reduction in headcount through attrition;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest income resulting from higher average balances of loans and the effects of higher interest rates on asset yields, offset in part by lower average balances of securities;
    • higher wealth management services income due primarily to higher assets under management;
    • higher other income from bank owned life insurance policies; and
    • higher investment income from other equity investments.

    Average loans increased $180.8 million, or 14.4 percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $164.0 million, or 13.5 percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023, due primarily to growth in the construction, commercial real estate, and residential mortgage segments of the loan portfolio. Average deposits increased $140.2 million, or 6.9 percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $110.8 million, or 5.5 percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023, due primarily to higher balance of time deposits, partially offset by decreases in savings and interest-bearing demand deposits and noninterest-bearing demand deposits amid increased competition for deposits and the higher interest rate environment.

    Average loan yields and average costs of interest-bearing deposits were higher for the fourth quarter and the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods of 2023, due primarily to the effects of the higher interest rate environment.

    The community banking segment’s nonaccrual loans were $333,000 at December 31, 2024 compared to $406,000 at December 31, 2023. The community banking segment recorded no provision for credit losses for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $1.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to $75,000 and $1.6 million for the same periods of 2023. At December 31, 2024, the allowance for credit losses increased to $17.4 million, compared to $16.1 million at December 31, 2023. The allowance for credit losses as a percentage of total loans decreased to 1.20 percent at December 31, 2024 from 1.26 percent at December 31, 2023. The increases in provision and allowance for credit losses are due primarily to growth in the loan portfolio. Management believes that the level of the allowance for credit losses is adequate to reflect the net amount expected to be collected.

    Mortgage Banking Segment. The mortgage banking segment reported net income of $87,000 and $1.1 million for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to a net loss of $103,000 and net income of $465,000 for the same periods of 2023, due primarily to:

    • higher gains on sales of loans and higher mortgage banking fee income due to higher volume of mortgage loan originations; and
    • lower occupancy expenses due to an effort to reduce overhead costs;

    partially offset by:

    • higher variable expenses tied to mortgage loan origination volume such as commissions and bonuses, reported in salaries and employee benefits; and
    • lower reversal of provision for indemnifications.

    The sustained elevated level of mortgage interest rates, combined with higher home prices and lower levels of inventory, led to a level of mortgage loan originations in 2024 and 2023 for the industry that is lower than recent historical averages. Mortgage loan originations for the mortgage banking segment were $130.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, comprised of $15.9 million refinancings and $114.5 million home purchases, compared to $98.2 million, comprised of $12.5 million refinancings and $85.7 million home purchases, for the same period in 2023. Mortgage loan originations for the mortgage banking segment were $527.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, comprised of $50.2 million refinancings and $477.6 million home purchases, compared to $498.8 million, comprised of $52.7 million refinancings and $446.1 million home purchases, for the same period in 2023. Mortgage loan originations in the fourth quarter of 2024 decreased $26.6 million compared to the third quarter of 2024 due in part to normal industry seasonal fluctuations. Mortgage loan segment originations include originations of loans sold to the community banking segment, at prices similar to those paid by third-party investors. These transactions are eliminated to reach consolidated totals.

    During the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, the mortgage banking segment recorded a reversal of provision for indemnification losses of $85,000 and $460,000, respectively, compared to a reversal of provision for indemnification losses of $150,000 and $585,000 in the same periods of 2023. The mortgage banking segment increased reserves for indemnification losses during 2020 based on widespread forbearance on mortgage loans and economic uncertainty related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The release of indemnification reserves in 2024 and 2023 was due primarily to improvement in the mortgage banking segment’s assessment of borrower payment performance, lower volume of mortgage loan originations in recent years and other factors affecting expected losses on mortgage loans sold in the secondary market, such as time since origination. Management believes that the indemnification reserve is sufficient to absorb losses related to loans that have been sold in the secondary market.

    Consumer Finance Segment. The consumer finance segment reported net income of $272,000 and $1.4 million for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to net income of $618,000 and $2.9 million for the same periods in 2023. The decreases in consumer finance segment net income were due primarily to:

    • higher provision for credit losses due primarily to increased net charge-offs; and
    • higher interest expense on variable rate borrowings from the community banking segment as a result of higher interest rates and higher average balances of borrowings;

    partially offset by:

    • higher interest income resulting from the effects of higher interest rates on loan yields and higher average balances of loans;
    • lower salaries and employee benefits expense due to an effort to reduce overhead costs; and
    • lower loan processing and collection expenses due primarily to efficiency initiatives within the collections department.

    Average loans increased $2.5 million, or one percent, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased $2.9 million, or one percent, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the same periods in 2023. The consumer finance segment experienced net charge-offs at a rate of 2.62 percent of average total loans for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to 1.99 percent for the year ended December 31, 2023, due primarily to an increase in the number of delinquent loans, the number of repossessions, and the average amount charged-off when a loan was uncollectable. Higher amounts charged-off per loan resulted in part from larger loan amounts, generally purchased in 2020 and 2021 when automobile values were higher, being charged-off in the current year, with the wholesale values of automobiles having declined since then. At December 31, 2024, total delinquent loans as a percentage of total loans was 3.90 percent, compared to 4.09 percent at December 31, 2023, and 3.49 percent at September 30, 2024.

    The consumer finance segment, at times, offers payment deferrals as a portfolio management technique to achieve higher ultimate cash collections on select loan accounts. A significant reliance on deferrals as a means of managing collections may result in a lengthening of the loss confirmation period, which would increase expectations of credit losses inherent in the portfolio. Average amounts of payment deferrals of automobile loans on a monthly basis, which are not included in delinquent loans, were 2.11 percent and 1.80 percent of average automobile loans outstanding during the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively, compared to 2.02 percent and 1.87 percent during the same periods during 2023. The allowance for credit losses was $22.7 million at December 31, 2024 and $23.6 million at December 31, 2023. The allowance for credit losses as a percentage of total loans decreased to 4.86 percent at December 31, 2024 from 5.03 percent at December 31, 2023, primarily as a result of growth in loans with stronger credit quality while balances of loans with lower credit quality declined. Management believes that the level of the allowance for credit losses is adequate to reflect the net amount expected to be collected. If loan performance deteriorates resulting in further elevated delinquencies or net charge-offs, the provision for credit losses may increase in future periods.

    Liquidity. The objective of the Corporation’s liquidity management is to ensure the continuous availability of funds to satisfy the credit needs of our customers and the demands of our depositors, creditors and investors. Uninsured deposits represent an estimate of amounts above the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance coverage limit of $250,000. As of December 31, 2024, the Corporation’s uninsured deposits were approximately $640.2 million, or 29.5 percent of total deposits. Excluding intercompany cash holdings and municipal deposits, which are secured with pledged securities, amounts uninsured were approximately $455.2 million, or 21.0 percent of total deposits as of December 31, 2024. The Corporation’s liquid assets, which include cash and due from banks, interest-bearing deposits at other banks and nonpledged securities available for sale, were $288.1 million and borrowing availability was $606.2 million as of December 31, 2024, which in total exceed uninsured deposits, excluding intercompany cash holdings and secured municipal deposits, by $439.1 million as of December 31, 2024.

    In addition to deposits, the Corporation utilizes short-term and long-term borrowings as sources of funds. Short-term borrowings from the Federal Reserve Bank and the Federal Home loan Bank of Atlanta (FHLB) may be used to fund the Corporation’s day-to-day operations. Short-term borrowings also include securities sold under agreements to repurchase. Total borrowings increased to $122.6 million at December 31, 2024 from $109.5 million at December 31, 2023 due primarily to higher long-term borrowings from the FHLB used in part to fund loan growth.

    Additional sources of liquidity available to the Corporation include cash flows from operations, loan payments and payoffs, deposit growth, maturities, calls and sales of securities and the issuance of brokered certificates of deposit.

    Capital and Dividends. The Corporation declared cash dividends during the year ended December 31, 2024 totaling $1.76 per share, including a quarterly cash dividend of 44 cents per share during the fourth quarter of 2024, which was paid on January 1, 2025. These dividends represent a payout ratio of 23.5 percent of earnings per share for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 29.3 percent of earnings per share for the year ended December 31, 2024. The Board of Directors of the Corporation continually reviews the amount of cash dividends per share and the resulting dividend payout ratio in light of changes in economic conditions, current and future capital requirements, and expected future earnings.

    Total consolidated equity increased $9.5 million at December 31, 2024, compared to December 31, 2023, due primarily to net income and lower unrealized losses in the market value of securities available for sale, which are recognized as a component of other comprehensive income, partially offset by share repurchases and dividends paid on the Corporation’s common stock. The Corporation’s securities available for sale are fixed income debt securities and their unrealized loss position is a result of rising market interest rates since they were purchased. The Corporation expects to recover its investments in debt securities through scheduled payments of principal and interest. Unrealized losses are not expected to affect the earnings or regulatory capital of the Corporation or C&F Bank. The accumulated other comprehensive loss related to the Corporation’s securities available for sale, net of deferred income taxes, decreased to $23.7 million at December 31, 2024 compared to $25.0 million at December 31, 2023 due primarily to fluctuations in debt security market interest rates and a decrease in the balance of securities available for sale.

    As of December 31, 2024, the most recent notification from the FDIC categorized the C&F Bank as well capitalized under the regulatory framework for prompt corrective action. To be categorized as well capitalized under regulations applicable at December 31, 2024, C&F Bank was required to maintain minimum total risk-based, Tier 1 risk-based, CET1 risk-based and Tier 1 leverage ratios. In addition to the regulatory risk-based capital requirements, C&F Bank must maintain a capital conservation buffer of additional capital of 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets as required by the Basel III capital rules. The Corporation and C&F Bank exceeded these ratios at December 31, 2024. For additional information, see “Capital Ratios” below. The above mentioned ratios are not impacted by unrealized losses on securities available for sale. In the event that all of these unrealized losses became realized into earnings, the Corporation and C&F Bank would both continue to exceed minimum capital requirements, including the capital conservation buffer, and be considered well capitalized.

    In December 2023, the Board of Directors authorized a program, effective January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024, to repurchase up to $10.0 million of the Corporation’s common stock (the 2024 Repurchase Program). During the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, the Corporation repurchased 11,100 shares, or $679,000, and 160,694 shares, or $7.9 million, of its common stock under the 2024 Repurchase Program, respectively. In December 2024, the Board of Directors authorized a new program, effective January 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, to repurchase up to $5.0 million of the Corporation’s common stock through December 31, 2025 (the 2025 Repurchase Program).

    About C&F Financial Corporation. The Corporation’s common stock is listed for trading on The Nasdaq Stock Market under the symbol CFFI. The common stock closed at a price of $75.40 per share on January 27, 2025. At December 31, 2024, the book value per share of the Corporation was $70.00 and the tangible book value per share was $61.86. For more information about the Corporation’s tangible book value per share, which is not calculated in accordance with GAAP, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” below.

    C&F Bank operates 31 banking offices and four commercial loan offices located throughout eastern and central Virginia and offers full wealth management services through its subsidiary C&F Wealth Management, Inc. C&F Mortgage Corporation and its subsidiary C&F Select LLC provide mortgage loan origination services through offices located in Virginia and the surrounding states. C&F Finance Company provides automobile, marine and recreational vehicle loans through indirect lending programs offered primarily in the Northeastern, Midwestern and Southern United States from its headquarters in Henrico, Virginia.

    Additional information regarding the Corporation’s products and services, as well as access to its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), are available on the Corporation’s website at http://www.cffc.com.

    Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures. The accounting and reporting policies of the Corporation conform to GAAP in the United States and prevailing practices in the banking industry. However, certain non-GAAP measures are used by management to supplement the evaluation of the Corporation’s performance. These include adjusted net income, adjusted earnings per share, adjusted return on average equity, adjusted return on average assets, return on average tangible common equity (ROTCE), adjusted ROTCE, tangible book value per share, price to tangible book value ratio, and the following fully-taxable equivalent (FTE) measures: interest income on loans-FTE, interest income on securities-FTE, total interest income-FTE and net interest income-FTE.

    Management believes that the use of these non-GAAP measures provides meaningful information about operating performance by enhancing comparability with other financial periods, other financial institutions, and between different sources of interest income. The non-GAAP measures used by management enhance comparability by excluding the effects of balances of intangible assets, including goodwill, that vary significantly between institutions, and tax benefits that are not consistent across different opportunities for investment. These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered an alternative to GAAP-basis financial statements, and other bank holding companies may define or calculate these or similar measures differently. A reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measures used by the Corporation to evaluate and measure the Corporation’s performance to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures is presented below.

    Forward-Looking Statements. This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These forward-looking statements are based on the beliefs of the Corporation’s management, as well as assumptions made by, and information currently available to, the Corporation’s management, and reflect management’s current views with respect to certain events that could have an impact on the Corporation’s future financial performance. These statements, including without limitation statements made in Mr. Cherry’s quote and statements regarding future interest rates and conditions in the Corporation’s industries and markets, relate to expectations concerning matters that are not historical fact, may express “belief,” “intention,” “expectation,” “potential” and similar expressions, and may use the words “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “plan,” “may,” “might,” “will,” “intend,” “target,” “should,” “could,” or similar expressions. These statements are inherently uncertain, and there can be no assurance that the underlying assumptions will prove to be accurate. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated or implied by such statements. Forward-looking statements in this release may include, without limitation, statements regarding expected future operations and financial performance, expected trends in yields on loans, expected future recovery of investments in debt securities, future dividend payments, deposit trends, charge-offs and delinquencies, changes in cost of funds and net interest margin and items affecting net interest margin, strategic business initiatives and the anticipated effects thereof, changes in interest rates and the effects thereof on net interest income, mortgage loan originations, expectations regarding C&F Bank’s regulatory risk-based capital requirement levels, technology initiatives, our diversified business strategy, asset quality, credit quality, adequacy of allowances for credit losses and the level of future charge-offs, market interest rates and housing inventory and resulting effects in mortgage loan origination volume, sources of liquidity, adequacy of the reserve for indemnification losses related to loans sold in the secondary market, the effect of future market and industry trends, the effects of future interest rate fluctuations, cybersecurity risks, and inflation. Factors that could have a material adverse effect on the operations and future prospects of the Corporation include, but are not limited to, changes in:

    • interest rates, such as volatility in short-term interest rates or yields on U.S. Treasury bonds, increases in interest rates following actions by the Federal Reserve and increases or volatility in mortgage interest rates
    • general business conditions, as well as conditions within the financial markets
    • general economic conditions, including unemployment levels, inflation rates, supply chain disruptions and slowdowns in economic growth
    • general market conditions, including disruptions due to pandemics or significant health hazards, severe weather conditions, natural disasters, terrorist activities, financial crises, political crises, war and other military conflicts (including the ongoing military conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and in the Middle East) or other major events, or the prospect of these events
    • average loan yields and average costs of interest-bearing deposits
    • financial services industry conditions, including bank failures or concerns involving liquidity
    • labor market conditions, including attracting, hiring, training, motivating and retaining qualified employees
    • the legislative/regulatory climate, regulatory initiatives with respect to financial institutions, products and services, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the CFPB) and the regulatory and enforcement activities of the CFPB
    • monetary and fiscal policies of the U.S. Government, including policies of the FDIC, U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the effect of these policies on interest rates and business in our markets
    • demand for financial services in the Corporation’s market area
    • the value of securities held in the Corporation’s investment portfolios
    • the quality or composition of the loan portfolios and the value of the collateral securing those loans
    • the inventory level, demand and fluctuations in the pricing of used automobiles, including sales prices of repossessed vehicles
    • the level of automobile loan delinquencies or defaults and our ability to repossess automobiles securing delinquent automobile finance installment contracts
    • the level of net charge-offs on loans and the adequacy of our allowance for credit losses
    • the level of indemnification losses related to mortgage loans sold
    • demand for loan products
    • deposit flows
    • the strength of the Corporation’s counterparties
    • the availability of lines of credit from the FHLB and other counterparties
    • the soundness of other financial institutions and any indirect exposure related to the closing of other financial institutions and their impact on the broader market through other customers, suppliers and partners, or that the conditions which resulted in the liquidity concerns experienced by closed financial institutions may also adversely impact, directly or indirectly, other financial institutions and market participants with which the Corporation has commercial or deposit relationships
    • competition from both banks and non-banks, including competition in the non-prime automobile finance markets and marine and recreational vehicle finance markets
    • services provided by, or the level of the Corporation’s reliance upon third parties for key services
    • the commercial and residential real estate markets, including changes in property values
    • the demand for residential mortgages and conditions in the secondary residential mortgage loan markets
    • the Corporation’s technology initiatives and other strategic initiatives
    • the Corporation’s branch expansions and consolidations plans
    • cyber threats, attacks or events
    • C&F Bank’s product offerings
    • accounting principles, policies and guidelines, and elections by the Corporation thereunder

    These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating the forward-looking statements contained herein, and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this release. For additional information on risk factors that could affect the forward-looking statements contained herein, see the Corporation’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 and other reports filed with the SEC. The Corporation undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

     
    C&F Financial Corporation

    Selected Financial Information
    (dollars in thousands, except for per share data)
    (unaudited)

     
    Financial Condition   12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks   $ 49,423   $ 58,777  
    Investment securities – available for sale, at fair value     418,625     462,444  
    Loans held for sale, at fair value     20,112     14,176  
    Loans, net:              
    Community Banking segment     1,436,226     1,257,557  
    Consumer Finance segment     444,085     444,931  
    Total assets     2,563,385     2,438,498  
    Deposits     2,170,860     2,066,130  
    Repurchase agreements     28,994     30,705  
    Other borrowings     93,615     78,834  
    Total equity     226,970     217,516  
                                     
        For The     For The  
        Quarter Ended     Year Ended  
    Results of Operations   12/31/2024     12/31/2023     12/31/2024     12/31/2023  
    Interest income   $ 36,443     $ 32,408     $ 139,594     $ 124,137  
    Interest expense     11,343       8,466       42,819       26,430  
    Provision for credit losses:                                
    Community Banking segment           75       1,650       1,625  
    Consumer Finance segment     3,500       2,400       11,600       6,650  
    Noninterest income:                                
    Gains on sales of loans     1,250       850       6,064       5,780  
    Other     5,700       6,953       24,474       23,835  
    Noninterest expenses:                                
    Salaries and employee benefits     11,953       14,035       53,578       54,876  
    Other     9,363       9,038       36,352       35,007  
    Income tax expense     1,205       1,109       4,215       5,418  
    Net income     6,029       5,088       19,918       23,746  
                                     
    Fully-taxable equivalent (FTE) amounts1                                
    Interest income on loans-FTE     33,122       29,147       127,288       111,146  
    Interest income on securities-FTE     3,046       3,121       12,079       12,710  
    Total interest income-FTE     36,731       32,677       140,741       125,101  
    Net interest income-FTE     25,388       24,211       97,922       98,671  

    _________________
    For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                                       
        For the Quarter Ended  
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
        Average   Income/   Yield/   Average   Income/   Yield/  
    Yield Analysis   Balance   Expense   Rate   Balance   Expense   Rate  
    Assets                                  
    Securities:                                  
    Taxable   $ 321,796     $ 1,898   2.36 % $ 392,368     $ 2,093   2.13 %
    Tax-exempt     120,119       1,148   3.82     118,263       1,028   3.48  
    Total securities     441,915       3,046   2.76     510,631       3,121   2.44  
    Loans:                                  
    Community banking segment     1,438,195       20,036   5.54     1,257,418       16,813   5.30  
    Mortgage banking segment     30,674       486   6.30     22,288       383   6.82  
    Consumer finance segment     473,816       12,600   10.58     471,355       11,951   10.06  
    Total loans     1,942,685       33,122   6.78     1,751,061       29,147   6.60  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks     58,212       563   3.85     42,114       409   3.85  
    Total earning assets     2,442,812       36,731   5.98     2,303,806       32,677   5.63  
    Allowance for credit losses     (40,930 )               (40,614 )            
    Total non-earning assets     159,082                 142,252              
    Total assets   $ 2,560,964               $ 2,405,444              
                                       
    Liabilities and Equity                                  
    Interest-bearing deposits:                                  
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 331,156       601   0.72   $ 341,243       556   0.65  
    Money market deposit accounts     299,321       1,136   1.51     299,712       896   1.19  
    Savings accounts     176,106       26   0.06     194,476       33   0.07  
    Certificates of deposit     811,224       8,325   4.08     635,702       5,665   3.54  
    Total interest-bearing deposits     1,617,807       10,088   2.48     1,471,133       7,150   1.93  
    Borrowings:                                  
    Repurchase agreements     30,673       131   1.71     33,418       126   1.51  
    Other borrowings     93,765       1,124   4.79     98,875       1,190   4.81  
    Total borrowings     124,438       1,255   4.03     132,293       1,316   3.98  
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     1,742,245       11,343   2.59     1,603,426       8,466   2.10  
    Noninterest-bearing demand deposits     547,890                 554,321              
    Other liabilities     43,379                 45,462              
    Total liabilities     2,333,514                 2,203,209              
    Equity     227,450                 202,235              
    Total liabilities and equity   $ 2,560,964               $ 2,405,444              
    Net interest income         $ 25,388             $ 24,211      
    Interest rate spread               3.39 %             3.53 %
    Interest expense to average earning assets               1.85 %             1.46 %
    Net interest margin               4.13 %             4.17 %
                                       
        For the Year Ended  
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
        Average   Income/   Yield/   Average   Income/   Yield/  
    Yield Analysis   Balance   Expense   Rate   Balance   Expense   Rate  
    Assets                                  
    Securities:                                  
    Taxable   $ 335,647     $ 7,563   2.25 % $ 428,895     $ 9,110   2.12 %
    Tax-exempt     119,978       4,516   3.76     108,006       3,600   3.33  
    Total securities     455,625       12,079   2.65     536,901       12,710   2.37  
    Loans:                                  
    Community banking segment     1,378,131       75,707   5.49     1,214,143       62,188   5.12  
    Mortgage banking segment     30,737       1,897   6.17     25,598       1,695   6.62  
    Consumer finance segment     476,775       49,684   10.42     473,885       47,263   9.97  
    Total loans     1,885,643       127,288   6.75     1,713,626       111,146   6.49  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks     37,238       1,374   3.69     35,351       1,245   3.52  
    Total earning assets     2,378,506       140,741   5.92     2,285,878       125,101   5.47  
    Allowance for loan losses     (40,736 )               (41,047 )            
    Total non-earning assets     156,726                 148,666              
    Total assets   $ 2,494,496               $ 2,393,497              
                                       
    Liabilities and Equity                                  
    Interest-bearing deposits:                                  
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 327,700       2,170   0.66   $ 354,643       2,134   0.60  
    Money market deposit accounts     296,278       4,313   1.46     317,601       3,017   0.95  
    Savings accounts     180,429       111   0.06     209,033       124   0.06  
    Certificates of deposit     767,721       31,465   4.10     541,252       15,112   2.79  
    Total interest-bearing deposits     1,572,128       38,059   2.42     1,422,529       20,387   1.43  
    Borrowings:                                  
    Repurchase agreements     27,754       456   1.64     32,393       399   1.23  
    Other borrowings     91,713       4,304   4.69     116,908       5,644   4.83  
    Total borrowings     119,467       4,760   3.98     149,301       6,043   4.05  
    Total interest-bearing liabilities     1,691,595       42,819   2.53     1,571,830       26,430   1.68  
    Noninterest-bearing demand deposits     536,828                 575,452              
    Other liabilities     45,217                 42,954              
    Total liabilities     2,273,640                 2,190,236              
    Equity     220,856                 203,261              
    Total liabilities and equity   $ 2,494,496               $ 2,393,497              
    Net interest income         $ 97,922             $ 98,671      
    Interest rate spread               3.39 %             3.79 %
    Interest expense to average earning assets               1.80 %             1.16 %
    Net interest margin               4.12 %             4.31 %
                       
        12/31/2024
    Funding Sources   Capacity   Outstanding   Available
    Unsecured federal funds agreements   $ 75,000   $   $ 75,000
    Borrowings from FHLB     257,734     40,000     217,734
    Borrowings from Federal Reserve Bank     313,499         313,499
    Total   $ 646,233   $ 40,000   $ 606,233
                   
    Asset Quality   12/31/2024   12/31/2023  
    Community Banking              
    Total loans   $ 1,453,605   $ 1,273,629  
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 333   $ 406  
                   
    Allowance for credit losses (ACL)   $ 17,379   $ 16,072  
    Nonaccrual loans to total loans     0.02 %   0.03 %
    ACL to total loans     1.20 %   1.26 %
    ACL to nonaccrual loans     5,218.92 %   3,958.62 %
    Year-to-date net charge-offs to average loans     0.01 %   0.01 %
                   
    Consumer Finance              
    Total loans   $ 466,793   $ 468,510  
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 614   $ 892  
    Repossessed assets   $ 779   $ 646  
    ACL   $ 22,708   $ 23,579  
    Nonaccrual loans to total loans     0.13 %   0.19 %
    ACL to total loans     4.86 %   5.03 %
    ACL to nonaccrual loans     3,698.37 %   2,643.39 %
    Year-to-date net charge-offs to average loans     2.62 %   1.99 %
                             
        For The   For The
        Quarter Ended   Year Ended
    Other Performance Data   12/31/2024   12/31/2023   12/31/2024   12/31/2023
    Net Income (Loss):                        
    Community Banking   $ 6,364     $ 5,186     $ 20,284     $ 22,928  
    Mortgage Banking     87       (103 )     1,108       465  
    Consumer Finance     272       618       1,414       2,879  
    Other1     (694 )     (613 )     (2,888 )     (2,526 )
    Total   $ 6,029     $ 5,088     $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
                             
    Net income attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 6,037     $ 5,068     $ 19,834     $ 23,604  
                             
    Earnings per share – basic and diluted   $ 1.87     $ 1.50     $ 6.01     $ 6.92  
    Weighted average shares outstanding – basic and diluted     3,226,999       3,367,931       3,299,574       3,411,995  
                             
    Annualized return on average assets     0.94 %     0.85 %     0.80 %     0.99 %
    Annualized return on average equity     10.60 %     10.06 %     9.02 %     11.68 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity2     12.17 %     11.74 %     10.37 %     13.58 %
    Dividends declared per share   $ 0.44     $ 0.44     $ 1.76     $ 1.76  
                             
    Mortgage loan originations – Mortgage Banking   $ 130,426     $ 98,238     $ 527,750     $ 498,797  
    Mortgage loans sold – Mortgage Banking     154,552       109,387       522,001       498,852  

    _________________
    1 Includes results of the holding company that are not allocated to the business segments and elimination of inter-segment activity.
    2 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                   
    Market Ratios   12/31/2024     12/31/2023
    Market value per share   $ 71.25     $ 68.19
    Book value per share   $ 70.00     $ 64.28
    Price to book value ratio     1.02       1.06
    Tangible book value per share1   $ 61.86     $ 56.40
    Price to tangible book value ratio1     1.15       1.21
    Price to earnings ratio (ttm)     11.86       9.87

    _________________
    1 For more information about these non-GAAP financial measures, please see “Use of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures” and “Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

                   
                   
                Minimum Capital
    Capital Ratios   12/31/2024   12/31/2023   Requirements3
    C&F Financial Corporation1              
    Total risk-based capital ratio   14.1%   14.8%   8.0%  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   11.9%   12.6%   6.0%  
    Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   10.7%   11.3%   4.5%  
    Tier 1 leverage ratio   9.8%   10.1%   4.0%  
                   
    C&F Bank2              
    Total risk-based capital ratio   13.6%   14.1%   8.0%  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   12.3%   12.9%   6.0%  
    Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   12.3%   12.9%   4.5%  
    Tier 1 leverage ratio   10.1%   10.3%   4.0%  

    _________________
    1 The Corporation, a small bank holding company under applicable regulations and guidance, is not subject to the minimum regulatory capital regulations for bank holding companies. The regulatory requirements that apply to bank holding companies that are subject to regulatory capital requirements are presented above, along with the Corporation’s capital ratios as determined under those regulations.
    2 All ratios at December 31, 2024 are estimates and subject to change pending regulatory filings. All ratios at December 31, 2023 are presented as filed.
    3 The ratios presented for minimum capital requirements are those to be considered adequately capitalized.

                             
        For The Quarter Ended   For The Year Ended
        12/31/2024   12/31/2023   12/31/2024   12/31/2023
    Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Financial Measures                
    Return on Average Tangible Common Equity                        
    Average total equity, as reported   $ 227,450     $ 202,235     $ 220,856     $ 203,261  
    Average goodwill     (25,191 )     (25,191 )     (25,191 )     (25,191 )
    Average other intangible assets     (1,183 )     (1,439 )     (1,273 )     (1,538 )
    Average noncontrolling interest     (518 )     (515 )     (649 )     (675 )
    Average tangible common equity   $ 200,558     $ 175,090     $ 193,743     $ 175,857  
                             
    Net income   $ 6,029     $ 5,088     $ 19,918     $ 23,746  
    Amortization of intangibles     64       69       260       273  
    Net loss (income) attributable to noncontrolling interest     8       (20 )     (84 )     (142 )
    Net tangible income attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 6,101     $ 5,137     $ 20,094     $ 23,877  
                             
    Annualized return on average equity, as reported     10.60 %     10.06 %     12.02 %     15.58 %
    Annualized return on average tangible common equity     12.17     11.74     10.37     13.58
                                   
        For The Quarter Ended     For The Year Ended
        12/31/2024     12/31/2023     12/31/2024     12/31/2023
    Fully Taxable Equivalent Net Interest Income1                              
    Interest income on loans   $ 33,075     $ 29,093     $ 127,089     $ 110,938
    FTE adjustment     47       54       199       208
    FTE interest income on loans   $ 33,122     $ 29,147     $ 127,288     $ 111,146
                                   
    Interest income on securities   $ 2,805     $ 2,906     $ 11,131     $ 11,954
    FTE adjustment     241       215       948       756
    FTE interest income on securities   $ 3,046     $ 3,121     $ 12,079     $ 12,710
                                   
    Total interest income   $ 36,443     $ 32,408     $ 139,594     $ 124,137
    FTE adjustment     288       269       1,147       964
    FTE interest income   $ 36,731     $ 32,677     $ 140,741     $ 125,101
                                   
    Net interest income   $ 25,100     $ 23,942     $ 96,775     $ 97,707
    FTE adjustment     288       269       1,147       964
    FTE net interest income   $ 25,388     $ 24,211     $ 97,922     $ 98,671

    _________________
    1 Assuming a tax rate of 21%.

                 
        December 31,   December 31,
    (Dollars in thousands except for per share data)   2024   2023
    Tangible Book Value Per Share        
    Equity attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 226,360     $ 216,878  
    Goodwill     (25,191 )     (25,191 )
    Other intangible assets     (1,147 )     (1,407 )
    Tangible equity attributable to C&F Financial Corporation   $ 200,022     $ 190,280  
                 
    Shares outstanding     3,233,672       3,374,098  
                 
    Book value per share   $ 70.00     $ 64.28  
    Tangible book value per share   $ 61.86     $ 56.40  
    Contact: Jason Long, CFO and Secretary
      (804) 843-2360

     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: NEWS: Sanders, Welch, Balint on Impact of Trump Administration’s Move Towards Authoritarianism on Vermonters 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Vermont – Bernie Sanders
    WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 — Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.), and Rep. Becca Balint (Vt.-AL) today released the following statement after the Trump Administration ordered a pause in all federal grants and loans, a sweeping decision that could disrupt education and health care programs, housing assistance, disaster relief and a host of other initiatives that depend on billions of federal dollars:
    President Trump’s decision to freeze all federal grants and loans will cause devastating harm to working families across Vermont.
    This unconstitutional action will impact more than 1,200 Vermont kids in Head Start programs; more than 10,000 women, infants, and children in Vermont who use WIC to keep from going hungry; nearly 200,000 Vermont patients who use community health centers; nearly 24,000 Vermonters who use the LIHEAP program to stay warm through the winter; 9,000 Vermonters who rely on Section 8 vouchers to keep a roof over their head; more than 12,000 Vermont seniors who rely on nutritious food from Meals on Wheels and at senior centers; countless Vermont communities that are still recovering from devastating floods; and all of our Vermont firefighters and police officers who put their lives on the line to keep us safe.
    This decision by the Trump Administration will cause immense pain for the most vulnerable people in Vermont and across our country. It represents a dangerous move toward authoritarianism. No president has the right to choose which laws to follow and which laws to ignore. Donald Trump is endangering the health and well-being of Vermonters. We will do everything in our power to see that it is reversed.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sanders, Welch, Balint on Impact of Trump Administration’s Move Towards Authoritarianism on Vermonters

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    WASHINGTON, D.C.— Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Sen. Peter Welch (D-Vt.), and Rep. Becca Balint (Vt.-AL) today released the following statement after the Trump Administration ordered a pause in all federal grants and loans, a sweeping decision that could disrupt education and health care programs, housing assistance, disaster relief and a host of other initiatives that depend on billions of federal dollars:“President Trump’s decision to freeze all federal grants and loans will cause devastating harm to working families across Vermont.“This unconstitutional action will impact more than 1,200 Vermont kids in Head Start programs; more than 10,000 women, infants, and children in Vermont who use WIC to keep from going hungry; nearly 200,000 Vermont patients who use community health centers; nearly 24,000 Vermonters who use the LIHEAP program to stay warm through the winter; 9,000 Vermonters who rely on Section 8 vouchers to keep a roof over their head; more than 12,000 Vermont seniors who rely on nutritious food from Meals on Wheels and at senior centers; countless Vermont communities that are still recovering from devastating floods; and all of our Vermont firefighters and police officers who put their lives on the line to keep us safe.“This decision by the Trump Administration will cause immense pain for the most vulnerable people in Vermont and across our country. It represents a dangerous move toward authoritarianism. No president has the right to choose which laws to follow and which laws to ignore. Donald Trump is endangering the health and well-being of Vermonters. We will do everything in our power to see that it is reversed.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New approaches to eradicating child poverty

    Source: Scottish Government

    Wrap-around support delivering improved outcomes for families. 

    Lessons learned from innovative work with families in Inverclyde are helping deliver new approaches to eradicating child poverty. 

    Social Justice Secretary Shirley-Anne Somerville will visit Home-Start Renfrewshire and Inverclyde in Greenock tomorrow (Wednesday 29th January) to see work funded under the Scottish Government’s Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund, which is helping to reshape services locally and elsewhere in Scotland. 

    The Social Justice Secretary will meet staff at the project as well as parents who have benefited from the work which focuses on providing early intervention to support families, particularly those with children under five and those affected by poor mental health.  

    Learning from the project is supporting Inverclyde’s Fairer Futures Partnership, which is supporting local services to test and improve how they deliver services to promote family wellbeing, maximise incomes and support people towards education and into sustained employment.   

    Ms Somerville said: 

    “Eradicating child poverty is the Scottish Government’s top priority and a national mission.   

    “I’m keen to hear more about how whole family, person-centred support is being developed in Inverclyde through the Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund and the Fairer Futures Partnership. 

    “Through close partnership between Home-Start and Inverclyde Council, this project provides holistic support so that families can maximise their household incomes, and parents can improve their employment prospects through upskilling and volunteering. Putting this kind of vital support in place means that we don’t just help families in a  crisis but enable them to thrive in the longer term. 

    “The Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund was set up to support local areas to test new ideas and innovate to improve local approaches to eradicating child poverty. I’m pleased to  have the opportunity to learn more about how this funding is informing Inverclyde’s overall approach to supporting families out of poverty.” 

    Background:  

    The Child Poverty Practice Accelerator Fund supports local areas to test innovative approaches to eradicating child poverty, including testing new approaches to a known problem, adapting an approach from elsewhere to work in a new area, and evaluating promising approaches.  

    Fairer Futures Partnerships in Clackmannanshire, Dundee and Glasgow are working to ensure families get the help they need, where and when they need it. Building on these successful partnerships the programme is expanding into Aberdeen City, East Ayrshire, Inverclyde, North Ayrshire and Perth & Kinross Councils. 

    The Scottish Government made over £2 million available in financial year [2024/25] to these eight local authorities and their partners to deliver the programmes. 

    The budget for the Partnerships has been increased budget to £6 million for next financial year [2025/26]. £2.4 million of this  will be made available to the eight existing partnerships to continue the work underway, as well as exploring opportunities to expand. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Fowler, Starr Director of the Research and Academic Program, Clark Art Institute, and lecturer in Art History, Williams College

    The so-called golden age of Dutch painting in the 1600s coincided with an economic boom that had a lot to do with the transatlantic slave trade. But how did the slave trade shape the art market in the Netherlands? And how is it reflected in the paintings of the time?

    This is the subject of a new book called Slavery and the Invention of Dutch Art by art historian Caroline Fowler. We asked about her study.

    What was Dutch art about before slavery and what was the golden age?

    The earliest paintings that would be called Dutch were predominantly religious. They were made for Christian devotion. In the 1500s, major divisions in the church led to a fragmentation of Christianity called the Reformation.

    In this new religious climate, artists began to create new types of paintings, studying the world around them. They included landscapes, seascapes, still lifes, and interior scenes of their homes. Instead of working for the church, many painters began to work within an art market. There was a rising middle class that could afford to buy paintings.

    Duke University Press

    Historically, this period in Dutch economic prosperity has been called the “golden age”. This is when many of the most famous Dutch painters worked, such as Rembrandt van Rijn and Johannes Vermeer.

    Their work was made possible by a strong Dutch economy built on global trade networks. This included the transatlantic slave trade and the rise of the middle class. Although artists did not directly paint the transatlantic slave trade, in my book I argue that it is central to understanding the paintings produced in the 1600s as it made the economic market possible.

    In turn, many of the types of painting that developed, like maritime scenes and interior scenes, are often obliquely or directly about international trade. The slave trade is a haunting presence in these images.

    How did this play out within Dutch colonialism?

    The new “middle class” consisted of economically prosperous merchants, artisans, lawyers and doctors. For many of the wealthiest merchants, their prosperity was fuelled by their investments in trade overseas. In land and plantations, and also commodities such as sugar, salt, mace and nutmeg.


    Read more: Slavery, tax evasion, resistance: the story of 11 Africans in South America’s gold mines in the 1500s


    Slavery was illegal within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic on the European continent. But it was widely practised within Dutch colonies around the world. Slavery was central to their trade overseas – from the inter-Asian slave network that made possible their domination in the export of nutmeg, to the use of enslaved labour on plantations in the Americas. It also contributed in less visible ways to Dutch economic prosperity, like the development of maritime insurance.

    What was the relationship between artists and Dutch colonies?

    In the new school of painting, artists would sometimes travel to the Dutch colonies. For example, Frans Post travelled to Dutch Brazil and painted the sugar plantations and mills. Another artist named Maria Sibylla Merian went to Dutch Suriname, where she studied butterflies and plants on the Dutch sugar plantations.

    Both depict landscapes and the natural world but don’t directly engage with the profound dehumanisation of slavery, and an economic system dependent on enslaved labour. But this doesn’t mean that it’s absent in their sanitised renditions.

    Among the sources that I used to think about the presence of the transatlantic slave trade in a culture that did not overtly depict it were inventories of paintings and early museum collections. Often the language in these sources differed from the painting in important ways. They demonstrate how the violence of the system emerges in unexpected places.

    One inventory that describes paintings by Frans Post, for example, also narrates the physical punishment meted out if the enslaved tried to run away from the Dutch sugar plantations. This isn’t depicted in the painting, but it is part of the inventory that travelled beside the painting.

    These moments reveal the profound presence of this system within Dutch painting, and point to the ways in which artists negotiated making this structure invisible in their paintings although they were not able to completely erase its presence.

    How do you discuss Rembrandt’s paintings in your book?

    Historically, studies of the transatlantic slave trade in early modern painting (about 1400-1700) have looked at paintings that directly depict either enslaved or Black individuals.

    One of the points of this book is that this limits our understanding of the transatlantic slave trade in Dutch painting. A focus on blackness, for example, precludes understanding how whiteness is constructed at the same time. It fails to recognise the ways in which artists sought to diminish the presence of the slave trade in their sanitised rendition of Dutch society.

    Syndics of the Draper’s Guild by Rembrandt. Txllxt TxllxT/Wikimedia Commons/Rijksmuseum

    One painting that I use to think about this is Rembrandt van Rijn’s very famous work called Syndics of the Draper’s Guild. It’s a group portrait of wealthy, white merchants gathered around a table looking at a book of fabric samples.

    Although there aren’t enslaved or black individuals depicted, this painting would be impossible without the transatlantic slave trade. Cloth from the Netherlands was often exchanged for enslaved people in west Africa, for example.

    In my book, I draw attention to these understudied histories to understand how certain assumptions around whiteness, privilege, and wealth developed in tandem with an emerging visual vocabulary around blackness and the transformation of individual lives into chattel property.

    What do you hope readers will take away from the book?

    I hope that readers will think about how many of our ideas about freedom, the middle class, art markets, and economic prosperity began in the 17th-century Dutch Republic. As this book demonstrates, a central part of this narrative that has been overlooked was the transatlantic slave trade in building this fantasy.

    This is in many ways an invention that traces back to the paintings of overt consumption and wealth produced in the Dutch Republic – like Vermeer’s interiors of Dutch homes.


    Read more: How we proved a Rembrandt painting owned by the University of Pretoria was a fake


    My aim with this book is to present not only a more complex view of Dutch painting but also a reconsideration of certain dogmas today around prosperity and the art market. The rise of our current financial system, art markets and visible celebration of landscapes, seascapes and interior scenes are all inseparable from the transformation of individual lives into property. We live with this legacy today in our systems built on racial, economic and gendered inequalities.

    – Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting
    – https://theconversation.com/rereading-rembrandt-how-the-slave-trade-helped-establish-the-golden-age-of-dutch-painting-247918

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

    What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

    The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

    The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

    They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

    As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.


    Read more: Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight


    And the conflict still rages.

    One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

    It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

    It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

    Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

    My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

    Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

    An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.


    Read more: Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions


    Use of force

    In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

    Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

    But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

    The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

    At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

    To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

    The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.


    Read more: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle


    Resistance to outside intervention

    In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

    One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

    In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

    America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

    The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

    The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.


    Read more: Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability


    Looking ahead

    Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

    Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

    People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

    Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

    Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

    Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

    The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

    It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

    Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

    Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

    – Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it
    – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gerrit Kurtz, Peace and Conflict Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

    Intense fighting has ravaged Sudan since 15 April 2023. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Famine, displacement and mass atrocities are wreaking havoc in the country.

    International mediation efforts have been lacklustre and fruitless. The United Nations security council has been preoccupied with other crises and blocked by its own divisions. The African Union has created diplomatic groups, a high-level panel and a presidential committee, none of which has been particularly active. It has been very slow in tackling the political process it wanted to lead.

    The US and Saudi Arabia convened several rounds of talks, first in Jeddah, then in Switzerland. The Sudanese Armed Forces delegation failed to turn up in Switzerland. The Rapid Support Forces expressed willingness to talk peace, while simultaneously committing sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale. The Biden administration only lately slapped sanctions on the top leaders of both forces, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).

    I have studied civil wars, mediation and peacebuilding for more than 12 years, with a focus on Sudan, including regular visits to the country and the region in the past five years. Based on this experience I have identified five reasons why mediation has failed. These are: the resistance of the conflict parties based on the dynamic nature of the war; continued military and financial aid by their external sponsors; as well as mediation attempts that were too narrow, not viewed as impartial, and lacking in coherence.

    Clearly, a new approach to mediation is needed, not simply a new mediator. Turkey has recently offered to lead talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces, but Egypt, Kenya and several multilateral organisations also keep looking for opportunities.

    Any new initiative will have to have certain components if it’s going to succeed:

    • political parameters, ideally set by a parallel civilian political process, of what might come next for Sudan should guide mediators

    • negotiations should take place in secret so that trust can be established

    • back channel communications networks must be established with potential spoilers without ceding undue legitimacy to them

    • a gender- and youth-inclusive approach

    • more effective international coordination

    • consistent pressure on the conflict parties and their external backers.

    Why previous mediation efforts failed

    Firstly, neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have shown significant willingness to stop hostilities.

    The military fortunes of the two sides has waxed and waned. As long as either side feels successful militarily, they are unlikely to commit to sincere negotiations. Outright military victory leading to control of the whole territory (and its borders) remains out of reach for all.

    Secondly, their respective allies have not shown any particular interest in peace.

    External actors have provided military support to the warring parties, and helped finance them. The UAE is the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese Armed Forces cooperates with Egypt, Eritrea, Iran and Russia, for arms deliveries and training. The UAE promised the US to stop supporting the Rapid Support Forces, but the arms flows continued.

    Thirdly, some conflict management efforts were based on a flawed conflict analysis. There were attempts to organise a face-to-face meeting between Hemedti and Burhan, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. But the war is not primarily a contest of “two generals”. Neither Hemedti nor Burhan has full control of their forces. Nor is a renewed military government acceptable to large parts of Sudan’s vibrant civil society.

    Fourth, mediation efforts suffered because some of the parties saw them as lacking impartiality. Sudanese Armed Forces leaders don’t trust Kenya, whose President William Ruto is closely aligned with the UAE and has, until recently, allowed the Rapid Support Forces to conduct meetings and a press conference in Nairobi. Kenya was supposed to lead the Intergovernmental Authority on Development quartet of mediators, which never really got off the ground. Similarly, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union.

    Finally, there was a competition of mediation platforms, allowing the warring parties to shop for the most convenient forum for them.

    What a path to a ceasefire might look like

    International attention is currently focused on Turkish president Recep Erdogan, who has offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces has harshly criticised the UAE for its support to the Rapid Support Forces. The offer, then, is based on the assumption the UAE might actually cease that support.

    Any new approach should differ from previous efforts.

    • Mediators should provide a broad sense of political parameters for a post-war (interim) order, ideally with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. Those could include a conditional amnesty as well as assurances of personal safety for the top military leaders and of some stake in a transitional period, without promising any blanket impunity or renewed power-sharing.

    But international mediators should grant the warring parties political recognition and legitimacy only in exchange for feasible concessions.

    • Negotiations should take place in secret, allowing confidential exchanges between declared enemies. This is particularly important for the Sudanese Armed Forces given the rivalry among its leadership.

    • Back channel communications should be established to all actors with real constituencies in Sudan, without empowering them unnecessarily. Turkey is well-placed to reach out to senior members of the previous (Bashir) regime who have found exile there. They control large parts of the fighting forces on the side of Sudanese Armed Forces and could prove to be a major spoiler. The armed groups in the so-called “joint forces” would also need to feel somewhat included.

    • Mediators should find ways to include a broad array of civilian actors, in particular women and youth groups. Instead of only targeting “men with guns”, a peace process should be gender-inclusive.

    • Any lead mediator should keep other interested parties such as the EU, the UK, Norway, and the other countries and organisations already mentioned, informed and engaged.

    • Pressure should be kept up by the US, UK and EU on external backers of the two main warring parties, and target both military and financial flows. Policies, including further targeted sanctions, should be as aligned as possible.

    Preparing for a window of opportunity

    There’s no guarantee that the violence would cease even if these conditions were met. The main belligerents are likely to continue their current offensives. The Sudanese Armed Forces will try to oust the Rapid Support Forces from central Khartoum completely. The Rapid Support Forces will keep trying to take El Fasher, the only capital in Darfur not under their control.

    The impending re-capture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces may provide an opportunity for a new round of talks, if it comes with consistent international pressure. Mediators should be ready to push for an end to the fighting.

    – Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work
    – https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-a-fresh-mediation-effort-is-needed-how-it-could-work-248330

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Canada: The Canada-Poland Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Canada and Poland’s relationship is steadfast, from our mutual commitment to transatlantic and energy security to our common pursuit of a more sustainable planet. Together, we stand united and determined to create a safer and more prosperous world today – and for generations to come.

    Today, the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, concluded his trip to Warsaw, Poland, where he signed the landmark Canada-Poland Nuclear Cooperation Agreement alongside the Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk.

    Once in force, the Agreement will deepen ties between Canadian and Polish energy sectors, enabling Canadian companies to apply their nuclear expertise to support Poland’s energy transition and enhance energy security for Poland and the region. It will create good well-paying jobs and opportunities for people on both sides of the Atlantic, while reinforcing Canada and Poland’s shared commitment to nuclear co-operation, non-proliferation, safety, and security. This collaboration will help Poland enhance its clean energy sector and accelerate its efforts to phase out coal from its energy mix.

    This Agreement complements other initiatives to strengthen Canada and Poland’s bilateral relationship, including the General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA), which was signed earlier this month. Once implemented, the GSOIA will enhance information sharing between Canada and Poland and create business opportunities for companies in industries such as defence, security, aerospace, marine, and nuclear.

    Prime Minister Trudeau also held bilateral meetings with his Polish counterparts, including Prime Minister Tusk, the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, and the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski. As the world marks 80 years since the liberation of the Auschwitz Birkenau German Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camp, they agreed on the importance of combatting antisemitism and hate across the globe.

    The leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to transatlantic security and underlined the importance of providing military, financial, humanitarian, and other support for Ukraine as it continues to defend itself against Russia’s unjustifiable war of aggression. Prime Minister Trudeau emphasized that supporting Ukraine will continue to be a priority for Canada, particularly in the context of its 2025 G7 Presidency.

    Prime Minister Trudeau reiterated his thanks to the people of Poland for their hospitality during his two-day visit to the country and reaffirmed Canada’s desire to continue deepening ties with Poland in the years to come.

    Quote

    “By working together to advance nuclear technology, Canada and Poland are pushing innovation forward and accelerating energy security. Once in force, the newly signed Canada-Poland Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will promote Canadian innovators, create good-paying jobs, and combine Polish and Canadian expertise in the sector. It’s a testament to Canada’s commitment to building a more secure future, alongside our closest Allies.”

    Quick Facts

    • In 2023, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and the National Atomic Energy Agency of Poland signed a Memorandum of Understanding on small modular reactors (SMR), paving the way for increased exchanges on best practices and technical reviews related to SMR technology.
    • Poland does not yet generate nuclear power commercially, but it has comprehensive plans to use both large-scale and SMR nuclear technology.
    • Canada expects to be the first G7 country to have the first operational SMR, the GE-Hitachi BWRX-300, by 2029. It is under active development by Ontario Power Generation at its Darlington Nuclear Station, and Poland is watching developments at Darlington closely, as it plans to deploy the same SMR technology shortly thereafter.
    • In 2023, on the margins of the 28th meeting of the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Canada, Poland, and over twenty other nations endorsed a statement calling for the tripling of nuclear energy capacity by 2050.
    • Yesterday in Kraków, Poland, the Prime Minister announced $3.4 million in new funding to combat antisemitism, preserve Holocaust remembrance, and educate against Holocaust denial and distortion in Canada and around the world.
    • Canada and Poland enjoy a close-knit and multifaceted defence partnership. Canada takes pride in being the first NATO country to have ratified Poland’s membership, in 1998. Polish troops are deployed to the Canada-led NATO Multinational Brigade in Latvia.
    • Poland is Canada’s largest trading partner in Central and Eastern Europe. In 2023, bilateral merchandise trade between the two countries totalled $4.1 billion.
    • The warm ties between our peoples serve as the foundation of our countries’ strong bilateral relationship. Close to one million Canadians of Polish descent call Canada home.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: More Than $100M Awarded to Pro-Housing Communities

    Source: US State of New York

    January 28, 2025

    Albany, NY

    Governor Kathy Hochul today announced new investments of more than $100 million for projects located in certified Pro-Housing Communities, part of a total $123 million allocated as part of the latest round of the State’s Regional Economic Development Council initiative. Governor Hochul’s Pro-Housing Communities initiative allocates up to $650 million each year in discretionary funds for communities that pledge to modestly increase their housing supply; to date, 273 communities across New York have been certified as Pro-Housing Communities. This year, Governor Hochul is proposing an additional $110 million in funding to cover infrastructure and planning costs for Pro-Housing Communities.

    “There’s only one solution to New York’s housing affordability crisis: we’ve got to build more housing,” Governor Hochul said. “The Pro-Housing Communities initiative is delivering the incentives communities are looking for, and this latest round of grant funding will make a real difference in every region of New York. We’re proud of all the certified Pro-Housing Communities in New York and look forward to seeing their continued growth.”

    Empire State Development President, CEO and Commissioner Hope Knight said, “The Round XIV awards demonstrate how local priorities align with the state’s economic development goals – especially in our Pro-Housing Communities. The overwhelming response to the new Capital Improvement Grants program reflects how municipalities are eager to strengthen their foundations while addressing critical housing needs. Under Governor Hochul’s leadership, we continue to create new and dynamic opportunities to create jobs and generate sustainable and equitable growth throughout New York State.”

    New York State Homes and Community Renewal Commissioner RuthAnne Visnauskas said, “Governor Hochul has been clear – municipalities who share our vision for smart housing growth will be rewarded. Through these $100 million awards announced today, Pro-Housing Communities will receive a financial boost to their efforts to upgrade infrastructure, strengthen their economies, and embark on projects that improve the quality-of-life for New Yorkers. We thank the Governor for her continued leadership and applaud our partners at the local level who are working diligently in every region of the state to find solutions to the housing shortage.”

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    Regional Economic Development Council Round XIV

    Round XIV of the Regional Council initiative further advanced Governor Hochul’s housing agenda by including a new program featuring funding earmarked for projects located in Pro-Housing Communities, as certified by Homes and Community Renewal (HCR). The Capital Improvement Grants for Pro-Housing Communities Program, administered by Empire State Development (ESD), made up to $40 million available to municipalities, counties and not-for-profits to support capital improvement and placemaking projects within Pro-Housing Communities. Due to an overwhelming response in applications and high demand, more than $55 million is being awarded to support these projects, reflecting the strong pro-housing commitment of the State’s municipalities.

    Three other programs in Round XIV were included in the Pro-Housing Community designation: ESD’s Grants and Market New York programs, and HCR’s New York Main Street program. Additionally, more than $9 million in Excelsior Jobs Program tax credits have been awarded to support the job creation and investment goals in projects located throughout the State. In the coming weeks, more than $250 million will be awarded to Pro-Housing Communities from the Downtown Revitalization Initiative, New York Forward and Mid-Hudson Momentum Programs.

    Select projects in Pro-Housing Communities from Round XIV include:

    • Capital Region – Schenectady Community Action Program – SCAP Campus: In partnership with DePaul Properties, Inc., SCAP will construct a building to house a new child care center, program space and administrative offices for its wide array of family support services, including employment services, supportive housing services and individual and family crisis intervention. The new site is in a New York State-designated child care desert and will provide new classrooms for comprehensive child care slots. The building is expected to be part of a larger mixed-use redevelopment that will create a one-of-a-kind campus in the City of Schenectady where housing, child care and family support services are co-located. ESD Grant – $4.975 million; Total Project Cost – $12.4 million.
    • Central New York – SEED Syracuse, Inc. – Chimes Building: The not-for-profit group will redevelop the Chimes Building into a mixed-use, mixed-income building. The project will create several residential units available to a mix of incomes and includes commercial space to house telecommunications tenants that serve as a fiber optic hub, providing internet access for roughly half of the City of Syracuse, including hospitals, fire departments, local businesses and residential users. ESD Grant – $1.25 million; Total Project Cost – $40.7 million.
    • Finger Lakes – Rochester Housing Authority – Fernwood Avenue Library & Mixed-Use Development: The project includes building a new branch of the Rochester Public Library System within a four-story, 80,000 square foot mixed-use building that includes affordable housing. The site will include 65 housing units with space for the new library to also provide support services, computer training and workforce development. Community Action Agencies will help coordinate and administer an integrated system of support services, creating new opportunities for success through targeted education and training efforts. The new building will be located on a Brownfield site. Capital Improvement for Pro-Housing Communities – $775,000; Total Project Cost – $4 million.
    • Long Island – Town of Riverhead – Downtown Riverfront Amphitheater: The Town will create a riverfront amphitheater and public park. Due to their location below the flood plain and increasing flood risks from climate change, the buildings will be relocated to the northern end of the property and elevated on new foundations. The southern end, with a 13-foot slope, will be converted into tiered seating with a stage and bandshell near the Peconic River. This design leverages the natural slope to protect the buildings while creating a flood barrier. The amphitheater will double as a public park, hosting activities like exercise classes, movie nights and children’s events. Capital Improvement Grant for Pro-Housing Communities – $1.4 million; Total Project Cost – $2.8 million.
    • Mid-Hudson – Habitat for Humanity of Dutchess County, Inc. – Taylor Ave. Development: Working in partnership with the City of Poughkeepsie, HFHDC will undertake the site preparation and construction of a mixed-use development that includes a child care center and housing units, with a portion of the units dedicated to senior and workforce housing. The project involves comprehensive site planning, modular townhouse designs, and the integration of necessary infrastructure such as roads, utilities and green spaces. ESD Grant – $1.6 million; Total Project Cost – $14.5 million.
    • Mohawk Valley – Municipal Housing Authority of the City of Utica (People First) – THRIVE Cornhill: This project will integrate two mixed-use buildings in the Cornhill section of Utica, offering two Community Impact Centers and several mixed-income apartments. The Impact Centers will support community-focused programs including a multipurpose gym, urban grocery, coworking space, test kitchen, entrepreneurial incubator, dance, art space and a courtyard. Capital Improvements for Pro-Housing Communities – $3 million; Total Project Cost – $17.6 million.
    • New York City – Brooklyn Navy Yard Development Corporation – Center for Planetary Health: The Center will establish a cutting-edge biotech innovation hub at Newlab in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. C4PH is purpose-built to accelerate the commercialization of non-therapeutic life sciences that can be applied to address climate change. The Center will be able to support over 30 companies, focusing on sectors like agriculture, textiles and building materials. ESD Grant – $1.6 million; Total Project Cost – $8 million.
    • North Country – Village of Massena – Raw Water Capital Project: The Village will construct a secondary raw water transmission line from the Massena Intake Dam to the water treatment plant. The new line will provide redundancy in the case of an emergency or routine maintenance, should the older main line fail. It will provide critical water service to residential, commercial, and industrial users in the Village and Town of Massena, plus Norfolk and Louisville. The line will also include new taps for the extension of raw water service to the proposed Air Products Green Hydrogen Facility. Capital Improvement Grant for Pro-Housing Communities – $2.34 million; Total Project Cost – $4.69 million.
    • Southern Tier – Village of Dryden – Water and Sewer Infrastructure Improvements: The Village will upgrade its water and sewer infrastructure as the first phase in having several hundred workforce apartments being built as Ezra Village in Tompkins County. The water improvements include extending water mains, and the sewer infrastructure upgrades include replacing several thousand feet of pipeline. Capital Improvements for Pro-Housing Communities – $1.82 million; Total Project Cost – $3.64 million.
    • Western New York – Jewish Community Center of Greater Buffalo, Inc. – Workforce Child Care Initiative: The project includes the construction of a two-story child care center on the Buffalo Niagara Medical Campus that will provide much needed service and provide specialized space for children with special needs. Partnerships within the campus like BestSelf Behavior Health and Buffalo Hearing and Speech will enable the new center to offer specialized resources and services to children in need, and a space to host these services for parents and their children. ESD Grant – $3 million; Total Project Cost – $8.2 million.

    More information on the projects awarded through the 2024 Regional Economic Development Council initiative, including a full list of awardees, is available here.

    There’s only one solution to New York’s housing affordability crisis: we’ve got to build more housing.”

    Governor Hochul

    Governor Hochul’s Housing Agenda

    Today, Governor Hochul announced that 273 municipalities have been certified as Pro-Housing Communities. The Governor is committed to addressing New York’s housing crisis and making the State more affordable and more livable for all New Yorkers.

    As part of her 2025 State of the State, Governor Hochul proposed a bold plan to make owning and renting a home more affordable. The Governor proposed bolstering the Pro-Housing Community Program by investing $100 million to support critical housing infrastructure projects and providing $10.5 million technical assistance grants to help communities adopt pro-housing policies. The Governor also proposed creating the State’s first revolving loan fund to spur mixed-income rental development outside of New York City, as well as legislation to address rent-price fixing collusion by landlords, increase the effectiveness of State tax credits that support affordable housing development, and extending security deposit protections that market rate tenants currently have to rent-regulated tenants.

    Additionally, Governor Hochul proposed new steps to make homeownership more accessible and affordable to all New Yorkers, including funding for starter home development and first-time homebuyer downpayment assistance, and disincentivizing private equity firms from buying single-family and two-family homes across the State. The State of the State also proposes increased support for supportive housing that serves some of the most vulnerable New Yorkers.

    As part of the FY25 Enacted Budget, the Governor secured a landmark agreement to increase New York’s housing supply through new tax incentives for Upstate communities, new incentives and relief from certain State-imposed restrictions to create more housing in New York City, a $500 million capital fund to build up to 15,000 new homes on State-owned property, an additional $600 million in funding to support a variety of housing developments statewide and new protections for renters and homeowners.

    In addition, as part of the FY23 Enacted Budget, the Governor announced a five-year, $25 billion Housing Plan to create or preserve 100,000 affordable homes statewide, including 10,000 with support services for vulnerable populations, plus the electrification of an additional 50,000 homes. More than 55,000 homes have been created or preserved to date.

    Embedded Flickr Album

    State Senator Brian Kavanagh said, “Addressing our statewide housing shortage requires that we use all the tools we have. Today’s announcement by Governor Kathy Hochul underscores our collective commitment to fostering vibrant, sustainable communities, while incentivizing localities to be open to producing more housing. I am proud to support the State budget that makes these funds available and I commend the Governor, Housing Commissioner RuthAnne Visnauskas, and their colleagues in the administration for effectively implementing and growing the Pro-Housing initiative.”

    State Senator Sean Ryan said, “New York’s housing affordability crisis is a problem we can solve, but it’s going to require creative ideas and consistent support for a wide range of programs to deal with this problem’s many causes. I thank Governor Hochul for her commitment to meeting this challenge, and I look forward to continuing to work together to implement solutions that address the unique problems facing Upstate communities.”

    Assemblymember Linda B. Rosenthal said, “Communities in every region of the state need to step up to the plate to build a more affordable New York. With the latest round of funding awarded by the Regional Economic Development Council, public housing authorities and non-profit organizations will be able to create much-needed affordable housing for those who are struggling to stay financially afloat in the Empire State. As we look toward the start of another budget season, I am once again committed to fighting for every available cent to build and preserve our state’s affordable housing stock. I applaud the Governor’s tenacity in addressing the housing crisis and her continued partnership on this critical issue.”

    Assemblymember Al Stirpe said, “Today’s announcement of ESD Round XIV grants truly benefits the Pro-Housing Communities as well as addresses critical needs throughout the state. Here in Central New York, SEED Syracuse, Inc. received funding for their project creating mixed income housing and commercial space in the City of Syracuse by redeveloping an iconic 1929 office building. Funding local projects in Pro-Housing Communities strengthens the fundamental economic base in these municipalities. Whether it is supporting child care, water infrastructure, innovative technologies, or libraries, all contribute to enhancing the daily lives of New Yorkers and the health of their neighborhoods and the region. Governor Hochul has taken the lead to address the state’s housing needs while, at the same time, reinforcing job creation and a spectrum of economic development opportunities.”

    Assemblymember Angelo Santabarbara said, “This initiative is about more than housing—it’s about creating opportunity and building a foundation for families to thrive. Growing up in the City of Schenectady, I saw how challenging it was for families like mine to get by without the resources we’re now able to provide. Investments like these in affordable housing, child care, and support services give families the tools they need to build a brighter future. I’m grateful for the collaboration and shared vision that made this possible, and I look forward to seeing how these projects transform our communities for generations to come.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Fowler, Starr Director of the Research and Academic Program, Clark Art Institute, and lecturer in Art History, Williams College

    Detail from Rembrandt van Rijn’s painting Two African Men. Sailko/The Mauritshuis/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    The so-called golden age of Dutch painting in the 1600s coincided with an economic boom that had a lot to do with the transatlantic slave trade. But how did the slave trade shape the art market in the Netherlands? And how is it reflected in the paintings of the time?

    This is the subject of a new book called Slavery and the Invention of Dutch Art by art historian Caroline Fowler. We asked about her study.

    What was Dutch art about before slavery and what was the golden age?

    The earliest paintings that would be called Dutch were predominantly religious. They were made for Christian devotion. In the 1500s, major divisions in the church led to a fragmentation of Christianity called the Reformation.

    In this new religious climate, artists began to create new types of paintings, studying the world around them. They included landscapes, seascapes, still lifes, and interior scenes of their homes. Instead of working for the church, many painters began to work within an art market. There was a rising middle class that could afford to buy paintings.

    Historically, this period in Dutch economic prosperity has been called the “golden age”. This is when many of the most famous Dutch painters worked, such as Rembrandt van Rijn and Johannes Vermeer.

    Their work was made possible by a strong Dutch economy built on global trade networks. This included the transatlantic slave trade and the rise of the middle class. Although artists did not directly paint the transatlantic slave trade, in my book I argue that it is central to understanding the paintings produced in the 1600s as it made the economic market possible.

    In turn, many of the types of painting that developed, like maritime scenes and interior scenes, are often obliquely or directly about international trade. The slave trade is a haunting presence in these images.

    How did this play out within Dutch colonialism?

    The new “middle class” consisted of economically prosperous merchants, artisans, lawyers and doctors. For many of the wealthiest merchants, their prosperity was fuelled by their investments in trade overseas. In land and plantations, and also commodities such as sugar, salt, mace and nutmeg.




    Read more:
    Slavery, tax evasion, resistance: the story of 11 Africans in South America’s gold mines in the 1500s


    Slavery was illegal within the boundaries of the Dutch Republic on the European continent. But it was widely practised within Dutch colonies around the world. Slavery was central to their trade overseas – from the inter-Asian slave network that made possible their domination in the export of nutmeg, to the use of enslaved labour on plantations in the Americas. It also contributed in less visible ways to Dutch economic prosperity, like the development of maritime insurance.

    What was the relationship between artists and Dutch colonies?

    In the new school of painting, artists would sometimes travel to the Dutch colonies. For example, Frans Post travelled to Dutch Brazil and painted the sugar plantations and mills. Another artist named Maria Sibylla Merian went to Dutch Suriname, where she studied butterflies and plants on the Dutch sugar plantations.

    Both depict landscapes and the natural world but don’t directly engage with the profound dehumanisation of slavery, and an economic system dependent on enslaved labour. But this doesn’t mean that it’s absent in their sanitised renditions.

    Among the sources that I used to think about the presence of the transatlantic slave trade in a culture that did not overtly depict it were inventories of paintings and early museum collections. Often the language in these sources differed from the painting in important ways. They demonstrate how the violence of the system emerges in unexpected places.

    One inventory that describes paintings by Frans Post, for example, also narrates the physical punishment meted out if the enslaved tried to run away from the Dutch sugar plantations. This isn’t depicted in the painting, but it is part of the inventory that travelled beside the painting.

    These moments reveal the profound presence of this system within Dutch painting, and point to the ways in which artists negotiated making this structure invisible in their paintings although they were not able to completely erase its presence.

    How do you discuss Rembrandt’s paintings in your book?

    Historically, studies of the transatlantic slave trade in early modern painting (about 1400-1700) have looked at paintings that directly depict either enslaved or Black individuals.

    One of the points of this book is that this limits our understanding of the transatlantic slave trade in Dutch painting. A focus on blackness, for example, precludes understanding how whiteness is constructed at the same time. It fails to recognise the ways in which artists sought to diminish the presence of the slave trade in their sanitised rendition of Dutch society.

    One painting that I use to think about this is Rembrandt van Rijn’s very famous work called Syndics of the Draper’s Guild. It’s a group portrait of wealthy, white merchants gathered around a table looking at a book of fabric samples.

    Although there aren’t enslaved or black individuals depicted, this painting would be impossible without the transatlantic slave trade. Cloth from the Netherlands was often exchanged for enslaved people in west Africa, for example.

    In my book, I draw attention to these understudied histories to understand how certain assumptions around whiteness, privilege, and wealth developed in tandem with an emerging visual vocabulary around blackness and the transformation of individual lives into chattel property.

    What do you hope readers will take away from the book?

    I hope that readers will think about how many of our ideas about freedom, the middle class, art markets, and economic prosperity began in the 17th-century Dutch Republic. As this book demonstrates, a central part of this narrative that has been overlooked was the transatlantic slave trade in building this fantasy.

    This is in many ways an invention that traces back to the paintings of overt consumption and wealth produced in the Dutch Republic – like Vermeer’s interiors of Dutch homes.




    Read more:
    How we proved a Rembrandt painting owned by the University of Pretoria was a fake


    My aim with this book is to present not only a more complex view of Dutch painting but also a reconsideration of certain dogmas today around prosperity and the art market. The rise of our current financial system, art markets and visible celebration of landscapes, seascapes and interior scenes are all inseparable from the transformation of individual lives into property. We live with this legacy today in our systems built on racial, economic and gendered inequalities.

    Caroline Fowler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Rereading Rembrandt: how the slave trade helped establish the golden age of Dutch painting – https://theconversation.com/rereading-rembrandt-how-the-slave-trade-helped-establish-the-golden-age-of-dutch-painting-247918

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julius A. Amin, Professor of History, University of Dayton

    What began in late 2016 as a peaceful protest by lawyers and teachers in Cameroon’s North West and South West regions quickly turned violent and developed into what’s become known as Cameroon’s anglophone crisis.

    The protest was instigated by perceived marginalisation of Cameroon’s anglophone region, which makes up 20% of the nation’s 29 million people.

    The conflict has resulted in immense destruction and casualties. Cameroon’s military responded to the protest with arrests and torture. Voices that called for complete secession of the anglophone regions from the Republic of Cameroon gained momentum.

    They created a virtual Ambazonia Republic and an interim government in exile, and vowed to fight back. They formed a military wing, Ambazonia Self-Defence Force, which attacked and disrupted economic and social services in the region.

    As of October 2024, over 1.8 million people have needed humanitarian assistance. Over 584,000 have been internally displaced. Over 73,000 have become refugees in next-door Nigeria. Over 6,500 have been killed.




    Read more:
    Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight


    And the conflict still rages.

    One possible avenue that could be pursued to end the impasse is mediation, with help from other countries. But the Cameroonian government has repeatedly rebuffed intervention from organisations such as the African Union, arguing that the conflict is an internal affair.

    It also ended a government-sponsored mediation by the Swiss in 2022.

    It is clear to me, as a historian who has studied Cameroon foreign policy for the past three decades, that Cameroon’s leadership will not look to external actors to help solve their crisis.

    Founding leader Ahmadou Ahidjo, and later his successor Paul Biya, did not respond to external pressure to address issues. Cameroon’s diplomatic relations are based on respect of national sovereignty and nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs.

    My research shows that the Cameroonian leadership rejects outside intervention on issues it regards as within its sovereignty and internal affairs.

    Removing Cameroon from aid programmes such as the United States Agency for International Development programme and the African Growth and Opportunity Act has not deterred its leaders.

    An understanding of this background is crucial in the search for solutions to the ongoing anglophone crisis.




    Read more:
    Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions


    Use of force

    In the 1960s, Ahidjo used brutal force against a nationalist organisation called the Maquisard. His presidency was characterised by murders, imprisonments and torture.

    Political rivals were imprisoned or forced to go into exile. Biya, who served in Ahidjo’s government, learned that repressive measures work. As president, he used similar tactics against rivals and the opposition.

    But the use of force as a response to the anglophone protest was a miscalculation. The Biya regime failed to see the crisis in its context of changing times, misunderstood the sources of the conflict, and misread the role of social media in protest activities in the 21st century.

    The crisis originated from a series of grievances: poverty, unemployment, political and economic neglect of the anglophone region, failure to treat French and English as equal languages in the country, and disrespect and disregard of English-speaking Cameroonians.

    At the beginning protesters were generally peaceful, but things changed in 2017. Biya stated that Cameroon was being hijacked by “terrorists masking as secessionists” and vowed to eliminate them.

    To anglophone leaders it was a formal declaration of war, and the message spread quickly on social media. The Biya team did little to slow or stop its spread, and anglophones inside and outside the country accepted the message as fact. It mobilised the region. And few took the time to read the full text of his remarks.

    The brutality of the war on both sides intensified. Everything had all happened so quickly, and most did not anticipate the intensity of the violence.




    Read more:
    Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle


    Resistance to outside intervention

    In its diplomatic relations, Cameroon has a long history of protecting what it sees as its own business.

    One example was in 1992, after the US administration criticised Biya for electoral fraud. The Cameroon government fired back. Biya withdrew Cameroon’s ambassador from Washington DC, and informed the US ambassador that America should stay clear of Cameroon’s internal affairs.

    In 2008, tension erupted again when Biya changed Cameroon’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits. The US ambassador criticised the move in the Cameroonian press. Again, Cameroonian officials pushed back, asking the ambassador not to interfere in the nation’s internal politics.

    America’s disposition towards the anglophone crisis has been one of non-interference. Other major powers have responded similarly, asking both sides to end the violence.

    The Cameroon government has rebuffed initiatives from Switzerland and Canada, both friendly to the country, publicly stating it asked no nation to mediate.

    The rejection of the Swiss initiative was surprising, given that Biya spends much time in that country. Unlike the Swiss plan, in which conversations began, the Canadian initiative did not even take off.




    Read more:
    Cameroon’s rebels may not achieve their goal of creating the Ambazonian state – but they’re still a threat to stability


    Looking ahead

    Measurable indicators show that the Biya regime is failing to end the anglophone crisis. The killings – including those of law enforcement officers – kidnaps, brutality and ransom demands are now normalised in the anglophone region, especially in rural areas.

    Biya’s Grand National Dialogue and National Commission for the Promotion of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism have failed to address the sources of the crisis. Locals dismiss them as a joke.

    People are exasperated by public service announcements about what the government has achieved. Their condition remains much worse than it was in the pre-crisis period.

    Ordinary people are focused on bread-and-butter issues and the desire for dignity and respect. But they don’t see it.

    Young Cameroonians need to see both anglophone and francophone residents at every level of government, on every rung of the business ladder, in every management position, at every school — even on every billboard advertisement.

    Only such a widespread and visible approach can convincingly challenge Cameroon’s pattern of discrimination and exclusion.

    The Biya regime must commit to doing that and not be distracted by supporters urging him to be a candidate in the upcoming presidential election.

    It is important to track and bring to justice the apparent sponsors of the killings in the country. This must be done while government keeps its promises to make things right for those living in the anglophone regions.

    Finally, given China’s investment in Cameroon, it can do more to engage the Biya regime on the anglophone crisis. Like Cameroon, China’s policy also stipulates a policy of nonintervention, but it has repeatedly changed course when its strategic interests are threatened.

    Major power status demands major responsibilities, and showing the will to stop chronic human rights violations remains an important obligation.

    Julius A. Amin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Cameroon could do with some foreign help to solve anglophone crisis – but the state doesn’t want it – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-could-do-with-some-foreign-help-to-solve-anglophone-crisis-but-the-state-doesnt-want-it-244770

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gerrit Kurtz, Peace and Conflict Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

    Intense fighting has ravaged Sudan since 15 April 2023. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and its erstwhile comrades-in-arms, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Famine, displacement and mass atrocities are wreaking havoc in the country.

    International mediation efforts have been lacklustre and fruitless. The United Nations security council has been preoccupied with other crises and blocked by its own divisions. The African Union has created diplomatic groups, a high-level panel and a presidential committee, none of which has been particularly active. It has been very slow in tackling the political process it wanted to lead.

    The US and Saudi Arabia convened several rounds of talks, first in Jeddah, then in Switzerland. The Sudanese Armed Forces delegation failed to turn up in Switzerland. The Rapid Support Forces expressed willingness to talk peace, while simultaneously committing sexual and gender-based violence on a massive scale. The Biden administration only lately slapped sanctions on the top leaders of both forces, Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti).

    I have studied civil wars, mediation and peacebuilding for more than 12 years, with a focus on Sudan, including regular visits to the country and the region in the past five years. Based on this experience I have identified five reasons why mediation has failed. These are: the resistance of the conflict parties based on the dynamic nature of the war; continued military and financial aid by their external sponsors; as well as mediation attempts that were too narrow, not viewed as impartial, and lacking in coherence.

    Clearly, a new approach to mediation is needed, not simply a new mediator. Turkey has recently offered to lead talks between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the Rapid Support Forces, but Egypt, Kenya and several multilateral organisations also keep looking for opportunities.

    Any new initiative will have to have certain components if it’s going to succeed:

    • political parameters, ideally set by a parallel civilian political process, of what might come next for Sudan should guide mediators

    • negotiations should take place in secret so that trust can be established

    • back channel communications networks must be established with potential spoilers without ceding undue legitimacy to them

    • a gender- and youth-inclusive approach

    • more effective international coordination

    • consistent pressure on the conflict parties and their external backers.

    Why previous mediation efforts failed

    Firstly, neither the Sudanese Armed Forces nor the Rapid Support Forces have shown significant willingness to stop hostilities.

    The military fortunes of the two sides has waxed and waned. As long as either side feels successful militarily, they are unlikely to commit to sincere negotiations. Outright military victory leading to control of the whole territory (and its borders) remains out of reach for all.

    Secondly, their respective allies have not shown any particular interest in peace.

    External actors have provided military support to the warring parties, and helped finance them. The UAE is the main sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces. The Sudanese Armed Forces cooperates with Egypt, Eritrea, Iran and Russia, for arms deliveries and training. The UAE promised the US to stop supporting the Rapid Support Forces, but the arms flows continued.

    Thirdly, some conflict management efforts were based on a flawed conflict analysis. There were attempts to organise a face-to-face meeting between Hemedti and Burhan, by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union. But the war is not primarily a contest of “two generals”. Neither Hemedti nor Burhan has full control of their forces. Nor is a renewed military government acceptable to large parts of Sudan’s vibrant civil society.

    Fourth, mediation efforts suffered because some of the parties saw them as lacking impartiality. Sudanese Armed Forces leaders don’t trust Kenya, whose President William Ruto is closely aligned with the UAE and has, until recently, allowed the Rapid Support Forces to conduct meetings and a press conference in Nairobi. Kenya was supposed to lead the Intergovernmental Authority on Development quartet of mediators, which never really got off the ground. Similarly, Sudan remains suspended from the African Union.

    Finally, there was a competition of mediation platforms, allowing the warring parties to shop for the most convenient forum for them.

    What a path to a ceasefire might look like

    International attention is currently focused on Turkish president Recep Erdogan, who has offered to mediate between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the UAE. The Sudanese Armed Forces has harshly criticised the UAE for its support to the Rapid Support Forces. The offer, then, is based on the assumption the UAE might actually cease that support.

    Any new approach should differ from previous efforts.

    • Mediators should provide a broad sense of political parameters for a post-war (interim) order, ideally with strong input from Sudan’s civilian groups. Those could include a conditional amnesty as well as assurances of personal safety for the top military leaders and of some stake in a transitional period, without promising any blanket impunity or renewed power-sharing.

    But international mediators should grant the warring parties political recognition and legitimacy only in exchange for feasible concessions.

    • Negotiations should take place in secret, allowing confidential exchanges between declared enemies. This is particularly important for the Sudanese Armed Forces given the rivalry among its leadership.

    • Back channel communications should be established to all actors with real constituencies in Sudan, without empowering them unnecessarily. Turkey is well-placed to reach out to senior members of the previous (Bashir) regime who have found exile there. They control large parts of the fighting forces on the side of Sudanese Armed Forces and could prove to be a major spoiler. The armed groups in the so-called “joint forces” would also need to feel somewhat included.

    • Mediators should find ways to include a broad array of civilian actors, in particular women and youth groups. Instead of only targeting “men with guns”, a peace process should be gender-inclusive.

    • Any lead mediator should keep other interested parties such as the EU, the UK, Norway, and the other countries and organisations already mentioned, informed and engaged.

    • Pressure should be kept up by the US, UK and EU on external backers of the two main warring parties, and target both military and financial flows. Policies, including further targeted sanctions, should be as aligned as possible.

    Preparing for a window of opportunity

    There’s no guarantee that the violence would cease even if these conditions were met. The main belligerents are likely to continue their current offensives. The Sudanese Armed Forces will try to oust the Rapid Support Forces from central Khartoum completely. The Rapid Support Forces will keep trying to take El Fasher, the only capital in Darfur not under their control.

    The impending re-capture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces may provide an opportunity for a new round of talks, if it comes with consistent international pressure. Mediators should be ready to push for an end to the fighting.

    Gerrit Kurtz is also a non-resident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute and a member of the Forum New Security Policy of the Heinrich Böll Foundation.

    ref. Peace in Sudan: a fresh mediation effort is needed – how it could work – https://theconversation.com/peace-in-sudan-a-fresh-mediation-effort-is-needed-how-it-could-work-248330

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How people will be ringing in the year of the snake

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sijing Lu, Assistant Professor in Translation and Transcultural Studies, University of Warwick

    SeventyFour/Shutterstock

    Lunar new year is the most important traditional festival for the Chinese people, symbolising unity, prosperity and hope for the future. It is, however, celebrated all over Asia and in the diaspora.

    Unlike, the new year that is celebrated only on December 31 and January 1, lunar new year celebrations begin the month before and end days after the start of the new year.

    In the Chinese tradition, new year celebration begins on the eighth day of the 12th lunar month with the Laba festival (腊八节). On this day, it is customary to eat Laba congee, a porridge which is also known as “eight-treasure congee” because it’s often made with eight or more ingredients. This year the Laba festival fell on January 7.

    The biggest day in this period of celebration is, of course, new year, which this year falls on January 29.

    According to historical records, the Chinese people have been celebrating the lunar new year for over 4,000 years. Around 2,000BC, Shun, an ancient Chinese leader, ascended to the throne and led his followers in a worship ceremony to honour heaven and earth.

    This day was regarded as the beginning of the year, corresponding to the first day of the first lunar month. This event is believed to mark the origin of the lunar new year.

    During this festival, people typically express their hopes for prosperity and health in the coming year through family reunions and ancestor worship. Communities also host traditional activities to celebrate, such as lion dances, the giving of red envelopes, and putting up of spring couplets (pairs of poems written on red paper with black or gold characters), all of which symbolise good fortune and abundance.

    The traditional Chinese lunar new year reunion dinner includes many symbolic dishes. For example, eating fish represents abundance, dumplings symbolise reunion and wealth, and rice cakes signify progress and success.


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    But this day isn’t the end of celebrations. Instead, new year is celebrated up until the 15th day of the first lunar month when the lantern festival (元宵节) is celebrated. This festival coincides with the first full moon of the lunar year. On this day reconciliation, peace and forgiveness are sought.

    To celebrate, people will cover their houses with colourful lanterns, often with riddles written on them. Children will go out and try to solve these to win small gifts. There might be lion and dragon dances as well as parades and fireworks. People eat small glutinous rice balls, known as yuanxiao or tangyuan. The round shape symbolises wholeness and unity within the family.

    This year’s lantern festival – and the end of lunar new year celebrations – is on February 12. By this time, we will be well into 2025, which is the year of the snake.

    The year of the snake

    The year of the snake holds profound meaning and special significance in Chinese culture. The animal symbolises wisdom, spirituality, elegance and renewal.

    In Chinese traditions, the snake is also considered a “small dragon” and has a unique presence. Many scholars believe that the basic form of the dragon has evolved from the snake, with the snake’s body forming the main structure of the mythical beast.

    In ancient art, images of dragons and snakes often overlap, with motifs that appear simultaneously dragon-like and snake-like being very common.

    In ancient China, the snake was regarded as a mysterious and powerful creature. Its strong reproductive ability symbolised a continuous lineage and abundant offspring, while its ability to shed its skin and renew itself represented life and longevity. This process of renewal and rebirth highlighted the snake’s connection to cycles of growth and the passage of time.

    Beyond its physical traits, the snake was also revered for its intelligence and adaptability, often being portrayed as a creature of wisdom and strategy.

    These qualities have translated into cultural beliefs about people born in the year of the snake. For instance, for those born in this year, the snake’s flexibility and patience are seen as representing wisdom in problem-solving and overcoming challenges.

    Sijing Lu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How people will be ringing in the year of the snake – https://theconversation.com/how-people-will-be-ringing-in-the-year-of-the-snake-248468

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Southport attacks: why the UK needs a unified approach to all violent attacks on the public

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Barry Richards, Emeritus Professor of Political Psychology, Bournemouth University

    The conviction of Axel Rudakubana for the murder of three young girls in Southport has prompted many questions about how the UK handles violence without a clear ideological motive. This case has also shown up the confusion in this area, and made clear the need for a basic reframing of how we understand murderous violence against the public today.

    The home secretary may be right to keep Prevent focused on violent Islamist and extreme right-wing terror. Yet there needs to be a complementary but distinct strategy to protect against another Southport-style attacker.

    The prime minister, Keir Starmer, has come rather late to his observation that the nature of terrorism has changed. Over four years ago it was becoming clear that the “terrorist” threat was increasingly coming from those with no clear and consistent attachment to any specific ideology, let alone any terrorist organisation.

    This is borne out in the latest data on referrals to the Prevent counter-terrorism scheme. “Mixed, unstable and unclear” ideologies – when added to school massacre fixations and incel cases – outrank both extreme right-wing and Islamist categories.

    Rudakubana had an al-Qaida-linked document in his possession, and had claimed to be a victim of racism. But overall his motive was not at all ideological, but is to be found in his mental ill-health.


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    All the evidence presents him as a profoundly damaged individual who harboured an overwhelming need to inflict deathly violence, unconnected with any political aim. His choice of young children as victims is probably also of psychological significance.

    Thus it may not be quite right to say, as the home secretary Yvette Cooper and others have, that Prevent “failed”. A cluster of agencies do seem collectively to have failed here. But Prevent was not designed to deal with apolitical and apparently random attacks on people unknown to the perpetrator.

    What has failed is the conceptual frame underlying the UK’s counter-terrorism approach, which sees terrorism simply as an ideologically-driven response to the world. This understands it as basically different from attacks which are apparently not ideologically-driven, and so are seen as more idiosyncratic and psychological, like school massacres (though these have come to fall within Prevent’s remit).

    Internal drivers of violence

    However, it is also true that many of those who do have conventional terrorist aims are also driven by forces in their internal worlds.

    While often not given a psychiatric diagnosis, many people who have carried out attacks appear to have been emotionally dysfunctional. Evidence for this goes back at least as far as 9/11, to the personality of the ringleader Mohamed Atta. It has since been accumulating in what is known of many convicted attackers, including those with lengthy ideological rationales, such as Anders Breivik.

    The emergence of “incel” terror has further blurred the distinction between those with an apparent ideological rationale and those with obvious psychological problems.

    At the psychological level, there is no clear separation between lone actor ideological attackers and those who are supposedly non-ideological. Common to all is some disturbance within the self, one requiring the enactment of lethal violence.

    Ironically, the clear presence of psychological factors can also be seen – at a different level – in some of the people involved in the violent riots which occurred in response to the Southport murders. These were, in considerable part, the creation of online agitators, extreme right-wing activists and their bussed-in followers.

    But some who took part were more casual joiners of the riots. These were people of no fixed ideological abode who were drawn by the excitement of the occasion and the opportunity to attack the police and other symbols of social order. The same psychological motive may be attributed to the “Maga tourist” element among the January 2021 invaders of the Capitol building in Washington DC.

    Protecting the public

    Such problems of group-based violence in public spaces may be amenable to primarily political and policy solutions (albeit very difficult ones to achieve). However, individuals who may suddenly erupt into violence, ideological or not, are even more difficult to identify, assess, monitor and contain.

    The first step towards better protecting the public should be to recognise the psychological drivers of all such attacks. These include a preoccupation with grievance, often linked to a powerful sense of humiliation and psychological defences against that. For example, the hypermasculinity and fantasied omnipotence of Islamic State.

    It is necessary, for various reasons, to retain the legal category of terrorist attacks. But it should be a subcategory of a more inclusive approach that covers all violent attacks on the public.

    Where there is little or no consistent ideological element, the term terrorism, which has political connotations, should not be employed. Violence that doesn’t aim to promote a political objective would be better described as the infliction of terror on innocent members of the public, as a form of revenge upon the world or as an expression of hatred. Other political terms such as “radicalisation” and “extremism” may also be inappropriate or confusing when applied to such cases.

    A conceptual framework which makes that distinction, while also recognising the common psychological ground of the draw towards violence, would allow for more effective interventions.

    Prevent could continue its work (with much-needed improvements) to minimise ideologically rationalised attacks. But it would be coordinated with a complementary national agency that oversees and supports local services in identifying and managing people like Rudakubana. The face-to-face client work of both prongs would be guided and overseen by forensic psychiatrists and psychotherapists.

    There will be more people in both sub-categories coming along with very weak control of their violent impulses. They will need skilful management that understands the drivers of profound disturbance.

    Barry Richards does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Southport attacks: why the UK needs a unified approach to all violent attacks on the public – https://theconversation.com/southport-attacks-why-the-uk-needs-a-unified-approach-to-all-violent-attacks-on-the-public-248185

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: The US stock market does better under Democrat presidents than Republicans – here’s what the data shows

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

    The US has been experiencing a long “bull” stock market, that is rapid growth in stock prices, although this week tech stocks tumbled over the future prospects for US-built AI.

    But could the market hit a significant downturn during Trump’s second term in the White House? At first sight this seems unlikely because it did well during his first term, from 2016 to 2020 (see chart below). However, long term trends in the US stock market reveal a pattern suggesting that stock prices might be quite vulnerable during his second term.

    The Nobel prize-winning economist, Robert Shiller, who studies financial markets thinks that the US stock market has peaked, and future returns will be much more modest than in recent history although he does not suggest that a crash is on the horizon.

    The market under different presidents

    Shiller’s data makes it possible to look at the relationship between who is the president and stock prices since 1925. By examining the performance of the stock market over that period we can identify the extent to which eight Democrat and nine Republican presidents have influenced the growth of the market.

    Changes in stock prices during Republican presidents 1925 to 2024:

    The chart shows the percentage changes in the Standard and Poor’s monthly stock price index (which gives a snapshot of the market), corrected for inflation, during the incumbencies of Republican presidents since January 1925.

    The average increase in stock prices for Republican presidents was 25%. But the thing that stands out in the chart is that three major crashes in the stock market also took place under these Republicans incumbents.

    The first of these, known as the Wall Street Crash, occurred on October 28 1929 when Herbert Hoover was president. This was the trigger event for the Great Depression of the 1930s and resulted in a fall of 64% in the stock market during his presidency.

    His reaction to the crash (when share values fell dramatically) was to do nothing in the belief that the economy would eventually recover on its own. This cost him the 1932 presidential election when Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected for the first time. He was subsequently elected a record four times, thanks to his New Deal policies for dealing with the crisis.




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    DeepSeek: how a small Chinese AI company is shaking up US tech heavyweights


    The second crash occurred during Richard Nixon’s incumbency. He would have been impeached by Congress had he not resigned in August 1974 following the revelations of the Watergate scandal.

    This occurred when the White House employed burglars to break into the Democrat party headquarters in the Watergate building in Washington DC. Once Nixon’s attempt to spy on his opponents became public he was forced to resign and overall the stock market fell by 47% during his incumbency.

    The third crash occurred in December 2007 when George W Bush was the president. It had its origins in the deregulation of the financial sector which had occurred in the US after Ronald Reagan became president in 1980. Lax financial regulations led to ever increasingly risky assets and trading practices on Wall Street starting in the real estate market.

    US stock market opens.

    The crisis spread rapidly throughout the world’s financial system and a recession of the scale of the 1930s was only averted by prompt action by the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, who worked with political leaders in other countries such as UK prime minister Gordon Brown to stabilise the system. The stock market fell by 45% during Bush’s period of office.

    Many factors are at work to explain this, but the overriding fact is that Republicans are less likely to regulate the financial sector, or across the board, than Democrats. Their voters are more likely to be optimistic about the prospects for the economy, and therefore to take risks when investing in the stock market, when a Republican is in the White House.

    Changes in stock prices during Democratic presidents 1925 to 2024:

    The second chart shows changes in stock prices during the incumbencies of eight Democratic presidents during this period. It is very different from the Republican chart, since, of those presidents shown, only Jimmy Carter left office with the stock market lower than when he arrived, and that by a modest 13%.

    Bill Clinton was the most successful president, achieving an increase of 151% during his two terms in the White House. Overall, the stock market rose by an average of 51% during Democrat incumbencies, more than twice the size of the Republican increases.

    These results are surprising given that the Republicans are the traditional party of big business and so might be expected to be good for the stock market.

    Donald Trump has promised to increase tariffs on imports from the rest of the world, particularly those from China. In addition, there is a burgeoning budget deficit caused by the gap between spending and taxation.

    Most economists think these policies will create inflation and slow growth.

    Many investors are currently quite nervous about a possible recession after the long bull market of the last few years. The drop in the price of tech stocks this week confirms this. One effect of this has been to cause a rise in yields on US Treasury long-term bonds, reflecting fears of further inflation.

    Recent comparative research shows that countries can pay a high price for populist economic policies. So, it would be well worth Trump studying the history of US stock markets rises and falls, if he wants to avoid a severe economic downturn during his second term.

    Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC.

    ref. The US stock market does better under Democrat presidents than Republicans – here’s what the data shows – https://theconversation.com/the-us-stock-market-does-better-under-democrat-presidents-than-republicans-heres-what-the-data-shows-246652

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Suffocating seas: low oxygen levels emerging as third major threat to tropical coral reefs

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jennifer Mallon, Postdoctoral research fellow, Nova Southeastern University

    Corals in low-oxygen seawater may not show visible signs of stress. Mike Workman/Shutterstock

    Coral reef research has focused on the twin evils birthed by record-high greenhouse gas emissions: warming oceans and increasingly acidic seawater. These global threats are caused by seawater absorbing the excess heat and carbon dioxide that fossil fuel burning has added to the atmosphere. But there is another consequence that is seldom discussed.

    Globally, oceanic oxygen is being depleted because seawater holds less oxygen as it heats up. In the warm coastal waters where tropical coral reefs grow, the immediate effects of low oxygen concentrations can be catastrophic. Short-term hypoxia events are increasingly reported in which dissolved oxygen levels suddenly plummet – often triggered or exacerbated by chemical pollution running off the land, like nutrient-rich fertilisers – which can kill entire coral communities and decimate reefs within days.

    Corals are animals, and like other aquatic animals, they breathe in oxygen from the water to fuel their metabolism. Thanks to a symbiotic relationship with microscopic algae, corals also turn the Sun’s energy into food – oxygen is the byproduct.

    Oxygen levels on coral reefs naturally fluctuate in a daily cycle, with dissolved oxygen peaking around noon and gradually falling as the light fades. At night when photosynthesis stops, corals continue to respire (consume oxygen), and seawater oxygen is depleted.

    This cyclic rise and fall in oxygen means that some corals have already evolved strategies to withstand changes in dissolved oxygen. When the amount of oxygen available to corals falls below this natural range, corals can get stressed and their normal biological processes are disrupted, in many cases leading to death.

    Just like us, corals need oxygen to survive. But I (Jennifer Mallon) discovered that the effects of low oxygen on corals are not always obvious to the naked eye, and that juvenile corals may be especially vulnerable.

    Hard to spot signs

    To understand the effects of low oxygen levels on corals I travelled to the Smithsonian Marine Station in Florida, as part of a research project led by the University of Florida’s Andrew Altieri and the Smithsonian’s Maggie Johnson and Valerie Paul.

    At the Smithsonian, 24 climate-controlled seawater tanks simulate varying levels of deoxygenation already present on coral reefs around the world, ranging from severe deoxygenation, which our research observed on the Caribbean coast of Panama, to normal conditions, such as those replicated in aquariums around the world.

    Researchers recreated environmental conditions for corals in the lab.
    Jennifer Mallon

    While some corals, like the Caribbean staghorn coral (Acropora cervicornis),
    died within a few days of severe deoxygenation, other important reef-building species such as the mountainous star coral (Orbicella faveolata) survived, demonstrating that tolerance of low oxygen was different between species.

    When we studied the corals that survived deoxygenation, we discovered that hypoxic stress may not always be visible. Even when exposed to deoxygenation for two weeks, some corals showed no signs of bleaching, which is when the colourful algae depart and corals turn a ghostly white. More detailed measurements revealed something worrying: despite outward appearances, low oxygen exposure had impaired coral metabolism, potentially stunting their growth and reef-building abilities.

    Existing methods for measuring coral health in the field are mainly visual, and include assessments by trained divers who search for signs of paling or bleaching corals. The hypoxic stress responses we saw in our experiment could be going under the radar.

    Baby corals at risk

    We also wanted to know how deoxygenation affects a coral’s ability to breed.

    Coral sexual reproduction is already a tricky business. Spawning events, when corals release egg bundles into the water, occur just a few nights a year, and the resulting larvae are highly vulnerable. Few survive the multi-day swim to the reef where they settle and metamorphose into juvenile corals.

    On modern Caribbean reefs, wild juvenile corals are rare. People involved in restoring reefs help corals to sexually reproduce in the lab and rear the juveniles in order to later transplant them onto the reef.

    Juvenile corals often settle in reef crevices where they are exposed to lower oxygen levels for longer than in open water, because less water flows over them. When we incubated coral larvae in deoxygenated water throughout the settlement process, we found that initial rates of larval survival and settlement were not significantly affected.

    Things changed once the larvae had settled and begun to form juvenile corals. Early-stage juvenile corals, known as primary polyps, lack symbiotic algae to help them meet their nutritional needs via photosynthesis and so rely on respiration for energy. Without enough oxygen, they cannot respire properly and begin to die off.

    A coral spawning event off the coast of Queensland, Australia.
    Coral Brunner/Shutterstock

    Coral conservation in breathless waters

    Our research can help those involved in restoring reefs understand the oxygen needs of corals, as well as highlight a previously overlooked threat.

    Even corals that survive deoxygenation show signs of a weaker metabolism that will make it harder to conserve healthy reefs, as restoration relies on healthy coral growth to regenerate what is damaged.

    As a next step, field measurements of coral metabolism will be carried out on Florida’s barrier reef tract when oxygen levels are predicted to drop during the warm summer months, to capture the real impact of deoxygenation on coral health.

    Dissolved oxygen data has not always been collected as part of reef monitoring, even during warm water bleaching events when oxygen is low. As the climate crisis worsens, it will be imperative to do more of this monitoring in tropical coastal waters. Further research into how distinct coral species respond to hypoxia is also essential for targeted conservation strategies.

    By confronting the silent threat of deoxygenation head on, we can safeguard the future of coral reefs and the countless marine species that depend on them.

    Jennifer Mallon receives funding from US-UK Fulbright Commission, Smithsonian Institution Fellowship Program, University of Glasgow Early Career Mobility Award and the Link Foundation.

    Adrian Michael Bass receives funding from the Natural Environmental Research Council.

    Maggie D. Johnson has received funding from NOAA’s Coastal Hypoxia Research Program and the Smithsonian Marine Global Earth Observatory.

    ref. Suffocating seas: low oxygen levels emerging as third major threat to tropical coral reefs – https://theconversation.com/suffocating-seas-low-oxygen-levels-emerging-as-third-major-threat-to-tropical-coral-reefs-224805

    MIL OSI – Global Reports