Source: IMF – News in Russian
March 6, 2025
SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF
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MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF press briefing. It is very good to see you all, both those of you who are here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.
I am Julie Kozak, Director of the Communications Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. I will start with a short announcement and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center.
The 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21 through Saturday, April 26. Press registration to attend the spring meetings in person in Washington D.C. is now open and you can register through www.IMFconnect.org.
And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And with that, over to you.
QUESTIONER: If the Congress does not approve the future agreement, as it is established by the local law, does the IMF give the money to Argentina?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so that is a question on Argentina. Any other questions on Argentina? I do not see any hands up in the room. Let us go online. QUESTIONER: Do you think we are already in the final stage? And what remains to announce the Staff Agreement with the IMF?
QUESTIONER: Good morning. I was wondering about also there have been versions of a new loan up to $20 billion and the first deployment of $8 billion this year. Can you confirm that, or can you give us an insight into the fresh funds that could be coming in the new agreement? And also, when can we expect a signing of the letter of intent?
QUESTIONER: So, my question is about the Congress. President Milei confirmed that the staff-level agreement must be approved by the Parliament as indicated by the Argentine law. So, is that also a requirement from the IMF itself or could the President sign a decree avoiding the current law that requires the staff-level agreement to be approved by Parliament.
QUESTIONER: I want to ask about the scope of the potential agreement with Argentina. There are reports out saying it could be as high, or there is an expectation it could be as high as $20 billion.
QUESTIONER: I think a few people have already asked, but when [do] you expect to reach a staff-level agreement, whether, as the Argentine government has said, it is only the final numbers that need to be agreed and not other technical aspects? And whether the IMF requires that the entirety of the SLA be reviewed by Congress for approval or if whether a general outline produced by the government will be enough?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, with that, let me go ahead and talk about Argentina. So, first, I just want to start by saying, as I think many of you know, both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director recently met with the Argentine authorities. And as they recently emphasized, we are continuing to make good progress toward a program, and we are working constructively with the Argentine authorities in this regard. The authorities’ stabilization and growth plan is delivering significant results.
It has made notable strides in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and fostering a return to growth in the country, and poverty is finally beginning to decline in Argentina. To sustain these early gains, there is a shared understanding about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, while very importantly, advancing growth enhancing reforms. And the new program would build on the progress achieved so far while also addressing Argentina’s remaining challenges.
Now, with respect to some of the questions regarding Congressional approval, we do take note of President Milei’s commitment to seek congressional support for a new IMF supported program. As we have often said in the past, strong ownership and broad support are key to the program’s success,
Here, I want to emphasize, though, that securing congressional support is a decision of the authorities as legislated in Argentine domestic law. And at the same time, of course, as I just noted, broad political and social support can enhance program implementation. Questions regarding the specific process on achieving or seeking congressional support should be addressed really to the Argentine authorities because it is a matter of domestic law.
From our side, as I noted, the negotiations are continuing in a constructive manner. In terms of the process from the IMF side. Once the negotiations are completed, as with any IMF program or proposed program, the final arrangement, the documents, will require approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. And we will provide further updates as we have them.
With respect to some of the questions about the details of the negotiations, the potential size of the program. All I can say right now is this is still under discussion as part of the ongoing and constructive dialogue that we are having with the authorities. And we will provide an update when we have more information that we can share with you.
QUESTIONER: On Lebanon, so following recent reports that the Lebanese government is in discussions with IMF over a potential deal on its financial default in public debt. I just want to see if the IMF can confirm these reports. If so, what does it look like? Are there any contingencies to this? And will there be an IMF mission visiting Lebanon? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Lebanon is that an IMF team will visit Lebanon very soon, March 10th to 14th. This mission is aimed at, of course, meeting the new authorities, discussing Lebanon’s recent economic developments, its reconstruction needs, and the authorities’ economic priorities in the near-term. This is a fact-finding mission that will take place. But beyond this fact-finding mission, as we look ahead, future next steps could include helping the authorities to formulate a comprehensive economic reform program.
Our staff continues to be closely engaged with the authorities. We are providing policy advice and capacity development to help the authorities’ efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and institutions in coordination with other international partners. And that is what I have for now on Lebanon.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask you about what is happening in the United States. The trade wars have begun, and we are seeing some impact already, both in terms of market reaction and a lot of volatility in the markets, ups, and downs. We are also seeing some interesting developments in terms of bond markets and yields; it is going to increase the cost of borrowing. So, I wanted to ask you if you, at this point, I know we’ve asked this question before, but I wonder if you’ve got an additional assessment, as we’re now seeing some of these policies that had been promised taking effect, and whether you can say now whether you’re expecting an impact on the global economy and also on the U.S. economy and the affected economies that have been targeted thus far — China, Canada, Mexico.
QUESTIONER: As a follow up to [that] question, does the IMF consider that the ongoing developments of the U.S. tariffs and trade wars would push other nations to seek more trade relations and more alliances with other economic organizations and trade organizations such as BRICS, for example, or others? And broadly speaking, what is the IMF assessment of the global fragmentation that is going on right now? Do you see that it is slowing down or opposite it is moving faster, taking into account the latest developments in the United States?
QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the development of 10 years of U.S. bond yield movement. The 10-year bond yield now decreased, dropping substantially. And what does it mean? What is the implication of the movement? Does it represent some U.S. recession or U.S. economy?
QUESTIONER: With the tariffs actually now in place, has the IMF undertook a study to determine the potential impact on small island states that are heavily dependent on flows and goods and commodities coming out of the United States, more specifically, those countries within the Caribbean region who are very much dependent and could face significant inflationary pressures based on these tariffs?
MS. KOZACK: So, first I want to just step back a little bit to recognize that we have seen now several new and significant developments over the past few days. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico as well as additional tariffs on China. Canada and China have, in response, announced tariffs on some U.S. goods and other measures. And Mexico has indicated that it will provide more details in the coming days.
And as we have said before, you know, while assessing the full impact of tariffs on economic activity and inflation will depend on many factors, we do expect to provide an analysis of this, certainly at the global level and for the most affected countries at the time of our World Economic Outlook update in April. And of course we will also cover this issue, I imagine, in some of the regional updates where relevant. And I want to also emphasize that as part of our bilateral surveillance with countries, the individual Article IV reports this topic will also be covered to the extent that the countries are affected.
What I can say today is that if sustained the impact of the U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico can be expected to have a significant adverse economic impact on those countries given their very strong integration and exposure to the U.S. market.
Now, more broadly, there were some questions about financial market movements. So let me also just step back for a moment on some of these, and here I want to refer to some remarks that our Managing Director has been making recently. As she’s been saying, we are now in the midst of significant transformations, and these include the rapid advance of AI to changing patterns of capital flows and trade. She has also been mentioning that trade is no longer the engine of global growth that it used to be.
For example, during the period of 2000 to 2019, global trade growth reached nearly 6 percent on an annual basis, whereas over the more recent period of 2022 to 2024, global trade is growing closer to 3 percent. So global trade growth has been on a downward — has declined. And of course, it is in this more global context that governments are recalibrating their approaches and adjusting policies.
I also want to recognize, of course, that we have seen increased volatility in financial markets. We see that in indicators such as the VIX. We also have seen indicators of global uncertainty showing an increase. And what will be critical to assess what the economic impact of this will be — will be whether these trends are short-lived or whether they are sustained. Generally speaking, our research shows that both historically and across countries, sustained periods of elevated uncertainty can be associated with both households and firms holding back on consumption and investment decisions. And as I said, we will be providing a comprehensive analysis of our views on the global economy and individual economies as part of the World Economic Outlook that will be released in April.
On the specific question on U.S. bond yields, we do recognize of course, that U.S. bond yields have moved lower since the beginning of the year. And it does seem that on that basis markets may be reappraising or reassessing their views, particularly on the outlook for monetary policy. I will stop there and move on.
QUESTIONER: When is the IMF Board expected to review and approve the next disbursement for Ukraine? Are there any remaining conditions or procedural steps that Ukraine must fulfill before approval? And the Ukrainian government is engaging in debt restructuring efforts with its creditors. How does the IMF assess Ukraine’s debt sustainability and what role does this play in bord’s decision making process regarding future disbursement announcements?
QUESTIONER: So, to follow up on previous question. In February, you stated, that Ukraine would have access to about U.S. $900 million for the next review. Now we are speaking about $400 million. So, why the IMF has made a decision to adjust to the total sum of disbursement that will be provided to Ukraine?
QUESTIONER: And do you think that it can impact financial stability of Ukrainian economy or there is no risk for them?
QUESTIONER: How do you expect the freezing of the U.S. aid for Ukraine might impact the program you have already on course right now? And how does this affect the global plan that had been made like a year ago or two years ago now?
QUESTIONER: I just want to follow up the last question about the impact — what the impact Trump administration is doing. Does this impact the IMF projections on Ukraine this and next year?
QUESTIONER: An adjacent question, maybe related to the prospect for ending the war. And, you know, we have seen economic developments in Russia continue to percolate along even though the war has been going on and there have been sanctions. Have you started to look at what the end of the war could mean for both the Russian and Ukrainian economies in terms of, you know, perhaps, you know, assuming that there would be an end of sanctions once there was a cessation of hostilities, whether that would give a boost to the Russian economy, maybe the European economy in general could lower costs, things like that? So just kind of walk us through what you are seeing there.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me go ahead on Ukraine. So, just to bring everyone up to speed. So, on February 28th, the IMF staff, and the Ukrainian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Seventh Review of the four-year EFF arrangement. This is subject to approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. Ukraine is expected to draw, as noted, about U.S. $400 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.1 billion.
I just want to note that program performance in Ukraine remains strong. All of the end December quantitative performance criteria were met, and understandings were reached between the Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff on a set of policies and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability. The structural reform agenda in Ukraine is continuing to make good progress, and there are strong commitments from the Ukrainian authorities in a number of other areas.
Now on some of the specific questions, first on the matter of the disbursement, what I can say there is that it is not unusual over the life of a program for the pattern of disbursements to shift based on evolving balance of payments needs. And that is what has happened in this case. It is also important to emphasize that the overall size of the program, which is $15.6 billion, remains unchanged. And so that shift in disbursement pattern reflects the shifting balance of payments pattern for Ukraine.
So, on the issue the debt restructuring and debt process, what I can say there is that restoring debt sustainability in Ukraine hinges on continued implementation of the authority’s debt restructuring strategy, where completing the treatment of the GDP warrants remains important. And it also hinges very much on continuation of the revenue-based fiscal adjustment strategy, which is supported under the program. And as you know, Ukraine’s debt has been assessed in the last review to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis contingent on these two areas that I just mentioned. And of course, there will be a revised debt sustainability assessment as part of the ongoing review.
With respect to the other question, what I can say here is that the Ukrainian economy, you know, has shown continued resilience despite the challenges arising from the war. At the time of the Seventh Review, the last review, we estimated GDP growth to be 3.5 percent in 2024. But we did expect it at that time to moderate to 2 to 3 percent in 2025. And that was reflecting some headwinds from labor constraints and damage to energy infrastructure, given the ongoing war. It is the case in general for Ukraine, and we have been saying this throughout the life of the program, that the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, especially as the war continues and it is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine’s people, economy, and infrastructure.
On the more recent developments that you were referring to, we are following these developments very closely. It is premature at the moment to comment on them, but we are following them, and we will make an assessment in due course.
And on your question, the answer is essentially the same. We are following the developments very closely, and we will, as developments evolve, be undertaking obviously an assessment of what a peace deal could potentially look like and what would be the implications for all of the involved parties.
QUESTIONER: Julie, can you on the basis of having studied previous conflicts ending, can you just give us divorced from Ukraine and Russia, but just can you give us an indication of what generally happens when a conflict ends, what that means? And is there anything that we can draw on, at least just from history?
MS. KOZACK: So, I do not have, you know, off the top of my head a piece of research that I can kind of point to in terms of the interest analysis. What I certainly can say is that we always, for all of our member countries, hope for peace and stability in all of our member countries. And I think at that moment this is really what I can say. But I take note of the importance of your point, and we will, I have no doubt, in due course be conducting all of the necessary analysis as events unfold.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions mainly on Egypt. as Egypt is scheduled for 10th of March for the discussion of the Fourth Review of the EFF for the country, what are we expecting from this meeting? And if you please, could you update us on the RSF facility worth $1.2 billion for the country? Thank you so much.
QUESTIONER: I would second exactly those questions. And just to add to that, I know it says on the IMF Executive Board calendar that the Board will be discussing waivers of non-observance for some of the performance criteria related to Egypt’s loan program and modifications for others. Are you able to tell us any more about exactly which criteria the Board will be looking at? And on the RSF, if you are able to give us any more detail about the prospective value of that. I know it has been put at $1 billion before. A related question, not on Egypt but on Gaza. I would be interested to know if the IMF has begun to think, whether internally or with partners in the region, about what its potential role would be in funding a reconstruction plan for Gaza given the $50 billion, upwards of $50 billion, cost of any reconstruction.
QUESTIONER: I may repeat questions about the value of current tranche to be given to Egypt and the timing of when the central bank of Egypt to receive it. And also, I have another question about the program of state assets selling. Will we witness some steps, new steps in that program? Could it be connected with the decision to be taken in March?
MS. KOZACK: And any other questions on Egypt? All right. And then I have a question that came in through the Press Center. I am going to read it out loud – ’Does the IMF’s approval of the fourth tranche to Egypt require Egypt to implement some reforms? And when will the Fifth Review of the loan be held? What is the estimated size of the loan allocated to Egypt, and here will it be dispersed in installments or in one lump sum?’
On Egypt – on March 10th, our Executive Board will be discussing Egypt’s Article IV consultation and the fourth review under the EFF. It will also be discussing at the same time Egypt’s request for an RSF, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Subject to completion by the Executive Board, the authorities, would have access to $1.2 billion under the EFF. So, under the EFF program. And then in addition, subject again to approval by our Executive Board, the size of the RSF would be about U.S. $1.3 billion. Regarding the RSF, like all of the IMF programs, the RSF is also delivered in tranches. So, it is not one lump sum up front. It is a phased program where tranches are dispersed on the basis of conditions being met.
And with respect to some of the other questions, what I can say today is just that we will provide, of course, more details following the Board meeting and on the question of waivers and modifications and also the questions on the state-owned enterprises. And again, the board meeting will be on March 10th.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions related to Japan. Firstly, amid rising uncertainty due to President Trump’s tariff policy, I would like to ask you — ask your thoughts on whether the Bank of Japan, currently in a rate hike phase, should continue raising rate or take more cautious approach in assessing the impact. And secondly, President Trump recently made remarks suggesting that Japan and China are engaging in currency devaluation. I would appreciate it if you share your views on Japan’s foreign exchange policy. Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: So, maybe just stepping back to give a bit of context on Japan. What I can say on Japan is that on the growth side, growth this year is expected to strengthen, and we also expect inflation to converge to the Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target by the end of 2025.
In 2024, growth in Japan slowed due to some temporary supply disruptions. But since then, we have seen a strengthening in growth driven by domestic demand, particular — particularly private consumption in Japan and rising wages. And we expect this to continue into 2025, where we project growth, at the time of the January WEO, we projected growth at 1.1 percent for Japan in 2025. And of course, just to say that we will be updating this projection as part of the April forecast.
Looking at inflation — headline and core inflation, as I said, are expected to decline gradually toward the 2 percent target. We have been supportive of the Bank of Japan’s recent monetary policy decisions. We believe that these decisions will help anchor inflation expectations at the 2 percent target but also given balance risks around inflation, our assessment has been that further hikes in the policy interest rate should continue to be data dependent, and they should proceed at a gradual pace over time.
With respect to the question on the exchange rate, what I can say there is that the Japanese authorities have affirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime has helped the country or has helped the economy absorb the impact of shocks. And it also supports the focus of monetary policy on price stability. And at the same time, what I can say is that that flexible exchange rate regime is helping maintain an external position that is in line with fundamentals.
QUESTIONER: Could you give us an update on the negotiations for Ethiopia, please? And on El Salvador, the deal that you agreed on in December and was approved a couple of weeks ago involves the government not increasing its exposure to Bitcoin. Government has continued to buy through the Office of Bitcoin, which is linked to the presidential palace. But yesterday the Fund said that these purchases do not increase the government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Could you please explain that?
QUESTIONER: Also on El Salvador, obviously he was saying to not to not buy it as a government reserve. I just wanted to, I guess, contrast to the U.S. I mean, President Trump has very much announced a digital assets reserve, including Ethereum and other coins, as well as Bitcoin. And I wondered if the IMF could – can you comment on the U.S. program or how would you distinguish the two countries and why the IMF might be taking a different approach?
MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go ahead and take the El Salvador question in Ethiopia and then we will go back. I see many hands up online.
So, on El Salvador, as you know, last week our Executive Board approved a 40-month Extended Fund Facility, EFF, for U.S. $1.4 billion and with an immediate disbursement of $113 million. The program is expected to catalyze financial and technical support from other IFIs. And this will lead to a combined total over the program period of about U.S. $3.5 billion of support for El Salvador. The goals of the program are to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild external and financial buffers, strengthen governance and transparency, and ultimately create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth.
Regarding Bitcoin, in particular, the program aims to address the risks associated with the Bitcoin project to protect consumers and investors, as well as to limit potential fiscal costs. So, to start, there were recent legal reforms that have made the acceptance of Bitcoin voluntary, and taxes can be paid only in U.S. dollars. Under the program, the government has committed to not accumulate for their Bitcoins at the level of the overall public sector.
Regarding the recent increase in Bitcoin holding by the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve Fund, the authorities have confirmed that these are consistent with the agreed program conditionality, and we do remain engaged with the authorities on this important issue.
And then, to your question. We are obviously closely monitoring President Trump’s announcement in this area. The Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has not yet completed its work. So, we do not yet have details on the implementation of this proposal, but we will come back in due course.
And then turning to the question on Ethiopia. So just an update on Ethiopia. On January 17th, the IMF Executive Board completed the Second Review of the arrangement, the ECF arrangement for Ethiopia, and that allowed for a drawdown of about U.S. $245 million. The ECF arrangement supports the authorities’ reforms to address macroeconomic imbalances, restore external debt sustainability, and lay the foundation for strong private sector-led growth.
I can also just remind you that the Managing Director recently traveled to Ethiopia. She was there February 8th and 9th. She met with Prime Minister Abiy and his team to take stock of the economic reforms and the progress that is being made in the country. And she also took the opportunity to meet with other stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.
QUESTIONER: My question is on USAID. USAID has now totally stopped its business. And to what extent do you see the impact, especially on lower income countries at the global level? And should you consider using your facility to support them just in case?
MS. KOZACK: So, on this issue, we are obviously again paying close attention to developments, and we are working with our country authorities. But it is, at the same time, it is too early to really say what the precise impact may be. And so, we will come back in due course. For now, we are monitoring.
QUESTIONER: I have a question on Senegal. Following a recent audit of the country’s debt, it was found to be 99.7 percent of GDP. That was in 2023. And I know that IMF has said before that Senegal debt was stable even though it was high. I am wondering if that is the figure that you still consider sustainable. And then also with regards on talks of a new IMF program, I am wondering if Senegal could be asked to reimburse previous dispersion under this reporting period.
QUESTIONER: Still on Senegal, as soon as the report from the Audit Supreme Court was released, we saw rating agency downgrading Senegal sovereign notes. So, the country is now stuck. It cannot raise funds from the internal market, and it cannot go in a very comfortable position in international markets while they still face a lot of challenges. So, I am wondering why the IMF is working fast and bold to find a solution for Senegal in the midterm or even long-term. Is there any situation where IMF can provide a short-term, I mean, short-term relief to the country so they can go through these hard moments in a very soft way?
MS. KOZACK: So, on Senegal, what I can say is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities with respect to the Court of Auditors Report and the associated misreporting under the IMF program. The Court of Auditors Report was released on February 12th. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and debt were under reported during the period of 2019 to 2023.
So, what we are doing is working closely with the authorities in their efforts to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. We are working actively to advance on our discussions following the publication of the report, and we are also working with the authorities on measures to correct and remedy the misreporting that took place. What I can add is that the resolution of the misreporting in line with IMF policy is a precondition for discussions of any future financial assistance by the IMF.
And with respect to potential consequences, I can say that the IMF does not impose any sanctions for misreporting cases. It is up to our Executive Board to decide on the next steps. And those next steps, you know, could include a waiver. And that waiver could — it could also include; it could be a waiver without a request for reimbursement. So, all of those discussions on Senegal are now underway. We are actively, very much working with the authorities, supporting as much as possible their efforts on fiscal and debt sustainability, as I said. And we will come back and report back when we have more information on Senegal.
I have a question here online that I am going to read. It came from the Press Center on Thailand. And the question is – ‘The upcoming World Bank IMF Annual Meetings in Thailand will bring significant attention to Southeast Asia’s economic outlook. From the from IMF’s perspective, how can Thailand best leverage this opportunity to address regional challenges such as digital transformation, climate change adaptation, and income inequality? And what collaborative initiatives between the IMF and Thailand are being planned to ensure lasting economic benefits for the country beyond the meetings themselves?’
So, on this very important question, a very nice question, actually, what I can say is that we are very much looking forward to having Thailand host the annual meetings in 2026. So, this will be in October of 2026. Every three years, we do our Annual Meetings abroad. 2026, October will be Thailand. So, mark your calendar. I can also add that preparations are underway. The Fund, the IMF staff are working hand in hand with the Thai authorities to make this a highly successful event and showcasing the significant strides that Thailand has made since it last hosted our annual meetings in 1991. So, it will be 25 years when we get to 2026.
The Managing Director recently met with Bank of Thailand’s Governor Sethaput at the AlUla Conference in Saudi Arabia. They discussed the preparations for the annual meetings and agreed that it would be a very good opportunity to showcase on the global stage the region’s dynamism and economic activities. And of course, the meetings will also allow Thailand to position itself as a key contributor to the international economic dialogue and to gather views and experiences from countries throughout the membership of the IMF and the World Bank.
This ongoing close relationship leading up to and beyond, we hope, the Annual Meetings will focus on prioritizing reform reforms that are necessary to ensure the lasting benefits for Thailand and building the relationships and the shared policy, dialogue and experiences we hope will deepen our engagement, our excellent engagement and relationship with Thailand and will be sustained even past the Annual Meetings in 2026.
QUESTIONER: My question is, what are the IMF growth projections for Jordan amid the ongoing impact of the Gaza war? And when will the Third Review under the EFF begin? And are any adjustments expected to the war’s region effect on Jordan’s economy?
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Jordan is that the Executive Board on December 12th completed the Article IV Consultation with Jordan and the Second Review under the EFF arrangement. The mission for the next review, which will be the Third Review, is expected to take place in April.
What I can also say is that Jordan has demonstrated resilience and maintained macroeconomic stability throughout the prolonged regional conflict. This resilience reflects the authority’s continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and progress with reforms. While recent developments in the region, particularly the ceasefire agreements, give rise to some cautious optimism, uncertainty, of course, in Jordan does remain high. And with respect to the growth projections, what I can say is that growth in 2024 was 2.3 percent. We are projecting growth at 2.5 percent in 2025 and a further increase in growth in 2026 to 3 percent. But like in all countries, we will be updating these projections as both part of our April World Economic Outlook Global Forecast, and also, of course, the team will be doing a full assessment of the Jordanian economy as part of their mission in April
And so, with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much for participating today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. The transcript, as always, will be made available later today on IMF.org. And in case of clarifications or additional questions, please reach out to my colleagues at media@IMF.org. And I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you very much.
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MIL OSI