Category: Latin America

MIL-OSI Security: President Trump is Already Securing Our Border and Deporting Criminal Aliens

Source: US Department of Homeland Security

Immediately after being sworn in President Trump took executive action to stop the invasion at the southern border and to empower law enforcement agents to deport criminal aliens

“In a move fulfilling one of now-President Donald Trump’s campaign promises, the Trump administration shuttered the use of CBP One, a President Joe Biden-era app meant to help process migrants seeking to apply for asylum in the U.S.” USA Today: Trump kills Biden-era CBP One app for asylum-seekers at the border

“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on Monday issued memos to repeal limits on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents imposed by former DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas…ICE agents who spoke to Fox News said they believe that rescinding the Mayorkas order is going to free them up to go after more illegal immigrants.” Fox News: Trump DHS repeals key Mayorkas memo limiting ICE agents, orders parole review

On January 22, ICE law enforcement’s officers arrested Franz Cadet a 43-year-old citizen of Haiti. Cadet was convicted of multiple drug offenses.

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On January 22, ICE law enforcement’s officers arrested Franz Cadet a 43-year-old citizen of Haiti. Cadet was convicted of multiple drug offenses. | View Original

“Federal officers swept into sanctuary cities on President Trump’s first full day in office Tuesday, nabbing more than 300 illegal migrant criminals — including an attempted murderer and a child molester — to hold them for deportation.” The New York Post: ICE arrested 308 illegal migrants — including attempted murderer and a child molester — on Trump’s first full day in office

“The Trump administration is attempting to amass a larger force of law-enforcement officials to help carry out deportations by granting agents across the federal government the same powers as an immigration officer, according to an internal memo.” The Wall Street Journal: Trump Gives Gun, Drug Agents Deportation Power

“The number of Border Patrol encounters at the southern border in the first three days of the Trump administration is 35% lower than the final three days of the Biden administration, the sources said.” Fox News: Border encounters drop sharply as Trump launches crackdown on illegal immigration

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Briefing Security Council on Worsening Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo, Senior Official Says Actions Endangering Civilians, UN ‘Will Not be Tolerated’

Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

Holding an emergency meeting following advances by the 23 March Movement, or M23, towards the city of Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and concurrent attacks on United Nations peacekeepers there, the Security Council heard today that urgent action is needed to address a rapidly deteriorating situation while time remains to do so.

“The United Nations is profoundly concerned by the resumption of hostilities,” said Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. On 23-24 January, M23 fired on positions of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). He reported that, as a result, several blue helmets were “killed in carrying out the tasks entrusted to them by this Council”. He also noted that M23 has significantly extended its territorial gains over the past few weeks and has opened a new front in South Kivu, from which MONUSCO recently withdrew.

“At this critical juncture, with the lives of countless vulnerable civilians, peacekeepers and respect for this Council’s mandate at stake, MONUSCO remains committed to the robust defence of its mandate,” he stated. He stressed that, for its part, the Council “must honour the sacrifices made by the peacekeepers who laid down their lives in pursuit of this noble goal by sending a clear and unequivocal message to M23 and its backers that actions endangering the lives of civilians and UN peacekeepers will not be tolerated.”

Also reporting on the situation was Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Head of MONUSCO. Noting that M23 and Rwandan forces have penetrated the outskirts of Goma — “causing mass panic and flight amongst the population” — she said that roads are blocked and that M23 has declared Goma’s airspace closed. “In other words, we are trapped,” she said, calling on the Council to “act now” to secure the civilian population, humanitarian-aid workers and all UN personnel.

Calling on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda to continue political negotiations in the context of the Luanda Process, she urged: “More than ever, we must find a political solution.” She also called on Rwanda to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory and end support for M23, and on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to “make significant efforts” to neutralize the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda, or FDLR.

Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, then stressed that if hostilities spread into Goma, “the impact on civilians could be devastating”. In North and South Kivu, hundreds of civilians have been killed and injured over the last few weeks. Further, hundreds of thousands have fled their homes, humanitarian access remains constrained and hospitals are overwhelmed. Against that backdrop, she urged all parties to “protect civilians and the critical infrastructure they rely on”.

She also urged them to avoid using wide-area explosives and heavy weapons in populated areas. “This will be particularly important should the hostilities spread into Goma, given the risks of conflict in urban areas,” she observed. And, to address the escalating humanitarian crisis “before the situation worsens further”, she called on the Council to end the hostilities, ensure respect for international law and provide adequate funding for humanitarian action.

“The resolution of the conflict in eastern DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] must be political, not military,” stated the representative of Sierra Leone, also speaking for Algeria, Guyana and Somalia. The Luanda and Nairobi Processes “remain viable paths to peace”, he said, while underscoring that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be respected “by all States and non-State actors alike”. France’s representative, stating that the presence of foreign military forces threatens civilian protection and contributes to displacement, concurred: “Force is not an option.”

Along those lines, China’s representative said: “All external forces should refrain from providing support to M23 and other armed groups to prevent further deterioration.” He also joined other Council members in pointing out that “attacks on peacekeepers may constitute war crimes”. The representative of Greece echoed that, also noting that attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers constitute a basis for sanctions designations. Also making these points was the representative of the United Kingdom, who observed that “the numbers of those lost and injured is changing by the hour”.

These attacks, stressed Slovenia’s representative, constitute “an attack on peace itself”. Recalling the Council’s recent, unanimous decision to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, she underlined the organ’s responsibility to “stand unequivocally behind [its personnel] in these perilous times and ensure they return safely to their loved ones”. She added: “The international community, and this Council, cannot afford to remain passive in the face of this crisis.” Panama’s representative similarly stated: “History will not judge us on our intentions but, rather, our actions.”

The United Nations must take immediate measures to ensure the safety and security of both civilians and peacekeepers, underscored the representative of Pakistan. Expressing particular concern over a “highly exposed” Pakistani artillery battery near Sake, he stressed that this unit should be quickly redeployed for the safety of its personnel and heavy, expensive equipment. Stating that peacekeepers cannot be expected to implement the “challenging mandate assigned to them by the Council” without adequate support, he also urged the organ to address the root cause of the conflict — the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

On that, Denmark’s representative observed: “The illegal exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC is a key driver to instability in the Great Lakes region — this must end.” The representative of the United States also expressed concern over the illicit exploitation of mining areas in territories controlled by M23, as did the representative of the Russian Federation: “The struggle to gain access towards strategically important Congolese minerals is one of the reasons for the continuation of the crisis.”

The representative of the Republic of Korea detailed that crisis: “In the past week alone, as [M23] has expanded its territory by 11 per cent, the number of [internally displaced persons] has doubled to 400,000.” He joined other Council members in calling on Rwanda to cease its support for the group and urged both Kinshasa and Kigali to return to dialogue and fully implement their commitments under the Luanda Process. He added: “We recognize the differing interests of the DRC and Rwanda, but further escalation of tensions is simply unacceptable — many lives are at stake.”

Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Francophonie of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, meanwhile, took the floor to stress that the situation in her country is “not a conflict like others”. Rather, it is “a declaration of war that no longer hides itself behind diplomatic manoeuvres”, she said, stressing that “Rwanda is preparing to orchestrate a carnage in broad daylight”. She also said that it is “clear that this crisis is directly linked to the economic plunder of our country by Rwanda”.

On that, she said that over 150 tons of coltan are illegally extracted and transported to Rwanda each month, where they are fraudulently labelled for export. Yet, while this illicit commerce finances the military activities of armed groups, it is “only one aspect of the aggression carried out by Rwanda”, she stressed. Others include the systematic targeting of peacekeeping forces, the 24 January assassination of the military governor of North Kivu and the sabotage of the Luanda Process.

Underscoring that the Council “cannot content itself with declarations of concern or simply ‘remaining seized of the matter’”, she said that the organ’s duty is to “defend human life without distinction”. It must therefore order an immediate end to Rwanda’s hostilities, impose targeted sanctions against those responsible for the aggression, impose an embargo on the export of all minerals labelled as Rwandan — particularly coltan and gold — and revoke Rwanda’s status as a troop-contributing country. “History will remember your decision today,” she said.

Meanwhile, Rwanda’s representative stressed: “The current crisis could have been averted had the DRC Government demonstrated a genuine commitment to peace.” While the Luanda Process achieved “significant milestones” — including a ceasefire that came into force on 4 August 2024 — the Government and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo decided to increase militarization in the country’s east in October 2024. This included the deployment of heavy weaponry and additional troops — 10,000 from Burundi — along the border.

“By prioritizing militarization of the conflict instead of embracing the regional mechanisms that have been put in place to foster a sustainable solution born out of dialogue, the conflict has continued to escalate — leading to the prevailing situation today,” he said. He added that the FDLR has “even moved from being a suppletive force to a strategic ally of the Kinshasa Government”. Further, he said that the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has publicly vowed to instigate regime change in Rwanda for two years now.

While stating that “no one should harm peacekeepers”, he expressed concern that MONUSCO is “at the risk of being sucked into a conflict in which it would be a belligerent force”. MONUSCO should therefore focus on protecting civilians instead of fighting alongside Kinshasa’s military coalition. Noting that the situation today mirrors that which occurred 12 years ago, he stressed that “the DRC must play a helpful role — after all, this is a Congolese problem, for which the DRC is looking to outsource its solution.”

“It is with profound regret that this meeting is taking place at a time when a number of peacekeepers have lost their lives in the line of duty,” observed South Africa’s representative. Urging the Council to “send a clear message that peacekeepers’ lives matter”, she underlined the need to “value and safeguard the contribution of those entrusted to carry out the mandates adopted in this chamber”. Extending condolences to all victims’ families, the representative of Uruguay reiterated his country’s “steadfast commitment to peace”.

Angola’s representative pointed to “remarkable progress in the implementation of the Luanda Process”. “We need speedy and unconditional de-escalation of the conflict and genuine, renewed engagement of the parties to explore the ways of overcoming the pending issues,” he added. On that, Burundi’s representative said that the Luanda and Nairobi Processes “set out a clear road map to reach a lasting ceasefire”. Calling on the Council to demand an end to foreign interference and act decisively to guarantee that the Democratic Republic of the Congo can fully exercise its sovereignty and restore peace, he stressed: “Security and stability in Central Africa and beyond are at stake.”

MIL OSI United Nations News –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Issues Statement on Measures Against Colombia

Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Media Contact 202-226-8467

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast released the following statement on President Trump‘s retaliatory measures against Colombia for refusing to accept the return of illegal aliens.

“We don’t allow our people to cross Colombia’s borders illegally, they shouldn’t allow theirs to cross our illegally. If they do, they should work with us to clean up the mess. The rule of law and the law of the jungle have returned.”

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MIL OSI USA News –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK is deeply concerned by the scale and pace of recent M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces advances in eastern DRC: UK statement at the UN Security Council

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

President, MONUSCO peacekeepers and personnel work bravely to deliver this Council’s mandate in the most difficult of circumstances.

The United Kingdom reiterates clearly today that attacks on UN peacekeepers are absolutely unacceptable, and may constitute war crimes.

We also recall that planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers may constitute a basis for UN sanctions designations.

The UK extends its sympathies to the families of the Blue Helmets from South Africa and Uruguay who have lost their lives serving in MONUSCO, and we extend our best wishes for a full recovery to those peacekeepers who have been injured.

The UK also extends its condolences to the families of all troops from the Southern African Development Community Mission in DRC who have lost their lives in support of DRC’s stability and security.

As we do so, we fully acknowledge that the numbers of those lost and injured is changing by the hour. It is a critical moment for DRC and for the region.

President, I would now like to make three points.

First, the United Kingdom once again condemns the violent actions of all armed groups, including FDLR and M23.

We are deeply concerned by the scale and pace of recent M23 and Rwandan Defence Forces advances in eastern DRC.

In December this Council renewed MONUSCO’s mandate. And in the four weeks since, M23’s unacceptable offensive, and that of the Rwanda Defence Forces, through North and South Kivu, has resulted in the capture of several towns and villages.

As we’ve heard, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced, and violence has intensified as a result.

We are also deeply alarmed by M23’s declaration that they intend to take Goma, a city where the humanitarian situation is already catastrophic.

The rising number of displaced people resulting from M23’s territorial expansion has placed further pressure on crowded IDP camps and exacerbates the challenges faced by humanitarian actors.

This morning, the UK Foreign Secretary spoke with President Kagame and called for urgent de-escalation, outlining the need for Rwanda and the DRC to urgently return to the negotiating table.

Now, more than ever, it is critical that MONUSCO is able to deliver its mandate. M23 attacks on peacekeepers, with support from the RDF, must stop immediately.

These attacks prevent the force from being able to discharge its Security Council-mandated mission to protect civilians.

Rwandan spoofing and jamming of GPS signals, which obstruct UN and humanitarian operations, must also stop.

We urge all parties to remember their obligations under international humanitarian law.

Finally, President, the United Kingdom once again extends its thanks to Angola for its leadership on mediation efforts.

We encourage DRC and Rwanda to return to the negotiating table and to focus on making tangible progress on delivering on their commitments under the concept of operations.

There can be no military solution. Fighting must stop. Civilians must be protected. And the parties should engage in good faith in the political process.

Updates to this page

Published 26 January 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Canada’s claim that it champions human rights is at odds with its mining practices

Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Véronique Plouffe, PhD candidate in Feminist and Gender Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Canada presents itself as a gender equality and human rights champion both at home and abroad. But it’s also a global leader in mining, an industry with an abysmal human rights record.

Under the previous Conservative federal government, Canadian foreign aid was more directly aligned with mining and commercial interests. But when Liberal Justin Trudeau was elected in 2015, it appeared to signal a return to more “progressive” values.

Read more:
Justin Trudeau’s resignation creates a progressive void in Canada, part of a long-established cycle

The launch of the Feminist International Assistance Policy in 2017 was a powerful symbol in this direction. But despite Canadian mining companies being accused of environmental and human rights violations in various countries, the Liberal government continues to actively support mining abroad.

Canada is a global mining powerhouse, home to almost half of the world’s publicly listed mining and mineral exploration companies.

According to 2023 data, Canadian mining companies operate in 95 foreign countries and the value of Canadian mining assets totalled $336.7 billion. Half of Canadian foreign mining assets are located in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Canadian mining in Peru

Peru is a key mining partner; 71 firms operate in the country and Canada has nearly $10 billion of mining assets in the South American country. Canada has the largest number of mining exploration projects in Peru at 24, and ranks third (after the United Kingdom and Peru itself) in terms of mining exploration investments.

At last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Lima, Trudeau announced investments to create “a better future by focusing on a healthier planet and equal opportunities for all.” These included initiatives to support women’s and girls’ rights as well as improving access to the justice system for Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian communities.

Trudeau also announced the creation of a Canada-Peru Dialogue of Critical Minerals and Mining Sustainability.

But can Canada be both a human rights champion and a global mining leader? While Canada describes its mining industry as sustainable and socially responsible, human rights organizations paint a different picture.

Backing Boluarte government

Canadian mining companies have been accused in Peru of environmental contamination, criminalizing community leaders, land dispossession and the violation of Indigenous self-determination. Canada has also supported Peruvian mining law reforms in favour of foreign mining investment.

Canada’s support of the current and highly unpopular Dina Boluarte government, which ousted left-wing president Pedro Castillo in 2022, points to the ongoing prioritization of mining interests over human rights, even those of Canadian citizens.

Castillo meanwhile had proposed a plan to renegotiate mining contracts with multinational companies so that more profits stayed in Peru.

The impact on women

Reports have shown that women bear the brunt of mining’s negative impacts, which include gender violence, economic and food insecurity and health problems.

Women human rights defenders confronting extractive industries also face gender-specific risks and challenges. Indigenous women are often at the forefront of resisting extractive projects.

Despite the bold ambitions of Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy to promote a “more peaceful, more inclusive and more prosperous world,” critics have highlighted several weaknesses and challenges.

Among them: insufficient funding, its instrumentalist approach (when women are used for broader economic and political goals), as well as its emphasis on neoliberal capitalist growth and the private sector.

Some have also highlighted its lack of coherence with other policy areas, including trade and security, its support for Israel and its treatment of Indigenous women in Canada.

Read more:
Canada’s inaction in Gaza marks a failure of its feminist foreign policy

Structural causes not addressed

My ongoing research with civil society organizations in Peru suggests that Canada is providing much-needed and highly appreciated support for women’s rights, LGTBQ+ and Indigenous women’s organizations, namely through its Women’s Voice and Leadership Program. The positive impacts of such initiatives should not be overlooked.

But even though these projects — often short-term — may benefit some people and some organizations, they often fail to tackle the structural causes of poverty and gender inequality. They also neglect to take into account Canada’s role in creating and maintaining global inequalities through its disruptive mining activities.

Read more:
The role of Canadian mining in the plight of Central American migrants

For years, Canadian civil society organizations have been demanding greater accountability and regulation for Canadian overseas corporations. Despite promises to hold companies accountable for abuses abroad with the creation of the Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, the Trudeau government has been criticized for failing to deliver on these pledges.

With the possible election of a Conservative federal government in the coming months, it’s unlikely that tightening regulations for private Canadian companies operating in other countries will be a priority.

Despite its feminist ambitions, taking a closer look at Canada’s role in countries where it has significant mining interests reveals a more complex and nuanced image of Canada in the world.

Véronique Plouffe receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

– ref. Canada’s claim that it champions human rights is at odds with its mining practices – https://theconversation.com/canadas-claim-that-it-champions-human-rights-is-at-odds-with-its-mining-practices-246757

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Finding ‘Kape’: How Language Documentation helps us preserve an endangered language

Source: The Conversation – Indonesia – By Francesco Perono Cacciafoco, Associate Professor in Linguistics, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University

Shiyue Wu, a member of Francesco Perono Cacciafoco’s research team at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU), who is currently developing intensive fieldwork in Alor Island to document and preserve endangered languages, discovered and first documented Kape during a Language Documentation fieldwork in August 2024 and therefore actively contributed to this study.

As of 2025, more than 7000 languages are spoken across the world. However, only about half of them are properly documented, leaving the rest at risk of disappearing.

Globalisation has propelled languages such as English and Chinese into the mainstream, and they now dominate global communication.

Parents today prefer their children learn widely-spoken languages. Meanwhile, indigenous languages, such as Copainalá Zoque in Mexico and Northern Ndebele in Zimbabwe, are not even consistently taught in schools.

Indigenous people generally did not use writing for centuries and, therefore, their languages do not have ancient written records. This has contributed to their gradual disappearance.

To prevent the loss of endangered languages, field linguists – or language documentarists – work to ensure that new generations have access to their cultural heritage. Their efforts reveal the vocabulary and structure of these languages and the stories and traditions embedded within them.

My research team and I have spent over 13 years documenting endangered Papuan languages in Southeast and East Indonesia, particularly in the Alor-Pantar Archipelago, near Timor, and the Maluku Islands. One of our significant and very recent discoveries is Kape, a previously undocumented and neglected language spoken by small coastal communities in Central-Northern Alor.

Not only is the discovery important for mapping the linguistic context of the island, but it also highlights the urgency of preserving endangered languages by employing Language Documentation methods.

The discovery of Kape

In August 2024, while working with our Abui consultants, Shiyue Wu, my Research Assistant at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, discovered a previously-ignored, presumably undocumented Papuan language from Alor, ‘Kape’.

At the time, she was gathering information about the names and locations of ritual altars known as ‘maasang’ in the Abui area, with assistance from our main consultant and several native speakers. In Central Alor, every village has a ‘maasang’.

During conversations about the variants in altar names across Alor languages and Abui dialects, some speakers mentioned the name of the ‘maasang’ (‘mata’) in Kape—a language previously unrecorded and overlooked in linguistic documentation.

‘Kape’ translates to ‘rope’, symbolising how the language connects its speakers across the island, from the mountains to the sea. Geographically and linguistically, it is associated with Kabola in the east and Abui and Kamang in Central Alor.

At this stage, it is unclear whether Kape is a distinct language or a dialect of Kamang, as the two are mutually intelligible. Much of Kape’s basic lexicon (the collection of words in one language), indeed, shares cognates (related words among languages) with Kamang.

However, Kape is spoken as the primary (native) language by the whole Kape ethnic group of Alor, and the speakers consider themselves an independent linguistic and ethnic community. This could serve as an element for regarding Kape as a language.

Kape also shows connections with Suboo, Tiyei, and Adang, other Papuan languages from Alor Island. The speakers, known as ‘Kafel’ in Abui, are multilingual, fluent, to some extent, in Kape, Kamang, Bahasa Indonesia, Alor Malay, and, sometimes, Abui.

So far, no historical records have been found for Kape, though archival research may reveal more about its origins. Based on its typology and lexical characteristics, Kape appears as ancient as other languages spoken in Alor. Like many Papuan languages, it is critically endangered and requires urgent documentation to preserve its legacy.

Documenting languages: An ongoing challenge

Language Documentation aims to reconstruct the unwritten history of indigenous peoples and to guarantee the future of their cultures and languages. This is accomplished by preserving endangered, scarcely documented or entirely undocumented languages in disadvantaged and remote areas.

External sources, like diaries by missionaries and documentation produced by colonisers, can help reconstruct some historical events. However, they are insufficient for providing reliable linguistic data since the authors were not linguists.

My research team and I document endangered languages, starting with their lexicon and grammar. Eventually, we also explore the ancient traditions and ancestral wisdom of the native speakers we work with.

We have contributed to the documentation of several Papuan languages from Alor Island, especially Abui, Kula, and Sawila. These languages are spoken among small, sometimes dispersed communities of indigenous peoples belonging to different but related ethnic clusters.

They communicate with each other mostly in Bahasa Indonesia and Alor Malay. This is because their local languages are almost never taught in schools and are rarely used outside their groups.

Over time, in addition to documenting their lexicons and grammars, we worked to reconstruct their place-names and landscape names, oral traditions, foundation myths, ancestral legends and the names of plants and trees they use.

We also explored their traditional medical practices and local ethnobotany, along with their musical culture and number systems.

Safeguarding Kape is not just linguistically relevant. Its preservation and documentation are not just about attesting its existence – they also contribute to revitalising the language, keeping it alive, and allowing the local community to rediscover its history, knowledge, and traditions to pass down to the next generations.

This journey has just begun, but my team and I – with the indispensable collaboration from our local consultants and native speakers – are prepared to go all the way towards its completion.

Francesco Perono Cacciafoco received funding from Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU): Research Development Fund (RDF) Grant, “Place Names and Cultural Identity: Toponyms and Their Diachronic Evolution among the Kula People from Alor Island”, Grant Number: RDF-23-01-014, School of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS), Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU), Suzhou (Jiangsu), China, 2024-2025.

– ref. Finding ‘Kape’: How Language Documentation helps us preserve an endangered language – https://theconversation.com/finding-kape-how-language-documentation-helps-us-preserve-an-endangered-language-247465

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 26, 2025

MIL-OSI: Key Tronic Corporation Announces Results for the First Quarter of Fiscal Year 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SPOKANE VALLEY, Wash., Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Key Tronic Corporation (Nasdaq: KTCC), a provider of electronic manufacturing services (EMS), today announced its results for the quarter ended September 28, 2024.

For the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, Key Tronic reported total revenue of $131.6 million, compared to $150.1 million in the same period of fiscal year 2024. Revenue in the first quarter of fiscal year 2025 was adversely impacted by customer-driven design and qualification delays of three programs that we believe impacted revenue by approximately $9 million. These delays have since been resolved on two of these programs and shipments have resumed in the second quarter. Production in Key Tronic’s Mexico facilities in the first quarter of fiscal year 2025 increased by approximately 10% sequentially from the prior quarter.

The Company saw significant improvement in its production efficiencies compared to the first quarter of fiscal year 2024, primarily as a result of recent headcount reductions, continued improvements in the supply chain and a favorable decline in the exchange rate of the Mexican Peso. Gross margins were 10.1% and operating margins were 3.4% in the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, up from 7.2% and 2.2%, respectively, in the same period of fiscal year 2024.

Net income was $1.1 million or $0.10 per share for the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, compared to net income of $0.3 million or $0.03 per share for the same period of fiscal year 2024. Adjusted net income was $1.2 million or $0.11 per share for the first quarter of fiscal year 2025, compared to $0.0 million or $0.00 per share for the same period of fiscal year 2024. See “Non-GAAP Financial Measures,” below for additional information about adjusted net income and adjusted net income per share.

“While we did not meet revenue expectations in our first quarter of fiscal 2025 due to unavoidable delays for a few programs, we are pleased to see our improved operating efficiencies, margins, and liquidity,” said Brett Larsen, President and CEO. “The recent workforce reductions in Mexico, trimming of non-profitable programs, and making a concerted effort to improve working capital are starting to pay off. We also continued to reduce our inventories, which are now much more in line with our revenue levels. Over the longer term, we expect that these strategic changes will improve our overall profitability.”

“During the first quarter, we also continued to win new business, including new programs in manufacturing equipment, vehicle lighting, and commercial pest control. We believe we are well positioned for increased growth and profitability in coming periods.”

The financial data presented for the first quarter of fiscal 2025 should be considered preliminary and could be subject to change, as the Company’s independent auditor has not completed their review procedures.

Business Outlook

For the second quarter of fiscal 2025, Key Tronic expects to report revenue in the range of $130 million to $140 million and earnings in the range $0.05 to $0.15 per diluted share. These expected results assume an effective tax rate of 20% in the coming quarter.

Conference Call

Key Tronic will host a conference call to discuss its financial results at 2:00 PM Pacific (5:00 PM Eastern) today. A broadcast of the conference call will be available at www.keytronic.com under “Investor Relations” or by calling 888-394-8218 or +1-313-209-4906 (Access Code: 7268667). The Company will also reference accompanying slides that can be viewed with the webcast at www.keytronic.com under “Investor Relations”. A replay will be available at www.keytronic.com under “Investor Relations”.

About Key Tronic

Key Tronic is a leading contract manufacturer offering value-added design and manufacturing services from its facilities in the United States, Mexico, China and Vietnam. The Company provides its customers with full engineering services, materials management, worldwide manufacturing facilities, assembly services, in-house testing, and worldwide distribution. Its customers include some of the world’s leading original equipment manufacturers. For more information about Key Tronic visit: www.keytronic.com

Forward-Looking Statements

Some of the statements in this press release are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to those including such words as aims, anticipates, believes, continues, estimates, expects, hopes, intends, plans, predicts, projects, targets, will, or would, similar verbs, or nouns corresponding to such verbs, which may be forward looking. Forward-looking statements also include other passages that are relevant to expected future events, performances, and actions or that can only be fully evaluated by events that will occur in the future. Forward-looking statements in this release include, without limitation, the Company’s statements regarding its expectations with respect to financial conditions and results, including revenue and earnings, cost savings from headcount reduction and the Mexican Peso exchange rate, demand for certain products and the effectiveness of some of its programs, business from customers and programs, and impacts from operational streamlining and efficiencies. There are many factors, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those predicted or projected in forward-looking statements, including but not limited to: the future of the global economic environment and its impact on our customers and suppliers; the availability of components from the supply chain; the availability of a healthy workforce; the accuracy of suppliers’ and customers’ forecasts; development and success of customers’ programs and products; timing and effectiveness of ramping of new programs; success of new-product introductions; the risk of legal proceedings or governmental investigations relating to the previously reported financial statement restatements and related material weaknesses, the May 2024 cybersecurity incident and the subject of the internal investigation by the Company’s Audit Committee and related or other unrelated matters; acquisitions or divestitures of operations or facilities; technology advances; changes in pricing policies by the Company, its competitors, customers or suppliers; impact of new governmental legislation and regulation, including tax reform, tariffs and related activities, such trade negotiations and other risks; and other factors, risks, and uncertainties detailed from time to time in the Company’s SEC filings.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures

To supplement our consolidated financial statements, which are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (GAAP), we use certain non-GAAP financial measures, adjusted net income and adjusted net income per share, diluted. We provide these non-GAAP financial measures because we believe they provide greater transparency related to our core operations and represent supplemental information used by management in its financial and operational decision making. We exclude (or include) certain items in our non-GAAP financial measures as we believe the net result is a measure of our core business. We believe this facilitates operating performance comparisons from period to period by eliminating potential differences caused by the existence and timing of certain income and expense items that would not otherwise be apparent on a GAAP basis. Non-GAAP performance measures should be considered in addition to, and not as a substitute for, results prepared in accordance with GAAP. We strongly encourage investors and shareholders to review our financial statements and publicly-filed reports in their entirety and not to rely on any single financial measure. Our non-GAAP financial measures may be different from those reported by other companies. See the table below entitled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP measures” for reconciliations of adjusted net income to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, which is GAAP net income, and the computation of adjusted net income per share, diluted.


KEY TRONIC CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (In thousands, except per share amounts) (Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended
	September 28, 2024		September 30, 2023
Net sales	$	131,558	$	150,112
Cost of sales		118,255		139,250
Gross profit		13,303		10,862
Research, development and engineering expenses		2,289		2,241
Selling, general and administrative expenses		6,570		5,784
Gain on insurance proceeds, net of losses		—		(431	)
Total operating expenses		8,859		7,594
Operating income		4,444		3,268
Interest expense, net		3,263		3,011
Income before income taxes		1,181		257
Income tax (benefit) provision		57		(78	)
Net income	$	1,124	$	335
Net income per share — Basic	$	0.10	$	0.03
Weighted average shares outstanding — Basic		10,762		10,762
Net income per share — Diluted	$	0.10	$	0.03
Weighted average shares outstanding — Diluted		10,762		11,003


KEY TRONIC CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (In thousands) (Unaudited)

	September 28, 2024			June 29, 2024
ASSETS
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents	$	6,555		$	4,752
Trade receivables, net of credit losses of $3,129 and $2,918		133,984			132,559
Contract assets		23,626			21,250
Inventories, net		95,845			105,099
Other, net of credit losses of $1,642 and $1,679		28,273			24,739
Total current assets		288,283			288,399
Property, plant and equipment, net		27,910			28,806
Operating lease right-of-use assets, net		14,612			15,416
Other assets:
Deferred income tax asset		18,394			17,376
Other		6,735			5,346
Total other assets		25,129			22,722
Total assets	$	355,934		$	355,343
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable	$	83,768		$	79,394
Accrued compensation and vacation		6,870			6,510
Current portion of long-term debt		3,057			3,123
Other		18,450			15,149
Total current liabilities		112,145			104,176
Long-term liabilities:
Long-term debt, net		109,675			116,383
Operating lease liabilities		9,573			10,312
Deferred income tax liability		74			263
Other long-term obligations		124			219
Total long-term liabilities		119,446			127,177
Total liabilities		231,591			231,353
Shareholders’ equity:
Common stock, no par value—shares authorized 25,000; issued and outstanding 10,762 and 10,762 shares, respectively		47,351			47,284
Retained earnings		78,045			76,921
Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)		(1,053	)		(215	)
Total shareholders’ equity		124,343			123,990
Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity	$	355,934		$	355,343

KEY TRONIC CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP measures (In thousands, except per share amounts) (Unaudited)

	Three Months Ended
	September 28, 2024			September 30, 2023
GAAP net income	$	1,124		$	335
Gain on insurance proceeds (net of losses)		—			(431	)
Stock-based compensation expense		67			59
Income tax effect of non-GAAP adjustments (1)		(13	)		74
Adjusted net income:	$	1,178		$	37

Adjusted net income per share — non-GAAP Diluted	$	0.11		$	0.00
Weighted average shares outstanding — Diluted		10,762			11,003

(1) Income tax effects are calculated using an effective tax rate of 20%, which approximates the statutory GAAP tax rate for the presented periods.


CONTACTS:	Tony Voorhees	Michael Newman
	Chief Financial Officer	Investor Relations
	Key Tronic Corporation	StreetConnect
	(509)-927-5345	(206) 729-3625

The MIL Network –

January 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Albuquerque FBI Division Announces It’s 2025 Citizen’s Academy
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

Have you ever wondered how the FBI solves a case? Want to hear about the work agents are doing across New Mexico? Special Agent in Charge Raul Bujanda welcomes business, civic, and faith-based community leaders to apply for FBI Albuquerque’s Citizens Academy program, where we will give participants a first-hand look into life at the FBI.

“The FBI’s Citizens Academy provides an incredible opportunity for members of the community to better understand the work of the FBI and partner with us in keeping New Mexico citizens safe,” said Raul Bujanda, special agent in charge for the FBI Albuquerque Division. “The FBI Citizens Academy program is a unique opportunity for us to share our work one-on-one with community leaders of all backgrounds, and for them to provide us with feedback. Through frank discussion and information sharing, we can improve relationships and advance our mission to protect all Americans.”

FBI Albuquerque is now accepting nominations for the 2025 FBI Citizens Academy. Over the course of 8 sessions this spring, select business, religious, civic, and community leaders will be given an opportunity to go behind the scenes of local FBI operations and experience case studies and demonstrations led by Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and FBI Professional Staff. Topics will include how the FBI works to combat violent crime, human trafficking, cybercrime, counterintelligence, Indian Country, terrorism, and how teams train in forensics, firearms, evidence recovery, and more.
- When: Wednesday evenings February 19th, 2025 – April 23rd, 2025
- Where: FBI Albuquerque 4200 Luecking Park Ave NE, Albuquerque New Mexico 87107
How to Apply: The FBI Citizens Academy is open to anyone with an interest in learning how the FBI works to protect and serve the community. Candidates can be nominated by a program alumnus, former or current FBI employee, or self-nominated. The nomination form must be completed in full and returned by the close of business on Friday, December 20, 2024. If selected, there is no cost to attend. Questions regarding the program or application process can be directed to aq.outreach@fbi.gov

Requirements:
- Business, religious, civic, or community leader
- Be at least 21 years of age
- No felony or serious misdemeanor convictions
- Cannot be under investigation as a subject in a criminal case
- Must live or work in New Mexico
- Must agree to and pass a limited background check
- Must be able to attend classes in person
MIL Security OSI –
January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Two National MS-13 Gang Leaders and Other MS-13 Members and Associates Indicted for Murders in Queens and Long Island
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

Superseding Indictment Adds Charges Relating to Three Murders, Including Charges Against National Gang Leaders Edenilson Velasquez Larin and Hugo Diaz Amaya
A 49-count superseding indictment was unsealed today in federal court in Brooklyn that includes new charges relating to murders allegedly ordered and committed by national leaders, members and associates of the violent transnational criminal organization La Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13. To date, multiple MS-13 members and associates have been charged in the case for numerous crimes including the murders of Andy Peralta in 2018, Victor Alvarenga in 2018, Abel Mosso in 2019 and Eric Monge in 2020. The superseding indictment filed today includes new charges against the following MS-13 members and associates:
- Edenilson Velasquez Larin, also known as “Agresor,” “Saturno,” “Tiny,” “Erick” and “Paco,” allegedly a national leader of MS-13 and the Fulton Locos Salvatruchas (Fulton) clique, who is charged with the 2016 murder of Kenney Reyes and for ordering the murders of Monge in 2020 and Oswaldo Gutierrez Medrano in 2022.
- Hugo Diaz Amaya, also known as “21” and “Splinter,” allegedly another national leader of MS-13 and the Park View Locos Salvatruchas clique, who is charged with racketeering conspiracy and the murder of Gutierrez Medrano in 2022.
- Numerous other members of the Fulton clique, all of whom were previously charged in the case, have also now been charged with the murders of Reyes, Monge and Gutierrez Medrano.
Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, James E. Dennehy, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI), William S. Walker, Special Agent in Charge, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), New York, Thomas G. Donlon, Interim Commissioner, New York City Police Department (NYPD), and Patrick Ryder, Commissioner, Nassau County Police Department (NCPD), announced the arrests and charges.

“My Office and our law enforcement partners have worked tirelessly to hold MS-13 accountable for the unspeakable harm it has done to its victims and our communities. As these charges make clear, our pursuit of those responsible will not be deterred by the passage of time or by the leaders of MS-13’s futile attempts to hide in the shadows,” stated United States Attorney Peace. “This indictment strikes yet another blow at MS-13’s leadership and demonstrates our work to dismantle MS-13 from top to bottom.”

Mr. Peace also thanked the FBI Baltimore Field Office’s Cross Border Task Force, the Nassau County District Attorney’s Office and the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office for their valuable coordination with the investigation.

“Edenilson Velasquez Larin and Hugo Diaz Amaya, national MS-13 leaders, allegedly assumed the role of executioner by ordering and participating with the other charged defendants in a series of brutal murders to achieve status and revenge. These alleged conspiracies highlight the fearmongering and callousness in which MS-13 leaders and members operate. May today’s charges reflect the FBI’s commitment to continue its close collaboration with our law enforcement partners to rigorously dismantle the MS-13 hierarchy and disrupt all gang violence terrorizing our communities,” stated FBI Assistant Director in Charge Dennehy.

“The defendants’ ruthless violence, in furtherance of the MS-13 gang, has no place in society and our communities,” said Special Agent in Charge William S. Walker. “Everyday, HSI New York and our law enforcement partners are utilizing every tool at our disposal to dismantle transnational gangs that jeopardize the safety of New Yorkers, as demonstrated with today’s announcement. No stone will be left unturned in our pursuit of justice on behalf of the victims slain by MS-13 gang members.”

“These new charges highlight the NYPD’s relentless pursuit of individuals terrorizing our communities,” stated NYPD Interim Commissioner Donlon. “We and our law enforcement partners must continue to find and dismantle the gangs that fuel crime on our streets, and we must hold their members accountable for their senseless acts of violence. I express my gratitude to all of our federal, state, and local partners for their steadfast dedication to our shared public safety goal.”

“We want to thank our partners in federal law enforcement, particularly the United States Attorney’s Office, for this collaborative effort to bring these violent and destructive criminals to justice,” stated Nassau County Police Commissioner Patrick Ryder. “From our patrol officers on the street to the dedicated investigators in our Detective Division, the Nassau County Police Department is committed to fighting gang violence and rooting out those who bring destruction to our communities.”

The U.S. Program

As alleged in court filings, MS-13 is an extraordinarily violent street gang operating through “cliques” or chapters in Queens, Long Island and communities across the United States, as well as El Salvador, Honduras and other countries in the Americas and Europe. The gang primarily makes money through drug trafficking and extortion, and is known for its gruesome murders of perceived gang rivals and gang members and associates who have violated the gang’s rules. MS-13 has been responsible for dozens of murders in the Eastern District of New York alone.

Since approximately 2021, virtually all MS-13 cliques in the United States have been united under a single hierarchy known as the “U.S. Program.” The U.S. Program is led by a group of senior gang leaders, most of whom are incarcerated, known as “La Mesa” or “The Table.” La Mesa, among other roles, allegedly authorizes and directs murders throughout the country, including in New York. Prior to their arrests, Velasquez Larin and Diaz Amaya were allegedly two of the few members of La Mesa outside of prison — Velasquez Larin was living in Colorado and Diaz Amaya was living in Kansas — and were among the top leaders responsible for the gang’s operations on the East Coast.

Murder of Kenny Reyes

The superseding indictment adds charges for the 2016 murder in Uniondale, New York, of 18-year-old Kenny Reyes, who had recently come to the United States from Honduras. As alleged in court filings, Fulton clique member Jose Espinoza Sanchez befriended Reyes and learned that he had been associated with the 18th Street gang, rivals of MS-13. Velasquez Larin and Espinoza Sanchez plotted with other members of MS-13 in Nassau County to murder Reyes to increase their positions in the gang. On May 23, 2016, Velasquez Larin, Espinoza Sanchez and two others lured Reyes to a wooded area to smoke marijuana, where they killed him with machetes and buried his body. For years after the murder, Velasquez Larin bragged about their roles in the killing to other MS-13 members.

Murder of Eric Monge

The superseding indictment charges Velasquez Larin and Espinoza Sanchez for their roles in ordering the murder of Eric Monge, and Jose Guevara Aguilar, Jose Arevalo Iraheta and Erick Zavala Hernandez for their participation in the murder. As alleged, in the early morning hours of September 6, 2020, Guevara Aguilar and fellow Fulton clique member Oscar Hernandez Baires shot and killed Monge while he was seated in the front passenger seat of his parked car near his home in Queens. Monge’s wife had just returned to the car after bringing their young children inside their residence when Hernandez Baires and Guevara Aguilar began shooting. After the shooting, Guevara Aguilar and Hernandez Baires ran back to a car where Arevalo Iraheta and Zavala Hernandez were waiting to help them escape. As they fled to the car, Guevara Aguilar dropped his hat, which was later found to have his DNA on it.

Murder of Oswaldo Gutierrez Medrano

The superseding indictment also adds charges relating to the 2022 murder in Nassau County of 20-year-old Oswaldo Gutierrez Medrano, a member of the Sailors clique of MS-13. As alleged, Velasquez Larin and Diaz Amaya ordered the murder of Gutierrez Medrano, and Diaz Amaya coordinated luring Gutierrez Medrano to meet other MS-13 members under the false pretense that he would be receiving a promotion within MS-13. In Nassau County, on February 13, 2022, Gutierrez Medrano allegedly met with those other members of MS-13, including defendants Arevalo Iraheta, Carlos Alvarado, Erick Galdamez Leon and Jose Mejia Hernandez, who allegedly killed him with machetes and knives, dismembered his body and buried him in a wooded area.

The charges in the superseding indictment are allegations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

This case was investigated as part of the ongoing efforts by the OCDETF, a partnership that brings together the combined expertise of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The principal mission of the OCDETF program is to identify, disrupt and dismantle the most serious drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and money laundering organizations, and those primarily responsible for the nation’s illegal drug supply.

Today’s charges are the latest in a series of federal prosecutions by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York targeting members of the MS-13. Since 2003, hundreds of MS-13 members, including dozens of clique leaders, have been convicted on federal felony charges in the Eastern District of New York. A majority of those MS-13 members have been convicted on federal racketeering charges for participating in murders, attempted murders and assaults. Since 2009, this Office has obtained indictments charging MS-13 members with carrying out more than 70 murders in the district and has convicted dozens of MS-13 leaders and members in connection with those murders. These prosecutions are the product of investigations led by our law enforcement partners.

The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s Organized Crime and Gangs Section. Assistant United States Attorneys Jonathan Siegel, Michael W. Gibaldi, Anna L. Karamigios and Sophia M. Suarez are in charge of the prosecution, with the assistance of Paralegal Specialist Eleanor Jaffe-Pachuilo.

New Defendant:

HUGO DIAZ AMAYA (also known as “21” and “Splinter”)
Age: 36
Kansas City, Kansas

Defendants Previously Indicted:

RAMIRO GUTIERREZ (also known as “Cara de Malo”)
Age: 31
Flushing, New York

VICTOR LOPEZ (also known as “Curioso”)
Age: 26
Flushing, New York

TITO MARTINEZ-ALVARENGA (also known as “Imprudente”)
Age: 24
Flushing, New York

ISMAEL SANTOS-NOVOA (also known as “Profe” and “Travieso”)
Age: 36
Flushing, New York

EDENILSON VELASQUEZ LARIN (also known as “Agresor,” “Saturno,” “Tiny,” “Erick” and “Paco”)
Age: 35
Thornton, Colorado

CHRISTIAN ALAS LEON (also known as “Pata de Chucho”)
Age: 26
Westbury, New York

CARLOS ALVARADO (also known as “Brayle” and “Danny”)
Age: 21
Westbury, New York

JOSE AREVALO IRAHETA (also known as “Splinter,” “Inesperado” and “Daniel”)
Age: 27
Queens, New York

JOSE ESPINOZA SANCHEZ (also known as “Cable,” “Bleca,” “Clave,” “Fantasma” and “Victor”)
Age: 25
Carrboro, North Carolina

ERICK GALDAMEZ LEON (also known as “Truco,” “Burro,” and “Chicle”)
Age: 24
Westbury, New York

JOSE GUEVARA AGUILAR (also known as “Tranquilo,” “Malhechor,” and “Angel”
Age: 25
Queens, New York

KEILA HERNANDEZ MAY
Age: 37
Carrboro, North Carolina

YONATHAN HERNANDEZ
Age: 25
Hempstead, New York

JOSE MEJIA HERNANDEZ (also known as “Mismo” and “Timbre”)
Age: 22
Westbury, New York

JOSE PEREZ OVANDO (also known as “Domino” and “Incompleto”)
Age: 24
Westbury, New York

ERICK ZAVALA HERNANDEZ (also known as “Berry,” “Berro,” and “Alex”)
Age: 26
Queens, New York

E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 20-CR-228 (S-3) (LDH)
MIL Security OSI –
January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Romance Scammer Who Took U.S. Citizens Hostage in the Dominican Republic Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

WASHINGTON – Deivy Jose Rodriguez Delgado, 30, a Venezuelan national, was sentenced today in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to 25 years in federal prison for the 2022 armed hostage takings of three U.S. citizens in the Dominican Republic, announced U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves and FBI Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey B. Veltri of the Miami Field Office.

On December 11, 2023, after a nearly two week trial, a jury convicted Delgado of one count of conspiracy to commit hostage taking and three counts of hostage taking. In addition to the prison sentence, U.S. District Court Chief Judge James E. Boasberg ordered Delgado to serve five years of supervised release. Following his release from prison, Delgado will be subject to deportation proceedings.

According to the government’s evidence, Delgado, also known as “Sebastian,” kidnapped three men in separate instances between July 5 and July 30, 2022. In each of the three hostage-takings, Delgado lured his victim online with the promise of a friendly “date” and picked the victim up in his car. After driving a short distance, Delgado suddenly stopped to let an accomplice into the backseat, at which point Delgado and his accomplice held the victim at knifepoint, physically restrained the victim, and demanded ransom for his release. Delgado ordered that the ransoms be paid to online banking accounts, including the same CashApp account.

Each of the three victims was forced at knifepoint to call his friends and family and ask for money to secure his release. The victims were held in captivity by Delgado and his accomplice(s) for up to an hour and were only released after Delgado believed a ransom payment had been made by the victims’ friends and family. In all three hostage takings, the victims were also robbed of their personal belongings before being released on the streets of the Dominican Republic.

Following multiple victim reports, Dominican authorities began an investigation in August 2022. Local law enforcement in the Dominican Republic traced a vehicle used in one of the hostage takings to Delgado and arrested him on Sept. 14, 2022. During a search of the vehicle, Dominican authorities found two serrated knifes like those used in the hostage takings.

This case was investigated by the FBI’s Miami Field Office with valuable assistance provided by the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Dominican Republic’s Division Especial de Investigacion de Crimen Organizado Internacional (DECROI). The case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys John Korba and Jolie Zimmerman of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia with assistance from paralegal Michael Watts.

##

Deivy Jose Rodriguez Delgado, 30, a Venezuelan national, used this image of himself to meet his victims on a social media dating application.

During a search of the vehicle linked to Delgado, Dominican authorities found two serrated knifes like those used in the hostage takings.

An image Delgado used on his social media app to lure victims.

##

22cr0304

MIL Security OSI –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Guatemalan National Pleads Guilty to Heroin and Methamphetamine Delivery to Fresno

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

FRESNO, Calif. — Donis Ariel Maldonado, 28, a Guatemalan national residing in El Monte, pleaded guilty today to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and methamphetamine, U.S. Attorney Phillip A. Talbert announced.

According to court documents, Maldonado agreed with other members of the conspiracy to distribute 22 pounds of heroin and over 80 pounds of methamphetamine sourced from Mexico. On June 24, 2019, Maldonado delivered the drugs to an informant in Fresno.

This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Fresno County Sheriff’s Office, and the High Impact Investigation Team (HIIT), a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Initiative (HIDTA), which consists of personnel from the California Department of Justice, Fresno Police Department, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office, Fresno County District Attorney’s Office, California Highway Patrol, Madera County Sheriff’s Office, Tulare County Sheriff’s Office, Kings County Sheriff’s Office, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Karen Escobar is prosecuting the case.

Maldonado is scheduled to be sentenced by U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston on Feb. 18, 2025. Maldonado faces a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years in prison and a $2 million fine. The actual sentence, however, will be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables.

The case was investigated under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. For more information about Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, please visit Justice.gov/OCDETF.

MIL Security OSI –

January 26, 2025

MIL-OSI: Parex Resources Announces Third Quarter Results, Declaration of Q4 2024 Dividend, and Operational Update

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

CALGARY, Alberta, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Parex Resources Inc. (“Parex” or the “Company”) (TSX: PXT) is pleased to announce its financial and operating results for the three-month period ended September 30, 2024, the declaration of its Q4 2024 regular dividend of C$0.385 per share, as well as an operational update. All amounts herein are in United States Dollars (“USD”) unless otherwise stated.

“Following lower than expected results, Management is focused on driving production efficiency and optimizing performance from our key assets,” commented Imad Mohsen, President & Chief Executive Officer.

“As we transition from 2024 to our 2025 planning phase, we are committed to improving results, delivering safe and reliable production, and positioning Parex to outperform.”

Key Highlights

Generated Q3 2024 funds flow provided by operations (“FFO”)⁽¹⁾ of $152 million and FFO per share⁽²⁾⁽³⁾ of $1.50.
FY 2024 average production guidance increased from 48,000-50,000 boe/d to 49,000-50,000 boe/d, based on stable operations at key assets as well as successful well results at Capachos and LLA-32.
FY 2024 capital expenditure⁽⁶⁾ guidance updated from $370-390 million to $350-370 million, based on a conservative capital program focused on improving capital returns.
Declared Q4 2024 regular dividend of C$0.385 per share⁽⁴⁾ or C$1.54 per share annualized.
Repurchased approximately 4.5 million shares YTD 2024 under the Company’s current normal course issuer bid (“NCIB”).
October 2024 average production was 47,000 boe/d⁽⁵⁾.

Q3 2024 Results

Quarterly average oil & natural gas production was 47,569 boe/d⁽⁷⁾.
Realized net income of $66 million or $0.65 per share basic⁽³⁾.
Generated quarterly FFO⁽¹⁾ of $152 million and FFO per share⁽²⁾⁽³⁾ of $1.50, a 4% decrease and a 1% increase from Q3 2023, respectively.
Current taxes decreased from Q2 2024 by $39 million due to reduced corporate production as well as lower global oil prices; the Company also moved from an estimated 15% surtax to a projected 10% surtax with the depreciation of Brent oil price in the quarter.
Produced an operating netback⁽²⁾ of $39.64/boe and an FFO netback⁽²⁾ of $34.58/boe from an average Brent price of $78.71/bbl.
Incurred $82 million of capital expenditures⁽⁶⁾, primarily from activities at LLA-34, Capachos, LLA-32 and LLA-122.
Generated $69 million of free funds flow⁽⁶⁾ that was used for return of capital initiatives and $20 million of bank debt repayment; working capital surplus⁽¹⁾ was $38 million and cash $147 million at quarter end.
Paid a C$0.385 per share⁽⁴⁾ regular quarterly dividend and repurchased 1,584,650 shares.

(1) Capital management measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory.”
(2) Non-GAAP ratio. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory.”
(3) Per share amounts (with the exception of dividends) are based on weighted-average common shares; dividends paid per share are based on the number of common shares outstanding at each dividend date.
(4) Supplementary financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory.”
(5) Light & medium crude oil: ~8,956 bbl/d, heavy crude oil: ~37,325 bbl/d, conventional natural gas: ~4,316 mcf/d; rounded for presentation purposes.
(6) Non-GAAP financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory.”
(7) See “Operational and Financial Highlights” for a breakdown of production by product type.

Operational and Financial Highlights	Three Months Ended						Nine Months Ended
(unaudited)	Sep. 30,		Sep. 30,		Jun. 30,		Sep. 30,
	2024		2023		2024		2024
Operational
Average daily production
Light Crude Oil and Medium Crude Oil (bbl/d)	9,064		8,837		9,541		8,615
Heavy Crude Oil (bbl/d)	37,777		44,779		43,229		42,167
Crude Oil (bbl/d)	46,841		53,616		52,770		50,782
Conventional Natural Gas (mcf/d)	4,368		5,742		4,788		4,170
Oil & Gas (boe/d)⁽¹⁾	47,569		54,573		53,568		51,477

Operating netback ($/boe)
Reference price – Brent ($/bbl)	78.71		85.92		85.03		81.82
Oil & gas sales⁽⁴⁾	68.75		75.83		75.21		71.69
Royalties⁽⁴⁾	(10.59	)	(13.72	)	(12.54	)	(11.48	)
Net revenue⁽⁴⁾	58.16		62.11		62.67		60.21
Production expense⁽⁴⁾	(14.81	)	(9.73	)	(12.95	)	(13.43	)
Transportation expense⁽⁴⁾	(3.71	)	(3.56	)	(3.40	)	(3.50	)
Operating netback ($/boe)⁽²⁾	39.64		48.82		46.32		43.28

Funds flow provided by operations netback ($/boe)⁽²⁾	34.58		31.28		37.34		34.43

Financial ($000s except per share amounts)

Net income	65,793		119,736		3,845		129,731
Per share – basic⁽⁶⁾	0.65		1.13		0.04		1.27

Funds flow provided by operations⁽⁵⁾	151,773		157,839		180,952		481,032
Per share – basic⁽²⁾⁽⁶⁾	1.50		1.49		1.77		4.71

Capital expenditures⁽³⁾	82,367		156,747		97,797		265,585

Free funds flow⁽³⁾	69,406		1,092		83,155		215,447

EBITDA⁽³⁾	167,763		221,271		195,940		555,781
Adjusted EBITDA⁽³⁾	164,002		225,784		230,547		582,777

Long-term inventory expenditures	(6,318	)	(374	)	9,817		7,342

Dividends paid	28,467		29,239		28,528		85,526
Per share – Cdn$⁽⁴⁾	0.385		0.375		0.385		1.145

Shares repurchased	20,723		24,273		21,367		57,381
Number of shares repurchased (000s)	1,585		1,240		1,298		3,803

Outstanding shares (end of period) (000s)
Basic	100,031		105,014		101,616		100,031
Weighted average basic	100,891		105,621		102,259		102,203
Diluted⁽⁸⁾	100,933		105,722		102,528		100,933

Working capital surplus (deficit)⁽⁵⁾	37,509		(57,511	)	34,156		37,509
Bank debt⁽⁷⁾	30,000		—		50,000		30,000
Cash	147,454		34,548		119,468		147,454

(1) Reference to crude oil or natural gas in the above table and elsewhere in this press release refer to the light and medium crude oil and heavy crude oil and conventional natural gas, respectively, product types as defined in National Instrument 51-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities.
(2) Non-GAAP ratio. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(3) Non-GAAP financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(4) Supplementary financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(5) Capital management measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(6) Per share amounts (with the exception of dividends) are based on weighted average common shares. Dividends paid per share are based on the number of common shares outstanding at each dividend record date.
(7) Syndicated bank credit facility borrowing base of $200.0 million as at September 30, 2024.
(8) Diluted shares as stated include common shares and stock options outstanding at period end; September 30, 2024 closing price was C$12.00 per share.

Operational Update

2024 Corporate Guidance Update

FY 2024 average production guidance has been updated to 49,000 to 50,000 boe/d (49,500 boe/d midpoint) and concurrently, capital expenditure⁽⁵⁾ guidance for the year has been updated to $350 to $370 million ($360 million midpoint).

At $80/bbl Brent crude oil price, funds flow provided by operations⁽⁴⁾ is expected to be $575 to $585 million and generate roughly $220 million of free funds flow⁽⁵⁾ at the midpoint of guidance. A key driver of the funds flow provided by operations increase from the prior updated guidance is a lower projected effective tax rate for FY 2024.

Category	2024 Updated Guidance (August 28, 2024)	2024 Updated Guidance (November 5, 2024)
Brent Crude Oil Average Price	$80/bbl	$80/bbl
Average Production	48,000-50,000 boe/d	49,000-50,000 boe/d
Funds Flow Provided by Operations Netback^(1)(2)(3)	$30-32/boe	$31-33/boe
Funds Flow Provided by Operations⁽⁴⁾	$545-565 million	$575-585 million
Capital Expenditures⁽⁵⁾	$370-390 million	$350-370 million
Free Funds Flow⁽⁵⁾	$175 million (midpoint)	$220 million (midpoint)

(1) Non-GAAP ratio. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(2) 2024 updated assumptions: Vasconia differential: ~$4/bbl; production expense: $13-14/bbl; transportation expense: ~$3.50/bbl; G&A expense: ~$4.00/bbl; effective tax rate: 14-17%.
(3) Supplementary financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(4) Capital management measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.
(5) Non-GAAP financial measure. See “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory”.

Cabrestero and LLA-34⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾

The Cabrestero and LLA-34 blocks had average production of approximately 37,000 bbl/d of heavy crude oil (net) combined in Q3 2024. During the quarter, both blocks experienced higher-than-expected downtime that adversely affected quarterly production.

Additionally, at both blocks, annual decline rates are broadly in line with Management budgeting where there is a continued focus on ramping up injection rates. At Cabrestero specifically, the Company continues to progress its polymer injection pilot and is moving towards approving a full field expansion based on success to date.

(1) Cabrestero: 100% W.I.
(2) LLA-34: 55% W.I.

LLA-32 – Exploitation Update⁽¹⁾

Following the mid-year reallocation of 2024 capital to LLA-32, the Company has now drilled three successful wells on the block. The most recent well, the second follow-up appraisal well, is producing roughly 2,000 bbl/d of light crude oil (gross)⁽²⁾. Based on success to date, Parex is continuing to invest capital and has spud a horizontal well.

(1) 87.5% W.I.
(2) Short-term production rate. See “Oil & Gas Matters Advisory.”

Northern Llanos – Capachos Update⁽¹⁾

The first well of a three-well campaign came online in late Q3 2024. The well is currently producing roughly 4,000 bbl/d of light crude oil with approximately 6,000 mcf/d of natural gas (gross)⁽²⁾.

Parex plans to fulfill an exploration commitment and spud the second well of the campaign in the coming weeks.

(1) 50% W.I.
(2) Short-term production rate. See “Oil & Gas Matters Advisory.”

Northern Llanos – Arauca⁽¹⁾

The Arauca-81 well is expected to be onstream in Q4 2024, following a successful operational sidetrack.

(1) Business Collaboration Agreement with Ecopetrol S.A. (Parex 50% Participating Share); Ecopetrol S.A. currently holds 100% of the working interest in the Convenio Arauca while the assignment procedure is pending.

Big ‘E’ Exploration – Llanos Foothills – LLA-122⁽¹⁾

The drilling of the Arantes well in the high-potential Colombian Foothills continues to progress on an extended timeline. In Q3 2024, an operational sidetrack was executed following a stuck pipe event; the sidetrack was successful, and the well is now at roughly 17,750 feet. Parex is progressing toward the setting of the final liner immediately above the zones of interest, prior to drilling and evaluating the prospective zones. Based on the current pace of operations, the Company expects preliminary results by YE 2024.

(1) 50% W.I.

Return of Capital Update

Q4 2024 Dividend

Parex’s Board of Directors have approved a Q4 2024 regular dividend of C$0.385 per share to shareholders of record on December 9, 2024, to be paid on December 16, 2024. This regular dividend payment to shareholders is designated as an “eligible dividend” for purposes of the Income Tax Act (Canada).

Current Normal Course Issuer Bid

As at October 31, 2024, Parex has repurchased approximately 4.5 million shares under its current NCIB, for total consideration of roughly C$85 million.

2025 Budget & Guidance

The Company continues to assess its short- and long-term development and exploration opportunities as it progresses through its 2025 budgeting and planning process, with next year’s corporate guidance expected to be released in January 2025.

Q3 2024 Results – Conference Call & Webcast

Parex will host a conference call and webcast to discuss its Q3 2024 results on Wednesday, November 6, 2024, beginning at 9:30 am MT (11:30 am ET). To participate in the conference call or webcast, please see the access information below:

Conference ID:		7102953
Participant Toll-Free Dial-In Number		1-646-307-1963
Participant Dial-In Number:		1-647-932-3411
Webcast:		https://events.q4inc.com/attendee/321063614

About Parex Resources Inc.

Parex is one of the largest independent oil and gas companies in Colombia, focusing on sustainable conventional production. The Company’s corporate headquarters are in Calgary, Canada, with an operating office in Bogotá, Colombia. Parex shares trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol PXT.

For more information, please contact:

Mike Kruchten
Senior Vice President, Capital Markets & Corporate Planning
Parex Resources Inc.
403-517-1733
investor.relations@parexresources.com

Steven Eirich
Investor Relations & Communications Advisor
Parex Resources Inc.
587-293-3286
investor.relations@parexresources.com

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures Advisory

This press release uses various “non-GAAP financial measures”, “non-GAAP ratios”, “supplementary financial measures” and “capital management measures” (as such terms are defined in NI 52-112), which are described in further detail below. Such measures are not standardized financial measures under IFRS and might not be comparable to similar financial measures disclosed by other issuers. Investors are cautioned that non-GAAP financial measures should not be construed as alternatives to or more meaningful than the most directly comparable GAAP measures as indicators of Parex’s performance.

These measures facilitate management’s comparisons to the Company’s historical operating results in assessing its results and strategic and operational decision-making and may be used by financial analysts and others in the oil and natural gas industry to evaluate the Company’s performance. Further, management believes that such financial measures are useful supplemental information to analyze operating performance and provide an indication of the results generated by the Company’s principal business activities.

Set forth below is a description of the non-GAAP financial measures, non-GAAP ratios, supplementary financial measures and capital management measures used in this press release.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures

Capital expenditures, is a non-GAAP financial measure which the Company uses to describe its capital costs associated with oil and gas expenditures. The measure considers both property, plant and equipment expenditures and exploration and evaluation asset expenditures which are items in the Company’s statement of cash flows for the period and is calculated as follows:


	For the three months ended							For the nine months ended
	Sep. 30,		Sep. 30,		Jun. 30,			Sep. 30,
($000s)		2024		2023		2024		2024
Property, plant and equipment expenditures	$	68,406	$	93,957	$	49,214	$	158,451
Exploration and evaluation expenditures		13,961		62,790		48,583		107,134
Capital expenditures	$	82,367	$	156,747	$	97,797	$	265,585

Free funds flow, is a non-GAAP financial measure that is determined by funds flow provided by operations less capital expenditures. The Company considers free funds flow to be a key measure as it demonstrates Parex’s ability to fund return of capital, such as the NCIB and dividends, without accessing outside funds and is calculated as follows:


	For the three months ended									For the nine months ended
		Sep. 30,		Sep. 30,			Jun. 30,			Sep. 30,
($000s)		2024			2023		2024			2024
Cash provided by operating activities	$	181,874		$	87,568	$	222,782		$	502,068
Net change in non-cash working capital		(30,101	)		70,271		(41,830	)		(21,036	)
Funds flow provided by operations		151,773			157,839		180,952			481,032
Capital expenditures		82,367			156,747		97,797			265,585
Free funds flow	$	69,406		$	1,092	$	83,155		$	215,447

EBITDA, is a non-GAAP financial measure that is defined as net income adjusted for finance income and expenses, income tax expense (recovery) and depletion, depreciation and amortization.

Adjusted EBITDA, is a non-GAAP financial measure defined as EBITDA adjusted for non-cash impairment charges, unrealized foreign exchange gains (losses), unrealized gains (losses) on risk management contracts and share-based compensation expense (recovery).

The Company considers EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA to be key measures as they demonstrates Parex’s profitability before finance income and expenses, taxes, depletion, depreciation and amortization and other non-cash items. A reconciliation from net income to EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA is as follows:


	For the three months ended										For the nine months ended
		Sep. 30,			Sep. 30,			Jun. 30,			Sep. 30,
($000s)		2024			2023			2024			2024
Net income	$	65,793		$	119,736		$	3,845		$	129,731
Adjustments to reconcile net income to EBITDA:
Finance income		(963	)		(2,496	)		(1,097	)		(3,317	)
Finance expense		7,494			5,219			5,421			18,109
Income tax expense		42,767			49,995			130,888			249,472
Depletion, depreciation and amortization		52,672			48,817			56,883			161,786
EBITDA	$	167,763		$	221,271		$	195,940		$	555,781
Non-cash impairment charges		—			2,189			4,661			4,661
Share-based compensation expense (recovery)		(7,994	)		4,642			5,770			(4,687	)
Unrealized foreign exchange loss (gain)		4,233			(2,318	)		24,176			27,022
Adjusted EBITDA	$	164,002		$	225,784		$	230,547		$	582,777

Non-GAAP Ratios

Operating netback per boe, is a non-GAAP ratio that the Company considers to be a key measure as it demonstrates Parex’ profitability relative to current commodity prices. Parex calculates operating netback per boe as operating netback (calculated as oil and natural gas sales from production, less royalties, operating, and transportation expense) divided by the total equivalent sales volume including purchased oil volumes for oil and natural gas sales price and transportation expense per boe and by the total equivalent sales volume excluding purchased oil volumes for royalties and operating expense per boe.

Funds flow provided by operations netback per boe or FFO netback per boe, is a non-GAAP ratio that includes all cash generated from operating activities and is calculated before changes in non-cash working capital, divided by produced oil and natural gas sales volumes. The Company considers funds flow provided by operations netback per boe to be a key measure as it demonstrates Parex’s profitability after all cash costs relative to current commodity prices.

Basic funds flow provided by operations per share or FFO per share, is a non-GAAP ratio that is calculated by dividing funds flow provided by operations by the weighted average number of basic shares outstanding. Parex presents basic funds flow provided by operations per share whereby per share amounts are calculated using weighted-average shares outstanding, consistent with the calculation of earnings per share. The Company considers basic funds flow provided by operations per share or FFO per share to be a key measure as it demonstrates Parex’s profitability after all cash costs relative to the weighted average number of basic shares outstanding.

Capital Management Measures

Funds flow provided by operations, is a capital management measure that includes all cash generated from operating activities and is calculated before changes in non-cash working capital. The Company considers funds flow provided by operations to be a key measure as it demonstrates Parex’s profitability after all cash costs. A reconciliation from cash provided by operating activities to funds flow provided by operations is as follows:


	For the three months ended									For the nine months ended
		Sep. 30,		Sep. 30,			Jun. 30,			Sep. 30,
($000s)		2024			2023		2024			2024
Cash provided by operating activities	$	181,874		$	87,568	$	222,782		$	502,068
Net change in non-cash working capital		(30,101	)		70,271		(41,830	)		(21,036	)
Funds flow provided by operations	$	151,773		$	157,839	$	180,952		$	481,032

Working capital surplus (deficit), is a capital management measure which the Company uses to describe its liquidity position and ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Working capital surplus (deficit) defined as current assets less current liabilities.


	For the three months ended								For the nine months ended
	Sep. 30,			Sep. 30,		Jun. 30,			Sep. 30,
($000s)		2024		2023			2024		2024
Current assets	$	248,208	$	240,559		$	281,846	$	248,208
Current liabilities		210,699		298,070			247,690		210,699
Working capital surplus (deficit)	$	37,509	$	(57,511	)	$	34,156	$	37,509

Supplementary Financial Measures

“Oil and natural gas sales per boe” is determined by sales revenue excluding risk management contracts, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by total equivalent sales volume including purchased oil volumes.

“Royalties per boe” is comprised of royalties, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by the total equivalent sales volume and excludes purchased oil volumes.

“Net revenue per boe” is comprised of net revenue, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by the total equivalent sales volume and excludes purchased oil volumes.

“Production expense per boe” is comprised of production expense, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by the total equivalent sales volume and excludes purchased oil volumes.

“Transportation expense per boe” is comprised of transportation expense, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by the total equivalent sales volumes including purchased oil volumes.

“Dividends paid per share” is comprised of dividends declared, as determined in accordance with IFRS, divided by the number of shares outstanding at the dividend record date.

Oil & Gas Matters Advisory

The term “Boe” means a barrel of oil equivalent on the basis of 6 Mcf of natural gas to 1 barrel of oil (“bbl”). Boe’s may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A boe conversation ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 Bbl is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. Given the value ratio based on the current price of crude oil as compared to natural gas is significantly different from the energy equivalency of 6 Mcf: 1Bbl, utilizing a conversion ratio at 6 Mcf: 1 Bbl may be misleading as an indication of value.

This press release contains a number of oil and gas metrics, including, operating netbacks and FFO netbacks. These oil and gas metrics have been prepared by management and do not have standardized meanings or standard methods of calculation and therefore such measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies and should not be used to make comparisons. Such metrics have been included herein to provide readers with additional measures to evaluate the Company’s performance; however, such measures are not reliable indicators of the future performance of the Company and future performance may not compare to the performance in previous periods and therefore such metrics should not be unduly relied upon. Management uses these oil and gas metrics for its own performance measurements and to provide security holders with measures to compare the Company’s operations over time. Readers are cautioned that the information provided by these metrics, or that can be derived from the metrics presented in this news release, should not be relied upon for investment or other purposes.

Any reference in this press release to short-term production rates are useful in confirming the presence of hydrocarbons, however such rates are not determination of the rates at which such wells will continue production and decline thereafter and readers are cautioned not to place reliance on such rates in calculating the aggregate production of Parex.

Distribution Advisory

The Company’s future shareholder distributions, including but not limited to the payment of dividends and the acquisition by the Company of its shares pursuant to an NCIB, if any, and the level thereof is uncertain. Any decision to pay further dividends on the common shares (including the actual amount, the declaration date, the record date and the payment date in connection therewith and any special dividends) or acquire shares of the Company will be subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors of Parex and may depend on a variety of factors, including, without limitation the Company’s business performance, financial condition, financial requirements, growth plans, expected capital requirements and other conditions existing at such future time including, without limitation, contractual restrictions and satisfaction of the solvency tests imposed on the Company under applicable corporate law. Further, the actual amount, the declaration date, the record date and the payment date of any dividend are subject to the discretion of the Board. There can be no assurance that the Company will pay dividends or repurchase any shares of the Company in the future.

Advisory on Forward Looking Statements

Certain information regarding Parex set forth in this document contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial known and unknown risks and uncertainties. The use of any of the words “plan”, “expect”, “prospective”, “project”, “intend”, “believe”, “should”, “anticipate”, “estimate”, “forecast”, “guidance”, “budget” or other similar words, or statements that certain events or conditions “may” or “will” occur are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements represent Parex’s internal projections, estimates or beliefs concerning, among other things, future growth, results of operations, production, future capital and other expenditures (including the amount, nature and sources of funding thereof), competitive advantages, plans for and results of drilling activity, environmental matters, business prospects and opportunities. These statements are only predictions and actual events or results may differ materially. Although the Company’s management believes that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance or achievement since such expectations are inherently subject to significant business, economic, competitive, political and social uncertainties and contingencies. Many factors could cause Parex’s actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied in any forward-looking statements made by, or on behalf of, Parex.

In particular, forward-looking statements contained in this document include, but are not limited to, statements with respect to: the Company’s focus, plans, priorities and strategies; average production guidance and capital expenditure guidance; expectations and plans regarding the Cabrestero and LLA-34 blocks, the LLA-32 block, Northern Llanos – Capachos, the Arauca-81 well, and Llanos Foothills – LLA-122; the anticipated terms of the Company’s Q4 2024 regular quarterly dividend, including its expectation that it will be designated as an “eligible dividend”; and the anticipated date and time of Parex’s conference call to discuss Q3 2024 results.

These forward-looking statements are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, including but not limited to, the impact of general economic conditions in Canada and Colombia; prolonged volatility in commodity prices; industry conditions including changes in laws and regulations including adoption of new environmental laws and regulations, and changes in how they are interpreted and enforced in Canada and Colombia; determinations by OPEC and other countries as to production levels; competition; lack of availability of qualified personnel; the results of exploration and development drilling and related activities; obtaining required approvals of regulatory authorities in Canada and Colombia; the risks associated with negotiating with foreign governments as well as country risk associated with conducting international activities; volatility in market prices for oil; fluctuations in foreign exchange or interest rates; environmental risks; changes in income tax laws or changes in tax laws and incentive programs relating to the oil industry; changes to pipeline capacity; ability to access sufficient capital from internal and external sources; failure of counterparties to perform under contracts; the risk that Brent oil prices may be lower than anticipated; the risk that Parex’s evaluation of its existing portfolio of development and exploration opportunities may not be consistent with its expectations; the risk that Parex may not have sufficient financial resources in the future to provide distributions to its shareholders; the risk that the Board may not declare dividends in the future or that Parex’s dividend policy changes; the risk that Parex may not be responsive to changes in commodity prices; the risk that Parex may not meet its production guidance for the year ended December 31, 2024; the risk that Parex’s 2024 capital expenditures may be greater than anticipated; the risk that plans and expectations related to Parex’s drilling program as disclosed herein do not materialize as expected and/or at all; the risk that Parex may not be able to increase production into year end; and other factors, many of which are beyond the control of the Company.

Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. Additional information on these and other factors that could affect Parex’s operations and financial results are included in reports on file with Canadian securities regulatory authorities and may be accessed through the SEDAR+ website (www.sedarplus.ca).

Although the forward-looking statements contained in this document are based upon assumptions which Management believes to be reasonable, the Company cannot assure investors that actual results will be consistent with these forward-looking statements. With respect to forward-looking statements contained in this document, Parex has made assumptions regarding, among other things: current and anticipated commodity prices and royalty regimes; availability of skilled labour; timing and amount of capital expenditures; future exchange rates; the price of oil, including the anticipated Brent oil price; the impact of increasing competition; conditions in general economic and financial markets; availability of drilling and related equipment; effects of regulation by governmental agencies; receipt of partner, regulatory and community approvals; royalty rates; future operating costs; uninterrupted access to areas of Parex’s operations and infrastructure; recoverability of reserves and future production rates; the status of litigation; timing of drilling and completion of wells; on-stream timing of production from successful exploration wells; operational performance of non-operated producing fields; pipeline capacity; that Parex will have sufficient cash flow, debt or equity sources or other financial resources required to fund its capital and operating expenditures and requirements as needed; that Parex’s conduct and results of operations will be consistent with its expectations; that Parex will have the ability to develop its oil and gas properties in the manner currently contemplated; that Parex’s evaluation of its existing portfolio of development and exploration opportunities is consistent with its expectations; current or, where applicable, proposed industry conditions, laws and regulations will continue in effect or as anticipated as described herein; that the estimates of Parex’s production and reserves volumes and the assumptions related thereto (including commodity prices and development costs) are accurate in all material respects; that Parex will be able to obtain contract extensions or fulfill the contractual obligations required to retain its rights to explore, develop and exploit any of its undeveloped properties; that Parex will have sufficient financial resources to pay dividends and acquire shares pursuant to its NCIB in the future; that Parex is able to execute its plans with respect to the Company’s drilling program as disclosed herein; and other matters.

Management has included the above summary of assumptions and risks related to forward-looking information provided in this document in order to provide shareholders with a more complete perspective on Parex’s current and future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. Parex’s actual results, performance or achievement could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these forward-looking statements and, accordingly, no assurance can be given that any of the events anticipated by the forward-looking statements will transpire or occur, or if any of them do, what benefits Parex will derive. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this document and Parex disclaims any intent or obligation to update publicly any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or results or otherwise, other than as required by applicable securities laws.

This press release contains information that may be considered a financial outlook under applicable securities laws about the Company’s potential financial position, including, but not limited to; Parex’s FY 2024 capital expenditure guidance and midpoint capital expenditure guidance; Parex 2024 guidance, including anticipated Brent crude oil average prices, funds flow provided by operations netback; funds flow provided by operations, capital expenditures, free funds flow; and the anticipated terms of the Company’s Q4 2024 regular quarterly dividend including its expectation that it will be designated as an “eligible dividend”, all of which are subject to numerous assumptions, risk factors, limitations and qualifications, including those set forth in the above paragraphs. The actual results of operations of the Company and the resulting financial results will vary from the amounts set forth in this press release and such variations may be material. This information has been provided for illustration only and with respect to future periods are based on budgets and forecasts that are speculative and are subject to a variety of contingencies and may not be appropriate for other purposes. Accordingly, these estimates are not to be relied upon as indicative of future results. Except as required by applicable securities laws, the Company undertakes no obligation to update such financial outlook. The financial outlook contained in this press release was made as of the date of this press release and was provided for the purpose of providing further information about the Company’s potential future business operations. Readers are cautioned that the financial outlook contained in this press release is not conclusive and is subject to change.

The following abbreviations used in this press release have the meanings set forth below:

bbl		one barrel
bbls		barrels
bbl/d		barrels per day
boe		barrels of oil equivalent of natural gas; one barrel of oil or natural gas liquids for six thousand cubic feet of natural gas
boe/d		barrels of oil equivalent of natural gas per day
mcf		thousand cubic feet
mcf/d		thousand cubic feet per day
W.I.		working interest

PDF available: http://ml.globenewswire.com/Resource/Download/036d688c-0a1e-4b88-a59e-ea8a6ec811a7

The MIL Network –

January 26, 2025

MIL-OSI China: China-Europe SMILE satellite to depart for Europe

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

China-Europe SMILE satellite to depart for Europe

Updated: November 6, 2024 09:01 Xinhua

Technicians check the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. The SMILE is a joint mission between the CAS and the European Space Agency (ESA) that aims to deepen the understanding of the Sun-Earth connection by observing the dynamic interaction between the solar wind and the Earth’s magnetosphere. The SMILE satellite has completed the development work in China, including satellite testing, system interface testing and environmental experiments, according to the National Space Science Center of the CAS. The SMILE is about to depart for Europe. It is scheduled for launch by the end of 2025 from Europe’s space launch site in Kourou, French Guiana, by Arianespace’s Vega-C launch vehicle. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician checks the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician checks the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician measures the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Technicians check the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Technicians pack the battery pack of the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Customs officers check the packages for the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician checks the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician packs the battery pack of the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Technicians measure the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

A technician checks the Solar Wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) at a workshop of the Innovation Academy for Microsatellites of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 4, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

MIL OSI China News –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Trump takes first swing states of North Carolina and Georgia after voting passes peacefully

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of Portsmouth

Donald Trump looked poised to take some key battleground states this morning as votes continue to be counted. The Republicans were also being predicted to take control of the Senate.

North Carolina with its 16 electoral college votes was called for Trump in the early hours of the morning, and another key east coast state, Georgia and its 16 electoral college votes, was also predicted to have been gained by Trump. Trump won other major states, from Iowa to Texas, with a strong showing at the polls.

As well as this, Republicans have taken back control of the Senate as they were forecast to, after Democrats lost their slender lead. If Trump is victorious, this will provide him with the congressional support he needs to get his appointees ratified and pass laws without obstruction.

Turnout has been impressive and initial speculation is that Trump has surpassed his rural support from 2020 while Democrat Kamala Harris only matched the suburban numbers that Biden achieved four years ago. NBC exit polls also showed Trump had more support from voters under 30 than any Republican candidate since 2008.

The BBC reported that early exit polls indicated that voters were most concerned with the state of the democracy (35%) with the economy coming a close second (31%).

These concerns have led to a turnout that will be just below the 2020 figures, according to Professor Michael McDonald, of the University of Florida.

In too-close-to-call battleground state Pennsylvania, it was reported that voters were queueing in their hundreds over an hour before the polls opened at 7am.

In Michigan, another key state in the election, officials said that those voters who had voted early – both the absentee and in-person votes – numbered almost as many as the total votes for the 2020 election.

Michigan’s Secretary of State, Jocelyn Benson, said that the state was “on pace to see another high turnout election with voters all across the state enthusiastic and engaged”. And much of it was done in a good atmosphere with election chairperson Jennifer Jenkins telling reporters that it was “good vibes all around”.

Safety concerns

Concerns about whether election day would pass peacefully have not kept voters away.

As revealed in a memo obtained by the non-partisan group, Property of the People, the Department of Homeland Security had issued a warning in September that election infrastructure was “an attractive target for some domestic violent extremists” particularly those with “election-related grievances” who seek to disrupt the democratic process and election operations.

In the nation’s capital, Washington DC, police arrested a man who was stopped during the screening process at the US Capitol visitor centre. Authorities stated that he smelled like gasoline and had a torch lighter, flare gun and papers he intended to deliver to Congress.

Capitol Police Chief J. Thomas Manger, speaking at a press conference shortly after the incident, stated that “there is no indication right now that it had anything to do with the election”.

The greatest threat to the smooth running of the election on polling day seemed not to come from domestic perpetrators but from foreign interference, particularly in the crucial swing state races.

Several polling stations in Georgia, Michigan, Arizona and Wisconsin were the victims of hoax bomb threats that caused temporary closures of the sites. The threats were believed to be sent by emails that were traced back to Russian email domains.

In Navajo County in Arizona, four polling stations were the target of bomb threats. Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes told reporters that election officials in the state had “no reason to believe that any of our voters or any of our polling places are in any sort of jeopardy.”

“We also have reason to believe, although I won’t get into specifics, that this comes from one of our foreign enemies, namely Russia,” he continued.

In Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro announced at a press conference that there had been multiple bomb threats at polling stations and municipal centres across the state.

Shapiro, who was at one time thought of as a potential running mate for Harris, revealed that “state and local law enforcement – along with the FBI – are investigating these threats and thus far, there is no credible threat to the public”.

This came after reports emerged of at least ten polling locations in Philadelphia and in surrounding areas were sent a bomb threat via email at 6pm local time.

Republican Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger accused Russia of being the cause of the threats aimed at polling locations in the southern state. “They don’t want us to have a smooth, fair and accurate election, and if they can get us to fight among ourselves, they can count that as a victory,” he told reporters.

The FBI stated that it was aware of the threats and that many appeared “to originate from Russian email domains”. The Russian embassy in Washington denied the threats.

Last Thursday, Georgia was also the subject of what the US intelligence community called a disinformation campaign designed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election result through an online video that “depicted individuals claiming to be from Haiti and voting illegally in multiple counties in Georgia”.

Researchers at Clemson University in South Carolina identified the work as being that of Russian disinformation group Storm -1516. Darren Linvill of Clemson University, stated that Russian group had “turned their focus squarely on the US election.”

And the integrity of this election took a further hit when Republican candidate Donald Trump made unfounded accusations on social media platform Truth Social of election fraud in Philadelphia, a must-win state for the former president.

Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner said through a spokesperson that “the only talk about massive cheating has come from one of the candidates, Donald J. Trump. There is no factual basis whatsoever within law enforcement to support this wild allegation”.

Experts have warned that such campaigns could give momentum to accusations that the election is not legitimate and that this, in turn, could trigger post-election violence.

As the results come in, America holds it breath that any potential transition of power will be more peaceful than four years ago.

Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump takes first swing states of North Carolina and Georgia after voting passes peacefully – https://theconversation.com/trump-takes-first-swing-states-of-north-carolina-and-georgia-after-voting-passes-peacefully-242716

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Rosanna Costa: Medium – and long-run trends in interest rates – causes and implications for monetary policy

Source: Bank for International Settlements

1. Welcome Remarks

Good morning to all the speakers, discussants, the organizers of this event, Atif Mian, Sofia Bauducco, Mariana García and Lucciano Villacorta, and everyone who is here attending in person and to those following us via streaming. We welcome you to the twenty-seventh Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile entitled “Medium- and Long-Run Trends in Interest Rates: Causes and Implications for Monetary Policy.”

Since 1997, the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh) has been convening prominent scholars and policymakers to this Conference to discuss major issues in central banking and their implications for emerging economies. Since its inception, this Conference has served as a bridge between academics and policymakers. This version is no exception: fresh and thoughtful research will support the discussion over the next two days on a topic that is very much front and center on the policy agenda. We will enjoy the presentations of seven authors, seven discussants, two keynote speakers, and a policy panel.

2. Motivation and context

This year’s conference tackles a topic that is increasingly at the forefront of economic discussions: the future trajectory of long-run real interest rates, their potential determinants, and the implications for monetary policy. The timing of this topic couldn’t be more relevant, especially in light of the sharpest and most synchronized monetary tightening we have seen in decades.

As we all know, central banks in advanced economies have recently started lowering their policy rates and in many emerging economies this normalization process has been under way for some time now. Even so, policy rates had risen significantly over the past two years from their record lows in decades. This shift has sparked a lively debate regarding the future of medium- and long-run trends in the real rates; specifically, whether policy rates will revert to their pre-pandemic lows or will settle at a higher level.

Opinions on this matter vary widely among experts and I think there is not a clear consensus on what the long run interest rates will look like in the future. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that real interest rates are likely to revert to their historical lows, as the key factors that were mainly thought to have driven these rates down over the past forty years-such as demographic shifts, stagnant productivity growth, increased market power, higher risk aversion and sustained demand for safe assets-do not seem likely to revert sufficiently to produce a significant and lasting increase in real interest rates in the coming years.

On the other hand, recent market indicators suggest that equilibrium long-term real interest rates have risen. Also, some new estimates of the natural interest rate-defined as the “long-run” equilibrium rate after shocks have dissipated-indicates that this rate may have risen in several advanced countries in the past few years. As I will discuss in a while, this shift could indicate that at least some structural drivers of real interest rates have changed direction or that the natural interest rate is adjusting to a new economic environment possibly characterized by higher levels of public debt.

The future evolution of the natural interest rate has significant implications for monetary policy. Accurately assessing the long-run trend of the natural rate is essential for central banks, as this rate serves as a crucial reference point for monetary policy. The difference between the real interest rate and the natural rate provides valuable insight into a central bank’s monetary stance and aids in evaluating various policy options.

However, the natural rate is an abstract concept, and its estimates often carry considerable uncertainty, particularly in the post-pandemic period. Since the natural rate is not directly observable, understanding its determinants has become vital for effective monetary policy. I am confident that the fruitful discussions we will have during this conference will deepen our understanding of these determinants and clarify where natural rates and other relevant interest rates may stand in the years ahead.

In these opening remarks, I would like to take a moment to briefly review the key empirical long run trends we have observed in interest rates, as well as the primary explanations put forth in the literature. Following that, I will walk you through the main agenda of the Conference.

3. Drivers behind the trends in interest rates

Over the past forty years (up to the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020-2021), we have seen a remarkable decline in nominal interest rates across the globe. For example, during the 1981 to 2020 period, nominal returns on U.S. Treasury bonds, both short and long term, dropped significantly. The 2-year Treasury Bills experienced a drop of around 14 percentage points, and 10-year bonds saw a decline of 13 percentage points. During this same period, inflation also fell, albeit to a lesser degree, leading to real rate declines of about 5 and 4 percentage points for the 2- and 10-year bonds, respectively, putting sovereign real interest rates close to zero and even in negative territory for some periods. The decline was not limited to sovereign bond rates; it was also present in the returns on other so-called “safe” assets. Importantly, this downward trend was not exclusive to the United States. Real long-term rates have declined by several percentage points since the early 1980s in both developed and emerging economies, so this appears to be a global phenomenon.

The global downward trend in observed risk-free rates over an extended period suggests a significant decline in the natural interest rate, often referred to as the “long-run” equilibrium rate. This secular decline has coincided with a relatively stable trajectory in the marginal product of capital, a stable trajectory on the returns on risky assets, and a stable trajectory in the investment rate, particularly in advanced economies. As a result, these patterns are often attributed to factors that have increased the overall supply of savings over the years, alongside factors that have redirected this excess in savings toward the demand for safe assets rather than productive investments.

In recent years, much of the literature has centered on the hypothesis of a “global saving glut.” This theory suggests that a significant excess of savings from certain countries and affluent groups has led to a marked shift toward safe assets. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in the prices of these assets, accompanied by a decline in interest rates.

One contributor to this phenomenon was the increased savings from emerging economies, particularly since the 1990s. Factors such as robust economic growth, soaring commodity prices, and high risk aversion all fueled greater savings in these regions. As a result, these economies channeled substantial portions of their savings into global markets, with a significant impact on interest rates in developed countries.

Another contributor to this saving glut was the increasing savings rates among the wealthiest households in developed nations. As income inequality has risen, rich households have saved a larger share of their income, further contributing to the excess savings phenomenon. Research indicates that the savings of the top 1% in the United States is comparable to the savings generated by the excess from emerging markets, a trend the literature refersto as the “saving glut of the rich.” This dynamic has profound implications for wealth distribution and economic stability.

Other mentioned explanations for the excess savings are linked to more structural factors, such as the secular stagnation hypothesis, which suggests a persistent decline in potential economic growth that limits investment opportunities, thereby driving savings toward safer assets. Additionally, demographic changes-including declining population growth and longer life expectancy-have influenced savings behavior across generations and regions.

Finally, rising risk aversion, the declining cost of investment goods, and the substantial increase in corporate power over recent years further explain why this increase in savings has been directed toward safe assets rather than productive investments.

Over the past 40 years, all these factors have shaped the dynamics of savings, investment, and, consequently, interest rates, each contributing with varying significance during different phases. Looking ahead, the trajectory of interest rates will heavily depend on the uncertain evolution of these drivers.

The outlook for these structural factors influencing real interest rates is mixed. On the one hand, several key factors behind the pre-pandemic decline in interest rates- such as low potential growth, rising inequality, increasing uncertainty, growing market power, and longer life expectancy- show no significant signs of changing direction. These forces suggest that real interest rates may revert to their declining pre-pandemic trend. On the other hand, additional factors could lead to a sustained rise in rates. These include a decrease in savings due to a growing inactive population, substantial fiscal deficits resulting in very high levels of debt, potential productivity gains from advancements in artificial intelligence, geopolitical risks and climate disasters affecting global savings, and significant investments in the green transition.

I hope our upcoming discussion will help clarify the direction of these drivers and enhance our understanding of where the natural interest rate may be headed in the future.

4. Conference contents

Let me now give a very brief overview of what we will be hearing today and tomorrow:

The Conference will start with the session “Interest Rates and Macroeconomic Policy” In this session, the paper by Francesco Bianchi, Renato Faccini and Leonardo Melosi examines the role of fiscal policy in shaping the future path of real interest rates. Then, the paper by Gabriel Jiménez, Dmitry Kuvshinov, José-Luis Peydró and Bjorn Richter will look at the links between the path of the monetary policy rate over time and the risk of banking crises from a historical perspective.

Then, we will continue with the first keynote speech, delivered by Ricardo Reis. He will address the implications of interest rate trends on inflation, as well as the subsequent effects of inflation on these trends.

We will then transition to our second academic session, which will focus on “Theories of Natural Interest Rates.” The natural interest rate, an abstract concept, is defined as the interest rate that prevails in long-term equilibrium once economic shocks have dissipated and prices are fully flexible. As a latent variable, understanding its determinants and refining its measurement is of paramount importance.

This session will begin with a paper by Ozge Akinci, Gianluca Beningno, Marco del Negro, and Albert Queralto, who propose a complementary concept referred to as the Financial (In) Stability Real Interest Rate. While the natural interest rate is typically associated with macroeconomic stability, this new concept emphasizes the critical importance of financial stability. Following this presentation, Galo Nuño will discuss three theories concerning natural interest rates. Traditional theories often highlight structural drivers such as technological advancement and demographic changes. However, Galo’s paper will challenge this conventional view, exploring how factors such as public debt, household inequality, the zero lower bound, and persistent negative supply shocks may influence natural interest rates.

To conclude this session, we will hear from Elías Albagli, Sofia Bauducco, Guillermo Carlomagno, Luis Gonzales, and Juan Marcos Wlasiuk, who will discuss the potential impacts of climate change and escalating geopolitical tensions on long-term interest rates.

The second day will begin with the keynote speech titled “Long-Run Interest Rates: Past, Present, and Future” by Atif Mian. He will explore the interconnections between interest rates and both private and public debt over time. Atif will first address the role of inequality in explaining the simultaneous decline in interest rates and the rise in debt over the past few decades. He will then examine the dynamics of debt, discussing an appropriate constraint on interest rates to prevent explosive borrowing. Finally, he will focus on estimating future yields.

Next, we will transition to the session titled “Interest Rates, Inflation, and Transmission to Emerging Markets.” This session will open with the paper “U.S. Anti-Inflationary Policy and Emerging Economies: 1980 vs. 2020s” by Drishan Banerjee, Galina Hale, and Harrison Shieh. Their paper analyzes macroeconomic data from advanced and emerging economies in the 1980s and 2020s to highlight differences in how U.S. monetary policies have impacted emerging markets in these two distinct periods. The second paper in this session, by Francisco Legaspe and Liliana Varela, will show how country-specific risks, such as political uncertainty and risk on debt repayment explain excess returns from investing in local currency assets in LATAM countries. Finally, a policy panel featuring Elias Albagli, Jean-Marc Natal, Boris Hofmann, and Ricardo Reis will offer insights into the future of interest rates and their implications for monetary policy in emerging economies.

5. Acknowledgements

I would like to especially thank Atif Mian for being the external organizer of this Conference, as well as locals Sofia Bauducco, Mariana García and Lucciano Villacorta for putting togethersuch a wonderful program. I also thank all the speakers and contributors and look forward to the Conference volume that we will publish in some months with its formatted contents.

Let me finish by thanking María José Reyes, Constanza Martinelli, Carolina Besa, Daniela Gaete, Daphne Guiloff, Pablo Barros, and both the Public Affairs Department and the Economic Research Department of the Central Bank of Chile for all their invaluable help managing the logistics of organizing this Annual Conference.

I wish you a fruitful discussion over the next two days.

Thank you.

MIL OSI Economics –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Trump takes first swing states after voting passes peacefully

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Dafydd Townley, Teaching Fellow in International Security, University of Portsmouth

Donald Trump looked poised to take some key battleground states this morning as votes continue to be counted. The Republicans were also being predicted to take control of the Senate.

North Carolina with its 16 electoral college votes was called for Trump in the early hours of the morning, and another key east coast state, Georgia and its 16 electoral college votes, was also predicted to have been gained by Trump. Trump won other major states, from Iowa to Texas, with a strong showing at the polls.

As well as this, Republicans have taken back control of the Senate as they were forecast to, after Democrats lost their slender lead. If Trump is victorious, this will provide him with the congressional support he needs to get his appointees ratified and pass laws without obstruction.

Turnout has been impressive and initial speculation is that Trump has surpassed his rural support from 2020 while Democrat Kamala Harris only matched the suburban numbers that Biden achieved four years ago. NBC exit polls also showed Trump had more support from voters under 30 than any Republican candidate since 2008.

The BBC reported that early exit polls indicated that voters were most concerned with the state of the democracy (35%) with the economy coming a close second (31%).

These concerns have led to a turnout that will be just below the 2020 figures, according to Professor Michael McDonald, of the University of Florida.

In too-close-to-call battleground state Pennsylvania, it was reported that voters were queueing in their hundreds over an hour before the polls opened at 7am.

In Michigan, another key state in the election, officials said that those voters who had voted early – both the absentee and in-person votes – numbered almost as many as the total votes for the 2020 election.

Michigan’s Secretary of State, Jocelyn Benson, said that the state was “on pace to see another high turnout election with voters all across the state enthusiastic and engaged”. And much of it was done in a good atmosphere with election chairperson Jennifer Jenkins telling reporters that it was “good vibes all around”.

Safety concerns

Concerns about whether election day would pass peacefully have not kept voters away.

As revealed in a memo obtained by the non-partisan group, Property of the People, the Department of Homeland Security had issued a warning in September that election infrastructure was “an attractive target for some domestic violent extremists” particularly those with “election-related grievances” who seek to disrupt the democratic process and election operations.

In the nation’s capital, Washington DC, police arrested a man who was stopped during the screening process at the US Capitol visitor centre. Authorities stated that he smelled like gasoline and had a torch lighter, flare gun and papers he intended to deliver to Congress.

Capitol Police Chief J. Thomas Manger, speaking at a press conference shortly after the incident, stated that “there is no indication right now that it had anything to do with the election”.

The greatest threat to the smooth running of the election on polling day seemed not to come from domestic perpetrators but from foreign interference, particularly in the crucial swing state races.

Several polling stations in Georgia, Michigan, Arizona and Wisconsin were the victims of hoax bomb threats that caused temporary closures of the sites. The threats were believed to be sent by emails that were traced back to Russian email domains.

In Navajo County in Arizona, four polling stations were the target of bomb threats. Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes told reporters that election officials in the state had “no reason to believe that any of our voters or any of our polling places are in any sort of jeopardy.”

“We also have reason to believe, although I won’t get into specifics, that this comes from one of our foreign enemies, namely Russia,” he continued.

In Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro announced at a press conference that there had been multiple bomb threats at polling stations and municipal centres across the state.

Shapiro, who was at one time thought of as a potential running mate for Harris, revealed that “state and local law enforcement – along with the FBI – are investigating these threats and thus far, there is no credible threat to the public”.

This came after reports emerged of at least ten polling locations in Philadelphia and in surrounding areas were sent a bomb threat via email at 6pm local time.

Republican Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger accused Russia of being the cause of the threats aimed at polling locations in the southern state. “They don’t want us to have a smooth, fair and accurate election, and if they can get us to fight among ourselves, they can count that as a victory,” he told reporters.

The FBI stated that it was aware of the threats and that many appeared “to originate from Russian email domains”. The Russian embassy in Washington denied the threats.

Last Thursday, Georgia was also the subject of what the US intelligence community called a disinformation campaign designed to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election result through an online video that “depicted individuals claiming to be from Haiti and voting illegally in multiple counties in Georgia”.

Researchers at Clemson University in South Carolina identified the work as being that of Russian disinformation group Storm-1516. Darren Linvill of Clemson University, stated that Russian group had “turned their focus squarely on the US election.”

And the integrity of this election took a further hit when Republican candidate Donald Trump made unfounded accusations on social media platform Truth Social of election fraud in Philadelphia, a must-win state for the former president.

Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner said through a spokesperson that “the only talk about massive cheating has come from one of the candidates, Donald J. Trump. There is no factual basis whatsoever within law enforcement to support this wild allegation”.

Experts have warned that such campaigns could give momentum to accusations that the election is not legitimate and that this, in turn, could trigger post-election violence.

As the results come in, America holds it breath that any potential transition of power will be more peaceful than four years ago.

Dafydd Townley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump takes first swing states after voting passes peacefully – https://theconversation.com/trump-takes-first-swing-states-after-voting-passes-peacefully-242716

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: WTO members review latest notifications of anti-dumping actions

Source: WTO

Headline: WTO members review latest notifications of anti-dumping actions

The Committee reviewed new notifications of legislation submitted by Brazil, Cabo Verde, Solomon Islands and the United States. It continued its review of the legislative notifications of the European Union, Ghana, Liberia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.
In reviewing semi-annual notifications on anti-dumping actions, delegations questioned and discussed the practices of other members including in relation to the initiation of investigations, the imposition of provisional and final anti-dumping measures, and the review of existing anti-dumping measures. Delegations questioned and discussed actions contained in the semi-annual reports submitted by Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. In presenting its semi-annual report, Ukraine expressed concerns over the war in Ukraine and the effects on its domestic industry.
In respect of the semi-annual reports covering the period 1 January – 30 June 2024, 45 members notified the Committee of anti-dumping actions taken in this period, while 15 reported no new anti-dumping actions in the same period. In addition, 51 members submitted one-time notifications indicating they have not established an authority competent to initiate and conduct an investigation and have not, to date, taken any anti-dumping actions.
In addition to the semi-annual reports, the WTO’s Anti-Dumping Agreement requires members to submit without delay – on an ad hoc basis – notifications of all preliminary and final anti-dumping actions taken. Ad hoc notifications reviewed during the meeting were received from Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; the European Union; Georgia; India; Israel; Japan; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; the Kyrgyz Republic; Mexico; Morocco; Pakistan; the Russian Federation; South Africa; Chinese Taipei; Türkiye; Ukraine; the United Kingdom; and the United States. Members raised questions and discussed actions taken by Australia, China and Morocco. Canada encouraged members to submit timely ad hoc notifications and raised concerns about the conduct of investigations it considered to be politically motivated which are not based on sufficient evidence or justification.
In the absence of the Chair of the Committee Mr Mohamed Zuhair Taous (Tunisia), the interim Chair Mr Wolfram Spelten (Germany), who was elected to preside over the October 2024 meetings of the Committee and of its subsidiary bodies, urged members that had not submitted semi-annual reports and ad hoc notifications of actions taken to do so promptly. The interim Chair welcomed members’ continued extensive use of the anti-dumping portal to submit their semi-annual reports.
The Committee adopted its 2024 annual report to the Council for Trade in Goods.
Next meetings
The Committee decided that its spring and autumn meetings for 2025 would be held in the weeks of 28 April and 27 October 2025, respectively.

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MIL OSI Economics –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office, FBI, and USMS Target Drug Trafficking Operation Linked to Federal Correctional Facility
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

ALBUQUERQUE – This week, the FBI Violent Gangs Task Force and U.S. Marshals Service conducted a coordinated operation to dismantle a significant drug trafficking network linked to the Cibola County Correctional Center in Milan, NM, with the support of the New Mexico State Police. The operation was part of an ongoing investigation into an intergang conspiracy involving both incarcerated and non-incarcerated gang members.

On Wednesday, October 30, 2024, search warrants were executed at 13 identified premises across New Mexico, believed to contain evidence related to multiple federal offenses. The following individuals are among those targeted in this operation:
- Nora Baca – 417 Monte Alto Place NE, Albuquerque, NM
- Estrella Gonzalez – 1812 Del Norte Drive SW, Albuquerque, NM
- Angelo Garcia – 4903 Rincon Road NW, Albuquerque, NM
- Monalisa Vargas – 1333 Columbia Dr. SE, Apt #95, Albuquerque, NM
- Theresa Atencio – 9748 Summer Shower Place NW, Albuquerque, NM
- Johnny Valiterra (aka “Chopper”) – 2331 Menaul Boulevard NE, Albuquerque, NM
- Richard Porras (aka “Deuce”) – 2331 Menaul Boulevard NE, Albuquerque, NM
- Sonia Trinidad – 401 Dunes Court, Apt D, Albuquerque, NM
- Desiree Benavidez – 3 Jose P Sanchez Road, Los Lunas, NM
- Ana Romero – 200 E. Jefferson Avenue, Gallup, NM
- Adolfo Montano – 18 Arroyoito Loop, Seboyeta, NM
- Kimberly Perry and Kelly Perry – 8 Red Mesa Housing, Crownpoint, NM
- Monique Gallegos and David Hicks – 7 Hughes Blvd, Grants, NM
In addition to the operation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Mexico announced indictments against several individuals connected to the drug trafficking at Cibola County Correctional Center. Two current inmates, Lupe Vargas, 40, and Edward Vallez, 44, along with two co-conspirators, Monalisa Vargas, 38 (Lupe’s wife), and Michael Garcia, 46, have been charged with conspiracy and attempting to provide or obtain prohibited objects in a correctional facility. Additionally, a superseding indictment has been filed against Nora Baca, charging her with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

Nora Baca, Monalisa Vargas and David Hicks were arrested during the operation. If convicted, Baca faces between 15 years and life in prison and Vargas faces up to 20 years in prison. Michael Garcia remains a fugitive at this time.

As a result of the operation, 15 firearms, ammunition, fentanyl, methamphetamine, suboxone strips, $6,000 in cash, and 23 cell phones were seized, and six individuals were arrested and charged by federal or state authorities:
- Angelo Garcia was arrested and charged by criminal complaint with possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and possession a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. If convicted of the current charges, Garcia faces no less than 10 years and up to 45 years in prison.
- Theresa Atencio was arrested and charged by criminal complaint with providing contraband to a prisoner. If convicted of the current charges, Atencio faces up to one year in jail.
At Benavidez’s residence in Los Lunas, three armed felons were located and arrested:
- Raymond Lucero was arrested on federal criminal complaint and charged with being a felon in possession or a firearm and ammunition. If convicted of the current charges, Lucero faces up to 15 years in prison.
- Jacob Gonzales, aka “Trigger,” was arrested on federal criminal complaint and charged with being a felon in possession or a firearm and ammunition. If convicted of the current charges, Gonzales faces up to 15 years in prison.
- Nadine Gonzales was arrested on state criminal complaint and charged with being a felon in possession or a firearm and ammunition.
Jacob Gonzales recently was released from prison after completing a 22-year on a state sentence for felony convictions related to a murder.

In addition, Emmanleen Chavez was arrested at the residence in Grants on a state warrant for attempted murder.

The operation and ongoing investigation are intended to dismantle the criminal enterprises operating within and outside the correctional facility, which have been implicated in the distribution of controlled substances and other illegal activities.

“The Department of Justice protects the safety and dignity of all, including those in federal custody,” said U.S. Attorney Alexander Uballez. “Those who seek to profit from the addiction and vulnerability of detainees not only violate the law but perpetuate a cycle of harm that extends beyond the walls of the jail. That is why we are taking a comprehensive approach—leveraging technology to interdict contraband before it enters the facility, enforcing federal criminal laws against detainees and those who support them on the outside, relying on the cooperation of people motivated to do the right thing, and treating opioid use disorder with medical care for federal detainees while in custody. The Department of Justice will not tolerate the exploitation of addiction for profit in our correctional facilities.”

“This week’s operation demonstrates the FBI’s commitment to continue to dismantle criminal enterprises operating in New Mexico,” said Philip Russell, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Albuquerque Division. “The FBI, along with our federal, state, local and tribal partners are determined to bring drug traffickers to justice for crimes committed and damage done to our communities.”

“The U.S. Marshals Service is committed to providing a safe and secure environment for prisoners that are under our care,” said U.S. Marshal for the District of New Mexico David O. Barnett, Jr. “The execution of this joint operation is a testament to the unwavering dedication by our Federal, State, and Local partners to combat crime and improve the lives of our New Mexico communities.”

U.S. Attorney Alexander M.M. Uballez, Raul Bujanda, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Albuquerque Field Office, and David Barnett, U.S. Marshal for the District of New Mexico, made the announcement today.

The FBI Albuquerque Division Violent Gang Task Force (VGTF) and United States Marshals Service jointly investigated this case with assistance from the CoreCivic Intelligence Unit and the New Mexico State Police. Assistant United States Attorneys Paul Mysliwiec and David Hirsch are prosecuting these cases.

The VGTF is an FBI led task force comprising of agents and officers from the New Mexico State Police, Rio Rancho Police Department, Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office, and the Albuquerque Police Department.

An indictment or criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

# # #
MIL Security OSI –
January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Turkish National Arrested for Allegedly Conspiring to Violate Venezuela-Related Sanctions

Source: United States Attorneys General 1

Taskin Torlak, 37, of Turkey, was arrested in Miami, on Nov. 2 for allegedly conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions as part of a scheme to transport oil from Venezuela for the benefit of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company.

“As alleged, the defendant conspired to evade U.S. sanctions imposed on PdVSA, deploying deception to smuggle black-market oil from Venezuela,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Justice Department will continue to hold accountable those involved in criminal efforts to circumvent sanctions imposed on the Maduro regime.”

“This defendant allegedly conspired to illegally sell Venezuelan oil, using deceit and trickery to hide the fact that this oil originated from Venezuela,” said U.S. Attorney Matthew Graves for the District of Columbia. “Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PdVSA, was sanctioned by the U.S. government to prevent the current regime from further depleting the nation’s resources while it unlawfully remains in power. We remain dedicated to prosecuting violations of these sanctions until the government of Venezuela takes the necessary steps for these sanctions to be lifted.”

Torlak was arrested as he attempted to depart the United States to return to Turkey. He is charged by complaint with one count of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). According to the complaint, Torlak conspired with others to cause U.S. financial institutions to process transactions connected to the transport of Venezuelan oil for the benefit of PdVSA, which the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Specially Designated National (SDN) in January 2019.

According to the complaint, beginning at least in or around November 2020, Torlak and others devised and implemented a complex scheme to violate and evade U.S. sanctions related to petroleum products from Venezuela and Iran. The scheme included obfuscating the identities of tankers moving the oil by re-naming and re-flagging vessels, covering vessel names with paint or blankets, and turning off the electronics that track vessels’ locations for the safety of ships and their crews. Torlak and his co-conspirators allegedly received tens of millions of dollars from PdVSA in payment for transporting Venezuelan oil, and hid the ultimate beneficiaries of the related transactions from U.S. financial institutions, who then unwittingly processed payments in furtherance of the scheme. The complaint further alleges that Torlak and his co-conspirators explicitly discussed the need to hide their conduct from the U.S. Government and its agencies, including OFAC, as well as commercial maritime entities.

Homeland Security Investigations Washington D.C. is investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Maeghan Mikorski for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorneys Sean Heiden and Chantelle Dial of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.

A complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Turkish National Arrested for Allegedly Conspiring to Violate Venezuela-Related Sanctions

Source: US State of Vermont

Taskin Torlak, 37, of Turkey, was arrested in Miami, on Nov. 2 for allegedly conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions as part of a scheme to transport oil from Venezuela for the benefit of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil and natural gas company.

“As alleged, the defendant conspired to evade U.S. sanctions imposed on PdVSA, deploying deception to smuggle black-market oil from Venezuela,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Justice Department will continue to hold accountable those involved in criminal efforts to circumvent sanctions imposed on the Maduro regime.”

“This defendant allegedly conspired to illegally sell Venezuelan oil, using deceit and trickery to hide the fact that this oil originated from Venezuela,” said U.S. Attorney Matthew Graves for the District of Columbia. “Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, PdVSA, was sanctioned by the U.S. government to prevent the current regime from further depleting the nation’s resources while it unlawfully remains in power. We remain dedicated to prosecuting violations of these sanctions until the government of Venezuela takes the necessary steps for these sanctions to be lifted.”

Torlak was arrested as he attempted to depart the United States to return to Turkey. He is charged by complaint with one count of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). According to the complaint, Torlak conspired with others to cause U.S. financial institutions to process transactions connected to the transport of Venezuelan oil for the benefit of PdVSA, which the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated as a Specially Designated National (SDN) in January 2019.

According to the complaint, beginning at least in or around November 2020, Torlak and others devised and implemented a complex scheme to violate and evade U.S. sanctions related to petroleum products from Venezuela and Iran. The scheme included obfuscating the identities of tankers moving the oil by re-naming and re-flagging vessels, covering vessel names with paint or blankets, and turning off the electronics that track vessels’ locations for the safety of ships and their crews. Torlak and his co-conspirators allegedly received tens of millions of dollars from PdVSA in payment for transporting Venezuelan oil, and hid the ultimate beneficiaries of the related transactions from U.S. financial institutions, who then unwittingly processed payments in furtherance of the scheme. The complaint further alleges that Torlak and his co-conspirators explicitly discussed the need to hide their conduct from the U.S. Government and its agencies, including OFAC, as well as commercial maritime entities.

Homeland Security Investigations Washington D.C. is investigating the case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Maeghan Mikorski for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorneys Sean Heiden and Chantelle Dial of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section are prosecuting the case. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida.

A complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: New survey finds an alarming tolerance for attacks on the press in the US – particularly among white, Republican men

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Julie Posetti, Global Director of Research, International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) and Professor of Journalism, City St George’s, University of London

Press freedom is a pillar of American democracy. But political attacks on US-based journalists and news organisations pose an unprecedented threat to their safety and the integrity of information.

Less than 48 hours before election day, Donald Trump told a rally of his supporters that he wouldn’t mind if someone shot the journalists in front of him.

“I have this piece of glass here, but all we have really over here is the fake news. And to get me, somebody would have to shoot through the fake news. And I don’t mind that so much,” he said.

A new survey from the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) highlights a disturbing tolerance for political bullying of the press in the land of the First Amendment. The findings show that this is especially true among white, male, Republican voters.

We commissioned this nationally representative survey of 1,020 US adults, which was fielded between June 24 and July 5 2024, to assess Americans’ attitudes to the press ahead of the election. We are publishing the results here for the first time.

More than one-quarter (27%) of the Americans we polled said they had often seen or heard a journalist being threatened, harassed or abused online. And more than one-third (34%) said they thought it was appropriate for senior politicians and government officials to criticise journalists and news organisations.

Tolerance for attacks on the press appears as politically polarised as American society. Nearly half (47%) of the Republicans surveyed approved of senior politicians critiquing the press, compared to less than one-quarter (22%) of Democrats.

Our analysis also revealed divisions according to gender and ethnicity. While 37% of white-identifying respondents thought it was appropriate for political leaders to target journalists and news organisations, only 27% of people of colour did. There was also a nine-point difference along gender lines, with 39% of men approving of this conduct, compared to 30% of women.

It appears intolerance towards the press has a face – a predominantly white, male and Republican-voting face.

Press freedom fears

This election campaign, Trump has repeated his blatantly false claim that journalists are “enemies of the people”. He has suggested that reporters who cross him should be jailed, and signalled that he would like to revoke broadcast licences of networks.

Relevant, too, is the enabling environment for viral attacks on journalists created by unregulated social media companies which represent a clear threat to press freedom and the safety of journalists. Previous research produced by ICFJ for Unesco concluded that there was a causal relationship between online violence towards women journalists and physical attacks.

Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

While political actors may be the perpetrators of abuse targeting journalists, social media companies have facilitated their viral spread, heightening the risk to journalists.

We’ve seen a potent example of this in the current campaign, when Haitian Times editor Macollvie J. Neel was “swatted” – meaning police were dispatched to her home after a fraudulent report of a murder at the address – during an episode of severely racist online violence.

The trigger? Her reporting on Trump and JD Vance amplifying false claims that Haitian immigrants were eating their neighbours’ pets.

Trajectory of Trump attacks

Since the 2016 election, Trump has repeatedly discredited independent reporting on his campaign. He has weaponised the term “fake news” and accused the media of “rigging” elections.

“The election is being rigged by corrupt media pushing completely false allegations and outright lies in an effort to elect [Hillary Clinton] president,” he said in 2016. With hindsight, such accusations foreshadowed his false claims of election fraud in 2020, and similar preemptive claims in 2024.

His increasingly virulent attacks on journalists and news organisations are amplified by his supporters online and far-right media. Trump has effectively licensed attacks on American journalists through anti-press rhetoric and undermined respect for press freedom.

In 2019, the Committee to Protect Journalists found that more than 11% of 5,400 tweets posted by Trump between the date of his 2016 candidacy and January 2019 “…insulted or criticised journalists and outlets, or condemned and denigrated the news media as a whole”.

After being temporarily deplatformed from Twitter for breaching community standards, Trump launched Truth Social, where he continues to abuse his critics uninterrupted. But he recently rejoined the platform (now X), and held a series of campaign events with X owner and Trump backer Elon Musk.

The failed insurrection on January 6 2021 rammed home the scale of the escalating threats facing American journalists. During the riots at the Capitol, at least 18 journalists were assaulted and reporting equipment valued at tens of thousands of dollars was destroyed.

This election cycle, Reporters Without Borders logged 108 instances of Trump insulting, attacking or threatening the news media in public speeches or offline remarks over an eight-week period ending on October 24.

Meanwhile, the Freedom of the Press Foundation has recorded 75 assaults on journalists since January 1 this year. That’s a 70% increase on the number of assaults captured by their press freedom tracker in 2023.

A recent survey of hundreds of journalists undertaking safety training provided by the International Women’s Media Foundation found that 36% of respondents reported being threatened with or experiencing physical violence. One-third reported exposure to digital violence, and 28% reported legal threats or action against them.

US journalists involved in ongoing ICFJ research have told us that they have felt particularly at risk covering Trump rallies and reporting on the election from communities hostile towards the press. Some are wearing protective flak jackets to cover domestic politics. Others have removed labels identifying their outlets from their reporting equipment to reduce the risk of being physically attacked.

And yet, our survey reveals a distinct lack of public concern about the First Amendment implications of political leaders threatening, harassing, or abusing journalists. Nearly one-quarter (23%) of Americans surveyed did not regard political attacks on journalists or news organisations as a threat to press freedom. Among them, 38% identified as Republicans compared to just 9%* as Democrats.

The anti-press playbook

Trump’s anti-press playbook appeals to a global audience of authoritarians. Other political strongmen, from Brazil to Hungary and the Philippines, have adopted similar tactics of deploying disinformation to smear and threaten journalists and news outlets.

Such an approach imperils journalists while undercutting trust in facts and critical independent journalism.

History shows that fascism thrives when journalists can not safely and freely do the work of holding governments and political leaders to account. As our research findings show, the consequences are a society accepting lies and fiction as facts while turning a blind eye to attacks on the press.

*The people identifying as Democrats in this sub-group are too few to make this a reliable representative estimate.

Note: Nabeelah Shabbir (ICFJ Deputy Director of Research) and Kaylee Williams (ICFJ Research Associate) also contributed to this article and the research underpinning it. The survey was conducted by Langer Research Associates in English and Spanish. ICFJ researchers co-developed the survey and conducted the analysis.

Julie Posetti receives research funding via ICFJ from the Scripps Howard Fund, Luminate, the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, the Gates Foundation and the US State Department.

Waqas Ejaz works as Post-doc Research Fellow at University of Oxford as well as a Senior Research Associate at ICFJ.

– ref. New survey finds an alarming tolerance for attacks on the press in the US – particularly among white, Republican men – https://theconversation.com/new-survey-finds-an-alarming-tolerance-for-attacks-on-the-press-in-the-us-particularly-among-white-republican-men-242719

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: Serstech Secures 9.7 MSEK Orders from Chilean Partner Aerotech

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Serstech has today received two orders totaling 9.7 MSEK from its Chilean partner, Aerotech. The orders include the Serstech Arx mkII and ChemDash software, with delivery and invoicing scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2024.

The final recipients of these orders are the Carabineros and the Investigations Police of Chile (PDI). PDI is the nation’s primary civilian police force specializing in criminal investigations, intelligence operations, and counterterrorism, with a particular focus on areas such as drug trafficking and organized crime.

These orders represent the fourth and fifth in 2024 from Chilean law enforcement through Aerotech, underscoring the growing demand for Serstech’s solutions in the region.

For further information, please contact:

Stefan Sandor,

CEO, Serstech AB Phone: +46 739 606 067

Email: ss@serstech.com

or

Thomas Pileby,

Chairman of the Board, Serstech AB Phone: +46 702 072 643

Email: tp@serstech.com

or visit: www.serstech.com

This is information that Serstech AB (publ.) is obliged to make public pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation. The information was submitted for publication, through the agency of the contact person set out above at 18:50 CET on November 4, 2024.

Certified advisor to Serstech is Svensk Kapitalmarknadsgranskning AB (SKMG).

About Serstech

Serstech delivers solutions for chemical identification and has customers around the world, mainly in the safety and security industry. Typical customers are customs, police authorities, security organizations and first responders. The solutions and technology are however not limited to security applications and potentially any industry using chemicals of some kind could be addressed by Serstech’s solution. Serstech’s head office is in Sweden and all production is done in Sweden.

Serstech is traded at Nasdaq First North Growth Market and more information about the company can be found at www.serstech.com

The MIL Network –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: ONLINE EVENT | Latin America – Spain Railway Dialogues ‘Rails towards a sustainable future”

Source: CAF Development Bank of Latin America

Under the title ‘Rails Towards a Sustainable Future’, this event aims to highlight the tremendous potential of rail as a mode of land transport capable of ensuring the mobility of large volumes of people and goods, boosting the economic, environmental, and social sustainability essential for the future. The Railway Dialogues will take place on November 13 and 14 at the La Moneda Cultural Center, gathering experts, government representatives, private companies, and financial institutions involved in the railway sector.

The first day is designed to foster knowledge sharing and inter-institutional collaboration, creating an ideal setting for learning from expert insights, discovering best practices, and building valuable connections within the railway industry. Authorities from countries such as Chile, Brazil, Panama, Uruguay, and Spain will participate.

The second day, organized by EFE as part of its 140th anniversary celebration, will address the challenges and opportunities in Chile’s railway sector, including a panel that brings in international railway perspectives with contributions from experts, authorities, and key institutions in the field.

To mark this anniversary, the La Moneda Cultural Center will also host the exhibition ‘The Train Runs Along the Line‘, which explores the present and future of railways in Chile.

This event wraps up a week of railway-related activities in Santiago, Chile. In the days leading up to it, the 60th Annual Assembly of the Latin American Railway Association (ALAF) and the Regional Assembly of the International Union of Railways (UIC) will take place.

Date: November 13 and 14
Time: 9:30 a.m. (Chile)*
*The event will be streamed on this microsite

MIL OSI Economics –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Ukraine, Lebanon & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (4 Nov 2024)

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

Highlights:
-Occupied Palestinian Territory
-Lebanon/Israel
-Lebanon/Humanitarian
-Ukraine
-Ukraine/Humanitarian
-Security Council
-Rosemary DiCarlo/Japan
-West and Central Africa
-Democratic Republic of the Congo
-Deputy Secretary-General
-World Urban Forum
-Counter-Terrorism
-Resident Coordinator – Honduras
-NY marathon
-Briefings today

Occupied Palestinian Territory
In Gaza, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is deeply concerned about persistent reports of mounting casualties, with the number of Palestinians being killed and injured especially high in North Gaza Governorate, where the Israeli military operations are continuing.
In a statement on Saturday, Catherine Russell, the UNICEF, Children’s Fund head, said that more than 50 children had reportedly been killed in Jabalya over the previous two days alone, after strikes leveled two residential buildings sheltering hundreds of people.
Meanwhile, our humanitarian colleagues tell us that, for the past month, Israeli authorities have only allowed humanitarian access to Jabalya, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun on an exceptional basis, leaving us unable to confirm the conditions of people inside and we worry for their safety.
OCHA warns that the already limited humanitarian supplies entering Gaza have dwindled even further since October. Private imports are virtually banned, and Israeli authorities are only allowing the use of three entry points – Kerem Shalom, Gate 96, which is near Deir Al-Balah and Erez West. Furthermore, humanitarian colleagues can only access these border areas by highly dangerous routes. The use of most roads leading to these entry points has either been banned by the Israeli authorities or rendered unsafe due to the ongoing hostilities.
The routes available are often in poor condition and prone to armed looting fueled by the breakdown in public order and safety.
Our humanitarian colleagues note that supplies reaching the northern crossing at Erez West can only be sent to Gaza city, as requests to deliver them to besieged areas in North Gaza governorate are being consistently denied and rejected.
For its part, the World Food Programme warns that as winter approaches, the lack of food and other vital humanitarian supplies entering the Gaza Strip could soon escalate into famine unless immediate action is taken. In October, the World Food Programme has only been able to reach 42 per cent of the 1.1 million people targeted for food assistance in Gaza, with reduced rations due to dropping aid levels.

Lebanon/Israel
An update from UNIFIL, who is noting with continued concern the airstrikes by the Israel Defense Forces across Lebanon over the weekend, including in the South, in Sidon, Baalbek and Beirut, resulting in several casualties. In southern Lebanon, the peacekeepers report that IDF operations have continued, involving clashes with Hizbullah. Meanwhile, they also report that Hizbullah has continued to launch drones and dozens of rockets South, into Israel.
The increasing impact on civilians is of grave concern and we condemn the loss of civilian lives. All actors must adhere to international law and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. UNIFIL premises also continue to be impacted. On 2 November, a UN position near Markaba, in Sector East, sustained damage to its prefabricated containers and perimeters caused by demolition operations being undertaken by the IDF.
A nearby explosion also damaged a UN vehicle at the [UNIFIL] Naqoura Headquarters, with no injuries reported. We once again remind all actors of the inviolability of the UN premises and their responsibility to protect UN peacekeepers.
We urge the parties to halt the violence immediately. The United Nations continues to support efforts towards a ceasefire and a diplomatic solution.

Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20November%202024

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHC60gr1Lo8

MIL OSI Video –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: Arts – NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize 2025 Opens

Source: NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize

Award for fresh writing with a ‘unique and original vision’

The NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize celebrates the life and work of the writer Laura Solomon. As set by Laura, the main criteria for the exciting prize is for new writing with a ‘unique and original vision’. Published and unpublished writers are invited to enter with completed manuscripts written across all genres i.e. fiction, creative nonfiction, poetry, drama or children’s writing.
The NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize:

paves the way for new and exciting writing to make its way into the market place
awards the winner an ‘advance’ of $1000 and a publishing contract supplied by The Cuba Press
pays for the book production and printing. The Cuba Press will edit, design, print, market, distribute and promote the book and e-book and pay standard author royalties

The prize is open to writers holding New Zealand citizenship or who are permanent residents of New Zealand.

Applications are open from 5 November 2024 to 13 March 2025

The application form and terms & conditions for the NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize are available on the NZSA website, authors.org.nz

Previous winners of this prize are Lizzie Harwood (inaugural winner 2021), Rachel J Fenton with Between the Flags (2022), Lee Murray with Fox Spirit on a Distant Cloud (2023), Tracy Farr with Wonderland (2024).

History of the Prize

In July 2019, NZSA received a bequest from the estate of writer Laura Solomon to establish a new annual literary prize. The Solomon family wanted the NZSA Laura Solomon Cuba Press Prize to honour the creative legacy of a beloved daughter, sister and aunt.

“Laura’s passion for writing was a constant through her life, and for many years she expressed a desire to make a bequest that would support other writers,” says family spokesperson Nicky Solomon.

“She has created something positive to help other people, which she would be really proud of,” says Nicky. “It will give her an ongoing presence – not just for us as a family but for the writing community, which was so important to her. We were so delighted with the outcome of the inaugural prize – we can’t wait to see what talent emerges this year.”

Laura Solomon was a longstanding and active member of the New Zealand Society of Authors Te Puni Kaituhi O Aotearoa (PEN NZ Inc), and she is much missed by the society. Laura kept writing novels and plays throughout her life, despite being affected by a brain tumour that was discovered while she working at a high-end IT job in London.

In her review of Laura’s short story collection Alternative Medicine, Jessica Le Bas wrote: “The hallmark of Solomon… was to pull no punches and aim for the jugular when it came to working up the surreal, and the macabre.”

Right up until her death, Laura was planning new writing projects and pursuing her dream of being a full-time writer. In a 1996 interview, Laura said, “I’ve always written and I’ll continue to write. I wrote my name when I was three and never looked back.”

The New Zealand Society of Authors Te Puni Kaituhi o Aotearoa PEN NZ Inc is the principal organisation representing writers in Aotearoa. Founded in 1934, it advocates for the right to fair reward and creative rights, administers prizes and awards, works closely with the literary sector liaison and runs professional development programmes for writers.
authors.org.nz

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: The International Solar Alliance Announces the Selection of its third Director General
Source: Government of India (2)

Posted On: 04 NOV 2024 6:02PM by PIB Delhi

The seventh session of the ISA Assembly in progress in New Delhi today selected Mr Ashish Khanna from the Republic of India as its third Director General. The other office candidates included Mr Wisdom Ahiataku —Togobo from Ghana and Mr Gosaye Mengistie Abayneh from Ethiopia.

The Director General of ISA plays a crucial role in supporting the Assembly in advancing the International Solar Alliance mandate. This includes supporting to Member Countries in addressing common challenges and engaging in coordinated action to scale up the deployment of solar energy globally.

The outgoing Director General, Dr Ajay Mathur, wishing his successor luck, said, “As I step down from my role, I want to take a moment to welcome Mr Ashish Khanna to this incredible journey ahead warmly. Serving in this position has been an honour, and I am confident you will bring unique energy, vision, and passion to this office and role. Your leadership will undoubtedly steer this Alliance to new heights, building on the progress achieved while carving your legacy. The challenges ahead are great, but so are the opportunities. My simple advice is to trust your intuition, lean on the support around you, and know that you have the skills to make a lasting impact. I wish you the very best as you begin this new chapter.”

As part of the selection process, the three candidates presented to the ISA Member Country representatives, focusing on their vision for a solar energy-dominant world and the role of the Alliance.

Mr Ashish Khanna, Director General – Designate, ISA, expounding on his plans for expanding ISA’s reach and impact, said the focus has to shift from ‘what’ to ‘how’ as most countries are aware of what needs to be done, but require assistance in reaching those goals. He added that the Alliance will benefit from participating in international fora, where the motivation should be twofold: to explore collaborations, work together, and learn from each other’s experiences. Moving forward, he said he looks forward to building on what is working well and grooming existing partnerships, and he stressed purity of intent and passion for results.”

Dr Ajay Mathur, who has led the Alliance since 2021, will conclude his tenure on 14 March 2025. Under his leadership, the Alliance has achieved significant milestones, including a monumental rise in Member & Signatory Countries tallying at 103 and 17, respectively, the completion and launch of demonstration projects, and the successful identification of 50 start-ups with potential to dynamise their countries’ journey towards solar energy. His contributions have laid strong foundations to equal challenges that global solar deployment presents under the broad ambits of investments – via the Global Solar Facility, infrastructure through setting up of solar demonstration projects, and indigenisation – via the STAR-Centres and other ISA programme-related trainings.

Across the three priority areas of work: advocacy and analytics, capacity building, and programmatic support, drawing a spotlight on the Alliance’s accomplishments under his leadership.
- He steered the aggregation of 9.5 GW of project proposals, including notable projects like a 360 MW solar PV bid in Cuba and a 400 MW approval in Ethiopia. Guided the preparation of feasibility studies for ground-mounted projects and solar rooftop DPRs in Comoros, Sao Tome & Principe, and Bangladesh. Pilot projects are advancing in Ethiopia, and assessments are ongoing in nine countries. Mini-grid assessments in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Guinea, as well as solar water pumping studies, were completed in 10 countries.
- The STAR-C initiative, the stellar capacity-building ISA offering, has trained over 900 professionals through six centres, with 10 new centres planned. Regulatory workshops in eight countries have trained over 265 policymakers. ISA also drives knowledge management through its Knowledge Series, Solar Data Portals, and Green Hydrogen Innovation Centre. Flagship reports Easing of Doing Solar and World Solar Reports on Technology, Investment and Finance have been published annually since 2020 and 2022, respectively. The latest addition to this repertoire, ‘Unleashing the Role of Solar: In Advancing Economic, Social, And Environmental Equity’ report, focuses on exploring the global adoption of solar (and renewables) through the lens of socio-economic and developmental priorities for each archetype, utilising a diverse set of indicators across finance, technology, and policy enablers.
- Among the innovative financial tools, ISA’s Global Solar Facility, launched at COP27, aims to unlock $50M in commercial capital for underserved regions, with its first project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While the SolarX Startup Challenge, launched at COP27, mentors 50 scalable solar solutions from Africa and Asia-Pacific, supporting the creation of a project pipeline. ISA continues to lead global collaboration on solar energy through events at the Conference of Parties. Since COP27, ISA has been hosting a solar-focussed space, The Solar Hub, and took its advocacy efforts a notch up with the launch of the first International Solar Festival in September 2024, further cementing its role in the global solar transition.
Speaking of his legacy, Dr Mathur noted, “I would like to be remembered as the Director General who provided some degree of direction for the globalisation of solar energies while in office at the Alliance.”

About the International Solar Alliance

The International Solar Alliance is an international organisation with 120 Member and Signatory countries. It works with governments to improve energy access and security worldwide and promote solar power as a sustainable transition to a carbon-neutral future. ISA’s mission is to unlock US$1 trillion of investments in solar by 2030 while reducing the cost of the technology and its financing. It promotes the use of solar energy in the agriculture, health, transport, and power generation sectors.

ISA Member Countries are driving change by enacting policies and regulations, sharing best practices, agreeing on common standards, and mobilising investments. Through this work, ISA has identified, designed and tested new business models for solar projects; supported governments to make their energy legislation and policies solar-friendly through Ease of Doing Solar analytics and advisory; pooled demand for solar technology from different countries; and drove down costs; improved access to finance by reducing the risks and making the sector more attractive to private investment; increased access to solar training, data and insights for solar engineers and energy policymakers. With advocacy for solar-powered solutions, ISA aims to transform lives, bring clean, reliable, and affordable energy to communities worldwide, fuel sustainable growth, and improve quality of life.

With the signing and ratification of the ISA Framework Agreement by 15 countries on 6 December 2017, ISA became the first international intergovernmental organisation to be headquartered in India. ISA is partnering with multilateral development banks (MDBs), development financial institutions (DFIs), private and public sector organisations, civil society, and other international institutions to deploy cost-effective and transformational solutions through solar energy, especially in the least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

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Navin Sreejith

(Release ID: 2070660) Visitor Counter : 23

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: The International Solar Alliance Hosts the Seventh Session of its Annual Assembly with representatives from 103 Member & 17 Signatory Countries
Source: Government of India (2)

Posted On: 04 NOV 2024 5:54PM by PIB Delhi

The International Solar Alliance (ISA) is hosting the seventh session of its Assembly here in the Indian capital with ministers from 29 countries.

Speaking at the inaugural ceremony, the Hon’ble Minister for New and Renewable Energy, India, in his capacity as the President of the ISA Assembly, Shri Pralhad Joshi said: “It is my great honour to stand before you today at the Seventh Session of the Assembly of the ISA. Today, we find ourselves at a key turning point in our mission to reshape the global energy future. Solar energy, once just a vision, is now a powerful reality, leading the world toward a cleaner and more sustainable path. The progress we’ve made together is undeniable, and the true potential of solar energy is unfolding, showing us just how transformative it can be.” He further added, “As a coalition of 120 Member and Signatory countries, ISA has been at the forefront of mobilising resources and facilitating the deployment of solar projects worldwide, particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). I’m proud to state that ISA has successfully completed 21 out of 27 demonstration projects, showcasing our collective ability to make significant strides in solar energy deployment and support sustainable development across the globe. These successful projects are a testament to our shared commitment and dedication. I congratulate and dedicate the eleven demonstration projects and the seven STAR- Centres launched today to the people of these countries.”

The Hon’ble President also highlighted key interventions of ISA, which are globally pushing the solar agenda. The Solar Data Portal, a platform that delivers real-time data on solar resources, project performance, and investment opportunities across countries, transforms how governments, investors, and developers engage with solar projects by providing transparent and actionable insights. The Global Solar Facility aims to unlock commercial capital for solar projects in underserved regions, especially Africa. A pilot project is underway in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and commitments of USD 39 million from India, ISA, Bloomberg, and Children’s Investment Fund Foundation are on track to be operationalised by COP29.

In addition, the SolarX Startup Challenge has successfully identified and supported innovative, scalable solutions for the solar sector. The 2024 edition announced 30 winners from the Asia and Pacific region, including India, and preparations are underway to host the Third Edition of the challenge for the Latin America and Caribbean region.

The monthly ISA Knowledge Series and the Green Hydrogen Innovation Centre, launched at the G20 Ministerial, are advancing solar energy research and development to expand knowledge-sharing and advocacy. Global events like the International Solar Festival, CEO Caucus, and the ISA pavilion ‘Solar Hub’ at the Conference of Parties since COP27 have encouraged global participation and advocacy for solar as a preferred energy source.

The Co-President of the ISA Assembly, H.E. Mr H.E. Thani Mohamed Soilihi, France’s Minister of State for Development, Francophonie and International Partnerships, via a video message, said:

“I would like to thank the Secretariat of the International Solar Alliance for its significant work in developing the organisation and setting out ambitious programmes year after year. France has honoured its pledge at the outset of the International Solar Alliance to contribute €1.5 billion to finance solar projects in the organisation’s Member Countries. That is why we renewed our financial support for the Alliance in 2024, which is based on three priorities: First, support for the STAR-C programme which plays a key role in local capacity building. Second, France wishes to facilitate access to financing for developing economies which are transitioning towards sustainable development. Third, France wants to step up the ISA Secretariat’s internationalisation process to increase its outreach. France will continue to support the International Solar Alliance, to enhance collaboration and speed up the development of solar energy. It will thus encourage new partner countries to join the Alliance and will synergise with the initiatives and organisations in developing renewable energies.”

In his welcome address, Dr Ajay Mathur, Director General of the International Solar Alliance, said, “We are pleased to have honourable ministers from our member, signatory, and prospective countries present here today. Our collective presence symbolises our intention—to explore groundbreaking solutions, exchange expertise, and strengthen partnerships that will drive a new era of solar transformation. In this spirit of global cooperation, we find the collective strength to confront the critical challenges of our time. Over the past years, the Assembly has helped shape the ISA into a global leader in the international arena as the definitive voice on driving energy transition through the deployment of solar energy solutions. This year, too, the Assembly shall be taking up some major initiatives and programmes into consideration that will be laying the foundation for the future.”

The Assembly will also consider the budgets and work plans for the coming year and include updates on ISA’s priority areas of work, programmes, and projects. An important topic of discussion will be the guidelines for the Viability Gap Funding (VGF) Scheme, which provides for 10% to 35 % of the total solar project cost to be given as a grant for developing solar projects in LDCs and SIDS identified by the countries themselves, provided 90% of the project cost is locked in. Proposals from countries will be considered on a first-come, first-served basis until the annual budget provisions of ISA USD 1.5 million per year are available. The VGF can be availed for solar projects set up by government/government institutions or independent developers/beneficiaries selected through a process per the respective country policies.

This year’s proceedings will also consist of the election of the president and co-president, who will take over office immediately after the Assembly for the period: 2024 – 2026. The selection of the new Director General, who will assume office in March of 2025, will also be announced.

The Assembly will be followed by a day-long High-Level Technology Conference on Clean Technologies, which will witness the launch of the third edition of ISA’s flagship report series on technology, investment, and market—the World Solar Reports. The Assembly proceedings will culminate on 6 November 2024 with delegates marking a visit to a farm site in NCT of Delhi to witness first-hand the practical implementation of agrivoltaic system, which entails using the same land for solar energy production and agriculture.

About the ISA Assembly:

The Assembly is ISA’s yearly apex decision-making body, representing each Member Country. This body makes decisions concerning the implementation of the ISA’s Framework Agreement and coordinated actions to be taken to achieve its objective. The Assembly meets annually at the ministerial level at the ISA’s seat. It assesses the aggregate effect of the programmes and other activities in terms of deployment of solar energy, performance, reliability, cost, and scale of finance. The Sixth Assembly of the ISA is deliberating on the key initiatives of ISA on three critical issues: energy access, energy security, and energy transition.

About the Demonstration Projects:

In May 2020, ISA initiated Demonstration Projects to meet the needs of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Development States (SIDS). The aim was to exhibit solar technology applications that can be scaled up and build the capacity of Member Countries to replicate these solar-powered solutions.
1. Bhutan: Solar cold storage at the National Post Harvest Centre in Paro
2. Burkina Faso: Solarisation of two primary healthcare centres in the rural communes of Louda and Korsimoro in the north centre region
3. Cambodia: Solarisation of primary and secondary schools in Koh Rong city
4. Cuba: Solar water pumping system at the Hatuey Indian Experimental Station (EEIH) in Perico, Matanzas
5. Djibouti: Installation of two off-grid solar-powered cold storage units in Omar Jaga’a in the Arta region and Dougoum village in the Tadjourah region
6. Ethiopia: Solar-powered water pumps in Gedeo Zone, Irgachefe Woreda community
7. Mauritius: Solarisation of the Jawaharlal Nehru Hospital in Rose Belle
8. Samoa: Solar streetlights implemented across 46 locations
9. Senegal: Solar cold storage in the Borough of Ndande, within the Municipality of Theippe in the Kebemer Department
10. The Gambia: Solar water pumping systems in Wassadou and Julangel
11. Tonga: Solar water pumping project in four villages on Tongatapu
About the STAR-Centre Initiative:

Solar Technology Application Resource-Centre (STAR-C)are equipped with specialised training facilities, tools, and structured learning modules designed to cultivate a highly skilled solar workforce. To date, ISA has successfully established and operationalised STAR Centers in seven countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, Cuba, Côte d’Ivoire, Kiribati, Ghana, and Bangladesh. Since their launch, these centres have trained professionals in various aspects of solar energy, preparing them to contribute effectively to the sector’s rapid expansion.

About the International Solar Alliance

The International Solar Alliance is an international organisation with 120 Member and Signatory countries. It works with governments to improve energy access and security worldwide and promote solar power as a sustainable transition to a carbon-neutral future. ISA’s mission is to unlock US$1 trillion of investments in solar by 2030 while reducing the cost of the technology and its financing. It promotes the use of solar energy in the agriculture, health, transport, and power generation sectors.

ISA Member Countries are driving change by enacting policies and regulations, sharing best practices, agreeing on common standards, and mobilising investments. Through this work, ISA has identified, designed and tested new business models for solar projects; supported governments to make their energy legislation and policies solar-friendly through Ease of Doing Solar analytics and advisory; pooled demand for solar technology from different countries; and drove down costs; improved access to finance by reducing the risks and making the sector more attractive to private investment; increased access to solar training, data and insights for solar engineers and energy policymakers. With advocacy for solar-powered solutions, ISA aims to transform lives, bring clean, reliable, and affordable energy to communities worldwide, fuel sustainable growth, and improve quality of life.

With the signing and ratification of the ISA Framework Agreement by 15 countries on 6 December 2017, ISA became the first international intergovernmental organisation to be headquartered in India. ISA is partnering with multilateral development banks (MDBs), development financial institutions (DFIs), private and public sector organisations, civil society, and other international institutions to deploy cost-effective and transformational solutions through solar energy, especially in the least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The ISA is guided by the Towards 1000 strategy which aims to mobilise $1,000 billion of investments in solar energy solutions by 2030. This is our strategy to:
* Deliver energy access to 1,000 million people
* ⁠Installation of 1,000 GW of solar energy capacity
* ⁠Mitigate… pic.twitter.com/6VqFDAAWpG

— Pralhad Joshi (@JoshiPralhad) November 4, 2024

In India’s Union Budget for 2024-25, there is a 110% increase in funding for solar power projects and targeted support for initiatives like the @PMSuryaGhar Yojana. This, along with exemptions on critical mineral imports, underscores our resolve to lead in solar innovation. pic.twitter.com/koHSoHAeso

— Pralhad Joshi (@JoshiPralhad) November 4, 2024

Under India’s Prime Minister Shri @narendramodi ’s leadership, India has set ambitious renewable energy targets, and achieved remarkable milestones along the way. Last month, India reached an impressive 90 GW of installed solar capacity, moving steadily
forward towards its… pic.twitter.com/5DUhf9Od5C

— Pralhad Joshi (@JoshiPralhad) November 4, 2024

Navin Sreejith

(Release ID: 2070655) Visitor Counter : 57

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Sidney Man Sentenced for Possessing with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, Fentanyl, and Illegally Possessing a Firearm

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

United States Attorney Susan Lehr announced that Isidro Alvarado, age 36, of Sidney, Nebraska, was sentenced on October 28, 2024, in federal court in Lincoln, Nebraska for one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Senior United States District Judge John M. Gerrard sentenced Alvarado to 240 months’ imprisonment on the drug charge and 120 months on the gun charge. The sentences are to run concurrently. There is no parole in the federal system. After Alvarado is released from prison, he will begin a 5-year term of supervised release.

From July 2021 to July 2022, Alvarado and others worked together to sell meth and fentanyl in and around Kearney, Nebraska. In November 2021, Alvarado sold meth and a shotgun to a confidential informant (CI). The investigation into Alvarado and his co-defendant revealed he was dealing meth and fentanyl around the Kearny area and sending money from drug proceeds back to Mexico. Alvarado had a prior felony conviction for drugs, making him ineligible to possess a firearm.

Alvarado’s co-defendant, Samantha Miller, was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment in February 2024.

This case was investigated by the Nebraska State Patrol and FBI.

MIL Security OSI –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Committee Adopts Report on Views Concerning Individual Communications on Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Sweden, Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Ukraine

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today adopted a follow-up progress report on individual communications, presented by the Special Rapporteur for follow-up on Views, which concerned communications on Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, New Zealand, Sweden, Türkiye, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

José Manuel Santos Pais, Special Rapporteur for follow-up on Views, said one individual communication on Colombia concerned a case of enforced disappearance by parliamentary groups. The State party was urged to conduct an independent, thorough and effective investigation of the disappearances of Mr. Anzola and Mr. Molina and prosecute and punish those responsible; release these people if they were still alive; if they were dead, hand-over their remains to their family; and ensure effective reparation, including adequate compensation, and medical and psychological rehabilitation for the authors for the violations suffered. The State party was also under an obligation to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future and to ensure that any forced disappearances gave rise to prompt, impartial and effective investigations. The State party had established a search and investigative unit, but one Committee member noted that many measures had not been implemented and there seemed to be no urgency. The Committee recommended ongoing follow-up dialogue.

A second communication on Colombia involved the killing of a trade unionist. The Committee recommended that the State party promptly conduct a thorough, effective, impartial, independent and transparent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the murder, to establish the truth; provide the family members who were the authors with detailed information about the results of the investigation; and provide adequate compensation to the family members, including sufficient compensation to cover the reasonable legal expenses they have incurred. The State party had reported that it would proceed with the compensation procedure and had published the Committee’s Views publicly. However, it was reported that the State party had not conducted the criminal investigation in a way conducive to the identification of the perpetrators or to shed light on the reasons behind the murder. The Committee therefore recommended follow-up dialogue.

Regarding Ecuador, the communication concerned criminal conviction and the seizure of assets. The Committee recommended making full reparation to the persons whose rights had been violated and ensuring that due process was followed in the relevant suits at law. The State party had outlined that the Committee had not recommended restitution but called for ensuring effective remedy. It was acknowledged that partial reparation had been granted by the courts, with an appeal still pending. There were several conflicting interests in regards to this case. The Committee decided to close the case with partial satisfaction of the Committee’s Views, because the Views issued did not address directly the return of assets to the author, but gave them the possibility to contest the decisions, which had occurred.

On Finland, the communication related to the right to vote for elections at the Sami Parliament. The Committee had requested effective remedy, including to make full reparation to individuals whose rights had been violated. The State party was obligated to review the Act on the Sami Parliament with a view to ensuring that the criteria for eligibility to vote in Sami Parliament elections was defined and applied in a manner that respected the right of the Sami people to exercise their internal self-determination. A detailed proposal sent to the State party had requested several measures, but the authors had not received any written responses to their proposals. The Committee recommended ongoing follow-up dialogue.

The communication for Greece concerned conscientious objection to compulsory military service. Remedies proposed by the Committee included expunging the author’s criminal record, reimbursing all sums paid as fines, providing him with adequate compensation, taking all steps necessary to prevent similar violations in the future, and reviewing the legislation with a view to ensuring the effective guarantee of the right to conscientious objection. The Committee noted there were some positive steps taken, however, some human rights violations remained unaddressed. Contentious objectors still faced discrimination, and in some cases punishment, including fines and imprisonment. The State was requested to continue follow-up dialogue and was encouraged to look further into the matter.

On New Zealand, the communication concerned compensation for wrongful arrest and detention. The Committee recommended providing the author with adequate compensation and taking all steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future, including by reviewing its domestic legislation, to ensure that individuals who had been unlawfully arrested or detained as a result of judicial acts could apply to receive adequate compensations. The State party had requested a consultation process with civil society, but there was no timeline provided and no deadline for the subsequent report to be submitted to the Committee. The absence of legislative action demonstrated a lack of willingness on behalf of the State party to fulfil its obligations. In this regard, the Committee recommended follow-up dialogue and would request a meeting with a representative of the State party during a future session.

Regarding Sweden, the communication concerned deportation to Albania. The Committee had recommended that Sweden review the authors’ claims, taking into account the State party’s obligations under the Covenant and the Committee’s present Views, and refrain from expelling the authors to Albania while their requests for asylum were under reconsideration. The State party heeded to the Committee’s recommendations and therefore the Committee decided to close the follow-up dialogue with a note of satisfactory implementation of the Committee’s Views.

In the individual communication on Türkiye, which concerned conscientious objection to military service by Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Committee recommended expunging their criminal records, providing them with adequate compensation, and avoiding similar violations of the Covenant in the future. The State party submitted that it had made amendments regarding crimes related to compulsory military services, and had also abolished the military courts, which the Committee described as a welcome development. However, the author reported that their criminal records had not been expunged, they had not been provided with compensation, and they were still subject to military conscription. Given this, the Committee recommended follow-up dialogue.

On Turkmenistan, the communication included conscientious objection to compulsory military service. The Committee’s recommendations included expunging the author’s criminal record, providing them with adequate compensation, including by reimbursing any legal costs, and taking steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future, including by reviewing the legislation of the State party, for instance by providing for the possibility of alternative service of a civilian nature. The author’s counsel had stated that neither he nor the author were aware of any steps taken by the State party to implement the Committee’s Views. One Expert noted there was no convincing evidence that the State party had contemplated compensation of any kind to the author. The Committee decided to close the follow-up dialogue with a note of unsatisfactory implementation of the Committee’s recommendation.

On Ukraine, the communication concerned the impossibility of having life sentence reviewed. The Committee recommended providing the author with a meaningful review of his sentence of life imprisonment on the basis of a clear and predictable procedure, providing him with adequate compensation, and taking all steps necessary to prevent similar violations in the future. Due to the escalating conflict in Ukraine, the author requested that his life imprisonment be replaced with a fixed term imprisonment, which did not exceed 15 years of imprisonment, however, this was rejected by the Supreme Court. In this regard, the Committee recommended follow-up dialogue, but noted positively, that the State party had prepared legislation allowing for any convicted person to have their life sentence considered by the court.

In closing remarks, Mr. Santos Pais said it was his last report as Rapporteur on follow-up to Views. The report on follow-up to Views was essential in monitoring the Committee’s Views and ensuring victims had access to effective remedies. It also ensured accountability for States under the Optional Protocol. He thanked all those who had contributed to the report which was very much a team effort.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 7 November to close its one hundred and forty-second session.

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR24.024E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

January 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: SBA Disaster Assistance Available to New Mexico Private Nonprofit Organizations

Source: United States Small Business Administration

“As communities across the Southeast continue to recover and rebuild after Hurricanes Helene and Milton, the SBA remains focused on its mission to provide support to small businesses to help stabilize local economies, even in the face of diminished disaster funding,” said Administrator Isabel Casillas Guzman. “If your business has sustained physical damage, or you’ve lost inventory, equipment or revenues, the SBA will help you navigate the resources available and work with you at our recovery centers or with our customer service specialists in person and online so you can fully submit your disaster loan application and be ready to receive financial relief as soon as funds are replenished.”

SACRAMENTO, Calif. – Low-interest federal disaster loans are now available to certain private nonprofit organizations in New Mexico following President Biden’s federal disaster declaration for Public Assistance as a result of severe storm and flooding that occurred Oct. 19-20, announced Administrator Isabel Casillas Guzman of the U.S. Small Business Administration. Private nonprofits that provide essential services of a governmental nature are eligible for assistance.

These low-interest federal disaster loans are available in Chaves County.

“Private nonprofit organizations should New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Recovery Bureau by calling (505) 476-9600, emailing recovery.unit@dhsem.nm.gov or visiting https://www.dhsem.nm.gov to obtain information about applicant briefings,” said Francisco Sánchez Jr., associate administrator for the Office of Disaster Recovery and Resilience at the Small Business Administration. “At the briefings, private nonprofit representatives will need to provide information about their organization,” continued Sánchez. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will use that information to determine if the private nonprofit provides an “essential governmental service” and is a “critical facility” as defined by law. FEMA may provide the private nonprofit with a Public Assistance grant for their eligible costs. SBA encourages all private nonprofit organizations to apply with SBA for disaster loan assistance.

SBA may lend private nonprofits up to $2 million to repair or replace damaged or destroyed real estate, machinery and equipment, inventory and other business assets.

For certain private nonprofit organizations of any size, SBA offers Economic Injury Disaster Loans to help with meeting working capital needs caused by the disaster. Economic Injury Disaster Loans may be used to pay fixed debts, payroll, accounts payable and other bills that cannot be paid because of the disaster’s impact. Economic injury assistance is available regardless of whether the nonprofit suffered any property damage.

“SBA’s disaster loan program offers an important advantage–the chance to incorporate measures that can reduce the risk of future damage,” Sánchez continued. “Work with contractors and mitigation professionals to strengthen your property and take advantage of the opportunity to request additional SBA disaster loan funds for these proactive improvements.”

The interest rate is 3.25 percent with terms up to 30 years. The deadline to apply for property damage is Dec. 31, 2024. The deadline to apply for economic injury is Aug. 1, 2025.

Interest does not begin to accrue until 12 months from the date of the first disaster loan disbursement. SBA disaster loan repayment begins 12 months from the date of the first disbursement.

On October 15, 2024, it was announced that funds for the Disaster Loan Program have been fully expended. While no new loans can be issued until Congress appropriates additional funding, we remain committed to supporting disaster survivors. Applications will continue to be accepted and processed to ensure individuals and businesses are prepared to receive assistance once funding becomes available.

Applicants are encouraged to submit their loan applications promptly for review in anticipation of future funding.

Applicants may apply online and receive additional disaster assistance information at SBA.gov/disaster. Applicants may also call SBA’s Customer Service Center at (800) 659-2955 or email disastercustomerservice@sba.gov for more information on SBA disaster assistance. For people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech disability, please dial 7-1-1 to access telecommunications relay services.

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About the U.S. Small Business Administration
The U.S. Small Business Administration helps power the American dream of business ownership. As the only go-to resource and voice for small businesses backed by the strength of the federal government, the SBA empowers entrepreneurs and small business owners with the resources and support they need to start, grow, expand their businesses, or recover from a declared disaster. It delivers services through an extensive network of SBA field offices and partnerships with public and private organizations. To learn more, visit www.sba.gov.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 26, 2025

Category: Latin America

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