Source: International Monetary Fund
July 3, 2025
SPEAKER: Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF
MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.
Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th.
Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update. These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances. Stay tuned. We will share more details soon.
And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And now the floor is open.
QUESTIONER: Thank you so much. I have two questions on Ukraine. In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy. Could you please elaborate on this? What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when? And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled? Thank you.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability? Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release. Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine? Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine.
So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion. In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient. The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review.
Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy. And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head. It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards. And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term.
With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year. It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule. And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.
And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program. Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained. And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term.
It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives. And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program.
QUESTIONER: Two questions. Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question.
The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances? Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance? Are they reliable? Thank you very much.
QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal? Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal.
So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities. As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years. And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place. And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development.
What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits. The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized. And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward. And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers. We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged.
And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that.
QUESTIONER: Question about Russia. So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia. So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia? Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy.
So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply. Inflation is easing, but is still high. And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty. In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025. Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower. And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks.
With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high. Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target. But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time. In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027. And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising. So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future.
QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth?
MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast. But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast. What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things. First, tight policies. The other factors are cyclical factors. So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown. And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia. And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well. And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions.
QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years. It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans. Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill. It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy. So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates. Thanks.
MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?
QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.
QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries. As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates. And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that will have on the global economy. Thanks.
QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade. Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S. Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India. But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it. So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path. And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time.
And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt. And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits. We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy. We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks. And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation.
And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update. And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally.
As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty. And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us. And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy.
QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina? It’s a simple question.
MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?
QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement. And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.
QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. Good morning. I would like to address the question of my colleague. Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?
QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year. And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.
QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment. As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently. The mission concluded on June 27th. And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program. Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive.
What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results. The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth. The disinflation process has resumed. The economy continues to expand. High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina. Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years. And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.
Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop. Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program.
On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions. But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.
On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted. But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks. We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue.
On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation. However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case.
I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer. So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it. The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals. President Trump already signaled a deal with India. Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing? So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country.
So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made. But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part. And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward. So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account. But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have.
Let’s continue then.
QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet?
MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached. And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review. So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.
MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board.
QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team.
MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.
QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June. So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review? My second one is on the RSF financing. We want to also know an update on that.
MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.
QUESTIONER: I have another question on Egypt. So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche? And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June? And I have another question on Syria. I don’t know if I could put it in now. Maybe you can answer that later on. How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.
QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September.
MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?
So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities. The discussions were productive. Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program. And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.
To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment. Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset [divestment diversification] program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw. These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt. And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt. We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth.
With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met. Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal. And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined. And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall. So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews. More time [is] needed.
And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF.
QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said?
So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall. Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together? Could this be possible? Is this on the table?
MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place. So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage.
Okay, you had a question on Syria. So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria. I don’t see anyone else on Syria.
So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th. And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009. The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities. And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.
As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering. And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size. The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy. And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy.
So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have.
QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up. The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF. I just wanted to confirm my understanding. Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly?
MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program. I hope that clarifies.
QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me. Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there? Thank you.
MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique. I’m sorry about that.
All right, let’s go online. You had a question?
QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one. On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement? But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews. What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine?
And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion? So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already. Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?
And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit. So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone. At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems. And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that. We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries. That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying. And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment. For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing. So, just asking a broad question.
And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year. What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting? What is the importance of that as in that body?
QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter. And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period. I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine. And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.
On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment. I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying? If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order. So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment.
But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience. There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time. High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment. But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally. So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem.
That’s on the fiscal side. And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries. And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth. So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries.
And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years. And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries. So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries. But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing. But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs.
And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries. So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.
And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States.
Let me look online.
QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia. So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money. In this point, I have two questions. The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy? And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?
MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia?
QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second. Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why. So, could you maybe walk me through that? And I have a separate question on Lebanon. Maybe we’ll take that later.
MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million.
What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda. The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF. Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization. And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track.
With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally. I’m not sure exactly why. I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one.
I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them.
QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Sorry. So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya. President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets. And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF? I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders. Some of those countries have critical minerals. So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals. As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals. So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals. What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —
MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.
MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya?
QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do. Hello?
MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission. I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public? I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one.
MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments. As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program.
And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute.
So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission. The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued. This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year. So, collaboration on government diagnostics. It will continue over the next several months. A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year. So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities. So that is the process that we’ll have. But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready. So, kind of hold this space. We’ll continue to work on it.
And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday. What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits.
So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery.
On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance. We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission. Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time.
We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people.
And let me go — I have Jermine. You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time. So, I am going to wrap up with you as the last question.
QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs. What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs?
MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region.
MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU.
And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries.
With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region. It’s not really a matter for the IMF.
So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States. As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org. And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response. I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time. Thanks very much.
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IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani
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