NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Ukraine three years on: Pain, loss, solidarity and hope for a better future

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI

    By Nargiz Shekinskaya

    23 February 2025 Humanitarian Aid

    24 February 2025 marks the third year of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the civilian population continues to face near daily-attacks. The UN staff living alongside them, enduring the same difficult conditions, have been a lifeline throughout the war.

    “I’m trying not to cry, but I can’t help it. I’m glad I have tissues on hand,” admits Natalia Datchenko, a Ukrainian staff member of the UN children’s agency, UNICEF, struggling to hold back her tears as she recounts the explosions that awoke many Ukrainians three years ago, heralding the start of the conflict.

    Courtesy of Natalia Datchenko

    Natalia Datchenko, employee of UNICEF-Ukraine

    Alongside feelings of shock and anger, Ms. Datchenko also felt a surge of energy. “I knew, with absolute clarity, that I wanted to help others, to protect people. I knew I had to do something,” she recalls.

    UNICEF leadership instructed staff to prioritise their own safety and that of their families before resuming their work. Ms. Datchenko evacuated to Lviv, a city in the west of Ukraine, with her family.

    “There were 12 of us crammed into a small train compartment,” she says. “I held someone else’s child in my arms because there was no place for them to sit. The train moved slowly to avoid being targeted. When we finally arrived, we saw families with children sitting directly on the cold stone floor of the Lviv station. It was February, and it was freezing.”

    Life goes on

    Lyudmyla Kovalchuk, a staff member of the UN Women office in Ukraine, lived near Kyiv International Airport, one of the war’s first targets.

    “We woke up at five in the morning to the sound of explosions,” she explains. “It was shocking. Even though we had heard warnings of an impending invasion, we couldn’t believe it was actually happening.”

    Photo provided by Ludmila Kovalchuk

    Lyudmyla Kovalchuk, UN-Women Ukraine staff member

    After three years, exhaustion has set in but life and work continue. Women in Ukraine need the UN’s support – psychological, legal, logistical and financial. Many Ukrainian women are raising children alone, searching for jobs to support them and constantly moving to keep them safe from the war. Ms. Kovalchuk says that about 75,000 Ukrainian women are serving in the military and represent a group with unique needs that require specific support.

    “We have adapted to working under new conditions,” Ms. Kovalchuk says. “Whenever we arrange to meet somewhere, we check if there is a shelter nearby in case of an attack. We don’t plan long events as the risk of shelling increases the longer we stay in one place. During the pandemic, we learned to work in a hybrid format, and that experience has been invaluable.”

    ‘Hardest part was hearing their stories’

    Anastasia Kalashnyk, another UN Women staff member, used to live in Zaporizhzhia. Two years ago, she relocated to Kyiv with her family. “After 24 February 2022, my children stopped attending daycare and school, and my husband lost his job – the foreign company he worked for immediately shut down operations and left the country,” she says.

    However, Ms. Kalashnyk’s workload increased significantly. Since 2017, she has been responsible for emergency aid provided by UN Women in Ukraine, focusing on women in Luhansk and Donetsk regions. After 2022, many of these women were forced to flee their homes.

    © DRC Ukraine/Svitlana Koval

    In a town in Mykolaivska Oblast, a reconstructed kindergarten shelter now provides 200 children with a safe, fully equipped space for learning during frequent air alerts.

    “Looking back, the hardest part was hearing their stories – women I had known for years – about how they escaped occupied territories and what happened to their husbands who had gone to fight,” she says.

    For these and other Ukrainian women in need, UN Women, in collaboration with local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), established so-called “safe spaces”. These centres provide essential support, allowing women to connect, share experiences and heal.

    “I watched as Olga, one of the women who came to the centre, quite literally come back to life after experiencing trauma,” a UN worker recalls. “She started smiling again. Now, Olga is one of the centre’s activists, helping others.”

    The cost of war

    According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), more than 12,600 civilians have been confirmed killed and over 29,000 injured over the last three years. At least 2,400 children are among the casualties.

    Millions live in constant fear, while those in occupied territories face severe restrictions and limited access to humanitarian aid. An entire generation of Ukrainians is growing up in wartime.

    © UNICEF/Oleksii Filippov

    Alina, 12, stands next to her damaged home in Kobzartsi, Mykolaiv region.

    Relentless attacks on infrastructure are deepening the crisis. Over 10 per cent of Ukraine’s housing stock has been damaged or destroyed, leaving at least two million families without adequate shelter. More than 3,600 schools and universities have been hit, forcing hundreds of thousands of children into remote learning.

    Repeated strikes on the energy system – three winters in a row – have left towns without electricity, heating and essential services in freezing conditions. A total of 12.7 million people require humanitarian aid.

    Hopes for the future

    “Of course, everything that has happened is exhausting,” Ms. Kalashnyk says. “But my children give me hope for a better future. What they are going through now is unfair. I have to be strong, not just for them but for all Ukrainian families.”

    She adds that she also finds hope in the solidarity shown by the UN and other organizations. “They didn’t abandon Ukraine,” she explains. “They stayed. They continue to help. They didn’t come just for a month or two. They’ve been here for years. And now, they’re talking about rebuilding. These discussions about the future give me confidence that we have one.”

    Ms. Datchenko from UNICEF also speaks of unity and solidarity. “At first, we were all united by anger,” she recalls. “We shared our burdens. We shared our pain. We were furious together. But anger is no longer the driving force. Now, we are united by the desire to rebuild what has been destroyed. We want to restore our communities, support families and rebuild our country, not as it was, but better, to leave behind the Soviet legacy and create a truly new nation, built on human rights.”

    © UNFPA/Danil Pavlov

    Supplies are distributed by UNFPA at a centre for survivors of gender-based violence in Kherson, Ukraine.

    She says her work gives her hope. “I have a unique opportunity to reassess old programmes, create new ones, listen to the voices of the most vulnerable, direct resources where they are truly needed and bridge different sectors to bring together the best for those in need. I believe that working for UNICEF has helped me survive—it’s still my survival strategy.”

    ‘We have to become stronger’

    Ms. Datchenko also finds solace in culture. “I seek inspiration and motivation in the beauty that still exists in Ukraine. Our museums are open, concerts are happening, music is playing. For many, culture is a survival strategy.”

    Today, many Ukrainians are searching for their own survival strategies. “One of the biggest challenges we face in our work is the psychological toll, not only in supporting ourselves, but also our colleagues,” Ms. Kovalchuk says. “Recently, one of our colleague’s brothers went missing. Sometimes, it’s incredibly difficult to find the right words of comfort, yet we work with people – women and girls affected by war – who need our support.”

    “But, on the other hand, when you face one tragedy after another, one crisis after another, you start to feel stronger and more experienced. What doesn’t kill us makes us stronger.”

    Then, with a sad smile, she adds that “maybe it’s true, but I always say I wish I didn’t have the experience I have now. But I have no choice. This experience is mine to bear.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 24, 2025

  • MIL-OSI China: San Francisco to host Monkey King opera’s world premiere

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    He’s arrogant. He’s rebellious. He’s becoming the most powerful being in creation, and he’s about to wreak havoc on heaven.

    Based on the Chinese classic novel Journey to the West, the opera production, The Monkey King, will have its world premiere at the San Francisco Opera House on Nov 14.

    As a major production for the 2025-2026 season of the San Francisco Opera, the opera will run for eight performances, bringing the legendary story of the Monkey King to global audiences.

    Monkey King is a beloved figure and has inspired countless interpretations.

    A monkey born from stone, Sun Wukong (the Monkey King) is determined to find immortality for his tribe. Many scoff at his aspirations, but he is set on proving them wrong with his signature cunning and charm. He wins every battle against legendary warriors, but the respect he longs for is always eluding him. What will it take for the gods to recognize him as an equal?

    The Monkey King is a heroic-themed opera created by composer Huang Ruo, who was born in China and now lives in New York, with a libretto by Chinese-American playwright David Henry Hwang. The opera, co-commissioned by the San Francisco Opera, is based on the opening chapters of Journey to the West.

    Armstrong Music Arts Management Ltd, an international classical music agency and production management company, has been invited to lead the global operation of the opera. The creation of the opera not only marks a spectacular appearance of Chinese culture on the international stage but also builds a new bridge for cultural exchange between China and the world.

    In 2016, the San Francisco Opera premiered the opera Dream of the Red Chamber. Armstrong Music Arts Management Ltd served as the global adviser and Chinese co-producer for Dream of the Red Chamber and co-produced the work with Beijing Poly Theatre Management Ltd in 2017. The opera was performed six times at the Poly Theatre in Beijing, Meixi Lake Grand Theatre in Changsha, Hunan province, and Qintai Grand Theatre in Wuhan, Hubei province. After the success of Dream of the Red Chamber, San Francisco Opera’s general director Matthew Shilvock commissioned the creation of The Monkey King.

    Asked why he decided to create this opera, composer Huang explained that during a Halloween celebration in the pandemic, he saw his child dressed as a Western superhero. This made him think about the abundance of Western superheroes in the United States, while Asia lacked similar heroes for children to dress up for Halloween. This inspired him to create The Monkey King.

    The opera, lasting about two and a half hours, will be performed in both Chinese and English. It combines elements of puppetry, dance, Peking Opera, and other Chinese art forms to tell the story of how a monkey born from a stone becomes the king of the monkey tribe and challenges the Dragon Palace and the gods of the heavens.

    The cast is star-studded, with each lead performer excelling in their respective artistic fields, bringing immense vitality to this opera that merges Eastern and Western cultures. Tenor Wang Kang will portray the Monkey King; tenor Konu Kim will play the Jade Emperor; and soprano Zhang Meigui will portray Guanyin. The cast includes several Asian actors who also performed in Dream of the Red Chamber.

    MIL OSI China News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Dr. Rand Paul Introduces NIH Reform Act to Bring Accountability to Public Health Bureaucracy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Rand Paul

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

    February 21, 2025

     Contact: Press_Paul@paul.senate.gov, 202-224-4343

     

     

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Yesterday, U.S. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, introduced the NIH Reform Act, legislation aimed at overhauling the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) to increase congressional oversight on the agency’s leadership. The NIH Reform Act would separate the NIAID into three national research institutes: the National Institute of Allergic Diseases, the National Institute of Infectious Diseases, and the National Institute of Immunologic Diseases. Each new institute would be led by directors subject to Senate confirmation and limited to no more than two 5-year terms to prevent the unchecked authority that led to sweeping and disastrous pandemic-era mandates.

    “For nearly four decades, Dr. Anthony Fauci sat atop a bureaucratic empire, wielding unchecked power over public health policy—despite never being confirmed by the Senate once,” said Dr. Paul. “He dictated mandates that shut down businesses, kept kids out of school, and trampled individual liberties—all while being the highest-paid official in the federal government. That kind of power without oversight is dangerous, and my legislation will ensure it never happens again. This legislation will bring accountability and oversight into a taxpayer-funded position that has largely abused its power and has been responsible for many failures and misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    The legislation is currently cosponsored by U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) in the Senate. 

    “Anthony Fauci single-handedly shut down small businesses, forced our children out of classrooms, and took away the opportunity for many Americans to say goodbye to loved ones during the COVID pandemic,” said Senator Tuberville. “It’s scary to think that someone who was never elected – or even confirmed by the Senate – had so much power over health care decisions that impacted millions of Americans.  We need greater transparency in our government’s institutions to ensure this never happens again. I’m proud to join Senator Paul in this legislation to increase oversight of the NIH and give the American people greater transparency surrounding our government institutions.”

    U.S. Representative Chip Roy (R-TX-21) introduced the legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives.

    “From the earliest days of the pandemic, public health bureaucrats proved themselves far more adept at ruining lives than saving them. Never again should a single, unaccountable government employee, like Dr. Anthony Fauci, wield unchecked power and influence over the lives of the American people. Jay Bhattacharya is an excellent choice for NIH Director, and I support his efforts to regain trust in America’s health agencies and promote healthcare freedom. However, we can’t structure government on the assumption that we’ll always have great people in office. Breaking up Dr. Fauci’s taxpayer funded bully pulpit into three separate agencies — and requiring Senate confirmation for all their future directors — is one of many actions necessary to allow the American people to check government power and hold public health agencies accountable,” said Congressman Roy.

    Background:

    Dr. Anthony Fauci was Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for over 38 years—longer than J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the FBI. By the time he retired, he was the highest paid official in the entire federal government. Yet the Senate never voted to confirm him once. The law does not require Senate confirmation of the NIAID Director.

    The NIAID’s stated mission is “to better understand, treat, and ultimately prevent infectious, immunologic, and allergic diseases.” This sweeping mandate covers everything from asthma to Ebola, from peanut allergies to the plague. As the head of that institute, Dr. Fauci installed himself as a de facto pandemic czar, advocating for misguided policies like mandatory vaccinations for school-aged children (one of the populations least at risk from COVID-19).

    To improve accountability of the NIH, the NIH Reform Act will restructure the NIAID to better align with its mission as follows:

    Abolish the NIAID and replace it with the following three new institutes:

    1. National Institute of Allergic Diseases;
    2. National Institute of Infectious Diseases; and
    3. National Institute of Immunologic Diseases.

    The directors of each new institute would be:

    1. Appointed by the president,
    2. Subject to Senate confirmation, and
    3. Limited to no more than two 5-year terms.

    This type of reorganization is nothing new. In the aftermath of J. Edgar Hoover’s decades-long tenure as head of the FBI, Congress passed a law in 1976 limiting the FBI Director to a single 10-year term, and as recently as 2012, Congress eliminated one center within the NIH and replaced it with a new one. In the aftermath of the damage done by pandemic-era mandates and restrictions, Congress must enact the NIH Reform Act to ensure that one official cannot claim the unquestioned authority to dictate the federal response to public health emergencies.

    The NIH Reform Act is part of Dr. Paul’s ongoing fight to bring transparency and accountability to federal agencies and rein in government overreach.

    You can read the NIH Reform Act HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Blasts Trump & Elon for Illegally Paralyzing Lifesaving Research Again, Threatening to Extinguish Ongoing and Groundbreaking Work

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ICYMI: Murray Blasts Trump and Musk Decimating HHS, Risking Americans’ Health and Livelihoods

    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee issued the following statement upon learning that Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. directed National Institutes of Health (NIH) to pause issuance of all awards.

    “The scientists supported by NIH deliver groundbreaking and lifesaving cures that change lives and give patients hope all across this country. I think Americans want to understand: by crushing cancer research, what exactly are Trump and Elon making more efficient? By grinding promising new treatments for cerebral palsy to a halt, what corruption is Elon uncovering? Their game plan here is pretty blatant: gum up the works on the approval process for these grants until the money can’t be spent or entire research programs are forced to shutter.

    “Withholding this funding is illegal—Trump, and Elon are suffocating the work of cancer researchers with so much red tape that labs and clinical trials will be forced to shut down. It is plain to see that Trump and Elon are themselves creating waste, fraud, and abuse by illegally choking off lifesaving research. I am calling on every Member of Congress to join me in demanding that NIH grant funding get out the door immediately—to red and blue states—so that researchers can continue working towards cures and treatments.”

    Last Thursday, HHS issued a directive calling on NIH to pause issuance of all awards. Since then, the agency has again completely stopped issuing grants. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has been intentionally delaying the NIH approval process for grants and forcing NIH to cancel study section and Advisory Council meetings. For a research grant application to be approved it must be scored by a study section (a group of independent scientists) first and then approved by the appropriate Institute or Center’s Advisory Council. For either to occur, NIH must announce each of these meetings on the Federal Register. However, since Day 1 of the Trump Administration NIH has been prohibited from posting to the Federal Register. According to analysis in recent reporting, NIH has posted no notices on the Federal Register since Trump’s inauguration—yet during the same period last year there were already more than 150 notices posted by NIH.

    Senator Murray blasted the Trump administration immediately as soon as NIH announced an illegal new cap on the indirect cost rate, amounting to massive indiscriminate cut—pressing Dr. Jay Bhattacharya on the issue, leading Senate Democrats in pushing back, and forcing amendment votes to reverse the illegal Trump policy in the Senate Budget Committee and on the Senate floor. She has also pressed the administration for its arbitrary staffing cuts at HHS, its illegal funding and communications freeze.

    As a longtime appropriator and former Chair of the Senate HELP Committee, Murray has long fought to boost biomedical research, strengthen public health infrastructure, and make health care more affordable and accessible. Over her years as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, she has secured billions of dollars in increases for biomedical research at the National Institutes of Health, and during her time as Chair of the HELP Committee, she established the new ARPA-H research agency as part of her PREVENT Pandemics Act to advance some of the most cutting-edge research in the field. Senator Murray was also the lead Democratic negotiator of the bipartisan 21st Century Cures Act, which delivered a major federal investment to boost NIH research, among many other investments. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Mississippi Woman Pleads Guilty to Scheme to Defraud COVID-19 Relief Program of Over $5,000,000

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Memphis, TN – A Mississippi woman has pled guilty to defrauding the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a federal program intended to help small businesses survive the COVID-19 pandemic, of over $5,000,000. Reagan Fondren, Acting United States Attorney for the Western District of Tennessee, announced the guilty plea today.

    On February 20, 2025, Lisa Evans, 42, of Olive Branch, Mississippi, pled guilty before United States District Judge Thomas L. Parker to conspiracy to commit wire fraud.  She will be sentenced on May 22, 2025 and faces a maximum term of 20 years in federal prison. There is no parole in the federal system.

    According to information presented in court, Evans submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications for numerous individuals who were not entitled to PPP loans. The applications Evans submitted contained false representations, including fake federal tax documents.  When the individual borrowers obtained the PPP loan funds, they then paid Evans kickbacks of 20 to 30 percent.  The loss to the PPP program was $5,126,258.  

    Acting U.S. Attorney Fondren stated: “Individuals cheating the Paycheck Protection Program stole money from U.S. taxpayers who desperately needed these loans to keep their small businesses afloat and pay their employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. I would especially like to commend and thank the federal law enforcement agencies who uncovered this fraud and brought this defendant to justice: the Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General; the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Gulf States Field Division; the U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General; the U.S. Secret Service, Memphis Field Office; and the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee. My office will continue to work with these law enforcement partners to bring those who committed pandemic benefit fraud in the Western District of Tennessee to justice and to recover stolen pandemic relief funds.”

    Acting U.S. Attorney Fondren also thanked Assistant U.S. Attorney Tony Arvin, who prosecuted this case.

    ###

    For more information, please contact the Media Relations Team at USATNW.Media@usdoj.gov. Follow the U.S. Attorney’s Office on Facebook or on X at @WDTNNews for office news and updates.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Florida Businessmen Receive Prison Sentences in COVID-19 Mask and Glove Sale Fraud Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    ATLANTA – Brian H. Sperber and Edmond S. Norkus have received prison sentences for conspiring to commit wire fraud in a scheme in which the men tricked expectant purchasers of personal protective equipment out of more than $14 million. 

    “Sperber and Norkus cashed in on the unprecedented scarcity and skyrocketing price of personal protective equipment to get rich quick at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic was exploding,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Richard S. Moultrie, Jr. “Now they justifiably confront prison terms for their cynical, illegal cash grab.”

    “These sentences underline the FBI’s commitment to holding those who exploit federal relief programs for personal gain accountable,” said FBI Atlanta Acting Special Agent in Charge Sean Burke.

    According to Acting U.S. Attorney Moultrie, the charges, and other information presented in court: Shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic began, Brian H. Sperber became an authorized distributor for a Georgia-based personal protective equipment (“PPE”) manufacturer. Edmond S. Norkus operated warehouse space in Florida and was Sperber’s longstanding business associate. As the pandemic worsened, demand for, and market value of, PPE steeply increased. Even though Sperber was only authorized to sell to customers in a specific geographic sales territory and manufacturers had only extremely limited supplies available, Sperber and Norkus promised to sell large quantities of PPE to a wide range of would-be buyers. 

    But to make it appear that they could deliver on their promise, Sperber and Norkus diverted and showcased products already earmarked for other customers. They also provided customers with a variety of altered and counterfeit documents, designed to deceive customers into believing the products they had ordered were on the way. Ultimately, there were no products to supply and Sperber and Norkus pocketed the money while providing the victims with nothing.

    United States District Judge Michael J. Brown sentenced Brian H. Sperber, 48, of Plantation, Fla., to two years, two months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $14,231,605.36. Sperber was convicted on May 28, 2024, after he pleaded guilty.

    Judge Brown sentenced Edmond S. Norkus, 61, of Deerfield Beach, Fla., to three years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. Norkus was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $13,821,605.36. Norkus was convicted on May 28, 2024, after he pleaded guilty.

    Sperber used proceeds from the scheme to purchase a multi-million dollar waterfront mansion in Boca Raton, Florida. In a related civil forfeiture action, the United States and Sperber agreed to sell the property, netting approximately $4 million, and resolve the forfeiture in the criminal prosecution. As part of Sperber’s sentence, the district court forfeited Sperber’s interest in the funds. The United States, in Sperber’s plea agreement, agreed to recommend that the funds seized from the sale of the property be restored to the victims named in the restitution order. 

    This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Alana R. Black and C. Brock Brockington prosecuted the case.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the Department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    For further information please contact the U.S. Attorney’s Public Affairs Office at USAGAN.PressEmails@usdoj.gov or (404) 581-6280.  The Internet address for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia is http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Trade conflict: What can the Bank of Canada do?

    Source: Bank of Canada

    We are starting our framework renewal

    Since 1995, the Bank’s framework for monetary policy has been to target 2% inflation, the midpoint of a range between 1% and 3%. The post-pandemic inflation shock tested this framework like never before. But monetary policy worked, and inflation returned to 2%.

    Canada’s economy is now facing a future rife with more frequent shocks and more structural change. That’s why we’ll be asking a few key questions as we begin the review of our framework—a process that happens every five years:

    • With more supply shocks ahead, do we need a richer playbook for how we achieve the inflation target?
    • How do we best measure underlying inflation in a more volatile world?
    • How do monetary policy and housing interact?

    The monetary policy framework has worked well for decades, so the bar for change is high. But the world economy is shifting, and the Bank must be as ready as possible for what lies ahead.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tariffs, structural change and monetary policy

    Source: Bank of Canada

    What monetary policy can and cannot do

    If the economy is on a lower path and there’s upward pressure on inflation, what’s the response from monetary policy and the Bank of Canada?

    What the Bank can do is help the economy adjust. With inflation now back around the 2% target, we are better positioned to contribute to economic stability. However, with a single instrument—our policy interest rate—we can’t lean against weaker output and higher inflation at the same time. As we consider our monetary policy response, we will need to carefully assess the downward pressure on inflation from weakness in the economy and weigh that against the upward pressure on inflation from higher import prices and supply chain disruptions.

    Unlike the pandemic, if tariffs persist there will be no economic bounce-back. Long-lasting tariffs mean lower potential output because our economy works less efficiently. Monetary policy cannot restore the lost supply. At most, it can smooth the decline in demand.

    The sharp fall in exports and investment when tariffs are imposed, combined with weaker consumption, means that initially demand would fall more than potential output, creating excess supply in the economy. Provided the inflationary impact of tariffs is not too big, monetary policy can help smooth the adjustment by supporting demand so it doesn’t weaken too much more than supply. But how much support monetary policy can provide is constrained by the need to control inflation.

    The initial impact of tariffs is a one-time rise in the level of consumer prices. Monetary policy cannot change that. What monetary policy can—and must—do is ensure that higher prices do not become ongoing inflation. This means making sure that households and businesses continue to expect inflation to remain well anchored on the 2% target. Simply put, monetary policy needs to ensure the increase in inflation is temporary.

    Strengthening Canada’s economic union

    I hope—we all hope—Canada can continue open trade with the United States. A trusted open trade relationship benefits both countries. But if we are faced with a prolonged trade conflict, the only way to offset this negative structural change is with a positive structural change.

    Structural policies are appropriately the responsibility of elected governments and parliaments—not the Bank of Canada. So I will tread lightly here.

    The Bank has previously highlighted Canada’s productivity challenge. And it’s good to see more focus by federal and provincial governments on structural reforms to increase productivity and investment by strengthening our economic union.

    Removing rules that restrict interprovincial trade and harmonizing or mutually recognizing provincial regulations could provide some offset to increased trade friction with the United States. Provinces could also make it easier for workers to move within Canada by mutually recognizing different labour accreditations. There is also scope for all levels of government to reduce the timelines and uncertainty related to regulatory approvals. And better east-west transportation links would make trade within Canada less expensive—and help get Canadian products to overseas markets.

    Again, it is not for the Bank of Canada to prescribe these policies or investments. But higher productivity means higher potential output and more capacity for growth without inflation. As Canada confronts the reality of increased trade friction with the United States, a concerted focus on productivity has rarely been more important.

    Renewing our monetary policy framework

    In some ways, the US tariff threat is part of a broader global economic shift. The structural tailwinds of peace, globalization and demographics that helped keep inflation low are turning into headwinds—and the world looks increasingly shock prone. Higher long-term interest rates, elevated sovereign debt and slower economic growth have made the global economy more vulnerable. Compounding these vulnerabilities are war, rising trade protectionism and economic fragmentation. Canada also has a structural supply challenge in its housing market. For years, the supply of housing has not kept up with demand, and housing affordability has deteriorated.

    These shifts all have implications for inflation. They may put more upward pressure on prices, and a more shock-prone world means more volatility in inflation. And that brings me to my original topic: the Bank’s flexible inflation-targeting framework.

    Since 1995, the 2% target has been jointly agreed with the Government of Canada. This gives it political legitimacy and gives the Bank the operational independence to conduct monetary policy.

    For 25 years leading up to the pandemic, inflation was low and stable. But the pandemic tested the framework like never before. We faced huge shocks to both demand and supply, a deep recession and a rapid rebound. As the economy reopened, inflation rose sharply, hitting 8%. Guided by the framework, the Bank raised the policy rate forcefully to bring inflation down. Since last summer, inflation has been close to 2%, and we’ve cut our policy rate to keep it there. In short, the framework was tested—and it proved resilient.

    The measure of the framework’s success is not only whether inflation is close to 2%. It’s also how the framework performs in the face of shocks, especially big ones.

    The next renewal of the framework is set for 2026, and the review begins now. Our focus in this review will be how we can improve the framework and its implementation to best address structural changes. We will consider several questions.

    With more supply shocks, do we need a richer playbook for monetary policy? The usual response to supply shocks is to look through their temporary impact on inflation. But we saw in the pandemic that supply shocks can be persistent, and they can accumulate. The best response will depend on the situation.

    In a world with more volatility, how should we measure underlying inflation? No single measure of core inflation works for all circumstances. What measures are most robust in a shock-prone world? Should we focus on two or three preferred measures, or is a broader approach better?

    We also want to consider the interaction of monetary policy and housing. Housing affordability is a major concern for Canadians, and rising housing costs feed inflation. But monetary policy cannot directly increase housing supply—that’s an issue for elected governments at all levels. Still, we must consider how monetary policy affects housing demand and supply and how the imbalance between them feeds into inflation in shelter prices.

    The question of housing market imbalances also matters for the measurement of underlying inflation. Does persistently high inflation in shelter prices distort our measures of core inflation?

    Finally, each time we’ve reviewed our framework we’ve asked about the inflation target itself. In our five reviews since 1995, we’ve considered whether 2% is the right target and we’ve weighed alternatives, including price-level targeting and nominal GDP targeting, among others. Each time, we’ve concluded that 2% inflation is the right target. Canadians have told us they don’t want higher inflation. They have also told us that the 2% target is well known and well understood. That has helped anchor inflation expectations through thick and thin, including through the pandemic crisis. With trade conflict on our doorstep, we need to focus our resources on the most pressing and important issues for our framework review. In my view, now is not the time to question the anchor that has proven so effective in achieving price stability.

    Conclusion

    We have covered a lot of ground, and it’s time for me to conclude.

    Canada’s economy is on a better footing. Inflation has returned to target, interest rates have come down substantially, and household spending has strengthened. But a new crisis is on the horizon. If US tariffs play out as threatened, the economic impact would be severe. A protracted trade conflict would sharply reduce exports and investment. It will cost jobs and boost inflation in the next few years and lower our standard of living in the long run. The uncertainty alone is already causing harm.

    Central banks can do little to mitigate the damage caused by a trade war. Our role will be to balance the upside risks to inflation from higher costs with the downside risks from weaker demand. Our focus will be to help smooth the painful adjustment to a lower path for the economy while preventing price increases from becoming higher ongoing inflation.

    The inflation-targeting framework has proven both flexible and durable. Its review every five years is an opportunity to reflect on what’s working well and what could be improved. The framework proved itself time and again, and the bar for change is high.

    But the world economy is shifting. At the Bank of Canada, we are committed to ensuring we are as prepared as possible for the changes to come.

    Thank you.

    I would like to thank Daniel de Munnik, Mikael Khan, Oleksiy Kryvtsov and Stephen Murchison for their help in preparing this speech.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Jefferson, Reading between the Lines? Textual Analysis of Central Bank Communications

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, President Daly, for organizing this conference and for the opportunity to talk to this group.1 I have paid close attention to the papers presented at this annual conference in the past, and I look forward to today’s presentations and discussion.

    Today, I will talk about central bank communications and the use of textual analysis tools. These tools help process qualitative information that may be hard to capture in numerical forecasts. Also, they can improve our understanding of economic concepts that are otherwise difficult to measure. This topic has been covered at this conference in the past. Last year, for example, there was a paper on the program that highlighted the importance of considering the impact that speeches by the Chair of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have on asset prices when evaluating the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy.2 This paper also shows that speeches by the Vice Chair are less important than those by the Chair. So this might be a good time to catch up on your text messages! (Just kidding!)
    My talk is organized as follows. First, I will briefly discuss central bank communication and its effect on asset prices. Next, I will discuss how recent advances in automated textual analysis may be having an impact on how the information in central bank communication is incorporated into asset prices. Then I will review how researchers and market participants use textual analysis techniques, among other techniques, to gauge who is listening to central bank communication and to understand how monetary policy is transmitted to the economy. Before concluding, I will broaden my coverage and discuss how textual analysis tools can be used to estimate difficult-to-measure concepts in economics such as uncertainty and supply chain disruptions.
    These new textual analysis techniques are important to me as a policymaker because I want to understand how our communications are being heard, interpreted, understood, and acted upon.
    Central Bank Communication and its Effect on Financial MarketsFormer Fed Chair Ben Bernanke often highlighted the importance of central bank communication, saying that “monetary policy is 98 percent talk and 2 percent action.”3 Obviously, the “98 percent” is hyperbole; it is not meant to be taken as an exact measure of how much of the transmission of monetary policy is due to central bank communication. Even so, research and my own experience confirm that central bank communication is key for the transmission of monetary policy. In remarks I delivered almost two years ago, I discussed how monetary policy is transmitted to the rest of the economy through financial market prices.4 Changes in the federal funds target range are transmitted to overnight money market rates and other short-term interest rates through arbitrage relationships. The configuration of short-term interest rates, central bank communication about the likely future path of short-term interest rates, and the associated economic outlook, in turn, affect long-term interest rates through investors’ expectations.5 Higher long-term interest rates increase the cost of borrowing for households and businesses, thereby affecting households’ and businesses’ spending, savings, and investment decisions.
    Evolution of Fed CommunicationsPolicymakers’ approach to communication has evolved over time. In the past, policymakers were not focused on clarity and transparency in their communications as they are today. For example, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan famously quipped in 1987, “If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”6 In the 1990s, however, he started to embrace transparency. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the steps taken toward increasing transparency at the Fed since the 1990s. In 1993, the Fed started to publish Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes in their current form, and, soon after, it began releasing FOMC meeting transcripts with a five-year lag. In February 1994, the FOMC started to issue post-FOMC meeting statements following meetings at which there was a change in the intended policy stance. Later, it regularly incorporated the target federal funds rate into these statements. In May 1999, the FOMC started to publish statements after every meeting, even on occasions when there was no change in policy. In 2004, the FOMC accelerated the release of the minutes to three weeks after the meeting as opposed to after the subsequent FOMC meeting. During the tenure of former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, the Fed’s transparency increased significantly. In November 2007, the FOMC began releasing the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). In 2011, Chair Bernanke started holding press conferences after every other FOMC meeting. In 2012, under his leadership, the FOMC adopted an explicit inflation target of 2 percent in its new Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. Also, it started publishing anonymized individual FOMC participants’ views on the appropriate future path of the federal funds rate, now famously known as the “dot plot.” In 2019, Chair Powell continued this march toward transparency and started holding press conferences after every FOMC meeting.
    Of course, Chair Powell and other policymakers testify regularly before Congress, as required by law. Also, FOMC participants give public speeches and transparently discuss their views on monetary policy and associated issues, as evidenced by my speech here today.
    Previously, I have spoken about two primary reasons for the increase in transparency.7 First, transparency allows for greater accountability to the public. Second, there is a growing appreciation in the economics profession that clarity about policy actions helps the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy by, for example, making asset prices more informationally efficient. Relatedly, by conveying aspects of the Fed’s reaction function, communications can help inform investors’ views about the likely future path of monetary policy in a way that helps achieve the Fed’s monetary policy objectives.
    Using Textual Analysis to Quantify Central Bank CommunicationCentral bank communication is clearly important in shaping the path of interest rates, so it is not surprising that investors and researchers use textual analysis techniques, including artificial intelligence, to quantify in an automated way information conveyed through FOMC statements and other communications, such as speeches by Governors and Fed Bank presidents.8 Researchers have tested the hypothesis that clarity about policy actions would help the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy. Using textual analysis, high-frequency asset price data, and high-frequency central bank communication data, this research shows that investors’ reactions to specific sentences communicated by the central bank are quickly incorporated into asset prices.9 In addition, economists have used textual analysis to understand how media reporting of central bank communication affects short-term interest rates.10 For example, some have used a bag-of-words technique to estimate media sentiment during FOMC announcement days.11 By design, a high media sentiment is meant to capture times when journalists report that the FOMC is more likely to tighten monetary policy in the near future. Figure 2 shows that the correlation between media sentiment and six-month U.S. Treasury yield changes is positive and relatively high (40 percent), which suggests that media reporting of central bank communication plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy.
    Policymakers know that their communications are likely to affect the course of short-term interest rates, other asset prices, and the associated economic outlook, resulting in an easing or tightening of financial conditions. Therefore, policymakers have always paid close attention to what they say, well before market participants started applying artificial intelligence tools to central bank communications.
    In general, researchers argue that automated textual analysis and automated trading have increased the speed with which information is incorporated into asset prices. That suggests that asset prices have become more informationally efficient, sometimes in a matter of seconds or even milliseconds instead of minutes after information is released.12 Thus, increased transparency and advances in technology have potentially made asset prices more informationally efficient, which, in turn, helps with the transmission of monetary policy. Yet others argue that automated algorithms may be more prone to mistakes than humans, may provide an incentive for investors to value speed over accuracy, and may reduce the long-run informativeness of asset prices, which could hurt the transmission of monetary policy.13
    I look forward to the findings of future research as we develop a deeper understanding of this issue. For now, I do not think artificial intelligence is changing the way policymakers communicate, but research shows that it has affected how quickly information about policy is incorporated into asset prices.
    Central Bank Communication: Is Anyone Listening?Next, I will discuss whether research using textual analysis is helping policymakers to understand better who is listening to central bank communication. In 2018, former Fed Vice Chair Alan Blinder predicted that “central banks will keep trying to communicate with the general public, as they should. But for the most part, they will fail.”14 He explained further that “many economic models presume that central bank communication is aimed at wage-setters, price-setters, consumers, or investors—maybe all of them. But are they listening?” His answer was no, they are not listening to central bank communications, and he cited economic research using survey data to support his answer.15
    More recently, however, research shows that nonexperts and households are listening to central bank communications. Some of this research uses textual analysis, and some uses randomized control trials. Researchers have used textual analysis to process automatically and quantify more than 3.2 million posts on social media by experts and nonexperts. This research shows that journalists and professional forecasters who comment often on central bank policies, as well as nonexperts who do not comment regularly on central bank policies do listen to central bank communications.16
    Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy TransmissionFurther, research shows that direct central bank communication and the media’s reporting of central bank communication are highly correlated. Yet when they do not align, the media’s reporting tends to have a larger effect on asset prices and professional forecasters’ views about the future than the central bank’s direct communication.17 In addition, a randomized control trial with nearly 20,000 U.S. individuals shows that central bank communication affects households’ inflation expectations, which, in turn, affects their behavior as measured by scanner-collected data.18 This research shows that while central bank communication tends to affect household expectations and spending behavior, the way households receive information matters. In particular, households appear to react more to information conveyed by social media, friends, and family than to information conveyed by traditional media. All told, this research suggests that central bank efforts to communicate with the general public are having some success, but there is still room for improvement.
    Measuring Economic Concepts Using Textual AnalysisTextual analysis is not only helping researchers understand who is listening to central bank communication. Generally, it is helping them to measure qualitative information that is hard to capture with numerical forecasts and estimate difficult-to-measure economic concepts such as uncertainty, supply chain disruptions, and financial conditions.19 As I mentioned in a previous speech, uncertainty is not directly observable in the same way that inflation and economic output are.20 Notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring uncertainty, researchers have developed tools to assess it. In fact, in the past two decades, there has been tremendous growth in research devoted to the subject, especially on text-based measures of uncertainty. For example, researchers created an economic policy uncertainty index, shown in figure 3, based on the number of leading newspaper articles that contain a combination of words related to economic policy uncertainty.21 As shown in the figure, economic uncertainty in the U.S. reached an all-time high at the onset of the pandemic, came down slightly after the pandemic, and has recently increased as the potential economic implications of new government policies are discussed in newspaper articles. Research also shows that newspaper text-based measures are highly correlated with stock price volatility, and that higher values of these measures are associated with lower investment and employment. A corollary to that insight is that policymakers should communicate as clearly as possible to avoid increasing uncertainty.
    Recent research has also discovered that narrative sentiment conveys information that may be hard to capture in numerical forecasts. For example, it was shown that the tone of text accompanying a set of economic forecasts produced by the Fed’s staff, predicts forecast errors of the Fed’s staff as well as Blue Chip participants.22 The predictive power of sentiment seems to be arising from signaling the downside risks to economic performance for output, employment, and stock returns. These findings suggest that the tone of the narrative captures information that is not necessarily provided by corresponding forecasts. Not surprisingly, given this information, the tonality has predictive power for stock prices as well as monetary policy surprises.
    Another example of how textual analysis is helping researchers estimate difficult-to-measure concepts is new measures of firms’ demand and supply shocks. Traditionally, academic researchers use sign restrictions in price and quantity measures to identify and differentiate demand shocks from supply shocks. An increase in price and quantity is considered a demand shock; an increase in price accompanied by a decline in quantity is considered a supply shock. These so-called sign restrictions are useful tools; however, it is possible that an increase in price and quantity can be due to a surge in demand in the face of supply chain disruptions. Other popular measures of supply chain disruptions are supplier delivery times and order backlogs provided by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). These measures, however, only estimate firm activity relative to the previous month and can lack important context for understanding short-term dynamics that can otherwise be captured in qualitative, text-based measures. Thus, it can be useful to complement sign restriction methods, supplier delivery times, and order backlogs with textual analysis techniques that quantify firms’ narratives in earnings calls and the Beige Book to identify better demand and supply shocks.23 For example, figure 4 shows the Supply Chain Bottleneck Sentiment Index, the solid black line, estimated by a Board economist using textual analysis techniques to quantify the information conveyed in the Fed’s Beige Book publications, along with the ISM Supplier Delivery Index, the dashed red line.24 For illustration purposes, both indexes are normalized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation equal to one, with large positive numbers indicating that supply chains are stressed. Both indexes surged in the 1970s after the oil price increase and ensuing energy crisis. Supply chain disruptions reappeared in the 2000s with chip shortages, and, most recently, bottlenecks arose during the COVID-19 pandemic. The figure illustrates how the text-based measure signals a more prolonged period of supply chain disruptions during the pandemic. Comparing both measures, we see that the monthly changes in delivery times improved at a fast pace, as shown in the ISM index, but narratives of the post-pandemic recovery, as captured in the Beige Book, were signaling elevated levels of supply chain disruptions that eased more slowly.
    ConclusionThe idea of using qualitative information on media, government records, central bank, or management communication in economic research to understand better the transmission of monetary policy is not new.25 What is novel is that, in the past two decades, there have been advances in textual analysis techniques and incredible growth of data that are easily available to researchers and investors, in terms of both volume and variety. The advances in textual analysis techniques and the growth in alternative data have, in turn, helped researchers to better estimate difficult-to-measure economic concepts, to more easily identify who listens to central bank communications, and to investigate how quickly central bank communication is incorporated into asset prices, among other things. Also, we have greater access to high-frequency data, such as millisecond timestamp financial transactions, and “alternative data,” which includes textual information from social media posts. As I mentioned earlier, these new textual analysis techniques are important to policymakers because we seek to understand how our communications are being heard, interpreted, understood, and acted upon.
    While I am grateful that textual analysis techniques and data access have improved over the years, I will end on a cautionary note. Automatic textual analysis should not be regarded as superseding other analysis of the historical record on monetary policy. A wealth of data and techniques to analyze text does not necessarily translate into greater insight. Therefore, it is important that policymakers, researchers, and investors continue to be diligent in using the right tools and the right data to make the best possible inferences.26
    Thank you!
    ReferencesAdams, Travis, Andrea Ajello, Diego Silva, and Francisco Vazquez-Grande (2023). “More than Words: Twitter Chatter and Financial Market Sentiment,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-034. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.
    Appelbaum, Binyamin (2012). “A Fed Focused on the Value of Clarity,” New York Times, December 13.
    Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016). “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–636.
    Bernanke, Ben S. (2015). “Inaugurating a New Blog,” Ben Bernanke’s Blog, March 30.
    ——— (2022). “Ben Bernanke: The Fed from the Great Inflation to COVID-19 (PDF),” webinar, Brookings Institution, Washington, May 23.
    Bernanke, Ben S., and Kenneth N. Kuttner (2005). “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance, vol. 60 (June), pp. 1221–57.
    Blinder, Alan S. (2018). “Through a Crystal Ball Darkly: The Future of Monetary Policy Communication,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 108 (May), pp. 567–71.
    Chaboud, Alain P., Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson, and Clara Vega (2014). “Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market,” Journal of Finance, vol. 69 (October), pp. 2045–84.
    Cieslak, Anna, and Michael McMahon (2023). “Tough Talk: The Fed and Risk Premium,” working paper, April (revised June 2024).
    Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Michael Weber (2022). “Monetary Policy Communications and Their Effects on Household Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 130 (June), pp. 1537–84.
    Dessaint, Olivier, Thierry Foucault, and Laurent Fresard (2024). “Does Alternative Data Improve Financial Forecasting? The Horizon Effect,” Journal of Finance, vol. 79 (June), pp. 2237–87.
    Dugast, Jerome, and Thierry Foucault (2017). “Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 130 (November), pp. 367–91.
    Gertler, Mark, and Peter Karadi (2015). “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 7 (January), pp. 44–76.
    Ehrmann, Michael, and Alena Wabitsch (2022). “Central Bank Communication with Non-experts – A Road to Nowhere?” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 127 (April), pp. 69–85.
    Gardner, Ben, Chiara Scotti, and Clara Vega (2022). “Words Speak as Loudly as Actions: Central Bank Communication and the Response of Equity Prices to Macroeconomic Announcements,” Journal of Econometrics, vol. 231 (December), pp. 387–409.
    Gómez-Cram, Roberto, and Marco Grotteria (2022). “Real-Time Price Discovery via Verbal Communication: Method and Application to Fedspeak,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 143 (March), pp. 993–1025.
    Hanson, Samuel G., and Jeremy C. Stein (2015). “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 115 (March), pp. 429–48.
    Jefferson, Philip N. (2023a). “Implementation and Transmission of Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the H. Parker Willis Lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va., March 27.
    ——— (2023b). “Communicating about Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at “Central Bank Communications: Theory and Practice,” a conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, May 13.
    ——— (2023c). “Elevated Economic Uncertainty: Causes and Consequences,” speech delivered at “Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility,” a research conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Swiss National Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements, Zurich, Switzerland, November 14.
    Kumar, Saten, Hassan Afrouzi, Olivier Coibion, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2015). “Inflation Targeting Does Not Anchor Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Firms in New Zealand (PDF),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp. 151–208.
    O’Hara, Maureen (2015). “High Frequency Market Microstructure,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 116 (May), pp. 257–70.
    Piazzesi, Monika, and Martin Schneider (2006). “Equilibrium Yield Curves,” NBER Working Paper Series 12609. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October (revised January 2007).
    Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer (1989). “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 4, pp.121–70.
    ——— (2023). “Presidential Address: Does Monetary Policy Matter? The Narrative Approach after 35 Years.” American Economic Review, vol. 113 (June), pp. 1395-423.
    ——— (2024). “Lessons from History for Successful Disinflation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.148, Supplement (November), 103654.
    Schmanski, Bennett, Chiara Scotti, Clara Vega, and Hedi Benamar (2023). “Fed Communication, News, Twitter, and Echo Chambers,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-36. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.
    Sharpe, Steven A., Nitish R. Sinha, and Christopher A. Hollrah (2023). “The Power of Narrative Sentiment in Economic Forecasts,” International Journal of Forecasting, vol. 39 (July–September), pp. 1097–121.
    Soto, Paul (2023). “Measurement and Effects of Supply Chain Bottlenecks Using Natural Language Processing,” FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 6 (revised January 16, 2025).
    Swanson, Eric T., and Vishuddhi Jayawickrema (2024). “Speeches by the Fed Chair Are More Important Than FOMC Announcements: An Improved High-Frequency Measure of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks,” working paper, University of California, Irvine.
    von Beschwitz, Bastian, Donald B. Keim, and Massimo Massa (2020). “First to ‘Read’ the News: News Analytics and Algorithmic Trading,” Review of Asset Pricing Studies, vol. 10 (February), pp. 122–78.
    Young, Henry L., Anderson Monken, Flora Haberkorn, and Eva Van Leemput (2021). “Effects of Supply Chain Bottlenecks on Prices using Textual Analysis,” FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 3.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See Swanson and Jayawickrema (2024). Return to text
    3. See Bernanke (2015, 2022). Return to text
    4. See Jefferson (2023a). Arbitrage is the economic force that keeps prices of financial instruments with similar payoffs, such as the federal funds rate and repo rates, close to each other. Return to text
    5. More specifically, according to the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, intermediate- and long-term interest rates are importantly affected by the weighted average of expected future short-term interest rates. In addition, monetary policy affects risk premiums (see, for example, Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Hanson and Stein, 2015; and Gertler and Karadi, 2015) and term premiums (if monetary policy tightens in response to inflationary shocks, term premiums also tend to rise as longer-maturity bonds become riskier; see, for example, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2006). Return to text
    6. See Appelbaum (2012). Return to text
    7. See Jefferson (2023b). Return to text
    8. See, for example, Cieslak and McMahon (2023); Gardner, Scotti, and Vega (2022); Gómez-Cram and Grotteria (2022); and Sharpe, Sinha and Hollrah (2023). Return to text
    9. See, for example, Gómez-Cram and Grotteria (2022), who use textual analysis, high-frequency asset price data, and high-frequency central bank communication data to understand investors’ reactions to specific sentences communicated by the FOMC. Return to text
    10. See Schmanski and others (2023). Return to text
    11. A bag-of-words technique is a natural language processing technique that uses a collection (or “bag”) of words and a scoring system to quantify qualitative textual information. Schmanski and others (2023) use this technique to pair a set of topic keywords with modifiers and determine whether the combination of topic-modifier communicates tightening, neutral, or easing news. By construction, the sentiment is high when the media thinks the FOMC is more likely to tighten monetary policy in the near future. Return to text
    12. See Chaboud and others (2014) for evidence that automated trading has increased the informational efficiency of foreign exchange markets by reducing the frequency of triangular arbitrage opportunities and the autocorrelation of high-frequency returns. See von Beschwitz and others (2020) for evidence that automated textual analysis speeds up the stock price response to news. Return to text
    13. See, for example, von Beschwitz, Keim, and Massa (2020); Dugast and Foucault (2017); and O’Hara (2015). Return to text
    14. See Blinder (2018, p. 569). Return to text
    15. See Kumar and others (2015). Return to text
    16. Ehrmann and Wabitsch (2022) document that the number of expert and nonexpert comments posted on the X platform (formerly known as Twitter) that discuss central bank communication increases after European Central Bank (ECB) press conferences and other ECB communications, such as speeches by the ECB president. The authors also document that the content of the discussion tends to be objective (factual) rather than subjective, according to the authors’ dictionary base subjectivity measure. Return to text
    17. See Schmanski and others (2023). Return to text
    18. See Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2022). Return to text
    19. See, for example, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) for textual analysis measures of economic policy, Soto (2023) and Young and others (2021) for textual analysis measures of supply chain disruptions, and Adams and others (2023) for a textual analysis measure of financial conditions. Return to text
    20. See Jefferson (2023c). Return to text
    21. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Return to text
    22. See Sharpe, Sinha, and Hollrah (2023). Return to text
    23. See Young and others (2021) and Soto (2023). Return to text
    24. See Soto (2023). Return to text
    25. See, for example, Romer and Romer (1989, 2023, 2024) for a description of the “narrative” approach. Return to text
    26. For example, Dessaint, Foucault, and Fresard (2024) suggest that alternative data mainly help forecast short-term outcomes, and not so much long-term outcomes. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Railroad employee pays to settle False Claims Act liability

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    HOUSTON – A 53-year-old federal railroad employee has agreed to pay $24,000 to resolve potential violations related to his submission of unemployment benefit claims under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act during the COVID-19 pandemic, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei.

    Between April 20, 2020, and Aug. 27, 2021, Chad Gillingwater, Katy, allegedly falsely claimed federal unemployment benefits.

    Gillingwater was not entitled to those funds because he was already receiving state unemployment benefits and/or paid leave from his employer at the same time. Gillingwater also received additional benefits under The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act, which extended unemployment insurance benefits for railroad workers sidelined during COVID-19.

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office conducted the investigation with assistance from the Railroad Retirement Board – Office of Inspector General. Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) Michelle Luong handled the matter. 

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 21 February 2025 Departmental update World Health Day 2025 to spotlight women and babies’ survival, urging solidarity at a critical moment for global health

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The World Health Organization (WHO) has officially announced the theme of World Health Day 2025, Healthy beginnings, hopeful futures, which will focus on improving maternal and newborn health and survival.

    World Health Day is marked around the world on 7th April, the anniversary of WHO’s founding in 1948. Each year, it draws attention to a specific health topic of concern to people all over the world.

    “The focus of this campaign comes at a crucial moment, aiming to help countries regain lost progress while showcasing new research and evidence that will enhance the health of women and babies globally,” said Dr Anshu Banerjee, Director of Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health and Ageing at WHO. “As rollbacks to humanitarian assistance jeopardize a critical lifeline for millions, it will also be an opportunity to step up support and collaboration for global health – and deliver hope to those in urgent need of lifesaving care.”

    Helping every woman and baby survive and thrive

    According to the most recent estimates, close to 300 000 women lose their life due to pregnancy or childbirth each year; over 2 million babies die in their first month of life, and around 2 million more are stillborn. This is roughly 1 preventable death every 7 seconds – losses which bring tremendous sadness and heartache to millions of families around the world.

    While maternal and newborn deaths occur in all regions, the vast majority are in the poorest countries and those facing conflict and other crises. When health care facilities close, facilities are attacked, access routes denied or supplies disrupted, pregnant women and babies – who need regular access to health services – face severe, often life-threatening risks.

    Based on current trends, a staggering 4 out of 5 countries are off track to meet the United Nations’ global targets for improving maternal survival by 2030; 1 in 3 will fail to meet targets for reducing newborn deaths. Current funding constraints could further jeopardize progress, as many programmes providing critical health services have stalled alongside important medical research focused on pregnant and breastfeeding women and children.

    This year’s campaign, which will run until 2026, will urge governments, donors and the health community to invest in proven, high-impact interventions, as part of efforts to improve overall quality of care. These include pregnancy related services to detect complications and lifesaving emergency obstetrics – noting that the vast majority of maternal and newborn deaths happen during or shortly after birth – as well as special care for small and preterm babies. Complications relating to prematurity are now the leading cause of death of children under-5 worldwide.

    WHO will also highlight the evolving need for health systems to address the many underlying health issues that impact maternal and newborn health. These include not only direct obstetric complications but also mental health conditions, malnutrition (including under and overnutrition as well as nutritional deficiencies), and an increasing burden of noncommunicable diseases.

    Listening to women and supporting families

    Moving beyond actions to save lives, the campaign will urge increased global attention to women’s longer-term health and well-being. This includes advocating for laws and policies that safeguard their health and rights, such as paid maternity leave and other critical employment protections, and access to vital family planning services.

    “It is not sufficient that women survive childbirth, they must also be able to enjoy their lives in good health,” said Dr Pascale Allotey, Director for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Research at WHO. “Women and girls everywhere need access to health providers who listen to their concerns and meet their needs, while ensuring they can plan their fertility, take charge of their futures, and protect their health.”

    Efforts are also needed to address the particular risks of climate change for pregnant women and newborns,  as evidence shows an association between higher temperatures and preterm births, stillbirth, hypertension and gestational diabetes, as well as infant mortality.

    An investment, not a cost

    In low- and middle-income countries, every US$1 invested in maternal and newborn health is estimated to yield around US$9 to 20 in return. Evidence shows that spending on maternal and newborn health leads to economic development and happier, healthier societies.

    Around the world, WHO is supporting essential maternal and newborn health programmes including through:

    • Intensive support to 55 countries through the Every Woman Every Newborn Everywhere initiative, which is working to expand access to lifesaving emergency obstetric and newborn care units, family planning and other critical services;
    • Guidance relating to diverse aspects of maternal and newborn health through pregnancy, childbirth and the postnatal period.  New recommendations will be published later this year to help clinicians manage postpartum haemorrhage, one of the world’s leading causes of maternal deaths, and noncommunicable diseases in pregnancy;
    • Research to improve clinical care options for pregnant women and newborns, including during epidemics when it is critical to ensure high-risk populations are not left behind;
    • Ensuring maternity and newborn care during humanitarian emergencies, like mobile clinics and health posts in Syria and Sudan, where millions of women and babies would otherwise miss out on lifesaving medical screenings, vaccinations and treatments.
    • Support for health workers providing essential care to pregnant women and babies, such as efforts to strengthen the vital role of midwives within health systems through training, accreditation and related guidance.

    Get involved

    Here’s what you can do to support the campaign

    • Spread awareness: share information about the campaign using #HopefulFutures and #HealthForAll;
    • Participate: attend our global events to learn more about what it will take to end maternal and newborn mortality; organize your own local activities;
    • Donate: contribute to the WHO Foundation, which supports WHO’s work to protect mothers and babies in countries around the world;
    • Share personal experiences: Across its platforms, WHO will be launching new content to help women share birth stories and lived experiences from around the world, and to thank those who provide quality care.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Number of counterfeit euro banknotes continues to be low in 2024

    Source: European Central Bank

    21 February 2025

    • 554,000 counterfeit euro banknotes withdrawn in 2024 representing, by historical standards, small proportion of total banknotes in circulation
    • €20 and €50 most counterfeited denominations, accounting for over 75% of all counterfeit notes withdrawn
    • Euro banknotes remain safe and trusted means of payment
    • Authenticity of euro banknotes can be verified using “feel, look and tilt” method

    Some 554,000 counterfeit euro banknotes were withdrawn from circulation in 2024. The likelihood of receiving a counterfeit is low, as the number of counterfeits is very small in proportion to genuine euro banknotes in circulation. In 2024, 18 counterfeits were detected per million genuine banknotes in circulation, which is very low compared with the levels observed following the launch of the euro (see chart).

    Chart

    Number of counterfeit euro banknotes detected annually per million genuine notes in circulation

    Although the proportion is very small, the actual number of counterfeits has increased compared with the past few years, when the number of counterfeits was exceptionally low following the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, the number of counterfeits remains lower than in the years leading up to the pandemic.

    €20 and €50 denominations continued to be the most commonly counterfeited, together accounting for more than 75% of the total (see table). 97.8% of the counterfeits were found in euro area countries, while 1.3% were found in non-euro area EU Member States and 0.9% in other parts of the world.

    Table

    Breakdown of counterfeits by denomination in 2024

    Denomination

    €5

    €10

    €20

    €50

    €100

    €200

    €500

    Percentage of total

    1.3

    6.8

    36.0

    43.6

    7.9

    3.8

    0.6

    The public does not need to be concerned about counterfeiting but should remain vigilant. Most counterfeits are easy to detect, as they have either no security features or only very poor imitations of the existing features. Notes can be checked using the simple “feel, look and tilt” method described on our dedicated security features web page or on the websites of the euro area national central banks. The Eurosystem also helps professional cash handlers by ensuring that successfully tested machines for handling and processing banknotes can reliably identify counterfeits and withdraw them from circulation.

    If you receive a suspicious banknote, compare it side by side with one you know to be genuine. If your suspicions are confirmed, please contact the police or – depending on national practice – your national central bank or your own retail or commercial bank. The Eurosystem actively supports law enforcement agencies in the fight against currency counterfeiting.

    For media queries, please contact Nicos Keranis, tel.: +49 172 758 7237.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Number of counterfeit euro banknotes continues to be low in 2024

    Source: European Central Bank

    21 February 2025

    • 554,000 counterfeit euro banknotes withdrawn in 2024 representing, by historical standards, small proportion of total banknotes in circulation
    • €20 and €50 most counterfeited denominations, accounting for over 75% of all counterfeit notes withdrawn
    • Euro banknotes remain safe and trusted means of payment
    • Authenticity of euro banknotes can be verified using “feel, look and tilt” method

    Some 554,000 counterfeit euro banknotes were withdrawn from circulation in 2024. The likelihood of receiving a counterfeit is low, as the number of counterfeits is very small in proportion to genuine euro banknotes in circulation. In 2024, 18 counterfeits were detected per million genuine banknotes in circulation, which is very low compared with the levels observed following the launch of the euro (see chart).

    Chart

    Number of counterfeit euro banknotes detected annually per million genuine notes in circulation

    Although the proportion is very small, the actual number of counterfeits has increased compared with the past few years, when the number of counterfeits was exceptionally low following the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, the number of counterfeits remains lower than in the years leading up to the pandemic.

    €20 and €50 denominations continued to be the most commonly counterfeited, together accounting for more than 75% of the total (see table). 97.8% of the counterfeits were found in euro area countries, while 1.3% were found in non-euro area EU Member States and 0.9% in other parts of the world.

    Table

    Breakdown of counterfeits by denomination in 2024

    Denomination

    €5

    €10

    €20

    €50

    €100

    €200

    €500

    Percentage of total

    1.3

    6.8

    36.0

    43.6

    7.9

    3.8

    0.6

    The public does not need to be concerned about counterfeiting but should remain vigilant. Most counterfeits are easy to detect, as they have either no security features or only very poor imitations of the existing features. Notes can be checked using the simple “feel, look and tilt” method described on our dedicated security features web page or on the websites of the euro area national central banks. The Eurosystem also helps professional cash handlers by ensuring that successfully tested machines for handling and processing banknotes can reliably identify counterfeits and withdraw them from circulation.

    If you receive a suspicious banknote, compare it side by side with one you know to be genuine. If your suspicions are confirmed, please contact the police or – depending on national practice – your national central bank or your own retail or commercial bank. The Eurosystem actively supports law enforcement agencies in the fight against currency counterfeiting.

    For media queries, please contact Nicos Keranis, tel.: +49 172 758 7237.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 22, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets Abe Akie, wife of late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai attends opening of 2025 Halifax Taipei forum
    On the afternoon of February 20, President Lai Ching-te attended the opening of the 2025 Halifax Taipei forum. In remarks, President Lai thanked the Halifax International Security Forum for their strong support for Taiwan, and for having chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum. Noting that we face a complex global landscape, the president called on the international community to take action. He said that as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity, and called on the international community to create non-red global supply chains, as well as unite to usher in peace. President Lai emphasized that Taiwan will work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and collaborate with democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and together greet a bright, new era. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to give a warm welcome to all the distinguished guests here at the very first Halifax Taipei forum. The Halifax International Security Forum, held every year in Canada, has been an important gathering for freedom-loving nations worldwide. I would like to thank Halifax and President [Peter] Van Praagh for their strong support for Taiwan. Every year since 2018, Taiwan has been invited to participate in the forum. Last year, former President Tsai Ing-wen was invited to speak, and this year, Halifax has chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum. As President Van Praagh has said, “While the security challenges ahead are too big for any single country to solve alone, there is no challenge that can’t be met when the world’s democracies work together.” Today, we have world leaders and experts who traveled from afar to be here, showing that they value and support Taiwan. It demonstrates solidarity among democracies and the determination to take on challenges as one. I would like to express my gratitude and admiration to all of you for serving as defenders of freedom. At this very moment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is still ongoing. Authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran continue to consolidate. China is hurting economies around the world through its dumping practices. We face grave challenges to global economic order, democracy, freedom, peace, and stability. Taiwan holds a key position on the first island chain, directly facing an authoritarian threat. But we will not be intimidated. We will stand firm and safeguard our national sovereignty, maintain our free and democratic way of life, and uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan cherishes peace, but we also have no delusions about peace. We will uphold the spirit of peace through strength, using concrete actions to build a stronger Taiwan and bolster the free and democratic community. I sincerely thank the international community for continuing to attach importance to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Recently, US President Donald Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru issued a joint leaders’ statement expressing their firm support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and for Taiwan’s participation in international affairs. As we face a complex global landscape, I call on the international community to take the following actions: First, as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity. Just a few days ago, the top diplomats of the US, Japan, and South Korea held talks, underlining the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They also conveyed their stance against “any effort to destabilize democratic institutions, economic independence, and global security.” On these issues, Taiwan will also continue to contribute its utmost. I recently announced that we will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP.  Soon after I assumed office last year, I formed the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee at the Presidential Office. This committee aims to combine the strengths of government and civil society to enhance our resilience in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy. We will also deepen our strategic partnerships in the democratic community to mutually increase defense resilience, demonstrate deterrence, and achieve our goal of peace throughout the world. Second, let’s create non-red global supply chains.  For the democratic community to deter the expansion of authoritarianism, it must have strong technological capabilities. These can serve as the backbone of national defense, promote industrial development, and enhance economic resilience. So, in addressing China’s red supply chain and the impact of its dumping, Taiwan is willing and able to work with global democracies to maintain the technological strengths among our partners and build resilient non-red supply chains. As a major semiconductor manufacturing nation, Taiwan will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We will collaborate with our democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. The achievements of today’s semiconductor industry in Taiwan can be attributed to our collective efforts. Government, industry, academia, and research institutions had to overcome various challenges over the last 50 years for us to secure this position.  We hope Taiwan can serve as a base for linking the capabilities of our democratic partners so that each can play a suitable role in the semiconductor industry chain and develop its own strengths, deepening our mutually beneficial cooperation in technology. This benefits all of us. Moreover, it allows us to further enhance deterrence and maintain global security. Third, let’s unite to usher in peace. China has not stopped intimidating Taiwan politically and militarily. Last year, China launched several large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Its escalation of gray-zone aggression now poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will maintain the status quo. We will not seek conflict. Rather, we are willing to engage in dialogue with China, under the principles of parity and dignity, and work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. As the agenda of this forum suggests, democracy and freedom create more than just opportunities; they also bring resilience, justice, partnerships, and security. Taiwan will continue working alongside its democratic partners to greet a bright, new era. Once again, a warm welcome to all of you. I wish this forum every success. Thank you. Also in attendance at the event were Mrs. Abe Akie, wife of the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, and Halifax International Security Forum President Van Praagh.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group delegation
    On the morning of February 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from the British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). In remarks, President Lai thanked the delegation members, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the UK government for continuing to demonstrate support for Taiwan through a variety of means. He also stated that Taiwan-UK relations have advanced significantly in recent years, noting that the Taiwan-UK Enhanced Trade Partnership (ETP) is the first institutionalized economic and trade framework signed between Taiwan and any European country. The president said he looks forward to continuing to deepen Taiwan-UK relations and jointly maintaining regional and global peace and stability, and indicated that together, we can create win-win developments for both Taiwan and the UK and Taiwan and European nations. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: This is the first UK parliamentary delegation of the current session to visit Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. APPG Chair Sarah Champion visited Taiwan last May to attend the inauguration ceremony of myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. In July, she also attended the annual summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), which was held in Taipei. I am delighted that we are meeting once again. Taiwan-UK relations have advanced significantly in recent years. I would especially like to thank our distinguished guests, as well as the UK Parliament and government, for continuing to demonstrate support for Taiwan through a variety of means. For example, the House of Commons held a debate on Taiwan’s international status last November. After the debate, a motion was unanimously passed affirming that United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan. Responding to the motion, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Catherine West stated that the UK opposes any attempt to broaden the interpretation of the resolution to rewrite history. This highlighted concrete progress in Taiwan-UK bilateral relations. I would also like to thank the UK Parliament and government for openly opposing on multiple occasions any unilateral change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and for emphasizing that the security of the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic regions is closely intertwined. We look forward to continuing to deepen Taiwan-UK relations and jointly maintaining regional and global peace and stability. Together, we can create win-win developments for both Taiwan and the UK and Taiwan and European nations. For example, the Taiwan-UK ETP is the first institutionalized economic and trade framework signed between Taiwan and any European country. We hope to swiftly conclude negotiations on signing sub-arrangements on investment, digital trade, and energy and net-zero transition. This will facilitate even more exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and the UK. We also hope that the UK will continue to support Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Together, we can build even more resilient global supply chains and further contribute to global prosperity and development. I believe that this visit adds to a strong and solid foundation for future Taiwan-UK cooperation. Thank you once again for backing Taiwan. I wish you a fruitful and successful visit. Chair Champion then delivered remarks, thanking President Lai for his warm welcome and for the hospitality he has shown to her and the delegation, and thanking Taiwan’s excellent team of officials for their care and attention. Chair Champion expressed that she thinks the IPAC conference held in Taiwan at the end of July last year was very significant, with legislators from 23 countries coming to show support for Taiwan, adding that that is something they have built on since the conference. She stated that she is also very proud that the UK Parliament supported the motion which made very clear that UNGA Resolution 2758 is specific to China and only to China, expressing that it was important and powerful that they recognize that. The chair went on to say that after the UK’s general election, more than half of the members of parliament are now new. She said she is very proud that there are new MPs as part of the delegation, and that she hopes it gives President Lai reassurance that their commitment to Taiwan is still there.  Chair Champion emphasized that the all-party group is important because it is indeed all-party, and that they work together for their common interests, stating that the common interest for the UK and for the world is to maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty. She also noted that the United States has now come out very much in support of Taiwan, which she said she hopes encourages other countries around the world to do the same. Chair Champion said that the UK will be going into the 27th trade negotiation with Taiwan, and that they hope the partnership that develops is very fruitful. The chair closed by saying that it is wonderful for the delegation to be meeting President Lai, as well as legislators and ministers, and to be understanding more about the culture of Taiwan so that they can build a deeper, longer-lasting friendship. The delegation also included Lord Purvis of Tweed of the House of Lords and Members of Parliament Ben Spencer, Helena Dollimore, Noah Law, and David Reed. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Political and Communications Director at the British Office in Taipei Natasha Harrington.  

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets former United States Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger
    On the morning of February 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by former United States Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger. In remarks, President Lai thanked the delegation for demonstrating staunch support for Taiwan through their visit. The president pointed out that increased cooperation between authoritarian regimes is posing risks and challenges to the geopolitical landscape and regional security. He emphasized that only by bolstering our defense capabilities can we demonstrate effective deterrence and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and around the world. The president stated that moving forward, Taiwan will continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities. He also expressed hope of strengthening the Taiwan-US partnership and jointly building secure and resilient non-red supply chains so as to ensure that Taiwan, the US, and democratic partners around the world maintain a technological lead. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to welcome our good friends Mr. Pottinger and retired US Rear Admiral Mr. Mark Montgomery to Taiwan once again. Last June, Mr. Pottinger and Mr. Ivan Kanapathy came to Taiwan to launch their new book The Boiling Moat. During that visit, they also visited the Presidential Office. We held an extensive exchange of views on Taiwan-US relations and regional affairs right here in the Taiwan Heritage Room. Now, as we meet again eight months later, I am pleased to learn that Mr. Kanapathy is now serving on the White House National Security Council. The Mandarin translation of The Boiling Moat is also due to be released in Taiwan very soon. This book offers insightful observations from US experts regarding US-China-Taiwan relations and valuable advice for the strengthening of Taiwan’s national defense, security, and overall resilience. I am sure that Taiwanese readers will benefit greatly from it. I understand that this is Mr. Montgomery’s fourth visit to Taiwan and that he has long paid close attention to Taiwan-related issues. I look forward to an in-depth discussion with our two friends on the future direction of Taiwan-US relations and cooperation. Increased cooperation between authoritarian regimes is posing risks and challenges to the geopolitical landscape and regional security. One notion we all share is peace through strength. That is, only by bolstering our defense capabilities and fortifying our defenses can we demonstrate effective deterrence and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and around the world. Moving forward, Taiwan will continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities. We also hope to strengthen the Taiwan-US partnership in such fields as security, trade and the economy, and energy. In addition, we will advance cooperation in critical and innovative technologies and jointly build secure and resilient non-red supply chains. This will ensure that Taiwan, the US, and democratic partners around the world maintain a technological lead. We believe that closer Taiwan-US exchanges and cooperation not only benefit national security and development but also align with the common economic interests of Taiwan and the US. I want to thank Mr. Pottinger and Mr. Montgomery once again for visiting and for continuing to advance Taiwan-US exchanges, demonstrating staunch support for Taiwan. Let us continue to work together to deepen Taiwan-US relations. I wish you a smooth and fruitful visit.  Mr. Pottinger then delivered remarks, first congratulating President Lai on his one-year election anniversary and on the state of the economy, which, he added, is doing quite well. Mentioning President Lai’s recent statement pledging to increase Taiwan’s defense budget to above 3 percent of GDP, Mr. Pottinger said he thinks that the benchmark is equal to what the US spends on its defense and that it is a good starting point for both countries to build deterrence. Echoing the president’s earlier remarks, Mr. Pottinger said that peace through strength is the right path for the US and for Taiwan right now at a moment when autocratic, aggressive governments are on the march. He then paraphrased the words of former US President George Washington in his first inaugural address, saying that the best way to keep the peace is to be prepared at all times for war, which captures the meaning of peace through strength. In closing, he said he looks forward to exchanging views with President Lai.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets Deputy Prime Minister Thulisile Dladla of the Kingdom of Eswatini
    On the afternoon of February 11, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Thulisile Dladla of the Kingdom of Eswatini. In remarks, President Lai thanked Eswatini for continuing to support Taiwan’s international participation at international venues. The president stated that Taiwan and Eswatini work closely in such areas as agriculture, the economy and trade, education, and healthcare, and expressed hope that the two countries will continue to support each other on the international stage and strive together for the well-being of both peoples.  A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome our distinguished guests to the Presidential Office. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla previously visited Taiwan while serving as minister of foreign affairs. This is her first time leading a delegation here as deputy prime minister. I want to extend my sincerest welcome. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla has earned a high degree of recognition and trust from His Majesty King Mswati III. She was not only Eswatini’s first woman foreign minister, but is also the second woman to have held her current key position. She shows an active interest in people’s welfare, and has a reputation for being deeply devoted to her compatriots. I have great admiration for this. I am truly delighted to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Dladla today. I would like to take this opportunity to once again express my gratitude to His Majesty the King for leading a delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony for myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao last year. This demonstrated the close diplomatic ties between our countries. I also want to thank Eswatini for continuing to support Taiwan’s international participation at international venues. I would ask that when Deputy Prime Minister Dladla returns to Eswatini, she conveys Taiwan’s greetings and gratitude to His Majesty the King and Her Majesty the Queen Mother Ntombi Tfwala. Diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Eswatini have endured for over half a century. Our two nations have continued to work closely in such areas as agriculture, the economy and trade, education, and healthcare. Our largest collaboration to date has been assisting Eswatini in the construction of a strategic oil reserve facility. We will continue to push forward with this project, and look forward to achieving even greater results in all areas. I understand that Deputy Prime Minister Dladla is very concerned about issues regarding gender equality and women’s empowerment. During her term as foreign minister, she facilitated bilateral cooperation in those areas. Now, as deputy prime minister, she is actively attending to the disadvantaged and advancing social welfare. These policies are very much in line with the priorities of my administration. I look forward to strengthening cooperation with Deputy Prime Minister Dladla for the benefit of both our societies. Taiwan and Eswatini are peace-loving nations. Faced with a constantly changing international landscape and the growing threat posed by authoritarianism, we hope that our two countries will continue to support each other on the international stage and strive together for the well-being of both our peoples. In closing, I wish Deputy Prime Minister Dladla and our distinguished guests a pleasant and successful visit. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla then delivered remarks, first greeting President Lai on behalf of the King, the Queen Mother, and the people of Eswatini, and extending gratitude for the warm reception afforded to her and her delegation, which underscores the strong bonds of friendship between our two nations. The deputy prime minister stated that, in reflecting on the fruits of our partnership, the evidence of Taiwan’s commitment to Eswatini is all around us. The strategic oil reserve project launching in April, she indicated, will redefine Eswatini’s energy security, and the Central Bank complex and electrification project stand as monuments of Taiwan’s vision for Eswatini’s progress and indicate that our partnerships are very strong. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla pointed out that education is the foundation of any nation’s progress, and that Taiwan’s contribution to Eswatini’s education sector cannot be overstated. Through Ministry of Foreign Affairs scholarship programs, she said, Eswatini has sent numerous students to Taiwan, where they’ve received world-class education in various disciplines, including engineering, business, and medicine. In turn, she said, these graduates are now contributing to the development of Eswatini. The deputy prime minister stated that Taiwan has also strengthened Eswatini’s industrial and technological sectors, with collaborations and partnerships that create new opportunities for employment and innovation, and that Taiwan’s technical and medical assistance has strengthened Eswatini’s healthcare systems and uplifted the expertise of its professionals. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla also congratulated President Lai once again on his presidency, which she stated will lead Taiwan to new heights, adding that His Majesty coming to Taiwan personally for the inauguration was a resounding declaration of Eswatini’s enduring support for Taiwan’s sovereignty, stability, and rightful place on the world stage. She emphasized that Eswatini stands with Taiwan always and unwaveringly. In conclusion, the deputy prime minister stated that Eswatini fully agrees with Taiwan that we must all safeguard our national sovereignty and protect the lives and property of our people. She said that our common enemy will always be poverty and natural disasters, but against all odds, we will stand united, and we shall remain united and be one. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Eswatini Ambassador Promise Sithembiso Msibi.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    Presidential Office thanks US and Japan for joint leaders’ statement
    On February 7 (US EST), President Donald Trump of the United States and Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru of Japan issued a joint leaders’ statement reiterating “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community.” In the statement, the two leaders also “encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, and opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion” and “expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.” Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) on February 8 expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the Presidential Office to the leaders of both countries for taking concrete action to demonstrate their firm support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan’s international participation. Spokesperson Kuo pointed out that there is already a strong international consensus on the importance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The spokesperson emphasized that Taiwan, as a responsible member of the international community, is capable and willing to work together with the international community and will continue strengthening its self-defense capabilities as it deepens its trilateral security partnership with the US and Japan and works alongside like-minded countries to uphold the rules-based international order. The spokesperson said that Taiwan will work toward ensuring a free and open Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific region, as well as global peace, stability, and prosperity, as it continues to act as a force for good in the world.

    Details
    2025-02-14
    President Lai holds press conference following high-level national security meeting
    On the morning of February 14, President Lai Ching-te convened the first high-level national security meeting of the year, following which he held a press conference. In remarks, President Lai announced that in this new year, the government will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. He stated that the government will also continue to reform national defense, reform our legal framework for national security, and advance our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally. The president also proposed clear-cut national strategies for Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. President Lai indicated that he instructed the national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches outlined. He also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. He expressed hope that as long as citizens remain steadfast in their convictions, are willing to work hand in hand, stand firm amidst uncertainty, and look for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of time yet again. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to convey my condolences for the tragic incident which occurred at the Shin Kong Mitsukoshi department store in Taichung, which resulted in numerous casualties. I have instructed Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) to lead the relevant central government agencies in assisting Taichung’s municipal government with actively resolving various issues regarding the incident. It is my hope that these issues can be resolved efficiently. Earlier today, I convened this year’s first high-level national security meeting. I will now report on the discussions from the meeting to all citizens. 2025 is a year full of challenges, but also a year full of hope. In today’s global landscape, the democratic world faces common threats posed by the convergence of authoritarian regimes, while dumping and unfair competition from China undermine the global economic order. A new United States administration was formed at the beginning of the year, adopting all-new strategies and policies to address challenges both domestic and from overseas. Every nation worldwide, including ours, is facing a new phase of changes and challenges. In face of such changes, ensuring national security, ensuring Taiwan’s indispensability in global supply chains, and ensuring that our nation continues to make progress amidst challenges are our top priorities this year. They are also why we convened a high-level national security meeting today. At the meeting, the national security team, the administrative team led by Premier Cho, and I held an in-depth discussion based on the overall state of affairs at home and abroad and the strategies the teams had prepared in response. We summed up the following points as an overall strategy for the next stage of advancing national security and development. First, for overall national security, so that we can ensure the freedom, democracy, and human rights of the Taiwanese people, as well as the progress and development of the nation as we face various threats from authoritarian regimes, Taiwan must resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, strengthen self-sufficiency in national defense, and consolidate national defense. Taiwan must enhance economic resilience, maintain economic autonomy, and stand firm with other democracies as we deepen our strategic partnerships with like-minded countries. As I have said, “As authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must come closer in solidarity!” And so, in this new year, we will focus on the following three priorities: First, to demonstrate our resolve for national defense, we will continue to reform national defense, implement whole-of-society defense resilience, and prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. Second, to counter the threats to our national security from China’s united front tactics, attempts at infiltration, and cognitive warfare, we will continue with the reform of our legal framework for national security and expand the national security framework to boost societal resilience and foster unity within. Third, to seize opportunities in the restructuring of global supply chains and realignment of the economic order, we will continue advancing our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally, strengthening protections for high-tech, and collaborating with our friends and allies to build supply chains for global democracies. Everyone shares concern regarding Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. For these issues, I am proposing clear-cut national strategies. First, I will touch on Taiwan-US relations. Taiwan and the US have shared ideals and values, and are staunch partners within the democratic, free community. We are very grateful to President Donald Trump’s administration for their continued support for Taiwan after taking office. We are especially grateful for the US and Japan’s joint leaders’ statement reiterating “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community,” as well as their high level of concern regarding China’s threat to regional security. In fact, the Democratic Progressive Party government has worked very closely with President Trump ever since his first term in office, and has remained an international partner. The procurement of numerous key advanced arms, freedom of navigation critical for security and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and many assisted breakthroughs in international diplomacy were made possible during this time. Positioned in the first island chain and on the democratic world’s frontline countering authoritarianism, Taiwan is willing and will continue to work with the US at all levels as we pursue regional stability and prosperity, helping realize our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although changes in policy may occur these next few years, the mutual trust and close cooperation between Taiwan and Washington will steadfastly endure. On that, our citizens can rest assured. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, the US announced a total of 48 military sales to Taiwan over the past eight years amounting to US$26.265 billion. During President Trump’s first term, 22 sales were announced totaling US$18.763 billion. This greatly supported Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. On the foundation of our close cooperation with the past eight years’ two US administrations, Taiwan will continue to demonstrate our determination for self-defense, accelerate the bolstering of our national defense, and keep enhancing the depth and breadth of Taiwan-US security cooperation, along with all manner of institutional cooperation. In terms of bilateral economic cooperation, Taiwan has always been one of the US’s most reliable trade partners, as well as one of the most important cooperative partners of US companies in the global semiconductor industry. In the past few years, Taiwan has greatly increased both direct and indirect investment in the US. By 2024, investment surpassed US$100 billion, creating nearly 400,000 job opportunities. In 2023 and 2024, investment in the US accounted for over 40 percent of Taiwan’s overall foreign investment, far surpassing our investment in China. In fact, in 2023 and 2024, Taiwanese investment in China fell to 11 percent and 8 percent, respectively. The US is now Taiwan’s biggest investment target. Our government is now launching relevant plans in accordance with national development needs and the need to establish secure supply systems, and the Executive Yuan is taking comprehensive inventory of opportunities for Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation. Moving forward, close bilateral cooperation will allow us to expand US investment and procurement, facilitating balanced trade. Our government will also strengthen guidance and support for Taiwanese enterprises on increasing US investment, and promote the global expansion and growth of Taiwan’s industries. We will also boost Taiwan-US cooperation in tech development and manufacturing for AI and advanced semiconductors, and work together to maintain order in the semiconductor market, shaping a new era for our strategic economic partnership. Second, the development of our semiconductor industry. I want to emphasize that Taiwan, as one of the world’s most capable semiconductor manufacturing nations, is both willing and able to address new situations. With respect to President Trump’s concerns about our semiconductor industry, the government will act prudently, strengthen communications between Taiwan and the US, and promote greater mutual understanding. We will pay attention to the challenges arising from the situation and assist businesses in navigating them. In addition, we will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We are willing to collaborate with the US and our other democratic partners to develop more resilient and diversified semiconductor supply chains. Leveraging our strengths in cutting-edge semiconductors, we will form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. Through international cooperation, we will open up an entirely new era of growth in the semiconductor industry. As we face the various new policies of the Trump administration, we will continue to uphold a spirit of mutual benefit, and we will continue to communicate and negotiate closely with the US government. This will help the new administration’s team to better understand how Taiwan is an indispensable partner in the process of rebuilding American manufacturing and consolidating its leadership in high-tech, and that Taiwan-US cooperation will benefit us both. Third, cross-strait relations. Regarding the regional and cross-strait situation, Taiwan-US relations, US-China relations, and interactions among Taiwan, the US, and China are a focus of global attention. As a member of the international democratic community and a responsible member of the region, Taiwan hopes to see Taiwan-US relations continue to strengthen and, alongside US-China relations, form a virtuous cycle rather than a zero-sum game where one side’s gain is another side’s loss. In facing China, Taiwan will always be a responsible actor. We will neither yield nor provoke. We will remain resilient and composed, maintaining our consistent position on cross-strait relations: Our determination to safeguard our national sovereignty and protect our free and democratic way of life remains unchanged. Our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as our willingness to work alongside China in the pursuit of peace and mutual prosperity across the strait, remain unchanged. Our commitment to promoting healthy and orderly exchanges across the strait, choosing dialogue over confrontation, and advancing well-being for the peoples on both sides of the strait, under the principles of parity and dignity, remains unchanged. Regarding the matters I reported to the public today, I have instructed our national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches I just outlined. I have also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. My fellow citizens, over the past several years, Taiwan has weathered a global pandemic and faced global challenges, both political and economic, arising from the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Through it all, Taiwan has persevered; we have continued to develop our economy, bolster our national strength, and raise our international profile while garnering more support – all unprecedented achievements. This is all because Taiwan’s fate has never been decided by the external environment, but by the unity of the Taiwanese people and the resolve to never give up. A one-of-a-kind global situation is creating new strategic opportunities for our one-of-a-kind Taiwanese people, bringing new hope. Taiwan’s foundation is solid; its strength is great. So as long as everyone remains steadfast in their convictions, is willing to work hand in hand, stands firm amidst uncertainty, and looks for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of our time yet again, for I am confident that there are no difficulties that Taiwan cannot overcome. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 2024 – Level of financing reduced from previous year, expectations of future demand positive – Result EUR 228 million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Finnvera Group, Stock Exchange Release, 21 February 2025

    Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 2024

    Level of financing reduced from previous year, expectations of future demand positive – Result EUR 228 million

    Finnvera Group, summary 2024 (vs. 2023)

    • Result 228 MEUR (433) – The result for the period under review was strong for all business operations. Net interest income grew by 20% and net fee and commission income by 12%. During the period under review, Finnvera was able to partially reverse loss provisions for export credit guarantees and special guarantees, which have had a significant impact on the company’s result in recent years, especially those relating to cruise shipping companies. The reference period saw larger reversals of loss provisions than the period under review.
    • Result by business operations: Result of parent company Finnvera plc’s SME and midcap business stood at 23 MEUR (55) and that of Large Corporates business at 173 MEUR (351). The impact of Finnvera’s subsidiary, Finnish Export Credit Ltd, on the Group’s result was 32 MEUR (27).
    • The cumulative self-sustainability target set for Finnvera’s operations was achieved.
    • The balance sheet total EUR 14.8 bn (14.3) increased by 3%.
    • Contingent liabilities decreased by 9% and stood at EUR 14.9 bn (16.4).
    • Non-restricted equity and the assets of the State Guarantee Fund, which provide the Group’s reserves for covering potential future losses, increased by 12% and totalled EUR 2.1 bn (1.9).
    • Expected credit losses on the balance sheet were reduced by 4% to EUR 1.1 bn (1.2).
    • The NPS index (Net Promoter Score) used to measure client satisfaction improved by 15 points to 79 (64).
    • Outlook for 2025: The business outlook for cruise shipping companies continued to improve in 2024. The credit loss risk of export financing liabilities remains high, however, which causes uncertainty concerning the Finnvera Group’s financial performance in 2025.
    Finnvera Group, year 2024 (vs. 2023)
    Result
    228 MEUR
    (433), change -47%    		 Balance sheet total
    EUR 14.8 bn
    (14.3), change 3%
    Contingent liabilities
    EUR 14.9 bn
    (16.4), change -9%    		 Non-restricted equity and
    the assets of The State Guarantee Fund
    EUR 2.1 bn (1.9), change 12%
    Expense-income ratio
    17.3%
    (19.4), change -2,1 pp    		 NPS index
    (net promoter score)
    79
    (64), change 15 points

    Comments from CEO Juuso Heinilä: 

    “Year 2024 was challenging for the Finnish economy, even if a cautious improvement could be observed in the early part of the year. Finland’s key export markets were also affected by a downturn, which dampened Finnish export companies’ prospects. While interest rates dropped and inflation decreased, geopolitical uncertainty persisted.

    Finnvera granted EUR 0.9 billion (1.8) in domestic loans and guarantees in 2024. The significant decrease in financing from the previous year is due to a major individual amount of working capital financing granted to a large corporate in the reference period. The level of SME and midcap financing was similar to the reference period. The largest share of funding by sector was granted to industry, and the regional drivers were the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and Lapland. Financing for investments did not reach the previous year’s level. The level of financing for corporate acquisitions and transfers of ownership was also lower than in previous years.

    A total of EUR 73 million (36) was granted in climate and digitalisation loans intended for green transition and digitalisation projects under the InvestEU guarantee programme. These loans were first granted in June 2023. To ensure that companies of all sizes have access to financing, we launched loans for micro-enterprises’ growth as a pilot project at the beginning of October 2024. Over three months, EUR 6 million in these loans was granted to micro-enterprises. The pilot project will continue until the end of March 2025, after which we will reassess the availability of financing for small companies.

    In accordance with Finnvera’s strategy, 92% of domestic financing was allocated to start-ups, SMEs seeking growth and internationalisation, investments, transfers of ownership, export and delivery projects, and SME guarantee projects. The long period of economic uncertainty eroded SMEs’ liquidity and increased the number of applications for corporate restructuring and bankruptcy.

    Finnvera granted export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees amounting to EUR 2.9 billion (5.4). The lower amount of export financing reflected the post-cyclical nature of Finnish exports and reduced demand for exports. Annual fluctuations are also always influenced by the timing of large individual export transactions. In particular, financing was granted to companies in the telecommunications, cruise shipping and mining sectors.

    Largest export credit guarantee agreement related to telecommunications sector in Finnvera’s history was signed in April concerning Nokia’s deliveries for the Indian 5G network worth USD 1.5 billion. In the mining sector, we financed Sibanye-Stillwater’s Keliber lithium project with a Finance Guarantee, which can be granted for domestic investments that support exports. In the energy sector, we financed Wärtsilä’s deliveries of energy storage systems for solar and wind power projects in the United States and Chile. These mining and energy projects, whose total value was approx. EUR 500 million, were the first export financing projects compliant with Finnvera’s climate criteria. Towards the end of the year, Finnvera participated in Meyer Turku’s construction financing that amounted to around EUR 1 billion for the Icon 3 ship.

    Finnish Export Credit Ltd, which is Finnvera’s subsidiary, granted EUR 0.6 billion in export credits (0.5) in 2024. While the demand for export credits increased slightly, it remains significantly lower than in pre-pandemic years. An increasing number of export transactions are financed by a bank to which Finnvera grants a guarantee.

    2024 was a successful year for Finnvera. The Finnvera Group’s result was EUR 228 million (433). The SME and midcap business, export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations, and subsidiary Finnish Export Credit Ltd turned a profit. Finnvera also built up its reserves for possible future losses. The business outlook for the cruise shipping sector, which is important for Finnvera’s export credit guarantee exposure, has continued to improve. Repayments have also helped to reduce exposure relating to Russia. In recent years, Finnvera has been able to partially reverse loss provisions for export financing, which have had a significant impact on the Group’s financial performance since 2020. The reversal of loss provisions has especially impacted the good results for the last two financial periods.

    As a result of crises affecting the global economy, the difficulties faced by some companies around the world and in various sectors have built up to form an insurmountable obstacle. During the period under review, Finnvera incurred major export credit guarantee losses in two cases. Our mission is to bear the risks of export companies. Our core business enjoys a high level of profitability, building up our reserves and creating preconditions for enabling companies’ growth and exports. However, the credit loss risks of exposure relating to export financing remain high, which may affect Finnvera’s future financial performance and reserves.

    We continued to develop our operations and services in line with our strategy in 2024. The ongoing upgrade of our basic information systems supports the digitalisation of services and a good client experience. Our client satisfaction reached an exceptionally high level, as did our personnel satisfaction. We invested in accelerating the growth of midcap enterprises in close cooperation with the European Investment Bank and the Tesi Group, and worked together with the Team Finland network and Business Finland to promote exports. We maintained export financing expertise, especially in SMEs and midcap enterprises, and we brought out new export financing instruments to ensure the availability of financing. The overhaul of the legislation applicable to Finnvera, which is included in the Government Programme and which is extremely important in terms of developing Finnvera’s operations and the competitiveness of export financing, was circulated for comments.

    We advanced our sustainability measures based on our goals in 2024. We joined the Net-Zero ECA Alliance of export credit agencies, which enables us to focus on the sustainability theme and enhance our impact through international cooperation. We developed Finnvera’s sustainability reporting as planned.

    In 2025–2028, our new strategy adopted by the company’s Board of Directors at the end of the year will emphasise increasing the volume of Finnish exports and the number of exporters as well as enabling growth and new business. The achievement of these goals will be supported by our competent personnel and management as well as client-oriented digitalisation. Finnvera contributes to ensuring that Finnish companies are able to invest, develop their products and get their products out around the world. This is a prerequisite for ensuring that we can continue to look after our welfare in Finland in the future.”

    Finnvera Group Financing granted, EUR bn 2024 2023 Change, %
    Domestic loans and guarantees 0.9 1.8 -51%
    Export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees 2.9 5.4 -47%
    Export credits 0.6 0.5 15%
    The fluctuation in the amount of granted financing is influenced by the timing of individual major financing cases.

    The credit risk for the subsidiary Finnish Export Credit Ltd’s export credits is covered by the parent company Finnvera plc’s export credit guarantee.
    Exposure, EUR bn 31 Dec 2024 31 Dec 2023 Change, %
    Domestic loans and guarantees 2.9 3.0 -4%
    Export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees 21.1 23.4 -10%
    – Drawn exposure 14.3 14.2 1%
    – Undrawn exposure 4.4 4.5 -2%
    – Binding offers 2.4 4.7 -49%
    Parent company’s total exposure 24.0 26.4 -9%
    Contract portfolio of export credits 10.2 11.0 -8%
    – Drawn exposure 6.5 7.3 -11%
    – Undrawn exposure 3.7 3.7 -2%
    The exposure includes binding credit commitments as well as recovery and guarantee receivables.

    Financial performance 

    The Finnvera Group’s result for 2024 was EUR 228 million (433). Finnvera’s result was strong for all business operations. EUR 46 million of the total result was generated in the last quarter of the year, and EUR 182 million between January and September. Compared to the year before, the result was most significantly affected by the changes in the amount of expected losses, or loss provisions. Loss provisions have had a significant impact on the Group’s result in recent years. Finnvera was able to partially reverse its loss provisions for export credit guarantees and special guarantees in 2024, especially those relating to cruise shipping companies. In the reference period, Finnvera was able to reverse more loss provisions than in the review period, which led to an exceptionally good result in 2023. The result for the review period was also significantly affected by higher net interest income and fee and commission income as well as changes in the value of items recognised at fair value through profit or loss.

    The Group’s realised credit losses and change in expected losses totalled EUR 49 million during the review period, whereas the corresponding item was positive with a value of EUR 210 million during the reference period. The realised credit losses of EUR 121 million (128) were slightly lower than in the reference period. During the period under review, two larger individual export credit guarantee compensations were paid. Expected losses, or loss provisions, decreased by EUR 51 million (320), of which the reversal of loss provisions for export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations accounted for EUR 74 million (376). Credit loss compensation from the State covering losses in domestic financing totalled EUR 20 million (18).

    Compared to the year before, the Group’s net interest income increased by 20% to EUR 139 million (115) and net fee and commission income by 12% to EUR 198 million (177). The higher level of market interest rates was a particularly important factor affecting the increased net interest income. The most significant factors increasing the net fee and commission income were recognition of guarantee premiums for reimbursed export and special guarantees and prepayments of individual liabilities as well as the reimbursement of insurance premiums received as a result of the cancellation of reinsurance contracts. The changes in the Group’s value of items recognised at fair value through profit or loss and net income from foreign currency operations amounted to EUR 8 million (-9).

    After the result of the period under review, the parent company’s reserves for domestic operations as well as export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations for covering potential future losses amounted to a total of EUR 1,878 million (1,676) at the end of December. These reserves, which also cover the credit risk of export credits granted by the subsidiary, consisted of the following: the reserve for domestic operations, EUR 432 million (405) as well as the reserve for export credit guarantees and special guarantees and the assets of the State Guarantee Fund for covering losses, totalling EUR 1,446 million (1,272). The State Guarantee Fund is an off-budget fund whose assets include the assets accumulated from the activities of Finnvera’s predecessor organisations. Under the Act on the State Guarantee Fund, the Fund covers the result showing a loss in the export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations if the reserve funds in the company’s balance sheet are not sufficient. The non-restricted equity of the subsidiary, Finnish Export Credit Ltd, amounted to EUR 230 million (198) at the end of December.

    Finnvera Group
    Financial performance    		 2024
    MEUR    		 2023
    MEUR    		 Change
    %    		 Q4/2024
    MEUR    		 Q4/2023
    MEUR    		 Change
    %
    Net interest income 139 115 20% 37 33 10%
    Net fee and commission income 198 177 12% 50 40 24%
    Gains and losses from financial instruments carried at fair value through P&L and foreign exchange gains and losses 8 -9 – -2 -5 -54%
    Net income from investments and other operating income 0 1 -95% 0 0 -23%
    Operational expenses -53 -50 6% -16 -14 12%
    Other operating expenses, depreciation and amortisation -7 -5 35% -3 -1 118%
    Realised credit losses and change in expected credit losses, net -49 210 – -19 209 –
    Operating result 236 439 -46% 47 262 -82%
    Income tax -8 -6 45% -1 -1 4%
    Result 228 433 -47% 46 261 -82%

    Outlook for financing 

    The worst of the recession is behind us, and the Finnish economy is forecast to start growing in 2025. Great expectations are currently placed on the improved outlook for exports as well as the growth and renewal of the entire business sector.

    We expect that the demand for Finnvera’s domestic financing will increase, including more and more financing for investments, as the economic upturn drives a need for more production capacity. Due to the long-standing uncertainty, the economic position of many companies is weak. Finnvera’s role is stressed in arranging financing and sharing the risk with other providers of financing.

    We encourage companies to grasp the growth opportunities created by the green transition with the help of our climate and digitalisation loans and other incentives for sustainable financing. We will continue piloting loans for micro-enterprises’ growth projects until the end of March 2025. While we expect the high demand for the loans to continue, we will reassess small companies’ access to financing after the conclusion of the pilot. Finnvera strives to be active wherever our input is needed to arrange access to financing.

    We expect that the demand for export credit guarantees will start growing in 2025 and that this growth will continue in 2026. Exportation of investment goods, which is vital for Finland’s exports, is post-cyclical and the increase in demand will be reflected in export credit guarantees granted by Finnvera with a delay. Positive signs can already be seen in several sectors, however. Finnvera plays an important role in granting guarantees for long-term trade. We encourage export companies to seek growth in emerging and new markets and to rely on Finnvera for financing export transactions and risk hedging. We will continue to grant export credit guarantees to Ukraine as part of Finland’s national reconstruction programme for the country.

    Finnvera, the Tesi Group and Business Finland will step up their cooperation with the goal of boosting companies’ growth, exports, and the impact of financing. We will continue to work actively together with Team Finland and promote the growth and internationalisation of companies, also while the renewal of public export functions is underway. Finnvera’s Trade Facilitators strive to bring together foreign buyers and Finnish exporters and to promote trade using Finnvera’s export financing together with Business Finland. The aims also include increasing the number of midcap enterprises in Finland.

    Outlook for 2025

    The business outlook for cruise shipping companies continued to improve in 2024. The credit loss risk of export financing liabilities remains high, however, which causes uncertainty concerning the Finnvera Group’s financial performance in 2025.

    Further information:

    Juuso Heinilä, CEO, tel. +358 29 460 2576

    Ulla Hagman, CFO, tel. +358 29 460 2458

    Finnvera publishes the Report of the Board of Directors and its financial statements as an XHTML file compliant with the European Single Electronic Format (ESEF) requirements. Auditor Ernst & Young Ltd has issued an independent assurance report that provides reasonable assurance concerning Finnvera’s ESEF financial statements. The XHTML file is available in Finnish and English. Finnvera additionally publishes the report and financial statements in PDF format.

    ESEF Report 2024 (ZIP)

    Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 1 January – 31 December 2024 (PDF)

    Distribution: NASDAQ Helsinki Ltd, London Stock Exchange, key media, www.finnvera.fi

    The report is available in Finnish and English at www.finnvera.fi/financial_reports

    Attachments

    • 743700T69OBBJO7TCA15-2024-12-31-0-en
    • Finnvera-Group-Report-of-the-Board-of-Directors-and-Financial-Statements-2024

    The MIL Network –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Universities – University of Auckland unveils its world-class Recreation Centre Hiwa – UoA

    Source: University of Auckland (UoA)

    The University of Auckland’s new recreation centre was formally opened on 21 February by Hon Chris Bishop, Minister for Infrastructure and Associate Minister for Sport and Recreation, and the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Auckland, Professor Dawn Freshwater.

    The eight-storey building, complete with rooftop turf, pool, and state-of-the-art sports halls, is being used by staff, students and the public as part of the University’s concerted focus on balancing well-being with academia.

    The centre’s name Hiwa, gifted by Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei, means ‘vigorous, active, robust and sound’, reflecting the University’s aspirations for growth and well-being. The 26,000 sq m facility covers a space equivalent to roughly 3.7 rugby pitches or 100 standard tennis courts and is located on Symonds Street in the heart of Auckland.

    With an innovative vertically ‘stacked’ design, it centralises the University’s sport and recreation services into a single premises, overcoming the spatial constraints of its central city location.

    Features include a premier rooftop multi-sport turf and two sports halls with the southern hemisphere’s first glass sports floor with integrated LED markings to accommodate six different sports. It also holds capacity for 1,500 spectators, a running track, an eight-lane 33-metre lap pool, a dive tank, spa and sauna, climbing wall, group exercise studios, combat sports studio and expansive cardio and weights areas that make it one of the largest gym fit-outs in the southern hemisphere.

    Hiwa serves as a vibrant community hub, offering a café, social spaces and versatile indoor and outdoor areas for various activities. The University’s physical education programmes and exercise science students will also use the facility.

    Vice-Chancellor Professor Dawn Freshwater says the opening of Hiwa is a huge milestone for the University following comprehensive planning for a new recreation centre, spanning a decade. She says the investment in Hiwa further enhances the University of Auckland’s position as New Zealand’s pre-eminent, research-led higher education institution.

    “We are delighted to open the doors to this wonderful facility to bolster the world-class education our students receive and enhance the well-being of the wider community.

    “It’s an important hub for our growing University population and an asset for Auckland. Our community has long desired sport and recreation facilities that befit the world-class campus environment expected of Aotearoa New Zealand’s leading university.”

    She said campus experiences, especially in sport and recreation, are known to enhance student success.

    “Staff will also have more opportunity to pursue their health and well-being goals, and through public memberships and collaboration with the sport and recreation sector, we hope to positively impact the wider Auckland community.”

    As a focal point on campus, Hiwa Recreation Centre is designed to enrich campus life by connecting learning, sporting and social facilities.

    The building was designed by Warren and Mahoney in partnership with MJMA Architecture and Design, and constructed by Hawkins, in consultation with Rider Levett Bucknall, Beca and Colliers.

    It is the most multi-faceted building on campus, requiring 500 workers on site at the peak of construction. The University’s Chief Property Officer Simon Neale says Hiwa Recreation Centre is the most complex build the University has ever undertaken.

    “The project was not without its challenges, being delivered through one of the most challenging periods for the construction industry in New Zealand. The consultant and construction team masterfully navigated the Covid pandemic, supply-chain issues, moving 40-tonne trusses and vast pre-cast concrete beams for the pool hall roof overnight and at weekends.

    “But thousands of people and many businesses helped us deliver this significant project for the University, with a strong ethos of partnership between all those involved enabling us to overcome the challenges and to deliver an outstanding facility which will support the health and well-being of our student and staff communities, and high-performance sport, for many years to come.”

    Memberships are available to students, staff and members of the public. Casual visitors are also welcome.

    As well as the minister, guests at the official launch included Mayor Wayne Brown, Deputy Mayor Desley Simpson, Sports NZ CEO Raelene Castle and Eden Park CEO Nick Sautner.

    Bishop said as the former sports minister he had been to a number of sports facilities around the world, and Hiwa was “genuinely quite something. This is a remarkable facility for the university, but also for the city, and the whole country.”

    Simpson said she was blown away by the new recreation centre. “We know Auckland needs assets like this, but this is truly international class.”

    The event began with an elite diving demonstration for the Minister by engineering student and Commonwealth Games diver Frazer Tavener, and concluded with a shortened seven-aside netball match between the Vice-Chancellor’s Invitational Seven, which included Minister Bishop, and a Sport and Recreation Seven, which featured alumna and former Silver Fern Sulu Fitzpatrick.

    Fitzpatrick also spoke during the formalities, ahead of the plaque unveiling. She said: “The magnitude and the quality of this facility will make not only top athletes better for the world stage, but allow students and staff members to be happier and healthier, which will contribute to a better New Zealand. It’s exciting.”

    About Hiwa, Recreation Centre
    Hiwa, Recreation Centre is a showpiece for the University of Auckland and reflects the importance the University places on student and staff health and well-being. It significantly enhances the campus experience for students and staff, offering a state-of-the-art gym, sports centre and social hub, balancing health and relaxation with academia. It also offers gym memberships to Auckland residents and provides an additional recreational space for community outreach.

    Hiwa opened on 25 November 2024 (following a dawn blessing on 20 November) and is now operational.

    The official opening by the Vice-Chancellor Professor Dawn Freshwater and Hon Chris Bishop, Minister for Infrastructure and Associate Minister for Sport and Recreation, took place on Friday 21 February.

    Hiwa facts and figures

    Hiwa is a world-class facility for students, staff and the wider community to play sport, keep fit, have fun and socialise and get the most out of their time at Waipapa Taumata Rau, University of Auckland.
    Sport and recreation play a vital role in health and well-being. Hiwa befits a global university, meeting the national and international expectations of students.
    Hiwa is a 26,000 sqm facility, covering a space equivalent to 100 standard tennis courts or 20 Olympic-sized swimming pools. Spread across eight levels, its innovative design overcomes the spatial challenges of a central city location.
    It has a unique inner-city rooftop multi-sport turf and track, and two sports halls with the southern hemisphere’s first glass floor, accommodating six different sports.
    Hiwa includes an eight-lane pool, dive tank, spa and sauna, bouldering wall, and is one of the largest gym fit-outs in the southern hemisphere.  
    As well as the fitness facilities, it serves as a community hub, with a café, and indoor and outdoor multi-purpose spaces.
    While Hiwa is primarily for students and staff, Hiwa has reinvigorated the city centre. The University recognises Auckland’s need for quality sports facilities and will be working to support the wider sports sector and contribute to making Auckland a world-class city.
    The University’s physical education programmes and exercise science students will also use the facility.  

     
    FAQs
    What does Hiwa mean?
    The Hiwa name, gifted to the University by Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei, means ‘vigorous (of growth), active, robust, sound’. It has multiple synergies with the recreation centre and its place at the heart of our University community.
     
    How much did the new building cost?  
    The sum approved in the University Estate Strategy for the full programme was $320m, which covered demolition and clearance of the site, ground works, temporary facilities for use during construction and the design and construction costs themselves. Final costs will not be known until later this year at which time the overall position will be compiled.
     
    How can the University afford this?
    Hiwa is the culmination of decades of planning and more than half of the funding for its construction comes from past and present student levies. The former student facilities levy and the current Compulsory Student Services Fee is paid by all students to contribute to student support services and can only be spent on student initiatives.
     
    Why is Hiwa needed?  
    Health and well-being are vital to the success of our students. Research shows that participation in sport, leisure, clubs, societies and fitness activities increases retention and translates into better academic performance among students, as well as a greater sense of community, social connection and belonging. World-class facilities attract high-quality students and academic talent and enhance the University’s relationship with the Auckland community.
     
    The University of Auckland believes this is an investment in the well-being not only of our 46,000 students but of our wider community. Providing world-leading sports and recreation facilities will further enhance the reputation, visibility and attractiveness of Auckland as a premier city in which to study and live.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump is ruling like a ‘king’, following the Putin model. How can he be stopped?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By William Partlett, Associate Professor of Public Law, The University of Melbourne

    A month in, and it is clear even to conservatives that US President Donald Trump is attempting to fundamentally reshape the role of the American president.

    Trump and his supporters sees the natural authority of the American president in broad terms, similar to those of the Russian president, or a king. Trump, in fact, has already likened himself to a king.

    This desire to “Russify” the presidency is not an accident: Trump and many of his supporters admire the king-like power that Vladimir Putin exercises as Russian president.

    Understanding how Trump is attempting to transform presidential power is key to mobilising in the most effective way to stop it.

    Decrees by a ‘king’

    Russia’s system of government is what I call a “crown-presidential” system, which makes the president a kind of elected king.

    Two powers are central to this role.

    First, like a king, the Russian “crown-president” does not rely on an elected legislature to make policy. Instead, Putin exercises policy-making authority unilaterally via decree.

    Putin has used decrees to wage wars, privatise the economy and even to amend the constitution to lay claim to the parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia since 2014.

    He has also used these decrees in a performative way, for example, by declaring pay raises for all Russian state employees without any ability to enforce it.

    Over the last month, Trump has made similar use of decrees (what the White House now terms “presidential actions”).

    He has issued scores of presidential decrees to unilaterally reshape vast swathes of American policy – far more than past presidents. Trump sees these orders as a way of both exercising and demonstrating his vast presidential power.

    Control over the bureaucracy

    Second, like a king, Putin does not allow the Russian legislature to use the law to organise the executive branch and create agencies independent of presidential control. Instead, he has unquestioned dominance over both the organisation and staffing of the executive branch. This has given him vast power to dominate politics by controlling information gathering and legal prosecutions.

    A similar push is underway in the United States. Trump has appointed key loyalists to head the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    Moreover, he is seeking to restructure the executive branch by abolishing some agencies altogether and vastly reducing the size of the workforce in others.

    Can the courts stop Trump?

    Trump’s attempt to Russify the American presidency undermines the American constitutional order.

    Courts are the natural “first responders” in this kind of crisis. And many courts have blocked some of Trump’s early decrees.

    This legal response is important. But it is not enough on it own.

    First, the US Supreme Court might be more willing to accept this expansion of presidential power than lower courts. In a ruling last year, for example, the court granted the president immunity from criminal prosecution, showing itself to be sympathetic to broad understandings of executive power.

    Second, presidential decrees can be easily withdrawn and modified. This can allow Trump and his legal team to recalibrate as his decrees are challenged and find the best test cases to take to the Supreme Court.

    Third, parts of the conservative right have long argued for a far more powerful president. For instance, the idea of a “unitary executive” has been discussed in conservative circles for years. This essentially claims that the president should be able to direct and control the entire executive branch, from the bureaucracy to prosecutors to the FBI.

    These arguments are already being made to justify Trump’s actions. As Elon Musk has said, “you could not ask for a stronger mandate from the public” to reform the executive branch. These arguments will be made to courts to justify Trump’s expansion of power.

    Fourth, even if the Supreme Court does block some decrees, it is possible the White House will simply ignore these actions. We had an early glimpse of this when Trump posted that “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law”.

    Vice President JD Vance has also said judges “aren’t allowed” to block the president’s “legitimate power”.

    The importance of political mobilisation and messaging

    Trump’s aggressive use of presidential power is not just a constitutional crisis, it is a political one. For those seeking to resist, this is too important to just be left to the courts; it must also involve America’s key political institutions.

    The most obvious place to start is in Congress. Lawmakers must act decisively to assert the legal power granted to them in the constitution to check the power of the presidency. This would include active Congressional use of its budgeting power, as well as its oversight powers on the presidency.

    This could happen now if a few Republicans were to take a principled position on important constitutional issues, though nearly all have so far preferred to fall in line. Democrats could retake both branches of Congress in the midterm elections in 2026, though, and assert this power.

    The states can and should also act to resist this expansion of presidential power. This action could take many forms, including refusing to deploy their traditional police powers to enforce decrees they view to be unconstitutional or unlawful.

    In mobilising to defend the constitution, these institutions could appeal to the American people with more than the narrow legal argument that Trump’s acts are unconstitutional. They could also make the broader political argument that turning the American president into a Russian-style, elected king will foster a form of inefficient, unresponsive and corrupt politics.

    Or, in the words of The New York Times columnist Ezra Klein, “it’s the corruption, stupid”.

    Time is of the essence. Russia shows the more time a “crown-president” is able to operate, the more entrenched this system becomes. For those hoping to preserve American democracy, the time is now for not just legal, but political resistance.

    William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump is ruling like a ‘king’, following the Putin model. How can he be stopped? – https://theconversation.com/trump-is-ruling-like-a-king-following-the-putin-model-how-can-he-be-stopped-249721

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump is ruling like a ‘king’, following the Putin model. How can he be stopped?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By William Partlett, Associate Professor of Public Law, The University of Melbourne

    A month in, and it is clear even to conservatives that US President Donald Trump is attempting to fundamentally reshape the role of the American president.

    Trump and his supporters sees the natural authority of the American president in broad terms, similar to those of the Russian president, or a king. Trump, in fact, has already likened himself to a king.

    This desire to “Russify” the presidency is not an accident: Trump and many of his supporters admire the king-like power that Vladimir Putin exercises as Russian president.

    Understanding how Trump is attempting to transform presidential power is key to mobilising in the most effective way to stop it.

    Decrees by a ‘king’

    Russia’s system of government is what I call a “crown-presidential” system, which makes the president a kind of elected king.

    Two powers are central to this role.

    First, like a king, the Russian “crown-president” does not rely on an elected legislature to make policy. Instead, Putin exercises policy-making authority unilaterally via decree.

    Putin has used decrees to wage wars, privatise the economy and even to amend the constitution to lay claim to the parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia since 2014.

    He has also used these decrees in a performative way, for example, by declaring pay raises for all Russian state employees without any ability to enforce it.

    Over the last month, Trump has made similar use of decrees (what the White House now terms “presidential actions”).

    He has issued scores of presidential decrees to unilaterally reshape vast swathes of American policy – far more than past presidents. Trump sees these orders as a way of both exercising and demonstrating his vast presidential power.

    Control over the bureaucracy

    Second, like a king, Putin does not allow the Russian legislature to use the law to organise the executive branch and create agencies independent of presidential control. Instead, he has unquestioned dominance over both the organisation and staffing of the executive branch. This has given him vast power to dominate politics by controlling information gathering and legal prosecutions.

    A similar push is underway in the United States. Trump has appointed key loyalists to head the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

    Moreover, he is seeking to restructure the executive branch by abolishing some agencies altogether and vastly reducing the size of the workforce in others.

    Can the courts stop Trump?

    Trump’s attempt to Russify the American presidency undermines the American constitutional order.

    Courts are the natural “first responders” in this kind of crisis. And many courts have blocked some of Trump’s early decrees.

    This legal response is important. But it is not enough on it own.

    First, the US Supreme Court might be more willing to accept this expansion of presidential power than lower courts. In a ruling last year, for example, the court granted the president immunity from criminal prosecution, showing itself to be sympathetic to broad understandings of executive power.

    Second, presidential decrees can be easily withdrawn and modified. This can allow Trump and his legal team to recalibrate as his decrees are challenged and find the best test cases to take to the Supreme Court.

    Third, parts of the conservative right have long argued for a far more powerful president. For instance, the idea of a “unitary executive” has been discussed in conservative circles for years. This essentially claims that the president should be able to direct and control the entire executive branch, from the bureaucracy to prosecutors to the FBI.

    These arguments are already being made to justify Trump’s actions. As Elon Musk has said, “you could not ask for a stronger mandate from the public” to reform the executive branch. These arguments will be made to courts to justify Trump’s expansion of power.

    Fourth, even if the Supreme Court does block some decrees, it is possible the White House will simply ignore these actions. We had an early glimpse of this when Trump posted that “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law”.

    Vice President JD Vance has also said judges “aren’t allowed” to block the president’s “legitimate power”.

    The importance of political mobilisation and messaging

    Trump’s aggressive use of presidential power is not just a constitutional crisis, it is a political one. For those seeking to resist, this is too important to just be left to the courts; it must also involve America’s key political institutions.

    The most obvious place to start is in Congress. Lawmakers must act decisively to assert the legal power granted to them in the constitution to check the power of the presidency. This would include active Congressional use of its budgeting power, as well as its oversight powers on the presidency.

    This could happen now if a few Republicans were to take a principled position on important constitutional issues, though nearly all have so far preferred to fall in line. Democrats could retake both branches of Congress in the midterm elections in 2026, though, and assert this power.

    The states can and should also act to resist this expansion of presidential power. This action could take many forms, including refusing to deploy their traditional police powers to enforce decrees they view to be unconstitutional or unlawful.

    In mobilising to defend the constitution, these institutions could appeal to the American people with more than the narrow legal argument that Trump’s acts are unconstitutional. They could also make the broader political argument that turning the American president into a Russian-style, elected king will foster a form of inefficient, unresponsive and corrupt politics.

    Or, in the words of The New York Times columnist Ezra Klein, “it’s the corruption, stupid”.

    Time is of the essence. Russia shows the more time a “crown-president” is able to operate, the more entrenched this system becomes. For those hoping to preserve American democracy, the time is now for not just legal, but political resistance.

    William Partlett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump is ruling like a ‘king’, following the Putin model. How can he be stopped? – https://theconversation.com/trump-is-ruling-like-a-king-following-the-putin-model-how-can-he-be-stopped-249721

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Statement on Meeting with CDC Nominee Dave Weldon, RFK Plotting to Overthrow Vaccine Advisory Committees

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), a senior member and former Chair of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (HELP), released the following statement in response to her meeting with Dr. David “Dave” Weldon, President Donald Trump’s nominee to be Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and news reports that HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is preparing to remove members of the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, which plays a key role in setting vaccine policy.

    “In our meeting today, I pressed Dr. Weldon on his longstanding vaccine skepticism and whether he would make changes to the membership of the CDC’s vaccine advisory panel. He said he had no intention of getting rid of anyone. Yet just hours later, there is new reporting that RFK Jr. may upend the advisory committees that make important recommendations on vaccine approvals and coverage—and replace experts with dangerous anti-vaxxers. I have very little confidence that Dr. Weldon will stand up to RFK Jr.—not only has Dr. Weldon spent years promoting the false conspiracy that vaccines cause autism, but he has also criticized the CDC’s essential role in vaccine safety research.

    “Additionally, I remain deeply concerned by Dr. Weldon’s history of peddling inflammatory and medically debunked anti-abortion rhetoric and past legislative efforts, which have put the lives and health of countless women in danger.”

    Senator Murray further called on Republicans who said they were voting for RFK Jr. despite concerns over his anti-vaccine record to join her in speaking out and demanding RFK Jr. abandon any plans that would undermine vaccine access, like overthrowing the experts on CDC’s advisory committee.

    “Let’s not mince words here: the state of public health infrastructure in America is in a deeply precarious state. Thousands of researchers and public health experts have already been culled from the government by Elon Musk and RFK Jr. Now, we are hearing that while communities across the country are in desperate need of steady, science-based leadership to help protect families from measles outbreaks, tuberculosis, and the threat of bird flu—RFK Jr. is plotting to overthrow CDC’s vaccine advisory board. That is as alarming as it gets.

    “To every Republican who voted for this man because they believed, in spite of his record, RFK Jr. would not undermine vaccines: now—right now—is the time to speak up and hold RFK Jr. accountable. It is irresponsible to stay silent until after RFK Jr. follows through on this dangerous idea, and vaccines are already undermined. We all know perfectly well what is at stake here—so I desperately hope they will join me in finding the biggest microphone they can and demand RFK Jr. completely abandon any plans that will undermine access to vaccines.”

    As a longtime appropriator and former Chair of the Senate HELP Committee, Murray has long fought to boost biomedical research, strengthen public health infrastructure, and make health care more affordable and accessible. Over her years as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, she has secured billions of dollars in increases for biomedical research at the National Institutes of Health, and during her time as Chair of the HELP Committee she established the new ARPA-H research agency as part of her PREVENT Pandemics Act to advance some of the most cutting-edge research in the field. As Chair of the HELP Committee, Murray was also instrumental in crafting the American Rescue Plan Act, including its landmark investments in public health and health care. Senator Murray was also the lead Democratic negotiator of the bipartisan 21st Century Cures Act, which delivered a major federal investment to boost NIH research, among many other investments. Murray is also the lead sponsor of the Public Health Infrastructure Saves Lives Act (PHISLA), legislation to establish $4.5 billion in dedicated, annual funding for a grant program to build up and maintain the nation’s public health system across the board. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Dental patients to benefit from 700,000 extra urgent appointments

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Government delivers on its manifesto commitment to roll out extra urgent appointments across the country

    • Government delivers on its manifesto commitment to roll out extra urgent appointments across the country  
    • “Dental deserts” where patients struggle to get appointments targeted
    • Plans mark first step towards rebuilding NHS dentistry – with government also set to deliver supervised toothbrushing to improve children’s oral health

    Hundreds of thousands of people across England will soon be able to access urgent and emergency dental care as the government and NHS rolls out 700,000 extra urgent appointments, Health Minister Stephen Kinnock announced today (Friday 21 February). 

    Delivering on the government’s manifesto pledge, NHS England has today written to integrated care boards (ICB) across the country, directing health chiefs in each region to stand up thousands of urgent appointments over the next year.  

    Access to NHS dentistry is increasingly a lottery across the country. Statistics from the GP Patient Survey 2024 show that around 1 in 4 patients who tried to see an NHS dentist in the past two years were unable to do so.

    This has led to desperate scenes across the country, such as at St Paul’s Dental Practice in Bristol, where hundreds of patients gathered outside in the hope of seeing an NHS dentist and police had to intervene to manage the queue when the practice re-opened in February 2024.

    Previous interventions have failed to address the crisis in NHS dentistry. For example, the new patient premium – introduced as part of the dental recovery plan published in 2024 – revealed to have cost £88 million but with no impact for patients.

    Data published last week showed the number of new patients accessing NHS dentists has actually fallen by 3% since the scheme was introduced.

    This government has confirmed it will be scrapping the new patient premium, and today sees it already begin the work of rolling out new appointments across the country.

    As part of the government’s manifesto commitment, the extra appointments will be available from April and have been targeted at dental deserts – areas where patients particularly struggle to access NHS dentists. This includes parts of the East of England, such as Norfolk and Waveney, where there are just 31 NHS dentists respectively for every 100,000 people – way below the national average.

    The announcement marks the start of the government and NHS delivering on the manifesto pledge to provide 700,000 extra urgent and emergency dental appointments to address the crisis in NHS dentistry. 

    Stephen Kinnock, Minister of State for Care said:  

    “We promised we would end the misery faced by hundreds of thousands of people unable to get urgent dental care. Today we’re starting to deliver on that commitment.  

    “NHS dentistry has been left broken after years of neglect , with patients left in pain without appointments, or queueing around the block just to be seen.

    “Through our Plan for Change, this government will rebuild dentistry – focusing on prevention, retention of NHS dentists and reforming the NHS contract to make NHS work more appealing to dentists and increase capacity for more patients. This will take time, but today marks an important step towards getting NHS dentistry back on its feet.” 

    Each ICB has a target of urgent appointments to roll out, based on estimated local levels of unmet need for urgent NHS care. Levels of unmet need are calculated by measures including looking at how many people tried and failed to get an NHS dentist appointment. 

    These extra appointments will be for patients who are likely to be in pain – including those suffering from infections or needing urgent repairs to a bridge – and require urgent treatment. NHS commissioners will be working fast to secure these extra appointments this year, with appointments to start coming online from April. Patients will be able to access these appointments by contacting their usual dental practice or calling NHS 111 if they don’t have a regular dentist or need help out-of-hours.

    The plans are the first step towards securing more urgent care for patients over the longer term and will allow for more a more fundamental reform of urgent dental care provision. 

    Jason Wong, Chief Dental Officer for England said:

    “Dentists are working hard to help as many patients as possible but too many people experience difficulties in accessing NHS dental services.

    “It is vital that we do more to improve access – we are working with local systems to prioritise this, which includes providing 700,000 additional urgent dental appointments to help make it quicker and easier for those most in need to be seen and treated on the NHS and we are incentivising dentists to work in underserved areas so that all areas of the country can receive the care they need.”

    After inheriting an NHS dental sector in crisis, the government is acting now to make it fit for the future, following years of neglect and unsuccessful interventions.  

    A recent report by the National Audit Office found that access to NHS dentistry remains below pre-pandemic levels, with the previous administration’s dental recovery plan not on course to deliver its target of 1.5 million extra treatments by the end of 2024/25. 

    Children’s oral health is also in crisis, with tooth decay being the number one reason that children aged 5-9 years old are admitted to hospital. More than a fifth of five-year-old school children have signs of dental decay, according to data published by OHID last week.

    The data also showed stark regional inequalities in terms of good oral health – with areas of high deprivation having rates of tooth decay more than double that of wealthier areas. For example, almost 1 in 3 children (32.2%) living in Merseyside showed signs of decay, compared to just 13.6% of kids in Gloucestershire.

    To tackle this, the government will introduce a new supervised tooth-brushing scheme for 3-to-5-year-olds – which is aimed at providing advice and tooth brushing guidance in the school setting to children living in the most deprived areas in England, as well as providing toothbrushes and toothpaste.  

    The government is also recruiting new dentists to areas that need them most and will reform the dental contract, with a shift to focusing on prevention and the retention of NHS dentists. This includes the golden hello bonus incentive payment of £20,000, which is being offered per dentist for up to 240 dentists who agree to work in areas of the country that have traditionally been hard to recruit to.   Until July, none of the 240 roles had been filled, but the government has since delivered 68 posts, with more to come.

    Jacob Lant, Chief Executive of National Voices, said:

    “NHS dentistry has been left in a sorry state, with far too many people experiencing pain and discomfort because they can’t access basic care.

    “These extra urgent appointments will be welcome and are a helpful first step, but fixing the nation’s oral health crisis will require a sustained effort.

    “We now need local NHS leaders to work creatively to ensure available capacity is targeting those most in need, whether treating an infected tooth or ensuring cancer and transplant patients get the dental check-ups they need before starting treatment.”

    NOTES TO EDITORS  

    Urgent care appointments to be delivered by individual ICBs:

    Region ICB Additional Urgent care appts to be purchased
    EAST OF ENGLAND Bedfordshire, Luton and Milton Keynes ICB 6,041
    EAST OF ENGLAND Cambridgeshire and Peterborough ICB 14,195
    EAST OF ENGLAND Hertfordshire and West Essex ICB 5,712
    EAST OF ENGLAND Mid and South Essex ICB 6,098
    EAST OF ENGLAND Norfolk and Waveney ICB 21,520
    EAST OF ENGLAND Suffolk and North East Essex ICB 15,413
    LONDON North Central London ICB 8,976
    LONDON North East London ICB 17,452
    LONDON North West London ICB 11,445
    LONDON South East London ICB 8,616
    LONDON South West London ICB 6,402
    MIDLANDS Birmingham and Solihull ICB 9,005
    MIDLANDS Black Country ICB 14,473
    MIDLANDS Coventry and Warwickshire ICB 2,740
    MIDLANDS Derby and Derbyshire ICB 16,298
    MIDLANDS Herefordshire and Worcestershire ICB 12,970
    MIDLANDS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland ICB 10,137
    MIDLANDS Lincolnshire ICB 12,017
    MIDLANDS Northamptonshire ICB 17,826
    MIDLANDS Nottingham and Nottinghamshire ICB 24,360
    MIDLANDS Shropshire, Telford and Wrekin ICB 7,408
    MIDLANDS Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent ICB 16,190
    NORTH EAST AND YORKSHIRE Humber and North Yorkshire ICB 27,196
    NORTH EAST AND YORKSHIRE North East and North Cumbria ICB 57,559
    NORTH EAST AND YORKSHIRE South Yorkshire ICB 19,983
    NORTH EAST AND YORKSHIRE West Yorkshire ICB 32,312
    NORTH WEST Cheshire and Merseyside ICB 46,617
    NORTH WEST Greater Manchester ICB 17,897
    NORTH WEST Lancashire and South Cumbria ICB 20,822
    SOUTH EAST Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Berkshire West ICB 15,454
    SOUTH EAST Frimley ICB 6,626
    SOUTH EAST Hampshire and Isle of Wight ICB 30,032
    SOUTH EAST Kent And Medway ICB 20,319
    SOUTH EAST Surrey Heartlands ICB 6,585
    SOUTH EAST Sussex ICB 26,546
    SOUTH WEST Bath and North East Somerset, Swindon and Wiltshire ICB 13,990
    SOUTH WEST Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire ICB 19,076
    SOUTH WEST Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly ICB 10,910
    SOUTH WEST Devon ICB 24,269
    SOUTH WEST Dorset ICB 13,569
    SOUTH WEST Gloucestershire ICB 11,464
    SOUTH WEST Somerset ICB 13,498
    ENGLAND Total 700,018

    Share this page

    The following links open in a new tab

    • Share on Facebook (opens in new tab)
    • Share on Twitter (opens in new tab)

    Updates to this page

    Published 21 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Thailand

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    February 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On February 11, The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Thailand and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.

    Thailand’s economy is gradually recovering, but at a slower pace than peers. Economic activity expanded modestly by 1.9 percent in 2023 and 2.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2024, driven by private consumption growth and a rebound in tourism. Inflation remained subdued, averaging 0.4 percent (y/y) annually in 2024, well below the Bank of Thailand’s target range of 1 to 3 percent. External factors such as the decline in global energy and food prices, lower import prices have played a role, but domestic factors such as energy subsidies, price controls, and the unwinding of pandemic-related fiscal support have also contributed to the lower inflation. The current account balance strengthened to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2023, from -3.5 percent of GDP in 2022, and continues to register a moderate surplus as of November 2024, supported by the continued recovery in tourism and higher exports.

    A gradual cyclical recovery is expected to continue. Real GDP is projected to grow by 2.7 percent in 2024 and to increase to 2.9 percent in 2025. This is underpinned by the expansionary fiscal stance envisaged under the 2025 budget, which includes additional cash transfers of 1.0 percent of GDP and a rebound in public investment. Tourism-related sectors are expected to continue to support growth, as well as private consumption that will be further boosted by the authorities’ cash transfers. As growth continues to firm up, inflation is expected to pick up but remain in the bottom half of the target range in 2025. The current account balance is expected to improve further in 2024 and 2025, driven by the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals.

    Risks to Thailand’s economic outlook are tilted to the downside. On the external front, an escalation of global trade tensions or deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could disrupt Thailand’s export recovery and dampen FDI inflows, while increased commodity price volatility could affect growth and lead to inflation spikes, and potentially tighter-for-longer global financial conditions. The intensification of regional conflicts could disrupt trade and travel flows while more frequent extreme climate events would adversely impact growth prospects. On the domestic front, the private sector debt overhang could impair financial institutions’ balance sheets and further decrease credit supply, negatively affecting growth. Renewed political uncertainty could hinder policy implementation and undermine confidence.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Thailand, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Thailand’s economic recovery is ongoing, but it has been relatively slow and uneven. Economic activity expanded modestly in 2024, driven by private consumption and a rebound in tourism-related activities, while delayed budget implementation slowed the pace of public investment. The slow recovery, compared to ASEAN peers, is also rooted in Thailand’s longstanding structural weaknesses, while emerging external and domestic headwinds have also contributed to subdued inflation. The outlook remains highly uncertain with significant downside risks.

    As economic slack narrows, the focus should shift to rebuilding fiscal space. A less expansionary fiscal stance than envisaged under the FY25 budget would still provide impulse to support the recovery while helping to preserve policy space. Alternatively, reallocating part of the planned cash transfers toward productivity-enhancing investments or social protection would enable stronger inclusive growth and help reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Starting in FY26, a revenue-based medium-term fiscal consolidation is needed to bring down public debt and rebuild buffers.

    Thailand’s fiscal framework can be further strengthened. This would require strengthening fiscal rules to better support the debt anchor by introducing a risk-based rules approach. Costs associated with quasi-fiscal operations such as energy price caps should be adequately accounted for, and fiscal risks closely monitored. Improving data provision for government finance statistics and SOEs is important.

    Staff welcomes the BOT’s decision to cut the policy rate in October and recommends a further reduction in the policy rate to support inflation and also translate into improvements in borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity with limited risk of additional leverage amid tight lending. Given remaining high uncertainty in the outlook, the authorities should stand ready to adjust their monetary policy stance in a data and outlook-dependent manner. Central bank independence with clear communication of policy moves is key to maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy in anchoring inflation expectations.

    Effective coordination across policy tools, underpinned by adequate buffers, is essential for managing adverse scenarios. While the flexible exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber, the complementary use of FXI might alleviate policy trade-offs by smoothing destabilizing premia when large non-fundamental shocks render the FX market dysfunctional. Further liberalization of the FX ecosystem and phasing out of remaining capital flow management measures would help deepen the FX market and limit the need for FXI over time.

    A comprehensive package of prudential and legal measures needs to be deployed to facilitate an orderly private deleveraging. Staff welcomes the measures already implemented to address both the existing household debt stock and the buildup of new leverage. However, simultaneous and forceful implementation of personal debt workouts via more effective bankruptcy proceedings is essential to lower the existing household debt stock.

    The external position in 2024 was moderately stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policy settings. Policies aimed at promoting investment, enhancing social safety nets, liberalizing the services sector, and minimizing tax incentives and subsidies that distort competition would facilitate external rebalancing.

    Resolute structural reforms are needed to boost productivity and competitiveness. Reform priorities include facilitating competition and openness, upgrading physical and ICT infrastructure, upskilling/reskilling the labor force, increasing export sophistication by leveraging digitalization, and strengthening governance. Providing an adequate social protection floor to vulnerable households could help enhance their resilience to shocks and address structural drivers of household debt accumulation.

    Table 1. Thailand: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–30

    Per capita GDP (2023): US$7,338

    Exchange Rate (2023): 34.8 Baht/USD

    Unemployment rate (2023): 1 percent

    Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (2021): 6.3 percent

    Net FDI (2023): US$ -7.16 billion

    Population (2023): 70.18 million

    		                    

    Actual

    Projections

    2019

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Real GDP growth (y/y percent change) 1/

    2.1

    -6.1

    1.6

    2.5

    1.9

    2.7

    2.9

    2.6

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    Consumption

    3.4

    -0.3

    1.3

    4.8

    4.6

    4.3

    4.0

    2.9

    2.1

    2.3

    2.6

    2.6

    Gross fixed investment

    2.0

    -4.8

    3.1

    2.3

    1.2

    0.1

    4.1

    2.1

    1.8

    2.3

    2.4

    2.5

    Inflation (y/y percent change)

    		                        

    Headline CPI (end of period)

    0.9

    -0.3

    2.2

    5.9

    -0.8

    1.2

    1.3

    1.5

    1.5

    1.7

    1.7

    1.8

    Headline CPI (period average)

    0.7

    -0.8

    1.2

    6.1

    1.2

    0.4

    1.0

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.8

    Core CPI (end of period)

    0.5

    0.2

    0.3

    3.2

    0.6

    0.8

    1.3

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.4

    1.6

    Core CPI (period average)

    0.5

    0.3

    0.2

    2.5

    1.3

    0.6

    1.1

    1.2

    1.1

    1.3

    1.4

    1.5

    Saving and investment (percent of GDP)

    		                        

    Gross domestic investment

    23.8

    23.8

    28.6

    27.8

    22.5

    20.8

    21.9

    22.2

    22.0

    21.8

    21.8

    21.6

    Private

    16.9

    16.8

    16.9

    17.3

    17.3

    16.7

    16.6

    16.4

    16.3

    16.1

    16.1

    16.0

    Public

    5.7

    6.4

    6.5

    6.1

    5.6

    5.6

    5.9

    5.8

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    Change in stocks

    1.2

    0.5

    5.1

    4.5

    -0.4

    -1.5

    -0.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross national saving

    30.8

    27.9

    26.5

    24.4

    24.0

    22.6

    24.0

    24.5

    24.4

    24.4

    24.5

    24.4

    Private, including statistical discrepancy

    25.8

    26.2

    26.8

    22.6

    21.0

    19.8

    21.8

    21.9

    21.7

    21.7

    21.8

    21.6

    Public

    5.0

    1.8

    -0.3

    1.7

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.5

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.8

    Foreign saving

    -7.0

    -4.2

    2.1

    3.5

    -1.4

    -1.8

    -2.2

    -2.3

    -2.4

    -2.6

    -2.7

    -2.8

    Fiscal accounts (percent of GDP) 2/

    		                        

    General government balance 3/

    0.4

    -4.5

    -6.7

    -4.5

    -2.0

    -2.2

    -3.6

    -3.2

    -2.9

    -2.8

    -2.8

    -2.8

      SOEs balance

    0.4

    0.6

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.1

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    0.0

    Public sector balance 4/

    0.8

    -3.9

    -7.1

    -5.1

    -2.7

    -2.3

    -3.8

    -3.3

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.9

    -2.8

    Public sector debt (end of period) 4/

    41.1

    49.4

    58.3

    60.5

    62.4

    63.3

    64.7

    65.4

    66.0

    66.1

    66.4

    66.4

    Monetary accounts (end of period, y/y percent change)

    		            

    Broad money growth

    3.6

    10.2

    4.8

    3.9

    1.9

    2.3

    3.7

    3.5

    3.2

    3.8

    3.2

    3.7

    Narrow money growth

    5.7

    14.2

    14.0

    3.1

    4.2

    5.9

    3.2

    4.7

    4.2

    5.1

    4.3

    4.9

    Credit to the private sector (by other depository corporations)

    2.4

    4.5

    4.5

    2.5

    1.5

    0.1

    1.0

    1.6

    1.8

    2.1

    2.3

    2.5

    Balance of payments (billions of U.S. dollars)

    		                        

    Current account balance

    38.3

    20.9

    -10.7

    -17.2

    7.4

    9.5

    11.9

    13.2

    14.6

    16.5

    18.2

    19.4

    (In percent of GDP)

    7.0

    4.2

    -2.1

    -3.5

    1.4

    1.8

    2.2

    2.3

    2.4

    2.6

    2.7

    2.8

    Exports of goods, f.o.b.

    242.7

    227.0

    270.6

    285.2

    280.7

    293.6

    301.8

    312.5

    327.2

    343.1

    359.0

    375.5

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -3.3

    -6.5

    19.2

    5.4

    -1.5

    4.6

    2.8

    3.6

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.6

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -3.7

    -5.8

    15.4

    1.2

    -2.7

    2.1

    1.9

    2.7

    3.5

    3.6

    3.2

    3.2

    Imports of goods, f.o.b.

    216.0

    186.6

    238.6

    271.6

    261.4

    274.9

    284.6

    295.1

    309.1

    324.1

    339.1

    354.9

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -5.6

    -13.6

    27.9

    13.8

    -3.8

    5.2

    3.5

    3.7

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.7

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -5.8

    -10.4

    18.0

    1.0

    -4.1

    3.7

    3.5

    3.3

    3.4

    3.3

    3.3

    3.3

    Capital and financial account balance 5/

    -24.7

    -2.6

    3.6

    6.9

    -4.9

    -9.5

    -11.9

    -13.2

    -14.6

    -16.5

    -18.2

    -19.4

    Overall balance

    13.6

    18.4

    -7.1

    -10.2

    2.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross official reserves (including net forward position, end of period) (billions of U.S. dollars)

    259.0

    286.5

    279.2

    245.8

    254.6

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    (Months of following year’s imports)

    16.7

    14.4

    12.3

    11.3

    11.1

    11.1

    10.7

    10.2

    9.7

    9.3

    8.9

    8.5

    (Percent of short-term debt) 6/

    338.0

    315.3

    291.2

    236.3

    242.7

    239.6

    231.7

    222.5

    213.7

    206.2

    199.6

    252.3

    (Percent of ARA metric)

    252.5

    278.3

    263.3

    222.3

    233.2

    231.8

    226.4

    219.2

    212.3

    205.4

    199.3

    200.0

    Exchange rate (baht/U.S. dollar)

    31.0

    31.3

    32.0

    35.1

    34.8

    35.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    NEER appreciation (annual average)

    7.2

    -0.3

    -4.5

    -1.8

    3.9

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    REER appreciation (annual average)

    5.8

    -2.6

    -5.7

    -1.1

    1.2

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    External debt

    		                        

    (In percent of GDP)

    31.7

    38.0

    38.9

    40.6

    38.2

    38.4

    38.5

    38.6

    38.7

    38.7

    38.8

    38.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    172.7

    190.1

    196.9

    201.4

    196.5

    202.4

    213.1

    223.8

    233.8

    245.9

    257.0

    270.0

    Public sector 7/

    38.0

    37.2

    41.5

    41.2

    35.8

    38.4

    40.8

    43.3

    45.6

    48.1

    50.8

    53.7

    Private sector

    134.0

    152.9

    155.4

    160.3

    160.7

    164.5

    172.9

    181.1

    188.8

    198.3

    206.8

    217.0

    Medium- and long-term

    74.6

    79.4

    82.3

    82.3

    80.3

    80.7

    86.5

    91.1

    95.3

    101.5

    107.1

    114.0

    Short-term (including portfolio flows)

    59.4

    73.5

    73.1

    78.0

    80.4

    83.8

    86.4

    90.0

    93.5

    96.8

    99.7

    103.0

    Debt service ratio 8/

    7.8

    7.5

    6.3

    7.3

    7.9

    7.8

    7.8

    7.3

    8.3

    9.3

    10.3

    10.3

    Memorandum items:

    		                        

    Nominal GDP (billions of baht)

    16889.2

    15661.3

    16188.6

    17378.0

    17922.0

    18603.0

    19371.2

    20282.2

    21143.0

    22211.7

    23164.5

    24307.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    544.0

    500.5

    506.3

    495.6

    515.0

    527.1

    553.9

    580.2

    604.8

    635.4

    662.7

    695.4

    Output Gap (in percent of potential output)

    0.2

    -4.2

    -4.1

    -2.0

    -1.5

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.1

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Sources: Thai authorities; CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ This series reflects the new GDP data based on the chain volume measure methodology, introduced by the Thai authorities in May 2015.

    2/ On a fiscal year basis. The fiscal year ends on September 30.

    3/ Includes budgetary central government, extrabudgetary funds, and local governments.

    4/ Includes general government and SOEs.

    5/ Includes errors and omissions.

    6/ With remaining maturity of one year or less.

    7/ Excludes debt of state enterprises.

    8/ Percent of exports of goods and services.
                                                             

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Thailand

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On February 11, The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Thailand and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.

    Thailand’s economy is gradually recovering, but at a slower pace than peers. Economic activity expanded modestly by 1.9 percent in 2023 and 2.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2024, driven by private consumption growth and a rebound in tourism. Inflation remained subdued, averaging 0.4 percent (y/y) annually in 2024, well below the Bank of Thailand’s target range of 1 to 3 percent. External factors such as the decline in global energy and food prices, lower import prices have played a role, but domestic factors such as energy subsidies, price controls, and the unwinding of pandemic-related fiscal support have also contributed to the lower inflation. The current account balance strengthened to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2023, from -3.5 percent of GDP in 2022, and continues to register a moderate surplus as of November 2024, supported by the continued recovery in tourism and higher exports.

    A gradual cyclical recovery is expected to continue. Real GDP is projected to grow by 2.7 percent in 2024 and to increase to 2.9 percent in 2025. This is underpinned by the expansionary fiscal stance envisaged under the 2025 budget, which includes additional cash transfers of 1.0 percent of GDP and a rebound in public investment. Tourism-related sectors are expected to continue to support growth, as well as private consumption that will be further boosted by the authorities’ cash transfers. As growth continues to firm up, inflation is expected to pick up but remain in the bottom half of the target range in 2025. The current account balance is expected to improve further in 2024 and 2025, driven by the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals.

    Risks to Thailand’s economic outlook are tilted to the downside. On the external front, an escalation of global trade tensions or deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could disrupt Thailand’s export recovery and dampen FDI inflows, while increased commodity price volatility could affect growth and lead to inflation spikes, and potentially tighter-for-longer global financial conditions. The intensification of regional conflicts could disrupt trade and travel flows while more frequent extreme climate events would adversely impact growth prospects. On the domestic front, the private sector debt overhang could impair financial institutions’ balance sheets and further decrease credit supply, negatively affecting growth. Renewed political uncertainty could hinder policy implementation and undermine confidence.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Thailand, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Thailand’s economic recovery is ongoing, but it has been relatively slow and uneven. Economic activity expanded modestly in 2024, driven by private consumption and a rebound in tourism-related activities, while delayed budget implementation slowed the pace of public investment. The slow recovery, compared to ASEAN peers, is also rooted in Thailand’s longstanding structural weaknesses, while emerging external and domestic headwinds have also contributed to subdued inflation. The outlook remains highly uncertain with significant downside risks.

    As economic slack narrows, the focus should shift to rebuilding fiscal space. A less expansionary fiscal stance than envisaged under the FY25 budget would still provide impulse to support the recovery while helping to preserve policy space. Alternatively, reallocating part of the planned cash transfers toward productivity-enhancing investments or social protection would enable stronger inclusive growth and help reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Starting in FY26, a revenue-based medium-term fiscal consolidation is needed to bring down public debt and rebuild buffers.

    Thailand’s fiscal framework can be further strengthened. This would require strengthening fiscal rules to better support the debt anchor by introducing a risk-based rules approach. Costs associated with quasi-fiscal operations such as energy price caps should be adequately accounted for, and fiscal risks closely monitored. Improving data provision for government finance statistics and SOEs is important.

    Staff welcomes the BOT’s decision to cut the policy rate in October and recommends a further reduction in the policy rate to support inflation and also translate into improvements in borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity with limited risk of additional leverage amid tight lending. Given remaining high uncertainty in the outlook, the authorities should stand ready to adjust their monetary policy stance in a data and outlook-dependent manner. Central bank independence with clear communication of policy moves is key to maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy in anchoring inflation expectations.

    Effective coordination across policy tools, underpinned by adequate buffers, is essential for managing adverse scenarios. While the flexible exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber, the complementary use of FXI might alleviate policy trade-offs by smoothing destabilizing premia when large non-fundamental shocks render the FX market dysfunctional. Further liberalization of the FX ecosystem and phasing out of remaining capital flow management measures would help deepen the FX market and limit the need for FXI over time.

    A comprehensive package of prudential and legal measures needs to be deployed to facilitate an orderly private deleveraging. Staff welcomes the measures already implemented to address both the existing household debt stock and the buildup of new leverage. However, simultaneous and forceful implementation of personal debt workouts via more effective bankruptcy proceedings is essential to lower the existing household debt stock.

    The external position in 2024 was moderately stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policy settings. Policies aimed at promoting investment, enhancing social safety nets, liberalizing the services sector, and minimizing tax incentives and subsidies that distort competition would facilitate external rebalancing.

    Resolute structural reforms are needed to boost productivity and competitiveness. Reform priorities include facilitating competition and openness, upgrading physical and ICT infrastructure, upskilling/reskilling the labor force, increasing export sophistication by leveraging digitalization, and strengthening governance. Providing an adequate social protection floor to vulnerable households could help enhance their resilience to shocks and address structural drivers of household debt accumulation.

    Table 1. Thailand: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–30

    Per capita GDP (2023): US$7,338

    Exchange Rate (2023): 34.8 Baht/USD

    Unemployment rate (2023): 1 percent

    Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (2021): 6.3 percent

    Net FDI (2023): US$ -7.16 billion

    Population (2023): 70.18 million

    		                    

    Actual

    Projections

    2019

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Real GDP growth (y/y percent change) 1/

    2.1

    -6.1

    1.6

    2.5

    1.9

    2.7

    2.9

    2.6

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    Consumption

    3.4

    -0.3

    1.3

    4.8

    4.6

    4.3

    4.0

    2.9

    2.1

    2.3

    2.6

    2.6

    Gross fixed investment

    2.0

    -4.8

    3.1

    2.3

    1.2

    0.1

    4.1

    2.1

    1.8

    2.3

    2.4

    2.5

    Inflation (y/y percent change)

    		                        

    Headline CPI (end of period)

    0.9

    -0.3

    2.2

    5.9

    -0.8

    1.2

    1.3

    1.5

    1.5

    1.7

    1.7

    1.8

    Headline CPI (period average)

    0.7

    -0.8

    1.2

    6.1

    1.2

    0.4

    1.0

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.8

    Core CPI (end of period)

    0.5

    0.2

    0.3

    3.2

    0.6

    0.8

    1.3

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.4

    1.6

    Core CPI (period average)

    0.5

    0.3

    0.2

    2.5

    1.3

    0.6

    1.1

    1.2

    1.1

    1.3

    1.4

    1.5

    Saving and investment (percent of GDP)

    		                        

    Gross domestic investment

    23.8

    23.8

    28.6

    27.8

    22.5

    20.8

    21.9

    22.2

    22.0

    21.8

    21.8

    21.6

    Private

    16.9

    16.8

    16.9

    17.3

    17.3

    16.7

    16.6

    16.4

    16.3

    16.1

    16.1

    16.0

    Public

    5.7

    6.4

    6.5

    6.1

    5.6

    5.6

    5.9

    5.8

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    Change in stocks

    1.2

    0.5

    5.1

    4.5

    -0.4

    -1.5

    -0.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross national saving

    30.8

    27.9

    26.5

    24.4

    24.0

    22.6

    24.0

    24.5

    24.4

    24.4

    24.5

    24.4

    Private, including statistical discrepancy

    25.8

    26.2

    26.8

    22.6

    21.0

    19.8

    21.8

    21.9

    21.7

    21.7

    21.8

    21.6

    Public

    5.0

    1.8

    -0.3

    1.7

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.5

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.8

    Foreign saving

    -7.0

    -4.2

    2.1

    3.5

    -1.4

    -1.8

    -2.2

    -2.3

    -2.4

    -2.6

    -2.7

    -2.8

    Fiscal accounts (percent of GDP) 2/

    		                        

    General government balance 3/

    0.4

    -4.5

    -6.7

    -4.5

    -2.0

    -2.2

    -3.6

    -3.2

    -2.9

    -2.8

    -2.8

    -2.8

      SOEs balance

    0.4

    0.6

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.1

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    0.0

    Public sector balance 4/

    0.8

    -3.9

    -7.1

    -5.1

    -2.7

    -2.3

    -3.8

    -3.3

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.9

    -2.8

    Public sector debt (end of period) 4/

    41.1

    49.4

    58.3

    60.5

    62.4

    63.3

    64.7

    65.4

    66.0

    66.1

    66.4

    66.4

    Monetary accounts (end of period, y/y percent change)

    		            

    Broad money growth

    3.6

    10.2

    4.8

    3.9

    1.9

    2.3

    3.7

    3.5

    3.2

    3.8

    3.2

    3.7

    Narrow money growth

    5.7

    14.2

    14.0

    3.1

    4.2

    5.9

    3.2

    4.7

    4.2

    5.1

    4.3

    4.9

    Credit to the private sector (by other depository corporations)

    2.4

    4.5

    4.5

    2.5

    1.5

    0.1

    1.0

    1.6

    1.8

    2.1

    2.3

    2.5

    Balance of payments (billions of U.S. dollars)

    		                        

    Current account balance

    38.3

    20.9

    -10.7

    -17.2

    7.4

    9.5

    11.9

    13.2

    14.6

    16.5

    18.2

    19.4

    (In percent of GDP)

    7.0

    4.2

    -2.1

    -3.5

    1.4

    1.8

    2.2

    2.3

    2.4

    2.6

    2.7

    2.8

    Exports of goods, f.o.b.

    242.7

    227.0

    270.6

    285.2

    280.7

    293.6

    301.8

    312.5

    327.2

    343.1

    359.0

    375.5

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -3.3

    -6.5

    19.2

    5.4

    -1.5

    4.6

    2.8

    3.6

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.6

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -3.7

    -5.8

    15.4

    1.2

    -2.7

    2.1

    1.9

    2.7

    3.5

    3.6

    3.2

    3.2

    Imports of goods, f.o.b.

    216.0

    186.6

    238.6

    271.6

    261.4

    274.9

    284.6

    295.1

    309.1

    324.1

    339.1

    354.9

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -5.6

    -13.6

    27.9

    13.8

    -3.8

    5.2

    3.5

    3.7

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.7

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -5.8

    -10.4

    18.0

    1.0

    -4.1

    3.7

    3.5

    3.3

    3.4

    3.3

    3.3

    3.3

    Capital and financial account balance 5/

    -24.7

    -2.6

    3.6

    6.9

    -4.9

    -9.5

    -11.9

    -13.2

    -14.6

    -16.5

    -18.2

    -19.4

    Overall balance

    13.6

    18.4

    -7.1

    -10.2

    2.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross official reserves (including net forward position, end of period) (billions of U.S. dollars)

    259.0

    286.5

    279.2

    245.8

    254.6

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    (Months of following year’s imports)

    16.7

    14.4

    12.3

    11.3

    11.1

    11.1

    10.7

    10.2

    9.7

    9.3

    8.9

    8.5

    (Percent of short-term debt) 6/

    338.0

    315.3

    291.2

    236.3

    242.7

    239.6

    231.7

    222.5

    213.7

    206.2

    199.6

    252.3

    (Percent of ARA metric)

    252.5

    278.3

    263.3

    222.3

    233.2

    231.8

    226.4

    219.2

    212.3

    205.4

    199.3

    200.0

    Exchange rate (baht/U.S. dollar)

    31.0

    31.3

    32.0

    35.1

    34.8

    35.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    NEER appreciation (annual average)

    7.2

    -0.3

    -4.5

    -1.8

    3.9

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    REER appreciation (annual average)

    5.8

    -2.6

    -5.7

    -1.1

    1.2

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    External debt

    		                        

    (In percent of GDP)

    31.7

    38.0

    38.9

    40.6

    38.2

    38.4

    38.5

    38.6

    38.7

    38.7

    38.8

    38.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    172.7

    190.1

    196.9

    201.4

    196.5

    202.4

    213.1

    223.8

    233.8

    245.9

    257.0

    270.0

    Public sector 7/

    38.0

    37.2

    41.5

    41.2

    35.8

    38.4

    40.8

    43.3

    45.6

    48.1

    50.8

    53.7

    Private sector

    134.0

    152.9

    155.4

    160.3

    160.7

    164.5

    172.9

    181.1

    188.8

    198.3

    206.8

    217.0

    Medium- and long-term

    74.6

    79.4

    82.3

    82.3

    80.3

    80.7

    86.5

    91.1

    95.3

    101.5

    107.1

    114.0

    Short-term (including portfolio flows)

    59.4

    73.5

    73.1

    78.0

    80.4

    83.8

    86.4

    90.0

    93.5

    96.8

    99.7

    103.0

    Debt service ratio 8/

    7.8

    7.5

    6.3

    7.3

    7.9

    7.8

    7.8

    7.3

    8.3

    9.3

    10.3

    10.3

    Memorandum items:

    		                        

    Nominal GDP (billions of baht)

    16889.2

    15661.3

    16188.6

    17378.0

    17922.0

    18603.0

    19371.2

    20282.2

    21143.0

    22211.7

    23164.5

    24307.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    544.0

    500.5

    506.3

    495.6

    515.0

    527.1

    553.9

    580.2

    604.8

    635.4

    662.7

    695.4

    Output Gap (in percent of potential output)

    0.2

    -4.2

    -4.1

    -2.0

    -1.5

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.1

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Sources: Thai authorities; CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ This series reflects the new GDP data based on the chain volume measure methodology, introduced by the Thai authorities in May 2015.

    2/ On a fiscal year basis. The fiscal year ends on September 30.

    3/ Includes budgetary central government, extrabudgetary funds, and local governments.

    4/ Includes general government and SOEs.

    5/ Includes errors and omissions.

    6/ With remaining maturity of one year or less.

    7/ Excludes debt of state enterprises.

    8/ Percent of exports of goods and services.
                                                             

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/20/pr25040-thailand-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-with-thailand

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Baltimore Department Of Finance Employee Sentenced To Four Years In Connection With Bribery And Covid-19 Cares Act Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Baltimore Department of Finance employee took more than $250,000 in bribes and obtained more than $143,000 in fraudulent COVID-19 relief benefits

    Baltimore, Maryland – U.S. District Judge Richard D. Bennett, today, sentenced Joseph Gillespie, age 35, of Baltimore City, Maryland, to four years in federal prison and three years of supervised release in connection with a bribery scheme and conspiracy to commit wire fraud scheme involving COVID-19 CARES Act relief benefits.

    Phil Selden, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, announced the sentence with Special Agent in Charge William J. DelBagno of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Baltimore Field Office.

    “Defendant Gillespie abused the public trust through a bribery scheme and took advantage of money meant to help during the COVID-19 pandemic,” stated Acting United States Attorney Selden. “When government employees take bribes and public funds, it harms the very communities they are meant to serve. The District of Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office will relentlessly pursue those who try to compromise the public trust.”

    “Gillespie’s extensive schemes and lies ultimately cost hardworking taxpayers. Instead of performing his job with honesty, he looked for illicit ways to line his own pockets. This sentence proves that corruption never pays,” said FBI Baltimore SAC William J. DelBagno. “The FBI and our partners remain committed to holding accountable those who try to cheat the system for their own benefit and profit.”

    According to Gillespie’s plea agreement, beginning in 2016, and continuing to 2023, the Defendant engaged in a bribery scheme in which he abused his position of trust as a public official within the Baltimore City Department of Finance for his own personal gain.

    As an employee of the Baltimore City Department of Finance, Revenue Collections Department, Gillespie routinely accepted bribes from various property owners in Baltimore City (“the City”) whose property was subject to certain financial obligations, and if the obligations remained unpaid, to a tax sale.  He accepted these bribes — typically 10-15 percent of the amount owed to the City — in exchange for removing or extinguishing these financial obligations, including for citations, tax obligations, and water obligations – thereby causing losses to the City.  Gillespie also accepted bribes in exchange for delaying or postponing — without approval or permission from other City officials — due dates for the payment of outstanding financial obligations, fines, and payments owed to the City, thus forestalling the placement of a lien on the property by the City.

    Once Gillespie received the bribe payment, he would extinguish the financial obligation owed to the City by marking the obligations as paid in the City’s online records.  After removing the obligation, the Defendant would, at times, send a photograph of a cashier slip from his office reflecting that a payment was made towards a financial obligation owed to the City when, in fact, no such payment was made.

    Gillespie engaged in multiple covertly recorded telephone and video conversations with an FBI undercover agent (UC), in which the Defendant and the UC discussed the specifics of the bribery scheme outlined above.

    For example, in a recorded phone conversation with the UC, the UC confirmed the size of the bribe payment with the Defendant: “[S]o you want 100 for each property?” Defendant said, “yeah that’s basically how I do.”  Gillespie then informed the UC that he (Gillespie) had a “girl” in “water”— i.e., the Baltimore City Department of Public Works — that could “wipe some s*** out,” referring to financial obligations owed to the City.

    During a covert video recording of the conversation with the UC, Gillespie told the UC that he had the ability to “wipe a bill off” the City’s record of outstanding obligations tied to a particular property or to “put paid next to ‘em,” even though the financial obligation had not in fact been paid.  The Defendant further stated that he removed certain financial obligations linked to the properties that the UC told the Defendant were his, stating “[t]here was a couple, extra miscellaneous bills that y’all had that I wiped off . . . . That s*** gone now.”

    Gillespie also extended the deadline for payment of financial obligations owed to the City on eight properties by three months.  Gillespie asked for $800 in bribes in return — $100 for each of the eight properties, and, during the recorded meeting, the UC provided Gillespie $800 cash.  Gillespie also stated that he had the ability to wipe out overdue water bills owed to the City, “Once I let you know [about a big water bill], I’ll give it to my girl, and I’ll tell you what you need to give me for her to knock it off.”  Gillespie then stated:

    “Going forward, I’m just your inside man . . . That’s what I do for a lot of different people around the City.  You know what I mean – manage their s*** for them a little bit. . . .  I’m gonna go look at your s***.  Anyone with a high water bill I’m gonna text you the address, and I’m gonna tell you what I need, and we can knock them out going forward with that . . . . Any water bill that’s too high, I’ll get my girl to take care of that.”

    Gillespie’s bribery scheme continued for years thereafter, and he admitted that he enlisted the help of multiple co-conspirators in connection with his scheme.  According to the plea agreement, Gillespie received more than $250,000 in connection with the bribery scheme and caused losses to the City in excess of $1,250,000.

    Further, Gillespie also engaged in a scheme to fraudulent COVID-19 CARES relief funds.  Financial assistance offered through the CARES Act included forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses, through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), administered through the United States Small Business Administration (SBA).

    For example, in 2021, Gillespie and co-defendant Ahmed (“Adam”) Sary submitted a fraudulent PPP loan application to Cross River Bank to obtain a PPP loan for JAG Investments (“JAG”), a company the Defendant owned.  The PPP loan application contained numerous material misrepresentations, including that JAG, in 2019, had 19 employees and an average monthly payroll of more than $55,000. In support of the loan application, a fabricated 2019 Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Form 940 – Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return – was submitted, which falsely stated that JAG’s total payments to employees, in 2019, was more than $275,000.

    Based on the false representations and fraudulent submissions made on behalf of Gillespie as the owner of JAG, the PPP loan was funded on March 6, 2021, and approximately $138,000 was distributed to a bank account controlled by Gillespie. Gillespie agreed to pay Sary kickbacks totaling $38,000 for his work in submitting the false application and obtaining the fraudulent PPP loan.  In addition, after receipt of the PPP loan, Gillespie established payroll services for JAG to facilitate documentation that would later be used to substantiate a request for the PPP loan to be forgiven.

    The District of Maryland COVID-19 Strike Force is one of five strike forces established throughout the United States by the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute COVID-19 fraud, including fraud relating to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.  The CARES Act was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The strike forces focus on large-scale, multi-state pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors.  The strike forces are interagency law enforcement efforts, using prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams designed to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds.

    For more information about the Department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.  Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Acting United States Attorney Phil Selden commended the FBI for their work in the investigation, the Small Business Administration’s Office of Inspector General and the Baltimore City Inspector General for assistance as well.  Mr. Selden thanked Assistant U.S. Attorneys Paul A. Riley and Evelyn L. Cusson who are prosecuting the federal case.

    For more information about the Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office, its priorities, and resources available to help the community, please visit www.justice.gov/usao-md and https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/community-outreach.

    # # #

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Norman Gray, Founder and CEO Of Biomedical Company, Sentenced For Defrauding Investors Of More Than $13 Million

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Matthew Podolsky, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that NORMAN GRAY, the founder and CEO of a biomedical company (the “Biomedical Company”), who defrauded investors of over $13 million, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer to 10 years in prison.  GRAY was convicted of wire fraud at trial on May 29, 2024.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Matthew Podolsky said: “Norman Gray preyed upon people who wanted to invest in developing life-saving medicine for children with a rare and generally fatal disease.  Gray gained his victims’ trust by lying about everything from his educational background and to his supposed access to off-shore trusts he could use to fund his company alongside the investors.  He even submitted false patent applications, invented a fake mortgage company, and forged FBI background check records.  Thanks to the work of the career prosecutors of this Office and our law enforcement partners, Gray has now received just punishment.”

    According to the Superseding Indictment, public filings, public court proceedings, the evidence presented at trial and in connection with sentencing:

    At all relevant times, GRAY was the founder and CEO of the Biomedical Company, which is headquartered in Hamden, Connecticut.  GRAY presented himself to investors (including “Victim-1” and “Victim-2”) and others as a billionaire scientist and successful entrepreneur with a Ph.D. from MIT at the helm of a company he was personally funding that was potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  GRAY claimed to have previously created a successful medical equipment company (“Prior Company”) with over 1,000 employees, which was earning approximately $900 million in revenues before GRAY sold it to a foreign pharmaceutical company.  GRAY claimed that he put the profits from the sale of the Prior Company into his offshore trust (“Offshore Trust”), which he claimed held more than $300 million, and which he was using to self-fund the Biomedical Company.  In reality, GRAY did not have a Ph.D., had not created or sold a nearly billion-dollar company, did not have access to hundreds of millions of dollars to fund Biomedical Company, and, as of 2020, both he and the Biomedical Company were in significant debt. 

    Beginning in 2016, GRAY also claimed to employees and investors in Biomedical Company, including Victim-1 and Victim-2, and in written investment materials, that a flagship medication being developed by Biomedical Company was approved for compassionate treatment in Saudi Arabia, where it was saving the lives of two specific children who were suffering from a rare and generally fatal disease known as MVID.  Victim-2 sent $200,000 to GRAY to continue funding this supposed program.  GRAY submitted treatment data from the supposed program in patent applications for the flagship drug.  But the program did not exist.

    Based on GRAY’s misrepresentations, between 2018 and 2020, Victim-2 invested approximately $7.6 million in the Biomedical Company through wire transfers into accounts controlled by GRAY.  In May 2020, at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, GRAY fraudulently induced Victim-2 to invest into a joint venture with GRAY to purchase personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and resell it to hospitals and universities in the United States and Spain. GRAY provided Victim-2 with fabricated purchase orders from two New York-area hospitals purporting to show that he had close to $8 million of committed sales. Victim-2 sent three wire transfers totaling $1,751,342 to GRAY’s account.  Ultimately, the PPE that GRAY purchased  could not be sold, because it was defective or otherwise not fit for market, and Victim-2 lost the $1.75 million supposedly invested by GRAY into the PPE project.

    In or about August 2020, GRAY induced Victim-1 to send him $250,000 as a purported investment in the Biomedical Company.  Rather than purchase equity for Victim-1, GRAY used nearly all of Victim-1’s $250,000 payment to repay a loan that GRAY had taken out from a tenant in the same building where the Biomedical Company is headquartered in order to make payroll. In the ensuing weeks, GRAY extracted an additional $1,217,000 from Victim-1, representing that Victim-1’s funds would be invested in deals involving the procurement of PPE for two major universities in the tristate area who committed to close to $8 million in sales in essentially the same amounts as GRAY’s prior fabricated purchase orders sent to Victim-2.  Notwithstanding the losses Victim-2 had already experienced through GRAY’s venture, GRAY falsely represented to Victim-1 that his prior PPE deals had turned a 40% profit within 90 days, that he already had purchase orders in hand for PPE worth nearly $8 million, and that, therefore, the risk was “virtually zero.” In reality, over the preceding months, GRAY had accumulated a vast inventory of unsellable PPE, the purported purchase orders were recycled fakes, and GRAY did not invest Victim-1’s funds in PPE. Instead, GRAY misappropriated Victim-1’s funds, in part, to purchase himself a nearly $1 million home, a $50,000 luxury SUV, and to pay down $200,000 of his and his family’s credit card debt.

    As part of his scheme to defraud Victim-1, and as a means of dispelling Victim-1’s concern that an investment with GRAY might require Victim-1 to forego the purchase of a home, GRAY offered Victim-1 a mortgage from a purported boutique mortgage company of which he was the sole investor.  GRAY directed Victim-1 to a purported mortgage broker that worked for this boutique mortgage company.  In reality, both the mortgage company and the mortgage broker were completely fabricated by GRAY and did not exist.  To further this aspect of the fraud on Victim-1, GRAY registered an internet domain in the name of the purported mortgage company and created an email address in the name of the invented mortgage broker contemporaneously with making his false representations to Victim-1.   As GRAY’s fraud began to unravel in or about early November 2020, GRAY promised to return all of Victim-1’s money.  Ultimately, GRAY never returned any money to Victim-1 and, after Victim-1 asked GRAY to provide her with the purported PPE purchase orders from the two universities, she never heard from GRAY again.

    Victim-2 was a board member of the Biomedical Company at the time that GRAY defrauded Victim-1.  Following Victim-1’s report of GRAY’s fraud to the board in November 2020, accompanied by publicly available evidence of GRAY’s prior criminal history, GRAY reassured Victim-2 that he had no criminal history beyond driving infractions.  GRAY also produced to the board a fraudulent record purportedly from the FBI disclaiming any criminal history and falsely asserting that GRAY had a “top secret” clearance status renewed on November 14, 2016.  After being reassured by GRAY that Victim-1’s allegations were meritless, Victim-2 provided approximately over $2.3 million in loans separate from his over $7.5 million of Vanessa investments and $1.75 million of PPE investments.

    At trial, GRAY obstructed justice by attempting to introduce into evidence a false document supposedly drafted after GRAY’s fraud on Victim-1 was complete and purporting to memorialize an agreement by Victim-1 to “convert” her PPE investment into shares of Biomedical Company.

    *                *                *

    In addition to the prison term, GRAY, 69, of Hamden, Connecticut, was sentenced to 3 years of supervised release.  GRAY also was ordered to pay forfeiture in the amount of $1,467,000 and to forfeit his interest in the home and luxury vehicle discussed above.  The Court also ordered restitution of $1,533,675 to Victim-1.

    Mr. Podolsky praised the outstanding investigative work of the Special Agents of Homeland Security Investigations.  Mr. Podolsky also thanked the New Haven Police Department, as well as law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom and Spain and the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, for their assistance.

    This case is being handled by the Office’s Illicit Finance and Money Laundering Unit.  Assistant U.S. Attorneys Benjamin A. Gianforti, Vladislav Vainberg, and Jessica Greenwood are in charge of the prosecution.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Security: Sacramento Man Charged With Multimillion-Dollar Bank Fraud and Pandemic Loan Fraud Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SACRAMENTO, Calif. — A federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment last week against Akash Kumar Singh, 48, of Sacramento, charging him with four counts of bank fraud and three counts of money laundering, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced. The indictment was unsealed following Singh’s arrest today.

    According to court documents, Singh fraudulently obtained more than $3 million in Paycheck Protection Program loan funds intended to help small businesses maintain payroll and operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Singh obtained at least two PPP loans for a Sacramento software development company he purported to lead called Kryptoblocks. Singh falsely claimed that Kryptoblocks generated millions of dollars in revenue and paid millions of dollars in employee wages in 2019 and 2020. In reality, Kryptoblocks generated little to no revenues and employed no individuals in the United States during this time.

    This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the IRS Criminal Investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Sam Stefanki is prosecuting the case.

    If convicted, Singh faces a maximum statutory penalty of 30 years in prison and a fine of $1 million or of twice the amount of criminally derived property involved in each money laundering count. Any sentence, however, would be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables. The charges are only allegations; the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    This effort is part of a California COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Strike Force operation, one of five interagency COVID-19 fraud strike force teams established by the U.S. Department of Justice. The California Strike Force combines law enforcement and prosecutorial resources in the Eastern and Central Districts of California and focuses on large-scale, multistate pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors. The strike forces use prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Global: Moves to undermine public education in the U.S. should concern Canadians

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Melanie D. Janzen, Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba

    United States President Donald Trump has made a series of high-profile threats against Canada and other countries since his second term began a month ago — but his proposed educational reforms also require serious attention.

    Trump has promised to close the Department of Education, which enforces civil rights in education, sends funding to schools and oversees student loans.

    The Associated Press reported the president’s pick for education secretary, Linda McMahon, has acknowledged that only the U.S. Congress could fully shut down the education department, but she wants to “reorient” it.

    McMahon is expected to be confirmed after her nomination is considered by the full Senate.

    The Legal Defense Fund, an organization that supports racial justice, has expressed concern that McMahon will support reduced federal oversight that will result in undermining civil rights protections and key federal programs.



    Read more:
    Why does Trump want to abolish the Education Department? An anthropologist who studies MAGA explains 4 reasons

    Moves to weaken public education in the United States may seem distant. However, as Canadians have seen with polarization affecting democratically elected school boards, shifts in the U.S. can act like canaries in the coal mine for our own public education systems.

    We address this as researchers and educators whose combined expertise has examined how defunding and policy interventions can erode public education.

    Project 2025 and education

    In recent years, there has been escalating hype that public schools have become sites of political proselytizing as alleged “woke” teachers aim to instil “Marxist attitudes” among youth.

    Trump has, unfortunately, concertedly stoked flames of distrust, particularly among MAGA movement supporters, toward teachers, administrators, curricula and public educational systems.

    The now infamous Project 2025 policy framework has a dedicated chapter outlining drastic educational reformation in the U.S.

    While the president publicly disavowed any formal affiliation with Project 2025, his positions formally outlined in his Agenda 47 Ten Principles for Great Schools Leading to Great Jobs and other public statements are generally indistinguishable from those espoused by Project 2025.



    Read more:
    Trump’s administration seems chaotic, but he’s drawing directly from Project 2025 playbook

    Trump’s 10 Principles

    The 10 principles for educational revision include “restoring parental rights” by allowing parents to vote to appoint local school principals; abolishing teacher tenure, which will undermine teachers’ unions; and introducing merit pay. In addition, there are plans to “create a credentialing body to certify teachers who embrace patriotic values and support the American Way of Life.”

    Trump also aims to bar critical race theory and “gender indoctrination” from public schools. During campaign events, Trump often reiterated his goals to “cut federal funding for any school pushing critical race theory … and other inappropriate racial, sexual or political content ….”

    These ideas have been steadily infiltrating some states’ legislative and school policies. An example is Florida’s re-framing of academic standards to teach that some enslaved people benefited from enslavement. The non-profit Human Rights Campaign Foundation notes that that “of the 489 anti-LGBTQ+ bills introduced in 2024, over 60 per cent — more than 300 bills — focused on youth and education.”

    Smilar attacks seen in Canada

    Trump declared during his inauguration speech that “we have an education system that teaches our children to be ashamed of themselves — in many cases, to hate our country … All of this will change starting today, and it will change very quickly.”

    Evidently, significant educational reform is a high priority.

    Reforms to the American education system should be cause for concern for Canadians. The overt attacks on public education that we are seeing in the U.S. are already occurring in Canada, albeit often in more insidious and fragmented ways.

    Parental rights rhetoric

    “Parental rights” rhetoric is fuelling movements across Canada that are aimed at delimiting the rights of students to learn about sexual health and understand gender diversity.

    Parents have a multitude of diverse concerns for their children and their interests, and parental engagement is of importance for schools.



    Read more:
    If I could change one thing in education: Community-school partnerships would be top priority

    But these “rights”-based movements fuel public moral panic and fan the flames of neo-conservative agendas.
    The “parental rights” movement capitalizes on rights rhetoric to mobilize only the concerns of the conservative right and their traditional family narratives. This denies other parents’ concerns, and as child advocates have argued, it also violates children’s rights.

    The parental rights movement also aims to undermine school-based sexual health education, which most parents support.

    Across provinces

    In 2023, Saskatchewan passed a Parents’ Bill of Rights requiring parental consent for children under the age of 16 to use a different pronoun or name in school.

    The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission and numerous professors of law denounced the move for pre-emptively using the notwithstanding clause to override rights upheld in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

    We saw similar efforts in New Brunswick and in Manitoba in governing parties’ platforms and recent unsuccessful re-election campaigns.



    Read more:
    New Brunswick’s LGBTQ+ safe schools debate makes false opponents of parents and teachers

    This year, Alberta introduced a more expansive bill banning gender-affirming care for children under the age of 16 and banning trans women and girls from competing in female sports.

    The parental rights rhetoric, a dog-whistle for anti-2SLGBTQ+ views, is not new in Canada. However, it seems to be finding renewed energy, especially in conservative-led provinces.

    Anti-2SLGBTQ+ rhetoric can also found in recent attempts to advocate for book bans (like in Chilliwack B.C. and in Manitoba in 2022) or in protests against Drag Queen story hours (in Ontario in 2023).



    Read more:
    Shifts in how sex and gender identity are defined may alter human rights protections: Canadians deserve to know how and why

    There have also been efforts by national neoconservative organizations to interfere with school board elections, endeavouring to recruit and support anti-trans candidates to run for office.

    Undermining teachers and unions

    Similarly, attempts to undermine teachers and their unions are occurring.

    For example, the Manitoba government recently passed Bill 35. The legislation was introduced under the premise of addressing teacher sexual misconduct, but the bill’s language was broadened to include teacher “competence” and “professionalism.”

    A similar bill was recently passed in Alberta.

    In both examples, governments say they are creating an “arms-length” disciplinary process for teachers. But these reforms have been criticized for weakening teachers’ unions, deprofessionalizing teaching and conflating competence and misconduct — all of which work to expand government regulation and oversight of teachers while undermining unions.

    In Ontario, in 2022 following concerning pandemic interruptions to in-person schooling, the government implemented a mandatory online learning graduation requirement. Procedures exist for students to be opted out, but it’s up to parents or students to specifically request this.

    The requirement has been criticized for reducing teaching staff and increasing the privatization of public schools.

    Strong public schools

    Strong public schools rely on qualified teachers whose professional judgment and autonomy is protected and supported, in part, by teacher unions.

    The events unfolding in the U.S. should act as a warning to Canadians, calling us to pay close attention to what is happening in our local school districts and school boards.

    Being able to understand and identify regressive reform efforts and how they are subverting public education and democracy — as we endeavour to foster and build real relationships in our local school communities — is of urgent and national concern.

    Melanie D. Janzen receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and is a volunteer for People for Public Education Manitoba.

    Jordan Laidlaw is a volunteer for People for Public Education Manitoba.

    – ref. Moves to undermine public education in the U.S. should concern Canadians – https://theconversation.com/moves-to-undermine-public-education-in-the-u-s-should-concern-canadians-245230

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kugler, Navigating Inflation Waves: A Phillips Curve Perspective

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, Tom, and thank you for the invitation to give the Whittington Lecture.1 It is humbling to be here giving this lecture to honor the memory and legacy of Leslie Whittington. While I did not cross paths with Leslie here at Georgetown University, when I arrived, I heard so many stories about her contributions to the school, the university, and the students. She worked on research about the effects of economic policies on children and families, so I know that if I had had the good fortune to overlap with her as a colleague, I would have benefited greatly from her work and presence. It is also an honor to be giving this lecture, because so many dynamic leaders have previously stood before you, including some who have been inspirations to me in my career, such as Alice Rivlin and Cecilia Rouse.
    Today I will be discussing a topic that has certainly captured the attention of central bankers, and the public at large, in recent years: inflation and the relationship between inflation and unemployment. But before I talk about a lens through which to think about the inflation experienced in the pandemic period, I want to update you with my views on the current outlook for the U.S. economy and the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) efforts to sustainably return inflation to our 2 percent objective while maintaining a strong labor market.
    Economic OutlookThe overall picture is that the U.S. economy remains on a firm footing, with output growing at a solid pace. Real gross domestic product grew 2.5 percent in 2024. Consumer spending continued to drive this solid pace last year. While retail sales posted a decline last month, January data are often difficult to interpret. Bad weather and seasonal adjustment difficulties may have affected the release, and it should be noted the slowdown came after a strong pace of sales in the second half of last year. That said, as usual, I pay attention to many indicators to gauge the state of the economy. Employment readings show that the labor market is healthy and stable. Payroll job gains have been solid recently, averaging 189,000 per month over the past four months, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). After touching 4.2 percent as recently as November, the unemployment rate has flattened to 4 percent since then, consistent with a labor market that is neither weakening nor showing signs of overheating.
    Inflation has fallen significantly since its peak in the middle of 2022, though the path continues to be bumpy and inflation remains somewhat elevated. Readings last week from the BLS showed price pressures persisted in the economy in January. Our preferred inflation gauge at the Fed, the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, will be released next week. Based on the consumer price index and producer price index data for January, it is estimated that the PCE index advanced about 2.4 percent on a 12-month basis in January. Excluding food and energy costs, core prices are estimated to have risen 2.6 percent. Those readings show there is still some way to go before achieving the FOMC’s 2 percent objective.
    Regarding monetary policy, the FOMC judged in September that it was time to begin reducing our policy interest rate from levels that were strongly restrictive on aggregate demand and putting downward pressure on inflation. We reduced that rate 100 basis points through December, leaving our policy rate at moderately restrictive levels. At our latest meeting in January, I supported the decision to hold the policy rate steady. I see this as appropriate, given that the downward risks to employment have diminished but upside risks to inflation remain. The potential net effect of new economic policies also remains highly uncertain and will depend on the breadth, duration, reactions to, and, importantly, specifics of the measures adopted.
    Going forward, in considering the appropriate federal funds rate, we will watch these developments closely and continue to carefully assess the incoming data and evolving outlook.
    Now, turning back to the main topic of my speech, I will start with the core mission of the Federal Reserve: to pursue the dual mandate, given to us by Congress, of promoting maximum employment and stable prices. We saw firsthand during the pandemic period why the price-stability portion of the mandate is so important. High inflation imposes significant hardship and erodes Americans’ purchasing power, especially for those least able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation. As a policymaker and economist, I think it is vitally important to have a good understanding of inflation dynamics and how those dynamics may have evolved over time. This knowledge allows me to pursue the best policies to deliver stable prices while maintaining a solid labor market.
    Waves of InflationFive years after the pandemic took hold suddenly and with little warning, there is a tendency to remember the inflation buildup as a fast and uniform phenomenon. But that was not the case. Inflation stemming from the pandemic shock came in waves. Today I will first describe the different waves of inflation experienced in the pandemic period. Then I invite you aboard the sailboat that we will use to navigate those waves: You could call it the SS Phillips Curve. The Phillips curve is a model that has been used for a long time to try to explain inflation dynamics and the tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment. Finally, I will discuss with you how this voyage may have changed the charts for policymakers.
    Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S., and much of the world’s developed economies, experienced a prolonged period of low inflation. Then, when the economy broadly shut down in March and April 2020, the U.S. experienced a brief period of deflation. But by the middle of that year, we saw that the first of several waves of inflation began hitting the economy’s shores.
    The first notable wave of inflation came from food prices. With many restaurants closed and people fearful of gathering, consumers pivoted their spending to grocery stores and online grocery delivery to meet their families’ needs, with some stockpiling essential items because they feared future shortages. This jump in demand was met with snarled supply chains for food processing and groceries. Annual food inflation reached a first peak of 5 percent in June 2020. There was a second food inflation wave with the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the middle of 2022. Beyond the cost alone, grocery prices are an important determinant of inflation expectations for consumers since food is purchased so frequently.2 Another wave of inflation came from goods other than food and energy—what economists call “core goods.” In the years immediately before the pandemic, goods prices were not a significant source of inflation. During the expansion from 2009 until 2020, core goods inflation declined 0.5 percent annually on average. However, once the pandemic took hold, consumer demand rotated from services to goods. At the same time, additional supply chain issues arose, including closed factories and disrupted ports. As consumption rapidly shifted toward goods, their prices rose sharply.3 Core goods inflation picked up markedly in the spring of 2021 and reached a peak of 7.6 percent on a 12-month basis in February 2022. This was a notable development because, during most of this century, goods price deflation offset price increases in other categories and thus kept a lid on overall inflation.
    A third wave of inflation came from services costs, excluding housing. Near the start of the pandemic, millions of Americans lost their jobs, and many left the labor market, with some retiring and others fearful of being exposed to the virus. When the economy began to reopen from shutdowns, demand for workers rose faster than the supply. As a result, the labor market quickly became very tight. To attract workers, employers raised wages. And to offset that expense, many raised prices. Given that labor is the most important input into the production of services, core services inflation ensued, reaching a peak of 5.2 percent on a 12-month basis in December 2021. Core services inflation stayed persistently high until it began to turn down in February 2023.
    The final wave of inflation I will discuss came from PCE housing services inflation. During the pandemic, many Americans reassessed housing choices, including those who preferred to move to detached homes in the suburbs from multifamily dwellings in cities. The supply of housing has long been constrained, so when a further increase in demand met limited supply, prices rose. Housing inflation rose to a peak of 8.27 percent on a 12-month basis in April 2023 and has moved lower since then. The run-up in housing inflation came more slowly, but it is also the component most slowly to abate. This is an area that experienced catch-up inflation, as housing inflation rises and falls slowly because rents are reset infrequently, usually only once a year for most renters.
    For the remainder of this discussion, I will focus on core inflation, and specifically core goods and core services inflation. My objective is to discuss several additions to an augmented Phillips curve model that allow us to capture the dynamics of those waves we encountered on our journey.
    The Traditional Phillips CurveSince price stability and maximum employment are the two components of the Fed’s dual-mandate goal, it is important for policymakers to be able to interpret the inflation process and relate it to macroeconomic conditions, including unemployment. One traditional way of understanding the usual tradeoff between inflation and unemployment is the use of the Phillips curve. It was first employed by New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips in 1958 to describe a simple relationship between wage growth and unemployment. Basically, it demonstrates that wage inflation is lower when unemployment is high, and higher when unemployment is low. Since then, several variants and updates have been offered to the Phillips curve model, and I will offer updates, too.
    One of the most notable updates came from Milton Friedman in 1967 in his presidential address to the American Economic Association.4 In that speech, he argued that there is only a temporary tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, because inflation depends on both the unemployment rate relative to a natural rate (the unemployment gap) and expectations of future inflation.
    The unemployment gap measures how much unemployment is above or below some reference level such as the natural rate of unemployment, or NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment), which is thought to be the normal level of unemployment absent cyclical forces. An unemployment rate that is above the reference level indicates that there is slack in the economy. Conversely, if the unemployment rate is below the reference level, the economy is tight. The unemployment gap has an inverse relation to wage and price inflation, because slack in the economy means that there are excess resources to meet demand while tightness in the labor market means there is little room to expand demand without putting upward pressure on prices. Let’s turn now to the other ingredient in Friedman’s Phillips curve: inflation expectations. Inflation expectations represent the rate at which people expect prices to rise in the future. A Phillips curve model that includes inflation expectations is called an “expectations-augmented Phillips curve.”
    The idea behind adding inflation expectations to a Phillips curve is that workers care about their inflation-adjusted wage, rather than nominal wages, over the course of a period of employment when bargaining their pay. Meanwhile, price-setting firms care about their relative price in pricing their products. Both sets of agents must forecast as best as possible the future path of inflation to efficiently bargain their wages or set their prices. In other words, both parties form expectations about the general price level, and these expectations will feed back into the inflation process.5 Friedman assumed that inflation expectations respond to lagged observed inflation—or what are called “adaptive expectations”—and when that is so, it provides a mechanism for inflation to be persistent.
    This view captured inflation dynamics in the 1970s and early 1980s fairly well; however, it was not broadly applicable to the period from the late 1980s through 2019, often called the “Great Moderation.” Rather, regarding inflation dynamics over an extended period, inflation appears to be more strongly related to long-run inflation expectations than to lagged inflation or short-run inflation expectations measures. Monetary policy can play an important role in setting long-run inflation expectations. Both wage seekers and price setters form their inflation expectations, in part, from their beliefs about the central bank’s inflation goal. When long-run inflation expectations stay close to the central bank’s goal, we say that inflation expectations are anchored at that goal. That goal is currently set at 2 percent, and long-run inflation expectations have indeed been in a tight range around that target.6
    The empirical literature on the Phillips curve has considered additional variables that may affect inflation and used those variables to create new versions of a Phillips curve. For example, Phillips curves have long included measures of “cost-push” pressures such as core import prices. These cost pressures more fully capture shocks to firms’ costs coming from global price pressures and not captured by other measures of slack. Other Phillips curves also include lags of inflation to capture persistence in the inflation process.7
    To summarize, the empirical literature has come to the conclusion that inflation dynamics can best be captured by a Phillips curve that includes lags of inflation, long-run inflation expectations, and a measure of slack, as well as import and energy prices as cost-push shocks. An instance of that formulation of a Phillips curve is included in former Chair Janet Yellen’s speech from 2015.8 Next, I would like to assess the accuracy of this baseline model during the recent run-up of inflation and consider how to augment the Phillips curve model with some new variables that may be able to capture some of the shocks experienced during the pandemic and post-pandemic period. A large literature has emerged on how to interpret the recent run-up in inflation, and more research is needed to fully understand this complicated episode. The Phillips curve model that I will use is another approach to consider. This is a simple approach, but it is possible to consider more complex models, such as models that consider the joint dynamics of inflation and other variables or models that explicitly consider nonlinearities.9 However, I still see value in starting from this simple framework, seeing what it can and cannot explain about pandemic inflation, and then seeing whether the addition of certain variables can help the model more fully account for inflation during the pandemic.
    Estimation of the Phillips Curve TodayAs I just explained, the Phillips curve model allows flexibility in the choice of variables, but economists employing the model must decide how to weight these variables. And those weights must be chosen in some way. Economists choose weights by examining available data and deciding which capture the inflation process in the best possible way. This decision is called “estimation.” The modern way to undertake such an estimation is called “training.” Economists train a model on a specific set of data and consider different cuts of the data set to determine different ways to compute those weights.
    I will consider quarterly data that have been consistently produced since 1964, allowing us to include the periods of the Great Inflation, the Great Moderation, and the most recent inflation run-up. We could use this entire data set to train the model. However, subsample analysis also serves to prove some valuable points.
    First Result: Examining the Great ModerationLet’s start by updating former Fed Chair Yellen’s results. She estimated the model using the data during the so-called Great Moderation; I will update her results by training the model through 2019, the last year before the COVID-19 pandemic took hold in the U.S. As the term “moderation” implies, this was a period in which both inflation and output became much less volatile. We do not know exactly what brought about the Great Moderation. Hypotheses include the effects of better inventory management or better monetary policy. We do know, however, that inflation settled into a trend near to or slightly below 2 percent during that period. We estimate the model with data from this period, and we decompose how much of inflation is explained by the variables and how much is left unexplained, which economists call the “residual.” As it turns out, this model does a good job of capturing the inflation process over that period before the pandemic, and my results are similar to Yellen’s. The model explains 70 percent of the variation in inflation, meaning that only 30 percent of the variation in inflation is attributed to unexplained residuals. An alternative way to understand the unexplained part is as the standard deviation of the residual or the unexplained portion of the model, which was 0.50 percentage point for the period from 2010 to 2019, compared with the standard deviation of inflation of about 0.8 percentage point.
    This model, however, struggles to explain the run-up in inflation in the years immediately after the pandemic took hold. The unexplained portion of inflation, the residual, rises dramatically in 2021 and 2022. In 2021, the unexplained portion is almost 2 percentage points, and the following year, it is about 1.5 percentage points. Perhaps we should not be surprised by the outcome. These years saw inflation reach a four-decade peak, but the model has been trained on a Great Moderation sample that saw relatively quiet inflation.10
    Second Result: Using a Longer SampleThe results are more encouraging if, instead, we also include data from the previous period of significant inflation and train the model on data starting in 1964. Intuitively, it makes sense that including a period with persistent inflation, like the 1970s, might help us better understand another inflationary episode. I stop at 2019 because I want to see if training on data from the previous 55-year period can explain the post-2020 inflation.
    The model captures more of the most recent run-up in inflation when using the longer period of analysis. The unexplained residual drops to about 1.5 percentage points in 2021 and to a bit above 0.5 percentage point in 2022. Allowing for greater persistence in inflation allows an inflation equation to fit the pandemic period better, though it does not settle the question of whether the pandemic inflation was caused by large and persistent shocks or by large shocks and a persistent inflation process—for example, because of greater feedback between wages and prices.
    To improve the model further, it would be useful to include additional explanatory variables that could better capture the overheating of the economy. In what follows, I include variables that might account for factors experienced in the most recent bout of inflation, such as a very tight labor market and supply chain snarls.
    Third Result: Alternative Measure of SlackAs I mentioned before, the very tight labor market was an important contributor to inflation in recent years, especially to services inflation, yet the weight on the unemployment gap in the Phillips curve for the more recent period is very small. This measure of slack has become less and less important over time in explaining inflation, except during selected episodes such as in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, which was characterized by a very sluggish recovery. Outside of that episode, and very few others, the Phillips curve places little weight on that measure of slack in explaining inflation over the Great Moderation, including during the recent run-up. This is also a reflection of training the model over the Great Moderation, in which inflation moved fairly tightly around a very flat trend. Notice that this would suggest a “flat Phillips curve” or a big penalty in terms of unemployment needed to reduce inflation. Instead, I focus on another very promising alternative measure that I have paid a lot of attention to since I was chief economist at the Department of Labor—and again since I joined the Board of Governors—and that I am very familiar with as a scholar of labor markets. The measure is the ratio of vacancies to the level of unemployment.11 In effect, this ratio measures how much competition there is for a given job, or the “tightness” of the labor market. Labor is an important input into most production processes, and, thus, tightness in the labor market is closely related to price pressures. I use the standard version of this ratio that measures job openings from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey as the numerator and the unemployment level from the Current Population Survey as the denominator. This allows me to use data back to the 1960s.12 The vacancy-to-unemployment ratio as a measure of slack is more effective at explaining inflation than the unemployment gap. This represents an interesting result because it offers a larger role to heated labor markets in explaining the run-up in inflation. My results echo research that finds the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio is a helpful measure of slack to consider in out-of-sample forecasting exercises.13
    Fourth Result: Supply Chain SnarlsAlthough the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio offers a promising measure of slack and supply chain pressures due to labor shortages, that measure does not necessarily capture supply chain snarls whose roots lie outside of the labor market. As I mentioned earlier, there were substantial supply chain disruptions during the past few years that came at the same time as strong demand. That resulted in material and labor shortages. Attempts at quantifying supply-side disruptions have been around for some decades now.14 I rely on a new monthly shortages index created by a team of Fed Board economists, which relies on textual analysis to scan news articles for sentences that include the word pairs “labor shortages,” “material shortages,” or “food shortages.”15 The Shortage Index allows us to better measure cost-push pressures from different sources and is constructed all the way back to the beginning of the previous century. Thus, it makes a difference to have access to advances in natural language processing.16 When I add the Shortage Index to the baseline Phillips curve or to the vacancy-to-unemployment–based Phillips curve, I obtain that the Shortage Index explains an even larger portion of the inflation run-up during and after the pandemic. The residual for 2020 is cut in half, the residual for 2021 is about 1 percentage point, and the residual is effectively eliminated in 2022. I judge this a noteworthy result and a proof of concept that with additional augmentation, the Phillips curve model can better capture inflation dynamics during the recent period. Through the lens of this model, supply shortages played an important role in 2022 in constraining output to grow at an anemic rate and in pushing up inflation. Moreover, the model is also able to capture the decline in inflation in 2023 and 2024 despite the strong expansion in real activity. I view the Shortage Index as a powerful indicator of the nonlinear effects stemming from a compounding of the contemporaneous interaction of demand and supply bottlenecks.
    I have offered additional variables to account for a measure of slack as it relates to labor supply and material supply. This exercise could be extended further to better account for some of the subcategories of inflation that caused the waves I discussed earlier. For example, food inflation, which is characterized by two distinct waves, can mostly be explained by the Food Shortage Index, which captures a large portion of the residual in the baseline model.
    Lessons for the PolicymakerToday I have discussed the waves of inflation the country faced starting five years ago. I also talked about how the vessel we use to navigate those choppy waters can be improved upon. As I conclude, I want to discuss with you how central bankers might recalibrate their compasses, based on what we learned from considering these augmentations to Phillips curve models. I think a clear lesson is that no single model alone can give a policymaker an understanding of every possible state of the economy. Policymakers must be open to various options, models, and frameworks—and not be afraid to experiment in search of more accurate answers. Policymakers must be very attentive to the most recent contributions from academia and empirical practitioners. Broadly, that is the approach I take, and why I apply the same rigor I did as an academic researcher to the monetary policy decisions that I confront.
    The recent run-up in inflation in many ways was a rather unique period, spurred, at least initially, by the first onset of a global pandemic in more than a century. Fully understanding the dynamics at play has provided a tough test for economists. The models I described today have had some success in capturing salient features of the inflation process during the pandemic period. I hope this illustrative analysis helps you see the difficulties of forecasting inflation in real time.
    Another lesson to be learned from this experience is that the feared harsh tradeoff between unemployment and inflation, one that requires large costs in terms of job loss and reduction in incomes in order to reduce inflation, did not materialize in the years immediately after the 2022 inflation peak. Inflation has been significantly reduced while the labor market has remained solid. This is a historically unusual, but most welcome, outcome. While this outcome is in part due to the actions of Fed policymakers, it is also possible to explain that remarkable result through the lens of the models that I have presented today. A large fraction of the rise in inflation, most specifically core goods inflation, can be explained by supply chain snarls. The untangling of supply chains contributed to a decline in inflation with little cost in terms of unemployment. Likewise, labor markets were very tight in this period. As workers returned to the labor force, labor markets became less tight, and the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio declined. That corresponded with a subsequent decline in inflation. That is a consistent result because services inflation is closely connected to the cost of labor.
    Thank you for your time today. Once again, it is humbling to be asked to give the Whittington Lecture to honor the memory of fellow educator Leslie Whittington. I look forward to your questions.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. D’Acunto, Malmendier, Ospina, and Weber (2021) show that consumers disproportionately rely on the price changes of goods in their grocery bundles when forming expectations about aggregate inflation; see Francesco D’Acunto, Ulrike Malmendier, Juan Ospina, and Michael Weber (2021), “Exposure to Grocery Prices and Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 129 (May), pp. 1615–39. Return to text
    3. Ferrante, Graves, and Iacoviello (2020) show that a sharp reallocation of demand from one sector to another can exacerbate supply chain disruption and cause aggregate inflation; see Francesco Ferrante, Sebastian Graves, and Matteo Iacoviello (2023), “The Inflationary Effects of Sectoral Reallocation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, supp., vol. 140 (November), pp. S64–81. Return to text
    4. See Milton Friedman (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review, vol. 58 (March), pp. 1–17; and Edmund S. Phelps (1967), “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time,” Economica, vol. 34 (135), pp. 254–81. Return to text
    5. Friedman did not consider forward-looking price-setting firms, but more recent advances in macroeconomics do, such as New Keynesian models; see Jordi Galí (2015), Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework and Its Applications (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Return to text
    6. In an earlier speech, I have sketched a model in which agents infer the central bank target by observing inflation, interest rates, and unemployment data; see Adriana D. Kugler (2024), “Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the Albert Hirschman Lecture, 2024 Annual Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association and the Latin American and Caribbean Chapter of the Econometric Society, Montevideo, Uruguay, November 14. Return to text
    7. For a review of Phillips curve formulations, see Robert J. Gordon (2018), “Friedman and Phelps on the Phillips Curve Viewed from a Half Century’s Perspective,” Review of Keynesian Economics, vol. 6 (4), pp. 425–36. Return to text
    8. The model that I will use is similar to the one described by Janet Yellen in her famous speech at the University of Massachusetts in 2015; see Janet L. Yellen (2015), “Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, September 24. Return to text
    9. See Pierpaolo Benigno and Gauti B. Eggertsson (2023), “It’s Baaack: The Surge in Inflation in the 2020s and the Return of the Non-Linear Phillips Curve,” NBER Working Paper Series 31197 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, April). Return to text
    10. The results that I obtain for the 1990–2019 period are similar to those that Yellen reports for the 1990–2014 period. Return to text
    11. The ratio of job openings to unemployment has attracted the attention of many researchers. See, for instance, Olivier J. Blanchard and Ben S. Bernanke (2023), “What Caused the US Pandemic-Era Inflation?” NBER Working Paper Series 31417 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, June). Return to text
    12. Although job openings from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) go back only as far as the early 2000s, I use here the extended series from Barnichon that pieces together JOLTS data for the more recent period with a corrected version of the help-wanted index originally from the Conference Board for the period before 2001. See Regis Barnichon (2010), “Building a Composite Help-Wanted Index,” Economics Letters, vol. 109 (December), pp. 175–78. Return to text
    13. See Regis Barnichon and Adam Shapiro (2022), “What’s the Best Measure of Economic Slack?” FRBSF Economic Letter 2022-04 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, February); and Régis Barnichon and Adam Hale Shapiro (2024), “Phillips Meets Beveridge,” Journal of Monetary Economics, supp., vol. 148 (November), 103660. Return to text
    14. The Institute for Supply Management’s Supplier Deliveries Index has been around since the 1950s, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index since 1998, and the Census Bureau’s Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization since 2008. Return to text
    15. See Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, and David Yu (2024), “Measuring Shortages since 1900,” working paper. Their index is available at https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/shortages.html. Return to text
    16. Other authors have used natural language processing in an attempt to produce a measure of shortages. For instance, see Paul E. Soto (2023), “Measurement and Effects of Supply Chain Bottlenecks Using Natural Language Processing,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 6). Blanchard and Bernanke use Google searches for the word “shortage” as an indicator of sectoral supply constraints in a Phillips curve equation; see Blanchard and Bernanke, “What Caused the US Pandemic-Era Inflation?” in note 11. For an early-attempt, hand-coded shortage index, see Owen Lamont (1997), “Do ‘Shortages’ Cause Inflation?” in Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, eds., Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 281–306. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation Prices Public Offering of $300,000,000 6.340% Notes due 2030

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, CA, Feb. 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation (NASDAQ: OCSL) (“OCSL” or the “Company”), a specialty finance company, today announced that it has priced an underwritten public offering of $300.0 million aggregate principal amount of 6.340% notes due 2030. The notes will mature on February 27, 2030 and may be redeemed in whole or in part at the Company’s option at any time at par plus a “make-whole” premium, if applicable.

    OCSL expects to use the net proceeds of this offering to reduce its outstanding debt under its revolving credit facilities and for general corporate purposes.

    SMBC Nikko Securities America, Inc., BNP Paribas Securities Corp., ING Financial Markets LLC, Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, BofA Securities, Inc., J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC, CIBC World Markets Corp., Citigroup Global Markets Inc., Barclays Capital Inc., Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC are acting as joint book-running managers for this offering. KeyBanc Capital Markets Inc., First Citizens Capital Securities, LLC, Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., A Stifel Company, R. Seelaus & Co., LLC, B. Riley Securities, Inc., Blaylock Van, LLC, Citizens JMP Securities, LLC, Jefferies LLC and Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. are acting as co-managers for this offering. The offering is expected to close on February 27, 2025, subject to customary closing conditions.

    Investors are advised to carefully consider the investment objective, risks, charges and expenses of OCSL before investing. The pricing term sheet dated February 20, 2025, the preliminary prospectus supplement dated February 20, 2025 and the accompanying prospectus dated February 7, 2023, each of which have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, contain this and other information about the Company and should be read carefully before investing.

    The pricing term sheet, the preliminary prospectus supplement, the accompanying prospectus and this press release are not offers to sell any securities of OCSL and are not soliciting an offer to buy such securities in any jurisdiction where such offer and sale is not permitted.

    The offering may be made only by means of a preliminary prospectus supplement and an accompanying prospectus. Copies of the preliminary prospectus supplement (and accompanying prospectus) may be obtained by calling SMBC Nikko Securities America, Inc. at 1-212-224-5135, BNP Paribas Securities Corp. at 1-800-854-5674, ING Financial Markets LLC at 1-877-446-4930 or Wells Fargo Securities, LLC at 1-800-645-3751.

    About Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation

    Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation (NASDAQ:OCSL) is a specialty finance company dedicated to providing customized one-stop credit solutions to companies with limited access to public or syndicated capital markets. The Company’s investment objective is to generate current income and capital appreciation by providing companies with flexible and innovative financing solutions including first and second lien loans, unsecured and mezzanine loans, and preferred equity. The Company is regulated as a business development company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, and is externally managed by Oaktree Fund Advisors, LLC, an affiliate of Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Some of the statements in this press release constitute forward-looking statements because they relate to future events, future performance or financial condition. The forward-looking statements may include statements as to: future operating results of the Company and distribution projections; business prospects of the Company and the prospects of its portfolio companies; and the impact of the investments that the Company expects to make. In addition, words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “seek,” “plan,” “should,” “estimate,” “project” and “intend” indicate forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements include these words. The forward-looking statements contained in this press release involve risks and uncertainties. Certain factors could cause actual results and conditions to differ materially from those projected, including the uncertainties associated with (i) changes in the economy, financial markets and political environment, including the impacts of inflation and elevated interest rates; (ii) risks associated with possible disruption in the operations of the Company or the economy generally due to terrorism, war or other geopolitical conflict (including the current conflicts in Ukraine and Israel), natural disasters, pandemics or cybersecurity incidents; (iii) future changes in laws or regulations (including the interpretation of these laws and regulations by regulatory authorities); (iv) conditions in the Company’s operating areas, particularly with respect to business development companies or regulated investment companies; and (v) other considerations that may be disclosed from time to time in the Company’s publicly disseminated documents and filings. The Company has based the forward-looking statements included in this press release on information available to it on the date of this press release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update any such forward-looking statements. The Company undertakes no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, you are advised to consult any additional disclosures that it may make directly to you or through reports that the Company in the future may file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K.

    Contacts
    Investor Relations:
    Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation
    Dane Kleven
    (213) 356-3260
    ocsl-ir@oaktreecapital.com

    The MIL Network –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: CarGurus Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Q4’24 Marketplace revenue grew 15% YoY

    Q4’24 International revenue grew 26% YoY and OEM Advertising revenue grew double-digit YoY

    Q4’24 Consolidated GAAP Net Income of $45.9 million; Q4’24 Non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA of $76.4 million, up 25% YoY

    BOSTON, Feb. 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CarGurus, Inc. (Nasdaq: CARG), the No. 1 visited digital auto platform for shopping, buying, and selling new and used vehicles*, today announced financial results for the fourth quarter and year ended December 31, 2024.

    “We delivered exceptional results in 2024, with sustained revenue acceleration and significant margin expansion across geographies. Our Marketplace business achieved double-digit growth, driven by continued migration to premium tiers, strong OEM advertising demand, and growing adoption of our value-added products and services,” said Jason Trevisan, Chief Executive Officer at CarGurus. “Our relentless focus on product innovation and our ability to enhance dealers’ ROI throughout their workflow resulted in higher engagement and increased wallet share as dealers consolidate their investment with the highest-yielding online marketplaces. Looking ahead to 2025, we are excited about the opportunity to further consolidate our leadership position, leveraging our data-driven actionable insights and our unique ability to deliver dealer-specific competitive intelligence.”

    Fourth Quarter and Full Year Financial Highlights

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31, 2024     December 31, 2024  
        Results
    (in millions)    		     Variance from Prior Year     Results
    (in millions)    		     Variance from Prior Year  
    Revenue                        
    Marketplace Revenue   $ 210.2       15 %   $ 796.6       14 %
    Wholesale Revenue     9.9       (55 )%     51.2       (49 )%
    Product Revenue     8.5       (55 )%     46.6       (60 )%
    Total Revenue   $ 228.5       2 %   $ 894.4       (2 )%
                             
    Gross Profit (1)   $ 199.0       18 %   $ 738.9       13 %
    % Margin     87 %   1,176 bps       83 %   1,136 bps  
                             
    Operating Expenses (2)   $ 145.7       (23 )%   $ 725.5       17 %
                             
    GAAP Consolidated Net Income (3)   $ 45.9     NM(5)     $ 21.0       (5 )%
    % Margin     20 %   NM(5)       2 %   (7) bps  
                             
    Non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA (4)   $ 76.4       25 %   $ 247.2       26 %
    % Margin (4)     33 %   602 bps       28 %   623 bps  
                             
    Cash, Cash Equivalents, and Short-Term Investments   $ 304.2       (3 )%   $ 304.2       (3 )%

    (1)  During the three months ended December 31, 2024, no impairment was recorded. During the year ended December 31, 2024, we recorded a $9.9 million impairment-related charge in cost of revenue.
    (2)  During the three months ended December 31, 2024, no impairment was recorded. During the year ended December 31, 2024, we recorded a $134.5 million impairment-related charge in operating expenses.
    (3)  During the three months ended December 31, 2024, no impairment was recorded. During the year ended December 31, 2024, we recorded a $144.4 million impairment-related charge.
    (4)  For more information regarding our use of non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA and other non-GAAP financial measures, please see the reconciliations of GAAP financial measures to non-GAAP financial measures and the section titled “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Other Business Metrics” below.
    (5)  Not meaningful.

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31, 2024     December 31, 2024  
        Results     Variance from Prior Year     Results     Variance from Prior Year  
    Key Performance Indicators (1)                        
    U.S. Paying Dealers (2)     24,692       2 %     24,692       2 %
    International Paying Dealers (2)     7,318       11 %     7,318       11 %
    Total Paying Dealers (2)     32,010       3 %     32,010       3 %
                             
    U.S. QARSD (2)   $ 7,337       12 %   $ 7,337       12 %
    International QARSD (2)   $ 2,072       17 %   $ 2,072       17 %
    Consolidated QARSD (2)   $ 6,144       12 %   $ 6,144       12 %
                             
    Transactions     7,066       (48 )%     34,395       (47 )%
                             
    U.S. Average Monthly Unique Users (in millions) (3)     29.3     N/A(5)     N/A(5)     N/A(5)  
    U.S. Average Monthly Sessions (in millions) (3)     74.6     N/A(5)     N/A(5)     N/A(5)  
                             
    International Average Monthly Unique Users (in millions) (3)     9.1     N/A(5)     N/A(5)     N/A(5)  
    International Average Monthly Sessions (in millions) (3)     19.2     N/A(5)     N/A(5)     N/A(5)  
                             
    Segment Reporting (in millions)                        
    U.S. Marketplace Segment Revenue   $ 193.4       15 %   $ 733.7       13 %
    U.S. Marketplace Segment Operating Income   $ 56.1       30 %   $ 182.7       43 %
    Digital Wholesale Segment Revenue   $ 18.3       (55 )%   $ 97.8       (55 )%
    Digital Wholesale Segment Operating Loss (4)   $ (5.5 )   NM(6)     $ (179.3 )   NM(6)  

    (1)  For more information regarding our use of Key Performance Indicators, please see the section titled “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Other Business Metrics” below.
    (2)  Metrics presented as of December 31, 2024.
    (3)  CarOffer website is excluded from the metrics presented for users and sessions.
    (4)  During the three months ended December 31, 2024, no impairment was recorded. During the year ended December 31, 2024, we recorded a $144.4 million impairment-related charge.
    (5)  As a result of the change from Google Universal Analytics (“Google Analytics”) to Google Analytics 4 (“GA4”) on July 1, 2024, we are unable to provide comparable monthly unique users or monthly sessions information for this period. For more information regarding the change in methodology for monthly unique users or monthly sessions, please see the section titled “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Other Business Metrics” below.
    (6)  Not meaningful.

    First Quarter 2025 Guidance

    The table below provides CarGurus’ guidance, which is based on recent market trends, industry conditions, and management’s expectations and assumptions as of today.

      Guidance Metrics Range
      Total revenue $216 million to $236 million
      Marketplace revenue $209 million to $214 million
      Non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA $60 million to $68 million
      Non-GAAP EPS $0.41 to $0.47

    The first quarter 2025 non-GAAP EPS calculation assumes 107.0 million diluted weighted-average common shares outstanding.

    The assumptions that are built into guidance for the first quarter 2025 regarding our pace of paid dealer acquisition, churn, and expansion activity for the relevant period are based on recent market trends and industry conditions. Guidance for the first quarter 2025 excludes macro-level industry issues that result in dealers and consumers materially changing their recent market trends or that cause us to enact measures to assist dealers. Guidance also excludes any potential impact of future foreign currency exchange gains or losses.

    CarGurus has not reconciled its guidance of non-GAAP consolidated adjusted EBITDA to GAAP consolidated net income or non-GAAP EPS to GAAP EPS because reconciling items between such GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures, which include, as applicable, stock-based compensation, amortization of intangible assets, impairment, depreciation expenses, non-intangible amortization, transaction-related expenses, other income, net, the provision for income taxes, and income tax effects, cannot be reasonably predicted due to, as applicable, the timing, amount, valuation, and number of future employee equity awards and the uncertainty relating to the timing, frequency, and effect of acquisitions and the significance of the resulting transaction-related expenses, and therefore cannot be determined without unreasonable effort.

    Conference Call and Webcast Information

    CarGurus will host a conference call and live webcast to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 financial results and business outlook at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time today, February 20, 2025. To access the conference call, dial (877) 451-6152 for callers in the U.S. or Canada, or (201) 389-0879 for international callers. The webcast will be available live on the Investors section of CarGurus’ website at https://investors.cargurus.com.

    An audio replay of the call will also be available to investors beginning at approximately 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time today, February 20, 2025, until 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on March 6, 2025, by dialing (844) 512-2921 for callers in the U.S. or Canada, or (412) 317-6671 for international callers, and entering passcode 13750508. In addition, an archived webcast will be available on the Investors section of CarGurus’ website at https://investors.cargurus.com.

    About CarGurus

    CarGurus (Nasdaq: CARG) is a multinational, online automotive platform for buying and selling vehicles that is building upon its industry-leading listings marketplace with both digital retail solutions and the CarOffer online wholesale platform. The CarGurus platform gives consumers the confidence to purchase and/or sell a vehicle either online or in person, and it gives dealerships the power to accurately price, effectively market, instantly acquire, and quickly sell vehicles, all with a nationwide reach. The Company uses proprietary technology, search algorithms, and data analytics to bring trust, transparency, and competitive pricing to the automotive shopping experience. CarGurus is the most visited automotive shopping site in the U.S.*

    CarGurus also operates online marketplaces under the CarGurus brand in Canada and the U.K. In the U.S. and the U.K., CarGurus also operates the Autolist and PistonHeads online marketplaces, respectively, as independent brands.

    To learn more about CarGurus, visit www.cargurus.com, and for more information about CarOffer, visit www.caroffer.com.

    *Source: Similarweb, Traffic Report (Cars.com, Autotrader, TrueCar, CARFAX Listings
    (defined as CARFAX Total visits minus Vehicle History Reports traffic), Q4 2024, U.S.

    CarGurus® and Autolist® are each a registered trademark of CarGurus, Inc., and CarOffer® is a registered trademark of CarOffer, LLC. PistonHeads® is a registered trademark of CarGurus Ireland Limited in the United Kingdom and the European Union. All other product names, trademarks, and registered trademarks are property of their respective owners.

    © 2025 CarGurus, Inc., All Rights Reserved.

    Cautionary Language Concerning Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes forward-looking statements. Other than statements of historical facts, all statements contained in this press release, including statements regarding our future financial and operating results; our first quarter 2025 financial and business performance, including guidance; our business and growth strategy and our plans to execute on our growth strategy; our ability to grow our business profitably and efficiently; our capital allocation and investment strategy; the attractiveness and value proposition of our current offerings and other product opportunities; our ability to maintain existing and acquire new customers; addressable opportunities; our expectation that we will continue to invest in growth initiatives; our ability to quickly make transformations necessary for our business to achieve long-term goals; and the impact of macro-level issues on our industry, business, and financial results, are forward-looking statements. The words “aim,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “goal,” “guide,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “potential,” “predicts,” “projects,” “seeks,” “should,” “strive,” “target,” “will,” “would,” and similar expressions and their negatives are intended to identify forward-looking statements. We have based these forward-looking statements on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy, short-term and long-term business operations and objectives, and financial needs. You should not rely upon forward-looking statements as predictions of future events.

    These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those reflected in such statements, including risks related to our growth and our ability to grow our revenue; our relationships with dealers; competition in the markets in which we operate; market growth; our ability to innovate; our ability to realize benefits from our acquisitions and successfully implement the integration strategies in connection therewith; impairment of the carrying value of our goodwill, intangible assets, right-of-use assets, or other assets; increased inflation and interest rates, global supply chain challenges, and other macroeconomic issues; changes in our key personnel; natural disasters, epidemics, or pandemics; and our ability to operate in compliance with applicable laws as well as other risks and uncertainties as may be detailed from time to time in our Annual Reports on Form 10-K and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and other reports we file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover, we operate in very competitive and rapidly changing environments. New risks emerge from time to time. It is not possible for our management to predict all risks, nor can we assess the impact of all factors on our business or the extent to which any factor, or combination of factors, may cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statements we may make. In light of these risks, uncertainties, and assumptions, we cannot guarantee that future results, levels of activity, performance, achievements, or events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will occur. We are under no duty to update any of these forward-looking statements after the date of this press release to conform these statements to actual results or revised expectations, except as required by law. You should, therefore, not rely on these forward-looking statements as representing our views as of any date subsequent to the date of this press release.

    Investor Contact:
    Kirndeep Singh
    Vice President, Head of Investor Relations
    investors@cargurus.com

    Media Contact:
    Maggie Meluzio
    Director, Public Relations and External Communications
    pr@cargurus.com

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (in thousands, except share and per share data)

        As of December 31,  
        2024     2023  
    Assets            
    Current assets:            
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 304,193     $ 291,363  
    Short-term investments     —       20,724  
    Accounts receivable, net of allowance for doubtful accounts of $788 and $610, respectively     44,248       39,963  
    Inventory     338       331  
    Prepaid expenses, prepaid income taxes and other current assets     27,868       25,152  
    Deferred contract costs     12,523       11,095  
    Restricted cash     2,036       2,563  
    Total current assets     391,206       391,191  
    Property and equipment, net     130,010       83,370  
    Intangible assets, net     11,767       23,056  
    Goodwill     46,167       157,898  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     121,484       169,682  
    Deferred tax assets     106,672       73,356  
    Deferred contract costs, net of current portion     13,196       12,998  
    Other non-current assets     4,034       7,376  
    Total assets   $ 824,536     $ 918,927  
    Liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interest and stockholders’ equity            
    Current liabilities:            
    Accounts payable   $ 26,410     $ 47,854  
    Accrued expenses, accrued income taxes and other current liabilities     35,975       33,718  
    Deferred revenue     21,661       21,322  
    Operating lease liabilities     9,005       12,284  
    Total current liabilities     93,051       115,178  
    Operating lease liabilities     183,739       182,106  
    Deferred tax liabilities     26       58  
    Other non–current liabilities     6,031       4,733  
    Total liabilities     282,847       302,075  
    Stockholders’ equity:            
    Preferred stock, $0.001 par value per share; 10,000,000 shares authorized;
    no shares issued and outstanding    		     —       —  
    Class A common stock, $0.001 par value per share; 500,000,000 shares
    authorized; 89,002,571 and 92,175,243 shares issued and outstanding at
    December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively    		     89       92  
    Class B common stock, $0.001 par value per share; 100,000,000 shares
    authorized; 14,986,745 and 15,999,173 shares issued and outstanding at
    December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively    		     15       16  
    Additional paid–in capital     169,013       263,498  
    Retained earnings     375,119       354,147  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (2,547 )     (901 )
    Total stockholders’ equity     541,689       616,852  
    Total liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interest and stockholders’ equity   $ 824,536     $ 918,927  

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Income Statements
    (in thousands, except share and per share data)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Revenue                        
    Marketplace   $ 210,194     $ 182,250     $ 796,599     $ 698,236  
    Wholesale     9,850       22,035       51,201       100,908  
    Product     8,494       18,838       46,584       115,098  
    Total revenue     228,538       223,123       894,384       914,242  
    Cost of revenue(1)                        
    Marketplace     13,899       14,190       54,950       60,020  
    Wholesale(2)     7,068       22,286       54,340       90,066  
    Product     8,582       18,612       46,149       112,702  
    Total cost of revenue     29,549       55,088       155,439       262,788  
    Gross profit     198,989       168,035       738,945       651,454  
    Operating expenses:                        
    Sales and marketing     76,448       73,827       322,249       304,070  
    Product, technology, and development     35,948       36,737       144,432       146,169  
    General and administrative     28,384       75,667       112,066       152,757  
    Impairment     —       —       134,501       —  
    Depreciation and amortization     4,931       4,069       12,285       15,831  
    Total operating expenses     145,711       190,300       725,533       618,827  
    Income (loss) from operations     53,278       (22,265 )     13,412       32,627  
    Other income, net:                        
    Interest income     3,126       5,093       12,189       18,430  
    Other (expense) income, net     (1,066 )     782       (944 )     630  
    Total other income, net     2,060       5,875       11,245       19,060  
    Income (loss) before income taxes     55,338       (16,390 )     24,657       51,687  
    Provision for income taxes     9,457       6,213       3,685       29,634  
    Consolidated net income (loss)     45,881       (22,603 )     20,972       22,053  
    Net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest     —       (4,698 )     —       (14,889 )
    Net income (loss) attributable to CarGurus, Inc.   $ 45,881     $ (17,905 )   $ 20,972     $ 36,942  
    Deemed dividend on redemption of noncontrolling interest     —       5,838       —       5,838  
    Net income (loss) attributable to common stockholders   $ 45,881     $ (23,743 )   $ 20,972     $ 31,104  
    Net income (loss) per share attributable to common stockholders:                        
    Basic   $ 0.44     $ (0.21 )   $ 0.20     $ 0.27  
    Diluted   $ 0.43     $ (0.21 )   $ 0.20     $ 0.19  
    Weighted–average number of shares of common stock used in computing net income (loss) per share attributable to common stockholders:                        
    Basic     103,838,821       110,988,515       104,535,572       113,240,139  
    Diluted     106,116,888       110,988,515       106,263,886       114,188,834  

    (1)  For the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 and for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, there was depreciation and amortization of $2,107, $8,692, $13,075, and $32,643, respectively, in cost of revenue.
    (2)  For the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, no impairment was recorded in cost of revenue. For the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, we recorded impairment of $9,930 and $184, respectively in cost of revenue.

    Unaudited Segment Revenue
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Segment Revenue:                        
    U.S. Marketplace   $ 193,395     $ 168,897     $ 733,688     $ 647,284  
    Digital Wholesale     18,344       40,872       97,785       216,005  
    Other     16,799       13,354       62,911       50,953  
    Total   $ 228,538     $ 223,123     $ 894,384     $ 914,242  

    Unaudited Segment Income (Loss) from Operations
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Segment Income (Loss) from Operations:                        
    U.S. Marketplace   $ 56,068     $ 43,281     $ 182,738     $ 127,724  
    Digital Wholesale     (5,500 )     (67,199 )     (179,315 )     (96,383 )
    Other     2,710       1,653       9,989       1,286  
    Total   $ 53,278     $ (22,265 )   $ 13,412     $ 32,627  

    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Operating Activities                        
    Consolidated net income (loss)   $ 45,881     $ (22,603 )   $ 20,972     $ 22,053  
    Adjustments to reconcile consolidated net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:                        
    Depreciation and amortization     7,038       12,761       25,360       48,474  
    Gain on sale of property and equipment     —       —       —       (460 )
    Currency loss (gain) on foreign denominated transactions     1,205       (532 )     971       (283 )
    Other non-cash (income) expense, net     —       (80 )     (816 )     88  
    Deferred taxes     13,996       (5,735 )     (33,348 )     (37,864 )
    Provision for doubtful accounts     517       131       2,051       378  
    Stock-based compensation expense     15,658       19,968       62,272       63,737  
    Amortization of deferred financing costs     128       128       515       515  
    Amortization of deferred contract costs     3,734       3,188       13,975       11,817  
    Impairment     —       —       144,431       184  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:                        
    Accounts receivable     527       10,638       (4,866 )     10,975  
    Inventory     (261 )     (3,001 )     (112 )     1,958  
    Prepaid expenses, prepaid income taxes, and other assets     (8,720 )     (7,525 )     (1,627 )     (1,498 )
    Deferred contract costs     (4,394 )     (4,752 )     (15,701 )     (18,440 )
    Accounts payable     (15,433 )     903       (4,663 )     2,080  
    Accrued expenses, accrued income taxes, and other liabilities     6,465       (4,435 )     3,897       (3,419 )
    Deferred revenue     (193 )     270       362       9,067  
    Lease obligations     9,589       3,172       41,821       15,165  
    Net cash provided by operating activities     75,737       2,496       255,494       124,527  
    Investing Activities                        
    Purchases of property and equipment     (10,236 )     (15,515 )     (75,173 )     (24,563 )
    Proceeds from sale of property and equipment     —       —       —       460  
    Capitalization of website development costs     (3,462 )     (4,875 )     (18,776 )     (16,648 )
    Purchases of short-term investments     —       (1,268 )     (494 )     (98,016 )
    Sale of short-term investments     —       72,462       21,218       77,462  
    Advance payments to customers, net of collections     —       2,649       259       (259 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by investing activities     (13,698 )     53,453       (72,966 )     (61,564 )
    Financing Activities                        
    Proceeds from issuance of common stock upon exercise of stock options     4,848       —       4,923       74  
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements of restricted stock units     (7,500 )     (3,859 )     (24,891 )     (15,597 )
    Repurchases of common stock     —       (101,115 )     (146,180 )     (208,524 )
    Payment of excise taxes on repurchases of common stock     (1,584 )     —       (1,584 )     —  
    Payment of finance lease obligations     (19 )     (18 )     (75 )     (70 )
    Payment of tax distributions to redeemable noncontrolling interest holders     —       —       —       (38 )
    Acquisition of remaining interest in CarOffer, LLC     —       (25,014 )     —       (25,014 )
    Change in gross advance payments received from third-party transaction processor     (118 )     48       (822 )     (4,475 )
    Net cash used in financing activities     (4,373 )     (129,958 )     (168,629 )     (253,644 )
    Impact of foreign currency on cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash     (2,178 )     981       (1,596 )     475  
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash     55,488       (73,028 )     12,303       (190,206 )
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at beginning of period     250,741       366,954       293,926       484,132  
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at end of period   $ 306,229     $ 293,926     $ 306,229     $ 293,926  

    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Consolidated Net Income (Loss) to Non-GAAP Consolidated Net Income and Non-GAAP Net Income Attributable to Common Stockholders and GAAP Net Income (Loss) Per Share Attributable to Common Stockholders to Non-GAAP Net Income Per Share Attributable to Common Stockholders:
    (in thousands, except per share data)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    GAAP consolidated net income (loss)   $ 45,881     $ (22,603 )   $ 20,972     $ 22,053  
    Stock-based compensation expense     15,658       14,071       62,492       57,913  
    Stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units(1)     —       55,543       —       55,543  
    Amortization of intangible assets     507       7,513       3,655       30,062  
    Impairment(2)     —       —       144,431       184  
    Transaction-related expenses     421       1,044       1,536       1,044  
    Income tax effects and adjustments     (3,767 )     (16,807 )     (49,798 )     (27,489 )
    Non-GAAP consolidated net income   $ 58,700     $ 38,761     $ 183,288     $ 139,310  
    Non-GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest     —       (456 )     —       (1,686 )
    Non-GAAP net income attributable to common stockholders   $ 58,700     $ 39,217     $ 183,288     $ 140,996  
    GAAP net income (loss) per share attributable to common stockholders:                        
    Basic   $ 0.44     $ (0.21 )   $ 0.20     $ 0.27  
    Diluted   $ 0.43     $ (0.21 )   $ 0.20     $ 0.19  
    Non-GAAP net income per share attributable to common stockholders:                        
    Basic   $ 0.57     $ 0.35     $ 1.75     $ 1.25  
    Diluted   $ 0.55     $ 0.35     $ 1.72     $ 1.23  
    Shares used in GAAP and Non-GAAP per share calculations                        
    Basic     103,839       110,989       104,536       113,240  
    Diluted     106,117       110,989       106,264       114,189  

    (1)  CarOffer, LLC Units consist of CO Incentive Units, Subject Units (each as defined in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K as of December 31, 2024, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 2025), and payments made to noncontrolling interest holders. 
    (2)  During the three months ended June 30, 2024, we updated the table to disclose impairment in Non-GAAP Consolidated Net Income and Non-GAAP Net Income Attributable to Common Stockholders; the three months and year ended December 31, 2023 have been updated for comparison purposes.

    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Net Loss Attributable to Redeemable Noncontrolling Interest to Non-GAAP Net Loss Attributable to Redeemable Noncontrolling Interest
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest   $ —     $ (4,698 )   $ —     $ (14,889 )
    Stock-based compensation expense(1)     —       144       —       783  
    Stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units (1)     —       2,249       —       2,249  
    Amortization of intangible assets(1)     —       1,849       —       10,171  
    Non-GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest   $ —     $ (456 )   $ —     $ (1,686 )

    (1)  These exclusions are adjusted to reflect the noncontrolling interest of 38% for the period prior to our acquisition of the remaining minority equity interests in CarOffer, LLC in December 2023 (the “2023 CarOffer Transaction”).

    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Consolidated Net Income (Loss) to Non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA and GAAP Consolidated Net Income (Loss) Margin to Non-GAAP Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA Margin
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    GAAP consolidated net income (loss)   $ 45,881     $ (22,603 )   $ 20,972     $ 22,053  
    Depreciation and amortization     7,038       12,761       25,360       48,474  
    Impairment     —       —       144,431       184  
    Stock-based compensation expense     15,658       14,071       62,492       57,913  
    Stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units     —       55,543       —       55,543  
    Transaction-related expenses     421       1,044       1,536       1,044  
    Other income, net     (2,060 )     (5,875 )     (11,245 )     (19,060 )
    Provision for income taxes     9,457       6,213       3,685       29,634  
    Non-GAAP consolidated adjusted EBITDA     76,395       61,154       247,231       195,785  
    Non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest     —       (303 )     —       83  
    Non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA   $ 76,395     $ 61,457     $ 247,231     $ 195,702  
                             
    GAAP consolidated net income (loss) margin     20 %     (10 )%     2 %     2 %
    Non-GAAP consolidated adjusted EBITDA margin     33 %     27 %     28 %     21 %

    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Net Loss Attributable to Redeemable Noncontrolling Interest to Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA Attributable to Redeemable Noncontrolling Interest
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest   $ —     $ (4,698 )   $ —     $ (14,889 )
    Depreciation and amortization (1)     —       1,989       —       10,863  
    Impairment (1)     —       —       —       67  
    Stock-based compensation expense (1)     —       144       —       783  
    Stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units (1)     —       2,249       —       2,249  
    Other expense, net (1)     —       13       —       985  
    Provision for income taxes (1)     —       —       —       25  
    Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest   $ —     $ (303 )   $ —     $ 83  

    (1)  These exclusions are adjusted to reflect the noncontrolling interest of 38% for the period prior to the 2023 CarOffer Transaction.


    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Gross Profit to Non-GAAP Gross Profit and GAAP Gross Profit Margin to Non-GAAP Gross Profit Margin
    (in thousands, except percentages)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Revenue   $ 228,538     $ 223,123     $ 894,384     $ 914,242  
    Cost of revenue     29,549       55,088       155,439       262,788  
    GAAP gross profit     198,989       168,035       738,945       651,454  
    Stock-based compensation expense included in Cost of revenue     105       186       492       699  
    Stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units included in Cost of revenue     —       1,671       —       1,671  
    Amortization of intangible assets included in Cost of revenue     —       5,250       875       21,016  
    Transaction-related expenses included in Cost of revenue     —       —       92       —  
    Impairment included in Cost of revenue (1)     —       —       9,930       184  
    Non-GAAP gross profit   $ 199,094     $ 175,142     $ 750,334     $ 675,024  
                             
    GAAP gross profit margin     87 %     75 %     83 %     71 %
    Non-GAAP gross profit margin     87 %     78 %     84 %     74 %

    (1)  During the three months ended June 30, 2024, we updated the table to disclose impairment in Non-GAAP Gross Profit and Non-GAAP Gross Profit Margin; the three months and year ended December 31, 2023 have been updated for comparison purposes.


    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Expense to Non-GAAP Expense
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended December 31, 2024  
        GAAP expense     Stock-based
    compensation
    expense    		     Stock-Based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units     Amortization of
    intangible assets    		     Impairment (2)     Transaction-related expenses     Non-GAAP
    expense    		  
    Cost of revenue   $ 29,549     $ (105 )   $ —     $ —     $ —     $ —     $ 29,444  
    Sales and marketing     76,448       (3,035 )     —       —       —       (3 )     73,410  
    Product, technology, and development     35,948       (6,278 )     —       —       —       (283 )     29,387  
    General and administrative     28,384       (6,240 )     —       —       —       (135 )     22,009  
    Impairment     —       —       —       —       —       —       —  
    Depreciation & amortization     4,931       —       —       (507 )     —       —       4,424  
    Operating expenses(1)   $ 145,711     $ (15,553 )   $ —     $ (507 )   $ —     $ (421 )   $ 129,230  
    Total cost of revenue and operating expenses   $ 175,260     $ (15,658 )   $ —     $ (507 )   $ —     $ (421 )   $ 158,674  
                                               
        Three Months Ended December 31, 2023  
        GAAP expense     Stock-based
    compensation
    expense    		     Stock-Based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units     Amortization of
    intangible assets    		     Impairment (2)     Transaction-related expenses     Non-GAAP
    expense    		  
    Cost of revenue   $ 55,088     $ (186 )   $ (1,671 )   $ (5,250 )   $ —     $ —     $ 47,981  
    Sales and marketing     73,827       (2,701 )     (2,273 )     —       —       (1 )     68,852  
    Product, technology, and development     36,737       (5,408 )     (2,458 )     —       —       (3 )     28,868  
    General and administrative     75,667       (5,776 )     (49,141 )     —       —       (1,040 )     19,710  
    Impairment     —       —       —       —       —       —       —  
    Depreciation & amortization     4,069       —       —       (2,263 )     —       —       1,806  
    Operating expenses(1)   $ 190,300     $ (13,885 )   $ (53,872 )   $ (2,263 )   $ —     $ (1,044 )   $ 119,236  
    Total cost of revenue and operating expenses   $ 245,388     $ (14,071 )   $ (55,543 )   $ (7,513 )   $ —     $ (1,044 )   $ 167,217  
                                               
        Year Ended December 31, 2024  
        GAAP expense     Stock-based
    compensation
    expense    		     Stock-Based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units     Amortization of
    intangible assets    		     Impairment (2)     Transaction-related expenses     Non-GAAP
    expense    		  
    Cost of revenue   $ 155,439     $ (492 )   $ —     $ (875 )   $ (9,930 )   $ (92 )   $ 144,050  
    Sales and marketing     322,249       (12,176 )     —       —       —       (573 )     309,500  
    Product, technology, and development     144,432       (24,443 )     —       —       —       (346 )     119,643  
    General and administrative     112,066       (25,381 )     —       —       —       (525 )     86,160  
    Impairment     134,501       —       —       —       (134,501 )     —       —  
    Depreciation & amortization     12,285       —       —       (2,780 )     —       —       9,505  
    Operating expenses(1)   $ 725,533     $ (62,000 )   $ —     $ (2,780 )   $ (134,501 )   $ (1,444 )   $ 524,808  
    Total cost of revenue and operating expenses   $ 880,972     $ (62,492 )   $ —     $ (3,655 )   $ (144,431 )   $ (1,536 )   $ 668,858  
                                               
        Year Ended December 31, 2023  
        GAAP expense     Stock-based
    compensation
    expense    		     Stock-Based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units     Amortization of
    intangible assets    		     Impairment (2)     Transaction-related expenses     Non-GAAP
    expense    		  
    Cost of revenue   $ 262,788     $ (699 )   $ (1,671 )   $ (21,016 )   $ (184 )   $ —     $ 239,218  
    Sales and marketing     304,070       (11,437 )     (2,273 )     —       —       (1 )     290,359  
    Product, technology, and development     146,169       (23,476 )     (2,458 )     —       —       (3 )     120,232  
    General and administrative     152,757       (22,301 )     (49,141 )     —       —       (1,040 )     80,275  
    Impairment     —       —       —       —       —       —       —  
    Depreciation & amortization     15,831       —       —       (9,046 )     —       —       6,785  
    Operating expenses(1)   $ 618,827     $ (57,214 )   $ (53,872 )   $ (9,046 )   $ —     $ (1,044 )   $ 497,651  
    Total cost of revenue and operating expenses   $ 881,615     $ (57,913 )   $ (55,543 )   $ (30,062 )   $ (184 )   $ (1,044 )   $ 736,869  

    (1)  Operating expenses include sales and marketing, product, technology, and development, general and administrative, impairment, and depreciation & amortization. 
    (2)  During the three months ended June 30, 2024, we updated the table above to disclose impairment in Non-GAAP Expense; the three months and year ended December 31, 2023 have been updated for comparison purposes.


    Unaudited Reconciliation of GAAP Net Cash and Cash Equivalents Provided by Operating Activities to Non-GAAP Free Cash Flow
    (in thousands)

        Three Months Ended     Year Ended  
        December 31,     December 31,  
        2024     2023     2024     2023  
    GAAP net cash and cash equivalents provided by operating activities   $ 75,737     $ 2,496     $ 255,494     $ 124,527  
    Purchases of property and equipment     (10,236 )     (15,515 )     (75,173 )     (24,563 )
    Capitalization of website development costs     (3,462 )     (4,875 )     (18,776 )     (16,648 )
    Non-GAAP free cash flow   $ 62,039     $ (17,894 )   $ 161,545     $ 83,316  

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Other Business Metrics

    To supplement our consolidated financial statements, which are prepared and presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the U.S. (“GAAP”), we provide investors with certain non-GAAP financial measures and other business metrics, which we believe are helpful to our investors. We use these non-GAAP financial measures and other business metrics for financial and operational decision-making purposes and as a means to evaluate period-to-period comparisons. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures and other business metrics provide useful information about our operating results, enhance the overall understanding of past financial performance and future prospects, and allow for greater transparency with respect to metrics used by our management in its financial and operational decision-making.

    The presentation of non-GAAP financial information and other business metrics is not meant to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the directly comparable financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP. While our non-GAAP financial measures and other business metrics are an important tool for financial and operational decision-making and for evaluating our own operating results over different periods of time, we urge investors to review the reconciliation of these financial measures to the comparable GAAP financial measures included above, and not to rely on any single financial measure to evaluate our business.

    While a reconciliation of non-GAAP guidance measures to corresponding GAAP measures is not available on a forward-looking basis without unreasonable effort due to, as applicable, the timing, amount, valuation, and number of future employee equity awards and the uncertainty relating to the timing, frequency, and effect of acquisitions and the significance of the resulting transaction-related expenses, we have provided a reconciliation of non-GAAP financial measures and other business metrics to the nearest comparable GAAP measures in the accompanying financial statement tables included in this press release.

    We monitor operating measures of certain non-GAAP items including non-GAAP gross profit, non-GAAP gross margin, non-GAAP expense, non-GAAP consolidated net income, non-GAAP net income attributable to common stockholders, and non-GAAP net income per share attributable to common stockholders. These non-GAAP financial measures exclude the effect of stock-based compensation expense, stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units, amortization of intangible assets, impairments, and transaction related-expenses. Non-GAAP consolidated net income, non-GAAP net income attributable to common stockholders, and non-GAAP net income per share attributable to common stockholders also exclude certain income tax effects and adjustments. Non-GAAP net income attributable to common stockholders and non-GAAP net income per share attributable to common stockholders also exclude non-GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest. We define non-GAAP net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest as net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest, adjusted to exclude: stock-based compensation expense, stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units, and amortization of intangible assets. These exclusions are adjusted for redeemable noncontrolling interest, as applicable. Our calculations of non-GAAP net income per share attributable to common stockholders utilize applicable GAAP share counts as included in the accompanying financial statement tables included in this press release. In addition, we evaluate our non-GAAP gross profit in relation to our revenue. We refer to this as non-GAAP gross profit margin and define it as non-GAAP gross profit divided by total revenue. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures provide useful information about our operating results, enhance the overall understanding of past financial performance and future prospects, and allow for greater transparency with respect to metrics used by our management in its financial and operational decision-making.

    We define Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA as consolidated net income (loss), adjusted to exclude: depreciation and amortization, impairments, stock-based compensation expense, stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units, transaction-related expenses, other income, net, and provision for income taxes.

    We define Adjusted EBITDA as Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA adjusted to exclude: Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest.

    We define Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest as net loss attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest, adjusted to exclude: depreciation and amortization, impairments, stock-based compensation expense, stock-based compensation expense for CarOffer, LLC Units, other expense, net, and provision for income taxes. These exclusions are adjusted for redeemable noncontrolling interest of 38% by taking the noncontrolling interest’s full financial results and multiplying each line item in the reconciliation by 38%. We note that we use 38%, versus 49%, to allocate the share of loss because it represents the portion attributable to the redeemable noncontrolling interest. The 38% is exclusive of CO Incentive Units, Subject Units, and 2021 Incentive Units (as each term is defined in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on February 20, 2025), which are liability-classified awards that do not participate in the share of loss. Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest is reflective of the 2023 CarOffer Transaction. Following the 2023 CarOffer Transaction there was no redeemable noncontrolling interest as of December 1, 2023, and as a result, Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA is equivalent to Adjusted EBITDA for the three months and year ended December 31, 2024.

    In addition, we evaluate our Non-GAAP consolidated Adjusted EBITDA in relation to our revenue. We refer to this as Non-GAAP consolidated Adjusted EBITDA margin and define it as Non-GAAP consolidated Adjusted EBITDA divided by total revenue.

    We have presented Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, and Adjusted EBITDA margin because they are key measures used by our management and Board of Directors to understand and evaluate our operating performance, generate future operating plans, and make strategic decisions regarding the allocation of capital. We believe Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA help identify underlying trends in our business that could otherwise be masked by the effect of the expenses that we exclude. Accordingly, we believe that Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA provide useful information to investors and others in understanding and evaluating our operating results, enhancing the overall understanding of our past performance and future prospects, and allowing for greater transparency with respect to key financial metrics used by our management in its financial and operational decision making. We have presented Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest because it is used by our management to reconcile Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA to Adjusted EBITDA. It represents the portion of Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA that is attributable to our redeemable noncontrolling interest and enables an investor to gain a clearer understanding of the portion of Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA that is attributable to our redeemable noncontrolling interest. Adjusted EBITDA attributable to redeemable noncontrolling interest is not intended to be reviewed on its own.

    We define Free Cash Flow as cash flow from operations adjusted to include: purchases of property and equipment and capitalization of website development costs. We have presented Free Cash Flow because it is a measure of our financial performance that represents the cash that we are able to generate after expenditures required to maintain or expand our asset base.

    We define a paying dealer as a dealer account with an active, paid marketplace subscription at the end of a defined period. The number of paying dealers we have is important to us and we believe it provides valuable information to investors because it is indicative of the value proposition of our marketplace products, as well as our sales and marketing success and opportunity, including our ability to retain paying dealers and develop new dealer relationships.

    We define Quarterly Average Revenue per Subscribing Dealer (“QARSD”), which is measured at the end of a fiscal quarter, as the marketplace revenue primarily from subscriptions to our Listings packages and Real-time Performance Marketing, our digital advertising suite, and other digital add-on products during that trailing quarter divided by the average number of paying dealers in that marketplace during the quarter. We calculate the average number of paying dealers for a period by adding the number of paying dealers at the end of such period and the end of the prior period and dividing by two. This information is important to us, and we believe it provides useful information to investors, because we believe that our ability to grow QARSD is an indicator of the value proposition of our products and the return on investment that our paying dealers realize from our products. In addition, increases in QARSD, which we believe reflect the value of exposure to our engaged audience in relation to subscription cost, are driven in part by our ability to grow the volume of connections to our users and the quality of those connections, which result in increased opportunity to upsell package levels and cross-sell additional products to our paying dealers.

    We define Transactions within the Digital Wholesale segment as the number of vehicles processed from car dealers, consumers, and other marketplaces through the CarOffer website within the defined period. Transactions consists of each unique vehicle (based on vehicle identification number) that reaches “sold and invoiced” status on the CarOffer website within the defined period, including vehicles sold to car dealers, vehicles sold at third-party auctions, vehicles ultimately sold to a different buyer, and vehicles that are returned to their owners without completion of a sale transaction. We exclude vehicles processed within CarOffer’s intra-group trading solution (Group Trade) from the definition of Transactions, and we only count any unique vehicle once even if it reaches sold status multiple times. The Digital Wholesale segment includes the purchase and sale of vehicles between dealers, or Dealer-to-Dealer transactions, and Sell My Car – Instant Max Cash Offer transactions. We view Transactions as a key business metric, and we believe it provides useful information to investors, because it provides insight into growth and revenue for the Digital Wholesale segment. Transactions drive a significant portion of Digital Wholesale segment revenue. We believe growth in Transactions demonstrates consumer and dealer utilization and our market share penetration in the Digital Wholesale segment.

    Historically, we have used data from Google Analytics to measure two of our key business metrics: monthly unique users and monthly sessions. Effective July 1, 2024, GA4 replaced Google Analytics. The methodologies used in GA4 are different and not comparable to the methodologies used in Google Analytics. As discussed below, we also make certain adjustments to the GA4 data in order to improve the accuracy of the reported monthly unique users and monthly sessions. Due to the change in methodology, we are unable to provide comparable monthly unique user and monthly session information for prior periods, including any periods prior to June 30, 2024.

    For each of our websites (excluding the CarOffer website), we define a monthly unique user as an individual who has visited any such website and taken a Visitor Action (as defined below) within a calendar month, based on data as measured by GA4. We calculate average monthly unique users as the sum of the monthly unique users of each of our websites in a defined period, divided by the number of months in that period. Effective July 1, 2024, we count a unique user the first time a computer or mobile device with a unique device identifier accesses any of our websites or application during a calendar month and takes an action on such website or in such application, such as performing a search, visiting vehicle detail pages, and connecting with a dealer, which we refer to as a Visitor Action. If an individual accesses a website or application using a different device within a given month, the first Visitor Action taken by each such device is counted as a separate unique user. If an individual uses multiple browsers on a single device and/or clears their cookies and returns to our website or application and takes a Visitor Action within a calendar month, each such Visitor Action is counted as a separate unique user. We eliminate any duplicate unique users that may arise when users visit a webview within our native application. We view our average monthly unique users as a key indicator of the quality of our user experience, the effectiveness of our advertising and traffic acquisition, and the strength of our brand awareness. Measuring unique users is important to us and we believe it provides useful information to our investors because our marketplace revenue depends, in part, on our ability to provide dealers with connections to our users and exposure to our marketplace audience. We define connections as interactions between consumers and dealers on our marketplace through phone calls, email, managed text and chat, and clicks to access the dealer’s website or map directions to the dealership.

    We define monthly sessions as the number of distinct visits to our websites (excluding the CarOffer website) that include a Visitor Action that take place each month within a given time frame, as measured and defined by GA4. We calculate average monthly sessions as the sum of the monthly sessions in a defined period, divided by the number of months in that period. Effective July 1, 2024, a session is defined as beginning with the first Visitor Action from a computer or mobile device and ending at the earliest of when a user closes their browser window or after 30 minutes of inactivity. We eliminate any duplicate monthly sessions that may arise when users visit a webview within our native application. We believe that measuring the volume of sessions in a time period, when considered in conjunction with the number of unique users in that time period, is an important indicator to us of consumer satisfaction and engagement with our marketplace, and we believe it provides useful information to our investors because the more satisfied and engaged consumers we have, the more valuable our service is to dealers.

    The MIL Network –

    February 21, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Summary of the Joint NASA LCLUC–SARI Synthesis Meeting

    Source: NASA

    Introduction
    The NASA Land-Cover and Land-Use Change (LCLUC) is an interdisciplinary scientific program within NASA’s Earth Science program that aims to develop the capability for periodic global inventories of land use and land cover from space. The program’s goal is to develop the mapping, monitoring and modeling capabilities necessary to simulate the processes taking place and evaluate the consequences of observed and predicted changes. The South/Southeast Asia Research Initiative (SARI) has a similar goal for South/Southeast Asia, as it seeks to develop innovative regional research, education, and capacity building programs involving state-of-the-art remote sensing, natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences to enrich land use/cover change (LUCC) science in South/Southeast Asia. Thus it makes sense for these two entities to periodically meet jointly to discuss their endeavors.
    The latest of these joint meetings took place January 1–February 2, 2024, in Hanoi, Vietnam. A total of 85 participants attended the three-day, in-person meeting—see Photo.  A total of 85 participants attended the three-day, in-person meeting. The attendees represented multiple international institutions, including NASA (Headquarters and Centers), the University of Maryland, College Park (UMD), other American academic institutions, the Vietnam National Space Center (VNSC, the event host), the Vietnam National University’s University of Engineering and Technology, and Ho Chi Minh University of Technology, the Japanese National Institute of Environmental Studies (NIES), Center for Environmental Sciences, and the University of Tokyo. In addition, several international programs participated, including GEO Global Agricultural Monitoring (GEOGLAM), the System for Analysis, Research and Training (START), Global Observation of Forest and Land-use Dynamics (GOFC–GOLD), and NASA Harvest.

    Meeting Overview
    The purpose of the 2024 NASA LCLUC–SARI Synthesis meeting was to discuss LUCC issues – with a particular focus on their impact on Southeast Asian countries. Presenters highlighted ongoing projects aimed to advance our understanding of the spatial extent, intensity, social consequences, and impacts on the environment in South/Southeast Asian countries. While presenters reported on specific science results, they also were intentional to review and synthesize work from other related projects going on in Southeast Asia. 
    Meeting Goal
    The meeting’s overarching goal was to create a comprehensive and holistic understanding of various LUCC issues by examining them from multiple angles, including: collating information; employing interdisciplinary approaches; integrating research; identifying key insights; and enhancing regional collaborations. The meeting sought to bring the investigators together to bridge gaps, promote collaborations, and advance knowledge regarding LUCC issues in the region. The meeting format also provided ample time between sessions for networking to promote coordination and collaboration among scientists and teams. 
    Meeting and Summary Format
    The meeting consisted of seven sessions that focused on various LUCC issues. The summary report that follows is organized by day and then by session. All presentations in Session I and II are summarized (i.e., with all speakers, affiliations, and appropriate titles identified). The keynote presentation(s) from Sessions III–VI are summarized similarly. The technical presentations in each of these sessions are presented as narrative summaries. Session VII consisted of topical discussions to close out the meeting and summaries of these discussions are included herein. Sessions III–VI also included panel discussions, but to keep the article length more manageable, summaries of these discussions have been omitted. Readers interested in learning more about the panel discussions or viewing any of these presentations in full can access the information on the Joint LCLUC–SARI Synthesis meeting website.
    DAY ONE
    The first day of the meeting included welcoming remarks from the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam (Session I), program executives of LCLUC and SARI,  as well as from national space agencies in South and Southeast Asia (Session II), and other LCLUC-thematic/overview presentations (Session III).
    Session 1: Welcoming Remarks
    Garik Gutman [NASA Headquarters—LCLUC Program Manager], Vu Tuan [VNSC’s Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST)—Vice Director General], Chris Justice [University of Maryland, College Park (UMD)—LCLUC Program Scientist], Matsunaga Tsuneo [National Institute of Environmental Studies (NIES), Japan], and Krishna Vadrevu [NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center—SARI Lead] delivered opening remarks that highlighted collaborations across air pollution, agriculture, forestry, urban development, and other LUCC research areas. While each of the speakers covered different topics, they emphasized common themes, including advancing new science algorithms, co-developing products, and fostering applications through capacity building and training.
    After the opening remarks, special guest Marc Knapper [U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam] gave a presentation in which he emphasized the value of collaborative research between U.S. and Vietnamese scientists to address environmental challenges – especially climate change and LUCC issues. He expressed appreciation to the meeting organizers for promoting these collaborations and highlighted the joint initiatives between NASA and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to monitor environmental health and climate change, develop policies to reduce emissions, and support adaptation in agriculture. The U.S.–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership emphasizes the commitment to address climate challenges and advance bilateral research. He concluded by encouraging active participation from all attendees and stressed the need for ongoing international collaboration to develop effective LUCC policies.
    Session-II: Programmatic and Space Agency Presentations
    NOTE: Other than Ambassador Knapper, the presenters in Session I gave welcoming remarks and programmatic and/or space agency presentations in Session II,.
    Garik Gutman began the second session by presenting an overview of the LCLUC program, which aims to enhance understanding of LUCC dynamics and environmental implications by integrating diverse data sources (i.e., satellite remote sensing) with socioeconomic and ecological datasets for a comprehensive view of land-use change drivers and consequences. Over the past 25 years, LCLUC has funded over 325 projects involving more than 800 researchers, resulting in over 1500 publications. The program’s focus balances project distribution that spans detection and monitoring, and impacts and consequences, including drivers, modeling, and synthesis. Gutman highlighted examples of population growth and urban expansion in Southeast Asia, resulting in environmental and socio-economic impacts. Urbanization accelerates deforestation, shifts farming practices to higher-value crops, and contributes to the loss of wetlands. This transformation alters the carbon cycle, degrades air quality, and increases flooding risks due to reduced rainwater absorption. Multi-source remote sensing data and social dimensions are essential in addressing LUCC issues, and the program aims to foster international collaborations and capacity building in land-change science through partnerships and training initiatives. (To learn more about the recent activities of the LCLUC Science Team, see Summary of the 2024 Land Cover Land Use Change Science Team Meeting.)
    Krishna Vadrevu explained how SARI connects regional and national projects with researchers from the U.S. and local institutions to advance LUCC mapping, monitoring, and impact assessments through shared methodologies and data. The initiative has spurred extensive activities, including meetings, training sessions, publications, collaborations, and fieldwork. To date, the LCLUC program has funded 35 SARI projects and helped build collaborations with space agencies, universities, and decision-makers worldwide. SARI Principal Investigators have documented notable land-cover and land-use transformations, observing shifts in land conversion practices across Asia. For example, the transition from traditional slash-and-burn practices for subsistence agriculture to industrial oil palm and rubber plantations in Southeast Asia. Rapid urbanization has also reshaped several South and Southeast Asian regions, expanding both horizontally in rural areas and vertically in urban centers. The current SARI solicitation funds three projects across Asia, integrating the latest remote sensing data and methods to map, monitor, and assess LUCC drivers and impacts to support policy-making.
    Vu Tuan provided a comprehensive overview of Vietnam’s advances in satellite technology and Earth observation capabilities, particularly through the LOTUSat-1 satellite (name derived from the “Lotus” flower), which is equipped with an advanced X-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) sensor capable of providing high-resolution imagery [ranging from 1–16 m (3–52 ft)]. This satellite is integral to Vietnam’s efforts to enhance disaster management and climate change mitigation, as well as to support a range of applications in topography, agriculture, forestry, and water management, as well as in oceanography and environmental monitoring. The VNSC’s efforts are part of a broader strategy to build national expertise and self-reliance in satellite technology, such as developing a range of small satellites (e.g., NanoDragon, PicoDragon, and MicroDragon) that progress in size and capability. Alongside satellite development, the VNSC has established key infrastructure, facilities, and capacity building in Hanoi, Nha Trang, and Ho Chi Minh City to support satellite assembly, integration, testing, and operation. Tuan showcased the application of remotely sensed LUCC data to map and monitor urban expansion in Ha Long city from 2000–2023 and the policies needed to manage these changes sustainably – see Figure 1.

    Tsuneo Matsunaga provided a detailed overview of Japan’s Greenhouse Gases Observing Satellite (GOSAT) series of satellites, data from which provide valuable insights into global greenhouse gas (GHG) trends and support international climate agreements, including the Paris Agreement.
    Matsunaga reviewed the first two satellites in the series: GOSAT and GOSAT-2, then previewed the next satellite in the series: GOSAT-GW, which is scheduled to launch in 2025. GOSAT-GW will fly the Total Anthropogenic and Natural Emissions Mapping Observatory–3 (TANSO-3) – an improved version of TANSO-2, which flies on GOSAT-2. TANSO-3 includes a Fourier Transform Spectrometer (FTS-3) that has improved spatial resolution [10.5 km (6.5 mi)] over TANSO-FTS-2 and precision that matches or exceeds that of its predecessor. TANSO-FTS-3 will allow estimates with precision better than 1 ppm for carbon dioxide (CO2) and 10 ppb for methane (CH4), as well as enabling nitrogen dioxide (NO2) measurements. GOSAT–GW will also fly the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer (AMSR3) that will monitor water cycle components (e.g., precipitation, soil moisture) and ocean surface winds. AMSR3 builds on the heritage of three previous AMSR instruments that have flown on NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) missions.
    Matsunaga also highlighted the importance of ground-based validation networks, such as the Total Carbon Column Observing Network, COllaborative Carbon Column Observing Network, and the Pandora Global Network, to ensure satellite data accuracy.
    Son Nghiem [NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)] addressed dynamic LUCC in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. The synthesis study examined the factors that evolve along the rural–urban continuum (RUC). Nghiem showcased this effort using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) data from the Copernicus Sentinel-1 mission to map a typical RUC in Bac Lieu, Vietnam – see Figure 2.

    Nghiem described the study, which examined the role of rapid urbanization, agricultural conversion, climate change, and environment–human feedback processes in causing non-stationary and unpredictable impacts. This work illustrates how traditional trend analysis is insufficient for future planning. The study also examined whether slower or more gradual changes could inform policy development. To test these hypotheses, his research will integrate high-resolution radar and hyperspectral data with socioeconomic analyses. The study highlights the need for policies that are flexible and responsive to the unique challenges of different areas, particularly in “hot-spot” regions experiencing rapid changes.
    Peilei Fan [Tufts University] presented a study that synthesizes the complex patterns of LUCC, identifying both the spatial and temporal dynamics that characterize transitions in urban systems. The study explores key drivers, including economic development, population growth, urbanization, agricultural expansion, and policy shifts. She emphasized the importance of understanding these drivers for sustainable land management and urban planning. For example, the Yangon region of Myanmar has undergone rapid urbanization – see Figure 3. Her work reveals the need for integrated approaches that consider both urban and rural perspectives to manage land resources effectively and mitigate negative environmental and social impacts. Through a combination of case studies, statistical analysis, and policy review, Fan and her team aim to provide a nuanced understanding of the interactions between human activities and environmental changes occurring in the rapidly transforming landscapes of Southeast Asia.

    Session III: Land Cover/Land Use Change Studies
    Tanapat Tanaratkaittikul [Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA), Thailand] highlighted GISTDA activities, which play a crucial role in advancing Thailand’s technological capabilities and addressing both national and global challenges, including Thailand Earth Observation System (THEOS) and its successors: THEOS-2 and THEOS-2A. THEOS-1, which launched in 2008, provides 2-m (6-ft) panchromatic and 15-m (45-ft) multispectral resolution with a 26-day revisit cycle, which can be reduced to 3 days with off-nadir pointing. Launched in 2023, THEOS-2 includes two satellites – THEOS-2A [a very high-resolution satellite with 0.5-m (1.5-ft) panchromatic and 2-m (6-ft) multispectral imagery] and THEOS-2B [a high-resolution satellite with 4-m (12-ft) multispectral resolution] – with a five-day revisit cycle. GISTDA also develops geospatial applications for drought assessment, flood prediction, and carbon credit calculations to support government decision-making and climate initiatives. GISTDA partners with international collaborators on regional projects, such as the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Special Fund Project.
    Eric Vermote [NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center] presented a keynote that focused on atmospheric correction of land remote sensing data and related algorithm updates. He highlighted the necessity of correcting surface imaging for atmospheric effects, such as molecular scattering, aerosol scattering, and gaseous absorption, which can significantly distort the satellite spectral signals and lead to potential errors in applications, such as land cover mapping, vegetation monitoring, and climate change studies.
    Vermote explained that the surface reflectance algorithm uses precise vector radiative transfer modeling to improve accuracy by incorporating atmospheric parameter inversion. It also adjusts for various atmospheric conditions and aerosol types – enhancing corrections across regions and seasons. He explained that SkyCam – a network of ground-based cameras – provides real-time assessments of cloud cover that can be used to validate cloud masks, while the Cloud and Aerosol Measurement System (CAMSIS) offers additional ground validation by measuring atmospheric conditions. He said that together, SkyCam and CAMSIS improve satellite-derived cloud masks, supporting more accurate climate models and environmental monitoring. Vermote’s work highlights the ongoing advancement of atmospheric correction methods in remote sensing.
    Other presentations in this session included one in which the speaker described how Yangon, the capital city in Myanmar, is undergoing rapid urbanization and industrial growth. From 1990–2020, the urban area expanded by over 225% – largely at the expense of agricultural and green lands. Twenty-nine industrial zones cover about 10.92% of the city, which have attracted significant foreign direct investment, particularly in labor-intensive sectors. This growth has led to challenges with land confiscations, inadequate infrastructure, and environmental issues (e.g., air pollution). Additionally, rural migration for employment has resulted in informal settlements, emphasizing the need for comprehensive urban planning that balances economic development with social equity and sustainability.
    Another presentation highlighted varying LUCC trends across Vietnam. In the Northern and Central Coastal Uplands, for example, swidden systems are shifting toward permanent tree crops, such as rubber and coffee. Meanwhile, the Red River Delta is seeing urban densification and consolidation of farmland – transitioning from rice to mixed farming with increased fruit and flower production. Similarly, the Central Coastal Lowlands and Southeastern regions are experiencing urban growth and a shift from coastal agriculture – in this case, to shrimp farming – leading to mangrove loss. The Central Highlands is moving from swidden to tree crops, particularly fruit trees, while the Mekong River Delta is increasing rice cropping and aquaculture. These changes contribute to urbanization, altered farming practices, and biodiversity loss. Advanced algorithms (e.g., the Time-Feature Convolutional Neural Network model) are being used to effectively map these varied LUCC changes in Vietnam.
    Another presenter explained how 10-m (33-ft) resolution spatially gridded population datasets are essential to address LUCC in environmental and socio-demographic research. There was also a demonstration of PopGrid, which is a collaborative initiative that provides access to various global-gridded population databases, which are valuable for regional LUCC studies and can support informed decision-making and policy development.
    DAY TWO
    The second day’s presentations centered around urban LUCC (Session IV) as well as interconnections between agriculture and water resources. (Session V).
    Session IV: Urban Land Cover/Land Use Change
    Gay Perez [Philippines Remote Sensing Agency (PhilSA)] presented a keynote focused on PhilSA’s mission to advance Philippines as a space-capable country by developing indigenous satellite and launch technologies. He explained that PhilSA provides satellite data in various categories, including sovereign, commercial, open-access, and disaster-activated. He noted that the ground infrastructure – which includes three stations and a new facility in Quezon – supports efficient data processing. For example, Perez stated that in 2023, PhilSA produced over 10,000 maps for disaster relief, agricultural assessments, and conservation planning.
    Perez reviewed PhilSA’s Diwata-2 mission, which launched in 2018 and operates in a Sun-synchronous orbit around 620 km (385 mi) above Earth. With a 10-day revisit capability, it features a high-precision telescope [4.7 m (15ft) resolution], a multispectral imager with four bands, an enhanced resolution camera, and a wide-field camera. Since launch, Diwata-2 has captured over 100,000 global images, covering 95% of the Philippines. Looking to the near future, Perez reported that PhilSA’s launch of the Multispectral Unit for Land Assessment (MULA) satellite is planned for 2025. He explained that MULA will capture images with a 5-m (~16-ft) resolution and 10–20-day revisit time, featuring 10 spectral bands for vegetation, water, and urban analysis.
    Perez also described the Drought and Crop Assessment and Forecasting project, which addresses drought risks and mapping ground motion in areas, e.g., Baguio City and Pangasinan. Through partnerships in the Pan-Asia Partnership for Geospatial Air Pollution Information (PAPGAPI) and the Pandora Asia Network, PhilSA monitors air quality across key locations, tracking urban pollution and cross-border particulate transport. PhilSA continues to strengthen Southeast Asian partnerships to drive sustainable development in the region.
    Jiquan Chen [Michigan State University] presented the second keynote address, which focused on the Urban Rural Continuum (URC). Chen emphasized the importance of synthesizing studies that explore factors such as population dynamics, living standards, and economic development in the URC. Key considerations include differentiating between two- and three-dimensional infrastructures and understanding constraints from historical contexts. Chen highlighted critical variables from his analysis including net primary productivity, household income, and essential infrastructure elements, such as transportation and healthcare systems. He advocated for integrated models that combine mechanistic and empirical approaches to grasp the dynamics of URC changes, stressing their implications for urban planning, environmental sustainability, and social equity. He concluded with a call for collaboration to enhance these models and tackle challenges arising from the changing urban–rural landscape.
    Tep Makathy [Cambodian Institute For Urban Studies] discussed urbanization in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He explained that significant LUCC and infrastructure developments have been fueled by direct foreign investment; however, this development has resulted in environmental degradation, urban flooding, and infrastructure strain. Tackling pollution, congestion, preservation of green spaces, and preserving the historical heritage of the city will require sustainable urban planning efforts.
    Nguyen Thi Thuy Hang [Vietnam Japan University, Vietnam National University, Hanoi] explained how flooding poses a significant annual threat to infrastructure and livelihoods in Can Tho, Vietnam. Therefore, it is essential to incorporate climate change considerations into land-use planning by enhancing the accuracy of vegetation layer classifications. Doing so will improve the representation of land-cover dynamics in models that decision-makers use when planning urban development. In addition, Hang reported that a more comprehensive survey of dyke systems will improve flood protection and identify areas needing reinforcement or redesign. These studies could also explore salinity intrusion in coastal agricultural areas that could impact crop yields and endanger food security.
    In this session, two presenters highlighted how SAR data, which uses high backscatter to enhance the radar signal, is being used to assist with mapping urban areas in their respective countries. The phase stability and orientation of building structures across SAR images aid in consistent monitoring and backscatter, producing distinct image textures specific to urban settings. Researchers can use this heterogeneity and texture to map urban footprints, enabling automated discrimination between urban and non-urban areas. The first presenters showed how Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar techniques, such as Small Baseline Subset (SBAS) and Persistent Scatterer (PS) have been highly effective for mapping and monitoring land subsidence in coastal and urban areas in Vietnam. This approach has been applied to areas along the Saigon River as well as in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam. The second presenter described an approach (using SAR data with multitemporal coherence and the K-means classification method) that has been used effectively to study urban growth in the Denpasar Greater Area of Indonesia between 2016 and 2022. The technique identified the conversion of 4376 km2 (1690 mi2) of rural to built-up areas, averaging 72.9 hectares (0.3 mi2) per year. Urban sprawl was predominantly observed in the North Kuta District, where the shift from agricultural to built-up land use has been accompanied by severe traffic congestion and other environmental issues.
    Another presenter showed how data from the QuikSCAT instrument, which flew on the Quick Scatterometer satellite, and from the Sentinel-1 C-band SAR can be combined to measure and analyze urban built-up volume, specifically focusing on the vertical growth of buildings across various cities. By integrating these datasets, researchers can assess urban expansion, monitor the development of high-rise buildings, and evaluate the impact of urbanization on infrastructure and land use. This information is essential for urban planning, helping city planners and policymakers make informed decisions to accommodate growing populations and enhance sustainable urban development.
    Session V – LUCC, Agriculture, and Water Resources
    Chris Justice presented the keynote for this session, in which he addressed the GEOGLAM initiative and the NASA Harvest program. GEOGLAM, initiated by the G20 Agriculture Ministers in 2011, focuses on agriculture and food security to increase market transparency and improve food security. These efforts leverage satellite-based Earth observations to produce and disseminate timely, relevant, and actionable information about agricultural conditions at national, regional, and global scales to support agricultural markets and provide early warnings for proactive responses to emerging food emergencies. NASA Harvest uses satellite Earth observations to benefit global food security, sustainability, and agriculture for disaster response, climate risk assessments, and policy support. Justice also emphasized the use of open science and open data principles, promoting the integration of Earth observation data into national and international agricultural monitoring systems. He also discussed the development and application of essential agricultural variables, in situ data requirements, and the need for comprehensive and accurate satellite data products.
    During this session, another presentation focused on how VNSC is engaged in several agricultural projects, including mapping rice crops, estimating yields, and assessing environmental impacts. VNSC has created high-accuracy rice maps for different seasons that the Vietnamese government uses to monitor and manage agricultural production. Current initiatives involve using satellite data to estimate CH4 emissions from rice paddies, biomass mapping, and monitoring rice straw burning. For example, in the Mekong Delta, numerous environmental factors, including climate change-induced stress (e.g., sea-level rise), flooding, drought, land subsidence, and saltwater intrusion, along with human activities like dam construction, sand mining, and groundwater extraction, threaten the sustainability of rice farming and farmer livelihoods. To address these challenges, sustainable agricultural practices are essential to improving rice quality, diversify farming systems, adopt low-carbon techniques, and enhance water management.
    Presentations highlighted the importance of both optical and SAR data for LUCC studies, particularly in mapping agricultural areas. A study using Landsat time-series data demonstrated its value in monitoring agricultural LUCC in Houa Phan Province, Laos, and Son La Province, Vietnam. Land cover types were classified through spectral pattern analysis, identifying distinct classes based on Landsat reflectance values. The findings revealed significant natural forest loss alongside increases in cropland and forest plantations due to agricultural expansion. High-resolution imagery validated these results, indicating the scalability of this approach for broader regional and global land-cover monitoring. Another study showcased the effectiveness of SAR data from the Phased Array type L-band Synthetic Aperture Radar-2 (PALSAR-2) on the Japanese Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 (ALOS-2) for mapping and monitoring agricultural land use in Suphanburi, Thailand. This data proved particularly useful for capturing seasonal variations and diverse agricultural practices. Supervised machine learning methods, such as Random Forest classifiers, combined with innovative spatial averaging techniques, achieved high accuracy in distinguishing various agricultural conditions.
    In the session, presenters also discussed the use of Sentinel-1 SAR data for mapping submerged and non-submerged paddy soils was highlighted, demonstrating its effectiveness in understanding water management issues see – Figure 4. Additionally, large-scale remote sensing data and cloud computing were shown to provide unprecedented opportunities for tracking agricultural land-use changes in greater detail. Case studies from India and China illustrated key challenges, such as groundwater depletion in irrigated agriculture across the Indo-Ganges region and the impacts on food, water, and air quality in both countries.

    The session also focused on Water–Energy–Food (WEF) issues related to the Mekong River Basin’s extensive network of hydroelectric dams, which present both benefits and challenges. While these dams support sectors such as irrigated agriculture and hydropower, they also disrupt vital ecosystem services, including fish habitats and biodiversity. Collaborative studies integrating satellite and ground data, hydrological models, and socio-economic frameworks highlight the need to balance these benefits with ecological and social costs. Achieving sustainable management requires cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation, as well as the incorporation of traditional knowledge to address WEF trade-offs and governance challenges in the region.
    DAY THREE
    The third day included a session that explored the impacts of fire, GHG emissions, and pollution (Session VI) as well as a summary discussion on synthesis (Session VII).
    Session VI: Fires, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Pollution
    Chris Elvidge [Colorado School of Mines] presented a keynote on the capabilities and applications of the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) Nightfire [VNF] system, an advanced satellite-based tool developed by the Earth Observation Group. VIIRS Nightfire uses four near- and short-wave infrared channels, initially designed for daytime imaging, to detect and monitor infrared emissions at night. The system identifies various combustion sources, including both flaming and non-flaming activities (e.g., biomass burning, gas flaring, and industrial processes). It calculates the temperature, source area, and radiant heat of detected infrared emitters using physical laws to enable precise monitoring of combustion events and provide insight into exothermic and endothermic processes.
    Elvidge explained that VNF has been vital for near-real-time data in Southeast Asia. The system has been used to issue daily alerts for Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. Recent updates in Version 4 (V4) include atmospheric corrections and testing for secondary emitters with algorithmic improvements – with a 50% success rate in identifying additional heat sources. The Earth Observation Group maintains a multiyear catalog of over 20,000 industrial infrared emitters available through the Global Infrared Emitter Explorer (GIREE) web-map service. With VIIRS sensors expected to operate until about 2040 on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) platforms, this system ensures long-term, robust monitoring and analysis of global combustion events, proving essential for tracking the environmental impacts of industrial activities and natural combustion processes on the atmosphere and ecosystems.
    Toshimasa Ohara [Center for Environmental Science, Japan—Research Director] continued with the second keynote and provided an in-depth analysis of long-term trends in anthropogenic emissions across Asia. The regional mission inventory in Asia encompasses a range of pollutants and offers detailed emissions data from 1950–2020 at high spatial and temporal resolutions. The study employs both bottom-up and top-down approaches for estimating emissions, integrating satellite observations to validate data and address uncertainties. Notably, emissions from China, India, and Japan have shown signs of stabilization or reduction, attributed to stricter emission control policies and technological advancements. Ohara also highlighted Japan’s effective air pollution measures and the importance of extensive observational data in corroborating emission trends. His presentation emphasized the need for improved methodologies in emission inventory development and validation across Asia, aiming to enhance policymaking and environmental management in rapidly industrializing regions.
    Several presenters during this session focused on innovative approaches to understand and mitigate GHG emissions and air pollution. One presenter showed how NO2 data from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI) on the European Sentinel-5 Precursor have been validated against ground-based observations from Pandora stations in Japan, highlighting the influence of atmospheric conditions on measurement accuracy. Another presenter described an innovative system that GISTDA used to combine satellite remote sensing data with Artificial Intelligence (AI). This system was used to monitor and analyze the concentration of fine particulate matter (PM) in the atmosphere in Thailand. (In this context fine is defined as particles with diameters ≤ 2.5 µm, or PM2.5.) These applications, which are accessible through online, cloud-based platforms and mobile applications for iOS and Android devices, allow users, including citizens, government officers, and policymakers, to access PM2.5 data in real-time through web and mobile interfaces.
    A project under the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in Thailand is focused on improving air quality monitoring across the Asia–Pacific region by integrating satellite and ground-based data. At the core of this effort, the Pandora Asia Network, which includes 30 ground-based instruments measuring pollutants such as NO₂ and sulfur dioxide (SO₂), is complemented by high-resolution observations from the Geostationary Environment Monitoring Spectrometer (GEMS) aboard South Korea’s GEO-KOMPSAT-2B (GK-2B) satellite. The initiative also provides training sessions to strengthen regional expertise in remote sensing technologies for air quality management and develops decision support systems for evidence-based policymaking, particularly for monitoring pollution sources and transboundary effects like volcanic eruptions. Future plans include expanding the Pandora network and enhancing data integration to support local environmental management practices.
    PM2.5 levels in Vietnam are influenced by both local emissions and long-range pollutant transport, particularly in urban areas.The Vietnam University of Engineering and Technology, in conjunction with VNSC, continues to map and monitor PM2.5 using satellites and machine learning while addressing data quality issues that stem from missing satellite data and limited ground monitoring stations – see Figure 5.
    In addition to mapping and monitoring pollutants, another presentater explained that significant research is underway to address their health impacts. In Hanoi, exposure to pollutants ( e.g., PM2.5, PM10, and NO2) has led to increased rates of respiratory diseases (e.g., pneumonia, bronchitis, and asthma) among children,  as well as elevated instances of cardiovascular diseases among adults. A substantial mortality burden is attributable to fine particulate matter – particularly in densely populated areas like Hanoi. Compliance with stricter air quality guidelines could potentially prevent thousands of premature deaths. For example, preventive measures enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in reduced pollution levels that were associated with a decrease in avoidable mortality rates. In response to these challenges, Vietnam has implemented air quality management policies, including national technical regulations and action plans aimed at controlling emissions and enhancing monitoring; however, current national standards still fall short of the more stringent guidelines recommended by the World Health Organization. Improved air quality standards and effective policy interventions are needed to mitigate the health risks associated with air pollution in Vietnam.

    Another presenter explained how food production in Southeast Asia contributes about 40% of the region’s total GHG emissions – with rice and beef production identified as the largest contributors for plant-based and animal-based emissions, respectively. Another presentation focused on a study that examined GHG emissions from agricultural activities, which suggests that animal-based food production – particularly beef – generates substantially higher GHG emissions per kg of food produced compared to plant-based foods, such as wheat and rice. Beef has an emission intensity of about 69 kg of CO2 equivalent-per-kg, compared to 2 to 3 kg of CO2 equivalent-per-kg for plant-based foods. The study points to mitigation strategies (e.g., changing dietary patterns, improving agricultural practices) and adopting sustainable land management. Participants agreed that a comprehensive policy framework is needed to address the environmental impacts of food production and reduce GHG emissions in the agricultural sector.
    In another presentation, the speaker highlighted the fact that Southeast Asian countries need an advanced monitoring, reporting, and verification system to track GHG emissions – particularly within high-carbon reservoirs like rice paddies. To achieve this, cutting-edge technologies (e.g., satellite remote sensing, low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles, and Internet of Things devices) can be beneficial in creating sophisticated digital twin technology for sustainable rice production and GHG mitigation.
    Another presentation featured a discussion about pollution resulting from forest and peatland fires in Indonesia, which is significantly impacting air quality. Indonesia’s tropical peatlands – among the world’s largest and most diverse – face significant threats from frequent fires. Repeated burning has transformed forests into shrubs and secondary vegetation regions, with fires particularly affecting forest edges and contributing to a further retreat of intact forest areas. High-resolution data is essential to map and monitor changes in forest cover, including pollution impacts.
    Another speaker described a web-based Geographic Information Systems (GIS) application that has been developed to support carbon offsetting efforts in Laos – to address significant environmental challenges, e.g., deforestation and climate change. Advanced technologies (e.g., remote sensing, GIS, and Global Navigation Satellite Systems) are used to monitor land-use changes, carbon sequestration, and ecosystem health. By integrating various spatial datasets, the web GIS app enhances data collection precision, streamlines monitoring processes, and provides real-time information to stakeholders for informed decision-making. This initiative fosters collaboration among local communities, government agencies, and international partners, while emphasizing the importance of government support and international partnerships. Ultimately, the web GIS application represents a significant advancement in Laos’s commitment to environmental sustainability, economic growth, and the creation of a greener future.
    Session VII. Discussion Session on Synthesis
    The meeting concluded with a comprehensive discussion on synthesizing themes related to LUCC. The session focused on three themes: LUCC, agriculture, and air pollution. The session focused on trends and projections as well as the resulting impacts in the coming years. It also highlighted research related to these topics to inform more sustainable land use policies. A panel of experts from different Southeast Asian countries addressed these topics. A summary of the key points shared by the panelists for each theme during the discussion is provided below.
    LUCC Discussions
    This discussion focused on the challenges of balancing economic development with environmental sustainability in Southeast Asian countries, e.g., mining in Myanmar, agriculture in Vietnam, and rising land prices in Thailand. More LUCC research is needed to inform decision-making and improve land-use planning during transitions from agriculture to industrialization while ensuring food security. The panelists also discussed urban sprawl and infrastructure development along main roads in several Southeast Asian countries, highlighting the social and environmental challenges arising from uncoordinated growth. It was noted that urban infrastructure lags behind population increases, resulting in traffic congestion, pollution, and social inequality. Cambodia, for example, has increased foreign investments, which presents similar dilemmas of economic growth accompanied by significant environmental degradation. Indonesia is another example of a Southeast Asian nation facing rapid urbanization and inadequate spatial planning, leading to flooding, groundwater depletion, and pollution. These issues further highlight the need for integrated satellite monitoring to inform land-use policies. Finally, recognizing the importance of public infrastructure in growth management, it was reported that the Thai government is already using technology to manage urban development alongside green spaces.
    Panelists agreed that LUCC research is critical for guiding policymakers toward sustainable land-use practices – emphasizing the necessity for improved communication between researchers and policymakers. While the integration of technologies (e.g., GIS and remote sensing) is beginning to influence policy decisions, room for improvement remains. In summary, the discussions stressed the importance of better planning, technology integration, and policy-informed research to reconcile economic growth with sustainability. Participants also highlighted the need to engage policymakers, non-government organizations, and the private sector in using scientific evidence for sustainable development. Capacity building in Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, where GIS and remote sensing technologies are still developing, is crucial. Community involvement is essential for translating research findings into actionable policies to address real-world challenges and social equity.
    Agriculture Discussions
    These discussions explored the intricate relationships between agricultural practices, economic growth, and environmental sustainability in Southeast Asia. As an example, despite national policies to manage the land transition in Vietnam, rapid conversions from forest to agricultural land and further to residential and industrial continue. While it is recognized that strict land management plans may hinder future adaptability, further regulation is needed. These rapid shifts in land use have increased land for economic development – especially in industrial and residential sectors – and contribute to environmental degradation, e.g., pollution and soil erosion. In Thailand, land is distributed among agriculture (50%), forest (30%), and urban (20%) areas. Despite a long history of agricultural practices, Vietnam faces new challenges from climate change and extreme weather.
    Thailand, meanwhile, is exploring carbon credits to incentivize sustainable farming practices – although this requires significant investment and time. The nation is well-equipped with a robust water supply system, and ongoing efforts to enhance crop yields on Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, salinity levels, and flooding intensity have increased as a result of the rise in incidents of extreme weather, prompting advancements in rice farming mechanization to be implemented that are modeled after practices that have been successfully used in the Philippines.
    Despite these advances, issues (e.g., over-application of rice seeds) remain. The dominant land cover type in Malaysia is tropical rainforest, although agriculture – particularly oil palm plantations – also plays a significant role in land use. While stable, it shares environmental concerns with Indonesia. The country is integrating solar energy initiatives, placing solar panels on former agricultural lands and recreational areas, which raises coastal environmental concerns. In Taiwan, substantial land use changes have stemmed from solar panel installations to support green energy goals but have led to increased temperatures and altered wind patterns.
    All panelists agreed that remote sensing technologies are vital to inform agricultural policy across the region. They emphasized the need to transition from academic research to actionable insights that directly inform policy. Panelists also discussed the challenge of securing funding for actionable research – underlining the importance of recognizing the transition required for research to inform operational use. Some countries (e.g., Thailand) have established operational crop monitoring systems, while others (e.g., Vietnam) primarily depend on research projects. Despite progress in Malaysia’s monitoring of oil palm plantations, a comprehensive operational monitoring system is still lacking in many areas. The participants concluded that increased efforts are needed to promote the wider adoption of remote sensing technologies for agricultural and environmental monitoring, with emphasis on developing operational systems that can be integrated into policy and decision-making processes.
    Air Pollution Discussions
    The discussion on air pollution focused on various sources in Southeast Asia, which included both local and transboundary factors. Panelists highlighted that motor vehicles, industrial activities, and power plants are major contributors to pollutants, such as PM2.5, NO2, ozone (O3), and carbon monoxide (CO). Forest fires in Indonesia – particularly from South Sumatra and Riau provinces – are significantly impacting neighboring countries, e.g., Malaysia. A study found that most PM2.5 pollution in Kuala Lumpur originates from Indonesia. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pollution levels dropped sharply due to reduced economic activity; however, data from 2018–2023 shows that PM2.5 levels have returned to pre-pandemic conditions.
    The Indonesian government is actively working to reduce deforestation and emissions, aiming for a 29% reduction by 2030. Indonesia is also participating in carbon markets and receiving international payments for emission reductions. Indonesia’s emissions also stem from energy production, industrial activities, and land-use changes, including peat fires. The Indonesian government reports anthropogenic sources – particularly from the energy sector and industrial activities, forest and peat fires, waste, and agriculture – continue to escalate. While Indonesia is addressing these issues, growing population and energy demands continue to drive pollution levels higher.
    Vietnam and Laos are facing similar challenges related to air pollution – particularly from agricultural residue burning. Both governments are working on expanding air quality monitoring, regulating waste burning, and developing policies to mitigate pollution. Vietnam has been developing provincial air quality management plans and expanding its monitoring network. Laos has seen increased awareness of pollution, accompanied by government measures aimed at restricting burning and improving waste management practices.
    The panelists agreed that collaborative efforts for regional cooperation are essential to address air pollution. This will require collaboration in research and data sharing to inform policy decisions. There is a growing interest in leveraging satellite technology and modeling approaches to enhance air quality forecasting and management. To ensure that research translates into effective policy, communication of scientific findings to policymakers is essential – particularly by clearly communicating complex research concepts in accessible formats. All panelists agreed on the importance of improving governance, transparency, and scientific communication to better translate research into policy actions, highlighting collaborations with international organizations – including NASA – to address air quality issues. While significant challenges related to air pollution persist in Southeast Asia, noteworthy efforts are underway to improve awareness, research, and collaborative governance aimed at enhancing air quality and reducing emissions.
    Conclusion
    The LCLUC–SARI Synthesis meeting fostered collaboration among researchers and provided valuable updates on recent developments in LUCC research, exchange of ideas, integration of new data products, and discussions on emerging science directions. This structured dialogue (particularly the discussions in each session) helped the attendees identify priorities and needs within the LUCC community. All panelists and meeting participants commended the SARI leadership for their proactive role in facilitating collaborations and discussions that promote capacity-building activities across the region. SARI activities have significantly contributed to enhancing the collective ability of countries in South and Southeast Asia to address pressing environmental challenges. The meeting participants emphasized the importance of maintaining and expanding these collaborative efforts, which are crucial for fostering partnerships among governments, research institutions, and local communities. They urged SARI to continue organizing workshops, training sessions, and knowledge-sharing platforms that can equip stakeholders with the necessary skills and resources to tackle environmental issues such as air pollution, deforestation, climate change, and sustainable land management.
    Krishna VadrevuNASA’s Marshall Space Flight Centerkrishna.p.vadrevu@nasa.gov
    Vu TuanVietnam National Science Center, Vietnamvatuan@vnsc.org.vn
    Than NguyenVietnam National University Engineering and Technology, Vietnamthanhntn@vnu.edu.vn
    Son NghiemJet Propulsion Laboratoryson.v.nghiem@jpl.nasa.gov
    Tsuneo MatsunagaNational Institute of Environmental Studies, Japanmatsunag@nies.go.jp
    Garik GutmanNASA Headquartersggutman@nasa.gov
    Christopher JusticeUniversity of Maryland College Parkcjustice@umd.edu

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 21, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 105 106 107 108 109 … 162
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress