Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rapid Health Agrees to Pay $8.2M for Allegedly Billing Medicare for Over-the-Counter COVID-19 Tests That Were Not Provided to Beneficiaries

    Source: US State of California

    Covid Test DMV LLC, doing business as Rapid Health (Rapid Health), a pharmacy located in Los Angeles, has agreed to pay the United States $8,242,860 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting or causing the submission of false claims to Medicare for over-the-counter (OTC) Covid-19 tests that were not provided to Medicare beneficiaries.

    Between April 2022 and May 2023, Rapid Health distributed OTC Covid-19 tests in connection with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) OTC Covid-19 Test Demonstration Project (Demonstration Project). During the Demonstration Project, Medicare Part B beneficiaries could request OTC Covid-19 tests from participating providers, and CMS would reimburse those providers for up to eight OTC Covid-19 tests per Medicare Part B beneficiary per month at a fixed rate of $12 per test.

    The settlement announced today resolves allegations that Rapid Health knowingly submitted or caused the submission of claims to Medicare for OTC Covid-19 tests that Rapid Health never provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare patients could order OTC Covid-19 tests from Rapid Health during the Demonstration Project through Rapid Health’s website. When Rapid Health received an order, it was supposed to process the order, generate a shipping label, and send the OTC Covid-19 test to the beneficiary. The United States alleged that issues with Rapid Health’s processing procedures caused Rapid Health to bill orders to Medicare without shipping the test to the beneficiary, and that although Rapid Health was aware of these issues it nevertheless continued to bill Medicare for tests that were not shipped.

    “The Demonstration Project was designed to increase the availability of OTC Covid-19 tests to Medicare beneficiaries in an unprecedented time of need,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Providers that knowingly billed for tests that were never given to patients failed to support the goals of the project and defrauded the American taxpayers.”

    “This outcome serves as a reminder of our unwavering commitment to combat health care fraud and investigate those who allegedly attempt to exploit and defraud Medicare and other federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Maureen Dixon of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “With our local, state and federal partners, HHS-OIG will continue to work aggressively to ensure the dependability and the integrity of the Medicare program.”

    The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, and HHS-OIG.

    Trial Attorney Lindsay DeFrancesco of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section handled the matter.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The task force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Rapid Health Agrees to Pay $8.2M for Allegedly Billing Medicare for Over-the-Counter COVID-19 Tests That Were Not Provided to Beneficiaries

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Covid Test DMV LLC, doing business as Rapid Health (Rapid Health), a pharmacy located in Los Angeles, has agreed to pay the United States $8,242,860 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by knowingly submitting or causing the submission of false claims to Medicare for over-the-counter (OTC) Covid-19 tests that were not provided to Medicare beneficiaries.

    Between April 2022 and May 2023, Rapid Health distributed OTC Covid-19 tests in connection with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) OTC Covid-19 Test Demonstration Project (Demonstration Project). During the Demonstration Project, Medicare Part B beneficiaries could request OTC Covid-19 tests from participating providers, and CMS would reimburse those providers for up to eight OTC Covid-19 tests per Medicare Part B beneficiary per month at a fixed rate of $12 per test.

    The settlement announced today resolves allegations that Rapid Health knowingly submitted or caused the submission of claims to Medicare for OTC Covid-19 tests that Rapid Health never provided to Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare patients could order OTC Covid-19 tests from Rapid Health during the Demonstration Project through Rapid Health’s website. When Rapid Health received an order, it was supposed to process the order, generate a shipping label, and send the OTC Covid-19 test to the beneficiary. The United States alleged that issues with Rapid Health’s processing procedures caused Rapid Health to bill orders to Medicare without shipping the test to the beneficiary, and that although Rapid Health was aware of these issues it nevertheless continued to bill Medicare for tests that were not shipped.

    “The Demonstration Project was designed to increase the availability of OTC Covid-19 tests to Medicare beneficiaries in an unprecedented time of need,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Providers that knowingly billed for tests that were never given to patients failed to support the goals of the project and defrauded the American taxpayers.”

    “This outcome serves as a reminder of our unwavering commitment to combat health care fraud and investigate those who allegedly attempt to exploit and defraud Medicare and other federally funded health care programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Maureen Dixon of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “With our local, state and federal partners, HHS-OIG will continue to work aggressively to ensure the dependability and the integrity of the Medicare program.”

    The resolution obtained in this matter was the result of a coordinated effort between the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, and HHS-OIG.

    Trial Attorney Lindsay DeFrancesco of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section handled the matter.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The task force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    The claims resolved by the settlement are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Two Maryland Men Indicted For Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme Of More Than $1,000,000

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Defendants Allegedly Committed Aggravated Identity Theft by Using Identities of Victims in Connection with a Scheme to Wrongfully Obtain More than $1,000,000 in Unemployment Insurance Benefits

    Baltimore, Maryland – A federal grand jury has returned an indictment charging two Maryland men on federal charges related to a scheme to fraudulently obtain more than $1 million in unemployment insurance benefits. On February 1, 2024, a grand jury returned a sealed indictment of Daiwor Woah-Tee, age 51, of Belcamp, Maryland, and Dekwii Woah-Tee, age 46, of Rosedale, Maryland with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and one count of aggravated identity theft, respectively, relating to a scheme to obtain more than $1,000,000 in unemployment insurance benefits. The indictment was unsealed upon the arrest of the defendants. 

    The defendants had an initial appearance on December 18, 2024, in the U.S. District Court in Baltimore before U.S. Magistrate Judge Charles Austin.

    The indictment was announced by Erek L. Barron, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, Special Agent in Charge Troy W. Springer of the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, Office of Investigations for the National Capital Region (DOL-OIG), and Inspector General Dr. Joseph V. Cuffari, Department Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG).

    As detailed in the indictment, unemployment insurance (“UI”) was a joint state and federal program that provided monetary benefits to eligible beneficiaries. UI payments were intended to provide temporary financial assistance to lawful workers who were unemployed through no fault of their own. Beginning in or around March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, several federal programs expanded UI eligibility and increased UI benefits, including the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Program (PUA), Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC), and the Lost Wages Assistance Program (LWAP).

    In Maryland, those seeking UI benefits submitted online applications. Applicants had to answer specific questions to establish eligibility to receive UI benefits, including their name, Social Security Number (SSN), and mailing address, among other things.  Applicants also had to self-certify that they met a COVID-19-related reason for being unemployed, partially employed, or unable to work.  Maryland Department of Labor (MD-DOL) relied upon the information in the application to determine UI benefits eligibility. Once an application was approved, the MD-DOL typically distributed state and federal UI benefits electronically to a debit card, which claimants could use to withdraw funds and/or make purchases. 

    As alleged in the indictment, from March 2020 to September 2021, the defendants conspired to commit wire fraud defrauding State Workforce Agencies (SWA), including the MD-DOL, by impersonating victim individuals for the purpose of submitting fraudulent claims for unemployment insurance.  The defendants used victim personal identifying information (PII), including name, date of birth, and/or SSN submit applications for UI benefits.  The UI benefits obtained through the scheme was more than $1,000,000.

    If convicted, the defendants face a maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison for wire fraud conspiracy and aggravated identity theft carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years in prison  that runs consecutive to any other sentence.  Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. 

    An indictment is not a finding of guilt.  An individual charged by indictment is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty at some later criminal proceedings. 

    The District of Maryland Strike Force is one of five strike forces established throughout the United States by the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute COVID-19 fraud, including fraud relating to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act.  The CARES Act was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The strike forces focus on large-scale, multi-state pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors.  The strike forces are interagency law enforcement efforts, using prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams designed to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds.  

    For more information on the Department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.  Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    U.S. Attorney Barron commended the DOL-OIG, DHS-OIG, and IRS-CI for its work in the investigation.  Mr. Barron thanked Assistant U.S. Attorney John D’Amico and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Jared W. Murphy, who are prosecuting the federal case. 

    For more information on the Maryland U.S. Attorney’s Office, its priorities, and resources available to help the community, please visit www.justice.gov/usao-md and https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/community-outreach.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Delivers Remarks at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Oregon

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Remarks as Delivered

    Thanks, Nat.

    I am very grateful to be here and have the opportunity to talk to all of our federal, state, and local law enforcement here.

    All of you are the partners that make everything work. You represent people who take risks every single day to keep the people of Oregon safe. I can’t thank you enough, and I very much look forward to hearing your perspectives and ideas for me to take back.

    I am also grateful to have the chance to recognize the extraordinary work of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Oregon.

    For people of this state, this office is the face of the Justice Department. The attorneys and staff here understand that responsibility. And like all of our partners gathered around this table, you do outstanding work on behalf of those you serve.

    Three and a half years ago, the Justice Department launched an ambitious strategy to fight the sharp spike in violent crime that took place during the pandemic.

    We focused our efforts on the most powerful tools we have, which are reflected right here: our partnerships with federal, state, Tribal and local law enforcement.

    We fortified those partnerships with substantial funding from our grantmaking components to help police departments hire more officers, to support our law enforcement task forces, and to invest resources in initiatives aimed at preventing and disrupting violence before it occurs.

    And we brought to bear our unique prosecutorial authorities and new technologies that enable us to zero in on those individuals and gangs that are responsible for the most violence.

    Today, we know that work is starting to pay off.

    Data from the Major Cities Chiefs Association shows a nearly 8% drop in violent crime here in Portland between 2022 and 2023. And recent data shows an additional 4% decline in violent crime in Portland in the first nine months of this year compared to the same time period last year.

    But, of course, there is no acceptable level of violent crime.

    That’s why the Justice Department continues to work with our partners here to fight violent crime, disrupt illegal drug and firearms trafficking, and keep people safe.

    In May, working with the FBI and the Portland Police Bureau, this U.S. Attorney’s Office secured a 14-year sentence for a leader of Portland’s 18th Street Gang. The gang leader conspired to traffic large quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine into the Portland area for redistribution and sale.

    In August, working with the Westside Interagency Narcotics Team and the Oregon-Idaho High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, this office obtained a sentence of more than 10 years for a man who sold deadly Oxycodone pills to a 20-year-old woman who died from acute fentanyl poisoning.

    In September, working with the FBI and the Medford Police Department, this office secured sentences of three men for distributing counterfeit, fentanyl-laced pills that resulted in the death of a teenage girl.

    In October, working with DEA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, IRS, and the Oregon State Police, and other state and local law enforcement, this office obtained a 57-month sentence for a chief money launderer for a drug trafficking organization operating in the Pacific Northwest and California.

    The defendant laundered more than $4.6 million in drug proceeds and used laundered funds to purchase eight properties. Those properties were forfeited to the government and will ultimately be sold, with proceeds going to support crime victims and law enforcement.

    That same month, in partnership with the FBI, the Klamath Falls Police Department, the Oregon State Police, and half a dozen other law enforcement partners, this office obtained the conviction of a man who brutally victimized two women. The man kidnapped and sexually assaulted both women and held one of them in a cell that he constructed for the purpose in his garage.

    Thanks to the bravery and collaboration of our law enforcement partners, that man is being held accountable for his crimes.

    Just a couple of weeks ago, this office secured a five-year sentence for a man who illegally possessed and manufactured more than 100 semi-automatic firearms and silencers.

    During a search of his residence, investigators found methamphetamine, dozens of weapons, firearm manufacturing tools, and a 3D printer with a partially printed part for an AR15. When the defendant was arrested, he was carrying a semiautomatic pistol without an identifiable serial number.

    That investigation and successful prosecution reflected the joint efforts of this office, ATF, and the Lane County Sheriff’s Office.

    In addition to using our investigative and prosecutorial capabilities, we are also committed to using our grantmaking capabilities to invest in public safety.

    So far this year, the Justice Department has awarded more than $64 million in grants to Oregon.

    These funds will help law enforcement agencies in Oregon to hire more officers.

    And they will help agencies and community partners prevent and combat violent crime and drug trafficking and improve services for survivors of domestic and dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, and other crimes.

    The Department of Justice remains committed to providing our law enforcement and community partners with the resources they need to protect their communities.

    The examples I have just shared are just a snapshot of the extraordinary work that this U.S. Attorney’s Office is doing every day to protect people in Oregon and to fulfill the Justice Department’s mission to ensure the rule of law, to keep our country safe, and to protect civil rights.

    I am extremely proud of the public servants who make up this office and of the extraordinary leader beside me, Natalie Wight. And I am equally proud of the relationships they have developed with the people around this table.

    Your jobs are not easy. They are dangerous, but they are essential. Thanks to you for the many sacrifices you make to keep of this state safe.

    I’m looking forward now to beginning our meeting.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Luis de Guindos: Interview with the Telegraaf

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Wouter van Bergen and Martin Visser

    20 December 2024

    What has kept you awake over the past year?

    Looking back at recent times, I would say that my worst nightmare was that a cyber attack would wreak havoc in the payments system. We would have a complicated situation on our hands that would be very difficult to resolve and would have serious consequences for all of us.

    And what do you expect will keep you awake next year?

    For the future, I’m more concerned about trade policy and the potential fragmentation of the global economy. The new US administration has announced far-reaching import tariffs. If they materialise, a wholly new situation could arise, which would go completely against the lessons from the 1930s and the path we have chosen since the end of the Second World War.

    Trump has introduced import tariffs before. What is different this time?

    It’s not only the import tariffs imposed by the United States that are the problem, but also the retaliation by other countries in response. If a trade war erupts, it would be extremely negative for the world economy, mainly for growth but also for inflation. For example, if you impose a 60% tariff on goods from China, which already has excess capacity, it would cause a diversion in trade flows and even impact exchange rates. Nobody knows where that will end.

    What can the ECB do about that?

    We’re not responsible for trade policy. We can provide our advice and explain that a trade war would be extremely detrimental for the world economy and a lose-lose situation for everyone, and that is why it is better to be prudent. But the response is up to the European Commission, and our role is to give our view and deal with the consequences.

    Might it also threaten the euro?

    It should be the other way around. If such threats emerge, the answer lies precisely in more European integration. The euro plays a hugely important role in that.

    But election results indicate that the population in many European countries is not that keen on it…

    I think that the European population is smart, and people are well aware that the uncertainties and risks are intensifying, and that becoming more fragmented within Europe would be the wrong response. My impression of populist politicians is that they propose simple solutions for highly complex problems.

    Immigration is one such complex problem…

    There is talk about restricting immigration, but looking at demographic developments in Europe, you see that the population is ageing. From an economic viewpoint, it is crystal clear that we need ordered immigration, so we should focus on properly managing its social impact.

    Are you concerned about the high levels of public debt in many Member States, such as France?

    Countries need to put in place credible and prudent fiscal consolidation plans. The fiscal rules were suspended for five years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy crisis, but now we have a new fiscal framework, and it’s important to implement it accordingly. France is not the only country whose budget has not yet been approved. The same goes for Germany, Spain, Belgium and Austria. They know what they need to do, and I am convinced that they will act accordingly.

    Relative to GDP, public debt is indeed on average 10% higher than it was before the pandemic. At the same time, the situation in the southern European countries that were in trouble 12 years ago is much better now. Portugal now runs a budget surplus, as do Ireland and Cyprus. Greece and Italy are running primary surpluses. Precisely the ‘usual suspects’ back then are doing well now, thanks to the measures taken at the time.

    Former ECB President Mario Draghi painted a dire picture of the state of European competitiveness in a recent report. What can we do to restore it?

    The demographic reality is that our population is ageing. An ageing society takes less risks and innovates less. That’s why targeted immigration is so important. It’s something that Europe should reflect on from an economic perspective.

    Europe has other structural problems too, like the lack of a genuine single market for goods and services. The array of different rules applying throughout means that Europe is still highly fragmented, in contrast to the United States. We don’t have a real banking union as we don’t have a common deposit insurance scheme. And we don’t have a capital markets union, because there is no single capital market supervisor and insolvency laws still differ across countries. On top of that, we don’t have a fiscal union, unlike the United States. Savings are taxed differently everywhere in Europe, there are disparities in labour market rules and some exceptions to the temporary framework on state aid still have to be fully phased out.

    The list of necessary measures is long…

    Yes, there is a lot of work to do and the world is not going to wait for us. Because of the policies of the new United States administration, we may need to deal with import tariffs, uncertain fiscal policy, the possibility of deregulation in financial markets and, going beyond economics, even defence. This is a wake-up call for Europe.

    How can you remain optimistic in the face of such huge challenges?

    It’s not a question of optimism, but pragmatism. In Europe, there is only one way to preserve our current standard of living, and we will eventually choose the correct path.

    The inflation rate in the Netherlands has risen again to 4%. The ECB’s policy does not suit the situation in our country…

    In the euro area, we have seen that although there is an increase in households’ real disposable income because wages have started to catch up with past inflation, consumption is not recovering well. This is an issue of confidence, which has to do with past inflation, the lagging effects of the pandemic, and the current geopolitical landscape.

    People mainly look at prices and they now see that supermarket prices are much higher than they were two or three years ago. That’s why it’s so important that they realise that price levels are stabilising and wages are catching up. And not everything is negative, as labour markets are doing well.

    As the ECB, we have to look at the euro area average (at 2.2% in November, ed.). Dutch inflation is more volatile than average. We are confident that inflation will gradually decrease in the Netherlands too, and that inflation across the euro area will gradually converge towards our 2% target.

    What message do you have for Dutch consumers?

    You still have higher inflation, but inflation in the euro area has declined substantially and without a recession. You have very high employment, so wages are increasing and catching up with past inflation. The tight labour market also shows the need for targeted immigration.

    Do you already hold bitcoin?

    No, no bitcoin, but I know some people who do.

    You missed out on big gains…

    Yes, but I could just have gone to the casino [laughs]. The world of crypto-assets is a mixed bag, with stablecoins being very different from others like bitcoin. In general though, there are no fundamentals that determine the value of bitcoin, like there are for shares or bonds. There is only scarcity.

    Are crypto-assets a risk for the financial system?

    Not for now, there are few of them and volumes are still too small to pose material risks to the financial system.

    Europe is lagging behind the rest of the world. Out of the 50 largest tech companies, only three are European. Europeans heavily invest their funds on US stock exchanges and European banks can’t keep up with their US competitors. Is there still hope?

    This is an indication that there are some structural issues that we need to improve in Europe, namely by deepening economic integration. I talked earlier about common solvency and taxation rules and a coordinated approach to supervision in capital markets, for example. We have to channel European savings to Europe, and to attract savings from abroad.

    Every cloud has a silver lining. Europe is at a crossroads now. The future is now more uncertain than ever since the pandemic due to geopolitical tensions and the risk of significant frictions in global trade in the advent of the new United States administration. That is why we need more integration, not less. It will take courage, but common sense will ultimately prevail.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Doctor and Her Wife Sentenced for Fraud and Other Crimes

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    HUNTSVILLE, Ala. – A former family practice doctor in Huntsville was sentenced today for drug crimes, health care fraud, and COVID-19 disaster relief fraud, announced U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona, FBI Special Agent in Charge Carlton Peeples, Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent in Charge Steven L. Hofer, and Special Agent in Charge Tamela Miles of the Department of Health and Human Service Office of the Inspector General Atlanta Region. The doctor’s wife, who owned the medical practice, was also sentenced.

    Judge Liles C. Burke sentenced Francene Aretha Gayle, 50, to 87 months in prison on four opioid prescribing charges, one count of health care fraud, and one count of wire fraud. Judge Burke sentenced Schara Monique Davis, 48, to 42 months in prison for one count of health care fraud and one count of wire fraud. Each defendant was also ordered to pay $2.2 million in restitution, forfeit $226,815, and pay a fine.

    According to the defendants’ plea agreements, between about 2014 and early 2020, Gayle was a doctor who operated a multi-clinic practice in Huntsville, Athens, and Killen. Davis owned the practice and served as business manager. In 2019, the Killen clinic shut down. In March 2020, the Alabama Medical Licensure Commission revoked Gayle’s license, and the other two clinics closed shortly after that.

    Gayle admitted that she had unlawfully distributed drugs, including oxycodone, hydrocodone, and methadone.

    Gayle and Davis both admitted to having conspired to commit health care fraud for several years by billing insurers for office visits under Gayle’s name even when she did not see the patients, was not in the same building, and sometimes was not in the same town. The defendants knew that the billing scheme was fraudulent. In 2015, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama audited the practice and discovered that Gayle was absent, other staff were seeing patients, and yet all office visits were being billed under Gayle’s name. Blue Cross flagged the issue, and Gayle promised it would stop. Instead, the practice continued fraudulently billing insurers for office visits for the next four years. In total, between 2015 and 2020, Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross paid more than $2.3 million for office visits billed under Gayle’s name.

    Gayle and Davis both also admitted to having conspired to commit wire fraud. In March 2020, based on concerns about her prescribing and billing practices, Gayle’s Alabama medical license was revoked.  Months later, Gayle and Davis applied for and obtained more than $450,000 in COVID-19 disaster relief funds through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. Those funds were designed to stabilize businesses struggling because of the pandemic. In their funding applications, Gayle and Davis certified that their medical practice needed the money because of economic uncertainty or injury caused by the pandemic. In reality, Gayle and Davis’s practice had closed, and they used COVID-19 funds they received on other things. 

    The FBI, DEA, and HHS-OIG investigated the case. The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Alabama Attorney General’s Office provided exceptional investigative assistance after the Alabama Medicaid Agency’s Program Integrity Division initiated the case and referred it. Assistant U.S. Attorneys J.B. Ward and Ryan Rummage prosecuted the case. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: United States Joins Lawsuit Against Former Executives of Kabbage Inc. Alleging False Claims Act Violations in Connection with Paycheck Protection Program Lending

    Source: US State of California

    The United States has intervened and filed a complaint against Robert Frohwein, Kathryn Petralia and Spencer Robinson, three former executives of Kabbage Inc., a now-bankrupt financial technology company. The United States alleges that they violated the False Claims Act by submitting and causing the submission of false claims for loan forgiveness, loan guarantees and processing fees to the Small Business Administration (SBA) in connection with Kabbage’s participation in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

    “The PPP was intended to provide critical assistance to eligible businesses during the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The department is committed to ensuring that PPP lenders — including their executives — are held accountable for contributing to the misuse of PPP funds by knowingly failing to comply with applicable program requirements, including approving PPP loans in inflated amounts and to ineligible borrowers.”

    Congress created the PPP in March 2020, as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, to provide federally guaranteed loans to small businesses suffering economic hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA administered the PPP. The CARES Act authorized private lenders to approve PPP loans for eligible borrowers who could later seek forgiveness of the loans so long as they used loan funds on employee payroll and other eligible expenses. Among other things, participating PPP lenders were required to confirm borrowers’ average monthly payroll costs by reviewing the payroll documentation submitted with the borrower’s application. Lenders were also required to follow applicable Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering requirements to help combat fraud. Any unforgiven or defaulted PPP loans made by lenders were guaranteed by the SBA, so long as the lenders adhered to PPP requirements. Lenders who originated PPP loans were paid a fixed fee calculated as a percentage of the loan amount by the SBA.

    According to the government’s complaint, Frohwein and Petralia co-founded Kabbage in 2008 and served as the company’s chief executive officer and president, respectively, while Robinson formerly served as the company’s head of strategy. Kabbage was approved as a PPP lender in 2020 and approved more than $7 billion in PPP loans that year for which the company was paid more than $217 million in processing fees after certifying that it had complied with all applicable lending requirements.

    The complaint alleges that, between April and October 2020, the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for loan guarantees, loan forgiveness and processing fees relating to tens of thousands of PPP loans that were systemically inflated due to calculation errors by Kabbage. These errors allegedly included Kabbage’s double-counting of state and local taxes paid by employees and the failure to exclude annual compensation in excess of $100,000 per employee from its calculation of payroll costs. Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for processing fees related to tens of thousands of PPP loans where Kabbage failed to implement appropriate fraud controls. The government’s complaint alleges that the defendants ignored these violations to maximize PPP processing fees before selling off the majority of Kabbage’s assets in October 2020.

    Kabbage Inc., which is now winding down its operations as KServicing Wind Down Corp. after filing for bankruptcy in the wake of the 2020 asset sale, previously agreed to resolve allegations relating to its role in the submission of false claims to the SBA. As part of that settlement, the United States received a general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding of up to $120 million, and the company received a credit for $12.5 million that Kabbage returned to SBA during the department’s investigation.

    “The PPP was a light providing hope to businesses in the midst of the shadow of a global pandemic,” said U.S. Attorney Damien M. Diggs for the Eastern District of Texas. “Unfortunately, some unscrupulous lenders and executives took advantage of that situation by lining their pockets with ill-gotten incentive payments from processing PPP loans despite not performing even the most cursory fraud checks or reviews of borrower documentation. Individuals who shirked their responsibilities at the expense of the public fisc must be held accountable. This lawsuit against Kabbage’s former executives demonstrates our firm commitment to holding all parties responsible for their part in causing the submission of false claims to the PPP.”

    “SBA’s lending partners have a responsibility to ensure only eligible borrowers gain access to SBA’s programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Brady Ipock of the SBA Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG)’s Central Region. “SBA OIG stands ready to support the Justice Department in rooting out greed and wrongful actions. I want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners for their support and dedication to pursuing justice in this case.”

    The lawsuit was originally filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act by Paul Pietschner, a former analyst in Kabbage’s collections department. The FCA permits private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and to share in any recovery. The FCA also permits the United States to intervene in such an action, as it has done in this case. A defendant who violates the act is subject to liability for three times the government’s losses, plus applicable penalties. 

    On May 17, 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Trial Attorney Sarah E. Loucks of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Betty Young for the Eastern District of Texas are handling the matter, with assistance provided by the SBA’s Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General.

    The case is captioned United States ex rel. Pietschner v. Kabbage, Inc., et al., No. 4:21-cv-110-SDJ (EDTX).

    The claims asserted by the United States are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: United States Joins Lawsuit Against Former Executives of Kabbage Inc. Alleging False Claims Act Violations in Connection with Paycheck Protection Program Lending

    Source: United States Attorneys General 7

    The United States has intervened and filed a complaint against Robert Frohwein, Kathryn Petralia and Spencer Robinson, three former executives of Kabbage Inc., a now-bankrupt financial technology company. The United States alleges that they violated the False Claims Act by submitting and causing the submission of false claims for loan forgiveness, loan guarantees and processing fees to the Small Business Administration (SBA) in connection with Kabbage’s participation in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).

    “The PPP was intended to provide critical assistance to eligible businesses during the economic uncertainty caused by the pandemic,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The department is committed to ensuring that PPP lenders — including their executives — are held accountable for contributing to the misuse of PPP funds by knowingly failing to comply with applicable program requirements, including approving PPP loans in inflated amounts and to ineligible borrowers.”

    Congress created the PPP in March 2020, as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act, to provide federally guaranteed loans to small businesses suffering economic hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The SBA administered the PPP. The CARES Act authorized private lenders to approve PPP loans for eligible borrowers who could later seek forgiveness of the loans so long as they used loan funds on employee payroll and other eligible expenses. Among other things, participating PPP lenders were required to confirm borrowers’ average monthly payroll costs by reviewing the payroll documentation submitted with the borrower’s application. Lenders were also required to follow applicable Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering requirements to help combat fraud. Any unforgiven or defaulted PPP loans made by lenders were guaranteed by the SBA, so long as the lenders adhered to PPP requirements. Lenders who originated PPP loans were paid a fixed fee calculated as a percentage of the loan amount by the SBA.

    According to the government’s complaint, Frohwein and Petralia co-founded Kabbage in 2008 and served as the company’s chief executive officer and president, respectively, while Robinson formerly served as the company’s head of strategy. Kabbage was approved as a PPP lender in 2020 and approved more than $7 billion in PPP loans that year for which the company was paid more than $217 million in processing fees after certifying that it had complied with all applicable lending requirements.

    The complaint alleges that, between April and October 2020, the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for loan guarantees, loan forgiveness and processing fees relating to tens of thousands of PPP loans that were systemically inflated due to calculation errors by Kabbage. These errors allegedly included Kabbage’s double-counting of state and local taxes paid by employees and the failure to exclude annual compensation in excess of $100,000 per employee from its calculation of payroll costs. Additionally, the lawsuit alleges that the defendants knowingly submitted or caused the submission of false claims for processing fees related to tens of thousands of PPP loans where Kabbage failed to implement appropriate fraud controls. The government’s complaint alleges that the defendants ignored these violations to maximize PPP processing fees before selling off the majority of Kabbage’s assets in October 2020.

    Kabbage Inc., which is now winding down its operations as KServicing Wind Down Corp. after filing for bankruptcy in the wake of the 2020 asset sale, previously agreed to resolve allegations relating to its role in the submission of false claims to the SBA. As part of that settlement, the United States received a general unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding of up to $120 million, and the company received a credit for $12.5 million that Kabbage returned to SBA during the department’s investigation.

    “The PPP was a light providing hope to businesses in the midst of the shadow of a global pandemic,” said U.S. Attorney Damien M. Diggs for the Eastern District of Texas. “Unfortunately, some unscrupulous lenders and executives took advantage of that situation by lining their pockets with ill-gotten incentive payments from processing PPP loans despite not performing even the most cursory fraud checks or reviews of borrower documentation. Individuals who shirked their responsibilities at the expense of the public fisc must be held accountable. This lawsuit against Kabbage’s former executives demonstrates our firm commitment to holding all parties responsible for their part in causing the submission of false claims to the PPP.”

    “SBA’s lending partners have a responsibility to ensure only eligible borrowers gain access to SBA’s programs,” said Special Agent in Charge Brady Ipock of the SBA Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG)’s Central Region. “SBA OIG stands ready to support the Justice Department in rooting out greed and wrongful actions. I want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office and our law enforcement partners for their support and dedication to pursuing justice in this case.”

    The lawsuit was originally filed under the qui tam or whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act by Paul Pietschner, a former analyst in Kabbage’s collections department. The FCA permits private parties to file suit on behalf of the United States for false claims and to share in any recovery. The FCA also permits the United States to intervene in such an action, as it has done in this case. A defendant who violates the act is subject to liability for three times the government’s losses, plus applicable penalties. 

    On May 17, 2021, Attorney General Merrick B. Garland established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Justice Department in partnership with agencies across the federal government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international actors committing civil and criminal fraud and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud affecting COVID-19 government relief programs can be reported by visiting the webpage of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section, which can be found here. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can also report it by calling the Justice Department’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Trial Attorney Sarah E. Loucks of the Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Betty Young for the Eastern District of Texas are handling the matter, with assistance provided by the SBA’s Office of General Counsel and Office of the Inspector General.

    The case is captioned United States ex rel. Pietschner v. Kabbage, Inc., et al., No. 4:21-cv-110-SDJ (EDTX).

    The claims asserted by the United States are allegations only. There has been no determination of liability.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: East Bay Man Who Claimed His Marijuana Distribution Business Was A “Nonprofit” Sentenced To Over Three Years For Pandemic Relief Loan Fraud

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SAN FRANCISCO – A Brentwood man was sentenced yesterday to 37 months in prison for defrauding the United States by obtaining approximately $300,000 in COVID-19 relief funds for his “nonprofit” that was an unlicensed marijuana distribution business.  The sentence was handed down by the Honorable Rita F. Lin, U.S. District Judge, following defendant’s guilty plea on two counts of wire fraud.

    According to court documents, Thanh Duy Nguyen, 53, ran and was the sole officer of T&A Distribution, an unlicensed interstate marijuana trafficking scheme with grow houses around the Bay Area.  Nguyen used T&A Distribution to obtain two Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).  The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act authorized the SBA to provide EIDL loans to small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

    In the first application, which he submitted in April 2020, Nguyen certified that he was not engaged in any illegal activity as defined by federal law, even though he knew that his marijuana distribution business was illegal under federal law.  Nguyen fraudulently claimed that T&A Distribution was a nonprofit in the business of “Antiques/Collectibles,” when its business was marijuana distribution.  Nguyen also made other false statements, including about T&A Distribution’s gross revenue and employee count.  The true amount of T&A Distribution’s gross revenues in the 12 months before Jan. 31, 2020, was approximately $2.4 million.

    On a second EIDL application, which he submitted in June 2020, Nguyen again falsely certified that he was not engaged in any illegal activity as defined by federal law, and misrepresented T&A Distribution as a nonprofit in the business of “Miscellaneous Services.”  He also made false statements about the business’s gross revenues, cost of operations, and employee count.

    As a result of the falsified applications, Nguyen received approximately $300,000 in EIDL funds.  He used a significant amount of the loan funds for his marijuana distribution business and for gambling.

    In addition to the term of imprisonment, Judge Lin sentenced Nguyen to three years of supervised release and to pay $300,000 in restitution and $300,000 in forfeiture.  Nguyen will begin serving his sentence on Feb. 28, 2025.

    United States Attorney Ismail J. Ramsey, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent in Charge Bob P. Beris, and SBA Office of Inspector General (OIG) Special Agent in Charge of the Western Region Weston King made the announcement.

    This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigation.  OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks.

    Assistant United States Attorney Joseph Tartakovsky prosecuted the case with the assistance of Sara Slattery.  The prosecution is the result of an investigation by DEA and SBA OIG.
     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for Togo

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the first review under the ECF-arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw the equivalent of about US$57.4 million (SDR 44.0 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF-arrangement in March 2024.
    • Togo’s growth performance has remained robust, and inflation is moderating. The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth but also elevated risks.
    • Togo has continued to advance its reform agenda, and the program is on track. Policy priorities are to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review of the ECF-arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 58.7 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 390 million).

    The IMF approved the ECF-arrangement on March 1st, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/64) to help the authorities address the legacies of the shocks seen since 2020, notably the COVID-pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen these shocks’ impacts on the Togolese economy and population. However, this resulted in an increase in fiscal deficits and debt. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.6 percent in 2023 and is projected at 5.3 percent in 2024-25 and around 5.5 percent per year thereafter according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 3.3 percent in October 2024 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of food and transport) to 2.2 percent (annual averages).

    However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, terrorist attacks in the country’s North continues unabated and appears to be intensifying, putting pressure on spending. The authorities are contending with the challenging trade-offs between fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain robust growth in the context of limited fiscal space.

    Implementation of the program is on track. The authorities have met all end-June quantitative performance criteria, and prospects for meeting the quantitative targets for the rest of the year are favorable. The authorities also have met two out of the four due structural benchmarks, and there are prospects for the authorities to deliver at a later stage on the limited elements that have led to the missing of two benchmarks. Further, prospects for meeting the two end-December benchmarks are good. Finally, the authorities have made good progress on the reform of the remaining state-owned bank.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement: 

    “The Togolese authorities have shown strong implementation of the program supported under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The authorities have met all quantitative targets despite security challenges and tight financing conditions, and they have progressed on structural reforms to strengthen revenue mobilization, inclusion, and public financial management. 

    “Togo’s outlook is subject to elevated risks, broadly as at the program request in March 2024, while security conditions have deteriorated. In line with this, the design of the program as conceived at the outset remains broadly appropriate, and the authorities should continue to implement the program with determination to place the country on the path of strong and sustainable growth.   

    “In the area of fiscal policies, the authorities should continue to aim to address debt vulnerabilities in a context of regional vulnerabilities while supporting growth and enhancing inclusion. For this, it will be important to implement the agreed fiscal anchor by limiting fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GDP from 2025 onwards, continue to raise tax revenue while making taxation more efficient, and implement structural reforms to enhance the efficiency of spending and make the social safety net more effective and efficient. 

    “It will also be essential to continue efforts to strengthen governance. The authorities’ recent request for an IMF Governance Diagnostic is welcome, as is their commitment to strengthening beneficial ownership declarations for companies benefiting from public procurement contracts. On the financial sector, the authorities should continue the reform of the remaining public bank by bringing the bank’s capital in line with regulatory requirements and reforming its operations to ensure its stability and profitability. Efforts to strengthen the AML/CFT framework will also be important.

    Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–29

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

     

    Estimates

    Projections

     

    (Percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Real GDP

    2.0

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.3

    5.3

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    Real GDP per capita

    -0.4

    3.5

    3.3

    3.1

    2.8

    2.8

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    2.5

    3.7

    2.9

    2.2

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer price index (average)

    1.8

    4.5

    7.6

    5.3

    3.3

    2.3

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    GDP (CFAF billions)

    4253

    4621

    5069

    5507

    5927

    6366

    6850

    7371

    7932

    8536

    Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)

    575

    554

    622

    606

    Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)

    -2.0

    -1.4

    2.3

    -5.4

    Terms of trade (deterioration = –)

    -1.4

    6.6

    23.3

    3.4

    0.9

    -1.7

    -0.8

    1.4

    1.3

    0.4

       

    Monetary survey

    (Percentage change of beginning-of-period broad money)

      Net foreign assets

    14.1

    5.6

    -0.6

    6.2

    4.9

    -0.1

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.2

      Net credit to government

    -1.6

    -0.3

    8.0

    0.2

    -2.9

    1.0

    1.2

    2.0

    0.2

    0.2

      Credit to nongovernment sector

    0.2

    6.0

    10.7

    1.5

    7.3

    6.5

    4.4

    4.6

    4.9

    4.8

      Broad money (M2)

    11.4

    12.3

    14.9

    8.5

    8.8

    7.4

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

      Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)

    2.1

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

     

    Investment and savings

     

      Gross domestic investment

    21.4

    23.4

    25.9

    28.0

    25.7

    24.2

    25.0

    25.9

    26.7

    27.2

       Government

    9.3

    8.2

    9.7

    11.5

    9.0

    7.1

    7.7

    8.4

    8.9

    9.4

       Nongovernment

    12.1

    15.2

    16.2

    16.5

    16.7

    17.1

    17.3

    17.5

    17.8

    17.8

      Gross national savings

    21.1

    21.2

    22.5

    25.1

    22.7

    21.2

    22.4

    23.7

    24.7

    25.2

       Government

    2.2

    3.6

    1.4

    4.8

    4.1

    4.1

    4.7

    5.4

    5.8

    6.4

       Nongovernment

    18.9

    17.6

    21.0

    20.3

    18.6

    17.1

    17.7

    18.3

    18.9

    18.8

     

    Government budget

     

      Total revenue and grants

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    19.8

    18.8

    18.6

    19.1

    19.5

    19.9

    20.3

       Revenue

    14.1

    15.3

    15.1

    16.8

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    18.1

    18.5

    19.1

        Tax revenue

    12.5

    14.0

    13.9

    14.8

    15.2

    15.7

    16.2

    16.7

    17.2

    17.7

      Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operation)

    23.7

    21.8

    26.0

    26.6

    23.7

    21.6

    22.0

    22.6

    22.9

    23.3

      Overall primary balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -2.5

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall primary balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -3.4

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

     

    External sector

     

    Current account balance

    -0.3

    -2.2

    -3.5

    -2.9

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.6

    -2.2

    -2.0

    -2.0

       Exports (goods and services)

    23.3

    23.7

    26.6

    25.5

    25.7

    25.6

    26.0

    26.2

    26.2

    26.1

       Imports (goods and services)

    -32.3

    -34.0

    -38.8

    -36.2

    -35.4

    -34.4

    -33.9

    -33.7

    -33.5

    -33.5

    External public debt1

    27.6

    27.3

    26.2

    25.9

    29.5

    29.0

    29.9

    30.6

    30.8

    30.4

    External public debt service (percent of exports)1

    6.9

    5.2

    8.3

    8.2

    8.4

    15.5

    9.2

    8.3

    7.2

    6.5

    Domestic public debt2

    34.6

    37.6

    41.2

    42.1

    40.2

    39.1

    36.6

    34.3

    32.3

    31.4

    Total public debt3

    62.2

    64.9

    67.4

    68.0

    69.7

    68.2

    66.4

    64.8

    63.1

    61.8

    Total public debt (excluding SOEs)4

    60.1

    63.0

    65.8

    66.6

    68.6

    67.2

    65.6

    64.1

    62.5

    61.3

    Present value of total public debt3

    60.6

    60.7

    57.7

    54.5

    51.5

    48.8

    47.1

    Sources: Togolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

     

    1 Includes state-owned enterprise external debt.

    2 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise domestic debt.

    3 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise debt.

    4 Includes domestic arrears.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/12/20/pr24494-togo-imf-exec-board-completes-first-rev-ecf-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for Togo

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the first review under the ECF-arrangement for Togo, allowing the authorities to draw the equivalent of about US$57.4 million (SDR 44.0 million). The Executive Board approved the 42-month ECF-arrangement in March 2024.
    • Togo’s growth performance has remained robust, and inflation is moderating. The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth but also elevated risks.
    • Togo has continued to advance its reform agenda, and the program is on track. Policy priorities are to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review of the ECF-arrangement for Togo. The Board’s decision enables the immediate disbursement of SDR 44.0 million (about US$ 58.7 million), which will be used for budget support. The ECF-arrangement provides overall financing of SDR 293.60 million (about US$ 390 million).

    The IMF approved the ECF-arrangement on March 1st, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/64) to help the authorities address the legacies of the shocks seen since 2020, notably the COVID-pandemic and the increase in global food and fuel prices. The Togolese authorities were able to lessen these shocks’ impacts on the Togolese economy and population. However, this resulted in an increase in fiscal deficits and debt. The IMF-supported government program aims to (i) make growth more inclusive while strengthening debt sustainability, and (ii) implement structural reforms to support growth and limit financial sector and associated fiscal risks.

    The medium-term outlook is broadly favorable, with continued robust growth. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.6 percent in 2023 and is projected at 5.3 percent in 2024-25 and around 5.5 percent per year thereafter according to IMF staff projections, barring major adverse shocks. Headline inflation eased to 3.3 percent in October 2024 and core inflation (which excludes the prices of food and transport) to 2.2 percent (annual averages).

    However, the outlook is subject to high risks. In particular, terrorist attacks in the country’s North continues unabated and appears to be intensifying, putting pressure on spending. The authorities are contending with the challenging trade-offs between fiscal consolidation to lower the debt burden and the need to maintain robust growth in the context of limited fiscal space.

    Implementation of the program is on track. The authorities have met all end-June quantitative performance criteria, and prospects for meeting the quantitative targets for the rest of the year are favorable. The authorities also have met two out of the four due structural benchmarks, and there are prospects for the authorities to deliver at a later stage on the limited elements that have led to the missing of two benchmarks. Further, prospects for meeting the two end-December benchmarks are good. Finally, the authorities have made good progress on the reform of the remaining state-owned bank.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement: 

    “The Togolese authorities have shown strong implementation of the program supported under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). The authorities have met all quantitative targets despite security challenges and tight financing conditions, and they have progressed on structural reforms to strengthen revenue mobilization, inclusion, and public financial management. 

    “Togo’s outlook is subject to elevated risks, broadly as at the program request in March 2024, while security conditions have deteriorated. In line with this, the design of the program as conceived at the outset remains broadly appropriate, and the authorities should continue to implement the program with determination to place the country on the path of strong and sustainable growth.   

    “In the area of fiscal policies, the authorities should continue to aim to address debt vulnerabilities in a context of regional vulnerabilities while supporting growth and enhancing inclusion. For this, it will be important to implement the agreed fiscal anchor by limiting fiscal deficits to 3 percent of GDP from 2025 onwards, continue to raise tax revenue while making taxation more efficient, and implement structural reforms to enhance the efficiency of spending and make the social safety net more effective and efficient. 

    “It will also be essential to continue efforts to strengthen governance. The authorities’ recent request for an IMF Governance Diagnostic is welcome, as is their commitment to strengthening beneficial ownership declarations for companies benefiting from public procurement contracts. On the financial sector, the authorities should continue the reform of the remaining public bank by bringing the bank’s capital in line with regulatory requirements and reforming its operations to ensure its stability and profitability. Efforts to strengthen the AML/CFT framework will also be important.

    Togo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–29

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

     

    Estimates

    Projections

     

    (Percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    Real GDP

    2.0

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.3

    5.3

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    5.5

    Real GDP per capita

    -0.4

    3.5

    3.3

    3.1

    2.8

    2.8

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    2.5

    3.7

    2.9

    2.2

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    Consumer price index (average)

    1.8

    4.5

    7.6

    5.3

    3.3

    2.3

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    GDP (CFAF billions)

    4253

    4621

    5069

    5507

    5927

    6366

    6850

    7371

    7932

    8536

    Exchange rate CFAF/US$ (annual average level)

    575

    554

    622

    606

    Real effective exchange rate (appreciation = –)

    -2.0

    -1.4

    2.3

    -5.4

    Terms of trade (deterioration = –)

    -1.4

    6.6

    23.3

    3.4

    0.9

    -1.7

    -0.8

    1.4

    1.3

    0.4

       

    Monetary survey

    (Percentage change of beginning-of-period broad money)

      Net foreign assets

    14.1

    5.6

    -0.6

    6.2

    4.9

    -0.1

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.2

      Net credit to government

    -1.6

    -0.3

    8.0

    0.2

    -2.9

    1.0

    1.2

    2.0

    0.2

    0.2

      Credit to nongovernment sector

    0.2

    6.0

    10.7

    1.5

    7.3

    6.5

    4.4

    4.6

    4.9

    4.8

      Broad money (M2)

    11.4

    12.3

    14.9

    8.5

    8.8

    7.4

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

    7.6

      Velocity (GDP/end-of-period M2)

    2.1

    2.1

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

    2.0

     

    Investment and savings

     

      Gross domestic investment

    21.4

    23.4

    25.9

    28.0

    25.7

    24.2

    25.0

    25.9

    26.7

    27.2

       Government

    9.3

    8.2

    9.7

    11.5

    9.0

    7.1

    7.7

    8.4

    8.9

    9.4

       Nongovernment

    12.1

    15.2

    16.2

    16.5

    16.7

    17.1

    17.3

    17.5

    17.8

    17.8

      Gross national savings

    21.1

    21.2

    22.5

    25.1

    22.7

    21.2

    22.4

    23.7

    24.7

    25.2

       Government

    2.2

    3.6

    1.4

    4.8

    4.1

    4.1

    4.7

    5.4

    5.8

    6.4

       Nongovernment

    18.9

    17.6

    21.0

    20.3

    18.6

    17.1

    17.7

    18.3

    18.9

    18.8

     

    Government budget

     

      Total revenue and grants

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    19.8

    18.8

    18.6

    19.1

    19.5

    19.9

    20.3

       Revenue

    14.1

    15.3

    15.1

    16.8

    16.6

    17.1

    17.6

    18.1

    18.5

    19.1

        Tax revenue

    12.5

    14.0

    13.9

    14.8

    15.2

    15.7

    16.2

    16.7

    17.2

    17.7

      Expenditure and net lending (excl. banking sector operation)

    23.7

    21.8

    26.0

    26.6

    23.7

    21.6

    22.0

    22.6

    22.9

    23.3

      Overall primary balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -2.5

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (commitment basis, incl. grants)

    -7.0

    -4.7

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall primary balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -4.7

    -3.4

    -5.9

    -3.9

    -3.7

    -0.5

    -0.6

    -0.8

    -1.0

    -1.1

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants, excl. banking sector operations)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -4.9

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

      Overall balance (cash basis, incl. grants)

    -7.1

    -5.6

    -8.3

    -6.7

    -6.4

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

    -3.0

     

    External sector

     

    Current account balance

    -0.3

    -2.2

    -3.5

    -2.9

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.6

    -2.2

    -2.0

    -2.0

       Exports (goods and services)

    23.3

    23.7

    26.6

    25.5

    25.7

    25.6

    26.0

    26.2

    26.2

    26.1

       Imports (goods and services)

    -32.3

    -34.0

    -38.8

    -36.2

    -35.4

    -34.4

    -33.9

    -33.7

    -33.5

    -33.5

    External public debt1

    27.6

    27.3

    26.2

    25.9

    29.5

    29.0

    29.9

    30.6

    30.8

    30.4

    External public debt service (percent of exports)1

    6.9

    5.2

    8.3

    8.2

    8.4

    15.5

    9.2

    8.3

    7.2

    6.5

    Domestic public debt2

    34.6

    37.6

    41.2

    42.1

    40.2

    39.1

    36.6

    34.3

    32.3

    31.4

    Total public debt3

    62.2

    64.9

    67.4

    68.0

    69.7

    68.2

    66.4

    64.8

    63.1

    61.8

    Total public debt (excluding SOEs)4

    60.1

    63.0

    65.8

    66.6

    68.6

    67.2

    65.6

    64.1

    62.5

    61.3

    Present value of total public debt3

    60.6

    60.7

    57.7

    54.5

    51.5

    48.8

    47.1

    Sources: Togolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

     

    1 Includes state-owned enterprise external debt.

    2 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise domestic debt.

    3 Includes domestic arrears and state-owned enterprise debt.

    4 Includes domestic arrears.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: The Gambia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, enabling the immediate disbursement of about US$10.8 million to help meet financing needs and bolster inclusive, sustainable growth.
    • Economic recovery is strengthening, and inflation is gradually decreasing, although the pace remains slow. The country remains vulnerable to global shocks.
    • Program performance has been affected by fiscal pressures and delays in reform implementation, but the authorities remain committed to overall program targets. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Washington, DCDecember 20, 2024: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 12, 2024, in the amount of SDR74.64 million (about US$97.3 million). The completion of the review allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 8.29 million (about US$10.8 million), bringing total disbursements under the arrangement to about SDR 24.87 million (US$32.4 million).

    The economic recovery in The Gambia is strengthening. Real GDP growth is expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2024, supported by a broad-based rebound in economic activity. In particular, tourist arrivals are recovering and nearing pre-pandemic levels, while remittance inflows remain strong. Headline inflation has decreased significantly from a peak of 18.5 percent in September 2023, although energy prices led to a small uptick in inflation to 10 percent in October 2024.

    While the authorities remain committed to the objectives set out in the program and revenue collection has been strong, spending pressures from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit and emergency support to the public utility company NAWEC have weighed on fiscal balances. The new foreign exchange policy is working well, and international reserves exceeded targets by the end of September.  

    Based on the strength of the macroeconomic program, growth is projected at 5.9 percent in 2025 and around 5 percent in the medium term, though risks remain from global conflicts, commodity price shocks, and fluctuations in tourism and remittance flows. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Deputy Managing Director Bo Li issued the following statement:

    “The Gambia’s economic recovery is strengthening while inflation has trended down. Program implementation was mixed, reflecting broadly satisfactory adherence to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets but delays in implementing structural benchmarks. The authorities remain committed to their reform agenda, despite global economic headwinds. 

    “Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical to reduce fiscal risks and preserve debt sustainability. Finalizing and implementing the Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy will help secure consolidation gains and lower reliance on costly domestic and external financing. Improving the structure of expenditures will help maintain social services and space for growth-enhancing capital expenditures. Strengthening public financial management, including by preventing domestic arrears accumulation, and improving the performance of state-owned enterprises will help contain fiscal risks. To reduce debt vulnerabilities, it is crucial to adhere to the agreed fiscal targets, focus on grants and concessional loans, limit fiscal risks from PPPs, and implement a strong medium-term fiscal framework.

    “The Central Bank of The Gambia has appropriately maintained its tight monetary policy stance and is encouraged to remain vigilant and data dependent to ensure that inflation converges to the central bank’s medium-term target. The foreign exchange market has performed well following the introduction of the new foreign exchange policy. Going forward, the central bank is encouraged to continue pursuing an exchange rate that fully reflects market forces. The central bank’s commitment to cease financial support to public entities is welcome to prevent risks to its balance sheet.

    “Progress with structural reforms will be essential, including to enhance governance and further improve the business environment to promote private sector development and job creation. The publication of the action plan for the implementation of the recommendations of the governance diagnostic report as a prior action for this review was an important milestone. Adopting strong climate-related policies including through a possible RSF arrangement will be essential to build The Gambia’s resilience to climate risks.” 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Gambia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    December 20, 2024

    • The IMF Executive Board completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, enabling the immediate disbursement of about US$10.8 million to help meet financing needs and bolster inclusive, sustainable growth.
    • Economic recovery is strengthening, and inflation is gradually decreasing, although the pace remains slow. The country remains vulnerable to global shocks.
    • Program performance has been affected by fiscal pressures and delays in reform implementation, but the authorities remain committed to overall program targets. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Washington, DCDecember 20, 2024: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the second review under The Gambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 12, 2024, in the amount of SDR74.64 million (about US$97.3 million). The completion of the review allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 8.29 million (about US$10.8 million), bringing total disbursements under the arrangement to about SDR 24.87 million (US$32.4 million).

    The economic recovery in The Gambia is strengthening. Real GDP growth is expected to reach 5.8 percent in 2024, supported by a broad-based rebound in economic activity. In particular, tourist arrivals are recovering and nearing pre-pandemic levels, while remittance inflows remain strong. Headline inflation has decreased significantly from a peak of 18.5 percent in September 2023, although energy prices led to a small uptick in inflation to 10 percent in October 2024.

    While the authorities remain committed to the objectives set out in the program and revenue collection has been strong, spending pressures from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit and emergency support to the public utility company NAWEC have weighed on fiscal balances. The new foreign exchange policy is working well, and international reserves exceeded targets by the end of September.  

    Based on the strength of the macroeconomic program, growth is projected at 5.9 percent in 2025 and around 5 percent in the medium term, though risks remain from global conflicts, commodity price shocks, and fluctuations in tourism and remittance flows. Steadfast implementation of the policy and reform agenda will be essential to safeguard macroeconomic gains and debt sustainability.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Deputy Managing Director Bo Li issued the following statement:

    “The Gambia’s economic recovery is strengthening while inflation has trended down. Program implementation was mixed, reflecting broadly satisfactory adherence to quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets but delays in implementing structural benchmarks. The authorities remain committed to their reform agenda, despite global economic headwinds. 

    “Continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical to reduce fiscal risks and preserve debt sustainability. Finalizing and implementing the Domestic Revenue Mobilization Strategy will help secure consolidation gains and lower reliance on costly domestic and external financing. Improving the structure of expenditures will help maintain social services and space for growth-enhancing capital expenditures. Strengthening public financial management, including by preventing domestic arrears accumulation, and improving the performance of state-owned enterprises will help contain fiscal risks. To reduce debt vulnerabilities, it is crucial to adhere to the agreed fiscal targets, focus on grants and concessional loans, limit fiscal risks from PPPs, and implement a strong medium-term fiscal framework.

    “The Central Bank of The Gambia has appropriately maintained its tight monetary policy stance and is encouraged to remain vigilant and data dependent to ensure that inflation converges to the central bank’s medium-term target. The foreign exchange market has performed well following the introduction of the new foreign exchange policy. Going forward, the central bank is encouraged to continue pursuing an exchange rate that fully reflects market forces. The central bank’s commitment to cease financial support to public entities is welcome to prevent risks to its balance sheet.

    “Progress with structural reforms will be essential, including to enhance governance and further improve the business environment to promote private sector development and job creation. The publication of the action plan for the implementation of the recommendations of the governance diagnostic report as a prior action for this review was an important milestone. Adopting strong climate-related policies including through a possible RSF arrangement will be essential to build The Gambia’s resilience to climate risks.” 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/12/20/pr24496-gambia-imf-executive-board-completes-2nd-review-under-ecf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: 10% rise in non-local firms hailed

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    According to the latest annual survey jointly conducted by Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK) and the Census & Statistics Department, this year Hong Kong hosted 9,960 firms with parent companies located outside of the city, a record high number and a 10% increase on the previous year. Meanwhile, the number of people employed by such firms reached nearly 500,000, an increase of 5% year on year.

    Speaking to news.gov.hk, Director-General of Investment Promotion Alpha Lau said the figures demonstrate that Hong Kong’s business environment has fully regained its strong growth momentum following the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    She highlighted that due to uncertainty in the global economic situation, many companies are taking a cautious approach to expansion, but added that the latest numbers indicate Hong Kong is a pragmatic choice of location as it remains a very good place to do business.

    “Facts speak louder than words. Companies expand their business here and use Hong Kong as a springboard to enter into Mainland China, into Asia, or for Chinese companies to go out and expand into the rest of the world.”

    Analysed by parent company location, the top five sources of firms from outside Hong Kong are Mainland China (2,620), Japan (1,430), the US (1,390), the UK (720) and Singapore (520).

    Moreover, the top 10 locations all recorded increases in 2024. These include traditional markets in the Americas and Europe, as well as Asian markets.

    Notably, the number of regional headquarters in Hong Kong increased to 1,410, representing a 5.5% rise.

    These impressive figures not only reflect Hong Kong’s attractiveness but also indicate that InvestHK’s efforts to draw investment to the city are bearing fruit.

    As of November, InvestHK had assisted over 500 companies in setting up or expanding their operations in Hong Kong in 2024, an increase of more than 50% year on year. 

    Companies that have established their headquarters in Hong Kong believe that the city’s advantages as a hub for capital, talent and technology are self-evident.

    KN Group Hong Kong Treasury Centre General Manager Lucas Kong highlighted that the city maintains its status as one of the world’s leading financial centres, boasting a mature and open financial market environment.

    “As a fintech company leveraging artificial intelligence in the financial sector, establishing our headquarters in Hong Kong significantly facilitates the expansion of our international operations,” he explained.

    Mr Kong also stressed that the robust economic incentives provided by the Hong Kong Government have been instrumental both in attracting businesses and fostering technological innovation.

    He added that while the company’s expansion has led to its liquidity structure becoming more decentralised, resulting in increased management costs, establishing a global corporate treasury centre in Hong Kong has allowed the business to centralise fund management and allocation, thereby reducing costs and enhancing efficiency.

    “This move is made possible by Hong Kong’s transparent and open business ecosystem, coupled with its favourable tax regime.”

    Many family offices are also zeroing in on Hong Kong as the Government’s various high-value talent attraction schemes make the city an enticing choice for such operations.

    One example of such a firm is the family office Glory, which engages in insurance and trusts.

    Glory’s Global CEO, Gao Yang, explained that while it operates in both Hong Kong and Singapore, many of its clients favour Hong Kong, due to the Government’s introduction of a range of flexible and practical talent admission polices for Chinese high-net-worth individuals. She said these initiatives provide a variety of pathways, enhancing Hong Kong’s appeal as a premier financial hub.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI China: Annual buzzword selection highlights changes in China, world

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    People try VR devices during the 11th China (Wuhu) Popularized Science Products Exposition in Wuhu, east China’s Anhui Province, Oct. 21, 2023. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Multiple organizations in China released the most popular Chinese characters and phrases of 2024 on Friday, offering insight into the evolving trends of the country and the world.
    The top ten domestic buzzwords feature five Chinese characters for “integration,” “intelligence,” “new,” “safety,” and “stability” as well as the terms of “new-quality productive force,” “Black Myth: Wukong,” “work fatigue,” “low-altitude economy” and “digital transformation.”
    These buzzwords refer to various dimensions of China’s domestic society, ranging from its integrated and innovative development powered by new-quality productive forces and digital transformation, to cultural and economic phenomena in 2024 such as video game hit “Black Myth: Wukong” and its burgeoning low-altitude economy including drone deliveries.
    The top ten global buzzwords are characters for “election,” “war,” “change,” “turbulence” and “nuclear” and the terms of “Paris Olympics,” “Global South,” “Artificial Intelligence,” “drones” and “Large Language Model.”
    The lists were compiled using an algorithm that analyzed a corpus of Chinese characters along with public recommendations, with final results confirmed by experts and researchers.
    A closer look at the list of popular buzzwords recommended by the public also presents a more panoramic view of Chinese people’s social psyche over the past year.
    Frequently used words such as “say no to mental exhaustion” and “20-minute park life” signify a desire for a relaxed lifestyle amid the quick pace of modern life. Words like “Altay,” a prefecture in northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region made ultra-famous by a critically acclaimed TV drama series, and “ancient architecture tour” reveal the popular travel destinations of Chinese people in 2024.
    Among the recommendations, which are mostly in Chinese, the English expression of “China Travel” stands out, mirroring the country’s inbound travel boom buoyed by a series of facilitation policies and measures for foreigners.
    To welcome international visitors in the post-pandemic era, China has streamlined its visa application process, refined its immigration process to increase efficiency at border-control points, and made its payment services for international travelers more accessible and inclusive, among other efforts.
    According to official data, China recorded nearly 29.22 million inbound foreign visits between January and November 2024, up 86.2 percent year on year. Of these, 17.45 million visitors entered the country visa-free, marking a massive 123.3 percent increase from the previous year. Notably, the number of visa-free transit travelers surged by 132.9 percent year on year.
    With pride and love, “Beijing Central Axis” is also on the recommendation list as earlier this year, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) inscribed the “Beijing Central Axis: A Building Ensemble Exhibiting the Ideal Order of the Chinese Capital” on its World Heritage List.
    The Central Axis runs north to south through the heart of old Beijing and consists of ancient landmarks such as the Bell and Drum Towers, Wanning Bridge, Jingshan Hill, and the Forbidden City.
    “The Beijing Central Axis is an important symbol that highlights the outstanding features of Chinese civilization,” said Li Qun, China’s deputy minister of culture and tourism, in an interview.
    Having been held for 19 consecutive years, this annual event is jointly organized by the National Language Resources Monitoring and Research Center, the Commercial Press, and other institutions.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump has called time on working from home. Here’s why the world shouldn’t mindlessly follow

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Julia Richardson, Professor of Human Resource Management, Head of School of Management, Curtin University

    Gorodenkoff/Shutterstock

    US President Donald Trump has called time on working from home. An executive order signed on the first day of his presidency this week requires all federal government departments and agencies to:

    take all necessary steps to terminate remote work arrangements and require employees to return to work in-person.

    There are a few different models of working from home. Strictly speaking, remote work is where employees work from an alternative location (typically their home) on a permanent basis and are not required to report to their office.

    This is distinct from “telework”, a hybrid model whereby employees work from home an agreed number of days each week. But it’s clear Trump wants to end telework too.

    Under guidelines released on Wednesday, federal agencies were given until 5pm local time on 24 January to update their telework policies to require all employees back in the office full-time within 30 days.

    Obviously, Trump can’t end working from home for everyone. Private organisations are allowed to set their own policies. But the US government is a seriously big employer, with more than 3 million employees.

    According to the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), about 10% of federal workers are fully remote. The impact of this order will be far-reaching.

    Trump abruptly pulls the rug

    The work-from-home movement was a profound global shift, brought on by the COVID pandemic. We’ve been living with it for five years.

    Federal workers who have been working remotely for an extended period are likely to have made significant life decisions based on their flexible working arrangements.

    Flexible working arrangements have been mainstream for years, influencing key life decisions for many people.
    Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock

    It may have influenced where they bought a house, what school their children attend, and what their spouse or partner does for work.

    Trump’s order is likely to have a dramatic ripple effect on workers’ families and other life arrangements and responsibilities.

    True, federal heads of department and managers and supervisors will be allowed to make some exceptions – including for a disability, medical condition or other “compelling reason”.

    But the message is clear. What has been a growing but informal trend among some employers worldwide to “bring employees back into the office” is now being incorporated into US government policy.

    Why the backlash?

    Trump’s executive order reflects longstanding concerns among some employers and managers who think it is simply better to have employees in the office.

    They argue, among other things, that in-office work makes it easier to keep a close eye on performance, and supports more face-to-face collaboration. It also makes better use of often very expensive real estate.

    Amazon recently ordered all of its staff back into the office five days a week. Other surveys suggest many employers are planning a crackdown this year.

    City planners and businesses have also lamented the impact of remote and flexible working on restaurants, dry cleaners and coffee shops that rely on trade from commuters.

    What might be lost?

    Some employees may actually welcome the return to the office, particularly those who prefer more social interaction and want to make themselves more visible.

    Visibility is often linked with more promotion and career development opportunities.

    Others will find the change jarring, and may lose a range of benefits they’ve grown used to.

    A 2023 report by policy think tank EconPol Europe found working from home had become most prevalent in English-speaking countries.

    It suggested strong support, saying:

    the majority of workers highly value the opportunity to work from home for a portion of their work week, with some placing significant importance on it.

    Many also wanted to work more days from home than their employers were willing to allow.

    A recent analysis by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) found that working from home had significantly increased workforce participation for two key groups: working mums and people with a disability or health condition.

    Many employees now prioritise flexible work arrangements, and some are willing to sacrifice part of their salary for the privilege.

    Work-from-home arrangements also offer individuals living in remote communities access to employment. That benefit goes two ways, allowing employers to tap into a bigger talent pool.

    Will Australia follow?

    Trump’s executive order could have big, immediate impacts on federal workers in the US, but it’s unclear whether there’ll be domino effects here. It would be unwise for the Australian government or major employers to adopt a blanket approach.

    Indeed, some multinational US firms with offices in Australia may get caught up in Trump’s return-to-office movement.

    In the short term, this forced change is unlikely to make its way to Australia. While social trends do travel between regions, each country has its own employment laws, customs and trends.

    Researchers have shown it can be difficult, and in some cases impossible, to transfer human resource practices between countries
    and across cultures.

    Australia’s geography may be a factor on remote work’s side. A complete ban would immediately have a negative impact on employment opportunities for talented workers in the regions.

    The key message for Australian employers and policy-makers is that the benefits of remote work aren’t just for employees.

    It can enhance an organisation’s performance, widening the talent pool to include not only those who live far away from the office, but also talented workers who may otherwise be excluded.

    Julia Richardson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump has called time on working from home. Here’s why the world shouldn’t mindlessly follow – https://theconversation.com/trump-has-called-time-on-working-from-home-heres-why-the-world-shouldnt-mindlessly-follow-248036

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Asian Development Blog: How Can Asia Successfully Navigate New US Administration Policies?

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    Rising US tariffs and other policies of the new US presidential administration could create mixed outcomes for Asian economies, emphasizing the importance of building resilience through regional integration and open trade.

    How will new US administration policies affect economies in Asia and the Pacific, and how should they respond? 

    To gain insight into these questions, ADB recently completed two studies based on different global models—one strong on macroeconomics and one strong on trade—to estimate the magnitude of likely effects. 

    The first study examines the impact of the US imposing aggressive policies including 60% tariffs on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 10% tariffs on everyone else, reduced US immigration, and expansionary US fiscal policies. 

    The second study focuses only on the impact of tariffs. It assumes 60% tariffs on Chinese imports and examines different tariff scenarios for the rest of the world: 10% versus 20% tariffs, tariffs across the board versus exemptions for countries with free trade agreements with the US, and equal retaliatory tariffs versus no retaliation.   

    What do we learn from these exercises? 

    First, the negative effects on the Chinese economy will be relatively modest even with 60% tariffs. The first study, using a macro model, finds that growth slows by just 0.3% per year during the four years of the new administration, and the trade model predicts much smaller impacts thanks to opportunities to redirect trade to other countries and smaller impacts on global output than in the macro study. The impacts will be even less severe if the US only imposes additional tariffs of 10% as has been recently announced, even though further review of US trade imbalances could lead to more tariff increases later in the year.

    One reason for the modest impacts of high US tariffs is that the importance to the Chinese economy of exports to the US (both direct and indirect) has fallen steadily, now accounting for just 3% of the country’s GDP.

    Evidence from President Trump’s first term shows that the PRC was able to redirect exports to other countries and that the cost of US tariffs was largely borne by US consumers and firms.

    Second,  the effects on other Asian economies will be mixed, with some economies even expected to grow faster thanks to new export opportunities to the US to replace goods previously exported to the US from the PRC.

    Opportunities from trade diversion also were evident during the first trade war between the US and the PRC, benefiting export-competitive economies such as Viet Nam. 

    The recent shift observed in foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic sectors away from the PRC and toward other Asian economies, especially in Southeast Asia, is likely to be reinforced.   

    Despite these trends, it would be a mistake to assume that US tariffs on the PRC have zero-sum impacts that hurt the PRC and help other Asian economies. This is because in recent years the Chinese economy has become increasingly linked to other economies in the region through trade and investment despite geoeconomic fragmentation globally. 

    Thus,  slower Chinese growth hurts other economies by reducing demand for imports, and reduced Chinese exports to the US hurts economies that supply capital equipment and inputs to Chinese exporters, most notably the high-tech economies in East Asia including the Republic of Korea and Japan. 

    Also, if higher US tariffs on imports from the PRC help other Asian economies to attract more FDI and increase exports to the US, Chinese firms can still share in those benefits by increasing their outbound FDI and increasing exports of intermediate inputs to those economies. Indeed, such patterns of investment and trade have already become evident, especially in Southeast Asia.

    The trade study also finds that economies with trade agreements with the US will benefit if they are exempt from US tariff increases while tariffs are imposed on their competitors without such trade agreements. Most economies in the region lack trade agreements with the US and so would be negatively affected by such a differentiated policy. 

    Finally, economies in the region should be cautious in considering whether to respond to higher US tariffs with tariffs of their own. Higher import tariffs increase the price of imports which can contribute to inflation, make goods more expensive for domestic consumers, and increase the costs of production for producers that rely on imported intermediate inputs. 

     Perhaps of greater importance for Asian economies than tariffs is the impact of the new administration’s policies on US inflation and interest rates.

    All the announced policies—to increase tariffs, reduce immigration, and extend and perhaps increase tax cuts—are likely to be inflationary, which is expected to lead to higher US interest rates for longer periods of time. These expectations are already evident in the shift in the structure of US bond yields since the US election. Despite much progress by many Asian economies to reduce reliance on US-denominated debt, financial conditions in Asia remain quite sensitive to US interest rates and to inflation news when Fed policy is data dependent as it is now. 

    Higher US rates reduce the scope for Asian central banks to lower interest rates and support growth in the region. They increase debt sustainability risks for economies with high debt levels denominated in US dollars. 

    Given higher US interest rates, our macro model predicts that currencies in the region will depreciate relative to the dollar.

    However, we do not expect weaker currencies to lead to higher inflation overall because our macro model finds that the higher interest rates and trade costs associated with US policies will reduce global GDP and demand for commodities, which will lead to lower global energy and food prices.

    In recent years, developing economies in Asia have demonstrated tremendous resilience to large shocks associated with the pandemic, commodity prices, and geoeconomic fragmentation.

    This is due to sound macroeconomic management by most governments in the region. Moreover, despite global geoeconomic fragmentation, governments have maintained their commitment to open trade and investment, which has strengthened regional economic integration.

    This impressive track record means the region is well placed to maximize opportunities for inclusive growth and remain resilient to future shocks, including unexpected policy directions of the new US administration.
     

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Central bank independence in an era of volatility

    Source: European Central Bank

    Lamfalussy Lecture by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference organised by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, pre-recorded in Frankfurt am Main on 15 January 2025

    Budapest, 27 January 2025

    In his later years, Alexandre Lamfalussy was once asked what his fundamental motivation in life was. He recalled the experience of his turbulent youth, surrounded by the destruction caused by the Second World War.[1] “In the aftermath of the war,” Lamfalussy said, “I decided to serve the community in the rebuilding of Europe.”[2]

    He went on to do just that. A member of the Delors Committee and the first President of the European Monetary Institute, Lamfalussy helped pave the way for Europe’s monetary union and the establishment of the ECB.

    His generation had also been scarred by the difficulties of the “Great Inflation” in the 1970s.[3] And so Lamfalussy – alongside other architects of the euro[4] – ensured that the ECB would have sufficient powers to prevent a scenario where inflationary expectations once again became embedded in the economy.

    We can see proof of this today, as advanced economies emerge from the largest inflation shock in a generation.

    As in the 1970s, a series of shocks contributed to high and persistent inflation. But unlike the 1970s, inflation has since fallen relatively fast across advanced economies – and expectations have remained firmly anchored throughout.

    This hard-won progress has been in large part due to the independence of central banks, which has given them the ability to take difficult but necessary monetary policy decisions in pursuit of stable prices.

    The rise of central bank independence

    In the late twentieth century, central bank independence spread rapidly around the world.

    A strong social consensus about its benefits – emerging from the negative experience of the 1970s – sparked what Lamfalussy would later call a “sea change” in monetary policymaking.[5]

    By one account, over 80% of the world’s central banks became operationally independent by the turn of the millennium.[6] And price stability had been adopted as the primary objective of monetary policy frameworks across almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies.[7]

    Moreover, independent central banks both contributed to – and benefited from – a period of low macroeconomic volatility.

    In their famous paper, Alesina and Summers found a positive relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and lower and less volatile inflation outcomes.[8] At the same time, substantial structural changes were afoot in the global economy, which also helped to reduce macroeconomic volatility – an era that soon came to be known as the Great Moderation.[9]

    Globalisation led to an enormous increase in both global labour supply and production capacity, which meant that prices and wages were often little affected even in the face of strong demand. And the oil crises of the 1970s had sparked a wave of change in global energy markets, resulting in a more elastic energy supply.

    The upshot of the Great Moderation was a virtuous circle.

    An environment of low macroeconomic volatility made it easier for independent central banks to deliver on their price stability mandates. That, in turn, solidified the social consensus in support of central bank independence and helped ensure its growing adoption around the world – further contributing to lowering levels of volatility.

    The era of volatility

    The end of the Great Moderation came suddenly and unexpectedly in 2008 with the arrival of the global financial crisis. And over the last years in particular, our world has changed dramatically.

    Indeed, the two forces that fostered the spread of central bank independence – a strong social consensus and growing pools of global supply – are now coming under increasing pressure.

    While recent research suggests that de jure central bank independence has never been more prevalent than it is today[10], there is no doubt that the de facto independence of central banks is being called into question in several parts of the world.

    One study examining 118 central banks in the 2010s shows that around 10% of them faced political pressure in an average year – even those central banks with a high degree of de jure independence.[11] Another paper finds that between 2018 and 2020 alone, de facto central bank independence deteriorated for almost half of those central banks in jurisdictions accounting for 75% of global GDP.[12]

    There is evidence to suggest that political influence on central bank decisions can also contribute substantially to macroeconomic volatility. For instance, persistent political pressure on a central bank has been found to affect the level and the volatility of exchange rates, bond yields and the risk premium.[13]

    At the same time, geopolitical tensions threaten to amplify volatility by increasing the frequency of shocks hitting the global economy.

    We have already seen the impact of geopolitical tensions play out in Europe. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, average output growth volatility in the euro area surged by 60% compared with before the global financial crisis, while average inflation volatility shot up by 280%.[14]

    An environment of heightened volatility could make the task of maintaining price stability more difficult to achieve.[15] This could raise concerns that independent central banks are failing to deliver on their mandates, which could undermine the social consensus and further amplify volatility in the economy.

    So, the question that comes to the fore is: will the current era of volatility turn the virtuous circle that facilitated the rise of central bank independence into a vicious circle that leads to it being undermined?

    The benefits of central bank independence in today’s world

    All things considered, I would argue that this is unlikely to happen.

    A volatile macroeconomic environment actually makes the benefits of central bank independence all the greater. We saw this during the recent inflation shock.

    In OECD countries, average annual inflation surged to 9.6% in 2022 as they faced a variety of shocks that compounded each other.[16] In response, independent central banks sharply increased policy rates.

    These actions led to a rapid decline and convergence in the respective inflation paths of major economies – despite all these economies facing different shocks. Moreover, inflation expectations have remained firmly anchored, suggesting that the public continues to have faith in independent central banks’ commitment to price stability over the long run.[17]

    In today’s world, central bank independence offers two key advantages.

    First, it acts as a headwind to volatility in these unpredictable times.

    As we emerge from a period of very high inflation, the issue of time inconsistency is more relevant than ever.[18] Compared with the pre-pandemic era of low inflation, central banks may need to contend with lower levels of rational inattention.[19]

    In this environment, credible policy regimes become even more important for maintaining trust in central banks. Research finds that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation expectations on average and significantly reduces uncertainty about future inflation.[20]

    Second, central bank independence also contributes to regional strength in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalries.

    Price stability provides the foundation upon which other strategic goals can be achieved. Regions with stable prices tend to have more efficient resource allocation and higher levels of competitiveness, and they attract greater levels of investment. At heart, strong economic institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth and development differences between regions.[21]

    Conclusion

    Lamfalussy once described the task of launching the euro as “navigating in uncharted waters”.[22] In an era of volatility, independent central banks now also find themselves in unfamiliar waters.

    While inflation has fallen sharply, central banks are still likely to face a more volatile macroeconomic environment compared with the Great Moderation.

    It therefore remains imperative that central banks have the independence to fully deliver on their price stability mandates.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Orezone Intercepts High-Grade Mineralization Below North Zone Life of Mine Pits Including 2.55 G/T Gold Over 23.00m and 1.14 G/T Gold Over 29.50m

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, Jan. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Orezone Gold Corporation (TSX: ORE, OTCQX: ORZCF) (the “Company” or “Orezone”) is pleased to provide additional drill results from its recently announced multi-year exploration campaign at its flagship Bomboré Gold Mine. The new results are centered on the North Zone, with high grades intercepted below both the North Zone Footwall and North Zone Hill resource and reserve pits.

    Selected Drill Highlights:

    • 2.55 g/t Au over 23.00m, including 5.54 g/t Au over 5.00m (BBD1324)
    • 1.14 g/t Au over 29.50m, including 2.30 g/t Au over 4.50m (BBD1320)
    • 1.20 g/t Au over 23.80m (BBD1323)
    • 1.01 g/t Au over 18.70m (BBD1319)
    • 1.80 g/t Au over 15.00m (BBD1318)
    • 1.59 g/t Au over 9.80m (BBD1318)
    • 1.69 g/t Au over 6.85m (BBD1322)
    • 24.74 g/t Au over 2.00m (BBD1323)

    Patrick Downey, President and CEO stated, “These latest drill results further underscore the significant exploration upside at Bomboré, and the potential to materially expand the resource base from the current global 5.1 million gold ounces, to a targeted 7 to 10 million gold ounces longer term. Given Bomboré’s 14km long reserve defined strike length at an average reserve pit depth of less than 40m, we have been aggressive in our pursuit of illustrating this potential. Towards this goal, we are accelerating the Phase I exploration campaign and planning a comprehensive 30,000m drill program through 2025. Recent drilling from only 12 wide spaced drill holes in the North Zone Footwall has successfully extended mineralization 100m to 250m below the reserve pit bottoms along a strike length of over 800m. This has clear implications in terms of extending current life of mine pits to depth and increasing the future production profile at Bomboré.

    The discovery potential of the orogenic gold setting at Bomboré is also highlighted by the multiple higher-grade sub-zones, which we believe may host the potential to transition into an underground mining scenario beneath the existing life of mine open pits. This prospect continues to be an area of focus at North Zone Hill, as well as at P16 and P17 where drilling has recently commenced.

    Together with our ongoing production expansion, which is currently ahead of schedule, this renewed focus on exploration at Bomboré, and testing the overall size and scale of the broader system, represent a truly exciting time for Orezone on multiple fronts.”

    North Zone Footwall – Extending Mineral System to Depth

    Initial drilling last year, targeting the North Zone Footwall at depth, was successful in extending high-grade mineralization 240m below the current reserve pit, with intercepts of 1.02g/t Au over 57.00m (BBD1313) and 1.64g/t Au over 46.00m (BBD1314). Wide spaced follow-up drilling was successful in extending mineralization 100m to 250m below the reserve pits along a strike length of over 800m (Figure 2). This was marked by several broad high-grade intercepts including 1.17g/t Au over 29.50m (BBD1320), 1.20g/t Au over 23.80m (BBD1323), 1.01g/t Au over 18.70m (BBD1319) and 1.80g/t Au over 15.00m (BBD1318).

    While early-stage, the main takeaways from this recent round of drilling along the North Zone Footwall include:

    1)   The potential, with subsequent infill drilling, to materially extend the North Zone Footwall resource and reserve pits to depth. If successful, this would have positive implications in terms of further expanding the production profile at Bomboré.

    2)   Given the initial results at the North Zone Footwall, there are comparable opportunities to extend the mineralized system at depth across the greater 14km long reserve defined trend, where the average reserve pit depth is currently less than 40m.

    North Zone Hill and Higher-Grade Sub-Zone Targeting

    As part of the exploration campaign to test the broader size and scale of the Bomboré mineralized system, a second focus of the current drill program is to further delineate a number of higher-grade sub-zones within, and extending below, the current life of mine open pit resource and reserves. The Company believes that these higher-grade sub-zones may host the potential to transition into underground mining beneath the open pits in the future. This is a well demonstrated mine sequence in-country, and if successful, would not only serve to increase the operating head grade at Bomboré, but also increase the overall production profile.

    With exploration efforts initially concentrated in the northern end of the project, initial testing of this thesis was centered on North Zone Hill, where at open pit drill spacing, there is a defined trend of higher-grade mineralization. As detailed in Figure 3, this sub-zone is marked by multiple high-grade intercepts including 8.75g/t Au over 7.20m (BBD1246), 7.17g/t Au over 7.00m (BBD0903), 13.44g/t Au over 2.80m (BBD1249), and 6.92g/t Au over 6.00m (BBD0911). Initial drill testing down plunge along this trend intercepted a broad interval of 2.55g/t Au over 23.00m, with a higher-grade sub-interval of 5.54g/t Au over 5.50m (BBD1324). Follow-up testing at North Zone Hill in the future will focus on additional step-outs down plunge and on tighter spaced drilling along trend to further resolve the controls on this higher-grade mineralization.

    The Company’s objective to further delineate such higher-grade sub-zones has extended to the P16 and P17S deposits at the southern end of the mining permit, in advance of the start of the rainy season in May. As outlined below, and detailed in Figure 4 and Figure 5, the P16 and P17S deposits host a number of higher-grade sub-zones. Initial testing at these deposits will focus on the down plunge continuity of the high-grade sub-zones and the potential for limb extensions to the East and West. Follow-up drill programs will further reduce the drill spacing towards the base of the pits and down plunge, as well as to test for repeats of the system along strike, a prospect that is well supported by historical drilling.

    P16 – selected high-grade historical intercepts:

    • 10.63g/t Au over 14.0m (BBD0448)
    • 16.50g/t Au over 5.0m (BBD0448)
    • 9.03g/t Au over 12.0m (BBC3241)
    • 6.69g/t Au over 15.5m (BBD0443)
    • 5.91g/t Au over 15.0m (BBD0447)
    • 7.82g/t Au over 9.0m (BBD0213)
    • 58.91g/t Au over 3.0m (BBD0768)

    P17S – selected high-grade historical intercepts:

    • 14.67g/t Au over 6.0m (BBD1066)
    • 16.58g/t Au over 4.6m (BBD0991)
    • 11.52g/t Au over 10.6m (BBD1081)
    • 9.44g/t Au over 10.0m (TYD0041)
    • 8.47g/t Au over 6.0m (BBD1132)
    • 7.08g/t Au over 7.0m (TYC0123)
    • 7.62g/t Au over 5.5m (TYD0035)

    Figure 1: Bomboré Gold Mine Property Map

    Figure 2: North Zone Footwall Long Section Looking Southeast

    Figure 3: North Zone Hill Long Section Looking Northwest

    Figure 4: P16 Long Section Looking North-Northwest

    Figure 5: P17 Long Section Looking North-Northwest

    Bomboré Drill Results

    Table 1: Highlight Drill Intercepts from the North Zone

    Hole Easting Northing Elevation Dip Azimuth EOH
    (m)
    From
    (m)
    To
    (m)
    Length
    (m)
    Grade
    (g/t Au)
    Type
    BBD1315 729390 1354119 282 -51 313 414 322.00 325.00 3.00 0.70 HR
    and             336.00 345.00 9.00 1.06 HR
    and             363.00 368.00 5.00 1.02 HR
    and             386.30 393.00 6.70 1.40 HR
    BBD1316 729160 1354057 286 -52 313 300 188.00 191.00 3.00 0.69 HR
    and             271.00 282.60 11.60 0.78 HR
    and             292.00 293.00 1.00 2.68 HR
    BBD1317 729234 1353990 284 -51 313 429 14.00 18.00 4.00 0.44 OX
    and             20.80 24.20 3.40 1.02 OX
    and             45.50 48.60 3.10 0.37 OX
    and             65.00 75.00 10.00 0.75 OX
    and             303.00 314.00 11.00 0.95 HR
    and             328.00 339.00 11.00 0.75 HR
    and             380.10 387.40 7.30 1.53 HR
    incl.             382.25 387.40 5.15 1.92 HR
    and             398.00 401.00 3.00 1.73 HR
    BBD1318 729062 1354011 284 -56 312 317 167.20 177.00 9.80 1.59 HR
    and             254.00 269.00 15.00 1.80 HR
    incl.             261.00 267.90 6.90 2.52 HR
    and             286.00 287.00 1.00 2.95 HR
    BBD1319 729009 1353921 282 -53 313 330 282.00 300.70 18.70 1.01 HR
    incl.             293.70 300.70 7.00 1.23 HR
    and             305.65 309.75 4.10 1.29 HR
    and             318.00 323.00 5.00 1.04 HR
    BBD1320 729492 1354296 289 -56 312 321 88.00 93.30 5.30 1.55 HR
    and             259.00 288.50 29.50 1.14 HR
    incl.             261.50 266.00 4.50 2.30 HR
    and             275.00 281.20 6.10 1.93 HR
    BBD1322 729569 1354228 289 -55 311 456 5.50 9.80 4.30 0.56 OX
    and             58.15 61.50 3.35 0.47 OX
    and             364.00 367.00 3.00 0.75 HR
    and             391.00 402.00 11.00 0.95 HR
    and             409.00 415.85 6.85 1.69 HR
    incl.             411.90 414.80 2.90 3.07 HR
    BBD1323 729136 1353944 282 -56 311 429 4.50 6.75 2.25 0.86 OX
    and             12.80 15.10 2.30 0.54 OX
    and             209.00 211.00 2.00 24.74 HR
    and             244.25 247.00 2.75 0.99 HR
    and             364.00 387.80 23.80 1.20 HR
    incl.             371.00 375.00 4.00 1.79 HR
    and             391.30 394.00 2.70 0.96 HR
    BBD1324 728995 1353667 280 -52 310 312 20.20 23.20 3.00 1.23 OX
    and             193.00 216.00 23.00 2.55 HR
    incl.             196.00 201.00 5.00 5.54 HR
    and             277.95 280.00 2.05 0.91 HR
    and             382.00 385.00 3.00 2.42 HR
    BBD1325 728983 1353576 276 -54 311 381 233.00 237.00 4.00 1.94 HR
    incl.             235.00 236.00 1.00 5.40 HR
    and             243.00 248.00 5.00 1.46 HR
    BBD1326 729674 1354502 286 -52 314 335 6.00 8.15 2.15 0.71 OX
    and             189.00 191.00 2.00 5.42 HR
    and             253.00 254.00 1.00 2.11 HR
    BBD1327 728991 1353806 281 -51 312 468 13.50 17.50 4.00 0.54 OX
    and             21.60 23.80 2.20 1.38 OX
    and             33.55 34.50 0.95 1.48 OX
    and             360.00 362.00 2.00 0.99 HR
    and             372.20 373.10 0.90 8.81 HR
    and             384.70 396.00 11.30 0.86 HR
    BBD1328 728976 1353684 281 -51 313 282 24.00 31.75 7.75 0.58 OX
    and             59.25 63.90 4.65 0.46 OX
    and             172.20 173.10 0.90 5.53 HR
    and             210.25 212.15 1.90 2.44 HR
    and             253.60 257.55 3.95 1.39 HR

    True widths for North Zone drilling are approximately 85% of drilled lengths.
    HR – Hard Rock, OX – Oxide

    About Orezone Gold Corporation

    Orezone Gold Corporation (TSX: ORE OTCQX: ORZCF) is a West African gold producer engaged in mining, developing, and exploring its flagship Bomboré Gold Mine in Burkina Faso. The Bomboré mine achieved commercial production on its oxide operations on December 1, 2022, and is now focused on its staged hard rock expansion that is expected to materially increase annual and life-of-mine gold production from the processing of hard rock mineral reserves. Orezone is led by an experienced team focused on social responsibility and sustainability with a proven track record in project construction and operations, financings, capital markets and M&A.

    The technical report entitled Bomboré Phase II Expansion, Definitive Feasibility Study is available on SEDAR+ and the Company’s website.

    Contact Information

    Patrick Downey
    President and Chief Executive Officer

    Vanessa Pickering
    Manager, Investor Relations

    Tel: 1 778 945 8977 / Toll Free: 1 888 673 0663
    info@orezone.com / www.orezone.com

    For further information please contact Orezone at +1 (778) 945 8977 or visit the Company’s website at www.orezone.com.

    The Toronto Stock Exchange neither approves nor disapproves the information contained in this news release.

    QUALIFIED PERSON

    Alastair Gallaugher (CGeol), Exploration Manager for Orezone, is the Qualified Persons under NI 43-101 and has reviewed and approved the scientific and technical information contained in this news release.  

    QA/QC

    The mineralized intervals are based on a lower cut-off grade of 0.28g/t in the Oxide+Upper Transition zone, and 0.45g/t Au in the Lower Transition+Hard Rock zone. The true width of the mineralization is approximately 85% of the drill length in the North Zone. The half-core drilling samples were cut using a diamond saw by Orezone employees. The samples were prepared by BIGS Global Burkina s.a.r.l. (“BIGS Global”) and then split by Orezone to 1 kg using Rotary Sample Dividers (“RSDs”). A 1-kg aliquot was analyzed for leachable gold at BIGS Global in Ouagadougou, by bottle-roll cyanidation using a LeachWellTM catalyst. The leach residues from all samples with a leach grade greater than or equal to 0.25g/t Au were prepared by BIGS Global and then split by Orezone to 50 g using RSDs. A 50-g aliquot was analyzed by fire assay at BIGS Global.

    Orezone employs a rigorous Quality Control Program including a minimum of 10% standards, blanks and duplicates. The composite width and grade include the final leach residue assay results for most of the drill intercepts reported.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains certain information that may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable Canadian Securities laws and “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of applicable U.S. securities laws (together, “forward-looking statements”). Forward-looking statements are frequently characterized by words such as “plan”, “expect”, “project”, “intend”, “believe”, “anticipate”, “estimate”, “potential”, “possible” and other similar words, or statements that certain events or conditions “may”, “will”, “could”, or “should” occur.

    Forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to, statements with respect to the exploration program (including the significant exploration upside at Bomboré, and the potential to materially expand the project’s resource base from the current global 5.13 million gold ounces, to a targeted 7 to 10 million gold ounces longer term; implications of extending the current life of mine pits to depth, and increasing the project’s production profile; the potential with subsequent infill drilling to materially extend the North Zone Footwall resource and reserve pits to depth; opportunities to extend the mineralized system at depth across the greater 14km long reserve defined trend; the belief that the higher-grade sub-zones may host the potential to transition into underground mining beneath the existing open pits and that this is a well demonstrated mine sequence in-country, and if successful, would not only serve to increase the operating head grade at Bomboré, but also increase the overall production profile; and historical drilling supporting P16 and P17S deposits’ down plunge continuity of the high-grade sub-zones, the potential for limb extensions to the East and West and repeats of the system along strike); the potential expansion of mineral reservices and resources; exploration activities; interpretations of drilling results; future production; project development timelines (including the ongoing production expansion being ahead of schedule); and anticipated economic benefits.

    All such forward-looking statements are based on certain assumptions and analyses made by management in light of their experience and perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors management and the qualified persons believe are appropriate in the circumstances.

    All forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual events or results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, delays caused by pandemics, terrorist or other violent attacks (including cyber security attacks), the failure of parties to contracts to honour contractual commitments, unexpected changes in laws, rules or regulations, or their enforcement by applicable authorities; the failure of parties to contracts to perform as agreed; social or labour unrest; changes in commodity prices; unexpected failure or inadequacy of infrastructure, the possibility of unanticipated costs and expenses, accidents and equipment breakdowns, political risk, unanticipated changes in key management personnel and general economic, market or business conditions, the failure of exploration programs, including drilling programs, to deliver anticipated results and the failure of ongoing and uncertainties relating to the availability and costs of financing needed in the future, and other factors described in the Company’s most recent annual information form and management discussion and analysis filed on SEDAR+. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.

    Although the forward-looking statements contained in this press release are based upon what management of the Company believes are reasonable assumptions, the Company cannot assure investors that actual results will be consistent with these forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. Subject to applicable securities laws, the Company does not assume any obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of this press release.

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at
    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/7d80c26f-8efa-478f-a74e-2d4f292f47d6

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/182737de-3097-4ef3-b36b-f69e5e9cfb57

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/7ca17fad-8644-4d58-9376-8aecb7afd1a9

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8cbcbc8e-f7e5-4daf-8f1c-0676b7fa1a59

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/da4f18c1-e76f-4817-b50c-53dece8ff50d

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: Breaking up the band: why solo artists have come to dominate the music charts

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sam Whiting, Vice-Chancellor’s Senior Research Fellow, RMIT University

    Shutterstock

    Predictions for this year’s Hottest 100 countdown revealed an interesting trend that has come to dominate popular music over the past decade: the prevalence of solo artists over bands.

    In the past 15 years, only five winners of the Hottest 100 were bands, compared to 13 in the 15 years prior to that. This shift is being replicated across charts globally.

    And it’s not just rock bands that are losing out, but bands of all sorts, including pop groups (with the considerable exception of K-pop).

    The rise of solo artists doesn’t signify some sort of embrace of a hyper-individual idol culture, nor should we nostalgically lament a mythical “golden era of bands”. Solo artists have always been pervasive within popular music. Also, most bands are driven by one or two key songwriters, and often fronted by a charismatic individual.

    The trend towards solo artists is less a product of culture, and more a result of the creative and economic realities of pop music’s production, consumption, distribution and marketing.

    Doja Cat took out the top spot in the 2023 Triple J Hottest 100.

    Doing more with less

    With the emergence of digital audio workstations, home studio technologies, and the widespread availability of video tutorials, musicians and songwriters no longer need costly rehearsal rooms and recording studios to produce new music.

    They can record demos and workshop material with less players in the room, or in many cases with no room at all – as a large bulk of the work is done digitally.

    This has made writing and producing music cheaper, easier and more efficient. What previously might have required a whole band can now be done by a single artist with the help of a producer and some session musicians.

    More revenue between less people

    It’s no secret musicians are doing it tough in the streaming era. Many receive limited income from recorded music, and are pushed to depend heavily on touring and merchandise.

    Why then, would creatives want to increase their costs by bringing in more mouths to feed? Whether you’re a band or a solo artist, touring can come with financial risk and even major financial loss.

    Solo artists retain the lion’s share of whatever profits are made. Rather than negotiating tricky revenue-sharing agreements between members, they can hire session and contract musicians as needed for recording and touring, keeping costs down and side-stepping ownership issues that might lead to tension in a band.

    Such arrangements also make it easier to market the artist and music itself.

    The artist as a brand

    Creating a successful brand as a musician is more effective when working with one or two key identities, rather than a collective such as a band.

    Even popular K-pop groups – which stand as an exception to the trend towards solo acts – emphasise individual members, marketing each one to a different part of their fan-base.

    Likewise, many bands are strongly identified with a charismatic front-person, who tends to double as an artistic spokesperson.

    It’s easier to curate an artistic and aesthetic vision around one individual, rather than several. This also helps streamline marketing activities, as well as touring and media engagements.

    Bands break up

    It’s a harsh reality that bands break up.

    Bands can break up for many reasons, but no doubt the strain of touring plays a major role. With an increased prevalence of mental health issues among international touring musicians, as well as power imbalances and exploitative labour practices entrenched in the live music sector – touring can take a toll on many bands.

    In the years since the COVID pandemic, more and more artists have cancelled tours, citing exhaustion and burnout. Solo artists only have to make this decision for themselves (although it effects their touring crew), whereas bands have to negotiate such crucial decisions collectively.

    Despite good intentions and industry success, having to maintain creative and business relationships with the same group of people often becomes unsustainable.

    Solo artists have a clearer separation between their creative, business and personal relationships. They can maintain a business model that doesn’t necessarily rely on the consistent commitment of three, four or five people.

    Then again, this commitment is possibly the very thing that makes bands such an intriguing artistic phenemonen: a group of individuals working together to create something greater than the sum of their parts.

    Such demonstrations of collective creative alchemy might be the reason bands continue to captivate our attention, despite the atomising creative and economic realities of the modern music industry.




    Read more:
    This K-pop band just made US Billboard history. Here’s how Stray Kids conquered the music world


    Sam Whiting receives funding from RMIT University and the Winston Churchill Trust.

    ref. Breaking up the band: why solo artists have come to dominate the music charts – https://theconversation.com/breaking-up-the-band-why-solo-artists-have-come-to-dominate-the-music-charts-248123

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira, Post-doctoral researcher, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

    Urban agriculture takes many forms, among them community, school or rooftop gardens, commercial urban farms, and hydroponic or aquaponic systems. These activities have been shown to promote sustainable cities in a number of ways. They enhance local food security and foster economic opportunities through small-scale farming initiatives. They also strengthen social cohesion by creating shared spaces for collaboration and learning.

    However, evidence from some African countries (and other parts of the world) shows that very few young people are getting involved in agriculture, whether in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. Studies from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Nigeria show that people aged between 15 and 34 have very little interest in agriculture, whether as an educational pathway or career. They perceive farming as physically demanding, low-paying and lacking in prestige. Systemic barriers like limited access to land, capital and skills also hold young people back.

    South Africa has a higher rate of young people engaging in farming (24%) than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this number could be higher if young people better understood the benefits of a career in farming and if they had more support.

    In a recent study I explored youth-driven urban agriculture in Khayelitsha, a large urban area outside Cape Town whose residents are mostly Black, low-income earners.

    The young urban farmers I interviewed are using community gardens to grow more than vegetables. They’re also nurturing social connections, creating economic and business opportunities, and promoting environmental conservation. My findings highlight the transformative potential of youth-driven urban agriculture and how it can be a multifaceted response to urban challenges. It’s crucial that policy makers recognise the value of youth-led urban agriculture and support those doing the work.

    The research

    Khayelitsha is vibrant and bustling. But its approximately 400,000 residents have limited resources and often struggle to make a living.

    I interviewed members of two youth-led gardens. One has just two members; the other has six. All my interviewees were aged between 22 and 27. The relatively low number of interviewees is typical of qualitative research, where the emphasis is placed on depth rather than breadth. This approach allows researchers to obtain detailed, context-rich data from a small, focused group of participants.

    The first garden was founded in January 2020, just a few months before the pandemic struck. The founders wanted to tackle unemployment and food insecurity in their community. They hoped to create jobs for themselves and others, and to provide nutritional support, particularly for vulnerable groups like children with special needs.

    The second garden was established in 2014 by three childhood friends. They were inspired by one founder’s grandmother, who loved gardening. They also wanted to promote organic farming, teach people healthy eating habits, and create a self-reliant community.

    All of my interviewees were activists for food justice. This refers to efforts aimed at addressing systemic inequities in food production, distribution, and access, particularly for marginalised communities. It advocates for equitable access to nutritious, culturally appropriate food.

    One of the gardens, for instance, operates about 30 beds. It cultivates a variety of produce: beetroot, carrots, spinach, pumpkins, potatoes, radishes, peas, lettuce and herbs. 30% of its produce is donated to local community centres each month (they were unable to say how many people benefited from this arrangement). The rest is sold to support the garden financially. Its paying clients include local restaurants and chefs, and members of the community. The garden also partners with schools, hospitals and other organisations to promote healthy eating and sustainable practices.

    The second garden, which is on land belonging to a local early childhood development centre, also focuses on feeding the community, as well as engaging in food justice activism.

    Skills, resilience and connections

    The gardens also help members to develop skills. Members gain practical knowledge about sustainable agriculture, marketing and entrepreneurship, all while managing operations and planning for growth.


    Read more: Healthy food is hard to come by in Cape Town’s poorer areas: how community gardens can fix that


    This hands-on experience instils a sense of responsibility and gives participants valuable skills they can apply in future careers or ventures. The founder of the first garden told me his skills empowered him to seek help from his own community rather than waiting for government intervention. He approached the management of an early childhood development centre in the community to request space on their land, and this was granted.

    Social connections have been essential to the gardens’ success. Bonding capital (close ties within their networks) and bridging capital (connections beyond their immediate community) has allowed them to strengthen relationships between themselves and civil society organisations. They’ve also been able to mobilise resources, as in the case of the first garden accessing community land.

    Additionally, the gardens foster community resilience. Members host workshops and events to educate residents about healthy eating, sustainable farming and environmental stewardship.

    By donating produce to local early childhood centres, they provide direct benefits to those most in need. These efforts have transformed the gardens into safe spaces for the community.

    Broader collaboration has also been key to the gardens’ success. For instance, the second garden has worked with global organisations and networks, like the Slow Food Youth Network, to share and gain knowledge about sustainable farming practices.

    Room for growth

    My findings highlight the need for targeted support for youth-driven urban agriculture initiatives. Policy and financial backing can enable these young gardeners to expand their efforts. This in turn will allow them to provide more food to their communities, create additional jobs, and empower more young people.

    At a policy level, the government could prioritise land access for urban agriculture projects, especially in under-served communities. Cities can foster an environment for youth initiatives to thrive by allocating spaces within their planning for urban farming.


    Read more: Africa’s megacities threatened by heat, floods and disease – urgent action is needed to start greening and adapt to climate change


    There’s also a need for educational programmes that emphasise the value of sustainable urban agriculture, and workshops and training on entrepreneurship and sustainable farming techniques. Community organising could further empower young farmers. Finally, continued collaboration with national and international food networks would help strengthen such initiatives.

    – Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study
    – https://theconversation.com/urban-food-gardens-produce-more-than-vegetables-they-create-bonds-for-young-capetonians-study-243500

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira, Post-doctoral researcher, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

    Urban farms like this one in Nouakchott, Mauritania, have many benefits. John Wessels/AFP via Getty Images)

    Urban agriculture takes many forms, among them community, school or rooftop gardens, commercial urban farms, and hydroponic or aquaponic systems. These activities have been shown to promote sustainable cities in a number of ways. They enhance local food security and foster economic opportunities through small-scale farming initiatives. They also strengthen social cohesion by creating shared spaces for collaboration and learning.

    However, evidence from some African countries (and other parts of the world) shows that very few young people are getting involved in agriculture, whether in urban, peri-urban or rural areas. Studies from Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Nigeria show that people aged between 15 and 34 have very little interest in agriculture, whether as an educational pathway or career. They perceive farming as physically demanding, low-paying and lacking in prestige. Systemic barriers like limited access to land, capital and skills also hold young people back.

    South Africa has a higher rate of young people engaging in farming (24%) than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this number could be higher if young people better understood the benefits of a career in farming and if they had more support.

    In a recent study I explored youth-driven urban agriculture in Khayelitsha, a large urban area outside Cape Town whose residents are mostly Black, low-income earners.

    The young urban farmers I interviewed are using community gardens to grow more than vegetables. They’re also nurturing social connections, creating economic and business opportunities, and promoting environmental conservation. My findings highlight the transformative potential of youth-driven urban agriculture and how it can be a multifaceted response to urban challenges. It’s crucial that policy makers recognise the value of youth-led urban agriculture and support those doing the work.

    The research

    Khayelitsha is vibrant and bustling. But its approximately 400,000 residents have limited resources and often struggle to make a living.

    I interviewed members of two youth-led gardens. One has just two members; the other has six. All my interviewees were aged between 22 and 27. The relatively low number of interviewees is typical of qualitative research, where the emphasis is placed on depth rather than breadth. This approach allows researchers to obtain detailed, context-rich data from a small, focused group of participants.

    The first garden was founded in January 2020, just a few months before the pandemic struck. The founders wanted to tackle unemployment and food insecurity in their community. They hoped to create jobs for themselves and others, and to provide nutritional support, particularly for vulnerable groups like children with special needs.

    The second garden was established in 2014 by three childhood friends. They were inspired by one founder’s grandmother, who loved gardening. They also wanted to promote organic farming, teach people healthy eating habits, and create a self-reliant community.

    All of my interviewees were activists for food justice. This refers to efforts aimed at addressing systemic inequities in food production, distribution, and access, particularly for marginalised communities. It advocates for equitable access to nutritious, culturally appropriate food.

    One of the gardens, for instance, operates about 30 beds. It cultivates a variety of produce: beetroot, carrots, spinach, pumpkins, potatoes, radishes, peas, lettuce and herbs. 30% of its produce is donated to local community centres each month (they were unable to say how many people benefited from this arrangement). The rest is sold to support the garden financially. Its paying clients include local restaurants and chefs, and members of the community. The garden also partners with schools, hospitals and other organisations to promote healthy eating and sustainable practices.

    The second garden, which is on land belonging to a local early childhood development centre, also focuses on feeding the community, as well as engaging in food justice activism.

    Skills, resilience and connections

    The gardens also help members to develop skills. Members gain practical knowledge about sustainable agriculture, marketing and entrepreneurship, all while managing operations and planning for growth.




    Read more:
    Healthy food is hard to come by in Cape Town’s poorer areas: how community gardens can fix that


    This hands-on experience instils a sense of responsibility and gives participants valuable skills they can apply in future careers or ventures. The founder of the first garden told me his skills empowered him to seek help from his own community rather than waiting for government intervention. He approached the management of an early childhood development centre in the community to request space on their land, and this was granted.

    Social connections have been essential to the gardens’ success. Bonding capital (close ties within their networks) and bridging capital (connections beyond their immediate community) has allowed them to strengthen relationships between themselves and civil society organisations. They’ve also been able to mobilise resources, as in the case of the first garden accessing community land.

    Additionally, the gardens foster community resilience. Members host workshops and events to educate residents about healthy eating, sustainable farming and environmental stewardship.

    By donating produce to local early childhood centres, they provide direct benefits to those most in need. These efforts have transformed the gardens into safe spaces for the community.

    Broader collaboration has also been key to the gardens’ success. For instance, the second garden has worked with global organisations and networks, like the Slow Food Youth Network, to share and gain knowledge about sustainable farming practices.

    Room for growth

    My findings highlight the need for targeted support for youth-driven urban agriculture initiatives. Policy and financial backing can enable these young gardeners to expand their efforts. This in turn will allow them to provide more food to their communities, create additional jobs, and empower more young people.

    At a policy level, the government could prioritise land access for urban agriculture projects, especially in under-served communities. Cities can foster an environment for youth initiatives to thrive by allocating spaces within their planning for urban farming.




    Read more:
    Africa’s megacities threatened by heat, floods and disease – urgent action is needed to start greening and adapt to climate change


    There’s also a need for educational programmes that emphasise the value of sustainable urban agriculture, and workshops and training on entrepreneurship and sustainable farming techniques. Community organising could further empower young farmers. Finally, continued collaboration with national and international food networks would help strengthen such initiatives.

    Tinashe P. Kanosvamhira does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Urban food gardens produce more than vegetables, they create bonds for young Capetonians – study – https://theconversation.com/urban-food-gardens-produce-more-than-vegetables-they-create-bonds-for-young-capetonians-study-243500

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s message to the General Assembly of the International Science Council

    Source: United Nations – English

    niting through science is key to tackling our common challenges – from addressing the climate crisis, to combatting global pandemics, to taking on the untold risk posed by emerging technologies.

    The International Science Council is an indispensable bridge between science and policy, connecting researchers to the work of global decision-makers. 

    Your crucial role is the reason I invited the Council to contribute to the work of the United Nations through the Scientific Advisory Board. By uniting experts across disciplines, the Board connects UN leaders to global networks representing thousands of scientists and academics, especially in developing countries. And it helps ensure that science shapes policy solutions for people and planet.

    This spirit is central to the Pact for the Future, adopted at the United Nations by Member States last September. The Pact recognizes the crucial role of science and technology cooperation to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and supercharging progress around the world.

    We need your insights and expertise in this important task. Together, let’s harness the power of science to build a more peaceful, sustainable and healthy future for all.
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s message to the General Assembly of the International Science Council

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Uniting through science is key to tackling our common challenges – from addressing the climate crisis, to combatting global pandemics, to taking on the untold risk posed by emerging technologies.

    The International Science Council is an indispensable bridge between science and policy, connecting researchers to the work of global decision-makers. 

    Your crucial role is the reason I invited the Council to contribute to the work of the United Nations through the Scientific Advisory Board. By uniting experts across disciplines, the Board connects UN leaders to global networks representing thousands of scientists and academics, especially in developing countries. And it helps ensure that science shapes policy solutions for people and planet.

    This spirit is central to the Pact for the Future, adopted at the United Nations by Member States last September. The Pact recognizes the crucial role of science and technology cooperation to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and supercharging progress around the world.

    We need your insights and expertise in this important task. Together, let’s harness the power of science to build a more peaceful, sustainable and healthy future for all.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Microchip Technology Announces Financial Results for Second Quarter of Fiscal Year 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Net sales of $1.164 billion, down 6.2% sequentially and down 48.4% from the year ago quarter. The midpoint of our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was net sales of $1.150 billion.
    • Revenue, gross profit and non-GAAP gross profit were positively impacted by a $13.3 million legal settlement. This settlement also positively impacted GAAP and non-GAAP EPS by $0.02 per diluted share.
    • On a GAAP basis: gross profit of 57.4%; operating income of $146.6 million and 12.6% of net sales; net income of $78.4 million; and EPS of $0.14 per diluted share. Our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was for GAAP EPS of $0.10 to $0.14 per diluted share.
    • On a Non-GAAP basis: gross profit of 59.5%; operating income of $340.8 million and 29.3% of net sales; net income of $250.2 million; and EPS of $0.46 per diluted share. Our guidance provided on August 1, 2024 was for Non-GAAP EPS of $0.40 to $0.46 per diluted share.
    • Returned approximately $261.0 million to stockholders in the September quarter through dividends of $243.7 million and the repurchase of $17.3 million, or 0.2 million shares of our common stock, at an average price of $76.86 per share under our previously announced $4.0 billion stock buyback program. Cumulatively repurchased $2.444 billion, or 31.4 million shares, over the last twelve quarters.
    • Record quarterly dividend declared today for the December quarter of 45.5 cents per share, an increase of 3.6% from the year ago quarter.

    CHANDLER, Ariz., Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — (NASDAQ: MCHP) – Microchip Technology Incorporated, a leading provider of smart, connected, and secure embedded control solutions, today reported results for the three months ended September 30, 2024, as summarized in the table below.

      Three Months Ended September 30, 2024(1)
    Net sales $1,163.8      
      GAAP % Non-GAAP(2) %
    Gross profit $668.5 57.4% $692.9 59.5%
    Operating income $146.6 12.6% $340.8 29.3%
    Other expense $(55.1)   $(53.3)  
    Income tax provision $13.1   $37.3  
    Net income $78.4 6.7% $250.2 21.5%
    Net income per diluted share $0.14   $0.46  
             

    (1) In millions, except per share amounts and percentages of net sales.
    (2) See the “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” section of this release.

    Net sales for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 were $1.164 billion, down 48.4% from net sales of $2.254 billion in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter.

    GAAP net income for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 was $78.4 million, or $0.14 per diluted share, down from GAAP net income of $666.6 million, or $1.21 per diluted share, in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, GAAP net income was adversely impacted by amortization of acquired intangible assets associated with our previous acquisitions.

    Non-GAAP net income for the second quarter of fiscal 2025 was $250.2 million, or $0.46 per diluted share, down from non-GAAP net income of $889.3 million, or $1.62 per diluted share, in the prior year’s second fiscal quarter. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP results exclude the effect of share-based compensation, cybersecurity incident expenses, other manufacturing adjustments, expenses related to our acquisition activities (including intangible asset amortization, severance, and other restructuring costs, and legal and other general and administrative expenses associated with acquisitions including legal fees and expenses for litigation and investigations related to our Microsemi acquisition), professional services associated with certain legal matters, and losses on the settlement of debt. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP income tax expense is presented based on projected cash taxes for the applicable fiscal year, excluding transition tax payments under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. A reconciliation of our non-GAAP and GAAP results is included in this press release.

    Microchip announced today that its Board of Directors declared a record quarterly cash dividend on its common stock of 45.5 cents per share, up 3.6% from the year ago quarter. The quarterly dividend is payable on December 6, 2024 to stockholders of record on November 22, 2024.

    “Our September quarter results were consistent with our guidance, as we continued to navigate through an inventory correction that’s occurring in the midst of macro weakness for many manufacturing businesses, accentuated by heightened weakness in our European business which is concentrated with Industrial and Automotive customers,” said Ganesh Moorthy, President and Chief Executive Officer. “The ‘green shoots’ we saw in recent quarters have progressed unevenly with essentially flat sequential bookings, normalized cancellation rates and much higher expedite requests, which we believe are all positive signs for a potential bottom formation despite limited visibility.”

    Eric Bjornholt, Microchip’s Chief Financial Officer, said, “Our September quarter results reflect continued customer destocking efforts and sluggish end-market demand. We are maintaining strong cost discipline and balance sheet management while taking actions to ensure operational readiness for the anticipated market recovery.”

    Rich Simoncic, Microchip’s Chief Operating Officer, said, “Our Total System Solutions approach is driving strong execution and seeing growing adoption in AI-accelerated servers in the data center markets. Our PCIe switches, SSD controllers, CXL solutions, and associated power and timing products are key to continuing to strengthen our data center portfolio. With our expanding capabilities, we believe we are well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities in this growth market.”

    Mr. Moorthy concluded, “For the December quarter, we expect net sales between $1.025 billion and $1.095 billion. While substantial inventory destocking has occurred, we continue to face macro uncertainties in what is historically our seasonally weakest quarter. Our design-in momentum continues to remain strong, driven by our Total System Solutions strategy and key market megatrends.”

    Third Quarter Fiscal Year 2025 Outlook:

    The following statements are based on current expectations. These statements are forward-looking, and actual results may differ materially.

      Microchip Consolidated Guidance
    Net Sales $1.025 to $1.095 billion    
      GAAP Non-GAAP Adjustments(1) Non-GAAP(1)
    Gross Profit 56.2% to 58.1% $8.4 to $9.4 million 57.0% to 59.0%
    Operating Expenses(2) 49.1% to 51.4% $170.0 to $174.0 million 33.2% to 34.8%
    Operating Income 4.8% to 9.1% $178.4 to $183.4 million 22.2% to 25.8%
    Other Expense, net $69.3 to $69.7 million ($0.2) to $0.2 million $69.5 million
    Income Tax Provision $1.0 to $13.0 million(3) $12.6 to $21.1 million $22.1 to $25.6 million(4)
    Net Income (loss) ($21.1) to $16.5 million $157.0 to $170.9 million $135.9 to $187.4 million
    Diluted Common Shares Outstanding Approximately 537.3 to 543.0 million shares   Approximately 543.0 million shares
    Earnings (Loss) per Diluted Share ($0.04) to $0.03 $0.29 to $0.32 $0.25 to $0.35
           
    (1)  See the “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” section of this release for information regarding our non-GAAP guidance.
    (2) We are not able to estimate the amount of certain Special Charges and Other, net that may be incurred during the quarter ending December 31, 2024. Therefore, our estimate of GAAP operating expenses excludes certain amounts that may be recognized as Special Charges and Other, net in the quarter ending December 31, 2024.
    (3) The forecast for GAAP tax expense excludes any unexpected tax events that may occur during the quarter, as these amounts cannot be forecasted.
    (4) Represents the expected cash tax rate for fiscal 2025, excluding any transition tax payments associated with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
       

    Capital expenditures for the quarter ending December 31, 2024 are expected to be about $20 million. Capital expenditures for all of fiscal 2025 are expected to be about $150 million. We are selectively adding capital equipment to maintain, grow and operate our internal manufacturing capabilities to support the expected growth of our business.

    Under the GAAP revenue recognition standard, we are required to recognize revenue when control of the product changes from us to a customer or distributor. We focus our sales and marketing efforts on creating demand for our products in the end markets we serve and not on moving inventory into our distribution network. We also manage our manufacturing and supply chain operations, including our distributor relationships, towards the goal of having our products available at the time and location the end customer desires.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures:  Our non-GAAP adjustments, where applicable, include the effect of share-based compensation, cybersecurity incident expenses, other manufacturing adjustments, expenses related to our acquisition activities (including intangible asset amortization, severance, and other restructuring costs, and legal and other general and administrative expenses associated with acquisitions including legal fees and expenses for litigation and investigations related to our Microsemi acquisition), professional services associated with certain legal matters, and losses on the settlement of debt. For the second quarters of fiscal 2025 and fiscal 2024, our non-GAAP income tax expense is presented based on projected cash taxes for the fiscal year, excluding transition tax payments under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

    We are required to estimate the cost of certain forms of share-based compensation, including employee stock options, restricted stock units, and our employee stock purchase plan, and to record a commensurate expense in our income statement. Share-based compensation expense is a non-cash expense that varies in amount from period to period and is affected by the price of our stock at the date of grant. The price of our stock is affected by market forces that are difficult to predict and are not within the control of management. Our other non-GAAP adjustments are either non-cash expenses, unusual or infrequent items, or other expenses related to transactions. Management excludes all of these items from its internal operating forecasts and models.

    We are using non-GAAP operating expenses in dollars, including non-GAAP research and development expenses and non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses, non-GAAP other expense, net, and non-GAAP income tax rate, which exclude the items noted above, as applicable, to permit additional analysis of our performance.

    Management believes these non-GAAP measures are useful to investors because they enhance the understanding of our historical financial performance and comparability between periods. Many of our investors have requested that we disclose this non-GAAP information because they believe it is useful in understanding our performance as it excludes non-cash and other charges that many investors feel may obscure our underlying operating results. Management uses non-GAAP measures to manage and assess the profitability of our business and for compensation purposes. We also use our non-GAAP results when developing and monitoring our budgets and spending. Our determination of these non-GAAP measures might not be the same as similarly titled measures used by other companies, and it should not be construed as a substitute for amounts determined in accordance with GAAP. There are limitations associated with using these non-GAAP measures, including that they exclude financial information that some may consider important in evaluating our performance. Management compensates for this by presenting information on both a GAAP and non-GAAP basis for investors and providing reconciliations of the GAAP and non-GAAP results.

    Generally, gross profit fluctuates over time, driven primarily by the mix of products sold and licensing revenue; variances in manufacturing yields; fixed cost absorption; wafer fab loading levels; costs of wafers from foundries; inventory reserves; pricing pressures in our non-proprietary product lines; and competitive and economic conditions. Operating expenses fluctuate over time, primarily due to net sales and profit levels.

    Diluted Common Shares Outstanding can vary for, among other things, the trading price of our common stock, the exercise of options or vesting of restricted stock units, the potential for incremental dilutive shares from our convertible debentures (additional information regarding our share count is available in the investor relations section of our website under the heading “Supplemental Financial Information”), and repurchases or issuances of shares of our common stock. The diluted common shares outstanding presented in the guidance table above assumes an average Microchip stock price in the December 2024 quarter between $75 and $85 per share (however, we make no prediction as to what our actual share price will be for such period or any other period and we cannot estimate what our stock option exercise activity will be during the quarter).

    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME
    (in millions, except per share amounts; unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net sales $ 1,163.8     $ 2,254.3     $ 2,405.1     $ 4,542.9  
    Cost of sales   495.3       726.9       999.7       1,457.1  
    Gross profit   668.5       1,527.4       1,405.4       3,085.8  
                   
    Research and development   240.7       292.6       482.4       591.1  
    Selling, general and administrative   157.0       196.6       307.5       400.2  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Operating expenses   521.9       642.4       1,039.7       1,297.7  
                   
    Operating income   146.6       885.0       365.7       1,788.1  
                   
    Other expense, net   (55.1 )     (51.4 )     (112.4 )     (106.2 )
    Income before income taxes   91.5       833.6       253.3       1,681.9  
    Income tax provision   13.1       167.0       45.6       348.9  
    Net income $ 78.4     $ 666.6     $ 207.7     $ 1,333.0  
                   
    Basic net income per common share $ 0.15     $ 1.23     $ 0.39     $ 2.45  
    Diluted net income per common share $ 0.14     $ 1.21     $ 0.38     $ 2.42  
                   
    Basic common shares outstanding   536.7       543.1       536.7       544.1  
    Diluted common shares outstanding   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
                                   
    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (in millions; unaudited)
     
    ASSETS
      September 30,   March 31,
      2024   2024
    Cash and short-term investments $ 286.1   $ 319.7
    Accounts receivable, net   1,044.3     1,143.7
    Inventories   1,339.6     1,316.0
    Other current assets   235.5     233.6
    Total current assets   2,905.5     3,013.0
           
    Property, plant and equipment, net   1,171.2     1,194.6
    Other assets   11,545.6     11,665.6
    Total assets $ 15,622.3   $ 15,873.2
           
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
           
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities $ 1,339.4   $ 1,520.0
    Current portion of long-term debt   1,946.3     999.4
    Total current liabilities   3,285.7     2,519.4
           
    Long-term debt   4,476.6     5,000.4
    Long-term income tax payable   590.4     649.2
    Long-term deferred tax liability   29.8     28.8
    Other long-term liabilities   963.9     1,017.6
           
    Stockholders’ equity   6,275.9     6,657.8
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 15,622.3   $ 15,873.2
               
    MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AND SUBSIDIARIES
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES
    (in millions, except per share amounts and percentages; unaudited)
     
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP GROSS PROFIT TO NON-GAAP GROSS PROFIT
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Gross profit, as reported $ 668.5     $ 1,527.4     $ 1,405.4     $ 3,085.8  
    Share-based compensation expense   4.3       7.4       10.9       14.2  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   20.1             20.1        
    Non-GAAP gross profit $ 692.9     $ 1,534.8     $ 1,436.4     $ 3,100.0  
    GAAP gross profit percentage   57.4 %     67.8 %     58.4 %     67.9 %
    Non-GAAP gross profit percentage   59.5 %     68.1 %     59.7 %     68.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Research and development expenses, as reported $ 240.7     $ 292.6     $ 482.4     $ 591.1  
    Share-based compensation expense   (26.9 )     (23.7 )     (50.2 )     (46.6 )
    Other adjustments         (0.2 )           (0.4 )
    Non-GAAP research and development expenses $ 213.8     $ 268.7     $ 432.2     $ 544.1  
    GAAP research and development expenses as a percentage of net sales   20.7 %     13.0 %     20.1 %     13.0 %
    Non-GAAP research and development expenses as a percentage of net sales   18.4 %     11.9 %     18.0 %     12.0 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP SELLING, GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Selling, general and administrative expenses, as reported $ 157.0     $ 196.6     $ 307.5     $ 400.2  
    Share-based compensation expense   (15.1 )     (14.3 )     (29.2 )     (29.1 )
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   (1.3 )           (1.3 )      
    Other adjustments   (2.1 )     (0.6 )     (3.4 )     0.5  
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   (0.2 )     (0.3 )     (0.7 )     (0.8 )
    Non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses $ 138.3     $ 181.4     $ 272.9     $ 370.8  
    GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses as a percentage of net sales   13.5 %     8.7 %     12.8 %     8.8 %
    Non-GAAP selling, general and administrative expenses as a percentage of net sales   11.9 %     8.0 %     11.3 %     8.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES TO NON-GAAP OPERATING EXPENSES
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Operating expenses, as reported $ 521.9     $ 642.4     $ 1,039.7     $ 1,297.7  
    Share-based compensation expense   (42.0 )     (38.0 )     (79.4 )     (75.7 )
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   (1.3 )           (1.3 )      
    Other adjustments   (2.1 )     (0.8 )     (3.4 )     0.1  
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   (0.2 )     (0.3 )     (0.7 )     (0.8 )
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets(1)   (122.7 )     (151.4 )     (245.7 )     (302.9 )
    Special charges and other, net   (1.5 )     (1.8 )     (4.1 )     (3.5 )
    Non-GAAP operating expenses $ 352.1     $ 450.1     $ 705.1     $ 914.9  
    GAAP operating expenses as a percentage of net sales   44.8 %     28.5 %     43.2 %     28.6 %
    Non-GAAP operating expenses as a percentage of net sales   30.3 %     20.0 %     29.3 %     20.1 %
                                   

    (1) Amortization of acquired intangible assets consists of core and developed technology and customer-related acquired intangible assets in connection with business combinations. Such charges are excluded for purposes of calculating certain non-GAAP measures.

    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OPERATING INCOME TO NON-GAAP OPERATING INCOME
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Operating income, as reported $ 146.6     $ 885.0     $ 365.7     $ 1,788.1  
    Share-based compensation expense   46.3       45.4       90.3       89.9  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   21.4             21.4        
    Other adjustments   2.1       0.8       3.4       (0.1 )
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   0.2       0.3       0.7       0.8  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets(1)   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Non-GAAP operating income $ 340.8     $ 1,084.7     $ 731.3     $ 2,185.1  
    GAAP operating income as a percentage of net sales   12.6 %     39.3 %     15.2 %     39.4 %
    Non-GAAP operating income as a percentage of net sales   29.3 %     48.1 %     30.4 %     48.1 %
                                   

    (1) Amortization of acquired intangible assets consists of core and developed technology and customer-related acquired intangible assets in connection with business combinations. Such charges are excluded for purposes of calculating certain non-GAAP measures. The use of acquired intangible assets contributed to our revenues earned during the periods presented.

    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP OTHER EXPENSE, NET TO NON-GAAP OTHER EXPENSE, NET
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Other expense, net, as reported $ (55.1 )   $ (51.4 )   $ (112.4 )   $ (106.2 )
    Loss on settlement of debt         3.1             12.2  
    Loss on available-for-sale investments   1.8             1.8        
    Non-GAAP other expense, net $ (53.3 )   $ (48.3 )   $ (110.6 )   $ (94.0 )
    GAAP other expense, net, as a percentage of net sales (4.7) %   (2.3) %   (4.7) %   (2.3) %
    Non-GAAP other expense, net, as a percentage of net sales (4.6) %   (2.1) %   (4.6) %   (2.1) %
                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP INCOME TAX PROVISION TO NON-GAAP INCOME TAX PROVISION
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Income tax provision as reported $ 13.1     $ 167.0     $ 45.6     $ 348.9  
    Income tax rate, as reported   14.3 %     20.0 %     18.0 %     20.7 %
    Other non-GAAP tax adjustment   24.2       (19.9 )     35.0       (52.4 )
    Non-GAAP income tax provision $ 37.3     $ 147.1     $ 80.6     $ 296.5  
    Non-GAAP income tax rate   13.0 %     14.2 %     13.0 %     14.2 %
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP NET INCOME AND GAAP DILUTED NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE TO NON-GAAP NET INCOME AND NON-GAAP DILUTED NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    Net income, as reported $ 78.4     $ 666.6     $ 207.7     $ 1,333.0  
    Share-based compensation expense   46.3       45.4       90.3       89.9  
    Cybersecurity incident expenses   21.4             21.4        
    Other adjustments   2.1       0.8       3.4       (0.1 )
    Professional services associated with certain legal matters   0.2       0.3       0.7       0.8  
    Amortization of acquired intangible assets   122.7       151.4       245.7       302.9  
    Special charges and other, net   1.5       1.8       4.1       3.5  
    Loss on settlement of debt         3.1             12.2  
    Loss on available-for-sale investments   1.8             1.8        
    Other non-GAAP tax adjustment   (24.2 )     19.9       (35.0 )     52.4  
    Non-GAAP net income $ 250.2     $ 889.3     $ 540.1     $ 1,794.6  
    GAAP net income as a percentage of net sales   6.7 %     29.6 %     8.6 %     29.3 %
    Non-GAAP net income as a percentage of net sales   21.5 %     39.4 %     22.5 %     39.5 %
    Diluted net income per common share, as reported $ 0.14     $ 1.21     $ 0.38     $ 2.42  
    Non-GAAP diluted net income per common share $ 0.46     $ 1.62     $ 1.00     $ 3.26  
    Diluted common shares outstanding, as reported   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
    Diluted common shares outstanding non-GAAP   542.0       549.2       542.4       550.3  
                                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS TO FREE CASH FLOW
      Three Months Ended September 30,   Six Months Ended September 30,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    GAAP cash flow from operations, as reported $ 43.6     $ 616.2     $ 420.7     $ 1,609.4  
    Capital expenditures   (20.8 )     (74.4 )     (93.7 )     (185.5 )
    Free cash flow $ 22.8     $ 541.8     $ 327.0     $ 1,423.9  
    GAAP cash flow from operations as a percentage of net sales   3.7 %     27.3 %     17.5 %     35.4 %
    Free cash flow as a percentage of net sales   2.0 %     24.0 %     13.6 %     31.3 %
                                   

    Microchip will host a conference call today, November 5, 2024 at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) to discuss this release. This call will be simulcast over the Internet at www.microchip.com. The webcast will be available for replay until November 26, 2024.

    A telephonic replay of the conference call will be available at approximately 8:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on November 5, 2024 and will remain available until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on November 26, 2024. Interested parties may listen to the replay by dialing 201-612-7415/877-660-6853 and entering access code 13747161.

    Cautionary Statement:

    The statements in this release relating to continuing to navigate through an inventory correction, macro weakness for many manufacturing businesses, heightened weakness in our European business, that the green shoots we saw in recent quarters have progressed unevenly, our belief that these are all positive signs for a potential bottom formation despite limited visibility, that we are maintaining strong cost discipline and balance sheet management while taking actions to ensure operational readiness for the anticipated market recovery, that our Total System Solutions approach is driving strong execution and seeing growing adoption in AI-accelerated servers in the data center markets, that our PCIe switches, SSD controllers, CXL solutions, and associated power and timing products are key to continuing to strengthen our data center portfolio, that we believe we are well-positioned to capitalize on opportunities in this growth market, that for the December quarter we expect net sales between $1.025 billion and $1.095 billion, that we continue to face macro uncertainties in what is historically our seasonally weakest quarter, that our design-in momentum continues to remain strong, driven by our Total System Solutions strategy and key market megatrends, our third quarter fiscal 2025 guidance for net sales and GAAP and non-GAAP gross profit, operating expenses, operating income, other expense, net, income tax provision, net income, diluted common shares outstanding, earnings per diluted share, capital expenditures for the December 2024 quarter and for all of fiscal 2025, selectively adding capital equipment to maintain, grow and operate our internal manufacturing capabilities to support the expected growth of our business, our belief that non-GAAP measures are useful to investors and our assumed average stock price in the December 2024 quarter are forward-looking statements made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause our actual results to differ materially, including, but not limited to: any continued uncertainty, fluctuations or weakness in the U.S. and world economies (including China and Europe) due to changes in interest rates, high inflation or the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic (including lock-downs in China), actions taken or which may be taken by the Biden administration or the U.S. Congress, monetary policy, political, geopolitical, trade or other issues in the U.S. or internationally (including the military conflicts in Ukraine-Russia and the Middle East and the outcome of the U.S. elections in November), further changes in demand or market acceptance of our products and the products of our customers and our ability to respond to any increases or decreases in market demand or customer requests to reschedule or cancel orders; the mix of inventory we hold, our ability to satisfy any short-term orders from our inventory and our ability to effectively manage our inventory levels; the impact that the CHIPS Act will have on increasing manufacturing capacity in our industry by providing incentives for us, our competitors and foundries to build new wafer manufacturing facilities or expand existing facilities; the amount and timing of any incentives we may receive under the CHIPS Act, the impact of current and future changes in U.S. corporate tax laws (including the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017), foreign currency effects on our business; changes in utilization of our manufacturing capacity and our ability to effectively manage our production levels to meet any increases or decreases in market demand or any customer requests to reschedule or cancel orders; the impact of inflation on our business; competitive developments including pricing pressures; the level of orders that are received and can be shipped in a quarter; our ability to realize the expected benefits of our long-term supply assurance program; changes or fluctuations in customer order patterns and seasonality; our ability to effectively manage our supply of wafers from third party wafer foundries to meet any decreases or increases in our needs and the cost of such wafers, our ability to obtain additional capacity from our suppliers to increase production to meet any future increases in market demand; our ability to successfully integrate the operations and employees, retain key employees and customers and otherwise realize the expected synergies and benefits of our acquisitions; the impact of any future significant acquisitions or strategic transactions we may make; the costs and outcome of any current or future litigation or other matters involving our acquisitions (including the acquired business, intellectual property, customers, or other issues); the costs and outcome of any current or future tax audit or investigation regarding our business or our acquired businesses; fluctuations in our stock price and trading volume which could impact the number of shares we acquire under our share repurchase program and the timing of such repurchases; disruptions in our business or the businesses of our customers or suppliers due to natural disasters (including any floods in Thailand), terrorist activity, armed conflict, war, worldwide oil prices and supply, public health concerns or disruptions in the transportation system; and general economic, industry or political conditions in the United States or internationally.

    For a detailed discussion of these and other risk factors, please refer to Microchip’s filings on Forms 10-K and 10-Q. You can obtain copies of Forms 10-K and 10-Q and other relevant documents for free at Microchip’s website (www.microchip.com) or the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov) or from commercial document retrieval services.

    Stockholders of Microchip are cautioned not to place undue reliance on our forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date such statements are made. Microchip does not undertake any obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements to reflect events, circumstances or new information after this November 5, 2024 press release, or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    About Microchip:

    Microchip Technology Incorporated is a leading provider of smart, connected and secure embedded control solutions. Its easy-to-use development tools and comprehensive product portfolio enable customers to create optimal designs, which reduce risk while lowering total system cost and time to market. Our solutions serve approximately 116,000 customers across the industrial, automotive, consumer, aerospace and defense, communications and computing markets. Headquartered in Chandler, Arizona, Microchip offers outstanding technical support along with dependable delivery and quality. For more information, visit the Microchip website at www.microchip.com.

    Note: The Microchip name and logo are registered trademarks of Microchip Technology Incorporated in the U.S.A. and other countries. All other trademarks mentioned herein are the property of their respective companies.

    INVESTOR RELATIONS CONTACT:
    Sajid Daudi — Head of Investor Relations….. (480) 792-7385

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Near four-year high unemployment reveals dire need for new direction

    Source: Green Party

    Today, Statistics New Zealand’s latest labour market report revealed that unemployment has reached 4.8 per cent, the highest rate since late 2020, during the COVID pandemic.

    “The Government’s economy for the rich is leaving thousands behind,” says the Green Party’s Spokesperson for Social Development and Employment, Ricardo Menéndez-March.

    “We can build an economy that works for everyone and leaves nobody behind by investing in the public services and infrastructure which support our communities as well as programmes like jobs for nature that provide people with meaningful and stable work. 

    “The unemployment rate has hit the highest level since COVID, and this is down to the coalition government relying on making people unemployed to lower inflation while prioritising tax cuts, slashing public investment, and undermining the construction industry.

    “Losing a job shouldn’t condemn families to poverty, yet successive Governments have set benefit levels below the poverty line and pushed ahead with sanctions that entrench hardship. 

    “Instead of punching down on those doing it the toughest and pushing more children into hardship, the Greens will lift all families out of poverty with a Guaranteed Minimum Income. 

    “This Government’s punitive approach to welfare and public investment is clearly not working. The Government has engineered an economy that punches down on our communities, one without jobs that simultaneously punishes people for not being able to find work. 

    “Poverty is a political choice, one that successive governments have chosen not to address. However, with unemployment rising and households experiencing wave after wave of financial strain, there is no better time than the present to end poverty and introduce an Income Guarantee. 

    “This is a policy we campaigned on and will continue to push as disparities in wealth widen and the incomes of people on the breadline stagnate. 

    “The Income Guarantee is a commitment to every New Zealander that no matter what, your income will never fall below $390 per week, after tax. For couples, our Income Guarantee will be at least $780, and a single parent will always have an income of at least $750.

    “The Greens would support people into work with a supportive welfare system, more training opportunities, and restarting public investment in healthcare, schools, and houses that create good jobs,” says Ricardo Menéndez-March.

    • Statistics NZ data for the September quarter can be found here
    • The Reserve Bank’s Financial Stability report can be found here
    • The Income Guarantee 2023 election policy can be found here. Rates have been adjusted for inflation.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: Hut 8 Operations Update for October 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    20.1 EH/s and 967 MW under management in mining with path to ~35 EH/s

    Vega site buildout advancing on track for Q2 2025 energization

    MIAMI, Nov. 05, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Hut 8 Corp. (Nasdaq | TSX: HUT) (“Hut 8” or the “Company”), a leading, vertically integrated operator of large-scale energy infrastructure and one of North America’s largest Bitcoin miners, today released its operations update for October 2024.

    “Following the announcement of our partnership with BITMAIN to launch the U3S21EXPH with a 15 EH/s hosting deployment, progress continues on our 205-megawatt Vega site, which will feature the custom rack-based architecture we developed in-house for the project,” said Asher Genoot, CEO of Hut 8. “With groundwork progressing rapidly, we are on track to energize the site in Q2 2025. Our hosting agreement with BITMAIN is expected to generate up to $135 million in annualized revenue on a fully ramped basis.”

    “In parallel, we are preparing our existing sites for a near-term fleet upgrade as we finalize a commercial agreement. At Salt Creek, we launched an immersion cooling pilot as we continue to advance our technological innovation efforts. More broadly, we are focused on identifying further opportunities for technical and commercial innovation as we advance discussions for large-scale AI data center development opportunities across multiple sites in our development pipeline.”

    Highlights:

    • Groundwork at Vega progressing on track for Q2 2025 energization with ~15 EH/s hosting deployment of U3S21EXPH ASIC miner
    • Began preparing existing sites for expected near-term ASIC fleet upgrade
    • Launched immersion cooling pilot at Salt Creek as part of continued technological innovation efforts
    • Advanced discussions for large-scale AI data center development opportunities across multiple sites in development pipeline

    Operating Metrics

    Average during the period unless otherwise noted October 2024 September 2024
    Total energy capacity under management (mining)1,2 967 MW3 762 MW
    Total deployed miners under management4 194.2K 189.9K
    Total hashrate under management5 20.1 EH/s 19.5 EH/s
         
    Self-Mining6    
    Deployed miners7 57.1K 58.6K
    Deployed hashrate8 5.6 EH/s 5.6 EH/s
    Bitcoin produced1,9 100 BTC 85 BTC
    Bitcoin on balance sheet1 9,110 BTC 9,106 BTC
         
    Managed Services10    
    Energy capacity under management1 582 MW 582 MW
    Deployed miners under management 146.5K 140.8K
    Hashrate under management 15.5 EH/s 14.9 EH/s
         
    Hosting    
    Deployed miners under management11,12 76.7K 76.7K
    Hashrate under management13 8.5 EH/s 8.6 EH/s
         

    Energy Infrastructure Platform1

            Current/Contracted Revenue Stream(s)14
    Site Location Owner15 Power
    Capacity
    Self-
    Mining
    Managed
    Services
    Hosting HPC Power
    Sales
    Vega16 Texas Panhandle Hut 8 205 MW     Yes17    
    Medicine Hat Medicine Hat, AB Hut 8 67 MW Yes        
    Salt Creek Orla, TX Hut 8 63 MW Yes        
    Alpha Niagara Falls, NY Hut 8 50 MW Yes   Yes    
    Drumheller18 Drumheller, AB Hut 8 42 MW          
    Kelowna Kelowna, BC Hut 8 1.1 MW       Yes  
    Mississauga Mississauga, ON Hut 8 0.9 MW       Yes  
    Vaughan Vaughan, ON Hut 8 0.6 MW       Yes  
    Vancouver II Vancouver, BC Hut 8 0.5 MW       Yes  
    Vancouver I Vancouver, BC Hut 8 0.3 MW       Yes  
    King Mountain19 McCamey, TX Hut 8 (JV) 280 MW Yes Yes Yes   Yes
    Iroquois Falls20 Iroquois Falls, ON Hut 8 (JV) 120 MW         Yes
    Kingston20 Kingston, ON Hut 8 (JV) 110 MW         Yes
    North Bay20 North Bay, ON Hut 8 (JV) 40 MW         Yes
    Kapuskasing20 Kapuskasing, ON Hut 8 (JV) 40 MW         Yes
    Cedarvale3,16 Barstow, TX Managed 215 MW   Yes      
    East Stiles Midland, TX Managed 30 MW   Yes      
    Rebel Midland, TX Managed 25 MW   Yes      
    Stiles Midland, TX Managed 20 MW   Yes      
    Garden City Midland, TX Managed 12 MW   Yes      
    Total     1,322 MW          
                     

    Conference Call to Discuss Third Quarter 2024 Results

    Who: Analysts, media, and investors are invited to attend.
    What: Hut 8 executives will review the Company’s financial results for the third quarter of 2024.
    When: Results will be shared via media release and on the Company’s website at https://hut8.com/investors/ on November 13 2024. The conference call and webinar will begin at 8:30 a.m. ET.
    Where: The webcast can be viewed at: https://www.hut8.com/q3-2024/.
      Analysts can register here.
       

    Upcoming Conferences & Events:

    • November 13–14, 2024: Cantor Fitzgerald Crypto, Digital Assets & AI Infrastructure Conference 2024
    • November 19, 2024: Craig-Hallum 15th Annual Alpha Select Conference
    • November 19, 2024: Benzinga Future of Digital Assets Conference 2024

    Notes:

    (1) As of the end of the period
    (2) Energy capacity under management (mining) includes (i) 180 MW of self-mining sites comprised of Alpha, Medicine Hat, and Salt Creek, (ii) 205 MW of hosting capacity at Vega, which is currently under construction, (iii) 280 MW of capacity under management at King Mountain, and (iv) 302 MW from Hut 8’s Managed Services agreement with Ionic, assuming full 215 MW of capacity at Cedarvale, which was first energized in April and is currently under construction.
    (3) Starting October 2024, Hut 8 includes the full 205 MW of capacity at Vega as energy capacity under management (mining) as Vega is expected to host miners for BITMAIN. This was not reflected in Hut 8’s September 2024 figure.
    (4) Includes all miners that are racked with power and networking, rounded to the nearest 100, in Self-Mining, Managed Services, and Hosting infrastructure with power and networking, including all miners at the King Mountain site.
    (5) Includes all Self-Mining, Managed Services, and Hosting hashrate, including 100% of the hashrate at the King Mountain site.
    (6) Self-Mining operations for Hut 8 include 100% of operations at the King Mountain site.
    (7) Deployed miners are defined as those physically racked with power and networking, rounded to the nearest 100; deployed self-mining miners net of the 50% share of the King Mountain JV held by Hut 8’s joint venture partner was 48.2K during October and 49.6K during September.
    (8) Indicates the target hashrate of all deployed miners; deployed self-mining hashrate net of the 50% share of the King Mountain JV held by Hut 8’s joint venture partner was 4.7 EH/s during September and August, respectively.
    (9) Bitcoin produced net of the 50% share of the King Mountain JV held by Hut 8’s joint venture partner was 83 BTC during October and 72 BTC during September.
    (10) Managed services include (i) 280 MW of capacity under management at King Mountain and (ii) 302 MW from Hut 8’s Managed Services agreement with Ionic, assuming full 215 MW of capacity at Cedarvale, which was first energized in April and is currently under construction.
    (11) Miners are rounded to the nearest 100.
    (12) 42.6K deployed miners under management net of the 50% share of the King Mountain JV held by Hut 8’s joint venture partner during October and September, respectively.
    (13) 4.7 EH/s under management net of Hut 8’s joint venture partner’s 50% share of the King Mountain JV during October and September, respectively.
    (14) Reflects revenue sources to Hut 8, its subsidiaries, and/or joint ventures in which they participate.
    (15) Owned denotes ownership of power infrastructure at owned or leased data center locations, except for HPC sites where owned denotes ownership of mechanical and electrical infrastructure at leased data center locations.
    (16) Site is currently under development.
    (17) Anticipated to begin generating revenue by Q2 2025.
    (18) Site currently shut down; Hut 8 maintaining lease with option value of re-energizing site.
    (19) Owned by a JV between Hut 8 and a Fortune 200 renewable energy producer in which Hut 8 has an approximately 50% membership interest.
    (20) Owned by a JV between Hut 8 and Macquarie in which Hut 8 has an approximately 80% membership interest.
       

    About Hut 8

    Hut 8 Corp. is an energy infrastructure operator and Bitcoin miner with self-mining, hosting, managed services, and traditional data center operations across North America. Headquartered in Miami, Florida, Hut 8 Corp. has a portfolio comprising twenty sites: ten Bitcoin mining, hosting, and Managed Services sites in Alberta, New York, and Texas, five high performance computing data centers in British Columbia and Ontario, four power generation assets in Ontario, and one non-operational site in Alberta. For more information, visit www.hut8.com and follow us on X (formerly known as Twitter) at @Hut8Corp.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward–Looking Information

    This press release includes “forward-looking information” and “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Canadian securities laws and United States securities laws, respectively (collectively, “forward-looking information”). All information, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that Hut 8 expects or anticipates will or may occur in the future, including such things as future business strategy, competitive strengths, goals, expansion and growth of the business, operations, plans and other such matters is forward-looking information. Forward-looking information is often identified by the words “may”, “would”, “could”, “should”, “will”, “intend”, “plan”, “anticipate”, “allow”, “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “predict”, “can”, “might”, “potential”, “predict”, “is designed to”, “likely” or similar expressions. Specifically, such forward-looking information included in this press release includes statements relating to the execution, timing and potential revenues for the hosting deployment at our Vega site, the timing and completion of a fleet upgrade, and the advancement of the Company’s pipeline.

    Statements containing forward-looking information are not historical facts, but instead represent management’s expectations, estimates and projections regarding future events based on certain material factors and assumptions at the time the statement was made. While considered reasonable by Hut 8 as of the date of this press release, such statements are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking information, including but not limited to, security and cybersecurity threats and hacks; malicious actors or botnet obtaining control of processing power on the Bitcoin network; further development and acceptance of the Bitcoin network; changes to Bitcoin mining difficulty; loss or destruction of private keys; increases in fees for recording transactions in the Blockchain; erroneous transactions; reliance on a limited number of key employees; reliance on third party mining pool service providers; regulatory changes; classification and tax changes; momentum pricing risk; fraud and failure related to digital asset exchanges; difficulty in obtaining banking services and financing; difficulty in obtaining insurance, permits and licenses; internet and power disruptions; geopolitical events; uncertainty in the development of cryptographic and algorithmic protocols; uncertainty about the acceptance or widespread use of digital assets; failure to anticipate technology innovations; the COVID19 pandemic, climate change; currency risk; lending risk and recovery of potential losses; litigation risk; business integration risk; changes in market demand; changes in network and infrastructure; system interruption; changes in leasing arrangements; failure to achieve intended benefits of power purchase agreements; potential for interrupted delivery, or suspension of the delivery, of energy to mining sites and other risks related to the digital asset mining and data center business. For a complete list of the factors that could affect Hut 8, please see the “Risk Factors” section of Hut 8’s Transition Report on Form 10-K, available under the Company’s EDGAR profile at www.sec.gov, and Hut 8’s other continuous disclosure documents which are available under the Company’s SEDAR+ profile at www.sedarplus.ca and EDGAR profile at www.sec.gov.

    Hut 8 Corp. Investor Relations
    Sue Ennis
    ir@hut8.com

    Hut 8 Corp. Media Relations
    media@hut8.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Release: Unemployment rising under National

    Source: New Zealand Labour Party

    Nicola Willis’ policies continue to slow the economy with more Kiwis out of work as a result.

    StatsNZ figures released today show unemployment is now at 4.8%. This means 148,000 people do not have a job in New Zealand.

    “Unemployment continues to increase under the fiscal mismanagement of Nicola Willis,” Labour finance spokesperson Barbara Edmonds said.

    “The last time unemployment was this high was during the 2020 pandemic, before that in 2017 under another National Government. This disappointing record is what National will be remembered for.

    “National has failed to prioritise work and employment – the numbers speak for themselves. New Zealand has one of the highest rates of unemployment out of first world countries like Australia (4.1%) and Great Britain (4.2%).

    “But unemployment is much worse for Māori at 9.2%, and Pacific people at 9.9% This is a steep rise, and the impact this Government has had on Māori and Pacific people is disgraceful.

    “The Government can’t continue to say it is focused on getting people in to work when it is making decisions that are seeing more and more people unemployed, and more and more Kiwis leaving the country.

    “People are staying unemployed for longer, despite the sanctions National announced, which they claimed would prevent this from happening. I am concerned with the length of time people are out of work. For example, people who are unemployed for over six months to one year is up 53.2% to 32,500 compared to the same quarter last year.

    “Today’s numbers show the harm of Nicola Willis’ decisions. The number of people she is putting out of work could make up entire suburbs. The impact of this will be felt for generations,” Barbara Edmonds said.


    Stay in the loop by signing up to our mailing list and following us on FacebookInstagram, and X.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI China: China shines on opening up, as world openness level degrades

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Guests attend the press conference on World Openness Report 2024 and International Symposium on World Opening-Up during the 7th Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai, east China, Nov. 5, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    The World Openness Index, gauging the openness levels of 129 economies from 2008 to 2023, shows that China remains one of the bright spots in a globally declining landscape of openness.

    The index was included in the World Openness Report 2024, which was released on Tuesday at the seventh Hongqiao International Economic Forum in Shanghai.

    In 2023, the World Openness Index stood at 0.7542, reflecting decreases of 0.12 percent compared to 2022, 0.38 percent compared to 2019, and 5.43 percent compared to 2008. This suggests an overall downward trend in global openness.

    The index, first released in 2021, was compiled by the Institute of World Economics and Politics under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Research Center for Hongqiao International Economic Forum.

    According to the report, the pace of economic globalization has continued to falter over the past year, with the world’s opening-up level “in deficit.”

    “Various forms of unilateralism and protectionism are on the rise, global economic growth is slowing down, many economies are increasing tariffs and non-tariff measures, geopolitical risks are intensifying, and combined with shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic,” the report said, listing the major factors contributing to a less open global economy.

    Zhang Yuyan, an economist and academician of CASS, said that the number of global trade intervention measures exceeded 4,700 from 2020 to 2023, significantly higher than the levels before 2020.

    Economic sanctions are working against opening, imposing a negative impact on globalization, said Nobel laureate economist Christopher Pissarides at a symposium after the release of the report. “I hope they end soon, but I don’t quite see it,” he added.

    Despite these challenges, China is presented as one of the positive exceptions in the global landscape of openness, based on the data revealed by the report.

    China has made significant progress in expanding its opening-up. From 2008 to 2023, China’s openness index rose from 0.6789 to 0.7596, an increase of 11.89 percent, placing it among the top economies globally in terms of growth rate.

    “China’s opening up is a model for mutually beneficial engagement. In the current complex and ever-changing international landscape, events like the China International Import Expo (CIIE) have become shining symbols of China’s commitment to opening up,” said Qu Weixi, director of the Research Center for Hongqiao International Economic Forum.

    The report also underscores key areas of global cooperation that have emerged despite rising anti-globalization sentiment.

    Digital opening-up, environmental and climate governance, and the service sector are identified by the report as significant areas where international collaboration has gained momentum.

    These sectors present new opportunities for global growth and suggest the potential for a more interconnected and cooperative world economy in the face of rising protectionism, according to the report.

    “We hope the release of this report will spark more in-depth and widespread discussions about global openness. By fostering greater consensus and collective efforts, we can contribute to the development of an open global economy,” Qu said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: What is ‘ballot curing’? Election expert explains the method for fixing errors made when voters cast their ballots

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Paul Gronke, Professor of Political Science and Director, Elections & Voting Infomation Center, Reed College

    An imperfect signature on an absentee ballot can necessitate ballot ‘curing,’ when election workers verify the voter’s identity. Bill Oxford/iStock via Getty

    Most Americans used to vote on Election Day, and a small percentage of voters cast their ballots as absentee voters through the mail. That changed starting in the late 1970s, when some states began to allow no-excuse absentee voting and early in-person voting. Many more states chose to add these methods after the 2000 election, and by 2022, 60% of votes were cast in person at a polling place on Election Day, 21% were cast by mail and 19% were cast early in-person.

    In the 2020 election, many states accelerated the shift already underway to voting by mail to keep people safe from contracting COVID-19. Mail ballots were the dominant method of return that year: 43% of ballots were voted by mail, 31% on Election Day and 26% early in-person. Voting by mail remains the second-most common method of returning ballots and will continue to grow – though it may never reach the level of 2020.

    This rise in usage has created an issue that wasn’t seen much before: The need to “fix” a ballot where, due to a variety of reasons, the identity of the voter who cast the ballot can’t be verified. This process is called ballot “curing,” and it’s how states ensure that every valid vote is counted.

    The Conversation’s politics and democracy editor, Naomi Schalit, spoke about ballot curing with Reed College political scientist Paul Gronke, founder and director of the Elections & Voting Information Center, who studies early voting, election administration, public opinion and elections.

    What is ballot curing?

    Ballot curing is a process that is allowed in some states that, if a ballot has been rejected or challenged because the signature didn’t match or a copy of an ID needed to be included, then the voter has an opportunity to come in within a limited period of time and cure that problem. They can, for example, come in and provide an updated or corrected signature – the most common problem – or provide the required identification.

    An election worker curing a defective ballot cast in the 2024 presidential primary in Provo, Utah, on March 5.
    George Frey/AFP via Getty

    Can that process happen after Election Day?

    The process is triggered when an election office receives a ballot and identifies a problem that falls within the scope of the law and can be cured. As with seemingly everything in American elections, the deadlines and the window vary by state. Some states provide a quite lengthy period after the election. In Oregon, for example, the law provides a window of up to the 21st day after the election. In other states, it’s pretty narrow. In Michigan, it’s the third day after the election. In many but not all states, it’s tied to the deadline for certification of the vote.

    So the idea is that everybody should have the opportunity to have their vote count.

    I would agree with that. The idea is that we want to give everyone an opportunity to be represented. No one should be disenfranchised because of something relatively innocuous, like their signature doesn’t match, or when their ballot was being transported, it was humid or it rained, or something happened that meant the signature can’t be verified, or they forgot to include a copy of necessary identification. These are certainly not reasons why you would want someone to be disenfranchised.

    The Nevada Secretary of State said told a CNN reporter on Nov. 5, 2024, that the state is seeing a surge in ballots with signature problems, many from young voters. As The Wall Street Journal reported, 12,939 ballots have been cured successfully, and 13,906 ballots remain to be cured. “This is an opportunity, probably their first time they’ve had to really use an official signature,” Secretary of State Cisco Aguilar told CNN, “and what’s on their driver’s license, what’s on their voter registration form and what’s on their ballot is a little bit different.” What’s going on here?

    Young people these days – really, anyone under 40 – did not learn cursive when they were in grammar school. Why is that relevant in an election? Because there are clear patterns that people of a certain generation didn’t sign checks and were not sort-of trained in what election officials describe as writing their “formal signatures.” We also know that as people age, or suffer certain kinds of injuries, their signatures can change. And sometimes, people are just in a rush and don’t sign carefully.

    Are there problems with how election officials in different states handle ballots that need to be cured?

    In 2020, there were these major changes to our election system in order to adapt to provide a safe and secure voting environment during the pandemic. Many states ramped up vote-by-mail for the first time. What we saw in 2020 was that there were laws and procedures that fell out of sync with how people were voting. In some states, they mailed ballots to all eligible voters, yet they had laws that said you can’t begin the process of counting absentee ballots until the day of the election. That led to some slow counts in 2020 and opened up a window for charges of malfeasance, even though all that was happening was that officials were working through these piles of mail ballots.

    Since then, many states have improved their laws and brought them in sync with voter behavior. For example, many more now allow election officials to begin the process of processing mail ballots – checking signatures, opening envelopes, preparing to scan – before Election Day. That should improve the speed of ballot counting in 2024.

    Volunteers inform a voter in Nevada that a ballot mailed from his address has a discrepancy that must be fixed, or ‘cured,’ for it to be counted.
    David Becker for The Washington Post via Getty Images

    But there are still some places that could improve. I will highlight Michigan as an example of a place where I’m a little bit concerned, and I’ve heard this also from Michigan officials. Michigan law says the county clerk shall notify the voter of the ballot deficiency by “telephone, email, or text message, if available.” If neither a phone nor email is available, the clerk uses U.S. mail. The voter may cure the ballot by filling out a cure form and returning it in person, electronically or by mail, but the cured ballot has to arrive back at the clerk’s office by 5 p.m. on the Friday following the election – that’s only three days. That’s really not much time!

    Imagine a number of new voters casting ballots by mail in Ann Arbor, in Washtenaw County, and they vote by mail but turn it in at the last minute. And if there’s a problem with their ballot, then election officials have to generate some communications to them, and maybe they don’t have their cellphone, or the voter isn’t immediately responsive to email, and the whole process has to be completed in three days.

    I have spoken to some local officials in Michigan who think that needs to be changed because the rate of voting by mail in Michigan is so high now – nearly one-third of registered voters requested an absentee ballot as of 21 days before the election, and there will be more absentee ballots requested and returned by Nov. 5.

    It’s not just Michigan. There are a number of states that have comparatively high levels of voting by mail and fairly short curing periods. I don’t know the optimal time period, but anything less than five days is asking too much of clerks and of voters, and could disenfranchise people for making an innocuous mistake.

    The way America votes in 2024 is not the way the country voted in 2000 or even the way we voted in 2016. We are in a world where one-third or more of ballots are vote-at-home ballots, and those numbers will continue to increase. Best practices include providing ample time to allow clerks to notify voters of any problems with their ballots, and voters to provide the necessary information to make sure their ballots are counted. If we can do it that way in Oregon, where I live – and Colorado, and Washington, and many other states – I’m sure other states can do it as well.

    Paul Gronke receives funding from Elections Trust Initiative and Democracy Fund. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab (MEDSL) and a member of the Circle of Advisors of the National Vote At Home Institute.

    ref. What is ‘ballot curing’? Election expert explains the method for fixing errors made when voters cast their ballots – https://theconversation.com/what-is-ballot-curing-election-expert-explains-the-method-for-fixing-errors-made-when-voters-cast-their-ballots-243009

    MIL OSI – Global Reports