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Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ASEAN Mineral Awards 2024

    Source: ASEAN

    ASEAN Set to Honour Mining Excellence at 4th ASEAN Mineral Awards in Lao PDR

     
    The spotlight will soon shine on the region’s mining sector as ASEAN prepares to honour top-performing companies in the 4th ASEAN Mineral Awards (AMA), to be announced during the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Minerals (AMMin) in the week of 29 September 2025 in Vientiane, Lao PDR.
     
    Held biennially, the AMA recognises excellence in environmentally and socially responsible mining and minerals processing practices across Southeast Asia. The prestigious awards ceremony will take place during the AMMin Gala Dinner, a highlight of the ASEAN minerals calendar.
     
    The awards celebrate companies that have demonstrated significant contributions to sustainable development in the sector—ranging from community upliftment and workforce development, to improved resource efficiency and enhanced environmental, health and safety standards.
     
    Six awards will be given across two mineral categories:
     
    Metallic Minerals:

    Best Practices in Mining
    Best Practices in Processing (including smelting)
    Best Practices in Distribution (including transport, handling, storage)

     
    Non-metallic Minerals:

    Best Practices in Mining
    Best Practices in Processing
    Best Practices in Distribution

     
    Launched in 2017, the AMA has become a key platform for recognising regional excellence. While the first and second editions were held in 2017 and 2019 respectively, the third edition—originally planned for 2021—was postponed to 2023 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
     
    In addition to the awards, ASEAN will unveil a special AMA Handbook showcasing the achievements of winners and finalists. The publication will document real-world examples of best practices in the region’s minerals sector, serving as a reference and inspiration for future innovation.
     
    Applicants and stakeholders are encouraged to consult the official guidelines and contact their respective ASEAN Member State Focal Points for national nomination timelines and submission procedures.
     
    —

    The post ASEAN Mineral Awards 2024 appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 23, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Uranium reserves are sufficient, but investment is needed to maintain high growth rates of nuclear energy

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

    Until 2050 and beyond, uranium reserves will be sufficient for both the continued use of nuclear energy and for significant growth. However, to ensure that uranium is available on the market when needed, timely investment in new exploration, mining, and processing technologies will be needed.

    These are some of the main findings of the latest publication of 2024. “Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand”, commonly known as the Red Book, is a major global reference publication prepared every two years jointly by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

    The Red Book 2024 provides the latest comprehensive overview of the main characteristics of the uranium market based on official national data, as well as detailed statistics on the global uranium industry. The publication covers the calendar years 2021 and 2022 and contains data on uranium exploration, reserves and production. In addition, the report includes 62 country profiles that provide detailed information on mine development plans, environmental and social aspects of uranium mining, as well as national regulations and policies.

    According to the Red Book, as of 1 January 2023, the world’s indicated recoverable uranium resources were 7,934,500 tonnes. This includes all reasonably proven and inferred uranium resources that could be extracted at market prices between US$40 and US$260 per kilogram of uranium (equivalent to US$15–100 per pound of U3O8). Compared with the 2022 edition, this represents an increase of less than 0.5%. However, the uranium resource base could be replenished from undiscovered or unconventional sources, driven by the sharp rise in uranium spot prices since mid-2021 and the commitment to triple nuclear power generation capacity by 2050, first announced at COP28 and now signed by 31 countries.

    After a period of decline caused by unfavourable market conditions and the COVID-19 pandemic, global exploration and development spending has increased sharply. In 2022, annual spending reached US$800 million, and preliminary data for 2023 allow us to forecast a further increase to US$840 million.

    The Red Book also provides projections of installed nuclear capacity and uranium demand to 2050, describing low-growth and high-growth scenarios and assessing the adequacy of uranium supply and demand under each scenario. According to these projections, the uranium resource base is sufficient to meet rapidly growing nuclear energy needs to 2050 and beyond. However, significant investment in new exploration, improved processing technologies, and new mining centers will be needed to replenish reserves.

    Production increased by 4% between 2020 and 2022, and the report says this growth is likely to continue in the coming years. The establishment of new mining centres is expected to take a significant amount of time due to the current risk-averse investment climate and complex and lengthy regulatory processes in many uranium mining jurisdictions. Geopolitical concerns and the technical challenges associated with establishing new uranium mining and processing facilities could further complicate the situation. Therefore, action is needed now to ensure adequate uranium supply in the medium term.

    Help for editors

    The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It promotes cooperation among countries with advanced nuclear technology infrastructure to achieve advances in nuclear safety, technology, science, related environmental and economic issues, and law.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world’s leading intergovernmental forum for nuclear scientific and technical cooperation. It promotes the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.

    The Joint NEA/IAEA Uranium Group contributes to each edition of Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand. The Group also coordinates the preparation of periodic assessments of world natural uranium supply, examines the relationship of supply to projected demand, and recommends actions that can be taken to ensure adequate long-term supplies of uranium for the development of nuclear energy.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 22, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    When we met the last time, at ICONS 2020, many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security. A global pandemic was in the making and a war – in Ukraine – for first time soon would be fought among the facilities of one of Europe’s biggest nuclear power programmes.

    Meanwhile, profound technological advances have been made. Assessing their impact on nuclear security is a crucial task. Artificial Intelligence, and unmanned vehicles pose both a threat to nuclear security and offer new tools with which to enhance it. In the nuclear field itself, Small Modular Reactors promise new opportunities for applications such as desalination and power brought to remote communities via barge, but also require us to consider new security elements.

    The use of nuclear science and technology, often facilitated by the IAEA, has come on in leaps and bounds. Climate change and the drive for energy security are fuelling a desire for nuclear power. At this past Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP28, world leaders – those whose states use nuclear power and those whose do not – for the first time in nearly 30 years of COP meetings agreed nuclear power must be part of the transition to net zero. More than 20 countries have signed a pledge towards tripling nuclear power capacity and at the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Summit in March heads of state agreed on the urgent need for conducive financial conditions. 

    Nuclear security is relevant throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and is part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power. Nuclear power programmes require national nuclear security threat assessments and “security by design”. Nurturing relevant research and a strong security culture are key, not only in countries with NPPs.

    The use of life-saving and life-affirming applications of nuclear science and technology is growing, from cancer patients gaining access to radiotherapy to farmers benefiting from new crop varieties developed with the help of irradiation. IAEA initiative such as Rays of Hope: Cancer care for all; Nutec Plastics; Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC); and Atoms4Food are key vehicles facilitating wider access.

    All these opportunities to use nuclear and radioactive material depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime. For countries new to using nuclear and radioactive material, this means building up legal infrastructure, practices and culture that bolster nuclear security.  Nationally and across borders, collaboration and laser-focused vigilance are key to preventing groups with malicious intent from using nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic and harm.

    The threats to nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities are real and varied. The international nuclear security threat landscape keeps evolving. Today, anyone can type a few words into a computer and generative AI can create images of nuclear Armageddon, meaning it is now possible to spread panic about radiation fallout without a nuclear device. Risk scenarios include theft of nuclear and other radioactive material for use in improvised devices and sabotage at nuclear installations or during transport of nuclear and radioactive material. The risk of cyber-attacks requires the implementation of computer security programmes by those who use nuclear power and those who don’t. Risks come from outsiders and from those within the fold who are disgruntled or have been corrupted.

    Nuclear security is the national responsibility of individual states, but it also benefits enormously from close collaboration and the enabling role of the IAEA.  ICONS, which started in 2013, has been the place for ministers, policymakers, senior officials, and experts to gather to assesses current priorities, prepare for new challenges, and engage in scenario-based policy discussions. ICONS 2024, presided over by the co-presidents, HE Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and HE Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, covers the themes of policy, law and regulation; technology and infrastructure for prevention, detection and response; capacity building; and cross-cutting areas, such as the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety. ICONS is the most important high-level international meeting on nuclear security. At this time of heightened tensions, it is imperative that there remains a unity of purpose and that nuclear security does not become a political football.

    This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. The IAEA is at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges, including war. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security have broad international support. They have brought crucial clarity at a time of war and are testament to the adaptiveness of the IAEA and the security regime.

    Those seven pillars are backed up by an enormous ongoing effort by the IAEA to support Ukraine, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhya NPP on the front lines of the war. When there were allegations of nuclear security breaches, the IAEA was there to investigate with impartiality and science. We set the facts straight that no nuclear material had been diverted, cutting through the fog of war, and diffusing a tense situation.   

    Not all our efforts require quite as much courage as our experts have shown in Ukraine, nor do they make international headlines. But every day, the IAEA – the Secretariat and the Member States – work together fastidiously to underpin nuclear security, never resting, always learning.

    Radioactive sources are extensively used in many domains, including medicine, industry, agriculture and research. An incident in one State can have far-reaching consequences for others, so security for one is security for all. That means supporting States with no, or less developed nuclear security infrastructure makes everyone safer. That support, which often comes via the IAEA, includes making lawmakers aware of their responsibilities.

    Nuclear Security requires the implementation of appropriate and robust legislative regulatory frameworks. In 2022, the first Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) was held under the auspices of the IAEA. Reflecting the global importance of the legal framework and of nuclear security, parties managed to agree an outcome document and for the IAEA convene a subsequent conference. Since 2020, 14 new parties have joined the A/CPPNM bringing the total to 136. Five new Parties joined the CPPNM, bringing that total to 164. In addition to the A/CPPNM, political commitment to legally non-binding instruments, like the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance, is a strong indication of radiation safety and nuclear security culture.

    But legal frameworks are just the beginning. They must be implemented. The IAEA plays a central role in assisting its Members States so they are able to do that. Last year we inaugurated the most visible symbol of our collaboration: the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This first-of-its-kind space, made possible by 15 donors, is a cornerstone for capacity building amid the growing need for sophisticated hands-on nuclear security training using advanced, specialized equipment. The NSTDC is part of a wide range of services offered by the IAEA, including peer reviews, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), of which there have now been more than 100, and Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS), a service we launched in 2022. Our Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) now has 145 members and has enabled the reporting of more than 600 incidents in which nuclear or radioactive material went out of regulatory control.  Almost 8,000 people have benefited from our training in nuclear security, and we continue to work very hard to remove barriers that prevent talent from entering the field.  In March 2021, we launched the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) to support the achievement of gender equality in nuclear security. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme financially supports women pursuing a master’s degree in nuclear subjects and offers them internships, while our Lise Meitner offers women in the early and middle part of their career enriching opportunities within the field.   

    As the use of nuclear and other radioactive material around the world increases, more and more States are needing to increase their level of nuclear security. Nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety – we must put it on equal footing in terms of reliability of funding and the robustness of implementation.

    At ICONS 2024 we are – as the name of the conference indicates – “shaping the future”, not only of nuclear security, but of the world our children will inherit. That is because nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is an enabler to providing, through nuclear science and technology, the clean energy; cutting-edge medicine; nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 22, 2025
  • India to evacute citizens of Nepal, Sri Lanka from Iran

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The Indian Embassy in Iran has said that it will make efforts to evacuate citizens of Nepal and Sri Lanka. The embassy noted that these efforts will be made at the request of the Governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka.

    “On request of the Governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka, the Indian Embassy’s evacuation efforts in Iran will also cover citizens of Nepal and Sri Lanka,” the Indian Embassy in Iran posted on X.

    The Indian government has launched Operation Sindhu to evacuate Indian nationals from Iran, given the deteriorating situation as a result of the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel.

    Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said on Saturday that, so far, 517 Indian nationals have returned to India from Iran under Operation Sindhu.

    Jaiswal stated that a special flight from Turkmenistan’s Ashgabat carrying Indians from Iran arrived in New Delhi on June 21.

    In a post on X, Jaiswal stated: “Operation Sindhu continues. A special evacuation flight from Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, landed in New Delhi at 0300 hrs on 21st June, bringing Indians from Iran home. With this, so far 517 Indian nationals from Iran have returned home under Operation Sindhu.”

    The conflict between Israel and Iran entered its ninth day on Saturday. The conflict began after Israel, on June 13, launched a massive airstrike on Iranian military and nuclear sites, dubbed “Operation Rising Lion.”

    In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a large-scale drone and missile operation, “Operation True Promise 3,” targeting Israeli fighter jet fuel production facilities and energy supply centres.

    This is not the first time the Indian government has launched an operation to evacuate citizens from another country. In 2023, India launched Operation Kaveri to evacuate its citizens during violent military clashes in Sudan. Operation Ajay was launched in 2023 to evacuate Indian nationals from Israel during the Israel-Hamas conflict. Operation Ganga was launched in 2022 to evacuate Indian nationals when war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. 

    In 2021, the Indian government launched Operation Devi Shakti to evacuate citizens from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. Operation Samudra Setu was launched in 2020 to evacuate Indians via sea during the COVID-19 pandemic. Operation Raahat was conducted in 2015 to evacuate citizens amid the civil conflict in Yemen. In 2011, India launched Operation Safe Homecoming to bring home nationals during the Libyan civil war amid the Arab Spring.

    (ANI)

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Q&A: Senate Legislates One Big Beautiful Bill

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley

    Q: How will the Senate version of the One Big Beautiful Bill impact Iowans?

    A: Based on my county meetings, emails and phone calls, Iowans are paying close attention to the One Big Beautiful Bill moving through Congress. After passing the House of Representatives, the committees of jurisdiction in the Senate are now hammering out policy details on agriculture, taxes, immigration, health care and more. The bill is advancing in the Senate under the expedited reconciliation process that doesn’t require a 60-vote threshold and can’t include non-budgetary matters in the bill. As a senior member and former chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, I’ve had my sleeves rolled up at the policymaking table advocating on behalf of Iowans, including agriculture, energy, taxes, health care and more. This package is a generational opportunity to prevent the largest tax increase in U.S. history and restore fiscal sanity. Americans sent a strong message in the last election and delivered a mandate to President Trump and the Republican Majority in Congress. That mandate includes cutting government bloat, reining in wasteful spending and stopping the biggest tax increase in the history of the country.

    Let’s start with health care, in particular Medicaid. That’s the federal-state program that provides free or low-cost health care to individuals based on their income and family size, serving Americans with disabilities, seniors, kids, pregnant moms and others. A sizable majority of Americans supports efforts to stop wasteful spending that drains resources for people who truly need this safety net and puts an unfair burden on taxpayers. I’ve been a long-time champion for protecting the Medicaid program for the most vulnerable Iowans. This includes my work to pass the Family Opportunity Act and Advancing Care for Exceptional (ACE) Kids Act, and my continued work on supporting kids with complex medical needs and improving maternal and child health. The Senate bill includes measures to strengthen the integrity of the Medicaid program, delay costly Biden-era regulations, stop Obamacare subsidies from going to illegal immigrants and enacting work requirements for able-bodied adults with reasonable exemptions, such as parents with young kids.

    Contrary to misinformation campaigns seeking to stop these common-sense reforms from getting to the president’s desk, the Senate bill does not take away Medicaid from those who genuinely need it. In fact, our bill seeks to strengthen the program so that it can continue to serve vulnerable populations it was designed to serve. For example, it would stop people from taking advantage of Medicaid coverage in multiple states; remove safe harbor protections for those who make erroneous excess payments; and, ban Medicaid managed care PBM spread pricing, among many other common-sense program integrity provisions. Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) are the middlemen who negotiate prices with pharmaceutical companies, health insurance companies, employer benefit plans, pharmacies and the consumer. PBMs can raise prices consumers pay for their medications, and instead of passing that revenue along to the pharmacy, they pocket the difference, known as “spread pricing.” I’ve long worked to reduce prescription drug prices and I’m pleased to get this specific reform in the Senate bill.

    Q: What’s so critical about the tax provisions in the bill?

    A: Our bill makes the 2017 tax law permanent. If Congress does nothing, the U.S. economy will get strangled by a $4 trillion tax hike on American workers, small businesses, farmers and families. The last thing American households and small businesses need – after recovering from supply chain setbacks during the pandemic and record-setting inflation under the Biden administration – is a higher tax bill from the federal government. Letting the 2017 tax law expire would cut the child tax credit and standard deduction in half. Iowa families would see on average a $1,400 tax increase. It also would slap a massive tax increase on small businesses, slamming the brakes on hiring, investing and expanding in local communities across the country. Iowa would stand to lose 57,000 jobs and more than $5 billion in employee wages across the state.

    Instead, the Senate bill would provide additional tax relief to working families, making permanent across-the-board tax rates; expanding the child tax credit; strengthening employer-provided childcare credit; enhancing the standard deduction; and, making permanent the small business deduction. It adds new tax relief for tipped workers and hourly workers who earn overtime pay, repeals burdensome reporting requirements for gig workers (rolls back the proposed $600 threshold for online payment platforms) and reduces paperwork burdens for small businesses by increasing the 1099-MISC threshold. The Senate-backed pro-growth tax policies would fuel investment with full expensing for domestic research and development, new capital improvements (including machinery and equipment) and new factories and factory improvements. These measures would provide much-needed certainty for small businesses and factories across our state, concerns I hear about regularly during my county meetings.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson’s Keynote Remarks at the CCP AGM 2025

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    It is a pleasure to join CCP Global for your Annual General Meeting. Joining you today marks the third time that I have had the opportunity to address this important group at the center of the global derivatives markets. Addressing this body in Madrid, Spain in June of 2022 marked one of the earliest keynote addresses that I delivered during my time in service as a Commissioner only months after I joined the Commission.[1] 
    During my speech in Madrid, I reflected on then-recent market stress resulting from geopolitical events and a global pandemic. In February and March of 2020, our markets faced concerning shocks from the rise of a global pandemic[2] and regulatory responses to contain it.[3] Markets witnessed unprecedented volatility coupled with extreme volumes of trading and at times tight liquidity, placing extraordinary pressure on market infrastructures. Responding to these events, central counterparties CCPs carefully assessed initial and variation margin requirements and ultimately increased initial margin requirements (particularly for equity products) as an integral part of their market risk mitigating solutions.
    Facing these challenges, CCPs navigated the risks presented, deploying the carefully developed tools at hand with deep and continuous engagement with global regulators. As a result of effective reforms adopted almost a decade before the pressures of recent geopolitical events and a global pandemic at the start of this decade, our financial system demonstrated remarkable resilience.  As noted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) – “Banks and FMIs, particularly CCPs, held up well and were largely able to absorb rather than amplify the shock.”[4]
    In many ways, market conditions during these events stress tested CCP resilience reforms implemented pursuant to the 2009 G20 Pittsburg Summit and the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI) codified under local laws such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and European Market Infrastructure Regulation.[5]
    Turning back to the present, it is fitting that we gather here today in a building that has served as a gathering place for government and industry for hundreds of years. My understanding is that the building began as a convent in 1411, but later, in the 17th Century became the meeting place for the administrative board for the Admiralty of Amsterdam. And, in the mid-1600s, became known as a City Hall and served as the seat of Amsterdam’s government. 
    In the spirit of reflecting on the significant contributions of the CCP Global community and the issues that you will discuss and explore during your general meeting, I hope to highlight the work of the advisory committees of the CFTC. Over the last few years, your members have supported and served on a number of the CFTC advisory committees. Having a full complement of five Commissioners for the last three and a half-years means that we put lots of you to work. As the current remaining Commissioners, Acting Chair Pham and I are continuing our commitment to advance important multi-stakeholder dialogues through our role as advisory committee sponsors. I am hopeful that we may even find a path to collaborate with joint sessions hosted by the two advisory committees that we sponsor.   
    Today, please allow me to focus my remarks on the importance of our Commission’s advisory committees and highlight some of the suggestions put forth by the Market Risk Advisory Committee (MRAC) following deep engagement on these issues, especially those focused on operational resiliency and derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs) system safeguards, and DCO wind down and recovery plans.
    I know that many of you are familiar with the MRAC and other CFTC advisory committees from your service and support as members of their Committees and Subcommittees. The MRAC was established on May 6, 2014 in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) after the Commission determined that MRAC was necessary and in the public’s interest.[6] MRAC’s purpose is to support the Commission in “promoting [] integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of the U.S. derivatives markets through sound regulation, as well as the monitoring and management of systemic risk.”[7] Since MRAC’s inception, each sponsoring Commissioner has recognized the vital role this advisory committee plays in the development of Commission rules and regulations and utilized MRAC to put forth important reports and recommendations.[8] 
    The MRAC has a diverse membership with deep experience across all corners of the derivatives space, including representatives of clearinghouses, exchanges, intermediaries, market makers, end-users, academia, public interest advocates, and regulators. Diversity of membership in our advisory committees is critically important to their success and will be vital as we address jurisdiction over emerging markets and novel asset classes as well as the continuous evolution of complex liquidity and market risk issues. Without perspectives from every side of the integral issues that these committees address, we run the risk of limiting our supervision and oversight and missing out on the opportunity to effectively address emerging risks to market stability and integrity.
    The benefits of multi-stakeholder gatherings to address emerging market risks cannot be overstated. Sharing a wide variety of perspectives across our markets to engage in deep, thoughtful, and actionable solutions enables regulators and market participants to be prepared to navigate risks with minimal disruptions and maximum resiliency for strong and vibrant derivatives markets in the U.S. and across the world. 
    This, in essence, is why I believe you all meet here on an annual basis as well – because you recognize the value of deliberative engagement. Allow me to share briefly on two issues that are top of mind for me and that the MRAC has made significant progress addressing– operational resilience of our derivatives markets and orderly wind down and recovery for DCOs.
    Navigating the Cyber Landscape for CCPs
    Cybersecurity risks are growing in our markets and must be proactively managed and addressed. In its 2024 Systemic Risk Barometer Survey, the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) noted that cyber risk was a top five systemic risk to the global economy.[9] Similarly, in May 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that in the past 20 years, the financial sector has suffered over 20,000 cyber-attacks resulting in $12 billion in losses, and noted that there is a growing inequality between cyber resilient organizations and those that lack the resilience to withstand and prevent attacks.[10] Recent events demonstrate the chaos that cybersecurity events can cause for our markets, resulting in billions in losses.
    As many of you are aware, in January of 2023, ION Cleared Derivatives (ION) experienced a significant cyberattack. ION provides important back-office services for many global futures commission merchants (FCMs) and other market participants. ION’s effective operations and successful provision of these critical services enable many market participants to clear and settle a significant volume of global transactions on a daily basis. The cyberattack on ION triggered a series of disruptions across markets. Those who rely on ION to perform critical functions were taken offline and many had to rely on manual trade processing. The outage similarly delayed the Commission’s ability to deliver timely the Commitments to Traders reports.
    Two years later, in a very different corner of markets, on February 21, 2025, Bybit, a popular cryptocurrency exchange, lost nearly $1.5 billion in losses in mostly Ether from a hacking incident.[11] The Bybit hack represented one of the single largest losses by any cryptocurrency exchange since the first Bitcoin was mined. 
    The hackers identified a vulnerability in Bybit’s transaction approval process hosted through smart contract logic in off chain infrastructure. What appeared to be a routine transfer from Bybit’s Ethereum cold wallet ended up being a rerouting of the transaction to the hacker’s wallets. What kinds of vulnerabilities have enabled hackers to capture hundreds of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency? Commonly deployed tactics include phishing, supply chain compromises, and private key thefts. 
    In the context of the Bybit hack, reports indicate that the hackers accessed critical Bybit systems through a third party provided critical infrastructure system and used this access point to inject malicious software that detected and modified outgoing transactions in real time.[12] Hackers appear to have gained access to an off chain Safe user interface provided by a third-party service provider.[13]
    To provide guardrails for these types of issues, in December 2023, the Commission unanimously approved a proposed rule that would create an operational resilience framework for FCMs, swap dealers (SDs) and major swap participants (MSPs) to “identify, monitor, manage, and assess risks relating to information and technology security, third-party relationships, and emergencies or other significant disruptions to normal business operations”.[14] The proposed rule included three components: (1) an information and technology security program; (2) a third-party relationship program; and (3) a business continuity and disaster recovery plan. Each of these components was designed to deliver frameworks to establish protections to FCMs, SDs, and MSPs and, in an event like the ION Derivatives cyberattack, a plan to continue business as normal while post-mortem checks are completed.
    I want to highlight one of the risks that the proposed ORF seeks to address – concentration risks associated with critical third-party service providers. As early back as 2019, the FSB released a report on third-party dependencies in cloud services and considerations on financial stability implications, including implications of market concentration on competition.[15] These risks can be heightened for smaller or medium sized firms, who may lack both the resources to develop technology in house as well as the bargaining power to negotiate with limited service providers in many cases. 
    Evidence, as well as our experience in working towards the operational resilience framework, indicates that this may be more pronounced in the markets we regulate where there may be even more limited vendors that can provide the sophisticated technologies often used in the derivatives industry. This is not only a potential issue for compliance with regulations and risk management, but also a business risk for market participants.
    The Central Counterparty (CCP) Risk & Governance Subcommittee of MRAC recognized the need for a rule like ORF to create a regulatory framework for cybersecurity preparedness and business continuity for cyberattacks and built out a proposal to expand the scope to include DCOs and bolster system safeguards for critical third-party service providers.[16]
    MRAC’s Recommendation on DCO System Safeguards for Critical Third-Party Service Providers
    The DCO System Safeguards recommendations are an example of MRAC’s proactive response to a potential risk identified. The recommendations also highlight the value of the CFTC advisory committees and the potential for diverse stakeholders who may have divergent perspectives to work together to make real progress towards making our markets more resilient. 
    A technology and operations workstream of the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee began evaluating issues related to cybersecurity and third-party risk management in early 2023. In March of that year, MRAC held a “first-of-its-kind” public meeting to discuss the cybersecurity event at ION Cleared Derivatives that led to a ripple effect across our markets. This was the first chance for experts across our industry to come together following the ION cyberattack to evaluate the event and begin to map out next steps to ensure cyber preparedness among market participants, service providers, and other sources that have the potential to impact our markets. 
    At the meeting, Futures Industry Association (FIA) President and CEO Walt Lukken announced the creation of a new Cyber Risk Taskforce, the National Futures Association (NFA) President and CEO Tom Sexton discussed NFA’s role in standard setting to mitigate cyberthreats, and we heard from other experts including those from the White House’s Office of the National Cyber Director, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and of course, the CFTC, on strategies to enhance the security and resilience of financial markets in the face of new and evolving cyber threats. 
    Later the same year, the FIA Cyber Risk Taskforce issued an After Action Report outlining the challenges facing our markets.[17] Key findings in the report include a lack of communication amongst market participants in the wake of a cyber incident and the need to connect our market with the broader financial sector to learn from and share the best operational resilience strategies for cyber events. The After Action Report made six recommendations based on their findings: (1) the creation of an “Industry Resilience Committee” to help develop information channels with respect to operational and cyber resilience; (2) connecting our industry with sector-wide specialist groups who focus on operational resilience across our markets; (3) a self-reflective review of our market participant’s policies and procedures for cyber incidents; (4) the establishment of procedures for sharing critical data and information during cyber incidents; (5) identification of ways to assess risk to create more robust operational resilience frameworks; and (6) participation in regularly held cyber preparedness exercises.[18]
    The CCP Risk & Governance Committee recognized that there may have been some important gaps in operational resilience and took up the mantle to continue to examine areas not fully addressed by the Commission. The Subcommittee’s recommendations highlight the importance of cyber resilience in DCOs and the need for a more robust regulatory framework. These recommendations, which the MRAC voted to advance to the Commission, would improve upon the existing framework and require that DCOs establish, implement, and maintain a third-party relationship management program. 
    The CCP Risk & Governance Committee’s report focuses on CFTC Rule 39.18, which establishes system safeguard standards for DCOs and addresses outsourcing but does not expressly discuss third-party relationships. The CCP Risk and Governance recommendations build upon the framework of Rule 39.18 by adding a third-party risk management program to (b)(2). The proposal suggests that a robust third party relationship management program that identifies, assesses, mitigates, and monitors the full risks that are associated with using third party arrangements for critical services should include robust risk management frameworks like policies and procedures that cover the lifecycle of the relationship, personnel assigned to onboarding and diligence of the third party relationships, risk-based monitoring, and more. 
    The recommendations build upon the philosophy of the DCO Core Principles, lessons learned and best practices from voices across the industry, and international standard setting bodies. As noted in the report,

    These principles are intended to reflect lessons learned from industry efforts and best practices in derivatives, the guidance notes in Form DCO, the NFA interpretive guidance, lessons learned from the wider context of third-party relationship management, as well as the principles enunciated in the PFMIs. Incorporating these principles in Commission regulations would enable the Commission to update its regulatory framework with respect to critical third party service providers and to bring its regulations in line with internationally accepted standards, while maintaining a principles based approach to regulation.[19]

    Operational resilience, and especially third-party risk management, is a key issue for me, which I continue to track closely and to discuss frequently with my colleagues at the CFTC and at other agencies, as well as with market participants that we regulate, and at events like these. I frequently request that we take these issues seriously and continue to consider actionable steps to address them. As I’ve noted previously, “effectively combatting cyber threats will require a coordinated effort among regulators and industry,” and I am committed to continuing to foster conversations about how we can work together to make our markets safer and more resilient.[20]
    I expect that MRAC will continue to consider issues related to cyber resilience and third-party risk management, including as the risks continue to evolve and AI-enhanced cybersecurity creates new or heightened risks.
    DCO Recovery and Wind Down: Parallelism with International Standards
    Similarly, the CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee has outlined supplemental reforms that complement Commission staff work that aims to ensure recovery and orderly wind-down of DCOs as part of the post-crisis reforms and important robust preventative resilience framework. Since reforms adopted in the U.S. under the Dodd-Frank Act, international standard-setting bodies have adopted principles, guidance, and standards to support and inform national policymakers on CCP regulation.[21] The Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO and together with CPMI, CPMI-IOSCO) and the FSB have published numerous reports on these issues on resilience, recovery, and resolution.[22] In 2012, CPMI-IOSCO published a report setting forth 24 principles that financial market infrastructures, like CCPs, should apply, with the goal of enhancing safety and efficiency.[23] The principles, called the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (or PFMI), set forth four foundational pillars for managing financial risk associated with CCPs: governance arrangements of CCPs, comprehensive risk management frameworks, financial resources allocated to loss absorption, and stress testing for both credit and liquidity exposures. 
    The FSB issued guidelines[24] as well and worked together with CPMI-IOSCO to assess CCP financial resources in connection with recovery and resolution.[25] In the following years, the Commission took up a similar path, issuing a proposed rule that would apply guidelines and requirements for recovery and orderly wind down plans that are already required for systemically important DCOs (SIDCOs) and Subpart C DCOs to all DCOs.[26] 
    The Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule is robust and important to the Commission and its market participants. Again, MRAC and the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee identified four main areas to recommend enhancements: supervisory stress testing of recovery and wind-down plans; conducting recovery scenarios and analysis; inclusion of non-default loss (NDL) in recovery and wind-down plans; and porting of customer positions and collateral during a CCP resolution and clearing member default.[27]
    The MRAC’s Recommendations on DCO Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning
    At its April 2024 meeting, the MRAC approved another set of recommendations from the CCP Risk & Governance Subcommittee on DCO recovery and orderly wind-down plans and advanced them to the Commission. The recovery and resolution workstream worked on these recommendations in parallel with the Commission developing the Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule and aimed to support the staff in its drafting and the Commission in its consideration of such a rule. 
    The report included background about the importance of DCOs and CCPs in derivatives markets and actions taken both domestically and internationally to strengthen their resilience, some of which I have shared with you here today. The recommendations in the report demonstrate the depth of expertise available to the Commission through advisory committees and the inclusive nature of all participating viewpoints. For example, the recommendation to implement supervisory stress tests came with a caveat – while subcommittee members representing end-users, FCMs, and academia believed that stress tests should be required to take place annually, subcommittee members representing DCOs did not believe that the frequency of reverse stress tests should be annual but should be determined by Commission staff.[28] This is a prime example of why continued participation and robust discussion amongst all viewpoints is a necessity when evaluating the complex issues that face our markets. Although the Commission has yet to complete a final rulemaking on this topic, I hope that the recommendations made by MRAC in this report can provide a roadmap for future engagement.
    The Work Continues
    I will not have sufficient time today to share all of the details about all of the reports or recommendations that that MRAC has advanced during my time at the Commission, but if you will indulge me, I would like to say a word about some of the other projects that have been completed over the past two years. 
    The Market Structure Subcommittee developed a report and recommendations on the Treasury cash-futures basis trade and effective risk management practices, which the MRAC voted to advance to the Commission. The report takes a thoughtful and comprehensive look at the basis trade, including its mechanics and parties involved, the disruptions experienced in March 2020 during broader COVID-19-related market turmoil, and its impacts on the broader economy), and identifies both benefits and risks before the recommending effective risk management practices associated with the cash-futures basis trade.[29] 
    At the most recent MRAC meeting, Josh Frost, then-Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets at the Treasury Department, and members of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee spoke about the importance of Treasury markets and their role in price discovery and liquidity across the financial system, drawing on perspectives from a number of participants in the ecosystem, including both asset managers and hedge funds that participate in the basis trade. This discussion was a good example of the importance of the work of the MRAC on topics that have real implications for our market ecosystem, and the value of bringing together different voices to achieve a deeper, more informed understanding of important issues and how best we can address them.
    To take one more example, earlier last year, the MRAC Market Structure Subcommittee issued a report sharing results from a survey of data on FCMs spanning 2003-2023,[30] which showed some interesting trends in capacity and concentration. At a recent trade association meeting, FIA Boca, I described issues that I believe are critical for the Commission to consider as we begin to explore clearing U.S. Treasuries. 
    The data collected in the MRAC Market Structure Subcommittee report outlines industry concentration in the market for FCM services despite the growth of the industry. For example, the survey showed a disproportionate amount of increase in bank-affiliated FCMs and increased concentration of broker-dealer-FCMs that are dully registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All of the top ten industry positions in terms of holdings of customer funds were associated with banks or broker-dealers, and they accounted for more than 80% of all customer funds.
    Conclusion
    We must continue to support our advisory committees and robust multi-stakeholder engagement. Each significantly benefit the stability and integrity of our markets. 
    Before closing, I would like to personally thank everyone that has supported the MRAC in any way, through service as an MRAC member, participation on a workstream to advance a set of recommendations to the Commission, by serving as an expert presenter at a meeting, or just tuning into the CFTC YouTube page to watch a meeting – thank you for dedicating your time. If you have not served on an advisory committee, I encourage you to consider service and the potential to contribute to the important engagement that service offers. 
    The broader CFTC community is part of what makes this agency so special and enables us to punch above our weight. It has been an honor to work with and learn from all of you, and I look forward to seeing what we can accomplish together next. 

    [1] Commissioner Johnson to Deliver Keynote Address at the 2022 CCP12 Annual General Meeting in Madrid (June 22, 2022), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventjohnson062222; Commissioner Johnson to Provide a Keynote Speech and Participate in a Fireside Chat at the CCP-12 Annual General Meeting (June 14, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventjohnson061523. As in my previous speeches, the views I express today are my own and not the views of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners or the staff of the CFTC.
    [2] Opening Remarks of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General, at the WHO Media Briefing on COVID-19 (March 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.
    [3] Sir Jon Cunliffe, Keynote Address at the FIA & SIFMA Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022 (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2022/february/jon-cunliffe-keynote-address-fia-sifma-asset-management-derivatives-forum.
    [4] FSB Interim Report, Lessons Learnt from the COVID-19 Pandemic from a Financial Stability Perspective (July 13, 2021), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P281021-2.pdf.
    [5] See CFTC Regulation 39.13, applying a principles-based approach to managing procyclicality, and Article 41 of EMIR and Article 28 of the Regulatory Technical Standards, requiring CCPs to implement specific margin procyclicality mitigants.
    [6] Market Risk Advisory Committee, 79 Fed. Reg. 25844 (May 6, 2014), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/05/06/2014-10325/market-risk-advisory-committee.
    [7] CFTC, Renewal Chart of the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Apr. 16, 2024) (accessible at https://www.cftc.gov/About/AdvisoryCommittees/MRAC).
    [8] See, e.g.,  Opening Statement of Acting Chairman Rostin Behnam before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/behnamstatement022321 (“Advisory committees like MRAC are vehicles for change, challenge, and perhaps most importantly, debate and consensus.”); Statement of Commissioner Sharon Bowen before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (Apr. 2, 2025), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/bowenstatement040215 (“The information and recommendations from this Committee will be invaluable”). For a list of reports and recommendations set forth by the MRAC, see Market Risk Advisory Committee, CFTC, https://www.cftc.gov/About/AdvisoryCommittees/MRAC.  
    [9] DTCC, Systemic Risk Barometer Survey, 2024 Risk Forecast (2024), https://www.dtcc.com/-/media/downloads/Systemic-Risk/29873-Systemic_Risk-2024.
    [10] World Economic Forum, Global financial stability at risk due to cyber threats, IMF warns. Here’s what to know (May 15, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/05/financial-sector-cyber-attack-threat-imf-cybersecurity/; see also World Economic Forum, Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2024 (January 11, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-cybersecurity-outlook-2024/. 
    [11] Vicky Ge Huang and Robert McMillan, How the Biggest Crypto Hack Ever Nearly Destroyed the World’s No. 2 Exchange, WSJ (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/how-the-biggest-crypto-hack-ever-nearly-destroyed-the-worlds-no-2-exchange-ee273a3a?msockid=26f265067f5965a63f6273047e1464d0.  
    [12] Alexandra Andhov, Inside The Bybit Hacking Incident: Lessons From The Breach, Forbes (Apr. 1, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/04/01/inside-the-bybit-hacking-incident-lessons-from-the-breach/; see also Sandy Carter, Latest On The Bybit Record Breaking 1.4 Billion Dollar Crypto Hack, Forbes (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/02/21/latest-on-the-bybit-record-breaking-14-billion-dollar-crypto-hack/.  
    [13] Taylar Rajic, The ByBit Heist and the Future of U.S. Crypto Regulation, CSIS (Mar. 18, 2025), https://www.csis.org/analysis/bybit-heist-and-future-us-crypto-regulation.
    [14] CFTC, Operational Resilience Framework for Futures Commission Merchants, Swap Dealers, and Major Swap Participants, 89 Fed. Reg. 4706 (proposed Jan. 24, 2024). 
    [15] Third-party dependencies in cloud services, Considerations on financial stability implications, FSB (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P091219-2.pdf. 
    [16] Recommendations on DCO System Safeguards Standards for Third Party Service Providers, Central Counterparty Risk and Governance (CCP) Subcommittee, Market Risk Advisory Committee of the U.S. CFTC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac121024). 
    [17] FIA Taskforce On Cyber Risk After Action Report and Findings, FIA (Sept. 2023), https://www.fia.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/FIA_Taskforce%20on%20Cyber%20Risk_Recommendations_SEPT2023_Final2.pdf.
    [18] Id.
    [19] Recommendations on DCO System Safeguards Standards for Third Party Service Providers, Central Counterparty (CCP) Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [20] Keynote Remarks of Commissioner Kristin Johnson at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (May 29, 2025), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajohnson19.
    [21] Recommendations on Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Aug. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [22] Id. 
    [23] CPMI-IOSCO, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (April 16, 2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm; see also CPMI-IOSCO, Resilience and Recovery of Central Counterparties (CCPs): Further Guidance on the PFMI – Consultative Report (August 16, 2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d149.htm; CPMI-IOSCO, Implementation Monitoring of PFMI: Level 3 Assessment – Report on the Financial Risk Management and Recovery Practices of 10 Derivatives CCPs (August 16, 2016), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d148.htm.
    [24] FSB, Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning (July 5, 2017) https://www.fsb.org/2017/07/guidance-on-central-counterparty-resolution-and-resolution-planning-2/; FSB, Guidance on Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolution and on the Treatment of CCP Equity in Resolution (November 16, 2020), https://www.fsb.org/2020/11/guidance-on-financial-resources-to-support-ccp-resolution-and-on-the-treatment-of-ccp-equity-in-resolution/.
    [25] FSB, Central Counterparty Financial Resources for Recovery and Resolution (March 10, 2022), https://www.fsb.org/2022/03/central-counterparty-financial-resources-for-recovery-and-resolution/.
    [26] CFTC, Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, 88 Fed. Reg. 48968 (proposed July 28, 2023) (Proposed DCO Recovery and Wind-Down Rule).
    [27] Recommendations on Derivatives Clearing Organizations Recovery and Orderly Wind-Down Plans; Information for Resolution Planning, CCP Risk and Governance Subcommittee, MRAC (Aug. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).
    [28] Id.
    [29] The Treasury Cash-Futures Basis Trade and Effective Risk Management Practices, MRAC (Dec. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac121024).
    [30] Market Structure Subcommittee Data and Analysis Regarding FCM Capacity, MRAC (Apr. 2024) (available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaeventmrac040924).

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Digging Out of Our Fiscal Hole

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Ron Johnson

    Neither Congress, the Administration, nor the public at large has fully acknowledged the depth of the fiscal hole we have dug, or what it will take to dig ourselves out of it. This is why I am releasing my report “FY 2025 Budget Reconciliation: Facts, Figures, and Analysis.”

    My report provides an analysis of different scenarios using various growth rates and spending levels to prove that, without returning to a much lower pre-pandemic spending level, there is virtually no hope of achieving a balanced budget. Republican leaders have repeatedly stated, “We don’t have a revenue problem; we have a spending problem.” It’s time to find out if they’re willing to fix it.

    Republicans must ask themselves whether they’re willing to address this spending problem. I hope the answer is yes — and I will continue doing everything I can to ensure it is.

    Access the entire 30-page report: The primary purpose of this report is to graphically show what so many Republican leaders have repeatedly stated, including President Trump in his November 2, 2011 tweet, “Washington has a spending problem, not a revenue problem.” 

    As outlined in this report, the House bill will not reduce the deficit — the numbers simply don’t support that claim. This is our once in a lifetime opportunity to balance the federal budget and reset spending. We have to clean up the enormous mess that Biden and the Democrats left for us.

    We are all committed to helping the President and America succeed. My higher loyalty is to my children and grandchildren. We are immorally mortgaging their future. It’s time to take a businesslike approach and work seriously to reduce spending and deficits.

    READ: Washington Examiner —> Ron Johnson ramps up “Big, Beautiful Bill” opposition with release of deficit report

    READ: The Daily Signal —>  Sen. Ron Johnson Proposes Alternative to “Big, Beautiful Bill”

    WATCH: Clay & Buck —> Senator Ron Johnson Brings His Charts to the D.C. Studio to Talk Cutting the Budget

    WATCH: Fox Business interview clip —> “We have to clean up the enormous mess that Biden and the Democrats left for us.”

    READ: Badger Institute —>  At center of America’s essential debate, Johnson says resist spending frenzy

     

    I’ve been holding regular telephone town halls this month. The next one is Monday, June 23 at 2pm CT.

    I hope all subscribers to my newsletter have signed up, but if not, here is the form. 

    You can always listen to the telephone town halls live online or on X and Facebook. 

    I appreciate everyone who takes the time to listen and ask thoughtful questions, even if we disagree. We have thousands of people on these calls and try to answer questions on a wide array of topics.

    Here are the time codes and topics covered during the June 16 telephone town hall. 

    8:55       Telephone Town Hall #122 begins
    10:30     Thoughts on Sen. Alex Padilla at DHS Sec. Noem press conference
    11:20     Will Trump’s bill get passed by July 4?
    12:15     Are you concerned Republicans are on the wrong track?
    14:30     How will you vote on funding for public television and radio?
    15:35     Will Trump’s cuts hurt constituents?
    19:30     Taxes on Social Security
    22:13     Abortion
    23:50     Affordable Care Act vs. Obamacare
    25:58     VA care and government run health care
    29:30     Why democrats are protesting
    32:40     Illegal immigrants
    35:20     National debt
    38:11     China owning farmland near military bases
    40:00     Federal budget and how to limit spending
    42:35     Spending for Veterans
    45:05     Israel/Iran war
    47:50     Holding people accountable for illegal immigration
    51:28     Army parade
    53:20     Taxing the rich
    56:25     Social Security and taxes
    58:55     Revenue from tariffs
    1:02:43  Closing remarks

    Congratulations to Matt Pronovost from Homestead High School in Mequon for earning a spot in the U.S. Senate Page Program this summer.

    Pages play an important role in the daily operation of the Senate. They live in Washington, D.C. and attend Page School while working in the U.S. Senate. Pages deliver correspondence and legislative material within the Capitol and Senate office buildings, prepare the Chamber for Senate sessions, and work on the Senate floor.

    Contact my office and the Senate Page Coordinator for more information on the program for 16 or 17-year-olds in their junior year of high school. We are now taking applications for Spring 2026.

    It was great to meet five homeschool families from the Richfield area who were touring Washington, D.C. this week. 

    Our office can help you book several different tours for your upcoming trip to make it truly special. From the Capitol to the White House to the FBI, check out my Visiting DCwebpage for more information. 

    Our staff presented a Certificate of Special Senatorial Recognition to the Executive Director of Community Action for the organization’s 60th anniversary. The group fights poverty in Rock and Walworth counties. 
     

    The Spirit Cultural Exchange visits Madison each year with J-1 visa participants (also known as the Exchange Visitor Visa) to tour the State Capitol. 

    My staff met with these students from around the world to talk about United States government at the state and federal level. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Erie County Botanical Gardens’ Expansion & Renovation

    Source: US State of New York

    arlier today, Governor Kathy Hochul announced the Buffalo and Erie County Botanical Gardens broke ground on its long-anticipated expansion and renovation project. The $31 million project will include much-needed visitor amenities to meet the demands of the community, further the organization’s mission, and provide generational growth and stability. It is anticipated to be completed in early 2027.

    B-ROLL of the Governor at the groundbreaking for the Botanical Gardens is available to stream on YouTube here and TV quality video is available here (h.264, mp4).

    VIDEO: The event is available to stream on YouTube here and TV quality video is available here (h.264, mp4).

    AUDIO: The Governor’s remarks are available in audio form here.

    PHOTOS: The Governor’s Flickr page will post photos of the event here.

    A rush transcript of the Governor’s remarks is available below:

     Wow. First of all, this is a homecoming for me. No I mean, I was born right there — across the street. I was born at Our Lady of Victory Hospital, and this neighborhood is just part of my story. And as a little girl, I would take my naps when I was about three or four years old in my parents’ bed, and on their dresser was a picture of their wedding right in front of this building.

    So to me, this is always a magical place where mom and dad had their wedding pictures. And so as they brought us here as children, because when you grow up, and dad had worked at the steel plant down the road, the trailer park — still there, this is where you came for vacation, right? You didn’t have a lot of money to go on fancy trips. You came here, you thought you were going to the tropics, you thought you were going to a desert.

    I mean, you could use your imagination to just think of all the places around the world that you probably were never going to get to in person, but your mind was activated, and I know that dream is still there for so many people, and I want to thank the people who brought us here.

    Erin Grajek, who’s doing an extraordinary job as the President and CEO, I want to commend you for your leadership. It’s a good day. Probably the only person happier than you, Erin, is your 10-year-old son, Miles, who got out of school today. Right, Miles? You must be really proud of your mom. Tisha Luciani, our Board Chair. Let’s give her a round of applause as well.

    And we have a very special guest here, traveled some distance. Our former CEO and President, Dave Swarts. If you do not know him, he has been gone a little while, not too long, but he spent a decade of his life as the Chairman and CEO of this institution. Before that, he had been in public life and we worked closely together. But literally, I think my first trip home, after going to Albany, after I became Governor, Dave wanted me to come here, sit in his office, look at some plans.

    He showed me the plans, and I was hooked. And I knew that we could, with support from the State — which I would actually have a little more say over as the Governor — that we could make some real magic happen here. And so I was proud in April of 2022, my very first budget to announce significant funding to implement a vision here. So Dave, I want to give you a lot of credit for having the vision and the connections to be able to get this over the finish line. So welcome to you and Susan, your wife, who’s been at your side for such a long time.

    But it’s also a chance to thank our elected officials. This is something that I know our County Executive is enormously proud of. This is also his hometown and a place that he gathered often as a child, and I want to thank Mark Poloncarz for the county stewardship for this great project. Our Mayor, Chris Scanlon, has joined us as well. Mayor Scanlon, thank you for being here and all your support for this.

    The representatives of this area — the two elected officials of this particular property in Albany — Senator April Baskin, Assemblymember Pat Burke, thank you for getting your enormous support for this. Senator Sean Ryan, Assemblymember Jon Rivera, neighboring elected officials, but also this is a regional asset. This is for the entire region. Indeed it’s an incredible jewel for the State of New York, and I’m proud to be here.

    It’s hard to think about this place, though, without recognizing the life and legacy of Mark Mortenson, who really just drove this so hard and would’ve liked nothing more I’m sure than to be here on this day. And our thoughts go out to him, his family and what a loss for all of us.

    But also this is a place beloved by so many. And a $31 million investment signals that this community matters. And sometimes people who live here all their lives, they overlook how extraordinary this community is. This place — you have one of the most beautiful basilicas in the country right across the street, and we have to make Father Baker a saint someday. Right?

    Can we keep that going, everybody? Please keep that going. So I put out there we have an American Pope. We’re going to go have a little chat.

    I know he knows where Lackawanna is on a map — that’s a place that my dad — my mom went to school right there. My grandpa was the track coach at Father Baker. We always saw my uncles running around this beautiful property, and it’s such a tight-knit community here.

    And those who either live in Lackawanna, live in Western New York, or just true lovers of the extraordinary presentation of God’s greatest gift to us — nature and plants and flowers right here. All of you are part of something quite extraordinary.

    For 125 years — 125 years this place has been here. So people who came long before and people long after us, will take note of what we did when we were the stewards of this place.

    Didn’t just let it stay, but had to fix many of the deteriorating structures. The Conservatory is so beautiful now, and I remember the light shows we used to see before the pandemic struck. But a 120,000 square foot expansion so we can have a better gathering space and more programming for children and just welcome generations to come.

    Not even kids born yet. It’ll be coming to this place because we cared enough to make an investment and say, “This community matters. The botanical gardens matter, and the future for this community matters as well.” So I look at this, you welcome over a hundred thousand people every year. That’s extraordinary.

    We have many other assets in the state that don’t claim that many people who are drawn to this place of comfort and solace, especially when the weather’s bad outside. I loved coming here during snowstorms with my kids, right? Let them walk around a little and pretend they’re outside. And so this is always going to such a significant part of our community and it has an economic impact over $5 million. Don’t underestimate that.

    That’s me every time I come to the gift shop. I walk out with all kinds of loot but I know we can double those numbers, right? We can hit 200,000. Why not, and I’ll help promote this. The State of New York will help promote this even more. That’s my commitment to you. And we can double the economic impact.

    So right up there with places like Kleinhans, who we invested in, and Fort Niagara and the aquarium, and children’s museums and other places this is part of what makes this place so incredibly special? So I just want to tell you, I’m so glad it worked out that I could be here for this celebration. As Marv Levy used to say, “Where would you rather be than right here, right now?” Right, Bills fans?

    So this is a humbling experience for me to come back as Governor, as someone who’s born over there, raised in this community. Treasure this institution and be able to help with $12 million from the state. So, congratulations to everyone involved. I cannot wait to come back.

    December 18th, 2026. That’s the day. That’s the day I will proudly come back as your Governor to say we’ll be cutting the ribbon on the next chapter for the Botanical Gardens. So thank you everybody.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Erie County Botanical Gardens’ Expansion & Renovation

    Source: US State of New York

    arlier today, Governor Kathy Hochul announced the Buffalo and Erie County Botanical Gardens broke ground on its long-anticipated expansion and renovation project. The $31 million project will include much-needed visitor amenities to meet the demands of the community, further the organization’s mission, and provide generational growth and stability. It is anticipated to be completed in early 2027.

    B-ROLL of the Governor at the groundbreaking for the Botanical Gardens is available to stream on YouTube here and TV quality video is available here (h.264, mp4).

    VIDEO: The event is available to stream on YouTube here and TV quality video is available here (h.264, mp4).

    AUDIO: The Governor’s remarks are available in audio form here.

    PHOTOS: The Governor’s Flickr page will post photos of the event here.

    A rush transcript of the Governor’s remarks is available below:

     Wow. First of all, this is a homecoming for me. No I mean, I was born right there — across the street. I was born at Our Lady of Victory Hospital, and this neighborhood is just part of my story. And as a little girl, I would take my naps when I was about three or four years old in my parents’ bed, and on their dresser was a picture of their wedding right in front of this building.

    So to me, this is always a magical place where mom and dad had their wedding pictures. And so as they brought us here as children, because when you grow up, and dad had worked at the steel plant down the road, the trailer park — still there, this is where you came for vacation, right? You didn’t have a lot of money to go on fancy trips. You came here, you thought you were going to the tropics, you thought you were going to a desert.

    I mean, you could use your imagination to just think of all the places around the world that you probably were never going to get to in person, but your mind was activated, and I know that dream is still there for so many people, and I want to thank the people who brought us here.

    Erin Grajek, who’s doing an extraordinary job as the President and CEO, I want to commend you for your leadership. It’s a good day. Probably the only person happier than you, Erin, is your 10-year-old son, Miles, who got out of school today. Right, Miles? You must be really proud of your mom. Tisha Luciani, our Board Chair. Let’s give her a round of applause as well.

    And we have a very special guest here, traveled some distance. Our former CEO and President, Dave Swarts. If you do not know him, he has been gone a little while, not too long, but he spent a decade of his life as the Chairman and CEO of this institution. Before that, he had been in public life and we worked closely together. But literally, I think my first trip home, after going to Albany, after I became Governor, Dave wanted me to come here, sit in his office, look at some plans.

    He showed me the plans, and I was hooked. And I knew that we could, with support from the State — which I would actually have a little more say over as the Governor — that we could make some real magic happen here. And so I was proud in April of 2022, my very first budget to announce significant funding to implement a vision here. So Dave, I want to give you a lot of credit for having the vision and the connections to be able to get this over the finish line. So welcome to you and Susan, your wife, who’s been at your side for such a long time.

    But it’s also a chance to thank our elected officials. This is something that I know our County Executive is enormously proud of. This is also his hometown and a place that he gathered often as a child, and I want to thank Mark Poloncarz for the county stewardship for this great project. Our Mayor, Chris Scanlon, has joined us as well. Mayor Scanlon, thank you for being here and all your support for this.

    The representatives of this area — the two elected officials of this particular property in Albany — Senator April Baskin, Assemblymember Pat Burke, thank you for getting your enormous support for this. Senator Sean Ryan, Assemblymember Jon Rivera, neighboring elected officials, but also this is a regional asset. This is for the entire region. Indeed it’s an incredible jewel for the State of New York, and I’m proud to be here.

    It’s hard to think about this place, though, without recognizing the life and legacy of Mark Mortenson, who really just drove this so hard and would’ve liked nothing more I’m sure than to be here on this day. And our thoughts go out to him, his family and what a loss for all of us.

    But also this is a place beloved by so many. And a $31 million investment signals that this community matters. And sometimes people who live here all their lives, they overlook how extraordinary this community is. This place — you have one of the most beautiful basilicas in the country right across the street, and we have to make Father Baker a saint someday. Right?

    Can we keep that going, everybody? Please keep that going. So I put out there we have an American Pope. We’re going to go have a little chat.

    I know he knows where Lackawanna is on a map — that’s a place that my dad — my mom went to school right there. My grandpa was the track coach at Father Baker. We always saw my uncles running around this beautiful property, and it’s such a tight-knit community here.

    And those who either live in Lackawanna, live in Western New York, or just true lovers of the extraordinary presentation of God’s greatest gift to us — nature and plants and flowers right here. All of you are part of something quite extraordinary.

    For 125 years — 125 years this place has been here. So people who came long before and people long after us, will take note of what we did when we were the stewards of this place.

    Didn’t just let it stay, but had to fix many of the deteriorating structures. The Conservatory is so beautiful now, and I remember the light shows we used to see before the pandemic struck. But a 120,000 square foot expansion so we can have a better gathering space and more programming for children and just welcome generations to come.

    Not even kids born yet. It’ll be coming to this place because we cared enough to make an investment and say, “This community matters. The botanical gardens matter, and the future for this community matters as well.” So I look at this, you welcome over a hundred thousand people every year. That’s extraordinary.

    We have many other assets in the state that don’t claim that many people who are drawn to this place of comfort and solace, especially when the weather’s bad outside. I loved coming here during snowstorms with my kids, right? Let them walk around a little and pretend they’re outside. And so this is always going to such a significant part of our community and it has an economic impact over $5 million. Don’t underestimate that.

    That’s me every time I come to the gift shop. I walk out with all kinds of loot but I know we can double those numbers, right? We can hit 200,000. Why not, and I’ll help promote this. The State of New York will help promote this even more. That’s my commitment to you. And we can double the economic impact.

    So right up there with places like Kleinhans, who we invested in, and Fort Niagara and the aquarium, and children’s museums and other places this is part of what makes this place so incredibly special? So I just want to tell you, I’m so glad it worked out that I could be here for this celebration. As Marv Levy used to say, “Where would you rather be than right here, right now?” Right, Bills fans?

    So this is a humbling experience for me to come back as Governor, as someone who’s born over there, raised in this community. Treasure this institution and be able to help with $12 million from the state. So, congratulations to everyone involved. I cannot wait to come back.

    December 18th, 2026. That’s the day. That’s the day I will proudly come back as your Governor to say we’ll be cutting the ribbon on the next chapter for the Botanical Gardens. So thank you everybody.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Fiji

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On June 17, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Fiji, and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.

    The economic recovery continued in 2024. Staff estimates aggregate GDP growth in 2024 to have reached 3.7 percent. While employment has recovered to pre-pandemic levels, investment has recently been held back by labor shortages and supply-chain challenges. Inflation decelerated though 2024 as the impact of the 2023 value-added tax increase faded and the nominal exchange rate appreciated. The public debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decline from the peak reached in 2022, but remains elevated, at 80 percent. Likewise, the current account balance has improved, but the deficit in 2024 is estimated to be around 6.7 percent.

    Monetary and financial conditions remain accommodative, while the fiscal stance has tightened. The Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) has maintained the policy rate at 0.25 percent since early 2020. The fiscal stance tightened in FY2024, with the overall deficit declining from 7.2 percent of GDP in FY2023 (August-July) to 3.5 percent of GDP in FY2024, compared to a budgeted deficit of 4.8 percent of GDP.

    Executive Board Assessment

    In concluding the 2025 Article IV consultation with Fiji, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    The economy has been recovering from the pandemic but is facing new setbacks. Growth is expected to fall in 2025, to about 2.6 percent, mostly because of slowing external demand, and to take a couple of years to recover to its medium-term potential rate. The baseline projection implies that public debt would remain elevated. In addition, FX reserve coverage would fall, implying that the external position remains moderately weak. Growth would be higher with successful structural reforms, or should the external environment be more favorable than assumed. But the balance of risks appears to be mostly to the downside, both in the near term, if trade tensions were to worsen or their effects be more severe than assumed in the baseline, or over the medium term, mostly given vulnerabilities to natural disasters.

     

    Fiscal and monetary policies should focus on addressing macroeconomic imbalances.

    • Fiscal policy should focus on lowering public debt while continuing with growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, oriented toward capital spending. Significant progress has been achieved in recent years, but additional adjustment measures are needed to put public debt on a clear downward path. Targeted and temporary social protection measures should be used to protect the vulnerable. Fiscal tightening would also contribute to reducing external imbalances.
    • Over the medium term, given potential pressures on the exchange rate peg, monetary conditions should be gradually tightened, raising the policy rate and reducing excess liquidity.
    • Financial policy should be attentive to emerging credit risks and to safeguard against money laundering risks.
    • The authorities should avoid using exchange rate restrictions and CFMs in place of macroeconomic adjustment and focus on a gradual, sequenced capital account liberalization to support high long-run growth objectives.

    Raising potential growth calls for sustained structural reforms.

    • Progress has been achieved in enhancing the business environment and addressing near-term constraints to growth. Immediate concerns include addressing ageing infrastructure in electricity, water, and waste utilities, and improving the transport network and digital connectivity. Ongoing concerns include training and human capital. Successful measures would also encourage more foreign investment, ease external imbalances, and reduce “brain drain.”
    • As for other Pacific states, Fiji faces ongoing challenges from natural disasters and climate change. Increasing resilience adds to the motivation to shift away from current toward capital spending.

    Such issues require sustained political consensus and good governance. The government’s recognition of the importance of institutional reform, commitment to the rule of law, and reducing corruption and bribery is welcome. Recent legislative progress will need to be matched by proper enforcement and addressing capacity constraints in the civil service.

    Fiji: Selected Economic Indicators, 2022–30

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Est.

    Proj.

    Output and prices (percent change)

    Real GDP

    19.8

    7.5

    3.7

    2.6

    2.8

    3.2

    3.2

    3.2

    3.2

    GDP deflator

    2.4

    4.1

    6.3

    3.2

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    Consumer prices (average)

    4.3

    2.3

    4.5

    3.2

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    3.1

    5.1

    1.3

    3.1

    3.2

    3.3

    3.4

    3.5

    3.5

    Central government budget on fiscal-year basis (percent of GDP)

    Revenue and Grants

    21.4

    23.2

    27.4

    27.1

    27.1

    26.8

    26.8

    26.6

    26.5

    Expenditure

    33.5

    30.3

    31.0

    31.5

    31.2

    31.0

    31.0

    30.9

    30.9

    Overall balance

    -12.1

    -7.2

    -3.5

    -4.4

    -4.2

    -4.2

    -4.2

    -4.3

    -4.4

    Primary balance

    -8.5

    -3.3

    0.5

    -0.3

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.8

    Central government debt 

    90.4

    83.3

    79.5

    77.7

    77.7

    77.6

    77.3

    77.0

    76.8

    Central government external debt

    33.3

    30.6

    28.7

    26.5

    26.5

    26.4

    26.1

    25.8

    25.6

    External sector (percent of GDP)

    Current account balance

    -17.3

    -7.7

    -6.7

    -7.0

    -7.7

    -7.5

    -7.2

    -6.9

    -6.9

    Trade balance

    -32.9

    -32.7

    -30.0

    -29.1

    -27.7

    -27.3

    -27.3

    -26.9

    -26.4

    Services balance

    11.8

    20.4

    20.0

    19.9

    18.4

    17.8

    17.3

    17.1

    16.5

    Primary Income balance

    -5.3

    -5.7

    -6.4

    -6.8

    -6.6

    -6.4

    -6.0

    -5.9

    -5.9

    Secondary Income balance

    9.2

    10.3

    9.6

    9.0

    8.2

    8.5

    8.8

    8.9

    9.0

    Capital account balance

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    Financial account balance (-= inflows)

    -14.0

    -4.9

    -6.6

    -4.1

    -5.3

    -5.7

    -6.9

    -6.5

    -6.5

    FDI

    -1.8

    -1.1

    -1.6

    -4.5

    -5.4

    -6.1

    -7.3

    -7.1

    -7.2

    Portfolio investment

    0.5

    1.0

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

    Other investment

    -12.7

    -4.8

    -6.7

    -1.3

    -1.5

    -1.3

    -1.3

    -1.1

    -1.0

    Errors and omissions

    5.1

    4.2

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Change in reserve assets (-=increase)

    -2.1

    0.3

    0.1

    2.9

    2.3

    1.7

    0.3

    0.3

    0.4

    Gross official reserves (in months of prospective imports)

    5.5

    5.3

    5.2

    4.4

    3.7

    3.1

    2.9

    2.6

    …

    Money and credit (percent change)

    Net domestic assets of depository corporations

    4.9

    12.1

    8.0

    6.4

    6.1

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Claims on private sector

    6.7

    7.5

    11.4

    10.0

    8.0

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Broad money (M3)

    5.1

    9.1

    6.6

    4.1

    4.1

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Monetary base

    15.8

    -4.0

    7.5

    3.6

    1.4

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Central Bank Policy rate (end of period)

    0.25

    0.25

    0.25

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Commercial banks deposits rate (end of period)

    0.4

    0.4

    0.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Commercial banks lending rate (end of period)

    5.2

    4.8

    4.6

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Memorandum items

    Exchange rate, average (FJD/USD)

    2.2

    2.3

    2.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    Real effective exchange rate, average

    108.2

    106.4

    108.3

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    …

    GDP at current market prices (in millions of Fiji dollars)

    10,940

    12,245

    13,494

    14,286

    15,148

    16,130

    17,193

    18,342

    19,594

    GDP at current market prices (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    4,970

    5,442

    5,949

    6,257

    6,564

    6,913

    7,284

    7,674

    8,089

    GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

    5,450

    5,933

    6,447

    6,740

    7,030

    7,359

    7,707

    8,072

    8,508

    Sources: Reserve Bank of Fiji; Ministry of Finance; and IMF Staff Estimates and Projections.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/20/pr-25208-fiji-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Riverside County Woman Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Running $1.7 Million COVID-19 Benefits Fraud She Advertised on Instagram

    Source: United States Small Business Administration

    Click Here to Sign Up for SBA OIG Email Updates on Recent Investigative Cases, Audit Oversight Reports, and General News

    Click Here to View the Original U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release


    An Inland Empire woman was sentenced today to 84 months in federal prison for fraudulently obtaining $1.7 million in COVID-19 pandemic-related jobless benefits, federally-guaranteed small business loans, California Small Business COVID-19 relief grants, and Los Angeles County economic opportunity grants.

    Jasmine Unique Mallard-McCarter, 30, a.k.a. “JassyMC,” of Eastvale, was sentenced by United States District Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, who also ordered her to pay $1,765,407 in restitution.

    McCarter pleaded guilty on February 28 to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

    McCarter impersonated others to apply online for government benefits that she used for herself. McCarter also used the personal identifying information provided by her co-conspirators to apply for government benefits on their behalf, knowing those co-conspirators were not eligible for those benefits.

    McCarter charged fees to instruct others how to apply for government benefits for which they were not eligible without getting caught. Also, for a fee, McCarter served as a broker for counterfeit documents, such as Social Security cards, driver’s licenses, IRS Forms 1040, W-2s, bank statements, education degrees and transcripts, pay stubs, and doctors’ notes for handicapped placards. In some instances, the McCarter and her co-conspirators used the counterfeit documents to trick the government into paying unjustified benefits.

    McCarter advertised her fraud services on Instragram, using handles “JassyMc” and “EliteRealEstateandBusiness.” McCarter referred to herself as the “Jass of All Trades” in social media posts, because she could file fraudulent unemployment insurance applications, file grant applications, and broker counterfeit documents and identification in return for a fee.

    According to McCarter’s Instagram posts, she charged a fee for introducing customers to her connection at the California Department of Motor Vehicles, who could help bypass requirements for smog checks, insurance, and registration.

    The U.S. Department of Labor – Office of Inspector General, Employee Development Department Investigations Division, U.S. Small Business Administration – Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security – Office of Inspector General, FBI, Homeland Security Investigations, and United States Secret Service investigated this matter.

    Assistant United States Attorney Andrew Brown of the Major Frauds Section prosecuted this case.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolster efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

    On September 15, 2022, the Attorney General selected the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Central and Eastern Districts of California to jointly head one of the three national COVID-19 Fraud Strike Force Teams. The Department of Justice established the Strike Force to enhance existing efforts to combat and prevent COVID-19 related financial fraud. The Strike Force combines law enforcement and prosecutorial resources and focuses on large-scale, multistate pandemic relief fraud perpetrated by criminal organizations and transnational actors, as well as those who committed instances of pandemic relief fraud. The Strike Force uses prosecutor-led and data analyst-driven teams to identify and bring to justice those who stole pandemic relief funds. Additional information regarding the Strike Force may be found at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-covid-19-fraud-strike-force-teams.

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at (866) 720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Impact of the ‘Big Ugly Bill’ on Food Security

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today sounded the alarm on how the Republican budget reconciliation bill will affect the nation’s largest food assistance program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), undermining a program that millions of New Yorkers rely on to put food on the table every single day. Estimates indicate the reconciliation bill would shift exorbitant costs to states across the country, including New York, where up to an additional $2.1 billion annually would be forced on State and local county governments.

    “Every New Yorker deserves to eat every day – plain and simple.” Governor Hochul said. “I’m calling on our congressional leaders to join me and step up to the plate to protect the SNAP funding that families with children, seniors, New Yorkers with disabilities, local farmers, and shop owners rely on to survive.”

    The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a federally funded program overseen by the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and administered by local departments of social services. In New York, SNAP helps over 1.7 million households and 2.9 million recipients – most of whom are children, older adults or disabled – afford the cost of purchasing healthy, nutritious food. SNAP benefits are already relatively modest, with an average benefit of $7 per day, but this support is a vital lifeline for households. Over 14 percent of New York’s population, or 1 out of every 7 New Yorkers, relies on SNAP. As a result, SNAP is New York’s most effective tool in combating hunger and food insecurity, which are core priorities of Governor Hochul’s administration.

    In addition to supporting individuals and families and fighting hunger, SNAP also provides vital support to local economies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) own research has shown that investments in SNAP have significant multiplier effects, with every SNAP dollar generating $1.54 in economic activity as recipients spend their benefits in communities, including at grocery stores, farmers markets, small businesses, and more. A total of approximately $7.8 billion in SNAP benefits are issued annually in New York, which means $12 billion in economic activity is generated annually across the state, in urban, suburban, and rural areas alike.

    New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance Commissioner, and Child Poverty Reduction Advisory Council (CPRAC) Co-Chair Barbara C. Guinn said, “The cuts and policy changes proposed by Congress to SNAP would weaken the program and make it harder for low-income families in New York to afford groceries, worsening food insecurity and economic hardship in communities across our state. These proposals pose a grave threat to an effective and efficient program, which research consistently and clearly shows reduces hunger, supports work, and stimulates the economy – goals with national importance that justify continued federal investment. We encourage congressional leaders to act responsibly and not walk away from what has long been a federal commitment to fully funding SNAP benefits for all who are eligible.

    New York State Office of Children and Family Services Commissioner, and CPRAC Member Dr. DaMia Harris-Madden said, “The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is one of the most powerful tools we have to address chronic hunger across New York State, where more than one in seven New Yorkers is facing food insecurity. The proposed federal cuts to this program are unfathomable – that children and families will lack basic needs such as food will have catastrophic implications. Governor Hochul has championed the overall health, well being and economic security through multiple investments; yet, she cannot do this alone. We implore our Congressional leaders to oppose these cuts and preserve the funding that is vital to enabling the most vulnerable members of our community to keep food on the table.”

    By The Numbers: Shifting Exorbitant Costs onto States and Local Governments

    The proposals in the Republican reconciliation bill, supported by all of New York’s Republican Congressional delegation, threaten an effective and efficient program, which research consistently and clearly shows reduces hunger, supports work and stimulates the economy, by imposing exorbitant, unsustainable costs on states:

    • The federal government has always funded 100 percent of SNAP benefits. For the first time in the history of the program, under the GOP bill, the federal government is walking away from that commitment by shifting significant portions of the cost onto states, forcing difficult state budgetary decisions. For New York State, Republicans would shift between 15 percent and 25 percent of the benefit cost, totaling up to $1.9 billion annually in additional costs for the State and local governments.
    • The federal government and states have historically evenly split the administrative costs of the program. For the first time in the history of the program, under the GOP’s reconciliation bill, the federal government would require states to contribute significantly more for administrative costs, increasing the state share to 75 percent. For New York State, more than $200 million in additional administrative costs would be shifted annually on to the State and local governments.
    • The GOP bill also eliminates funding for SNAP education programs that teach recipients how to get the greatest fiscal and nutritional value from their SNAP benefits. This would strip roughly $29 million from New York State and our SNAP recipients.
    • In total, the SNAP-related cost shifts put forward by the GOP will cost New York State and local county governments up to $2.1 billion a year, which cannot be absorbed at the state or local level and would cause significant state and local budgetary impacts.

    By The Numbers: Changes to SNAP Work Requirements:

    Beyond the proposed cost shifts, Republicans also target SNAP recipients by significantly expanding the populations who are subject to overly punitive and administratively complex work reporting requirements without any additional support to those recipients:

    • Certain recipients would be required to prove that they work 80 hours per month, with limited qualifying work options and regardless of other factors such as economic conditions. Recipients who are unable to meet this requirement after three months, regardless of the circumstances or reasons why, would then be cut off and prohibited from receiving SNAP for three years.
    • Republicans would extend these reporting requirements, harsher time limits, and related prohibitions to more groups, including to families with children as young as seven and to individuals as old as 64. The bill provides no additional funding to support states in assisting these new populations to connect to jobs or training or to provide necessary supportive services such as child care and transportation.
    • State flexibility to administer the program would be severely curtailed by limiting states’ ability to request waivers for areas with high unemployment, where residents may be having difficulty finding work due to broader economic factors
    • These requirements create barriers for people with unstable jobs, caregiving responsibilities, or health conditions. Enforcing these rules adds complexity, increases the risk of errors, and takes needed resources that would be better used to support beneficiaries and administer the program. In fact, research published on the USDA’s own website shows that increased work requirements reduced SNAP enrollment for those subject to the time limit and found no evidence that they increase employment or annual earnings.

    It is estimated that over 300,000 households, including families with children, seniors, youth aging out of foster care, people experiencing homelessness, people with disabilities, and veterans would be impacted by these changes, losing all or a portion of their SNAP benefits, resulting in a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in SNAP benefits for some of our most vulnerable New Yorkers on an annual basis.

    By The Numbers: Impact on New York Farmers and Retailers:

    Beyond worsening food insecurity and malnutrition, cuts to the program would hurt local businesses and weaken SNAP’s ability to boost local economies in every state. Slashing families’ grocery budgets would reduce revenue for thousands of businesses in every state, with ripple effects throughout the food supply chain.

    • Cascading impact leading to job losses, small business closures, and lost revenue for businesses across the state of all shapes and sizes, from independent grocers to chain retailers
    • Lost sales and matching dollars having critical impact on over 18,000 retailers that accept SNAP in New York State and local economies. This includes grocery stores, local shops, and hundreds of SNAP-authorized local farmers, farmers’ markets, and farm stands that can be found in every county in New York selling New York agricultural products to the people in their local community. SNAP sales in the farming community have dramatically increased since 2019, providing New York consumers access to healthy, farm fresh foods and providing our farm communities additional economic development dollars. As the State matches SNAP dollars spent at farm markets through the Fresh2You FreshConnect program, the hit to farms of decreased SNAP funding is doubled.

    Combating Food Insecurity in New York State

    Governor Hochul has prioritized increasing access to food for all New Yorkers, supporting several groundbreaking programs that focus on improving access to locally grown foods including through SFY 2026 Budget, including the 30 Percent NYS Initiative for school meals, the Farm-to School program, the Farmers’ Market Nutrition Programs, the Urban Farms and Community Gardens Grants Programs, and the Nourish NY program, which helps New York’s network of emergency food providers purchase food from New York farmers to give to families in need.

    This year’s Budget also provides $340 million for school meals, a $160 million (89 percent) year-to-year increase, and requires all school districts, charter schools, and nonpublic schools that participate in the national school lunch and breakfast program to provide free breakfast and lunch meals to all students regardless of their families’ income, thereby reducing costs for families and ensuring that no student goes hungry at school. Additionally, the Budget included the third round of funding as part of the Regional School Food Infrastructure Grant Program, which provides $50 million over five years to support regional cooking facilities that will facilitate the use of fresh New York State farm products in meal preparation for K-12 school children.

    Senator Charles Schumer said, “The Republican ‘Big Ugly Bill’ will be the largest and cruelest cuts to food assistance in American history – all to pay for tax cuts to billionaires and corporations. If this Congressional Republican plan goes through, it would deal New York State a $2 billion blow, taking food from hungry kids and seniors. Local governments would carry the burden in a way they’ve never had to before, forced to make impossible decisions about who gets to keep their food benefits and who will be forced to go hungry. The GOP must step up and protect over 300,000 New York families and seniors in danger of losing their food benefits instead of pushing through tax cuts for the rich and powerful special interests.”

    Representative Jerry Nadler said, “The Republican reconciliation bill is a direct attack on food security in New York. It would gut billions from SNAP and other essential lifelines, forcing states to either absorb the cost or leave families without the support they need. In my district alone, one in seven households relies on SNAP to put food on the table. Under this bill, the average benefit would fall to less than five dollars a day. No one can feed themselves with dignity on that. These cuts are not only cruel and shortsighted, they are economically reckless. When families have less to spend on food, the entire community feels the impact. From neighborhood bodegas to upstate farmers, over 18,000 New York retailers could face lost sales, job cuts, or closures. SNAP dollars support small businesses, strengthen local economies, and enable people to purchase fresh, healthy food in their communities. I am fighting to stop this bill from becoming law because in the United States of America, no one should ever go hungry, especially so that billionaires can receive another tax break.”

    Representative Adriano Espaillat said, “For nearly a century, America has extended a lifeline to its most vulnerable families to ensure no child goes hungry, no matter their race, religion, or economic background. Today, however, Republicans are seeking to break that sacred agreement by cutting food stamps and other benefits that nearly 300,000 families in my district and more than 1.6 million across New York rely on. Families receive SNAP assistance because they need it, not because they want it. Those who pretend otherwise threaten to bankrupt state and local governments, upend vulnerable communities, and set back the generations of progress we have made to strengthen food security around our nation.”

    Representative Nydia M. Velázquez said, “The Republicans’ Big Ugly Bill is a direct attack on the most vulnerable New Yorkers, including working families, children, people with disabilities, and seniors who rely on SNAP to put food on the table. This bill guts a program that nearly 3 million New Yorkers depend on and that drives billions in local economic activity, all to fund tax breaks for billionaires. It is a disaster for our state, and I will keep fighting to make sure it never becomes law.”

    Representative Paul Tonko said, “The GOP’s ‘big ugly bill’ is an outrageous assault on the most vulnerable in our communities. By slashing critical food assistance programs like SNAP, this legislation would rip away earned benefits from families, children, and seniors — leaving millions of Americans to go hungry while billionaires enjoy trillions in tax breaks. These cuts will not only deepen poverty and hardship across our state and our nation, they’ll also shift crushing costs onto state and local governments, forcing states and municipalities to choose between drastic tax hikes or devastating service cuts. In the coming weeks, I’ll be working tirelessly to defeat this cruel, backward agenda and protect the programs that keep our communities healthy and strong.”

    Representative Joe Morelle said, “President Trump’s plan to cut funding for essential programs like SNAP would leave millions of working families struggling to put food on the table. I’m proud to support legislation that protects SNAP and Medicaid and keeps these lifeline programs fully funded. While Congressional Republicans continue to back the President’s cruel and chaotic agenda, I’ll keep fighting to protect working families and the services they count on because no child should ever have to wonder where their next meal is coming from.”

    Representative Tom Suozzi said, “Every individual deserves access to a meal every day. This is not just a privilege; it is a fundamental necessity that must be recognized and advocated for to ensure the dignity and well-being of all. If federal cuts to SNAP are enacted, it will lead to a preventable crisis and constitute the most significant reduction in food assistance in history. Americans young and old will go hungry. Simply put, SNAP benefits help put food on the table for our most vulnerable communities.”

    Representative Pat Ryan said, “Hardworking Hudson Valley families are feeling the pressure to make ends meet – the last thing folks need is to have food literally taken off of their plates. In my district alone, more than 74,000 people – including children, seniors, and veterans – rely on SNAP for consistent access to nutritious foods. It is unconscionable and cruel for this administration to rip that away. I’m going to keep fighting with everything I’ve got to stop these cuts – the lives of my constituents depend on it.”

    Representative George Latimer said, “The reckless Republican reconciliation bill, which lays out hundreds of billions of dollars in cuts to SNAP, is unacceptable. I voted against these cuts each time that they came to the House floor because of the devastating impact they would have on vulnerable New Yorkers who rely on SNAP for their survival. In NY-16, covering parts of Westchester and the Bronx, we have 74,000 people who depend on SNAP. While the GOP focuses on securing tax cuts for the wealthy at the expense of struggling Americans, my Democratic colleagues and I will continue to stand in opposition to these actions and do everything we can to address food insecurity for the millions of Americans who count on SNAP benefits to put food on the table, as every American deserves to be able to do.”

    Representative Timothy M. Kennedy said, “In communities across Western New York, we continue to see an increased need for food assistance as families struggle to make ends meet and inflation raises grocery prices. Food is a basic human right, and we have the tools to eradicate hunger in America. The absolute last thing we should be doing to families that are teetering on the edge is to rip the rug out from under them by cutting SNAP benefits. The Republican reconciliation bill is an affront to working families and must be rejected.”

    Representative John W. Mannion said, “I voted against this bill because it’s cruel and immoral to take food assistance away from children, seniors, and veterans. In NY-22, over 50,000 households rely on SNAP—and food insecurity is higher today than it was during the pandemic. This bill threatens our families, burdens our local governments, and pulls support from the people who need it most. I’ll continue to reject these devastating cuts and advocate for the better path forward – a five-year farm bill that supports farmers and everyone who depends on American agriculture.”

    Representative Josh Riley said, “I grew up believing every kid deserves a full belly and a fair shot — that’s not negotiable. This bill would rip food away from families in need and gut the small-town stores and farms that feed our communities. I’ll fight it with everything I’ve got, because nobody in Upstate New York should ever go hungry while billionaires get another tax break.”

    Acting Co-Chair of CPRAC Peter Hatch said, “SNAP helps feed our families, fund our grocery stores, and support our farmers, with decades of research showing how it improves children’s long-term health, reduces poverty, and boosts local economies as recipients spend their benefits. The Republican budget bill would increase hunger and poverty among children, reduce economic activity in communities, and force immense costs onto states and counties that we cannot afford, just as New York is making progress reducing child poverty. On behalf of New York’s CPRAC, we strongly oppose any action that would take SNAP away from the millions of children across the country who rely on it, and urge the Senate to protect this essential program, so that children can continue to receive the sustenance they need to thrive.”

    New York State Council on Children and Families Executive Director, and CPRAC Member Vanessa Threatte said, “When children and families experience hunger, it has severe and sweeping negative consequences on their physical and mental health, cognitive development, academic outcomes, family functioning, and overall well-being. By recognizing the intersectionality of food insecurity, and ensuring continued access to critical food programs, such as SNAP, all New York children and families can live their healthiest lives and communities can thrive.”

    Robin Hood CEO and CPRAC Member Rich Buery said, “Cutting SNAP is not just a moral failure—it’s an economic disaster that would set us back in the fight against child poverty. The data is clear: for every dollar we take away from families trying to put food on the table, we lose up to twenty dollars in future health, education, and economic productivity nationwide, according to an analysis by Columbia University. These cuts would harm our children, burden our healthcare and legal systems, and stall the progress we’ve made. We’ve come too far to pull the rug out from under children and families of New York State. Their well-being is the foundation of our shared future.”

    United Way of New York City President and CEO, and CPRAC Member Grace Bonilla said, “Funding for SNAP is a critical part of how New Yorkers maintain dignified access to nutritious food. We know from United Way of New York City’s True Cost of Living Report that 50 percent of working-age people in New York City are struggling to cover their basic needs—including food. SNAP represents the promise that despite having wages that do not keep up with the cost of living, our country cares and invests in our seniors, our children, and all vulnerable Americans so that they should not have to go hungry in the richest country in the world. The reconciliation bill is a dagger on that promise and on the precarious budgets of our most vulnerable and the budgets of cities and states across the country. It is the responsibility of every congressional leader to do what is in the best interest of the people they serve — safeguard funding for SNAP.”

    Regional Economic Development Council Mohawk Valley Executive Director and CPRAC Member Shelly Callahan said, “SNAP is not just a lifeline — it’s a foundation for long-term stability, public health, and economic mobility. Cuts to SNAP would not only harm vulnerable families, but they would also undermine local economies, like that of the Mohawk Valley, that depend on a healthy, stable population. We can’t build a stronger New York by taking food off the tables of those working hardest to achieve self-sufficiency. At our refugee center, we witness every day the resilience of families rebuilding their lives after fleeing unimaginable hardship. SNAP is not just a safety net — it’s a bridge to stability, health and dignity.”

    Guthrie Lourdes Hospital President and CEO, and CPRAC Member Kathy Connerton said, “SNAP is more than a budget line item. It’s a vital safety net that upholds the fundamental human right to nutritious food. When we protect SNAP funding, we affirm that every New Yorker deserves the dignity and security of knowing where their next meal will come from. This essential program forms the bedrock of daily life for our children, seniors and residents with disabilities ensuring they can not only survive but thrive. Compromising SNAP puts our most vulnerable neighbors in crisis and undermines the collective well-being of our entire community.”

    New York City Human Resources Administration Administrator and CPRAC Member Scott French said, “SNAP serves as a lifeline for 1.8 million New York City residents and fuels economic growth across our local communities. We absolutely cannot afford the magnitude of cuts being proposed in the budget reconciliation bill. We urge leaders in Congress to recognize what’s at stake for working class New Yorkers who keep the city running, vulnerable seniors and children who rely on this critical anti-hunger program to survive, and local farmers and businesses that benefit from SNAP spending. As part of our mandate to strengthen pathways to economic mobility for low-income New Yorkers, we will continue to sound the alarm to ensure that no child goes hungry, and families aren’t forced to choose between putting food on the table or paying the rent.”

    Community Action Organization of Western New York President and CEO, and CPRAC Member Dr. Marie Cannon said, “At the Community Action Organization of Western New York, we see firsthand how vital SNAP is for families striving toward self-sufficiency. These proposed federal cuts would not only strip essential food resources from our most vulnerable neighbors—they would undercut the very progress we’ve made in fighting multigenerational poverty. We urge our federal leaders to reject these changes and protect the safety net that gives hope and dignity to millions of Americans.”

    No Kid Hungry New York Director Rachel Sabella said, “With food prices continuing to climb and New Yorkers’ incomes not keeping pace, SNAP remains one of our most powerful tools to fight hunger and keep kids nourished and healthy. Meanwhile, budget proposals from both the U.S. House and Senate would unnecessarily hurt working families and states trying to administer SNAP while needlessly punishing retailers and farmers in New York and across the country, pushing fragile local economies to their limits. In a recent poll of New Yorkers, 91% told No Kid Hungry that ending childhood hunger should be a bipartisan goal. We need the entire New York congressional delegation to reject these proposed cuts to SNAP and protect programs that are proven to reduce hunger, support families, and strengthen local economies.”

    Schuyler Center for Analysis and Advocacy President and CEO, and CPRAC Member Kate Breslin said, “New York State is working to create a future where every child has what they need to thrive. By erecting barriers to food access, Congress is making it harder for families who are struggling to eat every day and limiting opportunities to thrive. Our federal leaders must preserve food security for our children and families – without additional barriers or cuts that hurt families and create problems for states and local communities.”

    The Children’s Agenda CEO Larry Marx said, “More than 360,000 children in the state of New York are fed in families relying on SNAP and the proposed cuts in the federal reconciliation will compromise their access to food. SNAP is a lifeline for children whose families are experiencing financial hardships. Hunger has devastating impacts on a child’s health, learning, and well-being. Nourishing our most vulnerable and precious population, our children, should not be a partisan issue. Congress should reject the proposals to cut SNAP.”

    Food Industry Alliance of New York State President and CEO Mike Durant said, “Reducing SNAP dollars in New York will not only threaten this essential program, but also have a cascading impact leading to job losses, decreased revenue, and further strain on state and local services. The retail food industry encourages lawmakers in Congress to work toward a solution which preserves SNAP without negatively impacting our communities and economy.”

    Farmers Market Federation of New York Executive Director Jack Riffle said, “SNAP plays a critical role in supporting food security for New Yorkers and an increasingly larger role for New York State farms, farmers’ markets, and local economies. With the help of New York’s generous SNAP incentive program, FreshConnect, SNAP benefit purchases now exceed $10 million annually at authorized farmers’ markets around the state. As an organization representing New York farmers’ markets and farmers, our federation urges NY lawmakers to consider the value of funding SNAP for NY farm vendors, NY customers, and NY communities.”

    Westchester Children’s Association Executive Director and CPRAC Member Allison Lake said, “Feeding all our children should be a baseline for our country. SNAP ensures some of our most vulnerable families can put food on the table. The proposed cuts and administrative burdens by the reconciliation bill will directly impact the health and wellbeing of children. The growing need is everywhere, in one of the wealthiest counties in the country, Westchester County, NY, our latest data publication shows the Child Feeding program provides 80,000 meals on average to children per month. Congress can and should do better by the hardworking families of Westchester County, New York State, and the nation.”

    Context Matters Strategy Group Partner and CPRAC Member Dr. Dia N. Bryant said, “Cuts to SNAP aren’t just budget decisions—they are moral decisions. When we reduce access to food assistance, we’re signaling that some families, some children, are less deserving of dignity and nourishment. In New York, where disparities already run deep, these changes will push more families into crisis and more children into classrooms hungry. We cannot build a just and thriving state by taking from those who have the least.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: The challenges of vaccine production in Africa

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Thursday, 19 June 2025

    World Health Organization (WHO)

    by Cosimo GrazianiAbuja (Agenzia Fides) – In recent weeks, a Lassa fever vaccine developed by local researchers in Nigeria has shown initial signs of effectiveness in combating the disease, which recorded 747 new cases and 142 deaths in the African country in the first half of 2025. This was announced by Simeon Agwale, CEO of the Nigerian pharmaceutical company Innovative Biotech. The vaccine was developed under license from the University of Melbourne, and test doses were produced in the United States until the necessary infrastructure is established in Nigeria.For the African giant, the possibility of developing and producing this vaccine locally represents a significant achievement for the country, especially considering that the mortality rate has increased compared to 2024. This progress reflects a positive trend regarding the development of vaccines across the continent.Several African countries are striving to increase domestic vaccine production, a priority that has gained importance since the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) initiative was launched, aiming to produce 60 percent of Africa’s vaccine needs by 2040 (currently just 1 percent).The challenge of vaccine manufacturing is also related to the planning and development phase.According to the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the African Union department that deals with disease prevention and control, in 2024 there were 25 vaccine projects across the continent: 15 in early stages of development, five with production capacity but no transfer capacity, and five with both production and transfer capacity. These figures are positive and are underpinned by the fact that there are at least a dozen active pharmaceutical companies across the continent in countries such as Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, South Africa, and Algeria. All of these aspects contribute to strengthening the vaccine ecosystem, which has already borne fruit in the past, such as the Ebola vaccine developed after the 2013 outbreak in West Africa.Three major agreements to strengthen vaccine production capacity in Africa were recently announced, one signed in December 2024 and two in February of this year. The first involved the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the African Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). It provided $45 million to VaxSen, a subsidiary of the Dakar-based Pasteur Institute in Senegal, a country also very active in vaccine research. The agreement was intended to strengthen production capacity, support the local supply chain, and create a strong vaccine distribution network, as envisioned in the African Union’s 2040 Strategy, of which PAVM is a part. In addition to its impact on healthcare, the agreement should also have an impact on the creation of skilled jobs, as the Pasteur Institute’s facilities are being expanded. The question arises whether this project will also be scaled back or even canceled following the Trump administration’s cuts in international cooperation in recent months.The first of the agreements signed in February concerns a $1.2 billion investment by Gavi-the Vaccine Alliance, a public-private partnership that supports vaccination projects worldwide, particularly for children. According to this agreement, the funds will be used to establish an RNA vaccine production platform in Africa, involving both private African companies such as the Egyptian company EVA Pharma and foreign companies such as the French company DNA Script and the Belgian companies Unizima and Quantoom Biosciences. A second agreement signed in February, however, is a purely African collaboration: Egyptian Biogeneric Pharma and South African Afrigen will expand the development of RNA vaccines to also strengthen continental expertise in manufacturing and application to combat diseases plaguing the continent.These initiatives were listed in the report published by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) in February this year. The Oslo-based foundation pointed out that among the issues that need to be resolved to develop a self-sufficient vaccine industry in Africa are problems with access to finance, production restrictions, tariffs, and customs duties and uncertain demand. The problem of the vaccine market in Africa has a major impact on the decisions of various vaccine companies around the world, also taking into account the fact that Africa’s population, especially its young population, will continue to grow strongly in the coming years. (Agenzia Fides, 19/6/2025)
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – BUDG-CONT – ECA Review: Lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF – 25.06 – Committee on Budgets

    Source: European Parliament

    © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 25 June 2025 the ECA Review 02/2025: “Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF” will be presented to Members of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee of Budgetary Control (CONT) by reporting ECA Members Jorg Kristijan Petrovic and Ivana Maletic.

    The RRF suffers from several weaknesses in terms of performance, accountability and transparency, the ECA observes in its review. Although the RRF has played a crucial role in the EU’s post-pandemic recovery, the ECA criticises that information on results is scarce, and there is no information on actual costs. As a result, it was not clear what citizens actually get for their money. The Court calls on EU policy makers to draw lessons from this when mulling future budgets based on performance rather than costs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Mobile messaging apps removed from government devices

    Source: Scottish Government

    Updated policy published.

    Mobile messaging apps, including WhatsApp, are being removed from Scottish Government devices as a new policy comes into effect.

    Deputy First Minister Kate Forbes committed to updating the government’s mobile messaging app policy following the publication of an externally-led review by former Channel Islands data protection commissioner Emma Martins in December 2024.

    The policy applies to all Scottish Government employees including contractors, senior civil servants, special advisers and Ministers, and states that mobile messaging apps and non-corporate communication channels will not be permitted on government devices.

    A small number of business areas will take part in a time-bound and limited transition period until the end of 2025. This includes areas responding to emergencies such as wildfires or for matters of safety and security.

    Ms Forbes said:

    “We are setting out a clear approach to ending government use of mobile messaging apps, and this will support wider work to deliver on our commitment to openness and transparency.

    “The use of mobile messaging apps increased during the pandemic as staff worked remotely in unprecedented and difficult circumstances. Having reflected on our working practices, we are now implementing changes to the use of such apps.

    “This follows on from actions to implement other recommendations from Ms Martins’ externally-led review including updating our hybrid working policy.

    “I want to reassure the public that it is a priority of this government to maintain secure and searchable data, ensuring compliance with all records management rules. We will continue to act to ensure our data policies are robust, especially considering technological advances.”

    Background

    The new policy comes into effect from Friday 20 June.

    Mobile messaging apps – usage and policy: guidance – gov.scot

    Written question and answer: S6W-38872 | Scottish Parliament Website

    Externally-led review into mobile messaging apps and non-corporate devices

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Disability Equality Plan published

    Source: Scottish Government

    £2.5 million investment to drive change across Scotland.

    A Disability Equality Plan launched today, backed by £2.5 million investment, will improve the lives of disabled people across Scotland and put their experiences and concerns at the heart of policymaking.

    The funding, an increase of £2 million, recognises the significant challenges and barriers disabled people continue to face.

    The plan reflects a government-wide commitment to ensure that the voices and experiences of disabled people are considered from the beginning.

    Key actions include:

    • improved mental health support tailored to disabled people
    • expanded access to advice and support services
    • training for policymakers and leaders to build understanding of the issues facing disabled people
    • an annual Cabinet Takeover, giving disabled people a direct platform to speak to Ministers

    Equalities Minister Kaukab Stewart said:

    “Disabled people are facing unprecedented hardship, deepening poverty and increasing social isolation. Years of austerity, the cost of living crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic have not helped and services need to be equipped to respond to these challenges. 

    “I am firmly opposed to the UK Government’s proposed reforms to social security and deeply concerned about the effects they will have on disabled people, people with long-term health conditions and unpaid carers. The UK Government’s own analysis estimates these will push a further 250,000 people across the UK, including 50,000 children, into poverty.

    “We will not mirror these changes. We are committed to safeguarding our Adult Disability Payment and upholding the dignity and rights of disabled people. Our approach is rooted in dignity, fairness and respect – not austerity- and the UK Government should follow our lead and protect the social security safety system, rather than dismantling it.

    “Scotland is showing that a better way is possible. The increased funding for the plan I am announcing today will build on our human rights-based approach to strengthen vital support and services for disabled people.

    “I want to thank all the organisations that have worked tirelessly to help shape this plan. Their insight and leadership have laid the foundation for lasting change.  We are committed to working with disabled people and their organisations, upholding the principle of ‘nothing about us, without us’. I am confident that Scotland can become a country where disabled people truly thrive.”

    Chief Executive Officer of Glasgow Disability Alliance Tressa Burke said:

    “This funding from the Scottish Government is a win for the collective action of disabled people and our allies. We are grateful to everyone who took part in our campaign Disabled People Demand Justice and commend the Scottish Government for responding positively. But it is a small step, when we need big leaps; poverty and inequality experienced by disabled people remain at unacceptable levels, and we need both the Scottish Government and the UK Government to urgently invest in disabled peoples’ lives to deliver dignity and justice.”

    Chief Executive Officer of Inclusion Scotland Heather Fisken said:

    “This plan and related actions are a welcome step forward, but these will only be successful if it is properly resourced and if it there is accountability of delivery. We want this accountability to be led by disabled peoples’ organisations and disabled people themselves – genuine partnership between our organisations and the Scottish Government requires honesty and scrutiny, and that will be our focus going forward.”

    Chief Executive Officer of Disability Equality Scotland Lyn Pornaro said:

    “This shows the power of disabled peoples’ campaigning, and is a step in the right direction, but our campaigning work to deliver justice for disabled people will continue. This includes making sure that both the Scottish Government and the UK Government deliver dignity, security, and human rights for disabled people – that requires investing in our communities and including services- not cutting the support we rely on.”

    Background

    Disability Equality Plan – gov.scot

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Clarification on the Commission’s position regarding the COVID-19 lab leak theory – E-001403/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has not been informed by any national or European authority about intelligence indicating that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory.

    The Commission closely monitors scientific studies on the origin of SARS-CoV-2 and supports the research of the World Health Organisation (WHO)[1].

    The WHO’s Global Study on the origins of SARS-CoV-2 suggests three possible zoonotic pathways for the introduction of the virus and concludes that the introduction through a laboratory incident is extremely unlikely[2]. Furthermore, a 2023 scientific critical review concluded that the strongest evidence supports a zoonotic over a laboratory origin[3].

    The Commission supported research on infectious diseases via its framework programmes for Research and Innovation[4]. Prior to the pandemic, the Commission provided financial support to institutions engaged in high-risk virological research including Wuhan Institute of Virology via two EU-funded projects[5].

    The Commission ensures transparency, traceability and safety in EU-funded research[6], including gain-of-function and dual use research.

    The Commission implements ethics assessments and promotes transparency through open-access publication of research results. Security checks are conducted as part of the ethics and security scrutiny process[7], with clearance required from the Security Scrutiny Group[8] before funding is granted.

    In addition, project monitoring is ensured until the end of a project to check its proper implementation and compliance with the obligations laid down in the grant agreement.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-who-led-covid-19-origins-study_en.
    • [2] https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/origins-of-the-virus, WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part Joint WHO-China Study, page 9.
    • [3] Alwine JC, Casadevall A, Enquist LW, Goodrum FD, Imperiale MJ. A Critical Analysis of the Evidence for the SARS-CoV-2 Origin Hypotheses. mBio. 2023 Apr 25;14(2):e0058323. doi: 10.1128/mbio.00583-23. Epub 2023 Mar 28. PMID: 36897098; PMCID: PMC10127682.
    • [4] I ncluding https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/id/FP6, https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/id/FP7, https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en and https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/horizon-europe_en.
    • [5] Grant agreements: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/653316; https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/871029.
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/projects-results.
    • [7] https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/funding-tenders-opportunities/display/OM/Special+procedures%3A+Ethics+review%2C+security+scrutiny%2C+Ownership+control+check.
    • [8] Composed of national security experts nominated in agreement with their national security authorities.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Uneven HPV uptake in some areas increases cervical cancer risk

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Uneven HPV uptake in some areas increases cervical cancer risk

    UKHSA data shows inequalities in HPV vaccination uptake in different areas and regions across the country

    As Cervical Cancer Screening Awareness week begins, the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) warns that variations in geographical coverage of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine in adolescents across England is leaving young women in some areas with less protection against cervical and some other cancers.

    Despite the opportunities to eliminate cervical cancer, the latest UKHSA HPV coverage data in adolescents 2023 to 2024 shows inequalities in vaccination uptake in different areas and regions across the country:

    • HPV coverage for female year 10 students by NHS commissioning region was lowest in London (64.9%) and highest in the South East (82.7%)
    • HPV coverage for male year 10 students by NHS commissioning region was lowest in London (58.9%) and highest in the South East (77.3%)
    • HPV coverage for female year 10 students at local authority level ranged from 38.7% (Lambeth) to 97.6% (Northumberland)
    • HPV coverage for male year 10 students at local authority level ranged from 28.2% (Lambeth) to 92.2% (West Berkshire)

    Data provided by Cancer Research UK on Cervical cancer incidence statistics report that rates in England are 65% higher in the most deprived quintile compared with the least.

    Research has shown that receiving the HPV vaccine before age 16 provides significantly stronger immune responses and greater protection against HPV-related cancers. While early vaccination is optimal, getting a HPV vaccination later as part of the catch-up programme still provides strong protection against HPV-related cancers.

    For those who missed their school HPV vaccinations in year 8 and 9, catch-up options remain available and are highly effective. Anyone who missed their HPV vaccination, now just a single jab, can still receive it for free until their 25th birthday through their GP surgery; this also applies to boys born after 1 September 2006.

    HPV vaccinations are also offered to boys in school in year 8 and 9, and similarly help protect them against HPV infection and its complications, including genital warts, head and neck cancers (which includes mouth and throat) and genital cancers. But boys also have an important role to play in helping eliminate cervical cancer by being vaccinated and not passing on the HPV virus when they become sexually active.

    Dr Sharif Ismail, Consultant Epidemiologist at UKHSA, said:

    The HPV vaccine, now just a single dose offered in schools, is one of the most powerful tools we have for cancer prevention. Every vaccination represents a young person with better protection against the devastating impact of HPV-related cancers and we must do more to ensure that no teenage girl or boy, young woman or man is denied that protection no matter where they live.

    Although we have seen some increase in the number of young people being vaccinated, uptake is still well below pre-Covid pandemic levels. Over a quarter of young people, many thousands, are missing out on this potentially life-saving vaccine, which protects not only against cervical cancer but all young adults, men and women, against genital warts and some genital cancers, as well as mouth and throat cancers.

    We’re calling on all parents to return their children’s HPV vaccination consent forms promptly. This simple action could protect your child from developing cancer in the future. For young adults up to age 25, who missed their school vaccinations, please speak to your GP about catch-up options. It’s never too late to get protected. 

    And it’s important to stress that even if you’ve had the HPV vaccine, it’s vital you still attend your cervical screening appointments when invited. Both vaccination and screening together give you your best chance of protection against cervical cancer.

    While the HPV vaccine provides excellent protection, attending cervical screening appointments remains crucial, regardless of vaccination status. Screening can detect abnormal cells before they develop into cancer, allowing for early treatment and prevention.

    Cancer Research UK’s chief executive, Michelle Mitchell, said:

    Thanks to the power of research and the efforts of NHS staff, a future where almost nobody gets cervical cancer is in sight. This progress hinges on people’s access to 2 lifesaving offers: HPV vaccination and screening. Together, they give the best protection against the disease.

    Latest data reveals an unequal uptake of the HPV vaccine across England, highlighting the need for local authorities and health services to work together and improve access to these lifesaving opportunities. Beating cervical cancer means beating it for everyone, so I encourage all parents and guardians to ensure young people don’t miss out on getting the HPV vaccine. And if you receive your cervical screening invite, don’t ignore it.

    Dr Amanda Doyle OBE, National Director for Primary Care and Community Services at NHS England, said: 

    The NHS HPV vaccination programme has already helped save thousands of lives and we need to go further to boost uptake of HPV vaccines and cervical screening to help eliminate cervical cancer in England by 2040.

    If we can ensure that almost every Year 10 girl in some areas is protected and extremely unlikely to ever develop cervical cancer, we need to match this in every part of the country. It’s vital for boys and young men to be vaccinated too. Rates in boys still lag behind girls and HPV causes thousands of cancers in men as well as things like genital warts. 

    I would urge all parents to give their consent for their child to be vaccinated and it’s important to remember that those that remain unvaccinated and have left school can still get vital protection by contacting their GP practice to catch up before their 25th birthday. With vaccination being just one dose, it is easier than ever to ensure young people get protection.

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    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 20, 2025
  • Resilient and rising: India in global economic big league

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    If we compare growth projections with actual data, Indian economy looks all set to achieve milestones well ahead of schedule. The journey to become the world’s fourth-largest economy, to graduate to third-largest and, ultimately, to attain developed-nation status now appears firmly on track for the coming years.

    The projections-versus-reality data confirm the resilience of its economy, putting it on the growth track, be it swift recovery after the COVID-19 crisis and its global after-effects or other global conflict points. The resilience gives Indian economy a positive push needed for the economic surge. India has emerged as the fastest-growing major economy, keeping inflation largely in check, even as the price pressure marker climbed worldwide and hit a 40-year high in the United States.

    The economic resilience that helps India endure negative outcomes – headwinds such as persistent trade frictions—including reciprocal tariff measures by the United States and global debate around it—and geopolitical shocks such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas conflict, and broader West Asian turbulence including the recently started Israel–Iran war.

    While these events are sending aftershocks through a global economy still battered by the pandemic, India’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals, strong infrastructure build-out, healthy financial sector and vast domestic market—underpinned by solid consumer demand, consistent policy, and an improving business climate—the underlying factors behind its resilience—have helped it weather the storm.

    While the global economy, on a whole, decelerates, India has managed to sustain a growth rate above 6 per cent year after year—an unparalleled feat for a major economy in the current gloomy economic scenario.

    Remains a Bright Spot

    Borge Brende, President and Chief Executive Officer of the World Economic Forum, remarked in a recent television interview that India remains a bright spot among the world’s major economies, citing its young, tech-savvy workforce. His interview was done after a WEF analysis that warned that the 2025 global economic outlook was clouded by deep uncertainty. Back in January 2024, he had described India as a bright spot amid global doom.

    The International Monetary Fund echoes this view. Its 2023 World Economic Outlook named India the bright spot in an otherwise gloomy global economic scenario, stressing that the country will be a key driver of growth in the years ahead.

    The World Bank is very bullish on India’s economic growth and will remain so, said Auguste Tano Kouame, the World Bank Country Director for India, in February 2025. India is the shining light in the world, according to World Bank analysts.

    The World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP), a report released by the United Nations on 15 May 2025, states that while the global economy is slowing down, India remains the only bright spot—a point the IMF had made back in 2022.

    Positive projections followed by assessments—that have been reiterated in credible analytic reports by different global agencies.

    An Economic Resilience that Performs

    According to an EY projection, India is expected to surpass Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. The assessment, “India — towards becoming the third-largest economy in the world”, states that India is expected to surpass both Japan and Germany in nominal GDP terms by 2027. The projection to surpass Japan’s economy comes two years in advance—by the 2025 financial year. The EY analysis also estimates that India’s economy will cross the USD 5 trillion mark by that year, with a projected GDP size of USD 5.2 trillion.

    According to the assessment, which compares nominal and PPP international dollar GDPs of six major economies—the United States, China, Japan, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom—from 2022 to projections until 2028—India leads in GDP growth rate. The country is projected to have an 8.7% compound nominal growth rate (between 2022 and 2028), outstripping China’s growth rate of 7.2%, and more than double the United States’ growth rate of 4.1% for the same period.

    In PPP international dollar terms, India is already the third-largest economy, ahead of Japan and Germany, and is fast closing the gap with the United States and China. The EY analysis says India’s PPP economy is expected to register a growth rate of around 8.5% a year and will add nearly USD 7.5 trillion to its economy between 2022 and 2028—equivalent to Japan’s entire current annual PPP output in 2028. By 2028, India will further narrow this gap with China, the country with the largest economy globally in PPP international dollar terms.

    The report further predicts that by 2027, in PPP terms, the United States’ economy will be just 1.7 times larger than the Indian economy, while another EY assessment estimates that by the late 2040s, with a real growth rate of 6 to 7%, India will surpass the United States to become the world’s second-largest economy in PPP terms.

    Another assessment, released by Morgan Stanley in March 2025, suggests India will become the third-largest economy in the world by 2028. According to the global financial services firm, India’s economy is expected to reach USD 4.7 trillion by 2026, overtaking Japan to become the fourth-largest economy. When compared with real data, the country is expected to achieve this milestone sooner.

    By 2028, India is projected to surpass Germany to become the third-largest economy globally, at USD 5.7 trillion. The analysis further states that India’s share in the world’s GDP, currently at 3.5%, is projected to rise to 4.5% by 2029.

    The growth rate of the last quarter—or real GDP growth rate from January 2025 to March 2025—further confirms the resilient nature of the Indian economy. The real growth rate for the last quarter was calculated at 7.4%, outperforming expectations. In nominal GDP terms, the Indian economy was estimated to have expanded by 10.8%. A composite annual growth rate for the year 2024–25, in real GDP terms for the country, was estimated at 6.5%, in line with expectations, while in nominal terms it was estimated at 9.8%.

    According to projections made in another EY analysis, the country’s GDP has the potential to cross the threshold of USD 5 trillion by 2026, USD 10 trillion by 2033, USD 20 trillion by 2042, and USD 30 trillion by 2047 in market exchange terms—a dataset that matches with projections made in India on its developmental journey to become a developed nation by 2047. In PPP terms, by 2047, India’s economy is expected to cross the USD 40 trillion-threshold. Its share in the world GDP is expected to reach 19.6% by that financial year.

    India’s per capita GDP in PPP terms, which was 50% of the world’s average per capita GDP in 2022–23, is expected to become equal to it by the 2040s and 1.5 times higher by 2057.

    According to a Goldman Sachs economic research report released in December 2022 on long-term economic forecasts, China, the US, India, Indonesia, and Germany are projected to be the world’s five largest economies in real GDP terms. By 2075, India is expected to replace the United States to become the second-largest economy behind China.

     

    June 20, 2025
  • India, Central American Integration System hold virtual dialogue to deepen cooperation

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    India and the Central American Integration System (SICA) held a virtual dialogue on Wednesday to strengthen bilateral cooperation and deepen engagement across key sectors. The meeting was co-chaired by Rajesh Vaishnaw, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, and Alejandro Solano, Vice Minister of Multilateral Affairs of Costa Rica, which currently holds the Pro-Tempore Presidency of SICA.

    Senior officials from the SICA Secretariat, including the Director of International Cooperation, Carmen Marroquín, and representatives from SICA member countries also participated in the discussions.

    Highlighting the shared values of democracy, sustainable development, and South-South cooperation, the Indian side reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the region through its development partnership initiatives. These include the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), and a dedicated SME grant programme.

    Vaishnaw emphasized India’s readiness to collaborate with SICA in areas such as digital transformation, affordable healthcare, disaster resilience, and renewable energy, underscoring India’s success in these fields.

    SICA member countries appreciated India’s proactive and consistent support, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and other natural disasters. Both sides agreed to further enhance cooperation in critical sectors including food and nutritional security, health, connectivity, agriculture, digital infrastructure, energy, and trade and investment.

    The dialogue reaffirmed the commitment to sustained political engagement and regional cooperation, with Panama set to assume the SICA presidency later this year.

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth, Warren Press RFK Jr. on “Dangerous War on Vaccines,” Reckless Decision to Slash HHS Vaccine Funding

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth
    June 19, 2025
    RFK Jr. cut hundreds of millions of dollars for bird flu, HIV vaccine development
    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] – U.S. Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wrote to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr., pressing him on his recent reckless decisions to slash funding for critical vaccine development. In May, the Trump Administration announced that it would cut off millions of dollars that the federal government had committed to the development of the critical bird flu vaccine, and HHS abruptly ended an over-$250 million program to develop an AIDS vaccine.
    “This is a grievous mistake that threatens to leave the country unprepared for what experts fear might be the next pandemic – and there appears to be no rationale for this decision other than your ill-informed and dangerous war on vaccines,” wrote the Senators.
    In January, HHS championed the development of new vaccines to make sure “Americans have the tools they need to stay safe.” Now, the RFK Jr.-led HHS is ripping those tools away — tools which would save lives and save billions in health care costs over time.
    An HHS spokesperson indicated that the decision to cut funding for the bird flu vaccine was made following a “rigorous review.” Another senior HHS official claimed that the decision to slash funding for the HIV vaccine was made after a “review by N.I.H. (National Institutes of Health) leadership.” HHS has made neither review available to the American public.
    “You have failed to justify either of these moves to (ruin) vaccine research,” continued the Senators. “This is just the latest example that calls into question your commitment to ‘radical transparency.’”
    “The public has little reason to trust your judgment or your review of the science surrounding vaccines or any aspect of public health,” concluded the Senators.
    The Administration also recently released its “Make America Healthy Again” report, containing numerous references and citations that were fully fabricated. RFK Jr. himself has long peddled anti-vaccine conspiracy theories and spread harmful misinformation.
    The lawmakers requested copies of the “rigorous review” that resulted in the termination of funding for the bird flu vaccine and the “review by N.I.H. leadership” that prompted the termination of funding for AIDS vaccine research. The lawmakers also requested a detailed description of the process by which HHS decided to end these contracts, including whether it was based on a recommendation by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) officials.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend Thailand on Gender Inclusive Climate Action, Ask about Combatting Patriarchal Stereotypes and Ensuring Education for Marginalised Girls

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Thailand, with Committee Experts commending Thailand on its climate change master plan, which was gender inclusive, while raising questions about how the State was combatting patriarchal stereotypes and ensuring the right to education for marginalised girls. 

    A Committee Expert congratulated Thailand on the steps being taken to revise the climate change master plan which focused on gender and social inclusive climate action, including climate finance, adaptation and mitigation, recognising that women and girls experienced disproportionately greater loss and damage from the impacts of climate change. 

    Another Expert said Thailand remained a patriarchal society where women were expected to be caregivers while men were seen as leaders, which was reinforced in the media and other avenues.  What programmes were in place to dismantle harmful gender stereotypes?  Were there programmes to engage men and boys in efforts to transform discriminatory social norms?  What mechanisms were in place to ensure that women from all communities could access justice and public services without stigma or discrimination? 

    A Committee Expert said the Committee was concerned about the high dropout rates among stateless and refugee girls and the fact that Patani Malay girls were discouraged from continuing their education due to early marriage and lack of education in Malay. Were there policies specifically targeted for expanding education to minorities?  What steps were being taken to ensure the safety of girls living in the Southern Border Provinces?

    The delegation said Thailand was aware that gender stereotypes were ingrained, and this would take a lifetime effort to overcome.  Currently, changing the mindset of the people was difficult.  It was important to raise awareness and re-learn what was appropriate.  The Department of Women’s Affairs coordinated with academics to work with young people on a project to identify sexist language in textbooks in schools.  A guidebook had been created and distributed to teachers to provide guidance on how to combat harmful gender stereotypes in schools. 

    The delegation said there were mechanisms in place to ensure women from marginalised groups received education.  There were schools established in the Southern Border Provinces, with border patrol officers teaching the students.  The State provided safety in all areas to prevent threats to students. A religious school, supported by the Government, was located in the Southern Border Provinces, providing additional opportunities for students. 

    Introducing the report, Ramrung Worawat, Director-General of the Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security of Thailand, head of the delegation, said the act amending the Civil and Commercial Code (no. 24) or the equal marriage act came into force in January 2025.  The act raised the minimum marriage age from 17 to 18 years old, adopted gender-neutral terms on marriage, permitted child adoption by same-sex couples, and ensured inheritance rights to them.  Recent results of the general election in 2023 reflected a notable increase in the number of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals elected to leadership positions.  The current cabinet included eight females at ministerial rank, the highest number in Thailand’s political history.   

    In closing remarks, Ms. Worawat said the discussion with the Committee had been very fruitful. The State would aim to take forward the Committee’s recommendations, with a will to transform them into concrete actions.

    In her closing remarks, Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, thanked Thailand for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country. 

    The delegation of Thailand was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security; the Ministry of Public Health; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Administrative Centre of the Southern Border Provinces; the Royal Thai Police; the Office of the Attorney General; the National Institute of Development Administration; and the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Friday, 20 June to begin its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Ireland (CEDAW/C/IRL/8).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the eighth periodic report of Thailand (CEDAW/C/THA/8).

    Presentation of Report

    RAMRUNG WORAWAT, Director-General of the Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security of Thailand, head of the delegation, said women made up just over half of Thailand’s population and almost 70 per cent of those were women between 15 to 59 years of age.  Since the submission of Thailand’s last report in 2017, Thailand had been revising and drafting laws to further promote women’s rights, gender equality, and the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 

    The act amending the Civil and Commercial Code (no. 24) or the equal marriage act came into force in January 2025.  The act raised the minimum marriage age from 17 to 18 years old, adopted gender-neutral terms on marriage, permitted child adoption by same-sex couples, and ensured inheritance rights to them.  In addition, the gender equality act was being reviewed to ensure it further aligned with international standards. 

    The draft anti-discrimination act would strengthen the legal basis for the elimination of discrimination on all grounds, including sex and gender, and address situations of multiple and intersecting discrimination.  Furthermore, the draft act on the protection and promotion of the way of life of ethnic groups was being considered by the Parliament.  The act focused on eliminating discrimination and promoting equality based on cultural diversity.  The plan of action on women’s development (2023-2027) was developed to ensure women’s participation in socio-economic development and to promote their leadership in public spaces. 

    The National Women’s Development Policy and Strategy Committee and the Committee for the Promotion of Gender Equality were responsible for setting and driving gender equality policies.  A substantial budget was allocated for the main agencies, with an additional budget allocated to assist specific groups of women and advance gender equality in an integrated manner.  A strategic plan for the promotion and protection of children and youth in the use of online media was being developed, and a coordinating centre, Child Online Protection Action Thailand, was established to lead collaborative efforts with partners. 

    Thailand continued its policy of inclusive education and provided 15 years of free education for all children without discrimination.  The country supported royal-initiated “Phiengluang Schools” for special target groups in border or underserved areas with limited access to rights and social welfare.  An online teacher training programme aimed to help schools and teachers plan inclusive sexuality education. 

    Economic empowerment measures had been introduced to protect both formal and informal female workers.  The Women’s Role Development Fund was established to enable women to pursue careers and income opportunities, improve women’s access to financial resources, and expand childcare services for children under three years old to promote equality in family responsibilities.  The child support grant programme and the state welfare card programme provided monthly allowances and financial assistance to support low-income households. 

    Women were increasingly taking part in politics at the national and local levels and within the public administration.  Recent results of the general election in 2023 reflected a notable increase in the number of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals elected to leadership positions.  The current cabinet included eight females at ministerial rank, the highest number in Thailand’s political history.  There were currently 15 female provincial governors, including the appointment of the first Muslim female governor of Pattani Province in 2022. 

    The Thai Government promoted universal access to public health services and implemented measures to ensure that vulnerable women, including informal female workers and registered migrant women, could access healthcare.  All women and girls were guaranteed equal access to health services under the Universal Health Coverage Scheme.  The most challenging task for Thai Government agencies was advanced and disaggregated data collection.  Enhanced data collection would enable Thailand to better implement policies and undertake targeted actions to empower specific groups. 

    In October 2024, the Cabinet approved guidelines to accelerate the resolution of nationality and legal status issues for long-term migrants and their children born in Thailand, to ensure the legal recognition and integration of stateless individuals who had lived in the Kingdom for extended periods, as well as their Thai-born descendants. 

    The draft policy on administration and development in the Southern Border Provinces (2025-2027) was developed to support vulnerable groups, strengthen family and community roles in problem-solving, and develop networks of women and youth to foster peace at the family and community level.  The Coordination Centre for Women and Children in the Southern Border Provinces was established as a joint mechanism between the Government and civil society, serving as a platform to coordinate and mobilise resources, receive complaints, and resolve issues involving women and children.

    Thailand had developed a national adaptation plan for climate change, with a strong emphasis on gender dimensions at every stage, from planning and decision-making to community participation.  The country was committed to promoting gender equality and to upholding and protecting the human rights of women, girls, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals, and those facing multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination.  Thailand’s progress in gender equality was not just a matter of fulfilling international obligations, but a national priority. 

    Statement by the National Human Rights Institution

    PORNPRAPAI GANJANARINTR, Chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, said while the Thai Government had made efforts to promote gender equality, many women, especially those from vulnerable groups, continued to face serious barriers in accessing their basic rights.  Women with disabilities faced violence and barriers in accessing the justice system, were subjected to forced sterilisation and abortion, and were excluded from decision-making processes.  Ethnic women remained without legal status and were not protected under the law.  Women in detention faced overcrowding, with 46 per cent of women’s detention facilities in Thailand exceeding their capacity, leading to poor hygiene, limited space, and mental health issues. 

    These cases illustrated that many women were still blocked from accessing basic rights due to deep-rooted discrimination.  The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand believed that the structural reform needed action in three key areas: inclusive participation in policymaking bodies at different levels; legal reform and proper enforcement; and the empowerment of women.  It was vital to ensure that every woman, regardless of her background, could fully enjoy her rights.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    RANGITA DE SILVA DE ALWIS, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, 

    signalled two significant law reform initiatives.  Thailand was the first country in Southeast Asia to guarantee same sex marriage in 2024. The marriage equality bill had helped bend the arch of justice toward all.  The organic act on anti-corruption (No. 2) included provisions to protect those who reported corruption. 

    The Committee looked forward to the expedited revision of the domestic violence law and the new sex worker protection law.  Thailand’s national artificial intelligence strategy must remain vigilant as this was an important new frontier for gender justice and women’s leadership.  Thailand was encouraged to cite the Convention as an authoritative tool in all jurisprudence. 

    How would Thailand broaden the civic space for female journalists and female human rights defenders? How did Thailand provide protection from arbitrary arrest for women human rights defenders?  How were they ensured the right to a fair trial?  How were they protected from online crimes and cyber harassment?  How did the Safe Internet Coalition address hate speech and tech-facilitated gender-based violence?  How was free speech for women guaranteed in politics? 

    Despite the de facto moratorium on the death penalty, Thailand had one of the largest proportions of women on death row, predominately for drug-related offenses. Many of these women had faced numerous stressors throughout their lives, including mental health problems.  Would Thailand consider reviewing mandatory sentencing guidelines so that specific exculpatory or mitigatory factors such as homelessness and metal health were considered? 

    Thailand should be lauded for its women, peace and security plan, which addressed both traditional and non-traditional security challenges.  Not citing the Convention in relation to climate change was a missed opportunity.  How were Muslim women, indigenous women, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex women engaged as peacemakers?  Would cyber security be considered in the women, peace and security plan? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said pregnant women were entitled to paid maternity leave, to protect the health and safety of mothers and children.  This was considered a form of positive discrimination.  Male, female and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex inmates were separated in prisons to ensure their rights.  Thailand recognised the important role of women human rights defenders, and they had been identified as a key target group under the national human rights plan.  The plan included special provisions for developing laws and mechanisms to protect this group.  Thailand had been forced to strengthen its legislative framework to create a safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders.  The anti-corruption act aimed to protect whistleblowers reporting corruption or public misconduct. 

    A course had been developed to promote internet awareness among children, youth and older persons.  In Thailand, most victims of online scams were older persons.  The implementation of the training was carried out in collaboration with public and private companies, academics and non-governmental organizations.  The training fostered skills to ensure safe and secure internet use.  Work to strengthen child and youth protection mechanisms on online media was driven by child protection committees and child protection centres. 

    The Department of Corrections was fully committed to ensuring the protection of the rights of all women in custody.  Special attention was given to the emotional wellbeing of women prisoners and their accompanying children.  Women were subject to non-invasive scans to avoid invasive strip searches.  Women prisoners underwent initial screenings by medical staff upon entry, and were ensured that their specific health needs were fulfilled.  Counselling services were provided to female inmates at least one month, and those who required further psychological support were identified. 

    Female death row inmates benefitted from the right to communicate with their family.  For pregnant women facing capital punishment, the sentence would be suspended until three years after the child was born. The human rights of female death row inmates were ensured, while also upholding legal and ethical safeguards.

    Thailand had participated in many United Nations peacekeeping operations for several decades, and believed female peacekeepers helped foster trust within the communities. The State was committed to providing more female peacekeepers.  Thailand was finalising the national action plan on women, peace and security for 2024 to 2027, which would focus on women affected by conflict-affected situations. It was expected to be launched by the end of 2025.  Gender initiatives had been integrated into several aspects of the peacekeeping module, including training courses. 

    The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre had established the subdistrict Peace Councils in 317 subdistricts.  Thailand’s climate change response aimed to allocate a budget for funding assistance to support women engaging in climate change and revise laws which created barriers for women’s participation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert recognised important advances, including the marriage equality act, and the adoption of a national strategy on this issue.  What measures had the State party adopted to ensure the territorialised adoption of gender policies in areas affected by armed conflict?  What measures had been taken to harmonise religious and customary laws with State legislation and gender equality?  How was it ensured that data collected reflected the multiple inequalities by marginalised groups? 

    Another Expert said the Committee was happy to note that the Government had improved relevant policies and regulations and formulated a national action plan for women’s development.  During the pandemic, the Government took a variety of measures to improve women’s working measures and legal provisions.  Would the State party adopt temporary special measures to address the persistent underrepresentation of women in the public and private sectors? 

    Would special measures be adopted to address intersecting forms of discrimination faced by women from marginalised groups, including indigenous women and elderly women? Would temporary special measures be adopted to further reduce poverty and levels of violence for women in Southern Border Provinces, including female genital mutilation?  Would these measures be coupled with capacity building to ensure their effectiveness?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Thailand had established gender-responsive budgeting.  Seminars had been organised by Government officials and representatives of the private sector to ensure that gender-responsive budgeting was understood, and that women and girls could benefit from the national budget.  The private business sector cooperated with United Nations Women to integrate gender-responsive budgeting into business operations. 

    A study had been conducted which focused on the allocation of quotas for women and gender diverse individuals at national and local levels of politics.  The Government encouraged political parties to include women proportionally to men in their candidate lists.  Thailand’s number of female candidates had dramatically increased since 2019 and was on a positive trend.   

    Under the application of Islamic law in certain provinces, the Islamic family law was currently applied to Muslim citizens in the Southern Border Provinces.  A hybrid court system was responsible for handling cases involving disputes with family cases.  Muslim women who were victims of domestic violence and sexual violence could seek assistance through alternative avenues.  Marriages were regulated under the Central Islamic Committee, which prohibited marriage for anyone under the age of 17.  Most of the Southern Border Provinces were Muslim.  There were also channels for grievances for Islamic women, including remedies for victims affected by the conduct of officials. Assistance had been provided to more than 3,000 victims, and remedy was also provided to those affected by violence in the Southern Border Provinces.  Scholarships and education support was provided to children affected by the unrest. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said patriarchal practices continued to drive high rates of gender-based violence.  Current frameworks prioritised family reunification over the protection of the survivors.  How was it ensured that survivor centred protection and legal remedies were available to all victims, including those in conflict-affected areas?  Were there plans to enact comprehensive legislation which criminalised online violence against women?  How was it ensured that survivors could report cases of violence safely without fear of reprisals?  How were gender-based violence policies being monitored and evaluated? 

    Thailand remained a patriarchal society where women were expected to be caregivers while men were seen as leaders, which was reinforced in the media and other avenues. What programmes were in place to dismantle harmful gender stereotypes?  Were there programmes to engage men and boys in efforts to transform discriminatory social norms?  What mechanisms were in place to ensure that women from all communities could access justice and public services without stigma or discrimination?  What steps was the State party taking to explicitly criminalise and eliminate harmful practices such as female genital mutilation and bride abduction, and to conduct awareness campaigns on their impact on women’s rights?

    Another Expert asked what steps the State party would take to effectively combat labour trafficking of women?  The anti-trafficking act allowed courts to waive punishments for parents who forced their children into labour due to extreme poverty and other extenuating circumstances; this was unacceptable.  How did the State party intend to ensure the protection of the girl child from being trafficked by her parents?  What steps was the State party taking to ensure the effective implementation of the national referral mechanism throughout the country. 

    The Committee commended the State party for the significant efforts made to bring the perpetrators of trafficking in persons to justice, including corrupt officials who protected traffickers.  While training was provided to police, immigration and labour officials, and prosecutors and judges, it was not mandatory for new judges.  What steps would be taken to ensure all those responsible for trafficking cases and prosecutions were adequately trained? How did the State party envisage regulating prostitution in the future?  Would sex workers be decriminalised and prostitution be legal? 

    Another Expert asked what the State was doing to combat cyber trafficking, which was an increasingly prevalent issue? 

    RANGITA DE SILVA DE ALWIS, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said the Thai President had been the victim of a voice scam.  How were scams tackled in the context of women in political and public life? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the domestic violence protection act was approved in 2025.  The Ministry of Public Health in Thailand opposed female genital mutilation and recognised it as a grave violation of human rights. Thailand was committed to eliminating this harmful practice in all its forms and was focused on providing education about its potential health consequences.  This effort was carried out in collaboration with community networks. 

    During the period 2021–2023, there were no violations found by labour inspectorates.  Thailand maintained proactive oversight through the labour inspectorate system.  Thailand aimed to conduct awareness raising among children and youth on trafficking and had developed youth focused education and training in this regard. 

    Thailand was aware that gender stereotypes were ingrained, and this would take a lifetime effort to overcome.  Currently, changing the mindset of the people was difficult.  It was important to raise awareness and re-learn what was appropriate. The Department of Women’s Affairs coordinated with academics to work with young people on a project to identify sexist language in textbooks in schools.  A guidebook had been created and distributed to teachers to provide guidance on how to combat harmful gender stereotypes in schools.  While gender stereotypes were the key focus currently, the States pledged to eventually address all kinds of stereotypes. 

    The country operated under the premise that sex work was not considered a crime and that sex workers should have access to appropriate justice avenues if required. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert acknowledged the second female Prime Minister of Thailand, who was historically the youngest.  The Committee was concerned about the low levels of women’s representation in political institutions.  Cultural norms and stereotypes actively discouraged women from entering politics. What legislative measures were being taken to combat issues such as gender hate speech and harmful stereotypes which deterred women from participating in public life?  Were there plans to address workplace bullying in parliament?  What was the level of representation of Muslim women in politics? 

    Women appeared to be underrepresented in the Foreign Office, comprising just 15 per cent of ambassadors.  What steps were being taken by the State party to ensure this underrepresentation of women was rectified, including minorities such as women from the deep south and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex women?  The Committee commended the Thai Government for increasing the protection of human rights defenders.  How many recommendations from the fourth and fifth national human rights plan targeting human rights defenders had been implemented? Were there plans to address the small number of female military personnel?  How was it ensured that civil society could participate in multilateral environments?

    A Committee Expert said Thailand had over half a million registered stateless persons in January 2022, many of whom were ethnic minorities in remote areas who were unaware of their rights.  Thailand had not ratified key United Nations Conventions on statelessness.  There were differences when it came to men and women obtaining Thai nationality.  Would the State plan to make amendments to the national act, providing equality on citizenship for men and women?  What measures had been taken to decrease the number of stateless women and children? How did the Government plan to support refugee women, including Rohingya women? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said female police officers could advance to the Commissioner rank through examinations.  Female police officers occupied the highest rank within the Thai police.  The representation of women in the Superintendent rank rose from 13 per cent in 2021 to 16.7 per cent in 2025. Approximately 66 per cent of Thai diplomats were women, and around 36 per cent of Thai ambassadors were women. Measures including maternity leave were put in place to ensure the support of female staff.  Women were encouraged to participate in multilateral fora. 

    For decades, the Thai Government had continually adopted policies and measures to improve the protection of stateless persons in the country.  Their access to public services had been increased.  In 2024, a cabinet solution was adopted to expedite the process to nationality acquisition to a large group of the population.  This would allow stateless children to obtain Thai nationality. 

    It was important to analyse data to determine how to counter the trend of violence against female political candidates. 

    Comprehensive health access was ensured for all migrants, including women.  The migrant health insurance scheme was a voluntarily contributory scheme utilised by migrant workers in the informal sector, prior to national health insurance enrolment.  Public health care was actively working to address the needs of unregistered migrants.  Although Thailand was not party to the 1951 Convention relating to the protection of refugees, the State had taken other steps to ensure their rights were upheld. For instance, a memorandum of understanding had been developed to ensure children and their mothers were placed in child protection centres, instead of being held in immigration centres. 

    Recent steps showed that 80 per cent of Thai women wished to start their own business, with 45 per cent of Thai women considering themselves to be entrepreneurs. 

    The delegation said within the fourth national human rights action plan (2019-2022), there were several recommendations for human rights defenders, including strengthening the protection act, studying best practices on the protection of freedom of assembly, and allocating more funding, among others.  The fifth national human rights action plan also contained three specific recommendations for human rights defenders, including acceding to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which came into effect in Thailand in 2024. 

    The Committee for the Promotion of Gender Equality was responsible for formulating policies, measures and operational plans to promote gender equality across all sectors. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee noted with satisfaction the adoption of the national education act of 1999 which guaranteed all children equal rights and opportunities to receive free and compulsory basic education.  The Committee encouraged the State party to continue efforts aimed at reaching gender parity in primary and secondary school enrolment.  Despite these efforts, the Committee was concerned about the high dropout rates among stateless and refugee girls and the fact that Patani Malay girls were discouraged from continuing their education due to early marriage and lack of education in Malay. 

    Were there policies specifically targeted for expanding education to minorities?  What steps were being taken to ensure the safety of girls living in the Southern Border Provinces?  How was cyber bullying against transgender students being addressed in schools and universities? 

    Thailand was commended for leading in science, technology, engineering and mathematics fields; how was it ensured these translated into employment opportunities for young women?  What steps was the State party taking to ensure age-appropriate sexual reproductive education in schools?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said there were mechanisms in place to ensure girls from marginalised groups received education.  There were schools established in the Southern Border Provinces, with border patrol officers teaching the students.  Schools in rural areas faced disadvantages; however, there were no discriminatory practices for migrant girls to access schools.  The current school graduation rates showed a higher percentage of girls compared to boys.  The State provided safety in all areas to prevent threats to students.  A religious school, supported by the Government, was located in the Southern Border Provinces, providing additional opportunities for students. 

    Bullying stemmed from stereotypes, and the Ministry of Education was aware of this issue.  Work had been undertaken to combat bullying of transgender students, including launching a digital platform for reporting on school safety.  At risk students, including victims and perpetrators, were identified, and activities were conducted to encourage friendship and positive interaction. Support was strengthened for teachers to enable them to identify early warning signs and respond in a timely fashion. The development of science and technology projects had provided scholarships to students of all genders. Thailand was committed to providing age-appropriate sexual and reproductive education in schools.  The protest “One School One Hospital” encouraged hospitals to provide advice on sexual health and contraception directly to students. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the gender pay gap remained at around 11 per cent in Thailand, and around 66 per cent of female workers in the agricultural sector earned below the minimum wage.  Had the equal pay act been adequately enforced?  What was being done to address noncompliance?  What measures were being taken to ensure women in the domestic sector and migrant workers were covered under social protection schemes? 

    How was the effective protection of pregnant women ensured, particularly in small businesses? Was there a plan to introduce mandated paternity leave?  What steps had been taken to ensure sexual harassment protections extended to all sectors? What mechanisms were in place to monitor sexual harassment?  Were there any plans to formalise the employment pathway for migrant workers? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the labour protection act mandated that employers paid equal wages for equal work, regardless of a person’s gender.  Thailand was developing a draft act to facilitate the empowerment of informal workers.  Thailand provided compensation for women migrant workers, including paid maternity leave and protection against dismissal due to pregnancy.  Thailand had enacted legislation which prohibited sexual harassment in all workplaces.  Steps were being taken to bring informal migrant workers into the formal system. The State provided legal guidance on rights and duties under the law, including regarding labour disputes. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said according to the Criminal Court, abortion could be interrupted up to the twelfth week, but after this time period, a pregnant woman was required to have a consultation with a doctor, and faced a sanction and fine if she proceeded with an abortion.  Did the State plan to amend its Criminal Code to fully decriminalise abortion and abolish the need for consultations after the 12-week mark?  How was the State combatting the stigma of abortion by health staff?  The number of forced sterilisation and coercive abortions of persons with disabilities was concerning.  What was being done to end these damaging practices?  What mechanisms were put in place to ensure appropriate measures were taken in this area?  Would the State provide reparations to victims? 

    Women in the Southern Border Provinces faced further issues, including female genital mutilation and unsafe abortions, as well as mental health issues due to the violence they experienced.  How was the State addressing these issues?  What steps was it taking to combat female genital mutilation, ensuring Muslim women could access care appropriate to their religious beliefs? The Committee had heard that women living with HIV were subject to tests without their consent and were pressured to undergo sterilisation.  What steps were being taken to ensure these tests were carried out without coercive pressure?  What was being done to ensure full access to HIV therapy for the most vulnerable groups? How was the right to health guaranteed for women in the prison system? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said a woman could fully terminate her pregnancy under 12 weeks without criminal liability.  Between 12 and 20 weeks, abortion services were accessible following certified consultations with public health professionals and based on medical grounds. Medical personnel received specialised training to enhance their expertise in abortion care.  The current national reproductive health policy aimed to ensure equitable and inclusive births, including for persons with disabilities. 

    Any HIV treatment was provided based on consent, and testing without consent was considered a violation of a patient’s rights.  Sterilisation could only be performed with an individual’s free and informed consent. Women and others living with HIV were only treated if they gave their informed consent; there were no practices of forced testing, and any allegations of such cases were investigated. Thailand focused on improving standardised medical treatment for females who were incarcerated.  Screenings were carried out for cancers and other diseases. The Universal Health Coverage Scheme also covered the border areas, as did the mental health programme. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked how the State party planned to reduce gender disparity in social security, particularly for refugees and migrants residing in camps?  Initiatives supporting women’s entrepreneurship were welcomed, including the Women’s Empowerment Fund.  However, women in rural communities faced issues in accessing services.  What policies were in place for ensuring equal access to financial services for women in all areas?  What measures were in place to promote disadvantaged women in sports and culture? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Human Development Fund was available to provide opportunities for women to access funds for businesses and economic empowerment.  Currently, there were around 17 million female members of this Fund.  By 2024, 17-million-baht worth of loans had been provided to females across the country. Work needed to be done to provide larger loans to women. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked what concrete steps the State party was taking to ensure the protection and empowerment of marginalised women and girls?  What was being done to effectively advance the rights of these women and girls?  How was the State party effectively implementing the international standards for the treatment of prisoners as provided for in the Nelson Mandela Rules and the Bangkok Rules?

    The Expert congratulated the State party on the steps being taken to revise the climate change master plan which focused on gender and social inclusive climate action, including climate finance, adaptation and mitigation, recognising that women and girls experienced disproportionately greater loss and damage from the impacts of climate change.  What concrete steps was the State party taking to ensure that climate financing, adaptation and mitigation strategies met the specific needs of women and girls? 

    What steps was the State party taking to ensure that the blue economy and agriculture were sustainable, inclusive, and resilient to climate change, to meet the specific needs of women and girls?  What measures was the State party taking to ensure the protection of all women and girls from the disproportionate impacts of air pollution?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said inmates in the prison system received three nutritious meals daily which respected local, cultural and religious practices, and drinking water was supplied in adequate quantities.  To address overcrowding concerns, the Department of Corrections could authorise inmates to be moved to alternative custody alternatives.  A committee had been established to manage this process.   

    A national adaptation plan on climate change had been developed, aligning with global adaptation goals.  The plan emphasised the importance of gender equality in planning, decision making and public participation.  Measures in the plan included enhancing early warning systems, developing adaptation guidelines for vulnerable farming communities, and gender-responsive budgets, among other measures.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert commended the State party for raising the minimum age of marriage to 18 years.  In addition, Thailand had become the first country in Southeast Asia to legalise same-sex marriage.  However, child marriage persisted in Thailand, particularly in lower income areas. Polygamy was prohibited under the Civil Code, but it was still practiced.  What enforcement mechanisms were in place to eradicate exceptions permitting marriage under the age of 18?  What progress was being envisaged in harmonising Islamic family and inheritance law? What was the body specifically assigned for this important task?  How was the State party addressing systemic barriers that Muslim women faced in accessing divorce?  What concrete steps were being taken to eradicate polygamous unions? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Islamic family law was currently provided to Muslim citizens in the Southern Border Provinces.  Government authorities had supported the application of the use of Islamic family law in line with human rights and standards.  The Administrative Centre of the Southern Border Provinces had disseminated a family law handbook on inheritance and other laws.  After divorce, women were required under the Civil Code to wait for a certain number of days before remarrying.  They could remarry earlier, if they could provide a certificate from a doctor which stated they were not pregnant.  Door to door outreach was conducted to screen populations at risk of air pollution, including pregnant women. 

    Closing Remarks

    RAMRUNG WORAWAT, Director-General of the Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security of Thailand, head of the delegation, said the discussion with the Committee had been very fruitful. The State would aim to take forward the Committee’s recommendations, with a will to transform them into concrete actions.  Thailand wished to maintain the dialogue with the Committee and advance this important agenda at the international level. 

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, thanked Thailand for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CEDAW25.014E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Hearings – ECA Review presentation on Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – 25-06-2025 – Committee on Budgets – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    ECA Review 02/2025: “Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF” © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 25 June 2025 the ECA Review 02/2025: “Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF” will be presented to Members of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee of Budgetary Control (CONT) by reporting ECA Members Jorg Kristijan Petrovic and Ivana Maletic.

    The RRF suffers from several weaknesses in terms of performance, accountability and transparency, the ECA observes in its review. Although the RRF has played a crucial role in the EU’s post-pandemic recovery, the ECA criticises that information on results is scarce, and there is no information on actual costs. As a result, it was not clear what citizens actually get for their money. The Court calls on EU policy makers to draw lessons from this when mulling future budgets based on performance rather than costs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – ECA Review presentation on Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    Presentation of ECA Review 02/2025: Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons learnt from the weaknesses of the RRF © Image used under license from Adobe Stock

    On 25 June 2025 the ECA Review 02/2025: “Performance-orientation, accountability and transparency – lessons to be learned from the weaknesses of the RRF” will be presented to Members of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee of Budgetary Control (CONT) by reporting ECA Members Jorg Kristijan Petrovic and Ivana Maletic.

    The RRF suffers from several weaknesses in terms of performance, accountability and transparency, the ECA observes in its review. Although the RRF has played a crucial role in the EU’s post-pandemic recovery, the ECA criticises that information on results is scarce, and there is no information on actual costs. As a result, it was not clear what citizens actually get for their money. The Court calls on EU policy makers to draw lessons from this when mulling future budgets based on performance rather than costs.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • Dr. Jitendra Singh highlights 11 years of transformational growth in space, tech and innovation

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    In a compelling address at the Economic Times Education Summit 2025, Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh underscored the sweeping technological transformation that has permeated Indian society over the past 11 years under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership. The Minister, who holds charge of Science and Technology, Earth Sciences, and the Department of Space, said India is now witnessing an unprecedented wave of scientific advancement and innovation reaching into every household.

    Dr. Singh credited this shift to the creation of an enabling ecosystem that has nurtured talent across sectors. He pointed to “Operation Sindoor” as a landmark achievement that showcases India’s enhanced scientific capacity and defense readiness, particularly in countering drone and missile threats.

    “There was never a lack of talent in this country. What we lacked was an enabling environment to nurture it. PM Modi’s visionary leadership over the past decade has created that ecosystem,” said the Minister.

    He highlighted the impact of key reforms such as the opening up of the space and nuclear sectors, which he said have had a multiplier effect on diverse fields including agriculture, education, defence, disaster management, land records, and e-governance.

    Emphasizing India’s emergence as a global hub for aspirational youth, Dr. Singh said the nation is now defined by its scientific ambitions and technological confidence. “The rise of aspirations enabled by science and innovation is testimony to the Ease of Living as well as the Ease of Doing Research. Indians abroad today wear their identity with pride, and the world respects that,” he said.

    Reflecting on India’s economic journey, the Minister projected that the country’s continued ascent to becoming the fourth-largest economy and beyond would be driven by core sectors such as space, marine technology, and biotechnology. He drew special attention to the recently launched BIO-e3 Policy, which centers on Economy, Employment, and Environment, calling it a catalyst for a biotechnology revolution.

    Dr. Singh also spotlighted India’s achievements in healthcare, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the development of the world’s first DNA-based vaccine and the execution of the largest vaccination campaign globally.

    He lauded India’s rapid progress in space exploration, recalling the landmark Chandrayaan-3 mission that made India the first country to land on the Moon’s South Pole. Looking ahead, he said India’s participation in the upcoming Axiom-4 mission, with Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla as Mission Pilot, marks a new chapter of international collaboration in space. This mission will feature Indian-developed biotechnology experiments focusing on space nutrition and self-sustaining life support systems using microgravity-compatible biotech kits.

    “These kits, conceptualized and validated by Indian scientists, will lay the foundation for long-duration human spaceflight research,” he stated.

    The Minister also projected robust growth for India’s space economy, estimating a rise from the current $8 billion to $44 billion in the coming years. He noted that India now has over 300 space startups, a remarkable leap from the single-digit count in 2014. Space medicine, he added, would be a key frontier in which India is already making strides.

    Highlighting the use of technology for citizen-centric governance, Dr. Singh cited innovations like face recognition technology for pension verification and the evolution of the CPGRAMS grievance redressal system, which now handles 26 lakh complaints annually, up from just 2 lakh in 2014.

    While acknowledging the growing role of artificial intelligence, Dr. Singh cautioned against over-reliance on AI-only models and advocated for a hybrid approach that integrates AI with human judgment to maintain empathy and integrity in governance.

    “India has matured into a nation where scientific research is not just academic—it’s strategic, secure, and sovereign,” he concluded.

    June 20, 2025
  • Dr. Jitendra Singh highlights 11 years of transformational growth in space, tech and innovation

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    In a compelling address at the Economic Times Education Summit 2025, Union Minister Dr. Jitendra Singh underscored the sweeping technological transformation that has permeated Indian society over the past 11 years under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership. The Minister, who holds charge of Science and Technology, Earth Sciences, and the Department of Space, said India is now witnessing an unprecedented wave of scientific advancement and innovation reaching into every household.

    Dr. Singh credited this shift to the creation of an enabling ecosystem that has nurtured talent across sectors. He pointed to “Operation Sindoor” as a landmark achievement that showcases India’s enhanced scientific capacity and defense readiness, particularly in countering drone and missile threats.

    “There was never a lack of talent in this country. What we lacked was an enabling environment to nurture it. PM Modi’s visionary leadership over the past decade has created that ecosystem,” said the Minister.

    He highlighted the impact of key reforms such as the opening up of the space and nuclear sectors, which he said have had a multiplier effect on diverse fields including agriculture, education, defence, disaster management, land records, and e-governance.

    Emphasizing India’s emergence as a global hub for aspirational youth, Dr. Singh said the nation is now defined by its scientific ambitions and technological confidence. “The rise of aspirations enabled by science and innovation is testimony to the Ease of Living as well as the Ease of Doing Research. Indians abroad today wear their identity with pride, and the world respects that,” he said.

    Reflecting on India’s economic journey, the Minister projected that the country’s continued ascent to becoming the fourth-largest economy and beyond would be driven by core sectors such as space, marine technology, and biotechnology. He drew special attention to the recently launched BIO-e3 Policy, which centers on Economy, Employment, and Environment, calling it a catalyst for a biotechnology revolution.

    Dr. Singh also spotlighted India’s achievements in healthcare, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the development of the world’s first DNA-based vaccine and the execution of the largest vaccination campaign globally.

    He lauded India’s rapid progress in space exploration, recalling the landmark Chandrayaan-3 mission that made India the first country to land on the Moon’s South Pole. Looking ahead, he said India’s participation in the upcoming Axiom-4 mission, with Group Captain Shubhanshu Shukla as Mission Pilot, marks a new chapter of international collaboration in space. This mission will feature Indian-developed biotechnology experiments focusing on space nutrition and self-sustaining life support systems using microgravity-compatible biotech kits.

    “These kits, conceptualized and validated by Indian scientists, will lay the foundation for long-duration human spaceflight research,” he stated.

    The Minister also projected robust growth for India’s space economy, estimating a rise from the current $8 billion to $44 billion in the coming years. He noted that India now has over 300 space startups, a remarkable leap from the single-digit count in 2014. Space medicine, he added, would be a key frontier in which India is already making strides.

    Highlighting the use of technology for citizen-centric governance, Dr. Singh cited innovations like face recognition technology for pension verification and the evolution of the CPGRAMS grievance redressal system, which now handles 26 lakh complaints annually, up from just 2 lakh in 2014.

    While acknowledging the growing role of artificial intelligence, Dr. Singh cautioned against over-reliance on AI-only models and advocated for a hybrid approach that integrates AI with human judgment to maintain empathy and integrity in governance.

    “India has matured into a nation where scientific research is not just academic—it’s strategic, secure, and sovereign,” he concluded.

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 19 June 2025 Departmental update Civil society shapes global health at WHA78

    Source: World Health Organisation

    With the theme “One World for Health,” WHA78 brought together Member States and other stakeholders to address major health priorities, including the Pandemic Agreement, antimicrobial resistance, climate-related health risks, and noncommunicable diseases.

    A key development was the growing inclusion of civil society in the policy-making process. “Civil society is not only identifying critical challenges – it is contributing actionable, community-informed solutions,” said Taina Nakari, WHO’s lead for civil society engagement. “This is central to building trust and delivering results that meet the needs of populations.”

    One of the main vehicles for strengthening civil society is the WHO Civil Society Commission, launched to support more systematic and inclusive civil society participation in global health governance. The Commission brings together over 400 organizations and individuals to co-develop policy inputs, share knowledge, and identify entry points into WHO processes.

    “We’ve built a space where civil society can speak with one voice while honouring our diversity,” said Lisa Hilmi, Co-Chair of the Commission and CORE Group, Executive Director.

    “We’re not just advising WHO,” added fellow Co-Chair and Medwise Solutions Director of Research and Evaluation, Ravi Ram. “We’re helping shape the way civil society engages in global health governance.”

    In parallel with the Commission’s work, WHO also supported over 60 non-State actors –including NGOs, foundations, and associations – in delivering more than 200 formal statements to Member States. Nearly 50 official side events provided additional platforms for dialogue and collaboration. While these organizations are not all members of the WHO Civil Society Commission, their engagement is an important avenue to ensure more inclusive and participatory decision-making across WHO processes.

    Another notable example was the high-level side event, “Securing Investments in Global Health: Time for a New Approach,” co-hosted by Save the Children, Medicus Mundi, World Vision, and the Government of Germany. Civil society representatives emphasized the need to reform global health financing by:

    • moving beyond traditional aid models;
    • strengthening domestic health financing;
    • leveraging multisectoral partnerships and innovation; and
    • reaffirming global solidarity amidst declining development assistance and weakening multilateralism.

    “We organized this event to underscore that sustainable financing for health is not only a technical necessity – it’s a matter of equity, accountability, and long-term impact,” said Tara Brace-John, Head of Policy, Advocacy and Research, Save the Children Fund. “Civil society brings grounded perspectives that can help policy-makers design solutions that prioritize health systems and deliver for the people who need them most.”
     

    Strengthening civil society’s policy influence

    WHA78 also featured the second Global Parliamentary Dialogue, convening legislators from around the world to discuss how parliaments can support health priorities through inclusive, accountable governance. During the session, the WHO Civil Society Commission introduced its flagship report: “Civil Society Engagement in the Development of World Health Assembly Resolutions.”

    The report offers practical guidance – including a checklist and real-world case studies – for systematically involving civil society throughout the resolution process.

    “This report is the result of extensive consultation and shared learning across regions,” said Kjeld Steenbjerg Hansen, a member of the WHO Civil Society Commission and Past-Chair of the European Lung Foundation (ELF). “It provides Member States with practical tools to engage civil society from the beginning and systematically throughout the resolution – from early input to final negotiations – while also emphasizing the political value of more inclusive and participatory policy-making.”

    Parliamentarians were encouraged to support the uptake of the report in their national and regional platforms, helping translate civil society perspectives into policy outcomes.
     

    Looking beyond the Assembly

    WHO’s engagement with civil society extends well beyond formal meetings. In May 2025, more than 500 civil society participants joined WHO’s Epidemic and Pandemic Intelligence – Information Network (WHO–EPI-WIN) technical briefing on the public health risks of avian influenza. Speakers at the session:

    • shared real-time updates on outbreak risks;
    • briefed civil society organizations on WHO preparedness and response;
    • explored how civil society organizations can support emergency response efforts; and
    • strengthened pathways for collaboration.

    Civil society also participated in similar sessions on the Universal Health and Preparedness Review (UHPR), antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the Interim Medical Countermeasures Platform, the WHO Investment Round, and access to safe, effective, and quality-assured health products. These engagements reflect WHO’s commitment to ensuring civil society is not only informed but also actively involved in shaping global public health.

    Their growing involvement in WHO governance helps ensure that health decisions are more inclusive, responsive, and effective, especially for those most affected.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 20, 2025
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