Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: NY Times Opinion: “Senator Padilla: The Trump Administration Handcuffed Me, but I Refuse to Stay Silent”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.)

    ICYMI: NY Times Opinion: “Senator Padilla: The Trump Administration Handcuffed Me, but I Refuse to Stay Silent”

    NY Times Op-Ed

    Padilla: “If this administration is willing to handcuff a U.S. senator, imagine what it is willing to do to any American who dares to speak up.”

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — In case you missed it, U.S. Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee, published an op-ed in the New York Times this morning following his forcible removal from Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s press conference, where he was thrown to the ground and handcuffed after attempting to ask a question.

    Padilla blasted President Trump’s unprecedented militarization of Los Angeles and warned against the immense consequences of the Trump Administration’s increasingly callous anti-immigrant rhetoric and actions, not only for hardworking immigrants essential to our communities and economy, but for the fundamental democratic rights of Americans across the country. He called Trump’s manufactured crisis in Los Angeles a “warning shot” and a “wake-up call” for his Republican colleagues and the American people to speak up against Trump’s egregious continued abuse of power.

    Key Excerpts:

    • If you watched what happened to me or Mr. Lander these past few days and thought this was about any one politician or altercation, you are missing the point. If this administration is willing to handcuff a U.S. senator, imagine what it is willing to do to any American who dares to speak up. If that’s what can happen when the cameras are on, imagine what is already happening in communities across the country when the cameras are off. Today, it’s immigrants on the receiving end of Donald Trump’s outrage machine. Tomorrow, it could be anyone.
    • As the proud son of immigrants from Mexico who came to California to pursue the American dream, I am living proof of the promise this country provides to all of us. Where else can the son of a housekeeper and a short-order cook become a senator? But I also know that America’s promise doesn’t happen by accident. It happens because throughout our history ordinary people have called out our country’s contradictions and called on the government to live up to the principles of equality established at our founding.
    • As we’ve seen in Los Angeles, public safety is not the point — the spectacle is. Americans are living through a historic moment of presidential overreach. With a cabinet of yes-men and underqualified attack dogs surrounding him — from the D.H.S. Secretary to the F.B.I. director to the secretary of defense — Mr. Trump is now testing the boundaries of his power. And he’s using the theatrics around his immigration policies to do it.
    • If you thought any of this administration’s theatrics in Los Angeles these past few weeks was truly about immigrants, it’s time to wake up. If federal troops can deploy to Los Angeles against the wishes of the governor, the mayor and even local law enforcement, they can do the same tomorrow in your hometown. This is a fundamental threat to the rule of law nationwide.
    • Democracy doesn’t fall from any one decision or any one attack. It falls from a thousand cuts that slowly erode our fundamental freedoms. It falls when good people see our democracy sliding backward but still choose to say nothing.
    • To any American wondering if democracy is lost or if they can ever make a difference, I’d say this: If the Trump administration was this scared of one senator with a question, imagine what the voices of tens of millions of Americans organizing will do. No one is coming to save us but us.

    Senator Padilla has been outspoken in calling out the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids in Los Angeles and Trump’s misguided deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marine Corps. This past weekend, Padilla led the entire Senate Democratic Caucus in demanding that President Trump immediately withdraw all military forces from Los Angeles and cease all threats to deploy the National Guard or active-duty servicemembers to American cities. Last week, Padilla and Senator Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) demanded answers regarding the Trump Administration’s decision to deploy approximately 700 Marines to Los Angeles. Padilla has spoken at a spotlight hearing and on the Senate floor multiple times to blast President Trump for manufacturing a crisis by launching indiscriminate ICE raids across Los Angeles and deploying the National Guard and active-duty servicemembers to the region. He also joined all Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats earlier this week in calling on Chairman Grassley to schedule Department of Homeland Security Secretary Noem for a broad oversight hearing for testimony before the committee.

    Full text of Senator Padilla’s NY Times op-ed is available here and below:

    NY Times: Senator Padilla: The Trump Administration Handcuffed Me, but I Refuse to Stay Silent

    By U.S. Senator Alex Padilla

    Growing up in the northeast San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles in the 1980s and 90s, you know what can happen if you don’t completely cooperate with law enforcement.

    Even so, it was jarring last week when, despite clearly identifying myself as a U.S. senator, I was forcibly removed from a news conference at which Kristi Noem, the secretary of homeland security, promised to “liberate” Los Angeles from our democratically elected mayor and governor. As I was thrown to the ground, handcuffed and walked down a hall while officers refused to tell me why I was being detained, my mind raced with questions.

    Where are they taking me? Am I being arrested? What will a city already on edge from being militarized think when they see their senator has just been handcuffed?

    What will my wife and our three boys think?

    I imagined similar questions were running through the mind of Brad Lander, the New York City comptroller and mayoral candidate, this week when he, too, was handcuffed by federal agents for asking them whether they had a warrant to arrest a migrant he had locked arms with. Like me, Mr. Lander had the audacity to question the legitimacy of federal actions, only to find himself pushed against a wall and detained.

    If you watched what happened to me or Mr. Lander these past few days and thought this was about any one politician or altercation, you are missing the point.

    If this administration is willing to handcuff a U.S. senator, imagine what it is willing to do to any American who dares to speak up.

    If that’s what can happen when the cameras are on, imagine what is already happening in communities across the country when the cameras are off.

    Today, it’s immigrants on the receiving end of Donald Trump’s outrage machine. Tomorrow, it could be anyone.

    We have seen this playbook before. In fact, it’s what drew me to politics in the first place, back in 1994. I had just earned my mechanical engineering degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with my sights set on a lucrative career in engineering, but life had a different plan for me. I returned home from school to find hateful TV ads and a statewide ballot called Proposition 187, a proposal targeting immigrant families and communities like mine. It was the result of a Republican governor who was up for re-election and who had turned to scapegoating immigrants to try to improve his declining political standing.

    As the proud son of immigrants from Mexico who came to California to pursue the American dream, I am living proof of the promise this country provides to all of us. Where else can the son of a housekeeper and a short-order cook become a senator? But I also know that America’s promise doesn’t happen by accident. It happens because throughout our history ordinary people have called out our country’s contradictions and called on the government to live up to the principles of equality established at our founding.

    And so I got involved. Alongside friends and family, I marched against the vile anti-immigrant rhetoric that was growing in California. Because of the movement that started in the 1990s, a generation of diverse leaders have come of age in California. Today, we celebrate immigrants — knowing full well that California has become the fourth-largest economy in the world, not despite our immigrants but because of them.

    So when Mr. Trump began to face a groundswell of criticism a few weeks ago for his unpopular Medicaid cuts, failed tariff wars and embarrassing public breakup with a billionaire adviser, I suspected that it wouldn’t be long before he broke out the same tired anti-immigrant tactics to distract the public. Raids intensified, detentions skyrocketed and Mr. Trump’s narrative of crisis escalated in the hopes of diverting attention from his political failures.

    If the administration were primarily targeting dangerous criminals, as some White House officials have claimed, there would be no debate. But new reporting shows that less than 10 percent of immigrants taken into ICE custody since October have serious criminal convictions. They may be undocumented, but who are they? Oftentimes, they’re hardworking cooks, day laborers, carwash employees, farmworkers and construction workers. Many are the same people Mr. Trump declared essential workers during the Covid-19 pandemic.

    But as we’ve seen in Los Angeles, public safety is not the point — the spectacle is. Americans are living through a historic moment of presidential overreach. With a cabinet of yes-men and underqualified attack dogs surrounding him — from the D.H.S. Secretary to the F.B.I. director to the secretary of defense — Mr. Trump is now testing the boundaries of his power. And he’s using the theatrics around his immigration policies to do it.

    That’s why when Angelenos gathered to protest these injustices, the administration labeled them “insurrectionists,” deliberately twisting dissent into something dangerous to use as a pretext for repression.

    So if you thought any of this administration’s theatrics in Los Angeles these past few weeks was truly about immigrants, it’s time to wake up. If federal troops can deploy to Los Angeles against the wishes of the governor, the mayor and even local law enforcement, they can do the same tomorrow in your hometown. This is a fundamental threat to the rule of law nationwide.

    What’s happening in Los Angeles is a warning shot. But I pray it can also be a wake-up call — for my Republican Senate colleagues who have stayed silent in the face of their colleague’s handcuffing, but also for Americans of every stripe who think they’re insulated from Mr. Trump’s power grabs because they’re not immigrants or because they’re not from a blue state.

    Democracy doesn’t fall from any one decision or any one attack. It falls from a thousand cuts that slowly erode our fundamental freedoms. It falls when good people see our democracy sliding backward but still choose to say nothing.

    Even as I’ve seen the authoritarian instincts of this administration up close, I know America is not past saving. True liberation doesn’t come through military occupation. It comes through democratic participation — participation like what we saw this past weekend, when millions of Americans came out to protest this administration’s abuse of power.

    To any American wondering if democracy is lost or if they can ever make a difference, I’d say this: If the Trump administration was this scared of one senator with a question, imagine what the voices of tens of millions of Americans organizing will do. No one is coming to save us but us.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: CIRA’s Internet Performance Test turns 10 with new features and insights on Canada’s digital divide

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    OTTAWA, Ontario, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CIRA is proud to celebrate the 10-year anniversary of its Internet Performance Test (IPT), marking a significant milestone in the journey towards building a more equitable and accessible internet across Canada. Since the first test was captured in the spring of 2015, Canadians have run over 1.7 million tests, leveraging the tool and its crowd-sourced approach to better understand their connection. The platform allows local governments, advocates and researchers to track national progress toward closing the digital divide.

    Over the years, the data collected through IPT has provided insight into how the internet is evolving across Canada. In its inaugural year, the national median download speed was just over 11 Mbps, with an upload speed of 2.4 Mbps. Fast forward to last year, the national median speeds soared to 92 Mbps download and 27 Mbps upload, showcasing incredible progress.

    This milestone coincides with the launch of new CRTC hearings that will investigate how to improve the shopping experience for consumers to ensure they get the speed and quality they pay for.

    Key insights

    • A noticeable inflection point after 2019 suggests that increased government and private investments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—and its consequences on the online lives of Canadians—have significantly impacted connectivity.
    • While rural speeds have improved substantially, the gap between rural and urban connectivity remains largely unchanged.
    • Regional disparities persist, with New Brunswick enjoying relatively fast speeds, while the Prairies continue to lag behind.
    • The far North, particularly the territories, shows the lowest connectivity levels, with median speeds well below half the national average.
    • Latency—a critical quality metric that can lead to noticeable delays in online activities such as video calls, streaming and other real-time applications—highlights the challenges faced by networks covering vast territories. Areas such as Nunavut, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan exhibit the highest latency levels, indicating the need for continued investment in underserved regions.

    Executive quote

    “Ten years of the IPT marks a major milestone in Canada’s connectivity journey. Thanks to community partnerships, we’ve built a powerful tool for change, but the digital divide persists. More than ever, we must keep investing, collaborating and pushing forward to ensure fast, reliable internet is a reality for everyone, no matter where they live.” — Charles Noir, Vice-president, Community Investment, Policy & Advocacy, CIRA

    New features
    To mark this anniversary, CIRA is rolling out a series of powerful new features designed to enhance user experience and deliver even deeper insights:

    1. Autotesting capability: the IPT can now run automated tests at regular intervals over hours or days. Logged-in users can track how their connection performs throughout the day.
    2. New speed categories: newly added categories highlight areas with exceptional service and ultra-fast connections.
    3. Basemap selection: in addition to the default street map, users can now switch to satellite imagery for added geographic context.
    4. Upload speed visualization: the Internet Performance Map now displays both download and upload speeds, offering a more complete view of internet performance.
    5. Expanded dashboard insights: IPT account holders now have access to more detailed metrics and visualizations via updated dashboards.

    Resources 


    About CIRA
     
    CIRA is the national not-for-profit best known for managing the .CA domain on behalf of all Canadians. As a leader in Canada’s internet ecosystem, CIRA offers a wide range of products, programs and services designed to make the internet a secure and accessible space for all. CIRA advocates for Canada on both national and international stages to support its goal of building a trusted internet for Canadians by helping shape the future of the internet. 

    About Net Good by CIRA and the Internet Performance Test  
    Net Good by CIRA supports communities, projects and policies that make the internet better for all Canadians including CIRA’s Internet Performance Test (IPT). The IPT platform offers advanced and detailed diagnostic data enabling communities, researchers, and decision-makers to better understand and improve internet access in Canada. Each year, CIRA proudly funds its Net Good program from the revenue generated through .CA domains. 

    Media contact 
    Delphine Avomo Evouna 
    613.315.1458 
    delphine.avomoevouna@cira.ca 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Australia’s unemployment rate remains stable at 4.1 per cent.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    CANBERRA, June 19 (Xinhua) — Australia’s unemployment rate remained stable at 4.1 percent in May, official data showed.

    Monthly labour force data released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) on Thursday showed the unemployment rate was unchanged in May, both seasonally adjusted and year-on-year, at 4.1 per cent.

    The ABS said employment fell by 2,500 people between April and May but rose by 329,100, or 2.3 per cent, over the past 12 months, compared with the pre-pandemic 10-year average annual growth of 1.7 per cent.

    The fall in employment in May came after the number of Australians in work increased by 89,000 between March and April.

    The labour force participation rate in May was 67 percent, down slightly from 67.1 percent in April, according to the ABS.

    It is noted that the total number of hours worked by Australians increased by 1.3 percent from April to May and by 3.1 percent over 12 months, amounting to 1.99 billion. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • India records highest growth in power generation after US & China in last five years: IEA

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    India has emerged as a country with the third-largest growth in power generation capacity globally over the past five years, according to the latest report by the International Energy Agency (IEA).
    Only China and the United States surpassed India in power generation growth during this period.

    It said “India has seen the third-largest growth in power generation capacity in the world after China and the United States”.

    The report highlighted that India’s electricity demand has been rising sharply due to several factors. These include the expansion of commercial and residential spaces, increased ownership of air conditioners and other household appliances, and growing demand from industries.

    To meet this growing demand, power generation in the country has expanded across all energy sources.

    The report mentioned that a major driver of this expansion has been the strong push towards renewable energy.

    The report noted a significant increase in investments in clean energy, especially solar photovoltaic (PV) projects. In fact, solar PV alone accounted for more than half of the total non-fossil energy investment in India over the past five years. In 2024, as much as 83 per cent of power sector investment in the country went into clean energy initiatives.

    India was also the largest recipient of development finance institution (DFI) funding for clean energy in 2024. The country received around USD 2.4 billion in project-specific funding aimed at boosting clean energy generation.

    In terms of foreign investment, India has seen a steady rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the power sector. FDI reached USD 5 billion in 2023, nearly twice the level seen before the COVID-19 pandemic.

    This growth is partly driven by government policies that allow 100 per cent FDI in all areas of electricity generation (except nuclear power) and transmission infrastructure.

    However, the report also pointed out that foreign portfolio investment in India’s energy sector has seen a decline in the past two years. This drop is attributed to a mix of macroeconomic and sector-specific challenges, though the long-term trend remains positive.

    Overall, the IEA report outlined India’s strong performance in power generation and its growing focus on clean energy investment.

    (ANI)

  • India records highest growth in power generation after US & China in last five years: IEA

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    India has emerged as a country with the third-largest growth in power generation capacity globally over the past five years, according to the latest report by the International Energy Agency (IEA).
    Only China and the United States surpassed India in power generation growth during this period.

    It said “India has seen the third-largest growth in power generation capacity in the world after China and the United States”.

    The report highlighted that India’s electricity demand has been rising sharply due to several factors. These include the expansion of commercial and residential spaces, increased ownership of air conditioners and other household appliances, and growing demand from industries.

    To meet this growing demand, power generation in the country has expanded across all energy sources.

    The report mentioned that a major driver of this expansion has been the strong push towards renewable energy.

    The report noted a significant increase in investments in clean energy, especially solar photovoltaic (PV) projects. In fact, solar PV alone accounted for more than half of the total non-fossil energy investment in India over the past five years. In 2024, as much as 83 per cent of power sector investment in the country went into clean energy initiatives.

    India was also the largest recipient of development finance institution (DFI) funding for clean energy in 2024. The country received around USD 2.4 billion in project-specific funding aimed at boosting clean energy generation.

    In terms of foreign investment, India has seen a steady rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the power sector. FDI reached USD 5 billion in 2023, nearly twice the level seen before the COVID-19 pandemic.

    This growth is partly driven by government policies that allow 100 per cent FDI in all areas of electricity generation (except nuclear power) and transmission infrastructure.

    However, the report also pointed out that foreign portfolio investment in India’s energy sector has seen a decline in the past two years. This drop is attributed to a mix of macroeconomic and sector-specific challenges, though the long-term trend remains positive.

    Overall, the IEA report outlined India’s strong performance in power generation and its growing focus on clean energy investment.

    (ANI)

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Backgrounder: Unique air travel challenges for northern and remote communities

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Backgrounder

    Highlights from the Competition Bureau’s market study of Canada’s airline industry

    June 19, 2025 – GATINEAU (Québec), Competition Bureau

    The Competition Bureau’s market study on competition in Canada’s airline industry included an analysis of the unique challenges faced by northern and remote communities.

    For these communities, air transportation is essential—not optional. It impacts even those who never fly. Residents depend on it for access to healthcare, groceries, medicine, jobs, and social connection. Yet harsh weather, small populations, limited facilities, and high costs make it difficult for airlines to serve these markets.

    This backgrounder summarizes the market study’s key findings concerning air travel for Canada’s northern and remote communities, and our recommendations on how to improve competition.

    What we heard

    The Bureau consulted with nearly 50 stakeholders on the challenges faced by northern and remote regions, including airlines, industry associations, academics, airports, consumer associations, regional chambers of commerce, and provincial, territorial, and federal governments. We also heard from over 200 members of the public about northern issues during public consultations in June and August 2024. To gain a deeper understanding of these challenges, Bureau employees visited Iqaluit as a part of this study and met with local stakeholders.

    Residents across the North—particularly in Nunavut—shared consistent concerns about the high cost of air travel, limited competition, and unreliable service.

    Most routes in Nunavut are served by two airlines: Canadian North, which primarily operates in the Qikiqtaaluk and Kitikmeot regions, and Calm Air, which mainly serves the Kivalliq region (with both carriers overlapping only at Rankin Inlet). This limited competition, combined with rising costs and reduced flight options, affects residents’ ability to travel, access essential services, and get work or business opportunities.

    The Bureau’s prior work in northern aviation

    The Bureau has examined competition issues in northern and remote airlines markets in the past. For example:

    • In 2016, the Bureau investigated concerns over alleged predatory pricing by First Air and Canadian North to block a new entrant, GoSarvaq. While there were signs that First Air’s and Canadian North’s pricing promotions likely had some impact on GoSarvaq’s entry plans, the Bureau concluded that there was not enough evidence to take enforcement action. GoSavarq ceased operations shortly thereafter.
    • In 2019, the Bureau reviewed the merger of Canadian North and First Air and concluded it would likely reduce competition and lead to higher prices and worse service. However, the federal cabinet, on the recommendation of the Minister of Transport, approved the merger with conditions to limit price hikes and service cuts. In April 2023, those conditions were amended due to the pandemic’s impact on the airline industry.

    Although our current study did not re-examine these cases in detail, stakeholders consistently raised concerns about aggressive competitive responses to entry and cited the merger of Canadian North and First Air as an example of how limited competition and policy gaps have harmed air service in the North.

    Persistent challenges in northern aviation

    In our report, we identified barriers that make it difficult for new players to enter and expand services in northern and remote communities. These include:

    • Vast geography and isolation: Small, spread-out populations in the North limit potential revenue for airlines, a significant challenge as they also face high operating costs—such as fuel, labor, and housing.
    • Underdeveloped airport facilities: Infrastructure such as buildings, weather monitoring systems, and runways play a large role in airlines’ operations. This airport infrastructure is underdeveloped in the North, making it more challenging for airlines to operate, and causing their costs to rise.
    • Regulations are not adapted to northern factors: Regulations play an important role in the aviation sector, but their standard application in northern and remote regions can impose burdens on airlines that cost them money and may drive them to exit the market. A one-size-fits-all approach to regulations does not work for the specific conditions of northern communities.
    • Unnecessary bidding restrictions on government contracts: Government contracts are important to northern airlines. When contracts are difficult for smaller operators to bid on, it can limit the number of airlines that can compete.
    • The strategic behaviour of existing airlines: Existing airlines can make it hard for new airlines to enter the northern market by restricting access to airline-owned airport facilities and by aggressively cutting prices and adding extra seats on routes served by the new airlines.

    These unique challenges show why solutions must be tailored to northern needs. While the economics of operating in the North limits the number of competitors serving many routes, competition can be enhanced by making it easier for newer or more efficient airlines to operate in the market.

    Our recommendations

    To improve competition in northern and remote communities, the Bureau makes the following recommendations to governments:

    1. Coordinate leadership of northern and remote aviation. Establish a national working group focused on remote air transportation to properly address the unique challenges of these regions. This group should prioritize competitive solutions that lead to high-quality and accessible air service for northern communities.
    2. Tailor regulations to the northern context. Adopt an approach to policy specific to the North that reduces unintended regulatory costs on northern operators.
    3. Leverage government investments and tools to foster competition. Improve critical infrastructure at key northern airports and develop open-access airport facilities to reduce operational barriers and enable broader carrier access. Open government contracts to as many bidders as possible and promote interlining agreements to expand carrier participation and support regional connectivity.

    We make additional recommendations in our market study to promote airline entry and growth, as well as to support informed passenger decision-making. Those recommendations would also benefit northern and remote communities.

    Our commitment to protect airline competition

    We recognize the important role the Competition Bureau plays to safeguard competition against anti-competitive activity in this sector. In addition to our recommendations for governments across Canada, we will continue to approach our work in the Canadian airline industry with careful attention and scrutiny. Following recent amendments to the Competition Act, we are committed to using our full range of enforcement tools. This includes seeking court orders where appropriate to try to quickly stop anti-competitive practices.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Alexey Overchuk: “A change in the technological order is taking place”

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk discusses the nature of the changes taking place in international trade, the struggle of countries for access to rare earth minerals, and the establishment of new trade relations for Russia in an interview with Vedomosti.

    Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper

    Question: Vedomosti, together with Roscongress and economists, prepared a report for the SPIEF on the topic of “Global Development Opportunities.” The main trend that experts are currently noting is the fragmentation of the global economy. In your opinion, what balance of power may be established in the near future?

    A. Overchuk: Indeed, fragmentation of the world economy, or deglobalization, is happening. This has an economic background.

    Globalization emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a response to the economic and social successes of the socialist economy. In the United States, it was seen as a threat to a way of life based on private property.

    In this global confrontation, the USSR and its allies were excluded from global supply chains, financial restrictions were imposed on them, export controls were applied, obstacles were created to obtaining export revenues, and conditions were created for the diversion of resources to unproductive expenditures, such as the arms race and peripheral military conflicts. The policy of containment put the USSR in a position where its revenue opportunities were narrowed and its expenditure obligations increased. The calculation was that at some point the country’s budget, formed on the basis of a strict planning system, would cross the break-even point and the state would not be able to fulfill its obligations to the Soviet people.

    At the same time, in exchange for participating in the containment policy, the United States created the most favorable conditions for the development of the countries that supported them. They were provided with access to cheap finance, technology, education, and security guarantees. Thus, these countries were freed up funds that could be used for development, and market conditions and freedom of capital movement made it possible to build the most effective international supply chains. Investments were placed where they gave the greatest return, which made it possible to better saturate the market with goods. An international trade system was formed that sought to ensure free access of goods to foreign markets, including the most capacious consumer market on the planet.

    The United States bore the burden of maintaining this system for decades, but also, thanks to the strength of its domestic market, it was able to turn a blind eye to tariff restrictions and barriers to American exports in the markets of friendly countries. Many of these countries took advantage of globalization, which demonstrated the advantages of a market economy. It was not emphasized that this success was financed by the largest economy in the world. The outcome of the confrontation between the two economic systems is known, and, obviously, the point of further bearing these costs has diminished. Today, countries that have enjoyed the benefits of globalization for 70 years are forced to pay their own bills, costs and their structure are changing, and this is pushing the world to find a new balance.

    Question: Why did fragmentation begin now?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are long and are now just becoming noticeable. Over the past 30 years, there has been a series of economic crises and regional conflicts that have diverted resources and influenced the growth of national debt. The United States allowed a trade imbalance and barriers to its exports. Trust in the dollar-based international financial system has been undermined. The freezing of Russian foreign assets and talk of their confiscation have called into question the security of property rights. New technologies have emerged. Internal problems have accumulated. Apparently, [US President Donald] Trump wondered: why continue to bear this global burden when solving the accumulated internal problems requires corresponding expenses? All this has a complex effect.

    In addition, the pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of the global economy. China has gone into isolation, causing supply disruptions to global markets. The vulnerability of international commodity flows and dependence on foreign suppliers, for example, of the same chips, began to be perceived as a security threat. There has come an understanding that the global economy does not always work as we would like, it is necessary to reduce the transport shoulder, move production closer to consumers, and even better, especially when it comes to security issues, not to transfer technology and develop our own production.

    Question: How would you identify the potential fault lines of global economic fragmentation?

    A. Overchuk: The modern world is connected by complex economic threads, and if they begin to break, their recreation in other regions will require very large investments, the justification of which will often be questionable. At the same time, processes have already been launched that are throwing the global system out of balance and forcing the formation of new cooperation chains and the search for new balances. In this environment, countries will be attracted to the largest economies of their regions. Obviously, such factors as the presence of domestic consumer demand capable of ensuring the necessary level of sustainable independent development, the presence of science and a production base that supports technological sovereignty, own resources necessary to ensure food and energy security, as well as the development of a new economy will play a role here. Availability of water will be critical. The presence of a civilizational community and a common language for communication will play a role. Not many regions of the planet that, despite fragmentation, will continue to maintain ties with each other fall under this description.

    Question: The trade deficit has been the main reason for the double- and triple-digit tariffs in the US. What are the long-term consequences of the US tariffs?

    A. Overchuk: They will negotiate and look for a balance of interests. First, they announced an increase in tariffs and made it clear to their partners how everything could suddenly change and become bad, and then they rolled back and negotiations began. Tariffs are a double-edged sword. Their growth entails an increase in prices for imported consumer goods, which affects inflation, leads to a drop in real incomes, etc. It is unlikely that anyone wants to go this route completely, but some positions of American exports may improve. The main goal of these efforts is to create conditions for the relocation of production to North America. A self-sufficient macro-region with a huge consumer market and global export opportunities is being formed here. Such shifts do not happen quickly, so the coming years will be spent in a joint search for new equilibrium points, which will be very dynamic. Agreements will be reached and quickly revised.

    Question: We discussed with experts how difficult it will be for China to overcome this. They are focused on the domestic market, but the export economy still accounts for a significant part of the GDP. How will this hit China, even if they agree to reduce duties to reasonable levels?

    A. Overchuk: China is making a lot of efforts to improve people’s living standards and increase domestic consumption. Its progress in this area is obvious. On the other hand, it is, of course, an export-oriented economy that has extracted maximum benefits from globalization and has become one of the most technologically advanced on the planet. The international trade system has made the economies of the United States and China interdependent like no other. The state of relations between them determines the well-being of the entire world, and both countries understand the consequences of their abrupt rupture. At the same time, it is known that China’s growth is now perceived in the United States as a threat to its leadership. Hence the use of export control measures and the withdrawal of assets of American companies. In addition, recreating the international supply chains formed in and around China will require attracting an unbearable volume of investment. This will take time. So there will be agreements on some positions.

    At the same time, China is actively diversifying its export markets. As a country with a strategic vision, China has been working on implementing its Belt and Road Initiative for over 10 years, creating favorable conditions for promoting its goods, services, technologies, and knowledge to foreign markets. This is a global project. Geography does not allow us to talk about it as a macro-region, but rather as a global network structure with the center of economic gravity in China.

    Question: It used to be that the production process was distributed across different countries: raw materials were mined here, processing and assembly took place – design and software work took place there… If the value chains were to be broken, how would production and international trade take place?

    A. Overchuk: It will not come to a complete break. The world is very complex now. Hundreds and thousands of individual components and parts are produced in dozens of countries and cross state borders dozens of times before they are put together into a final product that is consumed on some completely different side of the world. The changes that are taking place lead to changes in the cost structure of production and delivery of goods and services to end consumers, which does not go unnoticed by investors and they react to it. In addition, the global economic system has shown its vulnerabilities. Some things will continue to be created as a product resulting from coordinated global efforts, while others will be localized within individual macro-regions and countries. Much of this is based on economic calculations, while others are dictated by the current global situation.

    Particular attention should be paid to new types of resources for the new economy. After all, countries with technologies do not always have a sufficient resource base. Therefore, international supply chains connecting different regions of the world are likely to receive new content. Countries with technologies will strive to develop their own production, and therefore the need for cross-border knowledge transfer will decrease. End consumers will have access to user devices connected to computing power located in countries that own technological solutions and intellectual property rights. The main flows of global income will also be directed there. Such technological dependence will be avoided by those who can independently develop the relevant competencies and protect their market. Potentially, there are three or four macro-regions on the planet that are already doing this or will be able to do so.

    Question: Is it economically feasible to do everything in one country?

    A. Overchuk: It is economically expedient to optimize costs, i.e. to distribute production in such a way that the best competitive conditions are achieved for each specific product on the consumer market. This is how it worked under globalization. On the other hand, there are factors of technological sovereignty, food and energy security. Some countries can afford greater dependence on external circumstances, some less. Their income level will also depend on this.

    Question: So this is a question of national security and sovereignty?

    A. Overchuk: This is at the intersection of interests, ambitions and opportunities.

    Question: If we resume trade relations with the US, is it possible to increase trade turnover? Last year it was a 30-year low – $3.5 billion. Compared to the economies these are, one could say there was simply no trade turnover.

    A. Overchuk: Our trade turnover with one of the two largest economies in the world (China. – Vedomosti) exceeds $244 billion. With Belarus we have $51 billion, with Armenia it exceeded $12 billion. Therefore, as they say, when there is practically nothing, Russian-American mutual trade has good potential. Taking into account the low base effect, trade turnover with the USA will grow rapidly if such decisions are made.

    The United States is currently attracting investors to its country and seeking to create new production facilities. Even taking into account the capacity of the North American market, the United States will be interested in increasing its exports. From this point of view, the EAEU is about 190 million consumers with good purchasing power living within the perimeter of the common customs contour. In other words, this is a promising market for the United States. As for the reverse flow of goods from the EAEU, we see interest in access to critical minerals and rare earths, which Central Asia, located between China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian Sea and Russia, is rich in. Investing in the creation of modern high-tech production facilities in North America requires ensuring guaranteed supplies of raw materials, which makes the existence of secure supply chains critically necessary. The most cost-effective and secure route from Central Asia to North America lies north of Kazakhstan to the Baltic and the Barents Sea. There are other areas of mutual interest, so there is certainly potential.

    Question: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Greater Eurasian Partnership idea. It was planned that the EAEU would be “coupled” with other associations that already exist on the continent. Which ones have more prospects?

    A. Overchuk: Various integration associations are being formed on the large Eurasian continent today. There is the EU, the EAEU, the CIS, and ASEAN. China is developing its Belt and Road project. The SCO has recently been paying increasing attention to issues of improving transport connectivity on the continent and creating common investment mechanisms for development. These are already mechanisms for linking participating economies.

    If we talk about the EAEU, work is underway to develop international transport corridors that will play a central role in the overall transport framework of Greater Eurasia, integration with the Chinese Belt and Road initiative is being carried out, industrial cooperation projects that build value chains are being supported, trade barriers are being reduced, and the free trade zone is being expanded. This is what is already being done.

    Of particular importance for the EAEU is the development of trade relations with the countries of the Global South and the formation of better conditions for promoting exports from our countries to this market, as well as saturating our common market with their products. These efforts contribute to the development of mutual trade with India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and further – with Southeast Asia, with Africa. These are all rapidly developing markets with good demographics, and there is prospect there.

    Question: Since you mentioned Afghanistan… The Supreme Court lifted the terrorist status of the Taliban, the de facto authorities of the country. How do you think this could change the approaches to the implementation of international projects in the country and Russia’s participation in them?

    A. Overchuk: Russia has a varied history with this country, and many people have questions about the normalization of relations with the Taliban movement. What should be understood here? For the first time in many years, a situation has developed in Afghanistan where the central government controls the entire territory of the country and seeks to ensure peaceful conditions. Representatives of Afghanistan say that they are interested in living in peace with their neighbors and developing their own economy. The results of these efforts are already noticeable. Automobile transit from Russia, from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan has begun.

    The Afghans have proposed a list of projects: from the construction of residential buildings to power plants, from road construction to the production and processing of agricultural products. Any government interested in improving life in its country will take such actions. It is in our interests for Afghanistan to be a peaceful state, and for people to be engaged in peaceful life. We want to contribute to this. Especially since the leadership of this country demonstrates a positive attitude towards Russia.

    Question: On the issue of Eurasian transport corridors. There is North-South. Iraq has spoken about its intention to build a branch from Iran. There is Turkey’s “Development Road” project – from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Turkey and Europe. Can this also be connected somehow? Or are they competitors?

    A. Overchuk: There are many initiatives in the transport and logistics sector on the continent. Countries are striving to develop international transport corridors. As a result, a single transport framework of Greater Eurasia will be formed. The totality of these efforts, even competing with each other, will strengthen transport connectivity in the macro-region and promote the development of its economies. Everyone in Greater Eurasia will benefit from this. But peace is needed for this.

    Question: We have a free trade zone with Vietnam. Are there any similar agreements planned with India, with which our trade is growing?

    A. Overchuk: The purpose of such agreements is to simplify trade conditions, reduce costs for business by improving the accessibility of foreign markets, which leads to an increase in mutual trade, complementarity and growth of the economies of the participating countries. The EAEU member states view India as the largest and geographically closest market in Eurasia to our union, with which it is possible to conclude a free trade agreement. Together with our partners in the EAEU and the CIS, we are working to improve transport connectivity with India and create better conditions for the mutual movement of goods between our markets. Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are also interested in developing such infrastructure. The free trade agreement with Iran entered into force in May this year. Preparations were underway with Pakistan to launch the first freight train between our countries. Our vision of Greater Eurasia, among other things, includes the formation of a continental transport framework, which, where possible, will be supported by free trade agreements. It is clear that what is now starting to happen between Iran and Israel is pushing this prospect back and slowing down the economic development of the countries in the region.

    Consultations are underway on the issue of the agreement with India. We see that India is also working in this direction, concluding agreements with other countries, for example with the UAE or, most recently, in May, with Britain, developing trade and economic ties with the USA. The totality of such efforts of many countries is forming a new network of mutually beneficial ties and relations between states and international integration associations.

    Question: What are the positions of the parties?

    A. Overchuk: The positions of the parties will be set out in the signed document.

    Question: You said that it is important to strengthen good-neighborly relations in order to counter external challenges that are growing every year. In this regard, what prospects do you see for the development of the EAEU? Is it possible to expand the number of its participants?

    A. Overchuk: The EAEU has already reached a very high level of economic integration. Five equal member states have access to a large common market, have put in place a mechanism to support industrial cooperation and are jointly expanding the free trade zone, providing better competitive conditions for their exports. In general, the EAEU has resolved the problems of food and energy security, and transport connectivity is being strengthened. Last year, the GDP growth rates of the EAEU member states exceeded the world average. All this does not go unnoticed, and an increasing number of countries are showing interest in closer cooperation with our integration association.

    As for the accession of new states to the EAEU, this is always their sovereign decision, taken based on an analysis of the pros and cons that the respective economies will receive. Countries comprehensively assess the impact of integration on individual sectors of their economy, investment attraction, the labor market, their foreign economic and foreign policy relations with other countries. For our part, we also consider these models, assess how the opening of our markets to potential member states will affect our economies, as well as how the structure of their economies will be transformed. We understand that for the economies of our closest neighbors, joining the EAEU will create new opportunities for growth and development.

    Question: We have observer countries in the EAEU. As if joining is the next step for them?

    A. Overchuk: Observer states in the EAEU are Uzbekistan, Iran, Cuba. This status gives the country the opportunity to gain access to materials, documents, have the opportunity to participate at the expert level in working meetings, can state their positions there, and also take part in regular meetings at the level of heads of government and heads of state. The EAEU is the largest economic integration association in our region, and, understanding its logic, they can make more informed decisions for interaction and development of their economies.

    The EAEU is a leading trading partner, for example, for Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan is a member of the CIS, where there is also a free trade zone for goods and services. In addition, Uzbekistan has certain advantages in customs clearance of goods going to our markets. Russian business is actively investing in the economy of this country. Our countries have a flexible set of economic integration tools and have the choice to act as they see fit. If any country ever considers it promising to join the EAEU, it will make a corresponding request, and the EAEU member states will consider it.

    Question: There is also the issue of distribution of duties in the EAEU. Could this be a barrier for countries to join?

    A. Overchuk: The system of distribution of customs duties is designed in such a way that the accession of a new member state will require a revision of the existing shares due to each state. This is part of the accession process, during which all countries will agree on a new distribution formula, which directly affects the size of customs revenues of each participant in the integration association. However, even if we imagine that the country will incur losses, it will still ultimately benefit from access to a larger market, participation in cooperation chains, resources and the economic growth associated with all this. All this is taken into account, and the experience of the EAEU shows that agreements are always found. So there is no barrier here – there will be negotiations, and this is normal.

    Question: It seems that there is a threat of the opposite process – a reduction in the number of EAEU participants. Armenia recently adopted a law on striving to join the EU. At the end of 2024, you said that Yerevan’s trade with it was falling, while with the EAEU it was growing. The Armenian Foreign Ministry said in May that they had not submitted applications to the EU and intended to work in the EAEU. How do you assess such conflicting signals?

    A. Overchuk: In 2014, before joining the EAEU, Armenia’s per capita GDP was approximately $3,850. Thanks to barrier-free access to the EAEU market, this figure exceeded $8,500 in 2024. Mutual trade with the EAEU in 2024 reached $12.7 billion. For comparison: the volume of mutual trade between Armenia and the EU in 2024 was $2.3 billion. Providing the republic with food and energy on favorable terms also contributes to the sustainable and dynamic development of Armenia as our ally. Armenia’s economic success is a demonstration of the advantages of the interaction model within the EAEU. On the one hand, this is what shapes reality in Armenia, and on the other hand, there are people in Armenia who believe that developing relations with the EU opens up more prospects for their country than interaction with the EAEU. Ultimately, this will be the choice of the Armenian people, and we will always respect it.

    Currently, there is a discussion in Armenia and practical measures are being taken to get closer to the EU. This is already having a negative economic effect. Back in September of last year, I drew the attention of my colleagues to the fact that due to the rapprochement with the EU, Russian entrepreneurs are starting to be more cautious about doing business with Armenia. According to our estimates, our mutual trade turnover last year already lost about $2 billion. This year, we have already lost $3 billion, and the overall decline by the end of the year will obviously be $6 billion. For a country with a GDP of about $26 billion, these are very noticeable figures. And this is only the reaction of Russian business to the Armenian discussion about rapprochement with the EU.

    It is obvious that the EAEU and the EU are incompatible. It is impossible to be in two unions at the same time. Moreover, Brussels, despite the fact that many in Armenia do not want a break, will not allow Yerevan to have normal relations with Russia in the current conditions. Therefore, when the people of Armenia go to make their choice, they will need to imagine how this will affect the lives of ordinary people and what will happen next.

    For example, in 2022, Brussels closed the skies of Europe to Russian air carriers. The European perspective means that Yerevan will also have to stop air traffic with Russia, since decisions will be made elsewhere. Of course, people will adapt and start flying via Tbilisi, but this means that families will not be able to communicate with their loved ones in Russia as easily, or grandchildren from Russia cannot simply be put on a direct flight to Yerevan and sent to their relatives for the summer. Of course, the flow of tourists from Russia – and this is the main source of tourist income – will come to naught, which will affect the hotel and restaurant business, and this will also affect retail.

    Europe has closed for Russian hauliers and retaliatory measures have been introduced against European hauliers. Today, at the borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus with the EU, cargo is being re-coupled, and then it is pulled by a vehicle with Russian or Belarusian license plates. The European perspective means that Armenian trucks will also come to Verkhniy Lars, re-coupled and return back to Armenia. There may be many such everyday examples in the future.

    This year, the dynamics of Armenia’s trade with the EU has shown growth, while Armenian exports to the EU are declining. Unfortunately, Armenia has already made a decision to simplify the procedure for processing documents on conformity assessment of food products imported to Armenia from non-EAEU member states. Because of this seemingly inconspicuous decision, in addition to the fact that foreign goods will begin to create competition within Armenia and displace Armenian producers, Russia will need to assess the threats to its market. The authors of this document expect that the EAEU will not be able to open its market to goods that do not meet its requirements, which means that Russia will need to strengthen control in Upper Lars, which will be felt by many bona fide Armenian producers selling their goods to Russia, and this will cause their dissatisfaction with the actions of Russia and the EAEU. We are being placed in such conditions, and the ultimate goal of these efforts, as the EU wants, is a complete break between Russia and Armenia. Whether the Armenians want this is a question they will have to answer. In today’s reality, given the state of relations between Russia and the EU, this is exactly how life looks, and people need to know about it.

    The law declaring the beginning of the process of joining the EU has already been adopted, and we have a tradition of taking the law seriously. It is a difficult situation: once again, it will be the choice of the people of Armenia, and we will respect it. We want to develop multifaceted ties with Armenia. Armenian employers and regions are also in favor of developing ties with Russia, they are talking about the urgent need to increase the number of checkpoints.

    Question: From the point of view of global development trends, can the EU somehow be part of the Greater Eurasian space?

    A. Overchuk: Someday, maybe. The main problem of the European Union is the lack of its own resources, and Europeans have long understood this well. Every time the world stood on the threshold of a new industrial revolution, the question of access to resources arose. If you recall the Treaty of Versailles, then significant attention was paid to coal, and if you recall the post-war agreements in the 20th century, then the discussion was about gas and oil. In the context of the transition to a new economic order, Europe is seeking to gain access to resources that it does not have, but which are necessary to maintain its position in the new world.

    The EU is the largest developed market with high purchasing power of the population. In the current conditions, the EU ceases to be a purely economic union, while it is losing its production base, in a number of important positions it depends on foreign technologies, and the most effective transport routes pass through the Union State. A more sober assessment of the situation would help Brussels peacefully fit into global trends, become part of Greater Eurasia and largely maintain its standard of living.

    Question: BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, has been expanding very rapidly in recent years – up to and including 2024. What opportunities does Russia have in BRICS? Is further expansion possible?

    A. Overchuk: BRICS is a unique platform: there are no big, small, senior or junior. It appeared relatively recently and, one might say, is still feeling out possible options for interaction, comparing the positions of the parties and, due to its global nature and respectful attitude to the opinions of all partners, is careful in forming institutional mechanisms for interaction. Discussions take place on an equal footing, without mentoring, moralizing or imposing someone else’s positions. Everyone has the opportunity to convey their point of view, and if others share it, it is reflected in the final documents, which, as a rule, reflect positions on issues on the global agenda, and also define a joint vision of development.

    BRICS does not oppose itself to the existing international institutions and does not seek to replace them, most likely, it develops a joint position for work within them. At the same time, without opposing itself to the existing international structures, BRICS does not exclude the creation of alternative structures. For example, the New Development Bank has been created. There is an exchange of experience, knowledge, approaches, and certain positions are being developed at the interdepartmental level. There is in-depth interaction along the lines of finance ministries, central banks, tax authorities, transport workers and other areas. This in itself is very valuable and, in the case of joint interest, can begin to acquire specifics.

    Other important points that are probably not paid much attention to: BRICS does not include countries whose relations were burdened by a colonial past, and there is no division into developed and developing countries. All this makes it attractive for many countries of the world.

    Question: The BRICS countries are very geographically divided by regions: there are integration associations that are geographically more compact – the EAEU, the EU, NAFTA. That is, this is not an integration process and organization, but rather a club, like the G20 or an alternative to the G7?

    A. Overchuk: The advantage of BRICS is that it is not really a regional association. Its wide geographical distribution ensures the presence of various points of view on this platform, reflecting regional characteristics and vision. Countries that play a leading role in their regions participate there. Many of them are centers of economic attraction in their regions, and in this sense BRICS can become a coordinating support for the interaction of future macro-regions. And this gives BRICS additional weight, not to mention the fact that BRICS is today economically larger than the G7.

    Question: What are Russia’s prospects with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Is a free trade zone possible with this association?

    A. Overchuk: Interaction in the EAEU-ASEAN format is developing. EAEU and ASEAN days are held at the ASEAN and EEC venues. Last year, a session on “Economic Integration and Connectivity of ASEAN and Northern Eurasia Macroregions” was held as part of the ASEAN Business Investment Summit, where the conjugation of their economic potentials was discussed. Over the past 10 years, mutual trade between Russia and ASEAN countries has grown by more than 80%. Cooperation will develop, but, of course, the relocation of production, changes in tariff policy, and the need to create conditions for development in the EAEU member states require a careful assessment of the consequences of concluding free trade agreements, which our five countries always do.

    And then there is APEC, which includes the USA, China, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia and other countries of the Pacific Ocean basin, where the idea of creating a free trade zone was also previously promoted. The world is trying out interaction in various formats, in which, in principle, everyone shares common points of view regarding a set of global challenges.

    Question: You have previously predicted that there will be a struggle between countries for access to rare earth minerals. The United States and Ukraine recently signed an agreement on access to them. Why have rare earth minerals become such an important resource?

    A. Overchuk: The fall in the cost of memory storage and the data streams continuously generated by the Internet of Things, along with the ability to work with unstructured data, have pushed the corporate world to create digital services based on algorithms and predictive analytics methods that allow us to predict the behavior of both various systems and individual users. In turn, all this has paved the way for the development of large language models and artificial intelligence, which requires a lot of energy. A little earlier, global concern about the growth of the average temperature on the planet and the need to switch to clean energy sources became more acute. The synergy of these changes leads to a point beyond which, as famous classics wrote, other production forces and production relations begin to operate. All this began to move actively about 15-17 years ago. So if you follow these processes, what is happening becomes clear.

    The technological order is changing, and this always requires new resources. When we depended – still depend, however – on the internal combustion engine, oil was the main resource. Today, the world is changing – and critical minerals and rare earths are becoming priority resources. But no serious investor will start investing until they have calculated all the risks and are completely confident in the control over the uninterrupted supply of raw materials.

    In the modern world, everyone strives to breathe fresh air, have access to clean water and prevent the planet’s temperature from rising. Achieving these noble goals requires restructuring the economy, closing old and organizing new production facilities, which creates a new demand and structure for the consumption of raw materials. For example, the transition to electric vehicles entails an increase in demand for lithium, copper, nickel and other so-called critical materials. Previously, these resources were not needed in such quantities, but today the situation has changed. Therefore, an assessment is made of global reserves, in which countries they are located, to what extent they will be able to meet the expected demand.

    There are studies that suggest that maintaining someone’s usual level of consumption, for example, two cars in each family, may raise the issue of a shortage of critical materials on the planet. It is clear that the economy of shared consumption has arrived and it is becoming more convenient to order a taxi or rent a car through an app than to buy one, but nevertheless, the issue of resource shortage is present. Therefore, those who have the appropriate technologies and an understanding of the development vector are striving to gain control over critical materials and rare earths. What happened in Ukraine with the signing of the well-known agreement is one illustration of the process. This is really very critical for the development of society, ensuring leadership positions in the global economy and maintaining the usual level of consumption. Those who do not yet fully understand this – enter into contracts with foreign companies to develop their reserves.

    Question: In addition to new types of resources, the issue of world hunger is also being discussed. It is believed that consumption will change, food preferences will change. For example, there is an opinion that there will not be enough meat for everyone, there will be plant food.

    A. Overchuk: At the recent Astana Forum, the FAO Director General said that Kazakhstan could theoretically feed 1 billion people. This is a very serious figure, given that the area under grain crops in Kazakhstan is about 15 million hectares, while in the world it is about 700 million hectares. This is only about Kazakhstan. Russia has more areas, better water supply, and higher yields. In addition, if we talk about the production and export of fertilizers to global markets, Russia and Belarus have strong positions here. Our macro-region is very well positioned in terms of ensuring its own food security and has unique export potential. If we are not hindered in receiving income from the sale of grain and food, then the problems of hunger in the world will be less acute.

    And of course, it is necessary to help needy countries develop food production, overcome poverty and increase incomes. This potential has not yet been exhausted either.

    Question: Another trend that is being talked about all over the world is the demographic problem: the aging population, the declining birth rate, even in India. This also directly affects the economy through labor resources, demand. How can we solve this problem here in Northern Eurasia? Attract labor from South Asia, ASEAN, Africa?

    A. Overchuk: A decrease in the supply of labor in the labor market leads to an increase in its cost and inflation. The import of cheap labor allows us to solve current problems, but in the longer term it reduces incentives to increase labor productivity, transition to new technologies and leads to economic backwardness. Given the advantages that Northern Eurasia has, it is already attracting migrants from South Asia and Africa.

    In some places, the demographic problem is considered to be population decline, while in others, on the contrary, it is population growth. Some places experience a labor shortage, while in others, there is an oversupply and pressure on social infrastructure. In general, Northern Eurasia looks rather balanced. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are recording rapid growth: for example, in Uzbekistan in 2024, with a population of almost 38 million people, 962,000 children were born. So the problems are different everywhere.

    Northern Eurasia is a single civilizational space with a common language of communication and worldview. This unity is the greatest advantage of all the peoples inhabiting our region, and therefore it is very important to preserve and support it. It is these efforts, as well as technological development and increased labor productivity, that will allow us to preserve our uniqueness and provide what is necessary for the further development of our macro-region in the new world.

    Question: Now the status of the world’s factory belongs to China. There is the US, which is transferring production to itself with the help of a trade war. There is ASEAN, for example, where even China is transferring production because there is cheap labor there. There is Africa. What new future layouts for the global division of labor do you see?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are constantly happening in the world. 70 years ago, the main production facilities were located in the USA and Europe. Then they moved to Japan, then to South Korea and China. Now the ASEAN countries are growing, and Africa is starting to develop. Every time one of the countries reached a certain level of development and income, investors had a question about the advisability of moving assets to economies that require lower costs. The impetus for making such decisions, as a rule, is a change in the cost of labor and, for example, tariff measures. Access to water and energy, the environment for doing business are also important. China has now reached a point of development where it itself has begun to move its production, and not only to the ASEAN countries, but also to the North American free trade zone, and is actively working with Africa.

    This process has been repeated in one form or another in different countries at different times. Assessing the features of the current stage, it is necessary to pay attention to the reduction in the share of live labor in the cost structure, which is happening due to the widespread introduction of new technologies, including artificial intelligence. This is what makes it possible to return production to highly developed countries with traditionally high labor costs. The advantage will be with those who master the technology and access to resources, but this will also increase the income gap, which will pose very serious social issues for these countries, including the need for a wider distribution of private property and the income it creates.

    Question: What will this changing world be like in the medium and long term, and what will be Russia’s role in it?

    A. Overchuk: In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia is one of the four leading economies in the world, which makes it the center of economic gravity of Northern Eurasia. Russia and its allies in the EAEU and the CIS have everything they need for confident development in the world of the future. Together, we have a literate and relatively large population, we have technologies and all the necessary resources, including water, we do not have acute problems with food and energy security, and we are expanding the free trade zone. The CIS countries have everything they need for success, which will be possible if we complement each other, develop integration, and jointly build ties with other macro-regions of the emerging world.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU – E-002331/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002331/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gerald Hauser (PfE)

    According to the ‘Health at a Glance: Europe 2024’ report, the OECD considers health professions in Europe to be in crisis. In the EU as a whole, there is a shortfall of 1.2 million doctors, nursing professionals and midwives. The WHO describes it as a ticking bomb: Without immediate action, healthcare staff shortages could have disastrous consequences. Moreover, the situation regarding healthcare staff in the EU is significantly worse than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic. With the Union’s crisis prevention strategy, the Commission seeks to take over key responsibilities from the Member States in the area of health, inter alia through the Critical Medicines Act and the Union of Skills, as well as with the help of various EU agencies and authorities. The Commission has explained that in order to safeguard citizens’ wellbeing, it is proposing additional measures in order to better cope with a series of threats, including pandemics and all manner of health emergencies.

    • 1.What does the Commission intend to do to overcome the disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU?
    • 2.What sum does the Commission intend to invest to overcome the disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU – E-002331/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002331/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gerald Hauser (PfE)

    According to the ‘Health at a Glance: Europe 2024’ report, the OECD considers health professions in Europe to be in crisis. In the EU as a whole, there is a shortfall of 1.2 million doctors, nursing professionals and midwives. The WHO describes it as a ticking bomb: Without immediate action, healthcare staff shortages could have disastrous consequences. Moreover, the situation regarding healthcare staff in the EU is significantly worse than it was before the Covid-19 pandemic. With the Union’s crisis prevention strategy, the Commission seeks to take over key responsibilities from the Member States in the area of health, inter alia through the Critical Medicines Act and the Union of Skills, as well as with the help of various EU agencies and authorities. The Commission has explained that in order to safeguard citizens’ wellbeing, it is proposing additional measures in order to better cope with a series of threats, including pandemics and all manner of health emergencies.

    • 1.What does the Commission intend to do to overcome the disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU?
    • 2.What sum does the Commission intend to invest to overcome the disastrous shortage of healthcare workers in the EU?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission’s call to Europeans to ‘prepare a stockpile of supplies for 72 hours’ – E-001449/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission’s advice that citizens be able to sustain themselves for at least 72 hours is grounded in existing emergency preparedness guidelines and international best practice, which suggest that individuals should be self-sufficient for a short period during potential disruptions in services or supply chains.

    This duration is recognised as critical for initial emergency response, allowing time for authorities to restore essential services and reach affected populations in a range of crisis scenarios.

    The Commission has identified several potential risks and threats, including in the Preparedness Union Strategy[1] and the Niinistö Report on Military Preparedness and Readiness of the European Union[2].

    The specific threats identified include the consequences of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, rising geopolitical tensions, hybrid and cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, foreign information manipulation, pandemics, and the increasing frequency of natural disasters.

    The Commission acknowledges the need for transparency and detailed information on the risks and threats identified. The Eurobarometer surveys published in 2024 show that 65% of EU citizens feel they need more information to prepare for disasters and emergencies[3].

    In response, the strategy foresees to support to Member States to increase awareness about risks and threats, with measures such as annual EU Preparedness Day and targeted communication campaigns to ensure citizens are well informed about potential threats and the rationale behind preparedness measures.

    The Commission will continue to provide regular updates and practical guidance to Member States.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/preparedness_en.
    • [2]  https://commission.europa.eu/document/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en.
    • [3]  https://civil-protection-knowledge-network.europa.eu/news/new-eu-eurobarometer-disaster-awareness-and-preparedness-eu-citizens#:~:text=A%20new%20Eurobarometer%20survey%20which%20looked%20into%20the,more%20information%20to%20prepare%20for%20disasters%20and%20emergencies.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – ODA and Innovation: Key Drivers for Health and Living Standards in the Global South – Committee on Development

    Source: European Parliament

    On 24 June, 17:45-18-45, Mr. Bill Gates will join the DEVE Committee for an exchange on “ODA and Innovation: Key Drivers for Health and Living Standards in the Global South.” The discussion will focus on the Gates Foundation’s work in public health, including vaccination, disease eradication, and innovative technologies. Members will explore the role of Official Development Assistance, the impact of funding cuts, and the importance of investing in human capital for sustainable development.

    On 24 June, Mr. Bill Gates, chair of the Gates Foundation, joins the DEVE Committee for an exchange on “ODA and Innovation as Key Drivers for Improving Health and Living Standards in the Global South.” The discussion will highlight the Gates Foundation’s major role in public health, including vaccination programs, disease eradication, healthcare system strengthening, nutrition initiatives, and pandemic preparedness. Members will explore the critical role of Official Development Assistance amid recent funding cuts and the U.S. withdrawal from WHO. The conversation will also focus on investing in human capital–through education, health, and skills development–to drive sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. The Foundation’s approach to maximizing impact through innovation and partnerships with governments, multilateral agencies, and the private sector will be discussed. A Q&A session will follow, with contributions from ITRE and SANT Committee chairs/vice-chairs.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Olaf Seijpen: Financial stability – it’s not glamorous, but it matters

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Good morning and welcome to the 9th Annual Macroprudential Conference. It is a pleasure to see so many distinguished representatives from central banks, regulatory institutions, the financial sector, and academia gathered here today. And welcome to our newly renovated building-a space designed not only for policy but also for people. Our new building is now partly open to the general public. As a central bank, we want to be transparent and accessible, and we wanted our new building to reflect that. And you know, people really take an interest. And I can imagine people are really excited to see so many macroprudential policy stars in person today.

    This conference has always been a collaborative effort. From the very beginning, it has been jointly organized by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Sveriges Riksbank and De Nederlandsche Bank. A macroprudential rock band if you will. And this year, we’re thrilled to welcome a new band member: the Central Bank of Ireland. I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to the Scientific Committee for their dedication in shaping this year’s programme. Your work behind the scenes makes all of this possible.

    In these volatile times, transparency and accessibility are more important than ever. Macroprudential policy may seem like a niche field, reserved for specialists. But its impact is universal. Financial stability affects households, businesses, governments-and ultimately, the trust that underpins our economies. And all the topics that we cover in this conference the coming two days, in all their diversity and richness and technical complexity – they are somehow related to this simple fact. Be it income-based tools to mitigate housing market risks, or QE and the bond market, or bank governance, to name just a few topics in the program.

    Safeguarding that stability requires three things: patience, commitment and cooperation.

    Let me begin with patience. The road to financial stability is long and often winding. It is not paved with quick wins or instant results. After the global financial crisis, governments, regulators and banks worked hard on a comprehensive reform of banking regulation that would boost buffers and make the financial sector more resilient. That has served us well. During the Covid pandemic, for example. Thanks to stronger buffers, banks were able to absorb losses and continue extending credit when the economy took a hit as a result of the lockdowns.

    And it continues to serve us well. Especially now in these times of fundamental uncertainty. A resilient financial sector can help the economy to withstand shocks from trade barriers and geopolitical events. But it takes patience and hard work.

    That brings me to the second theme: commitment. Financial stability seems like a natural state. We take out our phone and we pay. And the bread that we buy costs the same as it did last week. And when we wake up in the morning our savings are still in our bank account. Financial stability is something that seems to be just there, unconditionally. But it really isn’t. It is something we must continuously work for. It demands vigilance, coordination, and above all, the political will to act before the crisis hits.

    Lately, there have been calls for simplifying banking regulation. I have sympathy for that. Banking regulation has indeed become very complex. This is certainly something we should look into.

    But we should be careful not to confuse simplification with deregulation. Deregulation means effectively lowering buffers by relaxing the rules. That would increase both vulnerability in the banking system and the likelihood of financial crises. It would be a big mistake.

    We should be wary of undoing the hard work that has gone into strengthening the financial system over the past decade and a half. Especially now, in this time of unusually high uncertainty, both on the economic and political front.

    This requires commitment from regulators and governments. Because the system of international rules we have built to support financial stability and to create a level playing field is only as strong as our commitment to it.

    Finally, cooperation. Financial stability is an international public good. Almost every challenge we face in our highly interconnected financial system is global in nature. And so must be our response. No country can safeguard financial stability alone.

    If we want to meet today’s challenges to financial stability, we have to continue to work together. And we need to stay committed to the institutions we have built to underpin that cooperation, such as the Basel Committee and the FSB. Global cooperation is harder in a fragmented world. But it is also more essential. During the global financial crisis, policymakers acted swiftly and in unison. We must preserve that capacity.

    Patience, commitment, and cooperation. Let us use this conference to reaffirm these principles. Let us learn from each other, challenge each other, and inspire each other. But above all: let us enjoy the conference. And if you remember just one thing from this speech, let it be this: macroprudential policy may not be glamorous, it may not attract big crowds, you may not even make it to the support act. But it matters, and it is never boring.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Tiff Macklem: The impact of US trade policy on jobs and inflation in Canada

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Introduction

    It’s a pleasure to be here in Newfoundland and Labrador. I want to thank the St. John’s Board of Trade for the invitation to speak to you today. There is no better place to talk about trade than a community of exporters. The sea routes that begin and end in St. John’s have helped feed, supply and build Canada and the world.

    Port cities are attuned to global commerce. And until recently, the global economy had been recovering well from the hard years of the pandemic. Canada, a country that depends on foreign trade, was benefiting. At the end of 2024, inflation in Canada had been close to the 2% target for months. Substantial interest rate reductions had boosted household and business spending, and exports were strengthening. The economy had renewed momentum.

    But then something happened. Since President Trump took office in January, the world has faced a dramatic escalation in tariffs and pervasive uncertainty. In Canada, trade has been disrupted and jobs have been lost. Businesses have re-evaluated their investment plans. Consumers have become more cautious. And Canadians have told us that they expect higher prices for many imported goods.

    The recent announcement that Canada and the United States agreed to negotiate a new economic and security relationship within 30 days is very welcome news. Restoring open trade between our countries is critical to jobs and growth in Canada. It is also important for prices and inflation.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Jorgovanka Tabaković: Full support for a stable macroeconomic environment

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Dear colleagues, esteemed hosts, Mr Colangeli, Mr Petrović,

    Many times in life, everything seemed almost hopeless – bombing, COVID, many smaller or more personal crises – but life has always inevitably returned to normal. Never the same, but still normal. What is destroyed is rebuilt, what is broken is fixed, but only people remain permanently damaged by the behaviours they have experienced, and they remain outside of the normality that implies living in accordance with natural laws and cycles and in accordance with divine laws. And that is the greatest loss for humanity, but also for each individual. Especially for those for whom unnatural states offer an illusion of fulfilment – an illusion, and one of a limited duration. Anyone who doesn’t understand how illusory those feelings are – I reminded my fellow bankers yesterday – should read the book “The Circulation of Elites” by Vilfredo Pareto or Peter Turchin’s book on the hyperproduction of elites, of which there are more and more, while the seats in parliament, leadership positions in banks, and other institutions are limited in number. There is no room for everyone who believes they deserve a place in the elite.

    And now, a response to my friend and colleague, Mr Zoran Petrović:

    These days
    We owe a debt to future days
    and souls unborn
    Even if it means a sacrifice
    that won’t be recognised,
    acknowledged or cared for
    For it is only when good times pass
    heavy days come
    and people have none to blame
    that they will remember that someone     
    once knew how to create much from little
    because he respected even those
    who tripped him up
    and those who envied him
    They will recall the one who dared to stand    
    to guard his roots and take the future in his hands
    For he believed in humankind.
    The rage will pass, the children will grow
    The immature will learn what wise men know
    Some will always blame others
    for being somebody’s pawns
    for not realising in time
    that they lost much and gained little
    and that time – once gone – can’t be reclaimed.

    We won’t be able to recover what was missed in the first part of the year, but we will do our best to make up for everything that was lost.

    And before I move on to the topic of the state’s relationship with foreign investors – because of whom I put all other obligations aside to be here with you, just as I stand with you through every challenge you face – I would like to share some good news with you. News that illustrates how someone can always create something great from something small and leave it as a gift to the future. As of today, Serbia will have over 50 tonnes of gold in its FX reserves – and those who understand economics know that even the great Yugoslavia, since World War II, never had that much. This only illustrates what can be achieved with skill, knowledge and ability, as well as the determination not to let others do our job worse than us.

    Esteemed colleagues, honoured hosts,

    Let us remind ourselves of Adam Smith, and what he says in “The Wealth of Nations”:

    “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”, said Adam Smith. Everyone has their own interest and views movements from the perspective of their own interest, while the state is the one that considers the common good and works in the interest of all. When we go to the butcher, the baker, or anywhere else, we don’t address the humanity of the butcher or the baker. We don’t even appeal to their vanity, and we never talk to them about our needs. Instead, we speak about their advantages. For the most sustainable form of cooperation is one in which each side sees some benefit for themselves. This is the cooperation that endures. This does not mean that altruism does not exist, but it is most important to rely on predictable interests, rather than on good will.

    When we apply this in the context of investments and policies, while taking into account the specificities of the time in which we operate, contributing to investment growth requires that we first question ourselves on a personal level, and then collectively. If we simply wait for others to provide us with ideal conditions, without examining what we can do ourselves, then we are already set up for failure.

    In Serbia, we have ensured a favourable business environment, and it is up to the economy to take advantage of it – which it is doing successfully. Of course, when the period of the pandemic is analysed from a certain time distance, there will be individuals who will comment on what could have been done differently. Regardless of professional integrity, when evaluating any decision each of us must consider the context of the time and circumstances in which it was made. And that means we should draw lessons from everything that has happened and is happening, and never have a one-sided perspective. If, under difficult geoeconomic conditions, you manage to resolve inflation and ensure high growth in GDP, wages, and profits, while preserving fiscal parameters and FX reserves – I’d like to see the person who would say that Serbia doesn’t have good policies!

    What are the conditions?

    • We are working in a time of sudden and significant changes across all areas.
    • We are living in a time of growing divisions in the world – not only between economies but also within national economies – with increasingly pronounced social polarisation and a deepening gap between the rich and the poor.
    • We are making decisions in a period marked by forced measures, as a response to the measures of others, which were also imposed by necessity.
    • We are entering a new era in which the common denominator for all developments is uncertainty, and the source of success lies in creativity of approach!

    What should the responses be – global and local?

    • Cooperation instead of division;
    • Proactive rather than reactive policy;
    • Respect for the short term, but without losing focus on the long term and on sustainable growth;
    • The common good above personal interest!

    And let us not forget that, as important as it is to make a good decision, it is equally important to avoid making a bad one! And it is well known that investments are never bad; only our decisions can be such.

    Therefore, I will now talk about the investment environment in Serbia, global trends in investing, and our responses.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    I assume that the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions the National Bank of Serbia is not investment, although there is a direct and strong connection and interdependence. If we consider that a stable and predictable economic environment is the first pillar of sustainable investment, then the association is clear!

    Similarly, I believe that the relatively stable exchange rate of the dinar to the euro is the first association with the National Bank of Serbia, both for citizens and for the economy! And that stability, which makes decision-making and long-term project planning easier, is an important pillar of the investment environment.

    I also believe that the best answer to the question of whether we have created a favourable investment environment is provided by the data.

    • Fixed investment made up around 16% of GDP in 2014, while government investment stood at 2.2% of GDP. After ten years, fixed investment came to account for over 24% of GDP, and government investment exceeded 7.3% of GDP.
    • The implementation of investment projects has not only significantly improved the overall infrastructure, it has also had a multiplier effect on new investments.
    • The number of formally employed persons increased by almost 400 thousand and it is much easier to get a job today.
    • The unemployment rate, which used to exceed 20%, dropped to 8.6%, and youth unemployment rate was cut by more than a half.
    • The average GDP growth rate of Serbia over the past seven years of nearly 4%, and we are talking about real growth, speaks volumes about the environment we have created.
    • Even under the conditions of extremely challenging global circumstances and the slow recovery of external demand, our growth of 3.9% last year was one of the highest in Europe.

    A job well done is always the best marketing, and so Serbia’s image in the world has changed significantly.

    • Crucially, last year we obtained the status of an investment-grade country, a status we have long deserved.
    • And the fact that investors have long rated us as an investment-grade country is evident from the data, which shows that over the past seven years, an average of around EUR 4 bn in foreign direct investments have been invested in Serbia annually, or 6.8% of GDP on average. A record was set last year with EUR 5.2 bn.
    • Around 55% of these inflows go to export-oriented sectors, thus contributing to their growth even under conditions of anaemic external demand.
    • The fact that around 80% of foreign direct investments consist of investments in equity capital and reinvested earnings shows that investors in Serbia are expanding existing projects and launching new ones, despite the challenges in their home markets.  These investments simultaneously bring new technology and more modern equipment, as well as new knowledge, which has also enabled the growth of overall factor productivity.

    And when individuals – because they truly are few – ask us whether we are able to maintain stability without depleting FX reserves, and how long we can defend the exchange rate, I respond with a question: And did anyone believe that Serbia, during fiscal consolidation, when everyone predicted a decline in GDP, would achieve growth? We  achieved growth, just as during the pandemic we experienced the smallest decline in GDP compared to all other economies. These are the results of well-calibrated policies and the recognition of opportunities, which are based on the diversification of markets, sources of financing, and projects.

    Moreover, it is a fact that no one can dispute, that our FX reserves are at an exceptionally high level, measured by all criteria, and they cover nearly seven months of goods and services imports! In the reports of all rating agencies, one of the key elements that positively distinguishes us from countries with comparable credit ratings is precisely the high level of FX reserves, which we have built over the past more than ten years.

    No less important – we have become part of SEPA, for which we have long been prepared, but now we have the opportunity to make payment transactions with EU countries as well more efficient and cheaper. I say payment transactions with EU as well because we have long introduced in the domestic payments, which account for the majority of daily payments by citizens and businesses, the most modern services based on transactions that are completed in just 1.2 seconds. We have also developed a modern DOMESTIC payment card, taking care about the independence and reliability of the national payment system. And what is the EU doing now? It is developing its own card system, not wanting to depend on other systems and their operational stability.

    For our DinaCard, we have carefully selected partners, guided by the goal of international functionality, but also full security and independence of our system. We have achieved this through a partnership with Discover, which will positively impact the economy of Serbia, primarily merchants, who will now be able to accept payments by these cards, issued anywhere in the world.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    I said that we follow all relevant global trends, including global investment trends. We analyse where global capital is going today as the world rapidly changes under the influence of technological transformation, energy transition, and geopolitical tensions, because investments have never been evenly distributed across regions, sectors, or asset types. We are in a phase of structural capital reallocation on a global level.   

    One trend that stands out is digital transformation and the overwhelming allocation of the majority of capital towards artificial intelligence, cloud technologies, big data, cybersecurity, and fintech. These are no longer sectors of the future; they are the sectors of today, and here, funds from the United States and China dominate. In Serbia as well, the IT sector is experiencing strong growth, as seen in the export value of EUR 4.13 bn last year, which is ten times higher compared to ten years ago, when it was only around EUR 400 mn. The fact that its share in total service exports has increased from around 12% to nearly 29% confirms that this is substantial growth.

    Another direction is green and sustainable investment, focusing on renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and hydrogen, with funds also turning towards regenerative agriculture. Serbia’s potential in this area is significant, and investments are increasingly following environmental, social, and governance standards.

    The third trend is regionalisation, or investing closer to home markets (nearshoring), as a result of supply chain disruptions caused by the outbreak of the pandemic and the energy crisis. Shifting production closer to the European market opens up opportunities for countries like Serbia, which has an excellent geographic location, much like our DinaCard, which is expanding both East and West. Many companies are increasingly choosing Serbia as a manufacturing hub precisely for this reason, but especially because of the skilled workforce and free trade agreements with many countries, in whose conclusion a great deal of effort has been invested.

    The fourth trend is infrastructure projects and the return of the state as an investor, including investments in infrastructure: roads, railway, energy, telecommunications, and digital infrastructure… Serbia stands out in this regard with strong investments in all parts of the country. I would like to remind you, Mr Colangeli, of the presentation of the EBRD’s Transition Report, which dealt with navigating industrial policy, where you stated that by establishing good infrastructure, such as roads, railway, electricity, and the internet, Serbia facilitated investment and the opening of factories in its less developed regions. Such a policy has contributed to reducing regional income inequality, which is a goal as important as the quality of investments.

    However, one of the important questions is: what next?

    When it comes to the National Bank of Serbia, investors, as well as all agents in the country’s economic system, can count on our full support for a stable macroeconomic environment.   

    • According to our May projection, inflation will continue to slow down  and by the end of the year approach the target midpoint of 3% – the level around which it will hover until the end of the projection horizon.  The data for May inflation, according to our now-cast model, support such an outcome, and I believe the data to be released on Thursday will confirm this.
    • In June last year, we began to ease monetary policy at a cautious pace, assessing that it should remain restrictive for some time yet.
    • Caution is important always, but even more so today when we are witnessing pronounced volatility in global commodity and financial markets. In such circumstances, it is expected that global inflation will decline somewhat more slowly, and that global economic growth will be lower due to disruptions in trade flows and production chains, as well as weaknesses in key growth drivers such as foreign trade, investments, and consumption.
    • In Serbia, past monetary policy easing has fully passed through to interest rates in the money market and dinar lending market, while the easing of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy has affected the price of euro borrowing. With the growth in credit demand due to the increase in disposable income, we have a y-o-y growth in credit activity of 10.5% in April, which is also one of the channels supporting investments.

    Ladies and gentlemen, Mr Colangeli, Mr Petrović,

    I will reiterate that a job well-done is the best marketing, and also the best indicator as to how we will work in the future.

    I will repeat today that for the continued growth and development of every economy and society, including ours, stability and business certainty are key. Therefore, we must preserve stability in a challenging and competitive global environment, where changes are happening faster than ever in all areas of life and work! Without it, even the best-designed investment policies will not yield sustainable results!

    On behalf of the National Bank of Serbia, I can promise:

    • that relative exchange rate stability has no alternative,
    • that we will support every investment that is in the interest of Serbia and our citizens.

    We carefully follow all the creativity of the new era and respond cautiously – so that no measure becomes a target for us.

    And let us never forget those who laid the foundations of the market economy, as I began with Adam Smith: The baker does not bake bread because he wants to feed us, but because he wants to make a profit. May our cooperation continue as honestly and openly as that.

    I thank you and wish you a successful conference!

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Air pollution levels in Oxford continue to improve in 2024

    Source: City of Oxford

    Air pollution levels in Oxford are continuing to improve, new data from Oxford City Council has found.

    However, despite improvements, there continues to be no safe level of air pollution. 

    Latest data from Oxford City Council has found that during 2024, overall NO2 levels in Oxford decreased by 10% on average compared to 2023 levels – with some areas seeing decreases of up to 24% –  and a 38% decrease overall on pre-pandemic (2019) levels. 

    The data follows the publication of Oxford City Council’s latest Air Quality Annual Status Report for 2024 which examines air pollution levels across 118 locations in the city from January 2024 – December 2024. 

    According to the latest NO2 data, Oxford met all UK legal limits for NO2 at all sites of relevant public exposure, with one site in breach of the UK’s legal target (Headington Hill). In addition, the city is on track to meet its local NO2 target by the end of 2025, with only four locations exceeding this target, with just one site in a location of public exposure. 

    Monitoring air pollution 

    Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is measured in micrograms in each cubic metre of air (μg/m³), with the legal annual mean target set by Government of 40 μg/m³. 

    In 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) published new guidelines which recommended stricter limits on the ‘safe’ level of air pollution, including PM2.5 and NO2, advising that there is no level at which pollutants stop causing damage.   

    In Oxford, there are two annual mean targets for Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) air pollution: 

    • National legal limit: the annual mean concentration of NO2 which must not exceed 40 μg/m³
    • Oxford’s own adopted local annual mean target for NO2 of 30 µg/m3  

    Pollutant 

    World Health Organisation (WHO) recommended annual mean 

    UK Legal annual mean limit value 

    Oxford’s local annual mean target (commitment to be achieved across the city by 2025) 

    PM2.5 

    5 μg/m³ 

    10 μg/m³ 

    Non applicable 

    NO2

    10 μg/m³ 

    40 μg/m³ 

    30 μg/m³ 

    Oxford City Council has a statutory duty to report on air quality within the city and gathers data from each monitoring station within the city, following detailed technical guidance from DEFRA. 

    Report highlights: 

    Some of the highlights of the latest report are: 

    • On average, NO₂ levels fell by 10% in 2024 
    • In areas of high bus traffic – such as High Street and St Aldates – there were reductions of up to 24%, largely due to the introduction of ZEBRA funded electric buses in January 2024 
    • Oxford met all UK legal limits for NO₂ at all sites of relevant public exposure 
    • Only one site was found to be in breach of the UK’s legal target. This is in an area with limited public exposure to air pollution (eg busy roads away from residential areas or areas with pedestrians): 
    • Headington Hill measured a concentration of 43 μg/m³. While still 7% (3 μg/m³) over the legal target, this is a 19% reduction compared to in NO₂ levels in 2023 (53 μg/m³). 
    • Only four of the 118 sites were found to be in breach of Oxford’s local annual mean target for NO₂: St Clements (34 μg/m³), with the other three located in areas of limited public exposure: Headington Hill (43 μg/m³), and Oxford’s ring road (32 μg/m³ and 31 μg/m³). 
    • Over the past decade (2013 – 2023), average NO2 levels in Oxford have decreased by 52% 

    The full air pollution report is available to view here 

    Impact of electric buses 

    While NO₂ levels fell by 10% on average, areas of high bus traffic – such as High Street and St Aldates saw reductions of up to 24%. This is believed to be largely due to the introduction of 159 ZEBRA funded electric buses from January 2024. 

    In February, the Council published an updated source apportionment study for Oxford, which found that the transport is the largest contributor to nitrogen oxides (NO + NO₂) emissions, accounting for 44% of the total emissions of these pollutants. 

    The Source Apportionment Study modelling suggested that there was a 12% drop in road transport NOX emissions (from 40% to 32%), with buses now contributing only 4% to total NOX emissions. This reflects a significant (28%) reduction since the previous source apportionment study. 

    The latest air pollution data supports this modelling, with the 24% reduction on High Street (reduction from 27 to 21 μg/m³) and St Aldates (reduction from 31 to 23 μg/m³)  largely attributed to the introduction of the ZEBRA scheme electric buses, which now covers 69% of Oxford’s total bus mileage. 

    ZEZ Pilot 

    In February 2022, the Oxfordshire County Council and Oxford City Council launched the UK’s first Zero Emission Zone (ZEZ) pilot in Oxford. 

    In 2024, NO₂ levels within the ZEZ Pilot area overall remain well below both the UK’s legal limit of 40 μg/m³ and Oxford’s local target of 30 μg/m³ 

    • NO₂ levels have generally remained stable at locations that are largely pedestrianised: Cornmarket (15 μg/m³), New Inn Hall Street (14 μg/m³), and St Michael’s Street (14 μg/m³). 
    • Pedestrianised areas that are shared with buses and taxis (Queen Street, Bonn Square, and New Road) saw the largest reductions in NO2
    • Queen Street: 17 μg/m³ – a reduction of 4 μg/m³ 
    • Bonn Square: 18 μg/m³ – a reduction of 2 μg/m³ 
    • New Road: 16 μg/m³ – a reduction of 6 μg/m³ 

    Low Traffic Neighbourhoods (LTNs) 

    All the monitoring locations both inside and on the boundary roads of Oxford’s LTNS showed a decrease in NO₂ levels measured in 2024, compared to 2023.  

    • None of the NO2 levels measured both inside and on the boundary roads of Oxford’s LTNS were above the UK legal limit 
    • Only one location (St Clements) showed NO2 levels above the city’s local annual mean target for NO2 
    • St Clements – historically Oxford’s most polluted street – saw notable NO₂ reductions of 4 μg/m³, 5 μg/m³, and 3 μg/m³ – averaging 34 μg/m³ 
    • Between Towns Road also saw a significant reduction of 5 μg/m³ (from 28 to 23 μg/m³) 
    • Hollow Way saw a reduction of 2 μg/m³ (from 31 to 29 μg/m³), now meeting Oxford’s local air quality target for the first time 

    Particulate pollution (PM2.5 and PM10) 

    PM10 and PM2.5 were both monitored by automatic continuous monitors at St Ebbes (urban background) and Oxford High Street in 2024. 

    Oxford has consistently met all UK legal limits for PM2.5 in recent years and is now 2 μg/m³ away from achieving the WHO-recommended annual mean of 5 μg/m³ – considered the safest level for human health. 

    PM10 annual means for these sites were of 9 and 13 μg/m³. These values are both below the current UK legal annual mean limit of this pollutant (40 μg/m³) and of the WHO recommended annual mean (15 μg/m³). 

    Botley road closure 

    In April 2023, Botley Road was closed to traffic as part of broader improvement works on the western side of Oxford Railway Station. Since then, NO₂ levels have been monitored at four locations along Botley Road. 

    • In 2022, prior to the road closure, the average NO₂ concentration at these sites was 19 μg/m³ 
    • In 2023, this dropped to 16 μg/m³ (a 16% decrease) 
    • In 2024, the average further declined to 14 μg/m³ – a 2 μg/m³ decrease compared to 2023 levels, and 13% decrease, compared to the 10% city average 

    Main arterial routes into Oxford 

    On other major arterial roads into Oxford, 2024 monitoring data shows a consistent decline in NO₂ levels: 

    • Abingdon Road: saw a 1 μg/m³ reduction (from 24 to 23 μg/m³) 
    • Woodstock Road: saw a 1 μg/m³ reduction on average across 3 sites (from 16 to 15 μg/m³) 
    • Banbury Road: saw a 2 μg/m³ reduction on average across 3 sites (from 18 to 16 μg/m³) 
    • Headington Road/London Road: saw a 2 μg/m³ reduction on average across 3 sites (from 20 to 18 μg/m³) 
    • Sunderland Avenue: saw a 2 μg/m³ reduction on average across 5 sites (from 22 to 20 μg/m³) 

    Next steps 

    The Council’s report will be submitted to the Government to be ratified and approved. 

    The Council publishes annual air quality monitoring reports for the city every June, which are all freely available to read on its website

    The report will also be used to inform the Council’s upcoming Air Quality Action Plan, which will be updated in 2026 following public consultation later this year. 

    An Air Quality Action Plan (AQAP) outlines the actions that the Council and its partners will take to improve air quality in Oxford within a certain period of time. The Council’s current Air Quality Action Plan can be read here

    Comment 

    “It is great news that air pollution levels are continuing to fall across all areas of the city, that Oxford is are legally compliant in all locations of public exposure, and that we are close to reaching our localised air pollution target. However, it is important to remember that there is ultimately no safe level of air pollution – it always causes us harm. 

    “This data provides us with the latest picture on pollution in Oxford and will help inform our upcoming Air Quality Action Plan, which will look at what measures we can take over the next few years to further improve air quality for everyone in our city.” 

    Councillor Anna Railton, Deputy Leader, and Cabinet Member for a Zero Carbon Oxford 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New climate targets set

    Source: Scottish Government

    Carbon budgets to tackle climate change.

    Limits on the amount of greenhouse gases Scotland will emit over the coming decades have been announced as part of action to tackle climate change.

    The Carbon Budgets propose five-year, statutory limits on emissions from 2026 to 2045. The proposed budgets are in line with the advice from the independent Climate Change Committee (CCC) and the Scottish Government’s own assessments.

    The average level of emissions for Scotland over each five-year period are:

    • 57% lower than 1990 levels for 2026 – 2030
    • 69% lower than 1990 levels for 2031- 2035
    • 80% lower than 1990 levels for 2036 – 2040
    • 94% lower than 1990 levels for 2041 – 2045

    The proposals will be scrutinised by Parliament before being voted on in the autumn.

    Once the Carbon Budgets have been agreed, the Scottish Government will publish and consult on a new draft Climate Change Plan outlining the specific actions required to reduce emissions so as to meet each of the first three carbon budget targets, as well as setting out the associated costs and benefits.

    Cabinet Secretary for Climate Action and Energy Gillian Martin said:

    “Scotland is now halfway to our 2045 climate change target and is ahead of the UK as a whole in reducing long term emissions.

    “These Carbon Budgets will set clear limits on emissions for the coming decades in line with the independent advice of the UK Climate Change Committee.

    “When we publish our draft Climate Change Plan later this year, it will set out the policies needed to continue to reduce our emissions and meet our first three carbon budget targets.

    “It will not ask the impossible of people. We will not sacrifice people’s health or wealth.

    “While we welcome the UK CCC’s advice on how to stay within these limits, as they make clear, it is always for Scotland to decide whether those policies are right for us.

    “This means, for example, that we will chart our own path on forestry, going further than the CCC suggest. And, to ensure we protect rural communities and have a thriving rural economy, we will not adopt all their recommendations on agriculture and peatland and will instead meet our targets in a way which works for rural Scotland, including supporting and protecting our iconic livestock industries.  

    “These Carbon Budgets keep Scotland at the forefront of efforts to protect the planet and our Climate Change Plan will ensure the action we take is fair, ambitious and capable of rising to the emergency before us.”

    Background

    Carbon budgets provide a reliable and consistent framework to measure progress to net zero and are used by other countries including Japan, France, England and Wales. They are less prone to fluctuations than the Scottish Government’s previous approach of interim and annual targets, which could be affected by annual variations such as unseasonable weather or a global pandemic.

    Each carbon budget period will run from 1 January of the start year to 31 December of the final year.

    The budgets would continue to include emissions from international aviation and shipping, and there are no provisions to ‘carry over’ emissions from one carbon budget period to the next.

    Carbon budget breakdown totals:

    • 175  mega tonne 2026 – 2030
    • 126  mega tonne 2031- 2035
    • 81  mega tonne 2036 – 2040
    • 24  mega tonne 2040 – 2045

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sarah Annesley, Senior Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Cell and Molecular Biology, La Trobe University

    Edwin Tan/Getty

    Myalgic encephalomyelitis / chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is as complex as its name is difficult to pronounce. It’s sometimes referred to as simply “chronic fatigue”, but this is just one of its symptoms.

    In fact, ME/CFS is a complex neurological disease, recognised by the World Health Organization, that affects nearly every system in the body.

    The name refers to muscle pain (myalgia), inflammation of the brain (encephalomyelitis), and a profound, disabling fatigue that rest can’t relieve.

    However, the illness’s complexity – and its disproportionate impact on women – means ME/CFS has often been incorrectly labelled as a psychological disorder.

    What is ME/CFS?

    ME/CFS affects people of all ages but is most commonly diagnosed in middle age. It is two to three times more common in women than men.

    While the exact cause is unknown, ME/CFS is commonly triggered by an infection.

    The condition has two core symptoms: a disabling, long-lasting fatigue that rest doesn’t relieve, and a worsening of symptoms after physical or mental exertion.

    This is known as post-exertional malaise. It means even slight exertion can make symptoms much worse, and take much longer than expected to recover.

    This varies between people, but could mean simply having a shower or attending a social event triggers worse symptoms, either immediately or days later.

    These symptoms include pain, sleep issues, cognitive difficulties (such as thinking, memory and decision-making), flu-like symptoms, dizziness, gastrointestinal problems, heart rate fluctuations and many more.

    For some people, symptoms can be managed in a way that allows them to work. For others, the disease is so severe it can leave them housebound or bedridden.

    Symptoms can fluctuate, changing over time and in intensity, making ME/CFS a particularly unpredictable and misunderstood condition.

    Not just ‘in your head’

    A growing body of scientific evidence, however, clearly shows ME/CFS is a biological, not mental, illness.

    Neuroimaging studies have revealed differences in the brain activity and structure of people with ME/CFS, including poor blood flow and lower levels of neurotransmitters (chemical messengers in the nervous system).

    Other research indicates the condition affects how the body produces energy (the metabolism), fights infection (the immune system), delivers oxygen to muscles and tissues, and regulates blood pressure and heart rate (the vascular system).

    Issues with criteria

    To diagnose ME/CFS, a clinician will also exclude other possible causes of fatigue, which can be a lengthy process. A patient needs to meet a set of clinical criteria.

    But one of the major challenges in researching ME/CFS is that the diagnostic criteria clinicians use vary worldwide.

    Some criteria focus solely on fatigue and include people with alternate reasons for fatigue, such as a psychiatric disorder.

    Others are more narrow and may only capture ME/CFS patients with more severe symptoms.

    As a result, it can be very difficult to compare across different studies, as the reasons they include or exclude participants vary so much.

    Changes to the guidelines

    In Australia, doctors often receive little formal education about ME/CFS.

    Most commonly, they follow the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners’ clinical guidelines to diagnose and manage ME/CFS. These are based on the Canadian Consensus Criteria which are considered more stringent than other ME/CFS diagnostic criteria.

    They include post-exertional malaise and fatigue for more than six months as core symptoms.

    However, these guidelines are outdated and rely heavily on controversial studies that assumed the primary cause of ME/CFS was “deconditioning” – a loss of physical strength due to a fear or avoidance of exercise.

    These guidelines recommend ME/CFS should be treated with cognitive behavioural therapy – a common psychotherapy which focuses on changing unhealthy thoughts and behaviours – and graded exercise therapy, which gradually introduces more demanding physical activity.

    While cognitive behaviour therapy can be effective for some people managing ME/CFS, it’s important not to frame this condition primarily as a psychological issue.

    Graded exercise therapy can encourage people to push beyond their “energy envelope”, which means they do more than their body can manage. This can trigger post-exertional malaise and a worsening of symptoms.

    In June 2024, the Australian government announced A$1.1 million towards developing new clinical guidelines for diagnosing and managing ME/CFS.

    Leading organisations have scrapped the recommendation of graded exercise therapy in the United States (in 2015) and the United Kingdom (in 2021). Hopefully Australia will follow suit.

    What can people with ME/CFS do?

    While we wait for updated clinical guidelines, “pacing” – or working within your energy envelope – has shown some success in managing symptoms. This means monitoring and limiting how much energy you expend.

    Some evidence also suggests people who rest in the early stages of their initial illness often experience better long-term outcomes with ME/CFS.

    This is especially relevant after the COVID pandemic and with the emergence of long COVID. Studies indicate more than half of those affected meet stringent clinical criteria for ME/CFS.

    In times of acute illness we should resist the temptation to push through. Choosing to rest may be a crucial step in preventing a condition that is much more debilitating than the original infection.

    The Conversation

    Sarah Annesley receives funding from The Judith Jane Mason & Harold Stannett Williams Memorial Foundation and ME Research UK (SCIO charity number SCO36942).

    ref. It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired – https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-chronic-fatigue-me-cfs-is-much-more-than-being-tired-258803

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sarah Annesley, Senior Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Cell and Molecular Biology, La Trobe University

    Edwin Tan/Getty

    Myalgic encephalomyelitis / chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is as complex as its name is difficult to pronounce. It’s sometimes referred to as simply “chronic fatigue”, but this is just one of its symptoms.

    In fact, ME/CFS is a complex neurological disease, recognised by the World Health Organization, that affects nearly every system in the body.

    The name refers to muscle pain (myalgia), inflammation of the brain (encephalomyelitis), and a profound, disabling fatigue that rest can’t relieve.

    However, the illness’s complexity – and its disproportionate impact on women – means ME/CFS has often been incorrectly labelled as a psychological disorder.

    What is ME/CFS?

    ME/CFS affects people of all ages but is most commonly diagnosed in middle age. It is two to three times more common in women than men.

    While the exact cause is unknown, ME/CFS is commonly triggered by an infection.

    The condition has two core symptoms: a disabling, long-lasting fatigue that rest doesn’t relieve, and a worsening of symptoms after physical or mental exertion.

    This is known as post-exertional malaise. It means even slight exertion can make symptoms much worse, and take much longer than expected to recover.

    This varies between people, but could mean simply having a shower or attending a social event triggers worse symptoms, either immediately or days later.

    These symptoms include pain, sleep issues, cognitive difficulties (such as thinking, memory and decision-making), flu-like symptoms, dizziness, gastrointestinal problems, heart rate fluctuations and many more.

    For some people, symptoms can be managed in a way that allows them to work. For others, the disease is so severe it can leave them housebound or bedridden.

    Symptoms can fluctuate, changing over time and in intensity, making ME/CFS a particularly unpredictable and misunderstood condition.

    Not just ‘in your head’

    A growing body of scientific evidence, however, clearly shows ME/CFS is a biological, not mental, illness.

    Neuroimaging studies have revealed differences in the brain activity and structure of people with ME/CFS, including poor blood flow and lower levels of neurotransmitters (chemical messengers in the nervous system).

    Other research indicates the condition affects how the body produces energy (the metabolism), fights infection (the immune system), delivers oxygen to muscles and tissues, and regulates blood pressure and heart rate (the vascular system).

    Issues with criteria

    To diagnose ME/CFS, a clinician will also exclude other possible causes of fatigue, which can be a lengthy process. A patient needs to meet a set of clinical criteria.

    But one of the major challenges in researching ME/CFS is that the diagnostic criteria clinicians use vary worldwide.

    Some criteria focus solely on fatigue and include people with alternate reasons for fatigue, such as a psychiatric disorder.

    Others are more narrow and may only capture ME/CFS patients with more severe symptoms.

    As a result, it can be very difficult to compare across different studies, as the reasons they include or exclude participants vary so much.

    Changes to the guidelines

    In Australia, doctors often receive little formal education about ME/CFS.

    Most commonly, they follow the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners’ clinical guidelines to diagnose and manage ME/CFS. These are based on the Canadian Consensus Criteria which are considered more stringent than other ME/CFS diagnostic criteria.

    They include post-exertional malaise and fatigue for more than six months as core symptoms.

    However, these guidelines are outdated and rely heavily on controversial studies that assumed the primary cause of ME/CFS was “deconditioning” – a loss of physical strength due to a fear or avoidance of exercise.

    These guidelines recommend ME/CFS should be treated with cognitive behavioural therapy – a common psychotherapy which focuses on changing unhealthy thoughts and behaviours – and graded exercise therapy, which gradually introduces more demanding physical activity.

    While cognitive behaviour therapy can be effective for some people managing ME/CFS, it’s important not to frame this condition primarily as a psychological issue.

    Graded exercise therapy can encourage people to push beyond their “energy envelope”, which means they do more than their body can manage. This can trigger post-exertional malaise and a worsening of symptoms.

    In June 2024, the Australian government announced A$1.1 million towards developing new clinical guidelines for diagnosing and managing ME/CFS.

    Leading organisations have scrapped the recommendation of graded exercise therapy in the United States (in 2015) and the United Kingdom (in 2021). Hopefully Australia will follow suit.

    What can people with ME/CFS do?

    While we wait for updated clinical guidelines, “pacing” – or working within your energy envelope – has shown some success in managing symptoms. This means monitoring and limiting how much energy you expend.

    Some evidence also suggests people who rest in the early stages of their initial illness often experience better long-term outcomes with ME/CFS.

    This is especially relevant after the COVID pandemic and with the emergence of long COVID. Studies indicate more than half of those affected meet stringent clinical criteria for ME/CFS.

    In times of acute illness we should resist the temptation to push through. Choosing to rest may be a crucial step in preventing a condition that is much more debilitating than the original infection.

    Sarah Annesley receives funding from The Judith Jane Mason & Harold Stannett Williams Memorial Foundation and ME Research UK (SCIO charity number SCO36942).

    ref. It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired – https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-chronic-fatigue-me-cfs-is-much-more-than-being-tired-258803

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sarah Annesley, Senior Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Cell and Molecular Biology, La Trobe University

    Edwin Tan/Getty

    Myalgic encephalomyelitis / chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS) is as complex as its name is difficult to pronounce. It’s sometimes referred to as simply “chronic fatigue”, but this is just one of its symptoms.

    In fact, ME/CFS is a complex neurological disease, recognised by the World Health Organization, that affects nearly every system in the body.

    The name refers to muscle pain (myalgia), inflammation of the brain (encephalomyelitis), and a profound, disabling fatigue that rest can’t relieve.

    However, the illness’s complexity – and its disproportionate impact on women – means ME/CFS has often been incorrectly labelled as a psychological disorder.

    What is ME/CFS?

    ME/CFS affects people of all ages but is most commonly diagnosed in middle age. It is two to three times more common in women than men.

    While the exact cause is unknown, ME/CFS is commonly triggered by an infection.

    The condition has two core symptoms: a disabling, long-lasting fatigue that rest doesn’t relieve, and a worsening of symptoms after physical or mental exertion.

    This is known as post-exertional malaise. It means even slight exertion can make symptoms much worse, and take much longer than expected to recover.

    This varies between people, but could mean simply having a shower or attending a social event triggers worse symptoms, either immediately or days later.

    These symptoms include pain, sleep issues, cognitive difficulties (such as thinking, memory and decision-making), flu-like symptoms, dizziness, gastrointestinal problems, heart rate fluctuations and many more.

    For some people, symptoms can be managed in a way that allows them to work. For others, the disease is so severe it can leave them housebound or bedridden.

    Symptoms can fluctuate, changing over time and in intensity, making ME/CFS a particularly unpredictable and misunderstood condition.

    Not just ‘in your head’

    A growing body of scientific evidence, however, clearly shows ME/CFS is a biological, not mental, illness.

    Neuroimaging studies have revealed differences in the brain activity and structure of people with ME/CFS, including poor blood flow and lower levels of neurotransmitters (chemical messengers in the nervous system).

    Other research indicates the condition affects how the body produces energy (the metabolism), fights infection (the immune system), delivers oxygen to muscles and tissues, and regulates blood pressure and heart rate (the vascular system).

    Issues with criteria

    To diagnose ME/CFS, a clinician will also exclude other possible causes of fatigue, which can be a lengthy process. A patient needs to meet a set of clinical criteria.

    But one of the major challenges in researching ME/CFS is that the diagnostic criteria clinicians use vary worldwide.

    Some criteria focus solely on fatigue and include people with alternate reasons for fatigue, such as a psychiatric disorder.

    Others are more narrow and may only capture ME/CFS patients with more severe symptoms.

    As a result, it can be very difficult to compare across different studies, as the reasons they include or exclude participants vary so much.

    Changes to the guidelines

    In Australia, doctors often receive little formal education about ME/CFS.

    Most commonly, they follow the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners’ clinical guidelines to diagnose and manage ME/CFS. These are based on the Canadian Consensus Criteria which are considered more stringent than other ME/CFS diagnostic criteria.

    They include post-exertional malaise and fatigue for more than six months as core symptoms.

    However, these guidelines are outdated and rely heavily on controversial studies that assumed the primary cause of ME/CFS was “deconditioning” – a loss of physical strength due to a fear or avoidance of exercise.

    These guidelines recommend ME/CFS should be treated with cognitive behavioural therapy – a common psychotherapy which focuses on changing unhealthy thoughts and behaviours – and graded exercise therapy, which gradually introduces more demanding physical activity.

    While cognitive behaviour therapy can be effective for some people managing ME/CFS, it’s important not to frame this condition primarily as a psychological issue.

    Graded exercise therapy can encourage people to push beyond their “energy envelope”, which means they do more than their body can manage. This can trigger post-exertional malaise and a worsening of symptoms.

    In June 2024, the Australian government announced A$1.1 million towards developing new clinical guidelines for diagnosing and managing ME/CFS.

    Leading organisations have scrapped the recommendation of graded exercise therapy in the United States (in 2015) and the United Kingdom (in 2021). Hopefully Australia will follow suit.

    What can people with ME/CFS do?

    While we wait for updated clinical guidelines, “pacing” – or working within your energy envelope – has shown some success in managing symptoms. This means monitoring and limiting how much energy you expend.

    Some evidence also suggests people who rest in the early stages of their initial illness often experience better long-term outcomes with ME/CFS.

    This is especially relevant after the COVID pandemic and with the emergence of long COVID. Studies indicate more than half of those affected meet stringent clinical criteria for ME/CFS.

    In times of acute illness we should resist the temptation to push through. Choosing to rest may be a crucial step in preventing a condition that is much more debilitating than the original infection.

    Sarah Annesley receives funding from The Judith Jane Mason & Harold Stannett Williams Memorial Foundation and ME Research UK (SCIO charity number SCO36942).

    ref. It’s not just ‘chronic fatigue’: ME/CFS is much more than being tired – https://theconversation.com/its-not-just-chronic-fatigue-me-cfs-is-much-more-than-being-tired-258803

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Interview with Mark Kenny, Democracy Sausage, Australian National University podcast

    Source: Australian Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Industry

    Mark Kenny:

    G’day there and welcome to Democracy Sausage from the Australian National University. I’m Mark Kenny director of ANU’s Australian Studies Institute and I’m delighted to welcome back to Democracy Sausage federal Treasurer, Jim Chalmers. G’day there Jim.

    Jim Chalmers:

    It’s nice to see you again, Mark, thanks for having me back on your podcast.

    Kenny:

    It’s a great pleasure. There’s a fair bit happening in the world, it seems like the pace of events is such really, I don’t know. You have spoken about this, written about it a few times as well, the rate of change, the number of events that are happening globally and the significance of them and the combination of them. I think and the way things tend to sort of – we end up with these compound problems, don’t we, or compound challenges. I wonder how tiring that is for you but also how in a sense it makes things feel like they are moving so fast.

    Take the election for example, a big moment in Australia and a huge historic result as you were, I think, at some pains to grapple with as the numbers tumbled out on election night as you were sitting there on the ABC. But the election itself even seems – even though the 48th parliament hasn’t sat yet – the election feels likes it was quite a while ago now.

    Chalmers:

    Old news.

    Kenny:

    It’s extraordinary, isn’t it?

    Chalmers:

    It really is.

    Kenny:

    And not in a good way necessarily because most of these events we’re talking about aren’t things that we would automatically dial‑in if we could. Wars breaking out and various calamities, environmental and so forth. How does it feel to you? Does it feel to you like, in politics now, there’s this sense that governments age more quickly because of, just the sort of cadence of events and exposure, and having to explain it and navigate it all?

    Chalmers:

    It feels almost exactly as you’ve described it, the pace of change and churn is accelerating. And in my part of the shop I think about the fact that even in the last not even 2 decades we’ve had 4 major economic shocks now – a GFC, COVID, an inflation shock and now the shock that comes from these escalating trade and geopolitical tensions. And so the world is moving fast, the global economy is in lots of ways a perilous place because of this cascading change that we’re seeing that we need to respond to.

    And so I do feel like our responsibility really in this environment is, there’s an element of making our economy more resilient in the face of all this uncertainty and volatility but also a sense of working out how do we make our people, our economy, a beneficiary of all this churn and change.

    It would be naive I think to assume that this change is temporary, short term and that we will return to some long period of normalcy like we saw after the end of the Cold War. And so this really dominates our thinking – the international environment, the pace of change, the way that change is accelerating really is the primary influence on the way we think about this second term.

    Kenny:

    Yeah you have written about this in the past. You’ve got a reputation, quite rightly, as a thinker and someone who reads a lot and thinks a lot about the big historical trends and the forces that are happening underneath it. How do you reflect on that period that you talked about – that you just made reference to – the period after the Cold War? Of course we always hear it described as framed by the end of history argument and all of that. Now sort of, I suppose, what are we, quarter of a century after the 90s have ended. How do we look back on that now? How do you look back on it?

    Chalmers:

    Well I look at it in sort of 3 periods. There’s the period from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War.

    Kenny:

    Which we are saying is about sort of ‘89, ‘90 that sort of time.

    Chalmers:

    Yeah, that’s right. And you know momentous change in that period, dominated by the Cold War essentially. Then you had the end of the Cold War until the GFC, and others have described that as the Great Moderation.

    Kenny:

    I suppose you’d say until September 11 though wouldn’t you almost –

    Chalmers:

    Yeah in security terms, you’ll forgive me for having sort of an economic lens –

    Kenny:

    – an economic frame, yeah.

    Chalmers:

    But sure in the first decade of the 2000s, the world changed dramatically and the thing for us as Australians is we were among the primary beneficiaries of that period of moderation between the end of the Cold War and the early 2000s. We, the Australian economy, partly by choice, by intelligent policy choices in the ‘80s and ‘90s but also the way that the world was structured was very beneficial for Australia.

    And now we think about these 4 shocks in 2 decades and also against the backdrop of all of this technological change, demographic change, our industrial base is changing and the world is fragmenting. And so now we have to work out collectively, not just as a government but as Australians, how do we become the primary beneficiaries of all of this churn and change in the same way that we were the primary beneficiaries of that period of calm from the end of the Cold War.

    Kenny:

    Yeah, because during that period I suppose the rules held. There was a thing called the international rules‑based order, there was a sense in which there was at least a predictability about the framing of whatever might happen. Whereas now we don’t have that. We have this sort of sense of, particularly with the US being in a sense the chief architect and enforcer of that international order, having itself begun to walk away from it in quite dramatic ways, economic ways of course with tariffs and everything which we can come to.

    But that really – on top of things like pandemics and financial crises and the like – it really makes it, it means that we basically now have what replaced the predictability of the rules is the unpredictability of what follows, almost as a permanent dynamic.

    Chalmers:

    I think that’s a good way to describe it. Unpredictability is a good way of thinking even about these trade tensions that we’ve got right now because from day‑to‑day, week‑to‑week, the state of the negotiation between the US and China is changing. It’s the unpredictability that is making people wary, making investors wary and decision makers wary. It’s the sense of a lack of stability and predictability, I think as you rightly point out.

    And we’ve got this big fragmentation in the world and we shouldn’t over‑interpret that but we shouldn’t under‑interpret it either. The world is fragmenting, it has a huge influence on how we think about our own economy. And again it’s against these – we’ve got all these short term volatility – we see the gold price, the oil price bouncing around, stock markets have been bouncing around before and since so‑called Liberation Day, but that kind of masks a bigger structural change in the global economy.

    There’s a big change in the way that the world conducts its business now. And the responsibility on us as decision makers in government, but also in the private sector and the community more broadly, is to work out how do we make our people beneficiaries of that rather than victims of it.

    Kenny:

    And as you said in the early 2000s for example we were in a very good position to be beneficiaries. I remember covering budgets during that time and they were constantly framed by revenue upgrades, mostly from resources, and the budget was constantly in better shape than it was predicted to be.

    Now we are talking about a different world, much less predictable one. But I think I’ve heard you say, and I put the question to you I suppose rhetorically but where would you rather be in the circumstance that we’re in now, would it be Australia or somewhere else? We are still pretty well positioned.

    Chalmers:

    For sure. I hope it’s not talking out of school, but when Governor Phil Lowe and I used to go to these G20 conferences and we would sit there and we’d – when we were speaking in between the sessions or having a cup of tea or something we’d say, we’d look around the room and you’d say, who would you rather be in this group than us. And it’s an important bit of perspective and what I try to do in the speech at the National Press Club is to say we shouldn’t choose between these false binaries.

    There’s a bunch of people that will always talk the economy down. There’s a bunch of people – and maybe politicians are sometimes guilty of this – who will only ever talk the place up. Let’s just put it into its proper perspective.

    Australia in lots of ways is outperforming the world. The fact that we’ve got inflation down, while keeping unemployment low, we’ve got real wages growing again, the combination of things that we’ve got in our economy is something that a lot of our peer countries would like to see in their own economies. And we can recognise that at the same time as we can recognise our economy is not productive enough, the budget needs to be more sustainable, we need to be more resilient in the face of all this global uncertainty that you and I are talking about today.

    And so I think it’s not just possible to have those views simultaneously, it’s imperative that we do. That we have the proper perspective about our economy. Our economy in global terms is performing quite well, particularly our labour market, which in lots of ways to me is the most important thing, how people are actually earning and providing for their loved ones –

    Kenny:

    It’s like how the economy works for people.

    Chalmers:

    It’s the people‑facing part of the economy matters the most to me. And in some of those areas it’s been extraordinary, we’ve got the lowest average unemployment of any government in the last 50 years, at the same time as we’ve got inflation down and got real wages up.

    So it’s a long way of saying, let’s have some perspective about the economy. I’m going to try and get better at saying here is all the things that are going really well that we’re really pleased about, here are the things where we need to be doing better if we want to lift living standards for people in our country. Productivity, budget sustainability, resilience in the world, these are the things where we can acknowledge and work together on making things better.

    Kenny:

    Well let’s go to that productivity thing, because the Prime Minister recently at the Press Club and then you in the speech to the Press Club as well talking about productivity. And I think you have made the point before that the first term, how did you put it, the first term was basically –

    Chalmers:

    Primarily.

    Kenny:

    – primarily about fighting inflation but with an eye to productivity and the second term is about lifting productivity with an eye to keeping inflation under control. Is that sort of broadly what you were saying?

    Chalmers:

    Yeah it is, and I said that the morning after the election on the Insiders panel. I’d sat kind of in one corner of the ABC studio for about 6 or 7 hours in the evening and rocked up to the other corner of the studio in the morning. And that is how I see it.

    Kenny:

    Imagine what it’s like for David Speers.

    Chalmers:

    Exactly. I guess the point that I’m trying to make is we already have a productivity agenda. It’s substantial, it’s ambitious. But the bulk of our first term was about fighting inflation. And in the second term I think we still care about inflation, cost of living, real wages, still a huge focus of us but we will focus more on productivity, more on the supply side of the economy.

    When we talk about productivity, I think it’s important to remember it comes back to what we were just saying about the labour market more broadly. Productivity can come across as this kind of cold and soulless concept. It’s about how efficiently we use inputs to create outputs in our economy.

    Kenny:

    Is it widely understood, do you think, in the electorate when politicians and economists talk about productivity? What’s your – you’re an MP right, you represent people, you have your own electorate, you’re dealing with constituents all the time, right. What’s the general understanding of this as a term?

    Chalmers:

    It’s not a word that people use when they bail you up at Coles or Woolies. I acknowledge that. But it’s really the most important thing that will deliver higher living standards for people. And so I try not to think of productivity as that cold and soulless concept. Productivity is about a more dynamic economy, which lifts living standards, and a more dynamic society where we create more opportunities for more of our people.

    And what I’m trying to do is I’m trying to broaden the national policy and political conversation beyond the tired old fights over things like industrial relations. Productivity is about how we adapt and adopt technology, it’s how we transform our energy resources, it’s about making our businesses more competitive, it’s about the care economy, it’s about human capital, how we invest in people.

    Kenny:

    A lot of these things are things that as you say, they’re good, everyone would agree they’re all public goods. They’re things that should happen and so forth. Many of them – particularly if we think about human capital and getting more from people because they can contribute more and that adds to dynamism in the economy and creativity and opportunities all those brilliant things – but in a sense they’re long‑term investments that are required aren’t they?

    We are sitting here in a university. University education and training, obviously been a strong priority of the government. But it needs that’s the – I guess what I’m getting at is these aren’t things that you can just sort of flick a switch and make happen, right. They take long‑term planning and thinking and commitment and funding.

    Chalmers:

    Well 2 things about that. I mean, first of all there are 2 visions for productivity. And this is not the place for partisan reflections but there’s a view that says we’ll only get productivity if we make people work harder and longer for less. That is essentially our political opponent’s view of productivity.

    We think we’ll get productivity if we invest in people, their ability to adapt and adopt technology in a more modern economy. And so the way that our opponents think about productivity, that will never be our jam. That will never be – that’s not what we are on about.

    We are not trying to screw down people’s wages and working conditions. We think there’s a better way to go about it. But I think you’re absolutely bang on when you talk about – I think of it as the delayed gratification when it comes to productivity policy. There are some elements of economic policy where you get a bang for your buck sooner.

    Productivity is one of those things you got to chip away at and I’ve tried to point out, there’s not one thing as you rightly say, you can’t just flick one switch. If there was one switch we could flick somebody would have flicked it already to make our economy more productive. You’ve got to chip away, you’ve got to have a broader idea of productivity and you’ve got to work with people and bring people together. And that’s what we intend to do.

    Kenny:

    Let’s take a quick break and be back in a moment. Welcome back. I’m talking with Treasurer Jim Chalmers, ANU alum, among many things. Dr Chalmers, the productivity matter we were just talking about, there’s going to be this roundtable, the Prime Minister has announced, and you’ve spoken about at the Press Club as well.

    Obviously, the criticism that people will make if they want to will be another talk fest. We see these from time to time. From what I understand you’re girding against this, you’re trying to design it in ways that will mean that it has to deliver something more than kind of rhetoric and disagreement in a sense.

    Chalmers:

    Exactly right. I mean first of all I acknowledge it’s kind of unusual to have the Prime Minister and the Treasurer at the National Press Club 8 days apart but it’s deliberate. Because what we’re trying to do is in the Prime Minister’s great speech that he gave at the Press Club. And what I’m trying to do as well, is to say we’ve got a big agenda, it’s ambitious, our priority is delivering what we took to the election but we’ve got an obligation to work out what comes next.

    And the best way to do that, the tone that Anthony sets in our government is to try and do that together. And I know when you bring people together there will always be an element of people who want to say that it’s failed before it’s even happened. And it might be that people bring the same old talking points and maybe progress is hard to come by. But that’s not a reason not to have a crack at it and see where there might be common ground.

    Kenny:

    There’s an acceptance right across the board that productivity is an issue. That lifting productivity is the ticket to higher living standards and to insulating the economy as well against some of these external shocks. So it’s a good starting place, but then you get as you say, people sort of usually retreating in to certain camps defending their position and looking for gains from others.

    Chalmers:

    There might be a bit of that but let’s see how far we can get if we don’t take that approach. I think broadly people do understand it would be better if our economy was more productive, our budget more sustainable and that we are more resilient in a world that is as uncertain as it is.

    I think that is broadly understood and what I want to try to do at this roundtable is to go beyond problem ID into ideas. I want people to bring specific things and I want them to help build consensus, not just leave it to the government to build consensus.

    Kenny:

    So in other words within the framework of this round table you are looking for people to be talking to each other?

    Chalmers:

    Each other yeah.

    Kenny:

    So that the unions for example talking with employers. And together perhaps agreeing on something they can agree on, which will shift the needle as they say.

    Chalmers:

    And there are so many areas where this is so important. I mean technology, artificial intelligence is going to be a game changer in our economy.

    Kenny:

    It is for everyone right.

    Chalmers:

    Yeah and we need to work together to work out how do we get the best version of that. And so that is our hope and let’s be blunt about it, it remains to be seen how much appetite there is for that. But I think we owe it to ourselves to try to work out where there’s common ground. That’s what the round table is all about.

    People have been terrific about it in the conversations I’ve had with them so far, already there’s a heap of interest. People will be able to feed in, even if they’re not in the Cabinet room that week and so I think it’s set up to succeed, it remains to be seen whether it will.

    Kenny:

    So we’re going to be looking for the productivity of the productivity roundtable.

    Chalmers:

    That’s right, or we’ll get the Productivity Commission to measure it.

    Kenny:

    Yeah because it’s not – you can’t measure it just by butchers paper can you, and annoying‑smelling textas. It’s literally about, I mean the term people often use is concrete, but what’s substantive or concrete comes from it, and can actually result in policy changes. And you’re confident that that can actually achieve something?

    Chalmers:

    I’m confident about that. We’ve got a big agenda on productivity, even this week the Cabinet agreed some next steps. We’ve got the Productivity Commission working on a bunch of stuff. We really have everything we need to succeed except consensus and I hope that seeking consensus is not a naive undertaking. I feel cautiously confident that we can make some progress but it remains to be seen.

    Kenny:

    Consensus of course was the big word in the 1980s with Bob Hawke in particular and the summits that were held and so forth. And we know of course Kevin Rudd had his 2020 – I can’t remember what it was called exactly.

    Chalmers:

    2020 Summit I believe.

    Kenny:

    I think it was summit. This is much more, I suppose surgical in a sense.

    Chalmers:

    Deliberately. We did the Jobs and Skills Summit at the start of our government and I don’t like how that’s been caricatured, the outcomes of that. I actually think we made a lot of progress then.

    But rather than hundreds of people in the room, we will host a small group in the Cabinet room. We won’t do a lot of problem ID, the problem is broadly understood. We want people to bring their ideas. We want them to be responsible and realistic about that. We want them to see the whole chessboard when it comes to our national economy, not just their own kind of specific narrow interests.

    Kenny:

    Yeah because that’s always the frustration for governments isn’t it, it’s all very well for various interests to be pushing their position and perhaps that’s the way our economy and our society has been set up. But our governments have to try to look at the whole – as you say – chessboard, and figure out the implications of each of those moves and what it does to the whole.

    Chalmers:

    And even in budget terms, it’s very easy to call for huge tax cuts. It’s very easy to call for huge new outlays in one area or another. I don’t dismiss people who call for those things but we have to make it all add up at the end of the day. And so hopefully the kind of guidance we give people about how they approach this opportunity in the Cabinet room in the second half of August, hopefully people take that seriously. I think we will make more progress if they do.

    Kenny:

    Yeah. Now I mentioned before how you were there on election night and you were watching the events unfold. Do you think in the frame of what we have just been talking about the fact that it is such a stonking majority that the government has. And whilst it’s not impossible for the government to be turfed out at the next election, it’s not impossible but it doesn’t seem very likely to anyone who has been watching the game for a long time.

    I mean it is just, that would be such a dramatic turnaround from the current situation. I’m not asking you to comment on that particularly but what I am interested in is whether that changes the dynamic in a thing like this productivity roundtable and in the way generally people are looking at things. There’s a sort of a, I think a level of predictability, about who it is that these interests groups will be dealing with for this term and probably the next. Is that an opportunity for everyone?

    Chalmers:

    First of all, I don’t believe that a third term is assured. I don’t think those assurances –

    Kenny:

    I know you have to say it and I agree.

    Chalmers:

    No, no I believe it. There’s no assurances in politics. There’s no assurances in politics. I do think that there is a sense of relief that the election’s resolved and resolved decisively. I do think that there’s an element of that in the broader community and in the stakeholders I deal with. A little bit of an element of predictability in a very unpredictable world to join up where we began this conversation. So there is, I think that.

    For us, you mentioned sitting on the set on election night. The kind of 3 stages I progressed through were firstly surprise, secondly relief. An overwhelming sense of relief. And then thirdly most importantly a sense of gratitude and the reason I mentioned that sense of gratitude is because whether this government has 3 more years to live or 6 more years to live, I am more determined than I’ve ever been to make the most of the opportunity.

    Because when you think about where we were at at the end of 2024, it was conceivable that we could lose the election and the clarifying impact of that when you think about the clock is ticking on all of us. The clarifying impact of what could have been a close run thing but turned out to be a decisive thing. Surprised, relieved and grateful and determined to make the most of this opportunity for however long it lasts.

    Kenny:

    James McGrath, who you were on with, seemed to be moving through those stages slightly more slowly. His weren’t identical stages, they were the opposite I suppose. But he took some time it seemed to me to accept what the numbers were saying. But nonetheless as you say it was a very dramatic night. Just dwelling on that for a moment, how did you feel or how do you feel now reflecting on the sort of brutality of the way your fellow Queenslander Peter Dutton was ejected from politics altogether in that process? There’s a finality about it.

    Chalmers:

    First of all, on James, I genuinely felt for James. We’ve lost our share of national elections too and it’s just, it dawns on you at some point that you’ve got to do opposition for another 3 years and it’s a horrendous –

    Kenny:

    Slog.

    Chalmers:

    So I respect James and I felt for him sitting next to him, and it was a rugged night for him. Yeah, the brutality of 2 leaders of 2 of the 4 biggest parties in the parliament hit the fence on election night. That’s an extraordinary thing. And a brutal thing.

    The thing you will notice, I hope you notice, is I don’t dance on anyone’s political grave. I think politics is tough enough as it is when you’re in it that you shouldn’t dump on people when they’re out of it. And there’s a psychological thing about your own local community telling you they don’t want you anymore, I can only imagine that that is especially rugged for him. But I don’t want to dance on his political grave.

    I hope he doesn’t mind me saying that I’ve been in touch with him since he lost. We had a friendly exchange. He played politics as hard as anyone, if not harder than most. And so we acknowledge that too but I genuinely wish him well and his family. Politics is hard yards for everyone and to be disposed of with that level of brutality I can only imagine is really tough.

    Kenny:

    Yeah. I think it should be said that people who dealt with him, with Peter Dutton at a personal level, his colleagues. And he was popular at a personal level because there was a warmth about him and I’ve certainly said this in things I’ve written in the past as well. He was as you say, a very hard political player but he wasn’t like some other leaders that I won’t mention that weren’t particularly popular with their colleagues. Nonetheless, an extraordinarily badly‑designed campaign, it’s just unbelievable.

    Look in the brief amount of time we’ve got left, can I explore this idea that the Prime Minister has used a bit and you’ve used in your speech as well, made reference to this idea of progressive patriotism. I’m quite fascinated by this. I think the idea that the political right has had a mortgage on patriotism in the past I think is wrong. But it’s an ill‑defined concept at least or it’s a work in progress. How would you frame it?

    Chalmers:

    First of all you’re being characteristically humble, Mark, in not pointing out to all of your listeners that you have been grappling with, publicly, with some of these concepts for some time. I have listened to you and read you with interest in the past about this concept about patriotism. And really what Anthony is talking about when he talks about progressive patriotism is this sense that we can have Australian answers to these very difficult global questions.

    His progressive patriotism is really about Australian exceptionalism. It’s about the fact that we’ve built together, not just governments, but as a country, we’ve built together Medicare and superannuation, and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and all these sorts of things, which around the world other countries envy.

    And so a sense of patriotism which is progressive, which is exceptional and what I try to say in my contribution to this in tipping my hat to him. And this idea that he has prosecuted, is it’s also very pragmatic, it’s very practical. It’s not especially ideological. It’s progressive in the sense that it’s about being more inclusive, looking to the future not just to the past. But it’s practical, it’s pragmatic, it’s about problem solving. That’s what we intend to bring to this reform task in the second term.

    Kenny:

    Yeah so things like the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, universal health insurance, Medicare, that sort of roped in to this, right. I guess what I’m trying to get at is what’s beyond what we already do and know, what’s the use of the term if it is just to describe in a sense what we already do?

    Chalmers:

    I think it’s about recognising this huge opportunity that Australia has because of the progress we’ve made together, because of the way that we think about ourselves and each other. The responsibilities that we have to each other, we don’t believe in this kind of scorched‑earth view of the world that says when the world economy is going berserk it’s everyone for themselves.

    And so I think that’s central to it, that’s the progressive part of it, this sense that we’re all in it together at the worst times and in the worst crises. And also a sense of confidence and optimism that despite everything that’s coming at us from around the world we have it within us to respond effectively, not just to play defence, not just to play off the back foot, but to make this work for us. And that’s the mindset that we all need to have.

    Four shocks in 2 decades, all of this churn and change in the world, a lot of progress we’ve made as Australians. A lot to be proud of, but a lot that we need to do together and we have everything we need, as I said before, except this sense of consensus about the way forward and if Anthony’s second term is to be anything it’s about the search for that.

    Kenny:

    One of the things that’s really challenged the consensus, this will probably be the last question here, but one of the things that’s challenged that consensus, probably the most dramatic challenge to any sort of political consensus over the last 15 years or so has been the argument over climate change. It has just been so divisive and so unproductive to go back to a theme we have been talking about before. Just the amount of time that’s been wasted and policy reversals and division and so forth.

    You’ve studied, I mean you wrote your PhD about Paul Keating’s period you’ve thought about this a lot, right. The idea of the great reform era of the ‘80s and ‘90s, the things that have been done there. Most of those things of course as is well known can’t be done again, they don’t need to be done again.

    But the big reform question now it seems to me and I’m interested in your thoughts about this is decarbonisation of the economy. It’s the transition. We often hear that you shouldn’t waste a crisis. I guess you could also say you shouldn’t waste a huge majority, right. Is this a mandate to accelerate the process of Australia’s economic transition because that’s about resilience as well isn’t it?

    Chalmers:

    The energy transformation is a big part of our reform agenda, and we come at that with ambition not because we’ve got a big majority but because we’ve got a big responsibility. And we do have a big opportunity to be again as the whole world’s energy sources transform and transition, Australia’s got a really compelling role to play in that. I’m excited about our critical minerals, I’m excited about our human capital base, our renewables sector.

    And so I think one of the reasons why we’ve been, I say we, charitably, why the kind of ideology of the extremes on climate change has dominated the conversation. But in the investor communities I knock around in, this is not seen as an especially ideological thing. This is seen as to be about the future of our economy. The future of our industrial base, how we attract and deploy capital more efficiently. This is a very mainstream idea apart from the ideological extremes of X and social media.

    Kenny:

    We understand that Sussan Ley is reviewing all policies and one of those policies it turns out is apparently, is the commitment to net zero. Or at least that’s what a number of people are urging the Coalition to do, is to walk away from commitment to net zero by 2050. What’s your feeling about that?

    Chalmers:

    I think if they walked away it would show they haven’t learnt anything from the last couple of elections. And it feels like from my distance I’m not an expert on the internals of the Liberal and National parties, but it feels like they are setting themselves up for a big barney on this.

    And that’s not good for the way we think about our economy, the way we think about attracting capital and investment, the way we think about certainty in our economy, that would be a bad thing. First of all, if they spent the next 3 years fighting about this but also if they walked away from something that most sane people see as a sensible way to go for an economy like ours.

    Kenny:

    Jim, thanks so much for coming on Democracy Sausage again, for being back here on your old alma mater, the campus of ANU. It’s been a great pleasure talking to you and we’ll look forward to doing so again at some point.

    Chalmers:

    I really enjoyed being back, Mark, and having another great chat, thanks so much.

    Kenny:

    That’s Democracy Sausage for this week. Until next week bye for now.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian citizens in Iran and Israel are desperate to leave. Is the government required to help?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jane McAdam, Scientia Professor and ARC Laureate Fellow, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney

    As thousands of Australian citizens and permanent residents stuck in Iran and Israel continue to register for repatriation flights, the government is scrambling to find safe ways to evacuate them.

    With the airspace over both countries closed, the government is considering other ways to bring them home.

    The current plan is to charter buses from private companies to take people from Israel into neighbouring Jordan. As Prime Minister Anthony Albanese stressed: “We want to make sure people are looked after, but they need to be looked after safely as well”.

    This is not the first time Australia has faced challenges in evacuating nationals stranded abroad. When conflict, disasters or other emergencies occur overseas, the government regularly works to bring Australians home.

    In the early days of the COVID pandemic, for instance, the government arranged repatriation flights and established quarantine facilities to assist Australians who were stuck outside the country. Australia has repeatedly assisted its citizens caught in conflict zones to get back home, including from Afghanistan in 2021 and Lebanon in 2024.

    And when an earthquake devasted Vanuatu last December, Australia moved swiftly to get Australians out.

    Is Australia legally required to repatriate people?

    While there is a longstanding and widespread practice of governments repatriating their nationals in emergencies, countries generally do not have a legal responsibility to do so.

    Instead, governments’ decisions are discretionary and made on a case-by-case basis. They are often influenced by diplomatic, logistical and security considerations.

    Governments have a right – but not a duty – to provide consular assistance to their nationals abroad. This includes issuing travel documents, liaising with local authorities and, in exceptional cases, facilitating evacuations.

    The Consular Services Charter outlines what Australians abroad can expect from their government. It makes clear that while the government will do what it can, there are limits. Assistance is not guaranteed, especially in areas where Australia has no diplomatic presence or where security conditions make intervention too dangerous.

    The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is the lead agency responsible for coordinating Australians’ evacuation with embassies, airlines and international partners. Decisions to evacuate are ultimately made by the minister for foreign affairs following a recommendation, where possible, by the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF).

    Repatriation efforts are guided by the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN). This arrangement that sets out a process for “the safe repatriation of Australians, their immediate dependants, permanent residents and approved foreign nationals (evacuees) following an Australian government-led evacuation in response to an overseas disaster or adverse security situation”. It outlines how federal, state and territory agencies coordinate to receive and support evacuees once they arrive in Australia, ensuring that returns are not only swift, but also safe and orderly.

    Challenges and constraints

    Repatriation during a crisis is a complex undertaking. Quite aside from the emergency conditions, which may close off usual travel options or routes, the Australian government cannot force another country to allow an evacuation. It also cannot guarantee safe passage, especially in conflicts.

    Identifying and communicating with citizens overseas can also be tricky, often requiring people to have self-registered with consular authorities to receive updates. In addition, consular services may be strained when embassies and consular offices have closed, as is the case in Israel and Iran.

    For these reasons, countries sometimes band together to assist each other. For instance, Australia and Canada have agreed that where one has a consular presence but the other does not, they will help to repatriate the other’s citizens.

    Similarly, the United States helped evacuate Australians and other allies’ nationals from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover in 2021. Countries in the European Union can activate a special regional mechanism to facilitate the repatriation of their citizens caught up in emergencies abroad.

    In exceptional circumstances, countries have sometimes extracted their stranded nationals through military operations, known as “non-combatant evacuation operations” (NEOs). This involves the military temporarily occupying a location on foreign soil to evacuate people. Some recent examples include the large-scale evacuations of foreign nationals from Afghanistan in 2021, Sudan during the civil war that began in 2023 and Lebanon during the 2024 Israeli–Hezbollah conflict.

    NEOs generally require the consent of the country from where the evacuation takes place, but their precise legal basis remains ambiguous under international law.

    In all cases, the evacuation of nationals is operationally complex – as exemplified by the current situation in Iran and Israel. Countries with limited resources may struggle to repatriate their nationals at all. This can mean some foreign nationals are “rescued”, while others are left behind.

    And, of course, local populations generally aren’t eligible for evacuation at all. This can leave people in extremely dangerous circumstances.

    That is why we have proposed the creation of an Australian framework for humanitarian emergencies that, among other things, would facilitate the safe and swift departure of certain non-citizens at particular risk. This would underscore that Australia’s approach to evacuations is, at its heart, about protecting people during crises.

    Jane McAdam receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC) and is the Director of the ARC Evacuations Research Hub at the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney.

    Regina Jefferies and Thomas Mulder do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Australian citizens in Iran and Israel are desperate to leave. Is the government required to help? – https://theconversation.com/australian-citizens-in-iran-and-israel-are-desperate-to-leave-is-the-government-required-to-help-259272

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Economy – RBNZ Bulletin: Reflections on 35 Years of Flexible Inflation Targeting – Lessons from the RBNZ Research Conference

    Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand – Te Pūtea Matua

    19 June 2025 – The Reserve Bank of New Zealand – Te Pūtea Matua hosted a research conference on 6-7 March 2025 commemorating “35 Years of Flexible Inflation Targeting – Challenges and Opportunities”.

    This Bulletin summarises the key themes and insights that emerged during the conference.

    The conference marked a significant historical milestone. Reflecting on the decades leading to inflation targeting, Governor Christian Hawkesby described how New Zealand experienced high and volatile inflation when monetary policy was set under the direction of the Government, not an independent central bank.

    Reforms undertaken from 1988 set out, in the words of the then Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, to “ensure that future politicians don’t interfere with the primary objective of the Reserve Bank”.

    In March 1990, when the Minister of Finance and the Reserve Bank Governor signed the first Policy Targets Agreement (PTA), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand became the first central bank to have a numerical target for inflation specified in its monetary policy mandate. (ref. https://govt.us20.list-manage.com/track/click?u=bd316aa7ee4f5679c56377819&id=f7a74960f1&e=f3c68946f8 )

    Against this backdrop, 35 years after the first PTA, the research conference aimed to understand the inflation targeting experience across central banks, the challenges, and the opportunities to refine monetary policy frameworks and strategies in the post-pandemic world.
     
    Read the Bulletin: https://govt.us20.list-manage.com/track/click?u=bd316aa7ee4f5679c56377819&id=78cd896bea&e=f3c68946f8

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: PSB Holdings, Inc. announces semi-annual cash dividend of $0.34 per share

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    WAUSAU, Wis., June 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PSB Holdings, Inc. (OTCQX: PSBQ), parent company of Peoples State Bank, is pleased to announce that on June 17, 2025, its Board of Directors declared a regular semi-annual cash dividend of $0.34 per share of the Company’s common stock. The dividend is payable July 31, 2025 to shareholders of record as of July 11, 2025 and represents an increase of 6.3% over the $0.32 per share semi-annual cash dividend declared on December 17, 2024. The current dividend continues a 60-year tradition of cash dividends to PSB shareholders including 32 consecutive years of increased cash dividends declared per share.

    PSB President and CEO Scott M. Cattanach said, “We remain optimistic for continued strong financial performance through the end of 2025 and are pleased to announce a $0.34 per share semi-annual cash dividend to holders of our common stock. We thank our shareholders for their continued support.”

    About PSB Holdings, Inc.

    PSB Holdings, Inc. is the parent company of Peoples State Bank. Peoples is a community bank headquartered in Wausau, Wisconsin, serving northcentral and southeastern Wisconsin from twelve full-service banking locations in Marathon, Oneida, Vilas, Portage, Milwaukee and Waukesha counties and a loan production office in Dane county. Peoples also provides investment and insurance products, along with retirement planning services, through Peoples Wealth Management, a division of Peoples. PSB Holdings, Inc. is traded under the stock symbol PSBQ on the OTCQX Market. More information about PSB, its management, and its financial performance may be found at www.psbholdingsinc.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements are based on current expectations, estimates and projections about PSB’s business based, in part, on assumptions made by management and include, without limitation, statements with respect to the potential growth of PSB, its future profits, expected stock repurchase levels, future dividend rates, future interest rates, and the adequacy of its capital position. Forward-looking statements can be affected by known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors, including, but not limited to, strength of the economy, the effects of government policies, including interest rate policies, risks associated with the execution of PSB’s vision and growth strategy, including with respect to current and future M&A activity, and risks associated with global economic instability relating to the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on PSB and Peoples, and their customers, and other risks. The forward-looking statements in this press release speak only as of the date on which they are made and PSB does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statement to reflect events or circumstances after the date of this release.

    Investor Relations Contact
    PSB Holdings, Inc.
    1905 Stewart Avenue
    Wausau, WI 54401
    888.929.9902
    InvestorRelations@bankpeoples.com 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Mauritius

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 18, 2025

    • The Mauritian economy continues to exhibit resilience with growth at 4.7 percent in 2024 and contained inflation. The growth outlook remains favorable, though risks are to the downside.
    • Mauritius needs to recalibrate the macroeconomic policy mix to rebuild fiscal space. The monetary policy framework needs to be strengthened while continued monitoring of macro-financial risks is essential to maintain financial stability.
    • Advancing key reforms to foster external competitiveness and private sector-led growth while enhancing climate resilience will reduce external imbalances.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for Mauritius.[1]

    Mauritius’ economy remains resilient. Real GDP grew by 4.7 percent in 2024, from 5.0 percent in 2023, driven by services, construction, and tourism. Headline inflation (12-month average) declined to
    2.5 percent in March 2025 from 7.0 percent in 2023, helped by easing international food and energy prices and lower fuel excise duties. The external current account deficit widened in 2024 to
    6.5 percent of GDP, mostly reflecting higher imports and freight costs. Gross foreign reserves increased to US$8.5 billion by end-2024, covering almost 12 months of imports. Looking ahead, the country needs to address fiscal and structural challenges, notably the high public debt, significant public investment needs, low productivity, and an ageing society.

    The outlook for growth is favorable. Real GDP growth is projected to soften to 3.0 percent in 2025 due to weakening external demand, easing tourism activity, and the drought. Over the medium term, growth is expected at around 3.4 percent, reflecting demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Inflation is projected to average 3.6 percent in 2025 and remain within BOM’s target range over the medium term. The external current account deficit is projected to reduce to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2025—reflecting lower oil prices, as exports grow modestly amid the slowdown in global demand—and to increase in 2026 due to subdued exports, but gradually decline thereafter. The primary fiscal deficit (excluding grants) for FY24/25 is projected to worsen by 3.4 ppt of GDP relative to FY23/24, to 6.5 percent of GDP, mostly driven by higher compensation of employees, social benefits, and grants and transfers. The stock of public sector debt is projected at around 88 percent of GDP at end-June 2025, and to gradually decline in the medium term.

    Risks to the outlook are on the downside, including from global uncertainty, tariff wars, higher-than-anticipated fuel and food prices, and extreme climate shocks.

     

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    The economy has recovered solidly from the pandemic and the outlook is favorable, but fiscal and structural challenges remain. The recovery has been driven by services, construction, and tourism. The medium-term outlook is favorable but held back by demographic headwinds and labor shortages. Mauritius is facing fiscal and structural challenges from high public debt, significant public investment needs for climate, low productivity, and an ageing society. Risks to the outlook are on the downside including from high global uncertainty, highlighting the importance of addressing fiscal and external imbalances to increase the resilience of the economy.

    Fiscal policy should pursue frontloaded growth-friendly consolidation to shore up fiscal credibility, helping rebuild fiscal space while protecting the most vulnerable. Tax revenue should be increased and current and ESFs’ spending contained while safeguarding critical social spending and growth-enhancing capital spending. Pension system reform remains key to support fiscal sustainability, especially given the ageing of Mauritius’ population. Strengthening public financial management, including by streamlining ESFs, will support fiscal consolidation, transparency, and good governance.

    BOM should start to gradually phase out its ownership of MIC and strengthen the implementation of the monetary policy framework by resuming uncapped issuance of 7-Day BOM bills (at the key policy rate). BOM should stand ready to tighten the monetary policy stance should inflationary pressures reemerge. BOM should adopt amendments to the BOM Act, including to ensure fiscal backing, to protect central bank independence. Ministry of Finance and BOM are encouraged to strengthen the commitment on their mutual agreement for BOM independence. Mauritius should continue to rely on exchange rate flexibility and FX purchases when opportunities arise, and in line with the monetary policy framework, to help further build foreign reserves buffers to ensure ability to respond to large external shocks. 

    Mauritius’ external position at end-2024 is assessed as weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies, and structural reforms to foster external competitiveness are needed to reduce external imbalances. Steady progress in strengthening the AML/CFT framework is welcome and should be sustained, including provisions related to non-resident and cross-border activity. Financial sector risks should continue to be closely monitored including of the real estate sector. Ongoing efforts to improve external sector statistics, including measurement of the GBCs sector, should be sustained. Statistical gaps and discrepancies should be addressed to improve the quality and credibility of macroeconomic statistics.

    Mauritius should advance structural reforms that boost investment and innovation to secure longer-term private sector-led growth. Priorities include strengthening workers’ skills through better education and narrowing gender gaps as well as advancing climate adaptation efforts to support economic resilience.

     

    Mauritius: Selected Economic Indicators

     
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

     
           

    Est.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Proj.

     
     
                               
     

    (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    National income, prices and employment

                             

    Real GDP

     

    -14.5

    3.4

    8.7

    5.0

    4.7

    3.0

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

    3.4

     

    Real GDP per capita

     

    -14.6

    3.6

    8.9

    5.1

    4.9

    3.2

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

    3.7

    3.8

     

    GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars)

     

    9,011

    9,087

    10,235

    11,188

    11,883

    12,448

    13,287

    14,183

    15,128

    16,131

    17,190

     

    GDP deflator

     

    2.6

    3.2

    9.6

    6.6

    3.8

    3.8

    3.7

    3.7

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

     

    Consumer prices inflation (period average)

     

    2.5

    4.0

    10.8

    7.0

    3.6

    3.6

    3.6

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

     

    Consumer prices inflation (end of period)

     

    2.7

    6.8

    12.2

    3.9

    2.9

    3.9

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

     

    Unemployment rate (percent)

     

    9.2

    9.1

    6.8

    6.1

    5.8

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

    5.9

     
                               
       

    (Annual percent change)

       

    External sector

                             

    Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -23.8

    5.2

    45.7

    4.0

    3.0

    1.7

    2.3

    7.1

    6.2

    6.5

    7.4

     

    Of which: tourism receipts

     

    -73.8

    -23.8

    313.1

    29.7

    6.0

    -4.6

    5.3

    7.7

    8.6

    8.1

    7.7

     

    Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -29.1

    16.0

    32.9

    -0.3

    6.4

    0.7

    4.7

    5.3

    4.9

    4.3

    5.3

     

    Nominal effective exchange rate (annual average)

     

    -8.0

    -8.0

    3.6

    0.5

    -1.4

     

    Real effective exchange rate (annual average)

     

    -7.6

    -7.5

    6.2

    1.7

    -0.6

     

    Terms of trade

     

    5.1

    -12.0

    -5.1

    8.3

    0.0

    2.3

    2.0

    0.7

    0.5

    0.5

    0.4

     
                               
             

    Money and credit

                             

    Net foreign assets

     

    16.4

    18.6

    -3.6

    -0.3

    18.3

    1.5

    2.7

    2.5

    2.1

    2.2

    3.0

     

    Domestic credit

     

    7.9

    15.6

    13.1

    9.7

    13.7

    7.2

    6.5

    6.3

    6.1

    6.0

    5.9

     

    Net claims on government

     

    8.8

    34.8

    24.6

    26.1

    31.3

    13.2

    7.7

    6.0

    5.3

    4.5

    3.7

     

    Credit to non-government sector

     

    2.7

    0.4

    -0.6

    8.0

    8.3

    6.0

    6.9

    7.2

    7.1

    7.1

    7.1

     

    Broad money

     

    17.7

    8.6

    4.1

    7.8

    12.9

    6.4

    7.6

    8.5

    8.4

    8.4

    7.9

     

    Income velocity of broad money (M2)

     

    0.8

    0.8

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

     
                               
       

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    Central government finances 1

                             

    Overall borrowing requirement 2

     

    -22.1

    -5.5

    -4.7

    -6.1

    -10.4

    -5.4

    -3.7

    -3.4

    -2.9

    -2.4

    -2.0

     

    Primary balance (excluding grants) 

     

    -16.5

    -4.9

    -2.7

    -3.1

    -6.5

    -3.0

    -1.3

    -0.3

    0.1

    0.4

    0.5

     

    Revenues (incl. grants)

     

    21.6

    24.2

    24.5

    24.0

    25.7

    27.0

    27.3

    27.5

    27.5

    27.5

    27.4

     

    Expenditure, excl. net lending

     

    40.4

    31.1

    29.4

    29.7

    35.2

    32.3

    31.2

    30.3

    29.9

    29.4

    28.9

     

    Domestic debt of central government

     

    67.5

    61.9

    57.3

    58.7

    64.4

    65.8

    65.7

    65.3

    64.5

    64.0

    63.7

     

    External debt of central government

     

    15.8

    14.0

    13.8

    12.7

    14.8

    14.9

    14.8

    14.7

    14.6

    14.3

    13.9

     
                               

    Investment and saving 4

                             

    Gross domestic investment

     

    18.2

    19.8

    19.8

    20.2

    21.0

    22.0

    22.4

    22.5

    22.5

    22.5

    22.5

     

    Public

     

    4.1

    4.1

    3.9

    3.9

    3.8

    4.1

    4.2

    4.3

    4.3

    4.3

    4.3

     

    Private 3

     

    14.1

    15.7

    15.8

    16.3

    17.2

    17.9

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

    18.2

     

    Gross national savings

     

    11.6

    12.6

    17.1

    22.4

    23.4

    23.8

    25.0

    26.1

    26.5

    26.2

    26.4

     

    Public

     

    -7.9

    -5.6

    -2.0

    -2.4

    -4.5

    -4.0

    -1.7

    -0.7

    -0.1

    0.4

    0.8

     

    Private

     

    19.5

    18.2

    19.2

    24.8

    28.0

    27.8

    26.7

    26.8

    26.6

    25.9

    25.6

     

    External sector

                             

    Balance of goods and services

     

    -10.7

    -16.1

    -14.8

    -11.7

    -13.2

    -12.3

    -13.0

    -12.2

    -11.6

    -10.5

    -9.6

     

    Exports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    35.1

    36.7

    47.6

    45.3

    43.9

    42.7

    41.0

    41.2

    41.1

    41.2

    41.7

     

    Imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    -45.8

    -52.7

    -62.4

    -56.9

    -57.2

    -55.0

    -54.0

    -53.4

    -52.7

    -51.7

    -51.2

     

    Current account balance

     

    -8.9

    -13.1

    -11.1

    -5.1

    -6.5

    -4.7

    -6.1

    -5.0

    -4.3

    -3.7

    -3.0

     

    Capital and financial account

     

    3.3

    23.3

    13.4

    -0.9

    14.5

    6.1

    9.1

    6.7

    5.9

    5.2

    4.6

     

    Overall balance

     

    -4.4

    10.2

    2.8

    -5.5

    7.3

    1.4

    2.9

    1.8

    1.6

    1.5

    1.6

     

    Total external debt

     

    110.7

    134.0

    132.2

    131.6

    139.2

    128.9

    119.3

    110.8

    102.2

    94.1

    87.1

     

    Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)

     

    7,242

    7,805

    7,740

    7,254

    8,510

    8,675

    9,163

    9,475

    9,781

    10,083

    10,420

     

    Months of imports of goods and services, f.o.b.

     

    14.3

    11.6

    11.6

    10.2

    11.8

    11.6

    11.6

    11.4

    11.3

    11.2

    11.1

     
                               

    Memorandum items:

                             

    GDP at current market prices (billions of Mauritian rupees)

     

    448.9

    478.8

    570.3

    638.3

    694.0

    742.3

    796.0

    853.3

    914.0

    979.0

    1,048.7

     

    GDP at current market prices (millions of U.S. dollars)

     

    11,408

    11,484

    12,908

    14,101

    14,953

    15,641

    16,662

    17,748

    18,890

    20,082

    21,326

     

    Public sector debt, fiscal year (percent of GDP)4

     

    91.9

    86.1

    81.8

    81.5

    88.3

    89.1

    88.1

    86.9

    85.3

    83.9

    82.7

     
                               

    Foreign and local currency long-term debt rating (Moody’s)

     

    Baa1

    Baa2

    Baa3

    Baa3

    Baa3

    Baa3

     
                             

    Sources:  Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

                             

    1GFSM 2001 concept of net lending/net borrowing, includes special and other extrabudgetary funds. Fiscal data reported for fiscal years (e.g, 2019=2019/20).

         

    2 Following the GFSM 2014, Sections 5.111.5.116, the transfers from the BOM to the

    Central Government are considered as financing.

               

    Excludes changes in inventories in 2022 and outer years.

                                                                                                 

    4 The public debt series has been reclassified starting in the 2024 AIV Mission to allow

    consolidation of central government securities held by non-financial
    public corporations

                                                                       
                                                                                                                 

     

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/18/pr-25204-mauritius-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: From the Paris Air Show, Shaheen Pens Wall Street Journal Op-Ed Warning Trump’s Trade Policy Threatens Our National Defense and Global Alliances

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – After co-leading a bipartisan Congressional delegation to the Paris Air Show, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal warning that President Trump’s trade policy threatens American national defense and global alliances. In her piece, Shaheen argues that the president’s tariff policy threatens our relationships around the globe, exacerbates existing supply chain disruptions and threatens American defense readiness. You can read her op-ed here.

    In part, Shaheen writes: “While Beijing closely watches the war in Ukraine, it has also escalated confrontations in the South China Sea and conducted aggressive military exercises over the Taiwan Strait. In the face of these rising threats, our ability to produce and deliver weapons at scale—coordinated with our allies—is more critical than ever.”

    Shaheen concludes: “The Trump administration’s trade policies have weakened the alliances we rely on. Congress should reassert our leadership by re-examining its moves and exercising congressional oversight. If we’re going to be ready for the challenges ahead, we must treat American trade policy as a core pillar of American national security.”

    The op-ed is available here and in full below:

    Trump’s Tariffs Weaken America’s Military

    Eighty years ago, the U.S. Army Air Forces staged an exhibition beneath the Eiffel Tower. Thousands of Parisians gathered to admire the B-17 Flying Fortress—an American-built aircraft that helped liberate Europe from Nazi occupation. Primitive by today’s standards, those bombers were the product of a national industrial base operating at full capacity. They were deployed by a trans-Atlantic alliance that shared logistics, intelligence and purpose. That model of coordination is what we need now—but it’s being tested by a trade agenda that favors confrontation over cooperation.

    As I co-lead the congressional delegation to this week’s Paris Air Show, the world’s largest defense aerospace expo, I find myself asking: Is the greatest obstacle to America’s security not China or Russia but our own trade policy?

    The U.S. defense industry’s capacity to meet the demand for arms was already stretched thin by the Covid pandemic and conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. The Trump administration further disrupted supply chains and increased production costs through more than 50 tariff announcements and a patchwork of shifting duties. The imposition of these tariffs has pressured allies to respond in kind. This cycle worsens supply-chain disruptions, driving up costs and causing delays in defense production.

    President Trump imposed 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum earlier this month. Regardless of any exemptions the administration offers, building a modern America-class amphibious assault ship requires 45,000 tons of steel. The net effect of this trade policy will be higher costs across the board, from military aircraft and lightweight armor plating to submarine repairs and shipbuilding.

    Tariffs will also affect small, specialized components like those used in jet engines, night vision systems, and landing gear. When I recently met with a New Hampshire company that makes ball bearings for the aerospace industry, executives told me tariffs have driven up their costs and extended their production time—concerns industry leaders echoed in Paris.

    These delays and rising costs don’t only slow American readiness; they erode our allies’ trust in the U.S. as a dependable partner. The strain is already evident. Although the F-35 fighter jet is “the pinnacle of aerial combat technology,” in Vice President JD Vance’s words, several North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have signaled they may reconsider participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

    Demand for American-made weapons remains strong, especially from front-line nations like Poland. It is racing to acquire Himars rocket launchers and Abrams tanks. But even as the Trump administration pressures allies to spend more on defense, its trade policies and combative rhetoric are sowing doubt about the reliability of parts, maintenance and pricing. That’s prompting U.S. partners to reassess their long-term defense commitments. President Emmanuel Macron underscored this shift when he said, “My goal is to persuade EU countries that rely on U.S. weapons to choose European alternatives.”

    European leaders have legitimate cause for concern, and their increased defense spending reflects it. Vladimir Putin has reoriented Russia’s economy around the war in Ukraine, churning out more than 1,400 Iskander ballistic missiles a year and at one point signing up 1,000 new recruits a day. His effort is backed by North Korea, Iran and, most significantly, China.

    While Beijing closely watches the war in Ukraine, it has also escalated confrontations in the South China Sea and conducted aggressive military exercises over the Taiwan Strait. In the face of these rising threats, our ability to produce and deliver weapons at scale—coordinated with allies—is more critical than ever.

    The administration argues that reliance on foreign imports undermines American defense readiness and that tariffs will protect U.S. industries. But the defense industrial base has evolved over generations, and restructuring it would take decades—time we simply don’t have.

    Russia, China and Iran may feel distant to many Americans. But for those of us with family who served in World War II—or who confront national-security challenges daily in government service—the risks are clear and they are growing.

    As the B-17 displayed in Paris that summer of 1945 symbolized a robust industrial base united with steadfast allies, today’s defense readiness depends on a similarly coordinated approach—one that can’t thrive amid tariffs that alienate our closest partners.

    We need a smarter, more unified strategy. Tariffs on our closest allies aren’t only damaging our economy, they’re undermining our shared defense readiness. At a minimum, the administration should provide answers on how these tariffs are affecting our defense supply chains. I’ve asked Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth for this information but received no response.

    The Trump administration’s trade policies have weakened the alliances we rely on. Congress should reassert our leadership by re-examining its moves and exercising congressional oversight. If we’re going to be ready for the challenges ahead, we must treat American trade policy as a core pillar of American national security.

    Last week, Shaheen pressed U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on the impacts of the administration’s tariffs on steel and aluminum on the defense industrial base, supply chain lead times and our overall military readiness. The exchange followed a letter sent to Hegseth in April where Shaheen raised concerns about how the President’s trade war harms defense supply chains and ultimately weakens America’s military readiness. The Senator expressed how tariffs on imports will increase prices for the Department of Defense’s defense acquisitions – harming its purchasing power and further raising costs on small businesses.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc. Announces Results of Special Meeting of Stockholders; Approval of Conversion of Fund to CLO Equity Strategy

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIAMI BEACH, FLA., June 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc. (NASDAQ: CUBA) (the “Fund”) today announced that the Fund’s Stockholders have approved the Fund’s conversion from its current investment strategy to focus on a “CLO Equity Strategy”. The approval was voted for at a Special Meeting of Stockholders held on June 17, 2025, with approximately 96% of the votes cast in favor of the changes.

    With this change, the Fund’s primary investment objective will change to a total return strategy with a secondary objective of generating high current income for stockholders. In accordance with the change in investment objective, the Fund will focus on investing in equity and junior debt tranches of collateralized loan obligations, or “CLOs”. CLOs are portfolios of collateralized loans consisting primarily of below investment grade U.S. senior secured loans with a large number of distinct underlying borrowers across various industry sectors.

    The three proposals approved by the Fund’s stockholders at the special meeting were:

    • Proposal 1: approval of an amended and restated investment advisory agreement between the Fund and Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc. (the “Adviser”) to permit the Adviser to receive a fee based on “managed assets” and an incentive fee.
    • Proposal 2: approval to revise the Fund’s investment objective from obtaining “long term capital appreciation” to a primary objective of “maximizing risk adjusted total returns” with a secondary objective of “generating high current income;” and to reclassify the Fund’s investment objective as non-fundamental.
    • Proposal 3: approval to amend the fundamental policies of the Fund related to borrowing, the issuance of senior securities, underwriting securities issued by other persons, industry concentration, the purchase or sale of real estate, the purchase or sale of commodities, and making loans to other persons.

    The changes approved by the Fund’s Stockholders will go into effect July 1, 2025.

    Cecilia Gondor, Chairperson of the Fund’s Board of Directors commented: “This marks an important day in the long history of our Fund and the beginning of what we hope is a bright future for our Fund investors. I want to thank my fellow board members and our Chairman Emeritus, Tom Herzfeld, for the hard work that was undertaken in managing this transition.”

    About Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc.

    Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc., founded in 1984, is an SEC registered investment advisor, specializing in investment analysis and account management in closed-end funds.

    More information about the advisor can be found at www.herzfeld.com.

    Past performance is no guarantee of future performance. An investment in the Fund is subject to certain risks, including market risk. In general, shares of closed-end funds often trade at a discount from their net asset value and at the time of sale may be trading on the exchange at a price which is more or less than the original purchase price or the net asset value. An investor should carefully consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, charges and expenses. Please read the Fund’s disclosure documents before investing.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release, and other statements that TJHA or the Fund may make, may contain forward looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, with respect to the Fund’s or TJHA’s future financial or business performance, strategies or expectations. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words or phrases such as “trend,” “potential,” “opportunity,” “pipeline,” “believe,” “comfortable,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “current,” “intention,” “estimate,” “position,” “assume,” “outlook,” “continue,” “remain,” “maintain,” “sustain,” “seek,” “achieve,” and similar expressions, or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “would,” “should,” “could,” “may” or similar expressions. TJHA and the Fund caution that forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and TJHA and the Fund assume no duty to and do not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements and future results could differ materially from historical performance. With respect to the Fund, the following factors, among others, could cause actual events to differ materially from forward-looking statements or historical performance: (1) changes and volatility in political, economic or industry conditions, particularly with respect to Cuba and other Caribbean Basin countries, the interest rate environment, foreign exchange rates or financial and capital markets, which could result in changes in demand for the Fund or in the Fund’s net asset value; (2) the relative and absolute investment performance of the Fund and its investments; (3) the impact of increased competition; (4) the unfavorable resolution of any legal proceedings; (5) the extent and timing of any distributions or share repurchases; (6) the impact, extent and timing of technological changes; (7) the impact of legislative and regulatory actions and reforms, including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and regulatory, supervisory or enforcement actions of government agencies relating to the Fund or TJHA, as applicable; (8) terrorist activities, international hostilities and natural disasters, which may adversely affect the general economy, domestic and local financial and capital markets, specific industries or TJHA or the Fund; (9) TJHA’s and the Fund’s ability to attract and retain highly talented professionals; (10) the impact of TJHA electing to provide support to its products from time to time; (11) the impact of problems at other financial institutions or the failure or negative performance of products at other financial institutions; and (12) the effects of an epidemic, pandemic or public health emergency, including without limitation, COVID-19. Annual and Semi-Annual Reports and other regulatory filings of the Fund with the SEC are accessible on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov and on TJHA’s website at www.herzfeld.com/cuba, and may discuss these or other factors that affect the Fund. The information contained on TJHA’s website is not a part of this press release.

    TJHA has received certain nominations or awards by third-parties as reflected herein. Investors should review the criteria for each nomination or award as reflected on the third-party’s webpage. In addition, the nominations and awards reflect past performance of the nominee or award designee and may not reflect the current performance or status of any such firm or individual and may no longer be applicable. Morningstar award content presented with permission and licensing fee. Contact us for more information on how the ratings are apportioned and for full disclosures regarding third party news and awards.

    Contact:
    Thomas Morgan
    Chief Compliance Officer
    The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc.
    1-305-777-1660

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc. Announces Results of Special Meeting of Stockholders; Approval of Conversion of Fund to CLO Equity Strategy

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIAMI BEACH, FLA., June 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc. (NASDAQ: CUBA) (the “Fund”) today announced that the Fund’s Stockholders have approved the Fund’s conversion from its current investment strategy to focus on a “CLO Equity Strategy”. The approval was voted for at a Special Meeting of Stockholders held on June 17, 2025, with approximately 96% of the votes cast in favor of the changes.

    With this change, the Fund’s primary investment objective will change to a total return strategy with a secondary objective of generating high current income for stockholders. In accordance with the change in investment objective, the Fund will focus on investing in equity and junior debt tranches of collateralized loan obligations, or “CLOs”. CLOs are portfolios of collateralized loans consisting primarily of below investment grade U.S. senior secured loans with a large number of distinct underlying borrowers across various industry sectors.

    The three proposals approved by the Fund’s stockholders at the special meeting were:

    • Proposal 1: approval of an amended and restated investment advisory agreement between the Fund and Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc. (the “Adviser”) to permit the Adviser to receive a fee based on “managed assets” and an incentive fee.
    • Proposal 2: approval to revise the Fund’s investment objective from obtaining “long term capital appreciation” to a primary objective of “maximizing risk adjusted total returns” with a secondary objective of “generating high current income;” and to reclassify the Fund’s investment objective as non-fundamental.
    • Proposal 3: approval to amend the fundamental policies of the Fund related to borrowing, the issuance of senior securities, underwriting securities issued by other persons, industry concentration, the purchase or sale of real estate, the purchase or sale of commodities, and making loans to other persons.

    The changes approved by the Fund’s Stockholders will go into effect July 1, 2025.

    Cecilia Gondor, Chairperson of the Fund’s Board of Directors commented: “This marks an important day in the long history of our Fund and the beginning of what we hope is a bright future for our Fund investors. I want to thank my fellow board members and our Chairman Emeritus, Tom Herzfeld, for the hard work that was undertaken in managing this transition.”

    About Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc.

    Thomas J. Herzfeld Advisors, Inc., founded in 1984, is an SEC registered investment advisor, specializing in investment analysis and account management in closed-end funds.

    More information about the advisor can be found at www.herzfeld.com.

    Past performance is no guarantee of future performance. An investment in the Fund is subject to certain risks, including market risk. In general, shares of closed-end funds often trade at a discount from their net asset value and at the time of sale may be trading on the exchange at a price which is more or less than the original purchase price or the net asset value. An investor should carefully consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, charges and expenses. Please read the Fund’s disclosure documents before investing.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release, and other statements that TJHA or the Fund may make, may contain forward looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, with respect to the Fund’s or TJHA’s future financial or business performance, strategies or expectations. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words or phrases such as “trend,” “potential,” “opportunity,” “pipeline,” “believe,” “comfortable,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “current,” “intention,” “estimate,” “position,” “assume,” “outlook,” “continue,” “remain,” “maintain,” “sustain,” “seek,” “achieve,” and similar expressions, or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “would,” “should,” “could,” “may” or similar expressions. TJHA and the Fund caution that forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and TJHA and the Fund assume no duty to and do not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements and future results could differ materially from historical performance. With respect to the Fund, the following factors, among others, could cause actual events to differ materially from forward-looking statements or historical performance: (1) changes and volatility in political, economic or industry conditions, particularly with respect to Cuba and other Caribbean Basin countries, the interest rate environment, foreign exchange rates or financial and capital markets, which could result in changes in demand for the Fund or in the Fund’s net asset value; (2) the relative and absolute investment performance of the Fund and its investments; (3) the impact of increased competition; (4) the unfavorable resolution of any legal proceedings; (5) the extent and timing of any distributions or share repurchases; (6) the impact, extent and timing of technological changes; (7) the impact of legislative and regulatory actions and reforms, including the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and regulatory, supervisory or enforcement actions of government agencies relating to the Fund or TJHA, as applicable; (8) terrorist activities, international hostilities and natural disasters, which may adversely affect the general economy, domestic and local financial and capital markets, specific industries or TJHA or the Fund; (9) TJHA’s and the Fund’s ability to attract and retain highly talented professionals; (10) the impact of TJHA electing to provide support to its products from time to time; (11) the impact of problems at other financial institutions or the failure or negative performance of products at other financial institutions; and (12) the effects of an epidemic, pandemic or public health emergency, including without limitation, COVID-19. Annual and Semi-Annual Reports and other regulatory filings of the Fund with the SEC are accessible on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov and on TJHA’s website at www.herzfeld.com/cuba, and may discuss these or other factors that affect the Fund. The information contained on TJHA’s website is not a part of this press release.

    TJHA has received certain nominations or awards by third-parties as reflected herein. Investors should review the criteria for each nomination or award as reflected on the third-party’s webpage. In addition, the nominations and awards reflect past performance of the nominee or award designee and may not reflect the current performance or status of any such firm or individual and may no longer be applicable. Morningstar award content presented with permission and licensing fee. Contact us for more information on how the ratings are apportioned and for full disclosures regarding third party news and awards.

    Contact:
    Thomas Morgan
    Chief Compliance Officer
    The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund, Inc.
    1-305-777-1660

    The MIL Network