Category: Politics

  • Thai court suspends PM from duty pending case seeking her dismissal

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Thailand’s Constitutional Court on Tuesday suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from duty pending a case seeking her dismissal, adding to mounting pressure on a government under fire on multiple fronts.

    The court in a statement said it had accepted a petition from 36 senators that accuses Paetongtarn of dishonesty and breaching ethnical standards in violation of the constitution over the leak of a politically sensitive telephone conversation with Cambodia’s influential former leader Hun Sen.

    The government is expected to be led by a deputy prime minister in a caretaker capacity while the court decides the case against Paetongtarn, who will remain in the cabinet as the new culture minister following a reshuffle. The government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on her suspension.

    The leaked call with the veteran Cambodian politician triggered domestic outrage and has left Paetongtarn’s coalition with a razer-thin majority, with a key party abandoning the alliance and expected to soon seek a no confidence vote in parliament, as protest groups demand the premier resigns.

    During a June 15 call intended to defuse escalating border tensions with Cambodia, Paetongtarn, 38, kowtowed before Hun Sen and criticised a Thai army commander, a red line in a country where the military has significant clout. She has apologised and said her remarks were a negotiating tactic.

    FAMILY CRISIS

    Paetongtarn’s battles after only 10 months in power underline the declining strength of the Pheu Thai Party, the populist juggernaut of the billionaire Shinawatra dynasty that has dominated Thai elections since 2001, enduring military coups and court rulings that have toppled multiple governments and prime ministers.

    It has been a baptism of fire for political novice Paetongtarn, who thrust into power as Thailand’s youngest premier and replacement for Srettha Thavisin, who was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for violating ethics by appointing a minister who was once jailed.

    Paetongtarn’s government has also been struggling to revive a stuttering economy and her popularity has declined sharply, with a June 19-25 opinion poll released at the weekend showing her approval rating sinking to 9.2% from 30.9% in March.

    Paetongtarn is not alone in her troubles, with influential father Thaksin Shinawatra, the driving force behind her government, facing legal hurdles of his own in two different courts this month.

    Divisive tycoon Thaksin, according to his lawyer, appeared at his first hearing at Bangkok’s Criminal Court on Tuesday on charges he insulted Thailand’s powerful monarchy, a serious offence punishable by up to 15 years in prison if found guilty. Thaksin denies the allegations and has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the crown.

    The case stems from a 2015 media interview Thaksin gave while in self-imposed exile, from which he returned in 2023 after 15 years abroad to serve a prison sentence for conflicts of interest and abuse of power.

    Thaksin, 75, dodged jail and spent six months in hospital detention on medical grounds before being released on parole in February last year. The Supreme Court will this month scrutinise that hospital stay and could potentially send him back to jail.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges – A10-0122/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064-2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0164),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 164, 175, 177 and 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0064-2025),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to Rules 60 and 58 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Security and Defence,

     having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0122/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities.

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for more structural possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and the investment needs of industries and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities in an inclusive manner and only where those challenges have not been addressed in the current programmes, while safeguarding cohesion, creating quality jobs and preserving a level playing field in the internal market.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) The ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy. The main objectives of the ESF+ are to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and structures in the policy area of employment and social policies, which are far from met yet. ESF+ funding should support those objectives. The reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1b) The European Court of Auditors’ adopted on 6 May 2025 the opinion on the legislative proposal forming the basis for this Regulation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 c (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1c) Cohesion policy is often used as an emergency response tool, which risks undermining the primary longer-term policy and objectives of cohesion policy, as underlined in the European Court of Auditors’ opinion of 6 May 2025. It is essential to ensure that any measures taken in the context of emergencies do not interfere with the objectives of cohesion policy. Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of the cohesion policy.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 d (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1d) The Union and its Member States continue to show that they can rapidly react to geopolitical events and are willing to use sufficient financial resources towards strengthening our defence industry through different Union and national programmes, which is positive and needed for the security of the Union. It is important to strengthen our defence sector through competitiveness programmes. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to continue to invest in the social objectives of the Union through the ESF+, as social cohesion is a cornerstone of the Union’s  democratic and societal resilience which is essential in facing threats of aggression.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) It is already possible to support the development of skills in the defence industry under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council2a, to facilitate the development of skills and training in the defence industry, while safeguarding social standards. Together with the Niinisto Report, ‘Safer Together’, the EU Preparedness Strategy, and the European Defence Industrial Strategy, the White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence, civil defence, the defence industry, dual use technologies and civil preparedness capabilities, which should be carried out together with social spending, creating employment and up- and reskilling opportunities . In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem.

    __________________

    __________________

     

    2a Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    3Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025)0090

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

     

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation.

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and quality job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation. Particular consideration should be given to the specific needs and circumstances of less developed regions and rural areas, which should benefit from the green transition and to ensure their integration into the Union’s broader economic, social and environmental development. In accordance with Article 5(1),  second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the ESF+ contributes to the specific objective of enabling regions and people to address the social, employment, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards the Union’s 2030 targets for energy and climate and a climate-neutral economy of the Union by 2050, based on the Paris Agreement.

    __________________

    __________________

    6 COM (2025) 85 final

    6 COM (2025)0085

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership and the development of skills. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    __________________

    __________________

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8a) Skills development and the training of young talent and entrepreneurs through incentives and targeted training are essential for job creation, and institutions working on skills creation and uptake should cooperate closely to align with labour market needs. Especially, vocational education and training institutes, given their direct links to the labour market and this should be supported through the ESF+.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful reprogramming and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful and just reprogramming without losing focus on the main objectives of the fund and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic social challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments. While aligning with new Union priorities, diverting attention to global strategic challenges should not change the primary mission of the ESF+. The cohesion policy must remain firmly rooted in its core objective: reducing regional disparities.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. In order to incentivise the re-programming towards key priorities in the context of the mid-term review, the additional pre-financing should only be available where a certain threshold for the reallocation of financial resources to specific crucial priorities is reached.

    (6) NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are disproportionate heavily impacted by Russian war of aggression, experiencing job losses, less economic activity and social exclusion. In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, with no specific conditions to reallocate financial resources of the programme to dedicated priorities.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) It should also be possible to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 100% to priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    (8) It should also be possible, while taking into account the current differentiation between categories of regions, to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 95% to programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic social challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (9a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 11

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (11) [Given the urgent need to enable crucial investments in skills in the defence industry as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    (11) [Given the increased need to enable crucial investments in specific skills in the critical industries, including the defence industry, as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level. The one-off pre-financing for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face, and the related subparagraph is moved in a new paragraph.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing shall only apply where reallocations of at least 10% of financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d have been approved and provided that the measures supporting the dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d target smaller beneficiaries and provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

     

    For the purpose of calculating the total reallocations of the financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d, as referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall assess the measures and take into account only the measures responding to the strategic priorities identified.

    Amendment  18

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided that the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to supporting their resilience in countering hybrid attacks.

     

    The pre-financing due to the Member State which results from programme amendments pursuant to reallocation to the priorities referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph shall be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be de-committed in accordance with Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, provided that the request for programme amendment was submitted in 2025.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU)2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1b. Before disbursing payment for the pre-financing pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall assess the Union’s overall budgetary situation, in particular with respect to the principle of the sustainability of the Union budget. Where, on the basis of that assessment, the Commission identifies a risk to the Union budget arising from paying the full pre-financing amount in 2026, the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 to provide for only part of the pre-financing amount to be disbursed to the Member States in 2026, with the remaining part disbursed in 2027.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 10% of the ESF+ financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level.

    Amendment  21

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) When amending programmes, the Member States shall include, with the close and meaningful participation of social partners, for the dedicated priorities, obligations to the beneficiaries to respect working and employment conditions under applicable Union and national law, conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and collective agreements.

    Justification

    In line with Articles 33 and 169 of the Financial Regulation.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 95 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State.

    Justification

    The 95% co-financing rate for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face.

    Amendment  23

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d within 2 months of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [this Regulation]. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d by 31 December 2025. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    Justification

    Taking into account that a significant level of reprogramming is expected, Member States could need more time to provide a complementary assessment.

    Amendment  24

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment.;

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that smaller beneficiaries have priority access to the funding and that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment;

    Amendment  25

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support to skills in civil preparedness and the defence industry

    Amendment  26

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12 c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support for the development of skills in the defence industry and cyber security under dedicated priorities, prioritising dual use capabilities related to civil defence and preparedness, provided that micro, small and medium- sized enterprises have priority access to the support. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    In this context, Member States may allocate resources to attract young talent and entrepreneurs, particularly to rural or less developed regions, through incentives and targeted training.

    Amendment  27

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%.

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  28

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepeneurs to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may, after consulting the social partners at national level, decide to programme targeted support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling and training with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and the social economy to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities, with in the objective of maintaining competitiveness, sustainability and innovation during the green transition. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    Member States may support promoting collaboration between different organisations, such as educational institutions who support skills development, provided that such measures support any of the specific objectives set out in Article(4), points (a) to (g).

     

    Resources allocated to the dedicated priority referred to in the first two subparagraphs of this paragraph shall be taken into account when ensuring compliance with the thematic concentration requirements as set out in Article 7.

    Amendment  29

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%..

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  30

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) the following article is inserted:

     

    Article 12da

     

    Guidance and administrative simplification

     

    The Commission shall publish, by … [60 days after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX (this amending Regulation)], detailed guidelines, accompanied by a Q&A system, aiming to clarify the technical, legal and procedural implications of the measures adopted in Articles 5a, 12c and 12d. Those guidelines shall support the managing authorities in the uniform application of this Regulation, reducing the administrative burden and facilitating solutions to early doubts.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    ETUC

    Social Platform

    Save the Children

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (18.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Jean‑Marc Germain 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    The Committee on Budgets,

    A. whereas the proposal does not modify existing budgetary commitments and remains within the limits of the overall allocations for the period 2021-2027 and is therefore budgetary neutral;

    B. whereas the combined effect of exceptional one-off 30 % pre-financing and 100 % co-financing on new EU priorities, as well as additional one-off pre-financing of 4.5 % (9.5 % for NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine) for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their resources to the new priorities, leads to a partial frontloading of estimated payment appropriations of EUR 500 million in 2026, followed by lower payments in 2027;

    C. whereas the extension of the eligibility period by one year – from the end of 2029 to the end of 2030 – for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their total allocation to new specific objectives creates payments in 2030 and changes the applicable decommitment rule for 2027 from year n+2 to year n+3;

    Conclusions of the budgetary assessment 

    1. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the MFF Regulation[1]; notes that the proposed measures are voluntary and do not involve any top-up of the initial allocation available to Member States;

    2. Notes that the proposal requires additional human resources of EUR 376 000 per year in 2025, 2026 and 2027, for two establishment plan posts; notes that the additional needs will be covered by redeployment within the Directorate-General or other Commission services; notes, however, that the overall impact of redeployments within the Commission services has reached its limit;

    3. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline (IIA)[2]; notes, however, that re-programming in the context of the mid-term review is considered not to alter the contribution to climate targets as set out in point 16 of the IIA; underlines that allocating resources to new objectives, including for the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, could lead to shifting resources from interventions with a higher coefficient for calculation of support to climate change objectives to interventions with a lower coefficient, thus potentially reducing the expenditure supporting climate objectives; invites the Commission to take preventive action to counter this risk; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the revised plans on the shares of expenditure supporting climate objectives; notes also that the ‘do no significant harm’ principle should apply to all European investments in line with the applicable legislation;

    4. Considers that the proposal is compatible with the budgetary principles laid down in the Financial Regulation[3]; notes, however, that the pre-financing paid in 2026 will be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be decommitted, in particular as regards respect for the principle of annuality;

    5. Recalls the importance of the general regime of conditionality as set out in Article 6 of the Financial Regulation; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to respect the Union values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in the implementation of the budget;

    6. Notes that the Commission does not expect any implications for the budget for 2025 beyond the redeployment of existing human resources; expects the Commission to take into account the current proposal and the updated payment needs for the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) in the budgetary procedure for 2026 following the actual re-programming by Member States and to keep Parliament informed in a timely manner of the progress of the mid-term review in the Member States; calls for a prudent approach to payment frontloading;

    Recommendations as regards budget implementation

    7. Notes that the proposal provides further flexibility and introduces incentives for Member States in the context of the mid-term review of cohesion policy to address strategic challenges that the EU is facing by redirecting resources to new EU priorities; underlines that cohesion policy should not be used again as a crisis response tool and maintains that this approach risks undermining its longer-term policy and investment objectives, including investments in regional development, skills, innovation and productivity; regrets that the Commission did not perform an impact assessment of the changes; acknowledges that the proposal offers a pragmatic, albeit unsatisfactory, way forward for dealing with insufficient budgetary flexibility and response capacity in the EU budget;

    8. Recalls that the ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy and its main objective is to support Member States and regions in achieving social inclusion and social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and systems in the policy area of employment and social policies; highlights that the Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of cohesion policy; underlines the need to ensure that the implementation of the amended ESF+ Regulation[4] is accompanied by measures for simplification and strengthening of administrative capacities in order to drive investments in key sectors and increase the absorption rate;

    9. Underlines that the combined effect of reallocating a minimum of 15 % of resources and of lifting of the 20 % ceiling for transfer towards Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) objectives may have a negative impact on the achievements of targets initially set in the ESF+ Regulation and could result in some initially planned actions for later years not materialising owing to a discontinuity in matching objectives with resources, while noting the need to adapt to new priorities, taking into account the recent geopolitical dynamics;

    10. Notes that payments to 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes were of a very low level in the first years of implementation, leading to an increase in payment needs towards the later years; recalls that this actual payment cycle does not coincide with the more linear payment profile set out in the MFF Regulation[5] and that this situation results in a serious risk of exceeding payment ceilings; recalls that the gradual increase in payments towards the later part of the programming period is a feature of multiannual programmes; considers that the frontloading of payments towards 2026 could have an impact on the pressure on payments;

    11. Recalls that the STEP Regulation[6] and the RESTORE Amending Regulation of 2024 were accompanied by a frontloading of payment appropriations in the budgets for 2024 and for 2025; notes that the total amount of payment appropriations in the 2026 draft budget is very close to the payment ceiling and is concerned, in this respect, about the high level of uncertainty with regard to the volume of payment claims in 2026; highlights the difficulties in predicting the take-up of the newly introduced flexibilities and incentives and in estimating payment needs, as also underpinned by the ongoing trend of increasing inaccuracy of payment forecasts by Member States; calls on the Commission to closely monitor payment developments and provide timely information to Parliament in this regard, and to propose any remedial action to the budgetary authority if needed;

    12. Recalls that 100 % co-financing without additional resources leads to a lower total amount of financial support through the programme; insists that broadening the scope of investment must not lead to a reduction in financial support for the initial priorities of investing in employment, social services, inclusive education and skills, and of providing assistance to the most vulnerable, including children; recalls that mandatory co-financing is an important principle of cohesion policy funding;

    13. Requests that the Commission provide traceable information in the form of timely reports on transfers to ensure that the impact of the mid-term review is clearly identifiable for the budgetary authority;

    14. Calls on the Commission to maintain consistency in applying conditionality across all EU funding streams and insists that amendments in Parliament’s reading are essential to close any loophole; demands rigorous enforcement of conditionality mechanisms and explicitly rejects any reallocation of blocked cohesion policy funds if this would circumvent the rule-of-law-related requirements established in the Common Provisions Regulation[7]; underlines that rule of law conditionality is a fundamental principle that must apply to all EU funds without exception;

    15. Considers that the actual take-up of the proposal may depend on various factors, such as the effectiveness of the 15 % re-allocation threshold and the availability of more favourable funding options under other Union programmes; considers that the proposed condition of the reallocation of at least 15 % of the funds to new priorities may be too high and unsuitable for single national programmes, as it could create implementation complications; highlights the importance of preventing double financing and calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that support for new types of investment is in addition to support under other Union programmes, including the EDF, EDIP and SAFE;

    16. Notes that the mid-term review may reduce the amount of funds at risk of decommitment; recalls that an amount equivalent to the cumulative decommitments made on outstanding commitments since 2021 can be made available for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI); asks the Commission to provide further analysis of the impact of the mid-term review on the EURI instrument.

     

     

    AMENDMENT

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendment to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital [9] a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    ([9]a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment by

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Jean-Marc Germain

    12.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    5.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    6

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Tomasz Buczek, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Siegfried Mureşan, Jana Nagyová, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Pablo Arias Echeverría, Roman Haider, Céline Imart, Rasmus Nordqvist, Jacek Protas, Annamária Vicsek

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Benoit Cassart, Andi Cristea

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    24

    +

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Andrzej Halicki, Céline Imart, Siegfried Mureşan, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Andi Cristea, Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    6

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Roman Haider, Annamária Vicsek, Auke Zijlstra

     

    3

    0

    ECR

    Ruggero Razza, Bogdan Rzońca

    PfE

    Jana Nagyová

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (17.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    ((COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – (2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Urmas Paet

     

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Security and Defence submits the following to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. Investment in defence and security-related skills covering dual use and transferable skills contributes not only to European defence resilience but also to territorial cohesion. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Furthermore, lifelong learning programmes and initiatives should promote continuous development and adaptation to emerging technologies and defence needs. Moreover, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy of 5 March 2024, the Commission set the priority of the full integration of defence and security as a strategic objective of relevant Union funding and programmes, including ESF+. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the European defence industry, in particular to address skills gaps and shortages directly related to the ability to address the critical capability gaps set out in the White paper. Defence industry should be understood as the industries producing defence products, their respective supply chains, and industries which develop and produce dual-use goods.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

     

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 , Member States should promote synergies and avoid duplications between actions arising for dedicated priorities referred to in Article 12c and actions resulting from other Union programmes that benefit the defence industry.

    Amendment  3

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to support their resilience in countering hybrid attacks, breaches of the Union’s external borders, terrorist activities and war.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  5

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Amendment  6

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) The Member States shall work closely with social partners, when reprogramming, and respect working and employment conditions  under applicable ILO conventions, Union and national law and collective agreements.

    Amendment  7

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support European defence industry and cybersecurity

    Amendment  9

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry and related cybersecurity, as well as in skills related to civil defence and preparedness under dedicated priorities to meet urgent needs. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l). This support may include actions that promote the recognition of skills acquired during military service and facilitate their conversion into qualifications recognised on the civilian labour market.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 30% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 35% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (5a) When allocating funds to dedicated priorities pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that those funds contribute to the Member States’ ability to address critical capability gaps set out in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Urmas Paet

    14.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    3.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    31

    8

    4

    Members present for the final vote

    Petras Auštrevičius, Wouter Beke, Marc Botenga, Tobias Cremer, Salvatore De Meo, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Niclas Herbst, Costas Mavrides, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Hans Neuhoff, Andrey Novakov, Kostas Papadakis, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Mārtiņš Staķis, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Mihai Tudose, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Michael von der Schulenburg, Alexandr Vondra, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    José Cepeda, Bart Groothuis, Marina Mesure, Thijs Reuten, Hélder Sousa Silva, Villy Søvndal, Petra Steger, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    31

    +

    ECR

    Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Reinis Pozņaks, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Alexandr Vondra

    PPE

    Wouter Beke, Salvatore De Meo, Niclas Herbst, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Novakov, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Hélder Sousa Silva, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    José Cepeda, Tobias Cremer, Elio Di Rupo, Costas Mavrides, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, Mihai Tudose

    Verts/ALE

    Mārtiņš Staķis

     

    8

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff

    NI

    Kostas Papadakis, Michael von der Schulenburg

    PfE

    Petra Steger, Roberto Vannacci

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Özlem Demirel, Marina Mesure

     

    4

    0

    PfE

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

    Verts/ALE

    Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (25.6.2025)

    Ms Li Andersson

    Chair

    Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges (2025/0085(COD)COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025)

     

     

    Dear Ms Andersson,

     

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Regional Development was asked to submit an opinion to your Committee.

     

    At its meeting of 9 April 2025, REGI committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It discussed the matter at its meeting of 13 May 2025 and adopted the opinion at its meeting of 25 June 2025[8].

     

    The Committee on Regional Development:

     

    1. Underlines the crucial role that cohesion policy and sectoral programmes, in spite of the fact that they are not crisis management instruments, have repeatedly and efficiently played in helping regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters;

     

    2. Is aware of the rapidly evolving economic, societal, environmental and geopolitical context, as well as the housing crisis, and shares the need for more flexibility in assessing the extent to which cohesion policy programmes can help respond to these changes; nevertheless is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy, in accordance with Article 174 TFEU;

     

    3. Reiterates that ESF+ stands as positive example of EU solidarity and that its main objective is to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights that are far from met yet; stresses that the reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality;

     

    4. Underlines the fact that cohesion policy shall first and foremost ensure social cohesion, not defence spending; nonetheless acknowledges that flexibility of the policy from the point of view of the beneficiaries is a key point, and stresses the need to provide regions with greater flexibility already when programming the funding, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, particularly border regions; furthermore acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities through the development of skills and training, while safeguarding social standards, is already possible under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057;

     

    5. Acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities and in adaptation linked to decarbonisation makes a key contribution to the promotion of the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, and requires having people with the right skills; in general, recognises the importance of the development of skills through lifelong learning and training models, targeted in particular at young people not in education, employment and training (NEET) and unemployed people, and targeted also at teachers, trainers, mentors, coaches, as well as entrepreneurs and researchers; encourages in this regard private sector involvement to enhance skills development and labour market integration, ensuring that ESF+ investments translate into tangible economic benefits; calls for stronger partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and regional authorities to align training programs with labour market demands, fostering innovation and job creation;

     

    6. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; welcomes the focus given by the legislative proposal to the challenges the Eastern border regions are facing since the Russian aggression against Ukraine began; supports the proposal that programmes under the Investment for jobs and growth goal, with NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, should benefit from the possibility of a one-off 9.5% pre-financing of the programme allocation in 2026 and a 100% Union financing;

     

    7. Reaffirms that cohesion policy and ESF+ should reach all EU regions, especially those affected by transformation processes, while keeping a focus on least developed regions and people; stresses that cohesion policy should be deepened where possible, with a view to remain the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies;

     

    8. Reiterates the importance of compliance with horizontal enabling conditions, and stresses that funds suspended under Regulation 2020/2092 should not be subject to amended programmes or transfers;

     

    9. Encourages the European Commission to allow for targeted simplification measures in Member States where administrative capacity constraints may hinder full or efficient absorption of ESF+ and cohesion funds, and to provide technical assistance to local and regional authorities to ensure efficient implementation and spending; furthermore stresses the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures to limit bureaucratic burden;

     

    10. Believes that the ESF+ strengthens a pro-European identity in the entire EU and should be communicated as such and that local and regional authorities, in light of their role as both beneficiary and managing authority, as well as social partners shall be meaningfully involved in the formulation of new legislative proposals and in the revision of programmes pursuant to the mid-term review, in order to guarantee more effectiveness and coordination between the ESF+ and the broader cohesion and regional policy and its financing tools;

     

    11. Suggests laying down measures to facilitate access for Outermost Regions to flexibilities introduced by the mid-term review, such as lowering to 10% the amounts of reallocations to one or more dedicated priorities established in the second subparagraph of Art. 5a(1), and in the first subparagraph of Art. 5a(2), which are required to benefit from the additional one-off pre-financing.

     

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Dragoş BENEA

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    2.4.2025

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

     Date announced in plenary

    EMPL

    5.5.2025

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    ITRE

    5.5.2025

    REGI

    5.5.2025

    Not delivering opinions

     Date of decision

    ITRE

    9.4.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Marit Maij

    8.5.2025

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    5.5.2025

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    13.5.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    25.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    15

    11

    Members present for the final vote

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Grégory Allione, Marc Angel, Pascal Arimont, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Nikola Bartůšek, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Rachel Blom, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Estelle Ceulemans, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Henrik Dahl, Johan Danielsson, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Elena Donazzan, Gheorghe Falcă, Chiara Gemma, Niels Geuking, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Sérgio Humberto, Katrin Langensiepen, Miriam Lexmann, Marit Maij, Marlena Maląg, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Idoia Mendia, Maria Ohisalo, Branislav Ondruš, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Nicola Procaccini, Dennis Radtke, Nela Riehl, Liesbet Sommen, Villy Søvndal, Pál Szekeres, Georgiana Teodorescu, Jana Toom, Raffaele Topo, Francesco Torselli, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Marianne Vind, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Petar Volgin, Jan-Peter Warnke, Séverine Werbrouck

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Regina Doherty, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes, Hristo Petrov

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral

    Date tabled

    30.6.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    32

    +

    ECR

    Georgiana Teodorescu

    PPE

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Pascal Arimont, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Henrik Dahl, Regina Doherty, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gheorghe Falcă, Niels Geuking, Sérgio Humberto, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Dennis Radtke, Liesbet Sommen

    Renew

    Grégory Allione, Hristo Petrov, Jana Toom, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne

    S&D

    Marc Angel, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Estelle Ceulemans, Johan Danielsson, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Marit Maij, Idoia Mendia, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Raffaele Topo, Marianne Vind

     

    15

    ESN

    Petar Volgin

    NI

    Branislav Ondruš, Jan-Peter Warnke

    PfE

    Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Pál Szekeres, Séverine Werbrouck

    The Left

    Konstantinos Arvanitis, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes

     

    11

    0

    ECR

    Elena Donazzan, Chiara Gemma, Marlena Maląg, Nicola Procaccini, Francesco Torselli, Mariateresa Vivaldini

    PPE

    Miriam Lexmann

    Verts/ALE

    Katrin Langensiepen, Maria Ohisalo, Nela Riehl, Villy Søvndal

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MOFA response to IPAC statement condemning China for alleged plot targeting Vice President Hsiao

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    MOFA response to IPAC statement condemning China for alleged plot targeting Vice President Hsiao

    June 27, 2025  The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) issued a statement on June 27 condemning China for an alleged plot to engineer a collision with a car carrying Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during a visit to the Czech Republic in March 2024 when she was serving as vice president-elect. It denounced China for conspiring to engage in an act of state terrorism and said that the planning of such an overt act of politically motivated violence in a foreign country represented the crossing of a threshold and disregard for international diplomatic norms. Expressing solidarity with Vice President Hsiao and with Taiwanese citizens who may be subject to coercion by the Chinese state while traveling abroad, the statement also emphasized that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the Taiwanese people and called upon the governments of IPAC member countries to condemn the PRC’s unacceptable actions.
     
    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sincerely appreciates IPAC taking a stand and urging nations to strongly condemn China for seeking to engage in unlawful activities in other countries that amount to state terrorism. The contempt for international diplomatic norms, violent disregard for personal safety, and deliberate and worsening attempts to suppress Taiwan displayed by China in its actions are a clear demonstration of its exceedingly disgraceful and unscrupulous behavior. This is unacceptable to the international community. MOFA once again strongly condemns China and solemnly demands that it issue an apology.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Distressed by all the bad news? Here’s how to stay informed but still look after yourself

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Reza Shabahang, Research Fellow in Human Cybersecurity, Monash University and Academic Researcher in Media Psychology, Flinders University

    KieferPix/Shutterstock

    If you’re feeling like the news is particularly bad at the moment, you’re not alone.

    But many of us can’t look away – and don’t want to. Engaging with news can help us make sense of what’s going on and, for many of us, is an ethical stance.

    So, how can you also take care of your mental health? Here’s how to balance staying informed with the impact negative news can have on our wellbeing.

    Why am I feeling so affected by the news?

    Our brains are wired to prioritise safety and survival, and respond rapidly to danger. Repeatedly activating such processes by consuming distressing news content – often called doomscrolling – can be mentally draining.

    Unfiltered or uncensored images can have an especially powerful psychological impact. Graphic footage of tragedies circulating on social media may have a stronger effect than traditional media (such as television and newspapers) which are more regulated.

    Research shows consuming negative news is linked to lower wellbeing and psychological difficulties, such as anxiety and feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. It can make us feel more pessimistic towards ourselves, other people, humanity and life in general.

    In some cases, consuming a lot of distressing news can even cause vicarious trauma. This means you may experience post-traumatic stress symptoms such as flashbacks and trouble sleeping despite not being directly involved in the traumatic events.

    But this doesn’t stop us seeking it out. In fact, we are more likely to read, engage with, and share stories that are negative.

    Is there a better way to consume news?

    Switching off may not be an option for everyone.

    For example, if you have friends or family in areas affected by conflict, you may be especially concerned and following closely to see how they’re affected.

    Even without personal ties to the conflict, many people want to stay informed and understand what is unfolding. For some, this is a moral decision which they feel may lead to action and positive change.

    This is why, in research I co-authored, we suggest simply restricting your exposure to negative news is not always possible or practical.

    Instead, we recommend engaging more mindfully with news. This means paying attention to shifts in your emotions, noticing how the news makes you feel, and slowing down when needed.

    How to consume news more mindfully

    When you plan to engage with news, there are some steps you can take.

    1. Pause and take a few deep breaths. Take a moment to observe how your body is feeling and what your mind is doing.

    2. Check in. Are you feeling tense? What else do you have going on today? Maybe you’re already feeling worried or emotionally stretched. Think about whether you’re feeling equipped to process negative news right now.

    3. Reflect. What is motivating you to engage right now? What are you trying to find out?

    4. Stay critical. As you read an article or watch a video, pay attention to how credible the source is, the level of detail provided and where the information comes from.

    5. Tune into how it’s making you feel. Do you notice any physical signs of stress, such as tension, sweating or restlessness?

    6. Take time. Before quickly moving on to another piece of news, allow yourself to process the information you’ve received as well as your response. Has it changed your emotions, thoughts or attitudes? Did it fulfil your intention? Do you still have energy to engage with more news?

    It may not always be possible to take all these steps. But engaging more mindfully before, during and after you’re exposed to negative news can help you make more informed decisions about how and when to consume it – and when to take a break.

    Signs the news is affecting your mental health

    If you’re feeling emotionally overwhelmed, you’re more likely to have an automatic and emotion-driven response to what you’re reading or watching.

    Signs your negative news consumption may be affecting your mental health include:

    • compulsive engagement, feeling like you can’t stop checking or following negative news

    • experiencing feelings of despair, hopelessness, or lack of motivation

    • feeling irritable

    • difficulty concentrating

    • fatigue

    • strong physical symptoms (such as an upset stomach)

    • trouble sleeping

    • an increase in rash or risky behaviours, or behaviours you don’t usually display when you’re calm, such as panic shopping and hoarding following news about bad events.

    What should I do when I’m feeling upset?

    First, take a break. This could be a few minutes or a few days – as long as it takes you to feel emotionally steady and ready to re-engage with negative news.

    You might find it useful to reflect by writing down observations about how news is making you feel, and keeping track of intense fluctuations in emotions.

    It can also be helpful to connect with supportive people around you and do activities you enjoy. Spending time outdoors and doing hands-on tasks, such as gardening, painting or sewing, can be particularly helpful when you’re feeling anxious or emotional.

    But if you’re feeling overwhelmed and it’s affecting your work, life or relationships, it’s a good idea to seek professional help.

    In Australia, the government provides free mental health support at walk-in Medicare Mental Health Centres, Kids Hubs or via phone.

    Other free resources – including a symptom checker and links to online chat support – are available at Health Direct.


    If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

    Reza Shabahang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Distressed by all the bad news? Here’s how to stay informed but still look after yourself – https://theconversation.com/distressed-by-all-the-bad-news-heres-how-to-stay-informed-but-still-look-after-yourself-259913

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspends PM Paetongtarn from duty: Media

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra on Tuesday after accepting a petition accusing her of constitutional violation.

    A panel of judges voted to accept the petition and order Paetongtarn to stop performing her duties as prime minister starting Tuesday pending a final ruling, the court said in a statement.

    The decision comes after a group of senators last month filed the petition accusing Paetongtarn of breaching the constitution by a serious violation of ethical standards over a telephone conversation with Cambodian Senate President Samdech Techo Hun Sen on the border issue.

    Paetongtarn, the 38-year-old Pheu Thai Party leader and the daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was appointed last August to become Thailand’s youngest and second female prime minister after winning a parliamentary vote.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese envoy demands immediate, lasting ceasefire in Gaza

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A Chinese envoy on Monday demanded an immediate and lasting ceasefire in Gaza, saying military means cannot achieve lasting peace.

    At present, the Middle East is mired in serious turmoil. Just after reaching a fragile ceasefire with Iran, Israel launched an attack on southern Lebanon, resulting in casualties. Meanwhile, the suffering of the Palestinian people continues to intensify, said Fu Cong, China’s permanent representative to the United Nations.

    The continuation of the war in Gaza will only lead to more casualties, while the right way forward is the cessation of hostilities and negotiations toward a political solution.

    “We urge Israel to immediately stop all military operations in Gaza. Countries with significant influence on the parties concerned should act in an impartial and responsible manner and take effective actions to promote a ceasefire,” he told the Security Council.

    The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has been extremely critical. “Israel must fulfill its obligations under international humanitarian law as the occupying power by immediately lifting its blockade of Gaza, fully restoring humanitarian access, and supporting and cooperating with the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations in their work,” said Fu.

    Israel has continued to advance its settlement policy in the West Bank, resumed land registration in Area C under its control, demolished Palestinian homes, condoned settler violence, and expanded its military operations. Such actions violate international law and Security Council resolutions and erode the foundation of an independent Palestinian state. China calls on Israel to cease its attacks and settlement activities in the West Bank, curb settler violence, and lift restrictions on Palestinian banks, he said.

    The Palestinian question lies at the heart of the Middle East issue. The implementation of the two-state solution is the only viable path to resolving the Palestinian question. The international community should strengthen unity and jointly provide support and guarantee to advance the political process of the two-state solution, and firmly oppose the forced transfer of Palestinians and the dangerous attempts to annex Gaza and the West Bank, he said.

    China will continue to work with the international community to make unremitting efforts to put an end to the fighting in Gaza, ease the humanitarian catastrophe, implement the two-state solution, and work for a comprehensive, just, and lasting settlement of the Palestinian question, said Fu.

    MIL OSI China News

  • ‘Digital India, a people’s movement’: PM Modi charts roadmap for next decade

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday lauded the completion of ten years of the Digital India initiative, describing it as a journey that has transformed governance, empowered citizens, and positioned India as a global leader in digital technology.

    In a post on X, the Prime Minister said, “Today is a historic day as we mark #10YearsOfDigitalIndia! Ten years ago, Digital India began as an initiative to transform our nation into a digitally empowered and technologically advanced society. A decade later, we stand witness to a journey that has touched countless lives and ushered in a new era of empowerment.”

    Launched in 2015, the Digital India mission sought to bridge the country’s vast digital divide and make technology accessible to every citizen. Reflecting on the initiative’s impact, PM Modi said that India’s progress is visible not only in “data and dashboards” but also in the daily lives of 140 crore Indians.

    “While decades were spent doubting the ability of Indians to use technology, we changed this approach and trusted the ability of Indians to use technology,” PM Modi said in an article shared on LinkedIn.

    Expanding Access and Inclusion

    In 2014, India had about 25 crore internet connections. That figure has now grown to over 97 crore, with high-speed internet reaching remote villages and forward military outposts alike. The Prime Minister pointed out that over 42 lakh kilometres of Optical Fibre Cable now connect the country, equivalent to eleven times the distance between Earth and the Moon.

    The success of India’s real-time digital payments system, UPI, has also been a highlight. UPI now handles over 100 billion transactions a year, accounting for nearly half of all real-time digital payments worldwide.

    Through Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT), the government has directly transferred over ₹44 lakh crore to citizens, saving nearly ₹3.48 lakh crore by eliminating middlemen. Schemes like SVAMITVA have issued more than 2.4 crore property cards and mapped over 6.4 lakh villages, providing land ownership security to millions.

    Driving Entrepreneurship and Innovation

    Highlighting the impact on small businesses and entrepreneurs, PM Modi noted that initiatives like ONDC (Open Network for Digital Commerce) and GeM (Government E-Marketplace) have expanded opportunities for millions. ONDC recently crossed 200 million transactions, while GeM has surpassed ₹1 lakh crore GMV in just 50 days.

    “From Banarasi weavers to bamboo artisans in Nagaland, sellers are now reaching customers nationwide, without middlemen or digital monopolies,” the Prime Minister added.

    PM Modi also underlined India’s emergence as a global leader in Digital Public Infrastructure, citing examples like Aadhaar, CoWIN, DigiLocker, and FASTag. He said these platforms are now studied and adopted in other countries, with India launching a Global DPI Repository during its G20 Presidency.

    Looking Ahead

    Calling for greater innovation in the coming decade, the Prime Minister said India is moving from “digital governance to global digital leadership, from India-first to India-for-the-world.”

    He urged the country’s innovators and entrepreneurs to build technology that “unites, includes, and uplifts,” adding, “Let us build what empowers. Let us solve what truly matters.”

    The Prime Minister’s remarks come as India continues to scale its presence in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and digital commerce, supported by initiatives such as the $1.2 billion India AI Mission and new Centres of Excellence across the country.

    “Digital India has not remained a mere government program, it has become a people’s movement,” PM Modi said, reaffirming the initiative’s central role in building an Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

     

  • Death toll in Telangana pharma unit blast rises to 35

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The death toll from the explosion at a chemical factory in Telangana’s Sangareddy district rose to 35 on Tuesday, with officials saying that the number may increase as search and rescue operations continue.

    The blast occurred on Monday at Sigachi Industries Limited’s pharmaceutical facility, located about 50 km from Hyderabad. The impact of the explosion caused a three-storey building to collapse, triggering a massive fire.

    At the time of the incident, 108 workers were present at the factory. Thirty-five workers were injured in the explosion, with 11 reported to be in critical condition. More than 15 fire engines were deployed to contain the blaze.

    Most of the victims were migrant workers from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Odisha.

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed deep sorrow over the loss of lives and announced an ex-gratia of Rs 2 lakh each for the families of the deceased and Rs 50,000 for those injured, from the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund.

    Union Home Minister Amit Shah also expressed grief and said the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) team was immediately deployed and is assisting in the ongoing rescue operations along with local authorities.

    “Saddened by the tragic accident in a chemical factory in Sangareddy, Telangana. The NDRF team rushed to the spot immediately and is continuing the rescue operation along with the local administration,” Shah said in a post on X.

    According to Y Nagi Reddy, Director General of Telangana State Disaster Response and Fire Services, the explosion took place during the air handling and drying of microcrystalline cellulose, citing inputs from industrial experts.

    The state government has set up a high-powered committee to investigate the incident. The panel includes the Chief Secretary, Special Chief Secretary (Disaster Management), Principal Secretary (Labour), Principal Secretary (Health), and Additional DGP (Fire Services).

    The Chief Minister’s Office said the committee will also provide recommendations to prevent such industrial disasters in the future.

    (With inputs from agencies)

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump demands an end to the war in Gaza – could a ceasefire be close?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow, The University of Melbourne

    Anas-Mohammed/Shutterstock

    Hopes are rising that Israel and Hamas could be inching closer to a ceasefire in the 20-month war in Gaza.

    US President Donald Trump is urging progress, taking to social media to demand:

    MAKE THE DEAL IN GAZA. GET THE HOSTAGES BACK!!!

    Trump further raised expectations, saying there could be an agreement between Israel and Hamas “within the next week”.

    But what are the prospects for a genuine, lasting ceasefire in Gaza?

    Ceasefires are generally complicated to negotiate because they need to take into account competing demands and pressures. They usually (but not always) require both sides to compromise.

    Gaza is no exception. In a conflict that has been going on for more than 70 years, compromise and concession have become a game of cat and mouse.

    Israel is the cat that holds the military strength and the majority of the political power. Hamas is the mouse that can dart and delay, but in the end has little choice but to accept the terms of a ceasefire if it wants to halt the violence currently being inflicted on Palestinians.

    Trump the peacemaker?

    Trump appears buoyed by what he perceives as the recent success of his efforts to broker a truce in the Israel–Iran war. He may think he can use similar tactics to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into making a ceasefire deal for Gaza.

    US President Donald Trump has posted on social media that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is negotiating a deal with Hamas ‘right now’.
    noamgalai/Shutterstock

    Netanyahu will return to Washington next week for talks at the White House. This is a good sign some US pressure is being brought to bear.

    Trump’s current push for a Gaza ceasefire may also signal he is keen for a return to the normalisation of economic ties previously delivered by the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states. A ceasefire could unlock frozen regional relationships, potentially boosting the US economy (and Trump’s own personal wealth).

    Israeli opportunities

    Another positive sign a ceasefire may be on the cards is Netanyahu’s recent comments that the war with Iran had created opportunities for Israel in Gaza.

    During its 12-day war with Iran, Israel assassinated 30 Iranian security chiefs and 11 nuclear scientists. Iran’s weakened security apparatus might disrupt its support for Hamas and help advance Israeli objectives.

    Similar to what happened in Iran, this might enable Netanyahu to publicly declare Israeli victory in Gaza and agree to a ceasefire without losing face or political backing from his government’s right wing.

    Domestic Israeli politics have also played a role in the Gaza ceasefire negotiations. As part of the current round, Trump reportedly demanded the cancellation of Netanyahu’s ongoing trial on corruption charges. The idea is to enable Netanyahu to reach a ceasefire without the threat of criminal conviction, and potentially prison, awaiting him afterwards.

    Given there are no political or legal prescriptions or rules around what terms need to be included in a ceasefire, it is possible for such a demand to be made, although it is unclear how it would be accommodated by Israeli law.

    Difficult terms

    The current ceasefire deal, as proposed by Qatar and Egypt, seems to pick up where the deal negotiated in January fell apart – with a 60-day ceasefire.

    Reports suggest it requires Hamas’ leadership to go into exile and that four Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, would be tasked with jointly governing Gaza.

    Hamas has said for many months that it is open to a
    more permanent ceasefire deal that Israel has so far refused. However, the proposed terms appear too far-reaching to make it likely Hamas would accept them in their current form.

    The uptick in Israel’s military bombardment, as well as recent evacuation orders for parts of northern Gaza, suggest that even if there is a deal it may well mean Israel retains permanent territorial control of the northern Gaza Strip.

    As part of any ceasefire, it also seems likely Israel would retain control over all Gaza crossings.

    This, and the ongoing highly problematic promotion by Israel and the United States of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as the only organisation authorised to deliver and administer aid in Gaza, will be difficult for Hamas, and Palestinians, to accept.

    Displaced Palestinians carrying bags of flour distributed by the controversial Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
    Haitham Imad/Shutterstock

    There have also been reports a deal would enable Gazans wishing to emigrate to be absorbed by several as-yet-unnamed countries. Such a term would continue the Trump administration’s earlier calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, as well as Israel’s insistence such displacement would be a humanitarian initiative rather than a war crime.

    It would also not be the first time the terms of a ceasefire were used to forcibly displace civilian populations.

    Hope for the future?

    Many dynamics are wrapped up in getting to a ceasefire in Gaza.

    They include US allyship and pressure, domestic Israeli politics, and the recent war between Israel and Iran. There is also the international opprobrium of Israel’s actions in Gaza which, for public (if not legal) purposes, amount to a genocide.

    Ideally, any negotiated ceasefire would have detailed terms to ensure the parties know what they should do and when. Detailed terms would also enable international actors and other third parties to denounce any violations of the deal.

    However, a ceasefire would only ever be a short-term win. In the best case, it would enable a reduction in violence and an increase of aid into Gaza, and the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners.

    However, amid the deep-seated sense of injustice and anxiety in the region, any ceasefire that does not address historic oppression and is forced on the parties would inevitably have deleterious consequences in the months and years to come.

    Marika Sosnowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump demands an end to the war in Gaza – could a ceasefire be close? – https://theconversation.com/trump-demands-an-end-to-the-war-in-gaza-could-a-ceasefire-be-close-260185

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: What are police allowed to do at protests and who keeps them in check?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Hine, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of the Sunshine Coast

    Earlier this week, former Greens candidate Hannah Thomas was hospitalised with serious injuries after being arrested at a protest in Sydney. This incident sparked public outcry, raising questions about the limits of police power and what happens when things go wrong.

    Protests are becoming more common and more intense across Australia and worldwide. This surge stems from growing social and political concerns.

    The right to peacefully protest is a fundamental aspect of democratic societies. It gives people the freedom to gather, speak out, and push for change.

    But that right is not unlimited and can be subject to certain restrictions. While the public has a right to protest, police have a responsibility to ensure the safety of everyone involved including protesters, bystanders and officers. Maintaining public order and respecting the right to peaceful assembly is a balance.

    So, what exactly are police allowed to do at protests? And if someone is hurt in the process, who is responsible, and who keeps police in check?

    Why do things go wrong at protests?

    Peaceful protesting is lawful in Australia and people have the right to gather and express their views. But that doesn’t mean anything goes.

    If someone’s behaviour at a protest threatens public safety or breaches the law, police have a responsibility to intervene, and individuals can be charged with an offence.

    Protests are emotionally charged events. Some groups may come to protests already hostile, especially those with strong anti-authority views or past negative experiences with police. In turn, this can increase the risk of confrontation from the outset.

    Often protests are driven by a shared sense of injustice. This can build strong group identity and solidarity among protesters, but it can also intensify resistance towards police who are seen as symbols of authority.

    When people act as part of a crowd, emotions can spread quickly. In these settings, individuals may feel less personally responsible for their actions and behave more impulsively or aggressively.

    At the same time, police responses play a big role in how protests unfold. Tactics that are seen as heavy-handed (like blocking movement or using force) can heighten tensions and lead to confrontation.

    In contrast, strategies focused on communication and de-escalation are more likely to calm things down and prevent violence.

    Typically, protests don’t turn violent on their own. Instead, it’s a mix of crowd dynamics and police response that often determines the outcome.

    What powers do police have at protests?

    Police have wide-ranging powers to respond to protests to prevent behaviour escalation. A person does not need to be committing an offence for police to exercise powers during a protest. Police consider the behaviour of individual protesters, or the risk they’re perceived to pose, rather than waiting for a specific law to be broken.

    While the specific laws differ between states and territories in Australia, there are several common features.

    Police can tell community members to move on in some circumstances. If a protester is in a public place and causing disruption, interfering with others, endangering others or being disorderly, police can direct that person to leave. An offence does not need to be committed for police to direct community members to move on.

    Where a person does not follow a police officer’s lawful direction, they are contravening the law and can be arrested.

    However, move-on powers are limited when there is a peaceful protest. Police cannot direct a person to move on just because they are peacefully protesting something, picketing or publicly sharing their views (such as speaking loudly or carrying a sign).

    States and territories have also criminalised certain behaviour related to protests. For example, it is unlawful to harass, intimidate or threaten a person accessing a place of worship in New South Wales.

    Police can use force to maintain peace or prevent violence. The force used must only be “reasonably necessary”. This means police can only use the minimum amount of force needed that is proportionate to the event.

    It might be appropriate for police to restrain a protester using their hands or handcuffs and individual circumstances will be relevant to whether use of force is permitted. Lethal force, though, would not be permitted against a protester unless a protester was endangering the life of another person.

    Injuries can occur during police arrests. It has been alleged that Hannah Thomas’ injury arising during her arrest was the result of “excessive use of force”. However, just because a person is injured during an arrest does not automatically mean a police officer acted inappropriately.

    Who holds police accountable if someone gets hurt?

    Where concerns arise about police behaviour during a protest (including the use of force or other actions), there are different ways police can be held accountable.

    Policing organisations have internal processes for investigating police conduct. Each policing organisation has a professional or ethical standards unit that investigates allegations of conduct.

    But integrity bodies have flagged police investigating police can perpetuate potentially problematic “cover up behaviours that can mask police misconduct”.

    Australia’s states and territories also have independent statutory organisations which target crime and corruption in the public service. These are generally corruption or integrity commissions and apply to all public service workers, including police officers. The relevant ombudsman can also assist to resolve complaints.

    Community members can also sue a policing organisation for injuries they sustained during an arrest.

    What’s the right balance?

    Protest is a democratic right, but it also presents real public safety challenges.

    Police face genuine risks and have a difficult job managing dynamic and often unpredictable situations.

    They need certain powers to do their job, but those powers must come with strong accountability. If police exceed their power, it damages public trust and can escalate tensions further.

    Good policing practices mean talking to protest organisers early, keeping communication clear, using de-escalation tactics and responding proportionally to individuals – not treating the whole crowd the same.

    Protesters also play a role by staying peaceful, notifying police of a protest, knowing their rights, and helping to de-escalate tensions. The goal should always be to protect everyone. This includes protesters, police and the general public.

    Dominique is a former police officer who was previously employed by the Queensland Police Service.

    Hena Prince and Kelly Hine do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What are police allowed to do at protests and who keeps them in check? – https://theconversation.com/what-are-police-allowed-to-do-at-protests-and-who-keeps-them-in-check-260096

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • Trump suggests DOGE look at Musk’s companies to save money

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump suggested on Tuesday that his efficiency department should take a look at the subsidies that Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s companies have received in order to save the federal government “BIG” money.

    Trump’s comments come after billionaire Elon Musk renewed his criticism on Monday of Trump’s sweeping tax-cut and spending bill, vowing to unseat lawmakers who backed it after campaigning on limiting government spending.

    “Elon may get more subsidy than any human being in history, by far, and without subsidies, Elon would probably have to close up shop and head back home to South Africa. No more Rocket launches, Satellites, or Electric Car Production, and our Country would save a FORTUNE. Perhaps we should have DOGE take a good, hard, look at this? BIG MONEY TO BE SAVED!!!,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

    In response to Trump’s post, Musk, in his own social media platform X, said “I am literally saying CUT IT ALL. Now.”

    After weeks of relative silence following a feud with Trump over the legislation, Musk rejoined the debate on Saturday as the Senate took up the package, calling it “utterly insane and destructive” in a post on social media platform X.

    On Monday, he ramped up his criticism, saying lawmakers who had campaigned on cutting spending but backed the bill “should hang their heads in shame!”

    “And they will lose their primary next year if it is the last thing I do on this Earth,” Musk said.

    The Tesla and SpaceX CEO called again for a new political party, saying the bill’s massive spending indicated “that we live in a one-party country – the PORKY PIG PARTY!!”

    “Time for a new political party that actually cares about the people,” he wrote.

    Musk’s criticism of the bill has caused a rift in his relationship with Trump, marking a dramatic shift after the tech billionaire spent nearly $300 million on Trump’s re-election campaign and led the administration’s controversial Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a federal cost-cutting initiative.

    Musk, the world’s richest man, has argued that the legislation would greatly increase the national debt and erase the savings he says he has achieved through DOGE.

    It remains unclear how much sway Musk has over Congress or what effect his opinions might have on the bill’s passage. But Republicans have expressed concern that his on-again, off-again feud with Trump could hurt their chances to protect their majority in the 2026 midterm congressional elections.

    The rift has also led to volatility for Tesla, with shares of the company seeing wild price swings that erased approximately $150 billion of its market value, though it has since recovered.

    – Reuters

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China imposes sanctions on former Philippine Senator Francis Tolentino

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 1 (Xinhua) — China has decided to impose sanctions on former Philippine Senator Francis Tolentino for his despicable behavior on China-related issues and ban him from entering the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special Administrative Region, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Tuesday.

    For some time now, some anti-China politicians in the Philippines, guided by selfish motives, have made malicious remarks and actions on issues directly related to China, thereby causing harm to the interests of the PRC and China-Philippine relations, the official said.

    The Foreign Ministry stressed that the Chinese government is unwavering in its determination to protect national sovereignty, security and development interests. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Spanish PM calls for inclusive multilateralism at Financing for Development conference

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SEVILLE, Spain, July 1 (Xinhua) — Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez on Monday called for inclusive and strong multilateralism at the opening of the fourth International Conference on Financing for Development here in southern Spain.

    P. Sanchez, who is also the conference chair, said that in the current global context, inclusive and strong multilateralism is especially needed and the UN should be at its core.

    He called on delegates to translate slogans into action, resolve differences through unity and build trust through dialogue.

    Noting that two-thirds of the UN Sustainable Development Goals were behind schedule, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said at the opening of the session that the conference would take action in three areas – accelerating the flow of funds, reforming the international debt system and increasing the participation of developing countries in the institutions of the international financial system.

    The conference, dedicated to global development finance, will run until Thursday and will bring together representatives from governments, international organizations, financial institutions, businesses and other entities. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Protecting retailers from shoplifting

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government is making it easier for police to punish shoplifters and is introducing stronger penalties for low-level theft, Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith and Associate Justice Minister Nicole McKee say. 

    “Public confidence in our justice system is undermined if people can steal with apparent impunity. It’s disheartening, and our government will not sit by while shoplifters rob businesses of their livelihoods,” Mr Goldsmith says.

    “Currently, the administrative burden can deter retailers from making official complaints, and lower-level offending often goes unreported or unpunished. Our government is restoring real consequences for crime, and shoplifting is no exception.”

    The proposed changes include:

    Introducing an infringement regime for shoplifting in retail premises. For stolen goods valued up to $500, infringement fees will be up to $500. For goods valued over $500, fees will be up to $1,000.
    Strengthening the penalties for theft. The maximum penalties will be one year imprisonment (if the value is approximately $2,000 or less), or seven years imprisonment (if value is approximately more than $2,000).
    Creating a new aggravated theft offence for when the value of the goods is under $2,000 and the theft is carried out in a manner that is offensive, threatening, insulting, or disorderly.  

    “Harsher penalties could mean up to twice as long behind bars for aggravated theft, and criminals will be forced to think twice before destroying more lives,” Mrs McKee says.

    “Our government is focused on restoring law and order, reducing violent crime, and putting victims first in our justice system.
    “I want to thank the Ministerial Advisory Group, and its Chair Sunny Kaushal, for their work shaping this proposal.”
    These changes fulfill a commitment in the National/New Zealand First coalition agreement to ensure real consequences for lower-level crimes such as shoplifting.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Govt condemns smears against NSL

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government strongly condemned and opposed the malicious attacks on and the demonisation of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) and other laws safeguarding national security, as well as the slanderous and fact-distorting remarks made on the city’s work in safeguarding national security by foreign politicians, anti-China organisations, and various media outlets on the important occasion of the fifth anniversary of the promulgation and implementation of the HKNSL.

    In a statement, the Hong Kong SAR Government pointed out that anti-China and destabilising forces, organisations or media have made sweepingly generalised and grandstanding comments, completely disregarding the profound historical significance of the HKNSL and its undeniable positive impact on the city.

    The statement made it clear that they distorted the facts and made slanderous remarks on the Hong Kong SAR and the HKNSL. They even attempted to interfere with criminal trials conducted in Hong Kong SAR courts, thereby obstructing the course of justice.

    It also indicated that they never utter a word about the strict enforcement of national security laws by their own countries and other governments against activities that endanger their national security.

    The statement described their actions as despicable political manipulation. It stressed that the Hong Kong SAR Government must sternly denounce their wrongdoing to set the record straight and expose their shameless ‘double standards’ to the world.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government also emphasised that safeguarding national security is a top priority of every country. In accordance with international law and international relations based on the Charter of the United Nations, it is each and every sovereign state’s inherent right to enact laws safeguarding national security, and it is also an international practice.

    Moreover, the statement mentioned that for a considerable period, external forces, through their agents, have conducted infiltration and sabotage activities in Hong Kong, and further instigated the “black-clad violence” and the Hong Kong version of “colour revolution” in 2019, which nearly brought the “one country, two systems” to ruin.

    With the promulgation and implementation of the HKNSL, its effect in stopping violence and curbing disorder as well as quickly restoring social stability in the Hong Kong community was immediate.

    The statement highlighted that the Hong Kong SAR fulfilled its constitutional duty by enacting the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance last year with broad societal consensus, thereby improving the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security. This has enabled Hong Kong’s transition “from chaos to order” and advancement “from stability to prosperity”.

    It said the attempts by external forces to “use Hong Kong to contain China” are doomed to fail, leaving them with no option but to smear the HKNSL.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government pointed out that, over five years of its implementation, the HKNSL has restored the rights and freedoms that Hong Kong citizens were unable to enjoy during the period of “black-clad violence”, and has enabled the livelihood and economic activities of the Hong Kong community at large to swiftly return to normal and the business environment to be restored and improved continuously.

    It also stressed that human rights in Hong Kong have always been robustly guaranteed constitutionally by both the Constitution and the Basic Law, adding that the rule of law in Hong Kong is strong and robust, and withstands the test of time.

    In addition, the statement noted that, as guaranteed by the Basic Law, the HKNSL and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, all defendants charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to a fair trial by the Judiciary exercising independent judicial power. The courts of the Hong Kong SAR shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference.

    It also mentioned that foreign politicians, anti-China organisations, and various media have recently continued to make irresponsible and absurd remarks, distorting the truth regarding the national security case involving Lai Chee-ying, as well as his custodial arrangements, with the intention of perverting the course of justice.

    The Hong Kong SAR government has repeatedly pointed out that any attempt by any country, organisation, or individual to interfere with the judicial proceedings in the city by means of political power, to prevent any defendant from receiving a fair trial that they should have, is a blatant act undermining the rule of law of Hong Kong and should be condemned.

    The suggestion that persons or organisations with certain backgrounds should be immune from legal sanctions for their illegal acts and activities is tantamount to granting such persons or organisations privileges to break the law, perverting the course of justice, and is totally contrary to the spirit of the rule of law, the Hong Kong SAR Government stated.

    The HKSAR Government strongly urges any external forces to immediately stop interfering with the city’s internal affairs and the independent exercise of judicial power by the courts of the Hong Kong SAR.

    Regarding the custodial arrangements of Lai Chee-ying, the Hong Kong SAR Government reiterated that the Correctional Services Department (CSD) is committed to ensuring that the custodial environment is secure, safe, humane, appropriate and healthy, and has put in place an established mechanism to safeguard the rights of persons-in-custody (PICs), including regular independent visitors, namely Justices of the Peace, who inspect the prisons to ensure the rights of PICs are protected.

    The statement specified that the CSD consistently handles matters concerning Lai Chee-ying strictly in accordance with these mechanisms, no differently from other PICs.

    Furthermore, it clarified that the arrangement for Lai Chee-ying’s removal from association with other PICs has been made at his own request and approved by the CSD after considering all relevant factors in accordance with the law all along.

    The statement added that Lai Chee-ying’s legal representative has publicly clarified that he is receiving appropriate treatment and care in prison.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government emphasised that it will continue to uphold its constitutional duty and steadfastly safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

    The statement said that the Hong Kong SAR Government will continue to resolutely fulfil its duties and obligations to safeguard national security while simultaneously protecting the lawful rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents and others in Hong Kong in accordance with the law.

    By ensuring high-quality development with high-level security, a new chapter in the practice of “one country, two systems” would be continuously composed, the statement added.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide

    Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

    US President Donald Trump’s 90-day pause on implementing so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on some 180 trading partners ends on July 8.

    How are countries responding to the threat, and will the tariffs be re-applied from July 9?

    What the US thinks ‘reciprocal’ means

    The United States is demanding four things from all trading partners, while offering little in return. So these negotiations are anything but “reciprocal”.

    The main demand is to rebalance bilateral goods trade between the US and other countries. Nations with trade surpluses – meaning they export a greater value of goods than they import from the US – will be encouraged to import more from the US and/or export less to it.

    The US is also pushing countries to eliminate a range of “non-tariff barriers” that may affect US export competitiveness. These barriers are drawn from the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) March 2025 report and include a variety of perceived “unfair” practices, from value-added taxes (such as the Goods and Services Tax) to biosecurity standards such as those Australia applies to agricultural imports.

    In a nod to the “tech bros”, (alleged) restrictions on digital trade services, such as Australia’s media bargaining code, and digital service taxes must be removed, along with taxes on the tech giants. On Monday, Canada dropped a new digital service tax on firms such as Google and Meta after Trump suspended trade talks.

    Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Google CEO Sundar Pichai and Tesla CEO Elon Musk at President Trump’s inauguration ceremony.
    Saul Loeb/Pool/AFP via Getty Image

    Countries must also agree to reduce reliance on inputs from China in any exports to the United States. That means companies that moved manufacturing from China to countries such as Vietnam during President Trump’s first term trade wars will face challenges in sourcing input components from China.

    Put together, this is a difficult package for any government to accept without securing something in return.

    Who holds the cards?

    Trump has been fond of saying the United States holds “all the cards” in trade negotiations.

    It’s not known precisely how many countries are negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Between 10 and 18 countries are priority “targets”, or to use an early, colourful phrase, were targeted as the “Dirty 15”.

    Category 1 likely comprises many more countries than those in the US’s naughty corner. These countries were saddled with large reciprocal tariffs despite the tariff formula’s evident shortcomings. To paraphrase Trump, these countries don’t hold the cards and have limited negotiating power.

    They have no choice but to make concessions. The smarter ones will take the opportunity to make reforms and blame the bully in Washington. Mostly these are developing countries, some with high dependency on the US market, including the poorest such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Lesotho.

    To make matters worse, they must keep one eye on China for fear of retribution in case Beijing perceives any promises to reduce dependence on Chinese inputs would compromise Chinese interests.

    Category 2 consists of countries that “hold cards”, or have some degree of leverage. Some, such as Canada, Japan, India and the EU, will secure limited US concessions although they may resort to retaliation to force this outcome. From discussions with our government and academic sources, Japan and India likely won’t retaliate, but Canada has previously and the EU likely will.

    Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese initially said he would not negotiate and has repeated US reciprocal tariffs “are not the act of a friend”.

    However, the Australian government is wisely looking to bolster its negotiation cards, such as creating a critical minerals strategic reserve.




    Read more:
    Plans to stockpile critical minerals will help Australia weather global uncertainty – and encourage smaller miners


    No doubt policy makers are also reminding the US of their favourable access to Australia’s military infrastructure which could be essential to any US-China military confrontation.

    China is category 3.

    The Chinese government is determined not to kowtow to Washington as they did in Trump’s first term. The so-called “Phase 1 deal” was signed but instantly forgotten in Beijing.

    Beijing has several cards, notably dominance of processed critical minerals and their derivative products, particularly magnets, and the US’s lack of short-term alternative supply options.

    After China expanded export controls on rare earths and critical minerals, shortages hit the auto industry around the world and Ford was forced to idle plants.

    What happens next?

    Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, suggested on Friday more deals may be signed before July 8. But Trump is likely to undermine and/or negate them as his transactional whims change.

    The British, after announcing their US deal that included relatively favourable automotive and steel export market access, watched in horror as Trump doubled tariffs on steel imports to 50%, and reimposed the 25% tariff on the UK.

    The UK government was reminded this US administration cannot be trusted. That is why countries negotiate binding trade treaties governed by domestic and international laws.

    Many countries are waiting on the outcomes from various US court battles testing whether the president or Congress should have the power to impose unilateral tariffs. After all, if there is a chance the Supreme Court rules Trump cannot change tariffs by decree, then why negotiate with a serially untrustworthy partner?

    The Japanese government, for example, recently announced it is pausing negotiations after the US demanded increased defence spending.

    ‘I’m going to send letters’

    Trump on Sunday suggested he would simply send letters to foreign nations setting a tariff rate. “I’m going to send letters, that’s the end of the trade deal,” he said.

    That does not bode well for countries negotiating in good faith. It’s likely tariffs will be reimposed and bilateral negotiations will drag on to September or beyond as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said.

    After all, even the US government has limited bandwidth to process so many simultaneous negotiations. Category 2 trading partners will increasingly test their own political limits. And the rest of the world is hoping for a favourable Supreme Court ruling that may, like the character Godot in the play Waiting for Godot, never come.

    Nathan Gray receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Kumuthini Sivathas and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming – https://theconversation.com/im-going-to-send-letters-the-deadline-for-trumps-reciprocal-trade-tariffs-is-looming-259983

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide

    Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

    US President Donald Trump’s 90-day pause on implementing so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on some 180 trading partners ends on July 8.

    How are countries responding to the threat, and will the tariffs be re-applied from July 9?

    What the US thinks ‘reciprocal’ means

    The United States is demanding four things from all trading partners, while offering little in return. So these negotiations are anything but “reciprocal”.

    The main demand is to rebalance bilateral goods trade between the US and other countries. Nations with trade surpluses – meaning they export a greater value of goods than they import from the US – will be encouraged to import more from the US and/or export less to it.

    The US is also pushing countries to eliminate a range of “non-tariff barriers” that may affect US export competitiveness. These barriers are drawn from the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) March 2025 report and include a variety of perceived “unfair” practices, from value-added taxes (such as the Goods and Services Tax) to biosecurity standards such as those Australia applies to agricultural imports.

    In a nod to the “tech bros”, (alleged) restrictions on digital trade services, such as Australia’s media bargaining code, and digital service taxes must be removed, along with taxes on the tech giants. On Monday, Canada dropped a new digital service tax on firms such as Google and Meta after Trump suspended trade talks.

    Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Google CEO Sundar Pichai and Tesla CEO Elon Musk at President Trump’s inauguration ceremony.
    Saul Loeb/Pool/AFP via Getty Image

    Countries must also agree to reduce reliance on inputs from China in any exports to the United States. That means companies that moved manufacturing from China to countries such as Vietnam during President Trump’s first term trade wars will face challenges in sourcing input components from China.

    Put together, this is a difficult package for any government to accept without securing something in return.

    Who holds the cards?

    Trump has been fond of saying the United States holds “all the cards” in trade negotiations.

    It’s not known precisely how many countries are negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Between 10 and 18 countries are priority “targets”, or to use an early, colourful phrase, were targeted as the “Dirty 15”.

    Category 1 likely comprises many more countries than those in the US’s naughty corner. These countries were saddled with large reciprocal tariffs despite the tariff formula’s evident shortcomings. To paraphrase Trump, these countries don’t hold the cards and have limited negotiating power.

    They have no choice but to make concessions. The smarter ones will take the opportunity to make reforms and blame the bully in Washington. Mostly these are developing countries, some with high dependency on the US market, including the poorest such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Lesotho.

    To make matters worse, they must keep one eye on China for fear of retribution in case Beijing perceives any promises to reduce dependence on Chinese inputs would compromise Chinese interests.

    Category 2 consists of countries that “hold cards”, or have some degree of leverage. Some, such as Canada, Japan, India and the EU, will secure limited US concessions although they may resort to retaliation to force this outcome. From discussions with our government and academic sources, Japan and India likely won’t retaliate, but Canada has previously and the EU likely will.

    Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese initially said he would not negotiate and has repeated US reciprocal tariffs “are not the act of a friend”.

    However, the Australian government is wisely looking to bolster its negotiation cards, such as creating a critical minerals strategic reserve.




    Read more:
    Plans to stockpile critical minerals will help Australia weather global uncertainty – and encourage smaller miners


    No doubt policy makers are also reminding the US of their favourable access to Australia’s military infrastructure which could be essential to any US-China military confrontation.

    China is category 3.

    The Chinese government is determined not to kowtow to Washington as they did in Trump’s first term. The so-called “Phase 1 deal” was signed but instantly forgotten in Beijing.

    Beijing has several cards, notably dominance of processed critical minerals and their derivative products, particularly magnets, and the US’s lack of short-term alternative supply options.

    After China expanded export controls on rare earths and critical minerals, shortages hit the auto industry around the world and Ford was forced to idle plants.

    What happens next?

    Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, suggested on Friday more deals may be signed before July 8. But Trump is likely to undermine and/or negate them as his transactional whims change.

    The British, after announcing their US deal that included relatively favourable automotive and steel export market access, watched in horror as Trump doubled tariffs on steel imports to 50%, and reimposed the 25% tariff on the UK.

    The UK government was reminded this US administration cannot be trusted. That is why countries negotiate binding trade treaties governed by domestic and international laws.

    Many countries are waiting on the outcomes from various US court battles testing whether the president or Congress should have the power to impose unilateral tariffs. After all, if there is a chance the Supreme Court rules Trump cannot change tariffs by decree, then why negotiate with a serially untrustworthy partner?

    The Japanese government, for example, recently announced it is pausing negotiations after the US demanded increased defence spending.

    ‘I’m going to send letters’

    Trump on Sunday suggested he would simply send letters to foreign nations setting a tariff rate. “I’m going to send letters, that’s the end of the trade deal,” he said.

    That does not bode well for countries negotiating in good faith. It’s likely tariffs will be reimposed and bilateral negotiations will drag on to September or beyond as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said.

    After all, even the US government has limited bandwidth to process so many simultaneous negotiations. Category 2 trading partners will increasingly test their own political limits. And the rest of the world is hoping for a favourable Supreme Court ruling that may, like the character Godot in the play Waiting for Godot, never come.

    Nathan Gray receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Kumuthini Sivathas and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming – https://theconversation.com/im-going-to-send-letters-the-deadline-for-trumps-reciprocal-trade-tariffs-is-looming-259983

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Lambert, Associate Professor Nutrition and Dietetics, University of Wollongong

    Fly View Productions/ Getting Images

    On Tuesday, some Australian university students got access to a new payment. The Commonwealth Prac Payment is available to eligible teaching, nursing, midwifery and social work students.

    It will provide A$331.65 a week during compulsory professional placements, to help with living and study expenses. This could include travel, accommodation, uniforms and lost income from other employment.

    But while the payment is a much-needed step in the right direction, many students are still missing out.

    Who’s not covered?

    The prac payment was a recommendation from the federal government’s 2024 Universities Accord review. It is designed to help students complete essential professional placements, so they can graduate and enter the workforce.

    But numerous other health degrees with time-consuming work placements are excluded from the payment.

    This includes medicine, physiotherapy, dietetics, psychology, radiography and other allied health professions. Veterinary medicine students are also ineligible. Many of these professions are also experiencing serious workforce shortages.

    The payment is also only available to teaching, nursing and social work students who already qualify for Ausstudy (the income support payment for students and apprentices who are 25 and over).

    So this means the prac payment is means tested. It is also considered taxable income and paid at the rate of Austudy – which is not generous. The basic Austudy rate is below the national poverty line.

    The payment is also only available to Australian domestic students, even though many international heath students end up working in the Australian health system after graduating.

    Why is this an issue?

    Researchers, including ourselves, use the term “placement poverty” to describe the impact mandatory placements can have on students. It can be a major barrier to students completing their degrees.

    Students have repeatedly described widespread impacts of doing up to 1,000 hours of unpaid work to graduate – taking a toll on their income and mental health.

    Kelly Lambert’s 2024 research suggests health and teaching students can incur a further $12,500–15,000 to the cost of degrees during unpaid placements.

    Students have explained the placement hours mean they can’t work in their regular paid casual or part-time jobs – and may lose this work as a result.

    What does this mean for students?

    In the short term, if students are not supported to complete their placements, they may not have enough money for food or accommodation.

    Our research found 29% of teaching and allied health students regularly skip meals while on placement. Some students also described sleeping in cars or driving excessive distances due to limited or expensive accommodation options near their placements.

    If students are not supported in their placements, research suggests they can experience burnout and may not finish their degrees. Or they may not even begin them in the first place.

    This is particularly the case for students from regional or rural communities (who may have further to travel), students with parenting or caring responsibilities, and students from low economic and otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds.

    We also know its important to support students to do placements in rural, regional and remote areas – students who complete placements in these communities are more likely to return and work in those communities.

    What do we need to do instead?

    As a first measure, the government should expand eligibility criteria for the current payment to include other health disciplines and those who don’t currently meet the means testing threshold.

    Research tells us financial hardship is not confined to students who qualify for Austudy, it is experienced across the board.

    Students have also suggested interest-free short-term loans, subsidised parking (similar to hospital employees), and greater transparency about the costs associated with unpaid placements. International students have also said public transport subsidies would help them complete their placements.

    Other, more significant changes could include apprenticeship-type compensation models for healthcare students, where students get paid to study as part of their training. These schemes are already available in Scotland.

    Ultimately, we want to support more students to do health and teaching degrees to fill workforce gaps – not discourage them with high costs of studying.

    Kelly Lambert has received funding from the Australian Centre for Student Equity and Success.

    Scott William does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students – https://theconversation.com/a-new-prac-payment-has-just-kicked-in-but-it-ignores-many-uni-students-260087

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Lambert, Associate Professor Nutrition and Dietetics, University of Wollongong

    Fly View Productions/ Getting Images

    On Tuesday, some Australian university students got access to a new payment. The Commonwealth Prac Payment is available to eligible teaching, nursing, midwifery and social work students.

    It will provide A$331.65 a week during compulsory professional placements, to help with living and study expenses. This could include travel, accommodation, uniforms and lost income from other employment.

    But while the payment is a much-needed step in the right direction, many students are still missing out.

    Who’s not covered?

    The prac payment was a recommendation from the federal government’s 2024 Universities Accord review. It is designed to help students complete essential professional placements, so they can graduate and enter the workforce.

    But numerous other health degrees with time-consuming work placements are excluded from the payment.

    This includes medicine, physiotherapy, dietetics, psychology, radiography and other allied health professions. Veterinary medicine students are also ineligible. Many of these professions are also experiencing serious workforce shortages.

    The payment is also only available to teaching, nursing and social work students who already qualify for Ausstudy (the income support payment for students and apprentices who are 25 and over).

    So this means the prac payment is means tested. It is also considered taxable income and paid at the rate of Austudy – which is not generous. The basic Austudy rate is below the national poverty line.

    The payment is also only available to Australian domestic students, even though many international heath students end up working in the Australian health system after graduating.

    Why is this an issue?

    Researchers, including ourselves, use the term “placement poverty” to describe the impact mandatory placements can have on students. It can be a major barrier to students completing their degrees.

    Students have repeatedly described widespread impacts of doing up to 1,000 hours of unpaid work to graduate – taking a toll on their income and mental health.

    Kelly Lambert’s 2024 research suggests health and teaching students can incur a further $12,500–15,000 to the cost of degrees during unpaid placements.

    Students have explained the placement hours mean they can’t work in their regular paid casual or part-time jobs – and may lose this work as a result.

    What does this mean for students?

    In the short term, if students are not supported to complete their placements, they may not have enough money for food or accommodation.

    Our research found 29% of teaching and allied health students regularly skip meals while on placement. Some students also described sleeping in cars or driving excessive distances due to limited or expensive accommodation options near their placements.

    If students are not supported in their placements, research suggests they can experience burnout and may not finish their degrees. Or they may not even begin them in the first place.

    This is particularly the case for students from regional or rural communities (who may have further to travel), students with parenting or caring responsibilities, and students from low economic and otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds.

    We also know its important to support students to do placements in rural, regional and remote areas – students who complete placements in these communities are more likely to return and work in those communities.

    What do we need to do instead?

    As a first measure, the government should expand eligibility criteria for the current payment to include other health disciplines and those who don’t currently meet the means testing threshold.

    Research tells us financial hardship is not confined to students who qualify for Austudy, it is experienced across the board.

    Students have also suggested interest-free short-term loans, subsidised parking (similar to hospital employees), and greater transparency about the costs associated with unpaid placements. International students have also said public transport subsidies would help them complete their placements.

    Other, more significant changes could include apprenticeship-type compensation models for healthcare students, where students get paid to study as part of their training. These schemes are already available in Scotland.

    Ultimately, we want to support more students to do health and teaching degrees to fill workforce gaps – not discourage them with high costs of studying.

    Kelly Lambert has received funding from the Australian Centre for Student Equity and Success.

    Scott William does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students – https://theconversation.com/a-new-prac-payment-has-just-kicked-in-but-it-ignores-many-uni-students-260087

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Symphony concert held to mark 104th founding anniversary of CPC

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Symphony concert held to mark 104th founding anniversary of CPC

    Xinhua | July 1, 2025

    A symphony concert was held at the Museum of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Beijing on Monday night to celebrate the 104th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, which falls on Tuesday.

    Around 800 people attended the event, including recipients of major national honorary medals and titles, outstanding grassroots CPC members, and members of the public from all walks of life.

    It featured 17 musical works with themes of honoring history, remembering the martyrs, cherishing peace, striving for a better future, and celebrating ethnic solidarity and harmony.

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and several selections were performed to commemorate the occasion.

    Multiple orchestras and institutions, such as the China National Symphony Orchestra, the China National Opera and Dance Drama Theater, the China National Opera House, and the National Ballet of China, participated in the performance.

    The concert was co-hosted by the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the China Media Group (CMG), and will also be broadcast during prime time on CMG channels on Tuesday. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Fact Sheets – The European Council – 30-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    The European Council, formed by the heads of state or government of the Member States, provides the necessary impetus for the development of the European Union and sets out the general political guidelines. The Commission President is also a non-voting member. The President of the European Parliament addresses the European Council at the beginning of its meetings. The Lisbon Treaty established the European Council as an institution of the Union and endowed it with a long-term presidency.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: EUR 150 million share buyback completed

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Schiphol, July 1, 2025 – Aegon today announces the completion of its EUR 150 million share buyback program that began on January 13, 2025.

    Between January 13, 2025, and June 30, 2025, 25,200,170 common shares were repurchased for a total amount of EUR 150 million at an average price of EUR 5.9641 per share. Aegon will use 6,720,045 common shares to meet its obligations resulting from share-based compensation plans for senior management and cancel the remainder of the repurchased shares in the second half of 2025.

    For further details, visit our share buyback updates page at aegon.com.

    Contacts

    About Aegon
    Aegon is an international financial services holding company. Aegon’s ambition is to build leading businesses that offer their customers investment, protection, and retirement solutions. Aegon’s portfolio of businesses includes fully owned businesses in the United States and United Kingdom, and a global asset manager. Aegon also creates value by combining its international expertise with strong local partners via insurance joint-ventures in Spain & Portugal, China, and Brazil, and via asset management partnerships in France and China. In addition, Aegon owns a Bermuda-based life insurer and generates value via a strategic shareholding in a market leading Dutch insurance and pensions company.

    Aegon’s purpose of helping people live their best lives runs through all its activities. As a leading global investor and employer, Aegon seeks to have a positive impact by addressing critical environmental and societal issues. Aegon is headquartered in Schiphol, the Netherlands, domiciled in Bermuda, and listed on Euronext Amsterdam and the New York Stock Exchange. More information can be found at aegon.com.

    Forward-looking statements
    The statements contained in this document that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements as defined in the US Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The following are words that identify such forward-looking statements: aim, believe, estimate, target, intend, may, expect, anticipate, predict, project, counting on, plan, continue, want, forecast, goal, should, would, could, is confident, will, and similar expressions as they relate to Aegon. These statements may contain information about financial prospects, economic conditions and trends and involve risks and uncertainties. In addition, any statements that refer to sustainability, environmental and social targets, commitments, goals, efforts and expectations and other events or circumstances that are partially dependent on future events are forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Aegon undertakes no obligation, and expressly disclaims any duty, to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which merely reflect company expectations at the time of writing. Actual results may differ materially and adversely from expectations conveyed in forward-looking statements due to changes caused by various risks and uncertainties. Such risks and uncertainties include but are not limited to the following:

    • Changes in general economic and/or governmental conditions, particularly in Bermuda, the United States, the United Kingdom and in relation to Aegon’s shareholding in ASR Nederland N.V. and asset management business, the Netherlands;
    • Civil unrest, (geo-) political tensions, military action or other instability in countries or geographic regions that affect our operations or that affect global markets;
    • Changes in the performance of financial markets, including emerging markets, such as with regard to:         
      • The frequency and severity of defaults by issuers in Aegon’s fixed income investment portfolios;
      • The effects of corporate bankruptcies and/or accounting restatements on the financial markets and the resulting decline in the value of equity and debt securities Aegon holds;
      • The effects of declining creditworthiness of certain public sector securities and the resulting decline in the value of government exposure that Aegon holds;
      • The impact from volatility in credit, equity, and interest rates;
    • Changes in the performance of Aegon’s investment portfolio and decline in ratings of Aegon’s counterparties;
    • The effect of tariffs and potential trade wars on trading markets and on economic growth, globally and in the markets where Aegon operates.
    • Lowering of one or more of Aegon’s debt ratings issued by recognized rating organizations and the adverse impact such action may have on Aegon’s ability to raise capital and on its liquidity and financial condition;
    • Lowering of one or more of insurer financial strength ratings of Aegon’s insurance subsidiaries and the adverse impact such action may have on the written premium, policy retention, profitability and liquidity of its insurance subsidiaries;
    • The effect of applicable Bermuda solvency requirements, the European Union’s Solvency II requirements, and applicable equivalent solvency requirements and other regulations in other jurisdictions affecting the capital Aegon is required to maintain and our ability to pay dividends;
    • Changes in the European Commissions’ or European regulator’s position on the equivalence of the supervisory regime for insurance and reinsurance undertakings in force in Bermuda;
    • Changes affecting interest rate levels and low or rapidly changing interest rate levels;
    • Changes affecting currency exchange rates, in particular the EUR/USD and EUR/GBP exchange rates;
    • The effects of global inflation, or inflation in the markets where Aegon operates;
    • Changes in the availability of, and costs associated with, liquidity sources such as bank and capital markets funding, as well as conditions in the credit markets in general such as changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness;
    • Increasing levels of competition, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, emerging markets and in relation to Aegon’s shareholding in ASR Nederland N.V. and asset management business, the Netherlands;
    • Catastrophic events, either manmade or by nature, including by way of example acts of God, acts of terrorism, acts of war and pandemics, could result in material losses and significantly interrupt Aegon’s business;
    • The frequency and severity of insured loss events;
    • Changes affecting longevity, mortality, morbidity, persistence and other factors that may impact the profitability of Aegon’s insurance products and management of derivatives;
    • Aegon’s projected results are highly sensitive to complex mathematical models of financial markets, mortality, longevity, and other dynamic systems subject to shocks and unpredictable volatility. Should assumptions to these models later prove incorrect, or should errors in those models escape the controls in place to detect them, future performance will vary from projected results;
    • Reinsurers to whom Aegon has ceded significant underwriting risks may fail to meet their obligations;
    • Changes in customer behavior and public opinion in general related to, among other things, the type of products Aegon sells, including legal, regulatory or commercial necessity to meet changing customer expectations;
    • Customer responsiveness to both new products and distribution channels;
    • Third-party information used by us may prove to be inaccurate and change over time as methodologies and data availability and quality continue to evolve impacting our results and disclosures;
    • As Aegon’s operations support complex transactions and are highly dependent on the proper functioning of information technology, operational risks such as system disruptions or failures, security or data privacy breaches, cyberattacks, human error, failure to safeguard personally identifiable information, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including with respect to third parties with which Aegon does business, may disrupt Aegon’s business, damage its reputation and adversely affect its results of operations, financial condition and cash flows;
    • Aegon’s failure to swiftly, effectively, and securely adapt and integrate emerging technologies;
    • The impact of acquisitions and divestitures, restructurings, product withdrawals and other unusual items, including Aegon’s ability to complete, or obtain regulatory approval for, acquisitions and divestitures, integrate acquisitions, and realize anticipated results from such transactions, and its ability to separate businesses as part of divestitures;
    • Aegon’s failure to achieve anticipated levels of earnings or operational efficiencies, as well as other management initiatives related to cost savings, Cash Capital at Holding, gross financial leverage and free cash flow;
    • Changes in the policies of central banks and/or governments;
    • Litigation or regulatory action that could require Aegon to pay significant damages or change the way Aegon does business;
    • Competitive, legal, regulatory, or tax changes that affect profitability, the distribution cost of or demand for Aegon’s products;
    • Consequences of an actual or potential break-up of the European Monetary Union in whole or in part, or further consequences of the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union and potential consequences if other European Union countries leave the European Union;
    • Changes in laws and regulations, or the interpretation thereof by regulators and courts, including as a result of comprehensive reform or shifts away from multilateral approaches to regulation of global or national operations, particularly regarding those laws and regulations related to ESG matters, those affecting Aegon’s operations’ ability to hire and retain key personnel, taxation of Aegon companies, the products Aegon sells, the attractiveness of certain products to its consumers and Aegon’s intellectual property;
    • Regulatory changes relating to the pensions, investment, insurance industries and enforcing adjustments in the jurisdictions in which Aegon operates;
    • Standard setting initiatives of supranational standard setting bodies such as the Financial Stability Board and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors or changes to such standards that may have an impact on regional (such as EU), national (such as Bermuda) or US federal or state level financial regulation or the application thereof to Aegon;
    • Changes in accounting regulations and policies or a change by Aegon in applying such regulations and policies, voluntarily or otherwise, which may affect Aegon’s reported results, shareholders’ equity or regulatory capital adequacy levels;
    • The rapidly changing landscape for ESG responsibilities, leading to potential challenges by private parties and governmental authorities, and/or changes in ESG standards and requirements, including assumptions, methodology and materiality, or a change by Aegon in applying such standards and requirements, voluntarily or otherwise, may affect Aegon’s ability to meet evolving standards and requirements, or Aegon’s ability to meet its sustainability and ESG-related goals, or related public expectations, which may also negatively affect Aegon’s reputation or the reputation of its board of directors or its management;
    • Unexpected delays, difficulties, and expenses in executing against Aegon’s environmental, climate, or other ESG targets, goals and commitments, and changes in laws or regulations affecting us, such as changes in data privacy, environmental, health and safety laws; and
    • Reliance on third-party information in certain of Aegon’s disclosures, which may change over time as methodologies and data availability and quality continue to evolve. These factors, as well as any inaccuracies in third-party information used by Aegon, including in estimates or assumptions, may cause results to differ materially and adversely from statements, estimates, and beliefs made by Aegon or third-parties. Moreover, Aegon’s disclosures based on any standards may change due to revisions in framework requirements, availability of information, changes in its business or applicable governmental policies, or other factors, some of which may be beyond Aegon’s control. Additionally, Aegon’s discussion of various ESG and other sustainability issues in this document or in other locations, including on our corporate website, may be informed by the interests of various stakeholders, as well as various ESG standards, frameworks, and regulations (including for the measurement and assessment of underlying data). As such, our disclosures on such issues, including climate-related disclosures, may include information that is not necessarily “material” under US securities laws for SEC reporting purposes, even if we use words such as “material” or “materiality” in relation to those statements. ESG expectations continue to evolve, often quickly, including for matters outside of our control; our disclosures are inherently dependent on the methodology (including any related assumptions or estimates) and data used, and there can be no guarantee that such disclosures will necessarily reflect or be consistent with the preferred practices or interpretations of particular stakeholders, either currently or in future.

    This document contains information that qualifies, or may qualify, as inside information within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EU Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014). Further details of potential risks and uncertainties affecting Aegon are described in its filings with the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, including the 2024 Integrated Annual Report. These forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this document. Except as required by any applicable law or regulation, Aegon expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect any change in Aegon’s expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: ZetaDisplay and ENRA Technologies Partner to Drive Digital Signage Innovation in South Africa

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Leading European digital signage provider ZetaDisplay has announced an exciting new partnership with ENRA Technologies, a rapidly growing South African IT and AV solutions company, to accelerate the adoption of digital signage across South Africa and the wider African and Middle Eastern markets.

    This strategic collaboration will leverage ZetaDisplay’s proprietary Engage Suite, an advanced digital signage software platform, to offer a full-service digital signage solution to businesses in retail, manufacturing, finance, and insurance. Together, ENRA and ZetaDisplay will combine their expertise to create innovative, data-driven digital experiences that enhance customer engagement and operational efficiency.

    Raees Mukuddem, CEO and Founder of ENRA Technologies says:

    “The digital signage market in South Africa is still in its infancy, but we’ve recognised its immense potential. By partnering with ZetaDisplay, an internationally recognised leader in this space, we are bringing best-in-class full-service solutions to the market. We believe in success through collaboration—what we call ‘evoking Ubuntu’—and we’re excited to work alongside ZetaDisplay to transform the industry.”

    ENRA Technologies, founded in 2008, has grown from humble beginnings into a powerhouse delivering IT-managed services, integrated AV, security, and electronics across Africa and the Middle East. With a commitment to service excellence, the company has built strong, long-term relationships with major clients such as Woolworths, University of the Western Cape, Western Cape Government as well as other Public and Private sector Enterprises.

    A Level One Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) company, ENRA is deeply committed to driving economic transformation in South Africa and has been recognised as a three-time Impumelelo Award winner for business excellence.

    Ola Sæverås, Chief Business Officer at ZetaDisplay comments:

    “ENRA is the perfect partner for expanding into the South African market. They are incredibly well-established, working with leading brands and enterprise clients across the region. Their deep local expertise, combined with our innovative Engage Suite CMS platform, will allow us to create powerful digital signage solutions tailored to regional business needs.”

    The partnership is already making waves, with ENRA actively pursuing major digital signage rollouts with a leading South African retail chain with over 750 stores and one of the country’s top universities.

    At the heart of this collaboration is ZetaDisplay’s Engage Suite, a next-generation CMS designed for omnichannel content management, real-time data analytics and programmatic advertising integration. The platform will empower South African businesses to create seamless, automated and highly targeted digital signage campaigns.

    This partnership signals a new era for digital signage in South Africa, bringing together European innovation and African expertise to create engaging, effective, and future-proof digital solutions.

    For further information please contact:

    Ola Sæverås
    Chief Business Officer – ZetaDisplay Group
    Phone: +47 41 678 234
    Email: ola@zetadisplay.com  

    Raees Mukuddem 
    CEO / Founder – ENRA technologies South Africa
    Tel: +27 72 786 1856
    Email: raees@enra.co.za

    ABOUT ENRA Technologies

    Founded in 2008 ENRA Technologies CC (“ENRA”) is a B-BBEE Level 1, South African ICT organisation headquartered in Cape Town with a satellite office in Johannesburg servicing clients throughout the country and the wider African continent.
    ENRA’s core business is turnkey solutions design, implementation and maintenance of IT, Audio Visual and Security systems for government and private sector entities.
    ENRA is deeply committed to driving economic transformation in South Africa and has been recognised as a three-time Impumelelo Award winner for business excellence.
    More information at: www.enra.co.za/

    ABOUT ZETADISPLAY

    ZetaDisplay was founded 2003 in Sweden as one of the early pioneers of digital signage software and solutions. Today ZetaDisplay is of the leading European corporations in the digital signage market and a leading force in the European and global digital signage industry.

    Our proprietary software platform, digital business development and consulting services, innovative digital signage solutions, and creative concepts regularly inspire- influence and guide millions of people every day in retail environments, in restaurants, on advertising screens, in factories, on trains, on cruise ships, in stadiums, in workplaces and in all types of public spaces indoor and outdoor. ZetaDisplay is one of the largest leading European digital signage companies with direct operations in eight European countries and the US with +125,000 active installations in over 50 countries, across all major continents where we are the business partner of choice for many of the worlds most respected blue-chip brands and companies.

    ZetaDisplay is based in Malmö-Sweden, has a turnover of SEK +600 million and employs approx. 250 co-workers. ZetaDisplay is owned by the investment company Hanover Investors.

    More information about ZetaDisplay can be found on the group global website www.zetadisplay.com or for Investor relations at www.ir.zetadisplay.com  or for owner information at www.hanoverinvestors.com.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: EUR 200 million share buyback begins

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Schiphol, July 1, 2025 – Aegon today begins a EUR 200 million share buyback that was announced on May 16, 2025. The share buyback is expected to be completed by December 15, 2025, barring unforeseen circumstances.

    Aegon has entered into an agreement with its largest shareholder, Vereniging Aegon, to participate in the new EUR 200 million share buyback program. Vereniging Aegon will participate pro-rata in the share buyback program based on its combined common shares and common shares B which represent about 18.4% of the total shareholders’ voting rights that are currently exercisable. This results in a buyback amount of EUR 37 million. The number of common shares that Aegon will repurchase from Vereniging Aegon will be determined based on the daily volume-weighted average price per common share on Euronext Amsterdam.

    Aegon will engage a third party to execute the buyback transactions on its behalf. The common shares will be repurchased at a maximum of the average of the daily volume-weighted average price per common share during the repurchase period. Aegon intends to cancel the shares it repurchases during this share buyback program.

    The share buyback program will be executed in compliance with the EU’s Market Abuse Regulation and within the limitations of the existing authority as granted by our shareholders at our annual general meeting held on June 12, 2025. For further details, visit our share buyback updates page at aegon.com.

    Contacts

    About Aegon
    Aegon is an international financial services holding company. Aegon’s ambition is to build leading businesses that offer their customers investment, protection, and retirement solutions. Aegon’s portfolio of businesses includes fully owned businesses in the United States and United Kingdom, and a global asset manager. Aegon also creates value by combining its international expertise with strong local partners via insurance joint-ventures in Spain & Portugal, China, and Brazil, and via asset management partnerships in France and China. In addition, Aegon owns a Bermuda-based life insurer and generates value via a strategic shareholding in a market leading Dutch insurance and pensions company.

    Aegon’s purpose of helping people live their best lives runs through all its activities. As a leading global investor and employer, Aegon seeks to have a positive impact by addressing critical environmental and societal issues. Aegon is headquartered in Schiphol, the Netherlands, domiciled in Bermuda, and listed on Euronext Amsterdam and the New York Stock Exchange. More information can be found at aegon.com.

    Forward-looking statements
    The statements contained in this document that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements as defined in the US Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The following are words that identify such forward-looking statements: aim, believe, estimate, target, intend, may, expect, anticipate, predict, project, counting on, plan, continue, want, forecast, goal, should, would, could, is confident, will, and similar expressions as they relate to Aegon. These statements may contain information about financial prospects, economic conditions and trends and involve risks and uncertainties. In addition, any statements that refer to sustainability, environmental and social targets, commitments, goals, efforts and expectations and other events or circumstances that are partially dependent on future events are forward-looking statements. These statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions that are difficult to predict. Aegon undertakes no obligation, and expressly disclaims any duty, to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which merely reflect company expectations at the time of writing. Actual results may differ materially and adversely from expectations conveyed in forward-looking statements due to changes caused by various risks and uncertainties. Such risks and uncertainties include but are not limited to the following:

    • Changes in general economic and/or governmental conditions, particularly in Bermuda, the United States, the United Kingdom and in relation to Aegon’s shareholding in ASR Nederland N.V. and asset management business, the Netherlands;
    • Civil unrest, (geo-) political tensions, military action or other instability in countries or geographic regions that affect our operations or that affect global markets;
    • Changes in the performance of financial markets, including emerging markets, such as with regard to:         
      • The frequency and severity of defaults by issuers in Aegon’s fixed income investment portfolios;
      • The effects of corporate bankruptcies and/or accounting restatements on the financial markets and the resulting decline in the value of equity and debt securities Aegon holds;
      • The effects of declining creditworthiness of certain public sector securities and the resulting decline in the value of government exposure that Aegon holds;
      • The impact from volatility in credit, equity, and interest rates;
    • Changes in the performance of Aegon’s investment portfolio and decline in ratings of Aegon’s counterparties;
    • The effect of tariffs and potential trade wars on trading markets and on economic growth, globally and in the markets where Aegon operates.
    • Lowering of one or more of Aegon’s debt ratings issued by recognized rating organizations and the adverse impact such action may have on Aegon’s ability to raise capital and on its liquidity and financial condition;
    • Lowering of one or more of insurer financial strength ratings of Aegon’s insurance subsidiaries and the adverse impact such action may have on the written premium, policy retention, profitability and liquidity of its insurance subsidiaries;
    • The effect of applicable Bermuda solvency requirements, the European Union’s Solvency II requirements, and applicable equivalent solvency requirements and other regulations in other jurisdictions affecting the capital Aegon is required to maintain and our ability to pay dividends;
    • Changes in the European Commissions’ or European regulator’s position on the equivalence of the supervisory regime for insurance and reinsurance undertakings in force in Bermuda;
    • Changes affecting interest rate levels and low or rapidly changing interest rate levels;
    • Changes affecting currency exchange rates, in particular the EUR/USD and EUR/GBP exchange rates;
    • The effects of global inflation, or inflation in the markets where Aegon operates;
    • Changes in the availability of, and costs associated with, liquidity sources such as bank and capital markets funding, as well as conditions in the credit markets in general such as changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness;
    • Increasing levels of competition, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, emerging markets and in relation to Aegon’s shareholding in ASR Nederland N.V. and asset management business, the Netherlands;
    • Catastrophic events, either manmade or by nature, including by way of example acts of God, acts of terrorism, acts of war and pandemics, could result in material losses and significantly interrupt Aegon’s business;
    • The frequency and severity of insured loss events;
    • Changes affecting longevity, mortality, morbidity, persistence and other factors that may impact the profitability of Aegon’s insurance products and management of derivatives;
    • Aegon’s projected results are highly sensitive to complex mathematical models of financial markets, mortality, longevity, and other dynamic systems subject to shocks and unpredictable volatility. Should assumptions to these models later prove incorrect, or should errors in those models escape the controls in place to detect them, future performance will vary from projected results;
    • Reinsurers to whom Aegon has ceded significant underwriting risks may fail to meet their obligations;
    • Changes in customer behavior and public opinion in general related to, among other things, the type of products Aegon sells, including legal, regulatory or commercial necessity to meet changing customer expectations;
    • Customer responsiveness to both new products and distribution channels;
    • Third-party information used by us may prove to be inaccurate and change over time as methodologies and data availability and quality continue to evolve impacting our results and disclosures;
    • As Aegon’s operations support complex transactions and are highly dependent on the proper functioning of information technology, operational risks such as system disruptions or failures, security or data privacy breaches, cyberattacks, human error, failure to safeguard personally identifiable information, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including with respect to third parties with which Aegon does business, may disrupt Aegon’s business, damage its reputation and adversely affect its results of operations, financial condition and cash flows;
    • Aegon’s failure to swiftly, effectively, and securely adapt and integrate emerging technologies;
    • The impact of acquisitions and divestitures, restructurings, product withdrawals and other unusual items, including Aegon’s ability to complete, or obtain regulatory approval for, acquisitions and divestitures, integrate acquisitions, and realize anticipated results from such transactions, and its ability to separate businesses as part of divestitures;
    • Aegon’s failure to achieve anticipated levels of earnings or operational efficiencies, as well as other management initiatives related to cost savings, Cash Capital at Holding, gross financial leverage and free cash flow;
    • Changes in the policies of central banks and/or governments;
    • Litigation or regulatory action that could require Aegon to pay significant damages or change the way Aegon does business;
    • Competitive, legal, regulatory, or tax changes that affect profitability, the distribution cost of or demand for Aegon’s products;
    • Consequences of an actual or potential break-up of the European Monetary Union in whole or in part, or further consequences of the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union and potential consequences if other European Union countries leave the European Union;
    • Changes in laws and regulations, or the interpretation thereof by regulators and courts, including as a result of comprehensive reform or shifts away from multilateral approaches to regulation of global or national operations, particularly regarding those laws and regulations related to ESG matters, those affecting Aegon’s operations’ ability to hire and retain key personnel, taxation of Aegon companies, the products Aegon sells, the attractiveness of certain products to its consumers and Aegon’s intellectual property;
    • Regulatory changes relating to the pensions, investment, insurance industries and enforcing adjustments in the jurisdictions in which Aegon operates;
    • Standard setting initiatives of supranational standard setting bodies such as the Financial Stability Board and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors or changes to such standards that may have an impact on regional (such as EU), national (such as Bermuda) or US federal or state level financial regulation or the application thereof to Aegon;
    • Changes in accounting regulations and policies or a change by Aegon in applying such regulations and policies, voluntarily or otherwise, which may affect Aegon’s reported results, shareholders’ equity or regulatory capital adequacy levels;
    • The rapidly changing landscape for ESG responsibilities, leading to potential challenges by private parties and governmental authorities, and/or changes in ESG standards and requirements, including assumptions, methodology and materiality, or a change by Aegon in applying such standards and requirements, voluntarily or otherwise, may affect Aegon’s ability to meet evolving standards and requirements, or Aegon’s ability to meet its sustainability and ESG-related goals, or related public expectations, which may also negatively affect Aegon’s reputation or the reputation of its board of directors or its management;
    • Unexpected delays, difficulties, and expenses in executing against Aegon’s environmental, climate, or other ESG targets, goals and commitments, and changes in laws or regulations affecting us, such as changes in data privacy, environmental, health and safety laws; and
    • Reliance on third-party information in certain of Aegon’s disclosures, which may change over time as methodologies and data availability and quality continue to evolve. These factors, as well as any inaccuracies in third-party information used by Aegon, including in estimates or assumptions, may cause results to differ materially and adversely from statements, estimates, and beliefs made by Aegon or third-parties. Moreover, Aegon’s disclosures based on any standards may change due to revisions in framework requirements, availability of information, changes in its business or applicable governmental policies, or other factors, some of which may be beyond Aegon’s control. Additionally, Aegon’s discussion of various ESG and other sustainability issues in this document or in other locations, including on our corporate website, may be informed by the interests of various stakeholders, as well as various ESG standards, frameworks, and regulations (including for the measurement and assessment of underlying data). As such, our disclosures on such issues, including climate-related disclosures, may include information that is not necessarily “material” under US securities laws for SEC reporting purposes, even if we use words such as “material” or “materiality” in relation to those statements. ESG expectations continue to evolve, often quickly, including for matters outside of our control; our disclosures are inherently dependent on the methodology (including any related assumptions or estimates) and data used, and there can be no guarantee that such disclosures will necessarily reflect or be consistent with the preferred practices or interpretations of particular stakeholders, either currently or in future.

    This document contains information that qualifies, or may qualify, as inside information within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EU Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014). Further details of potential risks and uncertainties affecting Aegon are described in its filings with the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, including the 2024 Integrated Annual Report. These forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this document. Except as required by any applicable law or regulation, Aegon expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect any change in Aegon’s expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • PM Modi extends birthday wishes to former Vice-President Venkaiah Naidu

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday extended greetings to former Vice-President M. Venkaiah Naidu on the occasion of his 76th birthday, lauding his decades-long contribution to public service and nation-building.

    In a post on X, PM Modi said, “Best wishes to our former Vice President M. Venkaiah Naidu Garu on his birthday. I’ve had the good fortune of working together with Venkaiah Garu for many years. His commitment to public service and empowering the downtrodden is exemplary. Praying for his long and healthy life.”

    Born on July 1, 1949, Naidu served as India’s 13th Vice-President from 2017 to 2022. Prior to this, he held several key portfolios, including Minister for Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Urban Development, and Information and Broadcasting in the Union Cabinet.

    Union Home Minister Amit Shah also greeted the former Vice-President, describing his political journey as an inspiration for young leaders. “Warm birthday greetings to Shri @MVenkaiahNaidu Ji. Rising from the grassroots to the office of the Vice President, your journey serving the nation and voicing the marginalised is an inspiration for young leaders. Praying to God for your continued good health and long life,” Shah posted on X.

    Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Chandrababu Naidu wished Venkaiah Naidu in a post in Telugu, describing him as a remarkable leader whose dedication to public service has earned him a special place in national politics. He noted Naidu’s long journey from a student leader to holding one of the country’s highest constitutional posts.

    “I sincerely wish that Shri Venkaiah Naidu celebrates many more birthdays like this and continues to serve the public even more,” Chandrababu Naidu said.

  • MIL-Evening Report: 2 polls have Tasmania headed for another hung parliament, but disagree on which party is ahead

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

    Two Tasmanian state polls imply another hung parliament at the July 19 election under Tasmania’s proportional system. In one of these polls, Labor leads the Liberals, while in the other the Liberals lead.

    A Tasmanian snap state election will be held on July 19, just 16 months after the previous election in March 2024. This election is being held owing to a successful early June no-confidence vote in Liberal Premier Jeremy Rockliff.

    Tasmania uses the proportional Hare-Clark system to elect its lower house. There are five electorates corresponding to Tasmania’s five federal seats, and each electorate returns seven members, for a total of 35 lower house MPs.

    Under this system, a quota for election is one-eighth of the vote or 12.5%, but half of this (6.2%) is usually enough to give a reasonable chance of election. There’s no above the line section like for the federal Senate. Instead, people vote for candidates not parties, with at least seven preferences required for a formal vote.

    Robson rotation means that candidates for each party are randomised across ballot papers for that electorate, so that on some ballot papers a candidate will appear at the top of their party’s ticket and on others at the bottom.

    This means parties can’t control the ordering of their candidates. Independents can be listed in single-candidate columns.

    At the last election, the Liberals won 14 of the 35 seats, Labor ten, the Greens five, the Jacqui Lambie Network (JLN) three and independents three. Two of the three JLN MPs were later expelled from their party, but remained in parliament as independents.

    Candidate nominations were declared last Friday. There are 31 candidates in Bass, 38 in Braddon, 26 in Clark, 31 in Franklin and 35 in Lyons, for a total of 161 candidates, or 4.6 candidates per vacancy.

    The JLN isn’t running candidates, but the Nationals are running in Bass, Braddon and Lyons, and they include two former JLN MPs. Previous Tasmanian attempts by the Nationals have been failures, with their last effort in 2014 earning them just 0.8% of the statewide vote.

    YouGov and DemosAU polls

    A Tasmanian YouGov poll, conducted June 12–24 from a sample of 1,287, gave Labor 34% of the vote, the Liberals 31%, the Greens 13%, independents 18% and others 4%. Despite trailing on voting intentions, Rockliff led Labor’s Dean Winter by 43–36 as preferred premier.

    Respondents were asked to select the three most important items they wanted their candidate to agree with. Investing more in health was selected by 52%, building more public housing by 45% and reducing state debt by taxing those who can afford to pay by 41%.

    Opposing privatisation and asset sales was selected by 34%, while supporting privatisation was selected by 18%. Being anti-Macquarie AFL stadium was selected by 33%, while being pro-stadium was selected by 22%. When asked specifically about privatisation, voters were opposed by 47–36.

    Analyst Kevin Bonham reported a DemosAU poll, conducted June 19–26 from a sample of 4,289, gave the Liberals 34% of the vote, Labor 27.3%, the Greens 15.1% and independents 19.3%, leaving 4.7% presumably for others. This poll was originally reported in The Advocate, and was taken for an “unnamed peak body”.

    Bonham thinks it is likely that the independent vote in both these polls is overstated. These polls were both conducted before nominations were declared.

    If the DemosAU poll is correct, the Liberals would be likely to win more seats than Labor, while Labor would be likely to win more seats if the YouGov poll is right. But in both cases, the winning party would be well short of the 18 seats needed for a single-party majority.

    From 2010 to 2014, Labor governed in coalition with the Greens, and its heavy loss at the 2014 election was widely blamed on this coalition. Labor has tried to distance itself from the Greens since. In the last parliament, Labor may have been able to form government with the Greens’ assistance, but they refused to attempt to form one.

    If the YouGov poll is right, Labor may be able to form government with independents and not require the Greens. If the DemosAU poll is right, the result of this election is likely to be similar to the 2024 result, and Labor would need the Greens and some independents to form government.

    Federal Morgan poll: Labor far ahead

    A national Morgan poll, conducted June 23–29 from a sample of 1,522, gave federal Labor a 57.5–42.5 lead by headline respondent preferences, a 0.5-point gain for the Coalition since the June 2–22 Morgan poll.

    Primary votes were 36.5% Labor (down one), 30.5% Coalition (down 0.5), 12% Greens (steady), 8.5% One Nation (up 2.5) and 12.5% for all Others (down one). Using 2025 election preference flows, Labor’s lead was reduced to 56.5–43.5.

    Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. 2 polls have Tasmania headed for another hung parliament, but disagree on which party is ahead – https://theconversation.com/2-polls-have-tasmania-headed-for-another-hung-parliament-but-disagree-on-which-party-is-ahead-260062

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Preventive versus pre-emptive strikes.

    Headline: Preventive versus pre-emptive strikes. – 36th Parallel Assessments

    Photo credit: Reuters.

    Conceptual clarity is important in any context but especially when it comes to international relations, foreign policy and the initiation of conflict. Recent events in the Middle East have shown once again how clarity in the use of words is often deliberately obfuscated in pursuit of political agendas.

    Unlike what is being reported in the corporate media and by some Western defense officials, the Israeli strike on Iran was not “pre-emptive.” “Pre-emptive” means “a sudden strike thwarting an imminent attack.” That is not the case here. Iran was not about to imminently attack Israel before Israel, and then the US, attacked it. What Israel did was a preventive attack designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear R&D/storage facilities, missile launcher sites and command and control capabilities. The IDF attack focused on preventing and delaying development of Iran’s nuclear strike capability before it reached operational status and was telegraphed in advance (remember the US pulling out embassy staff and military families from facilities in the Middle East in anticipation of an tit-for-tat Iranian response). Both suspected weapons-grade nuclear stores as well as launching platforms were on the target list, as were those responsible for them. The US then followed up with some preventive strikes of its own, using so-called “bunker buster” bombs to penetrate deep into suspected Iranian nuclear development and storage sites. The Iranians responded by lobbing some short and medium-range missiles in the direction of the main US base in Qatar.

    Just like his response to October 7 with the ethnic cleansing of Gaza and expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank, Netanyahu has seized his moment of opportunity because, quite frankly, he can. No one will stop him (certainly not the Iranians) and the US backs him, with most of the West tacitly supporting Israel with their silence or tepid responses to the conflict. This, I suspect, is due to Israel’s value as an intelligence partner of the West as much as any other reason.

    The preventive nature and targets of the strikes may have helped moderate the Iranian response. On the other hand, killing the Revolutionary Guard Commander and Deputy Commander is a serious affront that will require a response in order for the Iranian regime to save face among its domestic audiences. So the escalation scenario is real, albeit not as bad as it could be. What is clear is that unlike preemptive attacks, the Israeli and US preventive attacks had no justification in the Laws of War (jus ad bellum) and were therefore illegal under International law. One might understand why the Israelis and US conducted the strikes and there is plenty of precedent for them, but that does not make them legal.

    Deliberate conflation of the terms “pre-emptive” with “preventive” by security officials and media is either a product of conceptual ignorance or deliberate obfuscation in pursuit of  legalistic white-washing of a blatant violation of international law. If the latter is true we know why they do it, but that does not mean that we have to accept they’re doing so.

    Analysis syndicated by 36th Parallel Assessments

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Preventive versus pre-emptive strikes.

    Headline: Preventive versus pre-emptive strikes. – 36th Parallel Assessments

    Photo credit: Reuters.

    Conceptual clarity is important in any context but especially when it comes to international relations, foreign policy and the initiation of conflict. Recent events in the Middle East have shown once again how clarity in the use of words is often deliberately obfuscated in pursuit of political agendas.

    Unlike what is being reported in the corporate media and by some Western defense officials, the Israeli strike on Iran was not “pre-emptive.” “Pre-emptive” means “a sudden strike thwarting an imminent attack.” That is not the case here. Iran was not about to imminently attack Israel before Israel, and then the US, attacked it. What Israel did was a preventive attack designed to degrade Iran’s nuclear R&D/storage facilities, missile launcher sites and command and control capabilities. The IDF attack focused on preventing and delaying development of Iran’s nuclear strike capability before it reached operational status and was telegraphed in advance (remember the US pulling out embassy staff and military families from facilities in the Middle East in anticipation of an tit-for-tat Iranian response). Both suspected weapons-grade nuclear stores as well as launching platforms were on the target list, as were those responsible for them. The US then followed up with some preventive strikes of its own, using so-called “bunker buster” bombs to penetrate deep into suspected Iranian nuclear development and storage sites. The Iranians responded by lobbing some short and medium-range missiles in the direction of the main US base in Qatar.

    Just like his response to October 7 with the ethnic cleansing of Gaza and expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank, Netanyahu has seized his moment of opportunity because, quite frankly, he can. No one will stop him (certainly not the Iranians) and the US backs him, with most of the West tacitly supporting Israel with their silence or tepid responses to the conflict. This, I suspect, is due to Israel’s value as an intelligence partner of the West as much as any other reason.

    The preventive nature and targets of the strikes may have helped moderate the Iranian response. On the other hand, killing the Revolutionary Guard Commander and Deputy Commander is a serious affront that will require a response in order for the Iranian regime to save face among its domestic audiences. So the escalation scenario is real, albeit not as bad as it could be. What is clear is that unlike preemptive attacks, the Israeli and US preventive attacks had no justification in the Laws of War (jus ad bellum) and were therefore illegal under International law. One might understand why the Israelis and US conducted the strikes and there is plenty of precedent for them, but that does not make them legal.

    Deliberate conflation of the terms “pre-emptive” with “preventive” by security officials and media is either a product of conceptual ignorance or deliberate obfuscation in pursuit of  legalistic white-washing of a blatant violation of international law. If the latter is true we know why they do it, but that does not mean that we have to accept they’re doing so.

    Analysis syndicated by 36th Parallel Assessments

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • India hosts first-ever ASEAN–India Cruise Dialogue in Chennai to boost maritime cooperation and tourism

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Union Minister for Ports, Shipping & Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal inaugurated the first-ever ASEAN–India Cruise Dialogue in Chennai on Monday, marking a significant milestone in maritime cooperation between India and Southeast Asian nations.

    Held aboard the MV Empress at Chennai Port, the dialogue brought together over 30 delegates from all ten ASEAN countries, along with Timor Leste, to explore ways to enhance cruise connectivity, promote sustainable tourism, and strengthen cultural and economic ties across the Indo-Pacific region.

    Sonowal emphasized India’s vision to professionalise 5,000 km of navigable waterways and boost cruise passenger traffic to one million annually by 2029 under the Sagarmala initiative. He also outlined plans for an integrated cruise network linking Indian and ASEAN ports, aligned with the Viksit Bharat 2047 and ASEAN Community Vision 2045.

    “Together, we want to develop a sustainable cruise circuit among culturally vibrant coastal regions of India and ASEAN, transforming the region into the hub of cruise tourism for the Global South,” the Minister said.

    The two-day dialogue includes thematic sessions on investment and cruise tourist circuits, and will continue in Mamallapuram, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Delegates will visit historic temples and monuments, highlighting India’s rich coastal tourism potential.

    Minister of State Shantanu Thakur highlighted ASEAN’s central role in India’s Act East Policy and reiterated India’s commitment to revitalising centuries-old maritime ties through cruise tourism and the blue economy.

    The event also saw participation from senior government officials and industry leaders. The Indian government envisions making the ASEAN–India Cruise Dialogue a recurring platform for advancing regional cruise tourism and maritime cooperation.

  • Centre launches BhashaSetu challenge to develop Real-Time Language Tech

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The centre on Monday launched the WAVEX Startup Challenge 2025, inviting startups from across the country to develop an AI-based real-time multilingual translation solution under its flagship accelerator programme, WaveX.

    The challenge, titled ‘BhashaSetu – Real-Time Language Tech for Bharat’, seeks to encourage the creation of innovative tools that can handle translation, transliteration, and voice localisation in real time across at least 12 major Indian languages. Officials said the initiative aims to foster inclusive and accessible communication technologies that are sensitive to India’s linguistic diversity.

    There is no minimum eligibility criterion for participation, allowing startups at any stage of development to apply. Startups have been encouraged to build scalable and cost-effective solutions, leveraging open-source or low-cost artificial intelligence models. Proprietary models may also be considered, provided they remain affordable for wide-scale deployment.

    The winning team will receive incubation support under the WaveX Accelerator, which will include mentorship, workspace, and development assistance until the solution is fully developed and deployed. Registrations opened on June 30 and will close on July 22. Interested startups may submit their proposals through the official WaveX portal.

    WaveX was launched under the Ministry’s WAVES initiative to promote innovation in the media, entertainment, and language technology sectors. At the WAVES Summit held in Mumbai this May, over 30 startups pitched their ideas directly to government representatives, investors, and industry leaders.

    Officials said that WaveX will continue to support promising startups through hackathons, incubation, mentorship, and opportunities for integration with national platforms.

    Startups can register for the challenge at: https://wavex.wavesbazaar.com