Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Statements by the President of Azerbaijan on achieving international recognition of the pseudo-state through the Organization of Turkic States – E-001683/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has consistently opposed any actions or statements that seek to upgrade the international status of the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, a territory not recognised by the international community.

    Such moves undermine the United Nations (UN) efforts to create a conducive environment for settlement talks. The EU only recognises the Republic of Cyprus as a subject of international law, in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

    The EU has been closely monitoring developments since the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) Summit in Samarkand in November 2022, when the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity became an observer to the organisation.

    The EU has expressed its concerns through public statements, including one from the European External Action Service (EEAS) Spokesperson[1], and has actively engaged with all OTS Member States, including Azerbaijan, at all levels on this worrying development. The High Representative/Vice-President has reiterated these concerns in statements made in July[2] and November 2024[3].

    The EU expects its partners to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states and to avoid taking any steps that contradict this principle.

    This expectation has been clearly communicated to Azerbaijan during the visit of the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission on 25 April 2025, and the EU will continue to convey this message at all levels of political dialogue.

    The EU remains committed to upholding relevant UN Security Council resolutions and fundamental principles of international law, particularly regarding state sovereignty, independence, and integrity. It will continue to work towards ensuring that these principles are fully respected.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/cyprus-statement-spokesperson-observer-status-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity-organisation_en?s=230.
    • [2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/443430_fr.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ots-statement-hrvp-josep-borrell-attempts-legitimise-turkish-cypriot-secessionist-entity_en.
    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – A police officer’s infiltration of the political movement Potere al Popolo: a potential violation of democratic principles and fundamental freedoms – E-002470/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002470/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pasquale Tridico (The Left), Dario Tamburrano (The Left), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Ilaria Salis (The Left), Mimmo Lucano (The Left), Manon Aubry (The Left), Estrella Galán (The Left), Catarina Martins (The Left), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Carolina Morace (The Left), Marc Botenga (The Left), Martin Schirdewan (The Left), Gaetano Pedulla’ (The Left), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Jussi Saramo (The Left), Mario Furore (The Left), Anthony Smith (The Left), Konstantinos Arvanitis (The Left)

    The recent news regarding an Italian police officer’s infiltration of the political movement Potere al Popolo without apparent judicial authorisation, if confirmed, raises serious concerns about the violation of democratic principles and the rule of law. This episode takes place in an already worrying context, marked by concerns expressed by the Commission in 2024 about the deterioration of press freedom and attacks on independent journalists in Italy.

    Such practices risk undermining the principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and are in conflict with the European Media Freedom Act on the protection of journalists and the promotion of political pluralism.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of these practices and what measures does it intend to take to ensure the protection of political parties and civic movements in the EU?
    • 2.Does it consider that this case could constitute a violation of the fundamental values of the EU and of the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 52 of the Charter?
    • 3.Can it clarify whether it is monitoring or if investigations are under way regarding governmental infiltration of political parties, and what instruments it intends to activate to prevent similar interference and ensure the protection of democratic freedoms?

    Submitted: 18.6.2025

    Last updated: 27 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Continuity planning empowers businesses to adapt, recover, and thrive

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Businesses often struggle to recover from extreme weather events and natural hazards because they are not ready. 

    It has been estimated that 40% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) do not reopen after a disaster and many of those that do, fail within a year. Businesses need to rethink their operating models before disruptions happen. Yet building disaster resilience does not always have to require a resource intensive process or lead to something new.  It does not mean changing what a business does, but how it does it. This is where business continuity planning comes in.

    A business continuity plan (BCP) outlines what is needed for a business to continue operating or resume operations after a disruption. It serves as a guide for pivoting operations if and as needed. Yet according to some estimates, only 20-30% of SMEs have written BCPs in place.

    In partnership with local governments, chambers of commerce and ARISE networks, UNDRR is implementing a project in Barcelona (Spain), Bridgetown (Barbados) and Sendai (Japan) to support SMEs in developing and testing business continuity plans to strengthen their disaster resilience. Early lessons are already emerging. 

    Here are five noteworthy things about business continuity planning that further highlight its importance:

    Business continuity plans can separate those that recover from those that do not

    With the increasing frequency and intensity of disasters, preparation is no longer optional. It makes all the difference. In many parts of the world, the question is not whether but when the next extreme weather event or natural hazard will strike. What businesses do today will determine how they fare in the face of a disaster tomorrow. A systemic approach to developing a BCP – conducting even quick multi-hazard risk assessments, identifying critical functions, outlining response and communications protocols, assigning roles, and stress-testing the plan – outline a clear roadmap that enables faster, risk informed decision-making and more effective resource allocation. Those without BCPs will inevitably face more chaos, operational delays, and significant losses – many times leading to business closure. Businesses that are risk-aware, with tested and up-to-date BCPs, however, are able to absorb shocks better, pivot operations, recover faster and become more resilient.  

    Business continuity plans are cost-effective mitigation measures

    Business continuity plans are a quick, low-cost way to mitigate potentially high-impact disaster risks. They typically require low financial investment especially when compared against the potentially significant losses of being unprepared for disasters. This is particularly true for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that often do not have the resources – human or financial – for developing more holistic disaster risk reduction approaches or undertaking disaster recovery efforts.

    Business continuity plans are a mechanism to operationalize resilience

    While resilience encompasses more than just business continuity, a well prepared BCP provides the foundation for reducing organizational vulnerabilities, pivoting operations and building resilient recovery capabilities. They clarify roles and actions that are needed to continue operations or resume quickly after a disruption. While resilience may be the ultimate goal, business continuity planning represents the practical steps to achieve it.

    Business continuity plans can offer a strategic advantage during uncertainty

    Business continuity plans can significantly enhance a company’s competitiveness and safeguard long-term success during disruptions. Those that have BCPs – and have tested and updated them regularly – are in a better position to minimize downtime and continue or quickly resume their operations. They are better equipped to protect their physical assets and data, while also retaining customers as well as contributing to the resilience of the communities where they operate. The operational flexibility – agility and ability to adapt to changing circumstances – can even help in capturing more market share.

    Business continuity plans can improve financial reserves

    Limited access to finance and no or inadequate insurance coverage are often cited among the key reasons why SMEs do not recover from disasters. Partners want to ensure that their supply chains and services are not disrupted, investors and lenders are keen to protect their capital, and insurers want to minimize payouts. A robust BCP can help improve financial cushioning by providing a form of assurance that operations will continue. As operational and financial risks are lowered, the business becomes a more stable, and thus attractive investment. Business continuity planning can also improve insurability: turning the business into a lower-risk policyholder, potentially leading to better policy terms and/or lower insurance premiums. In general, BCPs signal commitment to proactivity, stability and sustainability – making the business more credible and trustworthy in the eyes of all key stakeholders.

    To support businesses in understanding their resilience capacities, UNDRR has also developed the Resilience Maturity Assessment Tool (ReMA). ReMA helps businesses – particularly SMEs – identify gaps in their disaster preparedness and assess the maturity of their resilience strategies, offering a structured path toward stronger continuity planning and risk governance.

    Business continuity planning is more than a safeguard – it’s a strategic choice that empowers businesses to adapt, recover, and thrive amid disruption.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman García’s Statement on Supreme Court Decision on Nationwide Injunctions and Birthright Citizenship

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Jesús Chuy García (IL-04)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Congressman Jesús “Chuy” García (IL-04) issued the following statement on the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., which guts federal courts’ ability to issue nationwide injunctions and enables lawlessness by the Executive Branch: 

    “I represent a district where one out of every three people is an immigrant. Today, the Supreme Court betrayed them, millions of others, and the rule of law itself. By gutting the ability of federal courts to strike down illegal policies—like Trump’s Executive Order to ban birthright citizenship—nationwide, the right-wing justices have further opened the floodgates of presidential lawlessness. Unless this Executive Order is stopped by a class action lawsuit within 30 days, Trump will begin to deny citizenship to children born in the United States—a right that is explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. He will continue to succeed in his mission of creating a permanent underclass of immigrants, violating their rights, exploiting and criminalizing their existence, and denying them access to basic services like health care, housing, and food benefits.

    “From now on, any President will be able to violate any person’s rights unless that person can hire a lawyer, be part of a complicated class action lawsuit process, or live in a state that is willing to protect their rights. This absurd and lawless regime is incompatible with democracy and justice, and Congress must act to clarify the role of federal courts in blocking illegal policies nationwide. I will continue to fight for my community and for a government that upholds the rights of all people instead of a chosen few.”

    # # #

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: PIMCO Closed-End Funds Announce Shareholder Approval of Issuance of Common Shares in Proposed Reorganizations

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — At a joint special meeting earlier today, common shareholders of each of PIMCO Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PML), PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PNI) and PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PCQ) (each, an “Acquiring Fund”) approved the issuance of additional common shares in connection with each of the below reorganizations, as applicable (each, a “Merger” and collectively, the “Mergers”):

    • National Mergers: PIMCO Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PMF) and PIMCO Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PMX) with and into PML;
    • New York Mergers: PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund (NYSE: PNF) and PIMCO New York Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PYN) with and into PNI; and
    • California Mergers: PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund II (NYSE: PCK) and PIMCO California Municipal Income Fund III (NYSE: PZC) with and into PCQ.

    Once the Mergers are consummated, each of the Acquiring Funds will acquire all of the assets and liabilities of, as applicable, PMF, PMX, PNF, PYN, PCK, and PZC (each, an “Acquired Fund” and together with the Acquiring Funds, the “Funds”), and the common shares of each Acquired Fund will, in effect, be exchanged for new common shares of the corresponding Acquiring Fund with an equal aggregate net asset value. In addition, each Fund has one or more series of Remarketable Variable Rate MuniFund Term Preferred Shares (“RVMTP Shares”) outstanding. As part of each Merger, the outstanding RVMTP Shares of each Acquired Fund will, in effect, be exchanged for RVMTP Shares of the corresponding Acquiring Fund with an aggregate liquidation preference equal to, and other terms that are substantially identical to, the corresponding series of RVMTP Shares of each such Acquired Fund.

    The Mergers are currently expected to be completed on or about August 1, 2025, subject to PIMCO’s market outlook and operational considerations and the satisfaction of applicable regulatory requirements and customary closing conditions. In the event the completion of the Mergers is delayed, PIMCO will issue a press release notifying Fund shareholders of the new expected completion date.

    The holders of the RVMTP Shares of each Acquired Fund have been asked to consent to the applicable Merger, and the consummation of a Merger with respect to each such Acquired Fund is contingent upon the consent of the holders of its RVMTP Shares, as applicable. No further action is needed from common or preferred shareholders of any Fund.

    In light of the existing similarities in the Funds’ investment strategies and holdings, PIMCO does not currently expect to materially restructure any Acquired Fund’s portfolio or reposition its holdings prior to the Mergers in order to align with the applicable Acquiring Fund’s investment strategies. However, as of the close of business today through the closing of the Mergers, each Acquired Fund will be in a “transition period” during which PIMCO may reposition the Acquired Fund’s assets to prepare to transfer such assets to the corresponding Acquiring Fund, as needed, depending on market conditions and each Acquiring Fund’s portfolio holdings prior to the Mergers. During this time, an Acquired Fund may not be pursuing its investment objective and strategies, and limitations on permissible investments and investment restrictions will not apply.

    About PIMCO

    PIMCO was founded in 1971 in Newport Beach, California and is one of the world’s premier fixed income investment managers. Today we have offices across the globe and 3,000+ professionals united by a single purpose: creating opportunities for investors in every environment. PIMCO is owned by Allianz S.E., a leading global diversified financial services provider.

    Registration statements relating to each Acquiring Fund’s Common Merger Shares (as defined in the corresponding registration statement) have been filed with, and declared effective by, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). This press release is not intended to, and does not, constitute an offer to purchase or sell shares of the Funds; nor is this press release intended to solicit a proxy from any shareholder of the Funds.

    Except for the historical information and discussions contained herein, statements contained in this press release constitute forward-looking statements. These statements may involve a number of risks, uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, including the performance of financial markets, the investment performance of PIMCO’s sponsored investment products and separately managed accounts, general economic conditions, future acquisitions, competitive conditions and government regulations, including changes in tax laws. Readers should carefully consider such factors. Further, such forward-looking statements speak only on the date at which such statements are made. PIMCO undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date of such statement.

    This material has been distributed for informational purposes only and should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission. PIMCO is a trademark of Allianz Asset Management of America LLC in the United States and throughout the world. PIMCO Investments LLC, 1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019, is a company of PIMCO. ©2025, PIMCO.

    For information on PIMCO Closed-End Funds:
    Financial Advisors: (800) 628-1237
    Shareholders: (844) 337-4626 or (844) 33-PIMCO
    PIMCO Media Relations: (212) 597-1054

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: iAnthus Announces Results from Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK and TORONTO, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. (“iAnthus” or the “Company”) (CSE: IAN, OTCPK: ITHUF), which owns, operates and partners with regulated cannabis operations across the United States, is pleased to report the results for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders of iAnthus held on Thursday, June 26, 2025 at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern Time).

    All matters put forward before the iAnthus shareholders (the “Shareholders“) for consideration and approval as set out in the Proxy Statement dated May 21, 2025, were approved by the Shareholders. Specifically, the Shareholders: (i) approved the election of Scott Cohen, Michelle Mathews-Spradlin, Kenneth W. Gilbert, Alexander Shoghi, and Richard Proud as directors of the Company; and (ii) approved the appointment of PKF O’Connor Davies, LLP as auditors of the Company.

    About iAnthus
    iAnthus owns and operates licensed cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the United States. For more information, visit www.iAnthus.com.

    Neither the Canadian Securities Exchange nor the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has reviewed, approved or disapproved the content of this news release.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: iAnthus Announces Results from Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK and TORONTO, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. (“iAnthus” or the “Company”) (CSE: IAN, OTCPK: ITHUF), which owns, operates and partners with regulated cannabis operations across the United States, is pleased to report the results for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders of iAnthus held on Thursday, June 26, 2025 at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern Time).

    All matters put forward before the iAnthus shareholders (the “Shareholders“) for consideration and approval as set out in the Proxy Statement dated May 21, 2025, were approved by the Shareholders. Specifically, the Shareholders: (i) approved the election of Scott Cohen, Michelle Mathews-Spradlin, Kenneth W. Gilbert, Alexander Shoghi, and Richard Proud as directors of the Company; and (ii) approved the appointment of PKF O’Connor Davies, LLP as auditors of the Company.

    About iAnthus
    iAnthus owns and operates licensed cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the United States. For more information, visit www.iAnthus.com.

    Neither the Canadian Securities Exchange nor the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has reviewed, approved or disapproved the content of this news release.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: iAnthus Announces Results from Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK and TORONTO, June 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — iAnthus Capital Holdings, Inc. (“iAnthus” or the “Company”) (CSE: IAN, OTCPK: ITHUF), which owns, operates and partners with regulated cannabis operations across the United States, is pleased to report the results for the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders of iAnthus held on Thursday, June 26, 2025 at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern Time).

    All matters put forward before the iAnthus shareholders (the “Shareholders“) for consideration and approval as set out in the Proxy Statement dated May 21, 2025, were approved by the Shareholders. Specifically, the Shareholders: (i) approved the election of Scott Cohen, Michelle Mathews-Spradlin, Kenneth W. Gilbert, Alexander Shoghi, and Richard Proud as directors of the Company; and (ii) approved the appointment of PKF O’Connor Davies, LLP as auditors of the Company.

    About iAnthus
    iAnthus owns and operates licensed cannabis cultivation, processing and dispensary facilities throughout the United States. For more information, visit www.iAnthus.com.

    Neither the Canadian Securities Exchange nor the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has reviewed, approved or disapproved the content of this news release.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Agriculture negotiations Chair reports on prospects for progress ahead of MC14

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Agriculture negotiations Chair reports on prospects for progress ahead of MC14

    Ambassador Hussain told members he had held consultations on market access, domestic support and export restrictions on food as well as on food procurement at administered prices for developing economies’ public stockholding (PSH) programmes, and the proposed new Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), which would allow developing economies to raise duties temporarily in the event of a sudden surge in import volumes or price depression.
    The Chair reported that since the last meeting on 30 April, he had held 14 meetings where he explored with members several potential MC14 outcomes. These included: agreement on a framework for continued negotiations on outstanding topics; a political declaration reaffirming the value of existing disciplines and committing  to continue negotiations beyond MC14; recognition of progress made so far; and an agreement delivering early results for vulnerable WTO members facing food insecurity. These approaches could complement one another.
    “Overall, I was encouraged by the constructive tone and positive engagement throughout the consultations,” Ambassador Hussain said.
    He told the meeting that, despite the prevailing geopolitical tensions and challenges, there was broad support for advancing substantive work across all pillars. During his consultations, many members had underscored the importance of securing at least some concrete and meaningful outcomes as part of the MC14 package, he said.
    The Chair also noted that several delegations had emphasized the need to focus on realistic yet meaningful deliverables, and had cautioned that outcomes perceived as overly modest could risk further eroding confidence in the multilateral trading system.
    The Chair will continue his consultations on the various topics in different configurations, with the next consultation scheduled for 30 June with the cotton quad plus members, namely the C4+ cotton-producing countries (Benin, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire) and other key players in the negotiations related to the trade-related aspects of cotton.
    During the meeting, proponents of easing agricultural market access stressed the importance of  reducing and simplifying tariffs and other trade barriers in order to support economic development, food security and environmental sustainability. 
    Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay told participants that their November 2023 proposal JOB/AG/255 remains a substantive contribution to the talks, and that an MC14 outcome lacking progress on market access would be insufficient.
    Many members stressed that enhancing food security must remain a central objective in the negotiations. Some members also identified strengthening rural livelihoods and development — as well as promoting sustainable agriculture — as key priorities. Several members also reaffirmed the importance of a well-functioning multilateral rules-based trading system, emphasizing that it is essential for ensuring predictability and reducing costly uncertainty.
    The Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries and the African Group updated participants on their continued consultations. which have mainly focused so far on domestic support to the farm sector. The consultations were being held in a constructive spirit, they said. The Cairns Group proposal  JOB/AG/243 and the African Group proposal JOB/AG/242 were serving as a basis for dialogue.
    Some members told the meeting that it was critical to also address the issue of export restrictions on food as part of the negotiations to enhance food security. These members also noted that elements from their previous submissions remained relevant for ongoing discussions. Other ideas for further work were also mentioned, such as looking to facilitate trade in agricultural products including by looking at cross-cutting issues, such as agriculture-related supporting services.
    Ambassador Hussain noted that several members prefer to continue engaging with one another informally before widening discussions to the membership as a whole. These members also recognized that broader participation would soon be necessary.
    Several delegations called for more technical, data-informed discussions, including expert-led side events, to advance dialogue on complex, cross-cutting issues.
    Members had also acknowledged that it was too early to define the contours of a potential outcome for MC14, the Chair said. Their general view was that process and substance must continue to evolve in tandem to keep options open and ambition credible. He added that, overall, members had advocated for a balanced approach to negotiations, emphasizing the need for a spirit of engagement and transparency and the importance of avoiding maximalist positions.
    Ambassador Hussain told the meeting he will continue to facilitate focused discussions. He will encourage members to explore innovative approaches, collaborate effectively, and report their progress to the full membership. Delegations could usefully share written contributions which could be adopted at MC14, he said.
    Public food stockholding and Special Safeguard Mechanism
    Members held dedicated sessions on the procurement of food at administered prices for public stocks in developing economies and on the proposed Special Safeguard Mechanism  to facilitate more focused discussions on both topics. The Chair reported on his recent consultations on public food stockholding and noted that open and frank exchanges remain essential to making meaningful progress on this key issue.
    “I continue to believe that progress is possible if we focus on bridging differences through constructive and solution-oriented dialogues,” he said. He also told participants that he plans to pursue consultations in various configurations over the coming weeks to explore pragmatic and effective ways forward.
    During the meeting, developing economies that call for fast-tracking action in this area highlighted the importance of revisiting WTO rules in order to address food insecurity and called for text-based negotiations. Some other members called for technical sessions to enhance understanding of the technical aspects of the issue as well as the proposal on the table. Some noted that they were open to discussing the food security challenges faced by developing economies.
    On the Special Safeguard Mechanism, while developing economy proponents of the safeguard continue to consider it ought to be adopted as a stand-alone tool, agricultural exporting economies argue it should be addressed in parallel with talks on reducing barriers to the export of agricultural goods.
    Ambassador Hussain reported that, during his consultations, proponents of this issue made suggestions on how to break the current impasse and move the discussions forward. These included holding thematic sessions and targeted group discussions on specific technical issues and pursuing an interim price-based safeguard mechanism.
    The Chair urged members to continue exploring ways that could help to bridge differences and result in substantive progress.
    “We need to work towards identifying a practical way forward that could facilitate a meaningful conversation on various technical elements of an SSM,” he said.
    Next meeting
    The next meeting, followed by the dedicated sessions on public food stockholding and the Special Safeguard Mechanism, is tentatively scheduled for 9-10 July.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Agriculture negotiations Chair reports on prospects for progress ahead of MC14

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Agriculture negotiations Chair reports on prospects for progress ahead of MC14

    Ambassador Hussain told members he had held consultations on market access, domestic support and export restrictions on food as well as on food procurement at administered prices for developing economies’ public stockholding (PSH) programmes, and the proposed new Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), which would allow developing economies to raise duties temporarily in the event of a sudden surge in import volumes or price depression.
    The Chair reported that since the last meeting on 30 April, he had held 14 meetings where he explored with members several potential MC14 outcomes. These included: agreement on a framework for continued negotiations on outstanding topics; a political declaration reaffirming the value of existing disciplines and committing  to continue negotiations beyond MC14; recognition of progress made so far; and an agreement delivering early results for vulnerable WTO members facing food insecurity. These approaches could complement one another.
    “Overall, I was encouraged by the constructive tone and positive engagement throughout the consultations,” Ambassador Hussain said.
    He told the meeting that, despite the prevailing geopolitical tensions and challenges, there was broad support for advancing substantive work across all pillars. During his consultations, many members had underscored the importance of securing at least some concrete and meaningful outcomes as part of the MC14 package, he said.
    The Chair also noted that several delegations had emphasized the need to focus on realistic yet meaningful deliverables, and had cautioned that outcomes perceived as overly modest could risk further eroding confidence in the multilateral trading system.
    The Chair will continue his consultations on the various topics in different configurations, with the next consultation scheduled for 30 June with the cotton quad plus members, namely the C4+ cotton-producing countries (Benin, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire) and other key players in the negotiations related to the trade-related aspects of cotton.
    During the meeting, proponents of easing agricultural market access stressed the importance of  reducing and simplifying tariffs and other trade barriers in order to support economic development, food security and environmental sustainability. 
    Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay told participants that their November 2023 proposal JOB/AG/255 remains a substantive contribution to the talks, and that an MC14 outcome lacking progress on market access would be insufficient.
    Many members stressed that enhancing food security must remain a central objective in the negotiations. Some members also identified strengthening rural livelihoods and development — as well as promoting sustainable agriculture — as key priorities. Several members also reaffirmed the importance of a well-functioning multilateral rules-based trading system, emphasizing that it is essential for ensuring predictability and reducing costly uncertainty.
    The Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries and the African Group updated participants on their continued consultations. which have mainly focused so far on domestic support to the farm sector. The consultations were being held in a constructive spirit, they said. The Cairns Group proposal  JOB/AG/243 and the African Group proposal JOB/AG/242 were serving as a basis for dialogue.
    Some members told the meeting that it was critical to also address the issue of export restrictions on food as part of the negotiations to enhance food security. These members also noted that elements from their previous submissions remained relevant for ongoing discussions. Other ideas for further work were also mentioned, such as looking to facilitate trade in agricultural products including by looking at cross-cutting issues, such as agriculture-related supporting services.
    Ambassador Hussain noted that several members prefer to continue engaging with one another informally before widening discussions to the membership as a whole. These members also recognized that broader participation would soon be necessary.
    Several delegations called for more technical, data-informed discussions, including expert-led side events, to advance dialogue on complex, cross-cutting issues.
    Members had also acknowledged that it was too early to define the contours of a potential outcome for MC14, the Chair said. Their general view was that process and substance must continue to evolve in tandem to keep options open and ambition credible. He added that, overall, members had advocated for a balanced approach to negotiations, emphasizing the need for a spirit of engagement and transparency and the importance of avoiding maximalist positions.
    Ambassador Hussain told the meeting he will continue to facilitate focused discussions. He will encourage members to explore innovative approaches, collaborate effectively, and report their progress to the full membership. Delegations could usefully share written contributions which could be adopted at MC14, he said.
    Public food stockholding and Special Safeguard Mechanism
    Members held dedicated sessions on the procurement of food at administered prices for public stocks in developing economies and on the proposed Special Safeguard Mechanism  to facilitate more focused discussions on both topics. The Chair reported on his recent consultations on public food stockholding and noted that open and frank exchanges remain essential to making meaningful progress on this key issue.
    “I continue to believe that progress is possible if we focus on bridging differences through constructive and solution-oriented dialogues,” he said. He also told participants that he plans to pursue consultations in various configurations over the coming weeks to explore pragmatic and effective ways forward.
    During the meeting, developing economies that call for fast-tracking action in this area highlighted the importance of revisiting WTO rules in order to address food insecurity and called for text-based negotiations. Some other members called for technical sessions to enhance understanding of the technical aspects of the issue as well as the proposal on the table. Some noted that they were open to discussing the food security challenges faced by developing economies.
    On the Special Safeguard Mechanism, while developing economy proponents of the safeguard continue to consider it ought to be adopted as a stand-alone tool, agricultural exporting economies argue it should be addressed in parallel with talks on reducing barriers to the export of agricultural goods.
    Ambassador Hussain reported that, during his consultations, proponents of this issue made suggestions on how to break the current impasse and move the discussions forward. These included holding thematic sessions and targeted group discussions on specific technical issues and pursuing an interim price-based safeguard mechanism.
    The Chair urged members to continue exploring ways that could help to bridge differences and result in substantive progress.
    “We need to work towards identifying a practical way forward that could facilitate a meaningful conversation on various technical elements of an SSM,” he said.
    Next meeting
    The next meeting, followed by the dedicated sessions on public food stockholding and the Special Safeguard Mechanism, is tentatively scheduled for 9-10 July.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Georgia: Crackdown on government critics deepens as another opposition politician is jailed

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Reacting to the jailing of yet another Georgian opposition figure, former lawmaker Giorgi (Givi) Targamadze, to seven months in prison for refusing to recognize the parliament’s legitimacy and appear before a parliamentary investigative committee, Denis Krivosheev, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, said:

    “Summoning opposition figures before a parliamentary commission and arresting and imprisoning them for refusing to recognize its legitimacy raises serious concerns over the misuse of legislative, policing and other powers to silence government critics in Georgia.”

    “With its status disputed, the commission has been instrumentalized to target former public officials for their principled opposition. It has become a tool of political repression, not of parliamentary scrutiny, used to lock away political opponents ahead of local elections. The ruling party’s misuse of parliamentary structures is part of a broader crackdown on critics, which includes the arbitrary detention and persecution of activists and peaceful protesters and the suffocation of civil society through repressive legislation and unlawful demands.

    The ruling party’s misuse of parliamentary structures is part of a broader crackdown on critics

    Denis Krivosheev, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    “Authorities in Georgia must stop their relentless assault on dissent and targeting protesters and political activists for the peaceful exercise of their human rights, and release Givi Targamadze and the six other opposition members they have thrown behind bars in recent weeks. Authorities must halt practices that violate Georgia’s international human rights obligations. Authorities must uphold and ensure the human rights of everyone in the country.”

    Background

    On 27 June, Tbilisi City Court sentenced Giorgi (Givi) Targamadze to seven months in prison for “non-compliance” with a parliamentary commission led by the ruling Georgian Dream party. The commission purports to have been established to investigate alleged abuses by former government officials from the opposition United National Movement (UNM) party that ran the country from 2003 to 2012.

    Giorgi Targamadze is the seventh opposition figure to be arrested, and the fourth to be sentenced, under these proceedings in recent weeks, after Giorgi Vashadze received a seven-month prison sentence, and Mamuka Khazaradze, Badri Japaradze and Zurab Japaridze, were each sentenced to six months in prison. All of them have also been banned from holding public office for two years. Three other opposition figures – ex-UNM chair Nika Melia, former Justice and Defence ministers Nika Gvaramia and Irakli Okruashvili – are also currently in detention and standing trial under the same charges.

    Refusing to comply with a parliamentary commission can be punished by up to one year in prison or a fine under Georgian law. However, courts have so far imposed prison sentences only, in a string of cases which have targeted politicians who have challenged the legitimacy of the current parliament after disputed elections.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: UK: ‘Superficial’ revisions to PIP bill ‘fail to stand up to human rights checks’

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International UK has warned that the UK government’s revised welfare proposals remain fundamentally flawed and risk pushing thousands into poverty, particularly disabled people and those on low incomes. Amnesty is urging MPs not to make concessions on people’s human rights. 

    Despite proposed changes limiting certain cuts to the new Personal Independence Payment claimants, Amnesty says the Bill remains discriminatory and falls short of basic human rights standards.

    Jen Clark, Amnesty International UK’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Lead, said:

    “The revised changes to the PIP bill are nothing more than a superficial attempt to get MPs to vote through this cruel and harmful piece of legislation.

    “The new draft continues to fail on human rights checks – it will deepen poverty, entrench discrimination, and create a two-tier welfare system that cannot be justified under any circumstances.

    “Freezing or cutting benefits for new claimants doesn’t prevent poverty, it pushes more people into it, while entrenching income inequality across generations.

    “These proposals are not human rights compliant. They are being rushed through without proper scrutiny, transparency or engagement with those who stand to lose the most.

    “We urge MPs to stand firm against a Bill that continues to discriminate, harm, and marginalise.”

    Amnesty raised alarm over the following unresolved concerns in the Bill:

    • Cuts, freezes and eligibility changes will still push people into poverty, even if some are limited to new claimants.
    • A two-tier system is being created – an unjustifiable move that will deepen inequality, particularly for younger and future claimants in high areas of deprivation.
    • PIP assessments remain discriminatory and unfit for purpose, yet MPs are being asked to vote without any guarantees that the upcoming review will deliver meaningful change.
    • No meaningful consultation with disabled people, whose lives will be directly affected.
    • No published human rights impact assessment, and the partial assessments that exist are of poor quality.

    Poverty is a political choice: Amnesty is calling on all MPs to stand firm and reject the current version of the Bill and to demand a full human rights impact assessment, meaningful consultation with disabled people, and genuine reforms that reduce poverty rather than deepen it.

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    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Greenpeace activists rebrand NZ bottom trawler “ocean killer” at sea

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    PACIFIC OCEAN, Saturday, 28 June 2025 – Greenpeace Aotearoa activists have confronted a bottom trawler in the South Pacific ocean, east of New Zealand, rebranding it “ocean killer”, after witnessing it haul in a net straining with marine life.

    Launching from the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, activists came alongside the New Zealand-flagged ship, Talley’s Amaltal Atlantis, on the Chatham Rise[1] on Friday afternoon, and painted the message on its hull with non-toxic paint.

    Greenpeace Aotearoa activists confront the Talley’s bottom trawler Amatal Atlantis on the Chatham Rise, painting “ocean killer” on its hull to protest destructive bottom trawling. The Rainbow Warrior is off the coast of Aotearoa campaigning for an end to New Zealand’s destructive bottom trawling in New Zealand waters and the Tasman Sea.

    Speaking from onboard the Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace Aotearoa spokesperson Juan Parada says: “Appalled by the most recent evidence of destruction, people defending the oceans rebranded this Talley’s vessel today to expose the bottom trawling industry for what they are: ocean killers. When Talley’s bottom trawlers drag their heavy trawl nets across the seafloor and over seamounts, they bulldoze everything in their path, including killing precious marine life from coral to fur seals, dolphins and seabirds.

    “We’ve all seen the shocking footage of bottom trawling in David Attenborough’s film Ocean, and it’s happening right here, right now.

    “Faced with a fishing industry that profits from trashing the ocean, and a government that condones bottom trawling, we’re proud of the peaceful action taken today to call out this destruction and demand that bottom trawling stop.

    The Amaltal Atlantis trawls in the waters of Aotearoa, and has previously received permits to trawl in the High Seas of the South Pacific. Their trail of destruction is wide and long-lasting,” says Parada.

    New Zealand is the only country still bottom trawling in the high seas of the Tasman, between Australia and New Zealand.

    The at-sea action comes just months after a deep sea expedition led by Greenpeace Aotearoa documented whole swathes of destroyed coral in areas of the Tasman Sea that have been intensively trawled by New Zealand bottom trawlers. This area has been earmarked for one of the first high seas ocean sanctuaries under the Global Ocean Treaty.

    Talley’s vessels trawl in Australian waters; the Amaltal Explorer has been trawling for endangered orange roughy off Tasmania, after being allowed back in Australia’s waters last year.  In 2018, the Amaltal Apollo trawled in a protected area on the Lord Howe Rise, in the international waters of the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. 

    Greenpeace Aotearoa activists confront the Talley’s bottom trawler Amatal Atlantis on the Chatham Rise, painting “ocean killer” on its hull to protest destructive bottom trawling. The Rainbow Warrior is off the coast of Aotearoa campaigning for an end to New Zealand’s destructive bottom trawling in New Zealand waters and the Tasman Sea.

    It also comes just weeks after Greenpeace Australia Pacific activists disrupted an industrial longliner between Australia and New Zealand, and revealed the devastating impacts of industrial fishing on marine life in the South Pacific.

    Greenpeace Australia Pacific is calling on the Australian government to ratify the Global Ocean Treaty and propose high seas marine protected areas, including large protected areas in the Tasman Sea.

    In a statement responding to the protest, Talley’s said it would seek legal action which “may include the arrest of the Rainbow Warrior.”

    —ENDS—

    Contacts:

    • Nick Young, Greenpeace Aotearoa: +64-21-707-727
    • Kimberley Bernard, Greenpeace Australia Pacific: +61 407 581 404 or [email protected]

    Photos and videos available for media on request

    Notes:

    • [1] The action took place in the Chatham Rise area, where it was recently revealed a New Zealand vessel dragged up six tonnes of coral in a single trawl.
    • The paint used to paint the hull is water based and non-toxic
    • In the period 1990 to 2004 the total area trawled in NZ waters was 465,100 square kilometres – almost double NZ’s land mass.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 2444, Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    H.R. 2444 would require the Department of Commerce to assess and prepare for disruptions to supply chains for goods that are critical to national or economic security. H.R. 2444 would establish an interagency working group to identify actions that the federal government can take to mitigate the economic effects of incidents that cause gaps in manufacturing, warehousing, transportation, and distribution networks for those critical goods. The department would need to report annually to the Congress on the effectiveness of its efforts.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 2449, FUTURE Networks Act

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    H.R. 2449 would require the FCC to establish a task force on sixth-generation (6G) wireless technology. The task force would report to the Congress on issues, including the status of 6G standards-setting bodies; the uses and limitations of 6G technology; and how federal, state, and local governments could use that technology. Using information from the FCC, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2449 would cost less than $500,000 over the 2025-2030 period. However, because the FCC is authorized to collect fees each year sufficient to offset the appropriated costs of its regulatory activities, CBO estimates that the net cost to the FCC would be negligible, assuming appropriation actions consistent with that authority.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 2481, Romance Scam Prevention Act

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    H.R. 2481 would impose intergovernmental and private-sector mandates, but CBO estimates that the costs to comply with those mandates would not exceed the thresholds established in UMRA ($103 million and $206 million in 2025, respectively, adjusted annually for inflation).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 2481, Romance Scam Prevention Act

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    H.R. 2481 would impose intergovernmental and private-sector mandates, but CBO estimates that the costs to comply with those mandates would not exceed the thresholds established in UMRA ($103 million and $206 million in 2025, respectively, adjusted annually for inflation).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DHS and DOJ Announce Streamlined Process for Fining Illegal Aliens

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: DHS and DOJ Announce Streamlined Process for Fining Illegal Aliens

    he Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a new joint federal rule with the Department of Justice (DOJ) that will make it easier and more efficient to fine illegal aliens

    The current process requires giving illegal aliens 30 days’ notice of the intent to fine them before a fine is issued

    This new rule will eliminate the 30-day notice period, authorize DHS immigration officers to send fines to illegal aliens by regular mail, and shorten the process that applies if illegal aliens contest their fines

    “The law doesn’t enforce itself; there must be consequences for breaking it

    ” said Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin

    “President Trump and Secretary Noem are standing up for law and order and making our government more effective and efficient at enforcing the American people’s immigration laws

    Financial penalties like these are just one more reason why illegal aliens should use CBP Home to self-deport now before it’s too late


    The new process will be applied to:

    Aliens who enter the United States illegally
    Aliens who ignore removal orders or delay their removal
    Aliens who do not honor agreements to comply with judges’ voluntary departure orders

    Fines include:

    $100 to $500 per unlawful entry or attempted entry
    $1,992 to $9,970 for failure to honor a voluntary departure order
    Up to $998 per day for willfully failing to comply with a removal order

    Fines such as these were never issued by DHS prior to President Trump’s first term in office

    However, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) stopped issuing them when President Biden took office

    Shortly after President Trump returned to office, ICE started issuing failure-to-depart fines again as of June 13, 2025, nearly 10,000 fine notices have been issued by ICE
    Aliens who self-deport through the CBP Home App will receive forgiveness of any civil fines or penalties for failing to depart the United States

    All illegal aliens are encouraged to start their CBP Home self-deportation process immediately

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DHS and DOJ Announce Streamlined Process for Fining Illegal Aliens

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: DHS and DOJ Announce Streamlined Process for Fining Illegal Aliens

    he Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a new joint federal rule with the Department of Justice (DOJ) that will make it easier and more efficient to fine illegal aliens

    The current process requires giving illegal aliens 30 days’ notice of the intent to fine them before a fine is issued

    This new rule will eliminate the 30-day notice period, authorize DHS immigration officers to send fines to illegal aliens by regular mail, and shorten the process that applies if illegal aliens contest their fines

    “The law doesn’t enforce itself; there must be consequences for breaking it

    ” said Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin

    “President Trump and Secretary Noem are standing up for law and order and making our government more effective and efficient at enforcing the American people’s immigration laws

    Financial penalties like these are just one more reason why illegal aliens should use CBP Home to self-deport now before it’s too late


    The new process will be applied to:

    Aliens who enter the United States illegally
    Aliens who ignore removal orders or delay their removal
    Aliens who do not honor agreements to comply with judges’ voluntary departure orders

    Fines include:

    $100 to $500 per unlawful entry or attempted entry
    $1,992 to $9,970 for failure to honor a voluntary departure order
    Up to $998 per day for willfully failing to comply with a removal order

    Fines such as these were never issued by DHS prior to President Trump’s first term in office

    However, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) stopped issuing them when President Biden took office

    Shortly after President Trump returned to office, ICE started issuing failure-to-depart fines again as of June 13, 2025, nearly 10,000 fine notices have been issued by ICE
    Aliens who self-deport through the CBP Home App will receive forgiveness of any civil fines or penalties for failing to depart the United States

    All illegal aliens are encouraged to start their CBP Home self-deportation process immediately

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: DHS Terminates Haiti TPS, Encourages Haitians to Obtain Lawful Status

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: DHS Terminates Haiti TPS, Encourages Haitians to Obtain Lawful Status

    ASHINGTON – Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem today announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haiti

    The TPS designation for the country expires on Aug

    3, 2025, and the termination will be effective on Tuesday, September 2, 2025

     
    At least 60 days before a TPS designation expires, the Secretary, after consultation with appropriate U

    S

    government agencies, is required to review the conditions in a country designated for TPS to determine whether the conditions supporting the designation continue to be met, and if so, how long to extend the designation

      
    “This decision restores integrity in our immigration system and ensures that Temporary Protective Status is actually temporary,” said a DHS spokesperson

    “The environmental situation in Haiti has improved enough that it is safe for Haitian citizens to return home

    We encourage these individuals to take advantage of the Department’s resources in returning to Haiti, which can be arranged through the CBP Home app

    Haitian nationals may pursue lawful status through other immigration benefit requests, if eligible


    After conferring with interagency partners, Secretary Noem determined that conditions in Haiti no longer meet the TPS statutory requirements

    The Secretary’s decision was based on a U

    S

    Citizenship and Immigration Services review of the conditions in Haiti and in consultation with the Department of State

    The Secretary determined that, overall, country conditions have improved to the point where Haitians can return home in safety

    She further determined that permitting Haitian nationals to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States

    Haitian nationals returning home are encouraged to use the U

    S

    Customs and Border Protection CBP Home app to report their departure from the United States

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Notice of Availability: Draft Programmatic Agreement and Request for Public Comments

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: Notice of Availability: Draft Programmatic Agreement and Request for Public Comments

    Notice of Availability: Draft Programmatic Agreement and Request for Public Comments

    Annapolis City Dock Flood Mitigation UndertakingPHILADELPHIA– The City of Annapolis, Maryland has applied through the Maryland Department of Emergency Management to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program for a flood resiliency and stormwater improvement undertaking in the downtown Annapolis area in Anne Arundel County, Maryland

    The proposed undertaking consists of four separate, yet connected projects (HMGP-4491-0043-MD, LPDM-PJ-03-MD-2023-002, HMGP-4261-0013-MD, LPDM-PJ-03-MD-2024-003) that involve the design and construction of a comprehensive stormwater and flood mitigation system at the City Dock area

    The overall undertaking includes storm drain realignment; construction of three pump stations including wet wells, electric control building, and backup generator; deployable flood barriers; and grading modifications

     The purpose of this undertaking is to implement strategies to protect historic downtown Annapolis, the US Naval Academy, and surrounding areas against flooding to advance the City’s economy and safeguard the City’s cultural and historic heritage

    The City Dock is a busy hub in the historic heart of Annapolis City that has served as an important port within Annapolis and the Chesapeake Bay region for at least 350 years

    The project is needed because the City Dock is vulnerable to flooding, which threatens its structural integrity and functionality, importance to the local economy, and use by the community as well as the safety of those using the area

    FEMA is considering the effects of this undertaking on historic properties pursuant to 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800, the regulations implementing Section 106 of NHPA (Section 106) (54 U

    S

    C

    §§ 300101-306108)

    FEMA, consistent with Section 106 and 36 CFR § 800

    16(d), has defined the undertaking’s Area of Potential Effects (APE)

    The APE is the geographic area within which an undertaking may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic properties, if any such properties exist

    A historic property is any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included on, or eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP)

    FEMA determined the undertaking has the potential to affect historic properties including National Historic Landmarks (NHL), which are historic properties that illustrate the heritage of the United States

    In accordance with 36 CFR § 800

    10 and Section 110(f) of the NHPA, FEMA must, to the maximum extent possible, undertake such planning and actions as may be necessary to minimize harm to any NHL that may be directly and adversely affected by an undertaking

    The undertaking’s construction schedule and access constraints within the APE limit surveys to fully identify and evaluate historic and cultural resources to determine if they are historic properties, determine if the undertaking would have adverse effects on historic properties, or fully avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse effects, prior to completing the appropriate NEPA documentation and FEMA’s approval of the undertaking

    When completing the Section 106 process prior to making a final decision on a particular undertaking is not practical, the regulations allow an agency to pursue a “project” Programmatic Agreement (PA) under 36 CFR § 800

    14(b)(1)(ii)

    Accordingly, to outline the phased Section 106 process, account for inadvertent discoveries and effects, and to create a proposal to resolve potential adverse effects, FEMA intends to execute a PA in accordance with Stipulation II

    C

    6

    c of the Maryland Statewide Programmatic Agreement

    In accordance with the terms of the PA, studies shall be undertaken to identify both aboveground and belowground historic properties within the APE, evaluate the undertaking’s effects on these historic properties, and complete efforts to minimize or avoid adverse effects

    The City of Annapolis or its contractors will complete further site identification and evaluation efforts for the undertaking and archaeological monitoring

    The PA outlines consultation procedures for evaluating the NRHP eligibility of newly identified historic properties including archaeological sites, assessing the undertaking’s effects on all historic properties, and resolving adverse effects, if needed

    FEMA seeks to notify the public of this undertaking and involve potential consulting parties in the Section 106 process, including implementation of the PA

    According to 36 CFR § 800

    2, the following parties have consultative roles in the Section 106 process for undertakings not on tribal lands: the State Historic Preservation Officer (and the State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO)), Indian Tribes (Tribes) and Native Hawaiian organizations, representatives of local governments with jurisdiction over the area in which the effects of an undertaking may occur, applicants for federal assistance, and additional consulting parties (individuals and organizations with a demonstrated interest in the undertaking)

    Individuals or organizations with a demonstrated interest in this undertaking should contact FEMA using the instructions below

    The Draft PA is available for review and comment, and can be viewed on and/or downloaded here or from the City of Annapolis website

    The comment period on the Draft PA will conclude 30 days from today, June 27, 2025

    Written comments on the Draft PA, or Section 106 comments on potential effects to historic properties can be mailed or emailed to the contact listed below

    If no substantive comments are received, FEMA will seek to execute the Draft PA

     Contact Information:ATTENTION: Annapolis City Dock Section 106 CommentsFEMA Region 3 Environmental and Historic Preservation615 Chestnut Street, 6th FloorPhiladelphia, PA 19106Email: FEMA-R3-EHP-PublicComment@fema

    dhs

    govSelect documents are included in the Draft PA exhibits

    FEMA will provide additional documents upon request; please contact us by email at FEMA-R3-EHP-PublicComment@fema

    dhs

    gov

    ###FEMA’s mission is helping people before, during, and after disasters

     FEMA Region 3’s jurisdiction includes Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia

     Follow us on X at @femaregion3 and on LinkedIn at linkedin

    com/company/femaregion3
    erika

    osullivan
    Fri, 06/27/2025 – 16:12

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Crittenden, Garland, Mississippi Counties Eligible for FEMA Public Assistance

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency 2

    strong>LITTLE ROCK, Ark. – Crittenden, Garland and Mississippi counties have been added to the major presidential disaster declaration for the April 2-22 severe storms, tornadoes and flooding, meaning state and local governments and certain nonprofit organizations in those counties may seek funding under FEMA’s Public Assistance program. 
    The three counties are now authorized to recover eligible costs for emergency work including debris removal and emergency protective measures; and permanent work that includes projects to permanently restore community infrastructure affected by the storms.
    FEMA had previously designated Clark, Clay, Craighead, Cross, Dallas, Desha, Fulton, Greene, Hempstead, Hot Spring, Izard, Jackson, Lafayette, Lawrence, Lee, Little River, Lonoke, Marion, Monroe, Montgomery, Nevada, Newton, Pike, Poinsett, Prairie, Pulaski, Randolph, St. Francis, Saline, Scott, Searcy, Sevier, Sharp, Stone and Woodruff counties for Public Assistance funding for the April storms.
    The Public Assistance program is FEMA’s largest grant program, providing funding to help communities pay for emergency work to save lives and protect property, for debris removal, and for repairs to roads, bridges, water control facilities, public buildings, public utilities, parks and recreational facilities. The program reimburses eligible costs to local and state government agencies, and certain private nonprofits including houses of worship. 
    Federal funding is typically available on a cost-sharing basis, with FEMA reimbursing Arkansas applicants 75% of eligible costs and the applicant is responsible for the non-federal share, or up to 25%.
    Learn about Assistance for Governments and Private Non-Profits After a Disaster | FEMA.gov.
    For the latest information about Arkansas’ recovery, visit fema.gov/disaster/4873. Follow FEMA Region 6 on social media at x.com/FEMARegion6 and at facebook.com/FEMARegion6

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen Introduces Legislation to Boost Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Investments in Rural Communities

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) introduced the Energy Circuit Riders Act to help ensure communities in rural America can take advantage of cost savings from energy efficiency and clean energy projects. Shaheen’s bill would establish a new grant program within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Rural Development to help eligible entities hire local, on-the-ground experts that travel to rural communities and provide assistance on projects that can help save energy, cut costs and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

    “Granite State communities are facing sky-high electricity prices and investing in energy efficiency and clean energy is an important tool for bringing these costs down,” said Senator Shaheen. “Energy Circuit Riders will help small towns and rural communities make improvements to become more energy efficient, reduce emissions and lower their energy bills.”

    The Energy Circuit Riders Shaheen’s bill supports would work with local governments in rural areas to provide assistance, such as energy planning, energy audits, grant writing, identifying federal, state, local and utility-based energy incentives and more. The legislation is modeled after a successful Energy Circuit Rider program in New Hampshire run by Clean Energy NH, a nonprofit based in Concord, New Hampshire.

    “Rural communities often face the highest energy costs and the fewest resources to do something about it. The Energy Circuit Riders Act gives local governments access to practical, technology-neutral technical assistance—helping them cut energy waste, lower bills, and make smarter investments with taxpayer dollars. This is about common-sense support for towns that want to do more with less.” said Sam Evans Brown, Executive Director of Clean Energy New Hampshire.

    Shaheen’s legislation is co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Peter Welch (D-VT) and Ron Wyden (D-OR). The legislation is also endorsed by the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) and American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE).

    Shaheen leads legislative action in the U.S. Senate to support energy efficiency projects and initiatives. Last month, Shaheen pushed back on the Trump administration’s plans to scrap the Energy Star Program, which helps Americans save on energy costs.

    Shaheen was a lead negotiator of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which provided an approximately $6 billion investment in energy efficiency, including funding for residential, municipal, industrial and federal entities to implement efficiency upgrades based upon her longstanding bipartisan legislation with former U.S. Senator Rob Portman.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Outlines Harmful Judiciary Committee Provisions Included In Republicans’ Reconciliation Bill

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    June 27, 2025

    In speech on Senate floor, Durbin also spoke against Senator Cruz’s provision that would leave the U.S. AI industry an unregulated wild west

    WASHINGTON  In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, spoke about some of the harmful Judiciary provisions included in Republicans’ so-called One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which aims to slash Medicaid and Medicare coverage for hardworking Americans in order to pay for significant tax breaks forbillionaires. According to the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office, 16 million Americans will lose their health insurance under Republicans’ reconciliation bill.

    Durbin began by highlighting several harmful Judiciary provisions Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats have successfully challenged and removed from the Republicans’ legislation.

    “One example: the Republicans included a provision that would have limited the ability of individuals to challenge the Trump Administration’s executive actions by potentially putting them on the hook for millions of dollars when they try to defend their constitutional rights and go to court. Fortunately, the Senate Parliamentarian stuck this provision,” Durbin said. “Now I’m proud of what we accomplished in eliminating some harmful provisions, but there is a lot of problems with the ‘Big Beautiful Bill.’ The more we learn about this bill, the worse it looks. Perhaps that is why there is a hurry to get this done before the Fourth of July and people can take a close look at the details. And I cannot stand idly by as my Senate Republican colleagues try to steamroll this bill through Congress because the President wants to do something before the Fourth of July.”

    Durbin then outlined Republicans’ wish-list of policy changes included in the reconciliation package to help carry out mass deportations of immigrants who have lived in our country for years and pose no threat to our safety.

    “These policies of mass deportation of immigrants are cruel and mean. And they go beyond any question of public safety. This bill would impose exorbitant fees that would make it impossible forvulnerable immigrants to access humanitarian relief in the United States,” Durbin said. “This includes a $1,000 fee on asylum and a $5,000 bond for parents seeking to be reunited with their child. The fees also place barriers on due process—a $900 dollar fee for an appeal in immigration court. These fees are not just unconscionable—they are unfair.”

    Durbin then discussed how the Republican bill prohibits using grant funds for community violence intervention and prevention programs, which are proven, evidence-informed strategies to reduce violence.

    “We have a gun violence epidemic in America. Currently guns are the number one cause of death for American children and teens. Let me repeat that. In America, guns are the number one cause of death for American children and teens. Not auto accidents, not cancer. Guns. We need to support and strengthen community violence intervention and prevention programs. I’ve seen them. And I’ve seen them work in the City of Chicago and all around my state of Illinois to stop violent incidents before they happen. And we need to connect people with treatment and tools that decrease the risk of future violence,” Durbin said. “Instead of supporting valuable public safety measures, the Republicans’ ‘Big Beautiful Bill’ removes taxes and regulations on certain rifles, shotguns, and gun silencers. This is just what we need in America, isn’t it? Cheaper guns. Combatting this epidemic takes ingenuity and funding—not the reversal of lifesaving gun violence prevention policies. But Republicans’ reckless reconciliation bill will jeopardize the progress that’s been made in our communities.”

    Durbin then spoke against Senator Ted Cruz’s (R-TX) provision that would leave the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) industry an unregulated wild west. The provision would give states the choice between regulating AI or accepting federal funding under the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program. This means states would have to choose between freezing all regulations on AI for the next decade or giving up specific federal funding. In addition to preventing new state regulations, it would make many of the laws already passed by states unenforceable regarding issues such as political deepfakes, face recognition, and algorithmic discrimination.

    “We are currently living with the results of our failure to regulate Big Tech when it came to social media. Let’s not make the same mistake when it comes to AI,” said Durbin. “This provision by Senator Cruz will allow Big Tech and bad actors to prey on the lack of regulations in the AI space and develop deceptive, biased, and potentially dangerous tools that hurt ordinary Americans and diminish trust in technology… I promise to support any amendment that will remove the AI pause provision from this bill. And I hope my Republican colleagues will do the same.

    Durbin concluded, “So now is the real test for my Senate Republican colleagues. Will they stand with President Trump and provide tax breaks for millionaires and billionaires? Or will they stand with their hardworking constituents and reject this betrayal? What’s more important, a tax break for Elon Musk or the health insurance of 16 million in America? What’s more important, a tax break for the wealthiest people in America or your rural hospital? I think people know that when it comes to the quality of life, the hospital is more important and health insurance is critical. I hope for the sake of our country, four Republican Senators will have the courage to step up and choose their constituents over special interest groups.”

    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IAEA chief’s push to visit bombed Iranian nuclear sites ‘pointless’: Iranian FM

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 27 (Xinhua) — The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general’s insistence on visiting Iran’s bombed nuclear facilities is “meaningless,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday.

    The head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry made the corresponding statement in his post on the X social network, accusing IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of facilitating the adoption of an anti-Iranian resolution by the organization’s Board of Governors and the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel.

    “R. Grossi’s insistence on visiting the bombed Iranian nuclear facilities under the pretext of guarantees is senseless and perhaps even malicious. Iran reserves the right to take any steps to protect its interests, its people and sovereignty,” A. Araghchi said.

    The minister recalled a recent plan approved by the Iranian parliament and later endorsed by the Guardian Council of Iran, which called for an end to Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. “This is a direct result of the unfortunate role of R. Grossi, who obscured the fact that the agency had settled all issues with Iran ten years ago,” Araghchi added.

    The statement, published on the IAEA website, indicates that on Friday R. Grossi stressed the need to continue the agency’s inspections in Iran, “as provided for in the comprehensive safeguards agreement.” -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Meeting of States Parties to United Nations Convention on Law of Sea Held at Headquarters, 23-26 June

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    NEW YORK, 27 June (Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea) — The thirty-fifth Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was held at Headquarters from 23 to 26 June.  The background press release can be found at:  https://press.un.org/en/2025/sea2232.doc.htm and https://press.un.org/en/2024/sea2195.doc.htm.

    The Meeting elected Nguyen Minh Vu (Viet Nam) as President, by acclamation.  Milan Jaya Nyamrajsingh Meetarbhan (Mauritius), David Antonio Giret Soto (Paraguay), Laura McIlhenny (Australia) and Mykola Prytula (Ukraine) were elected as Vice-Presidents, also by acclamation.

    The Meeting took note of the annual report of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2024, as well as the information reported by the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority and the Chairperson of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, on the activities of these bodies since the thirty-fourth Meeting of States Parties held in 2024.

    In his capacity as Co-Coordinator of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Conditions of Service of Members of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, John Pangipita (United Republic of Tanzania) delivered a report on its work since the thirty-fourth Meeting.  Following the resignation of Sidney Kemble (Netherlands), the Meeting decided to defer the consideration of the appointment of a Co-Coordinator of the Open-Ended Working Group from developed States until the thirty-sixth Meeting of States Parties and that the Working Group would continue to function for the time being under the coordination of Mr. Pangipita.

    The Meeting conducted a by-election for vacancies in the Commission allocated to members of the Commission from the Group of Eastern European States and the Group of Western European and Other States, electing Stig-Morten Knutsen (Norway) for a term of office commencing on the date of the election and ending on 15 June 2028.

    In the absence of other nominations, the Meeting decided in respect of the vacant seat allocated to members of the Commission from the Group of Eastern European States, which had remained unfilled since 2015, that the Secretary-General would circulate a call for nominations with a view to conducting elections at the thirty-sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2026, if the President received information about potential candidates no later than 1 March 2026.  If a candidate had not been identified by that date, the Group should transmit, by the same date, a proposal on how to address the ongoing vacancy.

    In its consideration of administrative and budgetary matters of the Tribunal, the Meeting took note of the report on budgetary matters for the financial periods 2023 and 2024 and the report of the external auditor for the financial period 2024.  The Meeting also decided to extend Indonesia and Canada as member and alternate member, respectively, of the staff pension committee of the Tribunal for a three-year term of office starting on 1 January 2026.

    Under article 319 of the Convention, the Meeting considered the reports of the Secretary-General for the information of States Parties on issues of a general nature, relevant to States Parties, which had arisen with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see A/79/340 and A/80/70).  In their interventions, delegations addressed a wide range of matters of relevance to oceans and the law of the sea.

    A more detailed account of the proceedings of the thirty-fifth Meeting of States Parties will be included in the report of the Meeting, to be issued in due course as document SPLOS/35/11.

    The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was adopted on 10 December 1982, entered into force on 16 November 1994.  It sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out and is of strategic importance as the basis for national, regional and global action and cooperation in the marine sector.

    For further information on the Meeting, including its documents, please see the website of the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/meeting_states_parties.htm.

    MIL OSI United Nations News