Category: Russia

Source: IMF – News in Russian

May 20, 2025

An IMF team, led by Mr. Fabian Bornhorst, visited the Netherlands during May 7–20 to conduct the 2025 Article IV consultation. The following statement was issued at the end of the visit:

The Dutch economy is among the most developed countries globally and has drawn strength from integration in global value chains. In recent years, it has weathered shocks well, yet its resilience is being tested, again—this time by trade tensions and geoeconomic fragmentation. Fiscal buffers are ample, and the financial system is well-positioned to absorb shocks. At the same time, the economy is operating at capacity and inflation is elevated. And increasingly binding constraints—in the labor market, housing, emissions space, and the electricity grid—are limiting the ability to grow and adapt. Futureproofing the economy will therefore require policies that both tackle bottlenecks and expand supply capacity, and align with a long-term vision for sustainable growth. Reforms, complementary to EU initiatives, should aim to increase labor input and firm productivity, expand the availability of SME financing, and effectively manage the green and demographic transitions.

Outlook

1. After a weak start, domestic demand is projected to drive growth in 2025 even as trade tensions affect momentum. Real GDP growth is projected to reach 1.1 percent this year. Fundamentals remain strong: unemployment is low, wage growth is robust, and real household purchasing power is solid—supporting private consumption. However, tariffs, trade tensions, and lower trading partner growth are expected to dampen external demand. Combined with uncertainty over future trade policies and less favorable financial conditions, these factors hold back investment and weaken consumer confidence. With a cooling economy, the small positive output gap is expected to close next year; medium-term growth will converge to its estimated potential of 1.2 percent.
2. Elevated inflation is projected to decline gradually and reach the 2 percent target in late 2026. Inflation is projected at 3 percent in 2025. Wage growth has been robust, although real wages have not reached pre-pandemic levels. Going forward, wage growth is projected to moderate as indicated by recent collective wage agreements and early signs of easing labor market tightness. Fiscal measures, on net, will contribute positively to inflation in 2025 and 2026, as the roll-back of some reduced VAT rates and the increase in excise rates are partly offset by energy subsidies and the freeze on social housing rents. As the trade shock reverberates through the global economy, deflationary forces are expected to arise from lower global growth and energy prices, and appreciation of the euro.

Risks

3. Downside risks to growth dominate and arise mainly from trade tensions. Possible direct effects from new/higher U.S. tariffs on currently exempt items (e.g., pharmaceuticals) would lower exports. More generally, rising geoeconomic fragmentation and stronger-than-expected indirect effects from global trade disruptions pose downside risks to growth. The disruption to supply chains could be more severe than expected, leading to upward price pressures even in the context of subdued growth. Policy makers should stay vigilant and nimble. Barring more extreme scenarios, automatic stabilizers in the fiscal framework are sufficient to weather shocks. Domestically, uncertainties in economic policy and the extent to which growth bottlenecks are binding represent risks to the outlook. These can be addressed by implementing consistent, forward-looking, and confidence-building measures.

Fiscal Policy

4. Fiscal policy is geared to supporting households in the near term, while aiming to keep the deficit below 3 percent of GDP by 2030. In view of many, and competing, demands, it is welcome that revised plans in the Spring Memorandum adhere to the trend-based fiscal policy (the Dutch Medium-Term Fiscal Framework) and are in line with national fiscal rules. Key measures in 2025 to support household purchasing power include income tax relief, extending reduced fuel excise duties, energy subsidies, and rent support. To meet the deficit target by 2030, spending cuts in public administration, international cooperation, education, and asylum are proposed. The plans, however, are more backloaded than before, and, in many cases, specific measures have yet to be formulated.
5. Pivoting fiscal policy from stimulating demand to expanding supply would help the economy grow and adapt. Fiscal policy is set to provide an impulse of around 1 percent of GDP in 2025-26. As household real incomes now exceed pre-pandemic levels and the economy is operating at capacity with elevated inflation, broad fiscal support is no longer needed. Scaling back demand support is timely and advisable. While underspending and revenue overperformance could deliver a neutral fiscal stance—as in 2024—proactively identifying and implementing measures would allow for steering the adjustment. To boost the supply capacity of the economy, the government should invest in infrastructure, education, and R&D, foster investment to increase the housing supply and productivity, implement growth-enhancing tax reforms, and tackle bottlenecks from nitrogen and electricity grid congestion. Fostering private and increasing public investment will also contribute to reducing the high external current account surplus.
6. Better aligning policies with long-term goals would improve the effectiveness of fiscal policy. For example, while freezing social rents provides immediate support to some households, it weakens the financial health of housing associations and limits investment to expand and upgrade the housing stock—key to addressing shortages. Extending the reduction of fuel excises disincentivizes the clean energy transition, countering efforts to reduce implicit fuel subsidies and foster EV adoption through subsidies. Limited inflation adjustment of income tax brackets—including to finance reduced VAT rates—offsets previous income tax relief, disproportionately affects poorer households, and disincentivizes labor supply. Education and R&D spending cuts are at odds with fostering high levels of human capital and innovation. In this context, the announced tax and benefits system reform is welcome, offering an opportunity to simplify and align policies.
7. Tackling medium-term spending pressures through structural fiscal reforms will increase fiscal room to maneuver. With a low debt-to-GDP ratio of 43.4 percent, the fiscal position is strong. Moreover, deficits and debt are projected to remain structurally below 3 and 60 percent of GDP through 2030. However, projections also indicate that, by 2050, spending on health, ageing, and climate change will increase by about 4 percent of GDP. Ambitions to scale up defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP adds to these pressures. Addressing cost drivers early would free fiscal room to maneuver, including: (i) reversing the reduction of health deductibles, increasing health care co-payments, and adjusting the basic policy package while supporting solidarity; (ii) linking the retirement age one-to-one to greater life expectancy for tax-funded old-age pensions; and (iii) moving away from fuel subsidies to revenue-generating carbon pricing and taxation.
8. Implementing the planned tax reforms would support growth. The Building Blocks Tax report rightly recommends streamlining inefficient and ineffective tax expenditures, including abolishing reduced VAT rates. This would lower compliance costs, broaden the tax base, and may open the door to a lower tax rate. Speedy implementation of the proposed capital income taxation reform (‘Box 3’) would align investment incentives by taxing capital income more consistently. and encouraging better resource allocation. Together, the reforms will foster higher investment, productivity, and growth.

Financial Sector Policies

9. Risks to financial stability are elevated and have risen, warranting continued close monitoring. Trade policy tensions and uncertainty have increased financial market volatility and weighed on investor confidence in recent months. More volatility in asset prices could trigger periodic margin calls, particularly on pension funds’ derivatives. Elevated inflation still poses non-negligible risks for insurers. While household and corporate indebtedness is declining, it remains well above the euro area average. In real estate, developments in the commercial sector signal reduced risks. However, the residential market shows renewed signs of overheating. Nominal and real house prices, as well as sales, have picked up again, and housing valuations remain among the highest in Europe.
10. Even so, the financial sector remains resilient to shocks as buffers are ample and commensurate to risks, and the macroprudential policy stance is broadly appropriate. Banking, insurance, and pension fund (PF) fundamentals remain sound. Banks are well capitalized and liquid. Bank profits remain robust and loan delinquencies low, despite a pick-up in corporate bankruptcies, which reflects normalization following phasing out of pandemic support. The countercyclical capital buffer has been maintained at the 2 percent positive neutral rate since May 2024. Other buffers for the largest banks remain in a 0.25‑2 percent CET1-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio range. The insurance sector is profitable and solvent. Funding ratios of occupational PFs have declined as interest rates fell but are rebounding ahead of the system’s transition to defined-contribution schemes and stood comfortably at 120 percent, on average, at end-2025Q1. PFs are resilient to liquidity risks in adverse stress scenarios and can raise cash at short notice if needed from repo or other money markets to meet margin calls on interest derivatives.
11. Addressing access to homeownership through policies that increase housing supply would allow recalibrating borrower-based macroprudential measures towards minimizing financial risks. Housing market risks continue to be mitigated by structural factors including rising real disposable incomes, the large share of fixed-rate mortgages, and full legal recourse in case of default. The maximum LTV limit was lowered to 100 percent in 2018. Eligibility for, and duration of the mortgage interest deductibility were tightened, and the maximum rate reduced. Mortgage risks are further mitigated by the recent extension of risk-weight floors until November 2026. Efforts to ensure a clear legal basis for supervisory authorities’ regular access to granular transaction and loan-level data for risk monitoring and analysis—to identify pockets of vulnerability as they emerge—should continue. Still, as recommended in the 2024 IMF Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) report, to cool the housing market, maximum LTV limits should be progressively lowered even more, to 90 percent, mortgage interest deductibility gradually removed, and borrowers further incentivized to lower exposures to interest-only mortgages. A significant increase in housing supply is needed to boost housing affordability, facilitate broad access to the property ladder, and to reduce banking and insurance risks from residential mortgage exposures. This will require reconsideration of the roles of housing associations and private investors, revisiting rent controls, revising land-use policies and streamlining building regulations.
12. The pension reform will strengthen PFs financial sustainability, and offers an opportunity to improve intergenerational fairness, and rebalance portfolios. Most defined-benefit schemes (DBs) have faced financial pressure since 2008. Many have struggled to index benefits in the low-interest-rate environment, and some were forced to cut benefits. Also, DBs asset allocations do not reflect age-related risk preferences. This has raised concerns about intergenerational fairness. Together, these factors weakened confidence in the system. The transition to defined-contribution schemes will alleviate pressures from ageing on PFs sustainability. It will also allow for portfolio allocations that better align with risk preferences of age cohorts, including more investments in equity, while maintaining a high degree of solidarity and collective risk-sharing. Notably, about 80 percent of plans are expected to combine individual investment accounts with collective investments that bundle assets and distribute returns across individual accounts.

Addressing Growth Bottlenecks

13. A legally-robust and future-oriented nitrogen strategy is urgently needed. Developers now face permit uncertainty, investors lack confidence, and farmers remain in limbo, as environmental targets slip further out of reach. Recognizing the urgency, the government is developing a strategy that includes shifting from deposition to direct emission measurement and extending the timeline to halve emissions by 5 years. More details on possible measures are paramount. Economic considerations suggest that fees on emitters are the most cost-effective and efficient way to reduce emissions. To avoid tax increases for the average farmer, a system of feebates—where emissions-intensive farming pays fees that fund rebates for lower emission practices—offers a balanced approach. Socially-acceptable solutions and emission reductions have been achieved through a combination of taxation, regulation, subsidies, and science-based guidance.
14. Plans to relieve electricity grid bottlenecks and ready the grid for the green transition should be accelerated and paired with dynamic pricing. The government’s strategy focuses on expediting high-voltage grid extensions and streamlining permitting. There are plans to guarantee debt issuance by the grid operator of about 4.4 percent of GDP to facilitate grid expansion. However, in the meantime, connection wait-times remain too long. Efforts to manage grid pressures should also include increasing storage capacity and incentivizing energy efficiency of households and industry, while helping the energy-poor adapt. To better manage demand, energy savings could be further incentivized by promoting greater use of dynamic metering and pricing. These are effective in shifting consumption to off-peak periods, help consumers save money, and reduce the need for extra capacity to meet peak demand.

Strengthening Labor and Firm Productivity

15. Labor market reforms should continue to focus on enhancing human capital. Given the aging population and labor shortages, it is critical to fully utilize the potential of workers across all generations and smaller firms. Reforms should improve educational outcomes and vocational training to address skill shortages and enhance lifelong learning. Recent progress to address labor market duality, such as reducing false self-employment, are welcome. Introducing mandatory disability insurance and strengthening pension arrangements for the self-employed are important measures to be implemented.. Additionally, better integration of workers with a migratory background would be facilitated by stepped-up language training, job search support, and recognition of qualifications acquired abroad.
16. Policies to support firm productivity should address several key areas. First, business dynamism should be promoted by reducing entry/exit barriers to enhance firm-level allocative efficiency. Second, productivity-enhancing investment should be increased by improving the investment climate and addressing growth bottlenecks, advancing digitalization, and encouraging R&D. Third, productivity spillovers should be fostered by investments with large spillover effects (e.g., research parks and networks) to build connections among firms, research institutions, and regions. Fourth, efforts are needed to support firms to grow from start-ups to scale-ups and beyond. Plans to equalize tax treatment of stock options for small firms are welcome and should be expanded to include eliminating the reduced profit tax rate for SMEs as well as providing a menu of financing options along a firm’s development stages.  

Domestic Capital Market Reforms

17. Capital market reforms would help expand SME financing by improving valuations, stimulating investor demand for both equity and debt instruments, and simplifying debt issuances.  

• Improving valuations—thereby increasing the amount of capital firms can raise when they issue stocks or bonds—will require increasing the size and liquidity of secondary markets. This should be combined with measures to narrow information gaps, such as easing investor benchmarking, to help reduce investor risk, and with reforming the Bankruptcy Act and securities laws to help investors shorten the settlement cycle for transferable securities and reallocate capital from failed startups more quickly. The authorities should also continue to push forward EU-level reforms, as integration into a larger, EU-wide capital market would also improve liquidity, and hence valuations.
• Increasing PFs’ and insurers’ investments in domestic venture capital and other equity funds would also increase equity market size and raise valuations. The pension reform offers such an opportunity. Higher pension investment, including from abroad, in domestic equity may also be supported at the EU level by revised legal and supervisory requirements for pan-European private pension products that allow for more venture capital investment.
• Standardizing and simplifying procedures for smaller-denomination corporate debt securities issuance, lowering the minimum denomination, making pricing more transparent, and leveraging online platforms and other dealer markets would help increase retail investor participation and make more debt capital available to firms.

Managing the Green Transition

18. To meet national and European climate goals, stronger policies will be needed, including to reduce uncertainty and build public support.  The current policy settings are projected to fall short of the 2030 goals. Clear and consistent policies are required to provide investment certainty for the private sector. The EU climate agenda—including introduction of CBAM and phasing out of free ETS allowances and expansion of ETS coverage—will facilitate progress. These measures may impact purchasing power. Lower-income households may struggle to adapt even though the burdens of ETS reforms across different income groups are estimated to be uniform relative to consumption. To manage these challenges, implementing compensatory funds and other targeted fiscal tools can help balance policy trade-offs and enhance public support.
19. Recalibrating transport policies can prevent a decline in fiscal revenues and address congestion, while meeting climate targets and managing electricity demand. By 2035, revenue from transport is projected to decline by 0.5 percent of GDP, while electricity demand could rise by 20 percent with electrification of the vehicle fleet. These challenges would be best addressed with congestion pricing in urban areas and distance-based charges.

Supporting EU Reforms

20. The authorities should continue to push for rapid implementation of EU-wide reforms, including as the Netherlands stands to gain from these initiatives. With its mature markets, enhancing EU-wide competition by cutting intra-EU trade barriers would complement national efforts to boost business dynamism and productivity. EU-level actions to foster intra-EU labor mobility—recognition of professional qualifications, pension portability—are complementary to addressing labor and skill shortages at home. A European Savings and Investment Union (SIU) would broaden investment opportunities for Dutch savers and allow Dutch firms to more easily tap a wider pool of European savings. Finally, completing the EU energy market would ensure better connectivity and energy security, lower prices, and also lower investment needs to match increasing demand.

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The IMF team thanks the authorities and other counterparts for the constructive policy dialogue and productive collaboration.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/19/mcs-05192025-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-staff-concluding-statement-of-2025-art-iv-mission

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