Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Duisburg, Germany, June 22 (Xinhua) — The ASEAN Express freight train departed from Duisburg, Germany, on Saturday.
The train, loaded with maternity and childcare products, cosmetics and medical supplies, is expected to arrive in ASEAN countries in 19 days, passing through the southwest Chinese city of Chongqing.
“ASEAN Express” has provided a “seamless connection” between two major international trade routes – the new international land-sea trade corridor and the China-Europe freight rail route. It has also significantly improved transportation efficiency compared with traditional sea routes.
Li Yan, deputy director of Chongqing Port and Logistics Bureau, said that the ASEAN Express, an extension of the China-Europe freight rail service, has the potential to become an efficient, green and stable economic and trade corridor connecting the two continents.
Following the departure ceremony of the ASEAN Express train, a promotional event was held, during which representatives of Chinese and German enterprises exchanged views on corridor cooperation and supporting services. Several cooperation agreements were signed. –0–
Sterile insect method – is an approach that uses ionizing radiation to sterilize large numbers of laboratory-reared insects, which are then released into pest-infested areas to mate with wild populations of the same species. Since these sterilized insects are unable to produce offspring, the pest population eventually declines.
When using MSN for many insect species, breeding of both sterile males and females is allowed. However, in most cases, breeding of males is more effective, including economically. There are several main reasons for this.
First, sterile males are much more effective at preventing reproduction in wild insects, as they actively seek out wild females for mating and can mate with multiple females. Therefore, breeding and releasing only males into the wild speeds up the process of introducing sterility – sterile males mate only with wild females, without being distracted by sterile females. Moreover, in the unlikely event of a failure in the sterilization process, using only males eliminates the risk of fertile females being released into the environment.
Secondly, when breeding only male insects, the costs of transporting and releasing sterile individuals are reduced by half compared to breeding both males and females.
Thirdly, it is much safer, since in some cases releasing female insects can have negative consequences and be more dangerous. For example, only females mosquitoes They bite people in search of blood as a source of protein and can spread deadly diseases.
MSN is one of the safest and most environmentally friendly methods of insect birth control, which protects the environment by reducing the use of insecticidesIn addition, since sterile insects cannot reproduce on their own, problems caused by insect pests are solved in the long term without the risk of introducing new species into the ecosystem.
Since the 1950s, SIT has been used successfully to control certain insect species that affect human and livestock health, such as the tsetse fly and disease-carrying mosquitoes, and to control insect pests that destroy crops and affect trade, such as fruit flies and butterflies.
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The Council was presented with the IAEA Annual Report and Technical Cooperation Report for 2024, which reflect the Agency’s work in the fields of science, international cooperation and innovation.
The 2025 Spotlight Forum will be held in Ethiopia in late June, providing an opportunity to take stock of the work done over the past three years, strengthen collaboration mechanisms, and continue to mobilize resources. Spotlight aims to increase access to affordable cancer care where it is needed most, supporting countries to deliver life-saving radiotherapy and build the capacity of radiation medicine professionals. More than 90 countries have applied for support from the initiative.
The IAEA will also continue to work with partners through Atoms4Food, its joint initiative with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to fight hunger worldwide, Mr Grossi said. Joint FAO/IAEA Centre for Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture, which is one element of this initiative, promotes the use of nuclear technologies to strengthen global food security and sustainable agricultural development.
Speaking about NUTEC Plastics, the IAEA initiative to combat plastic pollution, Mr Grossi said: “At the UN Ocean Conference this week, we are demonstrating what we are doing concretely to combat plastic pollution using new technologies.”
IAEA uses opportunities nuclear technologies, which involve using radiation to improve waste recycling methods and create bioplastics, which are a sustainable alternative to conventional oil-based plastics.
With support from the NUTEC Plastics Initiative, 104 Member States are now using nuclear technology to monitor microplastics and 52 are collaborating with the IAEA on their recycling.
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Following Friday’s attacks on nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military conflict continues. As I reported to the IAEA Board of Governors and then to the UN Security Council last Friday, the IAEA is monitoring the situation very closely. Since the beginning of the events, our Incident and Emergency Centre has been working 24/7 to update the status of Iranian nuclear facilities and radiation levels at the sites in an ongoing exchange of information with the Iranian authorities.
The IAEA is ready to respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency within an hour.
Based on the information available to the IAEA, the following situation currently exists at Iranian nuclear facilities.
Following the strike on the Natanz fuel enrichment plant site, which destroyed the above-ground portion of the experimental fuel enrichment facility, one of the facilities used by Iran to produce uranium enriched to 60% U-235, no further damage was reported at the site.
The facility’s electrical infrastructure, including an electrical substation, the main electrical systems building, and emergency and backup generators, was also destroyed.
There are no signs of physical impact on the underground centrifuge cascade shop, which contains part of the experimental fuel enrichment facility and the main fuel enrichment facility. At the same time, the power outage in the centrifuge cascade shop could have damaged the centrifuges located there.
Radiation levels outside the Natanz site remain unchanged and within normal limits, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment as a result of this event.
The Natanz facility site contains both radiological and chemical contamination. Given the type of nuclear material present at the facility, it is possible that uranium isotopes contained in uranium hexafluoride, uranyl fluoride and hydrogen fluoride are dispersed throughout the facility. The radiation, consisting predominantly of alpha particles, poses a serious hazard if uranium is inhaled or ingested. However, this risk can be effectively mitigated by appropriate protective measures, such as the use of respiratory protection while inside the affected facilities. Of greatest concern to the facility itself is the chemical toxicity of uranium hexafluoride and the fluorides formed upon contact with water.
No damage was reported at the Fordow enrichment plant site or the heavy water reactor under construction at Khondab. The Bushehr nuclear power plant and the Tehran research reactor were not targets of the recent strikes and were not damaged in this regard.
Four buildings at the Isfahan nuclear facility were damaged in Friday’s strikes: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, a fuel fabrication plant for the Tehran reactor, and a plant under construction to convert uranium hexafluoride into uranium dioxide powder.
As at Natanz, radiation levels outside the facility remain unchanged.
I confirm the cooperation and exchange of information between the Iranian authorities and the IAEA. In these tense and challenging circumstances, it is essential for the IAEA to receive timely and regular technical information about the facilities and their associated sites. This information is essential to promptly inform the international community and to ensure an effective response and assistance in the event of any emergency in Iran. Without information, we cannot accurately assess the radiological conditions and potential impacts on the population and the environment, and we cannot provide the necessary assistance.
The Agency is and will continue to be present in Iran. Safeguards inspections will continue in Iran as soon as it is safe to do so, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under the NPT.
I remain in touch with the inspectors in Iran; their safety is our top priority and all necessary measures are being taken to ensure that they are not harmed.
I stand ready to travel immediately and work with all relevant parties to ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency’s mandate, including by deploying, where necessary, Agency nuclear security and safety experts to complement our safeguards inspectors in Iran.
Madam Chairperson,
Military escalation threatens human lives, increases the likelihood of a radiological release with serious consequences for the population and the environment, and delays the critical task of a diplomatic settlement to provide long-term assurance that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons.
In accordance with the objectives of the IAEA and its Statute, I call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation.
Last week, the Council made an important decision resolution on Iran’s safeguards obligations. The resolution contains important provisions on proliferation and underlines support for a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. IAEA Member States can play a vital and active role in promoting an urgent shift away from military escalation and towards diplomacy. I urge you to use all available diplomatic means and assure you of my continued readiness to contribute, including through an early visit to Iran to assess the situation and ensure nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation in that country.
There is probably no goal more important or more widely supported than that of ensuring that humanity uses the enormous energy of the atom for good, not destruction. For over 60 years, the IAEA has played a central role in helping its Member States translate this desire into real progress.
Given the IAEA’s clear mandate and unique resources, I reaffirm the Agency’s readiness to facilitate technical discussions and support efforts to ensure transparency, nuclear safety and security, and achieve a peaceful resolution of issues related to nuclear activities in Iran.
Dear colleagues,
For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two IAEA Member States, in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being threatened.
As in the case of a military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the IAEA will not stand aside.
We can and will act within our statutory mandate to help prevent a nuclear accident that could lead to unpredictable radiological consequences. For the IAEA to act, constructive and professional dialogue must begin, and this must happen as soon as possible.
As insurmountable as this task may seem in the context of an ongoing military conflict, we have already demonstrated that even in such circumstances, technical assistance, provided in a spirit of respect and impartiality, can benefit everyone without exception.
I intend to continue my ongoing engagement with the conflicting parties to find the most appropriate way to achieve this goal, and I ask Member States to support me in this effort. I count on the Council, and especially the Member States that are best placed to do so, to respond to this call to assist the IAEA in helping those who are trading blows today to prevent the worst from happening. There is always a time and a place for diplomacy.
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Early this morning, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed of a military operation launched by Israel that includes strikes on nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
We are currently in contact with Iranian nuclear safety authorities to determine the status of the relevant nuclear facilities and to assess any broader nuclear safety and security implications. Iranian authorities have now confirmed that the Natanz uranium enrichment facility was hit and that no elevated radiation levels were detected there. They have also reported that the Isfahan and Fordow facilities have not been hit to date.
This development is deeply concerning. I have repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities should never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as this could cause harm to both the population and the environment. Such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as for regional and international peace and security.
In this regard, the IAEA refers to numerous General Conference resolutions on the issue of military attacks on nuclear facilities, including GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which, inter alia, state that “any armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the Statute of the Agency.”
Moreover, the IAEA has consistently emphasized that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities may result in radioactive releases with serious consequences both within and beyond the State attacked”, as noted in resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/533.
As Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in line with the purposes of the IAEA as set out in its Statute, I call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation. I reiterate that any military action that jeopardizes the nuclear safety and security of nuclear facilities would have grave consequences for the people of Iran, the region, and beyond.
Yesterday the Board of Governors made an important decisionresolutionon Iran’s safeguards obligations. In addition, the Council’s resolution emphasizes its support for a diplomatic solution to the problems caused by the Iranian nuclear program.
The IAEA continues to monitor the situation closely, stands ready to provide technical assistance, and remains committed to its nuclear safety, security and safeguards mandate in all circumstances. It stands ready to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency’s mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts (in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran) where needed to ensure that nuclear facilities are fully protected and remain used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
I wish to inform the Council that I have informed the relevant authorities of my readiness to travel at the earliest opportunity to assess the situation and ensure nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation in Iran.
I am also in contact with our inspectors in Iran and Israel. The safety of our employees is of utmost importance. All necessary measures are taken to ensure that they are not harmed.
Despite the current military actions and heightened tensions, it is clear that the only sustainable path forward – for Iran, Israel, the entire region and the international community – is one based on dialogue and diplomacy to ensure peace, stability and cooperation.
As the international technical institution charged with overseeing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency remains a unique and vital forum for dialogue, especially now.
In accordance with its Statute and long-standing mandate, the IAEA provides a framework and a natural forum where facts prevail over rhetoric and where engagement can replace escalation.
I reaffirm the Agency’s readiness to facilitate technical discussions and support efforts to promote transparency, safety, security and a peaceful resolution of nuclear-related issues in Iran.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to closely monitor and assess the situation in relation to the Israeli attacks on nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, issuing frequent public updates on developments and their possible impact on the population and the environment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.
Since the outbreak of hostilities nearly a week ago, the IAEA has reported damage at some of these facilities, including nuclear sites located in Arak, Isfahan, Natanz and Tehran, and their potential radiological consequences.
In his statementAt the meeting of the Board of Governors on 13 June, the morning of the day that Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted, the Director General recalled numerous General Conference resolutions on the issue of military attacks on nuclear facilities, including GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which, inter alia, state that “any armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.
He also mentioned that, moreover, the IAEA has consistently emphasized that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities may result in radioactive releases with serious consequences both within and beyond the State that is attacked”, as noted in resolution GC(XXXIV)/RES/533.
Later, at a special session of the Governing Council on 16 June 2025, in itsstatement The Director General stressed that “for the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two IAEA Member States, in which nuclear installations are being targeted and nuclear safety is being threatened. As in the case of the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the IAEA will not stand aside.”
“The IAEA is monitoring the situation very closely,” he added. “The IAEA is ready to respond within an hour to any nuclear or radiological emergency.”
It was the third summary statement by the Director-General on the situation in Iran in four days after he spokeat the meeting of the Board of Governors on June 13 andagain— at the United Nations Security Council later that day. The agency also regularly posts updates on its official X account.
Director General Grossi said IAEA inspectors remain present in Iran and are ready to visit nuclear sites when possible, even though the Agency’s staff numbers have been partially reduced given the security situation.
He also added: “The Agency is and will continue to be present in Iran. As soon as it is safe to do so, safeguards inspections will continue in Iran, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement.”
Calling on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation, Director General Grossi stressed that he “stands ready to travel immediately and engage with all relevant parties to ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency’s mandate, including by deploying, where necessary, Agency nuclear security and safety experts to complement our safeguards inspectors in Iran.”
“Military escalation threatens human lives, increases the likelihood of a radiological release with serious consequences for the population and the environment, and delays the critical task of a diplomatic solution to provide long-term assurance that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons,” he said.
The IAEA stands ready to act within its statutory mandate to help prevent a nuclear accident that could lead to serious radiological consequences, he said, adding: “For the IAEA to act, constructive and professional dialogue must begin, and this must happen as soon as possible.”
Based on the information available, the IAEA has reported on the situation at nuclear facilities and sites in Iran, including the following developments.
One of the targets of the June 13 strikes was the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, which destroyed the above-ground portion of the experimental fuel enrichment facility, one of the facilities Iran used to produce uranium enriched to 60% U-235.
The facility’s electrical infrastructure, including the electrical substation, the main power supply building, and emergency and backup generators, was also destroyed. A power outage to the underground centrifuge cascade hall could have damaged the centrifuges there, CEO Grossi told the Council in a speech on June 16.
Later this week, the IAEA issued an update, reporting that, following its ongoing analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery obtained after the strikes on the Natanz site, the Agency had identified additional indicators that point to direct impacts on the underground enrichment facilities at Natanz as well.
According to Director General Grossi, there are no radiological consequences outside the Natanz site, but there is limited radiological and chemical contamination in the enrichment plant premises.
“The contamination is limited to the perimeter of this facility. There was no radiological impact on the external environment,” he said.
He explained that given the type of nuclear material present at the Natanz facility, it is possible that uranium isotopes contained in uranium hexafluoride, uranyl fluoride and hydrogen fluoride are dispersed throughout the facility. The radiation, which consists predominantly of alpha particles, poses a serious hazard if uranium is inhaled or ingested. However, this risk can be effectively mitigated by appropriate protective measures, such as the use of respiratory protection when inside the affected facilities. The greatest concern for the facility itself is the chemical toxicity of uranium hexafluoride and the fluorides formed when in contact with water.
At the Isfahan nuclear facility, Friday’s strikes damaged four buildings: the central chemical laboratory, the uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor fuel fabrication plant, and the facility under construction to convert uranium hexafluoride into enriched uranium metal. As in Natanz, radiation levels outside the Isfahan facility remain unchanged.
On June 18, the IAEA said in an update that it had information that two Iranian centrifuge-related facilities were targeted by the attacks: the TESA facility in Karaj and the Tehran Research Center. Both locations were previously subject to IAEA monitoring and verification measures under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
One building was damaged at the Tehran Research Center, where rotors for advanced centrifuges were manufactured and tested. In Karaj, two buildings were destroyed, which housed workshops for manufacturing various centrifuge components.
On 19 June, the heavy water research reactor under construction at Hondaba was hit. Since the reactor was not operational and did not contain nuclear material, Director General Grossi reported that there were no radiological consequences. Although damage to the nearby heavy water plant was initially not visible, the Agency now assesses that major structures, including the distillation plant, were damaged.
To date, no damage has been reported at other Iranian nuclear facilities.
Although no major radiological incidents have occurred as a result of these attacks so far, Director General Grossi emphasized the possible risks from a nuclear safety perspective.
“There are significant quantities of nuclear material in Iran in different places, which means that the possibility of a radiological accident with the dispersion of radioactive substances and particles in the atmosphere really does exist,” he said.
Director General Grossi also stressed the importance of cooperation and information exchange with Iranian authorities.
“In this tense and challenging environment, it is of utmost importance for the IAEA to receive timely and regular technical information on nuclear facilities and their respective sites. This information is necessary to promptly inform the international community and ensure an effective response and assistance in the event of any emergency in Iran,” he explained, adding that he is in constant contact with other countries in the region.
This update was first published on IAEA.org in English on June 19.
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Many of the advantages of SMRs are related to their design: they are small and modular. Given their small footprint, SMRs can be placed in locations that are not suitable for larger nuclear power plants. Prefabricated SMR units can be manufactured in advance and then shipped and installed on site, making them more affordable to build than large reactors, which are often designed specifically for a specific site, sometimes leading to construction delays. SMRs can save on construction costs and time, and they can be deployed gradually to meet growing energy demand.
One of the barriers to expanding energy access is infrastructure – limited grid coverage in rural areas – and the cost of connecting to the grid to electrify these areas. No single power plant should account for more than 10% of the total installed capacity of the grid. In areas where there is insufficient transmission and grid capacity, SMRs can be connected to the existing grid or operate off-grid due to their smaller capacity, generating low-carbon power for industry and households. This is especially true for microreactors, a type of SMR designed to generate electricity, typically up to 10 MW(e). Microreactors have a smaller footprint than other SMRs and are better suited for areas where clean, reliable, and affordable energy is not available. Microreactors can also serve as a backup power source in emergency situations or be used to replace diesel-powered power generators, such as in rural areas or remote industries.
Compared to existing reactors, proposed SMR designs are generally simpler, and the safety concept for SMRs often relies more heavily on passive systems and the inherent safety characteristics of these reactors, such as low power and low operating pressure. This means that no human intervention or external energy or force is required to shut down the systems, as passive systems rely on physical phenomena such as natural circulation, convection, gravity, and pressurization. This in some cases eliminates or significantly reduces the likelihood of hazardous radioactive releases to the environment and public exposure to them in the event of an accident.
SMRs have reduced fuel requirements. SMR-based power plants can be refuelled less frequently: every 3-7 years, while traditional plants require it every 1-2 years. Some SMRs are designed in such a way that they can operate without refuelling for up to 30 years.
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Nuclear Security Detection and Monitoring Equipment Laboratories
Laboratory of Nuclear Security Detection and Monitoring Equipment at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna helps countries more effectively identify and respond to nuclear security threats. From testing and maintenance to training and procurement, the Laboratory plays a key role in ensuring that radiation detection equipment is functional, reliable and ready for use.
The laboratory provides countries with advanced radiation detection equipment that can be used as part of nuclear security measures at major public events such as international conferences and sporting tournaments. It enables security personnel to detect and respond to potential nuclear security threats.
“The tour is an immersive experience, offering an inside look at the laboratory and the different types of radiation detection instruments available at the Laboratory,” says Itimad Sufi, head of the Nuclear Security for Materials Out of Regulatory Control Section. She adds that “through this virtual walk-through, users can see the detection technologies and learn how the equipment is maintained and tested.”
The tour provides an insight into the laboratory’s facilities and how its work is organised, as well as the opportunity to observe equipment in operation – a useful source of knowledge for those responsible for radiation safety and nuclear security planning and response, as well as an interactive experience for policy makers, industry professionals and the general public.
Information on excursions on nuclear and physical security topics can be found here Here.
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A course of radiation therapy consists of several sessions, during which the patient’s body must be kept in the same position.
For most types of radiation therapy to the brain, head, or neck, patients wear a special thermoplastic mask that holds their head in place to maintain a certain body position during the procedure. This allows the radiation to be directed precisely to the tumor while minimizing the impact on healthy tissue.
Some hospitals paint masks for children in bright colors or style them like favorite characters. Pretending to be superheroes helps children feel more confident during the procedure and tolerate the treatment better.
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Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi Was in Ukraine as Part of the Ongoing Effforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) To Help Prevent aCcident During the Military Conflict, with The Wail of Air Raid Sirens ForCing His Meetings to Be Held in An Underground Shelter.
One of the main priorities of the one-day visit to Kyiv – including a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – was to discuss how the IAEA could assist in rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged and degraded nuclear energy infrastructure.
But the current risks to nuclear safety and security remained a prominent topic, both in the day’s high-level meetings in the capital and in reports from some of the IAEA teams deployed elsewhere in the country.
IAEA expert teams based at two of Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy and Rivne – were also told to seek shelter during a day of unusually frequent air raid alerts. The team at the Rivne NPP, in western Ukraine, went to the shelter three times, two of which were reportedly due to cruise missile alerts and the other due to a ballistic missile alert.
While the Were No Reports of Attacks Affecting the Operation of the Npps, The Sound of Air Raid Sirens Blaring in Kyiv and Elsewhere Highlighted the Continbed Dangerous Situation, Including for Nuclear Safety.
In HIS FIRST MEITING AFTER Arriving to the Capital for HIS 12TH VISIT To UKRANE SINCE February 2022, Director General General General Met with Energy Galushchenko and Oteer Senior Officials in the Basement of the Energy Ministry in Downtown Kyiv Because of the Air Raid Alarm.
Later in the day, he met with President Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, with whom he also discussed the IAEA’s plans to support the country in restoring and expanding its infrastructure related to nuclear power, which is of paramount importance for Ukraine’s electricity generation.
“It is clear that the dangers to nuclear safety continue to be very real and ever-present. My teams report that this was the most intense day of air raid alarms they had experienced since late last year. More than three years after this horrific war began, the IAEA’s on the ground presence remains essential to help avoid the threat of a severe nuclear accident,” Director General Grossi said.
“But at the same time, we must start looking to the future. While the IAEA remains committed to doing everything we can to help keep Ukraine’s nuclear facilities safe and secure until this devastating war ends, it is also crucial to prepare for the reconstruction phase, where the IAEA can also play an important role,” he said. “In today’s meetings, President Zelensky and his ministers voiced strong support and appreciation for the IAEA’s continued presence at Ukraine’s nuclear sites and our essential role in helping to strengthen its energy infrastructure.”
Specifically, the Director General spoke to his hosts about the IAEA conducting a thorough safety assessment of the damaged New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl site, as well as the Agency’s safety assistance related to a government plan to build two new reactor units at the Khmelnytskyy site and its technical work to help keep the national grid stable, which is of critical importance for the safe operation of NPPs.
At Ukraine’s largest NPP, Zaporizhzhya, the IAEA team was informed that the nearby city of Enerhodar – where most plant staff live – had experienced several power outages since midnight, with intermittent tap water supplies also affecting the plant itself. The IAEA team was also informed that the city and its water pump station have relied on mobile diesel generators for power. The Zaporizhzhya NPP remained connected to off-site power at all times.
Later this Week, Director General General Grossi Will Also BE Visiting The Russian Federal High-Level Talks on Nuclear Safety and Security.
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How could nuclear technology revolutionise plastic recycling?
Today, plastic is used to make everything from water bottles and medical devices to building materials and clothing. The material is an integral part of our daily lives. However, only about 9 percent plastic, and 91 percent ends up in landfills and pollutes the seas, oceans, soil and even the air we breathe.
Last year alone, the world was formed 400 million tons plastic waste. Many plastic items are not designed to be reused or recycled, and some can only be recycled once or twice. In addition, plastic does not decompose naturally. Instead, discarded plastic breaks down into tiny fragments called microplastics, which can be toxic to humans and the environment.
One innovative solution to this problem is based on advances in nuclear science. The IAEA is using nuclear technology to understand and address plastic pollution and the crisis it is causing. Through the initiative “NUTEK plastics”, which was launched in 2021, the Agency helps countries study microplastics already in the marine environment and use nuclear techniques to improve recycling technologies, ultimately reducing the amount of plastic waste ending up in the ocean.
In honor of World Environment Day, we interviewed Selina Horak, an IAEA expert on the use of radiation to recycle plastic.
How can we use nuclear science to prevent the negative impacts of plastic waste on our oceans and our lives?
Nuclear science offers the opportunity to find innovative solutions to the problem of plastic pollution throughout its entire life cycle. To tackle this problem, we need to understand its root causes. According to research, about 80 percent of plastic in the sea comes from land (the remaining 20 percent comes from ocean sources such as fishing nets, etc.), so measures taken on land are especially important.
The IAEA applies cutting-edge technology in two ways: first, we use radiation to create bioplastics, a sustainable alternative to conventional oil-based plastics. In simple terms, we are working to develop new materials that are both biodegradable and easily recyclable. This approach can not only reduce dependence on fossil fuels, but also support a circular economy by turning organic waste into a valuable resource.
Second, we use radiation technologies to create more durable, strong, and valuable products from plastic waste. For example, radiation technologies can improve the properties of concrete by partially replacing cement with recycled plastic. Nuclear methods can more effectively sort and separate polymers in mixed plastic waste streams. In addition, we are exploring the use of pyrolysis to transform plastics under the influence of radiation into different types of plastic material, fuels, and other valuable chemical additives.
Will new products made from irradiated plastic be dangerous?
Not at all — quite the opposite. Radiation is considered a form of “green chemistry” because it does not require toxic chemicals or extreme conditions like heat or pressure. When we use radiation to create new types of biopolymer-based plastics or recycle plastic waste, it is a safe, efficient, and environmentally friendly process.
The radiation itself does not make the material radioactive. As with dental X-rays, the radiation passes through tissues but does not remain in the body. The same principle applies here: after processing, the materials do not become radioactive and are absolutely safe to use.
You mentioned using nuclear technology to improve plastic recycling methods. Is this work already underway?
Of the 52 countries collaborating with the IAEA on the NUTEC Plastics initiative to recycle plastics, nine have already opened their first plants – and are turning promising ideas into reality. These countries are rapidly advancing through the Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) – an internationally recognised nine-step system that tracks the maturity of technologies from conceptual design to commercial deployment.
We are already getting impressive, tangible results.
Indonesia and the Philippines are developing wood-plastic composites for sustainable construction. In Malaysia, plastic waste is being turned into fuel. In Argentina, durable railroad ties made from recycled plastic are showing promise in early testing.
These pilot projects are not just experiments, but proof of progress. We expect that some of these technologies will reach the final level of technological readiness and we will begin preparing for their full-scale implementation as early as next year.
Why did you, as a scientist, decide to study this particular issue?
I have always believed that science should be a catalyst for meaningful and lasting change. This belief has led me to focus on plastic recycling and finding alternatives to petroleum-based materials – areas where the environmental challenges we face today can be directly addressed through innovation.
With over 30 years of experience working in the field of ionizing radiation, I have seen first-hand the untapped potential of ionizing radiation to transform waste into valuable resources. This work is more than just research: it is an effort to create a circular economy that will preserve ecosystems, reduce humanity’s carbon footprint, protect nature, and improve the sustainability of our planet – for future generations.
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Until 2050 and beyond, uranium reserves will be sufficient for both the continued use of nuclear energy and for significant growth. However, to ensure that uranium is available on the market when needed, timely investment in new exploration, mining, and processing technologies will be needed.
These are some of the main findings of the latest publication of 2024. “Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand”, commonly known as the Red Book, is a major global reference publication prepared every two years jointly by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The Red Book 2024 provides the latest comprehensive overview of the main characteristics of the uranium market based on official national data, as well as detailed statistics on the global uranium industry. The publication covers the calendar years 2021 and 2022 and contains data on uranium exploration, reserves and production. In addition, the report includes 62 country profiles that provide detailed information on mine development plans, environmental and social aspects of uranium mining, as well as national regulations and policies.
According to the Red Book, as of 1 January 2023, the world’s indicated recoverable uranium resources were 7,934,500 tonnes. This includes all reasonably proven and inferred uranium resources that could be extracted at market prices between US$40 and US$260 per kilogram of uranium (equivalent to US$15–100 per pound of U3O8). Compared with the 2022 edition, this represents an increase of less than 0.5%. However, the uranium resource base could be replenished from undiscovered or unconventional sources, driven by the sharp rise in uranium spot prices since mid-2021 and the commitment to triple nuclear power generation capacity by 2050, first announced at COP28 and now signed by 31 countries.
After a period of decline caused by unfavourable market conditions and the COVID-19 pandemic, global exploration and development spending has increased sharply. In 2022, annual spending reached US$800 million, and preliminary data for 2023 allow us to forecast a further increase to US$840 million.
The Red Book also provides projections of installed nuclear capacity and uranium demand to 2050, describing low-growth and high-growth scenarios and assessing the adequacy of uranium supply and demand under each scenario. According to these projections, the uranium resource base is sufficient to meet rapidly growing nuclear energy needs to 2050 and beyond. However, significant investment in new exploration, improved processing technologies, and new mining centers will be needed to replenish reserves.
Production increased by 4% between 2020 and 2022, and the report says this growth is likely to continue in the coming years. The establishment of new mining centres is expected to take a significant amount of time due to the current risk-averse investment climate and complex and lengthy regulatory processes in many uranium mining jurisdictions. Geopolitical concerns and the technical challenges associated with establishing new uranium mining and processing facilities could further complicate the situation. Therefore, action is needed now to ensure adequate uranium supply in the medium term.
Help for editors
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an intergovernmental agency within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It promotes cooperation among countries with advanced nuclear technology infrastructure to achieve advances in nuclear safety, technology, science, related environmental and economic issues, and law.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the world’s leading intergovernmental forum for nuclear scientific and technical cooperation. It promotes the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.
The Joint NEA/IAEA Uranium Group contributes to each edition of Uranium: Resources, Production and Demand. The Group also coordinates the preparation of periodic assessments of world natural uranium supply, examines the relationship of supply to projected demand, and recommends actions that can be taken to ensure adequate long-term supplies of uranium for the development of nuclear energy.
Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Nuclear safety remains precarious at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and its six reactors cannot be restarted as long as the military conflict continues to jeopardize the situation at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told IAEA Member States this week.
Addressing the regular June meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General briefed them about his 12th mission to Ukraine during the current conflict, which took place in early June, followed by a visit to Russia, which also focused on nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP.
Addressing the Board meeting, he highlighted “the extremely vulnerable” status of the off-site power supply at the site, which for more than a month now has relied on one single power line for the electricity it needs to cool its reactors and spent fuel. Before the conflict, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) had access to ten power lines.
In addition, Director General Grossi noted that the ZNPP reactors’ “reliance on groundwater for cooling remains an interim solution, whilst in their cold shutdown state”. The plant has depended on 11 groundwater wells since the downstream Kakhovka dam was destroyed two years ago.
In their meeting in Kyiv on 3 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “made a point to recognize the importance of the IAEA’s permanent presence” at the ZNPP, the Director General told the Board, adding he had assured President Zelenskyy of the IAEA’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s nuclear safety and to helping it rebuild its energy infrastructure.
The Director General added: “As the military conflict moves further into its fourth year, Ukraine needs support, and the IAEA is providing it … it is also crucial to prepare for the reconstruction phase.”
At the ZNPP, the IAEA team based there has held several meetings with the ZNPP to discuss the site’s electrical system and also visited its 750 kilovolt (kV) switchyard.
Apart from the sole remaining 330 kV back-up line that was disconnected due to military activities on 7 May, the site does not know the current condition of its five other 330 kV lines, which remain unavailable after they were damaged outside of the ZNPP area early in the conflict.
The ZNPP said maintenance work was conducted at one of the four 750 kV power lines that was originally connected to the ZNPP before being damaged in 2022. Since the conflict, the ZNPP had lost access to three of its 750 kV lines.
In addition, the ZNPP informed the IAEA about a planned project to pump water into the cooling pond from the Dnipro River in order to maintain a water level that is sufficient to cool one operating reactor initially, followed by a second unit, until the pond reaches its full capacity. According to the site, a pumping station will be constructed to supply water directly to the cooling pond until the plant can rebuild the Kakhovka dam.
The exact location of the pumping station cannot yet be determined, as it depends on the security conditions, the ZNPP said, adding the project would only start once military activities cease.
Separately this week, the IAEA team was informed that that the Russian regulator, Rostekhnadzor, over the next two weeks will perform pre-licensing inspection activities at ZNPP reactor units 1 and 2, whose current operational licences issued by Ukraine are due to expire in December this year and in February 2026, respectively. The IAEA team has requested to observe these activities and will seek additional information regarding items such as the scope of these undertakings and any criteria for assessing nuclear safety.
Over the past several weeks, the IAEA team has also been monitoring a leak in one reactor unit’s essential service water system which delivers cooling water to the safety systems. The leak – which can occur in NPPs without any significant safety consequences – was discovered during maintenance and the team was informed that it was caused by corrosion. It has since been repaired.
The IAEA team reported hearing military activities on most days over the past weeks, at varying distances away from the ZNPP including last week’s purported drone attack on the site’s training centre.
The Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and the South Ukraine NPPs are continuing to operate amid the problems caused by the conflict. Three of their nine operating reactor units are still undergoing planned outages for refuelling and maintenance. The IAEA teams at these plants and the Chornobyl sites have continued to report on – and be informed about – nearby military activities, including drones observed flying nearby. Last Monday, the IAEA teams at Khmelnytskyy and Rivne were required to shelter.
Over the past two weeks, the IAEA teams based at these four sites have all rotated.
As part of the IAEA’s assistance programme to support nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, the Chornobyl site received essential items to improve staff living conditions and the National Scientific Centre Institute of Metrology received personal radiation detectors.
These deliveries were funded by Austria, Belgium, France and Norway and brought the total number of IAEA-coordinated deliveries since the start of the armed conflict to 140.
The 68th Annual Regular Session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, #IAEAGC, will convene from 16 to 20 September at the Vienna International Centre (VIC) in Vienna, Austria. The opening session takes place on Monday, 16 September, at 10:00 CEST.
High-ranking officials and representatives from IAEA Member States will consider and make decisions on a range of issues pertaining to the work and the budget of the Agency.
The main conference events will take place in the M-Building of the VIC.
All plenary sessions of the General Conference will be livestreamed on the IAEA website (no login required) in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
The opening session of the GC will also be streamed live on the lAEA YouTube channel in high definition, and a download link will be made available afterwards.
The IAEA will host a briefing for media on the new projections. IAEA experts, including Henri Paillere, Head of Planning and Economic Studies at the IAEA, will provide the briefing on Monday, 16 September at 09:30 CEST in the Press Room.
Please note: All information presented during the briefing are under embargo until after the Director General’s opening statement on Monday, 16 September.
Please inform the IAEA Press Office if you plan to attend the briefing.
Scientific Forum
This year’s Scientific Forum, organized on the sidelines of the General Conference on 17 and 18 September, is entitled Atoms4Food – Better Agriculture for Better Life. It will focus on how nuclear science, technology and innovation can enhance sustainable agrifood systems, improve food security and address climate change.
The Scientific Forum will cover crop improvement, animal genetics and reproduction, crop and animal disease and pest management, food safety and nutrition, and sustainable management of natural resources, including soil and water. The two-day event will facilitate best practice exchanges, discuss sustainable adoption and scaling up of R&D results, and explore innovative financing and partnerships.
IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will open the Scientific Forum with high-level speakers on Tuesday, 17 September, at 09:30 CEST.
The Forum will take place in Boardroom D of the C-Building. All sessions will be livestreamed.
Accreditation
All journalists – including those with permanent accreditation – are requested to inform the IAEA Press Office of their plans to attend the General Conference. Journalists without permanent accreditation must send copies of their passport and press ID to the IAEA Press Office by 14:00 CEST on Friday, 13 September.
We encourage those journalists who do not yet have permanent accreditation to request it at UNIS Vienna.
Access to the plenary sessions of the General Conference and the Scientific Forum for photographers and video camera operators must be requested in advance.
I thank the President of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to update you on the IAEA’s activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support of the IAEA’s efforts.
It has been more than two years since the war began, the first ever to be fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.
The IAEA has been monitoring the situation closely and assisting Ukraine every day since the start of the war. IAEA staff are continuously present, monitoring the situation at all five of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which remains under Russian operational control.
Today my statement will focus on the recent grave violations of the five concrete principles that I first established in this very chamber on 30 May. These five concrete principles are there to prevent a nuclear accident and to maintain the integrity of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Let me remind them what they are:
There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
No action should be taken that undermines these principles.
On 30 May last year I said here that observing these principles was essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and that I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to commit to them.
At our meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.
Nevertheless, Madame President, over the past ten days, the first of these principles has been violated repeatedly in what marks a step-change increase in risk to nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.
On Sunday, 7 April, the International Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ) confirmed the first attacks since November 2022 to directly target ZNPP.
The ISAMZ team was able to inspect the location of one direct strike at the apex of the containment dome of the Unit 6 reactor building. Whilst the damage to the structure is superficial, the attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment.
The other two attacks were in close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty.
Agency experts at the site have been informed by ZNPP of a drone strike against the site’s oxygen and nitrogen production facility; two attacks on the training centre located just outside the site perimeter and reports of a drone shot down above the turbine hall of Unit 6.
These reckless attacks must cease immediately. Though, fortunately, they have not led to a radiological incident this time, they significantly increase the risk at Zaporizhzhya NPP, where nuclear safety is already compromised.
I am not only concerned about the attacks themselves, but also the context in which they have occurred. For several months before these direct attacks there had already been an increase in isolated drone incursions in the vicinity of the facility and in the nearby town of Energodar.
In other areas of nuclear safety degradation, the plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power. There have been at least four occasions in the past year when the plant has had only one line of external power supply, with the precarity lasting for periods of up to four months.
Let me put it plainly. Two years of war are weighing heavily on nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Every one of the IAEA’s 7 pillars of nuclear safety and security have been compromised. We cannot sit by and watch as the final weight tips the finely balanced scale.
Even though the plant’s six reactors are now in cold shutdown, with the final unit shifting into that status two days ago following the IAEA’s recommendation, the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.
The Agency will continue closely to follow the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and provide technically viable alternatives in a context of rapid changes and challenges.
Our work at this facility remains essential. This has been recognized by all, irrespective of their side in this conflict. But to be effective, the IAEA teams need timely access to assess the condition of the plant and evaluate the cumulative impact that more than 26 months in a war zone have had on nuclear safety.
Madame President,
We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident. We must not allow complacency to let a roll of the dice decide what happens tomorrow. We must do everything in our power today to minimize the risk of an accident.
The five principles established in this very chamber one year ago must be adhered to. They are there to prevent a major nuclear accident with potentially significant radiological consequences.
The latest attacks represent a flagrant violation of these crucial principles and must stop.
I am asking this Council for its steadfast support for the five principles and the IAEA’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which they help to underpin. And I am asking for your continued support of the IAEA’s role monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.
Despite huge challenges, the IAEA has kept open the indispensable lines of communication and will continue doing so. The support of your nations and of the Council as a whole is a necessity.
I thank the Council for inviting me today, thereby demonstrating your continuing commitment to this critical issue.
The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) led a team of international experts to collect samples today of ALPS treated water stored at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) prior to the water’s dilution with seawater and its discharge to the sea.
The sampling mission is the fourth under the additional measures, which focus on expanding international participation and transparency. These measures permit third parties to independently verify that water discharge which Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) – operator of the FDNPS – began in August 2023 continues to be consistent with international safety standards.
International experts from Belgium, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Switzerland, along with IAEA staff, conducted hands-on sampling of the water stored in tanks designated for the 14th batch of ALPS-treated water to be discharged.
The IAEA initiated the first practical steps of the additional measures in October last year. This fourth mission follows the mission in April which sampled diluted water just prior to its discharge into the sea, and a mission in February when IAEA Director General Grossi presided over the additional measures to collect seawater samples in the vicinity of FDNPS.
The samples collected in today’s mission will be analysed by the participating laboratories – the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, the China Institute of Atomic Energy, the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety, the Institute for Problems of Environmental Monitoring of the Research and Production Association “Typhoon” in Russia and the Spiez Laboratory in Switzerland – as well as by the IAEA’s laboratory and TEPCO in Japan. All laboratories are members of the IAEA’s Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental Radioactivity (ALMERA) network, which are selected for their high level of expertise and analytical proficiency.
The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been informed that challenges related to the availability of cooling water and off-site power will need to be fully resolved before any of its reactors can be restarted, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.
Those pre-conditions for any future decision to take the ZNPP’s six reactors from their current cold shutdown status were communicated to the IAEA team during discussions with the plant and Rostekhnadzor, the Russian regulator which is this week conducting pre-licensing inspection activities at reactor units 1 and 2. The current operating licenses – issued by the Ukrainian State regulator, SNRIU, – are due to expire in December this year and in February 2026, respectively.
Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) has not been generating electricity for almost three years now, and its location on the frontline of the conflict continues to put nuclear safety in constant jeopardy.
Its off-site power situation also remains extremely fragile, with only one power line currently functioning compared with ten before the conflict. In addition, the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in mid-2023 means the ZNPP does not have sufficient water to cool six operating reactors.
“Based on the discussions at the site this week, it is clear that there is a general consensus among all parties that the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant cannot start operating again as long as this large-scale war continues to endanger nuclear safety at the site, which is what the IAEA has also been stating very clearly,” Director General Grossi said.
During this week’s meeting, the Rostekhnadzor representative said a team of its inspectors are currently conducting a two-week pre-licensing inspection scheduled to end on Friday. The results of the inspection – together with documentation submitted by the ZNPP – will subsequently be evaluated by Rostekhnadzor.
Also this week, the IAEA team has been observing various maintenance activities at the site, including on parts of the safety system of reactor unit 5 and on the unit 4 main transformer – which commenced its planned maintenance period this week.
The team was informed that a pump in one of the site’s 11 groundwater wells built after the destruction of the Kakhovka dam is currently not working and will be replaced. The ten remaining wells continue to supply the sufficient flow of water needed for the shutdown reactors.
The IAEA team reported hearing explosions at various distances from the site on most days over the past week.
At Ukraine’s other nuclear sites, the IAEA teams at the three operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and the South Ukraine – and the Chornobyl site all reported hearing air raid alarms over the past week, with the IAEA team at the Khmelnytskyy NPP sheltering at the site yesterday.
The IAEA team based at the Khmelnytskyy NPP observed a two-day emergency exercise to test the response to a site blackout.
Over the past week, one of the three reactor units at the South Ukraine NPP completed its planned refuelling and maintenance outage and returned to full power generation, after which another unit was shut down for maintenance. The refuelling and maintenance outage of the third unit is still ongoing, as is the planned such outage of one Rivne NPP’s four reactors.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is continuing to closely monitor and assess the situation regarding the Israeli attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing frequent public updates about developments and their possible consequences for human health and the environment, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.
Since the military attacks began almost a week ago, the IAEA has been reporting on damage at several of these facilities, including at nuclear-related sites located in Arak, Esfahan, Natanz and Tehran, and their potential radiological impact.
In his statement to the Board of Governors on 13 June, the morning of the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Director General recalled the numerous General Conference resolutions on the topic of military attacks against nuclear facilities, in particular, GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provide, inter alia, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.
He also stated that, furthermore, the IAEA has consistently underlined that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked”, as was stated in GC(XXXIV)/RES/533.
Later at the special session of the Board of Governors on 16 June 2025, in his statement, the Director General emphasized that, “For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idly by during this conflict.”
“The IAEA is monitoring the situation very carefully,” he said. “The IAEA is ready to respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.”
It was the Director General’s third comprehensive statement in four days about the situation in Iran, following the statement to the Board on 13 June and one to the United Nations Security Council later the same day. In addition, the Agency has provided regular updates on its official X account.
IAEA inspectors remain present in Iran, ready to be deployed at nuclear sites when possible, even though the number of Agency staff has been reduced somewhat in light of the security situation, Director General Grossi said.
He added: “The Agency is and will remain present in Iran. Safeguards inspections in Iran will continue as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.”
Calling for maximum restraint to avoid further escalation, Director General Grossi stressed that he was ready “to travel immediately and engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.”
“Military escalation threatens lives, increases the chance of a radiological release with serious consequences for people and the environment and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon,” he said.
The IAEA stands ready to act within its statutory mandate to assist in preventing a nuclear accident that could result in grave radiological consequences, he said, adding: “For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue will have to ensue, and this must happen sooner rather than later.”
Based on information available to it, the IAEA has been reporting on the situation at the nuclear facilities and sites in Iran, including:
The Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant site was targeted in attacks on 13 June that destroyed the above-ground part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, one of the facilities at which Iran was producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235.
Electricity infrastructure at the plant – including an electrical sub-station, a main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators – was also destroyed. The loss of power to the underground cascades may have damaged the centrifuges there, Director General Grossi told the Board on 16 June.
Later this week, the IAEA issued an update, saying that based on continued analysis of high- resolution satellite imagery collected after the attacks on the nuclear site at Natanz, the Agency has identified additional elements that indicate direct impacts also on the underground enrichment halls at Natanz.
There has been no radiological impact outside the Natanz site, but circumscribed radiological and chemical contamination inside the enrichment facility, Director General Grossi reported.
“It was limited to this facility. There was no radiological impact externally,” he said.
Considering the type of nuclear material at the Natanz facility, it is possible that uranium isotopes contained in uranium hexafluoride, uranyl fluoride and hydrogen fluoride are dispersed inside the facility, he said. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if uranium is inhaled or ingested. However, this risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory protection devices while inside the affected facilities. The main concern inside the facility is the chemical toxicity of the uranium hexafluoride and the fluoride compounds generated in contact with water.
At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction. As in Natanz, off-site radiation levels remain unchanged at the Esfahan nuclear site.
On 18 June, the IAEA said in an update that it had information that two centrifuge production facilities in Iran – the TESA Karaj workshop and the Tehran Research Center – were hit. Both locations were previously under IAEA monitoring and verification under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
At the Tehran Research Center, one building was hit where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings were destroyed where different centrifuge components were manufactured.
The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor, under construction, was hit on 19 June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, Director General Grossi said no radiological consequence was expected. While damage to the nearby Heavy Water Production Plant was initially not visible, it is now assessed that key buildings at the facility were damaged, including the distillation unit.
At present, no damage has been observed at Iran’s other nuclear sites.
While there so far has been no major radiological incident as a result of the attacks, Director General Grossi stressed the possible nuclear safety and security risks.
“There is a lot of nuclear material in Iran in different places, which means that the potential for a radiological accident with the dispersion in the atmosphere of radioactive materials and particles does exist,” he said.
Director General Grossi also emphasized the importance of cooperating and exchanging information with the Iranian authorities.
“Amid theses challenging and complex circumstances, it is crucial that the IAEA receives timely and regular technical information about the nuclear facilities and their respective sites. This information is needed to promptly inform the international community and ensure an effective response and assistance to any emergency situation in Iran,” he said, adding that he was also in constant contact with other countries in the region.
The IAEA has been monitoring the situation on the reported military activities taking place in the vicinity of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).
This NPP has six units of two different reactor types: RBMK-1000 and VVER-510. Two of the RBMK-1000 are in shutdown and two are fully operational. The two VVER-510 units are under construction.
In view of the reportedly significant military activity, I wish to remind all parties of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. Additionally, I emphasize the five concrete principles to help to ensure nuclear safety and security which have been established for the Zaporizhzhya NPP in the context of the current conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and which are equally applicable in this situation. These include, among others, the imperative to ensure the physical integrity of a nuclear power plant. This is valid irrespective of where an NPP is situated.
At this juncture, I would like to appeal to all sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident with the potential for serious radiological consequences. I am personally in contact with the relevant authorities of both countries and will continue to be seized of the matter. I will continue to update the international community as appropriate.
Nobel’s spotlight on our perilous path and how we change course
I want to start by congratulating Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha for their Nobel Peace Prize.
As a young diplomat almost 40 years ago, I was fortunate to be part of a UN disarmament fellowship programme and to visit Hiroshima. There, fellows had an opportunity to meet the hibakusha and I had a conversation with an ailing victim. I have carried to every meeting, to every negotiation, and to every posting, the memory this woman’s silent testimony. When I asked her about that morning in 1945, she struggled to express the horror in words. She tried to articulate some words but stayed silent. Looking at me, right into my eyes. The look in her eyes has stayed with me ever since, like a powerful reminder, a secret mandate, to work so that her suffering is never repeated.
For decades after the Second World War, the international community has been dealing with this unique dilemma: we built robust norms and passed nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Instead of dozens of countries armed with nuclear weapons, as was the concern in the 1960s, there are less than ten. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons have shrunk from tens of thousands to thousands.
But on its journey through the perils of the atomic age, the world has come to a crucial crossroads. Our deep psychological connection caused by collectively seeing the horror of the consequences of nuclear war seems to be evaporating, taking with it our joint resolve to do everything possible to prevent a repetition.
Like a giant spotlight, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has lit up our path ahead. It has done it, by reminding us of the past, and of the consequences of ignoring the perils of nuclear weapons use.
Context of conflicts
To understand the important challenges we face, we must look at the global context, at what is happening around the world.
War has returned to Europe, and it directly involves a nuclear weapon state. The conflict in Ukraine is also an indirect confrontation between the world’s biggest nuclear weapon states, the first since the end of the Cold War. But nuclear exercises and open references to the use of nuclear weapons in the theatre of this war are increasing the risks and can not be ignored.
In the Middle East, the conflict of the past year has ignited smoldering tensions between Israel and Iran and led to the unprecedented step of direct exchanges and attacks between the two. Here there is also a nuclear weapons dimension. On one side, the assumed presence of nuclear weapons looms in the background. On the other, the very real potential of nuclear proliferation is raising the stakes.
We find ourselves in a harmful loop: the erosion of the restraints around nuclear weapons is making these conflicts more dangerous. Meanwhile, these conflicts are contributing to the erosion of the restraints. The vicious circle dynamic is in motion.
An unfortunate change of direction
Doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons are being revised or reinterpreted. The quantity and quality of nuclear weapon stockpiles are being increased.
And in some non-nuclear weapon states – states that are important in their region – leaders are asking “why not us?”. And they are asking this openly!
At the start of the nuclear arms race, J Robert Oppenheimer described the USSR and the US as “two scorpions in a bottle” each capable of killing the other, but only by risking their own life.
Oppenheimer’s blunt statement would later be developed and elaborated under the roof of deterrence and the more sophisticated concept of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD.
Today, independent of the vantage point of the observer, there is widespread concern that the risk of mutual destruction through nuclear war is higher than it has been for more than a generation.
Lessons from history
But it does not have to be this way. We can do better. History has shown that effective dialogue among superpowers has, more often than not, led to confidence and, as a result, also to arms limitation and even disarmament. At certain moments in history, world leaders took the right decisions, to tone down, or, to use today’s parlance, to de-escalate. Let’s see:
The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis happened thanks to the direct engagement of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and US President John F Kennedy. Decades later, at the Geneva Summit of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan agreed a crucial axiom: “Nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” They met again the next year in Reykjavik and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals followed. Nuclear weapon reductions and the elimination of a whole category of weapon, through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty, were agreed. These steps towards rapprochement took leadership and courage. They often happened despite skepticism and voices against them.
Diplomacy and dialogue (and the duty of nuclear weapon states)
A return to diplomacy and dialogue is urgently needed, and this, not only in things nuclear. Shutting the other side out has never solved a problem and almost certainly aggravates it. Top leadership involvement is simply indispensable when nuclear weapons are involved. President Trump took the initiative and talked to Kim Jong Un. More of this is needed. Some have said these talks were ill prepared. I say, this is important. Nuclear weapon policy and limitations does not work bottom up. It is of course the other way around.
We must be proactive in building the trust and protections that lower the risk of close calls and of brinkmanship, especially during today’s tensions. Not taking active steps means we rely on luck – or the assumption that the other side will show restraint – to save us from nuclear war. The longer you rely on luck, the more likely it is to run out.
Conflict and tensions compel nations to arm themselves. Diplomacy and compromise create conditions in which they can disarm.
The road to a nuclear weapon-free world is long and winding. The disarmament landscape is complex, and it’s worth acknowledging that. This does not diminish the responsibility nuclear weapons states have to make progress. After all, they committed themselves to this goal back in 1968, through the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Steps can be taken to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons, both in their production and the scenarios for their use.
Nuclear weapon states, through their actions at home and on the world stage, have a responsibility to avoid a scenario in which more countries seek nuclear weapons. Pushing ahead with increases in arsenals leads to despair, cynicism, and a growing skepticism about the value of past commitments. Disengagement and unilateralism fuel sentiments of vulnerability in other countries, and with that, the notion nuclear weapons could be the ultimate protection against outside threats.
Engagement among the five permanent members of the Security Council is indispensable. Such engagement can take many different shapes, starting with direct contact among themselves, bilaterally or as a group. This dialogue, which still exists, has been reduced to a very low level, virtually without real impact. Perhaps its revival could be assisted by an international organization, or facilitated with the support of a respected, impartial leader. Therefore, it’s essential that the United Nations, other international organizations, and their leaders work effectively to ensure their continued relevance amid the changing needs of their stakeholders.
Do not make things worse (by falling for the siren call of proliferation)
The IAEA has played its indispensable technical role during past attempts of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Middle East. As the difficult experiences in Iraq, Libya and Syria remind us, the draw of nuclear weapons is real and so is the geopolitical and military response.
Today’s tensions are prompting even leaders of important counties that, so far, are in good standing with the NPT to ask: “Why shouldn’t we have a nuclear weapon too?”
To this, I would say, “Do not make things worse.” Acquiring a nuclear weapon will not increase national security, it will do the opposite. Other countries will follow. And this will contribute to the unravelling of a nonproliferation regime that has had its ups and downs – and it still has its limitations – but none-the-less it has served humanity extraordinarily well. The problem and challenge to the NPT regime may come from those nuclear armed but also those who, while not having nuclear weapons, may feel the NPT has failed as a catalyst to disarmament.
Weakening the non-proliferation treaty under the argument that progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow and more drastic approaches are required, would be totally misguided and may make us throw away existing international measures committing nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in this field.
I come from a non-nuclear weapon state. I understand the frustration that some people feel about the “haves” and “have-nots” of nuclear weapons. But I have also seen the legacy of peace and prosperity left by leaders who resisted that siren call. In the 1980s, vision, resolve and dialogue meant Brazil and Argentina changed course and did not go down the path to nuclear arms. Today, Latin America is a nuclear weapon free zone.
Multilateral leaders: step up by stepping in
Many wonder whether there’s still a role for multilateralism in guiding us through this maze of conflicting interests. Yes, there is. During difficult times in the past, international organizations have had a big impact on peace and security. But it only happens when leaders of these organizations get off the side lines and use their mandate and their own good offices effectively.
We prove our relevance in extraordinary times.
Each organization has different tools, a different mandate, a different membership, and each of their leaders will determine how to act. I can speak for the IAEA. We have nuclear science at our core, and we are the world’s nuclear weapons watchdog. Let me give you an example:
For almost three years, Ukraine, the world and the IAEA have been confronted with a completely unprecedented situation – never before has a military conflict involved the seizure of a nuclear power plant and been fought among the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.
At the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s biggest nuclear power plant – the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, with nearly 6 gigawatts of installed capacity – was taken by Russia. This established a hotspot in the middle of a combat zone. The chance of an incident – or accident – causing terrible radiological consequences became real.
Observing this from the outside was never, in my mind, an option. Staying on the sidelines and later reflecting on “lessons learned” may have been the more traditional – or expected – path for an international organization. But to me this would have been a dereliction of duty. So, we leaned into our core mission, crossed the front lines of war, and established a permanent presence of IAEA experts at all Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. That makes us the only international organization operating independently in occupied territory. We are informing the world of what’s going on and reducing the chance that a radiological incident enflames the conflict and causes even more devastation.
We did the same by going to Kursk when a Russian nuclear reactor was at risk of coming into the line of fire. I am in constant communication with both sides.
I have been meeting with President Zelenskyy, and President Putin regularly. Nuclear safety and security during this conflict must have the buy-in and continued involvement of both leaders. Talking to only one of them would not achieve this important goal. At the same time, I am keeping an open dialogue with leaders on all continents and briefing the UN Security Council. When it comes to nuclear safety in Ukraine it has been possible to build a level of agreement that is rare during the divisions of this conflict. Where there is agreement, there is hope for more agreement.
Ukraine is not our only hotspot.
In Iran, the IAEA’s job is to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of a growing nuclear programme. Iran has now enriched uranium to a level that is hard to justify. It has not yet answered the IAEA’s questions completely and it has made our work more difficult by taking away some of our cameras and blocking some of our most experienced safeguards inspectors from going into the country. This has caused concern and led to a pattern of mistrust and recriminations. In diplomacy, progress often requires prompting, catalyzing, and suggesting ways forward. This presents a role for an impartial, honest and effective broker. It is a role I, in my capacity as the IAEA’s Director General, have been playing. In fact, I returned from my latest visit to Tehran just a few weeks ago where I presented alternatives and ideas to reduce the growing tensions, and hopefully to retain Iran within the NPT and the non-proliferation norms.
The danger of playing it safe
When it comes to working on behalf of peace and security, playing it safe is dangerous.
Silence and indifference can be deadly.
Dag Hammerskjold, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, said: “It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.”
A new path
This week, the Norwegian Nobel Committee looked beyond today’s conflicts. In its own way, it did not play it safe. Instead, it shined a light on the horrors of nuclear war and the people who have been warning us about them for many decades.
In doing that, the Nobel Committee, Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha have illuminated the danger of the path we are now on.
We have to make a new path.
First, the leaders of the nuclear weapon states must recognize the need for a responsible management of their nuclear arsenals. Experiences from the past confirm that even at times of crisis and conflict it has been possible to recognize the unique terminal power of these weapons and the responsibility that comes with it. What Kennedy, Khrushchev, Reagan, Gorbachev, or Trump did by reaching out to a nuclear-armed adversary, sets a precedent, a useful one. Such contacts, either bilateral or at the P5 level could possibly be facilitated by a competent broker. These are the first steps to bringing down the tone so that nuclear sabre rattling recedes and the commitments to the unequivocal undertakings to move towards a nuclear free world can be fulfilled.
Secondly, an iron-clad resolve to observe and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime needs to be adopted. Nuclear weapon and nuclear non-weapon states must work together to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Ladies and gentlemen,
We need to walk through perilous times by recognizing limitations and keeping our eyes on our common objectives.
Nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed on the nuclear armed.
Realism is not defeatism. Diplomacy is not weakness.
Difficult times call for enlightened leadership, at the national level, and at the international level as well.
Putting the international system back on track is within our reach. World leaders, including those at the top of the multilateral system, have a duty and an irrevocable responsibility to work towards this.
Personally, I am convinced. Perhaps, because the secret mandate I received that day in Hiroshima from a hibakusha burns in me, stronger than ever. Thank you.
Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.
Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.
The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.
The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.
The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.
However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.
Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.
At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.
No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.
The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.
As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.
Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.
Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.
Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.
I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.
The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.
In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.
As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.
Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.
Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.
Madame President,
The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.
I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.
Madame President,
The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.
For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.
As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.
For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.
The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.
Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.
Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.
Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.
A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran. They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.
The IAEA Board of Governors will convene a meeting at the Agency’s headquarters starting at 10:00 CEST on Monday, 16 June, in Board Room C, Building C, 4th floor, in the Vienna International Centre (VIC).
The meeting is convened by the Chair of the Board following a request from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation for “an urgent session of the IAEA Board of Governors on the matter related to the Israeli attacks against the Iranian nuclear facilities that are under the IAEA safeguards”.
The Board of Governors meeting is closed to the press.
Photo Opportunity
There will be a photo opportunity with the IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and the Chair of the Board, Ambassador Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman of Ghana, before the start of the Board meeting, on 16 June at 10:00 CEST in Board Room C, in the C building in the VIC.
Accreditationand Press Working Area:
The Press Room on the M-Building’s ground floor will be available as a press working area starting from 9:00 CEST on 16 June.
Journalists are requested to register with the Press Office by 08:00 CEST on Monday, 16 June. Please email press@iaea.org.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
SHENZHEN, June 22 (Xinhua) — The ecosystem of China’s self-developed operating system HarmonyOS is expanding rapidly and currently has more than 8 million developers, Chinese tech giant Huawei said Friday at the Huawei Developer Conference held in Dongguan, south China’s Guangdong Province.
According to Huawei, more than 30,000 HarmonyOS apps and meta-services are in development or receiving updates, covering nearly 20 sectors including government, healthcare, and industrial applications. More than 100 major productivity platforms such as DingTalk and Feishu have been adapted for HarmonyOS, serving nearly 38 million enterprises.
On September 25, 2023, HarmonyOS apps were fully launched, marking the beginning of the development of an independent operating system ecosystem.
At the conference, Huawei unveiled the beta version of its next-generation operating system, HarmonyOS 6, for developers. In addition, the company introduced the Harmony Agent Framework (HMAF) for its HarmonyOS ecosystem, which aims to create a revolutionary AI ecosystem with autonomous decision-making and collaborative capabilities.
HarmonyOS, or Hongmeng in Chinese, is an open-source operating system designed for a variety of devices and scenarios, including smart screens, tablets, wearables, and cars. It was first launched in 2019. -0-
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
WASHINGTON, June 22 (Xinhua) — Iran will face new military strikes if peace does not come soon, U.S. President Donald Trump said on Saturday.
Addressing his fellow citizens on television, Trump said Iran’s key nuclear facilities had been “completely and utterly destroyed,” adding that future attacks would be “much bigger and much simpler.”
“If peace does not come quickly, we will attack other targets with precision, speed and skill. Most of them can be destroyed within minutes,” the US leader said after the bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites.
“Our goal was to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities,” he said, calling the bombing an “impressive” success. -0-
The jagged silhouette of a B2 stealth bomber seen during a 2015 flyover in the US.Jonathan Daniel / Getty Images
Late on Saturday night, local time, the United States carried out strikes against Iranian nuclear enrichment sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, marking its open participation in the conflict between Iran and Israel.
The US says it fired 30 submarine-launched missiles at the sites in Natanz and Isfahan, as well as dropping more than a dozen “bunker buster” bombs at Fordow and Natanz.
The kind of bomb in question is the extremely destructive GBU-57 Massive Ordance Penetrator, or MOP, which weighs around 13.5 tonnes.
The attacks raise a lot of questions. What are these enormous bombs? Why did the US feel it had to get involved in the conflict? And, going forward, what does it mean for Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
What are ‘bunker busters’, and why are they used?
Bunker busters are weapons designed to destroy heavily protected facilities such as bunkers deep underground, beyond the reach of normal bombs.
Bunker busters are designed to bury themselves into the ground before detonating. This allows more of the explosive force to penetrate into the ground, rather than travelling through the air or across the surface.
Iran’s nuclear enrichment sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan are built deep underground. Estimates suggest that Fordow for example could be 80m beneath the surface, and capped with layers of reinforced concrete and soil.
What is the MOP?
The bunker buster used in this particular operation is the largest in the US arsenal. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, the MOP is the largest known buster buster in the world.
Weighing some 13.5 tonnes, the MOP is believed to be able to penetrate up to 60 metres below ground in the right conditions. It is not known how many the US possesses, but the numbers are thought to be small (perhaps 20 or so in total).
We also don’t know exactly how many were used in Iran, though some reports say it was 14. However, it is likely to be a significant portion of the US MOP arsenal.
Why does only the US possess this capability?
The US is not the only state with bunker-busting weaponry. However, the size of MOP means it requires very specialised bombers to carry and drop it.
Only the B2 stealth bomber is currently able to deploy the MOP. Each B2 can carry at most two MOPs at a time. Around seven of America’s 19 operational B2s were used in the Iran operation.
There has been some consideration whether large transport aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules could be modified to carry and drop the MOP from its rear cargo doors. While this would allow other countries (including Israel) to deploy the MOP, it is for now purely hypothetical.
Why has the US (apparently) used them in Iran
The Trump administration claims Iran may be only a few weeks from possessing a nuclear weapon, and that it needed to act now to destroy Iranian nuclear enrichment sites. This claim is notably at odds with published assessments from the US intelligence community.
However, Israel lacks bunker busting weaponry sufficient to damage the deeply buried and fortified enrichment sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.
An F-15E Strike Eagle releases a GBU-28 ‘bunker buster’ laser-guided bomb, a smaller equivalewnt of the 13,600 kg GBU-57 ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ believed to have been used in Iran. Michael Ammons / US Air Force
Only the MOP could do the job (short of using nuclear weapons). Even then, multiple MOPs would have been required to ensure sufficient damage to the underground facilities.
The US has claimed that these sites have been utterly destroyed. We cannot conclusively say whether this is true.
Iran may also have other, undeclared nuclear sites elsewhere in the country.
Iran’s reaction
The US has reportedly reached out to Iran via diplomatic channels to emphasise that this attack was a one-off, not part of a larger project of regime change. It is hard to say what will happen in the next few weeks.
Iran may retaliate with large strikes against Israel or against US forces in the region. It could also interrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, which would affect a large portion of global oil shipments, with profound economic implications.
Alternatively, Iran could capitulate and take steps to demonstrate it is ending its nuclear program. However, capitulation would not necessarily mean the end of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The value of nuclear weapons
Perhaps a greater concern is that the attack will reinforce Iran’s desire to go nuclear. Without nuclear weapons, Iran was unable to threaten the US enough to deter today’s attack.
Iran may take lessons from the fate of other states. Ukraine (in)famously surrendered its stockpile of former Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1990s. Russia has since felt emboldened to annex Crimea in 2014 and launch an ongoing invasion in 2022. Other potential nuclear states, such as Iraq and Gadaffi’s regime in Libya, also suffered from military intervention.
By contrast, North Korea successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. Since then there has been no serious consideration of military intervention in North Korea.
Iran may yet have the ability to produce useful amounts of weapons-grade uranium. It may now aim to buy itself time to assemble a relatively small nuclear device, similar in scale to the bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Depending on what facilities and resources have survive the US strikes, the attack has likely reinforced that the only way the Iranian regime can guarantee its survival is to possess nuclear weapons.
James Dwyer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
BEIJING, June 22 (Xinhua) — China’s disaster relief and strategic reserve department said Saturday that emergency supplies have been dispatched to flood-hit central China’s Hunan Province.
According to the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Commission, the Ministry of Emergency Management and the State Food and Material Administration of China, the aid includes more than 81,500 daily necessities such as tents, folding beds, blankets and mattresses. In addition, effective assistance will be provided to relocate the affected residents and meet their basic living needs.
Hunan Province has been hit by severe floods in recent days, with Zhangjiajie City and Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture hit hardest.
Let us recall that China has adopted a four-tier emergency response system for flood-related emergencies, with level 1 being the highest. -0-
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
An immigration officer processes entry procedures for personnel attending the 2025 Blue Bay LPGA at Sanya Phoenix International Airport in Sanya, south China’s Hainan Province, March 3, 2025. (Xinhua/Yang Guanyu)
For Canadian visitor Stephanie Wing See Yau, the therapy experience at a care center in Bo’ao, a coastal city in China’s southernmost island province of Hainan, felt more like “a vacation.”
“This place is top-notch. They cater to so many aspects of wellness, not just physical, but mental too,” she told Xinhua during her stay in the Boao Lecheng International Medical Tourism Pilot Zone, which hosts over 30 top-tier domestic and international medical institutions.
Thanks to special policy support, the pilot zone has introduced 485 cutting-edge medicines and medical devices that are licensed abroad but not yet available in the domestic market. The policy has benefited more than 130,000 patients, including individuals like Yau.
Her four-day experience — blending advanced health screenings, traditional therapies, tea ceremonies, and cultural immersion — offers much more than just a chance to relax. It showcases a tangible outcome of a key move in China’s opening-up strategy: the transformation of Hainan into a Free Trade Port (FTP).
As the Hainan FTP is set to begin independent customs operations by the end of the year, it is poised to become not only a tourist haven but also a pivotal gateway for China’s opening-up drive.
Frontier for free-flowing factors
A central component of this transformation is the Lecheng medical tourism pilot zone. A total of 25 medical tourism routes have been rolled out to cater to a wide range of needs, including traditional Chinese medicine, chronic disease care, luxury diagnostics and cosmetic rehab, garnering popularity among visitors from countries such as Indonesia, Russia, Spain, and beyond.
In 2024, the medical special zone attracted over 410,000 medical visitors, up 36.76 percent year on year.
Lecheng is only one part of Hainan’s wider push for opening up. Beyond the medical sector, the province has been fast-tracking foreign access across sectors ranging from finance and education to communication and high-tech industries, as China aims to build an FTP with global top-tier trade standards.
Hainan, supported by the country’s vast domestic market and its strategic positioning, stands as a vital hub that connects the world’s second-largest economy with global markets.
The FTP is gearing up to be “a pivotal gateway leading China’s new era of opening-up,” said Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute for Reform and Development.
With independent customs operations imminent, the FTP’s policy framework, underpinned by features like zero tariffs, low tax rates, simplified tax systems and facilitated factor flows, has taken shape.
For firms in Lecheng, a zero-tariff policy on medical imports has saved nearly 8.2 million yuan (about 1.14 million U.S. dollars) in duties since December 2024.
The start of independent customs operations will represent a concrete step toward building a major gateway for China’s high-level opening-up, Chi said.
Institutional opening-up luring foreign capital
As Hainan FTP has prioritized institutional integration and coordination across trade, finance and regulatory systems, experts believe this will create a powerful driving force for the development of the FTP and contribute to China’s high-standard opening up strategy.
Official data showed that so far, the province has rolled out a total of 158 institutional innovation cases. These reform measures include technology-empowered public tendering, one-stop business licensing, and a specialized IP zone to support the seed industry.
Hainan FTP serves not only as a testing ground for free-flowing goods, services and data, but as a frontier for the innovation of regulations and mechanisms, said Zhou Xiaochuan, vice chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA).
With its optimized business environment, Hainan has emerged as a premier foreign investment destination, ranking among China’s top performers. In 2024, the number of foreign-invested enterprises in Hainan rose 19.2 percent year on year, while its foreign direct investment volume climbed to the tenth spot nationally.
To date, Hainan has attracted investment from 158 countries and regions, while its economic openness ratio — the ratio of total trade to GDP — more than doubled from 17.3 percent in 2018 to 35 percent in 2024.
High-profile events held in the province like the BFA, a premier platform advocating openness and multilateral cooperation, and the China International Consumer Products Expo, the largest consumer expo in the Asia-Pacific region, offer global investors dynamic gateways to observe the country’s evolving openness agenda.
DFS, the travel retail company of the luxury goods conglomerate LVMH, in 2024 sealed its largest single investment in 60 years to launch a landmark complex in Yalong Bay of Sanya, the well-known tropical resort city in Hainan. The project will merge luxury retail, hotels and entertainment, with the goal of building a top destination for luxury shopping and tourism.
“Hainan FTP embodies China’s commitment to high-standard openness,” said Nancy Liu, president of DFS China.
China’s special economic zones, like Hainan FTP and the 21 pilot free trade zones, serve as pivotal engines for industrial transformation and opening up, Chi noted, highlighting their role as “growth accelerators for both regional and global economies.”
When the independent customs operations begin, Hainan FTP will create key opportunities for international enterprises to access China’s domestic market more efficiently, and play a greater role in enhancing market connectivity with global markets through service trade-focused regulatory alignment, he added.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
MINSK, June 22 (Xinhua) — A meeting between Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg took place in Minsk on Saturday. The conversation took place at the Palace of Independence with the participation of members of the delegations. The corresponding information was published by the press service of the Belarusian head of state on the same day.
The agenda of the talks included international issues and the overall situation in the world, regional issues and Belarusian-American relations. “I am very glad, Mr. General, to meet with you. I very much hope that our conversation will be very sincere and open,” A. Lukashenko noted.
In turn, K. Kellogg thanked the Belarusian side for the hospitality and the meeting. “We live in a very dangerous time, when the crises we face can sharply escalate, grow, if we are not wise and fair,” he said. –0–
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
WASHINGTON, June 21 (Xinhua) — The United States has completed its attacks on three nuclear sites in Iran, including Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, U.S. President Donald Trump said on his Truth Social page on Saturday.
According to him, “all aircraft are now outside Iranian airspace. The full complement of bombs was dropped on the main target, Fordow.” -0-
Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –
June 22, 1941 is a day that will forever remain in the memory of our people.
At 4:15 a.m., when the world was still asleep, Nazi Germany, violating all agreements, unleashed a war against the Soviet Union. This moment marked the beginning of the Great Patriotic War – one of the most tragic periods in the history of our country.
Alarms woke people up. Many could not believe what was happening. The morning skies turned fiery as German planes began bombing towns and villages. The world that seemed stable collapsed in a second.
Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians found themselves in the epicenter of horror. Bombing, destruction, fear, death – all this became a reality that people had to face.
But despite heavy losses and terrible suffering, the people showed incredible resilience.
From the first days of the war, people gathered in self-defense units, signed up for the army, prepared to defend their homeland. This day marked the beginning of a long and difficult journey, in which everyone united from the southern seas to the polar region, regardless of gender, age, nationality or profession.
The Moscow Engineering and Economic Institute (today GUU) contributed to the common Victory. Many employees went to the front, fought in the 7th division of the people’s militia, the 3rd Moscow Communist Division and other formations. During the war years, the university continued to work on training specialists who were needed by the country’s economy more than ever. When the enemy approached the capital, university representatives participated in defense activities: they built fortifications, worked in logging, and organized subsidiary farming.
June 22, 1941 is not just a date. It is a symbol of courage and unity that became the basis for victory in a war that took millions of lives but did not break the spirit of the people.
We remember and honor those who fought, who gave their lives for freedom and independence. Eternal memory to the heroes!
Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
