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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI: Shell accelerates strategy to deliver more value with less emissions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    March 25, 2025 – Shell (LON/NYSE: SHEL, AMST: SHELL) will today present to investors at its Capital Markets Day 2025 the next steps in the execution of its strategy. Shell is strengthening its commitment to value creation and maintaining its focus on performance, discipline and simplification.

    ‘’We have made significant progress against all of the targets we set out at our Capital Markets Day in 2023. Thanks to the outstanding efforts of our people, we are transforming Shell to become simpler, more resilient and more competitive,’’ said CEO Wael Sawan. ‘‘We want to become the world’s leading integrated gas and LNG business and the most customer-focused energy marketer and trader, while sustaining a material level of liquids production. Today we are raising the bar across our key financial targets, investing where we have competitive strengths and delivering more for our shareholders.’’

    Today Shell announces that it will:

    • Enhance shareholder distributions from 30-40% to 40-50% of cash flow from operations (CFFO) through the cycle1, continuing to prioritise share buybacks2, while maintaining a 4% per annum progressive dividend policy.
    • Increase the structural cost reduction target from $2-3 billion by the end of 2025 to a cumulative $5-7 billion by the end of 2028, compared to 20221.
    • Invest for growth while maintaining capital discipline, with spend lowered to $20-22 billion per year for 2025-20281.
    • Grow free cash flow3 (FCF) per share by more than 10% per year through to 20301.
    • Maintain the climate targets and ambition set out in Shell’s Energy Transition Strategy 2024.

    To deliver more value with less emissions Shell will:

    • Reinforce our leadership position in liquefied natural gas (LNG) by growing sales by 4-5% per year through to 2030.
    • Grow top line production across our combined Upstream and Integrated Gas business by 1% per year to 2030, sustaining our 1.4 million barrels per day of liquids production to 2030 with increasingly lower carbon intensity.
    • Drive cash flow resilience and higher returns in our Downstream and Renewables & Energy Solutions businesses:
      • Pursue focused growth in our high-return Mobility and Lubricants businesses.
      • Leverage competitive strengths to drive profitable and scalable businesses across our lower carbon platforms, where we expect to have up to 10% of capital employed by 2030.
      • Unlock more value from our strong portfolio of Chemicals assets by exploring strategic and partnership opportunities in the US, and both high-grading and selective closures in Europe, enabling the business to prosper whilst improving returns and reducing capital employed by 2030.

    Shell will continue to deliver more value with less emissions, growing in areas where we have competitive strengths, and providing a compelling investment case for our shareholders, now, and into the future.

    Notes to editors:

    1 Non-GAAP measure, for reconciliations see www.shell.com/cmd25 this includes the definition of cash capex which in 2024 was $21 billion compared to a range of $22-25 billion per year as announced at CMD23.
    2 Subject to Board approval as well as shareholder approval at the 2025 Annual General Meeting. 
    3 Price normalised organic free cashflow, excluding working capital and derivative movements.

    Cautionary Note

    The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this announcement “Shell”, “Shell Group” and “Group” are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words “we”, “us” and “our” are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. ‘‘Subsidiaries’’, “Shell subsidiaries” and “Shell companies” as used in this announcement refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms “joint venture”, “joint operations”, “joint arrangements”, and “associates” may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties.  The term “Shell interest” is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest. 

    This announcement contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements other than statements of historical fact are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as “aim”; “ambition”; ‘‘anticipate’’; “aspire”, “aspiration”, ‘‘believe’’; “commit”; “commitment”; ‘‘could’’; “desire”; ‘‘estimate’’; ‘‘expect’’; ‘‘goals’’; ‘‘intend’’; ‘‘may’’; “milestones”; ‘‘objectives’’; ‘‘outlook’’; ‘‘plan’’; ‘‘probably’’; ‘‘project’’; ‘‘risks’’; “schedule”; ‘‘seek’’; ‘‘should’’; ‘‘target’’; “vision”; ‘‘will’’; “would” and similar terms and phrases. There are a number of factors that could affect the future operations of Shell and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this announcement, including (without limitation): (a) price fluctuations in crude oil and natural gas; (b) changes in demand for Shell’s products; (c) currency fluctuations; (d) drilling and production results; (e) reserves estimates; (f) loss of market share and industry competition; (g) environmental and physical risks, including climate change; (h) risks associated with the identification of suitable potential acquisition properties and targets, and successful negotiation and completion of such transactions; (i) the risk of doing business in developing countries and countries subject to international sanctions; (j) legislative, judicial, fiscal and regulatory developments including tariffs and regulatory measures addressing climate change; (k) economic and financial market conditions in various countries and regions; (l) political risks, including the risks of expropriation and renegotiation of the terms of contracts with governmental entities, delays or advancements in the approval of projects and delays in the reimbursement for shared costs; (m) risks associated with the impact of pandemics, regional conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the conflict in the Middle East, and a significant cyber security, data privacy or IT incident; (n) the pace of the energy transition; and (o) changes in trading conditions. No assurance is provided that future dividend payments will match or exceed previous dividend payments. All forward-looking statements contained in this announcement are expressly qualified in their entirety by the cautionary statements contained or referred to in this section. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Additional risk factors that may affect future results are contained in Shell plc’s Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024 (available at www.shell.com/investors/news-and-filings/sec-filings.html and www.sec.gov). These risk factors also expressly qualify all forward-looking statements contained in this announcement and should be considered by the reader.  Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of this announcement, March 25, 2025. Neither Shell plc nor any of its subsidiaries undertake any obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events or other information. In light of these risks, results could differ materially from those stated, implied or inferred from the forward-looking statements contained in this announcement.

    Also, in this announcement we may refer to Shell’s “net carbon intensity” (NCI), which includes Shell’s carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers’ carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers’ carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell’s NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell’s “net carbon intensity” or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

    Shell’s operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell’s operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell’s operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

    This announcement may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as adjusted earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc’s consolidated financial statements. See the document named “Comparable GAAP measures and non-GAAP measures reconciliation” available on our Capital Markets Day 2025 page on shell.com for presentation of the most comparable GAAP measures, definitions and further details of historic non-GAAP measures and other metrics used throughout this announcement. 

    The information presented in this announcement do not reflect IFRS 18, Presentation and Disclosure in Financial Statements (“IFRS 18”), which will be effective from reporting periods beginning on or after January 1, 2027. IFRS 18 will have no impact on recognition and measurement. From Shell’s initial impact assessment, it has concluded that the impact will be limited to disclosure and presentation in the Consolidated Financial Statements. The primary change will be that the share of profit from joint ventures and associates will be classified in the Consolidated Statement of Income under the investing category (income generated by the investment) instead of the operating category. As a result of this change, the dividends received from joint ventures and associates will be reclassified in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows from cash flow from operating activities to cash flow from investing activities.

    The contents of websites referred to in this announcement do not form part of this announcement.

    We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this announcement that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F, File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov.

    Contacts:
    – Sean Ashley, Company Secretary
    – Media: International +44 (0) 207 934 5550; Americas: https://www.shell.us/about-us/news-and-insights/media/submit-an-inquiry.html

    LEI number of Shell plc: 21380068P1DRHMJ8KU70
    Classification: Inside Information

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kaine & Colleagues Demand Answers about Trump Cabinet Officials’ Use of Unsecured Group Chat for Military Planning

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), a member of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, and 13 of his Senate colleagues sent a letter to President Donald Trump demanding answers about several Cabinet officials’ accidental adding of a reporter to an unsecured group chat where secret, high-level military planning was occurring, in violation of security protocols and potentially in violation of the law.  

    “I am gravely concerned by appalling reports that senior officials of your Administration, including the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other Cabinet members, coordinated military strikes in Yemen over the commercial and unclassified messaging application Signal. I am even more concerned by the fact that a reporter was included on the same Signal chat,” wrote the senators.

    “It does not take much imagination to consider the likely ramifications if this information had been made public prior to the strike – or worse, if it had been shared with or visible to an adversary rather than a reporter who seems to have a better grasp of how to handle classified information than your National Security Advisor,” the senators continued. “This is an astonishingly cavalier approach to national security.”

    “Finally, the fact that messages were set to disappear on this chain is a direct violation of the Presidential Records Act, a further egregious breach of public trust. This incompetence warrants disciplinary action,” added the senators.

    In the letter, the group of senators demanded answers from the Trump Administration to the following:

    • What disciplinary action will be taken against those involved in the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain? Will you revoke their security clearances? What security training had they received?
    • What remedial action was taken to limit damage following this disclosure?
    • What other sensitive military operations have been coordinated by your administration via Signal?
    • Please confirm whether or not the lives of servicemembers were placed at risk due to this carelessness and whether other operations or sources were impacted.
    • Are you aware of ongoing efforts by our adversaries, including China, Russia, and Iran, to target unclassified devices used by senior Administration officials, and can you confirm that China, Russia, Iran or other adversaries did not have access to any of the classified or sensitive information shared in this group chat?
    • Will you comply with the Presidential Records Act and provide the text of the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain for appropriate handling and preservation?
    • What remedial training regarding the handling of classified and sensitive military information will be provided to all who participated in the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain?
    • What other training will be provided to members of the executive branch who handle classified information to ensure that it is understood that classified materials should not be shared over Signal?

    In addition to Kaine, the letter is signed by U.S. Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Gary C. Peters (D-MI), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA).

    Full text of the letter is available here.

    President Trump:

    We are gravely concerned by appalling reports that senior officials of your Administration, including the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and other Cabinet members, coordinated military strikes in Yemen over the commercial and unclassified messaging application Signal. We are even more concerned by the fact that a reporter was included on the same Signal chat, entitled “Houthi PC small group,” demonstrating a complete lack of understanding by all involved of the gravity of the discussion and a profound carelessness for the lives of the servicemembers conducting operations against the Houthis. It does not take much imagination to consider the likely ramifications if this information had been made public prior to the strike – or worse, if it had been shared with or visible to an adversary rather than a reporter who seems to have a better grasp of how to handle classified information than your National Security Advisor.

    Not only was an uncleared reporter given access to sensitive intelligence via this group chat, since cell phones are not permitted in Secure Compartmentalized Information Facilities (SCIFs), it appears that these text conversations were sent in violation of basic security protocols – either from within a SCIF, or more likely, out in public where the unsecured devices were susceptible to theft, hacking, or being seen by anyone walking by. This is an astonishingly cavalier approach to national security.

    Finally, the fact that messages were set to disappear on this chain is a direct violation of the Presidential Records Act, a further egregious breach of public trust. This incompetence warrants disciplinary action.

    I demand prompt responses, at the appropriate classification level, to the following:

    • What disciplinary action will be taken against those involved in the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain? Will you revoke their security clearances? What security training had they received?
    • What remedial action was taken to limit damage following this disclosure?
    • What other sensitive military operations have been coordinated by your administration via Signal?
    • Please confirm whether or not the lives of servicemembers were placed at risk due to this carelessness and whether other operations or sources were impacted.
    • Are you aware of ongoing efforts by our adversaries, including China, Russia, and Iran, to target unclassified devices used by senior Administration officials, and can you confirm that China, Russia, Iran or other adversaries did not have access to any of the classified or sensitive information shared in this group chat?
    • Will you comply with the Presidential Records Act and provide the text of the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain for appropriate handling and preservation?
    • What remedial training regarding the handling of classified and sensitive military information will be provided to all who participated in the “Houthi PC small group” Signal chain?
    • What other training will be provided to members of the executive branch who handle classified information to ensure that it is understood that classified materials should not be shared over Signal?

    You have been entrusted with the security of our entire nation. It is my sincere hope that you will direct all who were involved to cease this unprofessional and careless behavior and endeavor to bring an approach to their positions that reflects the gravity of the current security environment.

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Booker, Rosen, Kim, and Schiff Joint Statement Marking Two Years Since Elizabeth Tsurkov’s Abduction in Iraq

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Andy Kim (D-NJ), and Adam Schiff (D-CA) issued the following joint statement:

    “As champions of human rights and freedom, as well as those wrongfully detained and held hostage all over the world, we call for the immediate and safe release of Elizabeth Tsurkov. Friday marked two years since Elizabeth, an Israeli-Russian citizen and Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University, was kidnapped in Baghdad by Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), an Iranian-backed foreign terrorist organization. Ms. Tsurkov is a vocal and principled expert, journalist, and political scientist who traveled to Iraq to conduct fieldwork for her doctoral dissertation on strategies to reduce conflict and foster peace in the Middle East. We are deeply concerned about Elizabeth’s health and wellbeing and urge the Government of Iraq and all other regional governments that have influence and leverage to swiftly help secure her release on humanitarian grounds. There is no justification for hostage taking and it is horrifically egregious to kidnap a brave advocate for peace and coexistence in the region.”

    Senator Booker continues to advocate for the release of Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University in New Jersey. Today, the two New Jersey Senators, Cory Booker and Andy Kim, sent a letter to President Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Steven Witkoff, Special Envoy to the Middle East, requesting an update on the Administration’s efforts seeking Ms. Tsurkov’s safe release.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Ukraine conflict brings EU-US ties to historic low

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The recent U.S.-brokered Russia-Ukraine peace talks highlighted growing divisions between Washington and Brussels, bringing trans-Atlantic relations to a historic low, an Italian geopolitical analyst has said.

    Sergio Fabbrini, a political science professor at Rome’s LUISS University, told Xinhua that the exclusion of Europe from the talks underscores the EU’s declining influence in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, due in large part to the bloc’s lack of unified foreign policy coordination.

    “This episode reveals the European Union’s structural weakness,” he said during a university conference on Monday. “Without a central authority to speak for all members, the bloc struggles to assert itself on the global stage, particularly when the U.S. chooses to act unilaterally.”

    This institutional fragmentation, he said, coincides with the skeptical view of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration of the EU. The U.S. president has repeatedly characterized the EU as “an institution designed to undermine American interests rather than bolster global security.”

    Fabbrini emphasized the fundamental divergence in how both sides perceive the Ukraine crisis. “For Europe, this is an existential security threat happening on our doorstep. For Washington, it’s a geopolitical calculation involving great powers,” he said.

    The professor warned that the current tensions mark “one of the worst crises in trans-Atlantic history,” urging Europe to develop more independent diplomatic capacity.

    “Geographical reality demands that Europe take greater responsibility for its own security architecture while maintaining equilibrium between national interests and collective European stability,” he said. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: The ICC showed its might by arresting Rodrigo Duterte. Its reputation will take longer to fix

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria, Lecturer in International Law, Curtin University

    Only five days after the arrest warrant against former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte was issued, he was apprehended and immediately put on a plane to The Hague to face charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

    The prompt action – and the fact he is the first former Asian head of state before the ICC – have been heralded as “a pivotal moment for the court”.

    While this is a rare success story in the court’s tumultuous history, many challenges remain. The successful arrest of one defendant will unfortunately do little to change negative perceptions of the court or remove the many obstacles it faces in prosecuting cases.

    A long history of criticism

    The ICC was conceived as a “court of last resort” in 1998 under the Rome Statute, the treaty that established it. The aim was to try individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression in cases where a state’s domestic courts refuse or are unable to do so.

    Shortly after it began its work in 2002, however, the ICC faced criticism for its perceived focus on Africa.

    In more recent years, it has also been criticised for its limited effectiveness, its perceived hypocrisy, and a lack of support from major powers, such as the US, China and Russia, which are not members.

    The court has long faced a public relations crisis it may never be able to resolve. When it does not investigate a potential case, it is said to be ineffective. And when it does initiate investigations, it is often said to be biased or acting beyond its capabilities.

    Putin and Netanyahu

    Currently, the ICC has 12 ongoing investigations, mostly in Africa and Asia. It has issued 56 arrest warrants, half of which have yet to be executed.

    As the focus of the court is limited to those who bear the greatest responsibility for international crimes, the cases frequently involve high-profile individuals.

    Current arrest warrants, for example, have been issued against Russian President Vladimir Putin on charges of allegedly deporting Ukrainian children to Russia and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes committed in Gaza.

    These two cases have been among the court’s most controversial. Critics say the ICC lacks jurisdiction because:

    • the alleged crimes did not occur in their own states
    • their states are not parties to the Rome Statute
    • the UN Security Council did not refer these cases to the ICC for investigation.

    Others have accused the court of selective prosecution and bias for pursuing a case against Netanyahu, specifically, instead of prioritising cases in states run by dictators, such as Syria.

    And some complain the court should be focusing on crimes allegedly committed by Western leaders in places like Iraq.

    Indicting leaders of states raises additional legal challenges. International law dictates that heads of state enjoy immunity in other states’ courts – unless this immunity is expressly waived by their own governments.

    The ICC defends its actions as fair. It argues it does have jurisdiction in the cases against Putin and Netanyahu because the alleged crimes took place in Ukraine and Palestine, two states who have explicitly accepted its jurisdiction.

    And Article 27 of the Rome Statute says the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over people with state immunity, although it’s debatable whether this must be first waived for leaders of states not party to the Rome Statute.

    Cooperation remains key

    The ICC is not only constrained by these complex legal questions, but also by the limited cooperation of states around the world.

    It relies on close cooperation with its 125 state parties, among others. But some states have been reluctant or even refused to cooperate with the court in executing the arrest warrants of controversial figures.

    For example, Putin was not arrested when he visited Mongolia, an ICC member, last year, in part, because Mongolia relies heavily on Russian energy. South Africa similarly refused to arrest Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir when he visited in 2015.

    Even when state parties do cooperate, the political fallout can impact the court’s reputation.

    Following Duterte’s arrest last week, a Filipino senator (the sister of the current president) launched an urgent investigation to ensure due process was followed and Duterte’s legal rights were upheld and protected. She acknowledged the arrest has “has deeply divided the nation”.

    The lack of support from the US – arguably, still the world’s most powerful democracy – remains a perennial problem, as well.

    While the US has generally supported the court’s mandate over the years, it has been wary of its jurisdiction over American citizens and those of its allies accused of crimes. Last month, President Donald Trump authorised new sanctions against ICC officials in an attempt to paralyse the international organisation.

    Although 79 states did declare their support for the ICC following the sanctions, the Trump adminstration’s rejection of the court’s jurisdiction, legitimacy and authority has had significant consequences for its operations.

    It remains to be seen how the case against Duterte will play out. Securing a conviction is not assured.

    However, his arrest demonstrates the court can fulfil its mandate and remain a relevant force in the fight against the gravest of crimes. It is also a significant moment for the families of those killed during Duterte’s rule, who have long sought justice for their loved ones.

    Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The ICC showed its might by arresting Rodrigo Duterte. Its reputation will take longer to fix – https://theconversation.com/the-icc-showed-its-might-by-arresting-rodrigo-duterte-its-reputation-will-take-longer-to-fix-252509

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI China: US-Russia Riyadh talks end, joint statement expected tomorrow

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The new round of talks between Russian and U.S. delegations concluded on Monday after some 12 hours, according to Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

    A joint statement following the talks will be published on Tuesday, RIA Novosti reported, citing a source familiar with the venue of the talks.

    According to Riyadh-based Al Arabiya News, the U.S. delegation is led by Andrew Peek, a senior director at the White House National Security Council, and Michael Anton, a senior official from the State Department.

    Russia is represented by Grigory Karasin, chair of the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee and a former diplomat, along with Sergei Beseda, an advisor to the director of the Federal Security Service, Al Arabiya News said.

    The talks, mainly focused on reaching a Black Sea ceasefire deal before securing a broader agreement, followed a meeting between the United States and Ukraine in Saudi Arabia on Sunday.

    Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump held phone talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Tuesday and Wednesday, respectively. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Shaheen Discusses Foreign Affairs, Trump Tariffs, Her Decision to Not Seek Reelection and More on WMUR’s CloseUp

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Manchester, NH) – On Sunday, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, joined Adam Sexton on WMUR’s CloseUp to discuss ongoing global affairs such as Russia’s war in Ukraine, as well as pressing issues in New Hampshire including the harmful impacts of President Trump’s tariffs and Republican-led threats to federal services. The Senator also detailed her decision to not seek reelection. The first segment can be found here and the second segment can be found here.   

    Key quotes from Senator Shaheen below: 

    On threats to U.S. leadership abroad:  

    • “Both ceasefires that this President is talking about taking credit for are falling apart already. The ceasefire in Israel with Gaza has already fallen apart. The ceasefire that he’s trying to broker with Russia has already fallen apart.” 
    • “[Elon Musk] came up with this brilliant idea to get rid of USAID and so has undermined so many of our efforts that help us compete with China around the world. Our efforts that keep Americans safe because we’re tracking epidemics in places like Africa. That promote democracy efforts in countries where, if we’re not there China comes in and takes up that vacuum that we’ve left. So, I think he’s totally misguided, and he has no real understanding of what it means for the United States to be a leader in the world.”  

    On the harmful impact of President Trump’s tariffs on Granite State businesses:  

    • “I was at C&J[…] yesterday. He’s had to cancel more than half of his bus order for new busses that are made in Canada because he’s concerned about the additional cost.” 
    • “I was up north on Wednesday in the North Country, talking to Littleton town officials who were talking about visitors coming down to New Hampshire who they’re concerned are not going to be here, about small businesses that are worried they are not expanding because they’re worried about the inability to have the relationship that they have had with Canada.” 

    On Elon Musk and DOGE’s gutting of federal services: 

    • “We are in this economic mess because of the decisions that President Trump is making about tariffs, about the uncertainty that he’s created, about the chaos that he’s created in Washington, about the layoffs that he’s doing and I want to keep people focused on that.” 
    • “The fact is, Donald Trump, in his campaign said he was going to do something about grocery prices. He was going to do something about inflation. He was going to do something about high energy costs. He was going to do something about the cost of rental housing and he was going to address mortgage rates. He was going to end the war in Ukraine on the first day. He’s done none of those things.” 

    On her decision not to seek reelection: 

    • “It’s time to think about what else I might want to do. I’m not going to leave trying to make a difference in New Hampshire and [I’ll] still be engaged, but it will be nice to have a little more flexibility to do some other things.” 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Europe concerned over marginalization in Ukraine peace process

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    As U.S.-Ukraine and U.S.-Russia delegations held separate talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on Sunday and Monday, growing concerns are emerging in Europe over its marginalization in the peace negotiations.

    Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov described Sunday’s talks as “productive and focused,” noting that “key points including energy” were addressed. Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation, emphasized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s goal is “to secure a just and lasting peace” for Ukraine and Europe at large.

    On Monday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow and Washington share a “desire and readiness” to pursue a peaceful settlement. He noted that the talks covered various technical issues, including a potential resumption of the Black Sea Initiative.

    However, the absence of European representation at the talks has sparked concern among officials and analysts. From discussions on the Black Sea to broader peace efforts, some European observers warn that critical decisions are being made without European input.

    A Financial Times newsletter on Monday reported that officials from Romania and Bulgaria, two Black Sea nations, privately voiced concern over significant shifts in the region’s status quo, arguing such changes could impact their security without giving them a say.

    In an article published Monday, Salvador Sanchez Tapia, professor of conflict analysis and international security at Spain’s University of Navarra, wrote: “Europe has been left out of negotiating efforts … This disregard shows how little the continent matters to its North American partner.”

    He added that, lacking the capacity to support Ukraine as the United States once did, Europe may have little choice but to accept Washington’s approach while still attempting to make its voice heard.

    Former German diplomat Rudiger Ludeking echoed these concerns in an interview with German media, saying that since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to office, diplomatic engagement between Washington and Moscow, as well as with Kiev, has intensified, largely bypassing NATO, the European Union (EU), and major European powers. He warned that “the EU could be the loser” in these negotiations.

    While some European voices express frustration, others view the talks as a potential step toward de-escalation.

    Balazs Orban, political director of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, welcomed the truce discussions, saying that changing circumstances would eventually compel Europe and policymakers in Brussels to adopt a more pragmatic stance. He warned that if the EU maintains its current position, it risks falling behind and becoming increasingly sidelined in the peace process.

    In an interview with local N1 Television on Monday, former Croatian Foreign Minister Miro Kovac expressed optimism over the White House’s mention of a possible ceasefire by Easter, saying such a development would allow people to “stop dying because it no longer makes sense.”

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: ICE, Law Enforcement Partners Arrest 370 Alien Offenders During Enhanced Operation in Massachusetts

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    BOSTON — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and federal law enforcement partners apprehended 370 illegal aliens in Massachusetts during an enhanced targeted enforcement operation focusing on transnational organized crime, gangs, and egregious illegal alien offenders March 18-23.

    “The Commonwealth is a safer place for our residents to live and work because ICE and our federal law enforcement partners arrested hundreds of alien offenders and removed them from the streets of Massachusetts,” said ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Boston acting Field Office Director Patricia H. Hyde. “Throughout this enhanced enforcement operation, we targeted the most dangerous alien offenders in some of the most crime-infested neighborhoods in and around Boston. Our efforts resulted in 370 arrests throughout the commonwealth. ICE and our federal law enforcement partners are committed to protecting the homeland through the eradication of transnational criminal organizations, dismantling dangerous criminal gangs preying on the American public, locating and arresting criminal alien offenders, and making our communities a safer place to live.”

    During the six-day enhanced operation, ICE and federal law enforcement partners targeted egregious criminal alien offenders including transnational criminal organizations known to operate in and around Boston and throughout Massachusetts. These organizations include the notorious MS-13, Tren de Aragua, Trinitarios, and 18th Street gangs.

    “This week’s enhanced enforcement operations with our partners from the FBI, DEA, ATF, DSS and CBP prove that we are taking a whole of government approach to protecting our communities from foreign nationals involved in transnational gangs, drug traffickers, child predators, violent criminals and dangerous individuals living in New England,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations New England Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Krol. “ICE will use every resource and authority we have to prioritize the safety and security of our communities.”

    “Everyone should agree that we cannot and will not tolerate individuals who not only violate our immigration laws but then commit crimes that endanger our communities. Those who enter and remain in this country unlawfully are breaking the law,” said U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Leah B. Foley. “My office remains committed to working alongside our law enforcement partners to ensure that dangerous individuals are identified, prosecuted, and removed, so that the people of Massachusetts can live and work in safe and secure communities.”

    205 of those arrested had significant criminal convictions or charges. Six were foreign fugitives currently facing charges or convictions for murder, drug trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering

    “Safeguarding the integrity of the immigration and citizenship process is critical. We simply can’t permit violent and dangerous criminals to enter or remain in the United States under false pretenses, with unknown allegiances and intentions. It’s a direct threat to public safety and our national security,” said Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Boston Division Jodi Cohen. “There’s no question our communities are safer today because of this enhanced, targeted operation. FBI Boston, like all our federal partners, will continue to support ICE with these efforts.”

    Law enforcement officials seized approximately 44 kilograms of methamphetamines, 5 kilograms of fentanyl, 1.2 kilograms of cocaine, three firearms and ammunition from illegal alien offenders during the operation.

    “DEA is proud to have worked with our federal partners in this successful enforcement effort using all of the resources of the federal government to remove violent criminal aliens from our communities, said DEA New England Field Division acting Special Agent in Charge Stephen Belleau. “DEA has prioritized investigations on those involving violent, illegal criminal aliens responsible for flooding our communities with deadly and dangerous drugs. DEA’s core mission is to keep the American public safe by seizing deadly and dangerous drugs before they get into our communities, and to bring justice to the criminals responsible for manufacturing, distributing, and supplying these drugs.”

    ICE and their federal law enforcement partners made many of the apprehensions after local jurisdictions refused to honor immigration detainer requests to turn over the offenders and instead chose to release aliens from custody, forcing officers and agents to make at-large arrests in Massachusetts communities.

    “The successful outcome of this immigration enforcement operation demonstrates the dedication and collaboration of our law enforcement partners,” said Special Agent in Charge of the ATF Boston Field Division James M. Ferguson. “By targeting individuals who pose a threat to public safety, we are reinforcing our commitment to protecting our communities and upholding the integrity of our nation’s immigration laws.”

    “The Diplomatic Security Service is fully committed to supporting the Administration’s priority to reduce illegal immigration and root out those who endeavor to exploit the U.S. travel system,” said Diplomatic Security Service Boston Field Office Special Agent in Charge Matthew O’Brien. “This enhanced operation definitively made our communities safer. DSS proudly coordinates with our U.S. and international law enforcement partners to conduct passport, visa fraud, and human trafficking investigations and assist in apprehending fugitives to protect the integrity of U.S. borders and prevent illegal immigration.”

    Among those arrested during the enhanced targeted operation include:

    • A Dominican alien who illegally re-entered the U.S. after removal charged with multiple drug distribution crimes, arrested in Boston.
    • A Dominican alien who illegally re-entered the U.S. after removal charged with trafficking fentanyl, arrested in Boston.
    • A Chilean alien convicted of 4 counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under 14 years old, arrested in Marlborough.
    • A Brazilian alien charged with manslaughter, homicide by a motor vehicle, homicide while under the influence of liquor, breaking and entering in the nighttime with intent to commit a crime, and larceny, arrested in Worcester.
    • A Honduran alien who illegally re-entered the U.S. after removal convicted of rape of a child, assault and battery of a person over 14 and failure to register as a sex offender, arrested in Salem.
    • A Brazilian alien wanted for murder and convicted for firearms trafficking in his native country, arrested in Milford.
    • A Brazilian alien wanted for homicide in in his home country, arrested in Lowell.
    • A Russian alien charged with unlawful possession of ammunition and wanted in his native country for armed robbery and membership in a criminal organization, arrested in Medford.
    • A Dominican alien wanted for homicide in his native country, arrested in Dorchester.
    • A Brazilian alien wanted in his native county for failure to serve a sentence after his convictions for homicide and illegal possession of a firearm arrested in Marlborough.
    • A Salvadoran alien previously deported from the U.S. and documented 18th Street gang member convicted of assault and battery and sentenced to two and a half years committed arrested in Wakefield.
    • A Guatemalan alien charged with rape and convicted of enticing a minor under the age of 16, released by the New Bedford District Court without the ICE detainer being honored, arrested in New Bedford.
    • A Jamaican alien previously deported from the U.S. convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, armed robbery, possession of a firearm, and assault arrested in Pittsfield.
    • A Brazilian alien wanted for in his native country for drug trafficking, money laundering, membership in a criminal organization arrested in West Yarmouth.

    Partner law enforcement participating in the operation were the Boston offices of the FBI, DEA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service and DSS, as well as the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts.

    Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

    Learn more about ICE’s mission to increase public safety in our communities on X: @EROBoston and @HSINewEngland.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Concludes Sixty-Third Session

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    NEW YORK, 24 March (Office of Legal Affairs) ― The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf held its sixty-third session at United Nations Headquarters from 17 February to 21 March.  The plenary parts of the session were held from 24 to 28 February and from 10 to 14 March.  The remainder of the session was devoted to the technical examination of submissions at the premises of the Division, including geographic information systems laboratories and other technical facilities.

    During the first plenary part of the session, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, Elinor Hammarskjöld, addressed the Commission for the first time since her appointment.  She acknowledged the crucial contribution of the Commission to the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and paid tribute to the significant work carried out by the members of the Commission in this regard.  Noting the ongoing liquidity crisis affecting regular budget operations of the United Nations Secretariat, the Under‑Secretary-General reiterated that the Division would continue to do its utmost to deliver high-quality support to the Commission within the available means.

    The Submissions of the following coastal States were considered by the Commission and its subcommissions: Mauritius in respect of the region of Rodrigues Island (partial submission); Palau in respect of the North Area (partial amended submission); Portugal; Spain in respect of the area of Galicia (partial submission); Namibia; Cuba in respect of the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; Mozambique; and Madagascar; as well as revised submissions made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Equatorial Margin (partial revised submission); Cook Islands concerning the Manihiki Plateau (revised submission); Iceland in respect of the western, southern and south-eastern parts of the Reykjanes Ridge (partial revised submission); Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin (partial revised submission); and the Russian Federation in the Area of the Gakkel Ridge in the Arctic Ocean (partial revised submission).

    The Commission approved three sets of recommendations, namely in regard to the submissions made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Equatorial Margin (partial revised submission); Cuba in respect the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; and Iceland in respect of the western, southern and south-eastern parts of the Reykjanes Ridge (partial revised submission).

    During its plenary meetings, with regard to the submission made by Guyana, the Commission decided to defer its consideration in view of an objection conveyed by Venezuela.

    The Commission further heard presentations on the submission of Mozambique, which was a repeat presentation made upon the request of the coastal State; the partial revised submission made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin; and the partial submission made by Viet Nam in respect of the Central Area.

    Underscoring the importance that submitting States attach to the work of the Commission, delegations were represented in the plenary at the high level:  the delegation of Mozambique was headed by the Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy, Estêvão Tomás Rafael Pale; the delegation of Cuba was headed by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Fernández de Cossío Domínguez; and the delegation of the Russian Federation was headed by the Minister for Natural Resources and Environment, Alexander Kozlov.

    In view of the progress in its work, the Commission decided to establish subcommissions to consider the partial submission made by Mexico in respect of the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; the submission made by the United Republic of Tanzania; and the partial submission made by Denmark in respect of the Southern Continental Shelf of Greenland. With a view to facilitating the efficient consideration of submissions, the Commission decided that subcommissions could actively consider two submissions in parallel, as needed.

    The Commission appointed the new member of the Commission, Ahmed Er Raji (Morocco), to subcommissions.  In view of the resignation of Mr. Brekke due to health reasons and the establishment of new subcommissions, the Commission also adjusted the membership of some existing subcommissions and subsidiary bodies.  The Commission also elected David Cole Mosher (Canada) as Vice-Chair of the Commission for the remainder of the current two-and-a-half-year term — until 15 December.

    With regard to the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 79/144 for the Secretary-General to develop and make available training courses to assist States in relation to the preparation, making and maintenance of submissions, as well as their consideration, the secretariat informed the Commission that no earmarked voluntary trust fund contributions for such activities had been received as of 13 March, and that, if no contributions were received by April, the secretariat would not be in a position to deliver on this mandate in 2025.

    The Commission also continued its consideration of initiatives to enhance efficiency in its work, including the development of technical bulletins and templates for presentations and recommendations.

    Further details on the sixty-third session will be available in the Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission (document CLCS/63/2).

    The background press release on this session is available at https://press.un.org/en/2025/sea2206.doc.htm.

    Background

    Established pursuant to article 2 of annex II to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Commission makes recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, based on information submitted by those coastal States.  The recommendations are based on the scientific data and other material provided by coastal States in relation to the implementation of article 76 of the Convention and do not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or prejudice the position of States that are parties to a land or maritime dispute, or application of other parts of the Convention or any other treaties.  The limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of the recommendations are final and binding. In the case of disagreement by a coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission.

    Under rule 23 of its rules of procedure (Public and private meetings), the meetings of the Commission, its subcommissions and subsidiary bodies are held in private, unless the Commission decides otherwise.

    As required under the rules of procedure of the Commission, the executive summaries of all the submissions, including all charts and coordinates, have been made public by the Secretary‑General through continental shelf notifications circulated to Member States of the United Nations, as well as States Parties to the Convention.  The executive summaries are available on the Division’s website at:  www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.  The summaries of recommendations adopted by the Commission are also available on the above-referenced website.

    The Commission is a body of 21 experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography serving in their personal capacities. Members of the Commission are elected for a term of five years by the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention having due regard to the need to ensure equitable geographical representation. Not fewer than three members shall be elected from each geographical region.

    Currently, two seats on the Commission are vacant as a result of the resignation of Mr. Brekke and the long-standing vacancy resulting from a lack of nominations from the Group of Eastern European States.  A call for nominations has been circulated to States Parties with a view to filling these vacancies at a by-election to be conducted at the thirty-fifth Meeting of States Parties, scheduled to be convened from 23 to 27 June. The nomination period opened on 12 February and will close on 12 May at midnight.

    The Convention provides that the State party which submitted the nomination of a member of the Commission shall defray the expenses of that member while in performance of Commission duties.  A voluntary trust fund for the purpose of defraying the cost of participation of the members of the Commission from developing countries has been established.  It has facilitated the participation of several members of the Commission from developing countries in the sessions of the Commission.

    The convening by the Secretary-General of the sessions of the Commission, with full conference services, including documentation, for the plenary parts of these sessions, is subject to approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations.  The Assembly does so in its annual resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea, which also address other matters relevant to the work of the Commission and the conditions of service of its members.

    For additional information on the work of the Commission see the website of the Division at www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm.  In particular, the most recent Statements by the Chair on the progress in the work of the Commission are available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Reports 2024 Financial Results and Business Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Revenue up 28% to $12.9 million in 2024

    Redomicile to U.S. Nears Completion; Set to Accelerate Market Opportunities

    Completed $10 Million Private Placement

    Entered into $50 Million At-The-Market (ATM) Program

    NEW YORK, March 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in sub-meter resolution Earth Observation (“EO”) data collection, today provided a business update and financial results for the year ended December 31, 2024.

    “The second half of 2024 was highlighted by commercial milestones, including a pivotal agreement with Maxar Intelligence granting them exclusive rights to task Satellogic’s high-revisit constellation and use our cost-effective satellite imagery to support national security missions for the U.S. Government and select U.S. partners internationally.” said Satellogic CEO, Emiliano Kargieman.

    “Additionally, we were selected by NASA as one of eight recipients of NASA’s Commercial SmallSat Data Acquisition Program (CSDA) On-Ramp1 Multiple Award contract, with a maximum cumulative value of $476 million for all award winners. We have begun work on our first task order with NASA, an 18-month, seven figure award that will allow NASA researchers to utilize Satellogic data for critical earth science imagery analysis. This award highlights Satellogic’s commitment to delivering high-quality Earth observation data to advance scientific research and enhance life on Earth,” said Kargieman.

    “In 2024, we have made good progress in raising capital to further invest in the business. In December we announced the private placement of $10 million made by a single institutional investor and the filing of a $150 million shelf registration statement and the entry into a $50 million ATM program. We are pleased to have successfully completed this private placement, which positions us for continued growth as we advance our mission and continue our focus on our U.S. strategy, the National Security market, and our global Space Systems opportunities. The shelf registration statement and ATM program allow for future flexibility in our capital markets strategy by establishing a framework for potential future capital-raising opportunities to further strengthen our liquidity position,” concluded Kargieman.

    “We are also excited to disclose our intended domestication to the U.S. in December, which is expected to be completed by the end of the month,” commented Rick Dunn, Satellogic CFO. We believe the domestication will continue to lower our barriers to entry in the U.S. and allied markets and improve transparency for investors and customers.”

    “In terms of financial results, we ended 2024 with $22.5 million of cash on hand and continued to reduce our cash used in operations by $13.7 million, or 27.6%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. Our revenue increased 28% to $12.9 million, while our cost of sales, excluding depreciation expense, remained flat year-over-year. As a percentage of revenue, our cost of sales were 39% for the year ended December 31, 2024, a substantial improvement compared to 50% in the prior year.”

    “While our improving revenue performance and strategic progress are encouraging and confidence-building, we’ve continued the work started in 2023 to realign and streamline our business to better position us to capitalize on near-term growth opportunities. Specifically, we further reduced our workforce by 104 full time equivalents in the second quarter of 2024, incurring approximately $2.0 million in cumulative severance-related charges that have been paid out in 2024, and also identified additional operating cost reductions. The cumulative impact of these workforce reductions and operating expense savings is expected to result in approximately $9.6 million of annual savings. As a result of our previously announced successful Mark V deployment, the Company now has capacity to meet current customer needs and we expect to moderate our constellation growth initiatives going forward to pace with expected customer growth.”

    “We expect that our revenue for 2025 will largely be dependent on closing opportunities within our Space Systems line of business, which we anticipate will contribute considerable per unit cash flow and strong gross margin. As we look to 2025 and beyond, management continues to focus on near-term growth opportunities and moving the Company forward on a path to profitability,” concluded Dunn.

    Financial Results for the Year Ended December 31, 2024

    • Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024, increased by $2.8 million, or 28%, to $12.9 million, as compared to revenue of $10.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was driven primarily by a $5 million increase in imagery ordered by new and existing Asset Monitoring customers, partially offset by a $2.2 million decrease in revenue generated from the Space Systems business line. Revenue for the year ended December 31, 2024 included $9.5 million attributable to our Asset Monitoring line of business, $1.8 million attributable to our Space Systems line of business, and $1.6 million attributable to our CaaS line of business compared to $4.5 million, $3.9 million and $1.6 million, respectively, in the prior year.
    • Cost of Sales, excluding depreciation expense, for the year ended December 31, 2024, remained flat at $5.0 million, as compared to $5.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. However, as a percentage of revenue, our cost of sales were 39% for the year ended December 31, 2024, as compared to 50% for the year ended December 31, 2023.
    • Selling, General and Administrative expenses for the year ended December 31, 2024, decreased by $2.0 million, or 6%, to $33.0 million, as compared to $35.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. This decrease was primarily driven by a decrease in salaries, wages, stock-based compensation and other benefits as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024 and other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024. Additionally, the decrease was driven by lower expense for estimated credit losses on accounts receivable and lower insurance costs due to rate improvements on certain policies. These decreases were partially offset by a $4.0 million increase in professional fees consisting mainly of the accrued, nonrecurring advisory fee pursuant to the subscription agreement entered into with Liberty in connection with going public in 2022 and professional fees related to the secured convertible notes.
    • Engineering expenses for the year ended June 30, 2024, decreased $7.8 million, or 35%, to $14.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 from $22.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The decrease was driven primarily by a decrease in salaries, wages, and other benefits and stock-based compensation as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024 and other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024, in addition to fees resulting from the termination of our high-throughput plant lease in the Netherlands.
    • Net loss for the year ended December 31, 2024, increased by $55.2 million to $116.3 million, as compared to a net loss of $61.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. The increase was primarily driven by an increase in the change in fair value of financial instruments ($60.0 million) and other expenses ($3.2 million) offset by increases in revenue and decreases in operating costs.
    • Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA loss for the year ended December 31, 2024, improved by $10.4 million to $33.7 million, from an Adjusted EBITDA loss of $44.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2023, primarily due to year-over-year increases in revenue and decreases in operating expenses.
    • Cash was $22.5 million at December 31, 2024, compared to $23.5 million at December 31, 2023.
    • Net cash used in operating activities was $35.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $49.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2023. This decline in net cash used by operations was primarily due to workforce reduction and overall cost control initiatives.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We monitor a number of financial performance and liquidity measures on a regular basis in order to track the progress of our business. Included in these financial performance and liquidity measures are the non-GAAP measures, Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA. We believe these measures provide analysts, investors and management with helpful information regarding the underlying operating performance of our business, as they remove the impact of items that we believe are not reflective of our underlying operating performance. The non-GAAP measures are used by us to evaluate our core operating performance and liquidity on a comparable basis and to make strategic decisions. The non-GAAP measures also facilitate company-to-company operating performance comparisons by backing out potential differences caused by variations such as capital structures, taxation, capital expenditures and non-cash items (i.e., depreciation, embedded derivatives, debt extinguishment and stock-based compensation) which may vary for different companies for reasons unrelated to operating performance. However, different companies may define these terms differently and accordingly comparisons might not be accurate. Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA are not intended to be a substitute for any GAAP financial measure. For the definitions of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA and reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, net loss, see below.

    We define Non-GAAP EBITDA as net loss excluding interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. We did not incur amortization expense during the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023.

    We define Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA as Non-GAAP EBITDA further adjusted for professional fees related to the secured convertible notes, other income (expense), net, changes in the fair value of financial instruments and stock-based compensation. Other income, net consists mainly of differences related to foreign exchange gains and losses as well as gains and losses on disposal of property and equipment.

    The following table presents a reconciliation of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA to its net loss for the periods indicated.

      Years Ended December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars) 2024   2023
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (116,272 )   $ (61,018 )
    Interest expense   71       51  
    Income tax expense   2,858       9,082  
    Depreciation expense   12,655       17,256  
    Non-GAAP EBITDA $ (100,688 )   $ (34,629 )
    Professional fees related to Secured Convertible Notes   2,444       —  
    Other expense (income), net   2,107       (9,271 )
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   60,071       (6,474 )
    Stock-based compensation   2,335       6,299  
    Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA $ (33,731 )   $ (44,075 )
                   

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high-resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s strategic realignment as a U.S. company, and the visibility and high growth opportunities it will provide in connection therewith. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third pirates for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, (xv) competition for EO services, (xvi) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xvii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xviii) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xix) substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch and (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 20-F and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Contacts

    Investor Relations:

    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development
    ryan.driver@satellogic.com

    Media Relations:

    Satellogic
    pr@satellogic.com

    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE LOSS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Year Ended December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except share and per share amounts) 2024   2023
    Revenue $ 12,870     $ 10,074  
    Costs and expenses      
    Cost of sales, exclusive of depreciation shown separately below   5,024       5,056  
    Selling, general and administrative   32,992       34,968  
    Engineering   14,405       22,197  
    Depreciation expense   12,655       17,256  
    Total costs and expenses   65,076       79,477  
    Operating loss   (52,206 )     (69,403 )
    Other (expense) income, net      
    Interest income, net   970       1,722  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   (60,071 )     6,474  
    Other (expense) income, net   (2,107 )     9,271  
    Total other (expense) income, net   (61,208 )     17,467  
    Loss before income tax   (113,414 )     (51,936 )
    Income tax expense   (2,858 )     (9,082 )
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (116,272 )   $ (61,018 )
    Other comprehensive loss      
    Foreign currency translation gain (loss), net of tax   (538 )     279  
    Comprehensive loss $ (116,810 )   $ (60,739 )
           
    Basic net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (1.28 )   $ (0.68 )
    Basic weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   91,164,286       89,539,910  
    Diluted net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (1.28 )   $ (0.68 )
    Diluted weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   91,164,286       89,539,910  
                   
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    UNAUDITED
     
      December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except per share amounts)  2024     2023 
    ASSETS      
    Current assets      
    Cash and cash equivalents $         22,493     $         23,476  
    Accounts receivable, net of allowance of $148 and $126, respectively                          1,464       901  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets                           3,907                               2,173  
    Total current assets                         27,864                             26,550  
    Property and equipment, net                         27,228                             41,130  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   877       3,195  
    Other non-current assets                           5,722                               5,507  
    Total assets $         61,691     $         76,382  
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ (DEFICIT) EQUITY      
    Current liabilities      
    Accounts payable $         3,754     $         7,935  
    Warrant liabilities                         11,511                               2,795  
    Earnout liabilities                           1,501       419  
    Operating lease liabilities   363       2,143  
    Contract liabilities                           5,871                               3,728  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities                         11,621                               4,372  
    Total current liabilities                         34,621                             21,392  
    Secured Convertible Notes at fair value   79,070       —  
    Operating lease liabilities   516       1,789  
    Contract liabilities   —       1,000  
    Other non-current liabilities   516       526  
    Total liabilities                       114,723                             24,707  
    Commitments and contingencies      
    Stockholders’ (deficit) equity      
    Preferred stock, $0.0001 par value, 5,000,000 shares authorized, 0 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023                                 —                                     —  
    Class A Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 385,000,000 shares authorized, 83,000,501 shares issued and 82,432,678 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and 77,289,166 shares issued and 76,721,343 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2023                                 —                                     —  
    Class B Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 15,000,000 shares authorized, 13,582,642 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023                                 —                                     —  
    Treasury stock, at cost, 567,823 shares as of December 31, 2024 and 567,823 shares as of December 31, 2023                         (8,603 )                           (8,603 )
    Additional paid-in capital                       356,247                           344,144  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (571 )     (33 )
    Accumulated deficit   (400,105 )     (283,833 )
    Total stockholders’ (deficit) equity                       (53,032 )                           51,675  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ (deficit) equity $         61,691     $         76,382  
                   
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Year Ended December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars) 2024   2023
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net loss $ (116,272 )   $ (61,018 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash used in operating activities:      
    Depreciation expense   12,655       17,256  
    Debt issuance costs   2,397       —  
    Operating lease expense   1,515       2,751  
    Stock-based compensation   2,335       6,299  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   60,071       (6,474 )
    Foreign exchange differences   (2,936 )     (10,933 )
    Loss on disposal of property and equipment   4,377       —  
    Expense for estimated credit losses on accounts receivable, net of recoveries   22       1,126  
    Non-cash change in contract liabilities   (1,323 )     1,188  
    Other, net   234       666  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable   (1,126 )     (385 )
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   (1,666 )     2,114  
    Accounts payable   (2,356 )     1,533  
    Contract liabilities   2,532       598  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   7,200       (2,059 )
    Operating lease liabilities   (2,024 )     (2,233 )
    Cash paid for interest on Secured Convertible Notes   (1,525 )     —  
    Net cash used in operating activities   (35,890 )     (49,571 )
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Purchases of property and equipment   (5,038 )     (14,885 )
    Other   6       450  
    Net cash used in investing activities   (5,032 )     (14,435 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from Secured Convertible Notes   30,000       —  
    Payments of debt issuance costs   (2,397 )     —  
    Tax withholding payments for vested equity-based compensation awards   (660 )     (458 )
    Proceeds from exercise of Public Warrants   1       —  
    Proceeds from PIPE Investment, net of transaction costs   9,600       —  
    Proceeds from exercise of stock options   911       375  
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   37,455       (83 )
    Net (decrease) increase in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash   (3,467 )     (64,089 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes   2,546       10,900  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – beginning of period   24,603       77,792  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – end of period $ 23,682     $ 24,603  

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: INVESTOR SUMMIT SPEECH

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Ka nui te mihi kia kotou, kia ora, and good morning everyone. 
    To those of you visiting us from overseas, can I extend a very special welcome to each and every one of you. 
    Welcome to New Zealand, welcome to the best country on planet Earth, and welcome to our stunning Auckland waterfront. 
    And to all those Kiwis I see in the room today, thank you for being here and showcasing some of the extraordinary businesses and talent that exists in our business community. 
    And it was a real pleasure to meet many of you informally last night, and my Ministers and I are really looking forward to spending much more time with you over the next two days. 
    I meant it before when I said this is the best country on planet Earth. 
    Because what makes New Zealand so very special and unique is our Kiwi Spirit which is exemplified in the qualities, character, and attitude of New Zealanders.  
    For us, it‘s about resilience and determination, ingenuity and innovation, adventure and exploration, creativity and practical problem-solving, humility and mateship, fairness, and a deep care for our land and community. 
    It’s no surprise that growing up in New Zealand, our heroes are Kiwi trailblazers and pioneers, people who have dared to push boundaries, challenge the status quo, and leave a lasting mark on the world.
    From our early Māori explorers navigating vast oceans guided by the stars, to modern-day adventurers like Sir Edmund Hillary conquering Everest.   
    To Ernest Rutherford, the father of nuclear physics, who split the atom and revolutionised our understanding of science. To Rocket Lab’s Peter Beck and his groundbreaking developments in rocket technology launching satellites into space. 
    And Kate Shepperd, who secured New Zealand women the right to vote – the very first country in the world to do so. 
    And our phenomenal athletes who show the world what determination and talent can achieve. Or the stunning world of The Lord of the Rings created by one of our most creative storytellers – Peter Jackson.
    We may be a small country, but time and again, we have proven that size is no barrier to greatness. From the peaks of Everest to the frontlines of social progress, from scientific breakthroughs to arts and sporting legends, Kiwis have led the way.
    And we’re living in an age when New Zealand has never been closer to the action – right in the middle of the booming Indo-Pacific with direct connections to Asia and North America. 
    With the weight of global economic activity shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific and digital connections breaking down barriers, New Zealand has never been closer to the world.  
    But for all our spirit and hard work, we also know New Zealand can’t do it alone. 
    We’re a small country of around five million people like Ireland, Singapore, and Denmark. 
    Just as those countries have prospered by tapping into larger markets, building stronger international connections, and fostering trade and investment, New Zealand needs to do the same. 
    If we want our country to thrive, we need to work even harder to compete on the world stage – and, in particular, to unlock the commercial partnerships that will supercharge the next generation of growth in the New Zealand economy. 
    That means the Government will work more with Industry to deliver much of the infrastructure and projects that will be showcased over the next two days. 
    Many of your organisations will have extensive experience delivering outstanding world-class infrastructure to national and regional governments worldwide.
    I want New Zealand to seize every opportunity to partner with the private sector and deliver a fresh generation of infrastructure investment to unleash economic growth.  
    But it’s not just infrastructure. 
    I want to develop closer ties between outstanding New Zealanders and their companies based here, with investors and organisations based offshore.  
    I also want to unlock more partnerships between indigenous Iwi Māori organisations and commercial investors, whether they are based in Auckland or Abu Dhabi, Dunedin or Denver.  
    I want start-ups based in Christchurch and Hamilton fighting for seed capital in San Francisco and London – winning their share of global influence and success. 
    Breaking perceptions about the New Zealand economy is critical to that. 
    Yes, we have globally competitive dairy, film, and tourist industries, but our space industry is also operating at the cutting edge, ranking fourth in the world for launches behind the US, China, and Russia. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear more about our plan to unleash growth and ensure New Zealand reaches its full potential. 
    We want you to join us on that journey, and we will have several opportunities on display. 
    That will include the opportunity to deliver infrastructure in partnership with the Crown – both in the form of immediate opportunities and the pipeline of projects going forward. 
    It will include working with Iwi Māori organisations to grow their businesses as they make a multigenerational investment in their people. 
    It will include opportunities in a range of specific sectors where we believe New Zealand has a unique role to play and where we expect the Government to focus its efforts on growth. 
    In the very short term, we have made good economic progress in our first year in Government, although there’s still a long way to go. 
    New Zealand is now in the early stages of a cyclical economic recovery, with growth beginning to pick up and unemployment expected to peak around its current rate. 
    Inflation has fallen and now sits comfortably anchored within the Reserve Bank’s target band at 2.2%. 
    Annual tourism expenditure was up 23% last year, and services and manufacturing activity have returned to growth after extended periods of contraction. 
    Business confidence is at around its highest level in a decade. As confidence has risen, retail trade has picked up, and growth is expected to rise, hitting 3% in 2026. 
    So, there’s now cause for optimism in the New Zealand economy that the recovery is underway and better days lie ahead. 
    For policymakers here in New Zealand, that poses an opportunity – not just to watch the economic recovery, but to shape it. 
    Step-changing economic productivity, lifting incomes, creating jobs, and unleashing the investment New Zealand needs to become much more prosperous.  
    Which brings us to today. 
    I know the only way we will raise incomes, lift New Zealanders’ standard of living, and fund the quality public services we rely on is by unlocking more investment, more innovation, and more entrepreneurship.
    Having broken inflation last year, our collective focus has now turned to shaping the economic recovery – ensuring we take every possible step to lift New Zealand’s economic performance. 
    That renewed energy and effort forms the backdrop of this Summit. 
    My Government is working around the clock to make New Zealand an outstanding place to do business. 
    But before I highlight some of those reforms and my economic priorities as Prime Minister, I want to make a more fundamental point about New Zealand as an investment destination. 
    New Zealand has been and will continue to be a poster child for social and political stability in a more volatile and challenging world. 
    That reputation is long-standing, but in challenging times, it has come into sharper focus. 
    We stand up for our values and live by them, too. That means respecting civil liberties, private property and private life, and the democratic and social institutions that underpin them. 
    We consistently advocate for a rules-based international order that allows small countries like New Zealand to thrive. Free trade isn’t just an idea in New Zealand; it’s the bedrock of our prosperity. 
    For farmers and growers living in rural New Zealand, it has allowed a modern economic miracle: the opportunity to not just collectively operate one of the most efficient agricultural sectors in the world but to live in some of the most stunning parts of the world while they do it. 
    Finally, we might disagree sometimes – but we’re not disagreeable. Over the next two days, you will hear from various political leaders.
    You will hear from senior Ministers representing each of the three political parties in our Coalition Government, as well as Barbara Edmonds, the Labour Party’s Opposition Finance Spokesperson.  
    It’s pretty normal in New Zealand for political parties to disagree with each other – often loudly, and sometimes even with my own Coalition colleagues. 
    But I believe the broad political representation that is here demonstrates that most New Zealanders share the same motivations – higher incomes and more financial freedom, quality public services, and a long-standing belief that our best days lie ahead of us. 
    When you look at all the tension, volatility, and strife in the world today, I think that makes us pretty special, and a very attractive destination for anyone looking to take shelter from the global storm. 
    Political stability, however, is not an excuse for a lack of ambition. 
    You should be under no illusions about my commitment to the Government’s growth agenda and the reforms we are pushing through to unleash investment in the New Zealand economy. 
    Last month, Minister for Economic Growth Nicola Willis published our Government’s Going for Growth Agenda – we have copies for you here – which outlines a range of actions we are taking to get the New Zealand economy moving and realising its vast potential. 
    Each of those actions fits into one of five pillars we have identified as critical to lifting economic growth and improving New Zealanders’ standard of living:

    Developing talent,
    Encouraging innovation, science, and technology,
    Introducing competitive business settings,
    Promoting global trade and investment,
    And delivering infrastructure for growth. 

    Across each of those pillars, we have Ministers from across the Government working day and night to drive through reform – in transport,  tourism, aquaculture, construction, advanced aviation, mining, energy, agriculture, and horticulture. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear much more about our work programme in those areas that will play a critical role in the next phase of New Zealand’s growth story – with more information on a series of specific investable propositions available in the private sector. 
    Among that reform programme are some significant changes designed to achieve a profound step change in the New Zealand economy that I would like to touch on today. 
    For a start, we are clearing away decades of broken planning law – brick by brick. 
    We have introduced the Fast Track regime, which streamlines the consenting process for projects that are regionally and nationally significant. 
    In short, instead of seeking different permissions under different laws, under Fast Track, it’s all done in one place, with a faster process and fewer hurdles to getting underway. 
    That regime is now up and running, and I know a number of projects have already submitted applications since it became operational last month. 
    In short, if you want to build a wind farm, a highway, a quarry, hundreds of new homes, or any other regionally or nationally significant projects, we are busting down the doors to make it happen faster and cheaper. 
    149 projects have already been listed in legislation, but nothing prevents new projects from applying for referral into the scheme. 
    And it doesn’t stop with Fast Track. 
    Further planning reforms are also on the way, including a total replacement of the Resource Management Act. 
    We are also eliminating the barriers to more significant investment in energy and generation to unleash abundant, affordable energy. 
    The impact of unaffordable and unreliable energy on economic growth has been brought into the spotlight in recent years following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 
    Industries in Europe that had historically relied on access to low-cost natural gas came under tremendous strain, putting pressure on growth and household incomes. 
    In New Zealand, we are lucky that 85% of electricity generation is already renewable, thanks to decades of investment in hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal.  
    But we can’t risk falling short in the years to come. So, as a Government, we are tearing down the barriers to fresh energy investment. That means introducing more permissive rules for renewables.
    But it also means ending restrictions on offshore oil and gas exploration – and providing certainty for market participants by confidently saying that gas has to be part of New Zealand’s energy mix going forward.  
    At the same time, we are making it easier to invest in New Zealand from offshore.  
    That started last year, with fresh directives to our Overseas Investment Office, which slashed processing times and made applications more predictable. 
    Today, an application for offshore investment is approved within 18 days on average, compared to 28 days prior to those changes.
    And two weeks ago, we announced upcoming changes to legislation designed to further improve the timeliness and reliability of our overseas investment regime. 
    We also announced just last month that, from April 1 this year, individuals who invest at least $5 million in New Zealand will be eligible for an Active Investor Visa, with a pathway to residency after three years. 
    I know that for many of you from offshore in this room, that will be positive news. But as a New Zealander, I have to say it’s an even bigger deal for the sharp, ambitious Kiwis here and all around the country, who are hungry for capital and hungry to grow. 
    We know the impact foreign investment has on local businesses. It’s not just the capital investment; it’s the skills, connections, and linkages into new markets. 
    That translates into higher wages, more jobs, more money in Kiwi wallets, and more resilient businesses that make an even greater contribution in the community. 
    We need more of it, especially for a small country hungry to grow like New Zealand, which is why I have invited many of you here today. 
    I believe New Zealand’s best days are ahead of us—and we can make them happen if we get serious about partnering with commercial expertise to solve some of our biggest economic challenges and seize on the huge economic opportunities ahead of us. 
    Helping to end New Zealand’s infrastructure deficit through private sector partnership.
    Fattening out our capital markets and opening up new sectors for growth.
    Strengthening our connections to the world, enhancing technology, lifting productivity, and opening new markets for our products and services. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear from a range of leaders—cabinet Ministers, business leaders, and Iwi Māori leaders—who I know are committed to responding to our challenges and opportunities. 
    There will also be plenty of time across both days for closer interactions and to discuss the opportunities and challenges that you are confronting in your own businesses. 
    While you’re here, please also enjoy our hospitality and culture. We’re not just here to do business—we’re here to build relationships and make the case for New Zealand as an outstanding country to invest in, to visit, and to establish roots in. 
    So once again, and on behalf of the New Zealand Government and the New Zealand people, welcome to this year’s Summit. 
    I’m excited to get stuck in – and I can’t wait to hear more from you over the next two days about your approach to business and the difference you could make for growth, investment, jobs, and opportunity for us here in New Zealand. 
    Thank you. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Examines Ways to Strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping against New Threats

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Delegates Debate ‘Christmas-Tree’ Add-on Mandates versus Focusing on Core Tasks

    The Security Council today debated ways to adapt United Nations peacekeeping to evolving threats with Member States emphasizing the need to partner with regional organizations and actively involve local communities, particularly women.  They also stressed the importance of aligning mandates with available resources, leveraging intelligence-led strategies and digital tools for data-driven decision-making, and avoiding overly broad “Christmas-tree mandates” that prolong operations and escalate costs.

    “Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said during the Council’s day-long open debate focusing on the ability of United Nations peace operations to adjust to new realities on the ground.  These challenges along with more complex and deadly wars, he cautioned, “throw fuel on the fires of conflict”.

    He also highlighted a “persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources”, as well as growing divisions within Council itself.  To address this, he called for a tailored and collective approach to peace operations. Announcing a forthcoming United Nations peace operation review — mandated by Member States in the Pact for the Future, he said that this process will incorporate insights from the New Agenda for Peace and from the first comprehensive study of special political missions in the 80-year history of the United Nations.

    Peace operations, he emphasized, must engage early with host nations and local partners, guided by clear, achievable mandates and viable exit strategies.  “Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process,” Mr. Guterres concluded.

    Cultural Shifts Required

    “The fact that peace operations are effective is one of the most verified findings in international relations literature,” said Jenna Russo, Director of Research at the International Peace Institute and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.  “Yet, there is often a dissonance between these findings and the lived experiences of those in conflict settings,” she added.

    Offering four recommendations, she first called for a stronger planning culture within the Secretariat.  Bureaucratic and political barriers have kept this culture of planning from taking root, she said, adding that the Organization should build the capacity to discern emerging trends, anticipate potential shifts and respond proactively.

    Secondly, she said, the Organization must embrace a “risk-tolerant culture around peace operations”, noting that “personnel are structurally disincentivized from trying new things and reporting what doesn’t work for fear that their budgets and jobs may suffer the consequences”.  She highlighted the need for a culture that creates space for trying and even failing, with the aim of learning and improving — “this culture must come from the top”.

    “The Secretariat should tell the Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear,” she underscored as her third recommendation, citing the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.  Instead of the Secretariat pre-emptively lowering the bar on what is politically possible, she said, it should present a wide range of options and leave it to the Council to adjust the bar.

    Modular Approach — Building Blocks

    Her final recommendation was that the Council should consider the advantages and the risks of a modular approach to peace operations.  Mandated sets of activities like electoral support, human rights monitoring or security sector reform can be “treated like building blocks that can be scaled up or down over the lifespan of a mission”, she said.  This approach can promote more tailored responses and align mandates with available resources, but it comes with the risk that broader peacebuilding aspects “could fall by the wayside if the Council or host States view them as optional”, she added.

    In the ensuing open debate, speakers stressed the need to evolve with the times, underscored the importance of regional partnerships and called for a more people-centered approach that involves local communities, and specifically women, in peace efforts.

    Closer Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    “For millions, the blue flag and the blue helmets are symbols of hope,” said Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, as he spoke in his national capacity.  However, just as conflicts and needs have evolved, so must the UN’s tools, he stressed, urging closer collaboration with regional and subregional organizations — “especially the African Union” — and the inclusion of women in peace processes.

    Zane Dangor, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, said that deployments by regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), if authorized and supported by the UN, could off-set the limitations of the Organization’s peacekeeping operations.  Calling for the accelerated implementation of Council resolution 2719 (2023), he said the Council can also gain insights from the experiences of African peace operations that are often conducted in difficult conditions and with limited resources.

    Jiří Kozák, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, emphasized that strong coordination with regional partners, such as the African Union and European Union, must be systematic, practical and based on the sharing of resources, information and best practices.  “Improved coordination will ensure stronger political and operational support,” he added.

    Similarly, Guyana’s representative highlighted the need for deeper collaboration with regional organizations and reiterated the calls of previous speakers who stressed that women must be present at all levels — from peacekeeping forces to peace negotiations.

    “Peace should be built from the ground up,” said Javier Martínez-Acha Vásquez, Panama’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Conflict-resolution mechanisms “are more likely to last when women are leaders and involved in the peacebuilding process”, he added.  Insun Kang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, called for a people-centered approach that respects host country priorities and national ownership.  “This approach views local populations as not just beneficiaries of peacekeeping efforts, but active participants,” she said, noting her country’s rice cultivation and vocational training initiatives in South Sudan.

    Noting that the Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation in 10 years, Syed Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned that the UN’s absence is being filled by “negative actors and soldiers of fortune”.  UN peacekeeping is cost effective, representing only 3 per cent of global military spending.  The Council must ensure it is properly funded and resourced.

    Accountability for Performance

    As the global leader of peacekeeping capacity-building, the United States aims to ensure that its programmes have measurable effects on the ground, said that country’s representative. “Robust accountability measures will enhance the effectiveness and efficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions,” she said, adding that accountability must incentivize positive performance and expedient consequences for performance failures.

    On that, Somalia’s delegate, pointing to Africa’s experience with peacekeeping operations, stressed that “success depends on two interlinked principles — clear strategic planning and operational adaptability”.

    Caution against ‘Christmas-Tree Mandates’

    Several speakers expressed concern about the overbroad mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, noting that these mandates often lead to prolonged missions in host countries, costing billions of dollars.  “The result is missions that are present in countries for decades and cost billions of dollars,” said the representative of the Russian Federation. Rather, she stressed that “the goal we need to be aiming for” is that, after a mandate is implemented, host States assume full responsibility for conflict prevention.

    “We must end the strange phenomenon where every mandate renewal leads to expansion,” said China’s representative, also rejecting the “unchecked growth of Christmas-tree mandates”.  He further underscored that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence “should always be upheld as fundamental guidelines”.

    Similarly, Algeria’s delegate said: “We are witnessing, in some cases, what can be described as ‘Christmas-tree’ mandates, under which UN missions are tasked with an overwhelming number of responsibilities, thus hindering their ability to undertake focused and targeted engagements”.

    Slovenia’s delegate was among the speakers who stressed the need to enhance early warning and rapid response capabilities to address conflicts before they escalate.  “Missions must be proactive rather than reactive,” she said.  Greece’s delegate, echoing many other delegations, condemned attacks on peacekeepers and emphasized the need to ensure their absolute safety.

    Clear, Realistic Mandates, Use of Digital Tools 

    France’s delegate said that “peacekeeping is the heart” of the UN.  Peacekeeping missions “need to be part of a strategy, but in order for them to be successful, the mandate has to be based on clear, realistic and political objectives”, he added.  The representative of the United Kingdom said the UN needs to harness innovation, using data-driven decision-making, intelligence-led approaches and digital tools.  Peacekeepers must be trained on emerging threats, including cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns and climate-related security risks.

    On the Secretary-General’s efforts to make the united Nations fit for purpose, Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of Austria, stated:  “Reform, yes; replace, no.”  Underlining the need for a “flexible toolbox of peace operations”, she stressed the importance of political solutions to the success of such operations.  “They can only keep peace where there is a peace to keep,” she observed.

    Over the past eight decades, the UN has deployed more than 120 peace operations in over 50 countries, and to a very large extent, these missions have helped prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, said the representative of Sierra Leone.  When his country was in the throes of a brutal civil war more than 20 years ago, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) assisted in disarming more than 75,000 ex-combatants, restored State authority and oversaw the first post-conflict democratic elections.  “The Mission, at the time, was seen as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding and showed how a well-resourced and adaptable UN operation can support a country to rebuild, reconcile and reclaim its future,” he said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt – A10-0037/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0461),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0009/2024),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0037/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the European Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The steady improvement of the human rights situation and women’s rights and fundamental freedoms due to an active, coherent and proactive policy in that area in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been marked by several macroeconomic adjustment programmes implemented under the aegis of the IMF in exchange for credit facilities (USD 12 billion from 2016 to 2019 and USD 3 billion in 2022, rising to USD 8 billion in March 2024);

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, and conflicts, are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Similarly, energy is also one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. The Energy Cooperation between the Union and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region but also strengthen energy security for the Union by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. In that respect, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum serves as a platform of positive regional cooperation. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including the International Law of the Sea, human rights and international humanitarian law.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the global and regional geo-political challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s responsibilities as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 7

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    (7) The objective of the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership with Egypt is to elevate the EU-Egypt political relations to a strategic partnership and enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. The partnership aims to contribute to support Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enable the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process foreseen under the IMF programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; irregular migration and mobility in respect of human rights; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital. Such Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level such as the Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan for Africa.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) Underpinning the partnership will be a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2 .

    (8) Underpinning the partnership is a financial package of EUR 7.4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, particularly in terms of irregular migration and renewable energy. Part of the support package is the EU MFA package of up to EUR 5 billion in concessional loans, composed of two MFA operations, one short-term for up to EUR 1 billion and a regular, more medium-term one for up to EUR 4 billion, financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed at mobilising public and private investments that benefit the majority of Egyptians with the objective of generating substantial new investments. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument2.

    __________________

    __________________

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    2 Established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds and gas production and loss of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve macroeconomic stability.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 12

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme is expected to be adopted by IMF Executive Board decision in March 2024 and aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    (12) Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024 and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped Extended Fund Facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. Negotiations at expert level on the fourth revision of Egypt’s economic reform programme were concluded in December 2024. The new programme aims to address the areas of 1) credible exchange rate flexibility, 2) sustainable tightening of monetary policy, 3) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability, 4) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending, 5) providing adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups from the cost of living and energy price rises, and 6) implementation of the State Ownership Policy and reforms to level the playing field by promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the staff level agreement’s signature, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the IMF programme’s priorities.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 16

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    (16) Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request for support to the economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s macro-financial assistance package, including the MFA of up to EUR 4 billion under this proposal, would support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF’s financial arrangement.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies, including those relating to democracy, human rights and rule of law, in line with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) Macro-financial assistance should remain an economic instrument. However, a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 23

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (23) In order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    (23) It is essential to underline that Egypt has to meet the necessary economic pre-condition for eligibility. Egypt has demonstrated its solvency and financial stability, which have been verified by the Commission. However, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently. Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to the assistance. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council3 and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/964 , the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after its availability period.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    3 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    4 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2).

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on respect for effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision, and provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to sustainable economic policy reforms, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    1. The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of concessional loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (“the Union’s macro-financial assistance”), with a view to supporting Egypt’s socio-economic stabilisation and a substantive structural reform agenda, as well as its responsibility to mitigate the effects of irregular migration and managing migratory flows. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the approval of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance of payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    Amendment  18

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    3a. Macro-financial assistance may, as far as possible, contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting and strengthening effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and continues to make efforts in order to guarantee respect for human rights.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and the Council on the fulfilment of the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  21

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms, such as the new criminal procedure reform, and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for SMEs, the development of rules-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  23

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    4. Where the conditions in paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    Amendment  24

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    1. In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  25

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall reimburse the loan, which shall be granted at terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including, after a formal notification to the European Parliament and the Council, a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    Amendment  26

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    1. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  27

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 2 and Article 3(1);

    Amendment  28

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) indicate the connection between the economic policy reform measures laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    (c) indicate the connection between Egypt’s economic policy reforms under the Memorandum of Understanding, its fiscal performance, and the release of Union macro-financial assistance, while outlining steps taken towards democratic mechanisms, the rule of law and human rights.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Political dialogue between Egypt and the EU was suspended after the revolution in 2011, and remained frozen through 2015. However, following Sisi’s election as president in May 2014, a rapprochement between Europe and Egypt gradually began to take place. The stability of the country became defining characteristics of European policy towards the Egypt. In 2024 the European Union (‘EU’) and Egypt have agreed to deepen their relationship and develop a strategic and comprehensive partnership for shared prosperity, stability and security, based on joint interest and mutual trust and building on the already existing positive agenda in EU-Egypt relations. The Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership covers specific areas of cooperation outlined in the Joint Declaration, clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely: political relations; economic stability; investment and trade; migration; security and law enforcement cooperation; demography and human capital.

    The partnership is based on a financial package consisting of short- and longer-term support for the necessary macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities.

    Given Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and Egypt’s role as an important stabilising factor amid geopolitical tensions in an increasingly volatile region, the Commission proposed on 15 March 2024 to support Egypt with macro-financial assistance (‘MFA’) of up to EUR 5 billion in loans as part of the EUR 7.4 billion financial package, divided into a short-term MFA operation of up to EUR 1 billion to be disbursed in one instalment, and a regular MFA operation of up to EUR 4 billion to be disbursed in three instalments.

    The short-term MFA was agreed without involvement of the European Parliament for urgency reasons. The rapporteur highlights that this can only be an exception and European Parliament should not be bypassed in the future.

    The amount of the proposed two new MFA operations corresponds to 56.7% of the estimated residual financing gap for the period FY24/25-FY26/27. This is consistent with standard practices on burden-sharing for MFA operations (for a country with an Association Agreement, the upper limit would be 60% according to the Council conclusions of 8 October 2002), taking into account the assistance pledged to Egypt by other bilateral and multilateral donors.

    The rapporteur would like to point out that the EU’s cooperation with Egypt does not begin with this MFA which is just a piece of the puzzle and in fact consequence of a longstanding cooperation with Egypt on human rights and security highlighted by the Association Agreement/Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (2004), the EU’s new Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021), the Partnership Priorities (2022) and the Joint Declaration launching a new Strategic and Comprehensive partnership (2024). Moreover, Egypt is a strategic, economic, military and geopolitical partner of the EU and the EU is the leading investor in Egypt.

    Given the instability in the region, Egypt remains a stable partner that engages in constructive dialogue with its partners. The EU need allies like that in the Middle East, and we need to emphasise their importance.

    But Egypt is also hit by a series of external shocks.

    A migratory shock first and foremost, with almost 10 million migrants and 800 000 registered refugees. Egypt is also committed to providing access to education for children, access to health services, help in finding housing and help in finding employment, with the support of NGOs. These commitments, if they are to be carried out properly, come at a cost.

    A geopolitical shock with the uncertainty of developments in Israel / Palestine and Syria.

    An economic shock, because Egypt, like many other countries, is seeing the cost of debt repayment and civil service salaries rise, thus limiting investment capacity.

    This MFA is based on strict pre-conditions requiring Egypt to continue to make concrete and credible steps towards democratic mechanism, rule of law and human rights. The rapporteur believes that those pre-conditions embedded in the long-term cooperation with Egypt will lead to reforms and long-term improvements in the country.

    Moreover, it is important to underline that Egypt already made big improvements in several areas.

    Firstly, on human rights, with a major plan launched in 2021 underlining the country’s commitment to this path. Some may feel that things are not moving fast enough, but it is hard to deny that the country is on the right track.

    Then there is the question of the place of women in society, which is very often a thermometer of democracy in a country. Wearing the veil is not compulsory. Women have access to public jobs and elected office (27% of women elected to the House, 13% to the Senate). Although Egyptian society is seen as patriarchal, the position of women has changed considerably in recent years.

    This is a financial instrument designed to support our partner in the face of the challenges it faces, but also to help it pursue change. The European Parliament will be closely monitoring progress and the rapporteur is asking the Commission to keep the European Parliament duly informed at all stages of the process. After all, the MFA is a loan and the grants are subject to reimbursement.

    To conclude the rapporteur would like to highlight that the MFA is an emergency instrument that has to be granted as soon as possible. The rapporteur is convinced that the MFA will be an effective incentive for – political and financial reforms in the country that will ensure a sustainable partnership between the EU and Egypt.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    European Commission – DG NEAR

    EEAS

    Embassy of Egypt

    Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    Amnesty International

    Human Rights Watch

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    Pursuant to Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Greens/EFA)

    On behalf of the Greens/EFA group, I would like to express our opposition to the fact that the European Commission has treated Egypt differently from other countries that receive Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU.

    Following an agreement between the Council and Parliament, all MFAs should, as a pre-condition, respect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. However, the Commission chose not to adhere to this policy when EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced a package of €7.4 billion in support for Egypt in March 2024, including €5 billion in Macro-Financial Assistance in the form of loans.

    We support providing Egypt with macro-financial assistance as a means to improve the living conditions of the Egyptian people, to reduce poverty and inequalities as well as to promote human rights. Our group has previously supported providing macro-financial assistance to alleviate financial burdens for countries in difficulty, while also promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide. However, the Commission must respect the agreements made by Parliament and the Council and act in line with the principles enshrined in the EU Treaties regarding external action.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (29.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Matjaž Nemec

     

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[1] (Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2],

    – having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (IIA) on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3],

    A. whereas Egypt continues to face sizeable and unmet financing needs, with an external financing gap estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme at around USD 17.7 billion for 2024-2027, requiring substantial international support to maintain economic stability and implement crucial reforms;

    B. whereas recently, Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has deteriorated noticeably, with intensified external pressures and increased debt, reflecting both domestic challenges and external shocks, including the repercussions of Russia’s war against Ukraine and regional instability;

    C. whereas the destructive and ongoing conflict in Gaza and the attacks in the Red Sea have severely impacted Egypt’s key sources of foreign currency earnings, particularly tourism revenues and Suez Canal proceeds, while persistent capital outflows and lower services exports have further strained the country’s external position; whereas Egypt’s socio-economic situation, including poverty rates and the Human Development Index, are also expected to be negatively impacted[4];

    D. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and the strategic importance of regional stability conditionally justify this comprehensive support package, while stressing the need for the EU to work towards a lasting long-term peace solution in the Middle East, which will help alleviate the reasons behind Egypt’s financial struggles;

    E. whereas Egypt’s public debt burden had increased substantially to 95.9 % of GDP at the end of the 2022/2023 fiscal year, up from 88.5 % the previous fiscal year, reaching its highest level since 2017 and raising concerns about long-term debt sustainability;

    F. whereas Egypt’s real GDP growth declined to 2.4 % in the 2023/2024 fiscal year due to inflation and external pressures, with food price inflation remaining a strain, especially on vulnerable households;

    G. whereas all major rating agencies have downgraded Egypt’s sovereign credit ratings to below-investment grade following the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza, reflecting increased regional risks and deteriorating humanitarian and economic conditions; whereas this has further complicated the country’s access to international financial markets;

    H. whereas the proposed macro-financial assistance (MFA) of up to EUR 4 billion would help Egypt address its external financing needs while supporting the implementation of structural reforms aimed at improving the macroeconomic situation, strengthening economic governance and transparency, and enhancing conditions for sustainable and inclusive growth;

    I. whereas on 12 April 2024, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2024/1144 providing EUR 1 billion in short-term macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt[5], pursuant to the urgency procedure provided under Article 213 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), bypassing Parliament entirely; whereas the Commission adopted a decision on 20 December 2024 to release this single instalment to Egypt;

    J. whereas the IMF has confirmed Egypt’s implementation of key reforms that have contributed to preserving macroeconomic stability despite the challenging environment;

    K. whereas the short-term macro-financial assistance was subject to conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed on and signed by the Commission and the Egyptian authorities on 29 June 2024, including the implementation of economic reforms, concrete and credible steps towards respecting democratic principles, and an on-track IMF programme; whereas the Commission and the European External Action Service undertook a review mission to Cairo in October 2024 and subsequently evaluated the Egyptian authorities’ written compliance reporting, with an overall positive assessment of Egypt’s progress in fulfilling these conditions;

    L. whereas Parliament, as one arm of the EU’s budgetary authority, was not involved in the negotiation and drafting of the MoU, which sets out the structural reform measures associated with the proposed MFA operation, including aspects of timing and sequencing for the disbursement of the initial assistance of EUR 1 billion;

    M. whereas the MoU to be concluded with the Egyptian authorities for the remainder of the MFA is an essential part of the assistance itself; whereas Parliament’s lack of involvement in this process severely hinders its budgetary scrutiny; whereas it is necessary to find an appropriate way to involve Parliament when such memorandums with non-EU countries are negotiated by the Commission;

    N. whereas the MoU should crucially provide the Commission with a mechanism to monitor progress as regards the implementation of structural reforms, notably the specific conditions for disbursement of the assistance;

    1. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument and should not serve as a substitute for structural development aid, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

    2. Highlights the importance of MFA in urgently addressing the situation in Egypt, taking into account Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and its role as an important stabilising actor in an increasingly volatile region;

    3. Regrets the fact that the first proposal of this package bypassed the co-decision rights of Parliament and undermined its democratic oversight role by using Article 213 TFEU instead of Article 212 TFEU; insists that this should not set a precedent and that Parliament’s rights and role should be respected in future proposals; emphasises that MFA is an instrument requiring proper parliamentary and budgetary scrutiny;

    4. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 4 billion in MFA requires EUR 360 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, which represents a significant allocation of limited resources;

    5. Recalls its previous concerns about the effectiveness of MFA in driving sustainable reforms; acknowledges, however, that linking this assistance to the broader strategic partnership framework can, when properly implemented, provide stronger leverage for implementing the agreed reform agenda; recalls that the partnership priorities cover three broad areas, namely sustainable modern economy and social development, partnering in foreign policy, and enhancing stability;

    6. Takes note of Egypt’s overall compliance with reform implementation under the previous MFA; reiterates its calls for transparent and timely reporting of assistance implementation; calls for adequate monitoring mechanisms with clear benchmarks and outcomes to be established in the MoU, and for regular reporting to the budgetary authority on developments related to the assistance, given the unprecedented size of this MFA package;

    7. Notes that while the MFA loan structure spreads repayments over a longer period, this creates extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require careful monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

    8. Emphasises that the MFA constitutes a general budgetary support instrument for the benefit of Egypt and that the EU has no control over how the funds are actually spent; nevertheless encourages the Egyptian authorities and counterparties to disclose information on spending at the Commission’s request;

    9. Recalls that Article 6 of the Financial Regulation establishes the obligation for the Commission to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and to respect the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union when implementing the EU budget; stresses that such a budgetary principle constitutes a core legal requirement for any form of EU financial assistance; underscores, therefore, the fact that the proposal lacks sufficient safeguards and clear benchmarks to measure progress towards compliance, particularly regarding respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities and freedom of belief, in order to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the MFA’s implementation in accordance with the Regulation;

    10. Recalls that a pre-condition for granting MFA involves respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multiparty parliamentary system and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights; highlights that, in this case, Egypt should continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting these criteria; emphasises the need to ensure their robust implementation;

    11. Emphasises that strict adherence to democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms should remain non-negotiable prerequisites for accessing EU financial support; calls on the Commission to withhold disbursements in the absence of credible progress on these fronts; notes that the Commission’s decision to disburse the short-term macro-financial assistance reflects Egypt’s progress in implementing reforms and the EU’s commitment to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and reform agenda under the strategic and comprehensive partnership, while noting that human rights challenges in Egypt remain significant; stresses, in this respect, the importance of Egypt’s stability and its crucial role in the region, particularly in the current geopolitical context;

    12. Regrets Parliament’s lack of involvement in and scrutiny of the MoU concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities, which, among other things, includes important budgetary provisions that fall within the remit of Parliament, will determine clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, and will include a time frame for achieving those reforms, which are linked to loan disbursement;

    13. Concludes that the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt is compatible with the elements referred to in Rule 58(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendments to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) This Decision has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

    Amendment  38

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 220a of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.

    (1) In order to finance the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

     

    Amendment  39

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 5 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 220 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

    (2) The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Egypt in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The detailed terms of the support under the MFA in the form of loans shall be laid down in a loan agreement in accordance with Article 223 of the Financial Regulation, to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the support under the macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, including in relation to the internal control systems. The loans shall be granted at terms that allow Egypt to repay the loan over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loans shall be 35 years. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 3.

     

    Amendment  40

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 6 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    (1) The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council7.

    _________________

    _________________

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.07.2018, p. 1).

    7 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast) (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    Amendment  41

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (b) assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Articles 2 and 3(1);

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the budgetary assessment, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission

    Ambassador of Egypt to the EU

    Head of delegation of the European Union to Egypt

    The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt

    The list is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for budgetary assessment.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Matjaž Nemec

    24.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    5

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    32

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

     

    5

    –

    PfE

    Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (30.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    (COM(2024)0461 – C10‑0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Tineke Strik

     

    SHORT JUSTIFICATION

    As enshrined in the Treaties, the EU is required to uphold and promote the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its external action. While acknowledging the importance of the EU-Egypt strategic partnership and the need for MFA-support to Egypt in light of the economic impact of, among others, the current geopolitical situation, this opinion aims to integrate human rights, democracy and the rule of law as core parts of the MFA and to strengthen provisions related to parliamentary scrutiny and transparency. The Rapporteur is pleased that the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) confirmed that these founding principles of the EU should form the basis of EU-Egypt relations, and concrete improvement from Egypt in this regard is a precondition for the disbursement of the MFA. Moreover, the vote confirmed that the AFET Committee is convinced that Commission services and the European External Action Service have the responsibility to integrate this approach into the Memorandum of Understanding to be negotiated with Egypt, and report on progress on the specific conditions to the European Parliament and Council. Payment of each instalment should be subject to concrete improvements on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Rapporteur has full trust that the competences of the AFET Committee will be integrated into the report of the Committee on International Trade, and will engage with the respective Rapporteur to that end.

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. The improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    (3) In line with the Partnership Priorities, the EU and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, the full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. These commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development and stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the EU and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights related issues. The subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy, International and Regional issues of December 2022 and the Association Committee of May 2023 provided the institutional platforms to exchange on an array of human rights issues, which the EU would like to continue and build on. A future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt, such as improving the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, introducing a moratorium on death penalty, combating torture and enforced disappearances, and improving the conditions of prisons, will have a positive impact on EU-Egypt relations.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability. Terrorism, organised crime and conflicts are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law.

    (5) The EU recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in that country that could have broader consequences as well as benefit geopolitical rivals. Terrorism, organised crime, disinformation, conflicts and persecution of religious and ethnic minorities are common threats against our security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. Therefore, the EU and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023 as well as the conflict in Sudan, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    (6) Recalling the geo-political challenges, such as the broader consequences of the situation in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks of 7 October 2023, as well as the armed conflict in Sudan and instability in Syria, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability and security for the whole Middle East, the Union is embarking on concluding a Strategic and Comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios.

    (9) Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war on Ukraine and of the situation in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, notably due to sharply falling income from tourism and Suez Canal proceeds. This is particularly challenging amid Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt to GDP ratios. Moreover, instability and uncertainty in Syria would further exacerbate the already existing macro-financial issues for Egypt.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 19

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (19) The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action and with other relevant Union policies.

    (19) As enshrined in Article 212 TFEU, the Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in line with the key principles, objectives and measures taken within the different areas of external action, and in particular with Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement of 2004 concerning the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights and with other relevant Union policies.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 22

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    (22) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that the country takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting and enhancing effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights, In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The fulfillment of the pre-condition and the achievement of the specific objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission services and the European External Action Service.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 26

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to the assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (26) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them with an annual report of developments relating to the assistance and on the respect of effective democratic mechanisms, as per the pre-conditions referred to in this Decision and, provide them with relevant documents.

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 28

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (28) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives set out in the EU-Egypt Association Agreement.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, as well as on the progress made relating to economic and democratic reforms in Egypt, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents, including third-party independent assessments, in due time.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 1 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    The transparent management of funds allocated under this macro-financial assistance is essential in order to ensure that resources are used wisely, in accordance with the set objectives. The Union shall ensure that effective and independent control and audit mechanisms are put in place to prevent any misappropriation.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.

    1. A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt takes concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and made a quantitative and substantial improvement in the respect for human rights, since the signing in June 2024 of the Memorandum of Understanding linked to the EUR 1 billion macro-financial assistance package, and that it continues to make concrete and credible improvements in those areas throughout the period covered by this Decision.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    2. The Commission services and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which civil society and international entities such as UN organisations are able to contribute, and report, regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament on the conditions referred to in Article 2 (1).

    Amendment  14

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    1. The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, as well as on democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance and the release of each separate instalment is to be subject, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding (“the Memorandum of Understanding”) which shall include a timeframe for the achievement of those reforms. The economic policy and financial conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at introducing reforms towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and ensuring respect for human rights, enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, poverty reduction, good governance, the fight against corruption, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those relating to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions and financial conditions agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    (c) the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy conditions, financial conditions, and democracy, rule of law and human rights conditions, agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (ca) outline the concrete and credible steps Egypt has taken towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and towards ensuring respect for human rights.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

    Entity and/or person

     

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    EEAS

    Various Egyptian authorities on multiple occassion

    Amnesty International

    Euromed Rights

    CIHRS

    Egyptian Front for Human Rights

    Committee to Protect Journalists

    Various Members of the Egyptian Parliament

    UNHCR

    Save the Children

    Frontex

    Various diplomats of EU Member States in Caïro

    Various local civil society organisations in Egypt

    Third country diplomat in Egypt

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Tineke Strik

    14.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    3.12.2024

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    59

    6

    7

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Chloé Ridel, Tineke Strik, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Catarina Vieira

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    59

    +

    ECR

    Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko

    PfE

    András László, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Roberto Vannacci

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans

    S&D

    Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido

    The Left

    Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan

    Verts/ALE

    Jaume Asens Llodrà, Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

     

    6

    –

    NI

    Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jordan Bardella, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Harald Vilimsky

     

    7

    0

    ECR

    Sebastian Tynkkynen

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt

    References

    COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    15.3.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    13.11.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Céline Imart

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

     

    BUDG

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    28

    7

    5

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    24.3.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    28

    +

    ECR

    Nicolas Bay, Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck

    ESN

    Markus Buchheit

    NI

    Lukas Sieper

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    PfE

    Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

    S&D

    Javier Moreno Sánchez

     

    7

    –

    S&D

    Udo Bullmann

    The Left

    Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

    Verts/ALE

    Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

     

    5

    0

    S&D

    Brando Benifei, Bernd Lange, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan – A10-0038/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0159),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0146/2024),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0038/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading, taking over the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    In an increasingly challenging global economic context, Jordan faces persistent structural challenges compounded by significant external shocks. While the country has maintained moderate growth of around 2% in recent years, this level remains insufficient to address fundamental economic needs: reducing high unemployment (22.9% in 2022) and alleviating a substantial public debt burden (88.7% of GDP in 2023).

    These domestic challenges are further exacerbated by heightened regional tensions, including the war between Israel and Gaza and ongoing instability in Syria, which are disrupting trade, straining public resources and jeopardizing key sectors such as tourism. Therefore, Jordan is facing a series of unfavorable factors with economic, political, social and demographic consequences, and must receive appropriate and rapid support as a reliable and stable partner of the EU. Moreover, the migratory pressure is very high in the Kingdom with 1.3 million refugees from Syria out of total of 3.8 million of refugees. It means 1/3 of the Kingdom population are refugees.

    To support Jordan’s economic stability and cover the country’s residual financing needs over the operation’s availability period, the Commission proposes a macro-financial assistance (MFA) operation of up to €500 million in loans, despite the Jordan’s request for €700 million.

    This assistance is designed to address pressing economic challenges, including high public debt, a structurally elevated budget deficit (5.1% of GDP in 2023), and a persistent external deficits (average of around 6.5% of GDP over the last five years). It also aims to mitigate the fiscal constraints exacerbated by recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and regional instability.

    The political and economic conditions necessary for granting the proposed MFA are fulfilled, as confirmed by the Commission’s evaluation of Jordan’s current situation. The loan will be provided under the External Action Guarantee with a provisioning at a rate of 9%, which will be programmed under the NDICI-GE, for a total amount of EUR 45 million. To ensure risk coverage, the EU will provision 9% of the total amount, or €45 million, under the External Action Guarantee.

    The MFA will have a validity period of two and a half years following the entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The disbursement of funds will occur in three tranches, contingent upon the full and timely implementation of the agreed-upon economic policies outlined in the MoU. These policies include ambitious reforms in key areas such as public governance, fiscal management, and anti-corruption efforts, ensuring that the assistance supports Jordan’s long-term economic resilience.

    This assistance complements the ongoing IMF program approved in January 2024, which provides $1.2 billion over four years, and aligns with support from other international partners, including substantial U.S. grants. It also builds on Jordan’s track record with macro-financial assistance, being the fourth MFA operation since 2014, totaling €1.08 billion to date. These successive programs underscore the EU’s ongoing commitment to strengthening Jordan’s institutional capacity and promoting economic stability.

    By addressing Jordan’s immediate financing needs and supporting reforms in key areas, the MFA reinforces the country’s economic resilience while contributing to regional stability. Subordinated to clear economic policy conditions, this assistance ensures accountability and progress. The full and timely implementation of these policies will remain a prerequisite for the disbursement of each tranche, ensuring that Jordan continues to meet its reform commitments.

    Jordan is a key partner in the region, able to engage in dialogue with the various geopolitical players in the Middle East. It is important to give Jordan due consideration and not to take its support for granted. It is therefore important to build a global and strategic partnership with Jordan, alongside and in addition to this MFA, in order to quickly lay the foundations for tomorrow’s collaboration.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    European Commission – DG NEAR

    EEAS

    Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (4.2.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Johan Van Overtveldt 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    A. whereas Jordan continues to face significant external financing needs and economic challenges, with a current account deficit of 7.1 % of gross domestic product (GDP) in the first half of 2023, driven by persistent deficits in trade in goods; whereas Jordan’s public debt burden remains high at 88.7 % of GDP in 2023, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability;

    B. whereas Jordan’s narrow revenue base, with domestic tax revenue at only 16 % of GDP, raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability and capacity to service external debts;

    C. whereas the policy measures associated with macro-financial assistance (MFA) cover selected provisions related to the Association Agreement and the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027;

    D. whereas significant structural challenges hinder economic growth, with deficiencies in the business environment, access to finance, labour market flexibility and public administration; whereas unemployment remains high, especially among women, youth and university graduates, with women’s labour force participation at just 14 % in 2023, among the lowest globally; whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 aim to address these issues by fostering decent work, innovation, skills development and comprehensive social protection systems;

    E. whereas the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities 2021-2027 highlight cooperation in inter-religious and intercultural dialogue and the protection of cultural heritage as drivers of peace and sustainable development; whereas these efforts can include safeguarding historical manuscripts and archives, contributing to inclusive dialogue and mutual understanding;

    F. whereas Jordan’s economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts and crises in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea; whereas these pose further risks to Jordan’s economic outlook, particularly affecting tourism and trade, with disruptions to exports and vessel traffic;

    G. whereas the severe deterioration of external accounts and Jordan’s strategic importance for regional stability justify this support package;

    H. whereas the conflicts in Gaza and the wider region have been exacerbating socioeconomic challenges in Jordan given its geographical position;

    1. Notes that the Commission proposal of EUR 500 million in MFA requires EUR 45 million in provisioning under the External Action Guarantee from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe; points out that the evolving financial and economic realities in Jordan might require a revision of the proposed amount of MFA, consequently having an effect on provisioning;

    2. Notes that the assistance will be disbursed in three instalments between 2024 and 2027, with release strictly linked to the progress of the implementation of both the International Monetary Fund programme and additional policy measures;

    3. Recalls that this represents the fourth MFA operation for Jordan since 2014, bringing total MFA support to EUR 1.58 billion, demonstrating the EU’s sustained commitment to supporting Jordan’s economic stability;

    4. Acknowledges that the loan structure includes a grace period and spreads repayments over a long period, creating extended contingent liabilities for the EU budget that require monitoring over multiple financial frameworks;

    5. Acknowledges that the International Monetary Fund assessed Jordan’s public debt level as sustainable in its report of January 2024, while noting that debt sustainability risks remain significant;

    6. Recalls that previous MFA operations for Jordan have demonstrated positive track records in terms of repayment;

    7. Emphasises that the MFA underpins Jordan’s continued commitment to values shared with the Union, including democracy, rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights; highlights that these commitments are key to ensuring effective reforms and long-term stability; stresses that a precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance is that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and guarantees respect for human rights;

    8. Stresses the importance of the regular verification of Jordan’s compliance with the preconditions, ongoing conditionality and objectives to protect the EU’s financial interests and ensure the implementation of the MFA in accordance with the regulation;

    9. Calls for proper monitoring and regular reporting to Parliament and the Council on developments relating to the assistance as well as the continuous monitoring of conditions and objectives;

    10. Recalls that while MFA is meant to be an exceptional crisis response instrument, its increasing use to address structural economic challenges in partner countries risks diluting its emergency nature;

    11. Concludes that the proposal for a decision on providing macro-financial assistance to Jordan is compatible with the EU’s budgetary framework and financial rules.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    25.4.2024

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Johan Van Overtveldt

    5.12.2024

    Discussed in committee

    16.1.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    35

    2

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Siegfried Mureşan, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Damian Boeselager, Michalis Hadjipantela, Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Rasmus Nordqvist, Michele Picaro, Jacek Protas, Beata Szydło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Thierry Mariani, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin

     

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    35

    +

    ECR

    Tobiasz Bocheński, Michele Picaro, Ruggero Razza, Beata Szydło

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Michalis Hadjipantela, Monika Hohlmeier, Janusz Lewandowski, Siegfried Mureşan, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thierry Mariani, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

    Renew

    Olivier Chastel, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Damian Boeselager, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    2

    –

    PfE

    Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

    for the Committee on International Trade

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    (COM(2024)0159 – C9‑0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Malik Azmani

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs submits the following to the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) Since 2011, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted.

    (2) Since 2021, Jordan has embarked on a number of political reforms to strengthen parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. A Constitutional Court and an Independent Electoral Commission have been set up and a number of major laws, including the Electoral Act and the Political Parties Act as well as laws on decentralisation and municipalities, have been passed by the Jordanian Parliament. Legislative improvements as regards the independence of the judiciary and women’s rights have been adopted. The European Election Observation Mission in Jordan took note of the inclusive and well-organised parliamentary elections that took place on 10 September 2024 in the context of the political modernisation initiated by the King in 2021. It is crucial that the Union continues to support peace in Jordan and does everything within its power to preserve the unique Jordanian model of ethnic and religious representation in order to ensure legitimate representation of those groups.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged.

    (3) The Jordanian economy has suffered significantly from protracted conflicts in the region, notably in neighbouring Syria, and most recently in Israel/Gaza and the Red Sea. Since the start of the war in Syria, the Jordanian economy has been impacted by a large inflow of Syrian refugees, which has increased pressure on its fiscal position, public services and infrastructure. The current uncertainty in Syria further exacerbates the already highly detrimental instability for Jordan. Jordan hosts around 1,3 million refugees, making it one of the countries with the highest number of refugee populations per capita. In addition to regional instability, the macroeconomic and fiscal challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/2021, commodity price developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, high exposure to trade fluctuations and the increase of borrowing costs for emerging markets globally continued to weigh on the Jordanian economy. As a result, Jordan experienced an economic contraction in 2020, followed by a slow economic recovery, as unemployment increased significantly in 2020 and remained high, and new fiscal and external financing needs emerged. Moreover, significant structural issues hinder economic growth, particularly in the area of private sector development. Challenges such as an unfavourable business environment and inflexibility in the labour market remain unresolved.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 4 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (4a) The Union recognises Jordan’s pivotal role in promoting regional stability and mediating conflicts, particularly amidst heightened tensions. The proposed macro-financial assistance aims to support Jordan in maintaining its positive role in the region. In that context, and in recognition of Jordan being one of the Union’s strongest regional partners, it is imperative for the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to further deepen and strengthen the EU-Jordan partnership, thereby advancing cooperation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 21

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation and fiscal consolidation. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS.

    (21) A pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be that Jordan respects effective democratic mechanisms – including a multi-party parliamentary system – and the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan and promote structural reforms aimed at supporting sustainable and inclusive growth, employment creation, and fiscal consolidation and policies. Both the fulfilment of the pre-conditions and the achievement of those objectives should be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, which should subsequently be reported to the European Parliament. The Union should encourage Jordan’s efforts toward economic diversification and sustainability, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy, technology  and digital services, in order to reduce its reliance on tourism and chemical exports and to enhance long-term resilience.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Recital 27

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    (27) The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to clear and measurable economic, as well as democracy, rule of law and human rights policy conditions, to be laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding. In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Jordanian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under that Regulation, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially important impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Jordan, the examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding, including clear and measurable benchmarks to evaluate the implementation of each instalment, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of the assistance.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 2 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance..

    2. The Commission and the European External Action Service shall monitor the fulfilment of this pre-condition throughout the life cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance in a transparent process in which independent third parties are able to contribute meaningfully. The Commission and the EEAS shall also report, both regularly and in writing, to the European Parliament and to the Council on the fulfilment of the pre-condition referred to in paragraph 1.

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 3 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission.

    2. The conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, at enhancing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Jordan, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. This shall include the publication of regular and detailed reports by the Jordanian government on the use of funds, specifying allocations for key sectors such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure, ensuring public access to such information. Progress in public services, mutual market opening, the development of rules-based and fair trade, and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy, including those related to democracy, rule of law and human rights, shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. Progress in attaining those objectives shall be regularly monitored by the Commission and the EEAS, and shall be communicated to the European Parliament.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a decision

    Article 4 – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation.

    4. Where the conditions referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of the reasons for the suspension or cancellation and of the subsequent steps.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur for the opinion received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the opinion:

    Entity and/or person

     

    European Commission – DG ECFIN

    The Court of Auditors

    The Ambassador of Jordan to the EU

    Member of the Royal committee to Modernize the Political System in Jordan

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur for the opinion.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur for the opinion declares that he has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    25.4.2024

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Malik Azmani

    14.10.2024

    Date adopted

    30.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    54

    11

    6

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Lucia Annunziata, Petras Auštrevičius, Jordan Bardella, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Grzegorz Braun, Sebastião Bugalho, Danilo Della Valle, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michael Gahler, Geadis Geadi, Giorgos Georgiou, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bernard Guetta, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Vilis Krištopans, Nathalie Loiseau, Claudiu Manda, David McAllister, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Leoluca Orlando, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Stanislav Stoyanov, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, António Tânger Corrêa, Marta Temido, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Hilde Vautmans, Harald Vilimsky, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Malik Azmani, Engin Eroglu, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, András László, Ana Catarina Mendes, Hans Neuhoff, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Tineke Strik, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Ivaylo Valchev, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Milan Zver

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Catarina Vieira

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    54

    +

    ECR

    Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Ivaylo Valchev

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Sebastião Bugalho, Michael Gahler, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, David McAllister, Francisco José Millán Mon, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Željana Zovko, Milan Zver

    PfE

    András László

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Nathalie Loiseau, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans

    S&D

    Lucia Annunziata, Robert Biedroń, Elio Di Rupo, Raphaël Glucksmann, Sandra Gómez López, Evin Incir, Claudiu Manda, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Tonino Picula, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marta Temido

    The Left

    Özlem Demirel, Rima Hassan

    Verts/ALE

    Leoluca Orlando, Villy Søvndal, Tineke Strik, Reinier Van Lanschot, Catarina Vieira

     

    11

    –

    ECR

    Sebastian Tynkkynen

    NI

    Grzegorz Braun, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jordan Bardella, Vilis Krištopans, Sebastiaan Stöteler, António Tânger Corrêa, Hermann Tertsch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Roberto Vannacci, Harald Vilimsky

     

    6

    0

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Stanislav Stoyanov

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Macro-financial assistance to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

    References

    COM(2024)0159 – C9-0146/2024 – 2024/0086(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    8.4.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    AFET

    25.4.2024

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Céline Imart

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

    30.1.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

     

    BUDG

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    35

    2

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    24.3.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    35

    +

    ECR

    Daniele Polato, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kris Van Dijck

    NI

    Lukas Sieper

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Hildegard Bentele, Niels Geuking, Borja Giménez Larraz, Céline Imart, Ilia Lazarov, Romana Tomc, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    PfE

    Christophe Bay, Anna Bryłka, Mélanie Disdier, Thierry Mariani, Matthieu Valet

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bart Groothuis, Karin Karlsbro

    S&D

    Brando Benifei, Udo Bullmann, Bernd Lange, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Chloé Ridel, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Verts/ALE

    Markéta Gregorová, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Majdouline Sbai

     

    2

    –

    ECR

    Nicolas Bay

    ESN

    Markus Buchheit

     

    3

    0

    The Left

    Danilo Della Valle, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

    – : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Using Renure and applying a derogation to reduce dependence on imported fertilisers – E-001077/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001077/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Wouter Beke (PPE)

    In its Competitiveness Compass for the EU, the Commission proposes that additional tariffs be introduced on chemical fertilisers from Russia and Belarus. That risks increasing prices for farmers and lowering competitiveness, even though the agricultural and horticultural sector is a strategic partner as a supplier of food, fibre, agricultural commodities and energy. Reducing dependence on imported chemical fertilisers and boosting agricultural sector competitiveness should therefore be priorities for the Commission.

    Under the new vision for agriculture and food, the use of low-carbon fertilisers and recycled nutrients, such as recovered nitrogen from manure (Renure) and digestate after appropriate treatment, is regarded as a win-win solution to environmental and circular economy challenges. Allowing some derogations from the Nitrates Directive enables farmers to replace expensive chemical fertilisers with processed livestock manure.

    • 1.Will the Commission make a specific proposal to use on-farm-processed livestock manure (Renure) as a substitute for chemical fertilisers? If so, what is the exact timetable for the proposal?
    • 2.Will the Commission also put forward a proposal to ensure structural use of more livestock manure, including on grassland (derogation)? If so, what is the intended timetable for the measure?

    Submitted: 12.3.2025

    Last updated: 24 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: Dragonfly Energy Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Fourth Quarter Revenue Growth of 17% Led by Significant OEM Growth
    Debt Restructuring and Concurrent Capital Raise Enhance Financial Position and Liquidity
    Initiates Corporate Optimization Program
    Guides to First Quarter 2025 Net Sales of Approximately $13.3 Million
    Targets Positive Adjusted EBITDA in Fourth Quarter 2025

    RENO, Nev., March 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. (“Dragonfly Energy” or the “Company”) (Nasdaq: DFLI), an industry leader in energy storage and battery technology, today reported its financial and operational results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024.

    Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Financial Highlights

    • Net sales of $12.2 million and $50.6 million
    • OEM net sales of $6.2 million and $27.6 million
    • Gross Margin of 20.8% and 23.0%
    • Net Loss of $(9.8) million and $(40.6) million
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $(2.0) million and $(18.5) million

    “After quarter end, we were very pleased to have successfully negotiated a significant debt restructuring with our lenders, allowing for covenant relief while pushing off the maturity date. With this action, our debt will be classified as long-term debt on our balance sheet. Concurrent with the debt restructuring, we also secured additional capital through a strategic investor,” commented Dr. Denis Phares, Chief Executive Officer. “We believe these actions greatly strengthen our near-term financial position, allowing us to focus on executing on our key strategic initiatives for 2025, including achieving positive anticipated Adjusted EBITDA in the fourth quarter.”

    “In addition, we have launched a corporate optimization program to establish a more efficient cost structure, aligning our operations with near-term revenue growth opportunities, which we believe will provide us with a path to profitability. As part of this initiative, we have promoted Dr. Vick Singh to Chief Operating Officer, where he will oversee the program while also driving operational efficiencies across the company.

    “Despite ongoing challenges in the RV market, our fourth-quarter net sales grew approximately 17%, marking a return to year-over-year growth, driven by increased adoption among OEM customers,” continued Dr. Phares. “Throughout the year, we have made significant strides in expanding our customer base beyond the RV sector, leveraging strategic partnerships in trucking and industrial markets. We believe the strong order activity from our recently announced partnerships reinforces this strategy, and we anticipate meaningful revenue contributions in 2025 and beyond.”

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Financial and Operating Results
    (All financial result comparisons made are against the prior-year period unless otherwise noted)

     
    Net Sales by Customer Type
    (in millions)
           
      Fiscal Quarter Ended
    		    
      December 31, 2024
    		   December 31, 2023
    		   Change (YoY)
    DTC $5,726   $6,561   -13%
    OEM $6,236   $3,877   61%
    Licensing $250   $0   N/A
    Net Sales $12,212   $10,438   17%
               

    Net Sales increased 17.0% to $12.2 million. OEM net sales grew 61% to $6.2 million, driven by increased adoption of existing products and new customer acquisitions. DTC net sales were $5.7 million compared to $6.6 million, reflecting ongoing macroeconomic pressures.

    Gross Profit increased 12.5% to $2.6 million. Gross Margin was 20.8%, compared to 21.6%, due to higher material costs and a shift in mix to OEM sales. Operating Expenses were $(6.3) million, compared to $(5.4) million. The increase was primarily due to one-time expenses related to patent litigation and the reverse stock split. We also incurred expenses associated with moving into our new 400,000 square foot facility. This strategic relocation is expected to drive long-term operational efficiencies as we centralize operations previously spread across multiple locations.

    The Company reported a Net Loss of $(9.8) million, or $(1.39) per diluted share, compared to Net Income of $3.3 million or $0.50 per diluted share. Adjusted EBITDA excluding stock-based compensation, changes in the fair market value of our warrants, and other one-time expenses, was negative $(2.3) million, compared to negative $(1.8) million.

    Full Year 2024 Financial and Operating Results
    (All financial result comparisons made are against the prior-year period unless otherwise noted)

     
    Net Sales by Customer Type
    (in millions)
           
      Fiscal Year Ended
    		    
      December 31, 2024
    		   December 31, 2023
    		   Change (YoY)
    DTC $22,616   $36,875   -39%
    OEM $27,612   $27,517   0%
    Licensing $417   $0   N/A
    Net Sales $50,645   $64,392   -21%
               

    Net Sales were $50.6 million, compared to $64.4 million. OEM net sales of $27.6 million were flat year-over-year, as increased adoption of existing products and new customer acquisitions were offset by the impact of our largest customer transitioning our product from a standard offering to an option. DTC net sales declined to $22.6 million, from $36.9 million, reflecting continued softness in the RV market due to continued macroeconomic pressures.

    Gross Profit was $11.6 million, with a gross margin of 23.0%, compared to gross profit of $15.4 million, with a gross margin of 24.0%. The year-over-year declines were primarily attributable to lower sales volume. Operating Expenses were $(34.0) million, compared to $(42.9) million, led by lower employee-related costs and lower stock-based compensation, partially offset by higher R&D costs.

    The Company reported a Net Loss of $(40.6) million, or $(5.91) per diluted share, compared to a Net Loss of $(13.8) million or $(2.36) per diluted share. Adjusted EBITDA excluding stock-based compensation, changes in the fair market value of our warrants, and other one-time expenses, was negative $(18.5) million, compared to negative $(17.1) million.

    Form 10-K Filing

    The independent registered public accounting firm’s audit report with respect to the Company’s fiscal year-end financial statements will not be issued until the Company files its annual report on Form 10-K. Accordingly, the financial results reported in this earnings release are pending completion of the audit.

    Summary and Outlook

    “Dragonfly Energy is advancing energy storage with innovative lithium battery technology, delivering safe, reliable, and efficient power solutions for industries that demand superior performance,” commented Dr. Denis Phares. “As we look ahead to 2025, our focus remains on driving shareholder value through growth, diversification across end markets, and continued product innovation. We anticipate continued year-over-year growth in the first quarter with revenue of approximately $13.3 million. And with the resumption of revenue growth alongside our corporate optimization program, we expect to achieve positive Adjusted EBITDA by the fourth quarter of this year.”

    1Q25 Guidance

    • Net Sales of approximately $13.3 million
    • Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $(3.8) million

    Webcast Information

    The Dragonfly Energy management team will host a conference call to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 financial and operational results this afternoon, March 24, 2025. The call can be accessed live via webcast by clicking here, or through the Events and Presentations page within the Investor Relations section of Dragonfly Energy’s website at https://investors.dragonflyenergy.com/events-and-presentations/default.aspx. The call can also be accessed live via telephone by dialing (646) 564-2877, toll-free in North America (800) 549-8228, or for international callers +1 (289) 819-1520, and referencing conference ID: 85219. Please log in to the webcast or dial in to the call at least 10 minutes prior to the start of the event.

    An archive of the webcast will be available for a period of time shortly after the call on the Events and Presentations page on the Investor Relations section of Dragonfly Energy’s website, along with the earnings press release.

    About Dragonfly Energy

    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp. (Nasdaq: DFLI) is a comprehensive lithium battery technology company, specializing in cell manufacturing, battery pack assembly, and full system integration. Through its renowned Battle Born Batteries® brand, Dragonfly Energy has established itself as a frontrunner in the lithium battery industry, with hundreds of thousands of reliable battery packs deployed in the field through top-tier OEMs and a diverse retail customer base. At the forefront of domestic lithium battery cell production, Dragonfly Energy’s patented dry electrode manufacturing process can deliver chemistry-agnostic power solutions for a broad spectrum of applications, including energy storage systems, electric vehicles, and consumer electronics. The Company’s overarching mission is the future deployment of its proprietary, nonflammable, all-solid-state battery cells.

    To learn more about Dragonfly Energy and its commitment to clean energy advancements, visit https://investors.dragonflyenergy.com/.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements include all statements that are not historical statements of fact and statements regarding the Company’s intent, belief or expectations, including, but not limited to, statements regarding the Company’s guidance for 2025, results of operations and financial position, planned products and services, business strategy and plans, market size and growth opportunities, competitive position and technological and market trends. Some of these forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking words, including “may,” “should,” “expect,” “intend,” “will,” “estimate,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “predict,” “plan,” “targets,” “projects,” “could,” “would,” “continue,” “forecast” or the negatives of these terms or variations of them or similar expressions.

    These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties, and other factors (some of which are beyond the Company’s control) which could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Factors that may impact such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: improved recovery in the Company’s core markets, including the RV market; the Company’s ability to successfully increase market penetration into target markets; the Company’s ability to penetrate the heavy-duty trucking and other new markets; the growth of the addressable markets that the Company intends to target; the Company’s ability to retain members of its senior management team and other key personnel; the Company’s ability to maintain relationships with key suppliers including suppliers in China; the Company’s ability to maintain relationships with key customers; the Company’s ability to access capital as and when needed under its $150 million ChEF Equity Facility; the Company’s ability to protect its patents and other intellectual property; the Company’s ability to successfully utilize its patented dry electrode battery manufacturing process and optimize solid state cells as well as to produce commercially viable solid state cells in a timely manner or at all, and to scale to mass production; the Company’s ability to timely achieve the anticipated benefits of its licensing arrangement with Stryten Energy LLC; the Company’s ability to achieve the anticipated benefits of its customer arrangements with THOR Industries and THOR Industries’ affiliated brands (including Keystone RV Company); the Company’s ability to maintain the listing of its common stock and public warrants on the Nasdaq Capital Market; the Russian/Ukrainian conflict; the Company’s ability to generate revenue from future product sales and its ability to achieve and maintain profitability; and the Company’s ability to compete with other manufacturers in the industry and its ability to engage target customers and successfully convert these customers into meaningful orders in the future. These and other risks and uncertainties are described more fully in the sections entitled “Risk Factors” and “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 to be filed with the SEC and in the Company’s subsequent filings with the SEC available at www.sec.gov.

    If any of these risks materialize or any of the Company’s assumptions prove incorrect, actual results could differ materially from the results implied by these forward-looking statements. There may be additional risks that the Company presently does not know or that it currently believes are immaterial that could also cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements contained in this press release speak only as of the date they were made. Except to the extent required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation to update such statements to reflect events that occur or circumstances that exist after the date on which they were made.

    Financial Tables

     
    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (U.S. Dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)
                 
            As of
            December 31, 2024   December 31, 2023
    Current Assets        
      Cash and cash equivalents   $ 4,849     $ 12,713  
      Accounts receivable, net of allowance for credit losses     2,416       1,639  
      Inventory     21,716       38,778  
      Prepaid expenses     806       772  
      Prepaid inventory     1,362       1,381  
      Prepaid income tax     307       519  
      Assets held of sale     644       –  
      Other current assets     825       118  
        Total Current Assets     32,925       55,920  
    Property and Equipment        
        Property and Equipment, Net     22,107       15,969  
      Operating lease right of use asset     19,737       3,315  
      Other assets     445       –  
      Total Assets   $ 75,214     $ 75,204  
                 
    Current Liabilities        
      Accounts payable   $ 10,716     $ 10,258  
      Accrued payroll and other liabilities     4,129       7,107  
      Accrued tariffs     1,915       1,713  
      Accrued settlement, current portion     750       –  
      Customer deposits     317       201  
      Deferred revenue, current portion     1,000       –  
      Uncertain tax position liability     55       91  
      Notes payable, current portion, net of debt issuance costs     –       19,683  
      Operating lease liability, current portion     2,926       1,288  
      Financing lease liability, current portion     47       36  
        Total Current Liabilities     21,855       40,377  
    Long-Term Liabilities        
      Deferred revenue, net of current portion     3,583       –  
      Warrant liabilities     5,133       4,463  
      Accrued expenses, long-term     –       152  
      Accrued settlement, net of current portion     1,750       –  
      Notes payable, non current portion, net of debt issuance costs     29,646       –  
      Operating lease liability, net of current portion     22,588       2,234  
      Financing lease liability, net of current portion     63       66  
      Total Long-Term Liabilities     62,763       6,915  
    Total Liabilities
    		     84,618       47,292  
                         
    Equity                
      Preferred stock, 5,000,000 shares at $0.0001 par value, authorized, no shares issued and outstanding as of of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively     –       –  
      Common stock, 250,000,000 shares at $0.0001 par value, authorized, 7,232,650 and 6,695,587 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively     1       6  
    Additional paid in capital     72,749       69,445  
    Accumulated deficit     (82,154 )     (41,539 )
    Total Stockholders’ (Deficit) Equity     (9,404 )     27,912  
    Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ (Deficit) Equity   $ 75,214     $ 75,204  
                         
     
    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.
    Unaudited Condensed Interim Consolidated Statement of Operations
    (U.S. Dollar in Thousands, except share and per share data)
            Three Months Ended   Year Ended
            December 31,   December 31,   December 31,   December 31,
            2024   2023   2024   2023
                         
    Net Sales   $ 12,212     $ 10,438     $ 50,645     $ 64,392  
                         
    Cost of Goods Sold     9,674       8,181       39,019       48,946  
                         
    Gross Profit     2,538       2,257       11,626       15,446  
                         
    Operating Expenses                
      Research and development     956       531       5,451       3,863  
      General and administrative     3,658       3,275       18,536       26,389  
      Selling and marketing     1,696       1,548       10,025       12,623  
                         
    Total Operating Expenses     6,310       5,354       34,012       42,875  
                         
      Loss From Operations     (3,772 )     (3,097 )     (22,386 )     (27,429 )
                         
    Other Income (Expense)                
      Interest expense     (6,251 )     (4,034 )     (21,504 )     (16,015 )
      Other (Expense) Income     –       19       (36 )     19  
      Loss on settlement     (2,500 )     –       (2,500 )     –  
      Loss on impairment of assets     (873 )     –       (873 )     –  
      Change in fair market value of warrant liability     3,554       10,400       6,684       29,582  
        Total Other (Expense) Income     (6,070 )     6,385       (18,229 )     13,586  
                         
    Net (Loss) Income Before Taxes     (9,842 )     3,288       (40,615 )     (13,843 )
                         
    Income Tax (Benefit) Expense     –       (26 )     –       –  
                         
    Net (Loss) Income   $ (9,842 )   $ 3,314     $ (40,615 )   $ (13,843 )
                         
    Net (Loss) Gain Per Share- Basic & Diluted   $ (1.39 )   $ 0.50     $ (5.91 )   $ (2.36 )
    Weighted Average Number of Shares- Basic & Diluted     7,085,956       6,621,115       6,866,826       5,865,165  
                                     
     
    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows
    Years Ended December 31, 2024 and 2023
    (U.S. in thousands)
          2024   2023
    Cash flows from Operating Activities        
    Net Loss   $ (40,615 )   $ (13,817 )
    Adjustments to Reconcile Net Loss to Net Cash        
    Used in Operating Activities        
      Stock based compensation     1,020       6,710  
      Amortization of debt discount     7,241       1,470  
      Change in fair market value of warrant liability     (6,684 )     (29,582 )
      Non-cash interest expense (paid-in-kind)     10,058       4,938  
      Provision for credit losses     3       114  
      Depreciation and amortization     1,372       1,237  
      Amortization of right of use assets     2,231       1,179  
      Loss on disposal of property and equipment     –       116  
      Loss on impairment of assets     873       –  
      Write-off of prepaid inventory     69       596  
    Changes in Assets and Liabilities        
      Accounts receivable     (780 )     (309 )
      Inventories     17,062       11,411  
      Prepaid expenses     (42 )     852  
      Prepaid inventory     (50 )     25  
      Other current assets     (707 )     149  
      Other assets     (445 )     1,198  
      Income taxes payable     212       6  
      Accounts payable and accrued expenses     (5,365 )     (3,527 )
      Accrued tariffs     202       781  
      Accrued settlement     2,500       –  
      Deferred revenue     4,583       –  
      Uncertain tax position liability     (36 )     (37 )
      Customer deposits     116       (37 )
    Total Adjustments     33,433       (2,710 )
    Net Cash Used in Operating Activities     (7,182 )     (16,527 )
               
    Cash Flows From Investing Activities        
      Proceeds from disposal of property and equipment     8       –  
      Purchase of property and equipment     (2,737 )     (6,885 )
      Net Cash Used in Investing Activities     (2,729 )     (6,885 )
               
    (Continued)        
    Cash Flows From Financing Activities        
      Proceeds from public offering     –       24,177  
      Payment of public offering costs     –       (1,258 )
      Proceeds from public offering (ATM), net     2,043       0  
      Proceeds from note payable, related party     2,700       1,000  
      Repayment of note payable, related party     (2,700 )     (1,000 )
      Repayment of note payable     –       (5,275 )
      Proceeds from exercise of public warrants     –       747  
      Proceeds from exercise of options     4       586  
      Proceeds from exercise of Investor Warrants     –       546  
      Net Cash Provided by Financing Activities     2,047       19,523  
               
    Net Decrease in Cash and cash equivalents     (7,864 )     (3,889 )
    Cash and cash equivalents – beginning of period     12,713       17,781  
    Cash and cash equivalents – end of period   $ 4,849     $ 13,892  
               
    Supplemental Disclosures of Cash Flow Information:        
      Cash paid for income taxes     –       238  
      Cash paid for interest   $ 6,288     $ 9,102  
    Supplemental Non-Cash Items        
      Purchases of property and equipment, not yet paid   $ 1,703     $ 96  
      Recognition of right of use asset obtained in exchange for operating lease liability   $ 18,653     $ –  
      Recognition of leasehold improvements obtained in exchange for operating lease liability   $ 4,683     $ –  
      Recognition of warrant liability – Penny Warrants   $ 7,354     $ 698  
      Recognition of warrant liability – Investor Warrants   $ –     $ 13,762  
      Settlement of accrued liability for employee liability for employee stock purchase plan   $ 250     $ –  
      Reclassification of assets held for sale   $ 644     $ –  
      Non-cash impact of cash exercise of liability classified warrants   $ –     $ 617  
      Cashless exercise of liability classified warrants   $ –     $ 12,629  
               
               
     
    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.
    Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Measures (Unaudited)
    (U.S. Dollars in Thousands)
     
          Three Months Ended   Year Ended
          December 31,   December 31,   December 31,   December 31,
          2024   2023   2024   2023
    EBITDA Calculation                
    Net (Loss) Income Before Taxes   $ (9,842 )   $ 3,314     $ (40,615 )   $ (13,817 )
      Interest Expense     6,251       4,034       21,504       16,015  
      Taxes     –       (26 )     –       (26 )
      Depreciation and Amortization     381       328       1,372       1,237  
    EBITDA   $ (3,210 )   $ 7,650     $ (17,739 )   $ 3,409  
                       
    Adjustments to EBITDA                
      Stock Based Compensation     261       323       1,020       6,710  
      Secondary offering costs     –       –       –       720  
      Separation Agreement     –       –       –       904  
      Tariff Investigation     –       –       463       –  
      Patent Litigation     624       –       624       –  
      Reverse Stock Split     90       –       90       –  
      Stryten Agreement     –       –       284       –  
      Loss on Settlement     2,500       –       2,500       –  
      Loss on Impairment of Assets     873       –       873       –  
      Write off of Prepaid Inventory     69       596       69       712  
      Change in fair market value of warrant liability     (3,554 )     (10,400 )     (6,684 )     (29,582 )
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ (2,347 )   $ (1,831 )   $ (18,500 )   $ (17,127 )
                     
     
    Dragonfly Energy Holdings Corp.
    Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (adjusted EBITDA)
    Three Months Ended March 31, 2025
    (U.S. Dollars in Thousands)
     
    Non-GAAP Financial Guidance          
                 
    Operating Loss(1) $ (4,843 )    
      Taxes   –      
      Depreciation and Amortization   297      
    EBITDA $ (4,546 )    
                 
    Adjustments to EBITDA          
      Stock Based Compensation   219      
      ATW Deal expenses   150      
      Patent Litigation expenses   368      
    Adjusted EBITDA $ (3,809 )    
     
     
    (1) Although net loss is the most directly comparable GAAP measure, this table reconciles adjusted EBITDA to operating loss because we are not able to calculate forward-looking net loss without unreasonable efforts due to significant uncertainties with respect to the impact of accounting for our change in fair market value of the Company’s warrant liability.
     

    Investor Relations:
    Eric Prouty
    Szymon Serowiecki
    AdvisIRy Partners
    DragonflyIR@advisiry.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Make in India Powers Defence Growth

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Make in India Powers Defence Growth

    Production hit ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, Exports cross ₹21,000 crore

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 7:19PM by PIB Delhi

    Summary

    India’s defence production reached ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24, marking a 174% rise since 2014-15, driven by the Make in India initiative.

    Defence exports hit a record ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24, expanding 30 times in a decade, with exports to 100+ countries.

    Initiatives like iDEX and SAMARTHYA are driving technological advancements in AI, cyber warfare, and indigenous weapon systems.

    14,000+ items indigenised under SRIJAN and 3,000 under Positive Indigenisation Lists.

    India aims for ₹3 lakh crore in production, ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029.

    Summary

    Introduction

    India’s defence production has grown at an extraordinary pace since the launch of the “Make in India” initiative, reaching a record ₹1.27 lakh crore in FY 2023-24. Once dependent on foreign suppliers, the country now stands as a rising force in indigenous manufacturing, shaping its military strength through homegrown capabilities. This shift reflects a strong commitment to self-reliance, ensuring that India not only meets its security needs but also builds a robust defence industry that contributes to economic growth.

    Strategic policies have fuelled this momentum, encouraging private participation, technological innovation, and the development of advanced military platforms. The surge in the defence budget, from ₹2.53 lakh crore in 2013-14 to ₹6.81 lakh crore in 2025-26, underlines the nation’s determination to strengthen its military infrastructure.

    This commitment to self-reliance and modernisation is reflected in the recent approval by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for the procurement of the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), a significant step in enhancing the Army’s firepower. The deal includes 307 units of 155mm/52 caliber guns along with 327 High Mobility 6×6 Gun Towing Vehicles, equipping 15 Artillery Regiments under the Buy Indian–Indigenously Designed, Developed, and Manufactured (IDDM) category, at an estimated cost of ₹7,000 crore. Developed by DRDO with Bharat Forge and Tata Advanced Systems, ATAGS is a cutting-edge artillery system with a 40+ km range, advanced fire control, precision targeting, automated loading, and recoil management, thoroughly tested by the Indian Army in all terrains.

    With modern warships, fighter jets, artillery systems, and cutting-edge weaponry being built within the country, India is now a key player in the global defence manufacturing landscape.

     

    Surge in Indigenous Defence Production

    India has achieved the highest-ever growth in indigenous defence production in value terms during Financial Year (FY) 2023-24, driven by the successful implementation of government policies and initiatives led by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, focusing on attaining Atmanirbharta. The value of defence production has surged to a record high of ₹1,27,265 crore, marking an impressive 174% increase from ₹46,429 crore in 2014-15, according to data from all Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), other public sector units manufacturing defence items, and private companies.

    This growth has been bolstered by the Make in India initiative, which has enabled the development of advanced military platforms including the Dhanush Artillery Gun System, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun, Light Specialist Vehicles, High Mobility Vehicles, Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), Akash Missile System, Weapon Locating Radar, 3D Tactical Control Radar, and Software Defined Radio (SDR), as well as naval assets like destroyers, indigenous aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, corvettes, fast patrol vessels, fast attack craft, and offshore patrol vessels.

     

    Key points:

    • 65% of defence equipment is now manufactured domestically, a significant shift from the earlier 65-70% import dependency, showcasing India’s self-reliance in defence.

     

    • A robust defence industrial base includes 16 DPSUs, over 430 licensed companies, and approximately 16,000 MSMEs, strengthening indigenous production capabilities.

     

    • The private sector plays a crucial role, contributing 21% to total defence production, fostering innovation and efficiency.

     

    • India targets ₹3 lakh crore in defence production by 2029, reinforcing its position as a global defence manufacturing hub.

    Unprecedented Growth in Defence Exports

    India’s expanding global footprint in defence manufacturing is a direct result of its commitment to self-reliance and strategic policy interventions. Defence exports have surged from ₹686 crore in FY 2013-14 to an all-time high of ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24, marking a 30-fold increase over the past decade.

    Key points:

     

    • Defence exports have grown 21 times, from ₹4,312 crore in the 2004-14 decade to ₹88,319 crore in the 2014-24 decade, highlighting India’s expanding role in the global defence sector.

     

    • Defence exports surged by 32.5% year-on-year, rising from ₹15,920 crore in FY 2022-23 to ₹21,083 crore in FY 2023-24.

     

    • India’s diverse export portfolio includes bulletproof jackets, Dornier (Do-228) aircraft, Chetak helicopters, fast interceptor boats, and lightweight torpedoes.
    • Notably, ‘Made in Bihar’ boots are now part of the Russian Army’s gear, highlighting India’s high manufacturing standards.

     

    • India now exports defence equipment to over 100 countries, with the USA, France, and Armenia emerging as the top buyers in 2023-24.

     

    • The government aims to achieve ₹50,000 crore in defence exports by 2029, reinforcing India’s role as a global defence manufacturing hub while boosting economic growth.

     

    Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX)

    Launched in April 2018, Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) has created a thriving ecosystem for innovation and technology development in defence and aerospace. By engaging MSMEs, startups, individual innovators, R&D institutes, and academia, iDEX has provided grants of up to ₹1.5 crore for developing innovative technologies. To further enhance self-reliance in defence technology, ₹449.62 crore has been allocated to iDEX, including its sub-scheme Acing Development of Innovative Technologies with iDEX (ADITI), for 2025-26. As of February 2025, 549 problem statements have been opened, involving 619 startups and MSMEs, with 430 iDEX contracts signed.

     

     

    The scheme has three key objectives:

     

    1. Facilitate rapid development of new, indigenised, and innovative technologies for the Indian Defence and Aerospace sector, to meet their needs in a shorter time span.

     

    1. Create a culture of engagement with innovative startups, to encourage co-creation for Defence and Aerospace sectors.

     

    1. Empower a culture of technology co-creation and co-innovation within the Defence and Aerospace sectors.

     

    The recently launched ADITI scheme aims to support critical and strategic technologies such as satellite communication, advanced cyber technology, autonomous weapons, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, nuclear technologies, and underwater surveillance. Under this scheme, grants of up to ₹25 crore are provided to innovators.

    Reinforcing its commitment to supporting startups and MSMEs, the Ministry of Defence has also cleared procurement of 43 items worth over ₹2,400 crore from iDEX startups and MSMEs for the Armed Forces as of February 2025. Additionally, projects worth over ₹1,500 crore have been approved for development.

    SAMARTHYA: Showcasing India’s Defence Indigenisation

    The success story of indigenisation and innovation in the defence sector was highlighted at the Aero India 2025 event ‘SAMARTHYA’, which showcased India’s progress in defence manufacturing. The event featured 33 major indigenised items, including 24 developed by Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), and the Indian Navy, along with nine successful innovation projects from iDEX.

    Among the key indigenised items displayed were:

    • Electro Block of the Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun
    • Electric Mobile Part for Submarines
    • Torsion Bar Suspension for HMV 6×6
    • Extruded Aluminium Alloy for LCA MK-I/II and LCH Components
    • Indian High-Temperature Alloy (IHTA)
    • VPX-135 Single Board Computer
    • Naval Anti-Ship Missile (Short Range)
    • RudraM II Missile
    • C4ISR System
    • DIFM R118 Electronic Warfare Systems

     

    The event further highlighted breakthroughs in AI-driven analytical platforms, next-generation surveillance systems, quantum-secure communication technologies, and counter-drone measures. Innovations like the 4G/LTE TAC-LAN, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system, Smart Compressed Breathing Apparatus, and Advanced Autonomous Systems for the Armed Forces reflect India’s evolving defence landscape.

    Efforts are ongoing to bridge the gap between the Indian Army’s operational challenges and the innovative solutions developed by academia, industry startups, and research institutions. Additionally, the focus remains on conducting multi-domain operations in a data-centric environment, especially in light of emerging transformative technologies.

    SAMARTHYA stands as a testament to India’s commitment to self-reliance in defence technology, reinforcing its ability to develop advanced, home-grown solutions for national security.

     

    Advancing Self-Reliance

    India’s pursuit of self-reliance in defence manufacturing has significantly reduced its dependence on foreign suppliers. Through strategic policies and indigenous innovation, the country is developing cutting-edge military platforms, strengthening both national security and economic growth.

     

     

    Self-Reliant Initiatives through Joint Action (SRIJAN)

    • Launched by the Department of Defence Production (DDP) in August 2020 to promote indigenisation under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
    • Serves as a common platform for Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the Armed Forces (SHQs) to list imported items for domestic manufacturing.
    • As of February 2025, over 38,000 items are available, with more than 14,000 successfully indigenised.

     

    Positive Indigenisation Lists (PILs)

    • The Department of Defence Production (DDP) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) have issued five Positive Indigenisation Lists (PILs) for LRUs, assemblies, sub-assemblies, sub-systems, spares, components, and high-end materials.
    • These lists set fixed timelines beyond which procurement will be restricted to domestic manufacturers.
    • Out of over 5,500 items listed, more than 3,000 have been indigenised as of February 2025.
    • Key indigenised technologies include artillery guns, assault rifles, corvettes, sonar systems, transport aircraft, light combat helicopters (LCHs), radars, wheeled armoured platforms, rockets, bombs, armoured command post vehicles, and armoured dozers.

     

     

    Defence Industrial Corridors

    • Two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs) have been set up in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu to boost defence manufacturing. These corridors provide incentives to companies investing in the sector.
    • Investments worth more than Rs 8,658 crore have already been made in the 6 nodes of UP viz. Agra, Aligarh, Chitrakoot, Jhansi, Kanpur and Lucknow and 5 nodes of Tamil Nadu viz. Chennai, Coimbatore, Hosur, Salem and Tiruchirappalli.
    • As of February 2025, 253 MoUs have been signed, with a potential investment of ₹53,439 crore.

    Ease of Doing Business (EoDB)

    • The government has introduced several measures to improve ease of doing business in the defence manufacturing sector.
    • The validity of export authorisation for parts and components has been extended from two years to the completion of the order or component, whichever is later.
    • In 2019, the Defence Product List was streamlined to reduce the number of items requiring a manufacturing licence.
    • Parts and components of defence items were de-licensed in September 2019 to encourage investment.
    • The validity of defence licences under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, has been extended from three years to 15 years, with a further extension option of up to 18 years.
    • Over 700 industrial licences have been issued to 436 companies in the defence sector.
    • The introduction of an end-to-end digital export authorisation system has improved efficiency, with more than 1,500 authorisations issued in the last financial year.

     

    MAKE Projects: Driving Indigenous Defence Innovation

    The MAKE procedure was first introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP-2006) to promote indigenous design and development in the defence sector. Over the years, it has been simplified and streamlined through revisions in 2016, 2018, and 2020, ensuring faster development of defence equipment, systems, and components by both public and private industries.

    MAKE projects have been divided into three categories:

    MAKE-I (Government Funded)

     

    • Up to 70% government funding for prototype development (capped at ₹250 crore per Development Agency).
    • Minimum 50% Indigenous Content (IC) required.

     

    MAKE-II (Industry Funded)

     

    • Focuses on import substitution, encouraging domestic industries to develop critical defence systems.
    • No government funding, with a minimum 50% Indigenous Content (IC) requirement.

     

    MAKE-III (Manufactured in India through Transfer of Technology – ToT)

     

    • Involves manufacturing in India under Technology Transfer (ToT) from Foreign OEMs.
    • No design and development but require a minimum of 60% Indigenous Content (IC).

     

    Key points:

     

    • As of March 24, 2025, a total of 145 projects have been undertaken under the MAKE initiative, with the participation of 171 industries, driving indigenous defence production.

     

    • The initiative includes 40 MAKE-I projects (Government Funded), 101 MAKE-II projects (Industry Funded), and 4 MAKE-III projects (Manufacturing through ToT), strengthening self-reliance in defence manufacturing.

     

    Other Key Initiatives

    In recent years, the Indian government has implemented a series of transformative initiatives aimed at bolstering the country’s defence production capabilities and achieving self-reliance. These measures are designed to attract investment, enhance domestic manufacturing, and streamline procurement processes. From liberalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) limits to prioritizing indigenous production, these initiatives reflect a robust commitment to strengthening India’s defence industrial base. The following points outline the key government initiatives that have been pivotal in driving growth and innovation in the defence sector.

     

    • Liberalized FDI Policy: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the defence sector was liberalised in September 2020 to attract foreign investment, allowing up to 74% FDI through the automatic route and above 74% through the government route. Since April 2000, the total FDI in defence industries stands at $21.74 million.

     

    • TATA Aircraft Complex: Tata Aircraft Complex was inaugurated in Vadodara in October 2024 to manufacture C-295 aircraft, boosting Atmanirbharta in defence with 40 made-in-India aircraft out of 56 under the programme.
    • Manthan: The annual defence innovation event, Manthan, held during Aero India 2025 in Bengaluru, brought together leading innovators, startups, MSMEs, academia, investors, and industry leaders from the defence and aerospace sectors, reaffirming confidence in the government’s commitment to technological advancements and Aatmanirbhar Bharat.
    • Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS): DTIS aims to boost indigenisation by providing financial assistance for setting up eight Greenfield testing and certification facilities in the aerospace and defence sector, with seven test facilities already approved in areas like unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare, electro-optics, and communications.

     

    • Priority for Domestic Procurement: Emphasis is placed on procuring capital items from domestic sources under the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP)-2020.

     

    • Domestic Procurement Allocation: MoD has earmarked 75% of modernisation budget amounting to Rs 1,11,544 crore for procurement through domestic industries during the current Financial Year.

     

    Conclusion

    India’s remarkable strides in defence production and exports underscore its transformation into a self-reliant and globally competitive military manufacturing hub. The combination of strategic policy interventions, increased domestic participation, and a focus on indigenous innovation has significantly strengthened the country’s defence capabilities. The surge in production, the exponential rise in exports, and the success of initiatives like the Make in India reflect India’s commitment to achieving Atmanirbharta in defence. With ambitious targets set for 2029, the nation is poised to further expand its global footprint, reinforcing its position as a dependable partner in the international defence market while enhancing national security and economic growth.

    References:

    Click here to see PDF.

    *****

    Santosh Kumar/ Sarla Meena/ Saurabh Kalia

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated 35 cartel cases in last five years

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated 35 cartel cases in last five years

    CCI has Signed MoUs with Global Regulators for Competition Law Cooperation

    Competition Act 2023 Introduced ‘Lesser Penalty Plus’ for Cartel Disclosures

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:15PM by PIB Delhi

    The Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigated a total of 35 cartel cases across various sectors over the last five financial years (till 13.03.2025).

    CCI has signed Bilateral/Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Egypt, Mauritius, Japan, Brazil, BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa), Canada, European Commission, Australia and United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for cooperation in the field of competition law and policy. These MOUs include provision for enforcement cooperation between CCI and its MoU partners, subject to their respective legal framework, constraints, enforcement interests and available resources.

    In addition, India has signed 14 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with its trading partners. Some of these FTAs have a separate Chapter on Competition, according to which each Party shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, take measures which it considers appropriate against anticompetitive activities, in order to facilitate trade and investment flows between the Parties and the efficient functioning of its market.

    The Commission has a Division for trend analysis and conducting research in various sectors of the economy to have a holistic view and to detect any anti-competitive activities. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 introduced the concept of “lesser penalty plus” within the framework of Section 46 of the Act. Consequently, on 20.02.2024, the CCI (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2024 were notified, replacing the 2009 regulations and introducing a “lesser penalty plus”(LPP) mechanism to incentivize disclosures of cartels. The LPP mechanism was introduced to incentivize an existing lesser penalty applicant in respect of a cartel to give full, true, and vital disclosures about another cartel, hitherto not in the knowledge of the CCI.

    To further widen the scope of cartel investigation, Hub & Spoke mechanism has been incorporated by introducing the Proviso in Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 through the Amendment Act 2023 which provides that an enterprise or association of enterprises or a person or association of persons though not engaged in identical or similar trade shall also be presumed to be part of the agreement under this sub-section if it participates or intends to participate in the furtherance of such agreement. 

    CCI, through its enforcement and advocacy mandate, seeks to promote and sustain competition in the markets by conducting market studies and advocacy events, imparting training about competition issues besides carrying out market corrections to eliminate distortions. The CCI conducted 1446 advocacy programmes during the last five financial years (till 19.03.2025).

    This information was given by Minister of Finance and Corporate Affairs, Shri Nirmala Sitharaman, in  reply to a question in the Lok Sabha today.

    *****

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump silences the Voice of America: end of a propaganda machine or void for China and Russia to fill?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Valerie A. Cooper, Lecturer in Media and Communication, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington

    Getty Images

    Of all the contradictions and ironies of Donald Trump’s second presidency so far, perhaps the most surprising has been his shutting down the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) for being “radical propaganda”.

    Critics have long accused the agency – and its affiliated outlets such as Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Asia – of being a propaganda arm of US foreign policy.

    But to the current president, the USAGM has become a promoter of anti-American ideas and agendas – including allegedly suppressing stories critical of Iran, sympathetically covering the issue of “white privilege” and bowing to pressure from China.

    Propaganda is clearly in the eye of the beholder. The Moscow Times reported Russian officials were elated by the demise of the “purely propagandistic” outlets, while China’s Global Times celebrated the closure of a “lie factory”.

    Meanwhile, the European Commission hailed USAGM outlets as a “beacon of truth, democracy and hope”. All of which might have left the average person understandably confused: Voice of America? Wasn’t that the US propaganda outlet from World War II?

    Well, yes. But the reality of USAGM and similar state-sponsored global media outlets is more complex – as are the implications of the US agency’s demise.

    Public service or state propaganda?

    The USAGM is one of several international public service media outlets based in western democracies. Others include Australia’s ABC International, the BBC World Service, CBC/Radio-Canada, France Médias Monde, NHK-World Japan, Deutsche Welle in Germany and SRG SSR in Switzerland.

    Part of the Public Media Alliance, they are similar to national public service media, largely funded by taxpayers to uphold democratic ideals of universal access to news and information.

    Unlike national public media, however, they might not be consumed – or even known – by domestic audiences. Rather, they typically provide news to countries without reliable independent media due to censorship or state-run media monopolies.

    The USAGM, for example, provides news in 63 languages to more than 100 countries. It has been credited with bringing attention to issues such as protests against COVID-19 lockdowns in China and women’s struggles for equal rights in Iran.

    On the other hand, the independence of USAGM outlets has been questioned often, particularly as they are required to share government-mandated editorials.

    Voice of America has been criticised for its focus on perceived ideological adversaries such as Russia and Iran. And my own research has found it perpetuates stereotypes and the neglect of African nations in its news coverage.

    Leaving a void

    Ultimately, these global media outlets wouldn’t exist if there weren’t benefits for the governments that fund them. Sharing stories and perspectives that support or promote certain values and policies is an effective form of “public diplomacy”.

    Yet these international media outlets differ from state-controlled media models because of editorial systems that protect them from government interference.

    The Voice of America’s “firewall”, for instance, “prohibits interference by any US government official in the objective, independent reporting of news”. Such protections allow journalists to report on their own governments more objectively.

    In contrast, outlets such as China Media Group (CMG), RT from Russia, and PressTV from Iran also reach a global audience in a range of languages. But they do this through direct government involvement. CMG subsidiary CCTV+, for example, states it is “committed to telling China’s story to the rest of the world”.

    Though RT states it is an autonomous media outlet, research has found the Russian government oversees hiring editors, imposing narrative angles, and rejecting stories.

    A Voice of America staffer protests outside the Washington DC offices on March 17 2025, after employees were placed on administrative leave.
    Getty Images

    Other voices get louder

    The biggest concern for western democracies is that these other state-run media outlets will fill the void the USAGM leaves behind – including in the Pacific.

    Russia, China and Iran are increasing funding for their state-run news outlets, with China having spent more than US$6.6 billion over 13 years on its global media outlets. China Media Group is already one of the largest media conglomerates in the world, providing news content to more than 130 countries in 44 languages.

    And China has already filled media gaps left by western democracies: after the ABC stopped broadcasting Radio Australia in the Pacific, China Radio International took over its frequencies.

    Worryingly, the differences between outlets such as Voice of America and more overtly state-run outlets aren’t immediately clear to audiences, as government ownership isn’t advertised.

    An Australian senator even had to apologise recently after speaking with PressTV, saying she didn’t know the news outlet was affiliated with the Iranian government, or that it had been sanctioned in Australia.

    Switched off

    Trump’s move to dismantle the USAGM doesn’t come as a complete surprise, however. As the authors of Capturing News, Capturing Democracy: Trump and the Voice of America described, the first Trump administration failed in its attempts to remove the firewall and install loyalists.

    This perhaps explains why Trump has resorted to more drastic measures this time. And, as with many of the current administration’s legally dubious actions, there has been resistance.

    The American Foreign Service Association says it will challenge the dismantling of the USAGM, while the Czech Republic is seeking EU support to keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty on the air.

    But for many of the agency’s journalists, contractors, broadcasting partners and audiences, it may be too late. Last week the New York Times reported some Voice of America broadcasts had already been replaced by music.

    Valerie A. Cooper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump silences the Voice of America: end of a propaganda machine or void for China and Russia to fill? – https://theconversation.com/trump-silences-the-voice-of-america-end-of-a-propaganda-machine-or-void-for-china-and-russia-to-fill-252901

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bloomberg: Syria Sanctions Relief Sought by Bipartisan Pair of Lawmakers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    March 21, 2025
    A bipartisan pair of lawmakers is seeking sanctions relief for Syria as the country rebuilds after the fall of President Bashar al Assad.
    Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Democrat from Massachusetts, and Representative Joe Wilson, a South Carolina Republican, wrote a letter to to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent asking them to review the US’s Syria sanctions policy with an eye toward removing some measures to help the country’s development and counter the influence of Russia and Iran.
    “Sanctions inertia would undercut Syria’s path to stability,” they wrote, citing Rubio’s own testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. “There is an opportunity to explore the removal of sanctions that were aimed at a regime that no longer exists, if doing so would advance positive outcomes.”
    …
    Read the full article here.
    By:  Daniel FlatleySource: Bloomberg

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:06 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for security RU000A105898 (IADOM 1P21) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:06

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on March 24, 2025, 10:06 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 72.09) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 559.4 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 21.25%) of the security RU000A105898 (IADOM 1P21) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:18 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A0JWV89 (Akron B1P1) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:18

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on March 24, 2025, 10:18 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 85.53) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 906.92 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 11.25%) of the security RU000A0JWV89 (Akron B1P1) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:22 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A0ZZCH9 (IA DOM 5P2) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:22

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on March 24, 2025, 10:22 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 87.43) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 149.94 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 27.5%) of the security RU000A0ZZCH9 (IA DOM 5P2) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:26 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A1065R7 (IADOM 1P33) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:26

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on March 24, 2025, 10:26 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 73.91) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 584.96 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 22.5%) of the security RU000A1065R7 (IADOM 1P33) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:30 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A0ZZ1N0 (DOM 1P-3R) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:30

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on March 24, 2025, 10:30 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 106.97) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1195.08 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 7.5%) of the security RU000A0ZZ1N0 (DOM 1P-3R) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03/24/2025, 10:47 (Moscow time) the values of the lower limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A0JX2F6 (TbankB11) were changed.

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    03/24/2025

    10:47

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on March 24, 2025, 10:47 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 96.05) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 959.83 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 8.13%) of the security RU000A0JX2F6 (TbankB11) were changed.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: The deposit auction of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund will take place on 24.03.2025

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters: Date of the deposit auction 03/24/2025 Placement currency RUB Maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) 160,000,000.00 Placement term, days 88. Date of depositing funds 03/24/2025 Date of refunding funds 06/20/2025 Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum 20.00 Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). Minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) 160,000,000.00 Maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1 Auction form, open or closed (Open).

    The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 12:00 to 12:10. Applications in competitive mode from 12:10 to 12:15. Setting the cutoff percentage rate or declaring the auction invalid before 12:25.

    Additional conditions – Placement of funds with the possibility of early withdrawal of the entire deposit amount and payment of interest accrued on the deposit amount at the rate established by the deposit transaction, in the event of non-compliance of the Bank with the requirements established by clause 2.1. of the Regulation “On the procedure for selecting banks for placing funds of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund in deposits under the GDS” (as amended on the date of the deposit transaction), early withdrawal at the “on demand” rate, interest payment monthly, on the last business day of the month, without replenishment.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 24.03.2025 deposit auction of JSC “GFSO” will take place

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters: Date of the deposit auction 03/24/2025 Placement currency RUB Maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) 240,000,000.00 Placement term, days 365. Date of depositing funds 03/24/2025. Date of return of funds 03/24/2026. Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum 19.55 Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). Minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) 240,000,000.00 Maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open).

    The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Preliminary bids from 13:15 to 13:30. Competitive bids from 13:30 to 13:45. Setting the cutoff percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 14:30.

    Additional conditions – interest on the deposit amount is accrued and paid monthly; no fees or remuneration for transactions on the deposit account is allowed; extension of the bank deposit agreement upon expiration of the deposit placement term is not allowed; early withdrawal of the deposit amount (part of the deposit amount) at the request of JSC MFI “GFSO”, while the interest rate on the amount of early withdrawn funds is set at a rate higher than the rate for early withdrawal of the deposit amount (part of the deposit amount) established in the credit institution (hereinafter – “on demand”).

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Yuri Trutnev: The state of the Far East economy and the security of the state as a whole depend on technological development

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The issues of technological development of the Far East and preparations for the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 were discussed at a meeting of the Council of the Far Eastern Federal District, which was held with the participation of the heads of regions under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister – Plenipotentiary Representative of the President in the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev.

    “Technological development is acute today. The state of the economy and the security of the state as a whole depend on this. This week, the head of state, speaking at the Congress of the RSPP, noted that, according to the Ministry of Finance of Russia, more than 28 thousand sanctions were introduced against Russian companies and individuals. It is important to understand that sanctions are not just temporary restrictions. Their main goal is to weaken the economy of the state. That is why we must strive with technological independence in all directions with all our means. Already today we have positive changes. In almost all regions, drones gather, including civil purposes, in Yakutia, electric motorcycles are produced, in the Khabarovsk Territory – Baggi. Of course, these results were achieved, among other things, thanks to the action of the “Patriotic“ mechanism ”. The construction of an innovative scientific and technological center on the island of Russian is underway, and these are, in turn, the prospects for the development of such areas as biomedicine, information technology. Created the Vostok Venture Foundation. Highly technologies are being introduced, atomic stations of low power are built. Literally, literally, literally. Literally. Literally. The other day, in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, for the first time, flying tests of the Superjate 100 aircraft were carried out with the domestic PD-8 engine. This is an important step towards technological independence. The economic development and safety of the macroregion and the country as a whole depends on the quality and speed of its solution, ”Yuri Trutnev opened the discussion.

    Sakhalin Region Governor Valery Limarenko reported on the scientific and technological development of the island region. On behalf of the head of state, the construction of the international-level campus “SakhalinTech” is underway on Sakhalin. This year, the first stage of the campus will be commissioned – a student town for 1.5 thousand people, and in 2026 – a scientific and educational center. Construction is proceeding at an accelerated pace. In parallel with the construction, the university is being transformed into “University 4.0”. An advanced engineering school has been opened in the region. An electrical engineering laboratory operates on the basis of the SKB SAMI academic institute. An oil and gas chemical analytical laboratory is being created. A hydrogen cluster is being formed, where projects are already being implemented. The first stage of the Oil and Gas Industrial Park has been launched. A research and production center for the development of unmanned systems, accredited by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, has been created on Sakhalin. A unified Far Eastern unmanned airline, Aurora BAS, was created on the basis of the Far Eastern airline Aurora. An aviation training center for manned and unmanned aircraft was opened. Eight more such training grounds will be created in the near future.

    “It is important for us not only to develop the gas chemical cluster and the Vostochny Cosmodrome, the construction of which is proceeding according to schedule, but also everything related to the use of modern technologies. The implementation of such projects is facilitated by the regime of advanced development territories. Now we are planning to create an industrial park, the residents of which will, among other things, be engaged in deep processing of polymers. We are discussing the construction of a plant for the production of mineral fertilizers in the industrial park. The enterprise will be important not only for the agriculture of the Far East, it will be focused on exports to China and, as a result, will affect the development of the logistics industry,” said Vasily Orlov, Governor of the Amur Region.

    “Vitus Bering Kamchatka State University has been participating in the Priority 2030 program for the third year. As part of it, we are rebooting the university, making it a university of entrepreneurs – with an emphasis on the expedition component and interaction with leading research centers in Russia. Specific projects have been launched with a number of leading Russian universities. Projects with practical implementation in the field of geothermal energy are being developed, including low-power geothermal stations. We are currently launching one of these projects for testing in Kamchatka, which is called a natural laboratory. We want to offer a unique format of a floating university, when leading researchers gather on a ship, study the features of aquatic biological resources, the dynamics of water temperature and salinity of the ocean, and generally outline the prospects for ocean research. Particular attention is paid to projects that help our victory. Thanks to the Patriotic Priority Development Area, we have launched the production of unmanned aerial vehicles. We are consistently increasing the depth of localization, moving from simple assembly to development,” said Kamchatka Krai Governor Vladimir Solodov.

    The preparations for the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War were discussed. “This is a special holiday for our entire country, our citizens. There is not a single family that was not affected by that war. The significance of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War for the fate of Russia is difficult to overestimate. Attempts are currently being made to falsify history, to diminish the significance of the feat of our ancestors. An important task for us is for the younger generation to know and remember the history of their country, their native region. The head of state has also declared this year the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland. Now our children, like their fathers and grandfathers, heroically and selflessly defend their homeland and their families. May 9 is a special holiday for every family in our country. As part of the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the district, we have planned about 450 different events, including five events to be held abroad. Victory parades are planned in all regions. It is also important to ensure the safety of mass events. I ask all governors and representatives of law enforcement agencies to take this issue extremely seriously,” noted Yuri Trutnev.

    The holding of ceremonial events and Victory parades in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok was considered. This year, Khabarovsk will host two anniversary Victory parades – on May 9 and September 3. The parade in September will be dedicated to the defeat of militarist Japan and the end of World War II. Primorsky Krai is preparing for the Victory Parade in Vladivostok in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet. The Immortal Regiment procession will take place in the capital of Primorye. An extensive program will be organized for residents and guests of the Far Eastern capital with a festive concert, thematic local sites, exhibitions, interactive activities, photo zones, and master classes. In Vladivostok, the key event on May 9 will be the holding of the “Victory Streets” campaign. Thematic banners and stands with photographs of veterans of the Great Patriotic War will be placed on the Tsarevich Embankment. An exhibition of captured equipment from the special military operation zone will be organized. And on September 3, a series of festive events are planned in Vladivostok on the territory of Primorsky Krai, including a large festive concert on the central square of Vladivostok, “Vladivostok Seasons”.

    The progress of creating a museum on Shumshu dedicated to the Kuril landing operation, the last major battle of the USSR against militarist Japan, was separately considered. During the Great Patriotic War, Shumshu Island was the northern stronghold of Japanese troops on the Kuril Islands and was considered impregnable. The landing of Soviet paratroopers on Shumshu became a decisive event during the entire Kuril landing operation. “We are preparing an open-air museum. This is a bright page in the heroism of our soldiers, and we must support this memory. This initiative was supported by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Our task is simply to implement it. We will try to ensure that the first events on Shumshu dedicated to the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War take place on May 9,” said Yuri Trutnev.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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