Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: ROBUST AND TIME-TESTED FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND RUSSIA SERVES AS A SHINING EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY FOR THE WORLD TO EMULATE: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    Source: Government of India

    ROBUST AND TIME-TESTED FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND RUSSIA SERVES AS A SHINING EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION AND DIPLOMACY FOR THE WORLD TO EMULATE: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    LOK SABHA SPEAKER UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES IN DEEPENING BILATERAL TIES

    PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES FUNCTION AS “MINI PARLIAMENT” IN A NON-PARTISAN MANNER: LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    OBSERVING PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS IN A MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY LIKE INDIA IS A GREAT LEARNING: H.E. MR. VYACHESLAV VOLODIN

    RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION CALLS ON LOK SABHA SPEAKER

    Posted On: 03 FEB 2025 6:24PM by PIB Delhi

     Lok Sabha Speaker Shri Om Birla said today that robust and time-tested friendship between India and Russia serves as a shining example of cooperation and diplomacy for the world to emulate. Highlighting historic and deep-rooted friendship between the two countries, he noted that India-Russia bilateral ties are seen as very special at global stage. He observed that the relationship between the two nations are centuries old and that Russia has been India’s closest ally since independence.

    Shri Birla made these observations during the visit of a Russian Parliamentary delegation led by H.E. Mr. Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, to the Parliament House today.

    Congratulating Russia on a very fruitful and substantial chairmanship of the BRICS in 2024 and recalling his visit to the BRICS Parliamentary Summit in St. Petersburg in 2024, Shri Birla underscored the importance of such exchanges in strengthening parliamentary processes and deepening ties.

    He was happy to note that the Russian delegation had witnessed the proceedings of both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, providing them with insights into India’s democratic functioning.

    Shri Birla also provided an overview of India’s Parliamentary Committee System, describing them as “Mini-Parliament” where budgetary matters and key issues are examined in detail. He emphasized that Committees function in a non-partisan manner, enabling thorough discussions that are often constrained in the larger House due to time limitations and the broad scope of issues.

    Referring to India’s 75th year as a Republic, Shri Birla reflected on the nation’s journey since independence and the visionary efforts of the Constitution’s founding fathers in securing equality for all citizens. He informed the visiting delegation about the progress made by India in these years, strengthening Constitutional values.

    Shri Birla further highlighted the robust cooperation between the Parliaments of India and Russia, citing frequent engagements at various levels, including multilateral platforms such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the BRICS Parliamentary Forum, and the G-20. He warmly recalled his participation in the BRICS Parliamentary Summit in St. Petersburg, where he had the opportunity to engage with Russian parliamentary leaders.

     He also underlined the role of mutual trust and respect in further strengthening India-Russia relations, which have evolved into a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership encompassing political, strategic, and cultural cooperation. Stating that India and Russia enjoy vibrant ties in multilateral domain, he noted that the people-to-people ties between the two nations have provided a solid foundation for this comprehensive partnership. He expressed confidence that the current visit would further strengthen bilateral relations, fostering mutual growth and prosperity.

    H.E. Mr. Vyacheslav Volodin thanked Shri Birla for the warm welcome extended to his delegation. He said that observing parliamentary proceedings in a multi-party democracy like India was a great learning. He lauded the longstanding India-Russia partnership, which continues to be nurtured through the close ties shared by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin. Congratulating India on 75 years of Indian republic, Mr. Volodin also commended India’s remarkable economic growth, acknowledging the country’s emergence as a global power in last 75 years. Acknowledging the strong people-to-people ties between India and Russia, he hoped that India-Russia friendship reaches new horizons.

    Among others, the meeting was attended by Shri Bhartruhari Mahtab, Dr. Sanjay Jaiswal, Smt. Aparajita Sarangi, Shri Konda Vishweshwar Reddy, Dr. Shashi Tharoor and Shri Utpal Kumar Singh, Secretary General, Lok Sabha.

    ***

    AM

    (Release ID: 2099246) Visitor Counter : 61

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION FROM RUSSIA CALLS ON THE PRESIDENT

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 03 FEB 2025 5:28PM by PIB Delhi

    A parliamentary delegation from the Russian Federation, led by H.E. Mr Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, called on the President of India, Smt Droupadi Murmu at Rashtrapati Bhavan today (February 3, 2025).

    Welcoming the delegation to India, the President said that exchanges of this nature among public representatives not only foster stronger cooperation but also allow the partnership to remain contemporary and updated. She stated that the positive impact of regular contacts is also evident in the broader ‘India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership’, which continues to benefit significantly from the ongoing interaction at various levels.

    The President noted that at the leadership level, there is regular interaction between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin. The level of cooperation between our parliaments has also been very good. She said that mechanisms like the Inter-Parliamentary Commission have played an important role in facilitating cooperation. She emphasised on special attention to closer interaction between women and youth parliamentarians of India and Russia.

    The President shared with the delegation that she had inaugurated the New Delhi World Book Fair, where Russia is the Focus Country. She said that this Fair gives Indian readers a wonderful opportunity to get to know the rich literary heritage of Russia. She urged for stronger engagements in cultural and artistic domains. 

     *****

    MJPS/SR

    (Release ID: 2099200) Visitor Counter : 54

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Sanctioning and deterring hybrid operations – P-003032/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In response to the intensified Russia’s hybrid campaign, the High Representative (HR) and the Commission have taken forward a number of measures in the framework of the EU hybrid toolbox[1] to deter and respond to these operations.

    On 8 October 2024[2], the HR issued a statement strongly condemning Russia’s hybrid campaign against the EU and its Member States. The same day, the Council also adopted a hybrid sanctions regime in response to Russia’s destabilising activities[3].

    On 16 December 2024, the first package of restrictive measures[4] was adopted against individuals and entities, involved inter alia in foreign assassinations, sabotage activities, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference, spreading Russian disinformation in Europe, Ukraine, the United States and Africa.

    In parallel, the HR and the Commission finalised the operationalisation of Hybrid Rapid Response Teams[5] to support Member States and partners to increase their resilience and response to hybrid threats.

    As part of the response to instrumentalisation of migrants, the Commission adopted the Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation in May 2024[6].

    As stated in the recent Joint Statement by the Commission and the HR[7], the EU is also strengthening efforts to protect undersea cables[8], including enhanced information exchange, new detection technologies, as well as undersea repair capabilities, and international cooperation.

    More broadly, the EU will continue to work closely with Member States to improve situational awareness, and maritime domain awareness, ensure the resilience and security of critical infrastructure and take additional measures, to further prevent, deter and respond to hybrid activities threatening EU’s security and stability.

    More so, the EU will continue close cooperation with its international partners via relevant formats such as the G7.

    • [1] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15880-2022-INIT/en/pdf
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/08/hybrid-threatsrussia-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-russia-s-continued-hybrid-activity-against-the-eu-and-its-member-states/
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202402642
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202403174
    • [5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/12/16/russian-hybrid-threats-eu-agrees-first-listings-in-response-to-destabilising-activities-against-the-eu-its-member-states-and-partners/
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401359
    • [7] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-statement-european-commission-and-high-representative-investigation-damaged-electricity-and_en
    • [8] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-security-and-resilience-submarine-cable-infrastructures

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Russian ‘shadow fleet’ in the Baltic Sea – E-000291/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000291/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN)

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment of the environmental and maritime safety implications of the so-called Russian shadow fleet of oil tankers in the Baltic Sea, which, according to Greenpeace and others, represents a major environmental threat?[1]
    • 2.Against this background, what is the Commission’s view of the impact of the sanctions policy against the Russian Federation?

    Submitted: 23.1.2025

    • [1] https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/mecklenburg-vorpommern/Tankerliste-Greenpeace-warnt-vor-russischer-Ostsee-Schattenflotte,schattenflotte102.html
    Last updated: 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Urgent action needed to counter the EU’s growing dependence on Russian fertilisers, including through the introduction of sanctions and tariffs – P-002726/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted unprecedented economic sanctions on Russia, imposing severe consequences and costs and seriously curbing its war economy.

    The EU has sought to balance effective sanctions against Russia with the specific economic needs of its Member States and partners and ensure, in the interests of global food security, that EU sanctions do not target in any way the trade in agricultural and food products, including wheat and fertilisers, between third countries and Russia.

    The Commission is closely monitoring the situation regarding the import of fertilisers into the EU from Russia and Belarus. The Commission is concerned by the EU’s continued reliance on certain types of Russian fertilisers and is considering ways to reduce it. While reflecting on new measures, upholding food security remains our primary consideration.

    The EU has designated a number of persons having interests in the fertiliser sector. Those listings are based either on their leading role in the Russian economy, or their involvement in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian government.

    The EU remains committed to ensuring that sanctions are robustly enforced and that they target those supporting or benefiting from activities that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

    Last updated: 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova – A10-0006/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova

    (COM(2024)0469 – C10‑0127/2024 – 2024/0258(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0469),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0127/2024),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budgetary Control,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Budgets (A10-0006/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

    AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT[*]

    to the Commission proposal

    ———————————————————

    2024/0258 (COD)

    Proposal for a

    REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova
     

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

    Whereas:

    (1) The Union is founded on the values referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), which include democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Those values form part of the accession criteria established at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 (‘Copenhagen criteria’), which constitute the conditions of eligibility for the Union membership,

    (2) The enlargement process is built on established criteria, fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits. A firm commitment to ‘fundamentals first’ approach, which requires a strong focus on the rule of law, fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions and public administration reform, as well as on economic criteria, remains essential. Progress depends on  implementation by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafer referred to as ‘Moldova’) of the necessary reforms to align with the Union acquis,

    (3) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine further showed that enlargement is a geo-strategic investment in peace, security and stability. The Union is fully and unequivocally committed to the Union membership perspective of Moldova. Moldova’s orientation and commitment towards the Union is a strong expression of its strategic choice and place in a community of values. Moldova’s EU path needs to be firmly anchored in tangible and concrete progress on reforms,

    (4) It is in the common interest of the Union and Moldova to advance with the reforms its political, legal and economic systems with a view to its future Union membership and to support its accession process. The prospect of Union membership has a powerful transformative effect, embedding positive democratic, political, economic and societal change,

    (5) It is necessary to bring forward some of the advantages of Union membership before accession. Economic convergence is at the heart of those benefits. Currently, the convergence of Moldova in terms of GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power standards remains low at 29% of the Union average and is not progressing fast enough,

    (6) As accession negotiations with Moldova opened in June 2024, it is important that support to Moldova’s accession track is brought to levels that are comparable with other candidate countries engaged in accession negotiations and to ensure commensurate resources.

    (7) The implementation of the Growth Plan for Moldova requires the appropriate funding under a dedicated new financing instrument, the Facility to assist the country in implementing reforms for sustainable economic growth and advance on the fundamentals.

    (8) To achieve the goals of the Growth Plan for Moldova, emphasis with respect to investment areas should be placed on sectors that are likely to function as key multipliers for social and economic development: connectivity, infrastructure, including sustainable transport, decarbonisation, energy, green and digital transitions, agriculture and rural communities as well as education, labour market participation and skills development, with a particular focus on children and youth and on raising the standard of living throughout the country. Moldova’s diaspora should also be considered as an important contributor to Moldova’s social and economic development.

    (9) The Facility should build on the Association Agenda with Moldova as well as the work of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Eastern Partnership in Moldova which spearheaded investments in critical sectors such as connectivity, energy efficiency and energy security, while avoiding stranded assets, business development, and competitiveness, recognising that the liberalisation of tariff-rate quotas for key Moldovan exports, facilitation of trade through infrastructure and regulatory alignment, and strengthening Moldova’s integration into Union-led economic initiatives and programs will contribute to Moldova’s  integration into the Union single market and will deliver immediate and tangible socio-economic benefits.

    (9a) Given Russia’s unjust war of aggression against Ukraine, which has profoundly impacted Moldova’s security, economy, and citizens’ livelihoods, as well as the ongoing and unprecedented hybrid attacks targeting the country and democratic institutions, it is appropriate for the Facility to provide support to Moldova in a timely manner and to enable Moldova to strengthen its resilience to foreign malign interference in its sovereignty, democratic processes and institutions. The Facility should also seek to support Moldova’s needs for energy independence from Russia.

    (10) Sustainable and cohesive transport infrastructure is essential to improve connectivity between Moldova and the Union. It should contribute to the integration of Moldova in the Union’s transport network In the revised trans-European transport network (TEN-T), the Commission extended the Baltic Sea – Black Sea – Aegean Sea European Transport Corridor to Moldova. The TEN-T network is the reference for funding sustainable transport infrastructure, including for environmentally friendly means of transport, such as railways as well as digitalisation of transport. Cross-border energy infrastructure projects and interconnections are essential for regional energy security and integration within the Union.

    (11) The Facility should support investments and reforms that promote Moldova’s path to the digital transformation of the economy and society in line with the Union vision for 2030 presented in the Commission communication, entitled ‘2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade’, fostering an inclusive digital economy that benefits all citizens. The Facility should strive to facilitate Moldova’ achievement of the general objectives and digital targets with regard to the Union. As outlined by the Commission in its communication of 15 June 2023, entitled ‘Implementation of the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox’, the 5G cybersecurity Toolbox should be the reference for Union funding to ensure security, resilience and the protection of integrity of digital infrastructure projects in the region.

    (12) The support under the Facility should be provided to meet general and specific objectives, based on established criteria and with clear payment conditions. Those general and specific objectives should be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner. The Facility should support the enlargement process by accelerating the alignment with Union values, laws, rules, standards, policies and practices (‘acquis’) with a view to Union membership, accelerate progressive integration of Moldova in the Union single market, and accelerate its socio-economic convergence with the Union. The Facility should also foster good neighbourly relations.

    (13) In addition to boosting socio-economic convergence, the Facility should also help accelerate reforms related to the fundamentals of the enlargement process including rule of law, fundamental rights, inter alia, the rights of refugees, of persons belonging to minorities, including national minorities and Roma, as well as the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. It should also improve the functioning of democratic institutions and public administrations; public procurement, state aid control and public finance management; the fight against all forms of corruption and organised crime; quality education and training as well as employment policies; the country’s green transition, climate and environmental objectives.

    (14) This Facility should help Moldova in its preparation for Union Membership and in line with the existing enlargement methodology[1].

    (15) The Facility should complement the existing Economic and Financial Dialogue without compromising its scope, thereby enhancing economic integration and preparation for the Union’s multilateral surveillance of economic policies.

    (16) The Facility should promote the development of effectiveness principles, respecting additionality to and complementarity with the support provided under other Union programmes and instruments and striving to avoid duplication and ensure synergies between assistance under this Regulation and other assistance, including integrated financial packages composed of both export and development financing provided by the Union, the Member States, third countries, multilateral and regional organisations and entities. Moldova’s participation in other EU funding programmes should be promoted and encouraged.

    (17) In line with the principle of inclusive partnerships, the Commission should strive to ensure that relevant stakeholders in Moldova, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations are duly consulted and have timely access to relevant information to allow them to play a meaningful role during the design and implementation of programmes and the related monitoring processes.

    (18) Technical assistance, as well as cross-border cooperation assistance, should be provided in support of the objectives of this Facility and in order to strengthen the relevant capacities of Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda.

    (19) The Facility should ensure consistency with, and support for the general objectives of Union external action as laid down in Article 21 of the TEU, including the respect for fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It should in particular ensure the protection and promotion of human rights, and the rule of law.

    (20) The Facility should boost innovation, research, and cooperation between academic institutions and industry in support of the green and digital transitions, promoting local industries with a particular emphasis on locally based micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups;

    (21) Moldova should demonstrate a credible commitment to European values, including through its alignment with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including Union restrictive measures.

    (22) In the implementation of the Facility, account should be taken of the Union’s strategic autonomy as well as of the Union and its Member States’ strategic interests and the values on which the Union is founded.

    (23) Activities under the Facility should support progress towards Union social, climate and environmental standards, and support progress towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and should not contribute to environmental degradation or cause harm to the environment or climate. Measures funded under the Facility should be in line with Moldova’ Energy and Climate Plans, their Nationally Determined Contribution and ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050. The Facility should contribute to the mitigation of climate change and to the ability to adapt to its adverse effects, and foster climate resilience. In particular, funding under the Facility should promote the transition towards a decarbonised, climate-neutral, climate-resilient and circular economy.

    (24) The implementation of this Regulation should be guided by the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as elaborated in the Union of Equality strategies. It should promote and advance gender equality and mainstreaming, ensure meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes, and the empowerment of women and girls, and seek to protect and promote women’s and girls’ rights, as well as prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence, taking into consideration relevant EU Gender Action Plans and relevant Council conclusions and international conventions. Furthermore, this Regulation should be implemented in full respect of the European Pillar of Social Rights, including on child protection and labour rights. The implementation of the Facility should be in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its protocol and ensure accessibility in its investments and technical assistance, in line with Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    (25) Reflecting the European Green Deal as Europe’s sustainable growth strategy and the importance of tackling climate and biodiversity objectives in line with the commitments of the Interinstitutional Agreement, the Facility should contribute to the achievement of an overall target of 30 % of Union budget expenditure supporting climate objectives and 7,5 % in 2024 and 10 % in 2026 and 2027 to biodiversity objectives. At least 37 % of the non-repayable financial support, including provisioning, provided to investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP), one of the regional investment platforms referred to in Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947[2], should account to climate objectives. That amount should be calculated using the Rio markers following the obligation to report the EU’s international climate finance to the OECD, as well as other international agreements or frameworks. As early as June 2025, the EU climate coefficients, applicable across all programmes under the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Financing Framework (MFF) and set out in the Commission Staff Working Document entitled ‘Climate Mainstreaming Architecture in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework’ (SWD(2022) 225), will also be applied to climate expenditure under the MFF’s Heading 6 (‘Neighbourhood and the world’). The Facility will align with the approach of other Heading 6 instruments, in order to ensure consistent climate reporting in the region. The Facility should support activities that fully respect the climate and environmental standards and priorities of the Union and the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6).

    (26) Projects are approved under the NIP after assessment by the Commission and subject to a positive opinion by the Member States in the NIP Board.

    (27) The Commission, in cooperation with the Member States and Moldova, should ensure the compliance, coherence, consistency and complementarity, increased transparency and accountability in the delivery of assistance, including by implementing appropriate internal control systems and anti-fraud policies. The support under the Facility should be made available under the preconditions that Moldova upholds and respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, independent and pluralistic media, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and to guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the effective rights of persons belonging to minorities.

    (28) The Facility should be supported with resources from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounting to EUR 420 million and a maximum amount of EUR 1 500 million in loans for the period from 2025-2027. The amount should cover the 9% provisioning required for the loans corresponding to EUR 135 million, support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, as referred to in Article 18(2), and complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance.  The non-repayable support should be financed from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. In order to maximise EU financial support, the 9 % provisioning required for the loans corresponding to EUR 135 million should be covered from the NDICI- Global Europe Emerging challenges and priorities cushion, in line with Articles 6(3) and 17 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. All provisions under Regulation (EU) 2021/947 should apply unless otherwise mentioned in this Regulation. In particular, Moldova should remain eligible for NDICI regional, thematic and rapid response programmes as well as humanitarian aid. The proposed Facility is closely modelled on the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans.

    (29) Decisions on the release referred to in Article 19(3) for the support in the form of loans should be adopted in the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2029. This final date includes the time necessary for the Commission to evaluate the successful fulfilment of the payment conditions concerned and to adopt the subsequent release decision.

    (30) In order to maximise the leverage of Union financial support to attract additional investment, and to ensure Union control over the expenditure, the investments supporting the Reform Agenda should be implemented through the NIP. At least 25% of the loan amount released to Moldova should be made available by Moldova to investment projects approved under the NIP. This is in addition to the non-repayable support provided by the Union for these projects.

    (31) The financial liability from loans under the Facility should not constitute part of the amount of the External Action Guarantee within the meaning of Article 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

    (32) Horizontal financial rules adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on the basis of Article 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should apply to this Regulation. Those rules are laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and determine in particular the procedure for establishing and implementing the budget in direct and indirect management through grants, procurement, financial assistance, blending operations and the reimbursement of external experts, and provide for checks on the responsibility of financial actors.

    (33) Restrictions on eligibility in award procedures under the Facility should be provided for, where appropriate, given the specific nature of the activity or when the activity affects security or public order.

    (34) In order to ensure the efficient implementation of the Facility, including the facilitation of Moldova’ integration in European value chains, all supplies and materials financed and procured under this Facility should originate from Member States, Moldova, candidate countries and contracting parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area and countries which provide a level of support to Moldova comparable to the one provided by the Union, taking into account the size of their economy, and for which reciprocal access to external assistance in Moldova is established by the Commission, unless the supplies and materials cannot be sourced under reasonable conditions in any of those countries.

    (35) A Facility Agreement should be concluded with Moldova to set up the principles of the financial cooperation between the Union and Moldova, and to specify the necessary mechanisms related to the control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of Union funding under the Facility, rules on taxes, duties and charges and measures to prevent, detect, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest. Consequently, a loan agreement should also be concluded with Moldova setting out specific provisions for the management and implementation of funding provided in the forms of loans. Both the Facility Agreement and the loan agreement should be transmitted without delay, simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council ▌.

    (36) The Facility Agreement should provide the obligation for Moldova to ensure the collection of, and access to data in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of Reform Agenda.

    (37) The implementation of the Facility should be underpinned by a coherent and prioritised set of targeted reforms and investment-related priorities in Moldova (the ‘Reform Agenda’), providing a framework for boosting inclusive sustainable socio-economic growth, clearly articulated and aligned with Union accession requirements and the fundamentals of the enlargement process. The Reform Agenda will serve as an overarching framework to achieve the objectives of the Facility. The Reform Agenda should be prepared in close consultation with relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations and their input should be reflected, in accordance with the national legal framework. Disbursement of Union support should be conditional on compliance with the payment conditions and on measurable progress in the implementation of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda assessed and formally approved by the Commission. The release of funds should be structured accordingly, reflecting the objectives of the Facility.

    (38) The Reform Agenda should include targeted reform measures and priority investment areas, along with payment conditions in the form of measurable qualitative and quantitative steps that indicate satisfactory progress or completion of those measures, and a timetable for the implementation of those measures. The Reform Agenda should also include a preliminary list of planned investment projects intended for implementation under NIP. Those steps should be planned to be implemented for no later than 31 December 2027, although it should be possible for the overall completion of the measures, to which such steps refer, to extend beyond 2027 but not later than 31 December 2028. The Reform Agenda should include an explanation of Moldova’s system to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, corruption, including high-level corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest, when using the funds provided under the Facility, and the arrangements to avoid double funding from the Facility and other Union programmes as well as other donors.

    (39) The Reform Agenda should include an explanation on how the measures are expected to contribute to the climate and environmental objectives and the principle of ‘do no significant harm’, and the digital transformation.

    (40) Measures under the Reform Agenda should contribute to improving an efficient public financial management and control system, money laundering, tax avoidance, tax evasion, fraud and organised crime and to an effective system of State aid control, with the aim of ensuring fair conditions for all undertakings.

    (41) The Reform Agenda should contain a description of such systems as well as specific steps related to Chapter 32 in order to support Moldova in bringing its audit and controls requirements in line with Union standards. In the event that a request for the release of funds includes a step related to Chapter 32, referred to in Article 19(2), the Commission may not adopt a decision authorizing the release of funds unless it assesses such step positively.

    (42) The Facility Agreement should also include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of general and specific objectives of the Facility set out in this Regulation. Those indicators should be based on internationally agreed indicators. Indicators should also, to the extent possible, be coherent with the key performance indicators included in Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agendas for the Western Balkans under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 and in the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework. The indicators should be relevant, accepted, credible, easy, and robust.

    (43) The Commission should assess the Reform Agenda based on the list of criteria set out in this Regulation. In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to approve the Reform Agenda. The Commission will duly take into account Council decision 2010/427/EU (11) and the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), where appropriate.

    (44) The work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 adopted in accordance with the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 should cover the amounts funded from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    (45) Given the need for flexibility in the implementation of the Facility, it should be possible for Moldova to make a reasoned request to the Commission to amend the implementing decision, where the Reform Agenda, including relevant payment conditions, is no longer achievable, either partially or totally, because of objective circumstances. Moldova should be able to make a reasoned request to amend the Reform Agenda, including by proposing addenda, where relevant. The Commission should be able to amend the implementing decision.

    (46) The Facility Agreement should provide the obligation for Moldova to ensure the collection of, and access to data in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of the Reform Agenda. Financial support for the Reform Agenda should be possible in the form of a loan. In the context of Moldova’s financing needs, it is appropriate to organise the financial assistance under the diversified funding strategy provided for in Article 224of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and established as a single funding method therein, which is expected to enhance the liquidity of Union bonds and the attractiveness and cost-effectiveness of Union issuance.

    (47) It is appropriate to provide loans to Moldova on highly concessional terms with a maximum duration of 40 years and to not start the repayment of the principal before 2034.

    (48) Considering that the financial risks associated with the support to Moldova in the form of loans under the Facility is comparable to the financial risks associated with lending operations under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, provisioning for the financial liability from loans under this Regulation should be constituted at the rate of 9 %, in line with Article 214 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and the funding of the provisioning should be sourced from the emerging challenges and priorities cushion under Article  6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    (49) In order to ensure that Moldova disposes of start-up funding for the implementation of the first reforms, it should have access to up to 20 % of the total amount provided for in this Facility, after deduction of complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance, and provisioning for loans, in the form of a pre-financing, subject to availability of funding and to the respect of the preconditions for support under the Facility.

    (50) It is important to guarantee both flexibility and programmability in providing Union support to Moldova. Moldova should submit on a six-monthly basis a duly justified request for the release of funds at the latest two months after the timeline for the planned fulfilment of steps, set in the Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agenda. For that purpose, funds under the Facility should be released according to a fixed semi-annual schedule, subject to availability of funding, on the basis of a request for the release of funds submitted by Moldova and following verification by the Commission of the satisfactory fulfilment of both the general conditions related to macro-financial stability, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget and the relevant payment conditions. Where a payment condition is not fulfilled as per the indicative timeline set in the decision approving the Reform Agenda, the Commission could withhold in whole or in part the release of funds corresponding to that condition, following a methodology on partial payments. The release of the corresponding withheld funds could take place during the next window for the release of funds and up to twelve months after the original deadline set out in the indicative timeline, provided that the payment conditions have been fulfilled. In the first year of implementation, that deadline should be extended to 24 months from the initial negative assessment.

    (51) By way of derogation from Article 116(2) and (5) of the Financial Regulation, it is appropriate to set the payment deadline for contributions to state budgets starting from the date of the communication of the decision authorising the disbursement to Moldova and to exclude the payment of default interest by the Commission to Moldova.

    (52) The Commission should provide▌ the European Parliament in the framework of the discharge procedure with detailed information about the implementation of the Union budget under the Facility, in particular as regards audits carried out, including weaknesses identified and corrective measures taken, and as regards projects approved under NIP, including where applicable the amount of Moldova’s co-financing as well as other sources of contributions including from other Union financing instruments.

    (53) In the framework of the Union’s restrictive measures, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, no funds or economic resources may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of designated legal persons, entities or bodies. Such designated entities, and entities owned or controlled by them, therefore should not be supported by the Facility.

    (54) In the interest of transparency and accountability, Moldova should publish data on final recipients receiving amounts of funding exceeding the equivalent of EUR 50 000 cumulatively during the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility.

    (55) In accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (13) and Council Regulations (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (14), (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 (15) and (EU) 2017/1939 (16), the financial interests of the Union are to be protected by means of proportionate measures, including measures relating to the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities, fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest, double funding, to the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used.

    (56) In particular, in accordance with regulations (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 and (EU, Euratom) 883/2013, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) should be in a position to carry out administrative investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.

    (57) In accordance with Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the necessary rights and access should be granted to the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), including by third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds.

    (58) The Commission should ensure that the financial interests of the Union are effectively protected under the Facility. Considering the long track record of financial assistance provided to Moldova also under indirect management and taking into account its gradual alignment with the Unions internal control standards and practices, the Commission should rely to a great extent on the operation of Moldova’s internal control and fraud prevention systems. In particular, the Commission and OLAF and, where applicable, the EPPO should be informed of all suspected cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the implementation of funds under the Facility without delay.

    (59) Furthermore, Moldova should report the irregularities including fraud which have been the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding, without delay, to the Commission and keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings. With the objective of alignment to good practices in Member States, this reporting should be done by electronic means, using the Irregularity Management System, established by the Commission.

    (60) Moldova should establish a monitoring system feeding into a semi-annual report on the fulfilment of its Reform Agenda’s payment conditions accompanying the semi-annual request for the release of funds. Moldova should collect and provide access to data and information allowing the prevention, detection and correction of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, in relation to the measures supported by the Facility.

    (61) The Commission should ensure that clear monitoring and independent evaluation mechanisms are in place in order to provide effective accountability and transparency in implementing the Union budget, and to ensure effective assessment of progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    (62) The Commission should provide an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    (63) The Commission should carry out an evaluation of the Facility upon its completion.

    (64) Moldova should support free pluralistic media that enhance and promote the understanding of Union values and the benefits and obligations of potential Union membership, while undertaking decisive actions in terms of tackling Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. They should also ensure pro-active, clear and consistent public communication, including on the Union support. The recipients of Union funding should actively acknowledge the origin and ensure visibility of the Union funding, in line with the Communication and Visibility Manual for EU External Actions.

    (65) Implementation of the Facility should also be accompanied by enhanced strategic communication and public diplomacy to promote the values of the Union and highlight the added value of the Union’s support.

    (66) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

    (67) In order to provide funding for Moldova in due time without further delay, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

     

    CHAPTER I

    General Provisions

     

    Article 1

    Subject matter

    1. This Regulation establishes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova for the period 2025-2027 (the ‘Facility’).

    2. The Regulation shall provide assistance to Moldova for the delivery of EU-related reforms, in particular inclusive and sustainable socio-economic reforms and reforms concerning fundamentals of the enlargement process, aligned with Union values, as well as investments to implement Moldova’s Reform Agenda.

    3. The rules set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/947 shall apply to the implementation of the Facility, unless specified otherwise in this Regulation.

    Article 2

    Definitions

    For the purposes of this Regulation, the following definitions apply:

    (1) ‘Moldova’ means the Republic of Moldova.

    (2) ‘Facility Agreement’ means an arrangement concluded between the Commission and Moldova laying down the principles for the financial cooperation between Moldova and the Commission under this Regulation; this arrangement constitutes a financing agreement within the meaning of Article 114(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 ;

    (3) ‘enlargement policy framework’ means the overall policy framework for the implementation of this Regulation as defined by the European Council and the Council, and includes the revised enlargement methodology, agreements that establish a legally binding relationship with Moldova, the negotiating frameworks governing accession negotiations with candidates, where applicable, as well as resolutions of the European Parliament, relevant communications from the Commission, including, where applicable, on the rule of law, and joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 

    (4) ‘loan agreement’ means an agreement concluded between the Union and Moldova laying down the terms of the loan support under the Facility;

    (5) ‘Reform Agenda’ means a comprehensive, coherent and prioritised set of targeted reforms and priority investment areas in Moldova, including payment conditions that indicate satisfactory progress or completion of related measures, and an indicative timetable for their implementation;

    (6) ‘measures’ means reforms and investments as set out in the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (7) ‘payment conditions’ means conditions for the release of funds that take the form of observable and measurable qualitative or quantitative steps to be implemented by Moldova, as set out in the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (8) ‘blending operation’ means an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public financial institutions, including export credit agencies, or from commercial finance institutions and investors;

    (9) ‘final recipient’ means a person or entity receiving funding under the Facility; for the part of the funding that is made available as financial assistance, final recipient will be the treasury of Moldova; for the part of the funding that is made available through the Neighbourhood Investment Platform, final recipient will be the contractor or sub-contractor implementing the investment project; 

    (10) ‘do no significant harm’ means not supporting or carrying out economic activities that do significant harm to any environmental objective, where relevant, within the meaning of Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852;

    (11) ‘the Neighbourhood Investment Platform’ is one of the regional investment platforms referred to under Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

     

    Article 3

    Objectives of the Facility

    1. The general objectives of the Facility shall be to:

    (a) support the enlargement process by accelerating the alignment with Union values, laws, rules, standards, policies and practices (‘acquis’) through the adoption and implementation of reforms with a view to future Union membership;

    (b) support progressive integration of Moldova into the Union single market;

    (c) accelerate the socio-economic convergence of Moldova’s economy with the Union;

    (d) foster good neighbourly relations, as well as people-to-people contact.

     

    2. The specific objectives of the Facility shall be to:

    (a) further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process, including the rule of law and fundamental rights, the functioning of democratic institutions, including de-polarisation, public administration and fulfil the economic criteria; build a functioning market economy capable of coping with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, ▌ promoting an independent judiciary, reinforcing security and stability, strengthening the fight against fraud and all forms of corruption, including high-level corruption, oligarchic influence and nepotism, organised crime, cross-border crime and money laundering as well as terrorism financing, tax evasion and tax fraud, tax avoidance; increasing compliance with international law; strengthening freedom and independence of media and academic freedom; combating hate speech; reinforce territorial integrity; enabling an environment for civil society, fostering social dialogue; promoting gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the empowerment of women and girls, children’s rights and child and youth participation, non-discrimination and tolerance, to ensure and strengthen respect for the rights of refugees and persons belonging to minorities, including national minorities and Roma, as well as rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons;

    (b) move towards full alignment of Moldova with the Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including Union restrictive measures;

    (c) fight disinformation, hybrid threats, cyberattacks and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, in particular by Russia, against Moldova’s sovereignty, democratic processes and institutions, as well as against the Union and its values;

    (d) move towards harmonisation of visa policies with the Union;

    (e) reinforce the effectiveness of public administration, build capacities and invest in administrative staff in Moldova; ensure access to information, public scrutiny and the involvement of civil society in decision-making processes; support transparency, accountability, structural reforms and good governance at all levels, including as regards their powers of oversight and inquiry over the distribution of and access to public funds as well as in the areas of public financial management and public procurement and State aid control; support initiatives and bodies involved in supporting and enforcing international justice in Moldova;

    (f) accelerate the transition of Moldova to sustainable, climate-neutral and inclusive economy, that is capable of withstanding competitive market pressures of the Union single market, and to a stable investment environment and reduce its strategic dependency by diversifying energy sources and by constructing new electricity interconnections with neighbouring countries in order to achieve energy security;

    (g) foster economic integration of Moldova with the Union single market, in particular through increased trade and investment flows, and resilient value chains;

    (h) support enhanced integration with the Union single market through improved and sustainable connectivity in line with trans-European networks to reinforce good neighbourly relations, as well as people-to-people contact;

    (i) accelerate the inclusive and sustainable green transition to climate neutrality by 2050, in accordance with the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal and covering all economic sectors, particularly energy, including the transition towards a de-carbonised, climate-neutral, climate-resilient and circular economy, while ensuring that investments respect the ‘do no significant harm’ principle;

    (j) promote the digital transformation and digital skills as an enabler of sustainable development and inclusive growth;

    (k) boost innovation, research, and cooperation between academic institutions and industry in support of the green and digital transitions, promoting local industries with a particular emphasis on locally based micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups;

    (l) boost quality education, training, reskilling and upskilling at all levels, with a particular focus on youth, including tackling youth unemployment, preventing brain drain and supporting vulnerable communities, including refugees, and support employment policies, including labour rights, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights, and fighting poverty.

    (la) support communication activities to improve Moldovan citizens’ awareness of the positive impact of Union accession and understanding of the required reforms.

     

    Article 4

    General principles

    1. Support from the Facility shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement and the EU enlargement policy.

    2. Cooperation under the Facility shall be needs-based and shall promote the development effectiveness principles, namely ownership of development priorities by Moldova with a focus on clear conditionality and tangible results, inclusive partnerships with local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations, as well as transparency and mutual accountability. That cooperation shall be based on an effective and efficient allocation and use of resources.

    3. The provision of macro-financial assistance shall not fall within the scope of this Facility.

    4. Support from the Facility shall be additional and complementary to the support provided under other Union programmes and instruments. Activities eligible for funding under this Regulation may receive support from other Union programmes and instruments provided that such support does not cover the same cost and that appropriate oversight and budget control is ensured. The Commission shall ensure complementarities and synergies between the Facility and other Union programmes, with a view to avoiding the duplication of assistance and double funding.

    5. In order to promote the complementarity, coherence and efficiency of their actions, the Commission and the Member States shall cooperate and shall strive to avoid duplication and ensure synergies between assistance under this Regulation and other forms of assistance, including integrated financial packages composed of both export and development financing provided by the Union, Member States, third countries, multilateral and regional organisations and entities, such as international organisations and the relevant international financial institutions, agencies and non-Union donors, in line with the established principles for strengthening operational coordination in the field of external assistance, including through enhanced coordination with Member States at local level. Such coordination at local level shall involve regular and timely consultations and frequent exchanges of information throughout the implementation of the Facility.

    5a. In order to maximise international support, it shall be possible for Member States, third countries, international organisations, international financial institutions or other sources to contribute to the implementation of the Facility. Such contributions shall be implemented in accordance with the same rules and conditions and shall constitute external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2), points (a), (d) and (e), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    6. Activities under the Facility shall mainstream and promote democracy, human rights and gender equality, progressively align with the social, climate and environmental standards of the Union, mainstream climate change mitigation and adaptation, where relevant, disaster risk reduction, environmental protection and biodiversity conservation, including through, where appropriate, environmental impact assessments, and shall support progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, promoting integrated actions that can create co-benefits and meet multiple objectives in a coherent way. Those activities shall avoid stranded assets, and shall be guided by the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and of ‘leaving no one behind’, as well as by the sustainability mainstreaming approach underpinning the European Green Deal. At least 37 % of the non-repayable financial support, including provisioning, provided to investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) should account to climate objectives.

    7. Moldova and the Commission shall ensure that gender equality, gender mainstreaming and the integration of a gender perspective are taken into account and promoted throughout the preparation of the Reform Agenda and the implementation of the Facility. Moldova and the Commission shall take appropriate steps to prevent any discrimination based upon gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Commission shall report on these measures in the context of its regular reporting under the Gender Action Plans.

    8. The Facility shall not support activities or measures which are incompatible with Moldova’s Energy and Climate Plans, their Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement, and ambition to reach climate-neutrality by 2050 at the latest or that promote investments in fossil fuels, or that cause significant adverse effects on the environment, the climate or biodiversity, while taking into account possible transitional arrangements, in line with existing Union legislation, to mitigate energy crises.

    9. In line with the principle of inclusive partnership, the Commission shall ▌ensure, as appropriate, democratic scrutiny in the form of consultation by Moldova’s government of the parliament of Moldova as well as of relevant stakeholders, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, including vulnerable groups, refugees, and all minorities and communities, as relevant, so as to allow them to participate in shaping the design and the implementation of activities eligible for funding under the Facility and in the related monitoring, scrutiny and evaluation processes, as relevant. That consultation shall seek to represent the pluralism of Moldova’s society. In addition, the Commission shall ensure that civil society in Moldova, including non-governmental organisations, is able to directly report any irregularities concerning funding or final beneficiaries to the Commission via appropriate standing channels, as well as to send to the Commission opinions on the implementation of the Reform Agenda and the evaluation of its measures by the Moldovan government.

    10. The Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and Moldova, shall ensure the implementation of Union commitments to increased transparency and accountability in the delivery of support, including by promoting the implementation and reinforcement of internal control systems and anti-fraud policies. The Commission shall make information on the volume and allocation of support publicly available through the Scoreboard referred to in Article 24. Moldova shall publish up-to-date data on final recipients receiving Union funds for the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility, as described in Article 20.

    Article 5

    Preconditions for Union support

    1. Preconditions for the support under the Facility shall be that Moldova upholds and respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, free and fair elections, pluralistic media, meaningful engagement of the civil society, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and guarantee respect for all human rights obligations, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.

    2. The Commission shall monitor the fulfilment of the preconditions set out in paragraph 1 before funds, including pre-financing, are released to Moldova under the Facility and throughout the period of the support provided under the Facility taking duly into account the enlargement policy framework. The Commission shall also take into account the relevant recommendations of international bodies, such as the Council of Europe and its Venice Commission, or the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the monitoring process.

    3. The Commission may adopt a decision concluding that some of the preconditions set out in paragraph 1 of this Article are not met, and in particular, withhold the release of funds referred to in Article 19, irrespective of whether the payment conditions referred to in Article 10 are fulfilled.

     

    CHAPTER II

    Financing and implementation

    Article 6

    Implementation

    1. The Facility shall be supported with resources from the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe amounting to EUR 420 million and a maximum amount of EUR 1 500 million in loans. The amount for loans shall not constitute part of the amount of the External Action Guarantee within the meaning of Article 31(4) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    2. The non-repayable financial support shall be financed for the period from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2027 from the envelope allocated to the Neighbourhood geographic programme under Article 6(2), point (a) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. It shall cover▌ support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, as referred to in Article 18(2)and complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance. That funding shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The provisioning for loans amounting to EUR 135 million shall be covered from the NDICI-Global Europe Emerging challenges and priorities cushion in accordance with Articles 6(3) and 17 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    Decisions on the release referred to in Article 19(3) for the support in the form of loans shall be adopted in the period from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2029.

    3. The release of the Union’s assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the key principles and objectives of reforms set out in the Reform Agenda. All funds, with the exception of complementary support referred to in paragraph 2, and resources referred to in paragraph 5 and the exceptional bridge financing shall be provided in twice-yearly instalments based on the completion of the necessary reforms in the specified timelines as agreed in the reform agenda and agreed in the Commission Implementing Decision.

    4. At least 25% part of the loan component released to Moldova shall be made available by Moldova to investment projects approved under the NIP, one of the regional investment platforms referred to in Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The Facility Agreement, referred to in Article 8, shall detail this obligation, as well as the detailed rules and principles for implementation. Failure to comply with this obligation shall trigger suspension of further operations under this Facility and recovery of said amounts from Moldova, as referred to in Article 19.

    4a  Complementary support shall correspond to at least 20 % of total non-repayable financial support as referred to in Article 6(2) and shall include measures to strengthen the administrative capacities of Moldovan authorities and other stakeholders, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society organisations.

    5. An amount of up to 1% of the non-repayable support referred to in paragraph 2 may be used for technical and administrative assistance for the implementation of the Facility, such as preparatory actions, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities, which are required for the management of the Facility and the achievement of its objectives, in particular studies, meetings of experts, training consultations with Moldova’s authorities, conferences, consultation of stakeholders, including local and regional authorities and civil society organisations, information and communication activities, including inclusive outreach actions▌insofar as they are related to the objectives of this Regulation, expenses linked to IT networks focusing on information processing and exchange, corporate information technology tools, as well as all other expenditure at headquarters and Union delegation for the administrative and coordination support required for the Facility. Expenses may also cover the costs of activities supporting transparency and of other activities such as quality control and monitoring of projects or programmes on the ground and the costs of peer counselling and experts for the assessment and implementation of reforms and investments.

    5a  Member States, third countries, international organisations, international financial institutions or other sources may provide additional financial contributions to the Facility. Such contributions shall constitute external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2), points (a), (d) and (e), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. Additional amounts received as external assigned revenue within the meaning of Article 21(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 under the relevant Union legal acts shall be added to the resources referred to in Article 6(1) and be implemented in accordance with the same rules and conditions.

    Article 7

    Rules on the eligibility of persons and entities, on the origin of supply and materials and on restrictions under the Facility

    1. By way of derogation from Article 28 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947, participation in procurement and in grant award procedures for activities financed under the Facility shall be open to international and regional organisations and to all natural persons who are nationals of, or legal persons effectively established in:

    (a) Member States, Moldova, candidate countries and contracting parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area;

    (b) countries which provide a level of support to Moldova comparable to that provided by the Union, taking into account the size of their economy, and for which reciprocal access to external assistance in Moldova is established by the Commission.

    2. The reciprocal access referred to in paragraph 1, point (b), may be granted for a limited period of at least one year where a country grants eligibility on equal terms to entities from the Union and from countries eligible under the Facility.

    The Commission shall decide on the reciprocal access after consulting Moldova.

    3. All supplies and materials financed and procured under this Facility shall originate from any country referred to in paragraph 1, points (a) and (b), unless those supplies and materials cannot be sourced under reasonable conditions in any of those countries. In addition, the rules on restrictions laid down in paragraph 6 shall apply.

    4. The eligibility rules under this Article shall not apply to, and shall not create nationality restrictions for, natural persons employed or otherwise legally contracted by an eligible contractor or, where applicable, subcontractor except where the nationality restrictions are based on the rules provided for in paragraph 6.

    5. For activities jointly co-financed by an entity or implemented under direct management or indirect management with entities referred to in Article 62(1), first subparagraph, point (c) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the rules applicable to those entities shall also apply in addition to the rules established under this Article, including, where applicable, the restrictions provided for under paragraph 6 of this Article and duly reflected in the financing agreements and contractual documents signed with those entities.

    6. The eligibility rules and rules on the origin of supplies and materials set out in paragraphs 1 and 3 and rules on the nationality of the natural persons as set out in paragraph 4 may be restricted with regard to the nationality, geographical location or nature of the legal entities participating in award procedures, as well as with regard to the geographical origin of supplies and materials where:

    (a) such restrictions are required on account of the specific nature or objectives of the activity or specific award procedure or where those restrictions are necessary for the effective implementation of the activity;

    (b) the activity or specific award procedures affect security or public order, in particular concerning strategic assets and interests of the Union, of Member States, or of Moldova, including the security, resilience and protection of integrity of digital infrastructure, including 5G network infrastructure, communication and information systems, and related supply chains.

    7. Tender applicants and candidates from non-eligible countries may be accepted as eligible in cases of urgency or where services are unavailable in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of an activity impossible or exceedingly difficult.

    8. In the framework of the Union’s restrictive measures, adopted on the basis of Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, no funds or economic resources may be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of legal persons, entities or bodies subject to Union restrictive measures. Such persons and entities, and entities owned or controlled by them, shall not be supported by the Facility either directly or indirectly, including as indirect owners, sub-contractors in the supply chain or ultimate beneficiaries.

    Article 8

     Facility Agreement

    1. The Commission shall conclude a Facility Agreement with Moldova for the implementation of this Regulation setting out the obligations and payment conditions for the disbursement of funding.

    2. The Facility Agreement shall be complemented by a loan agreement in accordance with Article 15, setting out specific provisions for the management and implementation of funding provided in the form of a loan. The Facility Agreement, including any related documentation, shall be made available▌, to the European Parliament and the Council simultaneously and without delay.

    3. With the exception of bridge financing referred to in Article 17a, funding shall be granted to Moldova only after the Facility Agreement and the loan agreement have entered into force.

    4. The Facility Agreement and the loan agreement concluded with Moldova shall ensure that the obligations set out in Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 are fulfilled.

    5. The Facility Agreement shall lay down the necessary detailed provisions concerning:

    (a) the commitment of Moldova to make decisive progress towards a robust legal framework to fight fraud, and establish more efficient and effective control systems, including appropriate mechanisms for the protection of whistleblowers as well as appropriate mechanisms and measures to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest as well as to strengthen the fight against money laundering, organised crime, misuse of public funds, terrorism financing, tax avoidance, tax fraud or tax evasion, and other illegal activities affecting the funds provided under the Facility;

    (b) the rules on the release, withholding and reduction of funds in accordance with Article 19;

    (c) the detailed rules on and the obligation of Moldova to provide part of total loan amount for projects approved under the NIP, pursuant to Art. 6(4).

    (d) the activities related to management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit, as well as system reviews, investigations, anti-fraud measures and cooperation;

    (e) the rules on reporting to the Commission on whether and how the payment conditions referred to in Article 10 are fulfilled;

    (f) the rules on taxes, duties and charges in accordance with Article 27(9) and (10) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947;

    (g) the measures to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and the obligation for persons or entities implementing Union funds under the Regulation to notify the Commission, OLAF and, where applicable, EPPO, without delay, of suspected or actual cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest and other illegal activities affecting the funds provided under the Facility and their follow-up;

    (h) the obligations referred to in Articles 21 and 22, including the precise rules and a timeframe on collection of data by Moldova and access to it for the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable, EPPO;

    (i) a procedure to ensure that disbursement requests for loan support fall within the available loan amount, in accordance with Article 6(1);

    (j) the right of the Commission to reduce proportionately the support provided under the Regulation and to recover any amount referred to in Article 6(1) spent to achieve the objectives of the Regulation, or to ask for early repayment of the loan, in cases of irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, of a reversal of qualitative or quantitative steps, or of a serious breach of an obligation provided for in the Facility Agreement;

    (k) rules and modalities for Moldova to report for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of the Facility and assessing the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3.

    (l) the obligation for Moldova to transmit electronically to the Commission the data referred to in Article 20.

     

    CHAPTER III

    Reform Agenda

     

    Article 9

    Submission of Reform Agenda

    1. In order to receive any support under this Regulation, Moldova shall submit to the Commission a Reform Agenda for 2025-2027 based on the key principles and objectives of socio-economic and fundamental reforms set out in the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, agreed under the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the enlargement policy framework.

    2. The Reform Agenda shall provide an overarching framework to achieve the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3, setting out the reforms to be undertaken by Moldova, as well as investment areas. The Reform Agenda shall comprise measures for the implementation of reforms through a comprehensive and coherent package. In the areas of the fundamentals of the enlargement process, including the rule of law, the fight against corruption, including high-level corruption, fundamental rights and the freedom of expression, the Reform Agendas shall reflect the assessments in the enlargement policy framework.

    3. The Reform Agendas shall be consistent with the latest macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework submitted to the Commission in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue with the Union.

    4. The Reform Agenda shall be consistent with and support the reform priorities identified in the context of Moldova’s accession path, and in other relevant documents, the Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement and the ambition to reach climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest.

    5. The Reform Agenda shall respect the general principles set out in Article 4.

    6. The Reform Agenda shall be prepared in an inclusive and transparent manner, in consultation with social partners and civil society organisations.

    7. The Commission shall invite Moldova to submit its Reform Agenda within three months of the entry into force of this Regulation. The Commission shall transmit Moldova’s Reform Agenda to the European Parliament and the Council as soon as it is received.

     

    Article 10

    Principles for financing under the Reform Agenda

    1. The Regulation shall provide incentives for the implementation of the Reform Agenda by setting payment conditions on the release of funds. Those payment conditions shall apply to funds under Article 6(1), with the exception of complementary support including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance. Those payment conditions shall take the form of measurable qualitative or quantitative steps. Such steps shall reflect progress on specific socio-economic reforms and on the fundamentals of the enlargement process linked to the achievement of the objectives of the Facility set out in Article 3, consistent with the enlargement policy framework.

    2. The fulfilment of those payment conditions shall trigger full or partial release of funds, depending on the degree of their completion.

    3. Macro financial stability, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget are general conditions for payments that shall be fulfilled for any release of funds.

    Funds under the Facility shall not support activities or measures which undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.

    Article 11

    Content of the Reform Agenda

    1. The Reform Agenda shall in particular set out the following elements, which shall be reasoned and substantiated:

    (a) measures constituting a coherent, comprehensive and adequately balanced response to the objectives set out in Article 3, including structural reforms, investments, and measures to ensure compliance with preconditions referred to in Article 5, where appropriate;

    (b) an explanation of how the measures are consistent with the general principles referred to in Article 4, as well as the requirements, strategies, plans and programmes referred to in Articles 4 and 10;

    (c) an explanation of how the measures are expected to further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process as referred to in Article 3(2), point (n), including the rule of law, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption;

    (d) an indicative list of investment projects and programmes intended for discussion and approval under the NIP,, including respective overall investment volumes and envisaged timelines for implementation;

    (e) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to climate and environmental objectives and their compatibility with the principle ‘do no significant harm’;

    (f) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to digital transformation;

    (g) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to education, training and employment and social objectives;

    (h) an explanation of the extent to which the measures are expected to contribute to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and the promotion of women and girls’ rights;

    (i) for the reforms and investments, an indicative timetable, and the envisaged payment conditions for the release of funds in the form of measurable qualitative and quantitative steps planned to be implemented by 31 December 2027 at the latest;

    (j) an explanation of how the measures are expected to contribute to a progressive and continuous alignment with the CFSP, including Union restrictive measures;

    (k) the arrangements for the effective monitoring, reporting and evaluation of the Reform Agenda by Moldova, including the proposed measurable qualitative and quantitative steps and relevant indicators set out in paragraph 2;

    (l) an explanation of Moldova’s system to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption, including high-level corruption, and conflicts of interest and to enforce State aid control rules, and the proposed measures to address existing deficiencies in the first years of the implementation of the Reform Agenda;

    (m) for the preparation and, where available, for the implementation of the Reform Agenda, a summary of the consultation process, conducted in accordance with Moldova’s legal framework, of relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional representative bodies and authorities, social partners and civil society organisations, and how the input of those stakeholders is reflected in the Reform Agenda;

    (n) a communication and visibility plan on the Reform Agenda for the local audiences of Moldova;

    (o) any other relevant information.

    2. The Reform Agenda shall be results-based and include indicators for assessing progress towards the achievement of the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3. Those indicators shall be based, where appropriate and relevant, on internationally agreed indicators and those already available related to the Moldova’s policies. Indicators shall also be coherent, to the extent possible, with the key performance indicators included in Commission Implementing Decision approving the Reform Agendas for the Western Balkans under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 and in the EFSD+ Results Measurement Framework.

    Article 12

    Commission assessment of the Reform Agenda

    1. The Commission shall assess the relevance, comprehensiveness and appropriateness of Moldova’s Reform Agenda or, where applicable, any amendment to that Agenda, without undue delay. When carrying out its assessment, the Commission shall act in close cooperation with Moldova, and may make observations, seek additional information or require Moldova to review or modify its Reform Agenda.

    2. As regards the objective set out in Article 11(1)(j) of this Regulation, the Commission, in accordance with Decision 2010/427/EU, shall duly take into account the role and the contribution of the EEAS.

    3. When assessing the Reform Agenda, the Commission shall take into account relevant available analytical information about Moldova, including its macroeconomic situation and debt sustainability, the justification and the elements provided by Moldova as referred to in Article 13, as well as any other relevant information such as the information listed in Article 11.

    4. In its assessment, the Commission shall consider in particular the following criteria:

    (a) whether the Reform Agenda represents a relevant, comprehensive, coherent and adequately balanced response to the objectives set out in Article 3 and elements set out in Article 11;

    (b) whether the Reform Agenda and its measures are consistent with the principles, strategies, plans and programmes referred to in Articles 4 and 11;

    (c) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to accelerate progress towards bridging the socio-economic gap between Moldova and the Union, and thereby enhances their economic, social and environmental development and supports the convergence towards the Union’s standards, reduces inequalities and reinforces social cohesion;

    (d) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to further strengthen the fundamentals of the enlargement process as referred to in Article 3(2), point (a);

    (e) whether the Reform Agenda can be expected to accelerate the transition of Moldova towards sustainable, climate-neutral and climate resilient and inclusive economy by improving connectivity, making progress on the twin transition of green and digital, including biodiversity, reducing strategic dependencies and boosting research and innovation, education, training, employment and skills and the wider labour market, with particular attention on youth;

    (f) whether the measures included in the Reform Agenda are compatible with the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and of ‘leaving no one behind’;

    (g) whether the Reform Agenda appropriately addresses potential risks in compliance with preconditions and payment conditions;

    (h) whether the payment conditions proposed by Moldova are appropriate and ambitious, consistent with the enlargement policy framework, as well as sufficiently meaningful and clear to allow for the corresponding release of funds in case of their fulfilment and whether the proposed reporting indicators are appropriate and sufficient to monitor and report on the progress made towards the overall objectives;

    (i) whether the arrangements proposed by Moldova are expected to effectively prevent, detect and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, organised crime and money laundering as well as to effectively investigate and prosecute criminal offences affecting the funds under the Facility,;

    (j) whether the Reform Agenda effectively reflects the input of relevant stakeholders, including Moldova’s parliament, local and regional representative bodies and authorities, social partners and civil society organisations.

    5. For the purpose of the assessment of the Reform Agenda submitted by Moldova, the Commission may be assisted by independent experts.

    Article 13

    Commission Implementing Decision

    1. In case of positive assessment, after informing the European Parliament and the Council, the Commission shall approve by means of an implementing decision the Reform Agenda submitted by Moldova, in accordance with Article 12 or, where applicable, of the amended Agenda submitted in accordance with Article 14. The provisions of Article 25(2) shall apply to the adoption of that implementing decision.

    2. The Commission implementing decision, referred to in paragraph 1, shall set out the reforms to be implemented by Moldova concerned, the investment areas to be supported and the payment conditions stemming from the Reform Agenda, including the timetable.

    3. The Commission implementing decision, referred to in paragraph 1, shall also lay down:

    (a) the indicative amount of overall funds available to Moldova against fulfilment of payment conditions, as referred in Article 10(1), and the scheduled instalments to be released, including pre-financing, structured in accordance with Article 11, once Moldova has achieved satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant payment conditions in the form of qualitative and quantitative steps identified in relation to the implementation of the Reform Agenda;

    (b) the breakdown by instalment of financing between loan support and non-repayable support;

    (c) the time limit by which the final payment conditions for the reforms must be completed;

    (d) the arrangements and timetable for the monitoring, reporting and implementation of the Reform Agenda, including, where appropriate, through democratic scrutiny as referred to in Article 4 as well as, where relevant, measures necessary for complying with Article 23.

    (e) the indicators referred to in Article 11(2) for assessing progress towards the achievement of the general and specific objectives set out in Article 3.

    Article 14

     Amendments to the Reform Agenda

    1. Where the Reform Agenda, including relevant payment conditions, is no longer achievable by Moldova, either partially or totally, because of objective circumstances, Moldova may propose an amended Reform Agenda. In that case, Moldova may make a reasoned request to the Commission to amend its implementing decision referred to in Article 13(1).

    2. The Commission, after informing the European Parliament and the Council, may amend the implementing decision, in particular to take into account a change of the amounts available in line with the principles under Article 19.

    3. Where the Commission considers that the reasons put forward by Moldova justify an amendment to its Reform Agenda, the Commission shall assess the amended Agenda in accordance with Article 12 and may amend the implementing decision referred to in Article 13(1) without undue delay.

    4. In an amendment, the Commission may accept timelines for payment conditions extending until 31 December 2028.

    Article 15

    Loan agreement, borrowing and lending operations

    1. In order to finance the support under the Facility in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered on behalf of the Union to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    2. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Moldova. The loan agreement shall lay down the maximum loan amount, the availability period and the detailed terms and conditions of the support under the Facility in the form of loans. The loans shall have maximum duration of 40 years from the date of the signature of the loan agreement. The loan agreement shall contain the amount of pre-financing and rules on clearing of pre-financing.

    In addition to and by way of derogation from Article 220(5) of the Financial Regulation, the loan agreement shall contain the amount of pre-financing and rules on clearing of pre-financing.

    2a  The Commission shall provide the European Parliament and the Council, simultaneously, with the following information:

    (a) the amount of the loan in EUR;

    (b) the average maturity of the loan;

    (c) the pricing formula, and the availability period of the loan;

    (d) the maximum number of instalments and a clear and precise repayment schedule.

    3. The loan agreement shall be made available, simultaneously and without delay, to the European Parliament and the Council.

    Article 16

    Provisioning

    1. Provisioning for the loans shall be constituted at the rate of 9 % from the envelope allocated to the emerging challenges and priorities cushion under Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 and shall be used as part of provisions supporting similar risks.

    2. By way of derogation from Article 211 (2), last sentence, of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning shall be paid progressively and fully constituted at the latest when the loans are fully disbursed.

    3.  The provisioning rate shall be reviewed at least every three years from the date of application of this Regulation. The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article xx [on exercise of the delegation] of this Regulation to amend the provisioning rates, following the principles laid down in Article 214(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2509.

     

    Article 17

    Pre-financing

    1. Following the submission of the Reform Agenda to the Commission, Moldova may request the release of a pre-financing of up to 20 % of the total amount foreseen under this Facility in accordance with Article 6(1), after deduction of complementary support, including support to civil society organisations and technical assistance, and provisioning for loans. Financing under this Article may be granted in addition to and during the same period of exceptional bridge financing granted under Article 17a.

    2. The Commission may release the requested pre-financing after the adoption of its implementing decision referred to in Article 13 and the entry into force of the Facility Agreement and of the loan agreement referred to in Articles 8 and 15 respectively. The funds shall be released in accordance with Article 19(3), first sentence, and subject to the respect of the preconditions set out in Article 5.

    3. The Commission shall decide on the timeframe for the disbursement of the pre-financing, which may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    Article 17a

    Exceptional bridge financing

     

    1. Without prejudice to Article 17, if the Facility Agreement is not signed or the Reform

    Agenda is not adopted by 1 May 2025, the Commission may decide to provide limited, exceptional support to Moldova in the form of loans for a period of up to 4 months starting from [the date of entry into force of the Regulation], subject to satisfactory progress on the preparation of the Reform Agenda, subject to conditions to be agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Commission and Moldova, to the respect of the precondition set out in Article 5(1), to compliance with Article 6 and to available funding.

     

    2.   The MoU shall in particular establish policy conditions, indicative financial planning and the reporting requirements, proportionate to the duration of the financing. The policy conditions shall include a commitment to the principles of sound financial management with a focus on anti-corruption and anti-money laundering.

     

      The MoU shall be adopted and amended by means of implementing acts. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 27.

     

    3.  The amount of support referred to in paragraph 1 shall not exceed EUR 50 000 000. The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement with Moldova, which shall comply as appropriate with Article 15.

    Article 18

    Implementation of investment projects under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform

    1. In order to benefit from the leverage of Union financial support to attract additional investment, investments supporting the Reform Agenda shall be implemented in cooperation with international financial institutions in the form of investment projects approved under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform.

    2. Following satisfactory fulfilment of payment conditions, the Commission will adopt a decision authorising a release of funds, as referred to in Article 19(3). This decision shall, in accordance with Article 6(1), set the amount of funds to be made available in the form of non-repayable support provided by the Union for projects approved under the NIP, and the amount of financial assistance in the form of loan support to be released to Moldova. This decision shall also set out, in accordance with the ratio set in the Facility Agreement as referred to in Article 8(5)(c), the share of this loan support to be made available by Moldova as co-financing for projects approved under the NIP.

    Article 19

    Assessment of the fulfilment of payment conditions, withholding and reduction of funds, rules on payments

    1. Twice per year, Moldova shall submit a duly justified request for the release of funds at the latest two months after the timeline set in the Commission Implementing Decision in respect of fulfilled payment conditions related to the quantitative and qualitative steps as set out in the Reform Agenda.

    2. The Commission shall assess without undue delay whether Moldova has met the preconditions set out in Article 5 and the principles for financing set out in Article 10(3) and achieved satisfactory fulfilment of the payment conditions set out in the Commission implementing decision referred to in Article 13. In case the Commission finds that payment conditions for which it had previously paid have been reversed by Moldova, the Commission will reduce future disbursements by an equivalent amount. The Commission may be assisted by experts, including experts from Member States. In the event that a request for the release of funds or a request for payment includes a step related to Chapter 32, referred to in Article 19(2), the Commission may not adopt a decision authorizing the release of funds unless it assesses such step positively.

    3. Where the Commission makes a positive assessment of the satisfactory fulfilment of all applicable conditions, it shall adopt without undue delay a decision authorising the release of funds corresponding to those conditions. In respect of those amounts, the decision shall constitute the condition referred to in Article 10.

    4. Where the Commission makes a negative assessment of the fulfilment of any conditions as per the timetable, the release of funds corresponding to such conditions shall be withheld. The withheld amounts shall be released only when Moldova has duly justified, as part of the subsequent request for release of funds, that it has taken the necessary measures to ensure satisfactory fulfilment of the corresponding conditions.

    5. Where the Commission concludes that Moldova has not taken the necessary measures within a period of 12 months from the initial negative assessment referred to in paragraph 4, the Commission shall reduce the amount of the non-repayable financial support and of the loan proportionately to the part corresponding to the relevant payment conditions. During the first year of implementation, a deadline of 24 months shall apply, calculated from the initial negative assessment referred to in paragraph 4. Moldova may present its observations within two months from the communication to them of the Commission’s conclusions.

    6. Any amount corresponding to payment conditions that have not been fulfilled by 31 December 2028 shall not be due to Moldova and shall be decommitted, or cancelled from the available amount of loan support, as appropriate.

    7. The Commission may reduce the amount of the non-repayable financial support and recover from Moldova, including by offsetting, any amount spent to achieve the objectives of the Facility, or to reduce the amount of the loan to be disbursed to Moldova or request early repayment of the loan in accordance with the loan agreement, in the event of funds unduly paid, identified cases of, or serious concerns in relation to, irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, or of a reversal of qualitative or quantitative steps or in cases it is found, after the payment has taken place, that steps were not satisfactorily fulfilled, or of a serious breach of an obligation resulting from the Facility Agreements or from the loan agreements-, including on the basis of information provided by OLAF or of the Court of Auditors’ reports. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council prior to taking any decision of such reductions.

    8. By way of derogation from Article 116(2) of the Financial Regulation, the payment deadline as referred to in Article 116(1), point (a), of the Financial Regulation shall start running from the date of the communication of the decision authorising the disbursement to Moldova pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article.

    9. Article 116(5) of the Financial Regulation shall not apply to payments made as financial assistance, channelled directly to Moldova’s treasury pursuant to this Article and to Article 23 of this Regulation.

    10. Payments of the non-repayable financial support and of the loans under this Article shall be made in accordance with the budget appropriations, as set in the annual budgetary procedure, and subject to the available funding, respectively. Funds shall be paid in instalments. An instalment may be paid in one or more tranches.

    11. The amounts shall be paid following the decision referred to in paragraph 3 in accordance with the loan agreement.

    12. Payment of any amount of the support in the form of loans shall be subject to the submission by Moldova of a request for payment in the form set out in the loan agreement, , and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Facility Agreement. This shall not apply to payment of pre-financing.

     

    Article 20

    Transparency with regard to persons and entities receiving funding for the implementation of the Reform Agenda

    1. Moldova shall publish up-to-date data on final recipients receiving amounts of funding exceeding the equivalent of EUR 50 000 cumulatively over the period of three years for the implementation of reforms and investments under this Facility.

    2. For final recipients referred to in paragraph 1, the following information shall be published in a machine- readable format on a webpage, in order of total funds received, having due regard to the requirements of confidentiality and security, in particular the protection of personal data:

    (a) in the case of a legal person, the recipient’s full legal name and VAT identification number or tax identification number, where available, or another unique identifier established by the legislation applicable to the legal person;

    (b) in the case of a natural person, the first and last name or names of the recipient;

    (c) the amount received by the recipient and the reforms and investments under the Moldova Facility that this amount contributes to implementing.

    3. The information referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be published where disclosure risks threatening the rights and freedoms of the final recipients concerned or seriously harming their commercial interests. Such information shall be made available to the Commission.

    4. Moldova shall transmit electronically to the Commission at least once a year the data on the final recipients referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, in a machine-readable format to be defined in the Facility Agreement, as referred to in Article 8(5)(l).

     

    CHAPTER IV

    Protection of financial interests of the Union

     

    Article 21

     Protection of the financial interests of the Union

    1. In implementing the Facility, the Commission and Moldova shall take all the appropriate measures to protect the financial interests of the Union, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the specific conditions under which the Facility will operate, the preconditions set out in Article 5(1) and conditions set out in the specific Facility Agreements, in particular regarding the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities as well as the investigation and prosecution of offences affecting the funds provided under the Facility. Moldova shall commit to progressing towards effective and efficient management and control systems and ensure that amounts wrongly paid or incorrectly used can be recovered.

    2. The Facility Agreement shall provide for the following obligations of Moldova:

    (a) to regularly check that the financing provided has been used in accordance with the applicable rules, in particular regarding the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities;

    (b) to protect whistleblowers;

    (c) to take appropriate measures to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities as well as to investigate and prosecute criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union, to detect and avoid double funding and to take legal actions to recover funds that have been misappropriated, including in relation to any measure for the implementation of reforms and investment projects or programmes under the Reform Agenda and to take appropriate measures to treat mutual legal assistance requests by EPPO and Member States’ competent authorities concerning criminal offences affecting the funds under the Facility, where applicable and without delay;

    (d) for the purpose of paragraph 1, in particular for checks on the use of funds in relation to the implementation of reforms in the Reform Agenda, to ensure the collection of, and access to, in compliance with Union data protection principles and with applicable data protection rules, adequate data on persons and entities receiving funding, including beneficial ownership information, for the implementation of measures of the Reform Agenda under Chapter III;

    (e) to expressly authorise the Commission, OLAF, the Court of Auditors and, where applicable, EPPO to exert their rights as provided for in Article 129 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    (ea) to include all information related to project implementation, in particular concerning performance and financial implementation, and final recipients in an interoperable information system provided by the Commission as laid down under Article 36(2)(d) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.

    3. The Facility Agreement shall also provide for the right of the Commission to reduce proportionately the amount of the non-repayable financial support provided under the Facility and to recover from Moldova, including by offsetting, any amount spent to achieve the objectives of the Facility and to reduce the amount of the loan to be disbursed to the Beneficiary or request early repayment of the loan in accordance with the loan agreement, in the event of funds unduly paid, identified cases of, or serious concerns in relation to, irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union that have not been corrected by Moldova, or in cases it is found, after the payment has taken place, that steps were not satisfactorily fulfilled, or of a serious breach of an obligation resulting from the Facility Agreement or from the loan agreement When deciding on the amount of the recovery and reduction, or the amount to be repaid early, the Commission shall respect the principle of proportionality and shall take into account the seriousness of the irregularity, fraud, corruption or conflict of interest affecting the financial interests of the Union, or of a breach of an obligation. Moldova shall be given the opportunity to present its observations before the reduction is made or early repayment is requested.

    4. Persons and entities implementing funds under the Facility shall report any suspected cases of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities affecting financial interests of the Union without delay, to the Commission and to OLAF.

     

    Article 22

    Role of Moldova’s internal systems and audit authority

    1. For the part of the Facility funding made available as financial assistance, the Commission can rely on the audit authorities established by Moldova for the purpose of controlling public expenditure. As appropriate, the Commission shall also rely on further democratic scrutiny as referred to in Article 4(9).

    2. The Reform Agenda shall prioritise in the first years of their implementation reforms related to negotiation Chapter 32, particularly on public financial management and internal control, as well as on the fight against fraud, together with Chapters 23 and 24, particularly when it comes to justice, corruption and organised crime and Chapter 8, particularly on State aid control.

    3. Moldova shall report any irregularities, including fraud, which have been the subject of a primary administrative or judicial finding, without delay, to the Commission and shall keep the Commission informed of the progress of any administrative and legal proceedings in relation to such irregularities. Such reporting shall be done by electronic means, using the Irregularity Management System, established by the Commission.

    4. The entities referred to in paragraph 1 shall maintain regular dialogue with the Court of Auditors, OLAF and, where appropriate, EPPO.

    5. The Commission may carry out detailed systems reviews of Moldova’s budget implementation based on a risk-assessment and dialogue with audit authorities, and issue recommendations for improvements in the systems.

    6. The Commission may adopt recommendations to Moldova on all cases where in its views competent authorities have not taken the necessary steps to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities that have affected or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the expenditure financed under the Facility and in all cases where it identifies weaknesses affecting the design and functioning of the control system put in place by the those authorities. Moldova concerned shall implement such recommendations or provide a justification on why it has not done so.

     

     

    CHAPTER V

    MONITORING, REPORTING AND EVALUATION

     

    Article 23

    Monitoring and reporting

    1. The Commission shall monitor the implementation of the Facility and assess the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 3. The monitoring of implementation shall be targeted and proportionate to the activities carried out under the Facility Agreement, and shall be without prejudice to the reporting requirements set out under Regulation (EU) 2021/947. The indicators referred to in Article 11(2) shall be expected to contribute to the Commission’s monitoring of the Facility.

    2. The Facility Agreement referred to in Article 8 shall set out rules and modalities for Moldova to report to the Commission for the purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article.

    3. The Commission shall provide an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council on progress towards the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation. The annual report shall be complemented by presentations on the state of play of the implementation of the Facility twice per year.

    4. The Commission shall provide the annual report referred to in paragraph 3 to the Committee referred to in Article 27(1).

    5. The Commission shall report on the progress of the implementation of the Reform Agenda of Moldova in the context of the scoreboard established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449.

     

    Article 24

    Facility scoreboard

    6. The Commission shall establish display the progress of the implementation of the Reform Agenda in the Facility scoreboard, established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1449.

    Article 25

     

    Evaluation of the Facility

    1. After 31 December 2027 and by 31 December 2031 at the latest, the Commission shall carry out an independent ex-post evaluation of the Regulation. That ex-post evaluation shall assess the Union contribution to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.

    2. The ex-post evaluation shall make use of the good practice principles of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, seeking to ascertain whether the objectives have been met and to formulate recommendations with a view to improving future actions.

    3. The Commission shall communicate the findings and conclusions of the ex-post evaluation accompanied by its observations and follow-up, to the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States. That ex-post evaluation may be discussed at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or the Member States. The results shall feed into the preparation of future programmes and actions and resource allocation. That ex-post evaluation and follow-up shall be made publicly available.

    4. The Commission shall, to an appropriate extent, associate all relevant stakeholders, including Moldova, social partners, civil society organisations, in the evaluation process of the Union’s funding provided under this Regulation, and may, where appropriate, seek to undertake joint evaluations with the Member States and other partners with close involvement of Moldova.

     

    Article 26

    Reporting by Moldova in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue

    1. The beneficiary shall report once a year in the context of the Economic and Financial Dialogue on the progress made in the achievement of the reform-related part of its Reform Agenda.

     

    Article 26a

     

    Parliamentary oversight and scrutiny over the Facility

     

    1. The Commission shall report to the competent committees of the European Parliament on the state of progress in the implementation of the Facility and the Reform Agenda. The Commission shall provide the European Parliament with written information on:

     

    (a) the state of progress in the implementation of the Facility, in particular the Reform Agenda and related investments and reforms, as well as the Facility Agreement;

    (b) the assessment of the Reform Agenda, and any amendments thereof;

    (c) the main findings of the report referred to in Article 23(3);

    (d) payment, withholding and reduction procedures, where applicable, including any observation presented to ensure a satisfactory fulfilment of the conditions;

    (e) the withholding and suspension of payments as well as the reduction of funds, including any observation presented and remedial measures taken by the beneficiary to ensure a satisfactory fulfilment of the payment conditions;

    (f) any other relevant elements in relation to the implementation of the Facility.

    2.  The regular dialogue between the European Parliament and the Commission shall take place at least once a year, in addition to ad-hoc meetings responding to sudden developments in the country. Ahead of each dialogue, the Commission shall provide the Parliament with information referred to in paragraph 1. The Facility scoreboard referred to in Article 24 may serve as a basis for the dialogue.

    3.  The European Parliament may express its views in resolutions as regards the matters referred to in paragraph 1 and the Commission shall take those views into account.

     

     

    CHAPTER VI

    FINAL PROVISIONS

     

    Article 27

    Committee procedure

    1. The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee, established by the Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    3. For implementing acts referred to in Articles 13(1) and 14(2), where the committee delivers no opinion, the Commission shall not adopt the draft implementing act and Article 5(4), third subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

     

    Article 28

    Information, communication and publicity

    1. Without prejudice to the requirements set out under Regulation (EU) 2021/947, the Commission shall engage in communication activities to ensure the visibility of the Union funding for the financial support envisaged in the Reform Agenda, including through joint communication activities with Moldova. The Commission shall ensure that support under the Facility is communicated and acknowledged through a funding statement. Actions financed under the Facility shall be carried out in accordance with communication and visibility requirements in Union-financed external actions and in other relevant guidelines.

    2. The recipient of Union funding shall actively acknowledge the origin and ensure the visibility of the Union funding, including, where applicable, by displaying the emblem of the Union and an appropriate funding statement that reads ‘funded by the European Union’, in particular when promoting the actions and their results, by providing coherent, effective and proportionate targeted information to multiple audiences, including the media and the public.

    3. Information, communication and publicity shall be provided in accessible format.

    Article 29

    Entry into force

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – “Europe must be responsible for its own security”, Metsola tells EU leaders

    Source: European Parliament

    At the informal European Council meeting on defence, the European Parliament President Metsola outlined her vision on how Europe can and must strengthen its own security and defence.

    “More action, more financing and more cooperation”, must be the EU’s goals, she argued.

    First, we need to do more to protect Europe.”

    “Russia can still produce more weapons in three months than we can in twelve. We need to do more, much more, to ramp up defence production and increase our defence industrial readiness. We can do all this in a way that respects the constitutional specificities of Member States. The best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.”

    “Second, we need to do more to finance this protection.”

    “Investing in security, is not just about protection – it is about boosting European competitiveness, driving growth, creating quality high-skilled jobs and powering everyday breakthroughs that improve how we live, work and connect.

    “Public funding can take us far but we know it will not be enough. This makes mobilising private capital essential. When it comes to the EIB’s mandate, the European Parliament has long emphasised the need to maximise its capacity to leverage private funding for the security and defence sector.”

    “The real incentive lies in addressing fragmentation within our markets. Different rules, standards, and systems are putting up barriers and risk holding us back. It makes no sense for Europe to have 178 different weapons systems, when the United States has 30.”

    “Third, we need to coordinate better.”

    “Fragmentation costs us billions: between 25 and 75 billion Euro are lost due to duplication and inefficiencies. The answer to this is staring us right in the face. Now is the time to move forward with a single market for defence.”

    “Defence – Trade – Political reality. The expectation on us is high. We must be ready to respond. Effectively, robustly – even drastically. Europe must be responsible for its own security. No one else will do this for us.”

    Read the full speech

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the renewal of the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine – A10-0007/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the renewal of the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine

    (COM(2024)0438 – C10‑0196/2024 – 2024/0240(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision (14848/2024),

     having regard to the Council Decision 2003/96/EC of 6 February 2003 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and Ukraine[1],

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 186 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0196/2024),

     having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4), and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0007/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the renewal of the agreement;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of Ukraine.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Ukraine has a long tradition of science and technology excellence and despite the difficulties of the last years and Russia’s unlawful and unprovoked war of aggression, Ukraine still has first class science and scientists, and remains an important science, technology and innovation (STI) actor in the neighbourhood of the Union. Cooperation between the Union and Ukraine has traditionally been very active notably in the fields of advanced/new materials, IT-technology, physics and astronomy, engineering, agricultural technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology and their applications across various sectors such as aviation, energy, and biomedicine, in particular immunotherapies for cancer.

     

    The ‘Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine’ was signed in Copenhagen on 4 July 2002 and was concluded originally until 31 December 2002. Article 12 point (b) of the Agreement provides for a possibility of renewal by common agreement between the Parties for additional periods of five years. The Agreement has been renewed four times: in 2003, 2011, 2015 and 2020.

     

    The renewal of the Agreement for an additional period of five years is in the mutual interest of both Parties to the Agreement in order to continue facilitating cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in common science and technology (S&T) priority areas leading to mutual benefits as laid out in Article 4 of the Agreement.

     

    The substance of the proposed decision is to extend the existing Agreement. It will in all other regards be identical to that of the content of the current Agreement.

     

    The content of the Agreement will remain unchanged and will not create new or additional rights and obligations for either of the Parties, but instead it will extend in time the legal regime already existing between the Parties in the field of S&T cooperation.

     

    For the reasons stated above, the Rapporteur believes that it is in the Union’s interest to renew the ‘Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine’ for a new period of five years.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Renewal of the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the European Community and Ukraine

    References

    14848/2024 – C10-0196/2024 – 2024/0240(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    20.11.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    ITRE

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Borys Budka

    3.12.2024

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    3.12.2024

    Date adopted

    29.1.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    77

    1

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Wouter Beke, Hildegard Bentele, Michael Bloss, Paolo Borchia, Borys Budka, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Elena Donazzan, Matthias Ecke, Christian Ehler, Sofie Eriksson, Jan Farský, Lina Gálvez, Jens Geier, Nicolás González Casares, Giorgio Gori, Bart Groothuis, Elisabetta Gualmini, András Gyürk, Niels Flemming Hansen, Eero Heinäluoma, Ivars Ijabs, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Fernand Kartheiser, Seán Kelly, Rudi Kennes, Sarah Knafo, Ondřej Knotek, Michał Kobosko, Ondřej Krutílek, Eszter Lakos, Isabella Lövin, Yannis Maniatis, Sara Matthieu, Eva Maydell, Marina Mesure, Jana Nagyová, Dan Nica, Angelika Niebler, Ville Niinistö, Mirosława Nykiel, Daniel Obajtek, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Tsvetelina Penkova, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jüri Ratas, Julie Rechagneux, Aura Salla, Jussi Saramo, Paulius Saudargas, Benedetta Scuderi, Anna Stürgkh, Marcin Sypniewski, Beata Szydło, Dario Tamburrano, Matej Tonin, Isabella Tovaglieri, Filip Turek, Yvan Verougstraete, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Andrea Wechsler, Angelika Winzig, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    René Aust, Per Clausen, Pietro Fiocchi, Hanna Gedin, Radan Kanev, Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal, Jutta Paulus, Massimiliano Salini, Davor Ivo Stier, Dimitris Tsiodras, Brigitte van den Berg, Marion Walsmann

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Raffaele Topo, Marianne Vind

    Date tabled

    31.1.2025

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03.02.2025 deposit auction of JSC “KAVKAZ.RF” will be held

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    The date of the deposit auction is 03.02.2025. The placement currency is RUB. The maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) is 10,000,000.00. The placement period, days is 3. The date of depositing funds is 03.02.2025. The date of return of funds is 06.02.2025. The minimum placement interest rate, % per annum is 25.00. The terms of the conclusion are urgent or special (Urgent). The minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) is 10,000,000.00. The maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form is open or closed (Open). The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 10:00 to 10:02. Applications in competition mode from 10:02 to 10:05. Setting a cut-off percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 10:12.

    Additional terms

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.Mom/NN77352

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 03.02.2025 the deposit auction of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund will take place

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters;

    The date of the deposit auction is 03.02.2025. The placement currency is RUB. The maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) is 60,000,000.00. The placement period, days is 17. The date of depositing funds is 03.02.2025. The date of return of funds is 20.02.2025. The minimum placement interest rate, % per annum is 20.70. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). The minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) is 60,000,000.00. The maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open). The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 11:30 to 11:40. Applications in competition mode from 11:40 to 11:45. Setting the cut-off percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 11:55.

    Additional conditions – Placement of funds with the possibility of early withdrawal of the entire deposit amount and payment of interest accrued on the deposit amount at the rate established by the deposit transaction, in the event of non-compliance of the Bank with the requirements established by clause 2.1. of the Regulation “On the procedure for selecting banks for placing funds of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund in deposits (deposits) under the GDS” (as amended on the date of the deposit transaction), early withdrawal at the “on demand” rate, payment of interest at the end of the term, without replenishment.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.Mom/NN77353

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Issuers from the Eurasian Economic Union countries will gain access to organized trading throughout the space

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    At the next meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, which was held in Almaty, an Agreement on cross-border admission to the placement and circulation of securities in organized trading in the EAEU member states was signed.

    This is the first document aimed at regulating the securities market in order to build a common financial market in the territory of the union countries.

    The agreement provides an opportunity for exchanges from the EAEU member states to list securities of issuers from other countries of the union on terms no less favourable than for “their” issuers.

    Preview photo: TippaPatt / Shutterstock / Fotodom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //vv. KBR.ru/Press/Event/? ID = 23336

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: The final of the V International Financial Security Olympiad will be held in Krasnoyarsk

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Previous news Next news

    Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad

    The first meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the International Financial Security Olympiad in 2025 was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that the Olympiad has been held for the fifth year with the support of President Vladimir Putin. Interest in it grows every year.

    In 2023, the head of state personally met with the participants of the third Olympiad finals, as a result of which the International Movement for Financial Security was created – representatives of 36 countries are participating in it.

    “Over four years, more than 1,900 people have taken part in the final stage of the Olympiad, including 514 prize winners and winners. President Vladimir Putin has decided to organize the final stage of the Olympiad in different regions. In 2025, Krasnoyarsk has been chosen as the venue. The Olympiad is celebrating its first anniversary, and during this time it has acquired its own list of events and traditions. I believe that they should be expanded. Each new host city will make more and more new proposals,” the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko and Director of Rosfinmonitoring Yuri Chikhanchin thanked the educational foundation “Talent and Success” and its director Elena Shmeleva, the federal territory “Sirius”, the administration of Krasnodar Krai and the city of Sochi, as well as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in the Southern Federal District for their assistance in organizing the first four Olympiads.

    Yuri Chikhanchin noted the need to expand the geography of the Olympiad, as well as to attract more interested countries to conduct the thematic lesson “Financial Security”, which in 2025 is dedicated to the problem of droppering (a fraudulent scheme for cashing out funds).

    “Interest of foreign countries in our Olympiad is growing. Schoolchildren and students from 36 countries, members of the CIS, BRICS, SCO and other international organizations, took part in the final of the fourth Olympiad. This year, new countries are going to fully participate in the Olympiad stages,” said the director of Rosfinmonitoring.

    Following the meeting, Dmitry Chernyshenko supported this idea and instructed to work on the issue of increasing the representation of countries.

    In 2025, the Siberian Federal University will be the venue for the Olympiad in Krasnoyarsk. Events for experts will traditionally be held on the sidelines of the finals.

    Governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai Mikhail Kotyukov noted that it is a great honor for the region to host the final stage of the Financial Security Olympiad, and expressed gratitude to the President of the country for supporting the idea of holding the competition in the region. Mikhail Kotyukov emphasized that the region has extensive experience in holding major events of federal and international scale (including the XXIX World Winter Universiade 2019), all the necessary infrastructure, which will allow organizing the main part of the Olympiad final, as well as its sports and cultural program, at a high level.

    From February 1 to 28, the invitational stage of the fifth Olympiad is being held in Russian and English on the international social and educational platform “Commonwealth”. Pupils of grades 8-11 and students are invited to participate first. Upon completion of the stage, participants who have completed the tasks will receive a certificate. To participate, you must register on the platformKHTTPS: // Society. Org/ru.

    The meeting of the organizing committee was attended by the Director of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring Yuri Chikhanchin, Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education Dmitry Afanasyev, Governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai Mikhail Kotyukov, representatives of the Administration of the President of Russia, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Rossotrudnichestvo, ANO National Priorities, financial organizations and rectors of universities participating in the Olympiad.

    The lesson “Financial Security” will be held from February 1 to April 30, 2025. The invitational stage of the Olympiad – from February 1 to 28, 2025. The selection stage will consist of two rounds: the first round – from March 31 to April 4, 2025, the second round – from April 9 to 15, 2025. The qualification stage – from August 1 to September 3, 2025. The final stage will be held in person from September 28 to October 3, 2025.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth Statement on Trump’s Dangerous Attack on USAID

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

    February 01, 2025

    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Today, U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)—a member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)—released the following statement after President Donald Trump took several actions to freeze funding and operations at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) this week, an agency that is critical to advancing American interests and supporting millions across the globe:

    “Donald Trump’s attack on USAID will have devastating, far-reaching consequences at home and abroad. Injecting this deliberate chaos into such a core agency will not only jeopardize the safety and well-being of innocent people around the world who rely on USAID for critical humanitarian assistance, but it will also undermine the United States’ global standing, our interests and national security.

    “Make no mistake: this short-sighted agenda is yet another illegal power grab by Donald Trump—and Americans will undoubtedly feel the ramifications as bad actors in the PRC and Russia step in to fill the leadership vacuum that Trump so foolishly created this week. In addition to saving lives, American aid encourages contributions from other international partners, ultimately improving global stability.

    “I strongly oppose any effort to dismantle USAID as an independent agency. As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I’ll continue to do everything in my power to hold the Trump Administration accountable, help repair the damage already done and ensure those most in need across the globe know that not all Americans have abandoned them.”

    -30-



    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Addicted: how the world got hooked on illicit drugs – and why we need to view this as a global threat like climate change

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ian Hamilton, Honorary Fellow, Department of Health Sciences, University of York

    Alex Solyanik/Shutterstock

    It has taken decades for some to accept the devastating effects of climate change on our planet. Despite scientific evidence that was available years ago, many people were reluctant to make the connection between increasing use of fossil fuels, rising global temperatures and devastating weather events.

    A key reason for this reluctance is the dislocation of cause and effect, both in time and geography. And here there are clear parallels with another deadly human activity that is causing increasing levels of suffering across the planet: the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. Here are some troubling “highlights” from the UN’s latest World Drugs Report:

    Cocaine production is reaching record highs, with production climbing in Latin America coupled with drug use and markets expanding in Europe, Africa and Asia.

    Synthetic drugs are also inflicting great harm on people and communities, caused by an increase in methamphetamine trafficking in south-west Asia, the near and Middle East and south-eastern Europe, and fentanyl overdoses in North America.

    Meanwhile, the opium ban imposed by the de facto authorities in Afghanistan is having a significant impact on farmers’ livelihoods and incomes, necessitating a sustainable humanitarian response.

    The report notes how organised criminal groups are “exploiting instability and gaps in the rule of law” to expand their trafficking operations, “while damaging fragile ecosystems and perpetuating other forms of organised crime such as human trafficking”.



    Illicit drug use is damaging large parts of the world socially, politically and environmentally. Patterns of supply and demand are changing rapidly. In our new longform series Addicted, leading drug experts bring you the latest insights on drug use and production as we ask: is it time to declare a planetary emergency?


    At every stage of the process of producing drugs such as cocaine, there are not only societal impacts but environmental ones too. An example of the interconnected relationship between climate change and drugs is demonstrated in the use of land.

    Demand for cocaine has grown rapidly across many western countries, and meeting this can only be met by changing how land is used. Forests are cleared in South America to make way for growing coca plants. The refinement of coca into cocaine involves toxic chemicals that pollute the soil and nearby watercourses. This in turn compromises those living in these areas as access to clean water and fertile land is reduced.

    Until this is reversed, these local communities will not be able to cultivate the land to earn an income or rely on water sources to live. And each year, some of their number will add to the hundreds of thousands of people around the world who die, directly or indirectly, as a result of illicit drug use.

    People in the world with drug use disorders (1990-2021)


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Having spent most of my career researching the human toll of drug use at almost every stage of the supply and consumption chain, I believe a complete shift in the way we think about the world’s drug problem is required.

    We already have many years of evidence of the ways that drugs – both natural and (increasingly) synthetic – are destabilising countries’ legal and political institutions, devastating entire communities, and destroying millions of lives. My question is, as with climate change, why are we so slow to recognise the existential threat that drug use poses to humanity?

    The disconnect between users and producers

    For decades, problems with drugs have been viewed as a mainly western issue, affecting Europe, North America and Australasia in terms of drug taking. This perception was fostered in part by US president Richard Nixon’s “war on drugs” announcement in June 1971, when he declared drug abuse to be “public enemy number one”.

    This western-centric focus has come at a cost – we still have little data and information about drug use and problems in Africa, for example. But we are beginning to see how far drugs and their associated devastation has reached beyond traditional western borders.

    Deaths attributed to illicit drug use (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Illicit drug use has increased by 20% over the past decade, only partly due to population growth. Almost 300 million people are estimated to consume illicit drugs regularly, with the three most popular being cannabis (228 million users), opioids (60 million) and cocaine (23 million). According to the UN report:

    The range of drugs available to consumers has expanded, making patterns of use increasingly complex and polydrug use a common feature in most drug markets. One in 81 people (64 million) worldwide were suffering from a drug use disorder in 2022, an increase of 3% compared with 2018.

    There are multiple harmful consequences of drug use. The largest global burden of disease continues to be attributed to opioids, use of which appears to have remained stable at the global level since 2019, in contrast to other drugs.

    In the same way that climate change has threatened whole populations, so too have drugs. Yet many of us remain disconnected from how they are produced and distributed – and the misery they cause throughout the supply chain, all over the world.

    The production of cocaine, for example, is associated with violence and exploitation at every stage of the manufacturing process. Death threats to farmers and unwilling traffickers have all increased in parallel with the growing demand for cocaine in the US and Europe.

    Global drug use disorder deaths by substance (2000-21):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Organised crime groups not only supply and distribute drugs but also trade in people, whether for the commercial sex trade or other forms of modern slavery. This makes sense as the infrastructure and contacts to move drugs are similar to those used to move humans across borders and even continents. Yet many cocaine users are oblivious – wilfully or otherwise – of the violence associated with how this drug is supplied to them. As the UK National Crime Agency points out:

    Reducing demand is another critical factor in reducing the supply of illegal drugs. Many people see recreational drug use as a victimless crime. The reality is that the production of illegal drugs for western markets has a devastating impact in source countries in terms of violence, exploitation of vulnerable and indigenous people and environmental destruction.

    While some of the suffering associated with the production of drugs like cocaine makes the headlines, it’s often overshadowed by the glamorisation of criminal drug gangs in films and on TV. To the extent that people worry about the impact of drugs, it’s usually focused on those in our immediate communities, such as people dependent on heroin who are sleeping rough and vulnerable to exploitation. But there have already been other victims before the drug reaches our streets.

    Shifts in the global supply chain

    Tracking heroin routes demonstrates the way that drug supply is an international effort which affects every community on its journey, from the Afghan farmer to officials who are bribed so the drug can cross borders or be let through ports without being seized, to the person injecting or smoking the finished product.

    Much of Europe’s heroin is produced in Afghanistan by small farming operations growing opium, which is then transformed into the drug. Most Afghan farmers are simply surviving growing the crop, and don’t reap significant wealth from their harvest. It is those supplying and distributing the opium as heroin who can make serious money from it.

    Meanwhile, following the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, those farmers’ livelihoods have faced a new threat.

    The Taliban is ideologically opposed to the production of opium. Soon after assuming control, its leaders issued a decree banning farmers from growing opium. They have enforced this by destroying crops when farmers have ignored the ban – although there is still believed to be a significant stockpile of heroin in the country, meaning that as yet, there has not been a big impact on supply to Europe and the UK. But this could change amid the emergence of more deadly synthetic alternatives, including nitazenes and other new synthetic opioids.

    Heroin trafficking flows based on reported seizures (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    Either way, the drug gangs who traffic heroin won’t worry about the opium farmers’ wellbeing. As so often happens with changes in the availability of illicit drugs, when there is a shortage, these groups prove adaptable and nimble at providing alternatives quickly.

    While gathering intelligence about organised crime gangs is difficult and potentially dangerous, the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) has provided some insights about who these groups are and how they operate. The Netherlands remains an important hub for the distribution of heroin, with several Dutch criminal groups involved in importing and distributing heroin from Afghanistan.

    But others are involved too: the EUDA’s intelligence shows that criminal networks with members from Kurdish background are central to the wholesale supply and have control over many parts of the supply chain. These professional, well-organised groups have established legal businesses throughout the route of supply that facilitate their illicit activities – largely along the Balkan route with hubs in Europe.

    Intermediate & final recipients of heroin shipments (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    Unlike these organised crime gangs, governments and law enforcement appear to respond to emerging threats slowly and lack the flexibility and ingenuity that the gangs repeatedly demonstrate.

    As drug detection techniques have improved, organised crime has shown how inventive it can be. Taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic, dealers used consignments of surgical masks to conceal large quantities of cocaine being trafficked to China and Hong Kong from South America.

    And as western markets for cocaine become saturated, organised crime gangs have exploited new markets in Asia, where cocaine seizures, a proxy for use of cocaine, have increased. But the shifting landscape is also reflected in changes in consumption, with use of the synthetic stimulant methamphetamine growing rapidly in Asia – reflected in record levels of seizures in the region in 2023.

    Main methamphetamine trafficking flows (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    For the organised crime gangs, production and supply of synthetic drugs is in many ways easier, as it is not reliant on an agricultural crop in the way that heroin and cocaine are and can be manufactured locally. This reduces the distribution logistics and distance needed for an effective supply chain. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, organised crime gangs are exploiting gaps in law enforcement and state governance to both traffic large volumes of drugs and expand their production in the region.

    Where there is destabilisation, there is opportunity for those who seek to profit from drug addiction. In Syria, Russia and Ukraine, war has made some people very rich.

    Syria and Russia: the new drug hotspots

    The wars in Syria and Ukraine bear testament to the way drugs provide solutions to people who are experiencing the worst of times – and to governments that are ready to exploit evolving situations.

    As the war in Syria progressed, the Bashar Al-Assad regime actively developed a strategy to dominate the captagon market in the Middle East and North Africa. First produced in the 1960s in Germany to treat conditions such as attention deficit disorders and narcolepsy and other conditions, captagon is a stimulant that staves off hunger and sleep, making it ideal for military use – particularly in countries where food supplies are inconsistent. It has been referred to as the “drug of jihad” used by Islamic fighters in the region.

    As the war progressed in Syria, the country and its leader became increasingly isolated, its economy crashed creating the perfect conditions to develop the trade in captagon. Rather than drug production leading to the collapse of law and order, it was the other way round.

    Isolated by the west and with a historically strained relationship with its neighbours including Saudi Arabia, the Assad regime – under the guidance, reportedly, of Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad– ruthlessly positioned itself as the world’s main producer and distributor of this drug, then used this position to leverage its influence and try to reintegrate into the Arab world.

    Video by TRT World.

    Captagon also provided much-needed revenue for the Assad regime. The drug was estimated to be worth US$5.7 billion annually to the Syrian economy – at a time when western governments have placed severe sanctions on the country, restricting its ability to raise revenue. Saudi Arabia was one of the main countries being supplied captagon by Syria. Until the fall of Assad, it was the senior leadership in Syria that controlled the supply and distribution of the drug – giving rise to the label “the world’s largest narco state”.

    The Assad government achieved this position by making captagon good value – a viable alternative to alcohol in terms of price and for those who don’t drink. Exploiting many of its own citizens, the regime encouraged individuals and businesses to participate in manufacturing and distributing the drug.

    The fall of Assad and his hurried escape to Russia left the rebel fighters to pick up vast hauls of captagon and other drug ingredients. “We found a large number of devices that were stuffed with packages of captagon pills meant to be smuggled out of the country. It’s a huge quantity,” one fighter belonging to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group told the Guardian. What this will do to drug production and supply in the region is unclear.




    Read more:
    What is the drug captagon and how is it linked to Syria’s fallen Assad regime?


    While the latest UN World Drug Report highlights “a rapid increase in both the scale and sophistication of drug trafficking operations in the region over the past decade”, it goes on to highlight that “one of the most striking changes worldwide in drug trafficking and drug use over the past decade has taken place in Central Asia, Transcaucasia [Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia] and eastern Europe”, where there has been a shift “away from opiates, mostly originating in Afghanistan – towards the use of synthetic stimulants, notably cathinones … There is hardly any other region where cathinones play such a significant role.”

    This is part of “a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally,” according to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. This shift is changing the nature of drug sales, using “darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations or ‘dead drops’, rather than direct exchanges.”

    The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia.

    Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs – especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone – overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia … These potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

    The report notes that this shift in drug distribution has been accompanied by rising levels of violence including punishment beatings, and a public health crisis.

    Podcast by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

    Yet officially, there is very little reliable data about drug use in Russia. Under the premiership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has no sympathy with those who are dependent, viewing them as weak and without value. And its invasion of Ukraine three years ago has had ramifications for Ukraine’s users too.

    Prior to the war, Ukraine had demonstrated an increasingly progressive policy towards those who had problems with drugs, establishing treatment centers and encouraging access to treatment. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, this strategy has been severely set back, with many people who need access to substitute treatments such as methadone unable to secure consistent supply of these drugs.

    Another global blind spot is China, where, like Russia, little is known about the extent or type of problems that drugs are causing. Both regimes are ideologically opposed to recreational or problem drug use and, as far as we know, there is no state-funded rehabilitation provided in either country; the approach is to criminalise people rather than offer health-based interventions.

    We shouldn’t be too critical as many western countries, including the UK, also need to pivot from a criminal approach to drug problems towards a health-focused one. Portugal made such a policy change several years ago, recognising that people who develop problems with drugs such as dependency need help rather than punishment.

    This radical shift in thinking has made a significant change to the way those using drugs are treated, in the main offered help and specialist support rather than being arrested and sent to jail, only to be released and then repeat the same cycle of drug use, arrest and prison.

    The evidence of this policy change is impressive: not only have drug-related deaths fallen, but population-level drug use is among the lowest in Europe. Nowhere is this policy shift more urgent than the US.

    North America: epicentre of the opioid crisis

    In the US, the synthetic opioids fentanyl and oxycodone have contributed to more than 100,000 fatal overdoses each year since 2021. While there are signs this deaths toll is at last beginning to fall, the harm and pain of addiction and overdose affects every strata of American society – as shown in moving portrayals of America’s opioid crisis such as Painkiller and Dopesick. Most fatalities are caused by respiratory depression where breathing is significantly slowed or stops altogether.

    Official trailer for Painkiller (Netflix)

    Fentanyl is an analgesic drug that is 50-100 times more potent than heroin or morphine. Where China used to be the principal manufacturer and supplier of fentanyl to the US, Mexico is now the primary source. In December 2024, Mexican authorities announced “the largest mass seizure of fentanyl pills ever made” – amounting to more than 20 million doses of fentanyl pills worth nearly US$400 million. The pills were found in Mexico’s Sinaloa state, home of the Sinaloa drug cartel and a hub of fentanyl production,

    “This is what makes us rich,” one fentanyl cook recently told the New York Times. He was scathing about the idea that Donald Trump would be able to stamp out the supply of fentanyl from Mexico to the US by threatening Mexico’s government with tariffs. “Drug trafficking is the main economy here.”

    However, the introduction of synthetic opioids to the US came not via organised crime but through a deliberate strategy of the pharmaceutical industry. Upon launching its prescription opioid painkiller OxyContin (a brand name for oxycodone) in 1996, Perdue Pharma, owned by the Sackler family, devised a plan to increase prescriptions of the drug by incentivizing and rewarding doctors to give these drugs to their patients. On a business level, this was a success; on a human level, it has been a disaster.

    As patients quickly developed tolerance to drugs such as OxyContin, they had to take higher doses to avoid withdrawal symptoms or the positive feelings it gave them. Taking more of these opiates increases the risk of accidental overdose, many of which proved to be fatal. It has also driven those dependent on drugs to the black market, and into the hands of organised drug gangs, as they seek the drugs in greater quantities.

    US overdose death rates by drug type (1999-2020):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Dependency on fentanyl and other opioids is all-consuming. When not using these drugs, people are entirely focused on ensuring sufficient supply of the next dose. This includes funding supply which can take people to places they thought they would never be, for example breaking the law, shoplifting or getting involved in commercial sex to make enough money to buy drugs.

    Synthetic opiates like OxyContin and fentanyl have proved to be classless, ageless and sex blind. The first-hand experience of addiction and fatalities have radically altered the way many Americans think about drugs and the problems they cause. Canada, too, is suffering a major crisis.

    Compounding this tragedy is the failure of the state to provide interventions and treatment that could have reduced fatal and non-fatal overdoses. It is only now that evidence-based interventions are beginning to be made widely available, such as access to Naloxone – a drug that can reverse the effects of opiates and potentially save a life.

    Of course, it isn’t just hospitals and health professionals that are challenged by the results of widespread use of opioids, but public services like the police and fire service. In some areas of the US, there have been so many daily overdoses that every service was called on to try and deal with it. Local mayors have made it a priority to train police and fire personnel to be trained as first responders, such is the scale of the problem.

    But it is not just in North America that we see the failure of politicians and the state to act when faced with growing problems with drugs. In the UK, where record numbers are dying because of using drugs such as heroin, the government has not invested in overdose prevention strategies. At a time when fatal overdoses increase year on year, budgets for specialist treatment have been reduced. It remains to be seen what the recently elected Labour government will do, if anything, to tackle the tragic rise in drug related fatalities.

    Death rates from opioid use disorders (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    What connects both examples from the US and UK is the attitude and perception of drug use many of us have. Drug use and the heavy use of prescription painkillers is still heavily stigmatised. Many of us still view this as something individuals bring on themselves or have a choice about.

    So, if we don’t care about what happens to people who develop problems with drugs, why should our elected representatives? In part, it is our bigotry that is enabling the lack of timely intervention, despite us possessing the knowledge and evidence of how drug harms can be minimised.

    Latin America: breakdown of the rule of law

    Under the last Conservative government, the UK Home Office asserted that people who used cocaine recreationally are supporting violence not only in the UK but in the countries that produce its raw ingredients. It’s not clear if this has made any difference to those using cocaine in the UK – personally, I doubt many people consider or are aware of how cocaine is produced or its provenance.

    Perhaps if those using cocaine, mainly in western countries, realised the extent of violence and suffering that cocaine manufacture causes they might think again. Latin America has suffered enormously, with few countries there not touched in some way by the violence and breakdown of law associated with drug production and supply. According to the latest UN World Drugs Report:

    Global cocaine supply reached a record high in 2022, with more than 2,700 tons of cocaine produced that year, 20% more than in the previous year … The impact of increased cocaine trafficking has been felt in Ecuador in particular, which has seen a wave of lethal violence in recent years linked to both local and transnational crime groups, most notably from Mexico and the Balkan countries.

    Cocaine seizures and homicide rates increased five-fold between 2019 and 2022 in Ecuador, with the highest such rates reported in the coastal areas used for trafficking the drug to major destination markets in North America and Europe.

    Cocaine trafficking flows based on reported seizures (2019-22):


    UN World Drug Report, CC BY

    As with opium production in Afghanistan, it is small-scale farmers in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia that grow the coca plant that will be turned into cocaine. Like their Afghan counterparts, they grow coca as it is more profitable than alternatives such as coffee. While it may be profitable in the short term, there are greater costs to them and their society.

    Cocaine production brings with it violence as those further up the drug production chain try to control its trade. Few parts of these societies are unscathed, from bribing local politicians through to whole regions that are controlled by organised crime. Keeping control means that the use of firearms and violence increases. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that basic health and social services suffer.

    So, while a coca grower may have more money, every other aspect of their life is negatively impacted. Whether it is regional or state institutions, both are compromised by the drug trade and those that control it. While this may not lead to the total collapse of law and order, it does create injustice and distorts the rule of law in many areas of Latin America and the Caribbean, where competition between gangs has also resulted in an increase in homicides.

    The impact is on all sectors of society, now and into the future. For example, while historically the role of women has been largely underrepresented in research and drug policy, the UN report recognises that this is changing:

    As women increasingly participate in economic activities, the role that women play in the drug phenomenon may become increasingly important. For example, a shift away from plant-based drug production may affect many women in rural households involved in opium poppy and coca bush cultivation.

    The UN also identifies the specific risk to young people and the drugs trade, highlighting:

    Long-term efforts to dismantle drug economies must provide socioeconomic opportunities and alternatives, which go beyond merely replacing illicit crops or incomes and instead address the root structural causes behind illicit crop cultivation, such as poverty, underdevelopment, and insecurity. They must also target the factors driving the recruitment of young people into the drug trade, who are at particular risk of synthetic drug use.

    Meanwhile, demand for treatment in Europe due to problems with cocaine has risen significantly in recent years, since 2011 there has been an 80% increase in treatment presentations. This reflects the growing number of people using cocaine and the rise in purity of the drug.

    Death rates from cocaine use disorders (2021):


    Our World in Data, CC BY

    Change is possible

    Amid what may seem to be a story of unrelenting despair and hopelessness, there are local initiatives and even a few state-wide policies that provide optimism that change is possible.

    In my roles both as clinician and scientist, I’ve often been amazed by how ingenious people can be when faced with the apparently impossible. For example, the way some people use heroin to dampen their psychotic symptoms, such as auditory and visual hallucinations – or the development of Naloxone, a drug that can temporarily reverse the effects of opioids, providing a short window for emergency services to treat people who have overdosed.

    Early in my career, I witnessed the emergence of HIV in the UK in the 1980s. The speed at which this disease spread was not matched by our ability to treat it. Our response to HIV was undoubtedly hampered by prejudice and stigma towards marginalised groups in society, namely gay men and those using drugs (particularly injecting them).

    However, unexpectedly and courageously, the Conservative government recognised those who were most at risk of contracting HIV, and organised a package of measures to contain the spread of infection. One part of this was a media campaign based on public health messaging designed to reduce the risk of contracting the disease. But the government also invested in treatment for those who had been infected and engaged with people at high risk, such as those intravenously injecting drugs.




    Read more:
    Drug consumption facilities: they’ve been around since 1986 and now Scotland has one – but do they work?


    I worked in specialist HIV clinics for those using drugs. At the time, methadone and diamorphine were provided as an alternative to heroin. Regulations and protocols that restricted the prescribing of these medical opioids were eased, so we could ensure patients attending these clinics were given sufficient oral and injectable opioids that they didn’t need to source street heroin.

    This meant they had access to medical grade opioids and, crucially, were given regular supplies of sterile injecting equipment. It was this that reduced the risk of contracting HIV, as some people would share injecting equipment when using heroin.

    This impressive policy ran counter to the Conservative party’s ideology at the time, which was to punish rather than help those using drugs like heroin. It showed me how, even with traditional mindsets, it is possible to shift policy thinking in the face of a health crisis. And make no mistake, the global drug problem is an ongoing health crisis. Today, the UN points to the risks that intravenous users of drugs still face:

    An estimated 13.9 million people injected drugs in 2022, with the largest number living in North America and East and South-East Asia … The relative risk of acquiring HIV is 14 times higher for those who inject drugs than in the wider population globally.

    There are, though, signs of positive change in the way some countries and regions are changing their drug policies. Scotland recently opened a drug consumption facility in Glasgow – a safe place for people to use their drugs, usually injecting drugs like heroin. Such spaces provide access to sterile injecting equipment, reducing the risk of blood-borne infections such as HIV or Hepatitis. At the same time, they offer the opportunity to engage with people who have not accessed traditional health services.




    Read more:
    Why Colombia sees legalising drugs as the way forward. Here’s what’s being proposed


    Portugal, as mentioned earlier, has made substantial changes to the way it approaches drug use and the problems associated with it. This policy shift since 2000 has saved lives and brought a more humane way of treating people who develop problems with drugs.

    Contrast this with the wasted effort and resources ploughed into the war on drugs – initiated by Nixon and followed by so many western governments ever since. My plea to policymakers is simple: employ the same evidence-based science you use for health issues towards drugs and problem drug use.

    Science and research can help in many ways, if given the chance. Some of it might seem radical, like providing safe drug consumption spaces. Some of it is more mundane, but vital – like tackling inequality, a clear driver of problem drug use across the world.

    But while we often look to politicians to take the lead on change, it is people – us – that really hold the solution. By far the greatest threat to people and society from drugs is ignorance and bigotry. So many lives have been lost to drugs because of shame, either as a driver of drug use or a barrier to seeking help.

    Beliefs are notoriously difficult to shift. As with climate change, the most powerful driver of change is personal experience. We know that when a family or community is affected by a drug overdose, their beliefs and perceptions change. But this is not the way any of us should want to see change happen.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Ian Hamilton does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Addicted: how the world got hooked on illicit drugs – and why we need to view this as a global threat like climate change – https://theconversation.com/addicted-how-the-world-got-hooked-on-illicit-drugs-and-why-we-need-to-view-this-as-a-global-threat-like-climate-change-248401

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: North Korea: Kim Jong-un is sending a second wave of soldiers to Ukraine – here’s why

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University

    North Korea is believed to be preparing to send another group of soldiers to come to Vladimir Putin’s aid in the war in Ukraine, despite heavy combat losses already suffered by troops from the east Asian country.

    When Ukrainian forces crossed the border into the Kursk region of Russia in August 2024, Ukraine’s military commanders hoped that their surprise move would force Moscow to withdraw troops from eastern Ukraine to defend Russia’s own territory. Kyiv did not expect its troops to end up fighting North Koreans.

    Neither Moscow nor Pyongyang have officially confirmed that North Korean troops are fighting side by side with Russians. But South Korean intelligence has been reporting on their presence since October 2024, when approximately 1,500 North Korean special forces were observed to have arrived in Russia’s far eastern city of Vladivostok, initially for training.

    This group was later joined by another 10,000 or so of their comrades (some of whom are also believed to be from North Korean special forces units). They were transported nearly 7,000 kilometres across Russia to reach the combat zone.

    North Korean soldiers were first spotted fighting in the Kursk region alongside Russian forces in early December, according to the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. By mid-January more than 40% of the North Koreans are believed to have been killed, injured, missing or captured – with as many as 1,000 thought to have been killed. There are some reports that North Korean troops are now being pulled by from the front lines due to those losses, potentially for extra training.

    North Korea, an isolated dictatorship with few allies, is one of Russia’s most reliable suppliers of weapons, including missiles and millions of rounds of ammunition that Russia needs to continue to fight its war against Ukraine. North Korea, however, would seem to have little reason to send its own people to risk their lives in that conflict. But North Korean soldiers appear to be at the heart of a deal struck by North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong-un and Russian president Vladimir Putin.

    What does Putin want?

    For Putin the gains are clear. His campaign in Ukraine has received a much-needed influx of trained soldiers to shore up efforts to retake Russian territory occupied by Ukrainian forces.

    Although the numbers of North Korean troops are relatively small, their strategic deployment allows Russia to push the Ukrainians back without diverting any of its forces from their offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Expectations are high that Donald Trump’s return to the White House could mean an end to the war – or at least a pause – sooner rather than later. This gives Putin an incentive to occupy as much Ukrainian territory as possible ahead of a ceasefire, when occupied areas are likely to form the basis of territorial settlements.

    The suggestion that Russia is not capable of maintaining its position in Ukraine and also defending its own territory without the addition of foreign troops is very revealing.

    Moscow is struggling to recruit enough of its own citizens to fight in Ukraine. This is despite offering salaries and benefits packages to prospective soldiers that are beyond generous. The lack of resistance to Kyiv’s summer incursion into Russian territory made it clear that Russia is relying upon barely trained conscripts – that is, teenage boys doing their one year of compulsory military service – to defend its borders rather than professional soldiers. And while Russia has regained control of a substantial proportion – perhaps more than 60% – of the area seized by Ukraine in the summer, this has taken nearly six months to accomplish.

    What does Kim Jong-un want?

    For Kim Jong-un, sending his soldiers to fight with Russia provides his troops with valuable experience of combat in a conflict that is rapidly defining how war will be waged in the future.

    Since the end of the Korean War (1950-53), Pyongyang has placed a high priority on maintaining a large and heavily armed standing army. After training, North Korean soldiers are mostly used for patrolling the de-militarized zone that marks its border with South Korea. Participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine provides the North Korean military with its first experience of combat in more than 70 years.

    North Korean soldiers captured in Ukraine.

    Observations from Ukrainian soldiers suggest the North Korean soldiers are courageous and determined fighters but with no experience of actual combat. The Ukrainians have described the North Koreans as relying on strategies typical of the second world war – for example advancing in large groups on foot, where they provide easy targets for artillery and drone strikes. They were also apparently bemused by the appearance of drones on the battlefield and had no idea that these objects could deliver lethal attacks.

    This degree of inexperience, together with Russia’s tactic of using the North Koreans to draw the fire of the Ukrainians and clear the way for the Russians to advance, is believed to be the reason for such high losses so soon after their deployment.

    In January the Ukrainians managed to capture two North Koreans and question them, which has provided the clearest picture so far of their experiences of fighting with the Russian armed forces. The North Korean soldiers both had false identity papers with Russian names, which is consistent with official denials of their presence. The men, who do not speak any foreign languages and had to be questioned through an interpreter, said that they had both been soldiers for several years. This supports the Ukrainians’ impression that the North Koreans are trained and disciplined. Both prisoners, however, reportedly believed they were being sent to Russia to participate in training exercises, not to fight in a war.

    Considering the heavy losses and the brutal treatment that North Korean troops have already suffered, Kim Jong-un might be expected to seek the speedy return of his soldiers rather than preparing to send more of their comrades to fight with Russia. But high casualties on the battlefield seems to be a price that North Korea’s president is willing to pay for combat experience that might give his army an edge in any future war that he fights on his own behalf.

    Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. North Korea: Kim Jong-un is sending a second wave of soldiers to Ukraine – here’s why – https://theconversation.com/north-korea-kim-jong-un-is-sending-a-second-wave-of-soldiers-to-ukraine-heres-why-248339

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Prime Minister’s remarks in Brussels: 3 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s remarks in Brussels.

    Thank you, Mark – it’s very good to be here.

    I should say it’s very good to be back here.

    And as you know, the UK’s commitment to NATO is stronger than ever –

    Because the need for NATO is clearer than ever.

    We’ve had a very good and productive discussion today…

    On how we can meet the rising threats that Russia poses across our continent…

    Including the situation, of course, in Ukraine.

    A couple of weeks ago, as you know, I was in Kyiv…

    I saw residential buildings, destroyed just days before.

    I met soldiers in the ICU…

    Recovering from really terrible burns.

    And I met children, whose parents are out there now…

    On the frontline.

    And, it’s yet another reminder…

    That this is a not a war not just in Ukraine…

    It’s a war on Ukraine…

    Against those children and their future.

    That’s why – together –

    We stand with them.

    We are all working to end this war…

    But let’s be absolutely clear –

    Peace will come through strength.

    And we must do all we can now to support Ukraine’s defence…

    And that means stabilising the front line…

    Providing the kit and the training they need.

    And that’s why, this year…

    The UK will give more military support to Ukraine than ever

    before.

    We need to see all allies stepping up – particularly in Europe.

    President Trump has threatened more sanctions on Russia…

    And it’s clear that that’s got Putin rattled.

    We know that he’s worried about the state of the Russian economy.

    So I’m here to work with our European partners on keeping up the

    pressure…

    Targeting the energy revenues and the companies supplying his

    missile factories…

    To crush Putin’s war machine.

    Because ultimately –

    Alongside our military support…

    That is what will bring peace closer.

    And we must keep working together to bolster NATO.

    And as you say, things that would have provoked utter outrage, just a few years

    ago…

    Have now become almost commonplace:

    Russian spy ships loitering off the British coast…

    A campaign of sabotage across Europe…

    Cyber-attacks, election interference, and attempted assassinations.

    Russia is seeking to destabilise our continent – target our values.

    So we should still be outraged.

    And we must harden European’s defence.

    In the UK we are proud to be a leading NATO ally…

    Part of the Forward Land Forces…            

    Helping to police our skies and patrol our seas.

    Our defence spending is of course 2.3% of GDP now…

    And we are working hard work to set the path to 2.5%…

    And NATO plans and requirements…

    As well as the principle of “NATO First”…

    Will be at the heart of our Strategic Defence Review this year.

    Across Europe, we must shoulder more of the burden now –

    Because it is our burden to carry.

    Now that’s what I’ll be discussing at the EU Council this evening.

    We want to deliver an ambitious UK-EU Security partnership…

    To bolster NATO…

    Covering military technology and R&D…

    Improving the mobility of forces across Europe…

    Protecting our critical infrastructure…

    And deepening our industrial collaboration to increase defence production.

    We can’t be commentators when it comes to matters of peace on

    our continent.

    We must lead. 

    And that is what I’m determined to do.

    Thank you so much Mark.

    Updates to this page

    Published 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Speech: Prime Minister’s remarks in Brussels: 3 February 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Prime Minister’s Office 10 Downing Street

    Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s remarks in Brussels.

    Thank you, Mark – it’s very good to be here.

    I should say it’s very good to be back here.

    And as you know, the UK’s commitment to NATO is stronger than ever –

    Because the need for NATO is clearer than ever.

    We’ve had a very good and productive discussion today…

    On how we can meet the rising threats that Russia poses across our continent…

    Including the situation, of course, in Ukraine.

    A couple of weeks ago, as you know, I was in Kyiv…

    I saw residential buildings, destroyed just days before.

    I met soldiers in the ICU…

    Recovering from really terrible burns.

    And I met children, whose parents are out there now…

    On the frontline.

    And, it’s yet another reminder…

    That this is a not a war not just in Ukraine…

    It’s a war on Ukraine…

    Against those children and their future.

    That’s why – together –

    We stand with them.

    We are all working to end this war…

    But let’s be absolutely clear –

    Peace will come through strength.

    And we must do all we can now to support Ukraine’s defence…

    And that means stabilising the front line…

    Providing the kit and the training they need.

    And that’s why, this year…

    The UK will give more military support to Ukraine than ever

    before.

    We need to see all allies stepping up – particularly in Europe.

    President Trump has threatened more sanctions on Russia…

    And it’s clear that that’s got Putin rattled.

    We know that he’s worried about the state of the Russian economy.

    So I’m here to work with our European partners on keeping up the

    pressure…

    Targeting the energy revenues and the companies supplying his

    missile factories…

    To crush Putin’s war machine.

    Because ultimately –

    Alongside our military support…

    That is what will bring peace closer.

    And we must keep working together to bolster NATO.

    And as you say, things that would have provoked utter outrage, just a few years

    ago…

    Have now become almost commonplace:

    Russian spy ships loitering off the British coast…

    A campaign of sabotage across Europe…

    Cyber-attacks, election interference, and attempted assassinations.

    Russia is seeking to destabilise our continent – target our values.

    So we should still be outraged.

    And we must harden European’s defence.

    In the UK we are proud to be a leading NATO ally…

    Part of the Forward Land Forces…            

    Helping to police our skies and patrol our seas.

    Our defence spending is of course 2.3% of GDP now…

    And we are working hard work to set the path to 2.5%…

    And NATO plans and requirements…

    As well as the principle of “NATO First”…

    Will be at the heart of our Strategic Defence Review this year.

    Across Europe, we must shoulder more of the burden now –

    Because it is our burden to carry.

    Now that’s what I’ll be discussing at the EU Council this evening.

    We want to deliver an ambitious UK-EU Security partnership…

    To bolster NATO…

    Covering military technology and R&D…

    Improving the mobility of forces across Europe…

    Protecting our critical infrastructure…

    And deepening our industrial collaboration to increase defence production.

    We can’t be commentators when it comes to matters of peace on

    our continent.

    We must lead. 

    And that is what I’m determined to do.

    Thank you so much Mark.

    Updates to this page

    Published 3 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Patrushev and Igor Kobzev discussed the socio-economic development of the Irkutsk region

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Dmitry Patrushev held a meeting with the Governor of the Irkutsk Region Igor Kobzev

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Patrushev held a meeting with Irkutsk Region Governor Igor Kobzev. The meeting discussed issues of the region’s socio-economic development.

    Igor Kobzev said that the Irkutsk region is developing successfully. The region’s industrial production index increased by 9% over 11 months last year. The mineral extraction index for the same period rose above the Russian average and amounted to 112% – this is seventh place in Russia as a whole. The manufacturing index increased by more than 5%.

    The meeting also touched upon issues of forest management, agriculture and the implementation of the national project “Environmental Well-being”.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The final stage of the VIII season of the Olympiad “I am a professional”: two weeks before the start

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    For the eighth year, the intellectual competition has been inviting talents from all over the country to become part of the universe of opportunities to receive bonuses upon admission to the HSE Master’s program, a chance to do an internship at partner companies (Yandex, VTB, Sber, Russian Railways and others) and cash prizes of up to 300,000 rubles. The results of the selection round are already known, and the final round is just around the corner. We share statistics and talk about important dates in February.

    Of the 71 areas of this Olympiad season, six are implemented by the Higher School of Economics: Economics, Sociology, Urban Studies, Business Informatics, Journalism, and Design.

    The qualifying stage has been completed

    Based on the results of the selection round, 3,619 participants were admitted to participate in the following areas of the Higher School of Economics: Business Informatics – 558, Design – 429, Journalism – 348, Sociology – 983, Urban Studies – 419, and Economics – 882.

    Participants who have scored the required number of points and presented a document confirming their student status are admitted to the final stage of the Olympiad. Passing scores may vary depending on the territorial affiliation of the university. More details are available at page.

    Alexander Chepovsky, Director of Strategic Work with Applicants, shares statistics: “The Higher School of Economics has been the university organizing the Olympiad for the eighth year now.”I am a professional“Our areas traditionally enjoy great interest among students from all over Russia. For example, this year, almost 80% of students who passed to the next stage in our areas are studying at other universities in the country. Students of the Higher School of Economics showed decent results in the selection stage of the Olympiad “I am a professional” and were admitted to participate in the final stage in 70 areas. The range of interests is impressive and makes you wonder how versatile and talented the people at the HSE are.”

    The final stage

    The final stage in all areas will begin in February. It may be held in several rounds (semi-final and final) or in one (final) depending on each specific area.

    “Business Informatics”

    The final stage is held in two rounds in a remote format. The semi-final will take place on February 23 in two time slots: from 03:00 to 09:00 and from 10:00 to 16:00 Moscow time. Participants have the right to choose one most convenient slot. The completion time is fixed: participants who start completing tasks not from the beginning of the allocated interval will have less time.

    “Design”

    There is no semi-final in this area — only the final. Participants must upload completed projects to their personal account from 00:00 on February 17 to 23:59 on March 16 Moscow time. The defense of completed assignments will take place in April.

    “Journalism”

    Participants will have an online semi-final and final. In the first round, they must complete and upload their work from 00:00 on February 26 to 23:59 on March 3 Moscow time. The final will also be held in April.

    “Sociology”

    There is no semi-final in this category. Participants must complete the final round in person.

    The competition will take place on February 15. The participants will gather and undergo the identification procedure from 09:30 to 09:50 Moscow time. The final will begin at 10:00 (Moscow time). You will have 240 minutes to complete the tasks.

    The final will be held in the following cities: Barnaul, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, Krasnoyarsk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov-on-Don, Samara, St. Petersburg, Stavropol, Tomsk, Tyumen and Yakutsk.

    “Urban Studies”

    The final stage will be held within one round (final) in person on February 16. The start is at 10:00 (Moscow time). You will have 240 minutes to complete the tasks.

    The final of the direction will take place at venues in Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Perm, Rostov-on-Don, St. Petersburg and Tomsk.

    “Economy”

    The final stage of this direction is also held in person at sites in Barnaul, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Kaliningrad, Krasnoyarsk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm, Rostov-on-Don, Samara, St. Petersburg, Stavropol, Tomsk, Tyumen and Yakutsk.

    The final will take place on February 15. The competition starts at 10:00 Moscow time. Participants will have 180 minutes to complete the tasks.

    You can find the materials of the final stage and a detailed schedule for each direction at website.

    Alexander Chepovsky gives advice to the participants of the final competition: “When going through the final stage, I advise you to be attentive and focused. Stay calm to easily cope with any tasks. Remember that the best will receive not only cash prizes, but also advantages when entering the HSE Master’s program, as well as valuable experience that will help in finding a job and building a career.”

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Lectures, business games and master classes: SPbGASU held Russian Science Day for students of Lyceum No. 126

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Business game “Interview”

    On January 31, SPbGASU held a large-scale event for students of grades 8–11 of St. Petersburg Lyceum No. 126. The students celebrated Russian Science Day at our university. They visited departments, museums, laboratories, the exhibition hall of the architectural faculty and the scientific and technical library, listened to lectures, took part in business games and master classes.

    On behalf of the university’s management and staff, Marina Malyutina, Vice-Rector for Youth Policy, welcomed the guests: “SPbGASU was founded in 1832 under Emperor Nicholas I as the School of Civil Engineers. Throughout our history, we have had different names, but the meaning has remained the same – our university has always been the center of engineering thought and construction science.”

    “Macaroni Builder”, “First-Year Grant” and other reasons to study at SPbGASU

    Alevtina Ragimova and Marina Malyutina

    Marina Viktorovna informed that more than 12 thousand students study at the university. Every year more than 2 thousand graduates leave its walls. All of them are at the cutting edge of new technologies and knowledge and are in demand by the industry: more than 70 percent of graduates find employment in their specialty.

    The university closely cooperates with industry partners – the largest developers of St. Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast and other regions. More than 500 teachers are involved in the educational process, 70 percent of whom have academic titles and degrees, many of whom are members of various state and public academies, including the Russian Academy of Architecture and Construction Sciences.

    You can study at SPbGASU throughout your life – full-time, part-time, part-time, improving your qualifications, undergoing retraining. Students have the opportunity to study in additional educational programs, master a second qualification. The university provides scope for research in more than 10 scientific areas. Scientists report the results of their scientific activities at conferences and symposiums.

    SPbGASU organizes intra-university and all-Russian TIM championships, participates in the International Engineering Championship CASE-IN, and holds the international competition “Macaroni Builder”. An active student life is in full swing here: the Student Leisure and Creativity Center “Kirpich”, the Center for Physical Culture and Sports operate, and student projects are supported. One of such projects is “Adapters”, within the framework of which senior students help first-year students for six months. Curators – teachers who help first-year students study, communicate, and solve everyday problems – also work with the first-year students.

    “Our university is especially proud of the SPbGASU personal scholarship, the so-called “First-Year Grant”. We support the guys who have shown themselves in school and in secondary vocational education – in public life, research, studies, and pay them an additional scholarship on a competitive basis. In general, we have 17 scholarships that our students can receive upon fulfilling certain requirements,” said Marina Malyutina.

    At the end of her speech, the vice-rector presented the lyceum with a book about the architects of St. Petersburg. Alevtina Ragimova, the director of Lyceum No. 126, in her response expressed confidence that many graduates will become students of SPbGASU.

    Students from the Kirpich Student Leisure and Creativity Center performed a concert program that drew thunderous applause. In addition, the winners of the Olympiads that the university holds for future applicants were awarded. Then the lyceum students were treated to a tour of the university and numerous events that immersed them in the world of science.

    What were university lectures about?

    Lecture by Ekaterina Voznyak “Architects of St. Petersburg and Architectural Education”

    Ekaterina Voznyak, Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, spoke about the architects of St. Petersburg and architectural education in her lecture. The Dean said that she does not encourage the audience to become architects, since an architect is a calling that either exists or does not. The students will be able to decide on this issue not now, but at the age of 18-19, however, according to the Dean, it is useful for everyone to know about the architecture and architects of St. Petersburg. Ekaterina Ryurikovna emphasized that in the Northern capital they love and know their architects, who, being different people, create an ensemble, build a single city. This is what distinguishes St. Petersburg architects.

    The lecture by Dmitry Ulrich, Dean of the Faculty of Environmental Engineering and Urban Management, was called “Excursion into the World of Science.” He spoke about the prerequisites for the development of science, the classification of sciences, and scientific discoveries that changed the world. Students learned about the role of chemistry, physics, and mathematics in construction, heat supply, land management, and their importance for engineering education.

    Galina Tokunova, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Management, offered to look into the future of the construction industry. The speaker’s focus was on TIM design, 3D printing, the Internet of Things and smart sensors, robots and drones. The audience learned why artificial intelligence will not replace specialists in economics and management, what specialists in business informatics and economic security do, what is happening in the Laboratory of Digital Information Models in Construction at SPbGASU and much more.

    What was taught in the master classes

    You could feel like an artist at the master class “City Landscape”. Before it began, Konstantin Tarasov, senior teacher of the drawing department, explained that the children would first make an air space “on the wet”, and then introduce into it the silhouette of St. Petersburg – the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Kazan Cathedral. The lesson helped the lyceum students to reveal their creative abilities.

    The model workshop hosted a master class called “Architectural Fantasies”. The children were divided into five teams and created a model of a skyscraper. Olga Belousova, associate professor of the architectural design department, said: “As a starting point, the teams received handouts – photos, pictures, discussed the concept and began to assemble a fantasy model. Forty-five minutes later, the captains presented their work. In this case, they were required not only to write a short story about their skyscraper, but also to come up with a motto for it.”

    Due to the expansion of its activities, the organization calculated its personnel needs. The calculation showed that there were not enough workers in certain areas… This is how the business game “Interview” began, in which the participants learned to present themselves to the employer.

    The guys were divided into two groups: the HR department and job seekers. Olga Bochkareva, Deputy Dean for Academic Affairs of the Faculty of Economics and Management, Associate Professor of the Construction Management Department, and Marina Egorova, Deputy Dean for Educational Work, Senior Lecturer of the same department, suggested choosing professional skills that correspond to the professions: economic security specialist, marketer, construction economist, HR department employee. The HR department developed a list of interview questions. Job seekers prepared resumes and talked about themselves. As in real life, only the best got the job.

    At the master classes of the Faculty of Forensic Expertise and Law in Construction and Transport, it was possible to acquire practical skills of legal literacy in relations with unscrupulous employers, take psychological training “How to negotiate with any person”, learn about the criminal liability of minors and receive a lot of other useful information.

    The Automobile and Road Faculty prepared an interesting program. The students learned about the operation of vehicles and transport infrastructure in Arctic conditions, about digital twins of the roads of the future, and reverse engineering. The Automobile and Road Faculty is confident that today the road industry is developing at an incredible speed, and the task of teachers is to prepare specialists who will not only follow modern trends, but also create them.

    “Students of SPbGASU master advanced technologies, participate in research on the introduction of sustainable materials in road construction and the design of safe transport interchanges. SPbGASU is a leader in training personnel for the transport complex, actively cooperates with leading enterprises in the industry and provides students with the opportunity to undergo practical training at the largest construction and transport sites,” commented Andrey Zazykin, Dean of the ADF.

    “Our graduates are in demand – they are invited to work even at the training stage, because employers know that at SPbGASU they receive not only a theoretical base, but also valuable practical experience,” added Igor Chernyaev, head of the department of technical operation of vehicles.

    “SPbGASU is an interesting option”

    We asked ninth-grade students what they remember about Russian Science Day at SPbGASU and where they plan to study next.

    “We are still searching, but this is an interesting option. I will consider it. My father studied here,” shared Timur Bukhtiyarov.

    “I liked the business game the most. It was very fun, interesting, and exciting,” said Zlata Khudyakova.

    Galina Avdeeva, deputy director of Lyceum No. 126 for educational work, said that the Lyceum is very happy with such invitations – not only students, but also teachers learn a lot of new things here.

    The Admissions Committee, which organized the celebration for the lyceum students, thanks the university teachers for their participation, as well as students from the Kirpich Center for Social and Cultural Development, the student media center, and the SPbGASU Volunteer Club.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Sophos Completes Secureworks Acquisition

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    OXFORD, United Kingdom and ATLANTA, Feb. 03, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sophos and Secureworks® (NASDAQ:SCWX), two global cybersecurity pioneers that have innovated and redefined services and technology solutions for defeating cyberattacks, today announced the completion of Sophos’ acquisition of Secureworks. The all-cash transaction values Secureworks at approximately $859 million. With the completion of the acquisition, Secureworks’ common stock has ceased trading on Nasdaq. Sophos is backed by Thoma Bravo, a leading software investment firm.

    With this acquisition, Sophos is now the leading pure-play cybersecurity provider of Managed Detection and Response (MDR) services, supporting more than 28,000 organizations of all sizes worldwide. The combination will enable Sophos to deliver an unparalleled security operations platform, featuring hundreds of built-in integrations for adaptive protection, detection and response for mitigating cyberattacks. The open and scalable platform helps organizations, especially those with diverse IT estates, safeguard current and future technology investments, providing greater operational efficiencies and return on cybersecurity spend. Sophos X-Ops is also expanding its threat intelligence and security services capabilities with the addition of the Secureworks Counter Threat Unit™ and security operations and advisory teams.

    As a channel-first cybersecurity provider, Sophos remains unwavering in its commitment to deliver cutting-edge security services and technologies that empower our global community of resellers, Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and Managed Security Services Providers (MSSPs). This includes expanding their reach, enhancing operational scalability and providing stronger defenses to the countless organizations that need the ability to effectively defend against today’s constant and complex cyberattacks.

    “The market is embracing MDR as a clear means to deliver positive cybersecurity outcomes, and this has meant rapid growth in the category,” said Joe Levy, CEO, Sophos. “Sophos is differentiated by our very mature competencies in ransomware detection, malware analysis and threat actor tradecraft. These defenses are further augmented by Sophos’ native artificial intelligence (AI), first innovated by our globally peer recognized AI team nearly a decade ago, and embedded in our MDR, endpoint, network, email, and cloud security to more effectively neutralize and stop threats. With the integration of Secureworks, our expanded services and product portfolio will provide even stronger end-to-end security solutions that will include identity threat detection and response (ITDR), next-gen SIEM and managed risk, all in a single open platform.

    “We will also be able to further advance our AI, threat intelligence and attack research through more diverse and deeper global telemetry that is analyst-tuned for the real-world. At every level, we are very excited about this next accelerated chapter for Sophos.”

    Available Now
    In the near term, Sophos and Secureworks are operating business as usual, working with our respective channel partners, MSPs and MSSPs worldwide to distribute our existing security services and technology. Both companies’ sales and customer experience groups will operate to support existing customers, assist with renewals and develop current and new business opportunities. Sophos protects more than 600,000 customers worldwide with its portfolio of MDR, endpoint, network, email, and cloud security solutions that integrate and adapt to provide real-time defense through the Sophos Central platform.

    Transaction Details
    Under the terms of the agreement, Sophos acquired Secureworks in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $859 million. Secureworks shareholders, including Dell Technologies (NYSE:DELL), will receive $8.50 per share in cash. This represents a 28% premium to the unaffected 90-day volume-weighted average price (VWAP).

    Kirkland & Ellis LLP acted as legal counsel to Sophos, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC., Barclays, BofA Securities, HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., and UBS Investment Bank acted as financial advisors and provided debt financing for the transaction. Piper Sandler & Company and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC acted as financial advisors to Secureworks, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP acted as legal counsel.

    About Sophos
    Sophos is a global leader and innovator of advanced security solutions for defeating cyberattacks. The company acquired Secureworks in February 2025, bringing together two pioneers that have redefined the cybersecurity industry with their innovative, native AI-optimized services, technologies and products. Sophos is now the largest pure-play Managed Detection and Response (MDR) provider, supporting more than 28,000 organizations. In addition to MDR and other services, Sophos’ complete portfolio includes industry-leading endpoint, network, email, and cloud security that interoperate and adapt to defend through the Sophos Central platform. Secureworks provides the innovative, market-leading Taegis XDR/MDR, identity threat detection and response (ITDR), next-gen SIEM capabilities, managed risk, and a comprehensive set of advisory services. Sophos sells all these solutions through reseller partners, Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) worldwide, defending more than 600,000 organizations worldwide from phishing, ransomware, data theft, other every day and state-sponsored cybercrimes. The solutions are powered by historical and real-time threat intelligence from Sophos X-Ops and the newly added Counter Threat Unit (CTU). Sophos is headquartered in Oxford, U.K. More information is available at www.sophos.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
    This communication includes certain disclosures which contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, including but not limited to certain statements related to the merger of the wholly-owned subsidiary of Sophos, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation (“Parent”) with and into Secureworks Corp. (the “Company”), with the Company continuing as the surviving corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent (the “Merger”). In most cases, you can identify these statements by forward-looking words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “confidence,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “guidance,” “intend,” “may,” “plan,” “potential,” “outlook,” “should,” and “would,” or similar words or expressions that refer to future events or outcomes. These forward-looking statements, including certain statements regarding the Merger and its effects, are based largely on information currently available to our management and our management’s current expectations and assumptions and are subject to various risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from historical results or those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Although we believe our expectations are based on reasonable estimates and assumptions, they are not guarantees of performance. There is no assurance that our expectations will occur or that our estimates or assumptions will be correct, and we caution investors and all others not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements. Important factors, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from such plans, estimates or expectations include but are not limited to: (i) potential adverse reactions or changes to business relationships resulting from the completion of the Merger; (ii) legislative, regulatory and economic developments; (iii) unpredictability and severity of catastrophic events, including but not limited to acts of terrorism, outbreaks of war or hostilities or the COVID-19 pandemic and other public health issues, as well as management’s response to any of the aforementioned factors; (iv) the impact of inflation, rising interest rates, and global conflicts, including disruptions in European economies as a result of the Ukrainian/Russian conflict and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the relationship between China and Taiwan and ongoing trade disputes between the United States and China; (v) there may be liabilities that are not known, probable or estimable at this time or unexpected costs, charges or expenses; (vi) those risks and uncertainties set forth under the headings “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements” and “Risk Factors” in the Company’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K, as such risk factors may be amended, supplemented or superseded from time to time by other reports filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) from time to time, which are available via the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. These factors should not be construed as exhaustive and should be read in conjunction with the other forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements relate only to events as of the date on which the statements are made. Neither Parent nor the Company undertakes to update, and expressly disclaim any obligation to update, any forward-looking statements, whether resulting from circumstances or events that arise after the date the statements are made, new information, or otherwise. If one or more of these or other risks or uncertainties materialize, or if the underlying assumptions prove to be incorrect, actual results may vary materially from what we may have expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. Furthermore, new risks and uncertainties arise from time to time, and it is impossible for us to predict those events or how they may affect Parent or the Company.

    Media Contacts
    Kelly Kane, Director of Public Relations, Americas: Kelly.Kane@sophos.com 
    Samantha Powers, VP of Public Relations: Sophos@walkersands.com 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Denis Manturov: It is necessary to legally prohibit the acquisition of foreign equipment in the presence of Russian equipment

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov held a meeting on the development of the machine tool industry as part of a working trip to Krasnodar Krai and visited the production facilities of the Southern Heavy Machine Tool Plant (YuZTS).

    Over the past ten years, the Russian machine tool industry has demonstrated continuous growth. By the end of 2024, machine tool production increased by 40% in value terms, and tool production by more than 10%. The First Deputy Prime Minister noted the high workload of Russian manufacturers and the mass order generated by the defense industry. At the same time, according to him, the peak of the defense industry production capacity modernization program has already passed and the influence of this factor will gradually decrease.

    “The main support for the further development of the industry is the new national project, which is already being implemented. Its priorities are well known to you. Budget financing of 52 billion rubles is provided for this year. And now the key point is prompt contracting. I ask that no delays be allowed in this area. Let me remind you that the first results of the national project should be reported to the President in June,” Denis Manturov said.

    In his speech, the First Deputy Prime Minister noted that in order to achieve planned indicators, it is necessary to synchronize the efforts of science, the state, regions, development institutions and the production sector.

    “In particular, plants, using the national project measures, need to focus on maximizing the development of a new product line and technical re-equipment of their own facilities. Customers need to formulate technical specifications ahead of time, provide technical support for contracts, and give unconditional priority in purchases to Russian machines. Unfortunately, there are still many cases of purchasing imports when there are analogues on the market. Anton Andreevich, I believe that it is necessary to legally prohibit the purchase of foreign equipment when there is Russian equipment,” said Denis Manturov.

    In turn, it is important for regions where the main enterprises of the industry are concentrated to ensure control over the execution of work and consider the possibility of expanding support measures for machine tool builders. In terms of state support, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia must monitor the balance of supply and demand for machine tools and, if necessary, expand protective mechanisms.

    “This is especially relevant for critical machine tool components. We must fully ensure technological sovereignty for them by 2030,” Denis Manturov emphasized.

    The head of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov spoke about the measures of state support for machine tool manufacturing that are being developed.

    “Together with the Innovation Assistance Fund, we are currently preparing a third program with grants of up to 50 million rubles to facilitate the commercialization of R&D results. This year, together with the SME Corporation, we want to launch a mechanism for preferential lending to small and medium-sized machine tool manufacturers. In terms of non-financial support measures, the Federal Competence Center in Productivity will consult companies on improving production efficiency. Today, a list of 25 companies that will be the first to take part in this event has already been developed,” shared Anton Alikhanov.

    “Thanks to the support of the Russian Government, we have managed to make industry one of the key sectors of the economy of our traditionally agricultural and resort region. This year, we plan to increase the capitalization of the regional Industrial Development Fund to 10 billion rubles. We continue to develop a network of industrial parks. There are already 8 industrial parks and 2 industrial technology parks operating in the region,” said Veniamin Kondratyev, Governor of Krasnodar Krai.

    Together with the head of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Russia and the governor of the region, the First Deputy Prime Minister got acquainted with the current activities of the Southern Heavy Engineering Plant, whose main production buildings are located on the territory of the former machine-tool plant named after G.M. Sedin. In 2024, a new branch of YUZTS was also put into operation on the territory of the industrial park “VB Kuban”. Modern machines and machining centers were purchased, which expanded the company’s technological capabilities, increased productivity and significantly improved the quality of finished products.

    The First Deputy Prime Minister was presented with the entire product line developed and manufactured by YUZTS in 2023. In particular, a horizontal milling and boring machining center and a five-axis milling machining center. All machines are equipped with a CNC system developed by the domestic company Mechatronika.

    Denis Manturov was also shown 3D metal printers developed by YUZTS. The equipment operates using selective laser melting technology. These systems are fully ready for serial production with minimal delivery times — up to 4 months. Multi-laser systems with large processing zones are also under development. These printers use stainless steel, aluminum, nickel, titanium and copper alloys in their work.

    Over the last year of operation, YUZTS has increased its production area from 16 to 90 thousand square meters. Production volumes are also growing: from 2021 to 2025, taking into account current plans, they have increased 14 times.

    The company’s immediate plans include launching a new modern foundry to provide its own production with parts that include operations requiring casting as part of the production technology. Another priority area is the launch of contract manufacturing, within the framework of which YUZTS will offer the market services for major repairs and reconstruction of heavy machine tools.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Rosneft expands contactless fuel payment in Siberia via Yandex Zapravki service

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Rosneft – Rosneft – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Rosneft continues to develop cooperation with the Yandex Zapravki service and expands the geography of remote payment for fuel. The service has become available to customers at all 70 of the Company’s gas stations in the Altai Territory and the Altai Republic. Today, Rosneft is the largest retail network in Russia with the possibility of contactless payment at almost 2,700 gas stations.

    Yandex Gas Stations are integrated into Yandex Go, Maps and Navigator, and are also available in a separate application. The service informs users about the types and cost of fuel at each gas station. Motorists can select the pump number, fuel brand, volume and pay for refueling remotely via a mobile phone.

    At Rosneft filling stations in the Altai Territory and the Altai Republic, a special offer will be available to all motorists who fill up their cars before March 1, 2025, using the digital service. Participants in the Family Team loyalty program will also be able to add their card details to Yandex Gas Stations to earn points, and motorists with an active Yandex subscription will be able to accumulate and spend Plus points when filling up at the network’s filling stations.

    Developing convenient customer services to increase the speed and improve the quality of customer service is one of the priority goals of Rosneft’s retail business. The Company’s petrol stations provide motorists with the opportunity to use various methods to pay for fuel and related products: by bank card, in cash, by QR code through the Fast Payment System, using the Yandex Zapravki service, as well as accumulated points upon presentation of the Family Team card.

    Reference:

    Rosneft has one of the largest retail sales networks in Russia, including about 3,000 petrol stations/gas stations. The geography of the Company’s retail business covers 61 regions of Russia. In Altai, the Company’s retail business is the most extensive network in the region. It covers all major highways in the directions from Novosibirsk Region to the Altai Republic, as well as to Kazakhstan and Mongolia. The petrol station network provides wide coverage of the territory and has high social significance.

    Department of Information and Advertising of PJSC NK Rosneft February 3, 2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: School of Synthetic Biology and Industrial Pharmacy Opens at NSU

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    From February 3 to February 7, 2025, the Novosibirsk State University is hosting the February School of Synthetic Biology and Industrial Pharmacy, organized by NSU Advanced Engineering School, Institute of Medicine and Medical Technologies of NSU with the support of JSC Generium and SUNC NSU.

    More than 200 students from more than 40 universities across the country applied to participate in the school. 42 participants from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Altai Krais, as well as other regions of the Ural, Volga, Southern, Central and Northwestern Federal Districts were selected to participate in the School. The leading universities by the number of participants were: NSU — 15 people, SFU — 7 people, SSMU — 4 people, Altai State University — 3 people.

    The school participants will master competencies in the field of technologies for managing the properties of biological objects, bioinformatics, and will become familiar with modern approaches to the development of drugs. The work will take place in the laboratories of the new educational building of the NSU SUNC, which is one of the first-stage facilities. modern campus of NSU, being built within the framework of the national project “Youth and Children”.

    At the opening of the intensive course, Dmitry Kudlai, Director of Innovative Development Programs at NSU and Vice President of Generium JSC, gave a welcoming speech.

    — Biotechnology is a trend worldwide, as well as a fundamental component of the life of Novosibirsk State University. NSU is actively developing the construction of a world-class campus. The educational building of the NSU SUNC, where the participants will work, is the first stage of this campus, the second is the building of the flow classrooms, the research center and the educational and scientific center of the Institute of Medicine and Medical Technologies of NSU. Perhaps, some of the participants of the School will be able to study in the premises of the flow classrooms building as early as September. To conduct the School, we attracted specialists from the Engineering School of Moscow State University, a team from the Faculty of Bioengineering and Bioinformatics will come. The Deputy Director of the State Institute of Medicines and Good Practices will also take part. I can say for sure that it will not be boring. It is wonderful that students participate in such events, laying the foundation for a confident future, — noted Dmitry Kudlai.

    Director of the Advanced Engineering School Sergey Golovin also welcomed the participants and spoke about the career and educational opportunities that participation in the intensive course opens up:

    — One of the areas that was initially developed at the Advanced Engineering School of NSU is biotechnology. Novosibirsk really has the widest range for development. Our task is to make you as competitive as possible and provide you with subject tools, as well as a set of personal qualities. I hope that your stay at the school for a week will be useful. So that you can not only decide on further education in master’s programs, but also take the first serious big step into the world of biotechnology.

    On the first day of the event, the participants got acquainted with the program of the event and also listened to a lecture on “Development of laboratory diagnostic systems” by Eduard Agletdinov, Deputy General Director for Scientific Work at Vector-Best JSC.

    During the week of intensive work, leading specialists from pharmaceutical companies, experts from universities and scientific organizations will give plenary lectures. An important element of the event will be the educational program, where talented students will be able to get acquainted with the best modern practices in the field of drug development and current technological and regulatory trends.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: While plastic dominates human consumption, the global economy will remain hooked on fossil fuels

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Hanieh, Professor of Political Economy and Global Development, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter

    Plastic waste in the Maldives. MOHAMED ABDULRAHEEM/Shutterstock

    In early December 2024, hopes for a landmark global treaty to curb plastic pollution were dashed as negotiations in South Korea stalled. Leading the campaign against the deal were major oil-producing nations, especially Saudi Arabia and Russia, who argued for a more flexible approach to any legally binding limits on plastic manufacturing.

    The collapse of any agreement came despite scientific research delivering ever more alarming warnings about the dangers of plastic pollution. Over the last two years, an avalanche of studies have revealed the pervasive presence of tiny plastic particles in human blood, brains, and even placental tissue.

    These particles, which stem from the breakdown of larger plastic waste, have been linked to everything from inflammation to hormonal disruption, and potential long-term health risks such as cancer. Aside from their effects on human health, plastics are wreaking havoc on marine ecosystems, with microplastics now found in Arctic ice and in the bodies of fish and birds.

    Behind these alarming studies stands a seemingly unstoppable juggernaut of plastic production. The annual global production of plastics reportedly grew nearly two hundredfold between 1950 (two million tonnes) and 2015 (381 million tonnes), and the pace of growth is accelerating.

    Over half of all plastics ever made were produced in the past 25 years, and production levels are estimated to double or triple again by 2050. And more production brings more waste.

    Less than 10% of all plastics ever produced have been recycled. And the volume of “mismanaged plastics” – those which are not recycled, incinerated, or sealed in landfills – is also estimated to double by 2050.

    It seems as if humans have become the organic detritus within a plastic world of our own creation.

    Plastic elephants

    But despite growing awareness around the problems associated with plastic, there is a fundamental flaw in how we tend to think about it as a product.

    For there is a tendency to frame plastic as a problem of pollution and recycling, rather than as an integral part of our fossil fuel-driven world. This narrative is also promoted by major oil companies, such as the American giant, ExxonMobil, which stated in the lead up to the South Korean summit: “The issue is pollution. The issue is not plastic.”

    The problem with this perspective is that it obscures the fact that plastics are petrochemical products: substances which are ultimately derived from oil and gas.

    Indeed, the future of fossil fuels is increasingly tied to the future of plastics. It has been estimated that by 2040, plastics will account for as much as 95% of net growth in oil demand.

    This is perhaps why 220 fossil fuel lobbyists attended those recent treaty discussions, outnumbering all other delegations. It could also explain why Saudi Arabia, home to one of the world’s largest petrochemical companies, led the opposition to any global limits on plastic production.

    At the core of capitalism

    The problem we confront is not simply the presence of an oil lobby, it is the systemic role that plastics play within capitalism.

    Plastics, and the wider petrochemical industry, played a crucial part in the transformation of global capitalism from the mid-20th century onwards.

    As I explore in my book, Crude Capitalism, the things we used to need to build and make things previously relied on sourcing naturally occurring, labour-intensive goods like timber, cotton or metals. But the invention of plastics and other synthetic materials separated commodity production from nature.

    More plastic in the pipeline.
    Kodda/Shutterstock

    Oil became more than a fuel – it was the substance that came to dominate our lives. A petrochemical shift to the rise of an oil-dominated world. With capitalism untethered from natural cycles, there was a radical reduction in the time taken to produce commodities and an end to any limits on the quantity and diversity of goods produced.

    Along with this, consumption habits became centred around notions of disposability and obsolescence. Plastics made the essential features of contemporary capitalism possible: a drive to limitless growth, continual acceleration of production and consumption, and the frenzied expansion of markets.

    The emergence of fast fashion is just one example. Alongside poorly paid garment workers in countries such as Bangladesh, really cheap clothing was only made possible through the massive expansion of polyester production (a kind of plastic), which freed the industry from its dependence on supplies of wool and cotton.

    The consumption of plastics looms large in today’s ecological crisis. And having become so accustomed to thinking about oil and gas as primarily an issue of energy and fuel choice, perhaps we have lost sight of how much of our lives depend upon the products of petroleum.

    These synthetic materials drove a post-war revolution in productivity, bringing labour-saving technology and mass consumption. It is now almost impossible to identify an area of life that has not been radically transformed by the presence of plastics and other petrochemicals.

    Plastic products have become normalised as natural parts of our daily existence. And it is this paradox which must be fully confronted if we are to move beyond fossil fuels.

    Adam Hanieh’s research into petrochemicals has been supported by a Political Economy Fellowship from the Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF).

    ref. While plastic dominates human consumption, the global economy will remain hooked on fossil fuels – https://theconversation.com/while-plastic-dominates-human-consumption-the-global-economy-will-remain-hooked-on-fossil-fuels-247393

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Marat Khusnullin: Rosreestr is implementing a pilot project to involve unused real estate objects into circulation and fill the Unified State Register of Real Estate

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The government is strengthening its comprehensive work to identify, record and involve unused real estate objects into circulation. This will ensure the completeness and quality of information in the Unified State Register of Real Estate (USRRE) by the end of 2030 and involve unused land plots and territories into economic circulation.

    “Since 2021, these issues have been addressed, among other things, within the framework of the state program “National Spatial Data System”. During this time, Rosreestr and the Roscadastre sub-company have entered 191 boundaries between subjects and 1.85 thousand boundaries of municipalities into the Unified State Register. Three times more than in the previous 10 years, the boundaries of territorial zones were entered – 298.6 thousand. 1.9 million registry errors were corrected. The number of objects with copyright holders increased by 18.1 million. At the same time, despite the significant dynamics, there is still a lot of work left. In order to complete it within the deadline set by the state program, by the end of 2030, this activity will be intensified. Rosreestr has launched a pilot project that will intensify the creation of a complete and accurate real estate register in the regions and identify new sites and territories for inclusion in economic circulation,” said Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin.

    Currently, the pilot project is being implemented in individual municipalities of 16 regions – in the Kostroma, Lipetsk, Novgorod, Omsk, Penza, Pskov, Smolensk, Tambov, Ulyanovsk regions, Primorsky and Khabarovsk territories, the republics of Mari El, Mordovia, the Chuvash Republic, the Jewish Autonomous Region and the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug.

    “In fact, a complete inventory of lands and property is being carried out, which will allow us to collect and summarize information about all real estate objects. At present, the work has been completed in 71 settlements, and is ongoing in 38 more. As a result, information about the title holders has been identified for 8.3 thousand real estate objects, information about the boundaries of 18.7 thousand land plots and capital construction projects has been clarified, and 3.2 thousand hectares of territory suitable for inclusion in circulation have been identified,” noted Oleg Skufinsky, head of Rosreestr.

    The project is being implemented within the framework of an agreement concluded between Rosreestr, the head of the region and the public-law company Roskadastr (which is the contractor). After the creation of an operational headquarters in the subject and the approval of the “road map”, work begins on the analysis of archival documents, including cartographic materials, and a survey of the territories.

    The results of the work are entered into the Unified State Register of Real Estate and the National Spatial Data System. Rosreestr provides organizational, coordination and methodological support for the pilot project on an ongoing basis.

    Today, in the land and real estate sector, there are still historically accumulated problems of missing information in the Unified State Register of Real Estate and other registries. There is no information about the owners of 29.9 million objects, and the boundaries of 17.4 million land plots have not been established. There is still a shortage of available land for provision to citizens, legal entities and investors.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Rosneft held a series of ski races dedicated to the 80th anniversary of Victory

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Rosneft – Rosneft – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Rosneft organized a corporate ski race in Nefteyugansk. More than 450 athletes from the Company’s subsidiaries and family members of oil workers working in several regions of Russia took part in the corporate winter race “Rosneft Ski Track”. Representatives of the “Movement of the First” joined the mass race.

    Earlier this winter season, mass races “Rosneft Ski Track” were held in Angarsk, Ufa and Krasnoyarsk. The total number of participants reached almost 1,500 athletes. The Company dedicated mass amateur competitions to the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, which the entire country is preparing to celebrate this year.

    In Nefteyugansk, five distances were prepared for skiers of various age categories – from 500 m to 10 km. Schoolchildren from the “First Movement” went out in whole classes for some distances.

    Despite the fact that the races have an amateur status, the level of their organization is not inferior to professional competitions. All conditions were created for oil industry athletes and guests of the event. A field kitchen with hot dishes and hot tea was operating at the races, sports equipment rental was organized, places for preparing skis, heated changing rooms and rest areas were equipped. A cultural and entertainment program was prepared for young athletes, a children’s corner and an animator worked.

    The winners of the competition in 13 age groups were determined by professional judges.

    Support for mass sports is one of the key areas of social work for Rosneft and its subsidiaries. The company carries out large-scale work to promote sports and a healthy lifestyle among both its own employees and the population in the regions where the Company operates.

    Ice arenas, sports complexes and multifunctional sports grounds are built in the regions with the funds of the Company and its subsidiaries. The Company also provides support to amateur and mass sports.

    Department of Information and Advertising of PJSC NK Rosneft February 3, 2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Outbrain Completes the Acquisition of Teads

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Highlights:

    • The combination will merge two open internet category leaders to create a unified omnichannel platform that delivers outcomes from branding to performance across all screens, including CTV, mobile and web. The new company will operate under the name Teads.
    • The union creates one of the largest open internet companies, with combined advertising spend of approximately $1.7 billion (FY24), reaching 2.2 billion consumers.
    • The company will unite two of the richest contextual and interest data sets on the open internet, powering an advanced AI prediction engine to optimize advertiser outcomes.
    • Outbrain CEO, David Kostman, will serve as CEO of the combined company, with Jeremy Arditi and Bertrand Quesada, former Teads CEOs, assuming the roles of Co-President, Chief Business Officer of the Americas and International respectively.
    • The two companies are preliminarily reporting a combined Ex-TAC Gross Profit of $623 million and Adjusted EBITDA of $230 million in 2024 including $65-75 million of estimated synergies1.
    • Transaction value of approximately $900 million, comprised of $625 million in cash and 43.75 million Outbrain shares.
    • Altice, selling shareholder of Teads, will nominate two out of a total of 10 board members.
    • Outbrain is providing selected preliminary results for the fourth quarter, in line with previously issued guidance in Outbrain’s November 2024 earnings call, and selected preliminary results for Teads and the combined company.

    NEW YORK, Feb. 03, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Outbrain Inc. (NASDAQ: OB) today announced the closing of its acquisition of Teads, following receipt of all necessary regulatory approvals. The two companies will merge their respective branding and performance offerings to create the omnichannel outcomes platform for the open internet, and will operate under the name Teads.

    The new Teads will create one of the largest optimized supply paths on the premium open internet, with a focus on connecting curated, exclusive media environments with elevated, data-driven creative experiences. The combined company offering will be strengthened by Outbrain’s proprietary predictive technology and AI optimization. It will provide a solution for marketers to leverage a single partner to deliver concrete outcomes at every step of the marketing funnel— offering unique ways to combine advertising solutions from awareness to sales. The company’s combined data set will power expanded contextual, audience and purchase-based targeting capabilities, connecting CTV experiences to digital moments to drive measurable outcomes.

    “I am extremely excited about this new chapter in our journey. This transformative merger creates a company that directly addresses a large gap in the advertising industry: a scaled end-to-end platform that can drive outcomes, from branding to consideration to purchase, across screens,” said CEO, David Kostman.

    “Together, we are creating an extraordinary new company, combining the best of both organizations’ deep expertise in omnichannel video branding solutions and performance advertising. The new Teads’ mission is to drive lasting value with an offering that invites marketers to expect better outcomes, media owners to expect sustainable value, and consumers to expect elevated experiences. I want to thank the teams of both Outbrain and Teads, who have pioneered major advertising categories, and have built leading global companies over more than a decade. It is their innovation and commitment that have brought us to this moment and will propel us to new heights,” added Kostman.

    Co-President & Chief Business Officer, Jeremy Arditi, added: “We’re committed to creating a solution that will harness the untapped opportunity of the open internet, and allow all of its constituents to thrive. We believe that by prioritizing beautiful creative experiences, trust and transparency in media, and delivery of meaningful outcomes, we can create a stronger ecosystem that provides value for all.”

    “The merger between Teads and Outbrain makes a lot of sense strategically. We look forward to exploring the new possibilities this provides us with to reach our audiences in a new and interesting way, to deliver full funnel solutions and better business outcomes,” said Sital Banerjee, Global Head of Integrated Media, Performance Marketing, and BMI Management at Lipton Teas and Infusions.

    Key Combined Strengths

    With the completion of the combination, the new Teads will offer clients and partners:

    • Exceptional reach at great scale, across exclusive environments
      • 96 percent open internet audience reach*
      • Number one most direct supply path, as rated by Jounce**
      • Direct access to 10,000 media environment
      • Connected to the top 4 OEMs and several of the top Streaming Apps unlocking access to 50bn CTV Monthly Ad Opportunities, including unique CTV homescreen inventory
      • Proprietary code-on-page relationships with premium editorial properties globally, providing access to incremental inventory and yielding extensive audience interest and engagement insights
    • Creatives built for outcomes
      • Data-driven, beautiful creative solutions designed to connect brand moments across the marketing funnel — from CTV to editorial and beyond
      • Proven impact from unique experiences, with 74 percent higher attention for unique CTV native creative
      • Strategic Joint Business Partnerships with more than 50 of the world’s most premium brands
    • AI-powered predictive technology
      • Proprietary prediction engine, cultivated over 18+ years to drive performance outcomes, making 1 billion predictions each minute
      • 4 billion signals processed each minute via AI and machine learning
      • 50 live AI models
    • Expansive omnichannel graph, expanded on the Teads Omnichannel Graph foundation
      • The Teads Omnichannel Graph (OG), a proprietary tool extending contextual and audience-targeting capabilities into the CTV environment, will be further expanded by Outbrain engagement, interest, and conversion data
      • Extensive data signals feeding an understanding of audiences across screens, including:
        • 130,000 articles scanned per minute
        • 500,000 CTV programs enriched with data per month
        • 1 billion engagement and contextual signals processed each minute

    *According to Comscore, Media Metrix, Key Metrix, US, December 2024 for Teads.
    **According to 2024 Jounce SPO analyses, specific to Teads platform.

    Transaction Details

    Outbrain, Altice and Teads have amended the previously announced share purchase agreement, dated August 1, 2024. Under the terms of the revised agreement, Outbrain will be paying a total consideration of approximately $900 million, consisting of $625 million upfront cash and 43.75 million shares of common stock of Outbrain (valued at approximately $263 million based on the closing price of Outbrain’s common stock as of January 31, 2025, of $6.01).

    Under the revised terms, there is no deferred cash payment or convertible preferred equity component. The revised terms have meaningfully reduced the level of required debt financing and simplified the transaction structure.

    Outbrain intends to finance the transaction with existing cash resources and $625 million in committed debt financing from Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Jefferies Finance LLC and Mizuho Bank, Ltd., subject to customary funding conditions. Outbrain will also issue to Altice 43.75 million shares of common stock. Altice will nominate two directors to the board of Outbrain and will be bound by a stockholder agreement with Outbrain containing arrangements and restrictions concerning voting and disposition of the shares issued to Altice.

    Financial Highlights

    Preliminary Estimated Unaudited Financial Information for the Quarter and Year Ended December 31, 2024

    Today Outbrain is furnishing on Form 8-K selected preliminary estimated unaudited financial information for each of Outbrain and Teads on a standalone basis and on a combined company basis for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024. Excerpts of such financial information can be found below. You are encouraged to refer to the Form 8-K and other documents filed or furnished by Outbrain with the SEC through the website maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov.

    The Company previously announced its expectation to achieve $50 – 60 million of annual revenue and cost synergies in the second full year following completion of the acquisition, with further opportunities for expanded synergies in the following years. The Company now expects to realize approximately $65 – 75 million of annual synergies in FY 2026 with further opportunities for expanded synergies in the following years. Of this amount, approximately $60 million relates to cost synergies, including approximately $45 million of compensation related expenses. The Company plans to action approximately 70% of the compensation related expense savings during the first month post-closing. The upsize in expected synergies follows a robust integration planning process, enabling a larger and more rapid synergy capture.

    Outbrain is providing selected preliminary results for the fourth quarter and full year 2024, as follows:

    • Ex-TAC gross profit of $68.3 million for Q4 2024, and $236.1 million for FY 2024
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $17.0 million for Q4 2024, and $37.3 million for FY 2024

    For Teads, we are providing the following selected preliminary results for the fourth quarter and full year 2024, as follows:

    • Ex-TAC gross profit of $119.9 million for Q4 2024, and $386.6 million for FY 2024
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $52.2 million for Q4 2024, and $122.7 million for FY 2024

    The two companies are preliminarily reporting a combined Ex-TAC Gross Profit of approximately $623 million and Adjusted EBITDA of approximately $230 million in 2024, including $65-75 million of estimated synergies2.

    Conference Call and Webcast:
    Outbrain will host an investor conference call this morning, Monday, February 3rd at 9:00 am ET. Interested parties are invited to listen to the conference call which can be accessed live by phone by dialing 1-877-497-9071 or for international callers, 1-201-689-8727. A replay will be available two hours after the call and can be accessed by dialing 1-877-660-6853, or for international callers, 1-201-612-7415. The passcode for the live call and the replay is 13751603. The replay will be available until February 17, 2025. Interested investors and other parties may also listen to a simultaneous webcast of the conference call by logging onto the Investors Relations section of the Company’s website at https://investors.outbrain.com. The online replay will be available for a limited time shortly following the call.

    Cautionary Note About Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which statements involve substantial risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on current expectations, estimates, forecasts and projections about the industries in which Outbrain and Teads operate, and beliefs and assumptions of Outbrain’s management. Forward-looking statements may include, without limitation, statements regarding possible or assumed future results of our business, financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, plans and objectives, expected synergies and statements of a general economic or industry-specific nature. You can generally identify forward-looking statements because they contain words such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “expects,” “plans,” “anticipates,” “could,” “intends,” “target,” “projects,” “contemplates,” “believes,” “estimates,” “predicts,” “foresee,” “potential” or “continue” or the negative of these terms or other similar expressions that concern our expectations, strategy, plans or intentions, or are not statements of historical fact. The outcome of the events described in these forward-looking statements is subject to risks, uncertainties and other factors including, but not limited to: risks that the acquisition disrupts current plans and operations or diverts management’s attention from its ongoing business; the initiation or outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against Outbrain or Teads, or their respective directors or officers, related to the acquisition; unexpected costs, charges or expenses resulting from the acquisition; the ability of Outbrain to successfully integrate Teads’ operations, technologies and employees; the ability to realize anticipated benefits and synergies of the acquisition, including the expectation of enhancements to Outbrain’s services, greater revenue or growth opportunities, operating efficiencies and cost savings; overall advertising demand and traffic generated by Outbrain and the combined company’s media partners; factors that affect advertising demand and spending, such as the continuation or worsening of unfavorable economic or business conditions or downturns, instability or volatility in financial markets, and other events or factors outside of Outbrain and the combined company’s control, such as U.S. and global recession concerns; geopolitical concerns, including the ongoing war between Ukraine-Russia and conditions in Israel and the Middle East; supply chain issues; inflationary pressures; labor market volatility; bank closures or disruptions; the impact of challenging economic conditions; political and policy uncertainties; and other factors that have and may further impact advertisers’ ability to pay; Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to continue to innovate, and adoption by Outbrain and the combined company’s advertisers and media partners of expanding solutions; the success of Outbrain and the combined company’s sales and marketing investments, which may require significant investments and may involve long sales cycles; Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to grow their business and manage growth effectively; the ability to compete effectively against current and future competitors; the loss or decline of one or more large media partners, and Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to expand advertiser and media partner relationships; conditions in Israel, including the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas and other terrorist organizations, may limit Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to market, support and innovate their products due to the impact on employees as well as advertisers and advertising markets; Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to maintain revenues or profitability despite quarterly fluctuations in results, whether due to seasonality, large cyclical events or other causes; the risk that research and development efforts may not meet the demands of a rapidly evolving technology market; any failure of Outbrain or the combined company’s recommendation engine to accurately predict attention or engagement, any deterioration in the quality of Outbrain or the combined company’s recommendations or failure to present interesting content to users or other factors which may cause us to experience a decline in user engagement or loss of media partners; limits on Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to collect, use and disclose data to deliver advertisements; Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to extend their reach into evolving digital media platforms; Outbrain and the combined company’s ability to maintain and scale their technology platform; the ability to meet demands on our infrastructure and resources due to future growth or otherwise; the failure or the failure of third parties to protect Outbrain and the combined company’s sites, networks and systems against security breaches, or otherwise to protect the confidential information of Outbrain and the combined company; outages or disruptions that impact Outbrain or the combined company or their service providers, resulting from cyber incidents, or failures or loss of our infrastructure; significant fluctuations in currency exchange rates; political and regulatory risks in the various markets in which Outbrain and the combined company operate; the challenges of compliance with differing and changing regulatory requirements; the timing and execution of any cost-saving measures and the impact on Outbrain and the combined company’s business or strategy; and the other risk factors and additional information described in the section entitled “Risk Factors”, and under the heading “Risk Factors” in Item 1A of Outbrain’s Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on March 8, 2024 for the year ended December 31, 2023, Outbrain’s Form 10-Q filed with the SEC on August 8, 2024 for the period ended June 30, 2024, Outbrain’s Form 10-Q filed with the SEC on November 7, 2024 for the period ended September 30, 2024 and in subsequent reports filed with the SEC.

    Accordingly, you should not rely upon forward-looking statements as an indication of future performance. Outbrain cannot assure you that the results, events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or will occur, and actual results, events or circumstances could differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements made in this press release relate only to events as of the date on which the statements are made. Outbrain and the combined company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the forward-looking statements. Outbrain undertakes no obligation, and does not assume any obligation, to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or circumstances after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    About The Combined Company
    Outbrain Inc. (Nasdaq: OB) and Teads combined on February 3, 2025 and are operating under the new Teads brand. The new Teads is the omnichannel outcomes platform for the open internet, driving full-funnel results for marketers across premium media. With a focus on meaningful business outcomes, the combined company ensures value is driven with every media dollar by leveraging predictive AI technology to connect quality media, beautiful brand creative, and context-driven addressability and measurement. One of the most scaled advertising platforms on the open internet, the new Teads is directly partnered with more than 10,000 publishers and 20,000 advertisers globally. The company is headquartered in New York, with a global team of nearly 1,800 people in 36 countries.

    For more information, visit https://thenewteads.com/.

    Media Contact

    press@outbrain.com

    Investor Relations Contact

    IR@outbrain.com
    (332) 205-8999

    Non-GAAP Reconciliations

    The following table presents the reconciliation of Gross profit to Ex-TAC gross profit, for the periods presented:

        Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Year Ended December 31, 2024
        Outbrain   Teads   Combined   Outbrain   Teads   Combined
    Revenue   $ 234,586     $ 188,953     $ 423,539     $ 889,875     $ 617,435     $ 1,507,310  
    Traffic acquisition costs     (166,247 )     (69,091 )     (235,338 )     (653,731 )     (230,831 )     (884,562 )
    Other cost of revenue (a)     (12,277 )     (26,441 )     (38,718 )     (44,042 )     (106,414 )     (150,456 )
    Gross profit     56,062       93,421       149,483       192,102       280,190       472,292  
    Other cost of revenue (a)     12,277       26,441       38,718       44,042       106,414       150,456  
    Ex-TAC Gross Profit   $ 68,339     $ 119,862     $ 188,201     $ 236,144     $ 386,604     $ 622,748  

    ___________
    (a) Other cost of revenue for Teads is subject to accounting policy harmonization.

    The following table presents the reconciliation of net income (loss) to Adjusted EBITDA, for the periods presented:

        Three Months Ended December 31, 2024   Year Ended December 31, 2024
        Outbrain   Teads   Combined   Outbrain   Teads   Combined
    Net (loss) income   $ (167 )   $ 69,613     $ 69,446     $ (711 )   $ 89,318     $ 88,607  
    Interest expense/financial costs     699     $ 116       815       3,649       1,176       4,825  
    Interest income and other income, net     (1,522 )   $       (1,522 )     (9,209 )           (9,209 )
    Gain related to convertible debt                       (8,782 )           (8,782 )
    Other financial income and (expenses)           (13,973 )     (13,973 )           (26,404 )     (26,404 )
    Provision for income taxes     3,525       16,143       19,668       2,415       38,256       40,671  
    Depreciation and amortization     4,985       3,027       8,012       19,479       12,834       32,313  
    Share-based compensation     3,974       (28,089 )     (24,115 )     15,461             15,461  
    Severance costs           393       393       742       1,593       2,335  
    Merger and acquisition costs     5,469       4,930       10,399       14,256       5,890       20,146  
    Adjusted EBITDA, excluding synergies   $ 16,963     $ 52,160     $ 69,123     $ 37,300     $ 122,663     $ 159,963  
    The Company expects to realize approximately $65 – 75 million of annual synergies in the second full year following completion of the Acquisition. (midpoint)                         70,000  
    Combined company Adjusted EBITDA (incl. synergies)                       $ 229,963  

    1Represents estimated full year 2026 Adjusted EBITDA synergies, with further opportunities for expanded synergies in the following years. Ex-TAC Gross Profit and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP financial measures. See “Non-GAAP Reconciliations” below.
    2Represents estimated full year 2026 Adjusted EBITDA synergies, with further opportunities for expanded synergies in the following years

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE University Opens Dual Degree Master’s Program with Chinese University RIEM SWUFE

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    In January 2025, HSE and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) signed a cooperation agreement to implement a dual degree master’s program within the Financial Economics program at ICEF and the Master’s in Finance program at SWUFE. This program will allow students to gain a unique educational experience in two countries, combining the best educational traditions of Russia and China. ICEF’s counterpart is the Research Institute of Economics and Management (RIEM), established at SWUFE in 2006 to implement research and educational programs in economics and finance at a high international level.

    ICEF delegation at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) in Chengdu, China, in October 2024. During the meetings, an agreement was reached to establish the ICEF–RIEM Dual Degree Master’s Program.

    © MIEF

    Features of the program

    The program is based on the principle of mirror mobility: students study for 1-1.5 years in China at RIEM SWUFE and for 1-1.5 years in Russia at ICEF HSE. During their studies, students will gain in-depth knowledge in economics, finance, and data analysis, and will also study the economic and cultural characteristics of both countries.

    To participate in the program, you must successfully complete the first year at your home university and be selected for the double degree program. In the second year, students will study at the partner university and then return to their home university to complete their studies. Master’s theses will be defended separately at each of the universities.

    The programme will be taught in English and will include courses in micro- and macroeconomics, asset valuation and corporate finance. Each university will offer its own unique emphasis: RIEM will focus on the Chinese economy and financial system, and ICEF on quantitative and applied finance and data analysis.

    Upon completion of the program, graduates will receive two diplomas: a Master’s degree from the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Economics and a SWUFE diploma in Economics (specialization in Finance).

    Dean of the Research Institute of Economics and Management RIEM, Professor Yan Dong (graduated with a Master’s degree from the London School of Economics, UK, and received a PhD from the University of Essex, UK) about RIEM:

    “Our institute is very special. From the name, it seems that we are a research institute, but in fact, we are an educational unit. We have about 1,000 undergraduate, graduate and doctoral students. Our institute is special because all of our teachers have obtained their PhD degrees abroad. We have graduates from universities in the United States, Europe, Asia and other countries. All of our teachers are fluent in English, and the language of instruction – the working language in our institute – is English. We have more than 100 foreign students studying at our institute. This is what makes our institute special – it is quite an internationalized institution, and we have teachers who do not speak Chinese at all – they are international specialists.”

    Academic Director of the ICEF Master’s Program “Financial Economics” Maxim Nikitin:

    “Since the creation of the Financial Economics program, its main feature has been its international format. We have sought to integrate international standards and practices into the educational process. Cooperation with one of China’s leading universities in the field of finance, such as SWUFE, is an important step in this direction and expands the geography of our educational interaction. We are pleased that this initiative is based on the principle of equal exchange, which will enrich the programs of both partners, and will also create a new platform for academic exchange and joint projects. We are confident that this partnership will provide our students with access to unique knowledge and skills that will be in demand in the global labor market.”

    Earlier in 2024, HSE ICEF and RIEM SWUFE launched Bachelor’s double degree program in economics and financeCurrently, the first cohort of 2nd year students of ICEF is already successfully studying at SWUFE under this program.

    Graduates of the program will receive a bachelor’s degree in economics from the National Research University Higher School of Economics and a bachelor’s degree in economics from SWUFE.

    Academic Director of the ICEF Bachelor’s Program Oleg Zamkov:

    “ICEF HSE and RIEM SWUFE are a very good match for each other in implementing dual degree programs due to the close financial and economic focus of the programs and the level of updating of the courses. All economic and financial subjects required for ICEF students are also available at SWUFE, and, conversely, ICEF has everything required for students of the partner university.”

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Polytechnic University held a refresher course on the topic “RISC-V Ecosystem”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    At the end of January, the Higher School of Electronics and Microsystems Engineering of the Institute of Electronics and Telecommunications of SPbPU held a unique advanced training course on the topic “RISC-V Ecosystem: Development and System Programming”.

    The course was devoted to the development of hardware and software for modern extensible open instruction sets and RISC-V processor architectures, which are widely used in rapidly developing areas of information technology, including the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence.

    The course instructors were practicing specialists from SPbPU, ETU “LETI”, SPbSU, MIET, MIEM, UNN with extensive experience in this field, which ensured a high level of training and relevant knowledge for the participants. The audience included representatives of enterprises and universities from St. Petersburg, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Saratov, Voronezh, Krasnoyarsk, Yekaterinburg (more than 10 organizations in total). Classes continued in an intensive mode throughout the week, on the final day, Dmitry Tikhonov, Vice-Rector for Continuing and Pre-University Education at SPbPU, presented the course participants with certificates of advanced training.

    The hardware for the course was deployed and installed with the support of the YADRO group of companies at the joint scientific laboratory “RISC-V Digital Technologies (YADRO-Polytech)”.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News