Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Mikhail Mishustin held a meeting with the State Secretary of the Union State Dmitry Mezentsev

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met with State Secretary of the Union State Dmitry Mezentsev.

    During the meeting, priority tasks for deepening Russian-Belarusian integration in the Union State were discussed in the context of preparations for the upcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Union State.

    The draft agenda of the Union Council of Ministers includes current issues of practical cooperation between Russia and Belarus. Priority attention will be given to the implementation of the Main Directions for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State for 2024–2026, approved by the Supreme State Council of the Union State on January 6, 2024.

    It is also planned to discuss the promotion of joint projects in various areas in order to create favorable conditions for increasing trade and economic cooperation and improving the well-being of citizens of Russia and Belarus.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 16:37 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for security RU000A107936 (RZhD 1P-29R) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    16:37

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/22/2024, 16:37 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 121.15) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 1326.75 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 21.25%) of the security RU000A107936 (RZhD 1P-29R) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74198

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On holding auctions on October 23, 2024 to place OFZ issues No. 26245RMFS and No. 29025MFS

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    For bidders

    We inform you that, based on the letter of the Bank of Russia and in accordance with Part I. General Part and Part II. Stock Market Section of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of Moscow Exchange PJSC, the order establishes the form, time, term and procedure for holding auctions for the placement and trading of the following federal loan bonds:

    1.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26245RMFS from 08.05.2024
    Date of the auction October 23, 2024
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code SO26245RMFS9
    ISIN code PO000A108EG6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 14:30 – 15:00; bid execution period: 15:30 – 18:00.

    2.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security variable coupon federal loan bonds
    State registration number of the issue 29025RMFS from 09/29/2023
    Date of the auction October 23, 2024
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code SU29025RMFS2
    ISIN code PO000A106Z61
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 12:00 – 12:30; bid execution period: 13:00 – 18:00.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232PR@moex.com

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74197

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial News: Interview with Philip Gabunia for Interfax

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    There should be no tolerance for someone in the market having access to information before others.

    The problem of insider trading and manipulation on the Russian market is not only not losing its relevance, but on the contrary, is even getting worse against the backdrop of the players becoming more active and anti-sanction relaxations in terms of information disclosure. Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia Filipp Gabunia spoke to Interfax about the steps the regulator has planned to counteract these and other negative practices, as well as proposals to increase the capitalization of the Russian stock market, discussions between the exchange and professional participants, and closing “loopholes” for unfriendly non-residents.

    — The Russian stock market has lost a lot in recent years and has changed significantly in general. In these conditions, the task of doubling its capitalization in relation to GDP sounded quite unexpected. Is it already clear what needs to be done in the current reality to solve this problem? Is it really possible in principle?

    — The task is certainly very ambitious. If we talk about what needs to be done, then, of course, there is no universal remedy. A set of actions is needed. Some measures have already been implemented, and we are waiting for their effect. For example, this is the reform of the IIS, the launch of a long-term savings program.

    Now we are also suggesting that the government consider changing the incentive system for companies that receive state support when implementing various projects. Today, loans as a form of raising funds dominate our economy as a whole. This is the bridge that brings together the lender and the borrower. The state usually directs funds to subsidize interest rates, there are benefits for investment projects, but they are all tied to raising funds in the form of loans.

    One measure we have proposed for discussion is subsidized equity financing, i.e. a spread-out payment to companies entering the capital market, as an alternative to subsidies under bank lending programs. In addition, tax incentives, such as income tax breaks for issuers, may also be justified if certain conditions are met.

    — Won’t companies find themselves in unequal conditions? If someone’s strategy doesn’t include publicity at all…

    — No, this does not mean that all support will be transferred exclusively in the form of equity capital. We expect that companies will have a choice — if a project is eligible for state support, it can be received either through preferential lending or in the form of benefits when entering the stock market. Companies themselves will make decisions based on the specifics of the project’s economy and the cost of various sources of financing. At the same time, it is important that state support is not an incentive for only one form of raising money.

    By the way, the use of equity financing will help reduce the debt burden of businesses and will not lead to an additional burden on the budget. There will simply be a redistribution of expenses between forms of support. Here, of course, the position of the government, which, in fact, provides this support, is important.

    — What else is on the “doubling agenda”?

    — The cornerstone, of course, is trust in the stock market, including the attitude towards minority shareholders. If the interests of investors are trampled, they will not come to the market, no matter what incentives we offer. And here it is important that the interests of minority shareholders are not neglected, but on the contrary, protected. This affects, among other things, issues of maximum possible disclosure of information about issuers in the current conditions, availability of price information, increasing the transparency of dividend policy, the quality of corporate culture and much more.

    — This taboo has become less unquestionable in the last couple of years. Some relaxations have already been lifted, but it is hardly possible to say that we have returned to the level that was, say, in 2021. Do you think that all the necessary conditions are now in place to raise the issue of a complete return of all rules, both in terms of disclosure and in terms of corporate governance, to the previous level?

    — Currently, companies have reasons to close some information about themselves, taking into account the sanctions risks. But the fact is that many companies use external circumstances to justify their “secrecy”. Our position is that investors need information to make informed decisions. We will need to come up with some more subtle mechanisms for investors to obtain information about companies.

    — And what can the expansion of trading hours on the stock market give in terms of doubling capitalization? The return of the morning session, trading on weekends?

    — Weekend trading is definitely not the main recipe. But we analyze this topic comprehensively. It sounds convincing and beautiful: if stores work around the clock, why not apply this principle to the stock market? But there are still some specifics here. It is connected primarily with changes in liquidity in different time periods: very early or very late. We used to record quite significant volatility in the morning hours. And this can have serious consequences for investors, if, for example, someone had a margin position. Suddenly they will take and close, although there were no fundamental reasons for this.

    Now we are trying to assess these risks and think about how to mitigate them so as not to create threats to investors. We conducted a survey among investors, asking whether they need trading on weekends. Well, the lion’s share of respondents were against it.

    At the same time, the idea of expanding trading hours is not the worst: our country is large, with different time zones. Therefore, there are indeed arguments in favor of such a decision.

    We have received proposals from both Moscow Exchange and St. Petersburg Exchange on how they see trading on weekends. It is important to make a balanced decision now.

    — The role of the domestic investor has grown significantly now, but it is unlikely that the market can be doubled solely by relying on one’s own efforts. But if you put yourself in the shoes of a foreign investor, even from a currently friendly jurisdiction: he should probably also be concerned about the “risks of foreign infrastructure” in relation to Russia, which the Central Bank has so often spoken about in relation to foreign markets. Perhaps there are some steps that can be taken, so to speak, to accommodate foreign investors? Some restrictions can be softened, removed, to show that the risks of foreign infrastructure in Russia are no greater than the risks of a Russian investor in a foreign jurisdiction?

    — It is clear that we cannot guess what concerns a foreign investor who wants to come to our market has. My opinion is that today we have no restrictions in relation to friendly jurisdictions. We have not taken a single unfriendly step, all our measures were a response to the actions of foreign institutions. Moreover, we are systematically moving towards easing regulations, for example, we have direct access for their brokers to currency trading on our exchange. In the future, we will develop depository bridges to synchronize asset accounting.

    We are not closing our market and are ready for constructive cooperation.

    — The head of the Bank of Russia said in May that we need to think about establishing a minimum free float level for admission to trading. Have you discussed this with the market?

    — Moreover, we have a regulatory act at the output. We propose to increase the minimum share of shares in free circulation for the second level of listing — to 5%. We analyzed the volume of securities issued by issuers that are actually available for exchange transactions. In general, our estimates coincided with the exchange’s estimates. It is planned that the new requirements will come into force on April 1, 2025.

    Requirements for first-tier issuers remain in place. To be included in the first quotation list, a company must direct 10% of the issue into free circulation. Then maintain a free float of 7.5%.

    With regard to securities that are not included in the quotation lists (and this echelon is precisely where securities that have historically had a low free float are concentrated), measures to counter volatility are taken by the organizers of trades based on their own methods, taking into account the recommendations of the Bank of Russia.

    — Recently, the topic of the risk of large companies leaving the stock exchange has been raised in the public arena. Does the regulator see such risks? Are you planning to do anything?

    — For now, it seems to us that this is somewhat exaggerated. We do not see any prerequisites for delisting the largest issuers of securities. At the same time, the current regulation allows the exchange to make a decision in certain situations to lower the level of the quotation list and even delist. But in each case, it is necessary to assess the consequences of such a decision for retail and institutional investors.

    — You have already outlined the problem of stock acceleration, especially low-liquidity stocks. How are things now? Are any additional steps needed?

    — Indeed, it was a serious problem. In just 3 quarters of last year, the number of shares subject to destabilization reached 63. For comparison, about 12 such cases were recorded for the whole of 2022. At the same time, price fluctuations could exceed 50%. And the most interesting thing is that this was not even direct manipulation in the legal sense of the word, but you know, a kind of lottery – who will jump first. The purpose of such actions is the artificial and planned formation of a trend on the paper. And when the market is already entering the expected state or is approaching it, the manipulator exits the position, as a rule, in advance.

    But the stock exchange is not gambling. Organized trading should determine adequate and transparent pricing. We, together with the Moscow Exchange, have taken measures to limit aggressive bids in the third tier. Because such swings, as I have already said, can only be arranged when the market is thin and the free float is low. New (rigid) price limits were set, the price step for the most volatile securities was increased, the possibility of submitting aggressive bids beyond a 5% deviation from the best price was limited, and the response time of the discrete auction was reduced.

    In fact, this has yielded results, the number of such practices has decreased many times – to isolated cases, and this trend has remained to this day. We do not see any more bright bursts of volatility. In general, the measures have worked, so we do not see any point in making any additional decisions yet.

    — Do you follow the price fluctuations of securities, including those of large issuers, at the St. Petersburg Exchange?

    – Of course, right now we are discussing that they introduce the necessary levels of control to avoid volatility.

    — There was an idea to increase fines for manipulation, what stage is it at now?

    — We are currently discussing with law enforcement agencies the possibility of toughening the punishment. In our opinion, it should be proportional to the scale of the damage caused. Today, the minimum fine for individuals is often insignificant compared to the “earnings” received — 3,000 rubles. Articles of the Criminal Code begin to be applied when damage is caused in the amount of 3.75 million rubles. That is, the fines are small, but criminal liability occurs very quickly. We believe that it is necessary, first of all, to toughen administrative punishment.

    In particular, we propose to provide for a fine that is a multiple of the amount of illegally obtained income in the process of manipulation – from 3 to 5 times. At the same time, we advocate increasing the minimum fine – up to 10 thousand for individuals, up to 100 thousand for officials and up to 1 million rubles for companies.

    In addition, we believe it is necessary to increase the limitation period for bringing to administrative responsibility, as well as to introduce the concept of a lower threshold of turnover for transactions, up to which administrative punishment is not applied. Now we must bring to responsibility for any identified fact. However, according to our estimates, transactions of up to 1 million rubles are not capable of significantly affecting fair pricing on the market. And such violations do not need to be brought to “administrative” responsibility; it is quite sufficient for the broker to warn his client that this should not be done. The introduction of such a threshold will allow us to focus our attention on more serious cases that cause more significant harm to the interests of investors on the exchange.

    As for criminal liability, in our opinion, it is necessary to increase the minimum threshold of damage for its occurrence. But at the same time, provide for confiscation of property as an additional measure of influence. At the same time, we believe that it is possible to exempt from criminal liability those who committed a crime for the first time and compensated for the damage.

    It must be said that we want to transfer many procedures for minor violations to the broker’s side.

    We have already greatly simplified the operational procedures for exchanging information with the exchange and professional participants when they inform us of any abnormal things. Traditionally, the model for combating insider trading and manipulation was, as we say, “central bank-centric”, that is, the Bank of Russia was the main link in collecting information from exchanges, issuers, and professional participants. We considered complaints and appeals from financial market participants, qualified violations, punished, and so on. Now we have managed to simplify interaction with other market participants and standardize our actions.

    We assume that each participant in the system – trade organizers, brokers, issuers – can share this responsibility.

    — You recently published information about a deal between an individual and a regulator. What was the agreement?

    — This is the first case since such a rule has been in force in the law. For ethical reasons, we do not disclose information about the person who has agreed to an agreement with us. But how does this work in principle?

    The essence of the deal is that the culprit repents of his actions and agrees to assist in the investigation of the manipulation case. In return, the charges against him are dropped, he retains his business reputation and can continue to work in the financial market.

    It should be noted that this is not possible in all cases. The Bank of Russia, before entering into a deal, must take into account the severity of the committed act, its social danger.

    Then we assess how the conditions that the person who has embarked on the path of correction is willing to accept in order to remove the charges against themselves are proportionate to the damage caused. This may be an agreement to undergo additional training on the topic of counteracting insider trading and manipulation, restrictions on trading with certain instruments or for a certain period of time. Providing information about other facts of manipulation may also be a condition of the deal.

    The agreement is considered fulfilled if the individual has documented compliance with the terms within 6 months. Otherwise, the procedure for bringing him to administrative responsibility will continue.

    — Has the insider problem gotten worse?

    — Yes, this problem has become more acute than before. Firstly, because the market has become more active, more players have appeared on it, and secondly, issuers have the right not to disclose some information. And here information asymmetry appears, when a limited group of people gets access to information that will never become public. And they can use this information to make a profit on the stock market. We must not allow tolerance to develop for the fact that someone has access to information earlier than others.

    We distinguish two types of insider information: trading, when an investor has learned information directly about the nature of planned trading operations on the stock exchange. And corporate, when an insider makes illegal transactions based on information from the issuer, such as the size of dividends.

    Both of these need to be addressed. We have analyzed a number of cases and have come to the following conclusion. It is necessary to introduce prohibitive periods when insiders are prohibited from making transactions with securities, and it is also necessary to expand the list of insider positions and require issuers to work with them more.

    Issuers need to gradually but actively form a culture: train insider employees, conduct checks on the facts of publication of insider information, including in messengers, before its official disclosure.

    Everyone should understand that insider trading is not allowed and will not go unpunished. We have now begun to actively conduct checks on the largest issuers for compliance with the legislation on combating insider trading. This is, of course, a more complex story in terms of proof.

    Therefore, we hope for a certain synergy due to the fact that the interests of the regulator, issuers, and professional market participants coincide here. Many companies are already turning to us for help, asking us to explain how to work with inside information.

    — There were plans to launch an insider index. How is this work progressing? How much will it help?

    — Yes, we worked with the Moscow Exchange on the possibility of introducing an aggregated indicator for transactions made by insiders. Obviously, without specifying the personalities and details of the transactions. The exchange is currently preparing a methodology for calculating the index. In our opinion, the introduction of such a tool will certainly provide additional transparency to the market. But unfortunately, I am not sure that this will be a panacea.

    — Does everything you listed eliminate the need to think about some kind of regulation of the “Telegram” environment? If conditions are created that prevent manipulation, including from Telegram channels, let them do what they think is necessary, or is some kind of approach to them still necessary?

    — Any source of information, from an insider point of view, is an object of attention for us, Telegram in this sense is just one of them. Recently, more attention has been paid to it, and we monitor this environment in the same way as other sources of information. Another issue is that Telegram channels and financial bloggers are really turning into an independent way of promoting products, in fact, they are engaged in hidden advertising. We see that bloggers often advise their subscribers to buy this or that financial product or use the services of a certain company. And people do not know whether this advice is the blogger’s personal opinion or “custom” information.

    We have a letter ready for professional participants who attract bloggers (financial influencers) to promote their services, where we recommend that they disclose information about such advertising on their websites and mobile applications. Also, the performer, that is, the blogger, in turn, must mark the material – indicate who is its customer. It is important for us that the information is presented correctly and does not create false investment expectations.

    — In July, NAUFOR proposed discussing the rejection of the central depository institution as a counter-sanction measure. What does the Central Bank think about this? Is there any life in this idea?

    — I consider this idea to be extremely harmful. Its authors argue that abandoning the central depository will protect against sanctions. But as practice shows, it is impossible to predict where the restrictions will come from next time. From our point of view, this infrastructure solution has proven its usefulness. Centralization of accounting ensured a “single chain” of interaction between registrars and depositories and simplified the payment of dividends from public companies.

    Now the issuer transfers funds to the central depository, which in turn transfers them to its clients – depositories, and thus the funds cascade to the end investor. And with decentralized accounting, the issuer is forced to interact with each nominal holder in the register.

    The centralized model of the accounting system allows market participants to work in uniform formats and minimize their operational risks. The National Settlement Depository has also become the central source of information on securities and corporate actions. And it is this institution that largely helps restore the rights of Russian investors after the introduction of restrictions by unfriendly states.

    In addition, it was precisely due to the centralization of securities accounting that it became possible to develop a technology that would simplify the client’s path when moving from one broker to another.

    To abandon such a system, from my point of view, is in a sense to shoot yourself in the foot.

    — In the spring, a discussion was launched on disintermediation, the Bank of Russia even issued a consultative report on this topic. Now the idea of a world without brokers, that is, with one super-broker in the form of the Moscow Exchange, is it closed or not yet? On the other hand, will the Central Bank think in the direction of limiting internalization, so as not to deprive the exchanges of part of their business? Where is the balance here?

    — We are close to completing this discussion. We are inclined to believe that disintermediation in the form in which it may now take shape will cause quite serious damage to the market as a whole, leading to its certain fragmentation. And ultimately, the processes that connect investors and issuers, on the contrary, will be complicated, will become more expensive and less accessible. Therefore, at the moment, we are inclined to believe that we should not go this way.

    At the same time, we have once again carefully assessed the practice of internalization and see that there are a number of significant negative factors here too. As a rule, the investor does not understand that he is making a deal not at an organized trade. And this affects the status of the deal itself, which may not be in favor of the broker in the event of litigation. The investor, at a minimum, should be informed that he is making an over-the-counter transaction and have the opportunity to choose where he wants to make it in order to avoid unnecessary risks.

    The second is the volume of transactions. In the practices that we see, the rule of best execution is observed, the price, albeit very slightly, is better than the quotes on the exchange. But then the question arises, where is the correct price. Because if the volume of transactions taking place within the broker is several times greater than that by which the price is formed, it can be very conditionally said that the price that was formed on the exchange is really adequate. Therefore, the volume of transactions within brokers should be limited. We are currently thinking through the parameters.

    — Another question for the doubling of our stock market. Now the rates are high, and the stock market, probably, is not so easy to withstand the competition for money. This year, what dynamics do you see with dividend payments that come to investors — are they reinvested for the most part or are they still withdrawn from the market and go to the banking system?

    — RUB 3.2 trillion in dividends have already been paid. We have not recorded a significant flow into the banking sector. In retail, we see that this money was overwhelmingly reinvested, just not always in shares. According to the Bank of Russia, part of the funds were directed by investors into stock market instruments: as a rule, these are money market funds, which is associated with higher expected returns against the backdrop of tightening monetary policy and low market risks. In addition, according to our estimates, no more than 10% of private investors’ funds in the second quarter of 2024 “flowed” from shares to OFZs, corporate bonds and mutual funds. The sources of net purchases of bonds and mutual funds by private investors were mainly “new” money – potentially, this could be “flows” from deposits and current accounts of individuals, as well as reinvestment of funds received from the redemption of bonds and dividend payments.

    — Is the launch of new instruments for retail investors being discussed — linked to cryptocurrencies, some kind of settlement futures?

    — No, our attitude towards cryptocurrency has not changed from an investment point of view.

    — We have not had exchange trading in dollars and euros for more than four months. For other jurisdictions, this is generally a familiar picture, but for us, it is new. Over the past time, have you seen any risks of non-market nature of exchange rate formation? Can we say that from the point of view of transparency of this process, its quality, the market has not lost anything, or does something still need to be fine-tuned?

    — Just so that everyone understands how the dollar and euro rates are set after the end of exchange trading, we have published the methodology for calculating these rates on our website. That is, we have made this process transparent, and it is absolutely not arbitrary. We use an approach similar to that used when calculating rates based on exchange trading, that is, we determine the average weighted rate by volume.

    In order to bring the calculation conditions closer to the stock market and exclude various anomalies, we have incorporated algorithms for cutting off atypical values into the methodology. We take the data for the calculation from bank statements.

    The ability to set a rate at will that differs from the conditions prevailing on the over-the-counter market is excluded.

    — This year, the threshold for mandatory sale of foreign currency earnings by exporters was lowered twice, and for a short period of time. Is it possible to move further in this direction or has the minimum required for financial stability already been reached?

    — We support the decisions taken to lower the threshold and increase the terms for crediting revenue. This facilitates cross-border payments and reduces the burden on exporters. We will continue to observe. But we do not make such decisions. This is the government’s competence.

    — How do you see the development of the digital financial assets market? In what prospects is the emergence of a secondary market possible, and is it needed at all?

    — DFA is a young instrument. It was formed in a certain arbitration environment — in DFA it was possible to do things that were not possible in classical instruments, and vice versa, DFA has some of its own limitations. Now we are talking about how we can evaluate the results of such a spontaneous experiment in terms of arbitrations, and perhaps soften something in the classical market, perhaps tighten it in the digital asset market. For now, we are discussing the problems and looking towards eliminating the current unequal conditions.

    As for the development prospects. In my understanding, it is not so much the “a la glass” treatment itself with some gigantic trading volumes that is important, but the fact that today we have each platform locked in itself, and investors have no opportunity to go beyond it. Therefore, we need to look for a solution to make these transitions possible. What it will be in the end, I cannot say yet, but by the end of the year we plan to decide on the concept.

    One of the options for the development of the secondary market could be digital certificates, which will allow the organization of the circulation of digital financial assets on the stock exchange.

    — Recently, a presidential decree was issued on the accounting of shares on type “C” accounts and a decision of the board of directors of the Central Bank in its development. Why was this necessary?

    — We are introducing additional protection of the market from attempts to circumvent anti-sanction regulation. I am talking about practices when citizens or companies buy Russian assets from “enemies” very cheaply abroad, and then sell them here at auctions. In simple terms, they create an overhang. So, the decree makes it possible to separate this overhang from the auctions.

    – But now it’s also impossible to transfer from accounts “C” without permission…

    — Yes, there is a regime for separating Russian securities in the accounting chains of which there is a hostile investor. At the same time, conditions were created for bona fide purchasers so that they could exit the assets. But all our concessions were the subject of creative ideas in order to obtain a higher marginality from transactions with Russian assets. Why is this bad? Firstly, this is a certain reduction in the “C-mass”, that is, this is a weakening of the countermeasure. And secondly, this hits honest investors who came, believed in our market, invest something, try to earn.

    Therefore, it was decided that now shares of Russian issuers, including international companies, can be transferred to a trading account from personal account “C” only by decision of the government commission.

    — Was the scale of the problem significant enough to require a presidential decree?

    — No. We responded in a timely manner (to attempts to circumvent restrictions — IF). But this game of “cat and mouse” simply shows that the demand is high, and drastic measures need to be taken to free us from constantly catching someone red-handed. And we need to protect our investors, because they are promised that everything will work out, and then it doesn’t work out, and they end up with losses. Now, from our point of view, a barrier has appeared that cannot be overcome. At least, I have not yet been able to come up with options and schemes. But I will emphasize once again that we have not recorded significant volumes that would somehow “spill” through circumventing restrictions. What we have found are isolated cases or even attempts.

    — Why is this measure being introduced temporarily, only until the end of 2025?

    — During this time, we want to provide additional protection mechanisms. They just require painstaking development.

    — At a recent discussion of the draft of the main directions of development of the financial market, the reform of microfinance organizations was almost the hottest topic. If we listen to representatives of the industry, your proposals will put an end to it. Do you counter?

    — Now the MFI market is a cauldron in which many different things are brewed, but everything that is there is considered a microfinance organization. And it is often said: “Let’s ban all this.” In fact, the market is diverse, it consists of three parts.

    The first are companies that focus on financing small businesses and have nothing to do with the practices that are troubling everyone.

    The second group are companies that provide installment services. Their rates are actually comparable to bank consumer loans. Also a normal product, has a right to exist.

    And the third piece, which worries everyone the most, is “payday loans”. Regulation here has been tightened many times. For example, loans secured by property were banned, so that there would be no stories of people being forced into bondage, or having their apartment taken away. Maximum overpayments and interest rates were systematically reduced. But there are practices that allow one to bypass restrictions on overpayments through hidden refinancing, when a new loan is issued to a client and previously accrued interest is included in its body. A chain of loans is formed, a kind of rolling, the debt grows. There are about a third of such loans on the market.

    We conducted research and found out where people spend the money they borrow “until payday.” There are categories that spend it on betting, sports games – this is a rather alarming story for us. Up to 20% of the amount of loans issued is spent on these purposes. That is, the problem is acquiring a social character.

    We plan to introduce regulations that will stop such rolling. This is the restriction of “one loan per hand until repayment” for the most expensive loans. The second regulation is the introduction of a cooling-off period between repayment of one loan and receipt of another.

    We have completed the discussion of the report, met with the market, State Duma deputies, received more than 100 questions and proposals. Some points are debatable, they may still move. But as far as fundamental things are concerned, we remain on our positions and intend to implement measures to protect borrowers as quickly as possible.

    Interfax

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    http://vvv.kbr.ru/press/event/?id=21108

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 14:59 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A0ZYFB8 (KrasYarKr14) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    14:59

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 10/22/2024, 14:59 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 104.9) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 548.58 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 7.5%) of the RU000A0ZYFB8 (KrasYarKr14) security were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74193

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 12:50 (Moscow time) the values of the upper limit of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the RU000A1009L8 security (RZhD 1P-15R) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    12:50

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/22/2024, 12:50 (Moscow time), the values of the upper limit of the price corridor (up to 91.32) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 965.03 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 18.0%) of the security RU000A1009L8 (RZhD 1P-15R) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74191

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow scientists have assessed diagnostic accuracy indicators for Russian and international artificial intelligence services

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine

    Moscow scientists have assessed the diagnostic accuracy of various artificial intelligence (AI) services for radiology. The recent study evaluated five AI algorithms, including three developed in Russia and two from India and South Korea. The study found that the Russian AI service demonstrated the highest accuracy in detecting pulmonary nodules, outperforming its foreign counterparts. Research results were published in the Chinese Journal of Quantitative Imaging in Medicine and Surgery.

    Yuri Vasiliev, CEO of the Diagnostics and Telemedicine Center of the Moscow City Health Department, noted the importance of this achievement. “In a recent study involving Russian and foreign artificial intelligence (AI) services, our own AI solution demonstrated the highest accuracy in detecting lung nodules, ahead of similar solutions from India and South Korea. This achievement is a significant advance in our efforts to improve the quality of medical care.” Currently, radiologists use more than 50 AI services to interpret medical images, and in Moscow, more than 13 million studies have been analyzed using neural networks. The growing AI services market is constantly evolving with solutions that optimize the workload of medical workers while maintaining high standards of work,” Vasiliev said.

    “We aim to provide doctors with tools that will not only make their work easier, but also improve the overall quality of medical care. To do this, we have developed a maturity matrix – a comprehensive tool designed to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of various artificial intelligence services. Since the end of 2022, our AI service has consistently occupied a leading position in the field of chest X-ray,” said Yuri Vasiliev.

    The AI service, designed for automatic analysis of chest X-rays, currently identifies 14 signs of various pathologies. In addition, it calculates the cardiothoracic ratio and forms a comprehensive X-ray report.

    “We have prepared a unique data set consisting of 100 radiographs, including 50 with confirmed pulmonary nodules and 50 without pulmonary nodules. Of these, 25 cases were found to have nodules that were initially questioned by radiologists, but were confirmed using computed tomography. At the same time, the presence of pulmonary nodules in all 50 studies was confirmed by computed tomography,” explained Kirill Arzamasov, head of the Department of Medical Informatics, Radiomics and Radiogenomics at the Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine.

    “The evaluation of AI services was carried out in three stages, at each stage the results were compared with the reference standard confirmed by CT studies. The results showed that the Russian AI service outperforms international analogues in all indicators of diagnostic accuracy.” The dataset is open source access on the website, which allows developers to independently assess the quality of AI services,” said Kirill Arzamasov, head of the Department of Medical Informatics, Radiomics and Radiogenomics at the Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine of the Moscow Department of Healthcare.

    This study is part of a larger experiment to introduce computer vision technologies into the Moscow healthcare system, which will start in 2020. With the support of the Moscow Social Development Complex and the Department of Information Technology, the project aims to promote innovation in the field of artificial intelligence, in particular by supporting developers.

    The Diagnostics and Telemedicine Center, established in 1996, plays a leading role in the implementation of AI technologies in medicine in Russia. Its activities are aimed at the development of AI in medicine, the development of diagnostic images, the management of medical units, research and training of medical workers.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Two deposit auctions of JSC “KAVKAZ.RF” will be held on 10/22/2024

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters:

    The date of the deposit auction is 22.10.2024. The placement currency is RUB. The maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) is 200,000,000.00. The placement period, days is 15. The date of depositing funds is 23.10.2024. The date of return of funds is 07.11.2024. The minimum placement interest rate, % per annum is 21.50. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). The minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) is 200,000,000.00. The maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open). The basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 12:00 to 12:10. Applications in competition mode from 12:10 to 12:15. Setting a cut-off percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 12:25.

    Additional terms

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    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74190

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On October 25 at 15:00 a press conference will be held on the results of the meeting of the Board of Directors on monetary policy

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    The event will be attended by the Chairman of the Bank of Russia Elvira Nabiullina and the Deputy Chairman of the Bank of Russia Alexey Zabotkin.

    Elvira Nabiullina will make a statement on monetary policy and the medium-term forecast of the Bank of Russia.

    The press conference will be held at the Bank of Russia press center. The broadcast of the speech will be available on our website, channel inTelegram, as well as on the official page inVKontakte.

    Accreditation for journalists runs until 17:00 on October 23 at the address media@kbr.ru.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    http://vvv.kbr.ru/press/event/?id=21107

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 10-18 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A100Z91 (GTLK 1P-15) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    10:18

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/22/2024, 10-18 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 86.01) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 163.57 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 13.5%) of the security RU000A100Z91 (GTLK 1P-15) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74182

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen, Collins Call on Navy to Reconsider Civilian Workforce Classification Review, Protect Employee Pay and Benefits at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen
    (Washington, DC) – U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and Co-Chair of the U.S. Senate Navy Caucus, and Susan Collins (R-ME) sent a bipartisan letter to the U.S. Department of the Navy urging it to reconsider the Office of Civilian Human Resources’ (OCHR) decision to review and modify civilian workforce position classifications across four public shipyards, including Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. In their letter to Secretary Carlos Del Toro and Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Senators note that the review could result in civilian employees losing pay and benefits as well as negatively impact efforts to eliminate submarine maintenance backlogs.
    The Senators wrote, in part: “Should OCHR’s review result in position description demotions and salary decreases for a significant population of technical professionals, it would cripple efforts to staff and support the needs of the Navy.  We, therefore, ask for your support in protecting our shipyard employees by reconsidering OCHR’s directive and by engaging with OPM to find a position that both maintains the integrity of the Federal and Department of Navy Classification Programs while protecting the wages and benefits of our valued workforce.”
    They concluded: “Today’s security environment requires the United States to have a combat-credible undersea fleet to maintain a competitive edge over our adversaries.  The overwhelming production capacity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia’s steady production progress toward fifth generation submarines, and growing cooperation between these authoritarian regimes will create additional demands on the U.S. submarine force.  Meanwhile, the U.S. submarine industrial base continues to face maintenance shortfalls at our four public shipyards that affect the Navy’s ability to get boats back into the fleet on time.  Reducing these maintenance backlogs is contingent on a robust, well-trained shipyard workforce.”
    The full text of the letter can be found here.
    As a co-chair of the U.S. Senate Navy Caucus and a senior member of both the U.S. Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee and U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Shaheen is New Hampshire’s strongest advocate for the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Navy shipbuilding programs. In the Senate-passed Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, Shaheen secured funding for the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), including the funding needed to complete dry dock projects at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The bill also includes $795 million for the SIOP above the President’s Budget, which will help to increase submarine maintenance availability at Portsmouth and across the country. Shaheen has a long legacy of supporting investments to increase maintenance capacity at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    Additionally, In the FY 2025 government funding bills, Shaheen and Collins worked to include a $9.5 million Congressionally Directed Spending add for a new parking structure at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard—which will contribute to quality of life for Shipyard’s workforce.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Scientists in Moscow conducted an assessment of the diagnostic accuracy metrics for both Russian and International AI services

    Source: Center of Diagnostics and Telemedicine

    Moscow scientists have assessed the diagnostic accuracy of various artificial intelligence (AI) services for radiology. In a recent study, five AI algorithms were evaluated, including three developed in Russia and two from India and South Korea. The study revealed that the Russian AI service demonstrated the highest accuracy in detecting pulmonary nodules, outperforming its foreign counterparts. The results were published in the Chinese journal “Quantitative Imaging in Medicine and Surgery.”

    Yuri Vasiliev, CEO of the Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine of the Moscow City Health Department, highlighted the importance of this achievement. “In a recent study involving both Russian and international artificial intelligence (AI) services, our in-house AI solution demonstrated the highest accuracy in identifying lung nodules, outperforming similar solutions from India and South Korea. This achievement marks a significant advancement in our efforts to enhance medical care quality. Radiologists currently utilize over 50 AI services to interpret medical image studies, and more than 13 million studies in Moscow have been analyzed using neural networks. The growing market for AI services is continuously introducing solutions that streamline the workload of healthcare professionals while maintaining high standards of performance.” said Vasiliev.

    “We aim to provide physicians with tools that not only facilitate their work but also enhance the overall quality of medical care. To achieve this, we have developed a maturity matrix—a comprehensive tool designed to assess and benchmark the performance of various AI services. Since the end of 2022, our AI service has consistently ranked as a leader in the field of chest organ radiography,” as stated by Yuri Vasilev.

    The AI service, designed for the automatic analysis of chest X-rays, currently identifies 14 signs of various pathologies. Additionally, it calculates the cardiothoracic ratio and generates a comprehensive radiology report.

    “We prepared a unique dataset consisting of 100 X-ray studies, including 50 with confirmed pulmonary nodules and 50 without pulmonary nodules. Of those, 25 cases involved nodules that were initially doubted by radiologists, but confirmed by CT scans. However, the presence of pulmonary nodules in all 50 studies was confirmed by CT scans,” explained Kirill Arzamasov, Head of the Department of Health Informatics, Radiomics, and Radiogenomics at the Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine.

    “The evaluation of AI services was conducted in three stages, with results at each stage compared against a reference standard confirmed by CT studies. The findings demonstrated that the Russian AI service outperformed its international counterparts across all diagnostic accuracy metrics. The dataset is publicly accessible on the website, allowing developers to independently assess the quality of AI services,” said Kirill Arzamasov, Head of the Department of Health Informatics, Radiomics, and Radiogenomics at the Center for Diagnostics and Telemedicine, Moscow Healthcare Department.”

    This study is part of a broader experiment launched in 2020 to integrate computer vision technologies into Moscow’s healthcare system. Supported by the Moscow Social Development Complex and the Department of Information Technologies, the project is designed to foster innovation in AI, particularly by supporting developers.

    The Diagnostics and Telemedicine Centre, established in 1996, plays a leading role in introducing AI technology to medicine in Russia. It focuses on advancing AI in medicine, developing diagnostic imaging, management of medical departments, conducting research, and the training of healthcare professionals.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 10:08 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the security RU000A100Z91 (GTLK 1P-15) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    10:08

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/22/2024, 10:08 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 88.13) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 167.82 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 11.25%) of the security RU000A100Z91 (GTLK 1P-15) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74180

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi calls on China, Russia to maintain global strategic stability, uphold int’l justice

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xi calls on China, Russia to maintain global strategic stability, uphold int’l justice

    KAZAN, Russia, Oct. 22 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday urged China and Russia to deepen comprehensive strategic coordination, jointly maintain global strategic stability and uphold international fairness and justice.

    Xi made the remarks in his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    Next year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War, he noted.

    China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council and major countries in the world, should strengthen communication and coordination within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, promote a correct view of World War II history, and firmly uphold the UN-centered international system, he said.

    In response, Putin said Russia is ready to continue to maintain close high-level exchanges and strategic communication and coordination with China in international affairs, and jointly safeguard international fairness, justice and global strategic stability.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Laos always at forefront of building community with shared future, says Xi

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China, Laos always at forefront of building community with shared future, says Xi

    KAZAN, Russia, Oct. 22 — Chinese President Xi Jinping said Tuesday that relations with Laos are of special importance in China’s neighborhood diplomacy, and the two countries have always stayed at the forefront of building a community with a shared future.

    Xi made the remarks when meeting Thongloun Sisoulith, general secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Central Committee and Lao president. The Chinese president arrived in Kazan earlier in the day for the 16th BRICS Summit.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi urges China, Laos to forge model for BRI cooperation

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KAZAN, Russia, Oct. 22 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday called on China and Laos to forge a model for Belt and Road cooperation.

    The two sides should continue to strengthen the development of the China-Laos Railway and promote the construction of the China-Laos Economic Corridor, Xi said when meeting Thongloun Sisoulith, general secretary of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party Central Committee and Lao president.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi says China, Russia find right way for neighboring major countries to get along with each other

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xi says China, Russia find right way for neighboring major countries to get along with each other

    KAZAN, Russia, Oct. 22 — Chinese President Xi Jinping said Tuesday that China and Russia have found the right way for neighboring major countries to get along with each other which features non-alliance, non-confrontation and not targeting any third party.

    In his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Xi said China-Russia relations have come a long way, and made a series of pioneering achievements.

    Xi expressed his great delight in coming to the ancient Russian city of Kazan to attend the 16th BRICS Summit at the invitation of Putin, adding that this is the third meeting between them this year.

    Around 400 years ago, the Great Tea Road that connected the two countries went past Kazan, through which tea leaves from China’s Wuyi Mountain region found their way into many Russian households, Xi said.

    Noting that earlier this month, he and Putin exchanged congratulatory messages on the 75th anniversary of China-Russia diplomatic relations, Xi said that in the new era, he and Putin have always paid great attention to and steadily steered the direction of China-Russia relations.

    The two sides have acted in the spirit of lasting good-neighborliness and friendship, comprehensive strategic coordination, and mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation, and kept deepening and expanding bilateral comprehensive strategic coordination and all-round, practical cooperation, which has injected strong impetus into the development, revitalization and modernization of the two countries, and contributed significantly to enhancing the well-being of the people of China and Russia and to safeguarding international fairness and justice, he said.

    Noting that the world today is facing momentous transformations unseen in a century, resulting in a fast-changing and turbulent international landscape, Xi expressed confidence that the profound and lasting friendship between China and Russia will not change, nor will their sense of responsibility as major countries for the world and for the people.

    The BRICS mechanism is the world’s most important platform for solidarity and cooperation between emerging markets and developing countries, Xi said, noting the mechanism is a pillar for realizing an equal and orderly multi-polar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.

    Xi said the upcoming BRICS Summit will be the first summit after last year’s expansion and carry great significance for the advancement of greater BRICS cooperation, adding that China highly commends Russia’s great efforts as BRICS chair.

    Xi voiced expectation of having in-depth discussions with Putin and other participating leaders on the future development of the BRICS mechanism to build consensus among the parties, send a positive message of solidarity and cooperation, and advance strategic coordination and practical cooperation between BRICS countries in various fields, so as to secure more opportunities for the Global South and make an even greater contribution to building a community with a shared future for mankind.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi says BRICS cooperation mechanism is pillar force for world multipolarization, economic globalization

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xi says BRICS cooperation mechanism is pillar force for world multipolarization, economic globalization

    KAZAN, Russia, Oct. 22 — Chinese President Xi Jinping said Tuesday that the BRICS cooperation mechanism is a pillar force in promoting equitable and orderly multipolarization of the world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization.

    Xi made the remarks in his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Chinese president arrived in Kazan earlier in the day for the 16th BRICS Summit.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by Vice President Harris and Liz Cheney at a Campaign Event | Royal Oak,  MI

    Source: The White House

    Royal Oak Music Theatre
    Royal Oak, Michigan

    4:31 P.M. EDT

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  Here we go.  Sit back.  We’ve got 40 — 40 minutes, and we’re going to move quick.  Okay?

    So, I want this to be like a kitchen table.  Like, just think that we’re sitting around the kitchen table and we’re jamming about all kinds of stuff.  That’s the feeling I want to have at this —

         MS. CHENEY:  This is like a Kennedy family kitchen table.

         MS. SHRIVER:  It — yeah.  (Laughter.)

         MS. CHENEY:  Most people don’t have this many, you know?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  That’s good.  That’s good.

    MS. SHRIVER:  That’s right.  It’s raucous.  It’s — it’s hot, but it’s fun.  That’s what it’s going to be like. 

    So, this is — I was saying before both of you walked out, this is historic — so I hope everybody takes this in for a minute — to have a leader of the Republican Party and the vice president of the United States.  (Applause.) 

    So, let me begin with you, Madam Vice President.  Did you ever think in your wildest dreams that you would be running for president alongside Liz Cheney, who would be advocating for you, campaigning for you — a member of a opposing party putting herself on the line for you?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  So, let me just start by thanking everyone.  Thank you all for taking time out of your busy lives to be here and have this conversation. 

    And I think we are all here together because we have many things in common.  First and foremost, we love our country.  We love our country.  (Applause.) 

    You know, so, Maria, perhaps not, but — (laughter).

    MS. SHRIVER:  Perhaps.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT: Perhaps not. 

    But let me say this.  So, you mentioned, you know, my background.  So, I started my career as a prosecutor, and most of my career has been spent outside of Washington, D.C., not in Washington, D.C.  And for most of my career, let me just tell you, I never once asked a victim of crime, a witness, “Are you a Democrat, or are you a Republican?”  Never.  It never would have even occurred to me to ask that.  What I did ask everyone: “Are you okay?” 

    And when I think, then, about what is at stake in this election, I think that’s the biggest question.  And it is a moment where, born out of our love of our country, born out of, for me, having taken the oath of office to the Constitution of the United ta- — States at least six times, I believe what is at stake in this election is so fundamental for us as Americans.  And it is about: Do we take seriously the importance of a president who obeys the oath to be loyal to the Constitution of the United States?  Do we prioritize a president of the United States who cares about rule of law, much less the spirit with which they approach this most powerful position? 

    There’s so much about this last era — when I talk about “turn the page,” that’s what I’m referring to, like the last decade — that has been about some powerful forces suggesting that the measure of the strength of a leader is based on who you beat down instead of what I think most of us believe, regardless of your party affiliation, that the real measure of the strength of a leader is based on who you lift up.

    And — (applause) — and so, for that reason, I’m not surprised that Liz Cheney and I are on the same stage 15 days before the election.  (Applause.)  You know?

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  Well, maybe you’re not surprised, but I’m surprised.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughs.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  And I think a lot of people are surprised.  So, I want to know: Are you surprised?  Are you surprised that you’re out here campaigning for a Democrat, campaigning for Kamala Harris, against the party that you’ve been a part of your entire life?

    MS. CHENEY:  You know, what I would say, first of all, is we all know — everyone who watched January 6th knows, you know, what Donald Trump is willing to do.  He lost the election, he tried to overturn it and seize power, and then he sat in his dining room and he watched the attack on television.  He watched it.  People pleaded with him to tell the mob to leave, and he wouldn’t.  And he watched law enforcement officers be brutally beaten.  He watched it. 

    That’s a depravity that, to me and — and, you know, I think to anyone who’s taken the oath of office, makes someone absolutely unfit ever to be president again.

    Now — (applause) — I — I could have just said, you know, I’m going to do everything I can to work against Donald Trump, and there are a lot of Republicans who have said that.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yes.

    MS. CHENEY:  I have decided — and I am very proud and I’m honored to have made the decision — to endorse Vice President Harris.  (Applause.) 

    And — and I have gotten to spend time with Vice President Harris.  I have had the chance to talk with her about how important it is that we have two strong parties in our country, about the kind of president that I know she’ll be. 

    And I think all of us — it doesn’t matter what party you’re in — we all know this is a good and an honorable and a great nation, and we have to have leaders — you might say, “I’m not going to agree on every issue” — but we have to have leaders who take that seriously.  We have to have leaders who are going to be sincere. 

    And — and as a mother, I want my children to know that there is someone sitting in the Oval Office that they can look up to, someone who can be a role model.  And I’m incredibly proud and I know that Vice President Harris will be that.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  Right.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And — and, Maria, let me just add one thing also, because it bears repeating.  I have seen a lot of Republicans go up to Liz Cheney and thank her.  And they may not be doing it publicly — they may not be doing it publicly, because I think she has shown, to your point, extraordinary courage, especially in this environment, post January 6th, where there’s something — an undercurrent that is violent in terms of the language and the tenor. 

    And for her to show the courage she has shown is extraordinary.  But she’s — I’ve seen Republicans come up to her and — and I — from my vantage point, she’s actually not alone.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  And so, I want to talk about that, because there are a lot of people who are scared.  Scared to vote —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  — for you.  Scared about the environment.  Scared to talk about politics. 

    How scary was it for you, personally, to make this decision?  What has been the personal cost for you to do so?

    MS. CHENEY:  It — it was not — it wasn’t scary at all, in terms of making this decision, because when I look at the — the nature of the threat that Donald Trump poses and — and, look, Donald Trump is doing everything he can to try to get people to forget about what he did — what he did on January 6th. 

    And — and when you think about that level of instability, the level of erratic decision-making, the misogyny, that’s not someone that you can entrust with the power of the Oval Office. 

    And so, I — I think that we are facing a — a choice in this election.  It’s not about party; it’s about right and wrong. 

    And — and I certainly have many Republicans who will say to me, “I can’t be public.”  They do worry about a whole range of things —

    MS. SHRIVER:  Right.

    MS. CHENEY:  — including violence.  But — but they’ll do the right thing. 

    And I would just remind people: If you’re at all concerned, you can vote your conscience and not ever have to say a word to anybody.  (Applause.)  And there will be millions of Republicans who do that on November 5th — vote for Vice President Harris.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yes.

    I — I love that you said you weren’t scared at all, because most people will talk today about “I’m afraid to say anything on social media.”  “I’m afraid to speak in my place of worship.”  “I’m aprai- — afraid to speak where I work.”  “I’m afraid.” 

    How are you not afraid?

    MS. CHENEY:  Well, I think that — that the point you’re making is a really important one.  Think about what’s happened in our country, the level of vicious, vitriolic attack. 

    You know, when — when Donald Trump says that his political opponents are the enemy within and when he contemplates deploying force against them, the response that we all have should not be to be so afraid we don’t act.  It should be: Vote him out.  Defeat him.  Defeat him.  Vote for Vice President Harris.  (Applause.)

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And, Maria, I’m going to add to that.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I — I would add to that an additional point, which is — and don’t think it’s a sick sense of humor and relegate it to simply being that.  You know, I’ve said many times, I do believe Donald Trump to be an unserious man, but the consequences of him ever being in the White House again are brutally serious.

    And — and take it from the people who know him best: his former chief of staff when he was president; two former Defense secretaries; his national security advisor; and, of course, his vice president, who have all in one way or another used the word that he is “unfit” to be president again and is dangerous. 

    Listen to the report that — what his former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a general, said about him: that he is “fascist to the core.” 

    And these are people who were in his administration, who worked closely with him in the Oval Office and the Situation Room. 

    And so, I would caution us also — you know, because some people find it humorous what he says and — and think it’s just silly.  But understand how brutally serious it is.

    AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Lock him up!

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Well, the courts will take care of that.  We’ll take care of November, yes.  (Applause.)  (Laughs.)  We’ll take care of November. 

    But it is brutally serious, because to — to the congresswoman’s point, anyone has — who has openly said, as he has, that he would terminate the Constitution of the United States should never again stand behind the seal of the president of the United States — never again.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  So, Madam Vice President, I wanted to ask you — several people that I talked to in preparation for this — when I asked them, they said, “Well, I — I want to vote for the vice president, but I just don’t feel like I know her.  I don’t know enough about her.  I see the ads, but I don’t have a feel for her.”  What are three things you can tell this audience about you that aren’t in your ads, that people aren’t telling people on the robocalls, that perhaps they just wouldn’t know that might give them a feeling for who you are as a woman?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  How much time do we have?  (Laughter.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  We’re at the kitchen table. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I — I have lived a full life.  (Laughter.)

    I am a wife.  I am a mother.  I am a sister.  I am a godmother.  I love to cook. 

    I started my career as a prosecutor, in large part — there are many reasons but one very fundamental is, when I was young, one of my best friends in high school, I learned, was being molested by her stepfather.  And I told her, when I learned, she had to come live with us.  I talked to my mother about it.  “Of course, she has to come live with us,” and she did.  And I decided I wanted to take on a career and a life that was about protecting the most vulnerable. 

    I served as attorney general of California two terms.  I was the — the top law enforcement officer of the biggest state in the country.  And doing that work, it included prosecuting transnational criminal organizations for the trafficking of guns, drugs, and human beings.  I did the work of taking on the big banks during the foreclosure crisis and delivered $20 billion for homeowners who had been targeted with predatory lending practices.  (Applause.)  I took on the big pharmaceutical companies on behalf of consumers.

    As vice president of the United States, my priorities have been many, including, to your point, the work that you and I have done over the years focusing on women’s health.  One of my priorities is — has been maternal mortality. 

    But I — I have only had one client in my career: the people.  And my belief is that there is great nobility in public service if one understands that they hold the office in the public trust.  It is not about personal power.  It is about what you can do that lifts up the condition of people. 

    And there is so much about how I think about my responsibility, and I am here to ask for your vote — is that I do — I intend to be a president for all Americans, understanding that the vast majority of us have so much more in common than what separates us. 

    And this era that was kind of initiated by Donald Trump has not only been exhausting, it has been harmful to us as a nation.  The notion that a president of the United States would encourage Americans to point fingers at each other, that — that there would be a suggestion that we are a divided country, that — instead of knowing we have so much more in common than what separates us.

    I have, as vice president, met over 150 world leaders: presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, and kings.  My most recent overseas trips as vice president — which were relatively close to, then, the election — our allies have expressed real concern. 

    I’ve shared this before, but, you know, when we walk in a room representing the United States of America, we should walk in that room, especially leaders, chin up, shoulders back, knowing that we have the self-appointed and earned authority to talk about the importance of democracy and rule of law. 

    But the thing about being a role model — it’s all role models who are here — people watch what you do to see if it matches up to what you say.  People around the world are watching this election, I promise you.  And my — one fear I have is I hope and I pray that we, the American people, understand not only what is at stake for us in this election but how much we mean to the rest of the world. 

         There is so much at stake in this election.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Liz Cheney, tell us real quick — I want to get to our first question.  But you’ve been traveling with the vice president.  You’ve been working with her.  You’ve been spending human time with her.  Tell the audience what you see that perhaps, you know, the camera doesn’t get or the ads don’t get so that they can get a sense of her that you have. 

         MS. CHENEY:  Well, I — I think that what I can tell you is that what the vice president is saying about wanting to be a president for all Americans, caring deeply about this country, those are things that — that come across very, very clearly and very directly. 

         And — and, look, I — I’m a conservative.  The very first campaign I ever volunteered in was for President Gerald Ford in 1976, and — and ever since then, I have been voting for Republicans.  I’ve never voted for a Democrat.  And —

         MS. SHRIVER:  Wow.

         MS. CHENEY:  And so, the — the fact that — that I — I believe so strongly that in this election — in this election, we need to elect the person who is the responsible adult — (laughter and applause) — and — and we need —

         And — and there is a lot — both parties do it.  There is a lot of vilification that goes on.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah.

         MS. CHENEY:  And — and I think it’s really important for people to — to think very carefully about the power that we’re going to invest in the president of the United States and what it would mean to — to give that power to Donald Trump. 

         Don’t take my word for who he is.  Listen to him every day.  Look at what he did.  Remember that the people, as the vice president said, who are opposing him are the people who know him best, the people who worked most closely with him. 

         And so, I would just say I — I know that the vice president has had the range of experience, has — as vice president, as senator, as attorney general of California.  She is supremely qualified to be president of the United States.  I think there — there — sometimes there are some men who suggest that she’s not.  But if you look at her qualifications, there’s no question.  And that she’s somebody that I know I can count on who will put the good of this country first, there’s just no question.  (Applause.)

         MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  I want to go — I want to go over here to Cecelia.  Cecelia Borland, can you stand up?  You have a question.

         Cecelia grew up in Birmingham, Michigan, which was a Republican stronghold as she grew up.  She now lives with her husband.  They’re raising two children in Berkley, Michigan, and she’s here with a question for the vice president.

         Q    Thank you both for coming to Michigan today for this important event.  I’d like to start by saying, personally, thank you, Representative Cheney, for — to you and your father for exemplifying putting country over party.  (Applause.) 

         And, Madam Vice President, I hope you had a wonderful birthday yesterday. 

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughter.)  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.

         Q    From the shootings at Oxford High School to my alma mater, Michigan State University, to an attack at a kid’s splash pad this summer just a few miles away from here, the issue of gun violence hits very close to home for our community. 

         Just yesterday, I learned from our school district that my preschooler will be going through his first active shooter drill.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         Q    As a gun violence survivor and mother of two young children, the issue of gun violence and the safety of my children in their schools and in our community is my top priority.

         Madam Vice President, if you are elected president and there is a Republican majority in Congress, how will you work with them to make impactful and immediate progress around gun violence, especially in our children’s schools?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Right.  Thank you —

         MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — Cecelia.  And thank you and — for your courage to speak up about this.

         So — well, we have done it, actually, in the last four years.  We had a bipartisan group of — of folks in Congress who came together for the Safer Communities Act, which is the first meaningful piece of gun safety legislation in 30 years.  And so, it’s a good step, and it really does tell us that we have a will within the United States Congress to work in a bipartisan way.  And — and then-Congresswoman Cheney was one of those Republicans that actually voted for it. 

         I — this is how I think of the issue.  And it is through the — the lens of many experiences, including act- — I’m so sorry about your kids going through active shooter drills.  It’s — our kids did.  It’s traumatic that our children — you know, growing up, I’ll speak for myself, we had fire drills.  Right?

         Our children are now learning how to keep themselves safe if there’s an active shooter at their school. 

         I did a tour last year of — of colleges — with college-aged kids, so I also did some trade schools.  And I would ask the room — the auditorium would be packed — college-age kids — and I’d ask them, “Raise your hand if at any point between kindergarten and 12th grade you had to endure an active shooter drill.”  Almost every hand went up. 

         Our kids are growing up where they are learning that they may be unsafe in the classroom where they should be absorbing the wonders of the world. 

         One kid said to me, “Yeah” — we were talking about this — and said to me, “Yeah, that’s why I don’t like going to fifth period.”  I said, “Why, sweetheart?  Why don’t you like going to fifth period?”  “Because in that classroom, there’s no closet,” in which to hide. 

         So, we — when we think of this issue, we must also consider the trauma that is the trauma of — the direct trauma for those who have been directly affected by gun violence, including that to our kids who are in schools across our country doing this — not to mention their teachers, who want to teach and not also have to worry about will they be able to physically protect a child from a bullet.

         Here’s how I think about it in terms of the macro point.  We have been pushing, as a country, I think, a false choice that suggests you’re either in favor of the Second Amendment or you want to take everyone’s guns away.  And that’s a false choice. 

         I’m in favor of the Second Amendment.  I have talked about the fact both Tim Walz and I are gun owners.  I also believe we need reasonable gun safety laws, assault weapons bans, red flag laws, universal background checks.  (Applause.)  And — and reports say that the majority of NRA members agree on, for example, universal background checks. 

         What is a universal background check?  It’s just common sense.  Here’s what it is: You just might want to know before someone can buy a lethal weapon whether they’ve been found by a court to be a danger to themselves or others.  You just might want to know.  It’s common sense.  (Applause.)  We need commonsense gun safety laws. 

         And I will continue — I’ve done it throughout my career — work with all of our colleagues across the aisle.  And I know that we can make progress. 

         But this is not — I’m not trying to take anybody’s guns away from them.  But we need reasonable gun safety laws.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  I want to come back to the issue of public safety in a minute.  But first we want to go to Martin.  Thank you, Cecelia, very much.  Martin Howrylak.  He’s a former Republican member of the Michigan House of Representatives, and he’s here with a question about national security.

         Q    Well, thank both of you for being here this afternoon.  I really appreciate your coming to the state of Michigan to — to be here.  I would like to ask: What can the U.S. do politically, economically, or militarily to deter Russia from continuing its war on the independent nation of Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening our own U.S. security interests?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, Martin. 

         MS. SHRIVER:  Go ahead.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  So, I was actually in Munich at the Munich Security Conference delivering a speech when I first met with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and it was just days before Russia invaded. 

         I’ve now met with President Zelenskyy, I think, seven times, because the United States has rightly taken a position as a leader — a global leader on international rules and norms — that we must stand in support of one of the most important international rules and norms, which is the importance of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, the importance of standing strong in opposition to the notion that, in this case, Russia would attempt to change borders by force, to invade another nation — a sovereign nation by force. 

         And sadly, there is a huge difference between my opponent and me on this very fundamental issue. 

         Back to the conversation about — there was a time when we used to — there was a phrase that I’ll paraphrase that, basically, politics ends at the — at the sea line, at the — at the — you know, at the — the boundaries of our country, that there are certain things — in particular, the matters of national security — where it’s not about partisanship; it’s about where should America stand in terms of supporting our allies and standing for certain principles.

         I’ll — I’ll give you, as a — as a point of reference for me in terms of how I feel about this, on the partisan issue.  

         I — for the four years that I was in the United States Senate, my favorite committee was the Senate Intelligence Committee.  And I served on that committee, and we would meet in a room that’s called a SCIF.  And it’s — it’s basically a — (laughs) — it’s a very secure room.  No press, with all due respect, is allowed in.  No cameras.  Everyone has to leave their cell phone outside. 

         It’s a bipartisan committee, and we would go in that room and receive classified information from America’s intelligence community, sometimes our military leaders, about hot spots around the world and threats to our national security.  And when we went in that room — and this is why it was my favorite committee — people would take off their suit jacket, roll up their sleeves, have a cup of coffee on the table.  And we weren’t Democrats or Republicans; we were Americans. 

         And that is so important on a number of issues we are discussing this afternoon but, in particular, on national security. 

         My opponent, however, has made it a thing of his to admire dictators and autocrats around the world.  He exchanged love letters with Kim Jong Un.  Remember that?  He has openly praised the president of Russia. 

         Most recently, the report is, in the height of COVID — remember everyone was scrambling to get their hands on COVID tests?  Remember when Americans were dying by the hundreds every day?  And Donald Trump secretly sent COVID tests to the president of Russia for his personal use. 

         He has said — Donald Trump — “I will solve the matter of Ukraine and Russia in a day.”  Read through and understand what he is saying.  He would surrender.  He would have Ukraine surrender its fight against an aggressor violating its sovereignty. 

         If Donald Trump were president, Vladimir Putin will be sitting in Kyiv.  And understand what that would mean for America and our standing around the world. 

         But thankfully, there has been bipartisan support — and to your point of what — where you stand — on this very fundamental issue.  But this is a — this is a very vivid example of what is at stake in this election.  Because Donald Trump has been very clear: He would give away the shop.  He has been manipulated and is so clearly able to be manipulated by favor and flattery, including from dictators and autocrats around the world. 

         And America knows that that is not how we stand.  That is not how we fight.  We fight in favor of our strength and our role as a leader in bringing the Allies together and standing for foundational and fundamental principles.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Congressman Cheney — (applause) — I know, kind of, the issue of national security is one of the big reasons you’re here and supporting the vice president.  Can you expand on that answer and add your thoughts to it?

         MS. CHENEY:  Yeah.  You know, I think that if — if you look at where the Republican Party is today, there’s been a really dangerous embrace of isolationism, a dangerous embrace of tyrants. 

         The president, you know, even just today, he heaps praise on the world’s most evil people while he attacks, you know, with venom, his political opponents here at home. 

         And, you know, the — the reality is that since the end of World War II, America has led.  And we’ve led — and that has been necessary to defend our freedom.  And we can’t do it by ourselves, though.  We need our allies. 

         And when Donald Trump says that he’s going to withdraw from NATO, when he invites Vladimir Putin to invade NATO, when he suggests that it is Zelenskyy’s fault that Ukraine was invaded, I mean that is — that i- —

         For anybody who is a Republican who is thinking that, you know, they might vote for Donald Trump because of national security policy, I ask you, please, please study his national security policy.  Not only is it not Republican, it’s dangerous.  And without allies, America will find our very freedom and security challenged and threatened. 

         And one final point on this: Don’t think that Congress can stop him. 

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         MS. CHENEY:  People say, “Well, you know what, he can’t really do the worst, you know, because Congress will step in.”  All he has to do is what he’s doing — is say, “I won’t fulfill our NATO treaty obligations,” and — and NATO begins to unravel. 

         So, it is — it is an incredibly dangerous thing to think about a foreign policy, a national security policy led by somebody who is — is as unstable as Donald Trump is.  And it’s a risk we just simply can’t take as a nation. 

         MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And I’m going to add for emphasis that — let’s also be clear about on the subject, specifically of Ukraine, Donald Trump’s approach would be to surrender.  Understand what that would mean.  That is signaling to the president of Russia he can get away with what he has done. 

    Understand — look at the map — Poland would be next.  NATO, our Allies, are — the reason that they have been so thankful for the position of strength we have taken in bringing the Allies together is because they are fully aware of and remember — to the congresswoman’s point — World War II.  Remember, this — this concept of isolation — we were once there as a nation, and then Pearl Harbor happened. 

    Let’s remember recent history.  Europe remembers it well.  We — then when we got attacked, Pearl Harbor, we jumped in, and it is because America jumped in that we were ultimately able to win that war, and it should be a constant reminder to us — we have to remember history — that isolationism, which is exactly what Donald Trump is pushing — pull out of NATO, abandon our friends — isolationism is not insulation.  It is not insulation.  It will not insulate us from harm in terms of our national security. 

    So, I say that to emphasize a point that the congresswoman made, and the other point I’d make is also check out where he’s been on how he thinks about America’s military and service members.  One of the great, great American heroes, a prisoner of war, John McCain.  Remember how he talked about John McCain?  He said he didn’t like him because he got caught. 

    You look — he’s called members of our military “suckers” and “losers.”  And then look at how some of the highest-ranking members of our military, including what I mentioned earlier, the chairman — the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a dedicated member, leader in our mil- — in America’s military, how he has assessed Donald Trump — fascism “to his core.”

    So, there we are.

    MS. SHRIVER:  There are your talking points for the kitchen table.  (Applause.)

    Our final question is from Courtney.  Courtney, can you stand?  Courtney is — Courtney Gabbara Agrusa is a wife, a mom, an attorney, and she’s a proud Chaldean, and she is here with a question.  Courtney.

    Q    Thank you so much.  Good evening, Madam Vice President Harris and Representative Cheney.  My name is Courtney Gabbara Agrusa, and I am a first-generation Chaldean American.  Chaldeans are Indigenous Iraqis who are Catholic, and we are predominantly in the metro Detroit area.  Chaldeans are a very close-knit community, but the recent political climate has really begun to divide us. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    Q    While I know that you have discussed several bipartisan proposals over the course of your campaign, what would you say to people like myself who are part of these traditionally conservative communities who want to move forward, but are feeling the pref- — the pressures of the political divide?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.  And I’ve actually met with — with members and leaders in the Chaldean community, and thank you for being here. 

    You know, I think that there is something at stake that is about core values, as well as what is at stake in terms of the risk and the danger.  And I would offer you an example of what I think would be an important issue that would affect the Chaldean community and all Americans, for example, the issue of — of how we think about health care in America. 

    So, I know enough about the culture and to know that it is reflective of who we are as Americans in general.  We respect our elders; we take care of them.  So, I will share with you a specific proposal that is an extension of how I think about things. 

    I — actually a personal story, I took care of my mother when she was sick.  And for anyone taking care of or who has taken care of an elder relative, you know what that is.  It’s about trying to cook something they feel like eating.  It is trying to find clothes that don’t irritate their skin or help them put on a sweater.  It’s about trying to figure out something you can say that will bring a smile to their face or make them laugh.  It’s about dignity. 

    And we now have, in particular in our country, a lot of people doing that and also raising young kids.  We call them the sandwich generation, right in the middle.  It’s a lot.  And the way the system currently works — well, God willing, you may have enough resources, you can hire somebody to come in and help. 

    If not, you may have to spend down all of your savings to be able to qualify for Medicaid or you may have to quit your job to be able to do what you need to do to take care of your children and take care of your relative — your older relative.  That’s just not right, and it’s not fair. 

    So, part of my proposal and the plan is that we’re going to now reconfigure so that Medicare covers home health care for our seniors, right?  It’s about dignity.  (Applause.)

    So, in addition to everything that we’ve discussed already about national security, what is at stake — something like this, because I absolutely do believe America is ready for a new generation of leadership that is taking on issues clear-eyed about what is going on that affects everybody — it doesn’t matter their political party; issues that are fundamentally about dignity, also about economic issues; and taking it on in a way that we relieve the American people of the burdens that get in the way of productivity and a certain quality of life.  And this is one example of that. 

    I believe we need to have an economy that I call an opportunity economy, where everyone has the opportunity to thrive — not just get by but get ahead. 

    And this is one example I would offer under the broader point, which is about, let’s move forward, taking on problems from a commonsense approach that is about just practical work. 

    Look, I am a capitalist.  I am a pragmatic capitalist.  I will work as I have with the private sector.  I believe we have to invest in America’s economy and in America’s industry and America’s entrepreneurs, and we can, at the same time, take care of those that are the most in need of just a little support to be able to not just get by but get ahead.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you, Courtney. 

    Liz, I just want to — we have two minutes left — (applause) — and when you hear the phrase a “new way forward,” when you hear “country over party,” what does that mean to you? 

    We’re two weeks out, what does a new way forward mean for families like everybody here, for your children, my children, everybody’s children, young men?

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, I —

    MS. SHRIVER:  What is it like?

    MS. CHENEY:  I think that, you know, we’re — we’re at a moment now where, when you think about America and — and the beacon of hope that we have been for so many years for so many communities, also how tremendously enriched we have been by communities — immigrants who want to come here and build a life, all of that depends upon fundamentally defending the rule of law, fundamentally defending our Constitution.  That’s — that’s what makes all of our opportunity and our freedom possible.

    And — and at the same time that we’re that beacon for the world, you know, it’s also because — because we’re a good nation —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. CHENEY:  — and because you know when — when you — when you look at who our leader is going to be, what — what Donald Trump represents is — is, in many ways, just cruel and — and not — not the kind of dignity and — and the kind of person that we all want to be able to look up to. 

    But — but what I would say is that if people are uncertain, if people are thinking, “Well, you know, I’m a conservative, I don’t know that I can support Vice President Harris,” I would say I don’t know if anybody is more conservative than I am.  (Laughter.)  And — and I understand the most conservative value there is is to defend the Constitution.  And if we don’t come together to do that then — (applause) —

    And so, just to — to finish that, I would say, to me, a new way forward is this: It’s what you’re seeing up here.  It’s having a president who will listen, having a president who will say, “I’m not, you know, necessarily sure I agree with you on this issue or that issue, but let’s talk about it.”

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. CHENEY:  “Why do you want, you know, that policy?  Why do you believe that?”  Someone who is willing to honor and respect all perspectives and points of views.  And there’s only one candidate in this race who does that, and that’s Vice President Harris.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  In fact, a lot of polling of undecided voters who call themselves “the exhausted majority” said, I just want leaders who listen —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  — to one another.  I just want leaders who speak respectfully to one another.  I want to see decency.  I want to see people I can look up to.  And, unfortunately, that’s considered a new way forward as the — as Representative Cheney —

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, let’s do that.  Let’s do that. 

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah, let’s do that.

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, let’s do that. 

    MS. SHRIVER:  Let’s make that a way forward. 

    The final word, Madam Vice President.  You know, everybody I talked to says, you know, “I have to turn off the news.  I can’t read anything.  I’m meditating.  I’m doing yoga.  I’m doing — I’m so anxious.  I just don’t even know.  I’m eating gummies.”  All kinds of things, you know?  (Laughter.) 

    What are you doing?  What are you doing —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Not eating gummies.  (Laughter and applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay, we got that clear.  But how do you — I mean, how do you handle this — the anxiety, the stress, the turmoil?  Everybody is freaked out.  I — I talked to the gentleman up there, and he’s like, “I’m so scared.” 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  A woman was like, “I’m so anxious.  I can’t sleep.”  Do you sleep?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  You know, I wake up in the middle of the night usually these days, to be honest with you, but I work out every morning.  I — I think that’s really important to just kind of — you know, mind, body, and spirit. 

    But let me — let me just say this —

    MS. SHRIVER:  No, say more about that.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — we — but I —

    MS. SHRIVER:  Say more.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — but — I will.  I work out.  I try to eat well.  You know, I love my family, and I make sure that I talk to the kids and my husband every day.  We’ve been — Doug and I’ve been kind of tr- — you know, traveling.  We’re trying to cover a lot of ground, so we’re not with each other every day these days, but my family grounds me in every way. 

    But let me, if I can just speak to the — what people are feeling.  You — we cannot despair.  We cannot despair.  You know, the nature of a democracy is such that I think there’s a duality. 

    On the one hand, there’s an incredible strength when our democracy is intact, an incredible strength in what it does to protect the freedoms and rights of its people.  Oh, there’s great strength in that.  And it is very fragile.  It is only as strong as our willingness to fight for it.  And so, that’s the moment we’re in. 

    And I say, do not despair, because in a democracy, as long as we can keep it — in our democracy, the people, every individual has the power to make a decision about what this will be, and that’s — and so let’s not feel powerless.  Let’s not let the som- — and I get it — overwhelming nature of this all make us feel powerless, because then we have been defeated, and that’s not our character as the American people. 

    We are not one to be defeated.  We rise to a moment, and we stand on broad shoulders of people who have fought this fight before for our country.  And in many ways, let us look at the challenge then that we are being presented and not be overwhelmed by it.  The baton is now in our hands to fight for — not against, but for — this country we love. 

    That’s what we have the power to do.  So, let’s own that — dare I say, be joyful in what we will do in the process of owning that, which is knowing that we can and will build community and coalitions and remind people that we’re all in this together.  Let’s not let the overwhelming nature of this strip us of our strength. 

    That’s how I feel about this.  (Applause.)  You know, that’s how I feel about this.  You know?  Yeah.  

    MS. SHRIVER:  So, I want to — I want to thank everybody here.  You heard from the vice president, from Congresswoman Cheney, do not despair.  I think you got a great glimpse into who this woman is, who this woman is, what brings them together, why they’re here, why they want to earn your vote, why they wanted to speak with you today. 

    And I want to leave you with this quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson that I think speaks to this moment.  It says,

    “Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you’re wrong.  There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right.  To map out a course of action and follow it to the end requires great courage.” 

    So, I leave you with that.  All of you are courageous people.  Do not despair. 

    Thank you so much for spending your time.  Brava.  (Applause.)

                                 END                5:18 P.M. EDT

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 18:44 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the SU26245RMFS9 security (OFZ 26245) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    18:44

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC), on 10/22/2024, 18:44 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 75.98) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 721.45 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 15.0%) of the SU26245RMFS9 security (OFZ 26245) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74209

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: 10/22/2024, 18-01 (Moscow time) the values of the lower boundary of the price corridor and the range of market risk assessment for the SU26245RMFS9 security (OFZ 26245) were changed.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    10/22/2024

    18:01

    In accordance with the Methodology for determining the risk parameters of the stock market and deposit market of Moscow Exchange PJSC by NCO NCC (JSC) on 10/22/2024, 18-01 (Moscow time), the values of the lower limit of the price corridor (up to 78.09) and the range of market risk assessment (up to 742.67 rubles, equivalent to a rate of 12.5%) of the SU26245RMFS9 security (OFZ 26245) were changed.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74202

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Three Federal Treasury deposit auctions will take place on 10/23/2024

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Application selection parameters
    Date of the selection of applications 10/23/2024
    Unique identifier of the application selection 22024544
    Deposit currency rubles
    Type of funds funds of the single treasury account
    Maximum amount of funds placed in bank deposits, million monetary units 247 400
    Placement period, in days 2
    Date of deposit 10/23/2024
    Refund date 10/25/2024
    Interest rate for placement of funds (fixed or floating) FIXED
    Minimum fixed interest rate for placement of funds, % per annum 18.14
    Basic floating interest rate for placement of funds
    Minimum spread, % per annum
    Terms of conclusion of a bank deposit agreement (fixed-term, replenishable or special) Urgent
    Minimum amount of funds placed for one application, million monetary units 1,000
    Maximum number of applications from one credit institution, pcs. 5
    Application selection form (open or closed) Open
    Application selection schedule (Moscow time)
    Venue for the selection of applications PAO Moscow Exchange
    Applications accepted: from 09:30 to 09:40
    Pre-applications: from 09:30 to 09:35
    Applications in competition mode: from 09:35 to 09:40
    Formation of a consolidated register of applications: from 09:40 to 09:50
    Setting a cut-off percentage rate and/or recognizing the selection of applications as unsuccessful: from 09:40 to 10:00
    Submission to credit institutions of an offer to conclude a bank deposit agreement: from 10:00 to 11:00
    Receiving acceptance of an offer to conclude a bank deposit agreement from credit institutions: from 10:00 to 11:00
    Deposit transfer time In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 63 and paragraph 64 of the Order of the Federal Treasury dated 04/27/2023 No. 10n
    Application selection parameters
    Date of the selection of applications 10/23/2024
    Unique identifier of the application selection 22024539
    Deposit currency rubles
    Type of funds funds of the single treasury account
    Maximum amount of funds placed in bank deposits, million monetary units 20,000
    Placement period, in days 182
    Date of deposit 10/23/2024
    Refund date 04/23/2025
    Interest rate for placement of funds (fixed or floating) FLOATING
    Minimum fixed interest rate for placement of funds, % per annum
    Basic floating interest rate for placement of funds RUONmDS
    Minimum spread, % per annum 0.00
    Terms of conclusion of a bank deposit agreement (fixed-term, replenishable or special) Urgent
    Minimum amount of funds placed for one application, million monetary units 1,000
    Maximum number of applications from one credit institution, pcs. 5
    Application selection form (open or closed) Open
    Application selection schedule (Moscow time)
    Venue for the selection of applications PAO Moscow Exchange
    Applications accepted: from 12:30 to 12:40
    Preliminary applications: from 12:30 to 12:35
    Applications in competition mode: from 12:35 to 12:40
    Formation of a consolidated register of applications: from 12:40 to 12:50
    Setting a cut-off percentage rate and/or recognizing the selection of applications as unsuccessful: from 12:40 to 13:00
    Submission of an offer to credit institutions to conclude a bank deposit agreement: from 13:00 to 14:00
    Receiving acceptance of an offer to conclude a bank deposit agreement from credit institutions: from 13:00 to 14:00
    Deposit transfer time In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 63 and paragraph 64 of the Order of the Federal Treasury dated 04/27/2023 No. 10n

    RUONmDS = RUONIA – DS, where

    RUONIA – the value of the indicative weighted rate of overnight ruble loans (deposits) RUONIA, expressed in hundredths of a percent, published on the official website of the Bank of Russia on the Internet on the day preceding the day for which interest is accrued. In the absence of a RUONIA rate value published on the day preceding the day for which interest is accrued, the last of the published RUONIA rate values is taken into account.

    DS – discount – a value expressed in hundredths of a percent and rounded (according to the rules of mathematical rounding) to two decimal places, calculated by multiplying the value of the Key Rate of the Bank of Russia by the value of the required reserve ratio for other liabilities of credit institutions for banks with a universal license, non-bank credit institutions (except for long-term ones) in the currency of the Russian Federation, valid on the date for which interest is accrued, and published on the official website of the Bank of Russia on the Internet.

    Application selection parameters
    Date of the selection of applications 10/23/2024
    Unique identifier of the application selection 22024540
    Deposit currency rubles
    Type of funds funds of the single treasury account
    Maximum amount of funds placed in bank deposits, million monetary units 30,000
    Placement period, in days 91
    Date of deposit 10/24/2024
    Refund date 01/23/2025
    Interest rate for placement of funds (fixed or floating) FLOATING
    Minimum fixed interest rate for placement of funds, % per annum
    Basic floating interest rate for placement of funds RUONmDS
    Minimum spread, % per annum 0.00
    Terms of conclusion of a bank deposit agreement (fixed-term, replenishable or special) Urgent
    Minimum amount of funds placed for one application, million monetary units 1,000
    Maximum number of applications from one credit institution, pcs. 5
    Application selection form (open or closed) Open
    Application selection schedule (Moscow time)
    Venue for the selection of applications PAO Moscow Exchange
    Applications accepted: from 15:30 to 15:40
    Preliminary applications: from 15:30 to 15:35
    Applications in competition mode: from 15:35 to 15:40
    Formation of a consolidated register of applications: from 15:40 to 15:50
    Setting a cut-off percentage rate and/or recognizing the selection of applications as unsuccessful: from 15:40 to 16:00
    Submission of an offer to credit institutions to conclude a bank deposit agreement: from 16:00 to 17:00
    Receiving acceptance of an offer to conclude a bank deposit agreement from credit institutions: from 16:00 to 17:00
    Deposit transfer time In accordance with the requirements of paragraph 63 and paragraph 64 of the Order of the Federal Treasury dated 04/27/2023 No. 10n

    RUONmDS = RUONIA – DS, where

    RUONIA – the value of the indicative weighted rate of overnight ruble loans (deposits) RUONIA, expressed in hundredths of a percent, published on the official website of the Bank of Russia on the Internet on the day preceding the day for which interest is accrued. In the absence of a RUONIA rate value published on the day preceding the day for which interest is accrued, the last of the published RUONIA rate values is taken into account.

    DS – discount – a value expressed in hundredths of a percent and rounded (according to the rules of mathematical rounding) to two decimal places, calculated by multiplying the value of the Key Rate of the Bank of Russia by the value of the required reserve ratio for other liabilities of credit institutions for banks with a universal license, non-bank credit institutions (except for long-term ones) in the currency of the Russian Federation, valid on the date for which interest is accrued, and published on the official website of the Bank of Russia on the Internet.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232PR@moex.com

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    https://www.moex.com/n74200

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament approves up to €35 billion loan to Ukraine backed by Russian assets

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday, MEPs gave their green light to an extraordinary loan of up to €35 billion to Ukraine, to be repaid with future revenues from frozen Russian assets.

    With 518 votes in favour, 56 against and 61 abstentions, Parliament endorsed the new macro-financial assistance (MFA) to help Ukraine against Russia’s brutal war of aggression. This loan is the EU’s part of a G7 package agreed last June, to provide up to $50 billion (approximately €45 billion) in financial support to Ukraine. The final amount that the EU will contribute could be lower, depending on the size of the loans provided by other G7 partners.

    The Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, a newly established framework, will make future revenues from the frozen Russian Central Bank assets located in the EU available to Ukraine. These funds will help Ukraine service and repay the EU’s MFA loan as well as loans from other G7 partners. While the mechanism’s funds can be used to service and repay loans, Kyiv may allocate the MFA funds as it sees fit.

    The new MFA funds will be disbursed until the end of 2025. The loan is conditional upon Ukraine’s continued commitment to uphold effective democratic mechanisms, respect human rights, and further policy conditions to be set out in a memorandum of understanding. Additionally, the management and control systems outlined in the Ukraine Plan, along with specific measures to prevent fraud and other irregularities, will apply to the MFA loan.

    Quote

    “Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression, with its brave citizens fighting not only for their own existence and freedom, but to defend democracy, human rights, freedom, and international law for all of us. The need for financial support is both immense and urgent. Russia must pay for attacking Ukrainians and brutally destroying the country’s infrastructure, cities, villages, and homes. The burden of rebuilding Ukraine will be shouldered by those responsible for its destruction, namely Russia,” rapporteur Karin Karlsbro (Renew, SE) said.

    Next steps

    EU governments already endorsed the proposal, and the Council plans to adopt the regulation by written procedure after Parliament’s vote. The regulation will enter into force on the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the EU.

    Background

    In September, the Commission announced a €35 billion EU loan for Ukraine as part of a plan by G7 partners to issue loans of up to $50 billion (about €45 billion). Future revenues coming from the frozen Russian state assets would finance the loans. Approximately €210 billion in assets from the Central Bank of Russia are held in the EU and remain frozen under sanctions imposed over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. EU governments decided to set aside the profits from these assets, and use them to support both military efforts and reconstruction in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0142/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Şerban‑Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Aurelijus Veryga, Claudiu‑Richard Târziu, Assita Kanko
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0142/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to Geneva Conventions of 1949,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

     having regard to the joint EU-US-Armenia high-level meeting of 5 April 2024 in support of Armenia’s resilience,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part[1] (CEPA), which fully entered into force on 1 March 2021,

     having regard to Decision 99/614/EC, ECSC, Euratom of the Council and of the Commission of 31 May 1999 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[2] (EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), which has been in force since 1999,

     having regard to the launch of the EU Mission in Armenia on 20 February 2023,

     having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties,

     having regard to the statement of 24 August 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on recent post-election developments,

     having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the early parliamentary elections of 1 September 2024 in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 3 September 2024 on Azerbaijan’s early parliamentary elections,

     having regard to the statement by the EEAS spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership in the field of energy signed between the EU and Azerbaijan on 18 July 2022,

     having regard to the 2023 Eastern Partnership Index,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Azerbaijan has serious shortcomings in the area of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly and media freedom, and engages in repression of political activists, journalists and civil society, all of which distances Azerbaijan from democratic norms and international human rights standards; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine the country’s governance, while government authorities continue to suppress dissent and persecute critics; whereas despite international agreements and calls for reform, including from the European Parliament, Azerbaijan has made limited to no progress on improving its human rights record;

    B. whereas journalists, human rights defenders and activists have been imprisoned in the country, with approximately 30 prominent figures behind bars on politically motivated charges, and a surge in arbitrary arrests and detentions has been reported, their number having tripled as Azerbaijan silences opposition ahead of the upcoming 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, and there are allegations of torture and beatings; whereas notable civil society organisations have called for the EU and international leaders to pressure Azerbaijan to improve its human rights record during COP29, urging the release of political prisoners and an end to arbitrary prosecutions;

    C. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, there were credible allegations that the Azerbaijani Government ‘used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries as politically motivated reprisal’; whereas according to this report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘limited freedom of expression and media independence’, and ‘there were reports that dissidents and journalists who lived outside the country suffered digital harassment and intimidation of family members who remained in Azerbaijan’;

    D. whereas early parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan on 1 September 2024, and, according to the OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission, took place ‘in a restrictive political and legal environment that does not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition’;

    E. whereas September 2024 was the fourth anniversary of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and marked one year since Azerbaijan forcibly regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of its internationally recognised territory; whereas all the state institutions of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were dissolved as of 1 January 2024; whereas these events, preceded by Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, resulted in the mass exodus of almost the entire population of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been entirely ethnically cleansed of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries;

    F. whereas over more than three decades, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, immense destruction, including of cultural, religious and historical heritage, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides; whereas there are six interstate cases before the European Court of Human Rights between Armenia and Azerbaijan in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with both countries standing accused of having violated human rights conventions; whereas Azerbaijan has repeatedly been accused of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where it is said to have displaced over 100 000 ethnic Armenians;

    G. whereas three decades of diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts by the OSCE, the EU and other international actors have failed to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and, therefore, to deter Azerbaijan from its use of military force;

    H. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘did not take credible steps to punish the majority of officials who were reported to have committed human rights abuses’; whereas the report also states that there was ‘no reported progress on government investigations of alleged abuses committed by Azerbaijani armed forces or individuals during the 2020 and 2022 hostilities’;

    I. whereas it is necessary to ensure connectivity between Europe and Asia while avoiding crossing Russian territory; whereas the South Caucasus is in a strategic position for promoting Europe-Asia connectivity, which is particularly important for the EU’s energy capacities and for trade with Central Asia;

    J. whereas Armenia has already managed to weaken its ties with Russia in relation to security, as it has frozen its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, although it remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union;

    K. whereas the eighth meeting of the border commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held on 19 April 2024, concluded with a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of four border sections;

    L. whereas the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be at a standstill and it is unlikely that an agreement will be concluded and signed before COP29; whereas the peace deal should contribute to the long-term stability of bilateral relations and of the wider region as a whole; whereas this goal can only be achieved if the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan can guarantee peaceful coexistence and respect for minority rights;

    M. whereas Azerbaijan is a major oil and natural gas producer, particularly through the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field and the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea, and the country primarily uses the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export hydrocarbons to Europe, bypassing Russia and offering the EU an alternative energy source, which is valuable in this geopolitical climate; whereas Azerbaijan’s economy is heavily reliant on oil and gas revenues, which make up more than 90 % of the country’s export revenues and account for a noteworthy portion of the government’s budget;

    N. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in light of the memorandum of understanding signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are significant challenges facing European efforts to replace Russian gas shipped via Ukraine with Azerbaijani gas by the end of 2024, and although Ukraine, the EU and Azerbaijan support the injection of Azerbaijani gas into Russian pipelines, Azerbaijan might lack sufficient gas supplies to make up the shortfall; whereas, in this regard, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline could provide an alternative route to ensure adequate supply, but new infrastructure is required to enhance gas transmission capacity in the interconnections with the EU, particularly through Bulgaria and Romania on one side and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline on the other, in order to ensure a more efficient and secure flow of gas into the European market;

    1. Expresses its concern about the human rights situation in Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to fulfil its obligations under its own constitution and under international agreements to protect fundamental freedoms and respect the human dignity of its citizens, and to cease the use of criminal prosecution as a tool to suppress government critics and members of civil society;

    2. Calls on Azerbaijan to drop all charges against Gubad Ibadoghlu, Ilhamiz Guliyev and all other people imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights, to release them and to ensure free and unhindered space for independent journalism and freedom of expression; calls on Azerbaijan to allow Dr Ibadoghlu to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family and to receive the medical care he urgently needs;

    3. Calls on the Commission, UN mechanisms and other international actors to step up their efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance in Azerbaijan ahead of COP29;

    4. Underlines that COP29 could be an opportunity for Azerbaijan to reaffirm its genuine commitment to its obligations under international law, instead of using it to gloss over its human rights record while continuing repressive practices;

    5. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the UN to urgently establish a comprehensive plan for investigating and clarifying the fate of the Armenian military personnel, including women, and the eight unarmed Armenian prisoners of war who were killed or reported missing in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to conduct impartial inquiries on the ground, facilitate information exchanges, secure unhindered access to detention facilities for international observers through the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, such observers having previously been denied access, and launch a centralised database for tracing and resolving missing persons cases, while also providing the necessary support and resources to the families affected;

    6. Demands that Azerbaijan release the 23 Armenian hostages who are still being held in Baku, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh;

    7. Reiterates its condemnation of the Azerbaijani military incursions into the internationally recognised territory of Armenia in recent years; expresses its sympathy with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who had to flee their ancestral lands, and calls on the authorities in Baku to guarantee the safe return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and to uphold their rights to cultivate their culture and traditions; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

    8. Expresses deep concern for the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access to heritage;

    9. Strongly condemns Russia’s increasing hybrid attempts to destabilise the political situation inside Armenia and in the region; is concerned that the EU Mission in Armenia is regularly targeted by Russian disinformation attempts and campaigns;

    10. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in the Caucasus region; underlines its unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan; expresses support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the goal of achieving lasting peace; encourages both countries to continue to make progress on finalising an agreement and signing a peace deal as soon as possible;

    11. Believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts, which must include the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, guarantees for the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the release of the remaining prisoners, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, and an end to the sham trials against them;

    12. Stresses that EU involvement in the region should be practical and result-oriented, unlike the role played by Russia, which for decades has fuelled the conflict and used it for its own political gain; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; underlines that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Coming Soon: Speech by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva at the 2024 Annual Meetings Plenary

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    Coming Soon: Speech by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva at the 2024 Annual Meetings Plenary

    October 25, 2024

    Annual Meetings Chairman, Ahmed Munawar, Chairperson and Governor, Maldives Monetary Authority, World Bank Group President Ajay Banga, and Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund Kristalina Georgieva speak at the October 25th plenary session of the Annual Meetings in Washington D.C.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/25/sp102524-annual-meetings-plenary

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Transcript of World Economic Outlook October 2024 Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    October 22, 2024

    Speakers:
    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Jean‑Marc Natal, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start. First of all, welcome, everyone. Good morning for those who are joining, as online. I am Jose Luis De Haro with the Communications Department here at the IMF. And once again, we are gathered here today for the release of our new World Economic Outlook, titled Policy Pivot Raising Threats. I hope that by this time, all of you have had access to a copy of the flagship. If not, I would encourage you to go to IMF.org. There, you’re going to find the document, but also, you’re going to find Pierre‑Olivier’s blog, the underlying data for the charts, videos, and other assets that I think are going to be very, very helpful for your reporting. And what’s best, that to discuss all the details of the World Economic Outlook that, to be joined here today by Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, the Economic Counsellor Chief Economist and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks. She is the Deputy Director of the Research Department. And also with us, Jean‑Marc Natal, the Division Chief at the Research Department. We are going to start with some opening remarks from Pierre‑Olivier, and then we will proceed to take your questions. I want to remind everyone that this press conference is on the record and that we will also be taking questions online.

    With no further ado, Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose, and good morning, everyone. Let me start with the good news. The battle against inflation is almost won. After peaking at 9.4 percent year on year in the third quarter of 2022, we now project headline inflation will fall to 3.5 percent by the end of next year, and in most countries, inflation is now hovering close to central bank targets.

    Now, inflation came down while the global economy remained resilient. Growth is projected to hold steady at 3.2 percent in 2024 and 2025. The United States is expected to cool down, while other advanced economies will rebound. Performance in emerging Asia remains robust, despite the slight downward revision for China to 4.8 percent in 2024. Low‑income countries have seen their growth revised downwards, some of it because of conflicts and climate shocks.

    Now, the decline in inflation without a global recession is a major achievement. Much of that disinflation can be attributed to the unwinding of the unique combination of supply and demand shocks that caused the inflation in the first place, together with improvements in labor supply due to immigration in many advanced countries. But monetary policy played a decisive role, keeping inflation expectations anchored.

    Now, despite the good news, on inflation, risks are now tilted to the downside. This downside risks include an escalation in regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East, which could cause serious risks for commodity markets. Policy shifts toward undesirable trade and industrial policies could also significantly lower output, a sharp reduction in migration into advanced economies, which can unwind some of the supply gains that helped ease inflation in recent quarters. This could trigger an abrupt tightening of global financial conditions that would further depress output. And together, these represent about a 1.6 percent of global output in 2026.

    Now, to mitigate these downside risks and to strengthen growth, policymakers now need to shift gears and implement a policy triple pivot.

    The first pivot on monetary policy is already underway. The decline in inflation paved the way for monetary easing across major central banks. This will support activity at a time when labor markets are showing signs of cooling, with rising unemployment rates. So far, however, this rise has been gradual and does not point to an imminent slowdown. Lower interest rates in major economies will also ease the pressure on emerging market economies. However, vigilance remains key. Inflation in services remains too elevated, almost double prepandemic levels, and a few emerging market economies are seeing rising price pressures, calling for higher policy rates. Furthermore, we have now entered a world dominated by supply shocks, from climate, health, and geopolitical tensions. And this makes the job of central banks harder.

    The second pivot is on fiscal policy. It is urgent to stabilize debt dynamics and rebuild much‑needed fiscal buffers. For the United States and China, current fiscal plans do not stabilize debt dynamics. For other countries, despite early improvements, there are increasing signs of slippage. The path is narrow. Delaying consolidation increases the risk of disorderly adjustments, while an excessively abrupt turn toward fiscal tightening could hurt economic activity. Success requires implementing, where necessary, and without delay, a sustained and credible multi‑year fiscal adjustment.

    The third pivot and the hardest is toward growth‑enhancing reform. This is the only way we can address many of the challenges we face. Many countries are implementing industrial and trade policy measures to protect domestic workers and industries. These measures can sometimes boost investment and activity in the short run, but they often lead to retaliation and ultimately fail to deliver sustained improvements in standards of living. They should be avoided when not carefully addressing well‑identified market failures or narrowly defined national security concerns.

    Economic growth must come, instead, from ambitious domestic reforms that boost innovation, increase human capital, improve competition and resource allocation. Growth‑enhancing reforms often face significant social resistance. Our report shows that information strategies can help improve support, but they only go so far. Building trust between governments and citizens and inclusion of proper compensation measures are essential features.

    Building trust is an important lesson that should also resonate when thinking about ways to further improve international cooperation to address common challenges in the year that we celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor for your questions, let’s remind some ground rules. First of all, if you have any question that it is related to a country program or a country negotiation, I would recommend not to formulate that question here. Basically, those questions can be formulated in the different regional press briefings that are going to happen later this week.

    Also, if you want to ask a question, just raise your hand, wait until I call you. Identify yourself and the outlet that you represent. And let’s try to keep it to just one question. I know that there are going to be many, many questions. We might not be able to take all of you. So please be patient. There are going to be many other opportunities to ask questions throughout the week.

    Let me start—how I am going to start. I am going to start in the center. A couple of questions here. Then I am going to go to my right, and then I am going to go there. I am going to start in the first row, the lady with the white jacket, thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose, for taking my question. I am Moaling Xiong from Xinhua News Agency. I want to ask about the geopolitical tensions that was mentioned in the report. It says there are rising geopolitical tensions. So far, the impact has been limited. But further intensification of geopolitical rifts could weigh on trade, investment, and beyond. I wonder whether Pierre‑Olivier, could you talk a little bit about what are the economic impacts of growing geopolitical tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. This is, of course, a very important question. This is something that we are very concerned about, the rising geoeconomic fragmentation, trade tensions between countries, measures that are disrupting trade, disrupting cross‑border investment. This is something that we have looked at in our World Economic Outlook report. In Chapter 1, we have a box that evaluates the impact of various adverse measures, measures that could be taken by policymakers or various of shocks that would impact output. And when we look at the impact that rising trade tensions could have, there are two dimensions of this. One is, of course, you are increasing tariffs, for instance, between different blocs. That would disrupt trade. That will misallocate resources. That will weigh down on economic activity. But there is also an associated layer that comes from the uncertainty that increases related to future trade policy. And that will also depress investment, depress economic activity and consumption. When we put these two together, what we find is, we find an impact on world output that is on the order of about 0.5 percent of output levels in 2026. So it’s a quite sizable effect of both an increase in tariffs between different countries and an increase in trade policy uncertainty.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I’m going to continue here in the center. We’re going to go to the gentleman on the third row. Yep. There. There, third row, there. Third row. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thanks very much for taking my question. I just want to ask about the inflation side of the WEO. You mentioned just now inflation, you know, the battle is almost won. I am just wondering, there’s sort of a divergence between the advanced economies and emerging markets and developing economies. When do you expect inflation to sort of fall toward that 2 percent target in emerging markets and developing economies? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So inflation, the progress on inflation has been more pronounced for advanced economies, and now we expect advanced economies to be back to their target sometime in 2025 for most of them. For emerging markets and developing economies, there is more variation, and we see an increase in dispersion of inflation, so a lot of countries have made a lot of progress. You look, for instance, at emerging Asia. There are inflation levels very similar to advanced economies for a number of them. You look at other regions—in the Middle East, for instance, or sub‑Saharan Africa—and you have countries that still have double‑digital inflation rates and will maybe take more time to converge back. So we see an increased divergence that reflects some of the shocks that are specific to some of these regions. Of course, conflict or climate‑related shocks can have an impact on inflation, and that’s what we’re seeing in these two regions I mentioned.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Now I’m going to move to my right. The first row here, the lady with the red suit.

    QUESTION: Hello. This is Norah from Asharq Business with Bloomberg from Dubai.

    Pierre, you mentioned that the geopolitical tensions could account for 0.5 percent of output if things kind of get out of hand. To what extent is this a very optimistic number here? Because we’re talking about tensions not only in the Middle East. You have things going down in the Taiwan Strait. We have the Russian‑Ukraine war still ongoing. And there is a very big risk that shipping lines, straits might get disrupted. And this would affect very substantially the price of oil and other commodities. To what extent this would affect output—again, global output and inflation levels? Would inflation be a big risk again if major commodities prices increased substantially?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So you are absolutely right. The scenario I was referring to earlier is a scenario where we have increased trade disruptions, tariffs, and trade policy uncertainty. But one can think also about geopolitical tensions impacting commodity market or shipping. Now, this is not something that we looked at in this report. That’s something that we had looked at in our April report. And in April, when we looked at the potential for escalation in conflicts in the Middle East, the impact it could have on oil prices or on shipping costs, we found that this would very much be in the nature of adverse supply shock. It would negatively impact output, and it would increase inflation pressures. Now, the numbers we had when we did that exercise back in April, they’re still very relevant for the environment we’re in now. And that was one of the layers I showed today, is that it would reduce output by another about 0.4 percent by 2026 and would increase inflation by something on the order of 0.7 percent higher inflation in 2025. So this is something that is very much on top of the other tensions that I mentioned. This is why we are living in this world where there are multiple layers of risk that could be compounding each other.

    Mr. De Haro: I’m going to stay here. First row, here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa Washington, D.C. I would like you to talk a little bit more about the situation in Africa. I know two years ago it was about COVID and then Ukraine. What do you see now? And what are some of the recommendations for sub‑Saharan Africa? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So sub‑Saharan African region is one that is seeing growth rates that are fairly steady this year, compared to last year, at about 3.6 percent, and then expected to increase to about 4.2 percent next year. So we’re seeing some pickup in growth from this year to next year. But now, this is certainly a region that’s been adversely impacted by weather shocks and, in some cases, conflict. So the growth remains subdued and somewhat uneven, and that’s certainly something that we are concerned about.

    Let me turn it over to my colleague Jean‑Marc Natal to add some color.

    Mr. Natal: I would be happy to. Do you hear me? OK.

    So yes, so there has been over the last year, year and a half, there has been some progress in the region. You saw, you know, inflation stabilizing in some countries going down even. And reaching close—level close to the target. But half of them is still at distance, large distance from the target. And a third of them are still having double‑digital inflation.

    In terms of growth, as Pierre‑Olivier mentioned, it’s quite uneven, but it remains too low. The other issue is debt in the region. Obviously, it is still high. It has not increased. It has stopped increasing, and in some countries already starting to consolidate. But it’s still too high. And the debt service is correspondingly still high in the region. So the challenges are still there. There has been some progress. So in terms of the recommendation, in countries where inflation is very high, you would recommend, you know, tight monetary policy and in some cases, when possible, helped by consolidation on the fiscal side.

    It’s complicated. In many countries, you know, there are trade‑offs, and, you know, consolidating fiscal is difficult when you also have to provide for relief, like in Nigeria, for example, due to the flooding. So targeting the support to the poor and the vulnerable is part of the package when you consolidate. I will stop here.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am moving to my left. I am going to go to the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. Joel Hills from ITV News. We know that the chancellor in the United Kingdom is planning on changing the fiscal rule on debt to allow for—to borrow more for investment. Pierre‑Olivier, do you support this idea? And what, in your view, are the risks? And should the U.K. government continue to target a fall in debt of some description or a rise in public sector net worth?

    Mr. De Haro: Pierre‑Olivier, before you answer, are there any other questions on the U.K. in the room? I am going to take just two more from this group of U.K. reporters on my right that they are very eager. Just two questions more. We do not want to overwhelm—

    QUESTION: Alex Brummer from the Daily Mail in London. Again, around the chancellor’s upcoming budget. In your opening remarks, you referred to the possibility of abrupt changes in fiscal policy, disrupting what might happen to economies. U.K., according to your forecast, is in a quite good place in terms of growth heading upward. Do you fear that too strong a change in direction in fiscal policy in the U.K. could affect future growth?

    Mr. De Haro: Just one more question.

    QUESTION: Mehreen Khan from The Times. You mentioned that there are some countries at risk of fiscal slippage because governments have promised to do their consolidation have struggled to execute. Is the U.K. in that group? Also, the IMF has previously recommended that countries are under fiscal strain should—can keep sort of investment flowing if they do shift to measures like public sector net worth. Is that still a recommendation that you stand by in particular relevance for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: And to give Pierre‑Olivier a little bit of time, I just want to remind everyone that we will have regional press briefings later this week, and some of these questions can be brought to all heads of departments that are going to be talking later on in the week. Pierre‑Olivier?

    Mr. Gourinchas: First, I will make three quick remarks. We are going to wait and see at the end of this month, on October 30, the details of the budget that will be announced by the U.K. government. And at that point, we’ll be able to evaluate and see the detail of the measures and how they will impact the U.K. economy.

    The broader question, I think, is relevant for many countries, not just the U.K. And it goes to the second pivot I mentioned, this narrow path in terms of fiscal consolidation. I think when countries have elevated debt levels, when interest rates are high, when growth is OK but not great, there is a risk that things could escalate or get out of control quickly. And so there is a need to bring debt levels down, stabilize them when they are not stabilized and rebuild fiscal buffers. That is true for many countries around the world. And if you are not doing that—and that is getting to the question that was asked by the gentleman on the right here—if you’re not doing that, that’s when you find yourself potentially later on at the mercy of market pressures that will force an adjustment that is uncontrolled to a large extent. At which point you have very few degrees of freedom, so you do not want to get in that position. And I think the effort to stabilize public debt has to be seen in that context.

    Now, the other side of the narrow path is, of course, if you try to do too much too quickly, you might have an adverse impact on growth. And you have to be careful there because we do have important—most countries have important needs when it comes to spending, whether it’s about central services, what we think about healthcare, or if we think about public investment and climate transition. So we need to protect also the type of spending that can be good for growth. So finding ways—and this is something that our colleagues in the Fiscal Monitor report emphasize, finding ways to consolidate by reducing expenditures where it’s needed. Maybe raising revenues. Often, it’s a combination of both but doing so in a way that is least impactful on growth. It’s country by country. There is no general formula. But that’s kind of the nature of the exercise.

    That pivot, that second pivot is absolutely essential. At the point we’re at again precisely because we’re in a world in which there will be more shocks and countries need to be prepared and need to have some room on the fiscal side to be able to build that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Last question on this side. Then I will go online, and then I will go around the room again. The gentleman in the second row.

    QUESTION: Thanks, Jose. Pierre‑Olivier, a question on Argentina. The IMF is maintaining its projections for the country for next year, improving GDP and inflation, 45 percent at the end of the year. Oh, yes. Sorry. Alam Md Hasanul from International.

    A question on Argentina. The IMF is maintaining its projections for next year, but I wanted to see if you could give us a little bit more detail on, where do you see the economy going. And if it’s accurate to say at this point that the worst of the crisis is in the past? Thanks.

    Mr. De Haro: We have received other questions regarding Argentina online from Lilliana Franco. Basically, she wants to know what’s behind our expectations for inflation for 2025. And I think that there are other Argentine reporters in the room. I see them in the back. Please, if somebody can get them the mic and we can get all the questions on Argentina and then move on to other regions. There. There. Those two, please. Try to keep it short.

    QUESTION: Hi. Patricia Valli from El Cronista. You mentioned the need to keep going with the reforms. And the government in Argentina is implementing a series of reforms. What’s the take of the IMF in terms of these? And if they are perhaps hurting the most vulnerable due to the increase of poverty numbers in Argentina in the past report?

    QUESTION: Hello. Juan Manuel Barca from Clarín Newspaper. I want to know if you raised your employment projection compared to the April—compared to the July forecast.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So let me first state at the outset that our projections for Argentina have not been updated since July, and the reason for this is because there are ongoing program discussions between the authorities and the Fund. And so while that process is going on, we did not update the projections for the October round.

    Now, to come to the question that was asked on the left. There are two things that are relevant for Argentina, two main things. One is what’s happening on the inflation side. Here, I think the progress has been very substantial. We are now seeing month‑on‑month inflation in Argentina close to 3.5 percent, and this is down from about 25 percent month on month back in December of last year. So very, very significant decline in the inflation rate. So that’s something to acknowledge. And the hope is, of course, that the measures in place will continue to improve the situation on that front.

    On the growth front, what we are saying is that activity has contracted substantially in the first half of the year, but there are signs that it’s starting to gradually recover. Now how much again, I cannot give you an update because we do not have it as of now. But there are signs that there is a recovery in real wages and in private credit and activity.

    Now, of course, this has been difficult for the Argentine economy, the decline in growth of that nature. And that’s something that, again, we are engaged in discussions with the authorities on the best way forward. I cannot comment more than that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Now I am going to get a question from our colleagues on WebEx. I think that Weier is there.

    QUESTION: I have a question on China. Given China’s recent implementation of various stimulus measures, such as support for the real estate—real sector and interest rate reductions and other economic incentives, we’ve already seen a major boost in its capital market. So how do you assess the potential impact of these developments on China’s economic recovery and growth perspective?

    Also, how the external effects, such as the Federal Reserve’s easing monetary path, will play a role here. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Before you answer on the Federal Reserve, there’s other questions on China of a similar nature. Recent stimulus announced by the Governor and its effects.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. So China, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have a slight downward revision for its 2024 growth, compared to our July projections to 4.8 percent. And that’s a revision that’s coming largely due to a weaker second quarter of the year. And that weaker second quarter of the year is reflecting continued decline in confidence in the household and corporate sector and also the continued problems in the property sector in China.

    Now, this is something that, of course, is a top priority to address for the Chinese authorities. And we’ve seen a number of measures that have been announced since the end of last month. First measures, monetary and financial measures announced by the People’s Bank of China, and then some fiscal measures that were announced a few weeks ago.

    These measures in general go in the right direction, from our perspective. They are trying to improve the situation in the property sector. They’re trying to, for instance, lowering borrowing rates or trying to improve the balance sheet of the property developers.

    In our view, in our assessment, the measures announced at the end of last month by the PBOC, although they go in the right direction, are not sufficient to lift growth in a substantially material way. And that’s why our forecast is still at about 4.8 percent for 2024 and is unchanged for next year, at 4.5 percent.

    The new, more recent measures announced a few weeks ago by the Ministry of Finance are not incorporated in our forecast. We are waiting to see the details. I should mention, however, that since then, there has also been a release of the Q3 growth for China, and this has also been a little bit on the disappointing side. So I would say that what we’re seeing in terms of where the Chinese economy might be going is a little bit of a downward revision coming from the Q3 forecast and then potentially some measures that will help lift the economy going forward.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we have an additional question online. Basically, it comes from a reporter in Israel who wants to know how the current conflict is affecting the region and the global economy. Also, if there’s any other questions regarding the ongoing conflict, we can go here in the first row, please.

    QUESTION: Hi. Amir Goumma from Asharq with Bloomberg. With the GCC countries increasingly focusing and diversifying their economies away from oil now, how the IMF sees the progress and how you assess that with geopolitical tensions that may affect the attraction of the investment?

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. So on the impact of the conflict in the Middle East on the countries in the region, and more broadly, let me ask my colleague Petya Koeva Brooks to come in.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed, the conflict has inflicted a heavy toll on the region, and our hearts go to all who have been affected by it. We are monitoring the situation very closely. And what we could say at this stage is apart from the enormous uncertainty that we see is that the fallout has been the hardest in the countries in the region, at the epicenter of the conflict. We’ve seen significant declines in output in West Bank, in Gaza. Lebanon has also been hard hit. Now, we’ve also seen impact in the—on the economy in Israel, although there, I think the—so far at least, the impact has been smaller.

    Now, beyond that, there has also been an impact on commodity prices, on oil prices. We’ve seen quite a lot of volatility, though, as other factors have also come in, such as the concerns about global demand kind of have pushed prices in the opposite direction.

    Now, beyond that, when it comes to specific countries in the GCC region, when it comes to, for instance, Saudi Arabia, we’ve seen there, actually the non‑oil output has done very well, and we do have a small downward revision in the overall growth rate, but that is pretty much because of the voluntary oil cuts that have now been extended through November. Let me stop here. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are coming here to the center of the room. I’m going to go way back. The gentleman in the blue shirt that I think is the third row from the back. Yep. There. He has—there, there, there. A little bit. Can you stand up? Yep. Perfect. And then I will go with you, with the lady.

    QUESTION: Thank you for doing this. Your alternative scenario about the trade war does not seem so far from reality. Indeed, especially if Trump wins the elections. So could you augment about that? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: We have a couple of questions similar to that nature.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So, I mean, of course, I will first preface by saying we are not commenting on elections or potential platforms here at the IMF. What we are seeing and when we’re looking at the world economy goes beyond what might be happening in a single country. This is why the scenario that we are looking at in Box 1.2 of our World Economic Outlook is one that focuses on, if you want, an escalation of trade tensions between different regions—whether the U.S., the European Union, or China. And the numbers I quoted earlier are reflecting our model estimates of the cumulative impact of this increase in tensions. So I think that this is something that we are very concerned about. We’ve seen a very sharp increase in a number of trade‑distorting measures implemented by countries since 2019, roughly. They’ve gone from 1,000 to 3,000, so tripling of trade‑distorting measures implemented by countries, and 2019 was not a low point. That was already something that was above what we were seeing in the 2010s. So there is definitely, you know, a direction of travel here that we are very concerned about because a lot of these trade‑distorting measures could reflect decisions by countries that are self‑centered but could be ultimately harmful not just to the global economy, but this is the benefits of doing a scenario analysis like the one we did. They are also hurtful for the countries that want to implement them, as well, because the impact on global trade also makes the residents of a country poorer.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I’m going to take a question from WebEx and then I’m going to go to you. I think that we have a question on the U.S. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: My question would be regarding the U.S. resilience toward inflation shock. I remember talks about this during the April meetings and the April report. And I wanted to ask you whether you’re still committed to this forecast of the U.S. resiliency, and whether we can still see the risk of recession in the U.S. since recent talks about the unemployment data, it has not always come to the expectations of what the bond market or the stock exchange thinks.

    So is the U.S. still as resilient as you saw it in April this year?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So, I mean, the news on the U.S. is good in a sense. We have had an upgrade in growth forecasts for 2024 and 2025. The historical numbers have also been revised, so even upgraded 2023, that is already sort of behind us. But the numbers came in, and they were stronger than what was realized. And that strong growth performance has been happening in a context of a continued disinflation. There have been some bumps in the road. The disinflation may not have been proceeding, especially earlier in the year, as quickly as was projected, but lately it has been quite substantial.

    So what accounts for this is two things that are really important there. One is, there is strong productivity growth that we see when we look at the U.S. That’s somewhat unlike other advanced economies, in fact. When we look around the world. And the second is also a very significant role that immigration has played, the increase in foreign‑born workers in the U.S. that have been integrated fairly quickly into the labor force. Now, the increase in unemployment that we’ve seen recently—I just showed it in my opening remarks—reflects to a large extent the fact that you have this increase in foreign‑born workers. And it takes—they have been integrated quickly in the labor force, but still there was an influx of them or there was an influx of them, and it’s taken a little bit of time to absorb them. And that’s what is reflected in the increased unemployment rate. So the labor market picture remains one that is fairly, fairly robust, even though it has cooled off but from very, very tight levels. Growth is solid. So I think the answer to the question that was posed, I think a risk of a recession in the U.S. in the absence of a very sharp shock would be somewhat diminished.

    Now, that is really what paved the way when you think about what the Federal Reserve is doing, seeing this inflation coming down a lot but noticing the increase in unemployment, pivoting away from just fighting inflation, that fight is almost done, and now being more concerned about, maybe what might be happening going forward with the labor market and wanting to make sure that that cooling off of the labor market does not turn into something that is more negative.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The clock here says that I have seven minutes that I can push a little bit, but we go there. Then we will go to this side. And come back here and maybe end around here.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is Hope Moses‑Ashike from Business Day Nigeria. So I am right here in this room, in April, you projected the Nigeria economy to grow by 3.3 percent, and you cited improved oil sector, security, and then agriculture. So I want to understand, what has changed since then in terms of Nigeria’s growth and the factors you mentioned? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. Jean‑Marc, do you want to comment on Nigeria?

    Mr. Natal: Yes. Rightly so. We revised growth for Nigeria in 2024 by .2 down. And, you know, things are volatile, I suppose, because the reason for the revision is precisely issues in agriculture related to flooding. And also issues in the production of oil related to security issues, and also maintenance issues that have pushed down the production of oil. So these two factors have played a role.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We go to this side. I’m going to go to the front row, the lady with the white jacket. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you. So this is still a follow‑up question since you just answered on Nigeria. What’s the IMF’s projection for the social impacts on full subsidy removal, especially when you—full subsidy removal and forex unification in terms of poverty, inequality, and food insecurity? And also, can give us your medium‑term projections for Nigeria’s growth? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So I am afraid on this one I will have to go back and check because I do not have the number ready on the impact of the removal of the fuel subsidies specifically that you asked about. I do not know if my colleagues—

    Mr. De Haro: And I would encourage you to formulate this question in the press briefing for the regional outlook for the African Department. Probably there, you will get your answer, but reach out to us bilaterally and then we will get you the question.

    We are going to stay—we’re going to go to the gentleman in the back. Yep.

    QUESTION: Thanks very much. Andy Robinson of La Vanguardia, Barcelona, Spain. There seems to be a strange sort of divergence in the euro zone economy in which Spain—you have revised upwards Spain’s GDP growth forecast a whole point, percentage point, whilst Germany is languishing. Could I ask you, is Spain’s performance sustainable? And Germany’s in a recession?

    Also, one other question. You seem in your box on inflation and wage share and profit share, wage share you seem to be suggesting if there’s any danger of increasing inflation in the future, it’s more an excessive profit share than exactly wage? Could you tell me if that’s a correct interpretation? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So just a few words on the euro area in general. And then I will let my colleague Petya come in on Spain. We do see some divergence across the different countries of the euro area. And one of the drivers is how reliant they are on manufacturing, as one of the key sectors in domestic production. And what you are seeing is, there is a general weakness in manufacturing and that’s heating countries like Germany. While countries that are maybe a bit more reliant on services, including tourism—and Spain is one of them—are seeing a better performance.

    Now, on the second part of your question, and I will turn it over to Petya, on the profit share and wages. We’re seeing now wage growth that is in excess of inflation. And sometimes people say, well, that’s a problem because that means, you know, maybe that cannot be sustained and therefore there will be more inflation. Well, not quite. That’s not the view we have here at the Fund. A lot of the increase in wages in excess of inflation right now—so that’s an improvement in real wages in standards of living—is reflecting a catchup phenomenon. It’s after years during which inflation was higher than wage inflation, wage increase. So real wages are catching up. They are covering lost ground.

    Now, during those years when inflation was higher than wages, profit margins somewhere were higher in the economy. And that is the profit margin that is being eroded back. So it’s not that we’re squeezing profits inordinately right now. It’s just they’re coming back more toward their historical level as real wages are catching up, and that’s not necessarily a concern in terms of inflation dynamics going forward. With this, let me turn it over to Petya.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Thank you. Indeed Spain does stand out as one of the countries with a substantial upward revision for this year. We’re now projecting growth to be 2.9, after last year, when it was 2.7. So what’s behind this revision is the positive surprises that we’ve already seen, especially in the second quarter, as well as some of the revisions to the back data.

    And then when we look at the composition of these surprises, again, it was net exports and the receipts from tourism that were a substantial contributor. But also, private consumption and investment also played a role, which may imply that some of the impact of the national recovery plan and the EU funds that are being used could—we could already be seeing the impact of that. And then when we move forward, we are expecting a slowdown in growth next year, but, again, if these—if this investment continues, of course, that would be a very positive factor behind the recovery. Thanks.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I have time for just one question because literally, we have 15 seconds. So I’m going to go with the gentleman here.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Barry Wood, Hong Kong Radio. Mr. Gourinchas, in April you said likely we will see one rate cut in the United States. We’ve seen it. The data, as you just said, is very good. Would further rate cuts be counterproductive?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Well, in our projections, of course, we need to make some assumptions about what central banks, and this round of projection is no exception. So in our projections just released today, we’re assuming that there will be two more rate cuts by the Fed in 2024 and then four additional rate cuts in 2025. And that would bring the policy rate towards the terminal rate that is around 2.75, 3. Why do we see the additional rate cuts? Well, in part it’s the progress on inflation. And then as I mentioned earlier, as an answer to an earlier question, the fact that we’re seeing the labor markets cooling and therefore the concern for the Fed is now to make sure that that last part of the disinflation process is not one that is going to hit activity. In the Chapter 2 of our report, we describe how that last mile could be somewhat more costly because, as the supply constraints have eased and moved away, it becomes harder to bring down inflation in that last mile without hurting economic activity, so it’s important to also adjust the policy rate path in a direction of a little bit more easing, as the economy is smooth landing.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. As in life, all good things have to come to an end. But before that, I want to thank you all, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, and Jean‑Marc. Also, on behalf of the Communications Department and a couple of reminders for all of you, the Global Financial Stability Report press briefing is going to happen in this same room at around 10:15 a.m. Tomorrow morning, you have the press briefing for the Fiscal Monitor, and later on in the week, you will have the Managing Director’s press briefing and all the regional press briefings that we’ve been talking about. I want to encourage you to go to IMF.org, download the flagships, the World Economic Outlook, and if you have any questions, comments, feedback, everything to media at IMF.org. So have a great day.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/22/tr102224-weo-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: English translation of Prime Minister’s opening remarks during bilateral meeting with President of Russia (October 22, 2024)

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 22 OCT 2024 7:24PM by PIB Delhi

    Excellency,

    I sincerely express my gratitude for your friendship, warm welcome, and hospitality. I am delighted to have the opportunity to visit such a beautiful city as Kazan for the BRICS summit. This city shares deep and historical ties with India. The opening of a new Indian consulate in Kazan will further strengthen these ties.

    Excellency,

    My two visits to Russia in the past three months reflect our close coordination and deep friendship. Our cooperation in every field has been strengthened by our Annual Summit held in Moscow in July.

    Excellency,

    I congratulate you on the successful chairmanship of BRICS over the past year. In the last fifteen years, BRICS has established its unique identity, and now severeal countries around the world wish to join it. I look forward to participate in the BRICS Summit.

    Excellency,

    We have remained in regular contact regarding the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As I have stated before, we believe that the resolution of issues should be achieved through peaceful means only. We fully support the earliest possible restoration of peace and stability. All our efforts prioritize humanity. India remains ready to provide all possible assistance in the future as well.

    Excellency,

    Today is yet another important opportunity to share our thoughts on all these matters. Once again, many thanks.

    DISCLAIMER – This is the approximate translation of Prime Minister’s remarks. Original remarks were delivered

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister meets with the President of the Russian Federation

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 22 OCT 2024 10:32PM by PIB Delhi

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi met with the President of the Russian Federation, H.E. Vladimir Putin, in Kazan today, on the margins of the 16th BRICS Summit. This was their second meeting this year. The two leaders had earlier met in Moscow for the 22nd Annual Summit in July 2024.

    Prime Minister thanked President Putin for his invitation to attend the 16th BRICS Summit. He appreciated the Russian Chairship of BRICS and its efforts to strengthen multilateralism, advance sustainable development, and push for global governance reform. The two leaders also reviewed bilateral cooperation in a range of fields, including political, economic, defence, energy, and people-to-people ties. They welcomed the forthcoming meeting of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Cultural matters, which is scheduled to be held in November 2024 in New Delhi.

    The leaders exchanged views on India-Russia engagement in multilateral fora, in particular in BRICS. They also shared views on key regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Prime Minister reiterated that dialogue and diplomacy was the way forward in resolving conflicts.

    The two leaders agreed to remain engaged to further strengthen the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between the two countries, which continues to register significant growth and has shown resilience in the backdrop of geopolitical uncertainties.

    Prime Minister invited President Putin to visit India next year for the 23rd Annual Summit.

     

    ***

    MJPS/SR

    (Release ID: 2067209) Visitor Counter : 33

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0141/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0141/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

     having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

     having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, signed on 22 April 1996[1],

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas 300 people remain in detention in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges; whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas economist and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 after 274 days in detention;

    B. whereas Azerbaijan has also intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    C. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity;

    D. whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    E. whereas on 19 September 2023, after a nine-month illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor and disregarding both the commitments it made in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control;

    F. whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, including 30 000 children, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh being almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this amounts to ethnic cleansing;

    G. whereas the Russian peacekeeping force did not act in accordance with its mandate, as laid down in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, the establishment of the Azerbaijani checkpoint at the entrance to the corridor or the offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023;

    H. whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    1. Stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    2. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders, journalists, environmental, political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated and or politically motivated charges; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, as well as human rights defenders and journalists including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; underlines that since April 2024, Azerbaijan has carried out further arrests of civil society activists on bogus charges, including Farid Mehralidze, Igbal Abilov, Bahurz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov;

    3. Recalls the need to lift the travel ban in force against Gubad Ibadoghlu and drop all charges against him, and calls on Azerbaijan urgently to ensure an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing, and allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    4. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their international commitments and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law;

    5. Calls for the EU to impose sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Armenia; strongly supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration;

    8. Recalls its previous condemnation of the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan of 19-20 September 2023 against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the expulsion of the entirety of the ethnic Armenian community which had been living there for centuries, amounting to ethnic cleansing; recalls that this attack resulted in the complete dissolution of the structures of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of full Azerbaijani control over the region; demands the release of all remaining Armenian political prisoners and prisoners of war;

    9. Reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    10. Calls on Azerbaijan to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to return to and live in their homes in dignity and safety, overseen by an international presence, to access their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and to fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights;

    11. Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the European institutions to identify or develop international mechanisms to guarantee the collective, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh to their ancestral land; calls for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the reports and resolutions adopted by Parliament on Nagorno-Karabakh;

    12. Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage that has occurred since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments;

    13. Recognises the urgent need to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Armenia in the field of security and defence; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; notes the added value of regular EU-Armenian Political and Security Dialogues, as an umbrella platform for all security related matters; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    14. Expresses its support for the decision of Armenia to discontinue the presence of Russian Federal Security Service border guards at the international airport in Yerevan, and its understanding for the suspension of relations with Belarus;

    15. Calls for the EU to end its dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the substantial Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU;

    16. Calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU; recalls its demand, in the light of Azerbaijan’s 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;

    17. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; believes that if a peace agreement is to be lasting, it requires genuine engagement from the parties, not the escalation of rhetoric and demands; welcomes the recent achievement in the Commission on Delimitation and Border Security of a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of several sectors of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;

    18. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; takes good note of Armenia’s European aspirations, as expressed by the Armenian foreign minister, among others; recalls its previous position that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law; considers that, should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its current path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU, not only in the area of economic partnership but also in political dialogue, people-to-people contacts, sectoral integration and security cooperation; believes that the experience stemming from the Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova should serve as a good basis for closer EU-Armenia cooperation, in particular in relation to a gradual sectoral integration with the single market;

    19. Welcomes the decision of 22 July 2024 to launch the visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, which is the first step towards achieving a visa free regime for short stays in the EU; welcomes further the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, worth EUR 10 million; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    20. Condemns the Baku Initiative Group’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise EU Member States; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; strongly opposes the allegations made by Ilham Aliyev himself at the Baku Initiative Group meeting in Baku in November 2023;

    21. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    22. Regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    23. Strongly condemns the intimidation, death threats and assassination attempts against opponents of the Azerbaijani Government, including in EU countries, and against Azerbaijani citizens who have been granted political asylum by Member States, such as Mahammad Mirzali in France; calls on the Member States to cooperate, if necessary, in the investigation into the murder, in September 2024, of Vivadi Isgandarl, an Azerbaijani political opponent residing in France; stresses that for the Member States, preventing any act of retaliation on their territory is a matter of democracy, human rights, security and sovereignty; insists that Europol should closely monitor this matter;

    24. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access for all Azerbaijani officials to EU institutional buildings be denied until further notice;

    25. Welcomes the fact that the Republic of Armenia formally deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2023 and that the statute entered into force for Armenia on 1 February 2024;

    26. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0138/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Adam Bielan, Charlie Weimers, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Carlo Fidanza, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0138/2024

    European Parliament resolution on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous reports, recommendations and resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

     having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan, passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

     having regard to the motion of 12 September 2024 passed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on UN resolution 2758,

     having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October on China’s latest military drills around Taiwan,

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in the 1970s, in the hope of enhancing prosperity, stability and peace, the PRC was offered a place in the UN; whereas Beijing seized this opportunity, benefiting from close ties with the West, joining the World Trade Organization, enjoying freedom of navigation and experiencing stabilisation in the seas and straits of South-East Asia, all of which opened the door to the country’s unprecedented economic and technological development;

    B. whereas, in recent years, through its actions – such as supporting Russia’s barbaric aggression and assertively expanding in the region, particularly with the threat of invading Taiwan – Beijing is failing to uphold the commitments expected of UN Security Council members and the commitments enshrined in the UN Charter; whereas UN resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the United Nations, nor of Taiwanese participation in UN agencies or international organisations;

    C. whereas the PRC has falsely leveraged some interpretations of UN Resolution 2758 to advance its ‘One China’ narrative globally and put pressure on Taiwan, limiting its voice on the international stage and influencing its diplomatic relationships;

    D. whereas the Australian and Dutch Parliaments have already decided not to go along with the PRC’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758;

    E. whereas the PRC is perpetuating its overly aggressive actions, and trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    F. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched, without prior warning, a large-scale military drill named Joint Sword 2024-B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coastguard ships around Taiwan, setting single-day records;

    G. whereas the PLA’s air manoeuvres have increased from under 20 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2019 to 2 459 so far in 2024; whereas the threat is exacerbated by Beijing’s announcement that it was practising for a blockade of Taiwan’s key ports and military bases; whereas the PLA’s primary locus for ADIZ operations has shifted over time from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait; whereas the PLA’s flight activity to the east of Taiwan has increased, demonstrating a shift from training and navigation operations to testing likely combat concepts in the event of a blockade or military invasion of Taiwan;

    H. whereas, besides military pressure, the PRC has for years pursued a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    I. whereas the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    J. whereas on 25 September 2024 the PRC fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980;

    K. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

    L. whereas Beijing’s active support of the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions against Ukraine contradicts the PRC’s claim to be a ‘stabilising power’; whereas the Russian war of aggression is being closely watched by the PRC as a test bed for the possible future invasion of Taiwan and to gauge the likely reaction of the international community;

    M. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    N. whereas the PRC is a one-party state controlled and ruled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); whereas the CCP has used its growing influence in international organisations to reshape the open, rules-based international order to protect and advance its own interests;

    O. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is an important EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region;

    2. Condemns the sustained efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN resolution 2758, historical documents and international rules;

    3. Remains deeply committed to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, which does not equate with the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle’;

    4. Stresses that nothing in resolution 2758 prevents Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and that it has no bearing on the sovereign choices of other countries with respect to their relationship with Taiwan;

    5. Regrets the PRC’s efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation, in line with the key UN principles of universal representation, in relevant international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to better protect global interests and address the serious challenges facing humanity, such as pandemics, climate change and human rights;

    6. Strongly condemns the PRC’s provocative, irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilising military exercises, including the recent exercises of 14 October, as well as its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its aggressive posture in the wider region; expresses its concern about the PRC’s recent launch of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean, which has contributed to further tensions across the Indo-Pacific region;

    7. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    8. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

    9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;

    10. Urges the PRC to immediately cease all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, and to restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, all of which also poses a risk to international aviation, and stop all other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns;

    11. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the free world, including the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only cause significant economic disruption affecting European interests and prosperity, but would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region, as well as democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core;

    12. Recalls Taiwan’s help and assistance during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    13. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;

    14. Reiterates its call for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to ‘European Union Office in Taiwan’ to reflect the broad scope of our ties;

    15. Reiterates its previous call for the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations on deepening bilateral economic ties;

    16. Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; condemns any form of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, with regard to the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of the PRC and Taiwan.

     

     

     

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