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Category: Statistics

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Year-end Population for 2024

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Year-end Population for 2024
    Year-end Population for 2024
    ****************************

         According to the statistics released by the Census and Statistics Department today (February 18), the provisional estimate of the Hong Kong population was 7 534 200 at end-2024, representing an increase of 6 400 or 0.1% from 7 527 900 at end-2023.      The population increase between end-2023 and end-2024 was mainly attributable to a net inflow of 21 000 Hong Kong residents (i.e. inflow more than outflow) recorded during the period. Over the same period, a natural decrease (i.e. deaths surpassing births) of 14 700 was recorded, with 36 700 births and 51 400 deaths.      Among the total population at end-2024, 7 267 100 were Usual Residents and 267 100 were Mobile Residents. The revised figure for the mid-year population for 2024 was 7 524 100. The number of Usual Residents was revised to 7 257 300 and the number of Mobile Residents to 266 800. The rate of change in population from mid-2023 to mid-2024 was also revised to -0.2%.      Table 1 presents estimated total population as at end-2024, while Table 2 presents population figures from mid-2013 to end-2024. Commentary        A government spokesperson pointed out that the Hong Kong population registered an increase for the third consecutive years amid resumption of normalcy. Continuing to benefit from various measures on talent attraction and labour importation, many people moved to Hong Kong from the Mainland and other places around the world throughout 2024, resulting in an increase of 0.3% in Usual Residents as at end-2024 as compared to end-2023, and thus an increase in the overall population.     Further information         “Usual Residents” refer to two categories of people: (1) Hong Kong Permanent Residents who have stayed in Hong Kong for at least three months during the six months before or for at least three months during the six months after the reference time-point, regardless of whether they are in Hong Kong or not at the reference time-point; and (2) Hong Kong Non-permanent Residents who are in Hong Kong at the reference time-point.      For those Hong Kong Permanent Residents who are not “Usual Residents”, they are classified as “Mobile Residents” if they have stayed in Hong Kong for at least one month but less than three months during the six months before or for at least one month but less than three months during the six months after the reference time-point, regardless of whether they are in Hong Kong or not at the reference time-point.      Under the current practice, the latest population estimate is released on a provisional basis in each round. The revised estimate will be released six months later. In other words, while the provisional population estimate for end-2024 is released today, the corresponding revised estimate will be released in August 2025. 

     
    Ends/Tuesday, February 18, 2025Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: HK population rises 0.1%

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The provisional estimate of Hong Kong’s population at the end of 2024 was 7,534,200, up 0.1% from a year earlier, the Census & Statistics Department announced today.

    The population increase was mainly attributable to a net inflow of 21,000 Hong Kong residents during the period, the department said.

    There were 36,700 births and 51,400 deaths, resulting in a natural decrease of 14,700.

    The Government highlighted that the city’s population had increased for a third consecutive year, coinciding with the resumption of normalcy.

    It outlined that many people moved to Hong Kong from the Mainland and other places around the world throughout 2024, thanks in part to measures to facilitate talent attraction and labour importation. It said this resulted in an increase of 0.3% in usual residents between end-2023 and end-2024.

    The number of usual residents was 7,267,100, while there were 267,100 mobile residents.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sergey Netesov: “You have to root for the positive”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    At the popular science marathon “Darwin Week”, a doctor of biological sciences, professor, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the laboratory of bionanotechnology, microbiology and virology spoke with a report “Evolution of a set of respiratory infections” Faculty of Natural Sciences of NSU Sergey Netesov.

    Evolution of the virus

    In Russia, doctors register 28 to 33 million cases of acute respiratory infections every year, but these are official statistics. When seeing a patient, the doctor fills out a statistical form, which is sent for processing to the health authorities, where statistical data is collected. However, not everyone comes to see a therapist, especially if the disease is mild, preferring to endure it “on their feet” or use home remedies to fight the infection. Such patients are not included in these statistics. Therefore, experts assume that the actual number of cases exceeds the official data at least twice.

    Acute respiratory infections (ARI) are caused by viruses, bacteria, mycobacteria and mycoplasma. In addition, most likely not all pathogens of ARI in humans have been discovered yet.

    Previously, doctors officially diagnosed ARVI without specifying the pathogen and specifically – influenza viruses, and even then the diagnosis was made by the doctor, guided only by the symptoms observed in the patient, and the laboratory diagnostic methods that existed before the 2000s were lengthy, inaccurate and insensitive. More or less reliable test systems for diagnosing influenza viruses based on the polymerase chain reaction PCR method appeared only in the late 90s, and for diagnosing other pathogens – only in the last 5-10 years. The data from a study of the causes of ARVI using the example of one of the counties of the state of Michigan (USA), published in 2002, surprised epidemiologists: influenza was not in the leading positions – its share was only 9%, while ordinary coronaviruses – 14%, rhinovirus – 34%. Unknown infections then accounted for 23%. Later, metapneumoviruses were identified, and their share in the structure of pathogens was about 10% in the category that was previously designated as “unknown infections.” Common coronaviruses, as a rule, have “overtaken” the flu in the share of infected people in the last 20-30 years, but did not pose a serious danger in the form of fatalities – until SARS-CoV-2 appeared, which took millions of lives around the world. At the initial stage of the pandemic, it posed a very serious danger with a mortality rate of up to 6%, but over time, due to the evolution into much less pathogenic variants, it almost equaled the mortality rate of the common flu – 0.1 – 0.2%.

    — The high mortality rate from the new coronavirus infection was due to vascular thrombosis, which was classified as a circulatory disease at the initial stages of the pandemic, and a cytokine storm — an overly aggressive immune response of the body to a viral infection. It manifests itself in different ways, depending on the chronic diseases of the infected person — in the form of circulatory diseases, pneumonia, complications of type 1 and type 2 diabetes, and sometimes — digestive organs. In the first six months of the pandemic, there were no reliable diagnostics for SARS-CoV-2 markers. Partly due to this, some cases of death from the new coronavirus infection were attributed to serious chronic diseases that the deceased patients suffered from – diseases of the circulatory system, respiratory system, endocrine system, etc. In addition, unlike most respiratory diseases, people died from the new coronavirus not during the first two weeks of the disease, but within a month or two, so it was believed that the patient’s death was the result of complications rather than an acute viral disease, explained Sergei Netesov.

    Over the past few years, the deadly coronavirus has evolved towards changing its antigenic properties and reducing pathogenicity, and is no longer as dangerous in terms of mortality as before. Large-scale vaccination of the population, as well as the immunity formed in those who have recovered, have also had an effect, but in terms of morbidity, this virus still sometimes outpaces the combined influenza viruses A and B, and mortality from it has not been reduced to zero. Last fall, 20-30 people died from Covid every week in Russia. These were mainly elderly people with serious chronic diseases.

    Currently, another pathogen of ARVI, the respiratory syncytial virus, is no less dangerous in terms of severe progression and mortality. In certain periods of the 2023-2024 season, its share in the causes of the overall incidence of ARVI was 40%. Scientists and doctors have long found out that it is one of the main causes of severe pneumonia in children and the elderly. Since last year, trials of vaccines against this virus have begun in the European Union and the United States.

    In the winter of 2024, rhinovirus was the leading cause of acute respiratory viral infections in Russia. It has unpleasant symptoms because it causes inflammation of the nasal sinuses, but does not pose a danger to humans.

    — Only in rare cases is the cause of ARI or ARVI only one pathogen, more often two or three. It often happens that the same patient has one or two ARI pathogens — viral and one — bacterial. In this case, the picture of the disease becomes complex. Viral infections, as a rule, prepare the ground for infection with pathogenic bacteria, — said Sergey Netesov.

    Reliable protection

    To reduce the risk of severe respiratory viral infections, it is necessary to get vaccinated in a timely manner, and it is advisable for people at increased risk of severe acute respiratory infections to wear medical masks in public places. Sergei Netesov also spoke about the influenza vaccines used in Russia. According to him, it is necessary to choose, if possible, four-component drugs with a share of 15 micrograms of antigens of each subtype of the virus. At the same time, the probability of severe disease is reduced by about 20-30 times. And for unvaccinated people, increased risks of severe acute respiratory infections remain for people with impaired immune systems, diabetics and representatives of other risk groups.

    In favor of the effectiveness of masks, Sergei Netesov noted that the mask will not hold a single viral particle, because the size of its pores is too large for this. But viruses in the form of single particles do not fly through the air. They move on microdroplets of fluids in our bodies, released from the body when talking, singing, coughing or sneezing. But these drops have a larger diameter and do not pass through the pores of the mask. And even the most primitive mask holds about 75-80% of such particles, of course, if you cover both your mouth and nose with it. And for infection, the size of the pathogen dose that a person receives is very important. Reducing this dose often leads to zeroing out the infection or getting a very small dose – then the disease does not develop quickly, and the body copes with it much easier.

    The flu virus is constantly evolving, and this process is aimed at an important goal for it – to “break through” the previous immunity and infect as many carriers – susceptible people – as possible.

    In early 2024, several publications were published in the United States stating that cow milk yields in some regions of the country had begun to decline; later, veterinarians identified the H5N1 subtype of avian influenza in them. The influenza virus of this subtype was first isolated not only from birds, but also from some sick people in 1997 in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. The virus also affected people, with a very high mortality rate. The reason was soon revealed: in most cases, it was a rare mutation characteristic of the inhabitants of these countries, in which one of the receptors in their lungs turned out to be similar to a similar receptor in birds. This feature is not typical for residents of other countries. And so in 2024, the virus spread not only among birds, but acquired new mutations and “switched” to cattle and more. Several dead cats that had previously drunk cow’s milk were found near the barns with sick cows. The cause of their death, like the illness of the cows on the farm, was the avian influenza virus. And although humans and animals do not have many common infections, this virus has become one of them. It turned out that at the end of 2023, the virus acquired mutations that allowed it to move from birds to cattle. From the beginning of 2024 to February 2025, 68 cases of infection of dairy and poultry workers were noted worldwide. It seems that this flu virus has not yet spread widely, but careful monitoring of its evolution is necessary.

    Race for survival

    Scientists believe that the more common this subtype of the virus becomes, the more likely it is to acquire a combination of mutations that will increase the risk of infection in humans. On the other hand, this subtype of flu has been circulating in various bird species and causing rare sporadic infections in humans for more than two decades, but so far there has been no pandemic. This is one of those cases where a pandemic could start next week or never.

    — Not only pathogens of viral diseases evolve, but also our immune system. It is a kind of race. Therefore, it is necessary to study not only pathogens, but also the parameters of our immunity. Increase the number and effectiveness of vaccines, increase the volume of vaccination. This really improves the quality of life of the population and increases its duration. At the same time, long-term monitoring studies are needed to study the occurrence of pathogens, their molecular genetic diversity and molecular evolution, including drug resistance. Russia has the necessary instrumental and material-reactive bases, including its own high-tech production of many (but not all) modern vaccines and diagnostics. But their wider implementation in practice is required. It is also necessary to develop new vaccines against a number of viral and bacterial pathogens. Unfortunately, so far the diagnostic algorithms in our compulsory insurance medicine have been worked out to a minimum — primarily due to underfunding. But it is possible to distinguish a bacterial infection from a viral one using a very simple test for the content of procalcitonin and some other markers in the blood, said Sergei Netesov.

    The scientist also noted that when fighting a viral disease, regardless of what virus caused it, the patient’s psychological state and the support of loved ones are also important. It is important to be sick in a good mood, then recovery will be faster.

    — You should always be positive when you are sick! A person with a bad emotional background is objectively sicker. You need to look to the future with confidence and optimism and tell your body: “Get well.” The human body is a very complex unified system, where all components influence each other. In this case, you need to establish positive feedback between the body and the brain, try to create a good mood for yourself and, of course, follow all the doctor’s recommendations, — said Sergey Netesov.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: The Reserve Bank has cut rates for the first time in four years. But it is cautious about future cuts

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By John Hawkins, Senior Lecturer, Canberra School of Politics, Economics and Society, University of Canberra

    The Reserve Bank cut official interest rates on Tuesday, the first decrease in four years, saying inflationary pressures are easing “a little more quickly than expected”.

    However, the central bank said the outlook for economic activity and inflation remains uncertain, with a risk that household spending may be slower than expected.

    The reduction in the cash rate target will come as a relief to the one-third of households with a mortgage. It will help to ease the cost of living crisis for them.

    The cut from a 13-year high of 4.35% to 4.1% had been widely expected by economists and financial markets.

    The interest rate cut may help tip the scales for the government to call an early election. But recent opinion polls suggest the government still has work to do to put itself in a winning position.

    Announcing its decision, the Reserve Bank said it had “more confidence that inflation is moving sustainably towards the midpoint of the 2-3% target”.

    All four of the major banks swiftly passed on the cut in official rates to mortgage-holders. The average new housing loan is $666,000. Reducing the interest rate on this by 0.25% will mean $110 less a month in repayments (assuming a standard 30-year loan).

    It is the first change in the cash rate since November 2023 and marks the first small reversal of 13 rate increases. The central bank had hiked interest rates quickly from the near-zero emergency level during the COVID epidemic and lockdowns.



    Why did the Reserve Bank cut now?

    The interest rate cut comes after headline inflation eased, to 2.4% during 2024, within the Bank’s 2-3% inflation target range.

    However, the Bank’s preferred measure of underlying inflation, the “trimmed mean”, which excludes temporary factors such as the government’s electricity rebates, rose by 3.2% during 2024. This is just above the target range but a little less than the 3.4% the Bank had been forecasting.



    “We cannot declare victory on inflation just yet,” Reserve Bank Governor Michele Bullock told a press conference after the decision. “It’s not good enough for it to be back in the target range temporarily, the board needs to be confident it’s returning to the target range sustainably.”




    Read more:
    Lower inflation in the December quarter boosts chances of an interest rate cut


    The RBA and the election

    In its first meeting for the year, the Reserve Bank board rejected the notion that they should hold off changing rates because an election is approaching.

    While cutting interest rates will suit one side of politics, not cutting would have benefited the other. The impartial approach is to take the same decision as if no election were looming.

    As then RBA governor Glenn Stevens said in 2007 after raising rates during an election campaign:

    I do not think we ever could accept the idea that in an election year — which, after all, is one year out of three — you cannot change interest rates.

    How does the Reserve Bank compare with other central banks?

    Some central banks in comparable economies had already started lowering interest rates and have cut them by more than the RBA. But that is because most had raised interest rates by more.

    The Reserve Bank adopted a strategy of being more patient in returning inflation to its target, so as to limit the increase in unemployment.



    The strategy has worked. Unemployment in Australia peaked at 4.2% and is now 4.0%. By contrast, in New Zealand it is over 5% and in the euro area and Canada it is over 6%.

    The Reserve Bank hasn’t received the credit it deserves for this strong performance.

    Where to from here?

    This is the last meeting of the current Reserve Bank board. It is being replaced by a new monetary policy committee, and a separate governance board as part of an overhaul of the bank. Two new members will replace two members of the current board for its next meeting on April 1.

    The RBA board’s statement said that it “remains cautious on prospects for further policy easing”. This is central bank-speak for not rushing into further interest rate cuts.

    The RBA also noted that “geopolitical and policy uncertainties are pronounced”. This is a reference to the economic fallout from United States President Donald Trump’s policies on trade and slashing jobs.

    His proposed tariffs and deportations will increase inflation in the US and make US interest rates higher than they otherwise would be.




    Read more:
    What would a second Trump presidency mean for the global economy?


    But this does not mean interest rates need to be higher here. Indeed, a trade war would weaken the global economy, which could lead to less inflation in Australia.

    The Reserve Bank also released its updated forecasts. These show the underlying inflation rate dropping to 2.7% by June and then staying around there through 2026 and 2027.

    Unemployment is low at 4%, and below what the Bank has previously regarded as “full employment”. But it is not leading to any surge in wage growth.

    Indeed, the Bank commented that wages growth has been a little lower than it had forecast. Inflationary expectations are also well contained.

    This offers hope there may be at least one further interest rate cut later this year (and the Reserve Bank’s forecasts assume this). But borrowers should not get their hopes up that interest rates will revisit the COVID-era lows. That is very unlikely.

    John Hawkins was formerly a senior economist at the Reserve Bank.

    – ref. The Reserve Bank has cut rates for the first time in four years. But it is cautious about future cuts – https://theconversation.com/the-reserve-bank-has-cut-rates-for-the-first-time-in-four-years-but-it-is-cautious-about-future-cuts-249704

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Asia Pacific – New UN report lauds community-driven innovations in closing SDG data gaps in Asia and the Pacific

    Source: United Nations – ESCAP

    Across Asia and the Pacific, communities are pioneering innovative solutions to bridge critical data gaps, ensuring that marginalized populations are no longer invisible in policymaking. From surveying hundreds of nomadic tribal households across Rajasthan State in India to health-monitoring mobile applications in Indonesia, these efforts are transforming sustainable development in the region.

    A new report by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) demonstrates that by amplifying the voices of underrepresented communities, these solutions are not only making policies more inclusive but also making sustainable development monitoring more representative across Asia and the Pacific.

    However, the Asia and the Pacific SDG Progress Report 2025 also stresses that urgent action is still needed in order to achieve the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030.

    “Data gaps persist and leave some of the most vulnerable populations invisible in official statistics, limiting policymakers’ ability to address their needs effectively,” underscored United Nations Under-Secretary-General and ESCAP Executive Secretary Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana.

    She added, “Constrained resources to modernize statistical systems pose additional hurdles. Without urgent action to accelerate progress, many of the Goals will remain out of reach.”

    The report highlights several SDG targets where Asia and the Pacific leads globally such as reducing income poverty (Goal 1), addressing undernourishment (Goal 2), supporting small-scale industries (Goal 9), reducing hazardous waste (Goal 12), mitigating land degradation (Goal 15), and combating human trafficking and intentional homicide (Goal 16).

    Despite these strides, slow progress or setbacks in critical goals such as quality education (Goal 4), decent work and economic growth (Goal 8), and sustainable consumption and production (Goal 12) threaten regional efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Rising fossil fuel subsidies, low literacy and numeracy rates, and unsustainable production patterns further compound these challenges.

    Meanwhile, environmental degradation, increasing vulnerability to natural disasters, and persistent greenhouse gas emissions are exacerbating setbacks on climate action (Goal 13), life below water (Goal 14) and life on land (Goal 15).

    The report further finds that development benefits often bypass vulnerable groups, with intersecting factors like age, gender, education, location and wealth exacerbating inequalities. Poverty and education level are the two most significant factors contributing to inequality of opportunity. Poorer households in rural areas with lower levels of education are the most disadvantaged in accessing basic services such as water, sanitation and clean energy.

    To bridge these gaps, ESCAP calls for innovative and inclusive data collection and analysis. Nuanced and granular data will provide policymakers a clearer understanding of the realities of specific population groups especially those most at risk of being left behind.

    The report further emphasizes that transforming national statistical systems to meet the data needs of the 2030 Agenda requires urgent political commitment, financial investment and stronger cross-sector partnerships.

    An annual flagship publication of ESCAP, the Asia and the Pacific SDG Progress Report 2025 uses the latest data for global SDG indicators to determine where additional effort is needed in the region and where momentum for future progress is building.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: What is divestiture and how would it stop insurance companies ‘ripping off’ customers?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Allan Fels, Professor Allan Fels, Professor of Law, Economics and Business at the University of Melbourne and Monash University., The University of Melbourne

    Australia is creeping towards adding a divestiture power to its Competition and Consumer Act.

    Under such a law, the courts, on the recommendation of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, could break a firm into parts.

    Divestiture is currently used in Australia when the competition and consumer commission considers proposed mergers. Often it will only approve a merger when certain parts of the business are broken up to prevent monopolies.

    It has also been used to deal with abuse of market power by electricity providers.

    Under the proposed change, a company with substantial market power which breaches the Consumer and Competition Act may be forced to divest assets to restore balance and ensure the market is competitive. This would reduce the possibility of consumers being over-charged.

    The Coalition has already proposed breaking up the major supermarkets, Coles and Woolworths which have been long-accused of price gouging customers.

    On Sunday, Coalition leader Peter Dutton signalled he was likely to introduce divestiture if elected to stop insurers from “ripping off” customers by charging exorbitant premiums or refusing to pay claims.

    Premiums have soared by 16.4% in the last year as Australia has been hit by major floods and bushfires. Climate Valuation analysts last month warned one in ten properties could be uninsurable by 2035.

    Repeating his position on Monday, Dutton said:

    If we have a situation where people are being priced out of insurance or they’re deemed an uninsurable risk when they shouldn’t be, that is a failure of the market and we’ll respond accordingly to that.

    He said insurance companies had to be responsible corporate citizens and work with their customers.

    We’re not going to have a situation where people can’t afford insurance or they’re being priced out of products.

    Previously the Morrison government enacted laws which enabled a breakup of energy companies in certain circumstances.

    Labor has not supported a divestiture power. One reason is the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association has opposed such measures.

    The case for divestiture

    In principle there is a strong case for a divestiture law.

    Monopolies and market power stem from an industry being highly concentrated. Often the only way to prevent them from misusing their monopoly is to break them up. The solution could be left to the market or to price regulation or other remedies but these do not address the source of the problem.

    A divestiture power has long existed in the United States. It was used to break up oil, cigarettes, and chemicals in the early days of antitrust law. In the mid-80s it was successfully used to break up the AT&T telephone monopoly. AT&T controlled both long distance and local calls before it was broken up.

    But divestiture is only occasionally used and only when stringent criteria are satisfied.

    Some 20 years ago the US Department of Justice proposed a breakup of Microsoft – the case was never finalised because of procedural problems. However, the Federal Court laid out many prerequisites before this drastic remedy could occur.

    The power has been used in a number of other OECD countries including the United Kingdom.

    When divesting is necessary

    There has been heavy use in Australia of divestiture powers to break up gas and electricity monopolies in the last 30 years

    And there is a strong case for making it a general remedy available for all industries, even though its use would be infrequent.

    Importantly, the availability of this sanction would provide an incentive for firms to comply with abuse of market power provisions of the competition law. These provisions are intended to stop powerful businesses from deterring competition by making it difficult for new entrants to join the market.

    The sanctions for this part of the law currently are very weak. Fines are rarely imposed and if they are, they are small and seen as a cost of doing business to be weighed up against the benefits of anti-competitive behaviour.

    Another reason is that cases take many years. For example, the ACCC case v Safeway 19 years ago took seven years before a court resolution.

    A divestiture power would make firms far more careful before breaching the law.

    Too ‘Russian’?

    Occasionally people question the desirability of this power on the grounds it is the sort of thing you would only see in a country like Russia.

    In an ABC interview last February, Prime Minister Albanese said:

    We have a private sector economy in Australia and not a command and control economy […]We’re not the old Soviet Union. What we have the power to do is to encourage competition and encouraging new entrants.

    However, most observers agree one of the big failures of the Soviet economy has been failure to divest monopolies in energy, transport and other parts of the economy.

    The Coalition’s adoption of a divestiture remedy in three industries is welcome. We need at some point to move to a divestiture power that is available for the whole economy.

    Allan Fels is a former chair of the ACCC.

    – ref. What is divestiture and how would it stop insurance companies ‘ripping off’ customers? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-divestiture-and-how-would-it-stop-insurance-companies-ripping-off-customers-250036

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: China leads in foreign-invested enterprises in Uzbekistan

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TASHKENT, Feb. 17 — China led in foreign-invested enterprises in Uzbekistan with 3,467 companies, local media reported on Monday, citing the country’s statistics agency.

    As of Feb. 1 this year, the total number of enterprises and organizations with foreign investments operating in Uzbekistan reached 15,163, according to the report.

    The statistics also showed Russia held the second place with 2,973 enterprises, and Türkiye with 1,869.

    According to the press service of the Uzbek president, Uzbekistan plans to attract 43 billion U.S. dollars in investment in 2025.

    MIL OSI China News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Stats NZ information release: National population estimates: At 31 December 2024 (2018-base)

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    National population estimates: At 31 December 2024 (2018-base) – 18 February 2025 –National population estimates give the best available measure of the population, by age and sex, usually living in Aotearoa New Zealand.

    Key facts
    At 31 December 2024:

    • the estimated resident population of New Zealand was 5,356,700 (provisionally)
    • there were 2,693,400 females and 2,663,300 males
    • the median age of females and males was 39.2 and 37.4 years respectively.

    For more see:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Women giving birth are older than ever recorded – Stats NZ media and information release: Births and deaths: Year ended December 2024 (including abridged period life table)

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Women giving birth are older than ever recorded – 18 February 2025 – The median age of women giving birth in Aotearoa New Zealand has reached 31.5 years in 2024, according to data released by Stats NZ today.

    The median age of 31.5 years is the highest since records began in 1962. The lowest median age recorded was 24.8 years in 1972. By 1994, the median age had risen to 28.5 years. Median age is the age at which half of women giving birth are younger and half are older than this age and is for all births rather than first births.

    “Women who are having children now are often older than those of previous generations,” population estimates, projections and coverage spokesperson Victoria Treliving said.

    “This births data, when considered alongside the 2023 Census data, supports a trend of women having fewer children.”

    Files:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Women giving birth are older than ever recorded – Stats NZ media and information release: Births and deaths: Year ended December 2024 (including abridged period life table)

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Women giving birth are older than ever recorded – 18 February 2025 – The median age of women giving birth in Aotearoa New Zealand has reached 31.5 years in 2024, according to data released by Stats NZ today.

    The median age of 31.5 years is the highest since records began in 1962. The lowest median age recorded was 24.8 years in 1972. By 1994, the median age had risen to 28.5 years. Median age is the age at which half of women giving birth are younger and half are older than this age and is for all births rather than first births.

    “Women who are having children now are often older than those of previous generations,” population estimates, projections and coverage spokesperson Victoria Treliving said.

    “This births data, when considered alongside the 2023 Census data, supports a trend of women having fewer children.”

    Files:

    • Women giving birth are older than ever recorded
    • Births and deaths: Year ended December 2024 (including abridged period life table)

    MIL OSI –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Stats NZ information release: National population estimates: At 31 December 2024 (2018-base)

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    National population estimates: At 31 December 2024 (2018-base) – 18 February 2025 –National population estimates give the best available measure of the population, by age and sex, usually living in Aotearoa New Zealand.

    Key facts
    At 31 December 2024:

    • the estimated resident population of New Zealand was 5,356,700 (provisionally)
    • there were 2,693,400 females and 2,663,300 males
    • the median age of females and males was 39.2 and 37.4 years respectively.

    For more see:

    • National population estimates: At 31 December 2024 (2018-base)

     

    MIL OSI –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Transocean Ltd. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

     

      Three months ended         Three months ended      
      December 31,    September 30,      sequential   December 31,       year-over-year
      2024   2024   change   2023   change
    (In millions, except per share amounts, percentages and backlog)                            
    Contract drilling revenues $ 952     $ 948     $ 4     $ 741     $ 211  
    Adjusted contract drilling revenues $ 952     $ 948     $ 4     $ 748     $ 204  
    Revenue efficiency (1)   93.5 %     94.5 %           97.0 %      
    Operating and maintenance expense $ 579     $ 563     $ (16 )   $ 569     $ (10 )
    Net income (loss) attributable to controlling interest $ 7     $ (494 )   $ 501     $ (104 )   $ 111  
    Basic earnings (loss) per share $ 0.01     $ (0.56 )   $ 0.57     $ (0.13 )   $ 0.14  
    Diluted loss per share $ (0.11 )   $ (0.58 )   $ 0.47     $ (0.13 )   $ 0.02  
                                 
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 323     $ 342     $ (19 )   $ 122     $ 201  
    Adjusted EBITDA margin   33.9 %     36.0 %           16.3 %      
    Adjusted net income (loss) $ 27     $ 64     $ (37 )   $ (74 )   $ 101  
    Adjusted diluted earnings (loss) per share $ (0.09 )   $ —     $ (0.09 )   $ (0.09 )   $ —  
                                 
                                 
    Backlog as of the February 2025 Fleet Status Report $ 8.3 billion                      
                                 

    STEINHAUSEN, Switzerland, Feb. 17, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Transocean Ltd. (NYSE: RIG) today reported net income attributable to controlling interest of $7 million, or loss of $0.11 per diluted share, for the three months ended December 31, 2024.

    Fourth quarter results included $20 million, $0.02 per diluted share, discrete tax items, net. After consideration of these unfavorable items, fourth quarter 2024 adjusted net income was $27 million, or loss of $0.09 per diluted share.

    Contract drilling revenues for the three months ended December 31, 2024, increased sequentially by $4 million to $952 million, primarily due to increased utilization for one rig that returned to work after undergoing a special periodic survey in the third quarter and higher reimbursement revenues, partially offset by lower revenue efficiency across the fleet.

    Operating and maintenance expense was $579 million, compared with $563 million in the prior quarter. The sequential increase was the result of higher in-service maintenance costs across our fleet, partially offset by a settlement with insurance carriers.

    General and administrative expense was $56 million, up from $47 million in the third quarter due primarily to increased legal and professional fees.

    Interest expense net of capitalized amounts was $152 million, compared to $154 million in the prior quarter, excluding the favorable adjustment of $61 million and $74 million in the fourth and third quarter, respectively, for the fair value of the bifurcated exchange feature related to the 4.625% exchangeable bonds. Interest income was $10 million, compared to $11 million in the prior quarter.

    The Effective Tax Rate(2) was 89.0%, up from 6.0% in the prior quarter. The increase was primarily due to higher income and increases in valuation allowance. The Effective Tax Rate excluding discrete items was 56.7% compared to 22.5% in the previous quarter.

    Cash provided by operating activities was $206 million during the fourth quarter of 2024, representing an increase of $12 million compared to the prior quarter. The sequential increase was primarily due to timing of interest payments and decreased payments for accounts payable, partially offset by reduced collections from customers.

    Fourth quarter 2024 capital expenditures of $29 million, compared to $58 million in the prior quarter, were related to capital upgrades for certain rigs in our fleet.

    “In 2024, we continued to advance our position as the technological leader in offshore drilling by, among other things, executing the first two 20K subsea completions in the history of the industry,” said Chief Executive Officer Jeremy Thigpen. “We also introduced and implemented other technologies that enhance our operational performances and further differentiate our fleet. This commitment to innovation, along with our reputation for delivering safe, reliable, and efficient operations, is clearly recognized by our customers, as demonstrated by the $2.4 billion in backlog we secured during the year.”

    Thigpen continued, “With industry-leading contract coverage well into 2026, our primary objective will be strong operational execution and an intense focus on cost control to ensure we maximize the conversion of our backlog to cash, enabling us to continue de-leveraging our balance sheet.”

    Full Year 2024

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, net loss attributable to controlling interest totaled $512 million, $0.76 per diluted share. Full year results included $458 million, $0.50 per diluted share, net unfavorable items as follows:

    • $755 million, $0.82 per diluted share, loss on impairment of assets; and
    • $5 million, $0.01 per diluted share, loss on impairment of our investments in unconsolidated affiliates; partially offset by,
    • $161 million, $0.18 per diluted share, gain on retirement of debt; and
    • $141 million, $0.15 per diluted share, related to discrete tax items, net.

    After consideration of these net unfavorable items, adjusted net loss for 2024 was $54 million, $0.26 per diluted share.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We present our operating results in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the U.S. (“U.S. GAAP”). We believe certain financial measures, such as Adjusted Contract Drilling Revenues, EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted Net Income, which are non-GAAP measures, provide users of our financial statements with supplemental information that may be useful in evaluating our operating performance. We believe that such non-GAAP measures, when read in conjunction with our operating results presented under U.S. GAAP, can be used to better assess our performance from period to period and relative to performance of other companies in our industry, without regard to financing methods, historical cost basis or capital structure. Such non-GAAP measures should be considered as a supplement to, and not as a substitute for, financial measures prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP.

    All non-GAAP measure reconciliations to the most comparative U.S. GAAP measures are displayed in quantitative schedules on the company’s website at: www.deepwater.com.

    About Transocean

    Transocean is a leading international provider of offshore contract drilling services for oil and gas wells. The company specializes in technically demanding sectors of the global offshore drilling business with a particular focus on ultra-deepwater and harsh environment drilling services, and operates the highest specification floating offshore drilling fleet in the world.

    Transocean owns or has partial ownership interests in and operates a fleet of 34 mobile offshore drilling units, consisting of 26 ultra-deepwater floaters and eight harsh environment floaters.

    For more information about Transocean, please visit: www.deepwater.com.

    Conference Call Information

    Transocean will conduct a teleconference starting at 9 a.m. EST, 3 p.m. CET, on Tuesday, February 18, 2025, to discuss the results. To participate, dial +1 785-424-1116 and refer to conference code 540196 approximately 15 minutes prior to the scheduled start time.

    The teleconference will be simulcast in a listen-only mode at: www.deepwater.com, by selecting Investors, News, and Webcasts. Supplemental materials that may be referenced during the teleconference will be available at: www.deepwater.com, by selecting Investors, Financial Reports.

    A replay of the conference call will be available after 12 p.m. EST, 6 p.m. CET, on Tuesday, February 18, 2025. The replay, which will be archived for approximately 30 days, can be accessed at +1 402-220-1152, passcode 540196. The replay will also be available on the company’s website.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    The statements described herein that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These statements could contain words such as “possible,” “intend,” “will,” “if,” “expect,” or other similar expressions. Forward-looking statements are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions, and are subject to inherent uncertainties, risks and changes in circumstances that are difficult to predict. As a result, actual results could differ materially from those indicated in these forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially include, but are not limited to, estimated duration of customer contracts, contract dayrate amounts, future contract commencement dates and locations, planned shipyard projects and other out-of-service time, sales of drilling units, timing of the company’s newbuild deliveries, operating hazards and delays, risks associated with international operations, actions by customers and other third parties, the fluctuation of current and future prices of oil and gas, the global and regional supply and demand for oil and gas, the intention to scrap certain drilling rigs, the success of our business following prior acquisitions, the effects of the spread of and mitigation efforts by governments, businesses and individuals related to contagious illnesses, and other factors, including those and other risks discussed in the company’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023, and in the company’s other filings with the SEC, which are available free of charge on the SEC’s website at: www.sec.gov. Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize (or the other consequences of such a development worsen), or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those indicated or expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. All subsequent written and oral forward-looking statements attributable to the company or to persons acting on our behalf are expressly qualified in their entirety by reference to these risks and uncertainties. You should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Each forward-looking statement speaks only as of the date of the particular statement, and we undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances that occur, or which we become aware of, after the date hereof, except as otherwise may be required by law.

    This press release, or referenced documents, do not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and do not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”) or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of Transocean and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of Transocean.

    Notes

    (1) Revenue efficiency is defined as actual operating revenues, excluding revenues for contract terminations and reimbursements, for the measurement period divided by the maximum revenue calculated for the measurement period, expressed as a percentage. Maximum revenue is defined as the greatest amount of contract drilling revenues the drilling unit could earn for the measurement period, excluding revenues for incentive provisions, reimbursements and contract terminations. See the accompanying schedule entitled “Revenue Efficiency.”
    (2) Effective Tax Rate is defined as income tax expense or benefit divided by income or loss before income taxes. See the accompanying schedule entitled “Supplemental Effective Tax Rate Analysis.”
       

    Analyst Contact:
    Alison Johnson
    +1 713-232-7214

    Media Contact:
    Pam Easton
    +1 713-232-7647

    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In millions, except per share data)
    (Unaudited)
                     
      Years ended December 31, 
      2024        2023        2022  
                     
    Contract drilling revenues $ 3,524     $ 2,832     $ 2,575  
                     
    Costs and expenses                
    Operating and maintenance   2,199       1,986       1,679  
    Depreciation and amortization   739       744       735  
    General and administrative   214       187       182  
        3,152       2,917       2,596  
                     
    Loss on impairment of assets   (772 )     (57 )     —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   (17 )     (183 )     (10 )
    Operating loss   (417 )     (325 )     (31 )
                     
    Other income (expense), net                
    Interest income   50       52       27  
    Interest expense, net of amounts capitalized   (362 )     (646 )     (561 )
    Gain (loss) on retirement of debt   161       (31 )     8  
    Other, net   45       9       (5 )
        (106 )     (616 )     (531 )
    Loss before income tax expense (benefit)   (523 )     (941 )     (562 )
    Income tax expense (benefit)   (11 )     13       59  
                     
    Net loss   (512 )     (954 )     (621 )
    Net income attributable to noncontrolling interest   —       —       —  
    Net loss attributable to controlling interest $ (512 )   $ (954 )   $ (621 )
                     
    Loss per share                
    Basic $ (0.60 )   $ (1.24 )   $ (0.89 )
    Diluted $ (0.76 )   $ (1.24 )   $ (0.89 )
                     
    Weighted-average shares outstanding                
    Basic   850       768       699  
    Diluted   925       768       699  
                           
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In millions, except share data)
    (Unaudited)
               
      December 31, 
      2024        2023  
    Assets          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 560     $ 762  
    Accounts receivable, net   564       512  
    Materials and supplies, net   439       426  
    Assets held for sale   343       49  
    Restricted cash and cash equivalents   381       233  
    Other current assets   165       144  
    Total current assets   2,452       2,126  
               
    Property and equipment   22,417       23,875  
    Less accumulated depreciation   (6,586 )     (6,934 )
    Property and equipment, net   15,831       16,941  
    Contract intangible assets   —       4  
    Deferred tax assets, net   45       44  
    Other assets   1,043       1,139  
    Total assets $ 19,371     $ 20,254  
               
    Liabilities and equity          
    Accounts payable $ 255     $ 323  
    Accrued income taxes   31       23  
    Debt due within one year   686       370  
    Other current liabilities   691       681  
    Total current liabilities   1,663       1,397  
               
    Long-term debt   6,195       7,043  
    Deferred tax liabilities, net   499       540  
    Other long-term liabilities   729       858  
    Total long-term liabilities   7,423       8,441  
               
    Commitments and contingencies          
               
    Shares, $0.10 par value, 1,057,879,029 authorized, 141,262,093 conditionally authorized, 940,828,901 issued          
    and 875,830,772 outstanding at December 31, 2024, and CHF 0.10 par value, 1,021,294,549 authorized,          
    142,362,093 conditionally authorized, 843,715,858 issued and 809,030,846 outstanding at December 31, 2023   87       81  
    Additional paid-in capital   14,880       14,544  
    Accumulated deficit   (4,545 )     (4,033 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (138 )     (177 )
    Total controlling interest shareholders’ equity   10,284       10,415  
    Noncontrolling interest   1       1  
    Total equity   10,285       10,416  
    Total liabilities and equity $ 19,371     $ 20,254  
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In millions)
    (Unaudited)
                     
      Years ended December 31, 
      2024        2023        2022  
                     
    Cash flows from operating activities                
    Net loss $ (512 )   $ (954 )   $ (621 )
    Adjustments to reconcile to net cash provided by operating activities:                
    Amortization of contract intangible asset   4       52       117  
    Depreciation and amortization   739       744       735  
    Share-based compensation expense   47       40       29  
    Loss on impairment of assets   772       57       —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   17       183       10  
    Amortization of debt-related balances, net   53       51       33  
    (Gain) loss on adjustment to bifurcated compound exchange feature   (214 )     127       157  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   (161 )     31       (8 )
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates   5       5       —  
    Deferred income tax expense   (42 )     18       46  
    Other, net   (7 )     43       44  
    Changes in deferred revenues, net   45       70       (20 )
    Changes in deferred costs, net   (2 )     (190 )     1  
    Changes in other operating assets and liabilities, net   (297 )     (113 )     (75 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities   447       164       448  
                     
    Cash flows from investing activities                
    Capital expenditures   (254 )     (427 )     (717 )
    Investment in loans to unconsolidated affiliates   (3 )     (3 )     (5 )
    Investment in equity of unconsolidated affiliates   —       (10 )     (42 )
    Proceeds from disposal of assets, net of costs to sell   101       10       7  
    Cash acquired in acquisition of unconsolidated affiliates   5       7       —  
    Net cash used in investing activities   (151 )     (423 )     (757 )
                     
    Cash flows from financing activities                
    Repayments of debt   (2,103 )     (1,717 )     (554 )
    Proceeds from issuance of debt, net of issue costs   1,770       1,983       175  
    Proceeds from issuance of shares, net of issue costs   —       —       263  
    Proceeds from issuance of warrants, net of issue costs   —       —       12  
    Other, net   (17 )     (3 )     (8 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   (350 )     263       (112 )
                     
    Net increase (decrease) in unrestricted and restricted cash and cash equivalents   (54 )     4       (421 )
    Unrestricted and restricted cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period   995       991       1,412  
    Unrestricted and restricted cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 941     $ 995     $ 991  
                                     
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    FLEET OPERATING STATISTICS
     
      Three months ended     Years ended  
      December 31,    September 30,   December 31,      December 31,    December 31,   
    Contract Drilling Revenues (in millions) 2024    2024    2023      2024    2023   
    Ultra-deepwater floaters $ 675   $ 668   $ 536     $ 2,518   $ 2,072  
    Harsh environment floaters   277     280     205       1,006     760  
    Total contract drilling revenues $ 952   $ 948   $ 741     $ 3,524   $ 2,832  
      Three months ended     Years ended  
      December 31,    September 30,   December 31,      December 31,    December 31,   
    Average Daily Revenue (1) 2024    2024    2023      2024    2023   
    Ultra-deepwater floaters $ 428,200   $ 426,700   $ 432,100     $ 428,000   $ 393,700  
    Harsh environment floaters   452,600     464,900     354,700       435,900     354,300  
    Total fleet average daily revenue $ 434,700   $ 436,800   $ 407,800     $ 430,100   $ 382,300  
      Three months ended     Years ended
      December 31,    September 30,   December 31,      December 31,    December 31, 
    Revenue Efficiency (2) 2024   2024   2023     2024    2023
    Ultra-deepwater floaters 92.0 %   92.5 %   96.8 %     93.4 %   96.5 %
    Harsh environment floaters 97.6 %   100.1 %   97.6 %     97.5 %   97.8 %
    Total fleet average revenue efficiency 93.5 %   94.5 %   97.0 %     94.5 %   96.8 %
      Three months ended     Years ended
      December 31,     September 30,    December 31,      December 31,     December 31, 
    Utilization (3) 2024   2024   2023     2024   2023
    Ultra-deepwater floaters 64.3 %   60.7 %   46.8 %     57.3 %   49.4 %
    Harsh environment floaters 75.0 %   75.0 %   66.7 %     71.1 %   59.1 %
    Total fleet average rig utilization 66.8 %   63.9 %   51.6 %     60.5 %   51.9 %
                                   
    (1) Average daily revenue is defined as operating revenues, excluding revenues for contract terminations, reimbursements and contract intangible amortization, earned per operating day. An operating day is defined as a day for which a rig is contracted to earn a dayrate during the firm contract period after operations commence.
                                   
    (2) Revenue efficiency is defined as actual operating revenues, excluding revenues for contract terminations and reimbursements, for the measurement period divided by the maximum revenue calculated for the measurement period, expressed as a percentage. Maximum revenue is defined as the greatest amount of contract drilling revenues the drilling unit could earn for the measurement period, excluding revenues for incentive provisions, reimbursements and contract terminations.
                                   
    (3) Rig utilization is defined as the total number of operating days divided by the total number of rig calendar days in the measurement period, expressed as a percentage.
     
                                             
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES AND RECONCILIATIONS
    ADJUSTED NET INCOME (LOSS) AND ADJUSTED DILUTED EARNINGS (LOSS) PER SHARE
    (in millions, except per share data)
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/24   12/31/24   09/30/24   09/30/24   06/30/24   06/30/24    03/31/24
    Adjusted Net Income (Loss)                                        
    Net income (loss) attributable to controlling interest, as reported $ (512 )   $ 7     $ (519 )   $ (494 )   $ (25 )   $ (123 )   $ 98  
    Loss on impairment of assets, net of tax   755       —       755       617       138       138       —  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates   5       —       5       —       5       4       1  
    Gain on retirement of debt   (161 )     —       (161 )     (21 )     (140 )     (140 )     —  
    Discrete tax items   (141 )     20       (161 )     (38 )     (123 )     (2 )     (121 )
    Net income (loss), as adjusted $ (54 )   $ 27     $ (81 )   $ 64     $ (145 )   $ (123 )   $ (22 )
                                             
    Adjusted Diluted Earnings (Loss) Per Share:                                        
    Diluted earnings (loss) per share, as reported $ (0.76 )   $ (0.11 )   $ (0.65 )   $ (0.58 )   $ (0.03 )   $ (0.15 )   $ 0.11  
    Loss on impairment of assets, net of tax   0.82       —       0.82       0.64       0.17       0.17       —  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates   0.01       —       0.01       —       —       —       —  
    Gain on retirement of debt   (0.18 )     —       (0.18 )     (0.02 )     (0.17 )     (0.17 )     —  
    Discrete tax items   (0.15 )     0.02       (0.18 )     (0.04 )     (0.15 )     —       (0.14 )
    Diluted earnings (loss) per share, as adjusted $ (0.26 )   $ (0.09 )   $ (0.18 )   $ —     $ (0.18 )   $ (0.15 )   $ (0.03 )
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/23     12/31/23    09/30/23     09/30/23    06/30/23    06/30/23    03/31/23
    Adjusted Net Loss                                        
    Net loss attributable to controlling interest, as reported $ (954 )   $ (104 )   $ (850 )   $ (220 )   $ (630 )   $ (165 )   $ (465 )
    Loss on impairment of assets   57       (1 )     58       5       53       53       —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   169       —       169       —       169       —       169  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliate   5       5       —       —       —       —       —  
    Loss on conversion of debt to equity   27       24       3       —       3       3       —  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   31       (1 )     32       —       32       —       32  
    Discrete tax items   (74 )     3       (77 )     (65 )     (12 )     (1 )     (11 )
    Net loss, as adjusted $ (739 )   $ (74 )   $ (665 )   $ (280 )   $ (385 )   $ (110 )   $ (275 )
                                             
    Adjusted Diluted Loss Per Share:                                        
    Diluted loss per share, as reported $ (1.24 )   $ (0.13 )   $ (1.13 )   $ (0.28 )   $ (0.85 )   $ (0.22 )   $ (0.64 )
    Loss on impairment of assets   0.07       —       0.08       0.01       0.07       0.07       —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   0.22       —       0.23       —       0.23       —       0.23  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliate   0.01       0.01       —       —       —       —       —  
    Loss on conversion of debt to equity   0.04       0.03       —       —       —       —       —  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   0.04       —       0.04       —       0.04       —       0.04  
    Discrete tax items   (0.10 )     —       (0.10 )     (0.09 )     (0.01 )     —       (0.01 )
    Diluted loss per share, as adjusted $ (0.96 )   $ (0.09 )   $ (0.88 )   $ (0.36 )   $ (0.52 )   $ (0.15 )   $ (0.38 )
                                               
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES AND RECONCILIATIONS
    ADJUSTED CONTRACT DRILLING REVENUES
    EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST, TAXES, DEPRECIATION AND AMORTIZATION AND RELATED MARGINS
    (in millions, except percentages)
                                               
                                               
        YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
         12/31/24   12/31/24   09/30/24   09/30/24   06/30/24   06/30/24   03/31/24
                                               
    Contract drilling revenues   $ 3,524     $ 952   $ 2,572     $ 948     $ 1,624     $ 861     $ 763  
    Contract intangible asset amortization     4       —     4       —       4       —       4  
    Adjusted Contract Drilling Revenues   $ 3,528     $ 952   $ 2,576     $ 948     $ 1,628     $ 861     $ 767  
                                               
    Net income (loss)   $ (512 )   $ 7   $ (519 )   $ (494 )   $ (25 )   $ (123 )   $ 98  
    Interest expense, net of interest income     312       81     231       69       162       60       102  
    Income tax expense (benefit)     (11 )     55     (66 )     (31 )     (35 )     156       (191 )
    Depreciation and amortization     739       180     559       190       369       184       185  
    Contract intangible asset amortization     4       —     4       —       4       —       4  
    EBITDA     532       323     209       (266 )     475       277       198  
                                               
    Loss on impairment of assets     772       —     772       629       143       143       —  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates     5       —     5       —       5       4       1  
    Gain on retirement of debt     (161 )     —     (161 )     (21 )     (140 )     (140 )     —  
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ 1,148     $ 323   $ 825     $ 342     $ 483     $ 284     $ 199  
                                               
                                               
    Profit (loss) margin     (14.5 ) %   0.7 %   (20.2 ) %   (52.0 ) %   (1.5 ) %   (14.3 ) %   12.9 %
    EBITDA margin     15.1   %   33.9 %   8.1   %   (28.1 ) %   29.2   %   32.2   %   25.8 %
    Adjusted EBITDA margin     32.5   %   33.9 %   32.0   %   36.0   %   29.7   %   33.0   %   26.0 %
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/23   12/31/23   09/30/23   09/30/23   06/30/23   06/30/23   03/31/23
                                             
    Contract drilling revenues $ 2,832     $ 741     $ 2,091     $ 713     $ 1,378     $ 729     $ 649  
    Contract intangible asset amortization   52       7       45       8       37       19       18  
    Adjusted Contract Drilling Revenues $ 2,884     $ 748     $ 2,136     $ 721     $ 1,415     $ 748     $ 667  
                                             
    Net loss $ (954 )   $ (104 )   $ (850 )   $ (220 )   $ (630 )   $ (165 )   $ (465 )
    Interest expense, net of interest income   594       (13 )     607       220       387       157       230  
    Income tax expense (benefit)   13       21       (8 )     (43 )     35       (16 )     51  
    Depreciation and amortization   744       184       560       192       368       186       182  
    Contract intangible asset amortization   52       7       45       8       37       19       18  
    EBITDA   449       95       354       157       197       181       16  
                                             
    Loss on impairment of assets   57       (1 )     58       5       53       53       —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   169       —       169       —       169       —       169  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliate   5       5       —       —       —       —       —  
    Loss on conversion of debt to equity   27       24       3       —       3       3       —  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   31       (1 )     32       —       32       —       32  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 738     $ 122     $ 616     $ 162     $ 454     $ 237     $ 217  
                                             
                                             
    Loss margin   (33.7 ) %   (14.0 ) %   (40.7 ) %   (30.9 ) %   (45.7 ) %   (22.6 ) %   (71.6 )%
    EBITDA margin   15.6   %   12.7   %   16.6   %   21.8   %   13.9   %   24.2   %   2.4 %
    Adjusted EBITDA margin   25.6   %   16.3   %   28.9   %   22.5   %   32.1   %   31.7   %   32.5 %
                                             
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    SUPPLEMENTAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE ANALYSIS
    (in millions, except tax rates)
                                 
      Three months ended   Years ended
      December 31,       September 30,      December 31,    December 31,    December 31, 
      2024        2024        2023     2024     2023  
                                 
    Income (loss) before income taxes $ 62     $ (525 )   $ (83 )   $ (523 )   $ (941 )
    Loss on impairment of assets   —       629       (1 )     772       57  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   —       —       —       —       169  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates   —       —       5       5       5  
    Loss on conversion of debt to equity   —       —       24       —       27  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   —       (21 )     (1 )     (161 )     31  
    Adjusted income (loss) before income taxes $ 62     $ 83     $ (56 )   $ 93     $ (652 )
                                 
                                 
    Income tax expense (benefit) $ 55     $ (31 )   $ 21     $ (11 )   $ 13  
    Loss on impairment of assets   —       12       —       17       —  
    Loss on disposal of assets, net   —       —       —       —       —  
    Loss on impairment of investment in unconsolidated affiliates   —       —       —       —       —  
    Loss on conversion of debt to equity   —       —       —       —       —  
    (Gain) loss on retirement of debt   —       —       —       —       —  
    Changes in estimates (1)   (20 )     38       (3 )     141       74  
    Adjusted income tax expense (benefit) $ 35     $ 19     $ 18     $ 147     $ 87  
                                 
    Effective Tax Rate (2)   89.0 %      6.0 %      (25.0 )%      2.2 %      (1.4 )%
                                 
    Effective Tax Rate, excluding discrete items (3)   56.7 %      22.5 %      (30.0 )%      159.1 %      (13.3 )%
                                 
                                 
    (1) Our estimates change as we file tax returns, settle disputes with tax authorities, or become aware of changes in laws, operational changes and rig movements that have an effect on our (a) deferred taxes, (b) valuation allowances on deferred taxes and (c) other tax liabilities.
                                 
    (2) Our effective tax rate is calculated as income tax expense or benefit divided by income or loss before income taxes.
                                 
    (3) Our effective tax rate, excluding discrete items, is calculated as income tax expense or benefit, excluding various discrete items (such as changes in estimates and tax on items excluded from income before income taxes), divided by income or loss before income taxes, excluding gains and losses on sales and similar items pursuant to the accounting standards for income taxes related to estimating the annual effective tax rate.
                                             
    TRANSOCEAN LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES AND RECONCILIATIONS
    FREE CASH FLOW AND LEVERED FREE CASH FLOW
    (in millions)
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/24   12/31/24   09/30/24   09/30/24   06/30/24   06/30/24   03/31/24
                                             
    Cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 447     $ 206     $ 241     $ 194     $ 47     $ 133     $ (86 )
    Capital expenditures   (254 )     (29 )     (225 )     (58 )     (167 )     (84 )     (83 )
    Free Cash Flow   193       177       16       136       (120 )     49       (169 )
    Debt repayments   (2,103 )     (30 )     (2,073 )     (258 )     (1,815 )     (1,664 )     (151 )
    Debt repayments, paid from debt proceeds   1,748       –       1,748       99       1,649       1,649       –  
    Levered Free Cash Flow $ (162 )   $ 147     $ (309 )   $ (23 )   $ (286 )   $ 34     $ (320 )
                                             
                                             
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/23   12/31/23   09/30/23   09/30/23   06/30/23   06/30/23   03/31/23
                                             
    Cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 164     $ 98     $ 66     $ (44 )   $ 110     $ 157     $ (47 )
    Capital expenditures   (427 )     (220 )     (207 )     (50 )     (157 )     (76 )     (81 )
    Free Cash Flow   (263 )     (122 )     (141 )     (94 )     (47 )     81       (128 )
    Debt repayments   (1,717 )     (10 )     (1,707 )     (139 )     (1,568 )     (4 )     (1,564 )
    Debt repayments, paid from debt proceeds   1,156       –       1,156       –       1,156       –       1,156  
    Levered Free Cash Flow $ (824 )   $ (132 )   $ (692 )   $ (233 )   $ (459 )   $ 77     $ (536 )
                                             
                                             
                                             
      YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD   QTD   YTD
      12/31/22   12/31/22   09/30/22   09/30/22   06/30/22   06/30/22   03/31/22
                                             
    Cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 448     $ 178     $ 270     $ 230     $ 40     $ 41     $ (1 )
    Capital expenditures   (717 )     (409 )     (308 )     (87 )     (221 )     (115 )     (106 )
    Free Cash Flow   (269 )     (231 )     (38 )     143       (181 )     (74 )     (107 )
    Debt repayments   (554 )     (101 )     (453 )     (196 )     (257 )     (92 )     (165 )
    Debt repayments, paid from debt proceeds   –       –       –       –       –       –       –  
    Levered Free Cash Flow $ (823 )   $ (332 )   $ (491 )   $ (53 )   $ (438 )   $ (166 )   $ (272 )

    The MIL Network –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Australians are waiting 12 years on average before seeking help for a mental health problem – new research

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Louise Birrell, Researcher, Matilda Centre for Research in Mental Health and Substance Use, University of Sydney

    Pixel-Shot/Shutterstock

    Australians are waiting an average of 12 years to seek treatment for mental health and substance use disorders, our new research shows.

    While many of us are proactive in looking after our physical health, we appear to be seriously neglecting our mental health, suffering for many years before reaching out for help. Some people never seek help.

    In our research, the length of delay in seeking help varied depending on the type of mental health problem and other factors such as sex and age.

    But delays in getting help mean mental health problems can become more complex, severe and difficult to treat. So it’s important to understand why these delays occur – and how we can reduce them.

    Some key findings

    We used national data from the 2020–22 Australian National Study of Mental Health and Wellbeing, a nationally representative survey by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).

    Among the information collected in this survey, respondents were asked about their history of mental health and substance use problems, and when they first sought help from a medical doctor or other professional regarding their symptoms (if at all).

    The survey asked about the most common types of mental health and substance use problems in the general population under three broad categories: mood disorders (for example, depression and bipolar disorder), anxiety disorders (such as social anxiety disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder) and substance use disorders.

    People with mood disorders waited an average of three years before seeking treatment, those with substance use disorders waited an average of eight, and people with anxiety disorders waited the longest to seek treatment – 11 years on average.

    We found people experiencing panic disorder, a type of anxiety disorder, had some of the shortest delays (an average of two years), while those with social anxiety disorder waited the longest (13 years).

    The average delay across all mental health and substance use disorders – 12 years – was calculated based on the prevalence of different conditions. Anxiety disorders, particularly social anxiety disorder, are the most common, which brought up this average.

    We found younger people were more likely to seek help.
    Perfect Wave/Shutterstock

    We also looked at how many people would eventually seek help across their lifetime. Nearly everyone with depression (94%) eventually sought help, but only 25% of people with an alcohol use disorder ever did.

    Women were less likely than men to seek help for alcohol or other drug-related problems but were more likely to reach out for help with anxiety or mood-related concerns.

    Gen Z and millennials were much more likely to seek help than older generations. Compared to people born before 1972, those born between 1992 and 2005 were more than four times as likely to seek treatment for a drug or alcohol problem, more than twice as likely to seek help for a mood disorder, and nearly four times as likely to seek help for an anxiety problem.

    Some limitations

    While the ABS survey is one of the largest and most comprehensive in Australia, it relies on people remembering and accurately reporting when they first experienced symptoms of a mental health or substance use problem, and when they first sought support.

    It was also conducted during the COVID pandemic, a time of heightened stress and increased mental health challenges. However, the impact of this is probably small, given people were asked about their experiences across their entire lifetime.

    The survey also didn’t measure less common (but very impactful) mental health problems such as psychosis or eating disorders.

    How do delays compare to other countries?

    While this data is not perfect, the delays we observed are mostly in line with those seen in other countries. In some ways we are actually doing better.

    The relatively short delays for seeking help for a mood disorder (for example, depression, for which the average delay was three years) are largely consistent with similar studies in the United States, New Zealand, Europe and Asia.

    It’s often several years between when someone first experiences a mental health problem and when they seek treatment.
    Erik Mclean/Unsplash

    While still lengthy, the average delay of 11 years to seek treatment for an anxiety disorder in Australia appears similar if not shorter than in many other countries (ranging between 10–30 years).

    What’s more, when it comes to seeking help for problems with alcohol, things seem to be improving. While overall delays remain long, and most people still don’t seek help for alcohol problems, the delay in getting help appears to have shortened over time in Australia.

    The average time to seek treatment for alcohol use disorder is now eight years shorter than the 18-year delay reported in 2007. This may be due to increased awareness and education around the impact of alcohol use.

    Why do people delay reaching out for help?

    There are a range of reasons someone may delay seeking help. Services are not always available and many carry high out-of-pocket costs. Fear and stigma play a significant role, while many people simply may not know where to seek support or what might help.

    Finding the right treatment can be hard and while some people recover without help, for many these delays come at a huge cost. Delays mean problems can become more complex, severe and difficult to treat.

    We need to actively encourage early help-seeking, as well as continue efforts to reduce the stigma associated with poor mental health. Expanding anti-stigma campaigns and education to encourage people to seek help early could assist with this.

    Alongside these efforts it’s essential that effective treatment services are accessible when people do reach out for help. There has been chronic underinvestment in the mental health treatment system over many decades, while prevalence rates have increased. We need continued and increased investment in mental health treatment, prevention and early intervention.

    Ultimately, by empowering future generations to be proactive about their mental health, we hope we can make going to the doctor for anxiety as normal as doing so for the flu.

    Services available across Australia include the National Alcohol and Other Drug hotline (1800 250 015), Lifeline (13 11 14), Kids Helpline (1800 55 1800) and Head to Health. Each state and territory also has specialised mental health services.

    Louise Birrell receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council and The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing.

    Cath Chapman receives funding from The National Health and Medical Research Council and The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing.

    Katrina Prior receives funding from the National Health and Medical Research Council.

    – ref. Australians are waiting 12 years on average before seeking help for a mental health problem – new research – https://theconversation.com/australians-are-waiting-12-years-on-average-before-seeking-help-for-a-mental-health-problem-new-research-249159

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation organised a half-day workshop on “Leveraging Citizen-Generated Data (CGD) for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in India” on 17th February 2025 in New Delhi

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 17 FEB 2025 6:36PM by PIB Delhi

    MoSPI organised a half-day workshop on “Leveraging Citizen-Generated Data (CGD) for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in India”, on 17th February 2025 at Janganana Bhawan, 2-A, Man Singh Road, New Delhi, as part of its ongoing initiatives to harness Citizen Generated Data. The workshop aims to enhance awareness and understanding of Citizen-Generated Data (CGD) as a valuable tool for addressing data gaps and promoting inclusivity in the national statistical landscape. It provided a platform to discuss the relevance of the Copenhagen Framework on CGD in the Indian context and explore its potential adaptation within the country’s statistical system. The discussions focused on strengthening data ecosystems and supporting evidence-based policymaking.

    The workshop was inaugurated by Dr. Saurabh Garg, Secretary, MoSPI, and was attended by approximately 75 participants, including senior officers from Central Ministries, MoSPI, as well as representatives from UN agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs).

    Dr. Saurabh Garg, Secretary, MoSPI, in his inaugural address, emphasized the importance of Citizen-Generated Data (CGD) as a valuable complement to the official statistics, helping to bridge data gaps and promote inclusivity. He highlighted MoSPI’s key role in India’s statistical system and the need for exploring the possibility of integrating CGD into SDG monitoring and reporting. He also emphasized that India is already engaged in participatory planning processes, social auditing, and CPGRAMS, all of these initiatives are aligned with the Government’s vision of “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas, and Sabka Paryas.” This is in line with the ethos of SDG of “No One is left behind”. Furthermore, these efforts need to be enhanced through a comprehensive framework. He underlined the various challenges involved in unleashing the full potential of citizen contribution to data such as subjectivity, representativeness, privacy and security, scalability, sustainability etc.  

    Delivering the welcome address, Shri N. K. Santoshi, Director General (CS), MoSPI emphasized MoSPI’s efforts to address the extensive data requirements for SDG monitoring and the need for granular insights. He highlighted that MoSPI is exploring non-traditional data sources, such as Citizen-Generated Data (CGD), Geo-spatial information, and other innovative approaches, to complement official statistics and strengthen the tracking of SDG progress across different administrative levels

    Representative from UNRCO provided an overview of global advancements in CGD, introduced the Copenhagen Framework on Citizen Data, and discussed its relevance and adaptation within the Indian statistical system. Mr. Suresh Khadakbhavi, CEO, Digi Yatra Foundation, shared insights on generating Citizen-Generated Data (CGD) through the DigiYatra platform, while Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, DGM (D&TB), State Bank of India, discussed the use of CGD in the Digital Life Certificate for Pensioners Scheme.

    Shri S. C. Malik, ADG, MoSPI, delivered the vote of thanks during the concluding session of the workshop.

    *****
     

    Samrat/Allen: pibmospi[at]gmail[dot]com

    (Release ID: 2104165) Visitor Counter : 23

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Flawed Albanian census supported by EU funding – E-001733/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In its 2023 Report on Albania[1], the Commission called on Albania to conduct the 2023 national population and housing census in line with the relevant international standards and recommendations, including those issued by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

    In the 2024 Report on Albania[2], the Commission noted that the national population and housing census was completed in October 2023, and the preliminary results, including as regards self-declared ethnic identity, were published in June 2024.

    In addition, in the statistic chapter (Chapter 18) of the 2024 Report on Albania, the Commission noted the results in regard to the decline in population and increase in its age and called on Albania to publish detailed data and a thematic analysis of the population and housing census following the initial data release in June 2024.

    The Commission is not directly involved in assessing the census procedure or in validating the census data. Furthermore, ethnic minorities are not part of the EU acquis on population censuses under Chapter 18 — Statistics.

    The conduct of the census will be reviewed by the competent international organisations, including as part of regular monitoring of rights of people belonging to minorities.

    In the 2024 report on Albania , the Commission noted that the legal framework for the protection of minorities is generally aligned with European standards.

    In December 2024 Albania adopted the remaining implementing legislation on the crucial issues of free self-identification of national minorities and the use of minority languages.

    The Commission provided EUR 4.8 million for technical and logistical assistance in support of the census, which is subject to the standard expenditure verification and audit provisions for this type of support.

    So far, no irregularity on the use of the EU funds has been reported to or detected by the Commission.

    • [1] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/ea0a4b05-683f-4b9c-b7ff-4615a5fffd0b_en?filename=SWD_2023_690%20Albania%20report.pdf
    • [2] SWD(2024) 690 final , https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a8eec3f9-b2ec-4cb1-8748-9058854dbc68_en?filename=Albania%20Report%202024.pdf

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: YouTube at 20: how it transformed viewing in eight steps

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alex Connock, Senior Fellow, Said Business School, University of Oxford

    Chay Tee

    The world’s biggest video sharing platform, YouTube, has just turned 20.

    It was started inauspiciously in February 2005 by former PayPal employees Chad Hurley, Steve Chen and Jawed Karim – with a 19-second video of Karim exploring San Diego Zoo.

    That year, YouTube’s disruption of the media timeline was minimal enough for there to be no mention of it in The Guardian’s coverage of TV’s Digital Revolution at the Edinburgh TV Festival.

    Twenty years on, it’s a different story.

    YouTube is a massive competitor to TV, an engagement beast, uploading as much new video every five minutes as the 2,400 hours BBC Studios produces in a whole year. The 26-year-old YouTube star Mr Beast earned US$85 million (£67 million) in 2024 from videos – ranging from live Call of Duty play-alongs to handing out 1,000 free cataract operations.

    As a business, YouTube is now worth some US$455 billion (2024 Bloomberg estimate). That is a spectacular 275 times return on the US$1.65 billion Google paid for it in 2006. For the current YouTube value, Google could today buy British broadcaster ITV about 127 times.

    YouTube has similar gross revenue (US$36.1 billion in 2024) to the streaming giant Netflix – but without the financial inconvenience of making shows, since most of the content is uploaded for free.

    YouTube’s first video: a 19-second look at the elephants of San Diego Zoo.

    YouTube has 2.7 billion monthly active users, or 40% of the entire global population outside China, where it is blocked. It is also now one of the biggest music streaming sites, and the second biggest social network (to Facebook), plus a paid broadcast channel for 100 million subscribers.

    YouTube has built a video Library of Babel, its expansive shelves lined eclectically with Baby Shark Dance, how to fix septic tanks, who would win a shooting war between Britain and France … and quantum physics.

    The site has taken over global children’s programming to the point where Wired magazine pointed out that the future of this genre actually “isn’t television”. But there are flaws, too: it has been described as a conduit for disinformation by fact checkers.

    So how did all that happen? Eight key innovations have helped YouTube achieve its success.

    1. How new creativity is paid for

    Traditional broadcast and print uses either the risk-on, fixed cost of hiring an office full of staff producers and writers, or the variable but risky approach of one-off commissioning from freelancers. Either way, the channel goes out of pocket, and if the content fails to score with viewers, it loses money.

    YouTube did away with all that, flipping the risk profile entirely to the creator, and not paying upfront at all. It doesn’t have to deal with the key talent going out clubbing all night and being late to the set, not to mention other boring aspects of production like insurance, cash flow or contracts.

    2. The revenue model of media

    YouTube innovated by dividing any earnings with the creator, via an advertising income split of roughly 50% (the exact amount varies in practice). This incentivises creators to study the science of engagement, since it makes them more money. Mr Beast has a team employed just to optimise the thumbnails for his videos.

    3. Advertising

    Alongside parent company Google/Alphabet, and especially with the introduction (March 2007) of YouTube Analytics and other technologies, the site adrenalised programmatic video advertising, where ad space around a particular viewer is digitally auctioned off to the highest buyer, in real time.

    That means when you land on a high-rating Beyoncé video and see a pre-roll ad for Grammarly, the advertiser algorithmically liked the look of your profile, so bid money to show you the ad. When that system works, it is ultra efficient, the key reason why the broad, demographics-based broadcast TV advertising market is so challenged.

    4. Who makes content

    About 50 million people now think they are professional creators, many of them on YouTube. Influencers have used the site to build businesses without mediation from (usually white and male) executives in legacy media.

    This has driven, at its best, a major move towards the democratisation and globalisation of content production. Brazil and Kenya both have huge, eponymous YouTube creator economies, giving global distribution to diverse voices that realistically would been disintermediated in the 20th century media ecology.

    5. The way we tell stories

    Traditional TV ads and films start slow and build to a climax. Not so YouTube videos – and even more, YouTube Shorts – which prioritise a big emotive hit in the first few seconds for engagement, and regular further hits to keep people there. Mr Beast’s leaked internal notes describe how to do sequential escalation, meaning moving to more elaborate or extreme details as a video goes on: “An example of a one thru three minute tactic we would use is crazy progression,” he says, reflecting his deep homework. “I spent basically five years of my life studying virality on YouTube.”

    6. Copyright

    Back in 2015, if someone stole your intellectual property – say, old episodes of Mr Bean – and re-broadcast it on their own channel, you would call a media lawyer and sue. Now there is a better option – Content ID – to take the money instead. Through digital rights monetisation (DRM), owners can algorithmically discover their own content and claim the ad revenue, a material new income stream for producers.

    7. Video technicalities

    Most technical innovations in video production have found their way to the mainstream via YouTube, such as 360-degree, 4k, VR (virtual reality) and other tech acronyms. And now YouTube has started to integrate generative AI into its programme-producing suite for creators, with tight integration of Google’s Veo tools.

    These will offer, according to CEO Neal Mohan, “billions of people around the world access to AI”. This is another competitive threat to traditional producers, because bedroom creators can now make their own visual effects-heavy fan-fiction episodes of Star Wars.

    8. News

    YouTube became a rabbit hole of disinformation, misinformation and conspiracy, via a reinforcement-learning algorithm that prioritises view time but not editorial accuracy. Covid conspiracy fans got to see “5G health risk” or “chemtrail” videos, because the algorithm knew they might like them too.

    How can the big, legacy media brands respond? Simple. By meeting the audience where the viewers are, and putting their content on YouTube. The BBC has 14.7 million YouTube subscribers. ITV is exploiting its catalogue to put old episodes of Thunderbirds on there. Meanwhile in February 2025, Channel 4 also announced success in reaching young viewers via YouTube. Full episode views were “up 169% year-on-year, surpassing 110 million organic views in the UK”.

    Alex Connock has worked or consulted for BBC, Channel 4, ITV and Meta.

    – ref. YouTube at 20: how it transformed viewing in eight steps – https://theconversation.com/youtube-at-20-how-it-transformed-viewing-in-eight-steps-250083

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Deeply religious African countries (surprisingly) provide little state support to religion – unlike countries in Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Jeffery-Schwikkard, PhD Candidate (Theology and Religious Studies), King’s College London

    In most of the world, countries with religious populations are more likely to have governments that support religion through laws and policies. These laws might include religious education, funding for religious institutions, and laws based on religious values. Not so in sub-Saharan Africa.

    In a recently published research paper, David Jeffery-Schwikkard, who studies secularism, argues that sub-Saharan African countries provide little state support for religion, even though their populations are among the most devout globally.

    These findings unsettle many common misconceptions about the role of religion in politics. The Conversation Africa asked him a few questions.


    How prevalent is religion in countries in sub-Saharan Africa?

    A population is normally considered very religious if most people say religion is “very important” in their lives or report attending religious services at least once a week.

    In surveys conducted between 2007 and 2018 by the Pew Research Centre, 46% of respondents outside sub-Saharan Africa said religion was very important in their lives. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the average is nearly twice that: 89%. Ethiopia and Senegal are among the most religious countries in the world. In both cases, 98% of people said religion was very important. Of the 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which Pew has data, Botswana (71%) and South Africa (75%) are the least religious. Yet even these countries are far above the global average.

    What does this matter for how states are run?

    Generally, countries with religious populations have states that provide a lot of support to religion. This is what you would expect, since religious citizens probably want more state support for their religions.

    What this means, though, is that commentators often assume that religious citizens are a threat to secular states. This then shapes how analysts make sense of public displays of religion. One example of this is in South Africa, where many people assumed that former president Jacob Zuma, who often used religious rhetoric, would pursue religious laws and policies.




    Read more:
    TB Joshua scandal: the forces that shaped Nigeria’s mega pastor and made him untouchable


    These assumptions are especially common in analyses of religion and politics in Africa. Yet, while it is easy to identify laws or policies in sub-Saharan Africa that are religious, one can easily overlook the fact that having some of these laws is not unusual globally. In other words, having some pro-religion laws and policies doesn’t necessarily mean that countries are governed by religious beliefs.

    Thus one might focus on Ghana’s support for Hajj, while forgetting that the UK reserves seats in the House of Lords for the Church of England, and that Germany collects taxes on behalf of churches. Yet the UK and Germany are rarely seen as religious states. Some level of state support for religion does not mean that a country is governed by religious beliefs.

    Why are African countries different?

    Contrary to the global trend, countries in sub-Saharan Africa provide very little state support to religion – less than half the global average. This is as measured by the Religion and State Project at Bar Ilan University, based on the number of different types of support provided, such as reserving political positions for religious leaders or funding religious schools.

    One of the most popular explanations for the scant support for religion is that states in sub-Saharan Africa lack the necessary financial and administrative capacity. These states, the argument goes, would provide more support if only they had more money and were better able to implement their policies.

    However, data from the World Bank shows that this is not the case: overall, there is no relationship between state capacity and support for religion.




    Read more:
    Catholic synod: the voices of church leaders in Africa are not being heard – 3 reasons why


    A more plausible explanation is that religious actors in these countries tend to lack moral authority. Moral authority, as theorised by American political scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse, is the extent to which people see religious actors as defenders of the nation.

    Several factors are conducive to moral authority. These include whether people share the same ethnicity or religion, whether religious actors have control over education, and whether they have sided with the “right side” in moments of national crisis.

    Can you give an example?

    Consider Rwanda and Mozambique.

    Until 1994, the Roman Catholic Church in Rwanda enjoyed moral prestige. The church controlled a significant share of the education system and had supported the independence movement against Belgium. Most Rwandans were Catholic. And indeed, the church maintained a very close relationship with the state after independence in 1962.

    Yet this moral authority was forfeited after the church was seen to be complicit in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which claimed about 800,000 lives. Today, the government keeps a careful distance from religion, despite 90% of Rwandans reporting that religion is very important in their lives.




    Read more:
    Rwanda’s genocide could have been prevented: 3 things the international community should have done – expert


    Mozambique provides a contrast to Rwanda, yet with similar outcomes. The Roman Catholic Church denounced the liberation movement’s struggle against Portugal. The country has no religious or ethnic majority. At independence, formal education was scarce.

    There was therefore little reason for Mozambicans to see the church as a defender of the nation. On the contrary, religious institutions were persecuted after independence. Like Rwanda, Mozambique provides extremely little state support for religion, despite being one of the most religious countries internationally.




    Read more:
    Between state and mosque: new book explores the turbulent history of Islamic politics in Mozambique


    These factors – religious diversity, limited enrolment in schools controlled by religious organisations, and moments of political crisis in which those organisations can misstep – make it less likely that religious actors are held by citizens as integral to national identity. And while sub-Saharan Africa is extremely varied, common historical influences, such as the legacies of colonialism, may make these factors more likely.

    What can we learn from this?

    Clearly, we need to be more careful in how we interpret the role of religion in politics. While it might be tempting to see religious fervour as a threat to secular democracy, it is not necessarily so. A politician might use religious rhetoric, but this does not mean that it will translate into religious laws. Equally, some state support for religion is not unusual globally. Analyses of single policies need to keep this in mind.




    Read more:
    Christianity is changing in South Africa as pentecostal and indigenous churches grow – what’s behind the trend


    This research also upends the way many people normally think about secularism. Many people in Europe have become less religious. Consequently, European states are offered as models of secularism. However, this has it backwards.

    Despite their electorates being less religious, European states are more involved in religion than their counterparts in sub-Saharan African. If secularism is the separation of religion and the state, then countries in sub-Saharan Africa – which maintain a secular state despite widespread religion – are in fact the exemplar.

    David Jeffery-Schwikkard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Deeply religious African countries (surprisingly) provide little state support to religion – unlike countries in Europe – https://theconversation.com/deeply-religious-african-countries-surprisingly-provide-little-state-support-to-religion-unlike-countries-in-europe-245490

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Deeply religious African countries (surprisingly) provide little state support to religion – unlike countries in Europe

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Jeffery-Schwikkard, PhD Candidate (Theology and Religious Studies), King’s College London

    In most of the world, countries with religious populations are more likely to have governments that support religion through laws and policies. These laws might include religious education, funding for religious institutions, and laws based on religious values. Not so in sub-Saharan Africa.

    In a recently published research paper, David Jeffery-Schwikkard, who studies secularism, argues that sub-Saharan African countries provide little state support for religion, even though their populations are among the most devout globally.

    These findings unsettle many common misconceptions about the role of religion in politics. The Conversation Africa asked him a few questions.


    How prevalent is religion in countries in sub-Saharan Africa?

    A population is normally considered very religious if most people say religion is “very important” in their lives or report attending religious services at least once a week.

    In surveys conducted between 2007 and 2018 by the Pew Research Centre, 46% of respondents outside sub-Saharan Africa said religion was very important in their lives. Within sub-Saharan Africa, the average is nearly twice that: 89%. Ethiopia and Senegal are among the most religious countries in the world. In both cases, 98% of people said religion was very important. Of the 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for which Pew has data, Botswana (71%) and South Africa (75%) are the least religious. Yet even these countries are far above the global average.

    What does this matter for how states are run?

    Generally, countries with religious populations have states that provide a lot of support to religion. This is what you would expect, since religious citizens probably want more state support for their religions.

    What this means, though, is that commentators often assume that religious citizens are a threat to secular states. This then shapes how analysts make sense of public displays of religion. One example of this is in South Africa, where many people assumed that former president Jacob Zuma, who often used religious rhetoric, would pursue religious laws and policies.


    Read more: TB Joshua scandal: the forces that shaped Nigeria’s mega pastor and made him untouchable


    These assumptions are especially common in analyses of religion and politics in Africa. Yet, while it is easy to identify laws or policies in sub-Saharan Africa that are religious, one can easily overlook the fact that having some of these laws is not unusual globally. In other words, having some pro-religion laws and policies doesn’t necessarily mean that countries are governed by religious beliefs.

    Thus one might focus on Ghana’s support for Hajj, while forgetting that the UK reserves seats in the House of Lords for the Church of England, and that Germany collects taxes on behalf of churches. Yet the UK and Germany are rarely seen as religious states. Some level of state support for religion does not mean that a country is governed by religious beliefs.

    Why are African countries different?

    Contrary to the global trend, countries in sub-Saharan Africa provide very little state support to religion – less than half the global average. This is as measured by the Religion and State Project at Bar Ilan University, based on the number of different types of support provided, such as reserving political positions for religious leaders or funding religious schools.

    One of the most popular explanations for the scant support for religion is that states in sub-Saharan Africa lack the necessary financial and administrative capacity. These states, the argument goes, would provide more support if only they had more money and were better able to implement their policies.

    However, data from the World Bank shows that this is not the case: overall, there is no relationship between state capacity and support for religion.


    Read more: Catholic synod: the voices of church leaders in Africa are not being heard – 3 reasons why


    A more plausible explanation is that religious actors in these countries tend to lack moral authority. Moral authority, as theorised by American political scientist Anna Grzymala-Busse, is the extent to which people see religious actors as defenders of the nation.

    Several factors are conducive to moral authority. These include whether people share the same ethnicity or religion, whether religious actors have control over education, and whether they have sided with the “right side” in moments of national crisis.

    Can you give an example?

    Consider Rwanda and Mozambique.

    Until 1994, the Roman Catholic Church in Rwanda enjoyed moral prestige. The church controlled a significant share of the education system and had supported the independence movement against Belgium. Most Rwandans were Catholic. And indeed, the church maintained a very close relationship with the state after independence in 1962.

    Yet this moral authority was forfeited after the church was seen to be complicit in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which claimed about 800,000 lives. Today, the government keeps a careful distance from religion, despite 90% of Rwandans reporting that religion is very important in their lives.


    Read more: Rwanda’s genocide could have been prevented: 3 things the international community should have done – expert


    Mozambique provides a contrast to Rwanda, yet with similar outcomes. The Roman Catholic Church denounced the liberation movement’s struggle against Portugal. The country has no religious or ethnic majority. At independence, formal education was scarce.

    There was therefore little reason for Mozambicans to see the church as a defender of the nation. On the contrary, religious institutions were persecuted after independence. Like Rwanda, Mozambique provides extremely little state support for religion, despite being one of the most religious countries internationally.


    Read more: Between state and mosque: new book explores the turbulent history of Islamic politics in Mozambique


    These factors – religious diversity, limited enrolment in schools controlled by religious organisations, and moments of political crisis in which those organisations can misstep – make it less likely that religious actors are held by citizens as integral to national identity. And while sub-Saharan Africa is extremely varied, common historical influences, such as the legacies of colonialism, may make these factors more likely.

    What can we learn from this?

    Clearly, we need to be more careful in how we interpret the role of religion in politics. While it might be tempting to see religious fervour as a threat to secular democracy, it is not necessarily so. A politician might use religious rhetoric, but this does not mean that it will translate into religious laws. Equally, some state support for religion is not unusual globally. Analyses of single policies need to keep this in mind.


    Read more: Christianity is changing in South Africa as pentecostal and indigenous churches grow – what’s behind the trend


    This research also upends the way many people normally think about secularism. Many people in Europe have become less religious. Consequently, European states are offered as models of secularism. However, this has it backwards.

    Despite their electorates being less religious, European states are more involved in religion than their counterparts in sub-Saharan African. If secularism is the separation of religion and the state, then countries in sub-Saharan Africa – which maintain a secular state despite widespread religion – are in fact the exemplar.

    – Deeply religious African countries (surprisingly) provide little state support to religion – unlike countries in Europe
    – https://theconversation.com/deeply-religious-african-countries-surprisingly-provide-little-state-support-to-religion-unlike-countries-in-europe-245490

    MIL OSI Africa –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Bowman, Brief Remarks on the Economy and Accountability in Supervision, Applications, and Regulation

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you for the invitation to join you here in Phoenix at the ABA’s Conference for Community Bankers.1 For the past seven years, this conference provided an excellent forum for me and bankers to meet and interact with a range of state and federal regulators, policymakers, service providers, and other stakeholders. Today I would like to share a brief update on my views on monetary policy and the economy, before I turn to bank regulatory issues, and describe how I think that regulators should approach the important work of “maintenance” of the regulatory framework.
    Economic Outlook and Monetary PolicyToward the end of last year, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began the process of moving the target range for the federal funds rate to a more neutral setting to reflect the progress made since 2023 on lowering inflation and cooling the labor market. At our September meeting, the FOMC voted to lower the target range, for the first time since we began tightening monetary policy to combat inflation, by 50 basis points to 4-3/4 to 5 percent.
    You may remember that I dissented from that decision, the first time a Fed Governor dissented from an FOMC rate decision in nearly 20 years. I preferred a smaller initial cut to begin the policy recalibration phase. I explained my reasoning in a statement published after the meeting noting that the strong economy and a healthy labor market did not warrant a larger cut. In addition, moving the policy rate down too quickly could unnecessarily risk stoking demand, potentially reigniting inflationary pressures, and could be interpreted as a premature “declaration of victory” on our price-stability mandate.
    At the most recent FOMC meeting last month, my colleagues and I voted to hold the federal funds rate target range at 4-1/4 to 4‑1/2 percent and to continue to reduce the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings. I supported this action because, after recalibrating the policy rate by 100 basis points through the December meeting, I think that policy is now in a good place, allowing the Committee to be patient and pay closer attention to the inflation data as it evolves.
    In my view, the current policy stance also provides the opportunity to review further indicators of economic activity and get further clarity on the administration’s policies and their effects on the economy. It will be very important to have a better sense of these policies, how they will be implemented, and establish greater confidence about how the economy will respond in the coming weeks and months.
    For now, the U.S. economy remains strong, with solid growth in economic activity and a labor market near full employment. Core inflation is still somewhat elevated, but has appeared to resume its downward path, and my baseline expectation has been that it will moderate further this year. Even with this outlook, there are upside risks to my baseline expectation for the inflation path.
    In 2023, the rate of inflation declined significantly, but it has taken longer to see further meaningful declines since that time. The latest consumer and producer price index reports suggest that the 12-month measure of core personal consumption expenditures inflation—which excludes food and energy prices—likely moved down to around 2.6 percent in January, which would represent a noticeable stepdown from its 2.8 percent reading in December and 3.0 percent at the end of 2023. Progress had been especially slow and uneven since the spring of last year mostly due to rising core goods price inflation.
    After increasing at a solid pace, on average, over the first nine months of last year, gross domestic product appears to have risen a bit more moderately in the fourth quarter, reflecting a large drop in the volatile category of inventory investment. In contrast, private domestic final purchases, which provide a better signal about underlying growth in economic activity, maintained its strong momentum from earlier in the year, as personal consumption rose robustly again in the fourth quarter. Following strong readings in December, retail sales and sales of motor vehicles softened in January. However, these data can be noisy around this time of the year and sales were likely affected by the cold and wintery weather last month.
    Payroll employment gains have picked up since the summer of last year and averaged a strong pace of about 240,000 per month over the past three months, with last month’s gains likely held back by the Los Angeles wildfires and the harsh winter weather. The unemployment rate edged down further to 4.0 percent in January and has moved sideways since the middle of last year, remaining below my estimate of full employment.
    The labor market appears to have stabilized in the second half of last year, after it loosened from extremely tight conditions. The rise in the unemployment rate since mid-2023 largely reflects weaker hiring, as job seekers entering or re-entering the labor force are taking longer to find work, while layoffs have remained low. The ratio of job vacancies to unemployed workers has remained close to the pre-pandemic level in recent months, and there are still more available jobs than available workers. The labor market no longer appears to be especially tight, but wage growth remains somewhat above the pace consistent with our inflation goal.
    The recent revision of the Bureau of Labor Statistics labor data further vindicates my view that the labor market was not weakening in a concerning way during the summer of last year. Although payroll employment gains were revised down considerably in the 12 months through March 2024, job gains were little revised, on net, over the remainder of last year. It is crucial that U.S. official data more accurately capture structural changes in labor markets in real time, so we can confidently rely on these data for monetary and economic policymaking. But in the meantime, given conflicting economic signals, measurement challenges, and significant data revisions in recent years, I remain cautious about taking signal from only a limited set of real-time data releases.
    Assuming the economy evolves as I expect, I think that inflation will slow further this year. As the inflation data since the spring of last year show, its progress may be bumpy and uneven, and progress on disinflation may take longer than we would hope. I continue to see greater risks to price stability, especially while the labor market remains strong.
    With encouraging signs that geopolitical tensions may be abating in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and in Asia, I will be monitoring global supply chains which could continue to be susceptible to disruptions, and lead to inflationary effects on food, energy, and other commodity markets. In addition, the release of pent-up demand following the election could lead to stronger economic activity, which could also influence inflationary pressures.
    Having entered a new phase in the process of moving the federal funds rate toward a more neutral policy stance, there are a few considerations that lead me to prefer a cautious and gradual approach to adjusting policy, as it provides us time to assess progress in achieving our inflation and employment goals.
    Given the current policy stance, I think that easier financial conditions from higher equity prices over the past year may have slowed progress on disinflation. And I am watching the increase in longer-term Treasury yields that has occurred since the start of policy recalibration at the September meeting. Some have interpreted it as a reflection of investors’ concerns about inflation risks and the possibility of tighter-than-expected policy that may be required to address inflationary pressures.
    There is still more work to be done to bring inflation closer to our 2 percent goal. I would like to gain greater confidence that progress in lowering inflation will continue as we consider making further adjustments to the target range. We need to keep inflation in focus while the labor market appears to be in balance and the unemployment rate remains at historically low levels. Before our March meeting, we will have received one additional month of inflation and employment data.
    Looking forward, it is important to note that monetary policy is not on a preset course. At each FOMC meeting, my colleagues and I will make our decisions based on the incoming data and the implications for and risks to the outlook and guided by the Fed’s dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and stable prices. I will also continue to meet with a broad range of contacts to help me interpret the signals provided by real-time data and as I assess the appropriateness of our monetary policy stance.
    Bringing inflation in line with our price stability goal is essential for sustaining a healthy labor market and fostering an economy that works for everyone in the longer run.
    Maintenance of the Regulatory FrameworkI will now turn to bank supervision, the bank applications process, and regulation. Community banks experience the burden of the regulatory framework most acutely when it is not appropriately tailored to their size, risk, complexity, and business model. While promoting safety and soundness in the banking system—particularly among community banks—is an important and necessary regulatory objective, we must also be cautious to ensure that the framework does not become an impediment to their operations, preventing them from providing competitive products and services, innovating, and engaging in appropriate risk-taking.
    During my tenure at the Board, I have laid out a wide range of issues and concerns that I see as critical components that are necessary to build and maintain an effective regulatory framework.2 While I will only address a subset of these issues today, I’d like to begin by clarifying what I mean by this.
    Our work to maintain an effective framework is never really complete. Just as complacency can be fatal to the business of a bank, complacency can also prevent regulators from meeting their statutory obligation to promote a safe and sound banking system that enables banks to serve their customers effectively and efficiently.
    System maintenance is not something that we should shy away from. In our everyday lives, we invest significant time in maintenance. We schedule regular oil changes for our cars, and we invest in the infrastructure that allows our economy to function. Devoting resources to maintenance often prevents more costly issues down the road—it’s easier to get oil changes than it is to rebuild an engine.
    So, what does maintenance look like in practice? To address this question, I think it’s helpful to look at three core areas in the bank regulatory framework: Supervision, Bank applications, and Regulation.
    Approach to SupervisionLet’s start with supervision. Supervision operates almost entirely outside of the public view. Much of the work involves the review of proprietary business information from banks, and the preparation of examination reports shielded from public scrutiny under the auspices of protecting confidential supervisory information. But confidentiality should not be used to prevent scrutiny and accountability in the assignment of ratings.
    So, today, I am going to dig a bit deeper into the realm of supervision to discuss supervisory ratings, accountability, and the troubling trend of inaction and opacity within the supervisory toolkit.
    Rational Standards & RatingsWhile there is some public disclosure of supervisory information, it is often difficult to get a true understanding of supervision based on data that may be released. In fact, this data often sends confusing and conflicting signals. For example, the Board’s Supervision and Regulation Report presented information stating that only one-third of large financial institutions maintained satisfactory ratings across all relevant ratings components in the first half of 2024.3 At the same time, this report noted that most large financial institutions met supervisory expectations with respect to capital and liquidity.4
    The odd mismatch between financial condition and overall supervisory condition as assessed by the prudential regulators raises a more significant issue, whether subjective examiner judgment—those evaluations based on subjective, examiner-driven, non-financial concerns—is driving the firm’s overall rating. Are ratings trends based on the materiality of the identified issues, or do they imply that the regulators see widespread fragility in the banking system?
    While this example highlights a large bank ratings framework issue, it is symptomatic of a broader issue that warrants scrutiny—whether the approach to supervision has led to a world in which core financial risks have been de-prioritized, and non-core and non-financial risks—things like IT, operational risk, management, risk management, internal controls, and governance—have been over-emphasized. These issues are important, and certainly worthwhile topics for examiners to consider, but their review should not come at the expense of more material financial risk considerations—and they should not drive the overall assessment of a firm’s condition. There is evidence that supervision has undergone such a shift, not only among large banks, but among regional and community banks as well.5 For all institutions, financial metrics are not among the primary findings determined from the examination process, and arguably they have been de-emphasized when assigning supervisory ratings.
    Prioritization is valuable in the supervisory process, both to inform how examiners allocate their time, but also in helping banks allocate resources to remediate issues identified during the supervisory process. The frequency of supervisory findings related to non-financial metrics may be a byproduct of how long it takes to remediate these issues, like longstanding issues with IT systems that have not been enhanced over many years of growth. However, we should also be vigilant and deliberate about any shift in supervisory focus from financial risk toward non-financial risks and internal processes, as this shift is not focused on fundamental safety and soundness issues and it is not cost-free.
    We should also not expect every firm to coalesce around a single set of products, internal processes, and risk-management practices. Variety in banking models is a strength and a necessity of the U.S. banking system, relying on management and boards of directors to determine bank strategy, rather than a bank’s business model effectively being set by supervisory directives.
    Supervisory practices like horizontal reviews can create examiner incentives to expect uniformity and “grade on a curve,” but this approach perversely punishes variation among bank practices, stifling competition and innovation. Supervisory findings also inform bank ratings, which can have follow-on effects like limiting options for mergers and acquisitions (M&A); raising the cost of liquidity; or diverting resources away from other, more important bank management priorities.
    Diagnostic AccountabilityTo maintain strong and appropriate supervisory standards and practices, we need to take a step back and diagnose the bank regulatory system in its entirety: what is working, what is broken, and what needs to be updated. When things go wrong, having an impartial check on subjective judgments can lead to a better diagnosis. Of course, a better diagnosis can produce more efficient and targeted improvements, and better promote accountability. Accountability is critical to maintaining an effective regulatory system, and yet it can be difficult to establish a regulatory culture that includes mechanisms to promote accountability for supervisors and regulators.6
    At every organizational level, from examiners to agency leadership, judgments are made that contribute to the overall effectiveness of the supervisory process. Reserve Bank examiners play a critical role in examining Fed-regulated institutions, both banks and holding companies. The Federal Reserve exercises its supervisory responsibilities by supervisory portfolio, with each portfolio relying on a combination of Board and Reserve Bank staff.7 But this split allocation of responsibility should not diminish the accountability for supervisory decision making. Responsibility for supervisory decisions must be coupled with accountability for these decisions. The misalignment of responsibility and accountability limits our ability to conduct effective supervision.
    This division of responsibility can pose a challenge to accountability. In the aftermath of the bank failures in 2023 and the broader stress to the banking system, the Board and other agencies proposed a variety of regulatory reform measures to remediate and address identified issues, based on internal reviews of the failures and banking stress. While I applaud efforts to hold ourselves accountable, we must ensure that self-reviews are credible, both in the causes they identify and in the reform agenda that they are used to support. An internal review process poses the temptation to avoid responsibility by assigning blame elsewhere, even when the review may be motivated by good intentions and with the outward appearance of impartiality.
    Many of the core problems in the lead-up to the bank failures involved well-known, core banking risks—interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and poor risk management. But if we look at the subsequent reform agenda, we see that the policy emphasis has been on broader regulatory changes rather than addressing supervisory program deficiencies. In my mind, this highlights the need to have a process that challenges the subjective judgments of those that were involved in oversight, not only in performing the diagnostics, but evaluating how identified issues can best be remediated.
    Purging Inaction and Opacity from the Supervisory ToolkitSupervision differs significantly from the regulatory process. Implementing new regulations, or amending existing ones, requires a public notice and comment process established by the Administrative Procedure Act. When done appropriately, regulations require regulators to “show their work” by providing extensive analytical and factual support for proposals and final rules and soliciting comment from the public and addressing those comments before finalizing a regulation. In contrast, the execution of bank examinations and the issuance of supervisory guidance lack these procedural safeguards, instead relying heavily on discretion and judgment with far lower standards for justifying actions taken with factual and analytical support under the veil of confidential supervisory information. The greater flexibility afforded in the supervisory process can lead to poor outcomes, often caused by the temptation to use inaction and opacity as supervisory tools. In my view, these tools, inaction and opacity, are not appropriate and must be subject to appropriate scrutiny or purged from the toolkit altogether.
    First let’s consider inaction. The exam process requires open communication between examiners and banks. Often interpretive questions arise during the exam process; how do existing rules and statutes apply in a particular circumstance? These questions arise when existing rules and guidance are unclear, which is a frequent occurrence. For example, how can a bank operate in a safe and sound manner while offering a new product or service, or when serving customers in particular business lines with unique needs? Banks go to great effort to meet all applicable requirements and regulatory expectations, and regulators should welcome banks seeking supervisory input and relying on a compliance-focused mindset.
    Open communication with regulated banks is a hallmark of good supervision, but regulators must live up to their end of the bargain by not leaving banks in “limbo” for extended periods of time. When a bank requests feedback and engages in good faith to provide information and respond to reasonable questions, regulators have an obligation to provide a clear response. Banks should not be left to wonder whether an interpretation of existing laws, regulations, and guidance is consistent with the understanding of regulators.
    Next, let’s consider opacity. Questions raised in the supervisory channel often result from supervisory expectations that lack sufficient clarity or the application of rules and regulations to new and emerging products and services. While regulators should not form an opinion without understanding the relevant facts and circumstances, they must also strive to provide clarity—not just to the bank being examined, but to all banks. Supervisory expectations should not surprise regulated firms, and yet transparency around expectations is often challenging to achieve.8
    The problem of opacity in supervisory expectations is exacerbated by the umbrella of confidential supervisory information, or CSI, which is the label given to most materials developed in the examination process. The rules designed to protect CSI limit the public’s visibility into shifting priorities and expectations in the supervisory process.9 Changes in supervisory expectations frequently come without the benefit of guidance, advance notice, or published rulemaking. In the worst-case scenario these shifts, cloaked by the veil of supervisory opacity, can have significant financial and reputational impacts or can disrupt the management and operations of affected banks.
    Opacity in supervisory expectations, or in the interpretation of applicable laws and regulations, should not be discovered only at the conclusion of an examination with the issuance of deficiencies, matters requiring attention, matters requiring immediate attention, or other shortcomings.
    Approach to ApplicationsSunshine is the best disinfectant when it comes to an approach that fosters transparency and accountability. So, I would like to spend a few minutes discussing how we can better shine a light into the dark corners of the bank applications process.
    De Novo FormationDe novo formation has essentially stagnated over the past several years. While many factors have contributed to the decline in the aggregate number of banks in the United States, one key factor has been the lack of new bank formation to replace banks that have been acquired or closed their doors. This lack of de novo bank approvals does not necessarily indicate a lack of demand for new charters though, particularly in light of ongoing demand for bank “charter strip” acquisitions where banks have been acquired just for their charters, the growing demand for banking-as-a-service partnerships, and the shift of activities outside of the banking sector into the non-bank financial system.10 We should consider whether the applications process itself has become an unnecessary impediment to de novo formation.
    How can we improve the process of de novo formation? As fewer applications come in, institutional muscle memory for how to deal with new bank charters erodes, and it becomes difficult to navigate and ultimately to overcome institutional inertia. A few steps like developing specialized expertise, streamlining the application process, and improving transparency can yield significant improvements.
    First, de novo formations are very different from other bank applications where there are existing institutions with established supervisory ratings and examination records. A de novo formation has no supervisory record of performance on which to base a decision or inform judgments about whether an application is consistent with approval. Instead, regulators must evaluate the proposal based on applicable statutory requirements: Is the business plan sound? Is appropriate bank leadership in place? Does the bank have a viable business plan and strategy? Is the bank’s proposal supported by sufficient capital? Should there be an expectation that all of these questions are answered exhaustively often well over a year before the bank would be formed, if it is approved?
    In recent years de novo formations have been rare, and therefore staff tasked with evaluating these proposals do not have a recent perspective or deep well of experience from which to draw. Under our current approach, regional Reserve Banks are the primary point of contact for de novo applicants. We should consider creating a specialized resource that can be utilized by any reserve bank to assist them during the pre-filing conversations with de novo applicants. Our goal should be to facilitate new bank creation—identifying and finding achievable pathways to yes, instead of expecting and insisting on increasing requirements to unachievable levels or those that are intended to deter applicants from filing or moving forward.
    We should also consider whether there are ways to streamline the application process, including, if needed, by recommending statutory changes. While the agencies use some common forms, de novo formations currently involve a range of regulatory approvals. A de novo applicant must apply for a bank charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state banking authority, deposit insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and potentially membership or a parallel holding company formation application with the Federal Reserve.
    Each regulator may be focused on different aspects of the application, and each has the right to ask for additional information as part of the application review and analysis potentially significantly extending the review timeframe. We should have clear standards of review and approval—and coordinated actions—among the state and federal regulators involved in any application. This should include clear timelines for the point at which a regulator forfeits their opportunity to object due to inaction, delay, or stalling tactics.
    But standards for de novo approval are not always clear to applicants, which can lead to lengthy back-and-forth discussions with banking agency staff even after an applicant has prepared the information required by the appropriate application forms. The need for extensive additional information from de novo applicants can be caused by a failure to provide information requested in the application form, but I suspect the submission of incomplete information is often a product of forms that do not include all necessary information.
    We should not need to constantly supplement application forms with ad hoc information requests. If additional information is needed, we should modify the required application forms. One area where the lack of transparent and clear standards is most evident is with the amount of capital required to establish a de novo bank. Discussions around required capital often hinge on subjective assessments based on planned business model and growth, but they rarely involve regulators providing a minimum required capital amount. Standards for approval should not be shrouded in mystery.
    Reform of the de novo applications process should not be thought of as a deregulatory exercise. Clear and transparent standards do not imply “low” or inadequate standards. At the same time, if we want to encourage a pipeline of de novo bank formations, we should also be comfortable with the uncertainty that accompanies any new business, including the risk that some de novo banks will not succeed.
    The cost of eliminating the failure of de novo banks—or really of any banks at any time—is simply too great. Banking is fundamentally about appropriately managed risks, and regulators play a key role in promoting a system that is safe and sound while also serving to support the banking needs of customers and broader economic growth. Our goal should not be to create a banking system that is safe, sound, and ultimately irrelevant.
    Mergers and AcquisitionsThe issues with the banking applications process extend beyond de novo formations, but involve some of the same concerns, whether there are clear standards, and we are able to act in a timely manner. As a threshold matter, if regulators are clear about the information they need to process an application—for example, by updating applications forms to include the full set of information needed to analyze each statutory approval requirement—then we should also hold ourselves to fixed approval timelines. In my view, the purgatory of a long application process is another form of regulatory “inaction” that must be eliminated.
    We should also address aspects of the applications process that contribute to delay, including both the approach to competition and the public comment process.
    The banking agencies have long relied on competitive “screens” to evaluate the pro forma effect of a merger. This process looks at the standalone institutions, imagines a merger in which their operations are combined, and then looks at how measures of competition will change in the areas served by the merged institutions. Where there is overlap in markets served, there is the potential for tripping competitive screens and triggering additional scrutiny. At the Federal Reserve, when a competitive screen is triggered the application process takes more time, as staff reviews the conflict, and the matter is removed from the Reserve Bank-delegated processing track.
    Perversely, many banks that trigger additional scrutiny operate in rural markets and have less aggregate banking business over which institutions can compete. In these concentrated markets, the analytical approach may involve a counterfactual in which only two future states of the world exist—the banks continue to operate on a standalone basis, or the banks merge and operate as a consolidated whole. However, this framing ignores a possible third option, that one or both of the institutions will cease being viable and shut its doors, or be acquired by a credit union, similarly leading to an erosion of market competition and potentially greater disruption to the communities served. This analytical approach to evaluating competition no longer remains appropriate, and it needs to be reformed to better reflect actual market realities. This must include competition from credit unions, the farm credit system, internet banks, financial technology firms and other non-banks.
    Finally, many M&A applications come to the Board due to the receipt of an adverse comment from the public about the past supervisory record of one or both of the institutions involved in a merger. The receipt of an adverse comment causes substantial delays in the processing of an application, as this too removes an application from the “delegated” processing by the local Federal Reserve Bank, escalating the matter to the Board of Governors in D.C. While it is important that regulators take into account public feedback—and indeed, is required by applicable law—we should also be concerned about comments that may lack factual support or may solely rely on matters always considered in the review of a proposal, like the existing supervisory records of the acquirer and the target institution, and may be negated by the regulator’s own examination report.
    Approach to Regulation – Cleanup and the Statutory Regulatory ReviewSince the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act nearly 15 years ago, the body of regulations that all banks are subject to has increased dramatically. Many of the reforms made after the 2008 financial crisis were important and essential to ensuring a stronger and more resilient banking system. Yet, a number of the changes are backward looking—responding only to that mortgage crisis—not fully considering the potential future unintended consequences or future states of the world.
    With well over a decade of change in the banking system now behind us post-implementation, it is time to evaluate whether all these changes continue to be relevant. Some of the regulations put in place immediately after that financial crisis resulted in pushing foundational banking activities out of the banking system into less regulated corners of the financial system. We need to ask whether this is appropriate. These tradeoffs are complicated, and we must consider not only the changes that were made but also the evolution of and differences in the banking system today.
    Driving all risk out of the banking system is at odds with the fundamental nature of the business of banking. Banks, after all, are businesses. And they must be able to earn a profit and grow while also managing their risks. Adding requirements that impose more costs must be balanced with whether the new requirements make the correct tradeoffs between safety and soundness and enabling banks to serve their customers and run their businesses. The task of policymakers and regulators is not to eliminate risk from the banking system, but rather to ensure that risk is appropriately and effectively managed.
    In a well-functioning and appropriately regulated banking system, banks serve an indispensable role in credit provision and economic stability. The goal is to create and maintain a system that supports safe and sound banking practices, and results in the implementation of appropriate risk management. No efficient banking system can eliminate all bank failures. But well-designed and well-maintained systems can limit bank failures and mitigate the harm caused by any that occur.
    Maintenance of the regulatory framework is necessary to ensure that our regulations continue to strike the right balance between encouraging growth and innovation, and safety and soundness. One easily identifiable way to achieve this is using the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA) review process, which the agencies initiated in February last year.
    Although to-date it has not done so, the EGRPRA review requires the federal banking agencies to identify any outdated, unnecessary, or overly burdensome regulations and eliminate unnecessary regulations and take other steps to address the regulatory burdens associated with outdated or overly burdensome regulations. As I noted, prior iterations of the EGRPRA process have been underwhelming in their ability to result in meaningful change, but it is my expectation that this review, and eventually the accompanying report to Congress, will provide a meaningful process for stakeholders and the public to engage with the banking agencies in identifying regulations that are no longer necessary or are overly burdensome. It is also my expectation that regulators will be responsive to concerns raised by the public.
    Another area that is ripe for review are several of the Board’s rules that address core banking issues—from loans to insiders, to transactions with affiliates, to state member bank activities, and holding company requirements. Many of the Board’s regulations have not been comprehensively reviewed or updated in more than 20 years. Given the dynamic nature of the banking system and how the economy and banking and financial services industries have evolved over that period, it is imperative that we update and simplify many of the Board’s regulations, including thresholds for applicability and benchmarks.
    Finally, I want to address the unintended consequences of anti-money laundering requirements in the provision of banking services. I think we can agree that fighting money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit activities is not only a statutory responsibility of the banking system but it also serves important public policy goals. But while the regulatory framework prescribing how banks fulfill this role is not within the Federal Reserve’s responsibilities, it is important to consider how these requirements affect the ability of banks to serve customers. For example, the threshold for currency transaction reports (CTR) was established more than 50 years ago and has not been updated or indexed to inflation during that time. Just as an example, at the time it was implemented, a fully loaded Cadillac cost less than the CTR threshold. We’ve come a long way since 1972.
    It has also created a regime of more extensive and invasive reporting of customers’ transactions that may pose little actual risks related to tracking illicit activities. This reporting regime is also not cost-free, as banks may opt to avoid banking customers that trigger high volumes of CTR reporting, or that otherwise trigger the filing of suspicious activity reports. The calibration of reporting requirements, their effect on bank customers, and the growing problem of customer “de-banking,” warrant greater public attention.
    The Federal Reserve should review the supervisory messages given to banks and their holding companies about how supervisors will evaluate and consider the bank’s risks associated with customers that are caught in the Bank Secrecy Act or Anti-Money Laundering reporting web. I am concerned that this framework is being used to downgrade a bank’s condition based on a disproportionate weighting of its compliance with these requirements in comparison to its overall condition. There are separate examinations conducted for this purpose, and they should be viewed separately, not as a cudgel for downgrading a bank’s condition through the governance and controls mechanism or management assessment.
    Closing ThoughtsThe banking system can be an engine of economic growth and opportunity, particularly when it is supported by a bank regulatory framework that is rational and well-maintained. The work of rationalizing and maintaining this system is an ongoing cycle. While my remarks today have touched on a wide range of issues that require rationalization and “maintenance,” this is by no means an exhaustive list.
    Maintaining an effective framework is not only about ensuring the existing plumbing continues to work (and making it more efficient where possible) but it also must include promoting a system that is responsive to emerging threats and the needs of the banking system. As an example, the significant increase in fraud over the past few years has not generated the strong regulatory and governmental response necessary, even though fraud can become a source of material financial risk, particularly to smaller institutions.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you today. As always, it is a pleasure to be with you!

    1. The views expressed in these remarks are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See, e.g., Michelle W. Bowman, “Bank Regulation in 2025 and Beyond (PDF)” (speech at the Kansas Bankers Association Government Relations Conference, Topeka, Kansas, February 5, 2025); Michelle W. Bowman, “Approaching Policymaking Pragmatically (PDF)” (speech at the Forum Club of the Palm Beaches, West Palm Beach, Florida, November 20, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “Building a Community Banking Framework for the Future (PDF)” (speech at the 2024 Community Banking Research Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, October 2, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “The Future of Stress Testing and the Stress Capital Buffer Framework (PDF)” (speech at the Executive Council of the Banking Law Section of the Federal Bar Association, Washington, D.C., September 10, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “Liquidity, Supervision, and Regulatory Reform (PDF)” (speech at “Exploring Conventional Bank Funding Regimes in an Unconventional World,” Dallas, Texas, July 18, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “The Consequences of Bank Capital Reform (PDF)” (speech to the ISDA Board of Directors, London, England, June 26, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “Innovation in the Financial System (PDF)” (speech at the Salzburg Global Seminar on Financial Technology Innovation, Social Impact, and Regulation: Do We Need New Paradigms?, Salzburg, Austria, June 17, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, and De Novo Bank Formation: Implications for the Future of the Banking System (PDF)” (remarks at A Workshop on the Future of Banking, Kansas City, Missouri, April 2, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “Tailoring, Fidelity to the Rule of Law, and Unintended Consequences (PDF)” (speech at the Harvard Law School Faculty Club, Cambridge, Massachusetts, March 5, 2024); Michelle W. Bowman, “The Role of Research, Data, and Analysis in Banking Reforms (PDF)” (speech at the 2023 Community Banking Research Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, October 4, 2023). Return to text
    3. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report (PDF) at 16-17 (Washington: Board of Governors, November 2024), (describing data for the first half of 2024, the most recent period for which data is available). Return to text
    4. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report. Return to text
    5. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report at 17, 20. Return to text
    6. See Michelle W. Bowman, “Accountability for Banks, Accountability for Regulators (PDF)” (Essay published in Starling Insights, February 13, 2024). Return to text
    7. “Understanding Federal Reserve Supervision,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, last modified April 27, 2023. Return to text
    8. See Michelle W. Bowman, “Approaching Policymaking Pragmatically (PDF)” (speech at the Forum Club of the Palm Beaches, West Palm Beach, Florida, November 20, 2024). Return to text
    9. See Michelle W. Bowman, “Reflections on the Economy and Bank Regulation (PDF)” (speech at the New Jersey Bankers Association Annual Economic Leadership Forum, Somerset, New Jersey, March 7, 2024). Return to text
    10. See Michelle W. Bowman, “The Consequences of Fewer Banks in the U.S. Banking System (PDF)” (speech at the Wharton Financial Regulation Conference, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 14, 2023). Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak took part in the board meeting of the Ministry of Economic Development

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Alexander Novak took part in the board meeting of the Ministry of Economic Development

    February 17, 2025

    Alexander Novak took part in the board meeting of the Ministry of Economic Development

    February 17, 2025

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    Alexander Novak took part in the board meeting of the Ministry of Economic Development

    At the meeting, the participants of the board of the Ministry of Economic Development summed up the main results of the department’s work for 2024. The priorities were identified as maintaining macroeconomic stability, mitigating risks in industries and increasing the potential for economic growth.

    “Despite the ongoing sanctions pressure from unfriendly countries, our economy has demonstrated a high degree of resilience. Moreover, it has shown unprecedented growth rates. GDP growth rates in 2024 amounted to 4.1%, over the past two years – 8.4%. They were the highest in the last decade. The achieved indicators are higher than the global average and significantly higher than the growth rates of Western economies. In nominal terms, since 2020, Russian GDP has doubled and amounted to 200 trillion rubles at the end of last year. Budget revenues were doubled, and the share of oil and gas revenues was reduced. This indicates the diversification of the Russian economy,” said Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, opening the board meeting.

    Taking into account the current challenges, the work of the Government and the Ministry of Economic Development, in particular, is focused on solving three main tasks, noted Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov in his report. “The first is ensuring macro stability. Together with the Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Finance, we are working on the interrelationship of monetary and fiscal policy,” he explained and recalled that this topic was discussed in January at a strategic session led by the Prime Minister.

    The second task is to mitigate risks in individual sectors due to the consequences of tightening monetary policy. The third block of questions is related to the growth of the economy’s potential. “We estimate the economy’s potential at 3% per year and believe that this parameter is achievable,” the minister confirmed.

    The head of the department emphasized the need for further support of investments in the regions and the development of existing support mechanisms. Thus, last year, special economic zones appeared in three regions (Rostov and Tver regions, Mordovia), and were expanded in seven. “A record 230 new residents came. There are 1,300 of them in total, which means that every fifth investor came last year,” he said.

    With the support of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy, the criteria for creating SEZs have been updated to allow for the development of individual specializations. The entry threshold for investments in technical sovereignty projects has been lowered. The ban on residents pledging lease rights to state-owned land has been lifted so that investors can attract loans at the construction stage.

    The first stage of work on mechanisms that help build infrastructure for investors has been completed. “This year, the task is to restart them, preserving the main principle: to focus on projects that have effects for the economy. They will generate taxes, not costs,” added Maxim Reshetnikov.

    “We will continue to improve the business climate: reduce costs and barriers within the framework of the TDC [transformation of the business climate], reengineering the rules of industrial construction, regional and municipal investment standards. Now, together with the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, we are restarting the national business model,” the minister said.

    Speaking about other priorities for work in 2025, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development emphasized the importance of developing state statistics. A large-scale project has already been launched to digitalize statistics, collect information, and combine data with departmental systems. The task is to create a single digital statistics platform, take all interactions to a new level, reduce data processing time and the reporting burden on businesses, he noted.

    Another important area is the OKVED reform. A law has been passed that assumes that the OKVED code will not be what the enterprise once determined during registration, but will reflect the real economic structure of its activities. A lot of interdepartmental work is ahead to switch to the new system. “This is important for the formation of adequate statistics. On the other hand, we will receive an instrument of mass support for enterprises,” the minister said.

    “The Federation Council has developed very productive relations with the economic bloc of the Government. We meet almost weekly to discuss further measures to ensure the stability of the financial sector and various sectors of the economy,” said Deputy Chairman of the upper house of parliament Nikolai Zhuravlev.

    “There are many joint issues on the agenda of the relevant committees of the Federation Council. Among them are the implementation of the Strategy for Spatial Development of Russia, support for long-term investments, and reduction of the administrative burden on business. And of course, the key task for the Federation Council remains the work on improving the investment climate in the regions,” he added.

    Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Economic Policy Maxim Topilin, in turn, noted the importance of the extensive legislative work carried out by the Ministry of Economic Development. As an example, he cited the law on creative industries, on technology policy, and changes to the law on concessions. In addition, according to him, existing support measures need to be accumulated within a single Internet platform, similar to government services.

    “Even seven or eight years ago, government services existed, in essence, in the form of a description of certain administrative regulations. Today, most of them can be obtained electronically. For business structures, it is necessary to set the task of creating similar access to the full range of support measures, everything related to preferential regimes,” the deputy said.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Cutting funding for science can have consequences for the economy, US technological competitiveness

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Chris Impey, University Distinguished Professor of Astronomy, University of Arizona

    National Institutes of Health indirect costs, which are under the knife, go toward managing laboratories and facilities. Fei Yang/Moment via Getty Images

    America has already lost its global competitive edge in science, and funding cuts proposed in early 2025 may further a precipitous decline.

    Proposed cuts to the federal agencies that fund scientific research could undercut America’s global competitiveness, with negative impacts on the economy and the ability to attract and train the next generation of researchers.

    I’m an astronomer, and I have been a senior administrator at the University of Arizona’s College of Science. Because of these roles, I’m invested in the future of scientific research in the United States. I’m worried funding cuts could mean a decline in the amount and quality of research published – and that some potential discoveries won’t get made.

    The endless frontier

    A substantial part of U.S. prosperity after World War II was due to the country’s investment in science and technology.

    Vannevar Bush founded the company that later became Raytheon and was the president of the Carnegie Institution. In 1945, he delivered a report to President Franklin D. Roosevelt called The Endless Frontier.

    In this report, Bush argued that scientific research was essential to the country’s economic well-being and security. His advocacy led to the founding of the National Science Foundation and science policy as we know it today. He argued that a centralized approach to science funding would efficiently distribute resources to scientists doing research at universities.

    The National Science Foundation awards funding to many research projects and early career scientists. Pictured are astronomers from the LIGO collaboration, which won a Nobel Prize.
    AP Photo/Andrew Harnik

    Since 1945, advances in science and technology have driven 85% of American economic growth. Science and innovation are the engines of prosperity, where research generates new technologies, innovations and solutions that improve the quality of life and drive economic development.

    This causal relationship, where scientific research leads to innovations and inventions that promote economic growth, is true around the world.

    The importance of basic research

    Investment in research and development has tripled since 1990, but that growth has been funded by the business sector for applied research, while federal investment in basic research has stagnated. The distinction matters, because basic research, which is purely exploratory research, has enormous downstream benefits.

    Quantum computing is a prime example. Quantum computing originated 40 years ago, based on the fundamental physics of quantum mechanics. It has matured only in the past few years to the point where quantum computers can solve some problems faster than classical computers.

    Basic research into quantum physics has allowed quantum computing to develop and advance.
    AP Photo/Ross D. Franklin

    Worldwide, basic research pays for itself and has more impact on economic growth than applied research. This is because basic research expands the shared knowledge base that innovators can draw on.

    For example, a biotech advocacy firm calculated that every dollar of funding to the National Institutes of Health generates US$2.46 in economic activity, which is why a recent cut of $9 billion to its funding is so disturbing.

    The American public also values science. In an era of declining trust in public institutions, more than 3 in 4 Americans say research investment is creating employment opportunities, and a similar percentage are confident that scientists act in the public’s best interests.

    Science superpower slipping

    By some metrics, American science is preeminent. Researchers working in America have won over 40% of the science Nobel Prizes – three times more than people from any other country. American research universities are magnets for scientific talent, and the United States spends more on research and development than any other country.

    But there is intense competition to be a science superpower, and several metrics suggest the United States is slipping. Research and development spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen from a high of 1.9% in 1964 to 0.7% in 2021. Worldwide, the United States ranked 12th for this metric in 2021, behind South Korea and European countries.

    In number of scientific researchers as a portion of the labor force, the United States ranks 10th.

    Metrics for research quality tell a similar story. In 2020, China overtook the United States in having the largest share of the top 1% most-cited papers.

    China also leads the world in the number of patents, and it has been outspending the U.S. on research in the past few decades. Switzerland and Sweden eclipse the United States in terms of science and technology innovation. This definition of innovation goes beyond research in labs and the number of scientific papers published to include improvements to outcomes in the form of new goods or new services.

    Among American educators and workers in technical fields, 3 in 4 think the United States has already lost the competition for global leadership.

    Threats to science funding

    Against this backdrop, threats made in the beginning of President Donald Trump’s second term to science funding are ominous.

    Trump’s first wave of executive orders caused chaos at science agencies as they struggled to interpret the directives. Much of the anxiety involved excising language and programs relating to diversity, equity and inclusion, or DEI.

    The National Science Foundation is particularly in the crosshairs. In late January 2025, it froze the routine review and approval of grants and new expenditures, impeding future research, and has been vetting grants to make sure they comply with orders from the U.S. president.

    The National Institutes of Health announced on Feb. 7, 2024 a decision to limit overhead rates to 15% which sent many researchers reeling though it has since been temporarily blocked by a judge. The National Institutes of Health is the world’s largest funder of biomedical research, and these indirect costs provide support for the operation and maintenance of lab facilities. They are essential for doing research.

    The new administration has proposed deeper cuts. The National Science Foundation has been told to prepare for the loss of half of its staff and two-thirds of its funding. Other federal science agencies are facing similar threats of layoffs and funding cuts.

    The impact

    Congress already failed to deliver on its 2022 commitment to increase research funding, and federal funding for science agencies is at a 25-year low.

    As the president’s proposals reach Congress for approval or negotiation, they will test the traditionally bipartisan support science has held. If Congress cuts budgets further, I believe the impact on job creation, the training of young scientists and the health of the economy will be substantial.

    Deep cuts to agencies that account for a small fraction – just over 1% – of federal spending will not put a dent in the soaring budget deficit, but they could irreparably harm one of the nation’s most valuable enterprises.

    Chris Impey has received funding from NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.

    – ref. Cutting funding for science can have consequences for the economy, US technological competitiveness – https://theconversation.com/cutting-funding-for-science-can-have-consequences-for-the-economy-us-technological-competitiveness-249568

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial News: Portrait of a Cyber Fraud Victim in 2024

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    In 2024, 34% of citizens who took part in cyber fraud encountered various typessurvey Bank of Russia. At the same time, 9% of those who contacted the criminals lost money. Based on this and other data, the regulator compiled portrait of the victim cyber fraudsters.

    As well asa year earlier, in 2024, women aged 25 to 44 with an average income and secondary education most often fell for the tricks of intruders. As a rule, these are city dwellers who should be more careful about following the rules of cybersecurity: use a strong password, do not share bank card details or codes from SMS messages with strangers. Last year, the proportion of elderly people among victims increased slightly.

    Telephone and SMS fraud, as well as fraud via messengers, still prevail. Among the most popular methods of deception is also gaining access to people’s accounts on Gosuslugi. It is noteworthy that victims usually follow the link sent by the attackers and also voluntarily transfer money to them.

    Most of the victims noted that their losses due to the actions of fraudsters did not exceed 20 thousand rubles. However, the share of large transfers increased: from 100 to 500 thousand rubles. Most of the respondents (more than 70%) lost their own savings after communicating with the attackers, and 15% of the victims gave them the credit money. The deceived began to report thefts more often: 42.8% contacted their bank, 30% – the police.

    Preview photo: fizkes / Shutterstock / Fotodom

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    MIL OSI Russia News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New funding to help create the next generation of aviators and boost the economy

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Latest round of Reach for the Sky programme awarded £810,000 to 16 organisations across the UK.

    • £810,000 of new government funding to help young people start a career in aviation by breaking down barriers to opportunity
    • with the air transport and aerospace sector contributing £20 billion to the UK economy, investment in the next generation of professionals will secure long-term economic growth and deliver on the government’s Plan for Change
    • Reach for the Sky scheme has now provided £2.3 million to 37 organisations, reaching 100,000 people across the country, from Cornwall to Carlisle

    The Aviation Minister has today (17 February 2025) launched the latest round of funding to encourage more young people into a career in aviation, helping to secure long term economic growth and ensuring the sector has the workforce needed for the future.

    Now in its third round, the government’s Reach for the Sky programme will see £810,000 awarded to 16 organisations across the UK, from Cornwall to Newcastle.

    The successful scheme, which totals £2.3 million, has now delivered funding to 37 outreach organisations and reached 100,000 people across the country.

    Supporting young people to pursue careers such as pilots, navigators and controllers also aligns with the government’s ambition to go further and faster to kickstart growth. As part of the drive to build up aviation capacity at Heathrow and across the sector – from increased travel options to more UK homegrown aviation jobs – expansion in the sector plays a crucial part in unlocking economic prosperity.

    Reach for the Sky aims to break down barriers to opportunity and form the next generation of aviators, particularly by supporting young people from disadvantaged backgrounds who may not have considered a career in the sector before.

    Funding will help organisations deliver events, interactive workshops, taster days, mentorship schemes and educational initiatives with schools, universities and career professionals.

    Aviation Minister, Mike Kane, said:

    As part of our Plan for Change, we are breaking down barriers to opportunity so that every young person has the chance to pursue their dreams.  

    Programmes like Reach for the Sky turn ambition into reality, helping to inspire young people and introducing them to the benefits of a career in the skies.  

    I look forward to seeing the achievements of the next generation of aviators.

    With Office for National Statistics (ONS) data showing that young people from disadvantaged households are more likely to feel they do not have as much of a chance in life, programmes like Reach for the Sky help break down barriers to opportunity and expand horizons for underserved, hard-to-reach groups.

    This year’s recipients of the DfT-funded scheme include SaxonAir, The King’s Trust and Employers and Educators, amongst others.

    SaxonAir, who have been successful in previous rounds, offer a range of scholarships, volunteering programmes and events for people of all backgrounds.

    One of their main initiatives is the INSPIRE programme, delivered in partnership with Business In The Community (BITC) at West Earlham Infant School. It aims to make the aviation industry inclusive for individuals of all ages, abilities, and backgrounds.

    The initiative is already making a tangible difference, with teachers at West Earlham Infant School in Norwich reporting a surge in enthusiasm for aviation among pupils following a recent visit.

    Hannah Colledge, HR and Wellbeing Coordinator at SaxonAir, said: 

    Our INSPIRE Outreach Programme is designed to spark a passion for aviation from as young as 5 years old offering tailored activities that align with different age groups and connect appropriately to the curriculum.

    With support from the Reach for the Sky funding, we can extend our reach, ensuring that young people from all backgrounds have the chance to experience aviation firsthand.

    By breaking down barriers and bringing aviation opportunities to underrepresented communities, we are reinforcing our commitment to a more diverse and inclusive aviation sector.

    Graham, the father of a student at Aylsham High School, Norwich, said:

    [My son] really enjoyed the INSPIRE event and loved the opportunity to see what goes on behind the scenes in the aviation industry. His ambition is to be a pilot, but this event opened his eyes into other possibilities of work with and around aircraft. Thank you for providing him with this rare opportunity.

    Education and Employers Charity helps young people discover their future by bringing inspiration from the world of work into school. Reach for the Sky funding helps them connect aviation professionals with young people to deliver careers events and provide training across the UK.

    Speaking about one of these events, a pupil at Ealing Fields High School, Josh from London said:

    I’ve wanted to be a pilot for a long time and the opportunity to listen to a pilot tell his story and career path was really impactful. At the end I was lucky enough to speak to him 1:1 and this really helped me with my questions. Since meeting with him I’ve made the most of opportunities and even visited a flight simulator. The talk was so impactful.

    The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is responsible for delivering the Reach for the Sky programme on behalf of DfT.

    Sophie Jones, Head of Organisational Capability and STEM Sponsor at the CAA, said:

    The aerospace sector provides many jobs and opportunities for development, and with the innovation and growth currently taking place, it is all the more vital for young people to join the industry.

    The Reach for the Sky Challenge fund provides support for outreach programmes that inspire the next generation, from all backgrounds, to pursue careers in aviation and aerospace, ensuring that the UK continues to be at the forefront of innovation and development.

    As the UK’s aviation regulator, we are proud to inspire the next generation’s journey into this fantastic industry through our STEM programme, funded by the Department for Transport.

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    Published 17 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Amish voters for Trump? The Amish and the religion factor in Republican electoral politics

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Daniele Curci, PhD Candidate in International and American History, University of Florence

    On November 5, 2024, as millions of Americans headed to the polls, billionaire Elon Musk posted a video on his social media platform X depicting a caravan of Amish individuals travelling via horse and buggy to vote for Donald Trump. The following day, in response to a post expressing gratitude to the Amish for their contribution to Trump’s victory, Musk wrote: “The Amish may very well save America! Thank goodness for them. And let’s keep the government out of their lives.” Musk’s tweets underscore the growing prominence of religion in US politics and the Republican party’s efforts to integrate the Amish into its electorate.

    The Amish and their vote in US history

    The Amish are a Protestant religious community rooted in early European Anabaptist movements. They accept technological advancements selectively, adhering to a distinct way of life marked by simple living, plain dress and a focus on community, distinguishing between what strengthens their social bonds and what might compromise their spiritual path. The Amish are a tiny minority in the US: in 2022, there were approximately 373,620 individuals in a population of around 330 million–slightly more than one in 1,000 Americans. They are predominantly concentrated in the election swing states of Pennsylvania and Ohio, which partly explains Republicans’ interest in courting their support.

    Traditionally, the Amish mainly abstain from voting unless they feel compelled to protect their religious freedoms, preserve their way of life or address critical moral issues. Historically, such instances of electoral participation have occurred only three times.

    The first instance dates back to the 1896 presidential election, when the Republican nominee, William McKinley, campaigned on a platform centred on industrial corporate interests. These interests diverged significantly from those of the Amish, who aligned instead with Democrat William Bryan’s policies advocating for small farmers and the defense of rural America.

    Amish political engagement resurfaced during the 1960 presidential election, which featured Republican Richard Nixon vs Democrat John F. Kennedy. The Amish viewed Kennedy as an ally of the Catholic church, an institution they viewed as intolerant. Consequently, they supported Nixon, a Quaker, whom they saw as a defender of a Protestant America.

    The most recent instances of notable Amish participation occurred amid the presidential election campaigns of Republican George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004. This phenomenon, dubbed “Bush Fever,” saw unprecedented Amish voter turnout. In 2000, 1,342 out of 2,134 registered Amish voters in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania–which has one of the largest Amish communities in the US–cast ballots, achieving a turnout rate of 63%. By 2004, Amish voter registration had increased by 169%, with 21% of eligible adults being registered. This mobilization was spearheaded by Chet Beiler, the son of Amish parents who left the community when he was three. Leveraging his heritage and fluency in Pennsylvania German, a traditional language spoken in many Amish communities, Beiler developed a voter registration strategy targeting the Amish to support Bush’s re-election campaign.

    The religious factor in US politics

    To understand the Republican party’s interest in the Amish, one must examine the increasing centrality of religion in US politics. This phenomenon persists despite a growing number of Americans identifying as non-religious or less religious.

    In the US political context, religion extends beyond faith to encompass cultural identity and social cohesion. Scholars often describe this phenomenon as “Christianism,” a form of nationalism that is bound together by a belonging to Christianity and that emerges, as a form of reaction, within the culture wars. Consequently, a political platform emphasizing Christian principles and rural values has the potential to galvanize segments of the electorate. This dynamic is exemplified by Musk’s tweets about the Amish. Within some parts of the Republican electorate, the Amish are perceived as “guardians of lost values,” embodying a vision of an untainted rural America defined by traditional family structures and an agrarian work ethic. This narrative has been further amplified by Amish PAC, a political action committee established in Virginia in 2016 to rally support for Trump through religiously framed identity politics that advocate for traditional values and oppose abortion rights.

    The influence of religion within the Republican party is further underscored by the ascendancy of the Christian right, a political movement that emerged in the late 1970s. Though not a monolithic entity, it is composed of individuals–primarily evangelical Christians–seeking to shape US politics based on a conservative interpretation of biblical principles and societal values.

    Legislation and the Amish

    Some Republicans have advocated for legislation favourable to the Amish, such as former US representative Bob Gibbs, who won election in the Amish-dominated congressional district of Holmes County, Ohio. In December 2021, Gibbs introduced legislation to allow people with specific religious beliefs such as the Amish, who view photography as a form of idolatry, to be exempt from a requirement of possessing identification documents featuring their photographs “to purchase a firearm from a federally licensed firearms dealer.” In the same month, Gibbs also proposed another bill to benefit the Amish, which would have allowed them to opt out of social security and Medicare wage deductions if they were employed by non-Amish-owned companies.

    Earlier in 2021, the conservative-majority Supreme Court resolved a longstanding dispute between the Amish of Lenawee County, Michigan and local authorities, ruling in favour of the Amish. The issue at the heart of the case concerned wastewater management. Following their religious principles, the Amish typically avoid using modern inventions such as septic systems, and the Amish in Lenawee County used a management method considered noncompliant by health officials. This case followed similar ones involving other Amish communities in Ohio, Minnesota and Pennsylvania. Legal disputes such as these could be leading the Amish to form a more positive view of the Republican party and Trump, both for their advocacy of “less government” and for positioning themselves as defenders of religious freedom.

    The Amish and the 2024 presidential election

    According to the online news source Anabaptist World, media reports suggested that the 2024 presidential election saw a surge in voter registrations among the Amish in Pennsylvania, allegedly contributing to Trump’s victory in the state. The alleged surge was reportedly driven by a reaction to federal legal actions against an Amish farmer accused of selling raw dairy products across state lines, which resulted in cases of Escherichia (E.) coli.

    However, official data from Lancaster County–where the principal Amish settlement in Pennsylvania is located–challenge claims of a massive Amish turnout. The increase in Trump’s vote share in the state, from 48.84% in 2020 to 50.37% in 2024, primarily occurred in urban and suburban areas. For example, by the time the Associated Press declared that Trump had won Pennsylvania, his vote share in Philadelphia had improved by three percentage points. Key suburban counties such as Bucks, Monroe and Northampton, which former president Joe Biden won in 2020, had swung in his favour. And the Republican had also performed better in the Philadelphia-area suburbs of Delaware and Chester counties. These regions, with few Amish residents, experienced substantial shifts, while districts with larger Amish populations saw only modest gains for Trump.

    While the Amish did not become a significant component of Trump’s electoral coalition, voters in some Amish communities may have grown more sympathetic to his candidacy. More importantly, members of the religious group serve as a potent symbol of mobilization and propaganda for the Republican party amid the intensifying polarization of US politics.

    Daniele Curci ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    – ref. Amish voters for Trump? The Amish and the religion factor in Republican electoral politics – https://theconversation.com/amish-voters-for-trump-the-amish-and-the-religion-factor-in-republican-electoral-politics-247869

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Heat pumps have a cosiness problem

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Aimee Ambrose, Professor of Energy Policy, Member of Fuel Poverty Evidence and Trustee of the Fuel Poverty Research Network, Sheffield Hallam University

    How we keep warm at home accounts for 17% of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions. The UK cannot reach net zero emissions, and end its contribution to climate change, without ending its reliance on natural gas as the dominant source of heating.

    As elsewhere in Europe, heat pumps (which use electricity to draw heat out of the air or ground and circulate it indoors) are regarded as the best way to reduce carbon emissions. But are people ready to ditch their gas boilers?

    My colleagues and I spent three years researching what people need, want and expect from their heating systems by asking 300 people in eight settlements across the UK, Finland, Sweden and Romania about their experiences of trying to keep warm at home. These memories ranged from as early as 1945 to the present day.

    Among the four countries we studied, the uptake of heat pumps is most sluggish in the UK and Romania. In Sweden, heat pumps are an established technology, used to heat homes outside of dense urban areas that tend to be served by heat networks, where a boiler is shared by multiple dwellings and heat pumped to each home through pipes.

    Successive oil crises accelerated the roll-out of electric heating in Sweden during the 1970s. Our participants credited widespread trust in the Swedish government at the time for the successful adoption of heat pumps.

    Relatively low trust in the government makes it more difficult to increase heat pump uptake in the UK, a problem shared by Romania, where, low trust in the government follows decades of communist rule during which energy could be cut off to maintain supply to industries.

    When coal was king and stoves were guilt-free

    We found that there were strong attachments to high-carbon fuels in many of the communities we studied – even where people were committed to a future with low-carbon energy.

    In former coalfields, such as Rotherham in south Yorkshire and Jiu Valley in south-west Romania, people spoke wistfully of the coal industry which provided jobs, housing and plentiful fuel for heating and cooking, except during industrial disputes. The coal fire was where most of our participants let their minds linger.

    The subsequent move to natural gas heating for most UK households, which started in the 1960s, failed to evoke the same enthusiasm. People did acknowledge the benefits of being able to heat the whole home evenly with gas central heating and remembered feeling glad to no longer have to clean out the grate, but this was a less remarkable era in home heating. Participants talked about it in less detail, for less time and with less enthusiasm.

    Many of our Finnish participants, despite having heat pumps or connection to a district heating network, wanted to continue burning wood at home. This treasured practice brought a sense of wellbeing. The intense pleasure of the fireside created a sense of homeliness and enabled cultural traditions such as cooking on a wood fire, plus the multi-sensory experience of a wood-fired sauna.

    Some participants worried about being considered an “environmental criminal” for driving a diesel car, but regarded burning wood as more socially acceptable. Outside of cities, plots of woodland are inherited in some families. Gathering firewood was a ritual many enjoyed and didn’t want to give up.

    Nice, but not sustainable.
    Skylines/Shutterstock

    More affluent participants in the UK also valued their wood burning stoves – a growing trend essentially borrowed from Scandinavian neighbours. Those we interviewed in Sweden also prized their wood burners but usually only in the homes or cabins where they holidayed.

    Thermal delight

    In 1979, US architect Lisa Heschong’s concept of “thermal delight” held that building designers were forgetting the importance of enabling pleasure through heat. Our research participants had not forgotten, however, and confirmed that we seek the most joyous route to warming our bodies.

    While the necessary speed of the net zero transition entails a clean sweep that substitutes fossil-fuelled heating for low-carbon, electric alternatives, our research shows that this may be unappealing to many households.

    The people we met wanted heating options to reflect different needs and preferences. Our participants valued central heating for bringing their houses to a consistent temperature, but this did not preclude a desire for the radiant heat of the log burner on some days. They also wanted the option of plugging in a portable, electric heater when they only needed to heat one room.

    They enjoyed the contrast between the intense warmth of the fireside and a cool bedroom and many regarded an even heat throughout the home as “uninviting” – something that met their needs but not their desires. The experience of different eras of home heating had taught them the value of flexibility and variety, which makes a “clean sweep” to electric heating unattractive.

    These findings do not mean that heat pumps are doomed. Indeed, heat pumps have a lot to offer in terms of reducing heating emissions. What we found does indicate a need for multiple ways to heat the home within scenarios for reaching net zero emissions.

    The transition from coal to gas heating is within living memory in the UK.
    AstroStar/Shutterstock

    Partly, this calls for innovation in home heating technology. There is really no place for burning solid fuels in a net zero future, but a concerted effort between heating researchers, designers and technologists could create a beautiful heat source that acts as a focal point, and offers something akin to the multi-sensory joy of the fireside.

    The findings also indicate the need to change how heating transitions are talked about by the government and energy companies. Away from an implacable duty to switch heating sources and the need for efficiency, and towards the joy and abundance of a heat source that (in the case of heat pumps) offers four times the heat output for the same energy input as a gas boiler.

    The best way to sell the low-carbon heating transition is locally, where the kinds of attachments and allegiances to heat that we have uncovered are best appreciated and understood. Local authorities are typically best placed to do that.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Aimee Ambrose receives funding from The Collaboration for the Humanities and Social Sciences in Europe (CHANSE) and The Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).

    – ref. Heat pumps have a cosiness problem – https://theconversation.com/heat-pumps-have-a-cosiness-problem-249529

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: GB Energy & Grangemouth show ‘You can’t trust Labour’

    Source: Scottish National Party

    ‘You can’t trust Labour’. It was an oft made comment during the latter year’s of Tony Blair’s premiership; particularly because of his role in dragging the UK into the Iraq war on the basis of a lie.

    But it took six years for that phrase to become common usage. With the current Westminster Labour government of Keir Starmer it’s only taken six months.

    And recently we saw an example which explains why trust in Keir Starmer’s Labour party has nosedived.

    Before the 2024 election Labour promised that Aberdeen would get 1,000 jobs from hosting the GB Energy headquarters; but now the appointed boss of GB Energy says it will only create 200 jobs in five years.

    The GB Energy boss who won’t even be working in Aberdeen but Manchester! So much for a ‘headquarters’ in Aberdeen.

    These revelations have been followed more recently by news that Grangemouth’s refinery is to close after 100 years.

    Again, another example of how Labour can’t be trusted.

    Before the election Labour, along with Keir Starmer and Anas Sarwar, promised to save the jobs:

    :wilted_flower: Before the Westminster election, Labour promised to save Grangemouth – they’ve broken that promise. :point_down: pic.twitter.com/coS3gDL2l0

    — The SNP (@theSNP) February 6, 2025

    Now it’s scenes of Anas Sarwar repeatedly pleading that he’s powerless because it’s a private company…

    Anas Sarwar promised in the 2024 Westminster election that Labour would save the jobs at Grangemouth.

    Labour broke that promise. pic.twitter.com/GAng87jhjz

    — The SNP (@theSNP) February 7, 2025

    …a private company Labour will financially support when it comes to a football stadium in England and a refinery in Belgium!

    Labour Government promises to back Ineos owners Old Trafford project and has also been given a £600million loan guarantee by the UK Labour Government for a refinery in Belgium.

    I thought Labour promised to save Grangemouth! pic.twitter.com/MMqNq2TaqR

    — Gordon Macdonald MSP (@GMacdonaldSNP) February 9, 2025

    And it was Westminster who tied their own hands when it gave Grangemouth to the private sector:

    The SNP’s @MichelleThomson on @bbcdebatenight reminding us that Westminster tied its own hands when it gave Grangemouth to the private sector.

    Once again, Scotland is bearing the brunt of Westminster’s mismanagement. pic.twitter.com/kVeXePfm7k

    — The SNP (@theSNP) February 6, 2025

    Is it any wonder that even Grangemouth’s own Labour MP sounds like he doesn’t trust Labour?

    :face_with_peeking_eye: Even Labour’s own MPs know they’ve betrayed Grangemouth

    Watch below :point_down: pic.twitter.com/roXsOcP17m

    — The SNP (@theSNP) February 10, 2025

    Even a letter he wrote to Starmer was signed by only one other Scottish Labour MP. So much for Scottish Labour MPs standing up for Scotland.

    But those two examples are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Labour promises.

    Take the WASPI women pensioners; betrayed so often by the Tories and now by Labour. As leader of the opposition, Starmer promised to “do something about it”, saying he understood their anger at having “the goalposts moved”.

    In 2020 he railed against the two-child cap on child benefits. In the days running up to the election Scots were told to vote Labour to end child poverty.

    Yet just after the election he suspended seven Labour MPs for voting with the SNP to scrap the cap on child benefit and tackle child poverty.

    Then there’s the winter fuel payment for pensioners. In the run up to voting in July 2024 Starmerrailed against the Tories about how pensioners suffered under the Tories and promised them security.

    Safely in Downing Street his government announced a cut to pensioners’ winter fuel payments despite research by his own party that it could cause 4,000 deaths.

    And what about National Insurance?

    Labour’s manifesto specifically pledged that they would not raise national insurance. In her budget Rachel Reeves increased employer national insurance – a policy that will hit those employing lower paid workers the hardest, charities, GPs and care homes.

    You would think such a level of untrustworthy behaviour would be more than enough after seven months; but there’s more that specifically affects Scotland.

    In the July 2024 election Anas Sarwar expressly promised that Scottish Labour ‘would put Scotland at the heart of Starmer’s government‘; and ‘stand up to Keir Starmer and defend Scotland’s interests‘.

    Instead, as a group, Scottish Labour MPs have meekly voted for cutting the winter fuel payment, keeping the two-child benefit, and failing to support WASPI women.

    And there’s a range of issues where that group of MPs have been subdued when it comes to putting Scotland at the heart of Starmer’s government.

    In August 2024 Rachel Reeves pulled funding for an £800 million computer at Edinburgh University with a Labour source saying the project made “little strategic sense.”

    Yet by January Keir Starmer was announcing that his government had arranged £14 billion of investment in various AI projects.

    At the end of January Rachel Reeves announced her plans for growth in the UK … which amounted to a concentration of UK government assistance between the cities hosting the UK’s two elitist universities.

    The absence for similar assistance for Scotland was notable despite claiming it would deliver to “all corners of the UK“:

    Labour have announced they are investing taxpayer money to drive growth “across the UK”.

    Guess where almost all of it is going. pic.twitter.com/Fo332thuae

    — The SNP (@theSNP) January 30, 2025

    Take CCS, or Carbon Capture & Storage; since the 2014 independence referendum the North East of Scotland has been repeatedly promised that Westminster would invest millions in it.

    Rachel Reeves eventually announced funding for Carbon Capture & Storage … in Teesside and Merseyside. No Scottish Labour MP or MSP has even mentioned this slap in the face to Scotland.

    Is it any wonder Scots believe Anas Sarwar doesn’t stand up to Keir Starmer. It’s no wonder Scottish Labour’s vote is at its lowest level in three years.

    And what is Anas Sarwar’s latest move as we approach a Scottish election year? To say he is open to ‘good ideas’ from Nigel Farage’s Reform party.

    A party that would like to abolish the Scottish Parliament and privatise the NHS. The party of Brexit which has increased the cost-of-living creating less money for public services.

    And Anas Sarwar’s latest gambit just raises more questions about trust in Labour. He’s now pledging to protect SNP policies like free tuition, free prescriptions and the Scottish Child Payment.

    After months of accusing the SNP government of ’18 years of failure’ he’s now saying it has been 18 years of “successes”.

    But why should anyone trust what many see as a panicked announcement by Anas Sarwar?

    On several occasions Labour’s Holyrood group of MSPs have voted against SNP government budgets which contained those policies. Even now they are not supporting the SNP budget containing those policies.

    A previous Scottish Labour leader notoriously called those policies a ‘something for nothing‘ culture which should end.

    Anas Sarwar’s health spokesperson, Jackie Baillie, is on record as saying prescription charges should “absolutely” be abolished.

    As for tuition fees it was only in February 2024 that Sarwar’s finance spokesperson, Michael Marra, said backdoor tuition fees, like endowments, would have to be considered.

    Shortly after Labour MSPs voted with the Tories in Holyrood against free tuition.

    And let’s not forget the behaviour of Anas Sarwar’s boss, Keir Starmer. In 2020 he promised Labour members in the party leadership election that he would “support the abolition of tuition fees”.

    Yet by September 2023 he claimed it would be ‘impossible‘ to abolish tuition fees … despite the fact that is the reality in Scotland.

    And let’s not forget which party first introduced tuition fees – whose policy they ultimately are.

    Just weeks before the 1997 election Tony Blair pledged: “Labour has no plans to introduce tuition fees for higher education.”

    A year after taking power, Blair went ahead and introduced tuition fees.

    It all just shows how the people of Scotland don’t and can’t trust any promise by Scottish Labour. Like a branch office they will always follow their bosses in Westminster.

    There’s only one party that Scots can trust to stand up and speak for Scotland. Speak out about Westminster ignoring your communities when it comes to investment. To vote for the benefit of Scotland’s pensioners, families and workers – the SNP.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade in December 2024

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade in December 2024
    Volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade in December 2024
    **************************************************************************

         Further to the external merchandise trade statistics in value terms for December 2024 released earlier on, the Census and Statistics Department (C&SD) released today (February 17) the volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade for that month.      In December 2024, the volume of Hong Kong’s total exports of goods increased by 2.3%, while the volume of imports of goods decreased by 3.6% over December 2023.      Comparing 2024 with 2023, the volume of Hong Kong’s total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 4.9% and 2.6% respectively.      Comparing the fourth quarter of 2024 with the preceding quarter on a seasonally adjusted basis, the volume of total exports of goods remained virtually unchanged, while the volume of imports of goods decreased by 0.8%.      Changes in volume of external merchandise trade are derived from changes in external merchandise trade value with the effect of price changes discounted.      Comparing December 2024 with December 2023, the prices of total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 2.7% and 2.3% respectively.      As regards price changes in 2024 over 2023, the prices of total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 3.6% and 3.2% respectively.      Price changes in external merchandise trade are reflected by changes in unit value indices of external merchandise trade, which are compiled based on average unit values or, for certain commodities, specific price data.      The terms of trade index is derived from the ratio of price index of total exports of goods to that of imports of goods. Compared with the same periods in 2023, the index increased by 0.4% in both December 2024 and 2024 as a whole.      Changes in the unit value and volume of total exports of goods by main destination are shown in Table 1.      Comparing December 2024 with December 2023, increases were recorded for the total export volume to Vietnam (47.9%), the mainland of China (the Mainland) (11.2%) and Taiwan (1.2%). On the other hand, the total export volume to the USA (-18.2%) and India (-31.7%) decreased.      Over the same period of comparison, the total export prices to the USA (3.4%), the Mainland (3.3%), Vietnam (2.5%) and Taiwan (2.3%) increased. On the other hand, the total export prices to India decreased by 3.8%.      Changes in the unit value and volume of imports of goods by main supplier are shown in Table 2.      Comparing December 2024 with December 2023, declines were recorded for the import volume from Korea (-13.8%), the Mainland (-4.6%) and Japan (-0.7%). On the other hand, the import volume from Taiwan (2.4%) and Singapore (8.3%) increased.      Over the same period of comparison, the import prices from all main suppliers increased: Korea (8.6%), Singapore (3.7%), the Mainland (1.8%), Japan (1.2%) and Taiwan (1.2%). Further information      Details of the above statistics are published in the December 2024 issue of “Hong Kong Merchandise Trade Index Numbers”. Users can browse and download the report at the website of the C&SD (www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1020006&scode=230).      Enquiries on merchandise trade indices may be directed to the Trade Analysis Section of the C&SD (Tel: 2582 4918).

     
    Ends/Monday, February 17, 2025Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: February 2025 issue of “Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics” now available

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    February 2025 issue of “Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics” now available
    February 2025 issue of “Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics” now available
    ***************************************************************************************

         The Census and Statistics Department (C&SD) published today (February 17) the February 2025 issue of the “Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics” (HKMDS).      Apart from providing up-to-date statistics, this issue also contains a feature article entitled “Road Traffic Accident Statistics in Hong Kong, 2014 to 2023”. Statistics presented in the “Road Traffic Accident Statistics in Hong Kong, 2014 to 2023” article are based on the data source from the Statistics Section of the Transport Department. “Road Traffic Accident Statistics in Hong Kong, 2014 to 2023”      There were 17 189 road traffic accidents in Hong Kong in 2023, involving 22 269 casualties and 28 808 vehicles. This feature article analyses the road traffic accidents and the characteristics of casualties and vehicles involved in these accidents from 2014 to 2023.      For enquiries about this feature article, please contact the Statistics Section of the Transport Department (Tel: 3842 6067; email: rssd@td.gov.hk).      Published in bilingual form, the HKMDS is a compact volume of official statistics containing about 130 tables. It collects up-to-date statistical series on various aspects of the social and economic situation of Hong Kong. Topics include population; labour; external trade; National Income and Balance of Payments; prices; business performance; energy; housing and property; government accounts, finance and insurance; and transport, communications and tourism. For selected key statistical items, over 20 charts depicting the annual trend in the past decade and quarterly or monthly trend in the recent two years are also available. Users can download the Digest at the website of the C&SD (www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1010002&scode=460).      Enquiries about the contents of the Digest can be directed to the Statistical Information Dissemination Section (1) of the C&SD (Tel: 2582 4738; email: gen-enquiry@censtatd.gov.hk).

     
    Ends/Monday, February 17, 2025Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: What We Heard report released on child naming and parentage laws

    What We Heard report released on child naming and parentage laws
    jlutz
    February 14, 2025 – 9:45 am

    The Government of Yukon has released the Inclusive Yukon Families: What We Heard report, summarizing feedback on child naming and parentage laws. The public-engagement, which took place from February to April 2024, aimed to understand barriers, burdens and inequities within the current legislative framework and explore how the Yukon’s laws can be modernized to better reflect the diversity of Yukon families.

    The report identifies key challenges in the Yukon’s current naming and parentage laws. It highlights barriers faced by Indigenous communities seeking to reclaim traditional names, 2SLGBTQIA+ families striving for legal recognition and individuals using assisted reproduction or surrogacy to grow their families.

    Key findings in this report include the following.

    • 44 per cent of respondents agreed that parents should be able to include letters and characters that are not part of the Roman alphabet in their child’s name.
    • Many Indigenous respondents emphasized the importance of name reclamation as a step toward reconciliation and cultural preservation.
    • Feedback on parentage laws indicated a need for more inclusive definitions that recognize diverse family compositions, including families formed through surrogacy, egg and sperm donation and polyamorous relationships.
    • There is broad support for ensuring children’s rights and best interests remain central in determining legal parentage.

    This report will inform the Government of Yukon’s next steps in potential legislative changes to the Children’s Law Act, Vital Statistics Act and Change of Name Act.

    Related information:

    Read the Inclusive Yukon Families: What We Heard report

    Read the Children’s Law Act

    Read the Vital Statistics Act

    Read the Change of Name Act

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Minister Rishworth interview on ABC Hobart Drive with Kylie Baxter

    Source: Ministers for Social Services

    17 February 2025

    E&OE TRANSCRIPT

    Topics: Family and domestic violence; Men’s behaviour change; Additional funding for Tasmania; Election timing.

    KYLIE BAXTER, HOST: We all know the figures around domestic violence. They are terrible and seem to be getting worse. Not everywhere, but in a lot of places. Now, Federal Labor has promised funding to tackle the issue, but the big question is, will it actually make a difference? I’m joined by Social Services Minister Amanda Rishworth. Thank you for joining me on the program.

    AMANDA RISHWORTH, MINISTER FOR SOCIAL SERVICES: Great to be with you.

    KYLIE BAXTER: So, what is the current situation around domestic violence? I mean, how bad is it?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: What we have in Australia is really unacceptable levels of family and domestic violence. When you look at the statistics, one woman loses their life around every 10 days, which is just unacceptable. Partly we are seeing, of course, an important conversation about this, often domestic and family violence. We knew it may be happening behind closed doors and we weren’t talking about it. It’s really important we have a conversation about it, but we’ve got to have action as well. That’s what I’ve been doing over the last two and a half years. But this new national partnerships agreement with the Tasmanian government allows us to roll out more support where it’s needed.

    KYLIE BAXTER: Okay, so let’s talk about Tasmania. How are we faring in relation to domestic violence?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: Well, look, each state and territory has its own challenges, but it also has some really important options and services available for people. And when it comes to Tasmania, there’s been a lot of work done delivering, for example, rural family violence outreach programs. We know Tasmania is a pretty spread out place and so some of the funding that we previously worked with the Tasmanian Government has been looking at rural family violence outreach programs, but also, for example, family violence training for legal professionals, which is really important. So, look, Tasmania has some of the same challenges as the rest of the country, but also there are some other challenges, such as the spread out population, which also needs to be looked at how we address that as well.

    KYLIE BAXTER: This funding announcement from the Labor Federal Government of more than $15.7 million, what exactly is it going to be used for?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: This will be used for a number of things and it complements the other investments we’ve made across the country, including to things like our Escaping Violence Program, which is a national program which people can get funds to leave a violent situation. But this particular new agreement will allow for funding for specialised services for women, services to support those exposed to family and domestic violence, to heal and recover, and also in particular working with men, including men’s behaviour change programs. One particular program that’s been identified by the Tasmanian government in which they could invest in is an early intervention program with young men, particularly around the ages of 12 to 17, really to break that cycle. They may have witnessed violence being used themselves and maybe showing signs of recreating that pattern. And so this program is really one example of a really important program about breaking that cycle.

    KYLIE BAXTER: If you’ve just joined me, you’re listening to the voice of Amanda Rishworth who is the Federal Social Services Minister. Now, when we have these conversations, despite the fact that men are mostly the perpetrators against women, we often receive texts asking, but what about men? Is there dedicated money for men? Possibly, I guess for things like psychologists and psychiatrists to help break the cycle. I mean, you’ve obviously mentioned, you know, younger men aged 12 and up, but what about guys of different age groups? I mean, is any money available to help them go and see a psychologist or a psychiatrist if they need it?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: Yes, look, there are a lot of programs. Firstly, I would say that while we do acknowledge that men can also be victims of domestic and family violence, the vast majority are women and it is perpetrated by men. But we do acknowledge that men can be victims too. And so things like 1800RESPECT or the Escaping Violence Program is open to all victim-survivors. But if we talk about what’s available to men and bringing men into the conversation, about how we solve it. You’re absolutely right, there’s a number or many programs that we’ve funded over the last two years to try and engage men. As you mentioned, we’ve been funding work with young boys and men, but also looking at how we have behaviour changed. So, there is No To Violence, which is a national phone line in which people can get telephone online counselling information about how they might, they might be concerned about their behaviour. This is dedicated to them to actually have a conversation. A lot of people, a lot of men decide to call Mensline as well. And that is also a very important option if people want, in a non judgmental way, to have a conversation about things that they might be concerned with and get the help they might need to engage with a behaviour change program, for example.

    KYLIE BAXTER: And I guess the important question is, when are these initiatives actually going to be rolled out?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: Well, the funding will begin from the first of July this year. That’s the agreement through the national partnerships. But it is not the only money that we have contributed to the Tasmanian Government. This builds on an extra $23 million that we’ve provided already to the Tasmanian Government to boost things like their frontline workforce and other programs. So, this is an additional money to continue this important work.

    KYLIE BAXTER: Obviously this is an election promise and so do you have concerns if Labor is not re-elected, how will things roll then for victims of domestic violence?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: We hope that whoever wins the election will commit to this funding. Of course, we’ve signed this agreement with the Tasmanian Government but I can’t speak for the Liberal National Party of whether they would seek to rip up this agreement. I hope they don’t. But this is our clear commitment to making a difference when it comes to these issues.

    KYLIE BAXTER: And have you had any closed door meetings in the past few days or week in relation to an election date?

    AMANDA RISHWORTH: Oh, look, I have to be honest, election dates are above my pay grade. So, no, I can’t, I can’t give you the inside scoop today. Unfortunately there is one person that I don’t know if he’s made up his mind yet, but one person that knows when that election is, and that’s our Prime Minister.

    KYLIE BAXTER: Thank you very much for your time. Appreciate you coming on the Drive program.

    MIL OSI News –

    February 17, 2025
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