Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Media Accreditation for the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s Peace Formula

    Source: Government of Canada News

    The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that Canada, together with co-organizers Norway and Ukraine, will host the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s 10-Point Peace Formula on October 30-31, 2024.

    October 22, 2024 – The Honourable Mélanie Joly, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that Canada, together with co-organizers Norway and Ukraine, will host the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of Ukraine’s 10-Point Peace Formula on October 30-31, 2024.

    Media representatives who wish to cover the visit must obtain media accreditation.

    The media accreditation process is open to journalists (print, radio, television, news agencies and online media) who are on assignment with a bona fide media organization.

    Individuals performing journalistic functions who do not work for a media organization and are unable to provide a letter of assignment will have to provide proof of recent publications under the applicant’s by-line that can be readily found in the public realm and under a bona fide media organization.

    Government officials, representatives, or observers will not be accredited as media.

    To apply, please complete the form here and include all requested documentation. The registration code for media is: c&Dw8sbLRQ@M

    Only applications that include all requested information will be considered.

    The application period will close on October 29, 2024 at 15:30 PM ET. Once the application process is closed, there will be no further opportunity to apply for accreditation. Please note that accreditation does not guarantee access to all events during the visit.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Meloni’s telephone conversation with President Erdoğan

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    22 Ottobre 2024

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, had a telephone conversation today with the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 

    The two leaders focused on the strength of bilateral relations, underlining the importance of continuing to work to further consolidate the steadily growing trend in trade. In this regard, President Meloni invited President Erdoğan to visit Italy in the first half of 2025 for a new session of the Italy- Türkiye intergovernmental summit.

    Their discussion also centred around the dramatic situation in the Middle East. Reaffirming Israel’s right to defend itself, the President of the Council of Ministers stressed the need to increase humanitarian aid to the civilian populations affected. The telephone conversation also highlighted the common commitment to call for a ceasefire in Gaza and in Lebanon. With regard to the latter, President Meloni underscored the crucial role played by UNIFIL and the need for the safety of this mission to be guaranteed at all times.

    At the end of their conversation, the two leaders also discussed the situation of Syrian refugees in the region and how to keep supporting Ukraine’s efforts for a just and lasting peace.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: McCaul on State Department OIG Reports: “Persistent Refusal to Address Systemic Issues”

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-226-8467

    Austin, Texas – House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul issued the below statement following receipt of two reports from the State Department’s inspector general (IG), which further confirm the chairman’s investigative finding that U.S. Embassy Kabul abandoned and failed to secure significant amounts of sensitive security assets, including firearms and other lethal weapons, during the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan. The IG reports also found the department has been unwilling and unable to learn from those mistakes. 

    “These reports by the State Department’s own inspector general confirm my investigation’s findings of willful blindness and dangerous negligence by key State Department officials at Embassy Kabul. They left valuable lethal assets available to the Taliban, who can use those same weapons in their oppression of the Afghan people, support for terrorist groups, and hostilities against the United States. In a world where Americans and our interests abroad are increasingly threatened by our adversaries, the State Department’s persistent refusal to address systemic issues is unacceptable. I will continue working to keep the United States safe and will not relent in pursuing the transparency and accountability Americans deserve.”

    Background:

    The State Department’s Inspector General recently released two reports: (1) Management Assistance Report: The Department Would Benefit From a Formal, Systematic Methodology To Capture and Utilize Lessons Learned Following Post Evacuations (U); and (2) Audit of the Disposition of Sensitive Security Assets at U.S. Embassies Kabul, Afghanistan, and Kyiv, Ukraine (SBU).

    According to the IG reports, U.S. Embassy Kabul abandoned 26% of its special protective equipment holdings and 63% of its total armored vehicle fleet in Afghanistan, with many of those abandoned assets intact for use by the Taliban.

    These findings are consistent with Chairman McCaul’s September 9 report, which — through public hearings, transcribed interviews, and document discovery — revealed how the State Department’s willful blindness to the deteriorating situation during the Afghanistan withdrawal resulted in a failure to plan for a Taliban takeover of the country and the deadly Abbey Gate ISIS-K terrorist attack killing 13 U.S. servicemembers and over 170 Afghan civilians.

    Click here to read the chairman’s full report.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by Vice President Harris and Liz Cheney at a Campaign Event | Royal Oak,  MI

    Source: The White House

    Royal Oak Music Theatre
    Royal Oak, Michigan

    4:31 P.M. EDT

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  Here we go.  Sit back.  We’ve got 40 — 40 minutes, and we’re going to move quick.  Okay?

    So, I want this to be like a kitchen table.  Like, just think that we’re sitting around the kitchen table and we’re jamming about all kinds of stuff.  That’s the feeling I want to have at this —

         MS. CHENEY:  This is like a Kennedy family kitchen table.

         MS. SHRIVER:  It — yeah.  (Laughter.)

         MS. CHENEY:  Most people don’t have this many, you know?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  That’s good.  That’s good.

    MS. SHRIVER:  That’s right.  It’s raucous.  It’s — it’s hot, but it’s fun.  That’s what it’s going to be like. 

    So, this is — I was saying before both of you walked out, this is historic — so I hope everybody takes this in for a minute — to have a leader of the Republican Party and the vice president of the United States.  (Applause.) 

    So, let me begin with you, Madam Vice President.  Did you ever think in your wildest dreams that you would be running for president alongside Liz Cheney, who would be advocating for you, campaigning for you — a member of a opposing party putting herself on the line for you?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  So, let me just start by thanking everyone.  Thank you all for taking time out of your busy lives to be here and have this conversation. 

    And I think we are all here together because we have many things in common.  First and foremost, we love our country.  We love our country.  (Applause.) 

    You know, so, Maria, perhaps not, but — (laughter).

    MS. SHRIVER:  Perhaps.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT: Perhaps not. 

    But let me say this.  So, you mentioned, you know, my background.  So, I started my career as a prosecutor, and most of my career has been spent outside of Washington, D.C., not in Washington, D.C.  And for most of my career, let me just tell you, I never once asked a victim of crime, a witness, “Are you a Democrat, or are you a Republican?”  Never.  It never would have even occurred to me to ask that.  What I did ask everyone: “Are you okay?” 

    And when I think, then, about what is at stake in this election, I think that’s the biggest question.  And it is a moment where, born out of our love of our country, born out of, for me, having taken the oath of office to the Constitution of the United ta- — States at least six times, I believe what is at stake in this election is so fundamental for us as Americans.  And it is about: Do we take seriously the importance of a president who obeys the oath to be loyal to the Constitution of the United States?  Do we prioritize a president of the United States who cares about rule of law, much less the spirit with which they approach this most powerful position? 

    There’s so much about this last era — when I talk about “turn the page,” that’s what I’m referring to, like the last decade — that has been about some powerful forces suggesting that the measure of the strength of a leader is based on who you beat down instead of what I think most of us believe, regardless of your party affiliation, that the real measure of the strength of a leader is based on who you lift up.

    And — (applause) — and so, for that reason, I’m not surprised that Liz Cheney and I are on the same stage 15 days before the election.  (Applause.)  You know?

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  Well, maybe you’re not surprised, but I’m surprised.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughs.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  And I think a lot of people are surprised.  So, I want to know: Are you surprised?  Are you surprised that you’re out here campaigning for a Democrat, campaigning for Kamala Harris, against the party that you’ve been a part of your entire life?

    MS. CHENEY:  You know, what I would say, first of all, is we all know — everyone who watched January 6th knows, you know, what Donald Trump is willing to do.  He lost the election, he tried to overturn it and seize power, and then he sat in his dining room and he watched the attack on television.  He watched it.  People pleaded with him to tell the mob to leave, and he wouldn’t.  And he watched law enforcement officers be brutally beaten.  He watched it. 

    That’s a depravity that, to me and — and, you know, I think to anyone who’s taken the oath of office, makes someone absolutely unfit ever to be president again.

    Now — (applause) — I — I could have just said, you know, I’m going to do everything I can to work against Donald Trump, and there are a lot of Republicans who have said that.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yes.

    MS. CHENEY:  I have decided — and I am very proud and I’m honored to have made the decision — to endorse Vice President Harris.  (Applause.) 

    And — and I have gotten to spend time with Vice President Harris.  I have had the chance to talk with her about how important it is that we have two strong parties in our country, about the kind of president that I know she’ll be. 

    And I think all of us — it doesn’t matter what party you’re in — we all know this is a good and an honorable and a great nation, and we have to have leaders — you might say, “I’m not going to agree on every issue” — but we have to have leaders who take that seriously.  We have to have leaders who are going to be sincere. 

    And — and as a mother, I want my children to know that there is someone sitting in the Oval Office that they can look up to, someone who can be a role model.  And I’m incredibly proud and I know that Vice President Harris will be that.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  Right.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And — and, Maria, let me just add one thing also, because it bears repeating.  I have seen a lot of Republicans go up to Liz Cheney and thank her.  And they may not be doing it publicly — they may not be doing it publicly, because I think she has shown, to your point, extraordinary courage, especially in this environment, post January 6th, where there’s something — an undercurrent that is violent in terms of the language and the tenor. 

    And for her to show the courage she has shown is extraordinary.  But she’s — I’ve seen Republicans come up to her and — and I — from my vantage point, she’s actually not alone.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  And so, I want to talk about that, because there are a lot of people who are scared.  Scared to vote —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  — for you.  Scared about the environment.  Scared to talk about politics. 

    How scary was it for you, personally, to make this decision?  What has been the personal cost for you to do so?

    MS. CHENEY:  It — it was not — it wasn’t scary at all, in terms of making this decision, because when I look at the — the nature of the threat that Donald Trump poses and — and, look, Donald Trump is doing everything he can to try to get people to forget about what he did — what he did on January 6th. 

    And — and when you think about that level of instability, the level of erratic decision-making, the misogyny, that’s not someone that you can entrust with the power of the Oval Office. 

    And so, I — I think that we are facing a — a choice in this election.  It’s not about party; it’s about right and wrong. 

    And — and I certainly have many Republicans who will say to me, “I can’t be public.”  They do worry about a whole range of things —

    MS. SHRIVER:  Right.

    MS. CHENEY:  — including violence.  But — but they’ll do the right thing. 

    And I would just remind people: If you’re at all concerned, you can vote your conscience and not ever have to say a word to anybody.  (Applause.)  And there will be millions of Republicans who do that on November 5th — vote for Vice President Harris.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yes.

    I — I love that you said you weren’t scared at all, because most people will talk today about “I’m afraid to say anything on social media.”  “I’m afraid to speak in my place of worship.”  “I’m aprai- — afraid to speak where I work.”  “I’m afraid.” 

    How are you not afraid?

    MS. CHENEY:  Well, I think that — that the point you’re making is a really important one.  Think about what’s happened in our country, the level of vicious, vitriolic attack. 

    You know, when — when Donald Trump says that his political opponents are the enemy within and when he contemplates deploying force against them, the response that we all have should not be to be so afraid we don’t act.  It should be: Vote him out.  Defeat him.  Defeat him.  Vote for Vice President Harris.  (Applause.)

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And, Maria, I’m going to add to that.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I — I would add to that an additional point, which is — and don’t think it’s a sick sense of humor and relegate it to simply being that.  You know, I’ve said many times, I do believe Donald Trump to be an unserious man, but the consequences of him ever being in the White House again are brutally serious.

    And — and take it from the people who know him best: his former chief of staff when he was president; two former Defense secretaries; his national security advisor; and, of course, his vice president, who have all in one way or another used the word that he is “unfit” to be president again and is dangerous. 

    Listen to the report that — what his former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a general, said about him: that he is “fascist to the core.” 

    And these are people who were in his administration, who worked closely with him in the Oval Office and the Situation Room. 

    And so, I would caution us also — you know, because some people find it humorous what he says and — and think it’s just silly.  But understand how brutally serious it is.

    AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Lock him up!

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Well, the courts will take care of that.  We’ll take care of November, yes.  (Applause.)  (Laughs.)  We’ll take care of November. 

    But it is brutally serious, because to — to the congresswoman’s point, anyone has — who has openly said, as he has, that he would terminate the Constitution of the United States should never again stand behind the seal of the president of the United States — never again.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  So, Madam Vice President, I wanted to ask you — several people that I talked to in preparation for this — when I asked them, they said, “Well, I — I want to vote for the vice president, but I just don’t feel like I know her.  I don’t know enough about her.  I see the ads, but I don’t have a feel for her.”  What are three things you can tell this audience about you that aren’t in your ads, that people aren’t telling people on the robocalls, that perhaps they just wouldn’t know that might give them a feeling for who you are as a woman?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  How much time do we have?  (Laughter.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  We’re at the kitchen table. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I — I have lived a full life.  (Laughter.)

    I am a wife.  I am a mother.  I am a sister.  I am a godmother.  I love to cook. 

    I started my career as a prosecutor, in large part — there are many reasons but one very fundamental is, when I was young, one of my best friends in high school, I learned, was being molested by her stepfather.  And I told her, when I learned, she had to come live with us.  I talked to my mother about it.  “Of course, she has to come live with us,” and she did.  And I decided I wanted to take on a career and a life that was about protecting the most vulnerable. 

    I served as attorney general of California two terms.  I was the — the top law enforcement officer of the biggest state in the country.  And doing that work, it included prosecuting transnational criminal organizations for the trafficking of guns, drugs, and human beings.  I did the work of taking on the big banks during the foreclosure crisis and delivered $20 billion for homeowners who had been targeted with predatory lending practices.  (Applause.)  I took on the big pharmaceutical companies on behalf of consumers.

    As vice president of the United States, my priorities have been many, including, to your point, the work that you and I have done over the years focusing on women’s health.  One of my priorities is — has been maternal mortality. 

    But I — I have only had one client in my career: the people.  And my belief is that there is great nobility in public service if one understands that they hold the office in the public trust.  It is not about personal power.  It is about what you can do that lifts up the condition of people. 

    And there is so much about how I think about my responsibility, and I am here to ask for your vote — is that I do — I intend to be a president for all Americans, understanding that the vast majority of us have so much more in common than what separates us. 

    And this era that was kind of initiated by Donald Trump has not only been exhausting, it has been harmful to us as a nation.  The notion that a president of the United States would encourage Americans to point fingers at each other, that — that there would be a suggestion that we are a divided country, that — instead of knowing we have so much more in common than what separates us.

    I have, as vice president, met over 150 world leaders: presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, and kings.  My most recent overseas trips as vice president — which were relatively close to, then, the election — our allies have expressed real concern. 

    I’ve shared this before, but, you know, when we walk in a room representing the United States of America, we should walk in that room, especially leaders, chin up, shoulders back, knowing that we have the self-appointed and earned authority to talk about the importance of democracy and rule of law. 

    But the thing about being a role model — it’s all role models who are here — people watch what you do to see if it matches up to what you say.  People around the world are watching this election, I promise you.  And my — one fear I have is I hope and I pray that we, the American people, understand not only what is at stake for us in this election but how much we mean to the rest of the world. 

         There is so much at stake in this election.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Liz Cheney, tell us real quick — I want to get to our first question.  But you’ve been traveling with the vice president.  You’ve been working with her.  You’ve been spending human time with her.  Tell the audience what you see that perhaps, you know, the camera doesn’t get or the ads don’t get so that they can get a sense of her that you have. 

         MS. CHENEY:  Well, I — I think that what I can tell you is that what the vice president is saying about wanting to be a president for all Americans, caring deeply about this country, those are things that — that come across very, very clearly and very directly. 

         And — and, look, I — I’m a conservative.  The very first campaign I ever volunteered in was for President Gerald Ford in 1976, and — and ever since then, I have been voting for Republicans.  I’ve never voted for a Democrat.  And —

         MS. SHRIVER:  Wow.

         MS. CHENEY:  And so, the — the fact that — that I — I believe so strongly that in this election — in this election, we need to elect the person who is the responsible adult — (laughter and applause) — and — and we need —

         And — and there is a lot — both parties do it.  There is a lot of vilification that goes on.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah.

         MS. CHENEY:  And — and I think it’s really important for people to — to think very carefully about the power that we’re going to invest in the president of the United States and what it would mean to — to give that power to Donald Trump. 

         Don’t take my word for who he is.  Listen to him every day.  Look at what he did.  Remember that the people, as the vice president said, who are opposing him are the people who know him best, the people who worked most closely with him. 

         And so, I would just say I — I know that the vice president has had the range of experience, has — as vice president, as senator, as attorney general of California.  She is supremely qualified to be president of the United States.  I think there — there — sometimes there are some men who suggest that she’s not.  But if you look at her qualifications, there’s no question.  And that she’s somebody that I know I can count on who will put the good of this country first, there’s just no question.  (Applause.)

         MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  I want to go — I want to go over here to Cecelia.  Cecelia Borland, can you stand up?  You have a question.

         Cecelia grew up in Birmingham, Michigan, which was a Republican stronghold as she grew up.  She now lives with her husband.  They’re raising two children in Berkley, Michigan, and she’s here with a question for the vice president.

         Q    Thank you both for coming to Michigan today for this important event.  I’d like to start by saying, personally, thank you, Representative Cheney, for — to you and your father for exemplifying putting country over party.  (Applause.) 

         And, Madam Vice President, I hope you had a wonderful birthday yesterday. 

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughter.)  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.

         Q    From the shootings at Oxford High School to my alma mater, Michigan State University, to an attack at a kid’s splash pad this summer just a few miles away from here, the issue of gun violence hits very close to home for our community. 

         Just yesterday, I learned from our school district that my preschooler will be going through his first active shooter drill.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         Q    As a gun violence survivor and mother of two young children, the issue of gun violence and the safety of my children in their schools and in our community is my top priority.

         Madam Vice President, if you are elected president and there is a Republican majority in Congress, how will you work with them to make impactful and immediate progress around gun violence, especially in our children’s schools?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Right.  Thank you —

         MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — Cecelia.  And thank you and — for your courage to speak up about this.

         So — well, we have done it, actually, in the last four years.  We had a bipartisan group of — of folks in Congress who came together for the Safer Communities Act, which is the first meaningful piece of gun safety legislation in 30 years.  And so, it’s a good step, and it really does tell us that we have a will within the United States Congress to work in a bipartisan way.  And — and then-Congresswoman Cheney was one of those Republicans that actually voted for it. 

         I — this is how I think of the issue.  And it is through the — the lens of many experiences, including act- — I’m so sorry about your kids going through active shooter drills.  It’s — our kids did.  It’s traumatic that our children — you know, growing up, I’ll speak for myself, we had fire drills.  Right?

         Our children are now learning how to keep themselves safe if there’s an active shooter at their school. 

         I did a tour last year of — of colleges — with college-aged kids, so I also did some trade schools.  And I would ask the room — the auditorium would be packed — college-age kids — and I’d ask them, “Raise your hand if at any point between kindergarten and 12th grade you had to endure an active shooter drill.”  Almost every hand went up. 

         Our kids are growing up where they are learning that they may be unsafe in the classroom where they should be absorbing the wonders of the world. 

         One kid said to me, “Yeah” — we were talking about this — and said to me, “Yeah, that’s why I don’t like going to fifth period.”  I said, “Why, sweetheart?  Why don’t you like going to fifth period?”  “Because in that classroom, there’s no closet,” in which to hide. 

         So, we — when we think of this issue, we must also consider the trauma that is the trauma of — the direct trauma for those who have been directly affected by gun violence, including that to our kids who are in schools across our country doing this — not to mention their teachers, who want to teach and not also have to worry about will they be able to physically protect a child from a bullet.

         Here’s how I think about it in terms of the macro point.  We have been pushing, as a country, I think, a false choice that suggests you’re either in favor of the Second Amendment or you want to take everyone’s guns away.  And that’s a false choice. 

         I’m in favor of the Second Amendment.  I have talked about the fact both Tim Walz and I are gun owners.  I also believe we need reasonable gun safety laws, assault weapons bans, red flag laws, universal background checks.  (Applause.)  And — and reports say that the majority of NRA members agree on, for example, universal background checks. 

         What is a universal background check?  It’s just common sense.  Here’s what it is: You just might want to know before someone can buy a lethal weapon whether they’ve been found by a court to be a danger to themselves or others.  You just might want to know.  It’s common sense.  (Applause.)  We need commonsense gun safety laws. 

         And I will continue — I’ve done it throughout my career — work with all of our colleagues across the aisle.  And I know that we can make progress. 

         But this is not — I’m not trying to take anybody’s guns away from them.  But we need reasonable gun safety laws.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Okay.  I want to come back to the issue of public safety in a minute.  But first we want to go to Martin.  Thank you, Cecelia, very much.  Martin Howrylak.  He’s a former Republican member of the Michigan House of Representatives, and he’s here with a question about national security.

         Q    Well, thank both of you for being here this afternoon.  I really appreciate your coming to the state of Michigan to — to be here.  I would like to ask: What can the U.S. do politically, economically, or militarily to deter Russia from continuing its war on the independent nation of Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening our own U.S. security interests?

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, Martin. 

         MS. SHRIVER:  Go ahead.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  So, I was actually in Munich at the Munich Security Conference delivering a speech when I first met with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and it was just days before Russia invaded. 

         I’ve now met with President Zelenskyy, I think, seven times, because the United States has rightly taken a position as a leader — a global leader on international rules and norms — that we must stand in support of one of the most important international rules and norms, which is the importance of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, the importance of standing strong in opposition to the notion that, in this case, Russia would attempt to change borders by force, to invade another nation — a sovereign nation by force. 

         And sadly, there is a huge difference between my opponent and me on this very fundamental issue. 

         Back to the conversation about — there was a time when we used to — there was a phrase that I’ll paraphrase that, basically, politics ends at the — at the sea line, at the — at the — you know, at the — the boundaries of our country, that there are certain things — in particular, the matters of national security — where it’s not about partisanship; it’s about where should America stand in terms of supporting our allies and standing for certain principles.

         I’ll — I’ll give you, as a — as a point of reference for me in terms of how I feel about this, on the partisan issue.  

         I — for the four years that I was in the United States Senate, my favorite committee was the Senate Intelligence Committee.  And I served on that committee, and we would meet in a room that’s called a SCIF.  And it’s — it’s basically a — (laughs) — it’s a very secure room.  No press, with all due respect, is allowed in.  No cameras.  Everyone has to leave their cell phone outside. 

         It’s a bipartisan committee, and we would go in that room and receive classified information from America’s intelligence community, sometimes our military leaders, about hot spots around the world and threats to our national security.  And when we went in that room — and this is why it was my favorite committee — people would take off their suit jacket, roll up their sleeves, have a cup of coffee on the table.  And we weren’t Democrats or Republicans; we were Americans. 

         And that is so important on a number of issues we are discussing this afternoon but, in particular, on national security. 

         My opponent, however, has made it a thing of his to admire dictators and autocrats around the world.  He exchanged love letters with Kim Jong Un.  Remember that?  He has openly praised the president of Russia. 

         Most recently, the report is, in the height of COVID — remember everyone was scrambling to get their hands on COVID tests?  Remember when Americans were dying by the hundreds every day?  And Donald Trump secretly sent COVID tests to the president of Russia for his personal use. 

         He has said — Donald Trump — “I will solve the matter of Ukraine and Russia in a day.”  Read through and understand what he is saying.  He would surrender.  He would have Ukraine surrender its fight against an aggressor violating its sovereignty. 

         If Donald Trump were president, Vladimir Putin will be sitting in Kyiv.  And understand what that would mean for America and our standing around the world. 

         But thankfully, there has been bipartisan support — and to your point of what — where you stand — on this very fundamental issue.  But this is a — this is a very vivid example of what is at stake in this election.  Because Donald Trump has been very clear: He would give away the shop.  He has been manipulated and is so clearly able to be manipulated by favor and flattery, including from dictators and autocrats around the world. 

         And America knows that that is not how we stand.  That is not how we fight.  We fight in favor of our strength and our role as a leader in bringing the Allies together and standing for foundational and fundamental principles.

         MS. SHRIVER:  Congressman Cheney — (applause) — I know, kind of, the issue of national security is one of the big reasons you’re here and supporting the vice president.  Can you expand on that answer and add your thoughts to it?

         MS. CHENEY:  Yeah.  You know, I think that if — if you look at where the Republican Party is today, there’s been a really dangerous embrace of isolationism, a dangerous embrace of tyrants. 

         The president, you know, even just today, he heaps praise on the world’s most evil people while he attacks, you know, with venom, his political opponents here at home. 

         And, you know, the — the reality is that since the end of World War II, America has led.  And we’ve led — and that has been necessary to defend our freedom.  And we can’t do it by ourselves, though.  We need our allies. 

         And when Donald Trump says that he’s going to withdraw from NATO, when he invites Vladimir Putin to invade NATO, when he suggests that it is Zelenskyy’s fault that Ukraine was invaded, I mean that is — that i- —

         For anybody who is a Republican who is thinking that, you know, they might vote for Donald Trump because of national security policy, I ask you, please, please study his national security policy.  Not only is it not Republican, it’s dangerous.  And without allies, America will find our very freedom and security challenged and threatened. 

         And one final point on this: Don’t think that Congress can stop him. 

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         MS. CHENEY:  People say, “Well, you know what, he can’t really do the worst, you know, because Congress will step in.”  All he has to do is what he’s doing — is say, “I won’t fulfill our NATO treaty obligations,” and — and NATO begins to unravel. 

         So, it is — it is an incredibly dangerous thing to think about a foreign policy, a national security policy led by somebody who is — is as unstable as Donald Trump is.  And it’s a risk we just simply can’t take as a nation. 

         MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  And I’m going to add for emphasis that — let’s also be clear about on the subject, specifically of Ukraine, Donald Trump’s approach would be to surrender.  Understand what that would mean.  That is signaling to the president of Russia he can get away with what he has done. 

    Understand — look at the map — Poland would be next.  NATO, our Allies, are — the reason that they have been so thankful for the position of strength we have taken in bringing the Allies together is because they are fully aware of and remember — to the congresswoman’s point — World War II.  Remember, this — this concept of isolation — we were once there as a nation, and then Pearl Harbor happened. 

    Let’s remember recent history.  Europe remembers it well.  We — then when we got attacked, Pearl Harbor, we jumped in, and it is because America jumped in that we were ultimately able to win that war, and it should be a constant reminder to us — we have to remember history — that isolationism, which is exactly what Donald Trump is pushing — pull out of NATO, abandon our friends — isolationism is not insulation.  It is not insulation.  It will not insulate us from harm in terms of our national security. 

    So, I say that to emphasize a point that the congresswoman made, and the other point I’d make is also check out where he’s been on how he thinks about America’s military and service members.  One of the great, great American heroes, a prisoner of war, John McCain.  Remember how he talked about John McCain?  He said he didn’t like him because he got caught. 

    You look — he’s called members of our military “suckers” and “losers.”  And then look at how some of the highest-ranking members of our military, including what I mentioned earlier, the chairman — the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a dedicated member, leader in our mil- — in America’s military, how he has assessed Donald Trump — fascism “to his core.”

    So, there we are.

    MS. SHRIVER:  There are your talking points for the kitchen table.  (Applause.)

    Our final question is from Courtney.  Courtney, can you stand?  Courtney is — Courtney Gabbara Agrusa is a wife, a mom, an attorney, and she’s a proud Chaldean, and she is here with a question.  Courtney.

    Q    Thank you so much.  Good evening, Madam Vice President Harris and Representative Cheney.  My name is Courtney Gabbara Agrusa, and I am a first-generation Chaldean American.  Chaldeans are Indigenous Iraqis who are Catholic, and we are predominantly in the metro Detroit area.  Chaldeans are a very close-knit community, but the recent political climate has really begun to divide us. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    Q    While I know that you have discussed several bipartisan proposals over the course of your campaign, what would you say to people like myself who are part of these traditionally conservative communities who want to move forward, but are feeling the pref- — the pressures of the political divide?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.  And I’ve actually met with — with members and leaders in the Chaldean community, and thank you for being here. 

    You know, I think that there is something at stake that is about core values, as well as what is at stake in terms of the risk and the danger.  And I would offer you an example of what I think would be an important issue that would affect the Chaldean community and all Americans, for example, the issue of — of how we think about health care in America. 

    So, I know enough about the culture and to know that it is reflective of who we are as Americans in general.  We respect our elders; we take care of them.  So, I will share with you a specific proposal that is an extension of how I think about things. 

    I — actually a personal story, I took care of my mother when she was sick.  And for anyone taking care of or who has taken care of an elder relative, you know what that is.  It’s about trying to cook something they feel like eating.  It is trying to find clothes that don’t irritate their skin or help them put on a sweater.  It’s about trying to figure out something you can say that will bring a smile to their face or make them laugh.  It’s about dignity. 

    And we now have, in particular in our country, a lot of people doing that and also raising young kids.  We call them the sandwich generation, right in the middle.  It’s a lot.  And the way the system currently works — well, God willing, you may have enough resources, you can hire somebody to come in and help. 

    If not, you may have to spend down all of your savings to be able to qualify for Medicaid or you may have to quit your job to be able to do what you need to do to take care of your children and take care of your relative — your older relative.  That’s just not right, and it’s not fair. 

    So, part of my proposal and the plan is that we’re going to now reconfigure so that Medicare covers home health care for our seniors, right?  It’s about dignity.  (Applause.)

    So, in addition to everything that we’ve discussed already about national security, what is at stake — something like this, because I absolutely do believe America is ready for a new generation of leadership that is taking on issues clear-eyed about what is going on that affects everybody — it doesn’t matter their political party; issues that are fundamentally about dignity, also about economic issues; and taking it on in a way that we relieve the American people of the burdens that get in the way of productivity and a certain quality of life.  And this is one example of that. 

    I believe we need to have an economy that I call an opportunity economy, where everyone has the opportunity to thrive — not just get by but get ahead. 

    And this is one example I would offer under the broader point, which is about, let’s move forward, taking on problems from a commonsense approach that is about just practical work. 

    Look, I am a capitalist.  I am a pragmatic capitalist.  I will work as I have with the private sector.  I believe we have to invest in America’s economy and in America’s industry and America’s entrepreneurs, and we can, at the same time, take care of those that are the most in need of just a little support to be able to not just get by but get ahead.

    MS. SHRIVER:  Thank you, Courtney. 

    Liz, I just want to — we have two minutes left — (applause) — and when you hear the phrase a “new way forward,” when you hear “country over party,” what does that mean to you? 

    We’re two weeks out, what does a new way forward mean for families like everybody here, for your children, my children, everybody’s children, young men?

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, I —

    MS. SHRIVER:  What is it like?

    MS. CHENEY:  I think that, you know, we’re — we’re at a moment now where, when you think about America and — and the beacon of hope that we have been for so many years for so many communities, also how tremendously enriched we have been by communities — immigrants who want to come here and build a life, all of that depends upon fundamentally defending the rule of law, fundamentally defending our Constitution.  That’s — that’s what makes all of our opportunity and our freedom possible.

    And — and at the same time that we’re that beacon for the world, you know, it’s also because — because we’re a good nation —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. CHENEY:  — and because you know when — when you — when you look at who our leader is going to be, what — what Donald Trump represents is — is, in many ways, just cruel and — and not — not the kind of dignity and — and the kind of person that we all want to be able to look up to. 

    But — but what I would say is that if people are uncertain, if people are thinking, “Well, you know, I’m a conservative, I don’t know that I can support Vice President Harris,” I would say I don’t know if anybody is more conservative than I am.  (Laughter.)  And — and I understand the most conservative value there is is to defend the Constitution.  And if we don’t come together to do that then — (applause) —

    And so, just to — to finish that, I would say, to me, a new way forward is this: It’s what you’re seeing up here.  It’s having a president who will listen, having a president who will say, “I’m not, you know, necessarily sure I agree with you on this issue or that issue, but let’s talk about it.”

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. CHENEY:  “Why do you want, you know, that policy?  Why do you believe that?”  Someone who is willing to honor and respect all perspectives and points of views.  And there’s only one candidate in this race who does that, and that’s Vice President Harris.  (Applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  In fact, a lot of polling of undecided voters who call themselves “the exhausted majority” said, I just want leaders who listen —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  — to one another.  I just want leaders who speak respectfully to one another.  I want to see decency.  I want to see people I can look up to.  And, unfortunately, that’s considered a new way forward as the — as Representative Cheney —

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, let’s do that.  Let’s do that. 

    MS. SHRIVER:  Yeah, let’s do that.

    MS. CHENEY:  Yeah, let’s do that. 

    MS. SHRIVER:  Let’s make that a way forward. 

    The final word, Madam Vice President.  You know, everybody I talked to says, you know, “I have to turn off the news.  I can’t read anything.  I’m meditating.  I’m doing yoga.  I’m doing — I’m so anxious.  I just don’t even know.  I’m eating gummies.”  All kinds of things, you know?  (Laughter.) 

    What are you doing?  What are you doing —

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Not eating gummies.  (Laughter and applause.)

    MS. SHRIVER:  Okay, we got that clear.  But how do you — I mean, how do you handle this — the anxiety, the stress, the turmoil?  Everybody is freaked out.  I — I talked to the gentleman up there, and he’s like, “I’m so scared.” 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    MS. SHRIVER:  A woman was like, “I’m so anxious.  I can’t sleep.”  Do you sleep?

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  You know, I wake up in the middle of the night usually these days, to be honest with you, but I work out every morning.  I — I think that’s really important to just kind of — you know, mind, body, and spirit. 

    But let me — let me just say this —

    MS. SHRIVER:  No, say more about that.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — we — but I —

    MS. SHRIVER:  Say more.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  — but — I will.  I work out.  I try to eat well.  You know, I love my family, and I make sure that I talk to the kids and my husband every day.  We’ve been — Doug and I’ve been kind of tr- — you know, traveling.  We’re trying to cover a lot of ground, so we’re not with each other every day these days, but my family grounds me in every way. 

    But let me, if I can just speak to the — what people are feeling.  You — we cannot despair.  We cannot despair.  You know, the nature of a democracy is such that I think there’s a duality. 

    On the one hand, there’s an incredible strength when our democracy is intact, an incredible strength in what it does to protect the freedoms and rights of its people.  Oh, there’s great strength in that.  And it is very fragile.  It is only as strong as our willingness to fight for it.  And so, that’s the moment we’re in. 

    And I say, do not despair, because in a democracy, as long as we can keep it — in our democracy, the people, every individual has the power to make a decision about what this will be, and that’s — and so let’s not feel powerless.  Let’s not let the som- — and I get it — overwhelming nature of this all make us feel powerless, because then we have been defeated, and that’s not our character as the American people. 

    We are not one to be defeated.  We rise to a moment, and we stand on broad shoulders of people who have fought this fight before for our country.  And in many ways, let us look at the challenge then that we are being presented and not be overwhelmed by it.  The baton is now in our hands to fight for — not against, but for — this country we love. 

    That’s what we have the power to do.  So, let’s own that — dare I say, be joyful in what we will do in the process of owning that, which is knowing that we can and will build community and coalitions and remind people that we’re all in this together.  Let’s not let the overwhelming nature of this strip us of our strength. 

    That’s how I feel about this.  (Applause.)  You know, that’s how I feel about this.  You know?  Yeah.  

    MS. SHRIVER:  So, I want to — I want to thank everybody here.  You heard from the vice president, from Congresswoman Cheney, do not despair.  I think you got a great glimpse into who this woman is, who this woman is, what brings them together, why they’re here, why they want to earn your vote, why they wanted to speak with you today. 

    And I want to leave you with this quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson that I think speaks to this moment.  It says,

    “Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you’re wrong.  There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right.  To map out a course of action and follow it to the end requires great courage.” 

    So, I leave you with that.  All of you are courageous people.  Do not despair. 

    Thank you so much for spending your time.  Brava.  (Applause.)

                                 END                5:18 P.M. EDT

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Meets With Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY: Thank you very much, dear Secretary Austin. Your colleagues, thank you very much. General Cavoli, thank you very much for coming. And first of all, thank you, American people, President Biden and bipartisan support. We are very thankful for all the support from the United States that’s been done for Ukraine from the very beginning of this war.

    Thank you so much, and thank you for the last hour meeting in Brussels on the platform of the Ukraine NATO Council. Thank you so much. That was an opportunity to make a direct dialog with the ministers of defense of our allies. And after that, I know that it was a very good meeting on the level of ministers, defense ministers of G7+. Thank you so much.

    According to our last dialog, I think very positive dialog with President Biden by phone, we discussed a lot of things. And by the way, thanks for the last package supporting our soldiers. And we discussed a lot of important things about victory plan, about preparing for winter with our air defense capabilities, how to strengthen all this. And we discussed also some details which will be, I think, sorry, out of — came about next packages which are crucial for us, especially now this challenging winter period.

    So — and we discuss all this with the president. I want to continue. Maybe we will have some results — no, I’m sure that we will have some important results. You’re very welcome. Again, thank you.

    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD AUSTIN: Mr. President, it’s great to see you again. Thanks for hosting us here in Kyiv. I’m honored to be back in Ukraine for my fourth visit as secretary of defense. And under your leadership, Ukraine has fought valiantly to defend its democracy, its sovereignty and its citizens.

    The United States understands the stakes here, Mr. President. The outcome of Putin’s war of choice matters to us and to the entire world, and that’s why I continue to convene the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. You saw the contact group first hand last month at Ramstein Air Base. We’ve moved heaven and earth to help Ukraine, and that inspiring coalition of more than 50 allies and partners continues to stand united to provide your country with the security assistance that Ukraine needs to prevail.

    Under President Biden’s leadership, the United States remains committed to keeping up this support. And so, I’m pleased to announce today the commitment of a $400 million presidential drawdown package to provide your forces with additional munitions, armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons.

    While the focus on Ukraine’s immediate needs goes on, we’re also committed to sustaining your support as pledged in the bilateral security agreement that you and President Biden signed in July.

    So, I look forward to a good discussion today, Mr. President, and to hearing your thoughts on how to further strengthen our strategic partnership. Thank you again, Mr. President, and it’s great to be here with you.

    PRESIDENT ZELENSKYY: Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament approves up to €35 billion loan to Ukraine backed by Russian assets

    Source: European Parliament

    On Tuesday, MEPs gave their green light to an extraordinary loan of up to €35 billion to Ukraine, to be repaid with future revenues from frozen Russian assets.

    With 518 votes in favour, 56 against and 61 abstentions, Parliament endorsed the new macro-financial assistance (MFA) to help Ukraine against Russia’s brutal war of aggression. This loan is the EU’s part of a G7 package agreed last June, to provide up to $50 billion (approximately €45 billion) in financial support to Ukraine. The final amount that the EU will contribute could be lower, depending on the size of the loans provided by other G7 partners.

    The Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, a newly established framework, will make future revenues from the frozen Russian Central Bank assets located in the EU available to Ukraine. These funds will help Ukraine service and repay the EU’s MFA loan as well as loans from other G7 partners. While the mechanism’s funds can be used to service and repay loans, Kyiv may allocate the MFA funds as it sees fit.

    The new MFA funds will be disbursed until the end of 2025. The loan is conditional upon Ukraine’s continued commitment to uphold effective democratic mechanisms, respect human rights, and further policy conditions to be set out in a memorandum of understanding. Additionally, the management and control systems outlined in the Ukraine Plan, along with specific measures to prevent fraud and other irregularities, will apply to the MFA loan.

    Quote

    “Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression, with its brave citizens fighting not only for their own existence and freedom, but to defend democracy, human rights, freedom, and international law for all of us. The need for financial support is both immense and urgent. Russia must pay for attacking Ukrainians and brutally destroying the country’s infrastructure, cities, villages, and homes. The burden of rebuilding Ukraine will be shouldered by those responsible for its destruction, namely Russia,” rapporteur Karin Karlsbro (Renew, SE) said.

    Next steps

    EU governments already endorsed the proposal, and the Council plans to adopt the regulation by written procedure after Parliament’s vote. The regulation will enter into force on the day after its publication in the Official Journal of the EU.

    Background

    In September, the Commission announced a €35 billion EU loan for Ukraine as part of a plan by G7 partners to issue loans of up to $50 billion (about €45 billion). Future revenues coming from the frozen Russian state assets would finance the loans. Approximately €210 billion in assets from the Central Bank of Russia are held in the EU and remain frozen under sanctions imposed over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. EU governments decided to set aside the profits from these assets, and use them to support both military efforts and reconstruction in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0142/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Şerban‑Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Aurelijus Veryga, Claudiu‑Richard Târziu, Assita Kanko
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0142/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to Geneva Conventions of 1949,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,

     having regard to the joint EU-US-Armenia high-level meeting of 5 April 2024 in support of Armenia’s resilience,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part[1] (CEPA), which fully entered into force on 1 March 2021,

     having regard to Decision 99/614/EC, ECSC, Euratom of the Council and of the Commission of 31 May 1999 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[2] (EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement), which has been in force since 1999,

     having regard to the launch of the EU Mission in Armenia on 20 February 2023,

     having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, to which Armenia and Azerbaijan are parties,

     having regard to the statement of 24 August 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on recent post-election developments,

     having regard to the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the early parliamentary elections of 1 September 2024 in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service (EEAS) spokesperson of 3 September 2024 on Azerbaijan’s early parliamentary elections,

     having regard to the statement by the EEAS spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership in the field of energy signed between the EU and Azerbaijan on 18 July 2022,

     having regard to the 2023 Eastern Partnership Index,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Azerbaijan has serious shortcomings in the area of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and assembly and media freedom, and engages in repression of political activists, journalists and civil society, all of which distances Azerbaijan from democratic norms and international human rights standards; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine the country’s governance, while government authorities continue to suppress dissent and persecute critics; whereas despite international agreements and calls for reform, including from the European Parliament, Azerbaijan has made limited to no progress on improving its human rights record;

    B. whereas journalists, human rights defenders and activists have been imprisoned in the country, with approximately 30 prominent figures behind bars on politically motivated charges, and a surge in arbitrary arrests and detentions has been reported, their number having tripled as Azerbaijan silences opposition ahead of the upcoming 2024 UN Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Baku, and there are allegations of torture and beatings; whereas notable civil society organisations have called for the EU and international leaders to pressure Azerbaijan to improve its human rights record during COP29, urging the release of political prisoners and an end to arbitrary prosecutions;

    C. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, there were credible allegations that the Azerbaijani Government ‘used violence or threats of violence against individuals in other countries as politically motivated reprisal’; whereas according to this report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘limited freedom of expression and media independence’, and ‘there were reports that dissidents and journalists who lived outside the country suffered digital harassment and intimidation of family members who remained in Azerbaijan’;

    D. whereas early parliamentary elections were held in Azerbaijan on 1 September 2024, and, according to the OSCE’s International Election Observation Mission, took place ‘in a restrictive political and legal environment that does not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition’;

    E. whereas September 2024 was the fourth anniversary of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and marked one year since Azerbaijan forcibly regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is part of its internationally recognised territory; whereas all the state institutions of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were dissolved as of 1 January 2024; whereas these events, preceded by Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, resulted in the mass exodus of almost the entire population of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been entirely ethnically cleansed of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries;

    F. whereas over more than three decades, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of casualties, immense destruction, including of cultural, religious and historical heritage, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on both sides; whereas there are six interstate cases before the European Court of Human Rights between Armenia and Azerbaijan in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with both countries standing accused of having violated human rights conventions; whereas Azerbaijan has repeatedly been accused of ethnic cleansing, particularly in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where it is said to have displaced over 100 000 ethnic Armenians;

    G. whereas three decades of diplomacy and peacebuilding efforts by the OSCE, the EU and other international actors have failed to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and, therefore, to deter Azerbaijan from its use of military force;

    H. whereas according to the US Department of State’s Azerbaijan 2023 Human Rights Report, the Azerbaijani Government ‘did not take credible steps to punish the majority of officials who were reported to have committed human rights abuses’; whereas the report also states that there was ‘no reported progress on government investigations of alleged abuses committed by Azerbaijani armed forces or individuals during the 2020 and 2022 hostilities’;

    I. whereas it is necessary to ensure connectivity between Europe and Asia while avoiding crossing Russian territory; whereas the South Caucasus is in a strategic position for promoting Europe-Asia connectivity, which is particularly important for the EU’s energy capacities and for trade with Central Asia;

    J. whereas Armenia has already managed to weaken its ties with Russia in relation to security, as it has frozen its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, although it remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union;

    K. whereas the eighth meeting of the border commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held on 19 April 2024, concluded with a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of four border sections;

    L. whereas the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan appear to be at a standstill and it is unlikely that an agreement will be concluded and signed before COP29; whereas the peace deal should contribute to the long-term stability of bilateral relations and of the wider region as a whole; whereas this goal can only be achieved if the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan can guarantee peaceful coexistence and respect for minority rights;

    M. whereas Azerbaijan is a major oil and natural gas producer, particularly through the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil field and the Shah Deniz gas field in the Caspian Sea, and the country primarily uses the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to export hydrocarbons to Europe, bypassing Russia and offering the EU an alternative energy source, which is valuable in this geopolitical climate; whereas Azerbaijan’s economy is heavily reliant on oil and gas revenues, which make up more than 90 % of the country’s export revenues and account for a noteworthy portion of the government’s budget;

    N. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in light of the memorandum of understanding signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are significant challenges facing European efforts to replace Russian gas shipped via Ukraine with Azerbaijani gas by the end of 2024, and although Ukraine, the EU and Azerbaijan support the injection of Azerbaijani gas into Russian pipelines, Azerbaijan might lack sufficient gas supplies to make up the shortfall; whereas, in this regard, the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline could provide an alternative route to ensure adequate supply, but new infrastructure is required to enhance gas transmission capacity in the interconnections with the EU, particularly through Bulgaria and Romania on one side and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline on the other, in order to ensure a more efficient and secure flow of gas into the European market;

    1. Expresses its concern about the human rights situation in Azerbaijan; urges Azerbaijan to fulfil its obligations under its own constitution and under international agreements to protect fundamental freedoms and respect the human dignity of its citizens, and to cease the use of criminal prosecution as a tool to suppress government critics and members of civil society;

    2. Calls on Azerbaijan to drop all charges against Gubad Ibadoghlu, Ilhamiz Guliyev and all other people imprisoned for exercising their fundamental rights, to release them and to ensure free and unhindered space for independent journalism and freedom of expression; calls on Azerbaijan to allow Dr Ibadoghlu to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family and to receive the medical care he urgently needs;

    3. Calls on the Commission, UN mechanisms and other international actors to step up their efforts to promote human rights and democratic governance in Azerbaijan ahead of COP29;

    4. Underlines that COP29 could be an opportunity for Azerbaijan to reaffirm its genuine commitment to its obligations under international law, instead of using it to gloss over its human rights record while continuing repressive practices;

    5. Calls on the Commission to work closely with the UN to urgently establish a comprehensive plan for investigating and clarifying the fate of the Armenian military personnel, including women, and the eight unarmed Armenian prisoners of war who were killed or reported missing in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to conduct impartial inquiries on the ground, facilitate information exchanges, secure unhindered access to detention facilities for international observers through the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, such observers having previously been denied access, and launch a centralised database for tracing and resolving missing persons cases, while also providing the necessary support and resources to the families affected;

    6. Demands that Azerbaijan release the 23 Armenian hostages who are still being held in Baku, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh;

    7. Reiterates its condemnation of the Azerbaijani military incursions into the internationally recognised territory of Armenia in recent years; expresses its sympathy with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who had to flee their ancestral lands, and calls on the authorities in Baku to guarantee the safe return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and to uphold their rights to cultivate their culture and traditions; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

    8. Expresses deep concern for the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access to heritage;

    9. Strongly condemns Russia’s increasing hybrid attempts to destabilise the political situation inside Armenia and in the region; is concerned that the EU Mission in Armenia is regularly targeted by Russian disinformation attempts and campaigns;

    10. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to peace, stability and prosperity in the Caucasus region; underlines its unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan; expresses support for the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the goal of achieving lasting peace; encourages both countries to continue to make progress on finalising an agreement and signing a peace deal as soon as possible;

    11. Believes that genuine dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia is the only sustainable way forward and calls for the EU and its Member States to support such efforts, which must include the mutual recognition of territorial integrity, guarantees for the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population and the release of the remaining prisoners, including the former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, and an end to the sham trials against them;

    12. Stresses that EU involvement in the region should be practical and result-oriented, unlike the role played by Russia, which for decades has fuelled the conflict and used it for its own political gain; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; underlines that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the UN and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Transcript of World Economic Outlook October 2024 Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    October 22, 2024

    Speakers:
    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Jean‑Marc Natal, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start. First of all, welcome, everyone. Good morning for those who are joining, as online. I am Jose Luis De Haro with the Communications Department here at the IMF. And once again, we are gathered here today for the release of our new World Economic Outlook, titled Policy Pivot Raising Threats. I hope that by this time, all of you have had access to a copy of the flagship. If not, I would encourage you to go to IMF.org. There, you’re going to find the document, but also, you’re going to find Pierre‑Olivier’s blog, the underlying data for the charts, videos, and other assets that I think are going to be very, very helpful for your reporting. And what’s best, that to discuss all the details of the World Economic Outlook that, to be joined here today by Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, the Economic Counsellor Chief Economist and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks. She is the Deputy Director of the Research Department. And also with us, Jean‑Marc Natal, the Division Chief at the Research Department. We are going to start with some opening remarks from Pierre‑Olivier, and then we will proceed to take your questions. I want to remind everyone that this press conference is on the record and that we will also be taking questions online.

    With no further ado, Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose, and good morning, everyone. Let me start with the good news. The battle against inflation is almost won. After peaking at 9.4 percent year on year in the third quarter of 2022, we now project headline inflation will fall to 3.5 percent by the end of next year, and in most countries, inflation is now hovering close to central bank targets.

    Now, inflation came down while the global economy remained resilient. Growth is projected to hold steady at 3.2 percent in 2024 and 2025. The United States is expected to cool down, while other advanced economies will rebound. Performance in emerging Asia remains robust, despite the slight downward revision for China to 4.8 percent in 2024. Low‑income countries have seen their growth revised downwards, some of it because of conflicts and climate shocks.

    Now, the decline in inflation without a global recession is a major achievement. Much of that disinflation can be attributed to the unwinding of the unique combination of supply and demand shocks that caused the inflation in the first place, together with improvements in labor supply due to immigration in many advanced countries. But monetary policy played a decisive role, keeping inflation expectations anchored.

    Now, despite the good news, on inflation, risks are now tilted to the downside. This downside risks include an escalation in regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East, which could cause serious risks for commodity markets. Policy shifts toward undesirable trade and industrial policies could also significantly lower output, a sharp reduction in migration into advanced economies, which can unwind some of the supply gains that helped ease inflation in recent quarters. This could trigger an abrupt tightening of global financial conditions that would further depress output. And together, these represent about a 1.6 percent of global output in 2026.

    Now, to mitigate these downside risks and to strengthen growth, policymakers now need to shift gears and implement a policy triple pivot.

    The first pivot on monetary policy is already underway. The decline in inflation paved the way for monetary easing across major central banks. This will support activity at a time when labor markets are showing signs of cooling, with rising unemployment rates. So far, however, this rise has been gradual and does not point to an imminent slowdown. Lower interest rates in major economies will also ease the pressure on emerging market economies. However, vigilance remains key. Inflation in services remains too elevated, almost double prepandemic levels, and a few emerging market economies are seeing rising price pressures, calling for higher policy rates. Furthermore, we have now entered a world dominated by supply shocks, from climate, health, and geopolitical tensions. And this makes the job of central banks harder.

    The second pivot is on fiscal policy. It is urgent to stabilize debt dynamics and rebuild much‑needed fiscal buffers. For the United States and China, current fiscal plans do not stabilize debt dynamics. For other countries, despite early improvements, there are increasing signs of slippage. The path is narrow. Delaying consolidation increases the risk of disorderly adjustments, while an excessively abrupt turn toward fiscal tightening could hurt economic activity. Success requires implementing, where necessary, and without delay, a sustained and credible multi‑year fiscal adjustment.

    The third pivot and the hardest is toward growth‑enhancing reform. This is the only way we can address many of the challenges we face. Many countries are implementing industrial and trade policy measures to protect domestic workers and industries. These measures can sometimes boost investment and activity in the short run, but they often lead to retaliation and ultimately fail to deliver sustained improvements in standards of living. They should be avoided when not carefully addressing well‑identified market failures or narrowly defined national security concerns.

    Economic growth must come, instead, from ambitious domestic reforms that boost innovation, increase human capital, improve competition and resource allocation. Growth‑enhancing reforms often face significant social resistance. Our report shows that information strategies can help improve support, but they only go so far. Building trust between governments and citizens and inclusion of proper compensation measures are essential features.

    Building trust is an important lesson that should also resonate when thinking about ways to further improve international cooperation to address common challenges in the year that we celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor for your questions, let’s remind some ground rules. First of all, if you have any question that it is related to a country program or a country negotiation, I would recommend not to formulate that question here. Basically, those questions can be formulated in the different regional press briefings that are going to happen later this week.

    Also, if you want to ask a question, just raise your hand, wait until I call you. Identify yourself and the outlet that you represent. And let’s try to keep it to just one question. I know that there are going to be many, many questions. We might not be able to take all of you. So please be patient. There are going to be many other opportunities to ask questions throughout the week.

    Let me start—how I am going to start. I am going to start in the center. A couple of questions here. Then I am going to go to my right, and then I am going to go there. I am going to start in the first row, the lady with the white jacket, thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose, for taking my question. I am Moaling Xiong from Xinhua News Agency. I want to ask about the geopolitical tensions that was mentioned in the report. It says there are rising geopolitical tensions. So far, the impact has been limited. But further intensification of geopolitical rifts could weigh on trade, investment, and beyond. I wonder whether Pierre‑Olivier, could you talk a little bit about what are the economic impacts of growing geopolitical tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. This is, of course, a very important question. This is something that we are very concerned about, the rising geoeconomic fragmentation, trade tensions between countries, measures that are disrupting trade, disrupting cross‑border investment. This is something that we have looked at in our World Economic Outlook report. In Chapter 1, we have a box that evaluates the impact of various adverse measures, measures that could be taken by policymakers or various of shocks that would impact output. And when we look at the impact that rising trade tensions could have, there are two dimensions of this. One is, of course, you are increasing tariffs, for instance, between different blocs. That would disrupt trade. That will misallocate resources. That will weigh down on economic activity. But there is also an associated layer that comes from the uncertainty that increases related to future trade policy. And that will also depress investment, depress economic activity and consumption. When we put these two together, what we find is, we find an impact on world output that is on the order of about 0.5 percent of output levels in 2026. So it’s a quite sizable effect of both an increase in tariffs between different countries and an increase in trade policy uncertainty.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I’m going to continue here in the center. We’re going to go to the gentleman on the third row. Yep. There. There, third row, there. Third row. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thanks very much for taking my question. I just want to ask about the inflation side of the WEO. You mentioned just now inflation, you know, the battle is almost won. I am just wondering, there’s sort of a divergence between the advanced economies and emerging markets and developing economies. When do you expect inflation to sort of fall toward that 2 percent target in emerging markets and developing economies? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So inflation, the progress on inflation has been more pronounced for advanced economies, and now we expect advanced economies to be back to their target sometime in 2025 for most of them. For emerging markets and developing economies, there is more variation, and we see an increase in dispersion of inflation, so a lot of countries have made a lot of progress. You look, for instance, at emerging Asia. There are inflation levels very similar to advanced economies for a number of them. You look at other regions—in the Middle East, for instance, or sub‑Saharan Africa—and you have countries that still have double‑digital inflation rates and will maybe take more time to converge back. So we see an increased divergence that reflects some of the shocks that are specific to some of these regions. Of course, conflict or climate‑related shocks can have an impact on inflation, and that’s what we’re seeing in these two regions I mentioned.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Now I’m going to move to my right. The first row here, the lady with the red suit.

    QUESTION: Hello. This is Norah from Asharq Business with Bloomberg from Dubai.

    Pierre, you mentioned that the geopolitical tensions could account for 0.5 percent of output if things kind of get out of hand. To what extent is this a very optimistic number here? Because we’re talking about tensions not only in the Middle East. You have things going down in the Taiwan Strait. We have the Russian‑Ukraine war still ongoing. And there is a very big risk that shipping lines, straits might get disrupted. And this would affect very substantially the price of oil and other commodities. To what extent this would affect output—again, global output and inflation levels? Would inflation be a big risk again if major commodities prices increased substantially?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So you are absolutely right. The scenario I was referring to earlier is a scenario where we have increased trade disruptions, tariffs, and trade policy uncertainty. But one can think also about geopolitical tensions impacting commodity market or shipping. Now, this is not something that we looked at in this report. That’s something that we had looked at in our April report. And in April, when we looked at the potential for escalation in conflicts in the Middle East, the impact it could have on oil prices or on shipping costs, we found that this would very much be in the nature of adverse supply shock. It would negatively impact output, and it would increase inflation pressures. Now, the numbers we had when we did that exercise back in April, they’re still very relevant for the environment we’re in now. And that was one of the layers I showed today, is that it would reduce output by another about 0.4 percent by 2026 and would increase inflation by something on the order of 0.7 percent higher inflation in 2025. So this is something that is very much on top of the other tensions that I mentioned. This is why we are living in this world where there are multiple layers of risk that could be compounding each other.

    Mr. De Haro: I’m going to stay here. First row, here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa Washington, D.C. I would like you to talk a little bit more about the situation in Africa. I know two years ago it was about COVID and then Ukraine. What do you see now? And what are some of the recommendations for sub‑Saharan Africa? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So sub‑Saharan African region is one that is seeing growth rates that are fairly steady this year, compared to last year, at about 3.6 percent, and then expected to increase to about 4.2 percent next year. So we’re seeing some pickup in growth from this year to next year. But now, this is certainly a region that’s been adversely impacted by weather shocks and, in some cases, conflict. So the growth remains subdued and somewhat uneven, and that’s certainly something that we are concerned about.

    Let me turn it over to my colleague Jean‑Marc Natal to add some color.

    Mr. Natal: I would be happy to. Do you hear me? OK.

    So yes, so there has been over the last year, year and a half, there has been some progress in the region. You saw, you know, inflation stabilizing in some countries going down even. And reaching close—level close to the target. But half of them is still at distance, large distance from the target. And a third of them are still having double‑digital inflation.

    In terms of growth, as Pierre‑Olivier mentioned, it’s quite uneven, but it remains too low. The other issue is debt in the region. Obviously, it is still high. It has not increased. It has stopped increasing, and in some countries already starting to consolidate. But it’s still too high. And the debt service is correspondingly still high in the region. So the challenges are still there. There has been some progress. So in terms of the recommendation, in countries where inflation is very high, you would recommend, you know, tight monetary policy and in some cases, when possible, helped by consolidation on the fiscal side.

    It’s complicated. In many countries, you know, there are trade‑offs, and, you know, consolidating fiscal is difficult when you also have to provide for relief, like in Nigeria, for example, due to the flooding. So targeting the support to the poor and the vulnerable is part of the package when you consolidate. I will stop here.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am moving to my left. I am going to go to the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. Joel Hills from ITV News. We know that the chancellor in the United Kingdom is planning on changing the fiscal rule on debt to allow for—to borrow more for investment. Pierre‑Olivier, do you support this idea? And what, in your view, are the risks? And should the U.K. government continue to target a fall in debt of some description or a rise in public sector net worth?

    Mr. De Haro: Pierre‑Olivier, before you answer, are there any other questions on the U.K. in the room? I am going to take just two more from this group of U.K. reporters on my right that they are very eager. Just two questions more. We do not want to overwhelm—

    QUESTION: Alex Brummer from the Daily Mail in London. Again, around the chancellor’s upcoming budget. In your opening remarks, you referred to the possibility of abrupt changes in fiscal policy, disrupting what might happen to economies. U.K., according to your forecast, is in a quite good place in terms of growth heading upward. Do you fear that too strong a change in direction in fiscal policy in the U.K. could affect future growth?

    Mr. De Haro: Just one more question.

    QUESTION: Mehreen Khan from The Times. You mentioned that there are some countries at risk of fiscal slippage because governments have promised to do their consolidation have struggled to execute. Is the U.K. in that group? Also, the IMF has previously recommended that countries are under fiscal strain should—can keep sort of investment flowing if they do shift to measures like public sector net worth. Is that still a recommendation that you stand by in particular relevance for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: And to give Pierre‑Olivier a little bit of time, I just want to remind everyone that we will have regional press briefings later this week, and some of these questions can be brought to all heads of departments that are going to be talking later on in the week. Pierre‑Olivier?

    Mr. Gourinchas: First, I will make three quick remarks. We are going to wait and see at the end of this month, on October 30, the details of the budget that will be announced by the U.K. government. And at that point, we’ll be able to evaluate and see the detail of the measures and how they will impact the U.K. economy.

    The broader question, I think, is relevant for many countries, not just the U.K. And it goes to the second pivot I mentioned, this narrow path in terms of fiscal consolidation. I think when countries have elevated debt levels, when interest rates are high, when growth is OK but not great, there is a risk that things could escalate or get out of control quickly. And so there is a need to bring debt levels down, stabilize them when they are not stabilized and rebuild fiscal buffers. That is true for many countries around the world. And if you are not doing that—and that is getting to the question that was asked by the gentleman on the right here—if you’re not doing that, that’s when you find yourself potentially later on at the mercy of market pressures that will force an adjustment that is uncontrolled to a large extent. At which point you have very few degrees of freedom, so you do not want to get in that position. And I think the effort to stabilize public debt has to be seen in that context.

    Now, the other side of the narrow path is, of course, if you try to do too much too quickly, you might have an adverse impact on growth. And you have to be careful there because we do have important—most countries have important needs when it comes to spending, whether it’s about central services, what we think about healthcare, or if we think about public investment and climate transition. So we need to protect also the type of spending that can be good for growth. So finding ways—and this is something that our colleagues in the Fiscal Monitor report emphasize, finding ways to consolidate by reducing expenditures where it’s needed. Maybe raising revenues. Often, it’s a combination of both but doing so in a way that is least impactful on growth. It’s country by country. There is no general formula. But that’s kind of the nature of the exercise.

    That pivot, that second pivot is absolutely essential. At the point we’re at again precisely because we’re in a world in which there will be more shocks and countries need to be prepared and need to have some room on the fiscal side to be able to build that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Last question on this side. Then I will go online, and then I will go around the room again. The gentleman in the second row.

    QUESTION: Thanks, Jose. Pierre‑Olivier, a question on Argentina. The IMF is maintaining its projections for the country for next year, improving GDP and inflation, 45 percent at the end of the year. Oh, yes. Sorry. Alam Md Hasanul from International.

    A question on Argentina. The IMF is maintaining its projections for next year, but I wanted to see if you could give us a little bit more detail on, where do you see the economy going. And if it’s accurate to say at this point that the worst of the crisis is in the past? Thanks.

    Mr. De Haro: We have received other questions regarding Argentina online from Lilliana Franco. Basically, she wants to know what’s behind our expectations for inflation for 2025. And I think that there are other Argentine reporters in the room. I see them in the back. Please, if somebody can get them the mic and we can get all the questions on Argentina and then move on to other regions. There. There. Those two, please. Try to keep it short.

    QUESTION: Hi. Patricia Valli from El Cronista. You mentioned the need to keep going with the reforms. And the government in Argentina is implementing a series of reforms. What’s the take of the IMF in terms of these? And if they are perhaps hurting the most vulnerable due to the increase of poverty numbers in Argentina in the past report?

    QUESTION: Hello. Juan Manuel Barca from Clarín Newspaper. I want to know if you raised your employment projection compared to the April—compared to the July forecast.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So let me first state at the outset that our projections for Argentina have not been updated since July, and the reason for this is because there are ongoing program discussions between the authorities and the Fund. And so while that process is going on, we did not update the projections for the October round.

    Now, to come to the question that was asked on the left. There are two things that are relevant for Argentina, two main things. One is what’s happening on the inflation side. Here, I think the progress has been very substantial. We are now seeing month‑on‑month inflation in Argentina close to 3.5 percent, and this is down from about 25 percent month on month back in December of last year. So very, very significant decline in the inflation rate. So that’s something to acknowledge. And the hope is, of course, that the measures in place will continue to improve the situation on that front.

    On the growth front, what we are saying is that activity has contracted substantially in the first half of the year, but there are signs that it’s starting to gradually recover. Now how much again, I cannot give you an update because we do not have it as of now. But there are signs that there is a recovery in real wages and in private credit and activity.

    Now, of course, this has been difficult for the Argentine economy, the decline in growth of that nature. And that’s something that, again, we are engaged in discussions with the authorities on the best way forward. I cannot comment more than that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Now I am going to get a question from our colleagues on WebEx. I think that Weier is there.

    QUESTION: I have a question on China. Given China’s recent implementation of various stimulus measures, such as support for the real estate—real sector and interest rate reductions and other economic incentives, we’ve already seen a major boost in its capital market. So how do you assess the potential impact of these developments on China’s economic recovery and growth perspective?

    Also, how the external effects, such as the Federal Reserve’s easing monetary path, will play a role here. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Before you answer on the Federal Reserve, there’s other questions on China of a similar nature. Recent stimulus announced by the Governor and its effects.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. So China, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have a slight downward revision for its 2024 growth, compared to our July projections to 4.8 percent. And that’s a revision that’s coming largely due to a weaker second quarter of the year. And that weaker second quarter of the year is reflecting continued decline in confidence in the household and corporate sector and also the continued problems in the property sector in China.

    Now, this is something that, of course, is a top priority to address for the Chinese authorities. And we’ve seen a number of measures that have been announced since the end of last month. First measures, monetary and financial measures announced by the People’s Bank of China, and then some fiscal measures that were announced a few weeks ago.

    These measures in general go in the right direction, from our perspective. They are trying to improve the situation in the property sector. They’re trying to, for instance, lowering borrowing rates or trying to improve the balance sheet of the property developers.

    In our view, in our assessment, the measures announced at the end of last month by the PBOC, although they go in the right direction, are not sufficient to lift growth in a substantially material way. And that’s why our forecast is still at about 4.8 percent for 2024 and is unchanged for next year, at 4.5 percent.

    The new, more recent measures announced a few weeks ago by the Ministry of Finance are not incorporated in our forecast. We are waiting to see the details. I should mention, however, that since then, there has also been a release of the Q3 growth for China, and this has also been a little bit on the disappointing side. So I would say that what we’re seeing in terms of where the Chinese economy might be going is a little bit of a downward revision coming from the Q3 forecast and then potentially some measures that will help lift the economy going forward.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we have an additional question online. Basically, it comes from a reporter in Israel who wants to know how the current conflict is affecting the region and the global economy. Also, if there’s any other questions regarding the ongoing conflict, we can go here in the first row, please.

    QUESTION: Hi. Amir Goumma from Asharq with Bloomberg. With the GCC countries increasingly focusing and diversifying their economies away from oil now, how the IMF sees the progress and how you assess that with geopolitical tensions that may affect the attraction of the investment?

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. So on the impact of the conflict in the Middle East on the countries in the region, and more broadly, let me ask my colleague Petya Koeva Brooks to come in.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed, the conflict has inflicted a heavy toll on the region, and our hearts go to all who have been affected by it. We are monitoring the situation very closely. And what we could say at this stage is apart from the enormous uncertainty that we see is that the fallout has been the hardest in the countries in the region, at the epicenter of the conflict. We’ve seen significant declines in output in West Bank, in Gaza. Lebanon has also been hard hit. Now, we’ve also seen impact in the—on the economy in Israel, although there, I think the—so far at least, the impact has been smaller.

    Now, beyond that, there has also been an impact on commodity prices, on oil prices. We’ve seen quite a lot of volatility, though, as other factors have also come in, such as the concerns about global demand kind of have pushed prices in the opposite direction.

    Now, beyond that, when it comes to specific countries in the GCC region, when it comes to, for instance, Saudi Arabia, we’ve seen there, actually the non‑oil output has done very well, and we do have a small downward revision in the overall growth rate, but that is pretty much because of the voluntary oil cuts that have now been extended through November. Let me stop here. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are coming here to the center of the room. I’m going to go way back. The gentleman in the blue shirt that I think is the third row from the back. Yep. There. He has—there, there, there. A little bit. Can you stand up? Yep. Perfect. And then I will go with you, with the lady.

    QUESTION: Thank you for doing this. Your alternative scenario about the trade war does not seem so far from reality. Indeed, especially if Trump wins the elections. So could you augment about that? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: We have a couple of questions similar to that nature.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So, I mean, of course, I will first preface by saying we are not commenting on elections or potential platforms here at the IMF. What we are seeing and when we’re looking at the world economy goes beyond what might be happening in a single country. This is why the scenario that we are looking at in Box 1.2 of our World Economic Outlook is one that focuses on, if you want, an escalation of trade tensions between different regions—whether the U.S., the European Union, or China. And the numbers I quoted earlier are reflecting our model estimates of the cumulative impact of this increase in tensions. So I think that this is something that we are very concerned about. We’ve seen a very sharp increase in a number of trade‑distorting measures implemented by countries since 2019, roughly. They’ve gone from 1,000 to 3,000, so tripling of trade‑distorting measures implemented by countries, and 2019 was not a low point. That was already something that was above what we were seeing in the 2010s. So there is definitely, you know, a direction of travel here that we are very concerned about because a lot of these trade‑distorting measures could reflect decisions by countries that are self‑centered but could be ultimately harmful not just to the global economy, but this is the benefits of doing a scenario analysis like the one we did. They are also hurtful for the countries that want to implement them, as well, because the impact on global trade also makes the residents of a country poorer.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I’m going to take a question from WebEx and then I’m going to go to you. I think that we have a question on the U.S. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: My question would be regarding the U.S. resilience toward inflation shock. I remember talks about this during the April meetings and the April report. And I wanted to ask you whether you’re still committed to this forecast of the U.S. resiliency, and whether we can still see the risk of recession in the U.S. since recent talks about the unemployment data, it has not always come to the expectations of what the bond market or the stock exchange thinks.

    So is the U.S. still as resilient as you saw it in April this year?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So, I mean, the news on the U.S. is good in a sense. We have had an upgrade in growth forecasts for 2024 and 2025. The historical numbers have also been revised, so even upgraded 2023, that is already sort of behind us. But the numbers came in, and they were stronger than what was realized. And that strong growth performance has been happening in a context of a continued disinflation. There have been some bumps in the road. The disinflation may not have been proceeding, especially earlier in the year, as quickly as was projected, but lately it has been quite substantial.

    So what accounts for this is two things that are really important there. One is, there is strong productivity growth that we see when we look at the U.S. That’s somewhat unlike other advanced economies, in fact. When we look around the world. And the second is also a very significant role that immigration has played, the increase in foreign‑born workers in the U.S. that have been integrated fairly quickly into the labor force. Now, the increase in unemployment that we’ve seen recently—I just showed it in my opening remarks—reflects to a large extent the fact that you have this increase in foreign‑born workers. And it takes—they have been integrated quickly in the labor force, but still there was an influx of them or there was an influx of them, and it’s taken a little bit of time to absorb them. And that’s what is reflected in the increased unemployment rate. So the labor market picture remains one that is fairly, fairly robust, even though it has cooled off but from very, very tight levels. Growth is solid. So I think the answer to the question that was posed, I think a risk of a recession in the U.S. in the absence of a very sharp shock would be somewhat diminished.

    Now, that is really what paved the way when you think about what the Federal Reserve is doing, seeing this inflation coming down a lot but noticing the increase in unemployment, pivoting away from just fighting inflation, that fight is almost done, and now being more concerned about, maybe what might be happening going forward with the labor market and wanting to make sure that that cooling off of the labor market does not turn into something that is more negative.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The clock here says that I have seven minutes that I can push a little bit, but we go there. Then we will go to this side. And come back here and maybe end around here.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is Hope Moses‑Ashike from Business Day Nigeria. So I am right here in this room, in April, you projected the Nigeria economy to grow by 3.3 percent, and you cited improved oil sector, security, and then agriculture. So I want to understand, what has changed since then in terms of Nigeria’s growth and the factors you mentioned? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. Jean‑Marc, do you want to comment on Nigeria?

    Mr. Natal: Yes. Rightly so. We revised growth for Nigeria in 2024 by .2 down. And, you know, things are volatile, I suppose, because the reason for the revision is precisely issues in agriculture related to flooding. And also issues in the production of oil related to security issues, and also maintenance issues that have pushed down the production of oil. So these two factors have played a role.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We go to this side. I’m going to go to the front row, the lady with the white jacket. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Thank you. So this is still a follow‑up question since you just answered on Nigeria. What’s the IMF’s projection for the social impacts on full subsidy removal, especially when you—full subsidy removal and forex unification in terms of poverty, inequality, and food insecurity? And also, can give us your medium‑term projections for Nigeria’s growth? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So I am afraid on this one I will have to go back and check because I do not have the number ready on the impact of the removal of the fuel subsidies specifically that you asked about. I do not know if my colleagues—

    Mr. De Haro: And I would encourage you to formulate this question in the press briefing for the regional outlook for the African Department. Probably there, you will get your answer, but reach out to us bilaterally and then we will get you the question.

    We are going to stay—we’re going to go to the gentleman in the back. Yep.

    QUESTION: Thanks very much. Andy Robinson of La Vanguardia, Barcelona, Spain. There seems to be a strange sort of divergence in the euro zone economy in which Spain—you have revised upwards Spain’s GDP growth forecast a whole point, percentage point, whilst Germany is languishing. Could I ask you, is Spain’s performance sustainable? And Germany’s in a recession?

    Also, one other question. You seem in your box on inflation and wage share and profit share, wage share you seem to be suggesting if there’s any danger of increasing inflation in the future, it’s more an excessive profit share than exactly wage? Could you tell me if that’s a correct interpretation? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So just a few words on the euro area in general. And then I will let my colleague Petya come in on Spain. We do see some divergence across the different countries of the euro area. And one of the drivers is how reliant they are on manufacturing, as one of the key sectors in domestic production. And what you are seeing is, there is a general weakness in manufacturing and that’s heating countries like Germany. While countries that are maybe a bit more reliant on services, including tourism—and Spain is one of them—are seeing a better performance.

    Now, on the second part of your question, and I will turn it over to Petya, on the profit share and wages. We’re seeing now wage growth that is in excess of inflation. And sometimes people say, well, that’s a problem because that means, you know, maybe that cannot be sustained and therefore there will be more inflation. Well, not quite. That’s not the view we have here at the Fund. A lot of the increase in wages in excess of inflation right now—so that’s an improvement in real wages in standards of living—is reflecting a catchup phenomenon. It’s after years during which inflation was higher than wage inflation, wage increase. So real wages are catching up. They are covering lost ground.

    Now, during those years when inflation was higher than wages, profit margins somewhere were higher in the economy. And that is the profit margin that is being eroded back. So it’s not that we’re squeezing profits inordinately right now. It’s just they’re coming back more toward their historical level as real wages are catching up, and that’s not necessarily a concern in terms of inflation dynamics going forward. With this, let me turn it over to Petya.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Thank you. Indeed Spain does stand out as one of the countries with a substantial upward revision for this year. We’re now projecting growth to be 2.9, after last year, when it was 2.7. So what’s behind this revision is the positive surprises that we’ve already seen, especially in the second quarter, as well as some of the revisions to the back data.

    And then when we look at the composition of these surprises, again, it was net exports and the receipts from tourism that were a substantial contributor. But also, private consumption and investment also played a role, which may imply that some of the impact of the national recovery plan and the EU funds that are being used could—we could already be seeing the impact of that. And then when we move forward, we are expecting a slowdown in growth next year, but, again, if these—if this investment continues, of course, that would be a very positive factor behind the recovery. Thanks.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I have time for just one question because literally, we have 15 seconds. So I’m going to go with the gentleman here.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Barry Wood, Hong Kong Radio. Mr. Gourinchas, in April you said likely we will see one rate cut in the United States. We’ve seen it. The data, as you just said, is very good. Would further rate cuts be counterproductive?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Well, in our projections, of course, we need to make some assumptions about what central banks, and this round of projection is no exception. So in our projections just released today, we’re assuming that there will be two more rate cuts by the Fed in 2024 and then four additional rate cuts in 2025. And that would bring the policy rate towards the terminal rate that is around 2.75, 3. Why do we see the additional rate cuts? Well, in part it’s the progress on inflation. And then as I mentioned earlier, as an answer to an earlier question, the fact that we’re seeing the labor markets cooling and therefore the concern for the Fed is now to make sure that that last part of the disinflation process is not one that is going to hit activity. In the Chapter 2 of our report, we describe how that last mile could be somewhat more costly because, as the supply constraints have eased and moved away, it becomes harder to bring down inflation in that last mile without hurting economic activity, so it’s important to also adjust the policy rate path in a direction of a little bit more easing, as the economy is smooth landing.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. As in life, all good things have to come to an end. But before that, I want to thank you all, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, and Jean‑Marc. Also, on behalf of the Communications Department and a couple of reminders for all of you, the Global Financial Stability Report press briefing is going to happen in this same room at around 10:15 a.m. Tomorrow morning, you have the press briefing for the Fiscal Monitor, and later on in the week, you will have the Managing Director’s press briefing and all the regional press briefings that we’ve been talking about. I want to encourage you to go to IMF.org, download the flagships, the World Economic Outlook, and if you have any questions, comments, feedback, everything to media at IMF.org. So have a great day.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/22/tr102224-weo-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: English translation of Prime Minister’s opening remarks during bilateral meeting with President of Russia (October 22, 2024)

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 22 OCT 2024 7:24PM by PIB Delhi

    Excellency,

    I sincerely express my gratitude for your friendship, warm welcome, and hospitality. I am delighted to have the opportunity to visit such a beautiful city as Kazan for the BRICS summit. This city shares deep and historical ties with India. The opening of a new Indian consulate in Kazan will further strengthen these ties.

    Excellency,

    My two visits to Russia in the past three months reflect our close coordination and deep friendship. Our cooperation in every field has been strengthened by our Annual Summit held in Moscow in July.

    Excellency,

    I congratulate you on the successful chairmanship of BRICS over the past year. In the last fifteen years, BRICS has established its unique identity, and now severeal countries around the world wish to join it. I look forward to participate in the BRICS Summit.

    Excellency,

    We have remained in regular contact regarding the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As I have stated before, we believe that the resolution of issues should be achieved through peaceful means only. We fully support the earliest possible restoration of peace and stability. All our efforts prioritize humanity. India remains ready to provide all possible assistance in the future as well.

    Excellency,

    Today is yet another important opportunity to share our thoughts on all these matters. Once again, many thanks.

    DISCLAIMER – This is the approximate translation of Prime Minister’s remarks. Original remarks were delivered

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Prime Minister meets with the President of the Russian Federation

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 22 OCT 2024 10:32PM by PIB Delhi

    Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi met with the President of the Russian Federation, H.E. Vladimir Putin, in Kazan today, on the margins of the 16th BRICS Summit. This was their second meeting this year. The two leaders had earlier met in Moscow for the 22nd Annual Summit in July 2024.

    Prime Minister thanked President Putin for his invitation to attend the 16th BRICS Summit. He appreciated the Russian Chairship of BRICS and its efforts to strengthen multilateralism, advance sustainable development, and push for global governance reform. The two leaders also reviewed bilateral cooperation in a range of fields, including political, economic, defence, energy, and people-to-people ties. They welcomed the forthcoming meeting of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Cultural matters, which is scheduled to be held in November 2024 in New Delhi.

    The leaders exchanged views on India-Russia engagement in multilateral fora, in particular in BRICS. They also shared views on key regional and global issues of mutual interest, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Prime Minister reiterated that dialogue and diplomacy was the way forward in resolving conflicts.

    The two leaders agreed to remain engaged to further strengthen the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between the two countries, which continues to register significant growth and has shown resilience in the backdrop of geopolitical uncertainties.

    Prime Minister invited President Putin to visit India next year for the 23rd Annual Summit.

     

    ***

    MJPS/SR

    (Release ID: 2067209) Visitor Counter : 33

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0141/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0141/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous reports and resolutions on Azerbaijan and Armenia,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002,

     having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

     having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part, signed on 22 April 1996[1],

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas 300 people remain in detention in Azerbaijan on politically motivated charges; whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas economist and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 after 274 days in detention;

    B. whereas Azerbaijan has also intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    C. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity;

    D. whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    E. whereas on 19 September 2023, after a nine-month illegal blockade of the Lachin corridor and disregarding both the commitments it made in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020 and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling, Azerbaijan launched an offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control;

    F. whereas more than 100 000 Armenians had to flee the territory, including 30 000 children, resulting in Nagorno-Karabakh being almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this amounts to ethnic cleansing;

    G. whereas the Russian peacekeeping force did not act in accordance with its mandate, as laid down in the trilateral statement of 9 November 2020, taking no action against Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor, the establishment of the Azerbaijani checkpoint at the entrance to the corridor or the offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023;

    H. whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    1. Stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan;

    2. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all human rights defenders, journalists, environmental, political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated and or politically motivated charges; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, as well as human rights defenders and journalists including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli and Farid Ismayilov; underlines that since April 2024, Azerbaijan has carried out further arrests of civil society activists on bogus charges, including Farid Mehralidze, Igbal Abilov, Bahurz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov;

    3. Recalls the need to lift the travel ban in force against Gubad Ibadoghlu and drop all charges against him, and calls on Azerbaijan urgently to ensure an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing, and allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    4. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect human dignity and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their international commitments and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law;

    5. Calls for the EU to impose sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s unequivocal support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Armenia; strongly supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the basis of the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration;

    8. Recalls its previous condemnation of the pre-planned and unjustified military attack by Azerbaijan of 19-20 September 2023 against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, which led to the expulsion of the entirety of the ethnic Armenian community which had been living there for centuries, amounting to ethnic cleansing; recalls that this attack resulted in the complete dissolution of the structures of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of full Azerbaijani control over the region; demands the release of all remaining Armenian political prisoners and prisoners of war;

    9. Reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of the sovereign territory of Armenia; rejects and expresses its grave concern regarding the irredentist and inflammatory statements made by the Azerbaijani President and other Azerbaijani officials threatening the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Armenia; warns Azerbaijan against any potential military adventurism against Armenia proper; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    10. Calls on Azerbaijan to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with the Karabakh Armenians to ensure respect for their rights and guarantee their security, including their right to return to and live in their homes in dignity and safety, overseen by an international presence, to access their land and property rights, to maintain their distinct identity and to fully enjoy their civic, cultural, social and religious rights;

    11. Calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee within the European institutions to identify or develop international mechanisms to guarantee the collective, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh to their ancestral land; calls for the creation of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the reports and resolutions adopted by Parliament on Nagorno-Karabakh;

    12. Urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destroying, neglecting or altering the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region, bearing in mind the destruction of cultural, religious and historical heritage that has occurred since the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and calls on it to instead strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments;

    13. Recognises the urgent need to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Armenia in the field of security and defence; welcomes the fact that Armenia has frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization; notes the added value of regular EU-Armenian Political and Security Dialogues, as an umbrella platform for all security related matters; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges other Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    14. Expresses its support for the decision of Armenia to discontinue the presence of Russian Federal Security Service border guards at the international airport in Yerevan, and its understanding for the suspension of relations with Belarus;

    15. Calls for the EU to end its dependency on gas exports from Azerbaijan; is seriously concerned about Azerbaijan’s import of Russian gas and the substantial Russian share in the production and transportation of Azerbaijani gas for the EU, which contradicts the EU’s objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine by cutting its revenues from oil and gas exports to the EU; urges the Commission to investigate suspicions that Azerbaijan actually exports Russian gas to the EU;

    16. Calls for the suspension of all imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to the EU; recalls its demand, in the light of Azerbaijan’s 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the European Union and Azerbaijan;

    17. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; believes that if a peace agreement is to be lasting, it requires genuine engagement from the parties, not the escalation of rhetoric and demands; welcomes the recent achievement in the Commission on Delimitation and Border Security of a preliminary agreement on the delimitation of several sectors of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border;

    18. Welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; takes good note of Armenia’s European aspirations, as expressed by the Armenian foreign minister, among others; recalls its previous position that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state may apply to become a member of the European Union provided that it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respects fundamental freedoms and human and minority rights, and upholds the rule of law; considers that, should Armenia be interested in applying for candidate status and continuing on its current path of sustained reforms consolidating its democracy, this could set the stage for a transformative phase in EU-Armenia relations; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU, not only in the area of economic partnership but also in political dialogue, people-to-people contacts, sectoral integration and security cooperation; believes that the experience stemming from the Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova should serve as a good basis for closer EU-Armenia cooperation, in particular in relation to a gradual sectoral integration with the single market;

    19. Welcomes the decision of 22 July 2024 to launch the visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, which is the first step towards achieving a visa free regime for short stays in the EU; welcomes further the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF) in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, worth EUR 10 million; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    20. Condemns the Baku Initiative Group’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise EU Member States; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; strongly opposes the allegations made by Ilham Aliyev himself at the Baku Initiative Group meeting in Baku in November 2023;

    21. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    22. Regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    23. Strongly condemns the intimidation, death threats and assassination attempts against opponents of the Azerbaijani Government, including in EU countries, and against Azerbaijani citizens who have been granted political asylum by Member States, such as Mahammad Mirzali in France; calls on the Member States to cooperate, if necessary, in the investigation into the murder, in September 2024, of Vivadi Isgandarl, an Azerbaijani political opponent residing in France; stresses that for the Member States, preventing any act of retaliation on their territory is a matter of democracy, human rights, security and sovereignty; insists that Europol should closely monitor this matter;

    24. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access for all Azerbaijani officials to EU institutional buildings be denied until further notice;

    25. Welcomes the fact that the Republic of Armenia formally deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2023 and that the statute entered into force for Armenia on 1 February 2024;

    26. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    27. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States and the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0138/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Adam Bielan, Charlie Weimers, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Michał Dworczyk, Carlo Fidanza, Alexandr Vondra, Alberico Gambino, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Assita Kanko, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0138/2024

    European Parliament resolution on People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous reports, recommendations and resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

     having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan, passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

     having regard to the motion of 12 September 2024 passed in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament on UN resolution 2758,

     having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October on China’s latest military drills around Taiwan,

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in the 1970s, in the hope of enhancing prosperity, stability and peace, the PRC was offered a place in the UN; whereas Beijing seized this opportunity, benefiting from close ties with the West, joining the World Trade Organization, enjoying freedom of navigation and experiencing stabilisation in the seas and straits of South-East Asia, all of which opened the door to the country’s unprecedented economic and technological development;

    B. whereas, in recent years, through its actions – such as supporting Russia’s barbaric aggression and assertively expanding in the region, particularly with the threat of invading Taiwan – Beijing is failing to uphold the commitments expected of UN Security Council members and the commitments enshrined in the UN Charter; whereas UN resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan and does not determine the future status of Taiwan in the United Nations, nor of Taiwanese participation in UN agencies or international organisations;

    C. whereas the PRC has falsely leveraged some interpretations of UN Resolution 2758 to advance its ‘One China’ narrative globally and put pressure on Taiwan, limiting its voice on the international stage and influencing its diplomatic relationships;

    D. whereas the Australian and Dutch Parliaments have already decided not to go along with the PRC’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758;

    E. whereas the PRC is perpetuating its overly aggressive actions, and trying to erode the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    F. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched, without prior warning, a large-scale military drill named Joint Sword 2024-B that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coastguard ships around Taiwan, setting single-day records;

    G. whereas the PLA’s air manoeuvres have increased from under 20 incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2019 to 2 459 so far in 2024; whereas the threat is exacerbated by Beijing’s announcement that it was practising for a blockade of Taiwan’s key ports and military bases; whereas the PLA’s primary locus for ADIZ operations has shifted over time from the South China Sea to the Taiwan Strait; whereas the PLA’s flight activity to the east of Taiwan has increased, demonstrating a shift from training and navigation operations to testing likely combat concepts in the event of a blockade or military invasion of Taiwan;

    H. whereas, besides military pressure, the PRC has for years pursued a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks, with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    I. whereas the PRC under the leadership of Xi Jinping has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    J. whereas on 25 September 2024 the PRC fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean for the first time since 1980;

    K. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security;

    L. whereas Beijing’s active support of the Russian Federation’s aggressive actions against Ukraine contradicts the PRC’s claim to be a ‘stabilising power’; whereas the Russian war of aggression is being closely watched by the PRC as a test bed for the possible future invasion of Taiwan and to gauge the likely reaction of the international community;

    M. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    N. whereas the PRC is a one-party state controlled and ruled entirely by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); whereas the CCP has used its growing influence in international organisations to reshape the open, rules-based international order to protect and advance its own interests;

    O. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from the PRC, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas the EU remains the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Taiwan; whereas there is considerable potential for increasing Taiwan’s FDI in the EU; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan and advocates stabilising tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is an important EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region;

    2. Condemns the sustained efforts made by representatives of the PRC to distort the meaning of UN resolution 2758, historical documents and international rules;

    3. Remains deeply committed to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy, which does not equate with the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle’;

    4. Stresses that nothing in resolution 2758 prevents Taiwan’s participation in international organisations and that it has no bearing on the sovereign choices of other countries with respect to their relationship with Taiwan;

    5. Regrets the PRC’s efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation, in line with the key UN principles of universal representation, in relevant international organisations such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to better protect global interests and address the serious challenges facing humanity, such as pandemics, climate change and human rights;

    6. Strongly condemns the PRC’s provocative, irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilising military exercises, including the recent exercises of 14 October, as well as its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its aggressive posture in the wider region; expresses its concern about the PRC’s recent launch of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean, which has contributed to further tensions across the Indo-Pacific region;

    7. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; calls for the EU and its Member States to ensure that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    8. Highlights that the PRC’s increasingly aggressive posture poses a threat to the freedom of navigation and jeopardises the stability which is vital for global trade; emphasises that this situation is being watched with concern by a growing number of like-minded partners committed to peace and stability in the region, including across the Taiwan Strait; underlines the need to shore up deterrence against destabilising behaviour, including through regular operations to assert freedom of navigation over the PRC’s attempts to impose control over international waters and airspace;

    9. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan;

    10. Urges the PRC to immediately cease all actions and intrusions into the Taiwanese ADIZ and the airspace violations above Taiwan’s outer islands, and to restore the full respect of the Taiwan Strait’s median line, all of which also poses a risk to international aviation, and stop all other grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns;

    11. Recalls that maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is a core interest for the free world, including the EU and its Member States; stresses that a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would not only cause significant economic disruption affecting European interests and prosperity, but would also seriously undermine the rules-based order in the region, as well as democratic governance with human rights, democracy and the rule of law at its core;

    12. Recalls Taiwan’s help and assistance during both the COVID-19 pandemic and the humanitarian crises caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    13. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight;

    14. Reiterates its call for the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs to change the name of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to ‘European Union Office in Taiwan’ to reflect the broad scope of our ties;

    15. Reiterates its previous call for the Commission to launch, without delay, an impact assessment, public consultation and scoping exercise on a bilateral investment agreement with the Taiwanese authorities in preparation for negotiations on deepening bilateral economic ties;

    16. Recommends further deepening cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; recommends posting a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office to coordinate joint efforts on tackling disinformation and interference; condemns any form of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, with regard to the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of the PRC and Taiwan.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Growing Russian oil trade continues to support the war in Ukraine – E-002061/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002061/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE)

    Despite EU sanctions, the Russian budget’s revenues from crude oil and refined petroleum products were 56 % higher for January to August 2024 than for the same months in 2023. This is one and a half times higher than one year ago and are almost the same as in the record year 2022[1].

    The biggest problem and challenge for the EU are the illegal ‘shadow’ tanker fleets that account for 90 % of Russia’s seaborne oil exports[2]. These allow Russia to ignore the price caps, so the Kremlin still has enough money to continue the war. If everything remains as it is, reserves will last at least two more years, according to analysts. Ukraine’s allies should therefore take advantage of Russia’s economic vulnerabilities and step up sanctions pressure now.

    • 1.How will the Commission enforce more decisive sanctions against all Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products and ensure that these sanctions cannot be evaded easily?
    • 2.Will the Commission consider placing greater emphasis on checking compliance with sanctions and monitoring their impact on the Russian economy?
    • 3.How else will the Commission contribute to blocking the illegal flow of Russian oil to the European market?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://kse.ua/about-the-school/news/kse-institute-s-russia-chartbook-global-prices-weigh-on-oil-exports-cbr-continues-to-struggle-with-inflation/.
    • [2] https://energyandcleanair.org/august-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Outcome of the European Council meeting of 17 October 2024 – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    The last formal European Council meeting under the presidency of Charles Michel had an exceptionally full agenda, covered in only a day. The most prominent topic was migration, with EU leaders agreeing on comprehensive conclusions, marking a shift in the European Council’s approach to the issue. Strong emphasis was put on fighting the instrumentalisation of migrants and on increasing returns. Other core agenda points were Ukraine, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy presenting his ‘victory plan’, and the Middle East, with EU leaders expressing their deep concern about the military escalation in the region and calling on all actors to show restraint and abide by international law. The meeting’s conclusions also address competitiveness, the rules based-international order, hybrid threats, energy prices, COP29 and COP16, fighting discrimination, and the situations in Moldova, Georgia, Sudan, Venezuela, Morocco and Haiti.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green growth and security to underpin UK relationships with Indonesia and South Korea

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Foreign Secretary David Lammy visits Indonesia and South Korea.

    Foreign Secretary David Lammy meets with President of Indonesia, Prabowo Subianto on his visit to Indonesia. Picture by Ben Dance / FCDO

    • UK will put green growth and security at the centre of our relationships across the region. 
    • Government will step up efforts towards a new, deeper Strategic Partnership with crucial G20 partner Indonesia to support green innovation and accelerate the clean energy transition.
    • Driving forward further security collaboration, the Foreign Secretary will visit South Korea to galvanise work on defence, clean energy and growth.

    A new chapter in the relationship between the UK and Indonesia, a vital Indo-pacific and G20 partner, begins with the Foreign Secretary arriving in Jakarta today (20th October).

    The Foreign Secretary will attend the inauguration of President Prabowo Subianto, as the UK and Indonesia celebrate seventy five years of diplomatic relations this year. With new governments in the UK and Indonesia, both countries will work together to build a deeper Strategic Partnership that delivers growth and security while ensuring a sustainable future for our planet. 

    Reinforcing the UK and South Korea’s shared global values, David Lammy will travel onwards to Seoul where he will visit the Demilitarized Zone and underline our geopolitical collaboration on security, climate and growth with another G20 power in the Indo-Pacific. 

    In South Korea the Foreign Secretary will witness first-hand the geopolitical reality and immediacy of the divided Korean peninsula and the ongoing threat posed by North Korea. 

    Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said: 

    Our South Korean partners have stood side-by-side with us in defence of Ukraine whilst also working to preserve regional stability here on the Korean peninsula.

    It is a stark reminder of the interconnectedness of conflict, with North Korea supporting Russia and prolonging conflict on Europe’s borders whilst their illegal weapons of mass destruction programme threatens regional security. That is why it is so important for the UK to engage globally over conflict on our continent and security beyond it.

    Indonesia is a key player in our fight to tackle the climate crisis – and our new governments are working together to build a strategic partnership that delivers green growth, deepens our cooperation on security and ensures a sustainable future for our planet. 

    Right across this region, we are working to further unlock growth, trade and green innovation.

    Underlining the UK and South Korea’s joint commitment to upholding peace both on the Korean Peninsula and across the globe, the Foreign Secretary will announce the first UK and South Korea Foreign and Defence Ministerial 2 + 2 Dialogue. This set-piece consultation will provide a formalised space to further enhance cooperation in addressing regional and global challenges to peace and security. 

    The Ministerial 2 + 2 will sit alongside an Inaugural UK-Korea Hybrid Threats Dialogue, which will enable discussion on issues of shared national interest and identification of new opportunities to tackle shared threats together – jointly improving our resilience. 

    The Foreign Secretary’s visit to both Indonesia and South Korea will also be underpinned by the UK’s international leadership on the climate crisis, through clean power and green solutions.  

    In Indonesia, the Foreign Secretary will meet Indonesian companies supported by the UK to spearhead green innovations. He will also see first-hand the UK expertise being deployed to support sustainable infrastructure development in Indonesia. 

    In the Republic of Korea, Mr Lammy will visit Ewha Women’s University to share expertise and experience on the UK’s and South Korea’s clean energy transition. Focusing on how both countries can deliver female leadership in climate and growth, the Foreign Secretary will meet with the university’s President, Kim Eun Mee, and leaders within the climate sphere.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 20 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Problems arising from the EU’s agreement with the Mercosur countries – E-001995/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001995/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nikolas Farantouris (The Left)

    The protests by farmers in the first quarter of 2024 across the EU demonstrated, among other things, the problems stemming from the finalisation of the EU’s agreement with the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). Specifically, it was emphasised that the agreement does not reflect the challenges facing EU agriculture, such as the climate crisis, food security issues and the war in Ukraine, while huge disparities exist between EU and non-EU farmers in terms of labour, social and environmental matters and production standards. Talks on the agreement remain stalled on the key point of the ‘mirror clauses’, for the application of the same standards to products imported from the Mercosur countries. On 7 February Commission Executive Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič announced to the European Parliament that ‘the conditions for the conclusion of the Mercosur agreement are not met’[1]. However, on 8 February Commission Executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis, responsible for trade, said that ‘work is continuing’[2].

    In view of this:

    • 1.At exactly what stage are the negotiations for the finalisation of the EU’s agreement with the Mercosur countries?
    • 2.Have European farmers’ reasonable requests for the removal of the inequalities created by the agreement been incorporated into the negotiations?

    Submitted: 9.10.2024

    • [1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-conditions-complete-mercosur-trade-deal-not-met-yet-2024-02-07/
    • [2] https://www.lafranceagricole.fr/libre-echange/article/862757/le-dossier-mercosur-continue-malgre-la-france
    Last updated: 21 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: 52 Bipartisan Congressmembers Urge Biden Administration to Tighten Russian Oil Sanctions and Question Exception Approval

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX)

    Contact: Alexis Torres, Alexis.Torres@mail.house.gov

    Washington, D.C.—U.S. Representatives Lloyd Doggett (D-TX-37) and Jake Auchincloss (D-MA-4) led a bipartisan effort to demand a tightening of Russian oil sanctions and to question an exception granted to a U.S.-based company, Schlumberger (SLB). Specifically, the lawmakers are questioning Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary Antony Blinken as to why the Biden administration has permitted SLB to serve as an accomplice to Vladimir Putin.

    We write regarding alarming findings that the U.S.-based company and world’s largest oilfield services firm SLB, widely known as Schlumberger, is expanding in Russia,” wrote the members. “Since Russia’s unjustified and illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, SLB has signed new contracts, recruited hundreds of staff, and imported nearly $18 million in equipment into Russia. This U.S.-based company is keeping Vladimir Putin’s war machine well-oiled with financing for the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. We urge you to continue supporting our Ukrainian allies by pursuing more rigorous oil sanctions to effectively restrict Putin’s profits.

    “My name is on the first sanctions legislation to become law shortly after the Russian invasion,” said Rep. Doggett. “Implementation of that and similar legislation by our allies has not prevented Putin from earning billions from oil exports. And unfortunately, North Korea and Iran are not the only places providing him help. By permitting his exports and permitting continued American company investments in Russia, Americans, and our European allies, are essentially funding both sides of this war. While well aware of concerns about the price of gasoline at the pump, we must stop oiling the Putin war machine to win this war, secure a just peace, and reparations.”

    “While Ukrainians fight and die on the front lines of freedom, a U.S. oil company is supporting the enemy,” said Rep. Auchincloss. “Oil is the lifeblood of the Russian war economy, which is why the West must stand united in tightening and enforcing oil sanctions. That begins by holding SLB and its collaborators accountable for evading allied sanctions, profiteering from pain, and fueling Putin’s ability to wage war.”

    Additional signers include Representatives Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (FL-20), Josh Gottheimer (NJ-05), Marcy Kaptur (OH-09), Barbara Lee (CA-12), Wiley Nickel (NC-13), Jared Huffman (CA-02), Dan Goldman (NY-10), Danny Davis (IL-07), Jim Costa (CA-21), Sean Casten (IL-06), Steve Cohen (TN-09), Adam Schiff (CA-30), Susan Wild (PA-07), Joe Wilson (R-SC-02), Hank Johnson (GA-04), Tom Suozzi (NY-03), Brad Sherman (CA-32), Zoe Lofgren (CA-18), Nikema Williams (GA-05), Gerry Connolly (VA-11), Mark Pocan (WI-02), Madeleine Dean (PA-04), Jamie Raskin (MD-08), Earl Blumenaur (OR-03), Seth Magaziner (RI-02), Chris Deluzio (PA-17), Patrick Ryan (NY-18), Chris Smith (R-NJ-04), Bonnie Watson Coleman (NJ-12), Salud Carbajal (CA-24), Raúl Grijalva (AZ-07),  Don Bacon (R-NE-02), Juan Vargas (CA-52), Jerry Nadler (NY-12), Annie Kuster (NH-02), Emanuel Cleaver (MO-05), Frank Pallone (NJ-06), Paul Tonko (NY-20), Adriano Espaillat (NY-13), Ted Lieu (CA-36), John Larson (CT-01), Mike Quigley (IL-05), Jill Tokuda (HI-02), Kweisi Mfume (MD-07), David Trone (MD-06), Seth Moulton (MA-06), Brian Fitzpatrick (PA-01), Stephen Lynch (MA-08), Bennie Thompson (MS-02) and Ro Khanna (CA-17).

    The full letter can be found here.

    Rep. Doggett is a strong champion for a prosperous Ukraine, consistently urging Congress and the Biden administration to take further actions in holding Putin accountable and ensuring full support for a Ukrainian victory. In 2022, the morning after Putin launched his unprovoked and illegal invasion, Rep. Doggett filed the first sanctions legislation, which later became law, to prohibit the direct import of energy products from Russia into the United States. The following year, he introduced the bipartisan Ending Importation of Laundered Russian Oil Act to close a “refining loophole” that allows Russian oil to be laundered through third-party countries and sold in the U.S. as gasoline and other petroleum products—therefore linking American consumers to financing parts of Putin’s war machine. In recent months, Rep. Doggett expanded his efforts to prevent Russia from continuing to profit off Western countries by publishing an opinion piece in Foreign Policy, calling for U.S. sanctions against a network of companies associated with Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: State of the Russian economy examined

    Source: Government of Sweden

    State of the Russian economy examined – Government.se

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    Article from Ministry of Finance

    Published

    Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine continues with unabated intensity and far-reaching consequences for civilians. At the same time, Russia is spreading propaganda to try and portray the Russian economy as more well-functioning than it actually is. As part of efforts to combat this propaganda, the Swedish Government commissioned the National Institute of Economic Research to analyse economic developments in Russia. Last Wednesday, Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson hosted a seminar in connection with the report’s conclusions.

    • Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson.

      Photographer: Magnus Liljegren/Swedish Government Offices.

    • Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson.

      Photographer: Magnus Liljegren/Swedish Government Offices.

    • Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson, Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, and Emil Wannheden, analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

      Photographer: Magnus Liljegren/Swedish Government Offices.

    • Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson.

      Photographer: Magnus Liljegren/Swedish Government Offices.

    “Russia is spreading propaganda in an attempt to portray its economy as strong and resilient in order to give the impression that sanctions are ineffective and thereby undermine continuance of support to Ukraine. That’s why it’s important to nuance the view of the Russian economy and look beyond the official figures,” said Ms Svantesson. 

    The seminar was attended by Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) Torbjörn Becker at the Stockholm School of Economics, who presented SITE’s report, done in response to the Government’s assignment to the National Institute of Economic Research. The report calls attention to one of the main challenges in analysing the Russian economy: the lack of reliable data because Russia’s economic reporting has become intertwined with its war propaganda. The Russian government has stopped publishing large parts of previously available data, and the figures that are available are being used to portray a more positive situation.

    The report also highlights that the Russian government’s financial reserves, which have been used to finance war spending, are rapidly running out and may be exhausted within a year. Once these reserves are exhausted, the Russian Central Bank will then be under pressure to lower its policy rate or even to start printing more money, which could lead to high inflation and a weakened rouble.

    “It is clear that the Russian economy is not working as well as Putin would have it appear. Resources are being drained to the war industry and the economy is overheated. There are obviously big question marks surrounding the official figures. We must continue to actively combat Putin’s propaganda. Wednesday’s discussion is an important part of these efforts,” said Ms Svantesson.

    Russian opposition politician and economist Vladimir Milov and analyst and economist Emil Wannheden at the Swedish Defence Research Institute also attended the seminar.

    Introduction by Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson

    Presentation by Torbjörn Becker

    Comments by Vladimir Milov

    Comments by Emil Wannheden

    Questions

    Closing statement by Minister for Finance Elisabeth Svantesson

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Kim Jong-un sends North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine – here’s what this means for the war

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ra Mason, Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia

    It is still unclear how many North Korean soldiers will find their way onto the killing fields of eastern Ukraine. What is clear is that the drive to recruit fighting forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is at least in part politically motivated. But is it also a tactical masterstroke that will boost the Russian war machine’s chances of a definitive victory?

    The political aspect appears straightforward. The use of foreign forces from an enemy of the United States demonstrates a clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order. It also deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.

    But despite boosting troop numbers, there are multiple problems with these would-be mercenaries from the far east joining Putin’s forces on the front line in Europe. North Korea is impoverished and authoritarian. This means its personnel are mostly poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished. Where and how they are deployed will, therefore, likely be critical.

    If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches. Most would surely be killed by FPV (first-person view) drones or western tank fire.

    Defections could well pose an additional risk. If commanded outside the immediate control of Korean officers in the field, some will doubtless view this as a chance to escape oppression and poverty in their homeland. Desertions en masse to the Ukrainian side might become a possibility. Even more so if identified and directed how to surrender by Ukrainian, or other, special forces on the ground.

    Considering these seemingly obvious flaws, it would be easy to assume the deliberate showcasing of training camps in eastern Russia for North Korean soldiers is little more than a political gimmick. One that is designed to strike fear into an already struggling Ukrainian army and poke its western backers in the eye. At the same time, there may be cause to think there is more to this move than pure politics.

    Rules of engagement

    The difference between supplying artillery shells for Russian guns and putting bodies on the line is stark.

    But this fundamental difference does not necessarily mean that there is no tactical value to the deployment of Korean forces on the battlefield. The key likely lies in where and how they are deployed.

    There is the immediate question of international law. Or, perhaps more importantly, how Nato countries might respond to further breaches of the established rules of engagement by Russian directed foreign forces. For sure, use of Korean mercenaries to fight in the Donbas region, which is recognised by western allies as Ukrainian territory, would constitute a gross violation.

    The response from Nato could be rapid and definitive, as it would effectively justify proportionate use of force, including foreign personnel, to counter any subsequent Russian advances. This would likely result in an own goal for Putin. Any initial advantage gained would quickly be lost as friends of Ukraine justifiably enter the fray to push back an illegal Moscow-Pyongyang alliance of aggression. Escalation thereafter would also be a serious and grave concern.

    Conversely, if deployed in a combination of technical and logistical roles, or primarily to defend Russian territory, the utility of additional manpower becomes more credible. Not least, it would seem legitimate from an international legal perspective for Russia to seek assistance from alliance partners in repelling Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region of southwestern Russia.

    This could deal a double blow to Kyiv. On the one hand it would likely supply sufficient personnel to rapidly finish off the already threadbare Ukrainian forces holding on to captured sovereign Russian territory. At the same time, Moscow’s own military machine would be able to focus its entire attention on the already growing advances being made along the Donbas front.

    Distraction from the end game

    North Korea’s influence on the international stage has grown since the start of the war in Ukraine as its massive stockpiles of ammunition proved significant in Russia’s attritional tactics. In that respect, the addition of foreign fighters may add a further factor in Moscow’s favour if skilfully deployed and directed.

    Ultimately, however, the limited dispatch of inexperienced Korean troops to a war zone in which they have no legal or moral basis to be sent is unlikely to prove decisive. As it stands, with or without the help of forces supplied by North Korea’s despotic leader, Kim Jong-Un, Russia’s brutal military advance looks set to grind on.

    In these regards, the arrival of North Koreans to Europe’s worst war for a generation is probably little more than another bizarre episode in this cruel conflict. The real concern is how authoritarian states such as Russia and North Korea can be transformed into something resembling civilised societies that might pursue more positive foreign policy pathways.

    Ra Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Kim Jong-un sends North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine – here’s what this means for the war – https://theconversation.com/kim-jong-un-sends-north-korean-troops-to-fight-in-ukraine-heres-what-this-means-for-the-war-241876

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0139/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0139/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

      having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

      having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

      having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

      having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

      having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

      having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

      having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment;

    B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov and Akif Gurbanov; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

    C. whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

    D. whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities;

    E. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

    F. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

    G. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship;

    H. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

    I. whereas in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

    J. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

    K. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons, including eight former leaders of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

    L. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas Azerbaijan occupies territories internationally recognised as Armenian;

    M. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani President indicate that Baku is not eager to conclude the negotiations;

    N. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

    O. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia; whereas there are worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

    P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

    1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges, and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan;

    2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    3. Expresses deep concern about the choice of Baku as the host city for COP29, given Azerbaijan’s flagrant violations of fundamental rights, democracy and international law; considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges the EU to use COP29 as an opportunity for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities;

    4. Demands that the organisers of COP29 ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change Conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

    5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent non-governmental organisations and media to the margins of the law; reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment;

    6. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations;

    7. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms, and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country;

    8. Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

    9. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity;

    10. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

    11. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to promptly sign a peace treaty – before COP29 – in order to resolve their long-lasting disputes; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU;

    12. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including the 17 November 2023 order indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the abovementioned ICJ order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

    13. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

    14. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious, or historical heritage in the region;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0140/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0140/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

     having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

     having regard to the statement of 23 September 2024 by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,

     having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

     having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

     having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October  1971,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC);

    B. whereas since then, most countries have shifted recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; whereas today, Taiwan, while not being a member of the UN, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 UN member states, and with the Holy See;

    C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its right to participate in multilateral forums, such as the World Health Organization;

    D. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024, the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

    E. whereas in recent years, the PRC has deliberately distorted UN Resolution 2758, persistently claiming that the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle allegedly has international endorsement through this resolution, which would entail that Taiwan is part of the PRC;

    F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy position, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

    G. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC was established in 1949;

    H. whereas over the past decade, the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

    I. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    J. whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

    K. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party; whereas the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the military of the Chinese Communist Party and not an army of the PRC’s Government;

    L. whereas on 14 October 2024, the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise, a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

    M. whereas on 23 May 2024, the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, coming just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

    N. whereas over the past years, the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022, the PRC also fired missiles into the exclusive economic zone of Japan;

    O. whereas on top of military pressure, the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference, including hybrid and cyber attacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    P. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan; whereas the PRC is engaging in a historically unprecedented military build-up that is continuously shifting the power balance in the Indo-Pacific; whereas this is negatively affecting cross-Strait stability;

    Q. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia, and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

    R. whereas in a speech on 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s national day, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

    S. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas the PRC has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas the PRC’s growing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in international institutions;

    T. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including a higher military presence and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

    U. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022, Taiwan was the EU’s 12th biggest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

    V. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC, and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

    2. Strongly condemns the PRC’s military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up that is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted;

    3. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

    4. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

    5. Strongly underlines that the EU’s ‘One China’ policy corresponds to UN Resolution 2758, while the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle is not endorsed by it;

    6. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law; recalls that neither Taiwan nor the PRC is subordinate to the other; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

    7. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further in order to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference;

    8. Reiterates its call on the Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and to deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island;

    9. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

    10. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan in the field of whole-of-society defence;

    11. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

    12. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan;

    13. Condemns all forms of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, regarding the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan, in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    14. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges between its Members and Taiwan and encourages further visits by official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; also encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters; encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Ukraine: 97 percent of prisoners provided accounts of torture – DPPA Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Briefing by Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and Americas, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, on Maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine.

    ———————–

    Briefing the Security Council Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Affairs said, “widespread and systematic reports of torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war remains a grave concern. 97 percent of Ukrainian prisoners interviewed by OHCHR since March 2023 provided consistent and detailed accounts of torture or ill-treatment during captivity. 68 percent reported sexual violence.”

    Jenčan also highlighted the civilian toll of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, citing data from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Jenča said, “since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, launched in violation of the UN Charter and international law, 11,973 civilians, including 622 children, have been killed. 25,943 people, including 1,686 children, have been injured.

    He also raised concerns about renewed attacks on Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which have damaged six civilian vessels and grain infrastructure since September. “Wheat prices have increased more than six percent between 1 September and 14 October,” he noted, attributing the spike to these attacks.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJD7EfGlJqs

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Global: On Ukraine, candidate Trump touts his role as dealmaker while Harris sticks with unwavering support

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Lena Surzhko Harned, Associate Teaching Professor of Political Science, Penn State

    Continued support from the White House for Ukraine could hinge on the presidential election. AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta

    The U.S. presidential election isn’t drawing eyes only at home – Moscow and Kyiv are watching closely, too.

    Regardless of who wins in November, there will be significant implications for Ukraine as it continues to resist Russia in a war heading toward a fourth year.

    Washington’s continued support is seen by some as no less than an existential issue for Ukraine. Without U.S. arms and aid, it is unlikely that the nation would be able to continue repelling its larger, better-armed neighbor.

    During the presidential debate on Sept. 10, 2024, Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris and Republican contender Donald Trump had a chance to clarify their positions on Ukraine. Trump evaded ABC moderator David Muir’s question regarding the importance of Ukraine’s victory over Russia, twice. Instead, he repeated his long-standing line that he would achieve a negotiated peace quickly – even before taking office as president.

    At the same debate, Harris dismissed the idea of Trump negotiating with “a dictator who would eat you for lunch.” She instead emphasized the Biden policy to support Ukraine “as long as it takes” in concert with U.S. allies.

    But detail has been light on what either candidate would actually do to support Ukraine and end the war. So, what do we know about each candidate’s approach to Ukraine based on their records?

    Trump: A ‘very fair and rapid deal’?

    Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Trump has repeatedly stated that ending the war is in the U.S.’s best interests and that he can end the war quickly. In fact, Trump is certain that had he remained president after the 2020 election, Russian President Vladimir Putin would not have invaded – an unsubstantiated claim he repeated during the Sept. 10 presidential debate.

    Trump has often reiterated that both Putin and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy respect him, and he would be able to use his “good relationship” with both to bring them to the negotiating table and end the war.

    Yet, Trump’s record on his relationships with Zelenskyy and Putin is rather complicated.

    Trump’s admiration for Putin is well documented and dates back to his first presidential run in 2016, sparking numerous investigations and reports of collusion. Most recently, Bob Woodward reported that Trump secretly sent COVID-19 tests to Putin in the midst of a pandemic shortage, a claim confirmed by the Kremlin.

    Trump’s relationship with Zelenskyy is similarly laden with baggage. A 2019 phone call between the two men, during which Trump pressured Ukraine’s president to open a criminal investigation into Joe Biden, led to Trump’s impeachment. In exchange, Ukraine would have received continued U.S. support for the country’s defense against Russia, which had been waging a proxy war in eastern regions of Ukraine since 2014. During the subsequent hearings in Congress, one of Trump’s aids testified that “Trump did not give a sh*t about Ukraine” and was only interested in his own political gains.

    Standing next to Zelenskyy during a meeting at the Trump Tower on Sept. 27, 2024 – their first meeting since Sept. 25, 2019 – Trump said he was sure that both Zelenskyy and Putin are interested in peace and that a “very fair” and “rapid” deal is possible.

    When asked what that deal might entail, Trump responded that it’s “too early” to discuss details and that both he and Zelenskyy have “their own ideas.”

    While the Republican candidate has not been explicit on the details of negotiations or possible conditions, some of his proxies have voiced proposals. Trump’s vice presidential pick, JD Vance, has laid out a plan that includes potential land concessions on the part of Ukraine and the creation of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines of the Russian-occupied territory of eastern Ukraine.

    Meanwhile, Trump’s son Donald Jr. co-authored a piece with former presidential candidate turned Trump ally Robert F Kennedy Jr., arguing that a concession to Russian demands for “Ukrainian neutrality and a halt to NATO’s eastward expansion” were reasonable to avoid a nuclear game of chicken. Although these have not been echoed in Trump’s own statements on Ukraine, both men have the ear of the Republican candidate.

    These plans have been criticized as closely resembling those of the Kremlin. Prior to meeting with Trump in New York, Zelenskyy had also criticized Vance’s plan and expressed doubts that Trump and his team really know how to end the war.

    Harris: ‘Strategic interest, not charity’

    Harris has been harshly critical of Trump’s approach to Ukraine. “They are not proposals for peace,” Harris said in response to suggestions that Ukraine cede territory for peace. “Instead they are proposals for surrender,” she added.

    Such views are in line with Harris’ record. As part of the Biden administration, Harris has given vocal support to Ukraine’s fight for political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    At the onset of the full-scale invasion in early 2022, Harris traveled to Europe to help shore up a coalition of European allies to support Ukraine.

    As vice president, Harris has repeatedly condemned Russian war crimes in Ukraine. In February 2023, while attending the annual Munich Security Conference in Germany, she announced that the U.S. has determined that Russian actions in Ukraine amounted to “crimes against humanity,” affirming U.S. commitment to the international rule of law.

    Along with continued support, the U.S. has provided substantial aid for Ukraine, totaling US$61.3 billion in military aid since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

    The Biden administration also has said that rising costs and keeping pressure on Russia through sanctions are important mechanisms to keep Moscow accountable. Harris reiterated this need to maintain sanctions and broad coalition support for Ukraine at the Munich Security Conference in February 2024 and again in June at the peace summit organized by Ukraine in Switzerland.

    As a presidential candidate, Harris has openly signaled her commitment to supporting Kyiv – not only for Ukraine survival but for the collective security of NATO allies and the U.S. itself. Harris emphasized this point in the September debate, suggesting that Ukraine was not Putin’s final stop and that he has “his eyes on the rest of Europe, starting with Poland.”

    Standing next to Zelenskyy in Washington on Sept. 26, 2024, Harris reiterated the point: “The United States supports Ukraine not out of charity, but because it’s in our strategic interest.”

    Yet, White House policy on Ukraine has been criticized for being slow and hesitant in supplying weaponry. The U.S. has imposed rules on the use of heavy weaponry against targets inside Russia. Furthermore, the U.S. has so far been reticent on Ukraine’s invitation to join NATO, which is seen as crucial for any lasting peace in Kyiv. How Harris’ White House would differ from Biden’s on these issues is not clear.

    Beyond the candidates

    Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the U.S. Congress has passed five bills that provide aid to Ukraine, totaling US$175 billion.

    However, a six-month delay in aid in early 2024 highlighted growing partisan tension in Congress over continued aid to Ukraine.

    The composition of Congress after the November election is another unknown factor in Washington’s support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy met with congressional leaders during his visit to the U.S. in September, but notably absent was Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson, who in the past has shown reluctance to support continued funding.

    For the large part, support for Ukraine remains bipartisan in Congress and among American voters. Yet there is a risk the election could further politicize the issue. And the outcome of November’s vote could determine whether U.S. efforts going forward focus more on pushing for a negotiated deal or on-going support for Ukraine.

    Lena Surzhko Harned does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. On Ukraine, candidate Trump touts his role as dealmaker while Harris sticks with unwavering support – https://theconversation.com/on-ukraine-candidate-trump-touts-his-role-as-dealmaker-while-harris-sticks-with-unwavering-support-237534

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Report calls for urgent action to reverse soil degradation in Europe

    Source: European Union 2

    Launched today at the EU Soil Observatory Stakeholder Forum, the 2024 State of Soils in Europe report assesses the state of soil degradation across the EU and other countries in the European Economic Area, including Ukraine, Türkiye, and the Western Balkans. The report shows alarming status and trends, with soil degradation getting much worse in recent years, and highlights the need for immediate action to reverse this trend. 

    For example, overall soil erosion is estimated to amount to 1 billion tonnes per year across the EU. At present date, approximately a quarter (24%) of EU soils are affected by water erosion, mainly in cropland, with projections referring to a possible increase of 13-25% by 2050. Unsustainable water erosion affects about a third (32%) of agricultural land. The mechanical agitation of soil, a common practice in agriculture, can also initiate soil degradation. This phenomenon, called tillage erosion, can have a significant impact on cultivated fields. Other forms of erosion include wind erosion and crop harvesting, among others.

    Nutrient imbalancesare also on the rise: they are now estimated to affect 74% of agricultural land. These changes to the composition of soil can have negative consequences. For example, nitrogen surplus is increasing and can be harmful to human health, crops, eco-systems, and the climate. Meanwhile, soil organic carbon, which is essential to keeping soil healthy, is decreasing in agricultural areas. An estimated 70 million tonnes of this organic carbon were lost from the mineral soils of croplands across the EU and UK between 2009 and 2018.

    The degradation of peatlands is also concerning. These wetlands are essential carbon sinks: they absorb greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and store them, contributing to mitigate climate change. When they deteriorate, peatlands can release those gases back into the atmosphere. In the EU, peatland drainage is responsible for around 5% of total greenhouse gas emissions. 50% of peatlands in the EU are now estimated to be degraded, many of which have been irreparably damaged.

    Outside the EU, the situation is similarly dire – particularly in Ukraine, where military activities have caused severe soil destruction. Over 10 million of Ukraine’s 60 million hectares of land are estimated to be degraded because of Russia’s invasion. Recovery from this damage could take decades or even centuries. In Türkiye, approximately 1.5 million hectares of land have salinity issues, which can impact both agricultural productivity and ecosystem health. The Western Balkans have reported over 100 identified contaminated or potentially contaminated sites due to mining and industrial activities, although the true extent of soil pollution in these areas remains unknown.

    The importance of soil monitoring and new legislation

    The State of Soils in Europe report is a collaboration between the Joint Research Centre and the European Environment Agency. It sets out the scale of the problem facing Europe today, but it also aims to reinforce and build capacities among the soil research community, while enhancing the engagement of soil users and society.

    The EU Soil Observatory (EUSO) has already laid the foundation for better soil monitoring, using advanced tools to improve the quality of data on soil erosion, soil organic carbon levels, and nutrient imbalances. Together with other collaborations and soil monitoring networks, EUSO is also giving a clearer understanding of how agricultural practices and climate change are impacting Europe’s soils.

    The EU Soil Monitoring Law aims to ensure that soil degradation is assessed more accurately by creating a monitoring framework, to promote sustainable soil management and to identify potentially contaminated sites. It will standardise data collection across EU member states, ensuring that the insights gathered by EUSO and initiatives like the Land Use/Cover Area frame Survey (LUCAS-Soil) are implemented effectively.

    As part of the common agricultural policy (CAP), the sustainable use of agricultural soils is already supported through the CAP Strategic Plans in all Member States by a mix of mandatory and voluntary measures for farmers. For the period 2023-2027, 47% of the European farmland (compared to 15% in the past) will receive support for actions aimed at improving soils or avoiding soil degradation, including by water erosion. 

    The EU Mission ‘A Soil Deal for Europe’ is a large-scale applied R&D funding programme that supports the EU soil strategy, the upcoming Soil Monitoring Law, and the CAP. The Mission funds actions to establish harmonised soil health monitoring in the EU; to develop and promote the adoption of sustainable soil management practices and technologies to restore soil health; and to provide advice and education on soil health to managers and citizens. The Mission has invested €435 million so far and has created the first of a network of 100 living labs, with more than 1000 testing sites across a wide range of land-use sectors (agriculture, forestry, industry, urban and regional planning) across Europe. The Mission currently encompasses 50 projects, which are contributing to increase and improve the knowledge of the state of soils in the EU.  

    Protecting our soils: a shared responsibility

    Tackling soil degradation is vital for achieving the EU’s environmental, agricultural, and climate goals. The numbers are clear: soil degradation has worsened significantly in the last decade, but with collective action, enhanced monitoring, and legislative support, the EU can restore this vital resource and ensure a sustainable future for generations to come.

    Background:

    The EUSO Stakeholder Forum serves as the platform for the formal presentation of the 2024 report, bringing together experts, policymakers, and stakeholders from across Europe. Discussions focus on future strategies for reversing soil degradation trends, with particular attention to the upcoming soil legislation and how it facilitates more comprehensive restoration efforts across the continent. With the EU Soil Strategy, the EU Soil Mission, and the Soil Monitoring Law on the horizon, the EU is positioning itself to implement coordinated actions that could dramatically improve soil health in the coming years.

    Related links

    JRC report: The state of soils in Europe

    Article in Nature: Policy implications of multiple concurrent soil erosion processes in European farmland

    European Soil Data Centre (ESDAC)

    EUSO Stakeholders Forum

    Land Use and Coverage Area frame Survey (LUCAS) project

    Soil health

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Remarks in Kyiv by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ukraine’s Fight for Freedom (As Delivered)

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    Well, good afternoon.

    Thanks for welcoming me back to Kyiv, and to this proud academy.

    Director Nadolenko, I’m very grateful for those generous words.

    And speaking of outstanding diplomats: All Americans should be proud of our tireless and fearless ambassador, Bridget Brink. Ambassador, thanks for doing tremendous work.

    [Applause]

    Let me also thank my good friend, Minister Umerov. Rustem, thanks for that very kind introduction and for your tremendous service to your country.

    Ladies and gentlemen, it’s a great honor to be here with you today.

    I’d like to talk today about Ukraine’s just war of self-defense, and the road ahead.

    And I’d like to start by echoing the words of President Kennedy in his historic 1963 speech in Berlin.

    There are some who say that they don’t understand — or say they don’t understand — what is at stake between the free world and an aggressive tyrant like Putin.

    And I say to them: Let them come to Kyiv.

    There are some who say that both sides are to blame for Putin’s war of aggression.

    Let them come to Kyiv.

    There are some who blur the lines between aggressor and victim.

    Let them come to Kyiv.

    There are some who deny that the Kremlin targets Ukrainian civilians.

    Let them come to Kyiv.

    There are some who say that Ukraine isn’t a real nation.

    Let them come to Kyiv.

    And finally, there are some who claim that Ukraine lacks the courage to prevail.

    Let them come to Kyiv.

    Ladies and gentlemen, let us never forget how this war began.

    For years, Putin had harassed and assaulted the independent nation-state of Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, Putin crossed the line into an all-out invasion. And the Kremlin started the largest war in Europe since World War II.

    Now, Putin’s war of choice poses fundamental questions to every government and every person who seeks a decent and secure world.

    And so I ask today: Do rules matter?

    Do rights matter?

    Does sovereignty matter?

    I believe that they do.

    President Biden believes that they do.

    And every free citizen of Ukraine believes that they do.

    When the largest military in Europe becomes a force of aggression, the whole continent feels the shock.

    When a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council tries to deny self-rule to more than 40 million people, the whole world feels the blow.

    And when a dictator puts his imperial fantasies ahead of the rights of a free people, the whole international system feels the outrage.

    And so that’s why nations of goodwill from every corner of the planet have seen and have risen to Ukraine’s defense. And that’s why the United States and our allies and partners have proudly become the arsenal of Ukrainian democracy.

    America’s values call us to stand by a peaceful democracy fighting for its life. And America’s security demands that we stand up to Putin’s aggression.

    America’s security demands that we stand up to Putin’s aggression.

    Ukraine matters to U.S. security for four blunt reasons.

    Putin’s war threatens European security.

    Putin’s war challenges our NATO allies.

    Putin’s war attacks our shared values.

    And Putin’s war is a frontal assault on the rules-based international order that keeps us all safe.

    Now, this invasion hasn’t gone the way that the Kremlin planned. After 970 days of war, Putin has not achieved one single strategic objective.

    Not one.

    President Zelenskyy didn’t flee. Kyiv didn’t fall. And Ukraine didn’t fold.

    Instead, Russia has paid a staggering price for Putin’s imperial folly.

    Russian forces have suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties since February 2022. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian losses in just the first year of Putin’s war were more than Moscow’s losses in all of its conflicts since World War II—combined.

    And Russia has had to dig so deep into its Soviet stockpiles that it’s attacking Ukraine with tanks from the time of World War II.

    And Russia has squandered more than 200 billion dollars to sustain its invasion. And Russia has given up untold billions of dollars more in previously anticipated economic growth.

    Now, Ukraine has suffered terribly at Putin’s hands.

    Since February 2022, according to the U.N., Russian forces have killed more than 11,000 Ukrainian civilians in verified civilian casualty incidents. And that includes more than 600 children.

    The U.N. says that Putin’s forces have bombed more than 250 Ukrainian schools and hospitals. And they’ve wrecked treasured sites of Ukrainian history, culture, and memory.

    But the Kremlin’s malice has not broken Ukraine’s spirit. Ukraine stands unbowed — and strengthened.

    You know, your fight began with soldiers setting tank ambushes on the streets of Kyiv, and with ordinary citizens making Molotov cocktails to defend their homes.

    And it continues today with a battle-tested Ukrainian military and security forces — and a roaring Ukrainian defense industrial base.

    Ukrainian factories are now pumping out some of the best UAVs in the world, and experienced Ukrainian air defenders are protecting their forces and their families. 

    And your soldiers have shown incredible skill. Your frontline defenders have shown heroic resolve. And your citizens have shown stunning courage.

    Ukraine’s resistance is powered by the emergency workers who rush to the scene; and by the energy workers who race to fix the damage of the Kremlin’s attacks; by the doctors who risk their own lives to save the wounded; by the nurses who provide comfort in hours of anguish; and by the clergy who tend to suffering souls; by the teachers who keep Ukraine’s schools open; and by the parents and grandparents who fight every day to keep their children safe and give them a future of peace.

    So your admirers around the world are studying the Ukrainian way of resistance. And we strongly encourage the reforms that Ukraine has launched to help realize its people’s hopes of joining the European Union and NATO. 

    Ukraine’s defenders have brought inspiration to the world — and glory to Ukraine.

    Slava Ukraini!

    [Audience responds in Ukrainian]

    Yet this struggle imposes obligations on us all. As President Biden told the U.N. General Assembly in September, “Our test is to make sure that the forces holding us together are stronger than the forces that are pulling us apart.”

    And make no mistake. The outcome of Ukraine’s fight for freedom will help set the trajectory for global security in the 21st century.

    Europe’s future is on the line.

    NATO’s strength is on the line.

    And America’s security is on the line.

    So the U.S. government has moved with urgency and purpose. And we’ve seen the huge progress that principled diplomacy can produce —the kind of diplomacy taught right here in this academy.

    Since April 2022, I have been convening the Ukraine Defense Contact Group — the coalition of some 50 countries from around the world determined to help Ukraine fight Putin’s aggression. The Contact Group has met 24 times now.

    And I know that Minister Umerov and my other Ukrainian friends often refer to the Contact Group as “the Ramstein format”— after Ramstein Air Base, where the Contact Group was forged.

    And each time that I’m back at Ramstein, I find it moving to look around that long table; to see in human form the global indignation over Putin’s crimes; and to see determined defense leaders from around the world — from Argentina to Australia, and from Tunisia to Türkiye.

    And it has worked.

    America’s allies and partners are sharing the burden of our shared security.

    And that’s the power of Ramstein.

    You know, as a percentage of GDP, a dozen U.S. allies and partners now provide more security assistance to Ukraine than the United States does. And members of the Contact Group have provided more than [51] billion dollars in direct security assistance to Ukraine.

    And I am proud to remind you that the United States is doing our part as well.

    My country has committed more than 58 billion dollars in security assistance for Ukraine since February 2022. We’ve delivered two Patriot batteries and dozens of other air-defense systems. We’ve provided 24 HIMARS [rocket] systems, and thousands of armored vehicles and drones, and millions of rounds of artillery and other critical munitions.

    Now, that is a very real financial commitment. But for anyone who thinks that American leadership is expensive — well, consider the price of American retreat.

    In the face of aggression, the price of principle is always dwarfed by the cost of capitulation.

    Our allies and partners know that. And I’ve been proud to watch the pro-Ukraine coalition dig deep.

    So just consider Germany, host to Ramstein Air Base. Germany alone has provided or committed to military assistance for Ukraine valued at close to 31 billion dollars.

    And through the Contact Group and its capability coalitions, Ukraine’s friends are now forging an unprecedented, coordinated, 13-country drive to increase industrial production, to meet Ukraine’s battlefield requirements, and to build up the force to deter and repel Russian aggression in the future.

    And so, not since World War II has America systematically rallied so many countries to provide such a range of industrial and military assistance for a partner in need.

    Now, there is no silver bullet. No single capability will turn the tide. No one system will end Putin’s assault.

    What matters is the way that Ukraine fights back. What matters is the combined effects of your military capabilities. And what matters is staying focused on what works.

    Now, I believe that President Biden and Vice President Harris will have a proud place in history for rallying the world to defend Ukraine.

    So will the allies and partners who seek a free Ukraine in a safer world.

    But the proudest place of all will go to the Ukrainian people.

    From President Zelenskyy on down, your leaders chose to fight back. And the people of Ukraine have met Russia’s aggression and atrocities with magnificent defiance.

    The spirit of Ukraine has inspired the world. And it has reminded us all to never take our freedom for granted.

    So we refuse to blame Ukraine for the Kremlin’s aggression.

    We refuse to offer excuses for Putin’s atrocities.

    And we refuse to pretend that appeasement will stop an invasion.

    We fully understand the moral chasm between aggressor and defender.

    And we will not be gulled by the frauds and the falsehoods of the Kremlin’s apologists.

    And we will continue to defend the Ukrainian people’s right to live in security and freedom.

    The Kremlin has forced us into an age where Europe’s largest military invades Europe’s second-largest country. And we dare not believe, as the novelist George Eliot once wrote, that “the giant forces that used to shake the earth are forever laid to sleep.”

    America’s goals remain clear, achievable, and principled. We seek a free and sovereign Ukraine that can defend itself from Russian aggression today — and deter Russian aggression in the future.

    We seek a more secure Europe — and a reinforced commitment from nations of goodwill worldwide to an open international system of rules, rights, and responsibilities.

    I know that the Kremlin’s war is a nightmare from which the Ukrainian people are trying to awake. But we should all understand that Putin’s assault is a warning. It is a sneak preview of a world built by tyrants and thugs — a chaotic, violent world carved into spheres of influence; a world where bullies trample their smaller neighbors; and a world where aggressors force free people to live in fear.

    So we face a hinge in history.

    We can continue to insist that cross-border invasion is the cardinal sin of world politics. And we can continue to stand firm against Putin’s aggression.

    Or we can let Putin have his way. And we can condemn our children and grandchildren to live in a far bloodier and more dangerous world.

    So we must continue to face, to squarely face, the specter of an aggressive Russia — backed by other autocrats from North Korea and Iran.

    If Ukraine falls under Putin’s boot, all of Europe will fall under Putin’s shadow.

    Putin is not just hammering at the norms of the international system built at such a terrible cost by the Allies after World War II. He is shoving us all toward a world where right — where might makes right, and where empire trumps sovereignty. And he is determined to show that his brand of autocracy can outlast the world’s democracies.

    You see, Putin does not just think that his will is stronger. He thinks that his system is better.

    But he could not be more wrong.

    You know, few forces are more powerful than a democracy fighting for freedom.

    As I have said: Peace is not self-executing. Order does not preserve itself. And the principles of freedom, and sovereignty, and human rights do not uphold themselves.

    Yes, there is a price to be paid for human freedom. But it is dwarfed by the price that we would all pay for letting aggression go unchecked.

    So President Biden has chosen the path of mutual responsibility and common security. And we have chosen to share the responsibility of ensuring that Ukraine remains sovereign and free.

    And make no mistake. The United States does not seek war with Russia. And even as Putin makes profoundly reckless and dangerous threats about nuclear war, we will continue to behave with the responsibility that the world rightly demands of a nuclear-armed state.

    So the United States will uphold our sworn NATO obligations.

    The United States will defend every inch of NATO territory.

    And the United States will get Ukraine what it needs to fight for its survival and security.

    [Applause]

    Ladies and gentlemen, let’s be clear.

    Ukraine does not belong to Putin.

    Ukraine belongs to the Ukrainian people.

    And Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.

    You know, Putin thought that Ukraine would surrender. He was wrong.

    Putin thought that our democracies would cave. He was wrong.

    And Putin thought that the free world would cower. He was wrong.

    And Putin thinks that he will win. He is wrong.

    And as I said in Halifax almost two years ago: free people will always refuse to replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by force and fear.

    Now, Ukraine faces complex challenges in the days to come.

    And as then-Vice President Biden said at this academy in 2014, “Democracy is not a destination. Democracy is a road traveled. And it’s a hard damn road to travel.”

    But you have shown the world the moral power of a free people fighting to defend their country.

    That force can bend the arc of history.

    Ladies and gentlemen: never underestimate the strategic advantage of a just cause.

    Never underestimate the resolve of free citizens.

    And never underestimate the power of a democracy summoned to defend itself.

    Ukraine has chosen the course of courage.

    And so have we.

    My friends, you walk a hard road.

    But you do not walk it alone.

    Thank you. God bless you. And may God bless all who fight to defend freedom.

    [Standing ovation]

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Canada announces new military assistance for Ukraine

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Today, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, announced $64.8 million in military assistance to Ukraine.

    October 18, 2024 – Brussels, Belgium – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces 

    Today, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of National Defence, announced $64.8 million in military assistance to Ukraine.

    Ukraine’s need for small arms remains ongoing and is a critical requirement on the battlefield. Today’s announcement commits $27.3 million to procure small arms and ammunition from Canadian industry—building upon more than $120 million in small arms and ammunition that Canada has donated.

    The Minister further announced $20 million to manufacture Canadian-made personal protective equipment and military uniforms for women Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) soldiers, expanding Canada’s pilot project announced in October 2023. This contribution will outfit 30,000 women AFU soldiers with appropriately sized military gear.

    Canada has also committed $5 million towards the Drone Capability Coalition Common Fund. Drones have become critical in this conflict and this Coalition has brought together Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) members working to find ways to support Ukraine’s drone industry and procure drones that are crucial to Ukraine’s defence efforts.

    In addition, Minister Blair also announced the donation of: 

    • Up to $10.5 million to support Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) activities such as training for Ukrainian Forces; and
    • Up to $2 million to join the IT Capability Coalition and continue Canada’s role in working with Ukraine to strengthen its cyber capabilities. 

    Since the beginning of the conflict, Canada has worked closely with Ukraine and its partners to strengthen Ukraine’s cyber capabilities against Russia’s attacks. Our membership in the IT Coalition will enable us to enhance our ongoing support and leadership in this important space.

    The donations announced today are part of an additional $500 million in military assistance to Ukraine, announced by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the NATO Summit in July 2024, including $444 million to support the costs of military equipment, assistance, and training for Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

    • Since February 2022, Canada has committed over $19.5 billion in total assistance to Ukraine, including $4.5 billion in military assistance. This includes Leopard 2 main battle tanks, armoured combat support vehicles, anti-tank weapons, small arms, M777 howitzers and associated ammunition. 

    • Canada is allocating up to $389 million to enhance F-16 pilot training through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group Air Force Capability Coalition. This commitment will support training for pilots in Ukraine’s Armed Forces as well as provide critical equipment to support Ukraine’s safe operation of F-16s.

    • Since the launch of Operation UNIFIER, the CAF has trained more than 42,000 members of the AFU. Canada has announced the extension of this mission until March 2026, so the CAF can continue to respond to Ukraine’s training needs.

    • Canada continues to train AFU members under Operation UNIFIER, with approximately 330 CAF members currently deployed in the United Kingdom, Poland, and Latvia in various roles.

    • These donations are all priorities that Ukraine has stated and have been validated by the Ukraine Defence Contract Group (UDCG) and the International Donor Coordination Centre. They further demonstrate Canada’s strong commitment, along with its Allies, to ensuring Ukraine’s success in its fight against Russia’s unjustifiable war. 

    • Canada is currently a member of the UDCG’s Armour, Air Force, Drone, and IT capability coalitions.

    • The UDCG was created by the United States Secretary of Defense in April 2022 to allow Allies and partners to synchronize donations, consult, and coordinate military assistance to Ukraine, and build up the capabilities of the AFU. The UDCG now comprises more than 50 countries.

    • Since late March 2022, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has been transporting Ukraine-bound military aid donated by Canada, Allies, and partners. To date, the RCAF has transported over 22 million pounds of military donations.

    Simon Lafortune
    Press Secretary and Communications Advisor
    Office of the Minister of National Defence
    Phone: 343-549-0778
    Email: Simon.Lafortune2@forces.gc.ca

    Media Relations
    Department of National Defence
    Phone: 613-904-3333
    Email: mlo-blm@forces.gc.ca

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 255 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stationed at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) are reporting daily military activity in the vicinity, with some explosions occurring close to the facility. This ongoing situation underscores the persistent threat faced by the nuclear power plant, which remains at the heart of an active war zone, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated today.

    No damage has been reported to the plant within the past week, and the IAEA team at the site has focussed its efforts on assessing the condition of the plant, as well as ongoing maintenance and training activities.

    The IAEA team conducted regular walkdowns across the ZNPP. At the pumping station of unit 4, the team confirmed that the circulation pump used to maintain the flow of cooling water between the ZNPP discharge and intake channels is still operational. Its operation is dependent on the overall water level in the ZNPP cooling pond, which has been steadily decreasing since the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023.

    In assessing maintenance at the plant, the IAEA team noted during a visit this week to cooling tower 1 damaged by fire in August 2024 that no maintenance activities were ongoing. The ZNPP informed the IAEA that it plans to use the support of external contractors to determine the extent of the damage.

    The team was informed that two of the six mobile diesel generators, introduced following the Fukushima stress tests, that are available on site, were moved to other locations. One was now being used at the recently damaged Zaria substation and one at the pumping water supply station in the city of Enerhodar.

    This week, the team was updated on ZNPP staffing numbers. Of the nearly 5000 ZNPP employees, 130 work at the training center, including 70 instructors. The goal is to expand the personnel to 6000.

    The team performed radiation monitoring measurements on site and in the nearby city of Enerhodar, confirming that radiation levels were normal.

    Separately, the IAEA teams at Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine nuclear power plants (NPPs) and the Chornobyl site experienced air raid alarms for several days over the past week but reported that nuclear safety and security is being maintained. The IAEA team at Khmelnytskyy sheltered twice over the past week.

    The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) informed the IAEA that on 10 October three UAV flights were recorded within the monitoring zone of the South Ukraine NPP, and five in the evening of 14 October.

    At the Rivne NPP, one of the two 750 kilovolt (kV) off-site power lines was put under maintenance and again reconnected within the past week. Additionally, it was reported to the team that one of the five 110 kV off-site power lines was disconnected and under planned maintenance.

    The three teams at the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs have successfully rotated over the past few days.

    Also this week, antigen combo rapid test kits were delivered to the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl site, as well as to Energoatom and SNRIU, in the 6th delivery under the IAEA medical assistance programme and the 70th under the Agency’s comprehensive programme of assistance to help Ukraine maintain nuclear safety and security. The delivery was supported by a contribution from Japan.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Statement from White  House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre on the Visit of Prime Minister Robert Golob of the Republic of  Slovenia

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    On October 22, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. will host Prime Minister Robert Golob of the Republic of Slovenia for a bilateral meeting at the White House. This will be their first meeting at the White House and follows conversations that helped pave the way for the largest prisoner swap since the Cold War. The leaders will have an in-depth discussion on a range of issues of mutual interest, including energy security and cooperation, a shared approach to the Western Balkans, continued robust support to Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression, and events in the Middle East. President Biden will underscore our appreciation for Prime Minister Golob’s leadership to bring home Americans unjustly detained by Russia and our continued cooperation on a host of other global issues.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Readout of the Meeting of President Macron of France, Chancellor Scholz of Germany, Prime Minister Starmer of the United Kingdom, and President  Biden of the United  States

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States met today in Berlin, Germany.
    The leaders condemned Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, discussed their plans to provide Ukraine with additional security, economic, and humanitarian assistance – including leveraging the extraordinary revenues of immobilized Russian sovereign assets, as decided at the G7 Summit –, discussed President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan, and reiterated their resolve to continue supporting Ukraine in its efforts to secure a just and lasting peace, based on international law, including the United Nations Charter, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    The leaders also discussed events in the Middle East, in particular the implications of the death of Yahya Sinwar, who bears responsibility for the bloodshed of the October 7th terrorist attack, the immediate necessity to bring the hostages home to their families, ending the war in Gaza, and ensuring humanitarian aid reaches civilians. The leaders also reiterated their condemnation of Iran’s escalatory attack on Israel and coordinated on efforts to hold Iran accountable and prevent further escalation. They discussed the situation in Lebanon and agreed on the need to work towards full implementation of UNSCR 1701 and a diplomatic resolution that allows civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely home.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with President Macron of France, Chancellor Scholz of Germany and President Biden of the United States: 18 October 2024

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Prime Minister met President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States today in Berlin, Germany.

    The Prime Minister met President Emmanuel Macron of France, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States today in Berlin, Germany.

    The leaders condemned Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, discussed their plans to provide Ukraine with additional security, economic, and humanitarian assistance, including leveraging the extraordinary revenues of immobilized Russian sovereign assets – as decided at the G7 Summit, discussed President Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan, and reiterated their resolve to continue supporting Ukraine in its efforts to secure a just and lasting peace, based on international law, including the United Nations Charter, and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    The leaders also discussed events in the Middle East, in particular the implications of the death of Yahya Sinwar, who bears responsibility for the bloodshed of the October 7th terrorist attack, for the immediate necessity to bring the hostages home to their families, for ending the war in Gaza, and ensure humanitarian aid reaches civilians.

    The leaders also reiterated their condemnation of Iran’s escalatory attack on Israel and coordinated on efforts to hold Iran accountable and prevent further escalation. They discussed the situation in Lebanon and agreed on the need to work towards full implementation of UNSCR 1701 and a diplomatic resolution that allows civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely home.

    Updates to this page

    Published 18 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom