Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI USA News: FACT SHEET: The U.S.-Germany Partnership
Source: The White House

On the occasion of President Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s visit to Germany, the United States reaffirms its commitment to deepening the close and historic bond between the two nations as Allies and friends. For over 75 years, Germany has been a crucial partner in ensuring the stability, security, and prosperity of the transatlantic alliance. In October 2023, President Biden welcomed President Steinmeier to Washington during German-American Day, underscoring the enduring people-to-people ties between our two countries, including the over 40 million Americans who claim German heritage and strengthen the diverse fabric of the United States. In February 2024, President Biden welcomed Chancellor Olaf Scholz to the White House, where the two leaders reaffirmed their support for Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s war of aggression, discussed regional stability in the Middle East, and prepared for the NATO Summit in Washington.

During his visit to Germany, President Biden will underscore our mutual commitment to upholding democracy, combating antisemitism and hatred, and expanding collaboration to promote economic growth and technological innovation. In addition, he will express gratitude to Germany for its role in hosting approximately 39,000 U.S. service members and its vital contributions to the security of NATO and the broader transatlantic community.

The United States and Germany are partners in a wide range of new and continuing initiatives to address the most pressing challenges of our time, some of which are listed below.

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SECURITY AND DEFENSE
- The United States and Germany cooperate through several multilateral institutions including NATO, the G7, the OSCE, and the UN, to advance security, democracy, and the rule of law globally.
- As host to the largest U.S. troop presence in Europe and second largest globally, Germany continues to play a critical role as a platform for U.S. military force projection, including support for NATO’s eastern flank and training for Ukrainian soldiers.
- Germany has been a key provider of military assistance to Ukraine in its defense against the Kremlin’s aggression. Contributions include advanced weaponry such as Leopard 2 tanks, air defense systems (such as IRIS-T), artillery, and ammunition. Germany also supplies medical aid, vehicles, and training for Ukrainian forces, continuously adapting its support to Ukraine’s evolving needs in coordination with NATO allies.
- As announced by President Biden and Chancellor Scholz on July 10, 2024, the United States looks forward to beginning the episodic deployments of its Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany in 2026, as part of planning for enduring stationing of these conventional long-range fire capabilities in the future.
- Germany plays a key role in the U.S-Italy co-led G7+ Coordination Group for Ukraine Energy Security Support. Germany has been a leading provider of financial assistance and critical components such as transformers and power generators to support the repair and strengthening of Ukraine’s energy sector in response to Russia’s continued brutal attacks on civilian infrastructure.
- Germany is a robust partner in the fight against terrorism and terrorism financing, in the Financial Action Task Force, and as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS). On September 30, State Secretary Tobias Lindner joined Secretary Blinken for the D-Isis Ministerial Meeting in Washington, D.C.
- Germany will accede to Operation Olympic Defender, a U.S.-led multinational effort intended to strengthen nations’ abilities to deter hostile acts in space, strengthen deterrence against hostile actors, and reduce the spread of debris orbiting the earth. International partners currently include the UK, Canada, and Australia.
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY
- As the second-largest provider of assistance to Ukraine after the United States, Germany has provided $37.2 billion (€34 billion) in bilateral assistance since February 2022. This includes humanitarian assistance, budgetary support, military equipment and training, and funding for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Germany hosted an international reconstruction conference for Ukraine in Berlin in June 2024 which generated over €60 billion in commitments to Ukraine and emphasized the human dimension of post-war recovery.
- At the September 2024 United Nations General Assembly, the United States, in partnership with Germany and other international allies, reaffirmed its commitment to supporting democratic transitions as part of the Democracy Delivers Initiative, launched by USAID. The initiative mobilized over $517 million to provide financial and technical assistance to countries undergoing democratic renewal, including Guatemala, Armenia, and Moldova, with the aim of strengthening global democratic resilience.
- Germany has increasingly recognized the importance of supporting Taiwan as a like-minded democratic partner. Education Minister Stark-Watzinger’s visit to Taiwan in 2023 marked the first visit by a German minister to Taiwan in 26 years. Two German warships recently transited the Taiwan Strait, a visible demonstration of Germany’s commitment to upholding international laws and norms and increasing engagement to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region.
- Germany was one of the first of twenty-one countries to endorse the U.S. government’s Framework to Counter Foreign State Information Manipulation, the U.S. Department of State’s key initiative to galvanize like-minded democracies to respond collectively to the threat posed by disinformation. 
ECONOMICS & TRADE
- Germany is the United States’ largest trading partner in Europe, with bilateral trade reaching over $324 billion in goods and services in 2023. U.S. direct investment in Germany was $193.2 billion in 2023. In total, German firms employ an estimated 923,600 people in the United States. Germany is the fourth-largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States and the number one foreign investor in U.S. renewable energy projects. Germany is currently the third-largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States, with investments worth more than $660 billion based on 2023 data.
- On September 24, 2024, the United States and Germany held the third round of the U.S.-Germany Economic Dialogue, building on the framework established in the 2021 Washington Declaration. The talks focused on strengthening collaboration to increase economic security, including cooperation in sectors such as digital technologies and clean energy supply chains. Both countries committed to enhancing supply chain resilience and advancing sustainability goals.
- Germany and the United States partner on several initiatives to advance women’s economic security around the world, including bolstering women’s participation in climate sectors through the Women in the Sustainable Economy Initiative, closing the gender digital divide through the Women in the Digital Economy Initiative, and supporting women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap through the Invest in Childcare Initiative.
COMBATTING ANTISEMITISM:
- Germany is a global leader and vital partner in the fight against antisemitism and extremism. Senior officials are unequivocal in condemning antisemitism and federal and state governments have robust strategies for tackling the problem. In July 2024, Germany co-launched the Global Guidelines for Countering Antisemitism in Buenos Aires, an initiative led by U.S. Special Envoy Deborah Lipstadt.
- Launched in 2021, The U.S.-Germany Dialogue on Holocaust Issues, plays an essential role in combatting Holocaust distortion online and promoting accurate Holocaust education and commemoration.
- Germany and the United States cooperate on improving resolution to Nazi-confiscated art to ensure just and fair solutions for survivors and heirs, and salute Germany’s new art restitution policy.
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES
- The German-American Fulbright program is one of the largest and most varied of the Fulbright Programs worldwide, sponsoring over 40,000 Germans and Americans since its inception in 1952.
- Established in 2016 as a public-private partnership, each year the USA For You program brings youth from underserved German communities to the United States for a two-week homestay and community service experience. The program promotes civic engagement and helps counter extremism and xenophobia by fostering cultural understanding. In 2023, the German government launched a reciprocal Germany for You program, allowing American high school students to visit Germany for a similar exchange, further strengthening transatlantic ties.
- The Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange (CBYX), jointly funded by the United States and German governments, supports the transatlantic relationship by fostering year-long academic, homestay, and community service opportunities for 700 American and German youth annually. Since 1983, CBYX has promoted cross-cultural understanding, professional skills, and mutual awareness of each nation’s history, politics, and society. With around 15,000 German and 14,000 American participants to date, the program strengthens ties and deepens the transatlantic partnership between the next generation of leaders.
- The German Bundestag-Bundesrat exchange (CBBSX) program is an annual two-way exchange between German Bundestag and Bundesrat staff and U.S. Congressional staff members. It was initiated during the 1983 German-American Tricentennial celebration and first implemented in 1984. Participants focus on the U.S. legislative process and U.S.-German relations; examining U.S. Congress and the U.S. political system. In 2024 the IVLP brought 10 German Bundestag and Bundesrat staff members to the United States. For the first time, CBBSX participants also engaged with state and local government.
SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENT, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY
- On January 10, 2024, the United States and Germany held a U.S.-Germany Critical and Emerging Technology Track 1.5 Dialogue to share strategic objectives, outlooks, and lessons learned in technological innovation. The two countries agreed to convene the first of an ongoing AI Dialogue to discuss approaches to AI governance, infrastructure and innovation, and applications of AI for good. They intend to hold the first session of this dialogue in early 2025.
- Furthering their commitment to monitoring the effects of climate change, the United States and Germany have partnered on space collaboration through NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment Follow-On (GRACE-FO) mission, which monitors Earth’s water movement by tracking shifts in gravity. This mission provides critical data for managing water resources, monitoring sea levels, and understanding climate change impacts on a global scale.
- The U.S.-Germany scientific partnership was further strengthened throughfunding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) and Germany’s Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) for Collaborative Research in Computational Neuroscience (CRCNS) program, which advances cutting-edge research in brain function and computational neuroscience. This initiative supports interdisciplinary approaches to understanding neural systems.
- On September 14, 2023, the United States and Germany held the inaugural U.S.-Germany Space Dialogue, advancing collaboration in space exploration, satellite technology, and space security. This dialogue promotes joint efforts in planetary science, climate monitoring, and managing space debris, while advancing international norms for responsible space operations.
CLIMATE & ENERGY
- In July 2021, the United States and Germany launched the U.S.-Germany Climate and Energy Partnership to deepen collaboration on the policies and sustainable technologies needed to accelerate the global net-zero future. Notable outcomes of the Partnership include the first U.S.-Germany Climate and Energy Summit held in Pittsburgh September 2022, and the U.S.-German Clean Hydrogen Conference held in Berlin October 2023.
- Beyond our strong bilateral partnership, the United States and Germany are also intensifying our cooperation to accelerate the clean energy transition and promote clean economic growth in emerging and developing economies. This includes leveraging and scaling-up our collective technical, policy, and financial support to catalyze investments in clean energy manufacturing and industrial decarbonization in developing countries, leveraging key international platforms such as the Climate Club and Clean Technology Fund.
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
- The United States participated in the International Humanitarian Conference on Sudan, hosted by France, Germany, and the European Commission on April 15, 2024, to address the vital need for greater humanitarian assistance for the Sudanese people.
- The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Germany’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) are strengthening their partnership through a Strategic Development Dialogue. This initiative focuses on joint efforts to tackle global challenges in climate change, food security, gender equality, health, and G7 development priorities.
- The United States and Germany have worked closely across multiple presidencies of the G7 Food Security Working Group to support efforts to achieve long-term food and nutrition security. As most recently affirmed in the Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué, both countries have committed to promoting and supporting multi-stakeholder programs to build climate resilience in our food systems. These programs include the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils, launched by the United States in partnership with the African Union and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
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MIL OSI USA News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: What does China want from the next US president?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Chee Meng Tan, Assistant Professor of Business Economics, University of Nottingham

During a Taiwan National Day speech on October 10, Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te said that Taipei was determined to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty against “annexation and encroachment”, and emphasised that “China has no right to represent Taiwan”.

China’s response was swift. Less than a week after Lai’s provocative speech, a record 153 Chinese war planes swarmed and surrounded Taiwan during a Chinese military exercise over 24 hours. Beijing’s intention was simple: issue Taipei a “stern warning” for what China considers a “separatist act”.

Beijing sees the island as a “sacred and inseparable part of China’s territory” that must return to the fold. The Taiwanese president sees things differently. Currently, the self-governing island has a different political system, and few Taiwanese are in favour of reunification with China.

Though Washington doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Taipei officially, it does have regular communication through back channels and a strong economic relationship. The island is a key US trading partner and is a major supplier of semiconductors which are critical to the production of computers and other technologies. It also sells arms to Taiwan, although this has reduced significantly under Joe Biden.

China has not ruled out taking Taiwan by force, and if it does, the US might come to the self-ruling island’s defence as indicated by Washington in the past.

China holds extensive military exercises around the island of Taiwan in October 2024.

But Xi will be hoping the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election might bring a leader that would have a different attitude to Taiwan as well as helping China resolve its economic storm, which has resulted in a rising number of protests. So, between an outspoken Donald Trump and a seemingly even-tempered Kamala Harris, does Beijing have a favourite? And do either of them offer Xi anything new?

Taiwan and Xi’s legitimacy

Aside from Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, Xi is the only sitting Chinese head of state without term limits and whose political ideology is enshrined in the Chinese constitution.

Xi could potentially prove his place in history by resolving China’s economic crisis. However, Beijing’s increasing isolation from the west due to its support of Russia’s Ukraine conquest makes this doubly hard.

Read more:
Biden on Taiwan: Did he really commit US forces to stopping any invasion by China? An expert explains why, on balance, probably not

Like it or not, Xi might have to ramp up whatever agenda Beijing has for Taiwan. If he could make sufficient progress towards unification, he may be hailed as one of the greats of the Chinese Communist Party, which would consolidate his status within the party, and distract from the nation’s economic woes.

Unlike Harris, who appears to take take alliances and partnerships seriously, Trump questions the benefits of many alliances forged by the US. In fact, the few times that he spoke about Taiwan centres on how the island state has taken America’s semiconductor business, and should pay more to the US for its defence.

So, would Trump come to Taiwan’s aid if China does invade Taiwan? Given the importance of semiconductors to electronics and AI, he just might. But Trump also has a reputation as a “dealmaker-in-chief”, so he might just cut a deal with Beijing, which erodes Taiwan’s independence. And that is likely to worry Taipei.

The Russia dilemma

As Russia’s “partner of no limits”, China has been supplying Russia with technology that fuels Russia’s war machinery against Ukraine. But this has strained Sino-western relations and earned Beijing trade and import restrictions, which hampers China’s economic recovery.

China could halt its aid to Russia to avoid western scrutiny, but that is not likely. Beijing needs a strong Russia to be a viable ally in its battle against a US-led world order, and to avoid being the focus of the west if Russia falters amid its conquest in Ukraine.

While Harris backs Kyiv and sees the war as a strategic and moral issue, Trump has criticised US aid to Ukraine. He also believes that Kyiv should provide concessions to Russia to end the war that Putin started in February 2022.

A future Trump administration might strengthen Russia by withdrawing support for Ukraine and lifting sanctions against Russia. And a more robust Russia is good news for Beijing.

US economic hostility

So, at first glance, Trump and Harris’s approaches towards China are different. Trump’s return to the White House could also intensify the trade war that he started in 2018, as tariffs on Chinese goods could go to as high as 60%. This might hasten the economic decoupling between the US and China.

Harris, on the other hand, wishes to “de-risk” China. This approach seeks to maintain US global interest while engaging with the east Asian economic behemoth. In such a scenario, Beijing might prefer a Harris presidency as it leaves room for negotiation.

However, Harris has relatively little foreign policy experience, and is expected to pick up where Joe Biden left off. This means the tariffs and technological restrictions that China faced under a Biden administration could stay under her presidency.

Another factor is Tesla founder Elon Musk, who is an ardent supporter of Trump, and may take a top job within a Trump administration.

How much influence the tech multi-billionaire actually has over Trump is uncertain. However, it’s worth noting that Musk has substantial business dealings in China, and might seek to lean on Trump if the former president’s policies harms Tesla’s interests.

With many of these factors unclear at the moment, Beijing will be hoping for a US leader who is more interested in economic wins than protecting Taiwan, and one that Xi can negotiate with to warm up relations between the two countries.

Chee Meng Tan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. What does China want from the next US president? – https://theconversation.com/what-does-china-want-from-the-next-us-president-240516

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany

Source: The White House

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. met today with President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany at Bellevue Palace to discuss the strong U.S.-German relationship, grounded in our shared democratic values. The two leaders coordinated on support for Ukraine in its self-defense against Russian aggression; countering antisemitism and other forms of hate at home and abroad; efforts to de-escalate conflict in the Middle East and support the protection of civilians; amongst other global issues. President Biden acknowledged the timing of his visit ahead of the 35^th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and our countries’ shared commitment to freedom and democracy. The President underscored the close U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relationship with Germany.

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MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO military leadership participates in the 2024 International Week in Kyiv

Source: NATO

Jointly organized by the NATO Defense College (NDC) and the National Defence University of Ukraine (NDUU), the conference addressed the Alliance’s role in a new era of collective defence. The Deputy Chair of the NATO Military Committee and the Director of the International Military Staff provided keynote speeches. Discussions also took place on the topics of a changing security environment, partner engagement, resilience building and deterrence and defence ten years from now.

The Director of the International Military Staff (DGIMS), Lieutenant General Adamczak virtually opened the 2024 International Week alongside Colonel General Koval and Lieutenant General Nielsen, Commandants of the NDUU and the NDC.

“Today is the 965th day of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. During this time, President Putin launched various devastating attacks over Ukrainian territory. What he didn’t expect was the will and determination of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to protect and defend their country”, Lieutenant General Adamczak stated.

In his speech, DGIMS outlined what the Alliance is doing to support Ukraine, having mentioned projects such as the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, among others.

Closing remarks were given by the Deputy Chair of the NATO Military Committee (DCMC), Lieutenant General Andrew Rohling, on the topic of strategic imperatives for NATO post Washington Summit.

“In July, Allies restated the commitment to collective security, enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the condemnation to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the bond to shared values such as individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law”, Lieutenant General Rohling underscored. “Nations reaffirmed their unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and stated that a strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine is vital for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area”.

During their interventions, DGIMS and DCMC expressed that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is irreversible. “Ukraine’s future is in NATO. We have witnessed concrete progress at democratic, economic and security aspects. And as Ukraine continues this vital reform work, we will continue to support its path to full NATO membership”, Lieutenant General Adamczak emphasized.

“We need to ensure that Ukraine can win this war, by keeping you in the fight, by training your soldiers. We will help you with the capabilities, and with ammunition. But looking into the future of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as NATO and Ukraine are closer than ever, we are increasingly focusing on developing interoperability and standardization aspects for seamless transition in Ukraine’s eventual path to NATO membership”, Lieutenant General Rohling said.

The International Week contributes to a deeper understanding of NATO’s mission, organization, operations, partnerships, cooperation and future priorities by NDUU students and senior military and civilian officers.

MIL Security OSI –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – India’s connectivity initiatives: A multi-faceted strategy – 18-10-2024

Source: European Parliament

Over the past decade, corridors have occupied an increasingly important place in international connectivity initiatives. They take several forms, ranging from ‘simpler’ transport corridors to more complex economic corridors. For them to be successful, several conditions need to be in place, both relative to the participating countries and to the wider regions they connect. Once operational, they can bring various benefits to participating countries, both economic and societal. India has had a two-pronged policy in recent years. On the one hand, it is investing increasingly in national infrastructure projects, such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. On the other, it is part of several major international infrastructure projects. Three such projects that stand out are the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the International North-South Transport Corridor and the more recent India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. According to experts, India’s approach towards international connectivity appears to be driven more by geostrategic sensitivities than purely economic considerations. Broadly, Delhi chooses to participate in projects that help to increase its regional and global footprint. It also takes into consideration the fact that Asia is a region with several nuclear powers, rising nationalism and the absence of a security structure. Its choices are further conditioned by Chinese initiatives in the region, US policy towards China, and developments following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The EU and India have long-standing diplomatic ties. In recent years, owing to both rising trade volumes and geopolitical considerations, they have increased their cooperation further. Aspects of this cooperation are the revival of negotiations on a free trade agreement, the launch of a Trade and Technology Council and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Once completed, these three initiatives could bring significant synergies to the parties involved. IMEC is facing several challenges, however, both logistical and geopolitical, that could delay its implementation.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Deepening the single market in the light of the Letta and Draghi reports – 18-10-2024

Source: European Parliament

Often considered the ‘cornerstone’ of European integration, the single market now serves 449 million consumers and 31 million active companies, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It has delivered substantial economic benefits, ranging between 8 % and 9 % of European Union gross domestic product (GDP). Trade between Member States has risen steadily over the years, and today accounts for an estimated 56 million European jobs. The EU is among the largest trading blocs in the world, representing 15 % of world GDP, compared with the United States at 16 % and China at 19 %. The single market’s attractiveness for foreign businesses also serves as an important geopolitical tool, enhancing the EU’s influence amid geopolitical shifts. Recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have revealed not only the single market’s vulnerability in crises, but also the extent to which the EU’s competitiveness relies on a well-functioning single market, ensuring unhindered access to the goods, services, and strategic inputs EU supply chains need. Although the single market has generally been a success, recent analyses, including those put forward by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi in 2024, clearly demonstrate that it remains highly fragmented, limiting EU companies’ ability to scale up and compete internationally, and preventing EU citizens from reaping the full benefits. For instance, 60 % of the barriers companies face today are of the same type as were already reported 20 years ago. The two reports converge on many points, not least on the need to take rapid action to deepen the single market. Advancing the single market requires action in multiple policy fields, its digital dimension gaining increasing importance in recent years. Ultimately, a well-functioning single market, fit for the green and digital transitions, new technological developments and changing geopolitical realities can be seen as central to the EU’s industrial policy.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Fighting fraud together

Source: European Anti-Fraud Offfice

Press release no 18/2024
PDF version

The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) hosted the joint conference of the national Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) from the EU Member States and their counterparts in candidate countries and potential candidate. Around 100 representatives met in Brussels on 15 – 16 October 2024 to exchange best practices, learn about the latest anti-fraud investigative techniques and work towards stronger cooperation.

OLAF and the AFCOS work together towards the same objectives of protecting the financial interests of the EU and ensuring that citizens can fully benefit from the opportunities provided by EU funds, in Europe and beyond.

OLAF Director-General Ville Itälä stressed the importance of a strong and effective cooperation for the success of all partners in the anti-fraud architecture. “It remains crucial that we work together like never before to protect the financial interests of the EU. Fraudsters use new technologies without any legislative or ethical limitations, they do not respect borders and their criminal activities exploit any loopholes they discover in multiple jurisdictions. That is why we, in the anti-fraud community, need to make sure that we have procedures in place to respond quickly, collectively and as efficiently as possible.”

The conference, which focussed on the theme of ‘Fighting fraud together’, offered participants valuable insights into the legal and operational framework that OLAF operates in. The programme addressed the shift in perspective and design needed to fight fraud in performance-based financial instruments, such as the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) and the Ukraine facility. These new instruments represent huge amounts of funds and require innovative approaches to financial controls and investigations. Nothing proves the abuse of EU funds more tangibly than bank accounts transfers. This is why the recently acquired power of OLAF to access banking data in Member States and cooperating countries is so important and has already led to success stories on how to follow the movement of money across borders.

The discussion on Artificial Intelligence illustrated concrete examples where the use of AI to generate profiles for monitoring purposes, support language processing and machine learning played a key role in complex, transnational investigations. Fraudsters use AI recklessly, free from any legislative or ethical limitations, and it is the role of anti-fraud actors to think out of the box and develop joint, fast and creative countermeasures in a challenging regulatory environment.

The conference highlighted the central role that AFCOS play in key areas such as the recovery of funds, thanks to their specific insight on debtors located in their territories. Discussions on the PIF report and its new features and the need of Irregularity Management System (IMS) reporting to fully exploit the potential of data mining and risk scoring, also emphasised the added value that AFCOS bring in the wider fight against fraud.

During the two days, participants from Member States, as well as candidate countries and potential candidate had the unique opportunity to reflect and report on their experiences within the EU anti-fraud community, for example on investigations into double funding and conflict of interest or practical difficulties with the confidentiality of data. From this perspective, the conference confirmed once again that OLAF is stronger when it works with others and that much of the success of the fight against fraud depends on a sustained, strong and efficient cooperation with AFCOS.

Background

EU Member States are required to designate an anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) in accordance with Article 12a of Regulation 883/2013 to facilitate effective cooperation and exchange of information, including information of an operational nature, with OLAF.

Member States are autonomous in deciding where to best place the AFCOS within their national administrative structure. The placement of AFCOS should provide for its visibility and importance in relation to other relevant authorities in the field of protection of the EU’s financial interests. Some Member States placed their AFCOS either within the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Interior; others established it as an independent Government’s service.

More information is available on OLAF’s website.

_{OLAF mission, mandate and competences:}
_{OLAF’s mission is to detect, investigate and stop fraud with EU funds.}

_{OLAF fulfils its mission by:}
_{•    carrying out independent investigations into fraud and corruption involving EU funds, so as to ensure that all EU taxpayers’ money reaches projects that can create jobs and growth in Europe;}
_{•    contributing to strengthening citizens’ trust in the EU Institutions by investigating serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU Institutions;}
_{•    developing a sound EU anti-fraud policy.}

_{In its independent investigative function, OLAF can investigate matters relating to fraud, corruption and other offences affecting the EU financial interests concerning:}
_{•    all EU expenditure: the main spending categories are Structural Funds, agricultural policy and rural development funds, direct expenditure and external aid;}
_{•    some areas of EU revenue, mainly customs duties;}
_{•    suspicions of serious misconduct by EU staff and members of the EU institutions.}

_{Once OLAF has completed its investigation, it is for the competent EU and national authorities to examine and decide on the follow-up of OLAF’s recommendations. All persons concerned are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty in a competent national or EU court of law.}

For further details:

Pierluigi CATERINO
Spokesperson
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
Phone: +32(0)2 29-52335
Email: olaf-media ec [dot] europa [dot] eu (olaf-media[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu)
https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
X: @EUAntiFraud
LinkedIn: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

Theresa ZAHRA
Deputy Spokesperson
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
Phone: +32 (0)2 29-57270
Email: olaf-media ec [dot] europa [dot] eu (olaf-media[at]ec[dot]europa[dot]eu)
https://anti-fraud.ec.europa.eu
X: @EUAntiFraud
LinkedIn: European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)

_{If you’re a journalist and you wish to receive our press releases in your inbox, please}_{leave us your contact data}_.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Translation: 18/10/2024 Security of OTAN’s eastern flank is a priority for the Alliance’s countries

MIL ASI Translation. Region: Polish/Europe –

Fuente: Gobierno de Polonia en poleco.

On Friday, October 18, the Minister of National Defense participated in the second day of the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels. – During the session, we also discussed matters concerning the upcoming events, analyzing the geopolitical situation. There is full unity of the Alliance here. This is my next meeting and I see that this integration of the Alliance, as well as the desire for greater spending, is becoming more and more common. This ambitious plan is not related to 2%, because it is the minimum, but it is to be the starting point. The ambition plan that Poland has set for itself, 4.7% of GDP next year, the highest among all OTAN countries. This commands great respect here and many countries follow Poland. I am not talking only about the countries of NATO’s eastern flank, but also the countries of southern Europe are changing their strategy – informed the Deputy Prime Minister. During the session of the North Atlantic Council on deterrence and defence, the heads of defence ministries summed up the key issues for Poland related to building the capabilities necessary for collective defence in our region, such as: logistics, development of capabilities, air and missile defence and increasing the readiness of forces. – I also spoke in bilateral meetings with the ministers of the Baltic states. We talked about the challenges for the new commissioner for defence. He comes from our region, from the eastern flank of NATO, so here we see a big chance to get a real budget – the vice prime minister emphasized, W. Kosiniak-Kamysz. On the second day of his visit to Brussels, the vice prime minister W. Kosiniak-Kamysz held bilateral talks with John Healey, the Secretary of Defense of the United Kingdom, and Pirro Vengu, the Minister of Defense of Albania. – I also met with the Minister of Defense of Italy, Luxembourg, Albania, and I also talked to the Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom. We said goodbye to Secretary Austin, the US Secretary of Defense, because this is the last meeting of the Biden administration at this level. I thanked him on behalf of our country, on behalf of Poland, for his great dedication to the security of the Polish state, for his great commitment – said the head of the Ministry of National Defense. The prime minister W. Kosiniak-Kamysz also referred to the letters of intent signed during the first day of the meeting. – The most important agreement concerns the DIAMOND air defense. Para bromear agreement on the initiative of the British, but it includes Germans, French and Italians. Para bromear a serious agreement on the exchange of experience related to air defence. Para bromear key for Europe – air defence is simply the most important thing. (…) The second agreement concerned the French initiative – acquiring and supplementing long-range capabilities. Many countries have joined this initiative, we are talking about this in the Weimar Triangle. We have already concluded and signed this declaration in Washington, now we are simply implementing it by inviting other countries. The third issue concerned issues in the field of cybersecurity, the exchange of skills in this area – noted the head of the Ministry of National Defence. As the head of the Ministry of National Defence informed after the Council meeting, the Education and Training Analysis Centre OTAN-Ukraine will be headed by a Polish general. – An important thing regarding the NATO Education and Training Analysis Centre-Ukraine in Bydgoszcz. The head of this centre will be the very experienced General Ozga, who spent many years here in NATO. In the alliance, he will head the Education and Training Analysis Center OTAN-Ucrania, which was located in Bydgoszcz in February this year, and the declaration from the Washington summit confirmed this. We want to achieve initial operational capabilities in January 2025, and develop them to full capabilities over the next year. I called on all our allies to participate. It is good that a Pole will be at the head of this unit – emphasized the Deputy Prime Minister. Deputy Prime Minister W. Kosiniak-Kamysz informed that according to the CBOS survey, the Polish Army enjoys the highest level of public trust in history. – Finally, good news from Poland. The Polish Army enjoys the highest recognition in CBOS research. Never before has there been such a level, as much as 83% of trust in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, in the history of research on support for various professional groups, various environments. The army during the time when I have the honor of being the Minister of National Defense, has reached this level of the highest Historical trust, for which I am very grateful, because only thanks to our citizens, thanks to our taxpayers, are we able to carry out the great transformation of the Polish army. Build its strength and resilience – informed the head of the Ministry of National Defense.

MILES AXIS

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

MIL Translation OSI

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE helps Ukraine protect the rights of people in pre-trial detention

Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

Headline: OSCE helps Ukraine protect the rights of people in pre-trial detention

A detainee at the window of Lukianivka pre-trial detention facility in Kyiv, Ukraine. 19 July 2017. (Depositphoto) Photo details

With the outbreak of the full-scale war, the judicial system in Ukraine faced unprecedented challenges, especially in communities adjacent to a frontline where courts ceased to operate. In response, an ad hoc procedure was introduced for the duration of the war which stipulates the suspension of periodic judicial reviews of detention legality and its automatic prolongation.
Following the appeal by two suspects in criminal investigations to consider the constitutionality of their detention without judicial review, the Constitutional Court, requested that the OSCE provide an amicus curiae, a consultative opinion from international expert Alexandru Tanasie on the case. Following this, the Court declared unconstitutional the ad hoc procedure, thus invalidating relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The ruling comes into force on 18 October 2024.
“Every human being is bestowed with inalienable dignity as part of his or her human nature. His or her dignity may not be denied even in cases when he or she is suspected of committing criminal wrong – in no case can a person be treated as an instrument in pursuit of however compelling public interest commend the opinion delivered in this case with the OSCE support by my eminent colleague Alexandru Tanase. Such instruments, like this amicus, offered by the OSCE within our project co-operation are effective and practical; they enrich our case law and help persuade. Thus, they have a lasting impact on human rights protection,” said Vasyl Lemak, the Constitutional Court’s judge-rapporteur on the case.
“We are pleased, that our help has such a noticeable impact, and our assistance is being used by our Ukrainian partner to prove in practical terms, that even in the duress of war Ukraine keeps human rights defense high on its agenda,” noted Pierre Baussand, the Chief of Operations of the OSCE Support Programme for Ukraine.
The tool of constitutional complaint, used in this case, was introduced by the 2016 Constitutional reform and put into operation in 2017, when changes to the Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine developed with the OSCE’s support were approved by the Parliament. The OSCE comprehensive support in this area also involved training courses for human rights defenders on how to use constitutional complaints and capacity-building for the Court’s Secretariat’s staff to enable swift processing of submissions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI USA News: Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany

Source: The White House

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. met today with Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany at the Chancellery to discuss the longstanding U.S.-German relationship, grounded in our shared democratic values. The two leaders coordinated on support for Ukraine in its self-defense against Russian aggression; efforts to counter antisemitism and other forms of hate at home and abroad; the Middle East; amongst other global issues. President Biden expressed his appreciation for Chancellor Scholz’s leadership in increasing Germany’s investment in NATO’s collective defense and in securing the release of wrongfully detained Americans, along with other human rights activists and political dissidents from Russian prison, earlier this year. He also underscored the U.S. commitment to continue working together to address the challenges of today and tomorrow and deliver results for both our peoples.

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MIL OSI USA News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO Secretary General: Strengthening deterrence “top priority”

Source: NATO

NATO Defence Ministers wrapped up two days of talks on Friday (18 October) with a commitment to further support Ukraine, strengthen ties with partners in the Asia-Pacific and reinforce the Alliance’s deterrence and defence.

“Strengthening our deterrence and defence is this Alliance’s top priority, because keeping our one billion people safe is NATO’s most sacred duty,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said after the meeting. The Secretary General cited greater defence industrial capacity, more secure supply chains, and new technologies as critical to ensuring the Alliance’s security. Mr. Rutte added that NATO was making a fresh push for common munitions standards and more joint procurement to drive down costs and improve ease of use among Allies. NATO operations in the Western Balkans and Iraq were also on the agenda.

Addressing the issue of Allied airspace breached by Russian drones, the Secretary General said that air and missile defence remains an Alliance priority. He highlighted the airspace violation in Romania yesterday and affirmed NATO’s solidarity with Romania, commending Romanian authorities and SACEUR for “their quick and effective response.” This was possible, in part, because NATO is stepping up surveillance on its eastern flank as part of a broader effort to reinforce deterrence. Mr Rutte went on to emphasise that Allies are purchasing hundreds of modern fighter aircraft and air defences systems.

Warning of Russia’s “increasingly irresponsible rhetoric”, the Secretary General said the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent remains “vital” to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.

On Thursday (17 October), NATO Defence Ministers were joined for the first time by their counterparts from Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand for talks on common security challenges, including in the context of Ukraine and the support that China, North Korea, and Iran are providing to Russia’s war effort.

Later on Thursday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky joined Ministers in the NATO-Ukraine Council and provided an overview of his plan for ending the war. The discussion among Defence Ministers with their Ukrainian counterpart, Rustem Umerov, focused on Ukraine’s most urgent needs, including equipment and training. The Secretary General noted that work is well underway to set up NATO’s new command to coordinate security assistance and training for Ukraine, and to deliver on the pledge of 40 billion euros in military aid. He reiterated that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is irreversible. “Ukraine will be member of NATO, there is no doubt about it, and until that happens we will make sure that Ukraine has everything it needs to prevail,” he said.

MIL Security OSI –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Joint Statement on Arctic Security and Defence
Source: Government of Iceland

Under the auspice of the Northern Defence Dialogue meeting held on the margins of the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting on 17 October 2024, the defence ministers of Canada, Denmark together with the Foreign Minister of the Faroe Islands and a representative from Greenland, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, and representatives from Iceland and the United States reaffirm their shared commitment to enhanced collaboration on security and defence in the Arctic.

In a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape marked by new challenges, the region has become a growing global point of focus. Climate change is having profound effects on the strategic and operational environment and growing access to the Arctic’s resource potential is enticing new non-Arctic actors to the region. Potential adversaries are rapidly developing their militaries’ ability to operate both in the High North and the circumpolar Arctic region. Among its many negative consequences, Russia’s illegal and unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine has caused grave impediments to international cooperation and degraded the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

These unprecedented challenges underline the need to foster deepened collaboration among the like-minded Arctic states. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO significantly strengthens NATO’s collective defence posture and capabilities in the region. As all like-minded Arctic states now belong to the Alliance, we affirm our leading role in NATO’s work relating to the region and stress the importance of maintaining a credible deterrence and defence in the entire Euro-Atlantic area—including our northern regions—as well as cooperation with our other NATO Allies to this end.

At this Northern Defence Dialogue meeting, building on the work of and aiming to also strengthen NATO, we discussed:
- Our situational awareness of the threat environment in the Arctic, and opportunities to enhance information and intelligence sharing in order to establish a common operating picture;
- Emerging threats, risks, and geopolitical challenges from potential adversaries at both the national and international level;
- Our capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defend against threats posed by our potential adversaries in the region, and our commitment to mutual participation in joint operations and exercises to enhance interoperability; and,
- Ways to increase collaboration to address common threats and challenges posed to the region.
Our countries’ common ambition to maintain low tension in the region has served as the foundation of our multilateral Arctic relations and will continue to guide our cooperation in the future. Guided by the core principles of multilateral cooperation, territorial integrity, and maintaining the rules-based international order, we are committed to strengthening our collaboration to address complex global challenges and maintain the Arctic as a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region.
MIL OSI Europe News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI: Decisions adopted in the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of AB Amber Grid

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

AB Amber Grid, legal entity code: 303090867. Address: Laisvės ave. 10, LT-04215 Vilnius, Lithuania.

The following decisions were adopted in the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of AB Amber Grid on 18 October 2024:

1. Aproval of the conclusion of the Humanitarian Aid Contract

1.1. In accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 11(21) of the Law on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of the Republic of Lithuania, upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the approval of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, to enter into a Humanitarian Aid Contract with the Ukrainian company KHMELNYTSKOBLENERGO and to approve the following main terms of the Humanitarian Aid Contract:

1.1.1. The subject matter of the Contract is humanitarian assistance to Ukraine’s energy sector. The humanitarian aid shall be provided through the transfer of 4 generators and 46 vehicles with a balance sheet value of EUR 60 285,53;

1.1.2. The parties to the Contract shall be AB Amber Grid and the Ukrainian company KHMELNYTSKOBLENERGO;

1.1.3. The purpose of humanitarian aid is the operation of energy infrastructure in wartime to meet the basic needs of people in wartime.

1.2 To authorise the Chief Executive Officer of the Company (with the right to sub-delegate) to sign the Humanitarian Aid Contract in accordance with the material terms and conditions of the Contract as set out in Clause 1.1, and to agree the other (non-material) terms and conditions of the Contract on behalf of the Company.

More information:
Laura Šebekienė, Head of Communications of Amber Grid,
+370 699 61 246, l.sebekiene@ambergrid.lt

The MIL Network –

January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Completes 2024 Article IV Mission to Madagascar
Source: IMF – News in Russian

October 18, 2024

End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.
- Madagascar’s growth is expected to remain stable at 4.2 percent in 2024, before accelerating to 4.6 percent in 2025.
- Ambitious policy reforms are needed to raise more fiscal revenue and make space for higher public investment and social expenditures, while preserving macroeconomic stability and limiting fiscal risks.
- Strengthening governance and accelerating reforms to bolster resilience to climate shocks and attract climate finance are key to deliver higher and more inclusive growth in the medium term.
Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Frederic Lambert conducted discussions for the 2024 Article IV consultation and first reviews of the arrangements supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) during September 30-October 11 in Antananarivo.

At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Lambert issued the following statement:

“Madagascar’s economy is stabilizing but facing persistent inflation. After 4.2 percent growth in 2023, economic activity remained steady in early 2024 despite a good rice harvest and a rebound in graphite mining. Inflation rose to 7.8 percent in August 2024, driven by energy and food prices. Poor road infrastructure and unreliable electricity continue to increase transport and production costs.

“Growth is projected to remain at 4.2 percent in 2024, and to accelerate to 4.6 percent in 2025. Average annual inflation is expected to decline to 7.2 percent in 2025, before gradually converging to 6 percent over the medium term. The current account deficit would stabilize under 5 percent of GDP.

“The primary fiscal deficit is expected to reach 2.7 percent of GDP in 2024, assuming no oil customs tax arrears. Despite the conclusion of two agreements in 2022 and 2023, some fuel distributors are withholding the payment of oil customs duties to force a settlement of their claims vis-à-vis the government, part of which are related to JIRAMA’s fuel purchases. The absence of settlement with fuel distributors would require expenditure cuts to prevent an increase in the fiscal deficit.

“The outlook faces downside risks from regional conflicts, such as those in Gaza and Israel, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, which could disrupt trade, finance, and commodity prices. Domestically, Madagascar’s water and electricity shortages, deteriorating infrastructure, and governance issues could fuel popular discontent. Climate shocks also threaten food price stability and security. In contrast, implementing the General State Policy (PGE) reforms could enhance productivity and growth.

“Increasing tax revenues to finance investment and social spending would help boost private sector-led and inclusive growth. The 2025 budget should include a combination of tax policy and administrative measures, including a reduction in tax expenditures by MGA 280 billion, to support the government’s revenue objectives. Over the medium-term, a gradual removal of costly import tax and VAT exemptions should be considered as well as other reforms to expand the tax base. A comprehensive excise tax reform and a revision of personal income taxation towards more progressivity should be accompanied by reforms of the tax and customs administrations, including to improve tax audit transparency and the appeal process and expedite VAT credit refunds.

“Structural reforms are key to limiting fiscal risks. Transfers to JIRAMA should be budgeted and gradually reduced. The company’s recovery plan, developed with World Bank’s technical assistance, needs to be swiftly implemented with strong backing from the executive branch. Implementing an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism is crucial to manage fiscal risks by adjusting pump prices monthly to reflect changes in market prices within a band of +/-200 ariary per liter. Negotiations with fuel distributors should resume to settle cross-liabilities within the 2024 budget, ensuring compliance with fiscal and para-fiscal obligations and settling government liabilities.

“While improving the selection, prioritization, and management of public investment projects is critical to enhance spending efficiency, reinforcing public financial management processes should improve budget execution and traceability. The approval of the budget law by Parliament should be sufficient to start the execution of spending or investment projects, without further authorization by the Council of Ministers or the Commitment Monitoring Bureau (BSE).

“Improving governance is key to delivering higher and more inclusive growth. The lack of transparency and predictability, and the suspicion of state capture by private interests are undermining private sector confidence and public trust in institutions, discouraging investment and development initiatives. Priorities include notably ensuring legal stability, avoiding retroactive regulations, enforcing existing laws, providing effective protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts, ensuring a level-playing field, and creating effective grievance redress mechanisms. The preparation of a new anticorruption strategy that will cover 2025-2030 is an opportunity to accelerate momentum in this field and the IMF will support the authorities’ efforts with a Governance Diagnostic Assessment to be finalized in 2025.

“The central bank should stand ready to raise its policy rates to keep inflation on a downward path. It should continue to manage liquidity through open market operations and communicate more predictably and transparently about monetary policy and liquidity management to enhance credibility and accountability. Foreign exchange interventions should be limited to smoothing excess volatility and building external buffers, without resisting underlying market forces. Further development of the interbank market and strengthening of the interest rate channel of monetary policy will support the functioning of the new monetary policy operational framework. Safeguarding financial stability is crucial for the development of private credit markets.

“To support resilience, stronger social safety nets are essential. Establishing food banks can reduce food insecurity and support local food production. Expanding the single social registry with clear eligibility criteria will improve social assistance targeting. More resources are needed for education and health, with transparent and merit-based recruitment. Digitalization can boost financial inclusion and cash transfer programs.

“Building climate resilience should be a government priority. With support from the Resilience and Sustainability Facility and the World Bank Group-IMF Enhanced Cooperation Framework for Climate Action, Madagascar should develop a national climate finance strategy to attract climate related investments.

“The IMF team thanks the Malagasy authorities and other counterparts for candid and productive discussions. The discussions on the first reviews of the ECF and RSF arrangements will continue virtually in the coming weeks.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/10/18/pr-24380-madagascar-imf-staff-completes-2024-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI
MIL OSI Russia News –
January 24, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: European Council summit held in Brussels

Source: European Union 2

EU leaders reiterated their support for Ukraine and expressed their concern over the situation in the Middle East. They also discussed ensuring a rules-based international order, competitiveness, migration, the situation in Moldova and Georgia, external relations and other issues.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 24, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Australia donates 49 Abrams tanks to Ukraine

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

Defence Department Supplied Photo

The Albanese government is giving 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine, despite earlier this year apparently playing down the prospect of the donation.

The latest Australian package is worth A$245 million. It brings the total Australian military aid to Ukraine since the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 to A$1.3 billion, and overall Australian support to A$1.5 billion.

When asked about a possible gift of the tanks in February, Defence Minister Richard Marles said it was “not on the agenda”.

Government sources say donating the tanks required US approval since Australia had purchased them from Washington, so there had been a process to go through.

Minister for Defence Industry and Capability Delivery Pat Conroy, who is on his way to the NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels, announced the decision in London. In Brussels, Conroy will meet with the Ukraine defence minister.

Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea form the “Indo-Pacific Four” group of non-NATO countries attending the meeting.

The 49 tanks are near the end of their life, so a small number will have to be repaired before they are delivered. Alternatively, they could be used as spare parts if Ukraine wants them delivered more quickly. Ukraine will decide which option to pursue.

The Australian army is retaining a handful of the M1A1 Abrams to help the transition to the M1A2 fleet of tanks.

Conroy said: “We stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine in their fight against Russia’s illegal invasion. These tanks will deliver more firepower and mobility to the Ukrainian armed forces, and complement the support provided by our partners for Ukraine”.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Australia donates 49 Abrams tanks to Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/australia-donates-49-abrams-tanks-to-ukraine-241485

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

January 23, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine – A10-0006/2024

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

(COM(2024)0426 – C10‑0106/2024 – 2024/0234(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2024)0426),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0106/2024),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 9 October 2024 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the letter from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0006/2024),

1. Adopts its position at first reading, taking over the Commission proposal;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The ongoing war of aggression by Russia has significantly increased Ukraine’s financial needs. To address these challenges, both the European Union (EU) and the international community are being called upon to provide additional funding.

In response, the European Commission has put forward a legislative proposal aligned with a G7 initiative. This proposal aims to utilize the extraordinary revenues from immobilized Russian assets to cover Ukraine’s urgent financial needs. Specifically, the proposal seeks to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM), which will enable Ukraine to service and repay loans of up to €45 billion. These loans will be repaid using the windfall profits generated from frozen Russian assets. The EU’s proposed macro-financial assistance (MFA) includes an amount of up to €35 billion, intended to support Ukraine’s immediate financing needs. This assistance will be delivered in a predictable, long-term, and timely manner.

A key feature of this MFA is that Ukraine will not be required to repay the loan directly. Instead, repayments will be covered by windfall profits generated from interest accrued on immobilized Russian assets. Additionally, the terms of this loan will align with the conditions under the Ukraine Facility.

The rapporteur emphasizes the importance of a swift procedure in order for the EU to adopt this proposal by the end of October 2024 to ensure that the MFA loan can be released by the end of 2024.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

Entity and/or person

Bálint Ódor, Chair of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, Council of the European Union

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT (11.10.2024)

for the Committee on International Trade

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine

(COM(2024)0426 – C10‑0106/2024 – 2024/0234(COD))

Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Janusz Lewandowski

The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 [1],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2463 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (macro-financial assistance +)[4],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/335 of 28 February 2022 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [5],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/577 of 12 February 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [6],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1470 of 21 May 2024 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union [8],

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources [9],

A. whereas the Commission proposed a draft amendment to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 that made it possible to allow contingent liabilities stemming from financial assistance to Ukraine for 2023 and 2024 only to be treated in the same manner as financial assistance for Member States;

B. whereas there is a need for greater sustained budgetary support to Ukraine;

C. whereas Ukraine’s financing needs are expected to significantly outstrip current IMF projections and total at least USD 38 billion for 2025, making the amounts available under previous rounds of macro-financial assistance (MFA), the Ukraine Facility and the current round of MFA insufficient to ensure the required level of support, particularly for 2026 and 2027;

D. whereas Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/577 provides rules for allocating extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Peace Facility and the Ukraine Facility, considering that EUR 210 billion of Russian Central Bank assets are currently held by financial institutions in the EU;

E. whereas the G7 leaders announced the launch of Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine, which would make USD 50 billion available to Ukraine and would be secured through immobilised Russian state assets;

F. whereas the next tranche of the IMF’s loan to Ukraine is also linked to the entry into force of the proposed regulation;

1. Takes note of the proposal for the creation of the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which will provide non-repayable financial support with a view to assisting Ukraine to repay loans provided for its support and will be endowed mainly by the amounts transferred in accordance with Annex XLI to Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 [10], as well as by any potential amounts stemming from voluntary contributions from Member States, third countries or other sources, for up to EUR 45 billion;

2. Takes note of the conditions and obligations that Ukraine must fulfil in order to receive and use the non-repayable financial support provided by the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, particularly the obligation for the repayment of the principal, interest and any other costs of the MFA loan or eligible bilateral loans;

3. Takes note of the proposal for the creation of a new MFA instrument for the benefit of Ukraine, providing support of up to EUR 35 billion, pending other contributions under the G7 agreement on Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine, over a duration of 45 years; takes note of the fact that the Commission’s proposal seems to be based on the assumption that the Russian state assets will remain immobilised for 45 years and on various assumptions regarding the future flows of extraordinary revenues stemming from the immobilisation of Russian sovereign assets held in the EU;

4. Takes note of the fact that there is no grace period for the repayment of the principal or interest for the MFA instrument;

5. Takes note of the fact that the MFA instrument, unlike previous instruments, does not give Ukraine the option to request interest rate subsidies covered by Member States;

6. Takes note of the preconditions for support, such as effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including for those of minorities, and takes note of the consequences of not meeting, or no longer meeting, these preconditions;

7. Takes note of the future negotiation between the Commission and Ukraine on the Memorandum of Understanding containing the guidelines that will underpin all future disbursements to Ukraine and must be consistent with the qualitative and quantitative steps contained in the Annex to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1447 of 14 May 2024 on the approval of the assessment of the Ukraine Plan [11] and any amendments thereto; takes note of the fact that the assessment criteria for the funds allocated through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism are aligned with the assessment criteria established in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 in order to guarantee effective support and optimal use of resources for Ukraine’s recovery and development; calls on the Commission to pay particular attention to consulting the Verkhovna Rada and involving relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations;

8. Takes note of the derogation from Article 31(3), second sentence, of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 [12], which implies that the External Action Guarantee will not be used to guarantee the borrowing of the amounts to be lent in the framework of this MFA and that, therefore, the guarantees for this MFA will be provisioned by the headroom; calls for caution in extending borrowing without a clear guarantee mechanism, with a view to ensuring that any additional borrowing does not jeopardise the Union’s financial stability;

9. Takes note of the derogation from Article 214(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2509, preventing the establishment of a provisioning rate, because of the use of the headroom for the provisioning of guarantees;

10. Recalls all the mandatory provisions to be included in the MFA Loan Agreement, particularly those related to the early repayment of the amounts borrowed should it be recognised that Ukraine has engaged in any act of fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity detrimental to the financial interests of the Union;

11. Takes note of the repayment arrangements, and particularly of the waterfall structure to be established in the MFA Loan Agreement and the potential implications for the EU budget;

12. Takes note of the provisions on the transmission of information to Parliament and the Council, as laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on good interinstitutional cooperation and governance and specifically within the framework of the annual budgetary procedure, ensuring full accountability and oversight of how funds are managed and disbursed; acknowledges the urgent need to implement the proposed regulation and calls for the relevant draft amending budget to include only the changes arising from the entry into force of the proposed regulation; expects the proposal to provide an update on the borrowing plan as per Article 52(1)(d)(iii), third indent, of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509; expects to be informed, in a timely manner, of the implementation of borrowing as per Article 223(4)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, including of any potential early repayments and the construction of a buffer, if applicable;

13. Takes note of the fact that, according to the financial legislative statement, the implementation of the proposal does not require any additional human resources or administrative expenditure; reiterates its understanding that new policy priorities or tasks must be accompanied by adequate resources and staff to properly implement them;

14. Regrets the proposal’s lack of clarity about whether the Union budget has final liability, particularly in the framework of a loan guaranteed solely by the headroom, independently of the support from the Ukraine Loan Mechanism, for example in the event of significant changes to the sanctions regime underwriting the mechanism;

15. Requests that the Commission clarify the potential interplay and complementarity in the funding provided by the Ukraine Facility, in particular under Pillar I for 2025, and by the MFA, and explain how the latter will be linked to relevant political and reform-related conditions that are consistent with and support the conditionality under the Ukraine Facility, in particular the Ukraine Plan;

16. Requests that the Commission provide the budgetary authority with details of the aggregation of liabilities to the headroom, contingent on borrowing and lending operations;

17. Recalls that a further amendment to the MFF, adopted by unanimity in the Council, would be required in order to extend the ability of the Union to treat the financial assistance to Ukraine in the same manner as financial assistance to Member States until the end of the current MFF;

18. Regrets the urgency of this proposal, stemming partly from the lack of flexibility granted by the Commission proposal on the amendment of the MFF, and the subsequent Council decision pressuring Parliament to co-legislate in a very limited time frame;

19. Calls on the Committee on International Trade, as the committee responsible, to recommend the approval of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine.

LETTER FROM THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2.10.2024)

Mr Bernd Lange

Chair

Committee on International Trade

BRUSSELS

Subject: Opinion on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine (COM/2024/426 final) (2024/0234(COD))

Dear Mr Lange,

Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. By way of a written procedure, the committee Coordinators decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. Due to the extreme urgency of the procedure, the committee Coordinators adopted the opinion at their meeting on 30 September 2024.

Yours sincerely,

David McAllister

SUGGESTIONS

The Committee on Foreign Affairs:

1. Expresses its complete solidarity with the people of Ukraine, along with its full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders;

2. Welcomes the commitments of the EU and its Member States to provide humanitarian assistance, military support, economic and financial aid and political support in every possible way until Ukraine’s victory;

3. Commends the Commission’s proposal to establish the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which contributes to answering Parliament’s call on the EU and its Member States to achieve the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, and builds upon the decision of the Council to direct extraordinary revenues stemming from immobilised Russian state assets to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility as well as upon the G7’s decision to offer Ukraine a USD 50 billion loan secured through immobilised Russian state assets;

4. Expresses its conviction that the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism is a substantive step towards making Russia financially compensate for the massive damage it continues to cause in Ukraine; insists that this should not preclude the establishment of a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state assets frozen by the EU, to be used for the benefit of Ukraine; urges the Commission and the EEAS to step-up their work in that direction;

5. Acknowledges that the Commission’s proposal is based on the assumption that Russian assets will remain immobilised until Russia definitively and irreversibly ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine. Therefore urges the Council to adopt swiftly a decision to that effect;

6. Invites the Commission, when evaluating whether Ukraine has met the precondition set out in Article 11 of the proposal, to apply the same standards it applies when it evaluates whether Ukraine has met the precondition set out in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 on the establishment of the Ukraine Facility; in particular, in its assessment, the Commission shall also take into account the context in Ukraine and the consequences of the application of martial law in Ukraine; invites the Commission to transmit its assessment simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council;

7. Calls on the Commission to ensure that, when it agrees with Ukraine the policy conditions to be set out in the MoU pursuant to Article 12 of the proposal, it is satisfied that Ukraine has complied with (i) the provisions set out in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 and provided all the relevant explanations, as appropriate; and (ii) the qualitative and quantitative steps provided for in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1447 and its annex. At the same time, calls on the Commission to make sure, when deciding on the release of funds pursuant to Article 13 of the proposal, that its assessment complies with Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792 and, in particular, takes into account the criteria listed in paragraph 3 thereof, where relevant; urges the Commission, in that context, to make sure that all decisions adopted by Ukraine on the use of the funds allocated to it in the framework of the proposed regulation respect democratic procedures and are supported by meaningful consultations with all relevant institutions and stakeholders, including the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, anti-corruption institutions and representatives of the civil society;

8. Calls on the Commission to transmit the MFA Loan Agreement to the European Parliament as soon as it will be signed;

9. Requests that the Commission include by default in its yearly report on the implementation of the proposed Regulation a review of the adequacy of the arrangements contained in the Regulation itself.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Establishing the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and providing exceptional macro-financial assistance to Ukraine
References	COM(2024)0426 – C10-0106/2024 – 2024/0234(COD)
Date submitted to Parliament	20.9.2024
Committee(s) responsible	INTA
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	AFET 10.10.2024
Not delivering opinions Date of decision	AFET 27.9.2024
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Karin Karlsbro 30.9.2024
Simplified procedure – date of decision	30.9.2024
Discussed in committee	14.10.2024
Date adopted	14.10.2024
	BUDG 7.10.2024
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	31 4 0
Members present for the final vote	Brando Benifei, Lynn Boylan, Udo Bullmann, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Kruis, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Gabriel Mato, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Francesco Torselli, Catarina Vieira, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski
Substitutes present for the final vote	Mika Aaltola, Dan Barna, Nina Carberry, Anna Cavazzini, Hana Jalloul Muro, Ľubica Karvašová, Marina Mesure, Branislav Ondruš, Pierre Pimpie, Jessika Van Leeuwen
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Peter Agius, Marie Dauchy, Elio Di Rupo, Virginie Joron
Date tabled	15.10.2024

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Vincenzo Mascioli appointed new State Secretary for Migration

Source: Switzerland – Department of Justice and Police

The Federal CouncilBern, 16.10.2024 – At its meeting on 16 November, the Federal Council appointed Vincenzo Mascioli as the new State Secretary for Migration. Vincenzo Mascioli is currently Vice Director of the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM). He will take up the post on 1 January 2025, succeeding Christine Schraner Burgener, who is moving to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).
Vincenzo Mascioli, who is 54, has been working in the Federal Administration since 2005, initially as a research assistant for the Control Committee of the Federal Assembly, and between 2007 and 2010 as an advisor on Federal Councillor Moritz Leuenberger’s personal staff at the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC). From 1 November 2011, Vincenzo Mascioli worked as the personal assistant to Federal Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga in the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP), where he was also responsible for the migration dossier and in particular the reform of the Asylum Act, which was adopted by a clear majority at the popular vote in 2016.
At the beginning of 2017, he was appointed Vice Director of SEM, where he took charge of the International Affairs Directorate, which includes the Returns, International Cooperation and European Cooperation Divisions. Switzerland is currently one of the leading European states in terms of cooperation with the countries of origin of asylum seekers. In addition, Switzerland’s consistent return policy is internationally recognised. Vincenzo Mascioli also served as Vice Director of SEM for several years under Federal Councillor Karin Keller-Sutter and for one year under Federal Councillor Elisabeth Baume-Schneider.
Before joining the Federal Administration, he worked for a number of years as an editor at a publishing house and as a lecturer at Zurich University of Teacher Education (PH Zurich) after graduating from the University of Zurich with a degree in education.
Migration expert with extensive management experience at SEM
Vincenzo Mascioli is as familiar with the international dimension of migration as he is with Swiss domestic policy. He is an expert in migration issues and, in addition to proven leadership skills, brings with him strong social skills, extensive diplomatic and political knowledge, and strong communication and negotiation skills. The Federal Council is confident that he can credibly represent SEM at home and abroad.
As State Secretary for Migration, Vincenzo Mascioli heads an administrative unit with around 1,300 employees. He is responsible for developing strategies and implementing and further developing Switzerland’s asylum, immigration and integration policy, as well as its foreign policy on migration. His tasks include liaising with Parliament, cantonal, communal and other federal authorities, non-governmental organisations in the field of migration, international organisations and foreign counterparts.
State Secretary Christine Schraner Burgener is to step down as head of SEM at the end of the year at her own request to take up a new role at the FDFA. She took over as state secretary on 1 January 2022. During her time in office, Switzerland has had to respond to the largest refugee movement since the Second World War as a result of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. At the same time, SEM has been confronted with a large number of new asylum applications in recent years.
The Federal Council thanks Ms Schraner Burgener for her services.
Address for enquiries
GS-FDJP Communications Services, T +41 58 462 18 18, info@gs-ejpd.admin.ch
Publisher
The Federal Councilhttps://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start.htmlFederal Department of Justice and Policehttp://www.ejpd.admin.chState Secretariat for Migrationhttps://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home.html

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Secretary General welcomes Sweden’s plans to boost defence spending

Source: NATO

On Wednesday (October 16), NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson met at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to discuss the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence and NATO’s increased support to Ukraine.

Since joining NATO in March this year, “Sweden’s membership has made NATO stronger, Sweden safer, and all of us more secure,” said the Secretary General. He commended the Swedish government for its recent proposals to bolster NATO’s deterrence and defence, including with ”troops for NATO’s battlegroup in Latvia, combat aircraft for NATO’s air policing mission, and vessels for NATO’s Standing Naval Forces.” The Secretary General thanked Sweden for its offer to lead the new NATO battlegroup to be established in Finland. He noted that Sweden spends more than 2 percent of GDP on defence and welcomed the country’s plans to further boost its defence spending in 2025.

The Secretary General also noted Sweden’s steadfast support to Ukraine. “On a per capita basis, Sweden is a top supporter of Ukraine. Providing over 4 billion euros in military assistance,” he said. He reiterated that Allies are working hard to deliver on the commitments made during the Washington Summit on support for Ukraine, including “a new Command to coordinate security assistance and training, and a financial pledge of 40 billion euros as a minimum baseline in the coming year.”

Secretary General Rutte stressed that Ukraine’s path to membership is irreversible. “Every nation has the right to choose its own path. No one outside NATO or outside that particular country has a veto or a vote on this. Sweden’s seat at the NATO table shows exactly that,” he concluded.

MIL Security OSI –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Threads: the harrowing 1984 BBC docudrama is back on our screens – scary but appropriate viewing for our uncertain times

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Mark Lacy, Senior lecturer, Politics, Philosophy, and Religion, Lancaster University

The BBC docudrama Threads shocked audiences in 1984. BBC

Threads – the horrific film made by the BBC in 1984 depicting the impact of a nuclear war on a city in the north of England – was recently made available to stream. It’s a brutal and grim tour of the aftermath of nuclear war, which anyone who viewed it when originally aired may struggle to watch again. But, 40 years on, the film is probably regarded more as an unpleasant artefact from a more dangerous time.

These days we consume many types of apocalyptic entertainment in film and video games, exploring all types of societal collapse: ecological disaster, manufactured pandemics, alien invasions, cyber-attacks and dangerous AI. But Threads is particularly chilling in its attempt to give a realistic account of what could happen if cold war tensions escalated. I remember watching it as a teenager in a lesson at school and once was enough for me.

But in the winter of 2024, it is difficult to escape the regular warnings about the escalating tensions around the world. There are widespread fears that a catastrophic series of diplomatic breakdowns and strategic miscalculations could result in a 2024 version of the events depicted in the 1984 film.

Since the end of the cold war, much of international conflict has played out below the threshold of open war, in the realms of cyberwarfare, espionage and subversion. Or in other attempts at economic and political tactics intended to influence and manipulate. But there is clearly something very alarming about the situation since the invasion of Ukraine and the escalation of events in the Middle East since October 7.

What makes the current situation so alarming is the sense that “great powers” or states with nuclear weapons could be pulled into conflicts that might quickly escalate beyond any diplomatic or political control. It’s hoped that leaders on all sides are determined to deter or contain conflict. But wars are shaped by accidents, miscalculations and errors of strategic judgement.

Would Vladimir Putin have sent his troops into Ukraine if he could see how the Ukrainians and the international community would react? Now he has turned to making regular threats about Russia’s nuclear arsenal.

So, there is a sense of unease about the current possibility of events getting out of control – of events escalating from brutal and horrific local or regional conflicts into a full blown global conflict. To be sure, there will (hopefully) be a continual diplomatic effort focused in ensuring that events in Ukraine or the Middle East do not escalate to the point where there the world is drawn into a wider war involving weapons of mass destruction.

Rational v irrational actors

But one of the concerns is that the situation in the 2020s is markedly difficult to geopolitical tensions during the cold war. The influential “realists” of international relations – academics like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt – argued that one of the reasons that the US should not invade Iraq was that Saddam Hussein was a “rational actor” whose behaviour could be contained and controlled. Iraq could be controlled through what they saw as “vigilant surveillance” and containment.

But the fear in 2024 is that the world isn’t populated by rational actors as it was during the cold war, with its doctrine of mutually assured destruction.

Putin is viewed as a leader increasingly detached from reality – surrounded by advisers too afraid to give him advice that he might not want to hear. In strategic terms, the fear he is that he might escalate to de-escalate. He might attempt a nuclear strike to deter events escalating further – an horrific warning signal that will end any attempts to challenge him.

Some would question whether Iran may be led by men who are also detached from reality and might actually be looking for an apocalyptic showdown with Israel and the west. This depiction of irrational leaders might be more a reflection of our panic and paranoia than a credible assessment of leadership in these states. And of course, some would argue that the liberal world has its fair share of irrational actors.

An interconnected world

So, are we in a time or dangerous irrational actors where deterrence will not prevent a potentially apocalyptic escalation in global events? Security analysts and policymakers often refer to what is known as “deterrence by entanglement”. There are various types of deterrence but one of the geopolitical differences between now and the cold war is the level of interconnection between states that might have diplomatic, economic and political tensions.

How many Chinese students study in UK universities? How much property in London is owned by Russian citizens? Societies are entangled to such a degree that a launching a nuclear strike on London would not only destroy investments, it might also kill your own citizens. Then there is the question of geographical location and nuclear strikes: would you risk the ecological blowback from nuclear strikes in a way that might endanger your territory, ecology and citizens – for generations?

Leaders make mistakes and situations escalate in dangerous and unpredictable ways. But one of the lessons of international relations – going back to the works of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli – is that deception is a vital part of statecraft and warfare. And the “performance” of statecraft often requires cultivating an image of irrationality as a form of rational statecraft and deterrence. Some have argued that Donald Trump’s actions and pronouncements on international affairs produce a sense of uncertainty that works as a one-man strategy of deterrence.

But as this performance plays out, it can be terrifying to watch and experience. Let’s not forget, the history of international relations is a history of tragic and mainly avoidable accidents.

Mark Lacy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Threads: the harrowing 1984 BBC docudrama is back on our screens – scary but appropriate viewing for our uncertain times – https://theconversation.com/threads-the-harrowing-1984-bbc-docudrama-is-back-on-our-screens-scary-but-appropriate-viewing-for-our-uncertain-times-241314

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers visit Ukraine

Source: Government of Sweden

Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers visit Ukraine – Government.se

Press release from Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Published 16 October 2024

On 16 October 2024, the Nordic-Baltic countries’ foreign ministers visited Odesa, Ukraine. The visit took place against the backdrop of intensified Russian attacks against Ukraine resulting in further loss of lives, injuries and widespread destruction. The needs are immense, especially within the energy sector, as Ukraine prepares for its third winter since Russia’s full-scale invasion. The Nordic-Baltic countries are united in their unwavering commitment to supporting Ukraine. During the visit, a substantial Nordic-Baltic winter package was announced in response to Ukraine’s most pressing needs, including energy, social infrastructure and humanitarian support. The support aims to alleviate the suffering caused by Russia’s attacks by contributing to basic needs such as heating and clean water during the cold winter months.

“Our visit to Odesa today is a manifestation of the Nordic-Baltic countries’ unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukraine’s heroic fight against Russia’s aggression is not only about defending Ukraine’s freedom, but all of our freedom,” said Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Coordinator of the NB8 Maria Malmer Stenergard, on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic delegation.

The delegation was received in Odesa by Ukraine’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrii Sybiha to discuss the current situation, pressing needs, Ukraine’s efforts for a just and lasting peace as well as Ukraine’s EU accession progress, including related reform progress. The visit also included a visit to a military hospital, where the delegation met with soldiers wounded in the defence of their country, as well as a meeting with governor Oleh Kiper, where the ministers were briefed on the current situation in the region.

The Nordic-Baltic countries have committed significant resources in support to Ukraine and this support will continue. During the visit, a substantial Nordic-Baltic winter package was delivered in response to Ukraine’s most pressing needs ahead of the coming winter, including energy, social resilience and humanitarian support. Together, the Nordic-Baltic countries will contribute turbines, generators, solar panels, transformers and heating as well as financial support to the energy sector and to the reconstruction of critical social infrastructure. This support, and the already earmarked support for next year, will strengthen Ukraine’s ability to provide electricity, heating, clean water, health care, education, and other critical social and civilian infrastructure.

NB8 and the support to Ukraine

In 2024, Sweden is serving as Coordinator of the informal foreign and security cooperation format of the Nordic and Baltic countries (NB8). Joint efforts to strengthen both immediate and long-term military and civilian support to help Ukraine prevail is central to the Nordic-Baltic cooperation format. The Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers last visited Odesa, Ukraine in April 2023, when Latvia was Coordinator of the NB8.

The NB8 delegation to Ukraine consisted of chair of the NB8 format, Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Maria Malmer Stenergard, Denmark’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Estonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna, Finland’s Political Secretary of State Pasi Rajala, Iceland’s Permanent Secretary of State Martin Eyjólfsson, Latvia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Baiba Braže, Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis and Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide.

Press contact

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Flight PS752: International Coordination and Response Group memorial statement
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

The International Coordination and Response Group have filed a memorial with the International Court of Justice instituting the next phase in proceedings against Iran.
Statement from the International Coordination and Response Group on filing memorial of Flight PS752:

“Today the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and Ukraine have jointly filed a memorial with the International Court of Justice, instituting the next phase of proceedings against Iran in relation to its breaches of the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

“Iran has, among other violations, failed to take all practicable measures to prevent the destruction of Flight PS752 by members of its armed forces. Iran has equally failed to advance a full, transparent and impartial investigation and prosecution in accordance with international standards.

“Today’s legal action underscores our commitment to achieving transparency, justice and accountability for the victims and their families.”

Media enquiries

Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

Telephone 020 7008 3100

Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

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Updates to this page

Published 16 October 2024
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Ukraine: Switzerland implements further measures in 14th EU sanctions package

Source: Switzerland – Federal Council in English

The Federal Council

Bern, 16.10.2024 – On 16 October, the Federal Council decided to adopt most of the measures in the EU’s 14th package of sanctions against Russia. The new measures will come into force on 17 October. On 8 July, 116 individuals and entities were already added to Switzerland’s sanctions list, and on 21 August the first measures in the 14th sanctions package were adopted.

The EU adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia on 24 June in response to Russia’s continued military aggression against Ukraine and its destabilising actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and security. The aim is to strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions to prevent their circumvention, and to apply new sanctions in order to weaken Russia’s ability to wage war.

On 8 July, the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (EAER) had already imposed sanctions on 116 additional individuals and entities within its jurisdiction. This means that around 2,250 individuals, companies and organisations in Switzerland are currently on the sanctions list in connection with the situation in Ukraine. The list is identical to that of the EU. On 21 August, the Federal Council decided to adopt further measures in the EU’s 14th package of sanctions against Russia. The international harmonisation of bans on Russian diamonds was a particular focus of these sanctions. After a detailed examination, the Federal Council decided on 16 October to adopt the remaining measures in the 14th sanctions package that concern Switzerland, thereby strengthening the impact of the sanctions.

Measures in the goods sector

This decision further tightens export restrictions on goods intended to strengthen Russia’s industrial sector and military and technological capabilities. In addition, the list of entities subject to tighter export restrictions will be extended by 61 entities. Around half of these entities are located in third countries and are linked to the Russian military complex. The Federal Council had already decided on 31 January that companies would have to contractually prohibit the re-export to Russia of certain critical goods (common high priority items) when exporting to third countries. An equivalent obligation has now been introduced for the transfer of intellectual property rights and trade secrets, in order to prevent industrial know-how transferred to third countries from being used to produce such goods for use in Russia. In addition, there is now a ban on the purchase and import of Russian helium.

Measures in the financial sector

The use of certain specialised financial messaging services for payment transactions (i.e. alternatives to SWIFT) will be prohibited for banks. The Federal Council has also introduced various legal provisions on transaction bans. One of these concerns crypto assets providers that facilitate transactions supporting Russia’s defence industry. These new sanctions will curb the ability of the Kremlin to channel funds to finance its war machine.

Measures in the energy sector

The Federal Council has introduced several sanctions targeting liquefied natural gas (LNG). It will now be prohibited to invest in LNG projects under construction in Russia or to supply such projects with the necessary goods. From March 2025, it will also be prohibited to provide services for the transshipment of Russian LNG on EU territory. The new sanctions package also prohibits the purchase, import and transport of Russian LNG via terminals in the EU that are not connected to the gas pipeline network.

Protection for Swiss individuals and entities

In order to better protect Swiss companies, the Federal Council has introduced legislation that enables them to sue companies targeted by sanctions in the Swiss courts to claim damages for losses that the Swiss companies have incurred as a result of arbitrary proceedings in Russia or third countries. The same applies to Swiss individuals and companies whose assets have been unlawfully expropriated in Russia.

The EU has also imposed restrictions on accepting applications for the registration of certain intellectual property rights (brands, patents, etc.) by Russian nationals and companies. This is because the Russian government and courts have taken measures to illegitimately deprive EU intellectual property rights holders of their protection in Russia. The situation for Swiss companies is different, as there have been no intellectual property rights violations committed by Russia against Swiss companies. The Federal Council has therefore decided not to adopt this measure to protect Swiss companies; however, it will continue to monitor the situation.

Subsidiaries abroad

With the 14th sanctions package, the EU has introduced a general obligation for businesses to ensure that their subsidiaries in third countries do not undermine the EU’s sanctions. Swiss law typically only covers situations that occur on Swiss territory. However, there may be cases where Swiss law applies, for example where payments are made or instructions issued from Switzerland that are prohibited by the sanctions. This allows Swiss companies that use their subsidiaries to circumvent sanctions to be prosecuted. SECO is currently examining a number of cases in which Swiss companies are suspected of violating sanctions through their subsidiaries abroad. The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland has taken over one of the cases. Under the current sanctions law, Switzerland already has the means to prosecute companies for circumventing sanctions by using their subsidiaries, and is actively doing so. Against this background, the Federal Council has decided not to adopt this EU measure in its current form. The EAER will monitor the situation and inform the Federal Council in the event of any changes in the position.

Further measures

Sanctions have also been imposed in relation to 27 ships involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, including vessels belonging to Russia’s ‘dark fleet’ (ships that deliver goods with military applications to Russia, circumvent the international oil price cap in defiance of international standards, or carry grain looted from Ukraine). The measures include bans on providing services, including financial services, to such vessels or on acquiring or operating them.

In order to limit Russia’s influence on democratic processes in Switzerland, the Federal Council has also decided to prohibit political parties, NGOs and media service providers from accepting donations from the Russian government. As in the EU, exceptions are provided for, to ensure the right to freedom of expression, information and the media, for example.

Address for enquiries

Enquiries from the media: EAER Communications, info@gs-wbf.admin.ch, +41 (0)58 462 20 07

Enquiries from businesses: sanctions@seco.admin.ch, +41 (0)58 464 08 12

Publisher

The Federal Council
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start.html

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: U.S. Achievements in the Global Fight Against Corruption

US Senate News:

Source: The White House
Corruption poses a grave and enduring threat to U.S. national interests and those of our partners. When officials abuse their entrusted power for personal or political gain, the interests of authoritarians and corrupt actors win – at the expense of citizens, honest businesses, and healthy societies. As the Biden-Harris Administration took office, this longstanding challenge had metastasized. In some countries, oligarchs were teaming up with foreign kleptocrats to warp policy and procurement decisions in exchange for kickbacks – with no accountability. Corrupt officials were laundering stolen assets through the U.S. and global financial systems, while local investigators were ill-equipped to follow the money. Reformers in countries saddled with corruption had scarce public resources to actually address development needs. The Biden-Harris Administration tacked these challenges starting Day One, to ensure democracy delivers and corrupt actors are held to account.
The first National Security Study Memorandum of the Biden-Harris Administration established countering corruption as a “core U.S. national security interest,” leading to the issuance in December 2021 of the first United States Strategy on Countering Corruption. Since then, the United States has taken action at home and around the world to curb illicit finance, hold corrupt actors accountable, forge multilateral partnerships, and equip frontline leaders to take on transnational corruption. The result has been historic progress in protecting the U.S. financial system from money-laundering, including in the residential real estate sector, while enhancing corporate transparency. This Administration has mobilized record levels of foreign assistance dedicated to anti-corruption, including $339 million in Fiscal Year 2023 alone – almost double the yearly average during the previous four years. This new assistance has unlocked support for anti-corruption institutions, leveled the playing field for law-abiding businesses, enabled journalists to team up across borders, and more. Expanded law enforcement cooperation and capacity-building have generated convictions of corrupt actors as well as the seizure, forfeiture, and return of criminal proceeds, while new anti-corruption offices at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) energized diplomatic and stakeholder engagement. The United States imposed sanctions on more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, and established – for the first time in any jurisdiction globally – a new visa restriction for those who enable corrupt activity.
U.S. progress on anti-corruption has produced concrete benefits for the American people and stakeholders around the world – enhancing prosperity, economic security, safety, and democracy, as outlined below. To bolster and sustain this work, the U.S. government has also modernized its approach to addressing corruption as a cross-cutting priority. Today, Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh will highlight the benefits of this work to American businesses and workers at a White House anti-corruption roundtable with leaders from 15 major U.S. companies.
Advancing economic opportunity abroad
Improving the business enabling environment: U.S. assistance advanced governments’ capacity to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption, while encouraging anti-bribery compliance. State expanded its Fiscal Transparency Innovation Fund – to help willing partners improve budget transparency – while holding countries to account for progress in its Fiscal Transparency Report. In the past two years alone, a newly expanded State-Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) program facilitated U.S. collaboration with foreign counterparts on more than 50 transnational corruption and money laundering cases with a U.S. nexus. In coordination with State, experienced legal advisors from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) assisted foreign justice partners around the world in investigating and prosecuting corruption and money laundering cases, and recovering assets. And DOJ’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, in partnership with the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, has recovered more than $1.7 billion and returned or assisted in returning more than $1.6 billion for the benefit of the people harmed by the corruption.
Enforcing our bans on foreign bribery and money-laundering – and pressing other countries to do the same: To enable honest companies to compete overseas, the United States upheld its commitments under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by enforcing its foreign bribery and related laws and working with partners to monitor other countries’ progress in implementing the Convention, which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2024. Since the start of the Administration, DOJ has imposed more than $3.5 billion in total monetary sanctions under the Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) in 16 corporate resolutions, and announced charges against more than 70 individuals. For instance, this April the former Comptroller General of Ecuador was convicted of money laundering relating to his receipt of over $10 million in bribes from, among others, the Brazil-based construction conglomerate Odebrecht S.A. The Securities and Exchange Commission continued civil enforcement of the FCPA, with approximately $1 billion in total monetary sanctions in 22 corporate resolutions, spanning conduct in 24 countries, since the start of the Administration. DOJ is also enforcing the recently enacted Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which criminalizes demands for bribes by foreign officials from U.S. companies and others. In addition, this August DOJ announced a new Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to uncover and prosecute corporate crime – with a particular focus on foreign and domestic corruption, as well as violations by financial institutions of their obligations to take steps to detect and deter money laundering.
Seizing windows of opportunity: U.S. assistance has become more agile via the establishment of USAID’s Anti-Corruption Response Fund (providing flexible support to countries experiencing new opportunities or backsliding), the State-DOJ Global Anti-Corruption Rapid Response Fund (providing assistance and case mentoring to foreign partners on short notice), and USAID’s Democracy Delivers initiative (which has marshalled $500 million in funding from the United States and others to help reformers deliver, including on their anti-corruption commitments). These innovations, informed by USAID’s Dekleptification Guide, are enabling the U.S. government to more nimbly pivot toward environments where local momentum can be bolstered by outside assistance.
Bolstering integrity in high-risk sectors: In April 2024, the United States and its partners launched the Blue Dot Network – a mechanism to certify infrastructure projects that have met global standards for quality and sustainability, including transparency in procurement and provisions to limit opportunities for corruption. The United States also supported the launch of PROTECT, a collective action project to address corruption risk in the supply chain for critical minerals.
Strengthening corruption safeguards in the Indo-Pacific: In June, the United States and thirteen other partners held a signing ceremony, after concluding eight rounds of negotiations in record time, for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Fair Economy Agreement. The Agreement aims to create a more transparent, predictable trade and investment environment across IPEF partners’ markets, including through binding obligations to prevent and combat corruption. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State are accelerating implementation by offering new anti-corruption technical assistance to IPEF partners, including workshops on procurement corruption.
Dialoguing with the private sector: In 2021, State launched the Galvanizing the Private Sector as Partners in Combatting Corruption initiative, which connects companies and governments to strengthen business integrity and encourage governance reform. Commerce’s International Trade Administration organized the 2024 forum of the Business Ethics for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Small and Medium Enterprises Initiative – the world’s largest public-private partnership on ethical business conduct – at which stakeholders formalized policy recommendations on business integrity in public procurement.
Protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse
Expanding corporate transparency: To deter kleptocrats and criminals from laundering money through anonymous shell companies, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) operationalized a new filing system for certain companies operating in the United States to report their beneficial owners – the real people who own or control them – pursuant to the bipartisan Corporate Transparency Act. Treasury held hundreds of outreach events across all states and territories, reaching thousands of stakeholders, to enable companies to quickly and easily comply with this reporting requirement.
Closing loopholes for money-laundering: Treasury finalized rules to close two major loopholes in the U.S. financial system: (1) to increase transparency in the U.S. residential real estate sector, to ensure that law-abiding homebuyers are not disadvantaged by individuals laundering their ill-gotten gains, and (2) to safeguard the investment adviser industry from illicit finance. Treasury also proposed a rule to modernize financial institutions’ anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) programs, to make them more effective and risk-based. Together, these rulemakings represent historic advances for the U.S. AML/CFT regime, in line with international standards, that will help the United States urge other countries to undertake similar reforms to curb illicit finance. The Biden-Harris Administration has also called on Congress to close even more loopholes that facilitate money-laundering by passing the ENABLERS Act.
Blocking assets and denying entry to corrupt actors: Since the start of the Administration, Treasury has designated more than 500 individuals and entities for corruption and related activities, across six continents. That includes blocking the assets of 20 individuals and 48 companies in Fiscal Year 2024 for corruption in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Guyana, Paraguay, Western Balkans, and Zimbabwe. In tandem, State publicly issued corruption-related visa restrictions for 76 foreign officials and family members in Fiscal Year 2024, and 292 over the course of the Administration. These actions have protected the U.S. financial system from corrupt actors and promoted accountability in domestic jurisdictions. For example, just one week after the U.S. issuance of a public visa restriction on former Director of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) Intelligence Services Osman Mehmedagic for significant corruption, he was arrested by BiH authorities for abuse of office.
Taking aim at enablers of corruption: In December 2023, President Biden issued an historic Presidential Proclamation establishing a visa restriction for those who facilitate and enable significant corruption and their immediate family members. This new visa restriction complements existing commitments to use sanction and law enforcement capabilities to target private enablers of public corruption. Earlier this year, the FBI and DOJ secured a guilty plea and a criminal penalty of $661 million from Gunvor – one of the largest commodities trading firms in the world – for facilitating bribery of Ecuadorian officials and laundering those bribes through U.S. banks. In addition, USAID launched new activities to incentivize integrity within professions that serve as gatekeepers to the international financial system.
Upholding international standards: The United States has helped lead efforts to expand anti-corruption work at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), including improving assessment tools, mitigating risks associated with “golden passport” programs, and highlighting how non-financial sectors can be abused by corrupt actors.
Keeping America and our partners safe
Addressing corruption risk in the security sector: Security sector corruption can divert essential supplies, empower malign actors, threaten the safety of U.S. service members, and undermine U.S. military missions writ large. In the past year, the Department of Defense (DOD) incorporated corruption risk into its security cooperation planning – subjecting certain proposals to further scrutiny and identifying risk mitigation measures as needed. State also created new resources to weigh corruption risk as part of security sector assistance decision-making. In addition, State’s Global Defense Reform Program and DOD’s institutional capacity building programs advanced more transparent, accountable, and professional defense institutions. DOD continued running a training course on combatting corruption for partner military commanders and civilian leaders.
Tackling organized crime and corruption: Transnational criminal organizations often rely on corruption to enable their criminal activities and evade accountability – which fuels narcotrafficking into the United States, human smuggling, cybercrimes, and more. The U.S. government is deploying anti-corruption tools to target criminal networks and their financial enablers, in line with the 2023 White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime.
Standing up to Russia’s aggression: The United States has adapted to address the wartime needs of Ukraine’s anti-corruption stakeholders, as they close off a key vector for Russian dominance and advance Ukraine’s democratic future. In 2023, Ukrainian anti-corruption investigators and prosecutors achieved an 80 percent increase in prosecutions and a 50 percent increase in convictions, plus opened cases against high-ranking officials including the former head of the Ukrainian Supreme Court. With U.S. support, Ukraine has advanced significant reforms on asset disclosure, launched a whistleblower portal, strengthened the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and enhanced transparency and integrity in reconstruction.
Securing a greener future: The United States has integrated an anti-corruption lens across sectors, with particular emphasis on addressing corruption vulnerabilities that threaten a secure, just energy transition for all. This includes USAID support to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), increased mining transparency in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, and innovations that address transnational corruption in green energy mineral supply chains across 15 countries.
Protecting global health: Corruption curtails the ability of states to respond to pandemics and undercuts access to basic healthcare. USAID is tackling this challenge by releasing cutting-edge guidance on anti-corruption in the health sector and launching integrated programming. For example, in Liberia the United States is working with the government to curb theft of pharmaceuticals through civil society monitoring, law enforcement trainings, and public awareness campaigns.
Addressing the root causes of migration: Combating corruption is a core component of improving conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – so people do not feel compelled to leave their homes, in line with the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America. Recent U.S. actions have included training up to 27,000 justice sector stakeholders in those countries to more effectively address corruption.
Defending democracy by rooting out corruption
Tackling electoral corruption: When candidates can be bankrolled by foreign adversaries and institutions captured by kleptocrats, citizens lose faith in their governments—or even in democracy itself. In response, USAID has launched new programs to bolster electoral integrity, strengthen independent media, and increase the transparency of political finance in high-risk locations.
Lifting up civil society and independent media: The U.S. government has substantially expanded support to frontline activists and journalists, including through the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium. In addition, a new State Department initiative is training hundreds of journalists in transnational corruption investigations, while USAID’s new investigative journalist networks in Asia and Southern Africa are building capacity to track corruption across sectors and across borders. The Secretary of State established a new award for Anti-Corruption Champions, which has honored dozens of courageous civil society leaders and embattled reformers. In 2022, the United States also hosted the largest regular gathering of civil society activists fighting corruption – the International Anti-Corruption Conference – in Washington, DC, with keynote remarks from APNSA Jake Sullivan.
Protecting sovereignty: Authoritarian actors like Russia and the PRC use bribery to interfere in the policy, procurement, debt, and electoral processes of other countries – undermining both sovereignty and democracy. The United States is standing up to this tactic by building the resilience of frontline actors to detect and deflect foreign-backed strategic corruption, educating partners about the kleptocrats’ playbook, harnessing sanction tools to deter threats, and increasing collaboration between practitioners working on anti-corruption and those addressing foreign malign influence – both within the USG and with likeminded partners. For example, in June the United States joined with Canada and the UK to expose Russia’s use of corruption and covert financing, among other tactics, to undermine democratic processes in Moldova.
Restoring trust in American democracy: The Biden-Harris Administration has established the strongest ethics standards of any U.S. presidency. On his first day in office, the President signed an Executive Order requiring administration officials to take a stringent ethics pledge, which extends lobbying bans, limits shadow lobbying, and makes ethics waivers more transparent. The Administration also restored longstanding democratic norms by protecting DOJ cases from political interference, releasing the President’s and Vice-President’s taxes, and voluntarily disclosing White House visitor logs. And in the last year, the Office of Government Ethics finalized rules updating the standards for ethical conduct and legal expense funds for executive branch employees.
Protecting American democracy from malign finance: Just as we defend democracy around the world, the U.S. government is working to keep American democracy safe from foreign adversaries. Actions to curb money laundering in the United States can help reduce the ability of foreign and domestic actors to make illegal campaign contributions and evade U.S. election laws. President Biden has called on Congress to go even further by passing the DISCLOSE Act, which would curb the ability of foreign entities and special interests to use dark money loopholes to influence our elections.
Revitalizing participation in the Open Government Partnership (OGP): The United States rejoined the Steering Committee of OGP – a platform for civil society and governments to forge joint commitments and learn from each other– and provided assistance for OGP’s work on anti-corruption. Domestically, the United States has turbocharged OGP implementation by creating the U.S. Open Government Secretariat at the General Services Administration, an Open Government Federal Advisory Committee, an Interagency Community of Practice – spanning federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, and engaged with hundreds of stakeholders to exchange lessons and expand transparency, accountability, and public participation. The United States also launched the first-ever Request for Information to feed into the 6th U.S. OGP National Action Plan and announced development of a toolkit to help federal agencies more meaningfully engage with the public.
Modernizing and coordinating U.S. government efforts to fight corruption
Institutionalizing anti-corruption as an enduring priority: Over the past four years, Departments and Agencies have made substantial organizational improvements to elevate corruption concerns. For example:
The State Department’s new Office of the Coordinator on Global Anti-Corruption leads the integration of anti-corruption priorities into bilateral and other policy processes, conducts targeted diplomatic engagements, and drives strategic planning, including through the Department’s senior-level Anti-Corruption Policy Board. In the past year, the Office jumpstarted implementation of the Combating Global Corruption Act and completed an analysis of anti-corruption assistance to inform future State Department decision-making.
USAID’s new Anti-Corruption Center, within the newly established Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, serves as a hub of technical expertise and thought leadership – driving the integration of corruption considerations across USAID’s portfolio, supporting USAID Missions in developing localized approaches, managing a suite of programming focused on transnational corruption, and using its convening power and policy insights to forge strategic partnerships. Since 2022, USAID has released its first-ever Anti-Corruption Policy, which outlines a cross-sectoral approach to constraining opportunities for corruption, raising the costs of corruption, and incentivizing integrity – plus a host of tools to drive uptake across USAID.
FBI’s International Corruption Unit expanded an agreement with the State Department to deploy six regional anti-corruption advisors to strategic locations around the world, where they organize regional working groups with local law enforcement officials, provide case-base mentorship, and facilitate coordination with the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre.

Expanded interagency capacity has been complemented by the National Security Council’s establishment of a dedicated Director for Anti-Corruption position, for the first time, to ensure whole-of-government coordination and advance anti-corruption within key policy processes.
Leading in multilateral fora: The United States has regained its leadership role in the international bodies that shape anti-corruption norms globally and can sustain momentum across time. In particular, the United States stepped into the presidency of the UN Convention against Corruption Conference of States Parties (UNCAC COSP), proudly hosting in December 2023 thousands of stakeholders in Atlanta, Georgia, led by the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield. As part of its commitment to championing the role of non-governmental actors in the fight against corruption, the United States facilitated record civil society participation in UNCAC working group meetings, hosted the first UNCAC Private Sector Forum, and supported inclusive implementation of UNCAC commitments in Latin America, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The United States also participated in several peer reviews of our own anti-corruption practices over the last three years, and proudly made these results public. Alongside these multilateral fora, we convened the Global Forum on Asset Recovery action series to accelerate practitioner cooperation across the United States, Algeria, Honduras, Iraq, Moldova, Nigeria, Seychelles, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Zambia.
Understanding corruption dynamics: The Intelligence Community developed and disseminated new resources to bolster intelligence prioritization, collection and analysis on corrupt actors and their networks. USAID commissioned research on topics like countering corruption through social and behavioral change and State initiated an interagency anti-corruption learning agenda and a small grants program to support it.
Deepening external partnerships: The United States convened a series of coordination meetings with other bilateral donors and philanthropies in order to harmonize our anti-corruption approaches and galvanized anti-corruption resources across the donor community through the Integrity for Development campaign. USAID’s Countering Transnational Corruption Grand Challenge for Development brought together technologists, businesses, activists, and others to collaboratively address concrete corruption challenges.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: World Food Day (October 16, 2024)

Source: Republic of France in English
The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

On this World Food Day, France reaffirms its commitment to the fight against every form of food insecurity and malnutrition.

In 2023, 281.6 million people faced high levels of food insecurity, 24 million more than in 2022. One hundred fifty million children under the age of five are suffering from delayed growth and 37 million are underweight.

France is fully engaged in the fight against malnutrition, which affects health and education systems and economies worldwide.

On March 27 and 28, 2025, Paris will host the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) summit, which will bring together members of the entire international nutrition community (governments, international organizations, civil society, companies, scientists) to undertake concrete, ambitious commitments to help combat all forms of malnutrition.

In light of worsening food crises in conflict zones, particularly in Gaza and Sudan, France remains fully mobilized through financial support for international organizations and food aid projects. France is also the leading funder of the Grain from Ukraine program, which was launched in 2022 as a response to the impact of the Russian aggression on global food insecurity in seven countries : Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Palestine, Djibouti, Malawi and Zambia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO Defence Ministers to advance work on deterrence and defence, support to Ukraine and global partnerships

Source: NATO

As NATO Defence Ministers prepare to meet at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on Thursday and Friday (17-18 October 2024), Secretary General Mark Rutte previewed the expected outcomes of the meeting in a press conference at NATO Headquarters.

Allies need “to move further and faster to meet the growing threats we face”, he explained, adding that ”this requires more forces, capabilities and investment to meet the ambitious targets set by our defence plans.” Mr Rutte listed expanded defence industrial capacity, more robust supply chains and new technologies as critical to ensuring the Alliance remains resilient across all domains. He said he expected Ministers to greenlight a new NATO initiative to improve standardisation, explaining that “better implementation of standards can help reduce the cost of defence procurement, so this is essential work for NATO.”

The Secretary General reaffirmed that NATO stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukraine, both now and into the future. NATO Defence Ministers will meet with their Ukrainian counterpart, Rustem Umerov in the NATO-Ukraine Council on Thursday evening to discuss the battlefield situation and Ukraine’s most urgent needs. Mr Rutte indicated that work is well on track both to set up the new NATO command in Wiesbaden to coordinate security assistance and training for Ukraine, and to deliver on the pledge of 40 billion euros in military aid for Ukraine. He announced that “NATO Allies provided 20.9 billion euros in military assistance to Ukraine during the first half of 2024 and Allies are on track to meet their commitments for the rest of the year”, adding that “the message is clear: NATO is delivering for Ukraine, and we will continue to do so.”

The Defence Ministers’ meeting will also be an opportunity to exchange views on the current global security situation with NATO’s close partners in the Indo-Pacific and with the European Union. For the first time, Defence Ministers from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea are joining a NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting. “In this more interconnected world, it is vital that we tackle our shared security challenges together” the Secretary General concluded.

MIL Security OSI –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Meeting With Danish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Troels Lund Poulsen

Source: United States Department of Defense

Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder provided the following readout:

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III hosted Danish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Troels Lund Poulsen at the Pentagon yesterday.

The Secretary thanked Minister Poulsen for Denmark’s significant assistance to develop Ukraine’s military capabilities and defense industry. The two leaders exchanged views on the upcoming NATO Defense Ministerial Meeting and ensuring continued military assistance to Ukraine, both bilaterally and through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

Minister Poulsen and the Secretary also discussed opportunities to deepen and broaden bilateral defense cooperation, in light of the Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in December 2023. Secretary Austin congratulated Minister Poulsen on Denmark’s Defence Agreement that includes an historic increase in defense spending and commended the announcement that Denmark will exceed two percent of Gross Domestic Product spending on defense this year.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Why breakdancing can give you a cone-shaped head

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Taylor, Professor and Director of the Clinical Anatomy Learning Centre, Lancaster University

Master1305/Shutterstock

For those of a certain age, Coneheads is an iconic 90s film. But for breakdancers, it seems, developing a cone-shaped head can be an occupational hazard.

According to a 2024 medical case report, a breakdancer who’d been performing for 19 years was treated for “headspin hole”, a condition also known as “breakdancer bulge” that’s unique to breakdancers. It entails a cone shaped mass developing on top of the scalp after repetitive head-spinning. Additional symptoms can include hair loss and sometimes pain around the lump.

Approximately 30% of breakdancers report hair loss and inflammation of their scalp from head-spinning. A headspin hole is caused by the body trying to protect itself. The repeated trauma from head-spinning causes the epicranial aponeurosis – a layer of connective tissue similar to a tendon, running from the back of your head to the front – to thicken along with the layer of fat under the skin on top of the head in an attempt to protect the bones of skull from injury.

The body causes a similar protective reaction to friction on the hands and feet, where callouses form to spread the pressure and protect the underlying tissues from damage. Everyday repetitive activities from holding smartphones or heavy weights through to poorly fitting shoes can result in callouses.

But a cone-shaped head isn’t the only injury to which breakdancers are prone, however. Common issues can include wrist, knee, hip, ankle, foot and elbow injuries, and moves such as the “windmill” and the “backspin” can cause bursitis – inflammation of the fluid filled sacs that protect the vertebrae of the spine. A headspin hole isn’t the worst injury you could sustain from breakdancing either. One dancer broke their neck but thankfully they were lucky enough not to have any major complications.

Read more:
How do breakdancers avoid breaking their necks?

Others, such as Ukrainian breakdancer Anna Ponomarenko, have experienced pinched nerves that have left them paralysed. Ponomarenko recovered to represent her country in the Paris 2024 Olympics.

As with other sports, it’s unsurprising to hear that the use of protective equipment results in the reduction of injuries in breakdancing too.

But breakdancers aren’t the only ones to develop cone shaped heads.

Newborns

Some babies are born with a conical head after their pliable skull has been squeezed and squashed during the journey through the vaginal canal and the muscular contractions of mother’s uterus.

A misshapen head can also be caused by caput secundum, where fluid collects under the skin, above the skull bones. Usually, this condition resolves itself within a few days. Babies who’ve been delivered using a vacuum assisted cup (known as a Ventouse) – where the cup is applied to the top of the baby’s head to pull them out – can develop a similar fluid lump called a chignon.

Vacuum assisted delivery can also result in a more significant lump and bruising called a cephalohematoma, where blood vessels in the bones of the skull rupture. This is twice as common in boys than in girls and resolves within two weeks to six months.

If you’ve ever seen newborns wearing tiny hats in the first few hours of their life, then one of these conditions may be the reason.

Some children may also present with “cone-head” due to craniosynostosis, which occurs in about one in every 2,000-2,500 live births.

Newborn skulls are made up of lots of small bony plates that aren’t fused together, which enables babies’ brains to grow without restriction. Usually, once the brain reaches a slower growth pace that the bones can keep up with, the plates fuse together. In craniosynostosis, the plates fuse together too early creating differently shaped heads. Surgery can prevent brain growth restriction but is usually unnecessary if the child hasn’t been identified as having an shaped head by six months of age.

Adam Taylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Why breakdancing can give you a cone-shaped head – https://theconversation.com/why-breakdancing-can-give-you-a-cone-shaped-head-241182

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Zelensky unveils Ukraine’s ‘victory plan’

Source: China State Council Information Office

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Wednesday presented to parliament his “victory plan,” outlining Ukraine’s strategy in the ongoing conflict with Russia.

“If we begin implementing this Victory Plan now, we could end the war no later than the next year,” Zelensky was quoted by the Interfax-Ukraine news agency as saying.

Zelensky said the five-point plan covers geopolitical, military, economic, and security goals, emphasizing that inviting Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the “near future” is its key element.

Other proposals include lifting the current restrictions hindering Ukraine from using long-range Western weapons on targets inside Russia and placing a comprehensive non-nuclear strategic deterrence package in Ukraine, Zelensky said.

He also said the document envisages that Ukraine will jointly protect, use and invest in its critical resources with partners.

Besides, Kiev stands ready to replace U.S. military contingents in Europe with Ukrainian units after the end of the conflict, according to the plan, which also contains three classified annexes.

MIL OSI China News –

January 23, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Pål Jonson attends NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels

Source: Government of Sweden

Pål Jonson attends NATO defence ministers meeting in Brussels – Government.se

Press release from Ministry of Defence

Published 17 October 2024

On 17–18 October, Sweden’s Minister for Defence Pål Jonson will meet with his colleagues from other NATO member countries in Brussels. Part of the meeting will also be attended for the first time by the defence ministers of Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand – NATO’s partners known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4).

The agenda includes discussions on continuing and deepening NATO’s cooperation with the IP4.

At the meeting in Brussels, the NATO defence ministers will also discuss deeper cooperation between NATO and the EU, and reinforcements of NATO’s deterrence and defence capabilities.

They will also discuss continued support to Ukraine and the support being provided to Russia by Iran, China and North Korea.

This is the first NATO ministerial meeting led by new Secretary General Mark Rutte.

Press contact

More about the Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers on 17–18 October

More information about the Meeting of Defence Ministers on 17–18 October is available on the NATO website. Images and video material from the meeting will also be published on the website as they become available.

About the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. For the NAC’s day-to-day work, member countries are represented by their NATO Ambassadors.

The NAC meets a number of times a year at the levels of defence ministers, foreign ministers and heads of state and government. Normally, one NATO summit, two meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs and three meetings of NATO Defence Ministers are held each year. The NATO Secretary General chairs the NAC.

About Sweden in NATO

MIL OSI Europe News –

January 23, 2025

Category: Ukraine

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PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

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An interconnected world

NB8 and the support to Ukraine

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