NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Security: Update 300 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost all off-site power for several hours today, once again underlining the extremely fragile nuclear safety situation at the site, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

    The plant’s connection to its last remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) power line was cut at 17:37 local time today and restored around 21:11, forcing it to rely on emergency diesel generators for more than three and a half hours. While the cause was not immediately known, it coincided with air raid alarms in the region, Director General Grossi said, citing information from the Ukrainian nuclear regulator.

    It was the ninth time the ZNPP suffered a complete loss of off-site power since the conflict began in February 2022, and the first since 2 December 2023.

    The IAEA team based at the site, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), reported that 18 emergency diesel generators immediately started operating to generate the electricity the plant needs to be able to cool the reactors and the spent fuel pools. The plant has diesel fuel for at least 10 days on-site, and arrangements in place to secure further supplies. Once off-site power was restored, the diesel generators were switched off.

    “What was once virtually unimaginable – that a major nuclear power plant would repeatedly lose all of its external power connections – has unfortunately become a common occurrence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Almost three and a half years into this devastating war, nuclear safety in Ukraine remains very much in danger,” Director General Grossi said.

    “Our team on the ground will continue to follow the situation very closely and report on further developments there,” he said.

    The ZNPP’s six reactors have been in cold shutdown since 2024 but still require cooling water for their reactor cores and spent fuel pools. The ZNPP lost the connection to its last remaining 330 kV back-up power line on 7 May, leaving the plant dependent on its sole 750 kV line. Before the conflict, it had ten off-site power lines available, highlighting the extent to which nuclear safety has deteriorated since February 2022.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Russia is paying schoolgirls to have babies. Why is pronatalism on the rise around the world?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University

    In some parts of Russia, schoolgirls who become pregnant are being paid more than 100,000 roubles (nearly £900) for giving birth and raising their babies.

    This new measure, introduced in the past few months across ten regions, is part of Russia’s new demographic strategy, widening the policy adopted in March 2025 which only applied to adult women. It is designed to address the dramatic decline in the country’s birthrate.

    In 2023 the number of births in Russia per woman was 1.41 – substantially below 2.05, which is the level required to maintain a population at its current size.

    Paying teenage girls to have babies while they are still in school is controversial in Russia. According to a recent survey by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, 43% of Russians approve of the policy, while 40% are opposed to it. But it indicates the high priority that the state places on increasing the number of children being born.

    Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, regards a large population as one of the markers of a flourishing great power, along with control over a vast (and growing) territory and a powerful military. Paradoxically, though, his efforts to increase the physical size of Russia by attacking Ukraine and illegally annexing its territory have also been disastrous in terms of shrinking Russia’s population.

    The number of Russian soldiers killed in the war has reached 250,000 by some estimates, while the war sparked an exodus of hundreds of thousands of some of the most highly educated Russians. Many of them are young men fleeing military service who could have been fathers to the next generation of Russian citizens.

    But while Russia’s demographic situation is extreme, declining birth rates are now a global trend. It is estimated that by 2050 more than three quarters of the world’s countries will have such low fertility rates that they will not be able to sustain their populations.

    It’s not only Russia

    Putin is not the only world leader to introduce policies designed to encourage women to have more babies. Viktor Orban’s government in Hungary is offering a range of incentives, such as generous tax breaks and subsidised mortgages, to those who have three or more children.

    Poland makes a monthly payment of 500 złoty (£101) per child to families with two or more children. But there’s some evidence this has not prompted higher-income Polish women to have more children, as they might have to sacrifice higher earnings and career advancement to have another child.

    In the United States, Donald Trump is proposing to pay women US$5,000 (£3,682) to have a baby, tied to a wider Maga movement push, supported by Elon Musk and others, to encourage women to have larger families.

    Reversing demographic trends is complex, because the reasons that individuals and couples have for becoming parents are also complex. Personal preferences and aspirations, beliefs about their ability to provide for children, as well as societal norms and cultural and religious values all play a part in these decisions.

    As a result, the impact of “pronatalist” policies has been mixed. No country has found an easy way to reverse declining birth rates.

    One country seeking to address population decline with policies, other than encouraging women to have more babies is Spain, which now allows an easier pathway to citizenship for migrants, including those who entered the country illegally. Madrid’s embrace of immigrants is being credited for its current economic boom.

    The US is seeing a pronatalist movement become more vocal.

    Looking for particular types of families

    But governments that adopt pronatalist policies tend to be concerned, not simply with increasing the total number of people living and working in their countries, but with encouraging certain kinds of people to reproduce. In other words, there is often an ideological dimension to these practices.

    Incentives for pregnancy, childbirth and large families are typically targeted at those whom the state regards as its most desirable citizens. These people may be desirable citizens due to their race, ethnicity, language, religion, sexual orientation or some other identity or combination of identities.



    Read more:
    Putin forced to send wounded back to fight and offer huge military salaries as Russia suffers a million casualties

    For instance, the Spanish bid to increase the population by increasing immigration offers mostly Spanish speakers from Catholic countries in Latin America jobs while opportunities to remain in, or move to, the country does appear to be extended to migrants from Africa. Meanwhile, Hungary’s incentives to families are only available to heterosexual couples who earn high incomes.

    Elon Musk believes people need to have more children.

    The emphasis on increasing the proportion of the most desirable citizens is why the Trump administration sees no contradiction in calling for more babies to be born in the US, while ordering the arrest and deportation of hundreds of alleged illegal migrants, attempting to reverse the constitutional guarantee of US citizenship for anyone born in the country and even attempting to withdraw citizenship from some Americans.

    Which mothers do they want?

    The success or failure of governments and societies that promote pronatalism hinges on their ability to persuade people – and especially women – to embrace parenthood. Along with financial incentives and other tangible rewards for having babies, some states offer praise and recognition for the mothers of large families.

    Putin’s reintroduction of the Stalin-era motherhood medal for women with ten or more children is one example. Sometimes the recognition comes from society, such as the current American fascination with “trad wives” – women who become social media influencers by turning their backs on careers in favour of raising large numbers of children and living socially conservative lifestyles.

    The mirror image of this celebration of motherhood is the implicit or explicit criticism of women who delay childbirth or reject it altogether. Russia’s parliament passed a law in 2024 to ban the promotion of childlessness, or “child-free propaganda”. This legislation joins other measures such as restrictions on abortions in private clinics, together with public condemnation of women who choose to study at university and pursue careers rather than prioritise marriage and child-rearing.

    The world’s most prosperous states would be embracing immigration if pronatalist policies were driven solely by the need to ensure a sufficient workforce to support the economy and society. Instead, these attempts are often bound up with efforts to restrict or dictate the choices that citizens – and especially women – make about their personal lives, and to create a population dominated by the types of the people they favour.

    Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Russia is paying schoolgirls to have babies. Why is pronatalism on the rise around the world? – https://theconversation.com/russia-is-paying-schoolgirls-to-have-babies-why-is-pronatalism-on-the-rise-around-the-world-258979

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: War, politics and religion shape wildlife evolution in cities

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Elizabeth Carlen, Living Earth Collaborative Postdoctoral Fellow, Washington University in St. Louis

    A Buddhist monk in Hong Kong releases fish and chants prayers during a ceremony to free the spirits of tsunami victims. Samantha Sin/AFP via Getty Images

    People often consider evolution to be a process that occurs in nature in the background of human society. But evolution is not separate from human beings. In fact, human cultural practices can influence evolution in wildlife. This influence is highly pronounced in cities, where people drastically alter landscapes to meet their own needs.

    Human actions can affect wildlife evolution in a number of ways. If people fragment habitat, separated wildlife populations can evolve to be more and more different from each other. If people change certain local conditions, it can pressure organisms in new ways that mean different genes are favored by natural selection and passed on to offspring – another form of evolution that can be driven by what people do.

    In a recent review, evolutionary biologists Marta Szulkin, Colin Garroway and I, in collaboration with scientists spread across five continents, explored how cultural processes – including religion, politics and war – shape urban evolution. We reviewed dozens of empirical studies about urban wildlife around the globe. Our work highlights which human cultural practices have and continue to shape the evolutionary trajectory of wild animals and plants.

    Religious practices

    If you’ve traveled internationally, you may have noticed the menu at any one McDonald’s restaurant is shaped by the local culture of its location. In the United Arab Emirates, McDonald’s serves an entirely halal menu. Vegetarian items are common and no beef is served in Indian McDonald’s. And in the United States, McDonald’s Filet-O-Fish is especially popular during Lent when observant Catholics don’t consume meat on Fridays.

    Similarly, ecosystems of cities are shaped by local cultural practices. Because all wildlife are connected to the environment, cultural practices that alter the landscape shape the evolution of urban organisms.

    Populations of fire salamanders have different genes depending on which side of city walls in Oviedo, Spain, they live on.
    Patrice Skrzynski via Getty Images

    For example, in Oviedo, Spain, people constructed walls around religious buildings between the 12th and 16th centuries. This division of the city led to different populations of fire salamanders inside and outside the walls. Because salamanders can’t scale these walls, those on opposite sides became isolated from each other and unable to pass genes back and forth. In a process that scientists call genetic drift, over time salamanders on the two sides became genetically distinct − evidence of the two populations evolving independently.

    Imagine dumping out a handful of M&Ms. Just by chance, some colors might be overrepresented and others might be missing. In the same way, genes that are overrepresented on one side of the wall can be in low numbers or missing on the other side. That’s genetic drift.

    Introducing non-native wildlife is another way people can alter urban ecosystems and evolutionary processes. For example, prayer animal release is a practice that started in the fifth or sixth century in some sects of Buddhism. Practitioners who strive to cause no harm to any living creature release captive animals, which benefits the animal and is meant to improve the karma of the person who released it.

    However, these animals are often captured from the wild or come from the pet trade, thereby introducing non-native wildlife into the urban ecosystem. Non-natives may compete with local species and contribute to the local extinction of native wildlife. Capturing animals nearby has downsides, too. It can diminish local populations, since many die traveling to the release ceremony. The genetic diversity of these local populations in turn decreases, reducing the population’s ability to survive.

    More than a thousand sparrows killed by peasants in 1958 are displayed on a cart near Beijing, China.
    Sovphoto/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

    Influence of politics

    Politically motivated campaigns have shaped wildlife in various ways.

    Starting in 1958, for instance, the Chinese Communist Party led a movement to eliminate four species that were considered pests: rats, flies, mosquitoes and sparrows. While the first three are commonly considered pests around the world, sparrows made the list because they were “public animals of capitalism” due to their fondness for grain. The extermination campaign ended up decimating the sparrow population and damaging the entire ecosystem. With sparrows no longer hunting and eating insects, crop pests such as locusts thrived, leading to crop destruction and famine.

    In the United States, racial politics may be shaping evolutionary processes in wildlife.
    For instance, American highways traverse cities according to political agendas and have often dismantled poor neighborhoods of color to make way for multilane thoroughfares. These highways can change how animals are able to disperse and commingle. For example, they prevent bobcats and coyotes from traveling throughout Los Angeles, leading to similar patterns of population differentiation as seen in fire salamanders in Spain.

    Wildlife during and after war

    Human religious and political agendas often lead to armed conflict. Wars are known to dramatically alter the environment, as seen in current conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine.

    The Russia-Ukraine war affected migration of greater spotted eagles.
    Nimit Virdi via Getty Images

    While documenting evolutionary changes to urban wildlife is secondary to keeping people safe during wartime, a handful of studies on wildlife have come out of active war zones. For example, the current Russia-Ukraine war affected the migration of greater spotted eagles. They made large diversions around the active war zone, arriving later than usual at their breeding grounds. The longer route increased the energy the eagles used during migration and likely influenced their fitness during breeding.

    Wars limit access to resources for people living in active war zones. The lack of energy to heat homes in Ukraine during the winter has led urban residents to harvest wood from nearby forests. This harvesting will have long-term consequences on forest dynamics, likely altering future evolutionary potential.

    A similar example is famine that occurred during the Democratic Republic of Congo’s civil wars (1996-1997, 1998-2003) and led to an increase in bushmeat consumption. This wildlife hunting is known to reduce primate population sizes, making them more susceptible to local extinction.

    Even after war, landscapes experience consequences.

    For example, the demilitarized zone between North Korea and South Korea is a 160-mile (250-kilometer) barrier, established in 1953, separating the two countries. Heavily fortified with razor wire and landmines, the demilitarized zone has become a de facto nature sanctuary supporting thousands of species, including dozens of endangered species.

    The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to the establishment of the European Green Belt, which runs along the same path as the Iron Curtain. This protected ecological network is over 7,800 miles (12,500 kilometers) long, allowing wildlife to move freely across 24 countries in Europe. Like the Korean DMZ, the European Green Belt allows for wildlife to move, breed and exchange genes, despite political boundaries. Politics has removed human influence from these spaces, allowing them to be a safe haven for wildlife.

    While researchers have documented a number of examples of wildlife evolving in response to human history and cultural practices, there’s plenty more to uncover. Cultures differ around the world, meaning each city has its own set of variables that shape the evolutionary processes of wildlife. Understanding how these human cultural practices shape evolutionary patterns will allow people to better design cities that support both humans and the wildlife that call these places home.

    Ideas for this article were developed as part of a NSF funded Research Coordination Network (DEB 1840663). Elizabeth Carlen was funded by the Living Earth Collaborative.

    – ref. War, politics and religion shape wildlife evolution in cities – https://theconversation.com/war-politics-and-religion-shape-wildlife-evolution-in-cities-260184

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – SAFE in name only: the EU regulation that will be paid for by ordinary people in blood, money, new and major sacrifices and significant adversities – E-002579/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002579/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kostas Papadakis (NI)

    The introduction of the SAFE Regulation is evidence of the EU’s deeper involvement in dangerous war planning and a shift to the ‘war economy’, in the context of competition with Russia, China and the US. The regulation envisages the participation of ‘like-minded third countries’, such as Türkiye – a country which challenges the borders and sovereign rights of Member States such as Greece, while occupying 37 % of the territory of Cyprus without recognising it.

    In view of this, can the Commission say:

    • 1.What view does it take of the fact that the SAFE Regulation intensifies competition between the EU and China, Russia and the US, promoting dangerous planning and a deeper involvement in war, actions which are already jeopardising – and harming – the safety ordinary people?
    • 2.What view does it take of the need – which is at odds with the EU’s war economy plans – to raise salaries and pensions, to reinstate 13th and 14th salaries and pensions for public sector employees and to increase health, education and welfare expenditure in order to meet the needs of workers rather than to finance groups in the EU’s war industry, which, through their dangerous planning, create new avenues for profit, with unpredictable risks for ordinary people?
    • 3.What view does it take of the fact that the SAFE Regulation involves so-called ‘third countries’, including Ukraine on the grounds of Russia’s invasion and occupation of its territories, while Türkiye – a country which has, among other things, invaded and occupied territories of Cyprus, an EU Member State, since 1974 and which challenges the borders and sovereign rights of Greece – is participating in the same programme?

    Submitted: 26.6.2025

    Last updated: 4 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Military mobility – 04-07-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drawn renewed attention to military mobility, highlighting the need for rapid cross-border movement of troops and equipment to strengthen deterrence and defence. Challenges such as outdated bridges, tunnels and railways, along with inconsistent regulations across EU Member States, impede swift military movements. Building on the first EU action plan on military mobility launched in 2018, the action plan on military mobility 2.0, adopted in November 2022, expands infrastructure upgrades, regulatory harmonisation and operational readiness. Two joint annual reports from the European Parliament and the Council show progress in implementing the action plans: €1.76 billion have funded 95 projects in 21 Member States, including €807 million in the latest round. The revised Regulation on the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) now legally recognises military mobility, and four strategic corridors have been identified in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European External Action Service. Operational readiness has also improved through streamlined customs and transport procedures, enhanced fuel supply chains, and joint exercises, while partnerships with NATO and third countries have deepened. The March 2025 White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 underscores military mobility as a critical enabler for EU security, identifying urgent investments, harmonised design standards, and regulatory reforms to remove persistent barriers and strengthen resilience of dual-use (civilian and military) infrastructure. However, the European Court of Auditors warns that funding remains insufficient, strategic focus is lacking, and project selection overlooks geopolitical priorities, while bureaucratic barriers remain. Persistent challenges include underfunding, fragmented procedures, limited strategic coherence, and the need for greater coordination with NATO. The European Parliament supports an integrated approach with harmonised regulations, increased dual-use investments, swift project implementation, greater partner participation under the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), and a deepened partnership with NATO. At the same time, Parliament stresses the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians – RC-B10-0304/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Lena Düpont, Jan Farský, Mircea‑Gheorghe Hava, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Ewa Kopacz, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Liudas Mažylis, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Oliver Schenk, Michał Szczerba, Davor Ivo Stier, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Roberts Zīle, Reinis Pozņaks, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Alexandr Vondra, Assita Kanko, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Anna‑Maja Henriksson, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sergey Lagodinsky
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians

    (2025/2710(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia,

    – having regard to the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Convention Against Torture, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UN Convention on the rights of the child,

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part[1], and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,

    – having regard to all relevant resolutions by the UN General Assembly and Security Council, in particular UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 25 February 2025,

    – having regard to the NATO Washington Summit Declaration of 10 July 2024 and the Hague Summit Declaration of 25 June 2025,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Russia has been waging a brutal, illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022;

    B. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine did not begin in February 2022, but in 2014, with the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with severe humanitarian, economic and ecological consequences and resulting in regional instability; whereas Russia could stop the brutal and unjustified war of aggression at any time;

    C. whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold Russia accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injuries and damage caused;

    D. whereas thus far in 2025, Russia has deployed over 20 000 drones against Ukraine, or around 3 500 per month, representing a 350 % increase compared to the 2024 monthly average; whereas Russia has killed over 1 050 civilians and injured 4 300 more, constituting clear evidence that it actively targets civilians, including ambulances and rescue personnel, in contrast to Ukraine’s defensive actions; whereas the recent attacks on Kyiv and Dnipro were the second deadliest and the deadliest attacks on these cities since the start of Russia’s invasion, starkly conflicting with Russia’s claims that it is interested in peace;

    E. whereas, as a reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has adopted 17 sanctions packages of unprecedented scope against Russia and continues to adopt sanctions against Russia with a view to definitively undermining its capacity to continue waging its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the circumvention of sanctions, including through Russia’s shadow fleet and the incomplete implementation of sanctions, remain a major enabler of Russia’s war of aggression; whereas despite these and other sanctions, Russia continues to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine;

    F. whereas the US has again halted supplies of crucial military assistance to Ukraine;

    G. whereas Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has caused the largest forced displacement of civilians in Europe since the Second World War, with 10 million Ukrainians – mostly women and children – displaced, including 7 million who have found refuge abroad[2];

    H. whereas Russia continues unabated to commit heinous war crimes against innocent civilians; whereas according to the Ukrainian authorities, approximately 16 000 Ukrainian civilians are known to be currently detained in Russia and the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, although the real figures are likely to be significantly higher; whereas more than 70 000 Ukrainians – including civilians, children, and military personnel – are officially listed as missing;

    I. whereas the Russian authorities have systematically carried out enforced disappearances against large numbers of Ukrainian civilians, detaining individuals with no military affiliation on baseless and fabricated charges, with their fate and whereabouts remaining unknown, leaving their families in agonising uncertainty; whereas enforced disappearances by Russia are part of a widespread, systematic and coordinated assault on Ukraine’s civilian population;

    J. whereas, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at least 29 civilians have died in custody in Russian detention facilities, and 170 have been executed in areas under Russian control since February 2022;

    K. whereas throughout the process of enforced disappearances, the Russian authorities have consistently failed to inform the families of the fate or location of their loved ones; whereas multiple responses from various authorities have likewise failed to provide any meaningful information;

    L. whereas the Russian authorities have systematically employed torture and other forms of inhumane and degrading treatment against numerous illegally detained Ukrainian civilians; whereas the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine has found evidence of Russia using rape and sexual violence as means of torture against both male and female detainees;

    M. whereas Russia refuses to disclose the number of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) it currently holds; whereas the Russian authorities are blatantly failing to meet their obligations under the Geneva Conventions to allow international representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisoners and to transmit the relevant information to the ICRC, state authorities and the families of POWs;

    N. whereas Ukrainian POWs and civilian captives are subjected to torture, including starvation, beatings, various types of coercion, physical, sexual and psychological violence and denial of medical care and legal representation;

    O. whereas Ukraine and international bodies have documented hundreds of executions of Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces since February 2022; whereas the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine is investigating the execution of 268 Ukrainian POWs (208 on the battlefield and 59 in the ‘Olenivka’ prison); whereas the increasing number of executions and available evidence suggests that these crimes are not isolated incidents but part of a systematic and deliberate policy, constituting serious violations of international law and human rights, and war crimes under the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute;

    P. whereas Ukraine and Russia have conducted 65 prisoner exchanges since February 2022, resulting in the release of 5 757 people, including three large-scale exchanges in May 2025, with an additional 469 individuals released outside formal exchange mechanisms;

    Q. whereas since the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has systematically targeted Crimean Tatars with politically motivated prosecutions, enforced disappearances, intimidation and harassment; whereas Crimean Tatar leaders, journalists, civil society activists and religious figures have faced disproportionate repression, including under the guise of anti-extremism and anti-terrorism charges; whereas these actions amount to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and aim to erase the identity and presence of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people;

    R. whereas Russia, while posturing as a defender of the Christian faith and values, has been conducting mass and systematic violations of religious rights in occupied Ukrainian territories, with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church banned outright, at least 47 Ukrainian religious leaders killed and more subjected to torture, and religious property willingly targeted and destroyed by Russian forces; whereas in parallel Russia weaponises the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate as a tool to tyrannise and control religious communities and the Ukrainian population more broadly;

    S. whereas the torture and killing of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in Russian captivity highlights the grave and growing dangers faced by Ukrainian journalists held by Russian forces; whereas others, including Iryna Danylovych, Dmytro Khyliuk, Iryna Levchenko and Heorhiy Levchenko, remain in detention under life-threatening conditions;

    T. whereas according to the ‘Bring Kids Back UA’ initiative and the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), since February 2022 around at least 20 000 and possibly up to 35 000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia and Belarus or detained in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, with only 1 366 returned and 637 confirmed dead; whereas the real figures are assumed to be much higher, as these transfers and deportations continue; whereas the HRL’s Ukraine Conflict Observatory has had its funding cut as of 1 July by the Trump administration, jeopardising the continuation of its work;

    U. whereas the ICC has been conducting an investigation into the situation in Ukraine since 2 March 2022 and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, followed up by additional arrest warrants against Russian officials issued on 24 June 2024; whereas the EU supports the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression that is being established in the framework of the Council of Europe;

    1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russia immediately cease all military activities in Ukraine, fully withdraw from Ukraine’s internationally recognised territory, end forced deportations, release all detained and deported Ukrainians and compensate Ukraine and victims of war crimes; reiterates its condemnation of Belarus’s direct involvement in Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine;

    2. Confirms its unwavering commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders and reiterates its policy of non-recognition of Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by Russia; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which entails the right to strike military targets on Russian soil;

    3. Reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine in their heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared European values; reiterates its belief that a strong, independent and democratic Ukraine is vital for Europe’s security, stability and prosperity; calls for the EU and all its 27 Member States to substantially enhance the effectiveness and accelerate the delivery of military support to Ukraine in order to allow Ukraine to legitimately defend itself against Russia’s escalating attacks on cities and civilian infrastructure across the country, and to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position for negotiations;

    4. Condemns Vladimir Putin’s ongoing revisionist and imperialist rhetoric and ideology, and treacherous propaganda; denounces the systematic attempts by the Russian Government to erase Ukraine’s history, culture, language and identity;

    5. Stresses that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered peace and stability in Europe and gravely undermined global security; underscores that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to European security;

    6. Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian POWs by Russian forces, constituting war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;

    7. Reiterates that Russia bears sole responsibility for its war of aggression and that there can be no impunity for violations of human rights, war crimes, or other breaches of international law committed by Russian forces and officials; expresses deep outrage at Russia’s brutal attacks on civilians and the indiscriminate targeting of civilian infrastructure; stresses that the systematic and deliberate targeting of civilians and, in particular, the deportation of children may constitute a genocidal strategy orchestrated and executed by the Russian Government;

    8. Fully supports the ICC’s ongoing investigations into the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russia; welcomes the recent agreement between the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine; emphasises that all those responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine must be held accountable and stresses that justice is essential for any sustainable peace; expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions on the ICC and its prosecutors, judges and staff, which undermine all its ongoing investigative and prosecutorial work and constitute a serious attack on the system of international justice; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to urgently step up their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the system of international justice;

    9. Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s forcible deportation, illegal detention and inhumane treatment of countless Ukrainian civilians; demands that Russia immediately provide families with accurate information regarding the whereabouts and state of health of detainees and calls for the immediate release of all the Ukrainian civilians currently held captive by the Russian authorities; underscores that the forced displacement, unlawful detention and mistreatment of Ukrainian civilians exemplify the intrinsic brutality of the Russian regime and its flagrant disregard for human life; strongly condemns the gruesome tactics deployed by the Russian authorities against both Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war; deplores the wide and systematic use of terror in Ukraine’s occupied territories, aimed at intimidating the civilian population, stifling resistance and political dissent, suppressing civic activism and eradicating the Ukrainian language and national identity;

    10. Condemns the ongoing persecution of Crimean Tatars in illegally occupied Crimea, including politically motivated detentions, torture, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association; calls for the immediate release of all Crimean Tatars imprisoned on political grounds and urges the EU and international organisations to enhance monitoring and advocacy on behalf of the indigenous people of Crimea;

    11. Urges Russia to immediately agree to and implement a comprehensive ‘all-for-all’ exchange of POWs with Ukraine, in accordance with its obligations under international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

    12. Strongly condemns Russia’s violent actions and the complicity of Belarus in the mistreatment of Ukrainian children, including murder, torture and criminal prosecution, forced transfer and deportation, sexual abuse and exploitation, forced Russification and militarisation; denounces the forced imposition of Russian citizenship on deported children and their state-sponsored adoption by Russian families as part of a deliberate policy of forced assimilation; regrets that the EU was unable to help Yale’s HRL secure sufficient funding; calls on its Member States to closely cooperate with and support the Ukrainian authorities and local and international non-governmental organisations in their efforts to document all missing and deported Ukrainian children, determine their whereabouts and repatriate them in order to promptly reunite them with their parents or legal guardians; reiterates that the deportation of Ukrainian children is a grave violation of international humanitarian law, in particular of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and constitutes a war crime; urges the EU to hold those responsible to account and to sanction individuals and entities implicated in these crimes;

    13. Demands that, in line with its obligations under the respective Geneva Conventions, Russia grant the ICRC immediate access to POW camps and other sites where Ukrainian soldiers or civilians are being held captive; notes the marked difference in the way Ukraine and Russia have treated the POWs they hold, with Ukrainian military personnel having been severely tortured, maltreated and malnourished, in violation of the laws of war and international humanitarian law;

    14. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to increase humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance for victims of Russian captivity, including access to medical and psychological care, reintegration services and legal assistance; commends Ukrainian and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, POWs and illegally detained civilians;

    15. Reaffirms the EU’s steadfast commitment to the reconstruction of Ukraine and reiterates its readiness to contribute to rebuilding Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure; stresses the strategic importance of the Ukraine Facility in reinforcing Ukraine’s resilience, accelerating its recovery, and supporting its path towards sustainable development and EU membership; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and therefore calls for the confiscation of Russian state assets immobilised under EU sanctions or otherwise for their use to support Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction; underlines its conviction that various legal pathways to do so are available and that lack of action is an inexcusable failure on the part of European governments;

    16. Condemns the Russian State Duma’s protocol adopted on 24 June 2025 allowing the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to deploy their troops on the territory of other members in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations and military exercises; condemns this step as a clear attempt by Russia to further scale up its relentless attacks on Ukraine by forcibly mobilising troops from neighbouring and allied states;

    17. Strongly condemns the recruitment and deployment of Cuban soldiers in addition to the involvement of North Korean troops;

    18. Urges all Member States to immediately provide further military assistance and to engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular air defence, long range strike and artillery systems and ammunition; in that regard, urges all Member States to devote a significant part of their SAFE Defence Investment Plans to assistance for Ukraine; urges the Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry, including through additional investments and setting up joint ventures, in order to maximise the full potential of its production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient way;

    19. Recalls the bold statements by several EU Heads of State and Government that Russia’s failure to agree to the US-proposed 30-day ceasefire would be met with severely enhanced sanctions and therefore urges the Council, the Commission and the Member States to follow-up on their declarations and substantially increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia; welcomes the seventeenth sanctions package of 20 May 2025 but urges the Member States to adopt the next sanctions package without further delay; underlines that there is a current strategic imperative to act boldly now; stresses that the negative global security and economic consequences of any future Russian aggression far outweigh the military and financial commitment needed today to definitively end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to deter further Russian aggression and achieve a just, fair and lasting peace; resolutely calls on the EU Member States to stop their shameful business as usual approach and instead act with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose;

    20. Believes that in order to pressure Russia to end its war of aggression, beginning with a sustained ceasefire, substantially more effective military, economic, political and diplomatic efforts and measures must be applied by the EU and like-minded partners; calls for all necessary steps to be taken to avoid the circumvention of sanctions, in particular by targeting Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ vessels; calls for a full ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil and raw materials, and interim measures to minimise Russia’s ability to pay for its war of aggression through energy exports, including a lower oil price cap and the introduction of an LNG price cap; underlines the importance of adopting the 18th sanctions package without further delay; calls on the Member States that are blocking the adoption of the latest sanctions package to follow other Member States, which have successfully found alternative sources for oil and gas deliveries; underlines that it is unacceptable that, in the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, Russian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in attacks continue to rely heavily on Western-manufactured components;

    21. Recalls that the overall support for Ukraine must be sufficient to stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; recalls that Europe has already supported Ukraine with EUR 50 billion in military aid, but underlines that further assistance is required and that such support now depends largely on Europe itself; urges the Member States to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine before any negotiations are concluded; denounces any attempts to pressure Ukraine to cede occupied territory, in which the population is exposed to continued repression, violence, forced disappearances, illegal detentions, deportations and other forms of systematic terror;

    22. Calls on the EU to impose personal sanctions against Russian officials responsible for violence and torture against imprisoned and detained Ukrainians;

    23. Expresses its full support for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, based on terms determined by Ukraine and acceptable to its people; stresses that any agreement must uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, prevent Russia from rearming and guarantee Ukraine’s long-term security; insists on accountability for war crimes and on reparations; underlines that peace negotiations must be preceded by an unconditional ceasefire;

    24. Stresses that in the light of the shift in the US stance on Russia’s war of aggression, the EU and its Member States must remain Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and should reinforce their leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty, peace and justice; calls for the EU and its Member States to work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building coalitions with like-minded non-EU partners;

    25. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the President, Government and Parliament of Ukraine, and to the authorities of Russia and Belarus.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky and D. Trump agreed to hold a meeting of representatives of the two countries to strengthen the Ukrainian air defense system

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, July 4 (Xinhua) — Ukrainian and US Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump held a telephone conversation during which they agreed to hold a meeting of delegations from the two countries to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense system, Zelensky said on his Telegram channel on Friday.

    The Ukrainian leader noted that during the conversation he discussed with D. Trump Russian air strikes on Ukraine and the situation at the front. The parties agreed to strengthen the protection of the skies over the country, as well as to organize a meeting of representatives of Ukraine and the United States to discuss this issue.

    Separately, V. Zelensky and D. Trump exchanged views on cooperation between the two countries in the defense industry and prospects for establishing joint production. The President of Ukraine expressed his readiness to implement direct projects with the United States, in particular in the field of drone manufacturing.

    Issues of mutual purchases and investments were also raised during the negotiations.

    Earlier this week, the media reported that the Pentagon had suspended the supply of certain types of air defense missiles and other precision-guided munitions to Ukraine due to the depletion of U.S. stockpiles. After this, V. Zelensky said that official Kyiv was clarifying the details of further military aid from Washington at all working levels. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: FlixBus bus overturns in northeastern Germany, injuring at least 23

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BERLIN, July 4 (Xinhua) — At least 23 people were injured, one of them seriously, after a FlixBus long-distance bus traveling from Denmark to Austria overturned early Friday in northeastern Germany, German police said.

    The accident occurred at around 2:40 a.m. local time on the A19 motorway in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern as the bus traveled to Berlin. According to law enforcement, the passenger with the most serious injuries remained trapped inside the vehicle for two hours before being rescued and airlifted to a Berlin hospital.

    The police noted that information about the number of victims and the severity of their injuries is not final, since the investigation is ongoing.

    There were 54 passengers and two drivers on the bus at the time of the accident. According to local media, the passengers included citizens of at least 20 countries, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, France, Italy, Australia, Syria, Japan and China. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russia and Ukraine Conducted Another Exchange of Prisoners of War — Russian Defense Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 4 /Xinhua/ — Russia and Ukraine on Friday held another round of prisoner of war exchanges as part of the agreements reached in Istanbul, the Russian Defense Ministry reported.

    “On July 4, in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian agreements reached on June 2 in Istanbul, another group of Russian servicemen was returned from the territory controlled by the Kyiv regime. In exchange, a group of prisoners of war of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was transferred,” the ministry said in a statement.

    It is noted that Russian military personnel are currently in Belarus, where they are receiving the necessary psychological and medical assistance.

    “All Russian military personnel will be transported to the Russian Federation for treatment and rehabilitation in medical institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defense,” the Russian Ministry of Defense stated.

    Let us recall that Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the exchange of prisoners of war were reached in Istanbul on June 2. Two categories of prisoners are subject to the “all for all” exchange: the wounded and seriously ill, as well as persons under 25 years of age. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO welcomes new Supreme Allied Commander Europe

    Source: NATO

    General Alexus G. Grynkewich of the US Air Force assumed command of Allied Command Operations in a ceremony at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium on Friday (4 July 2025). General Grynkewich succeeds General Chris Cavoli of the US Army, who had been in post since 2022.

    NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte commended General Cavoli for modernising NATO’s collective defence and for his work responding to the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He thanked General Cavoli for strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea, to deter and defend against threats targeting Allies’ critical undersea infrastructure, as well as for conceiving and establishing NATO’s new command in Germany, which is bolstering support to Ukraine. “You have been an outstanding SACEUR, leading with honour and integrity,” said Mr Rutte. 

    The Secretary General welcomed General Grynkewich, noting that he brings a wealth of experience to the post of SACEUR. As a former fighter pilot, General Grynkewich has “a deep understanding of the threats we face from the skies, and across other domains,” said Mr Rutte.  As the latest Director of Operations of the Joint Staff, he also has wide experience of delivering military and security priorities in the face of global challenges. “I know NATO can count on you to serve with the same steadfast resolve as your predecessors,” the Secretary General concluded.

    Allied Command Operations is responsible for the planning and execution of all NATO operations. General Grynkewich is the twenty-first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The first to occupy the post was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, subsequently the 34th President of the United States. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: NATO welcomes new Supreme Allied Commander Europe

    Source: NATO

    General Alexus G. Grynkewich of the US Air Force assumed command of Allied Command Operations in a ceremony at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium on Friday (4 July 2025). General Grynkewich succeeds General Chris Cavoli of the US Army, who had been in post since 2022.

    NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte commended General Cavoli for modernising NATO’s collective defence and for his work responding to the ongoing Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He thanked General Cavoli for strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea, to deter and defend against threats targeting Allies’ critical undersea infrastructure, as well as for conceiving and establishing NATO’s new command in Germany, which is bolstering support to Ukraine. “You have been an outstanding SACEUR, leading with honour and integrity,” said Mr Rutte. 

    The Secretary General welcomed General Grynkewich, noting that he brings a wealth of experience to the post of SACEUR. As a former fighter pilot, General Grynkewich has “a deep understanding of the threats we face from the skies, and across other domains,” said Mr Rutte.  As the latest Director of Operations of the Joint Staff, he also has wide experience of delivering military and security priorities in the face of global challenges. “I know NATO can count on you to serve with the same steadfast resolve as your predecessors,” the Secretary General concluded.

    Allied Command Operations is responsible for the planning and execution of all NATO operations. General Grynkewich is the twenty-first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The first to occupy the post was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, subsequently the 34th President of the United States. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Wednesday, 9 July 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    88 Objection pursuant to Rule 114(3): amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add certain countries to the list of high-risk third countries, and to remove other countries from that list     – Amendments Friday, 4 July 2025, 12:00 83 Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Deforestation Regulation – list of countries presenting a low or high risk     – Amendments Friday, 4 July 2025, 12:00 25 Amending Regulation (EU) No 1026/2012 on certain measures for the purpose of the conservation of fish stocks in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing
    Thomas Bajada (A10-0070/2025)      – Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 48 Draft amending budget no 1/2025: entering the surplus of the financial year 2024
    Victor Negrescu (A10-0116/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 52 Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods that occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods that occurred in October 2024
    Andrzej Halicki (A10-0114/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 53 Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Application EGF/2025/000 TA 2025 – Technical assistance at the initiative of the Commission
    Jean-Marc Germain (A10-0115/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 27 Product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports
    Salvatore De Meo (A10-0133/2025)      – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Thursday, 3 July 2025, 13:00     – Joint alternative motions for resolutions Friday, 4 July 2025, 12:00 19 2023 and 2024 reports on Albania
    Andreas Schieder (A10-0106/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 18 2023 and 2024 reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina
    Ondřej Kolář (A10-0108/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 46 2023 and 2024 reports on North Macedonia
    Thomas Waitz (A10-0118/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 17 2023 and 2024 reports on Georgia
    Rasa Juknevičienė (A10-0110/2025)      – Amendments Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 28 Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum
    Robert Biedroń, Nikolas Farantouris (A10-0125/2025)      – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least, Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00 60 The human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians     – Motions for resolutions Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Friday, 4 July 2025, 12:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Friday, 4 July 2025, 13:00 80 Case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 July 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 14:00 81 Arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 July 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 14:00 82 Urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 July 2025, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 4 July 2025, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 7 July 2025, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 8 July 2025, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 July 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • Russia pounds Kyiv with largest drone attack, hours after Trump-Putin call

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russia pummelled Kyiv with the largest drone attack of the war, injuring at least 23 people and damaging buildings across the capital only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, officials said on Friday.

    Air raid sirens, the whine of kamikaze drones and booming detonations reverberated from early evening until dawn as Russia launched what Ukraine’s Air Force said was a total of 539 drones and 11 missiles.

    Residents huddled with families in underground metro stations for shelter. Acrid smoke hung over the city centre.

    President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is due to speak to Trump later on Friday about the war and a U.S. pause in some deliveries of air defence missiles, called the attack “deliberately massive and cynical.”

    “Notably, the first air raid alerts in our cities and regions yesterday began to blare almost simultaneously with media reports discussing a phone call between President Trump and Putin,” Zelenskiy said on X.

    “Yet again, Russia is showing it has no intention of ending the war and terror,” he added, calling for increased pressure on Russia and more air defence equipment.

    Kyiv officials said the attack damaged about 40 apartment blocks, passenger railway infrastructure, five schools and kindergartens, cafes and many cars in six of Kyiv’s 10 districts. Poland said the consular section of its embassy was damaged in central Kyiv, adding that staff were unharmed.

    Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that fourteen of the injured were hospitalised.

    Ukraine’s state-owned railway Ukrzaliznytsia, the country’s largest carrier, said on Telegram that the attack on Kyiv forced them to divert a number of passenger trains, causing delays.

    Damage was recorded on both sides of the wide Dnipro River bisecting the city and falling drone debris set a medical facility on fire in the leafy Holosiivskyi district, Klitschko said.

    Russian air strikes on Kyiv have intensified in recent weeks and included some of the deadliest assaults of the war on the city of three million people.

    CALL FOR SANCTIONS

    Trump said that the call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war, while the Kremlin reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes”.

    A decision by Washington earlier this week to halt some shipments of critical weapons to Ukraine prompted warnings by Kyiv that the move would weaken its ability to defend against intensifying airstrikes and battlefield advances.

    On Friday, Zelenskiy called for increased pressure on Moscow to change its “dumb, destructive behavior”.

    “For every such strike against people and human life, they must feel appropriate sanctions and other blows to their economy, their revenues, and their infrastructure,” he said.

    SHELTERED

    Ukraine’s Air Force said that it destroyed 478 of the air weapons Russia launched overnight. However air strikes were recorded in eight locations across the country with nine missiles and 63 drones, it added.

    Social media videos showed people running to seek shelter, firefighters fighting blazes in the dark and ruined buildings with windows and facades blown out.

    Both sides deny targeting civilians in the war that Russia launched with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of civilians have died in the conflict, the vast majority of them Ukrainian. Many more soldiers are believed to have died on the frontlines, although neither side releases military casualty figures.

    Late on Thursday, Russian shelling killed five people in and near the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key target under Russian attack for months, Ukraine said.

    (Reuters)

  • Russia pounds Kyiv with largest drone attack, hours after Trump-Putin call

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russia pummelled Kyiv with the largest drone attack of the war, injuring at least 23 people and damaging buildings across the capital only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, officials said on Friday.

    Air raid sirens, the whine of kamikaze drones and booming detonations reverberated from early evening until dawn as Russia launched what Ukraine’s Air Force said was a total of 539 drones and 11 missiles.

    Residents huddled with families in underground metro stations for shelter. Acrid smoke hung over the city centre.

    President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is due to speak to Trump later on Friday about the war and a U.S. pause in some deliveries of air defence missiles, called the attack “deliberately massive and cynical.”

    “Notably, the first air raid alerts in our cities and regions yesterday began to blare almost simultaneously with media reports discussing a phone call between President Trump and Putin,” Zelenskiy said on X.

    “Yet again, Russia is showing it has no intention of ending the war and terror,” he added, calling for increased pressure on Russia and more air defence equipment.

    Kyiv officials said the attack damaged about 40 apartment blocks, passenger railway infrastructure, five schools and kindergartens, cafes and many cars in six of Kyiv’s 10 districts. Poland said the consular section of its embassy was damaged in central Kyiv, adding that staff were unharmed.

    Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that fourteen of the injured were hospitalised.

    Ukraine’s state-owned railway Ukrzaliznytsia, the country’s largest carrier, said on Telegram that the attack on Kyiv forced them to divert a number of passenger trains, causing delays.

    Damage was recorded on both sides of the wide Dnipro River bisecting the city and falling drone debris set a medical facility on fire in the leafy Holosiivskyi district, Klitschko said.

    Russian air strikes on Kyiv have intensified in recent weeks and included some of the deadliest assaults of the war on the city of three million people.

    CALL FOR SANCTIONS

    Trump said that the call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war, while the Kremlin reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes”.

    A decision by Washington earlier this week to halt some shipments of critical weapons to Ukraine prompted warnings by Kyiv that the move would weaken its ability to defend against intensifying airstrikes and battlefield advances.

    On Friday, Zelenskiy called for increased pressure on Moscow to change its “dumb, destructive behavior”.

    “For every such strike against people and human life, they must feel appropriate sanctions and other blows to their economy, their revenues, and their infrastructure,” he said.

    SHELTERED

    Ukraine’s Air Force said that it destroyed 478 of the air weapons Russia launched overnight. However air strikes were recorded in eight locations across the country with nine missiles and 63 drones, it added.

    Social media videos showed people running to seek shelter, firefighters fighting blazes in the dark and ruined buildings with windows and facades blown out.

    Both sides deny targeting civilians in the war that Russia launched with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of civilians have died in the conflict, the vast majority of them Ukrainian. Many more soldiers are believed to have died on the frontlines, although neither side releases military casualty figures.

    Late on Thursday, Russian shelling killed five people in and near the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key target under Russian attack for months, Ukraine said.

    (Reuters)

  • Russia pounds Kyiv with largest drone attack, hours after Trump-Putin call

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russia pummelled Kyiv with the largest drone attack of the war, injuring at least 23 people and damaging buildings across the capital only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, officials said on Friday.

    Air raid sirens, the whine of kamikaze drones and booming detonations reverberated from early evening until dawn as Russia launched what Ukraine’s Air Force said was a total of 539 drones and 11 missiles.

    Residents huddled with families in underground metro stations for shelter. Acrid smoke hung over the city centre.

    President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is due to speak to Trump later on Friday about the war and a U.S. pause in some deliveries of air defence missiles, called the attack “deliberately massive and cynical.”

    “Notably, the first air raid alerts in our cities and regions yesterday began to blare almost simultaneously with media reports discussing a phone call between President Trump and Putin,” Zelenskiy said on X.

    “Yet again, Russia is showing it has no intention of ending the war and terror,” he added, calling for increased pressure on Russia and more air defence equipment.

    Kyiv officials said the attack damaged about 40 apartment blocks, passenger railway infrastructure, five schools and kindergartens, cafes and many cars in six of Kyiv’s 10 districts. Poland said the consular section of its embassy was damaged in central Kyiv, adding that staff were unharmed.

    Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that fourteen of the injured were hospitalised.

    Ukraine’s state-owned railway Ukrzaliznytsia, the country’s largest carrier, said on Telegram that the attack on Kyiv forced them to divert a number of passenger trains, causing delays.

    Damage was recorded on both sides of the wide Dnipro River bisecting the city and falling drone debris set a medical facility on fire in the leafy Holosiivskyi district, Klitschko said.

    Russian air strikes on Kyiv have intensified in recent weeks and included some of the deadliest assaults of the war on the city of three million people.

    CALL FOR SANCTIONS

    Trump said that the call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war, while the Kremlin reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes”.

    A decision by Washington earlier this week to halt some shipments of critical weapons to Ukraine prompted warnings by Kyiv that the move would weaken its ability to defend against intensifying airstrikes and battlefield advances.

    On Friday, Zelenskiy called for increased pressure on Moscow to change its “dumb, destructive behavior”.

    “For every such strike against people and human life, they must feel appropriate sanctions and other blows to their economy, their revenues, and their infrastructure,” he said.

    SHELTERED

    Ukraine’s Air Force said that it destroyed 478 of the air weapons Russia launched overnight. However air strikes were recorded in eight locations across the country with nine missiles and 63 drones, it added.

    Social media videos showed people running to seek shelter, firefighters fighting blazes in the dark and ruined buildings with windows and facades blown out.

    Both sides deny targeting civilians in the war that Russia launched with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of civilians have died in the conflict, the vast majority of them Ukrainian. Many more soldiers are believed to have died on the frontlines, although neither side releases military casualty figures.

    Late on Thursday, Russian shelling killed five people in and near the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key target under Russian attack for months, Ukraine said.

    (Reuters)

  • Russia pounds Kyiv with largest drone attack, hours after Trump-Putin call

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russia pummelled Kyiv with the largest drone attack of the war, injuring at least 23 people and damaging buildings across the capital only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, officials said on Friday.

    Air raid sirens, the whine of kamikaze drones and booming detonations reverberated from early evening until dawn as Russia launched what Ukraine’s Air Force said was a total of 539 drones and 11 missiles.

    Residents huddled with families in underground metro stations for shelter. Acrid smoke hung over the city centre.

    President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is due to speak to Trump later on Friday about the war and a U.S. pause in some deliveries of air defence missiles, called the attack “deliberately massive and cynical.”

    “Notably, the first air raid alerts in our cities and regions yesterday began to blare almost simultaneously with media reports discussing a phone call between President Trump and Putin,” Zelenskiy said on X.

    “Yet again, Russia is showing it has no intention of ending the war and terror,” he added, calling for increased pressure on Russia and more air defence equipment.

    Kyiv officials said the attack damaged about 40 apartment blocks, passenger railway infrastructure, five schools and kindergartens, cafes and many cars in six of Kyiv’s 10 districts. Poland said the consular section of its embassy was damaged in central Kyiv, adding that staff were unharmed.

    Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that fourteen of the injured were hospitalised.

    Ukraine’s state-owned railway Ukrzaliznytsia, the country’s largest carrier, said on Telegram that the attack on Kyiv forced them to divert a number of passenger trains, causing delays.

    Damage was recorded on both sides of the wide Dnipro River bisecting the city and falling drone debris set a medical facility on fire in the leafy Holosiivskyi district, Klitschko said.

    Russian air strikes on Kyiv have intensified in recent weeks and included some of the deadliest assaults of the war on the city of three million people.

    CALL FOR SANCTIONS

    Trump said that the call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war, while the Kremlin reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes”.

    A decision by Washington earlier this week to halt some shipments of critical weapons to Ukraine prompted warnings by Kyiv that the move would weaken its ability to defend against intensifying airstrikes and battlefield advances.

    On Friday, Zelenskiy called for increased pressure on Moscow to change its “dumb, destructive behavior”.

    “For every such strike against people and human life, they must feel appropriate sanctions and other blows to their economy, their revenues, and their infrastructure,” he said.

    SHELTERED

    Ukraine’s Air Force said that it destroyed 478 of the air weapons Russia launched overnight. However air strikes were recorded in eight locations across the country with nine missiles and 63 drones, it added.

    Social media videos showed people running to seek shelter, firefighters fighting blazes in the dark and ruined buildings with windows and facades blown out.

    Both sides deny targeting civilians in the war that Russia launched with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of civilians have died in the conflict, the vast majority of them Ukrainian. Many more soldiers are believed to have died on the frontlines, although neither side releases military casualty figures.

    Late on Thursday, Russian shelling killed five people in and near the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key target under Russian attack for months, Ukraine said.

    (Reuters)

  • Russia pounds Kyiv with largest drone attack, hours after Trump-Putin call

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Russia pummelled Kyiv with the largest drone attack of the war, injuring at least 23 people and damaging buildings across the capital only hours after U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, officials said on Friday.

    Air raid sirens, the whine of kamikaze drones and booming detonations reverberated from early evening until dawn as Russia launched what Ukraine’s Air Force said was a total of 539 drones and 11 missiles.

    Residents huddled with families in underground metro stations for shelter. Acrid smoke hung over the city centre.

    President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, who is due to speak to Trump later on Friday about the war and a U.S. pause in some deliveries of air defence missiles, called the attack “deliberately massive and cynical.”

    “Notably, the first air raid alerts in our cities and regions yesterday began to blare almost simultaneously with media reports discussing a phone call between President Trump and Putin,” Zelenskiy said on X.

    “Yet again, Russia is showing it has no intention of ending the war and terror,” he added, calling for increased pressure on Russia and more air defence equipment.

    Kyiv officials said the attack damaged about 40 apartment blocks, passenger railway infrastructure, five schools and kindergartens, cafes and many cars in six of Kyiv’s 10 districts. Poland said the consular section of its embassy was damaged in central Kyiv, adding that staff were unharmed.

    Mayor Vitali Klitschko said on Telegram that fourteen of the injured were hospitalised.

    Ukraine’s state-owned railway Ukrzaliznytsia, the country’s largest carrier, said on Telegram that the attack on Kyiv forced them to divert a number of passenger trains, causing delays.

    Damage was recorded on both sides of the wide Dnipro River bisecting the city and falling drone debris set a medical facility on fire in the leafy Holosiivskyi district, Klitschko said.

    Russian air strikes on Kyiv have intensified in recent weeks and included some of the deadliest assaults of the war on the city of three million people.

    CALL FOR SANCTIONS

    Trump said that the call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war, while the Kremlin reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes”.

    A decision by Washington earlier this week to halt some shipments of critical weapons to Ukraine prompted warnings by Kyiv that the move would weaken its ability to defend against intensifying airstrikes and battlefield advances.

    On Friday, Zelenskiy called for increased pressure on Moscow to change its “dumb, destructive behavior”.

    “For every such strike against people and human life, they must feel appropriate sanctions and other blows to their economy, their revenues, and their infrastructure,” he said.

    SHELTERED

    Ukraine’s Air Force said that it destroyed 478 of the air weapons Russia launched overnight. However air strikes were recorded in eight locations across the country with nine missiles and 63 drones, it added.

    Social media videos showed people running to seek shelter, firefighters fighting blazes in the dark and ruined buildings with windows and facades blown out.

    Both sides deny targeting civilians in the war that Russia launched with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Thousands of civilians have died in the conflict, the vast majority of them Ukrainian. Many more soldiers are believed to have died on the frontlines, although neither side releases military casualty figures.

    Late on Thursday, Russian shelling killed five people in and near the eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk, a key target under Russian attack for months, Ukraine said.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UN Human Rights Council 59: UK Statement on the Oral Presentation of the High Commissioner on Ukraine and Interim Report of the Secretary General on Crimea

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    UN Human Rights Council 59: UK Statement on the Oral Presentation of the High Commissioner on Ukraine and Interim Report of the Secretary General on Crimea

    UK Statement for the Interactive Dialogue on the Oral Presentation of the High Commissioner on Ukraine and Interim Report of the Secretary General on Human Rights on Crimea. Delivered by the UK’s Human Rights Ambassador, Eleanor Sanders.

    Thank you, Assistant Secretary-General, for your update on the human rights situation in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories.

    In June 2024, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia to have committed multiple human rights violations since its illegal annexation of Crimea. In May this year, the Council of Europe urged Russia to restore Ukrainian law in Crimea and end the use of torture and ill-treatment.

    There are very concerning reports of civilians being detained and taken across the border into Russia, where they have been convicted on spurious charges. This includes those who work in critical civilian infrastructure, such as the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and journalists.

    We note your assessment that targeted use of drones, including attacks that have killed civilians while delivering humanitarian aid, has violated IHL principles of distinction and precaution. Russia must comply with international law. Rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians is needed.

    Those responsible must be held to account for the appalling forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, and the enlistment of these children into military patriotic training programmes, potentially then being sent to fight against their own country.

    Assistant Secretary-General,

    Given Russia’s attempt to erase children’s heritage, what steps can be taken to prevent the long-term erasure of their cultural and national identity?

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Prisoner Releases in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE, July 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Prisoner Releases in Belarus: Joint Statement to the OSCE, July 2025

    UK and others call for immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners

    Madam Chair, I am delivering this statement on behalf of the following participating States, who are members of the Informal Group of Friends of Democratic Belarus: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and my own country, Germany.

    The following participating States are also joining this statement: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, North Macedonia and San Marino.

    We welcome the release of several political prisoners, including Siarhei Tsikhanousky, in which the United States of America played a crucial role.

    While these are positive steps, we are deeply concerned that as of 26 June at least 1 170 political prisoners still remain in custody in Belarus according to the human rights organization Viasna. Many are subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including prolonged isolation and denial of essential medical care. Tragically, at least eight of them died in detention due to these inhumane conditions.

    We are also mindful of those who, upon release, are forced to flee Belarus or are compelled to remain under continuous repression that effectively prolongs their punishment beyond imprisonment.

    Moreover, the Belarusian authorities continue to arrest and detain opponents or people perceived as such and to suppress independent media, in disregard of international obligations and OSCE principles and commitments.

    Against this background, we reiterate our call for the Belarusian authorities to: stop persecuting individuals for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, to freedom of association and to peaceful assembly; immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, most urgently those with health issues and disabilities, the elderly and single parents and to ensure their rehabilitation; and, ensure fair and humane treatment of all prisoners, in particular by allowing prisoners who have been prevented from communicating with their families to do so, and by granting prompt access to appropriate medical care for those in need.

    We will continue to support the Belarusian people’s aspiration for a free, democratic and independent Belarus.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: International Day in Support of Victims of Torture 2025: Joint Statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    International Day in Support of Victims of Torture 2025: Joint Statement to the OSCE

    UK and 41 other OSCE participating States mark the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture

    Mr Chair, I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of 42 participating States: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia, Norway, San Marino, Ukraine, United Kingdom, the member states of the European Union and my own country Switzerland.

    On this International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This prohibition is clearly enshrined in international human rights law and international humanitarian law – in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN Convention against Torture. We recall that the prohibition of torture is also considered a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) and therefore does not allow for any derogation, even in situations of emergency.

    Five years after the adoption of the Tirana Ministerial Council Decision on the Prevention and Eradication of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the eradication of the use of torture in the OSCE region remains a distant goal. Torture and ill-treatment continue to occur across the region. Let us use this anniversary to redouble our efforts.

    Preventing torture requires transparency and independent monitoring. We call on all participating States to consider ratifying and implementing the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) and to ensure that independent and effective National Preventive Mechanisms are in place. Regular and unrestricted access to all places of detention is essential.

    In many detention facilities, conditions remain dire: overcrowding, lack of medical care, unsanitary conditions, prolonged isolation, and abuse during custody or interrogation. These conditions can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment and, at times, to torture.

    Perhaps even more pressing, torture has reemerged as a systematic and widespread practice in the context of armed conflict including occupation in the OSCE region. Torture and other inhuman treatment or acts may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the systematic use of torture by Russian forces has been thoroughly documented – including by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the OSCE Moscow Mechanism and ODIHR.

    Mr Chair, we are also alarmed by numerous reports of torture and ill-treatment used to suppress civil society and silence dissent. We express our strong support for civil society and human rights defenders. Their role in documentation, victim support and independent oversight is indispensable – and must be protected from reprisals.

    The use of torture and ill-treatment as means of intimidation, punishment or coercion are unacceptable in any context, and no derogation is permitted. We stand firm in our commitment to justice and accountability. These grave violations of international law, including human rights law and OSCE commitments, must not go unpunished.

    We urge all participating States to adopt a victim-centered and gender- responsive approach in all anti-torture efforts. Rehabilitation, justice and prevention must be guided by the voices and needs of survivors. The Méndez Principles should guide ethical and non-coercive interviewing practices.

    Mr Chair, torture must never be tolerated. Let us renew our collective efforts to uphold human dignity, support victims and survivors, and ensure accountability across the OSCE region and beyond.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Germany hold 8th round of strategic dialogue on diplomacy, security

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A good China-Germany relationship will not only drive the overall positive development of China-EU relations but also holds great significance for global stability and development, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the eighth round of China-Germany Strategic Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security held in Berlin on Thursday.

    He co-chaired the talks with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China-EU diplomatic relations, and the China-Germany all-round strategic partnership has also embarked on a new decade.

    China-EU and China-Germany relations are at a crucial juncture, drawing on past accomplishments to move forward and shape the future, he noted.

    As the world’s second and third-largest economies, China and Germany shoulder important international responsibilities and bear the hopes of all stakeholders, he said, noting that the two countries should join hands to reaffirm mutual trust, further consolidate cooperation, and continue to deepen bilateral relations.

    Facing the current turbulent international situation, particularly the prevalent protectionism, anti-globalization, and unilateral bullying, China and Germany must strengthen strategic communication and coordination, Wang stressed.

    The Chinese foreign minister added that the two countries should inject more certainty into the world by building on the stable relations between them, jointly advocate and practice multilateralism, uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core, the international order based on international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the UN Charter, and commit to developing a more reliable, stable, and predictable all-round strategic partnership.

    Wang noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping had a phone conversation with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, setting the direction and tone for the next stage of China-Germany relations.

    Despite the shifting international landscape, China-Germany relations have maintained steady development, mainly thanks to their way of dealing with each other, which is characterized by mutual respect, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and pursuing win-win cooperation, Wang said, calling this the fundamental logic for sustained development of China-Germany relations.

    Given the differences in history, culture, and social systems between China and Germany, it is natural that divergences exist, Wang said, noting that the key is to enhance understanding and mutual trust, and to view differences calmly and rationally.

    China places its relationship with Germany in an important position in its diplomacy and appreciates the positive and rational attitude of the new German government in developing relations with China, he said.

    It is hoped that the German side will support China’s efforts to achieve complete national reunification just as China had unconditionally supported the German reunification, and strictly adhere to the one-China principle, said Wang.

    As a core major country in the European Union, Germany has made positive efforts to advance China-EU relations, and it is hoped that Germany will continue to play a constructive role in the development of China-EU relations, Wang said.

    Wadephul said that Germany is willing to be a mutually trustworthy and predictable partner for cooperation with China.

    In an era fraught with crises and challenges, it is very important for Germany and China to maintain close communication and coordination, he said.

    The two countries have a long history of exchanges and a solid foundation for their partnership, he said, adding that the two share consensus on many issues and can properly handle differences and disagreements with mutual respect and a constructive attitude.

    Wadephul said that Germany looks forward to enhancing exchanges with China and to continuously strengthening bilateral cooperation.

    The German government firmly adheres to the one-China policy, he said.

    During the talks, the two sides also had an in-depth exchange of views on the Ukraine crisis, the Iran nuclear issue, the situation in the Middle East, and multilateral strategic coordination. They agreed to strengthen communication and coordination to work for ceasefires, ending conflicts, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Malign Activity in the OSCE Region: Joint statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Malign Activity in the OSCE Region: Joint statement to the OSCE

    Deputy Ambassador James Ford delivers a statement on behalf of the UK and Canada on the increasing malign activity faced by OSCE States across our region.

    Thank you, Madam Chair. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Canada, and my own country the United Kingdom.

    I would like to thank the US for the opportunity to address this important topic. The principle that security is comprehensive and interconnected across the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions sits at the very heart of the OSCE. But this is not the first time that this Council has had to address hybrid threats faced by participating States across our region.

    Hybrid activity can include espionage, transnational repression, foreign information manipulation and interference, malicious cyber activity, political interference, and sabotage – including of critical national infrastructure. These tactics are used to target all parts of societies, our citizens, institutions, journalists, universities, and businesses with the aim of undermining our national security.

    In recent years, such activity has increased in both frequency and intensity. As the UK has raised before, this includes arson in London, malign activity in various NATO and EU countries, and attempts to undermine Moldova’s democratic institutions in the leadup to last year’s October presidential elections.

    Moreover, the line between state and non-state actors is blurring as certain states increasingly use proxies, illicit finance and organised crime groups to facilitate and conduct hybrid attacks. Last week’s Economic and Environmental Committee highlighted the serious threat posed by the so-called ‘shadow fleet,’ an example of destabilising actions in the OSCE region in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The next Security Committee will examine how illicit financial networks enable transnational organised crime.     

    As the UK, we will continue to press for effective OSCE action to tackle reckless hybrid attacks and malign influence aimed at destabilising our society and the shared security principles on which this organisation is based.

    Thank you, Madam Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE – Meeting between the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and Mr Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Secretary General of the OSCE (3 July 2025)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    The Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs hosted a meeting this morning with Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

    The Minister reiterated France’s commitment to multilateralism and to the OSCE’s basic principles, enshrined 50 years ago in the Helsinki Final Act but violated every day by Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine.

    The Minister welcomed the efforts of the Finnish OSCE Chairpersonship-in-Office and of the Secretary General to ensure that the organization continues to run smoothly despite the many challenges facing it.

    The Minister and the Secretary General discussed the region’s key security issues, particularly Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and tensions in the Western Balkans. The Minister stressed the importance of the OSCE for strengthening every dimension of the security framework in Europe, from crisis prevention to respect for human rights, as well as safeguarding the rule of law.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • No progress at all, Trump says after phone call with Putin

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump said on Thursday that a phone call earlier in the day with Vladimir Putin resulted in no progress at all on efforts to end the war in Ukraine, while a Kremlin aide said the Russian president reiterated that Moscow would keep pushing to solve the conflict’s “root causes.”

    The two leaders did not discuss a recent pause in some U.S. weapons shipments to Kyiv during the nearly hour-long conversation, according to a readout provided by Putin aide Yuri Ushakov.

    U.S. attempts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine through diplomacy have largely stalled, and Trump has faced growing calls – including from some Republicans – to increase pressure on Putin to negotiate in earnest.

    Within hours of the call’s conclusion, an apparent Russian drone attack sparked a fire in an apartment building in a northern suburb of Kyiv, Ukrainian officials said, indicating little change in the trajectory of the conflict.

    In Kyiv itself, witnesses reported explosions and sustained heavy machine-gun fire as air defense units battled drones over the capital, while Russian shelling killed five people in the eastern part of the country.

    “I didn’t make any progress with him at all,” Trump told reporters in brief comments at an air base outside Washington, before departing for a campaign-style event in Iowa.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, meanwhile, told reporters in Denmark earlier in the day that he hopes to speak to Trump as soon as Friday about the ongoing pause in some weapons shipments, which was first disclosed earlier this week.

    Trump, speaking to reporters as he left Washington for Iowa, said “we haven’t” completely paused the weapons flow but blamed his predecessor, Joe Biden, for sending so many weapons that it risked weakening U.S. defenses.

    “We’re giving weapons, but we’ve given so many weapons. But we are giving weapons. And we’re working with them and trying to help them, but we haven’t. You know, Biden emptied out our whole country giving them weapons, and we have to make sure that we have enough for ourselves,” he said.

    The diplomatic back-and-forth comes as the U.S. has paused shipments of certain critical weapons to Ukraine due to low stockpiles, just as Ukraine faces a Russian summer offensive and increasingly frequent attacks on civilian targets.

    Putin, for his part, has continued to assert he will stop his invasion only if the conflict’s “root causes” have been addressed – Russian shorthand for the issue of NATO enlargement and Western support for Ukraine, including the rejection of any notion of Ukraine joining the NATO alliance.

    Russian leaders are also angling to establish greater control over political decisions made in Kyiv and other Eastern European capitals, NATO leaders have said.

    The pause in U.S. weapons shipments caught Ukraine off-guard and has generated widespread confusion about Trump’s current views on the conflict, given his statement just last week that he would try to free up a Patriot missile defense system for use by Kyiv.

    Ukrainian leaders called in the acting U.S. envoy to Kyiv on Wednesday to underline the importance of military aid from Washington, and caution that the pause in U.S. weapons shipments would weaken Ukraine’s ability to defend against intensifying Russian air strikes and battlefield advances.

    The Pentagon’s move has meant a cut in deliveries of the Patriot defense missiles that Ukraine relies on to destroy fast-moving ballistic missiles, Reuters reported on Wednesday.

    Ushakov, the Kremlin aide, said that while Russia was open to continuing to speak with the U.S., any peace negotiations needed to occur between Moscow and Kyiv.

    That comment comes amid some indications that Moscow is trying to avoid a trilateral format for any potential peace negotiations. The Russians asked American diplomats to leave the room during such a meeting in Istanbul in early June, Ukrainian officials have said.

    Trump and Putin did not talk about a face-to-face meeting, Ushakov said.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Russia: No progress on Iran and Ukraine in phone conversation with V. Putin — D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HOUSTON, July 3 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump said he made no progress on Iran and the conflict in Ukraine during a phone call with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin earlier on Thursday.

    “No, I didn’t make any progress with him at all today. I’m not thrilled about it,” the White House chief told reporters.

    “We had a phone call. It was a pretty long call. We talked about a lot of things, including Iran, and we also talked about, as you know, the war with Ukraine,” Trump said. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI China: No progress on Iran, Ukraine in phone call between Trump and Putin

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    People attend a memorial ceremony in Tehran, Iran, July 2, 2025. Memorial ceremonies were held here on Wednesday for people who lost their lives in Israeli attacks. [Photo/Xinhua]

    U.S. President Donald Trump said that he did not make any progress during his phone call earlier on Thursday with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin over Iran and the Ukraine conflict.

    “No, I didn’t make any progress with him today at all,” Trump told reporters. “I’m not happy about that.”

    “We had a call. It was a pretty long call. We talked about a lot of things, including Iran, and we also talked about, as you know, the war with Ukraine,” said Trump.

    During the phone call, which lasted about an hour, Putin said that Moscow would achieve its goals in the conflict with Ukraine, including the elimination of its root causes, according to Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov.

    “Our president said that Russia will achieve its goals, namely to eliminate the well-known root causes that led to the current state of affairs, to the current harsh confrontation. And Russia will not give up on these goals,” Ushakov said.

    Putin’s aide said that Russia is ready for the third round of talks with Ukraine, adding that Putin and Trump did not discuss the specifics of what would be discussed during the possible negotiations.

    Putin and Trump confirmed their mutual interest in implementing a series of economic projects between Russia and the United States, including in energy and space, Ushakov said.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Putin tells Trump he won’t back down from goals in Ukraine

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Russian President Vladimir Putin said that Moscow would achieve its goals in the conflict with Ukraine, including the elimination of its root causes, in a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday, according to Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov.

    “Our president said that Russia will achieve its goals, namely to eliminate the well-known root causes that led to the current state of affairs, to the current harsh confrontation. And Russia will not give up on these goals,” Ushakov said.

    He said that Russia is ready for the third round of talks with Ukraine, adding that Putin and Trump did not discuss the specifics of what would be discussed during the possible negotiations.

    The Kremlin aide told the media that Putin and Trump discussed the current situation in Iran and the Middle East, and the situation in Syria over phone.

    On the Middle East issue, “Putin stressed the importance of resolving all disputes, disagreements and conflict situations exclusively with political and diplomatic means. The sides agreed to maintain contacts in this regard at the level of foreign ministries, the defense ministries and presidential aides,” he added.

    Putin and Trump confirmed their mutual interest in implementing a series of economic projects between Russia and the United States, including in energy and space, Ushakov said.

    “Within the framework of exchange of opinions on bilateral issues, both sides have confirmed their mutual interest in the realization of a series of promising economic projects, particularly in the spheres of energy and space research,” he said.

    Ushakov said the presidents agreed to continue their communication.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    July 3, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF.  As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center. 

    Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th. 

    Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update.  These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances.  Stay tuned.  We will share more details soon. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  And now the floor is open. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.  I have two questions on Ukraine.  In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy.  Could you please elaborate on this?  What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when?  And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled?  Thank you.  

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you, Julie.  How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability?  Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release.  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine?  Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine. 

    So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion.  In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient.  The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review. 

    Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that  from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy.  And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head.  It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards.  And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term. 

    With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year.  It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule.  And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.

    And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program.  Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained.  And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as  how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term. 

    It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives.  And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions.  Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question. 

    The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances?  Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance?  Are they reliable?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal?  Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal. 

    So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities.  As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years.  And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place.  And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development. 

    What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits.  The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized.  And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward.  And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers.  We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged. 

    And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that. 

    QUESTIONER: Question about Russia.  So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia.  So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia?  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy. 

    So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply.  Inflation is easing, but is still high.  And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty.  In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025.  Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower.  And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks. 

    With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high.  Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target.  But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time.  In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027.  And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising.  So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast.  But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast.  What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things.  First, tight policies.  The other factors are cyclical factors.  So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown.  And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia.  And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well.  And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions. 

    QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years.  It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans.  Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill.  It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy.  So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates.  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?

    QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.

    QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries.  As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates.  And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that  will have on the global economy.  Thanks.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade.  Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S.  Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India.  But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it.  So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path.  And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time. 

    And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt.  And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits.  We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy.  We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks.  And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation. 

    And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update.  And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally. 

    As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us.  And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy. 

    QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina?  It’s a simple question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?  

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie.  Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement.  And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.  

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie.  Good morning.   I would like to address the question of my colleague.  Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?  

    QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year.  And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.  

    QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment.  As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently.  The mission concluded on June 27th.  And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program.  Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive. 

    What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results.  The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth.  The disinflation process has resumed.  The economy continues to expand.  High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina.  Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years.  And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.

    Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop.  Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program. 

    On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions.  But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.

    On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted.  But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks.  We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue. 

    On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation.  However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case. 

    I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer.  So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it.  The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals.  President Trump already signaled a deal with India.  Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing?  So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country. 

    So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made.  But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part.  And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward.  So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account.  But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have. 

    Let’s continue then.   

    QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet? 

    MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached.  And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review.  So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.

    MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board. 

    QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.

    QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June.  So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review?  My second one is on the RSF financing.  We want to also know an update on that. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.

    QUESTIONER:  I have another question on Egypt.  So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche?  And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June?  And I have another question on Syria.  I don’t know if I could put it in now.  Maybe you can answer that later on.  How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.

    QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September. 

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?   

    So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities.  The discussions were productive.  Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program.  And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.

    To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset [divestment diversification] program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw.  These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt.  And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt.  We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth. 

    With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met.  Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal.  And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined.  And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall.  So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews.  More time [is] needed. 

    And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said? 

    So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall.  Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together?  Could this be possible? Is this on the table? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place.  So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage. 

    Okay, you had a question on Syria.  So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria.  I don’t see anyone else on Syria. 

    So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th.  And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009.  The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities.  And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy. 

    As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering.  And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size.  The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy.  And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy. 

    So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have. 

    QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up.  The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF.  I just wanted to confirm my understanding.  Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program.  I hope that clarifies. 

    QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me.  Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique.  I’m sorry about that. 

    All right, let’s go online.  You had a question?

    QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one.  On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement?  But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews.  What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine? 

    And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion?  So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already.  Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?

    And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit.  So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone.  At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems.  And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that.  We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries.  That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying.  And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment.  For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing.  So, just asking a broad question.

    And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year.  What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting?  What is the importance of that as in that body?

    QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter.  And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period.  I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine.  And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.

    On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment.  I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying?  If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order.  So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment. 

    But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience.  There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time.  High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment.  But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally.  So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem. 

    That’s on the fiscal side.  And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries.  And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth.  So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries. 

    And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years.  And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries.  So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries.  But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing.  But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs. 

    And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up  assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries.  So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.

    And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States. 

    Let me look online. 

    QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia.  So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money.  In this point, I have two questions.  The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy?  And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia? 

    QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second.  Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why.  So, could you maybe walk me through that?  And I have a separate question on Lebanon.  Maybe we’ll take that later.

    MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million. 

    What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda.  The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF.  Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization.  And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track. 

    With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally.  I’m not sure exactly why.  I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one. 

    I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Sorry.  So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya.  President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets.  And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF?  I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders.  Some of those countries have critical minerals.  So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals.  As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals.  So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals.  What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —

    MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya? 

    QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do.  Hello? 

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission.  I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public?  I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments.  As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program. 

    And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute. 

    So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission.  The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued.  This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year.  So, collaboration on government diagnostics.  It will continue over the next several months.  A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year.  So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities.  So that is the process that we’ll have.  But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready.  So, kind of hold this space.  We’ll continue to work on it. 

    And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday.  What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits. 

    So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery. 

    On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance.  We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission.  Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time. 

    We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people. 

    And let me go — I have Jermine.  You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time.  So,  I am going to wrap up with you as the last question. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs.  What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs? 

    MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU. 

    And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries. 

    With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region.  It’s not really a matter for the IMF. 

    So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org.  And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response.  I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thanks very much.  

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, July 3, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 3, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF Press Briefing. It’s wonderful to see all of you, both those of you here in person and, of course, colleagues online as well. I’m Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department at the IMF.  As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  I’ll start as usual with a few announcements and then take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center. 

    Starting with the announcements, the First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, will participate in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meetings in Durban, South Africa, on July 17th to 18th. 

    Second, in the coming weeks, we will be releasing two flagship publications, our External Sector Report and the World Economic Outlook Update.  These reports will offer fresh insights into current global economic trends and external imbalances.  Stay tuned.  We will share more details soon. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions.  For those of you who are connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  And now the floor is open. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.  I have two questions on Ukraine.  In its Eighth Review, the IMF highlighted that Ukraine needs to adopt a supplementary budget for 2025 and enact critical reforms to restore fiscal sustainability and implement the National Revenue Strategy.  Could you please elaborate on this?  What specific reforms should Ukraine implement and when?  And secondly, could you also please inform us when the next review of Ukraine is scheduled?  Thank you.  

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you, Julie.  How concerned is IMF about the Ukraine’s debt sustainability?  Taking into account recent highlights in the IMF’s release.  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine? And no one online on Ukraine?  Okay, let me go ahead and answer these questions on Ukraine. 

    So, first, just stepping back to remind everyone where we are on Ukraine. On June 30th, so just a few days ago, the IMF’s Executive Board completed the Eighth Review of the EFF arrangement with Ukraine that enabled a disbursement of U.S. $0.5 billion, and it brought total disbursements under the program to $10.6 billion.  In that review, we found that Ukraine’s economy remains resilient.  The authorities met all end-March quantitative performance criteria, a prior action, and two structural benchmarks that were needed to complete the review. 

    Now, with respect to the specific questions. On the supplementary budget, what I can say there is that  from our discussions over time and from the program documents, restoring fiscal sustainability in Ukraine does require a sustained and decisive effort to implement the National Revenue Strategy.  And that strategy includes modernization of the tax and customs system, including timely appointment of a customs head.  It includes the reduction in tax evasion and harmonization of certain legislation with EU standards.  And the idea behind this package of reforms is that these reforms, combined with improvements in public investment management frameworks and medium-term budget preparation, as well as fiscal risk management, altogether, these are going to be critical to helping Ukraine underpin growth and investment over the medium term. 

    With respect to the Ninth Review, right now we expect the Ninth Review to take place toward the end of the year.  It will combine basically the Ninth and the Tenth Reviews together under this new schedule.  And of course, we do remain closely engaged with the Ukrainian authorities.

    And then on the question on debt, what I can say there is that Ukraine has been able to preserve macroeconomic stability despite very difficult circumstances and conditions under the Fund’s program.  Given the risks to the outlook and the overall challenges that Ukraine continues to face, it is essential that reform momentum is sustained.  And we talked about the measures for domestic revenue mobilization, which are critical, as well as  how important they are for restoring debt sustainability over the medium term. 

    It is also important for Ukraine to complete the remaining elements of the debt restructuring in line with program objectives.  And that will be essential for the full restoration of debt sustainability under the program. 

    QUESTIONER: Two questions.  Had the IMF confirmed any involvement by President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d’ Ivoire in supporting Senegalese ongoing negotiations with the Fund, particularly considering the recent data misreporting issues? This is the first question. 

    The second one, what are the IMF’s views on Senegal’s debt sustainability after the recent leak of the 119 percent national debt, as opposed to 99.7 which was indicated in the recent audit of the nation’s finances?  Do you trust the last numbers on debt, 119 percent of GDP, communicated by the Ministry of Finance?  Are they reliable?  Thank you very much. 

    QUESTIONER: Are there any other questions on Senegal?  Okay, so let me step back and remind where we are on Senegal. 

    So our team remains closely engaged with the Senegalese authorities.  As you know, a Staff Mission visited Dakar in March and April, just a few months ago, to advance resolution of the misreporting case, which was confirmed by the Court of Auditors and which, as you know, revealed underreporting of fiscal deficits and public debt over a number of years.  And we’re working closely with the authorities on the design of corrective measures and actions to address the root causes of the misreporting that took place.  And we’re also working closely with the authorities to strengthen capacity development. 

    What I can say with respect to the question on the debt numbers is we strongly welcome the new government’s commitment to transparency in revealing the discrepancies in the reported debt and the fiscal deficits.  The authorities are conducting their own audit and that audit is ongoing. We understand that the audit is close to being finalized.  And we’re waiting for its completion to better understand the challenges and how we can move forward.  And so ultimately, as we wait for that report, we are going to refrain from commenting on any numbers.  We’re waiting for the report, and we will remain very closely engaged. 

    And on your other question on President Ouattara, I don’t have any information for you at this time, but of course, we’ll keep you updated if we have anything to report on that. 

    QUESTIONER: Question about Russia.  So, the Bank of Russia has recently indicated that it can cut key interest rates for another one percentage point if the inflationary pressure remains to ease in Russia.  So, from the IMF standpoint, how – well-timed and appropriate will this step be, taking into account your view on the current economic situation in Russia?  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Russia? Okay, so let me start a little bit with our assessment of the economy, and then I’ll speak to your question on monetary policy. 

    So, in terms of how we see the Russian economy following last year’s overheating, what we see is that the Russian economy is now slowing sharply.  Inflation is easing, but is still high.  And Russia, like many countries, is affected by high risks and uncertainty.  In our April WEO, we projected growth to slow to 1.5 percent in 2025.  Recent developments since April suggest that growth may even be lower.  And we will, like for many countries, we will be updating our forecast for Russia in the July WEO update, which will come in a few weeks. 

    With respect to monetary policy, as I said, inflation remains high.  Annual inflation is above the Central Bank of Russia’s target.  But based on our April forecast, we do expect inflation to come down and to decline over time.  In April, we had expected inflation to return to target in the second half of 2027.  And so, we see that for the Central Bank policymaking is going to need to balance the fact that inflation is still high, and that unemployment is still very low in Russia, with the fact that the economy is rapidly slowing and that risks are rising.  So that will be the challenge for the Central Bank that we see in its making of monetary policy in the near future. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can I just follow up on that Russia question? So you said that because of the current conditions, can you just explain why your forecast is going to be revised downward for Russia’s growth? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I want to be clear, we will provide the revised forecast in July as part of the WEO. What the team has been seeing is that some recent data suggests that growth may be lower than we had forecast.  But I don’t want to preempt their actual forecast.  What we see is that the slowdown that we see in Russia reflects a few things.  First, tight policies.  The other factors are cyclical factors.  So, coming off of a period of overheating, you often see a cyclical slowdown.  And that’s what we’re seeing in Russia.  And also, the fact that oil prices are lower, which is also affecting Russia as well.  And we also do see some impact on the economy from tightening sanctions. 

    QUESTIONER: A couple of questions on the U.S. Congress, as you know, is about to pass the, what they call the One Big Beautiful Bill, the sweeping budget tax spending policy bill, which is going to, by all accounts, increase the U.S. deficit by $3.4 trillion over 10 years.  It contains major cuts to social programs such as Medicaid, which is going to be very hard on the poorest Americans.  Just wondering if you can provide any perspective from the IMF on this bill.  It kind of goes against everything that the IMF recommends that the U.S. do on the fiscal front, which is to bring deficits under control and tocreate more equality in the economy.  So just wondering if you can shed some light on sort of how the IMF is going to view this, including your perspective on what it might do for financial markets with extra U.S. debt, perhaps increasing U.S. interest rates in real terms and forcing other countries to pay higher interest rates.  Thanks. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there any other questions on the U.S.? You have another question?

    QUESTIONER: It’s a trade question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, well, if it’s on the U.S., go for it.

    QUESTIONER: So next week is the July 9th deadline for the U.S. to potentially raise tariff rates on many, many countries.  As you know, the president had lowered those tariff rates temporarily. It’s likely that a lot of countries are going to see much higher interest rates.  And I’m just wondering if you can comment on that and how it will affect whether that’s being factored into your WEO update, and the impact that  will have on the global economy.  Thanks.

    QUESTIONER: Julie, a follow-up?

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Just a follow-up to that question with regard to the U.S. and trade.  Now, one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners is the U.S.  Now, President Trump has already signaled deals with countries like Vietnam and India.  But, for small economies like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, there is still uncertainty around it.  So, given the uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking at changes in certain targets with these countries that are already in programs, or will there be any revisit to the financing already given to these countries?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start by saying, I think, to your first question, so at this stage, and as you noted, it’s fair to say there’s a consensus that the recent bill that was approved in the Senate and is now under discussion in the House would add to the fiscal deficit and it appears to run counter to reducing federal debt over the medium term. From the IMF side, we have been consistent in saying that the U.S. will need to reduce its fiscal deficit over time to put public debt-to-GDP on a decisive downward path.  And since a fiscal consolidation will ultimately be needed to achieve or to put debt on a downward path, of course, the sooner that process starts to reduce the deficit, the more gradual the deficit reduction can be over time. 

    And of course, there are many different policy options that the U.S. has to reduce its deficit and debt.  And it is, of course, important to build consensus within the United States about how it will address these chronic fiscal deficits.  We’re currently examining the details of the legislation and the likely impact on the U.S. economy.  We will be providing a broader update of our views in terms of the outlook for the U.S. and also, of course, for the global economy in the July WEO update, which, as I noted, will be coming in the next few weeks.  And of course, we will take into account in the update all updated developments, including potential new policies or legislation. 

    And that goes a little bit to your other question on July 9th and the tariff deadline, to the extent possible and feasible, we will take into account as many of the trade deals or announcements that are made, and we will take those into account in our July WEO update.  And we’re paying, of course, close attention to the situation globally. 

    As we’ve been saying, this is a moment for the global economy marked by high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is something that is still with us.  And we’re also taking the fact that we’re at a moment of high uncertainty into account in thinking about our forecasts for the global economy. 

    QUESTIONER: When will the Board will address the first revision of the agreement with Argentina?  It’s a simple question. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay. Other questions on Argentina?

    QUESTIONER: Is there a concern in the IMF that the external deficit exceed $5 billion in the first quarter of this year?  

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie.  Wanted to ask what the IMF is expecting in terms of Argentina’s ability to meet its reserves target, or whether the IMF will be considering a waiver to ask about the timing for the next $2 billion disbursement.  And finally, how the YPF court order this week influences the outlook for Argentina and the need to build foreign reserves.  

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie.  Good morning.   I would like to address the question of my colleague.  Do you think the court ruling of YPF will have significant implications for both, I mean, the company and Argentina’s economic stability?  

    QUESTIONER: Also, on the YPF issue, if that challenges in any way Argentina’s goal to return to international financial markets by the end of the year.  And if you could comment on the mission that was in Buenos Aires’ findings last week.  

    QUESTIONER: A recent JP Morgan report recommended that selling LECAP bonds due to their increased risk because of the lack of reserve accumulation. Also, Argentina failed to rise to MSCI Emerging Market status. Is this a cause for concern for the IMF? Could it obstruct Argentina’s return to international markets in 2026 as the Staff Report indicates? Thank you.

    MS. KOZACK: All right, anyone else on Argentina? Okay, so maybe just stepping back for a moment.  As you know, a recent IMF Staff Technical Mission visited Buenos Aires recently.  The mission concluded on June 27th.  And this mission was part of the First Review under the program under the new $20 billion EFF program.  Discussions for the First Review continue, and they remain very productive. 

    What I can also add is that the program, as we’ve said before, it continues to deliver positive results.  The transition to a more robust FX regime has been smooth.  The disinflation process has resumed.  The economy continues to expand.  High-frequency indicators suggest that poverty is on a downward trend in Argentina.  Argentina has also reaccessed international capital markets for the first time in seven years.  And all of this progress, of course, under the program, is being underpinned by appropriately tight fiscal and monetary policies.

    Discussions now are focused on policies to sustain the stabilization gains, including by continuing to rebuild buffers to address risks from a more complex external backdrop.  Both the IMF Staff and the Argentine authorities are closely engaged on these issues, and it reflects the ongoing collaboration that we have with the authorities as well as a shared commitment to the success of the program. 

    On some of the more specific questions with respect to targets under the program and the potential for waivers, at this stage, given that the discussions are ongoing, I’m not going to speculate on the potential for waivers or the outcome of those discussions.  But we will, of course, keep you updated in due course.

    On the broader question of reserve accumulation, what I can add is that, as I mentioned, Staff and the authorities do have a shared commitment to the success of the program, which I noted.  But I can add that this, of course, includes a shared recognition of the need to continue to build buffers against external risks.  We’re closely engaged with the authorities on the issue. 

    On the question of YPF, we’re obviously paying close attention, monitoring this situation.  However, as a matter of policy, we don’t comment on legal matters involving our member countries, and that includes this IMF case. 

    I need to apologize because a question was asked in the last round which I did not answer.  So, I’m going to repeat the question, and then I’m going to answer it.  The question is the U.S. is one of South Asia’s biggest trading partners and countries are racing to strike deals.  President Trump already signaled a deal with India.  Given this uncertainty around it, will the Fund be looking to change targets or revisit financing?  So here I think, they were asking really about program countries, and they mentioned Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and one other country. 

    So, what I can say on this one is that in all program countries, in all program contexts, the reason why we have reviews during the program is there’s a backward-looking part to the review, which is to assess whether the country has complied with the targets and the commitments that they have made.  But the other part is what we call a forward-looking part.  And that part really looks at what has happened to the economy, globally, what are the trends, and how should those be taken into account going forward.  So to the extent that uncertainty or changes in trading relations or in the trading environment has an effect on the economy, which is significant enough to affect the program, of course, those will be taken into account.  But it will be done on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific circumstances of every program country that we have. 

    Let’s continue then.   

    QUESTIONER: Do you know when the Board will meet? 

    MS. KOZACK: Ah, I apologize. So, with respect to the First Review, just in terms of the process, first, the discussions between the team and the authorities will need to come to a conclusion, and a Staff-Level Agreement would need to be reached.  And once that happens, we will submit the documentation to our Board for review.  So, I don’t yet have a timing for the Board meeting, but we will, of course, keep you informed as the discussions continue.

    MS. KOZACK: I’m not going to speculate at all. I want to give time, of course, for the authorities and the team to complete the discussions, and we will abide by our process, the first step of which is a Staff-Level Agreement, and then we will submit the documents for consideration by the Executive Board. 

    QUESTIONER: Can I have a short follow-up? Do you expect Minister Caputo in the upcoming days in Washington D.C.?

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say is that the discussions are continuing. There is a technical team here in Washington to have those discussions. But it’s a technical team. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go online.

    QUESTIONER: I have a couple of questions on Egypt specifically. The first is we all in Egypt were expecting the Fifth Review to be completed before the end of fiscal year, which ends by end of June.  So, could you please update us on the ongoing negotiations regarding the Fifth Review?  My second one is on the RSF financing.  We want to also know an update on that. 

    MS. KOZACK: Are there other questions on Egypt.

    QUESTIONER:  I have another question on Egypt.  So, what are the current points of contention that delayed this disbursement of the fifth tranche?  And do you think there is any room to extend the loan repayment due to the current challenges, especially that there were more effects that have affected Egypt recently, because of the war that happened during June?  And I have another question on Syria.  I don’t know if I could put it in now.  Maybe you can answer that later on.  How will lifting the sanctions change or expedite any program with the IMF regarding Syria? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so let’s first see if there’s other questions on Egypt and I’ll answer on Egypt and then I’ll turn to Syria.

    QUESTIONER: I just want to add to what my colleagues said before whether you’re able to confirm or say any more about reports recently that the Fifth and Sixth Reviews will be combined into one review that would then take place in September. 

    MS. KOZACK: Anyone else on Egypt?   

    So, on Egypt, an IMF team, as you know, visited Cairo in May, from May 6th to 18th, for discussions with the Egyptian authorities.  The discussions were productive.  Egypt continues to make progress under its macroeconomic reform program.  And we can say that there’s been notable improvements in inflation and in the level of foreign exchange reserves, which have increased.

    To move further and to really safeguard macroeconomic stability in Egypt and to bolster the country’s resilience to shocks, it is essential to deepen reforms, and this is particularly important to reduce the state footprint in the economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Some of the key policies that are under discussion and key priorities are advancing the state ownership policy and asset diversification program in sectors where the state has committed to withdraw.  These steps are critical to really enabling the private sector to drive stronger and more sustainable growth in Egypt.  And our commitment, of course, is strong to Egypt.  We’re committed to supporting Egypt in building this resilience and in fostering growth. 

    With respect to the reviews, the discussions suggest that more time is needed to finalize the key policy measures, particularly related to the state’s role in the economy and to ensure that the critical objectives of the program, the authority’s economic reform program, can be met.  Our Staff team is continuing to work with the authorities on this goal.  And for that reason, the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF will be combined.  And the idea is for them to be combined into a discussion or a combined review for the fall.  So that’s the rationale for combining the reviews.  More time [is] needed. 

    And I think there was also a question on Egypt’s RSF and what I can say on thisis that as the RSF was approved recently for Egypt and as per the schedule approved by the board, the First Review of the RSF is aligned with the Sixth Review under the EFF. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, would you allow me to follow up on something they’ve just said? 

    So, you said that the Fifth and the Sixth Review will be combined for the fall.  Does this mean that the Fifth and the Sixth disbursements will be together?  Could this be possible? Is this on the table? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, given that the discussions are still underway, a part of the discussions that will, of course, take place around combining the reviews will be to look at what are Egypt’s financing needs and around that, what should be the size of the disbursement around the combined Fifth and Sixth Review. So that’s all part of the discussions, the ongoing discussions that are taking place.  So, it would be premature for me to speculate at this stage. 

    Okay, you had a question on Syria.  So, let me see if anyone else has a question on Syria.  I don’t see anyone else on Syria. 

    So, turning to Syria. So, as I think you know, an IMF team visited Syria from June 1st to 5th.  And this was the first visit of an IMF team to Syria since 2009.  The team was in Syria to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity-building priorities.  And all of this, of course, is to support the recovery of the Syrian economy. 

    As we’ve discussed here before, Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that have caused, you know, immense human suffering.  And the conflict has reduced the economy to a fraction of its former size.  The lifting of sanctions can help facilitate Syria’s rehabilitation by supporting its reintegration into the global economy.  And as part of our ongoing engagement with the Syrian authorities, we will, as needed, of course, you know, assess the implications of the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian economy. 

    So, again, that’s going to be part of the work of the team as they are putting together a picture of the Syrian economy, but also of the very important and deep capacity development needs that the Syrian authorities will have. 

    QUESTIONER: I just wanted to follow up on a colleague’s follow-up.  The comments that you made a few minutes ago regarding Argentina having a technical team in Washington for discussions with the IMF.  I just wanted to confirm my understanding.  Were you saying that they have a — that there is currently a technical team in Washington, and can you tell us anything more about the dates of the meetings or anything beyond that technical team being currently in Washington, if I understood you correctly? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I think all I can add to that is that I can confirm that there is a technical delegation in Washington, you know, from Argentina in Washington, visiting headquarters this week. And the goal is to advance discussions on the First Review under the program.  I hope that clarifies. 

    QUESTIONER: Yes, I wanted to ask you on Mozambique — sorry, just pulling up my note here — which was that –excuse me.  Regarding Mozambique, is it feasible to agree to a new program with Mozambique by year-end, as the president of that country is hoping, or do you have anything on any of the hurdles and the process there?  Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: I’m sort of looking. I don’t have anything off-hand in terms of an update on Mozambique. So, we’ll come back to you separately on Mozambique.  I’m sorry about that. 

    All right, let’s go online.  You had a question?

    QUESTIONER: I have a quick follow-up on Ukraine and then another one.  On Ukraine, when you are talking about combining the Ninth and Tenth Reviews, what would that mean also in terms of the disbursement?  But you know, in the case of Egypt, you’re giving the authorities more time to execute reviews.  What is the reason for combining them in the case of Ukraine? 

    And then, how many more reviews, I just don’t remember, how many more reviews were planned to get to the $15.5 billion?  So, we’ve got $10.6 billion dispersed already.  Like, how much is left to go, and how much of that notionally would come in the Ninth and Tenth Reviews?

    And then separately, I just want to come back to the trade question and perhaps broaden it out a little bit.  So, as the United States under the administration of Donald Trump is imposing quite significant tariffs on many, if not all, of its trading partners, that raises costs, obvious for everyone.  At the same time, the government has also been reducing, significantly slashing its foreign aid for development systems.  And you know, obviously, there’s a lot of concern about that.  We’ve seen some reports recently from the Lancet that millions of people could die as a result of this money not being in — in those countries.  That has follow-on consequences for all the countries whose, you know, economies you’re guiding and accompanying.  And I just want to know if you — if you’ve done a sort of broader analysis about this trade environment.  For many years, you have been warning about trade restrictions, and we are now fully into a period where trade restrictions seem to be increasing.  So, just asking a broad question.

    And then finally, we do have the G20 meeting coming up. The United States has not participated in the initial G20 meetings this year.  What would it mean to the organization if the United States also chose to skip this July meeting?  What is the importance of that as in that body?

    QUESTIONER: So, on Ukraine, what I can say is the Ninth Review, as I said, we expect it to take place by the end of the year and it is going to combine the previously envisaged Ninth Review, which was scheduled for the fall, and the Tenth Review, which we expected to take place in the fourth quarter.  And the team is going to remain closely engaged with Ukraine over this period.  I don’t have more details on the reason that the reviews are being combined, but I believe the Staff Report has been published for Ukraine.  And so, I would refer you to that document, which should have the relevant details.

    On your broader question about the trade environment and the aid environment.  I think if you think about it, or if we look back at it, you know, what has the IMF been saying?  If we look back to the Spring Meetings, one of the main messages from the Managing Director’s Curtain Raiser and her global policy agenda, as well as our broader messages, was that it is very important for countries to, we were saying, kind of, or the Managing Director was saying to get their own house in order.  So, there’s — and the message really behind that was that yes, the trade environment is shifting, and we see very significant shifts in the trade environment. 

    But there is a lot that countries can and need to do domestically related to their own reforms to build their own resilience.  There’s a lot that countries can do in terms of policy, and that really relates in many countries to fiscal policy, which is about, because we’ve been talking about a low-growth, high-debt environment for some time.  High uncertainty and weaker trade affects that environment.  But the fact still remains that we have a low-growth and high-debt environment globally.  So, for countries, that means taking measures to reduce the high debt problem. 

    That’s on the fiscal side.  And that is a general piece of policy advice that we’ve given to many, many countries.  And on the growth side, we are strongly encouraging countries to take measures to boost productivity and medium-term growth.  So, this is really at the crux of our policy advice to countries. 

    And on the aid side, what we’ve been warning about for quite some time is that official development assistance, in general, has been on a declining downward trend for many, many years.  And we see the impact of the decline in official development assistance in low-income countries.  So, this is a broad trend that we observe globally across many countries, affecting low-income countries.  But what it means for those countries is that they are going to have to both work with the IMF, other MDBs [multinational development banks], [and] donors who are still providing financing.  But most importantly, those countries are going to need to look for ways to mobilize domestic resources so that they can fund many of their own development needs. 

    And so this is also part of, we call it a three-pillar approach where we look at the need for domestic reforms in countries, the need for assistance and stepped-up  assistance from multilateral organizations to provide needed financing for countries, and of course ways to ultimately reduce the cost of financing and also looking to mobilize private financing for countries.  So, there is a very rich and large agenda on this broad topic that we have been discussing for quite some time.

    And on the G20, this is really a matter, I think, for the G20 presidency and for the — for the United States. 

    Let me look online. 

    QUESTIONER: So, I have like two questions regarding the finalizing the four-year Extended Credit Facility that is linked between the International Monetary Fund and the government of Ethiopia.  So again, the IMF Staff has been paying a review visit to Ethiopia many times to review Ethiopia’s section and disperse the money.  In this point, I have two questions.  The first one is how does the IMF evaluate Ethiopia’s move and current achievement towards liberalizing its economy?  And the second one is what are the parameters to indicate whether the mission is going on the right track, as the people of the country are facing heavy life burden?

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Other questions on Ethiopia? 

    QUESTIONER: I noted [that] in the Third Review that came out late last night that most of the macroeconomic forecasts are looking up compared to the second.  Apart from public debt-to-GDP, I can’t really figure out why.  So, could you maybe walk me through that?  And I have a separate question on Lebanon.  Maybe we’ll take that later.

    MS. KOZACK: Anything else on Ethiopia? All right. So, with respect to Ethiopia, the IMF Executive Board approved the 2025 Article IV consultation and the Third Review under the ECF on July 2nd, and that enabled Ethiopia to access about U.S. $260 million. 

    What I can add is that the completion of the review reflects both the assessment of the Staff and our Executive Board that Ethiopia’s strong adherence to the program and the program goals, and it also reflects continued confidence in the government’s reform agenda.  The Ethiopian authorities have made significant progress in implementing some really important and fundamental reforms under the ECF.  Key economic indicators such as inflation, fiscal balance, and external balance are all showing signs of stabilization.  And that suggests that the country and the economy are kind of progressing on the right track. 

    With respect to your more detailed question, we will have to come back to you bilaterally.  I’m not sure exactly why.  I don’t know off the top of my head the answer to that, but we will come back to you on that one. 

    I know there’s a few more questions online, so let’s try to get to them. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Sorry.  So, I wanted to — my question is regarding what is going on in Kenya.  President Ruto announced that he planned to privatize some of the public assets.  And I was wondering if you could provide any views from the IMF?  I also wanted to ask you, next week, President Donald Trump will be meeting with several African leaders.  Some of those countries have critical minerals.  So perhaps the meeting we resolve around critical minerals.  As you know, a lot of countries, the U.S., China, as well as European nations, are very interested in African critical minerals.  So, I was wondering if you could share your view, giving what has happened in the past and the corruption around critical minerals and the mismanagement of the Fund received from the minerals.  What is the IMF’s recommendation to nations across the African continent right now, on how to —

    MS. KOZACK: I think we lost you.

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so, we lost you for a bit in the middle, but I think I got the gist of your question. So, let me now ask, does anyone else have a question on Kenya? 

    QUESTIONER: Yeah, I do.  Hello? 

    MS. KOZACK: Yes, please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask about that Diagnostic Mission.  I know I’d asked you about it before, but now it’s completed, and does the IMF want that report to be made public, or does it expect it to be made public?  I have a question on Barbados, too, but I’ll wait on that one. 

    MS. KOZACK: All right, so let me start with Kenya. So, on Kenya, maybe just to remind everyone where we are on Kenya. Our Staff team is actively engaged with the authorities on recent developments.  As you know, we’ve been discussing with them the timing of the next Article IV Mission and also their request for a new program. 

    And I will come to your question on the Government Diagnostics Mission in just a minute. 

    So, a big part of our work with Kenya now is this Government Diagnostics Mission.  The Technical Mission just concluded on June 30th, and they released a short press release, which was just issued.  This was kind of the first step of a process that we expect to take until the end of the year.  So, collaboration on government diagnostics.  It will continue over the next several months.  A draft diagnostic assessment report is expected to be shared with the Kenyan authorities before the end of the year.  So that first report will go to the authorities, and then the report will be published once consent is received from the authorities.  So that is the process that we’ll have.  But it will take quite some time to get that report prepared and ready.  So, kind of hold this space.  We’ll continue to work on it. 

    And then on your question on Kenya, what I can say is that we look forward to learning more details about the President’s statement that was made yesterday.  What I can say more broadly is that our engagement with the Kenyan authorities on privatization has been focused on establishing a solid framework to ensure that transparency and good governance, with the aim to unlock potential benefits. 

    So again, our discussions have very much focused on having a framework, and if done well, we see potential benefits that could include, for example, increased efficiency of improved private investment, reducing the fiscal burden, and improving service delivery. 

    On your second question, I think the way I will approach it is to say that, and Kenya is an example of this in some ways, with this governance Diagnostic Mission that, of course, at the IMF, we are concerned about not only in Africa, but in all countries where it’s a — where corruption affects economic activity, we are concerned about governance.  We have a strong governance program, and it includes a Government Diagnostic Mission.  Government diagnostic assessments allow our experts to go and do a deep assessment of governance in a country, look at where governance weaknesses exist, and to recommend a path forward to improve governance and reduce corruption over time. 

    We recognize that in many of our member countries, governance and corruption issues do have a significant impact on economic activity, and we are very committed to working with our member countries to improve governance as an important part of enabling countries to achieve stronger growth and better livelihoods for their people. 

    And let me go — I have Jermine.  You haven’t had a question yet, and I think we are over time.  So,  I am going to wrap up with you as the last question. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions pertaining to the Caribbean region, more specifically to the Citizenship by Investment programs.  What’s IMF’s position regarding the decisions made by St. Kitts and Nevis and other territories to establish a regulatory body to oversee these programs? 

    MS. KOZACK: Go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: Regarding the looming threat of visa waivers by the Schengen region, the European Union, regarding these particular passport holders, knowing that the CBI programs are the pillars of the economies of the region. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can say on the CBI, the citizenship by investment programs, is that our position has been that we generally advocate for common CBI program standards across the region, including in the area of transparency. And this was noted in our 2024 Regional Consultation Report on the ECCU. 

    And with respect to specific countries such as Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia, for those specific countries, we have provided country-specific information, and the information on those can be found in the respective Article IV reports for those countries. 

    With respect to the question on the Schengen region, this is really a matter between the individual countries in the Caribbean and the countries in the Schengen region.  It’s not really a matter for the IMF. 

    So, with that, given that we’ve taken more time than we normally allocate, I want to thank everyone very much for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 A.M. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made later — available later on IMF.org.  And of course, in case of any clarifications, additional queries, if you didn’t get a chance to ask your questions today, please do be in contact with my colleagues at media@imf.org, and we will be sure to give you a response.  I wish you all a wonderful day and a wonderful long weekend, and I look forward to seeing you all next time.  Thanks very much.  

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Rahim Kanani

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/03/tr-070325-com-regular-press-briefing-july-3-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI: Westhaven Closes Non-Brokered Private Placement with Eric Sprott and Earthlabs, for Gross Proceeds of $3.16 Million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. NEWS WIRE SERVICES OR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, July 03, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Westhaven Gold Corp. (TSX-V:WHN) (“Westhaven” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce that the Company has closed the non-brokered private placement (the “Offering”) previously announced on June 16th, 2025 for aggregate gross proceeds of $3,160,000 from the sale of 8,333,333 units of the Company (each, a “Unit”) at a price of $0.12 per Unit for gross proceeds of C$1,000,000, and 12,500,000 flow-through units of the Company sold on a charitable flow-through basis (each, a “Charity FT Unit”, and collectively with the Units, the “Offered Securities”) at a price of $0.1728 per Charity FT Unit for gross proceeds of C$2,160,000.

    Eric Sprott and Earthlabs Inc. were the subscribers for the Units and the end purchasers of Charity FT Units, following the charitable flow through donations in the Offering.

    The gross proceeds from the issuance of the Charity FT Units will be used for Canadian exploration expenses on the Company’s projects in British Columbia and will qualify as “flow-through mining expenditures”, as defined in subsection 127(9) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) and as a “BC flow-through mining expenditure” as defined in section 4.721 of the Income Tax Act (British Columbia) (the “Qualifying Expenditures”), which will be incurred on or before December 31, 2026 and renounced to the subscribers with an effective date no later than December 31, 2025 in an aggregate amount not less than the gross proceeds raised from the issue of the Charity FT Units.

    More specifically, proceeds of the Offering will be used for work related to the Company’s portfolio of exploration properties within the Spences Bridge Gold Belt, British Columbia, Canada. This work will include expansion of the current exploration drilling program at the Shovelnose gold project to at least 5,000m, as well as advancing efforts to realize the potential outlined in a recently completed preliminary economic assessment of a high grade, high margin underground gold mining opportunity at the South Zone, FMN and Franz gold deposits at Shovelnose (please see news release dated March 3rd, 2025 for details). The Company intends to use the net proceeds from the sale of the Units for working capital and general corporate purposes.

    Each Unit consisted of one common share of the Company (each, a “Unit Share”) and one-half of one common share purchase warrant (each whole warrant, a “Warrant”). Each Charity FT Unit consisted of one share that will qualify as a “flow-through share” within the meaning of subsection 66(15) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) and one half of one Warrant. Each whole Warrant shall entitle the holder to purchase one common share of the Company (each, a “Warrant Share”) at a price of $0.18 at any time on or before July 3, 2027.

    A finder’s fee, consisting of a cash payment of $66,823 and 250,000 non-transferable broker warrants was paid to Red Cloud Securities Inc. in respect of the private placement. Each broker warrant can be exercised to acquire one common share at a price of $0.12 on or before July 3, 2027.

    All the securities issued pursuant to the Offering are subject to a hold period under Canadian securities laws ending on November 4, 2025.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any of the securities in the United States. The securities have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “U.S. Securities Act”), or any state securities laws and may not be offered or sold within the United States or to or for the account or benefit of a U.S. person (as defined in Regulation S under the U.S. Securities Act) unless registered under the U.S. Securities Act and applicable state securities laws or an exemption from such registration is available.

    On behalf of the Board of Directors

    WESTHAVEN GOLD CORP.

    “Ken Armstrong”

    Ken Armstrong, President and CEO, is responsible for this news release and can be reached at 604-681-5558.

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    About Westhaven Gold Corp.

    Westhaven is a gold-focused exploration and development company targeting low sulphidation, high-grade, epithermal style gold mineralization within the Spences Bridge Gold Belt in southern British Columbia. Westhaven controls ~61,512 hectares (~615 square kilometres) within four gold properties spread along this underexplored belt. The Shovelnose Gold project is the most advanced property, with a recently updated 2025 Preliminary Economic Assessment that validates the Project’s potential as a robust, low cost and high margin 11-year underground gold mining opportunity with average annual life-of-mine gold production of 56,000 ounces and having a Cdn$454 million after-tax NPV6% and 43.2% IRR (base case parameters of US$2,400 per ounce gold, US$28 per ounce silver and CDN/US$ exchange rate of $0.72). Initial capital costs are projected to be Cdn$184 million with a payback period of 2.1 years. Please see Westhaven’s news release dated March 3, 2025 for details of the updated PEA. Shovelnose is situated off a major highway, near power, rail, large producing mines, pipelines and within commuting distance from the city of Merritt, which result in lower cost exploration and development.

    Qualified Person: The technical and scientific information in this news release has been reviewed and approved by Peter Fischl, P.Geo, who is a Qualified Person for the Company under the definitions established by National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects.

    Westhaven trades on the TSX Venture Exchange under the ticker symbol WHN. For further information, please call 604-681-5558 or visit Westhaven’s website at www.westhavengold.com.

    Forward Looking Statements:

    This press release contains “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable Canadian and United States securities laws, which is based upon the Company’s current internal expectations, estimates, projections, assumptions and beliefs. The forward-looking information included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release. Such forward-looking statements and forward-looking information include, but are not limited to, statements concerning the Company’s expectations with respect to the Offering and the use of proceeds of the Offering. Forward-looking statements or forward-looking information relate to future events and future performance and include statements regarding the expectations and beliefs of management based on information currently available to the Company. Such forward-looking statements and forward-looking information often, but not always, can be identified by the use of words such as “plans”, “expects”, “potential”, “is expected”, “anticipated”, “is targeted”, “budget”, “scheduled”, “estimates”, “forecasts”, “intends”, “anticipates”, or “believes” or the negatives thereof or variations of such words and phrases or statements that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might” or “will” be taken, occur or be achieved.

    Forward-looking information involves known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the actual results, performance, or achievements of the Company to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Such risks and other factors include, among others, and without limitation: the Company will not be able to raise sufficient funds to complete its planned exploration program; that the Company will not derive the expected benefits from its current program; the Company may not use the proceeds of the Offering as currently contemplated; the Company may fail to find a commercially viable deposit at any of its mineral properties; the Company’s plans may be adversely affected by the Company’s reliance on historical data compiled by previous parties involved with its mineral properties; mineral exploration and development are inherently risky industries; the mineral exploration industry is intensely competitive; additional financing may not be available to the Company when required or, if available, the terms of such financing may not be favourable to the Company; fluctuations in the demand for gold or gold prices generally; the Company may not be able to identify, negotiate or finance any future acquisitions successfully, or to integrate such acquisitions with its current business; the Company’s exploration activities are dependent upon the grant of appropriate licenses, concessions, leases, permits and regulatory consents, which may be withdrawn or not granted; the Company’s operations could be adversely affected by possible future government legislation, policies and controls or by changes in applicable laws and regulations; there is no guarantee that title to the properties in which the Company has a material interest will not be challenged or impugned; the Company faces various risks associated with mining exploration that are not insurable or may be the subject of insurance which is not commercially feasible for the Company; the volatility of global capital markets over the past several years has generally made the raising of capital more difficult; inflationary cost pressures may escalate the Company’s operating costs; compliance with environmental regulations can be costly; social and environmental activism can negatively impact exploration, development and mining activities; the success of the Company is largely dependent on the performance of its directors and officers; the Company’s operations may be adversely affected by First Nations land claims; the Company and/or its directors and officers may be subject to a variety of legal proceedings, the results of which may have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business; the Company may be adversely affected if potential conflicts of interests involving its directors and officers are not resolved in favour of the Company; the Company’s future profitability may depend upon the world market prices of gold; dilution from future equity financing could negatively impact holders of the Company’s securities; failure to adequately meet infrastructure requirements could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business; the Company’s projects now or in the future may be adversely affected by risks outside the control of the Company; the Company is subject to various risks associated with climate change, the Company is subject to general global risks arising from epidemic diseases, the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, rising inflation and interest rates and the impact they will have on the Company’s operations, supply chains, ability to access mining projects or procure equipment, supplies, contractors and other personnel on a timely basis or at all is uncertain; as well as other risk factors in the Company’s other public filings available at www.sedarplus.ca. Readers are cautioned that this list of risk factors should not be construed as exhaustive. Although the Company believes that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking information are reasonable, there can be no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. The Company cannot guarantee future results, performance, or achievements. Consequently, there is no representation that the actual results achieved will be the same, in whole or in part, as those set out in the forward-looking information. The Company undertakes no duty to update any of the forward-looking information to conform such information to actual results or to changes in the Company’s expectations, except as otherwise required by applicable securities legislation. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking information. The forward-looking information contained in this offering document is expressly qualified by this cautionary statement.

    The MIL Network –