Category: Ukraine

MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hundreds of jobs at risk as a result of sugar factory closure in Spain – E-002549/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002549/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE)

On 27 May 2025, AB Azucarera Iberia S.L. announced a collective redundancy plan which will affect 251 employees across all its sites in Spain. The plan involves closing the La Bañeza (León) sugar factory and converting the Miranda de Ebro (Burgos) sugar factory into a cane sugar refinery.

The sugar beet sector in Europe – and in Spain in particular – has been in profound crisis since 2018. High production costs, price volatility, imports and stagnation of sugar production and content as a result of reduced active substances are driving sugar production towards dire straits.

Considering the above:

1.Will the Commission change its current plant health policy in order to restore productivity and the sugar yield per hectare of sugar beet?

2.Does the Commission intend to improve the safety net and risk management under the common market organisation to avoid a market crisis like the one in 2017-2020?

3.Does the Commission intend to substantially change the preferential quotas under the future EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to help stabilise the markets?

Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements – A10-0117/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

(COM(2025)0084 – C10‑0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 172 and 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, and Articles 183 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0036/2025),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [1],

– after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0117/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT [*]

to the Commission proposal

———————————————————

2025/0040 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 172 and Article 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, Article 183 and Article 194 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [2],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions▌,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Union faces massive financing needs to deliver on its objectives in the areas of innovation, the green and digital transition, and social investment and skills, while a complex backdrop affecting the Union’s competitiveness and industrial base characterised by changing global dynamics, slow economic growth, accelerated climate change and environmental degradation, technological competition and rising geopolitical tensions needs to be addressed. In that context, enhancing the Union’s autonomy, in particular in the area of energy, by supporting investments that strengthen a renewable-based and clean energy system, is essential to reduce dependencies and safeguard economic and political stability.

(1a) Additionality and the leveraging effect of the EU guarantee are the foundation of both the EFSI and the InvestEU Programme, enabling especially the scaling up of new and innovative technologies and companies as well as de-risking investment for private investors. It is necessary for the European Parliament to have better oversight over the InvestEU Programme to ensure that the EU guarantee is used in accordance with the programme’s objectives, such as fostering sustainable growth and competitiveness, with genuine additionality compared to private investors.

(2) The Draghi report assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030, with EUR 450 billion needed for the energy transition alone. This includes a substantial amount for the green and digital transition. Ensuring sufficient public and private investment is critical to boost productivity growth and achieve Union’s goals, leverage private investments with the objective to decarbonise industry, accelerate the production, storage and deployment of clean energy and electrification, strengthen interconnections and grids, advance sustainable and circular business models, foster sustainable building renovation, develop clean tech manufacturing as well as digital technologies and their diffusion across economic sectors.

(2a) Europe is experiencing an acute housing crisis which consists in two market failures: a shortage of affordable and social housing, and a failure to bridge the energy efficiency gap, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty. According to an analysis by the EIB Group, an estimated annual investment of EUR 300 to 400 billion is needed for construction and renovation only. In that regard, the Commission is planning to present a first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and is partnering with the EIB Group, national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop a European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. Increasing the amount available under the social investment and skills policy window would allow greater support from InvestEU for that key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments in relation to housing. This would contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

(2b) In the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increased national and European spending is required to enhance European defence capabilities and to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). On 19 March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a White Paper for European Defence –Readiness 2030 containing a plan to significantly step up Europe’s spending on security and defence. InvestEU enables financing and investment operations to develop the Union defence industry and military mobility, including financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. Increasing the amount available under the relevant windows would allow greater support from InvestEU for this key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments for SMEs, mid-caps, and start-ups in the defence supply chain.

(2c) In 2024, the Commission launched, together with the European Investment Fund, an export credit guarantee facility under InvestEU with a view to encouraging Union SMEs to strengthen economic ties with Ukraine and revitalise trade, thereby contributing to Ukraine’s economic recovery and improving the competitiveness of SMEs. It is important that as many European export credit agencies as possible participate in this facility.

(2d) The Letta and Draghi reports underline the importance of well-functioning transport networks and services to ensure a transition towards a green economy while strengthening the Union’s competitiveness. In that regard, massive strategic investments are needed to complete missing links and to modernise transport infrastructure, where major gaps exist in public and private financing.

(3) The InvestEU Fund is the main EU-level tool to leverage public and private funding to support a broad range of Union policy priorities. Through its comprehensive network of implementing partners, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), other international financial institutions and national promotional banks and institutions, the InvestEU Fund is delivering much-needed financing through its risk-sharing capacity. The InvestEU interim evaluation highlighted that budgetary guarantees are inherently efficient for the EU budget and confirmed that the programme is well on track to mobilise investment, with a notable expected impact on the real economy. However, approvals of financing and investment operation under InvestEU were heavily frontloaded, and as a result, if no action is taken to address the issue, new approvals for some financial products may cease after 2025.

(4) The financial capacity of InvestEU Fund should be increased and used even more efficiently in combination with resources that will become available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and other legacy instruments (CEF Debt Instrument and InnovFin Debt Facility) implemented by the EIB Group. These combinations potentially reduce the budget revenues from legacy instruments. However, they would also create the possibility for an increased volume of guarantee cover to be provided for strategic investments in key Union priority areas for an additional investment of around EUR 25 billion that can be expected to be mobilised and by leading to an increased diversification of risks and thus not substantially increasing the risks for the Union budget.

(5) With the EUR 4,5 billion increase of the EU guarantee underpinned by ▌additional reflows of EUR 1,8 billion, and the efficiency measures implemented by combining the capacities of the legacy instruments with the InvestEU Fund, it is expected that around EUR 70 billion in additional investment could be mobilised. The financial contribution of the EIB Group should be proportionally adjusted to the share of the increased EU guarantee allocated to them. The indicative distribution of the EU guarantee between the four policy windows should be increased proportionally to the increase of the EU guarantee.

(5a) InvestEU advisory services play an important role in the development of a pipeline of projects. Those advisory services are particularly useful in complex areas, such as affordable social housing and defence. It would therefore be appropriate to use EUR 200 million in reflows to increase the amount made available for such services. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance the interaction between the various components of the InvestEU Programme, in particular between the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

(5b) The Commission estimates the amount of provisioning required to cover future life-time losses from the operations supported under the InvestEU Fund with a 95 % confidence level of the value at risk. Taking into account the positive experience with the InvestEU Programme to date and in order to maximise budgetary efficiency while preserving a suitable level of risk management, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assess whether to reduce that level to 90 %, which would be in line with risk-related methodologies in Union external policies and would enable a high volume of financing and investment operations in support of the Union’s strategic priorities.

(6) In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Member State compartment under the InvestEU Fund, it should be made possible for Member States to contribute also in a fully funded manner through an InvestEU financial instrument in addition to the existing option of contributing to the EU guarantee. The support from InvestEU financial instrument should, to the extent possible, be implemented following the same principles as those of the EU guarantee. Through the InvestEU financial instrument, non-euro Member States could benefit from the InvestEU programme financially more efficiently in their own currency. The InvestEU financial instrument should also provide a further incentive for responsibly increasing the risk appetite of the implementing partners thereby contributing to the crowding-in of private capital.

(6a) It is possible to combine amounts allocated to the Member State compartment with resources under the EU compartment in a layered structure to achieve a better risk coverage, in particular with a first loss tranche covered by national resources. Member States should further explore that possibility to mobilise more investments in strategic areas. To ensure coherence with the objectives of the InvestEU Programme, such combinations should respect the principles of EU value-added, fair competition, and the integrity of the internal market, and should support cross-border cooperation where relevant.

(7) In line with an overall objective of simplification so as to alleviate the administrative burden for final recipients, financial intermediaries and implementing partners, reporting requirements, including those relating to key performance and monitoring indicators, should be reduced, where appropriate, in particular those that affect small businesses and small-size operations. Without prejudice to the definition of an SME for the purposes of other Union acts and any future programmes and funds, the application of the definition of an SME for the purposes of the InvestEU Programme should be adjusted to remove complexities to the extent possible, taking account of the possibility for implementing partners to request information on the ownership structure of SMEs for the purpose of calculating the headcount. In that regard, and as noted in Recital 14 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [3], enterprises should be permitted to use solemn declarations to certify specific characteristics relevant to their SME status, such as the autonomy of their ownership structures. Specific attention should be paid to social economy enterprises and micro finance institutions.

(7a) It is appropriate for the Commission to take further non-legislative simplification measures in order to complement this amending Regulation, such as reducing the frequency of progress reports to be submitted by implementing partners. However, it is important that such measures do not compromise the effectiveness of auditing and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure alignment with the Union’s policy objectives.

(7b) It is important that State aid procedures applicable to operations supported under the InvestEU Fund be proportionate, predictable, and streamlined. In that context, it is also important that the Commission explore all available means to simplify and accelerate State aid assessments. This could include making greater use of the principle of market conformity. Furthermore, it is necessary that, where appropriate, the Commission provide timely guidance and further clarify and simplify the application of State aid rules to national financial instruments.

(8) The frequency and scope of reports should also be reduced for the InvestEU programme and its predecessor, the EFSI programme.

(9) For the Commission’s accounting, implementing partners should provide for combinations audited financial statements in line with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation, clearly delineating the amounts related to the different legal basis.

(10) Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 should be amended to allow for combinations of support under those Regulations and the EU guarantee under this Regulation.

(10a) On 18 April 2019, the Commission declared that ‘without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), one-off contributions by Member States, either by a Member State or by national promotional banks classified in the general government sector or acting on behalf of a Member State, into thematic or multi-country investment platforms should in principle qualify as one-off measures within the meaning of Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (13) and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (14). In addition, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the SGP, the Commission will consider to what extent the same treatment as for the EFSI in the context of the Commission communication on flexibility can be applied to the InvestEU Programme as the successor instrument to the EFSI with regard to one-off contributions provided by Member States in cash to finance an additional amount of the EU guarantee for the purposes of the Member State compartment’. Since then, the economic governance framework has changed. In light of this, Member State contributions should still be considered as one-off measures.

(11) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address Union-wide and Member State specific market failures and the investment gap within the Union, to accelerate the Union’s green and digital transition, enhance its competitiveness and strengthen its industrial base cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(11a) In order to support the European Parliament in exercising its institutional role in overseeing Union funds and ensuring alignment with agreed policy objectives, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should assess the effectiveness and impact of the derogations introduced by this amending Regulation, in particular their role in facilitating access to finance for target groups such as SMEs. It should also consider the overall functioning of the InvestEU Programme in the light of the principles of transparency, accountability and performance monitoring, including an examination of the relevance of financial thresholds applicable to SMEs in the light of economic developments.

(11b) With a view to reducing administrative complexity and legal uncertainty, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should also take into account any regulatory adjustments arising from the projected legislative proposal on a small mid-cap enterprise category. Due attention should be given to the effectiveness of measures aimed at facilitating enterprise development,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 [InvestEU Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2021/523 is amended as follows:

(1) In Article 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘This Regulation establishes the InvestEU Fund, which shall provide for an EU guarantee and an InvestEU financial instrument to support financing and investment operations carried out by the implementing partners that contribute to objectives of the Union’s internal policies.’;

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) points (3), (4) and (5) are replaced by the following:

‘(3) ‘policy window’ means a targeted area for support by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument as laid down in Article 8(1);’

(4) ‘compartment’ means a part of the support provided under the InvestEU Fund defined in terms of the origin of the resources backing it;’

(5) ‘blending operation’ means, under the EU compartment, an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support, repayable forms of support, or both, from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public finance institutions, or from commercial finance institutions and investors; for the purposes of this definition, Union programmes financed from sources other than the Union budget, such as the EU ETS Innovation Fund, may be assimilated to Union programmes financed by the Union budget;’;

(b) point (8) is replaced by the following:

‘(8) ‘contribution agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and one or more Member States specify the conditions for the implementation of the contribution under the Member State compartment, as laid down in Articles 10 and 10a, respectively;’;

(c) points (10) and (11) are replaced by the following:

‘(10) ‘financing and investment operations’ or ‘financing or investment operations’ means operations to provide finance directly or indirectly to final recipients through financial products:

(a) in the context of the EU guarantee, carried out by an implementing partner in its own name, provided by the implementing partner in accordance with its internal rules, policies and procedures and accounted for in the implementing partner’s financial statements or, where applicable, disclosed in the notes to those financial statements;

(b) in the context of the InvestEU financial instrument, carried out by the implementing partner in its own name or in its own name but on behalf of the Commission, as applicable;

(11) ‘funds under shared management’ means funds that provide for the possibility of allocating a portion of those funds to the provisioning for a budgetary guarantee or to a financial instrument under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4], the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] (the ‘ESF+ Regulation for 2021-2027’), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] (the ‘CAP Strategic Plans Regulation’);’;

(d) point 12 is replaced by the following:

‘(12) ‘guarantee agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and an implementing partner specify the conditions for proposing financing and investment operations in order for them to be granted the benefit of the EU guarantee and/or of the InvestEU financial instrument, for providing the EU guarantee or support through the InvestEU financial instrument for those operations and for implementing them in accordance with this Regulation;’;

(e) point 21 is replaced by the following:

‘(21) ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’ (‘SME’) means (a) in case of financial products not conferring advantage in State aid terms, an enterprise which, according to its last annual or consolidated accounts, employs an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250 and which has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and where information relating to the autonomy of its ownership structure for the purpose of calculating those thresholds may be made by way of a solemn declaration by the enterprise, or (b) in case of other types of financial products, a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [8] or as otherwise defined in the guarantee agreement;’;

(f) the following point 24 is added:

‘(24) ‘InvestEU financial instrument’ means a measure defined in Article 2, point (30), of the Financial Regulation to be implemented under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund.’;

(3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) in the first subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee for the purposes of the EU compartment referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) shall be EUR 30 652 310 073 in current prices.’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An additional amount of the EU guarantee may be provided for the purposes of the Member State compartment referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, subject to the allocation by Member States, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9] (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027’) and Article 81 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, of the corresponding amounts.’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An amount of EUR 15 827 310 073 in current prices of the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be allocated for the objectives referred to in Article 3(2).’;

(ba) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. The financial envelope for the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII shall be EUR 630 000 000 in current prices.’

(4) in Article 6(1), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument shall be implemented in indirect management with the bodies referred to in points (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(v) and (c)(vi) of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(5) Article 7 is amended as follows:

(a) The title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be combined to support financial products or portfolios implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(c) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and released from the operations approved under these instruments and Union support provided through the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 and released from operations approved under that EU guarantee may be combined to support financial products or portfolios containing exclusively financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(d) the following paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are added:

‘5. By derogation from Article 212(3), second subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, the released guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

6. By derogation from Article 216(4), point (a) of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning corresponding to the released guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may not be taken into account for the purpose of operations referred to in Article 216(4) of the Financial Regulation and may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

7. The release of the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to Common Provisioning Fund and the release of the guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 referred to in paragraph 4 shall take place by an amendment of the relevant agreements signed between the Commission and the EIB or the EIF.

The conditions of the use of the released guarantees referred to in the first subparagraph, to cover financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, and where relevant, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to the Common Provisioning Fund, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.

The terms and conditions of the financial products referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article and of the portfolios concerned, including the respective pro rata shares of losses, revenues, repayments and recoveries or the respective non pro rata shares in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.’;

(6) In Article 8(8), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission, together with implementing partners, shall seek to ensure that the part of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment used for the sustainable infrastructure policy window is distributed with the aim of achieving a balance between the different areas referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1.’;

(7) In Article 9(1), point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State compartment shall address specific market failures or suboptimal investment situations in one or several regions or Member States to deliver the policy objectives of the contributing funds under shared management or of the additional amount provided by a Member State under Article 4(1), third subparagraph, or under Article 10a(1), second subparagraph, in particular to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union by addressing imbalances between its regions.’;

(8) Article 10 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Specific provisions applicable to the EU Guarantee implemented under the Member State compartment’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Member State and the Commission shall conclude a contribution agreement or an amendment to it following the Commission Decision approving the Partnership Agreement pursuant to the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or the CAP Strategic Plan under the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation or simultaneously to the Commission Decision amending a programme in accordance with the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or a CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the provisions on the amendment to the CAP Strategic Plan laid down in the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.’;

(c) in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State strategy, consisting of the type of financing, the target leverage, the geographical coverage, including regional coverage if necessary, types of projects, the investment period and, where applicable, the categories of final recipients and of eligible intermediaries;’;

(9) The following Article 10a is inserted:

‘Article 10a

Specific provisions applicable to the InvestEU financial instrument implemented under the Member State compartment

1. A Member State may contribute amounts from the funds under shared management to the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund in view of deploying them through the InvestEU financial instrument.

Member States may also provide additional amounts for the purposes of the InvestEU financial instrument. Such amounts shall constitute an external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5), second sentence of the Financial Regulation.

Amounts allocated by a Member State on a voluntary basis pursuant to the first and second subparagraph shall be used for supporting financing and investment operations in the Member State concerned. Those amounts shall be used to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives specified in the Partnership Agreement referred to in Article 11(1)(a) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027, in the programmes or in the CAP Strategic Plan which contribute to the InvestEU Programme, in order to implement relevant measures set out in the recovery and resilience plans in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 or, in other cases, for the purposes laid down in the contribution agreement, depending on the origin of the amount contributed.

2. Contribution to the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the conclusion of a contribution agreement between a Member State and the Commission, which for the contributions from funds under shared management shall be done in accordance with Article 10(2), fourth subparagraph.

Two or more Member States may conclude a joint contribution agreement with the Commission.

3. The contribution agreement shall at least contain the amount of the contribution by the Member State and the currency of the financing and investment operations, provisions on the Union remuneration for the InvestEU financial instrument, the elements set out in points (b) to (e) and (g) of Article 10(3) and the treatment of resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument.

4. The contribution agreements shall be implemented through guarantee agreements concluded in accordance with Article 10(4), first subparagraph.

Where no guarantee agreement has been concluded within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be terminated or prolonged by mutual agreement. Where the amount of a contribution agreement has not been fully committed under one or more guarantee agreements within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, that amount shall be amended accordingly. The unused amount of a contribution from funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of a contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Where a guarantee agreement has not been duly implemented within the period specified in Article 14(6) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or Article 81(6) of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, or, in the case of a guarantee agreement related to amounts provided in accordance with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article, in the relevant contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be amended. The unused amounts allocated by Member States pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of an InvestEU financial instrument attributable to the contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

5. Contracts implementing the InvestEU financial instrument between the implementing partner and the final recipient or the financial intermediary or other entity referred to in Article 16(1), point (a), shall be signed by 31 December 2028.’;

(9a) In Article 11(1), point (d)(i) is replaced by the following:

‘(i) be allocated an amount of up to EUR 450 000 000 from the financial envelope referred to in Article 4(3) for the advisory initiatives referred to in Article 25 and the operational tasks referred to in point (ii) of this point;’;

(10) the title of Chapter IV is replaced by the following:

‘EU guarantee and InvestEU financial instrument’;

(11) in Article 13(4), the first two sentences are replaced by the following:

‘75 % of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), amounting to EUR 22 989 232 555, shall be granted to the EIB Group. The EIB Group shall provide an aggregate financial contribution amounting to EUR 5 747 308 139.’;

(12) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The InvestEU financial instrument may be used to provide funding to the implementing partners for the types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph provided by the implementing partners.

In order to be covered by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument, the financing referred to in the first and second subparagraph shall be granted, acquired or issued for the benefit of financing and investment operations referred to in Article 14(1), where the financing by the implementing partner was granted in accordance with a financing agreement or transaction signed or entered into by the implementing partner after the signature of the guarantee agreement and that has not expired or been cancelled.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations through funds or other intermediate structures shall be supported by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with the provisions laid down in the investment guidelines, as applicable, even if such structures invest a minority of their invested amounts outside the Union and in third countries referred to Article 14(2) or invest a minority of their invested amounts into assets other than those eligible under this Regulation.’;

(13) Article 17 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall conclude a guarantee agreement with each implementing partner on the granting of the EU guarantee up to an amount to be determined by the Commission or on providing support under the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

(i) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) detailed rules on the provision of the EU guarantee or support under the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with Article 19, including on the coverage of financing and investment operations or portfolios of specific types of instruments and the respective events that trigger possible calls on the EU guarantee or the use of the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

‘(f) the commitment of the implementing partner to accept the decisions by the Commission and the Investment Committee as regards the use of the EU guarantee or of the InvestEU financial instrument for the benefit of a proposed financing or investment operation, without prejudice to the decision-making of the implementing partner in respect of the proposed financing or investment operation without the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(iii) points (h) and (i) are replaced by the following:

‘(h) financial and operational reporting and monitoring of the financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument;

(i) key performance indicators, in particular as regards the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument, the fulfilment of the objectives and criteria laid down in Articles 3, 8 and 14, and the mobilisation of private capital;’;

(ba) the following paragraph is added:

‘5a. The Commission shall, upon request, provide to the European Parliament and the Council the names of the implementing partners party to the guarantee agreements and the main content of those agreements, having due regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.’;

(14) Article 18 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Requirements for the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The granting of the EU guarantee and the support from the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the entry into force of the guarantee agreement with the relevant implementing partner.’;

(c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations shall be covered by the EU guarantee or be supported through the InvestEU financial instrument only where they fulfil the criteria laid down in this Regulation and, if applicable, in the relevant investment guidelines, and where the Investment Committee has concluded that those operations fulfil the requirements for benefiting from the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument. The implementing partners shall remain responsible for ensuring that the financing and investment operations comply with this Regulation and the relevant investment guidelines.’;

(d) paragraph 3 is amended as follows:

(i) the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘No administrative costs or fees related to the implementation of financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument shall be due to the implementing partner by the Commission unless the nature of the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented and the affordability for the targeted final recipients or the type of financing provided allow the implementing partner to duly justify to the Commission the need for an exception.’

(ii) the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, implementing partners are entitled to appropriate fees in relation to the management of fiduciary accounts relating to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

(e) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘In addition, the implementing partner may use the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument to meet the relevant share of any recovery costs in accordance with Article 17(4), unless those costs have been deducted from recovery proceeds.’;

(15) Article 19 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Coverage and terms of the EU guarantee and of the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) the second sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The remuneration for the EU guarantee or for the InvestEU financial instrument may be reduced in the duly justified cases referred to in Article 13(2).’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The implementing partner shall have appropriate exposure at its own risk to financing and investment operations supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument, unless exceptionally the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented are of such nature that the implementing partner could not reasonably contribute its own risk-bearing capacity to it.’;

(c) in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (a), the introductory sentence is replaced by the following:

‘for debt products referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):’;

(d) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

‘2a. The InvestEU financial instrument shall cover:

(a) for debt products consisting of guarantees and counter-guarantees referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):

(i) the principal and all interest and amounts due to the implementing partner but not received by it in accordance with the terms of the financing operations prior to the event of default;

(ii) restructuring losses;

(iii) losses arising from fluctuations of currencies other than the euro in markets where possibilities for long-term hedging are limited;

(b) for other eligible types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1): the amounts invested or lent by the implementing partner;

For the purposes of point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, for subordinated debt a deferral, reduction or required exit shall be considered to be an event of default.

The Invest EU financial instrument shall cover the entire exposure of the Union with respect to the relevant financing and investment operations.’;

(16) in Article 22, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘A scoreboard of indicators (the ‘Scoreboard’) shall be established to ensure that the Investment Committee is able to carry out an independent, transparent and harmonised assessment of requests for the use of the EU guarantee or, as applicable, the InvestEU financial instrument for financing and investment operations proposed by implementing partners.’;

(17) in Article 23, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘EIB financing and investment operations that fall within the scope of this Regulation shall not be covered by the EU guarantee or benefit from the InvestEU financial instrument where the Commission delivers an unfavourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute.’;

(18) Article 24 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

‘(a) examine the proposals for financing and investment operations submitted by implementing partners for coverage under the EU guarantee or for support from the InvestEU financial instrument that have passed the policy check referred to in Article 23(1) of this Regulation or that have received a favourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute;’;

(ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) check whether the financing and investment operations that would benefit from the support under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument comply with all relevant requirements.’;

(b) in paragraph 4, second subparagraph, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Any project assessment conducted by an implementing partner shall not be binding on the Investment Committee for the purposes of granting a financing or investment operation coverage by the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(c) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:

(i) in the second subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Conclusions of the Investment Committee approving the coverage of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation shall be publicly accessible and shall include the rationale for the approval and information on the operation, in particular its description, the identity of the promoters or financial intermediaries, and the objectives of the operation.’;

(ii) in the fifth subparagraph, the second sentence is replaced by the following:

‘That submission shall include any decisions rejecting the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(d) in paragraph 6, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Where the Investment Committee is requested to approve the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation that is a facility, programme or structure which has underlying sub-projects, that approval shall comprise those underlying sub-projects unless the Investment Committee decides to retain the right to approve them separately.’;

(19) in Article 25(2), point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) where appropriate, assist project promoters in developing their projects so that they fulfil the objectives set out in Articles 3 and 8 and the eligibility criteria set out in Article 14, and facilitate the development of among others important projects of common European interest and aggregators for small-sized projects, including through investment platforms as referred to in point (f) of this paragraph, provided that such assistance does not prejudge the conclusions of the Investment Committee with respect to the coverage of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument with respect to such projects;’;

(20) Article 28 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 2, the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Implementing partners shall be exempt from reporting on key performance and monitoring indicators laid down in Annex III, except those in points 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2, 6.3 and 7.2, as far as financing or investments operations benefiting final recipients receiving financing or investment supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument from an implementing partner or a financial intermediary not exceeding EUR 300 000 are concerned.’;

(b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

‘3. The Commission shall report on the implementation of the InvestEU Programme in accordance with Articles 241 and 250 of the Financial Regulation. In accordance with Article 41(5) of the Financial Regulation, the annual report shall provide information on the level of implementation of the Programme with respect to its objectives and performance indicators. For that purpose, each implementing partner shall provide on an annual basis the information necessary to allow the Commission to comply with its reporting obligations, including information on the operation of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument.’

4. Once a year, each implementing partner shall submit a report to the Commission on the financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation, broken down by EU compartment and Member State compartment, as appropriate. Each implementing partner shall also submit information on the Member State compartment to the Member State whose compartment it implements. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and the Invest EU financial instrument and with the key performance indicators laid down in Annex III to this Regulation. The report shall also include operational, statistical, financial and accounting data on each financing or investment operation and an estimation of expected cash flows, at the level of compartment, policy window and the InvestEU Fund. The report may also include information on barriers to investment encountered when carrying out financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The reports shall contain the information the implementing partners have to provide under point (a) of Article 158(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(21) Article 35 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Transitional and other provisions’;

(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

‘1. By way of derogation from Article 212(3), first and fourth subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, any revenues, repayments and recoveries from financial instruments established by programmes referred to in Annex IV to this Regulation may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

2. By way of derogation from Article 216(4), point (a), of the Financial Regulation, any surplus of provisions for the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

▌ By way of derogation from Article 214(4)(d) of the Financial Regulation, any revenues from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 received in 2027 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation.’;

(22) Annex I is replaced by the following:

‘ANNEX I

AMOUNTS OF EU GUARANTEE PER SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

The indicative distribution referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(2) towards financial and investment operations shall be as follows:

(a) up to EUR 11 589 045 902 for objectives referred to in point (a) of Article 3(2);

(b) up to EUR 7 707 119 112 for objectives referred to in point (b) of Article 3(2);

(c) up to EUR 8 095 166 498 for objectives referred to in point (c) of Article 3(2);

(d) up to EUR 3 260 978 561 for objectives referred to in point (d) of Article 3(2).’;

(23) In Annex III, the following two paragraphs are added in point 1 below point 1.4:

‘By way of derogation from Article 2(40) of the Financial Regulation, when determining the leverage and multiplier effect for financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees, the amount of risk coverage shall be assimilated to the amount of reimbursable financing.

By way of derogation from Article 222(3) of the Financial Regulation, the financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees shall not be required to achieve multiplier effect.’;

(24) In Annex V, the following paragraph is added:

‘This Annex also applies to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

Article 2

Amendments to Regulation 2015/1017 [EFSI Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 11a is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’.

(b) the following second subparagraph is inserted:

‘The EU guarantee may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purposes of combinations referred to in Article 7(4) of that Regulation and it may cover losses in relation to financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(2) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The EIB, in cooperation with the EIF where appropriate, shall submit once a year a report to the Commission on EIB financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and with the key performance indicators referred to in Article 4(2), point (f)(iv). The report shall also include statistical, financial and accounting data on each EIB financing and investment operation and on an aggregated basis.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is deleted;

(c) in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

‘In relation to the combinations referred to in Article 11a, the EIB and the EIF, respectively, shall provide the Commission annually with the financial statements in accordance with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation. Such financial statements shall include accounting data about the support provided by the EU guarantee under this Regulation clearly delineated from the support provided by the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council.’;

(3) in Article 22(1), the fifth subparagraph is deleted.

Article 3

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 [CEF]

In Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, the following paragraph is added:

‘5. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the CEF Debt Instrument established under Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation and may cover losses in relation to the financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 4

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 [Horizon Europe]

In Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, the following paragraph is added:

‘3. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the InnovFin Debt Facility established under Regulations (EU) 1290/2013 and 1291/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 and may cover losses of the financial product containing the financing and investment operations and covered by the combined support.’:

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 5

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Latvia, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Law Granting Latvian Citizenship to Stateless Children, Raise Questions on Hate Crimes and Access to Elections for Minorities and Non-Citizens

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Latvia on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Committee Experts welcomed the adoption of the 2020 Latvian citizenship law, which granted Latvian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, while raising questions on hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and access to elections for minorities and non-citizens.

One Committee Expert welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State, and the recent reduction in the number of non-citizens.

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes, and on changes in the criminal law addressing motivations for such crimes, including sexual orientation and gender identity. How were these changes publicised? Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognise and support victims?

A Committee Expert said the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections? Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?

Osams Abu Meri, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, introducing the report, said the fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia, which had invaded parts of Georgia and launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. According to article 89 of the Constitution, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. Domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the general comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victims’ rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.

The delegation also said that if someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional.

In concluding remarks, Mr. Abu Meri expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.

Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.

The delegation of Latvia was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Welfare; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry for Culture on Cooperation with Non-governmental Organisations; the Ministry of Defence; the Prosecutor General’s Office; the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; the Internal Security Bureau; the State Police; the State Border Guard; the Cadet Force Centre; and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Wednesday 2 July to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

Report

The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Latvia (CCPR/C/LVA/4).

Presentation of the Report

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, presenting the report, said the situation in Europe had changed significantly since Latvia had last reported to the Committee. The fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia which, starting from 2008, had invaded parts of Georgia and acquired military and political control over parts of Ukraine, and on 24 February 2022 launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. Because of these events, Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order. These events, along with information and hybrid warfare operations directed against Latvia, had strengthened efforts to defend democracy, national security, and effectively implement the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant.



According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. To illustrate, domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the General Comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.



The financial resources allocated to domestic courts had steadily and consistently increased. Moreover, in 2024, the Academy of Justice, a new institution for the professional development of judges, prosecutors, prosecutor assistants, and investigators, was established. The Ombudsperson’s Office of Latvia had consistently received the highest “A” status of accreditation, and continued to operate in accordance with the highest international standards concerning respect for human rights and good governance. In 2022, Latvia ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Ombudsperson had been entrusted with the function of the national preventive mechanism, and, as of October 2024, had a new Department on the Prevention of Discrimination.



Latvia had continued to support the naturalisation of non-citizens; these were not stateless persons, as they enjoyed the right to reside in Latvia, along with a set of rights and obligations that extended beyond those prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. In recent years, Latvia had seen a gradual and steady decline in the number of non-citizens residing in the country. A significant achievement in reducing the number of non-citizens in Latvia was the enactment of the law on the discontinuation of the non-citizen status for children, which had contributed to a substantial decrease in the number of non-citizens among younger age groups. Since 2020, all children born in non-citizen families had been granted citizenship at birth.



Between 2024 and 2027, Latvia had identified three priority areas for gender equality: increasing equal rights and opportunities in the labour market and education; reducing negative gender stereotypes; and integrating the principle of gender equality into policy planning.

In respect to combating gender-based violence, Latvia had significantly strengthened legal protections, expanded victim support services, and increased awareness-raising campaigns to challenge societal norms that perpetuate violence. Between 2022 and 2024, the authorities, together with non-governmental organisations, held workshops and discussions for young people on how to build non-violent relationships, based on the principle of gender equality.



In 2024, Latvia took a significant step forward in recognising diverse family forms by introducing civil partnership legislation. This legal framework allowed both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register their partnership, granting them a range of rights and protections previously reserved for married couples. In 2021, the Latvian Parliament enacted amendments to the Criminal Law adding to the list of aggravating circumstances motivation based on “social hatred”, which covered hatred based on sexual orientation. Additionally, awareness-raising measures were continuously implemented, and investigators, prosecutors, and judges regularly attended trainings on the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert noted the various positive developments linked to civil and political rights, asking for additional information on the legal status of the Committee’s views in the national legal framework. What steps had Latvia taken to inform the public, including persons who did not read Latvian or English, about their rights under the Covenant and the possibility of submitting cases to the Committee under the Optional Protocol?

The Committee appreciated the rating of the Ombudsman and the increasing material and financial resources allocated to it, and the Expert asked for information on proposals to amend the Ombudsman’s enabling law. Regarding the implementation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Action Plan, what mechanisms were in place to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures? Regarding judicial integrity, were there plans to adopt additional safeguards to prevent undue political influence in the judiciary?

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes and on changes in the criminal law, adding “social enmity” and “any other characteristic” to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, and asked how these changes were publicised. Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognize and support victims?

Could the State party be more specific about the risks to national security posed by individuals with ties to the Russian Federation? How could fluency in the Latvian language prevent such risks? The Expert also asked for the number of persons deported so far, their background and to which countries they were deported. Had there been a state of emergency in parts of the country, in particular the Belarussian border from August 2021 to August 2023, and could the delegation confirm that Latvia did not derogate from its obligations under the Covenant during that period?

Regarding the equality of women, and efforts towards narrowing the gender pay gap, another Committee Expert asked what measures had been helpful so far, and what additional measures the government intended to introduce to narrow it further? Could the State party provide statistical data on gender-based violence and femicide from the last three years? What measures was the government preparing to improve prevention of the concerning occurrence of online violence against women, including against women journalists and women in politics and other leadership positions?

Regarding the right to life, a Committee Expert asked for disaggregated data on the high numbers of deaths in all places of detention, including psychiatric facilities. Was the definition of torture in line with that of international treaties, and what measures were in place to protect persons complaining of torture in places of detention?

Responses by the Delegation

Responding to the issues raised, the delegation said concerning the status of the Covenant and awareness-raising on submitting complaints, the Constitutional Court of Latvia had explained that the views of the Committee did not have the status of a legally binding instrument. While the Committee’s decisions did carry the weight of authoritative interpretation, they were not formally binding. The Committee’s views and opinions were soft-ball instruments, but had been taken into account by the courts over the years. Regarding awareness-raising on the United Nations human rights treaties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published informative material on its website in various languages, including guidance on submitting complaints to various treaty bodies, and ensuring accessible and transparent information for applicants. This was how Latvia ensured that society was informed about the Committee and the possibility of submitting complaints.

On training in the armed forces, the delegation said there were education programs which included human rights. The Ombudsman was appointed after approval by the Parliament. This aimed to strengthen human rights protection and ensure public awareness of the position. This approach aligned with the spirit of the Constitution and existing practice, whilst supporting the principles of democratic governance. On the Department of Discrimination, there was an Anti-Discrimination Unit, consisting of five people. There was a separation of the powers in Latvia, the delegation said, and there was currently a discussion on the procedure of nomination of the Ombudsman. There was no influence by political parties on the Ombudsman, and the election was entirely transparent.

Regarding anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan was in place since 2023, and the main reason for lack of fulfilment of its tasks was the lack of funding. The effectiveness of the Plan itself was usually measured by assessing the percentage of accomplished tasks, as well as feedback from institutions involved in its implementation. In 2025, six persons were fined in cases relating to corruption, and 2024 data showed that corruption was effectively investigated and sent to prosecution. On the independence of investigations conducted by the Internal Security Bureau, pre-trial detentions were supervised by a prosecutor. In accordance with the law, the Minister of the Interior could only supervise the legality and justification of the Bureau’s decisions, and could revoke them if necessary. On transparency of lobbying, work continued on effective implementation of legislation in this regard, and there was no Transparency Register yet.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victim’s rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. A specific hate speech conference event had been held in October 2024, with twenty-two participants who worked on such violations. A training session was also held for judges, prosecutors and investigators, focusing on a victim-centred approach to the justice system. For the general public, there were two specific web platforms with information about hate speech, hate crime, and related issues, and these were supported by the Ministries of Culture and Education, and the Ombudsman’s Bureau. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue. The legal framework, which prescribed criminal liability for social, national and ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance was sufficient and proportionate to existing needs.

Numbers of hate speech and hate crimes were not so large, usually fewer than 10 criminal cases per year, the delegation said, but this did not reflect the priority of the topic, as the Government was working on the issue. With regard to ethnic tensions, it was important to look at the information space, and how people used and consumed information inside the country. According to research and statistics, minorities, as well as the general population, found news and entertainment important, and consumed it at the same rates, showing that society was living in the same space. There were differences of opinion in society, as should be the case in any healthy society. Latvian society had gone through traumas, and was dealing with them, including by taking care of minorities, legally, but also practically, including through an annual festival celebrating cultural minorities.

Latvia saw its society as one which facilitated civic participation, and was working to strengthen this. Even Roma representatives and organisations were finally putting their projects forward, and they were being supported. Work was also being done on media literacy, as the current greatest threat to human rights was the great mass of information that was available, meaning critical thinking was a critical tool for building a cohesive society. Latvia had acquired a large number of refugees, including those fleeing from Ukraine, and was providing measures and support for their language acquisition and cultural and societal integration.

Latvia was working with the Roma strategy at the European Union level and had its own strategic plan for Roma integration. Unfortunately, the community was one of the most stigmatised, as it was across Europe. It was important for this stigmatisation to be approached and that communities were approached, with Roma mediators involved in the efforts to end the stigma. Hate speech had increased in the digital environment, and a plan was being put together to address it.

The delegation said the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an ethnic issue: it was an issue of international law, colonialism, and history. This was how society and the government had treated it. The government had been very clear that this was an issue that had to unite everybody within the country, no matter the language and ethnicity of the individual. Research showed that there was an increase of differences of opinion on the issue within the country, but these were not aligned with ethnicity. The Russian minority was very vocal in its lack of support for the actions of Russia. On the declaration of a State emergency at the border, there had been a deliberate attempt by Belarus to destabilise European countries, including Latvia, in response to the imposition of sanctions on the Belarus regime. Actions to protect the external borders must be interpreted in the light of the broader geo-political context and the will to protect the system against abuse, including the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees.

The gender pay gap had reduced further in Latvia, the delegation said, and female employment rates were relatively high, but the government needed to look into employment equality further, including encouraging women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Latvia was one of the rare countries that admitted to having problems in its prisons, and the government had approved an action plan to implement the Committee’s recommendations in this regard, showing its determination to tackle the issue. Prison staff were instructed and trained on sensitive periods in the life of a prisoner, aiming to limit incidents of self-harm and suicide.

Questions by Committee Experts

In follow-up questions, Experts asked for figures on deaths in prisons, and the reconciliation between self-administration prisons and the official system, and whether the former was to the detriment of detainees. Did psychiatric facilities offer education and therapeutic facilities, and was there sufficient staff? Another Expert asked for clarification on training in hate crimes and hate speech, asking whether it was mandatory and country-wide, or whether people could opt out. How was disaggregated data and statistics gathered on hate speech and hate crimes? There appeared to be a tension between language groups, and the Expert wondered how promoting a culture of human rights education and speech could be of help in resolving these matters.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the Ministry of Justice had prepared a general policy planning document to combat and reduce the effects of informal prison hierarchies in Latvian prisons. This included building a new prison, and the education of prison guards and administration, including a new education centre, among others. One of the biggest problems in Latvian prisons was the outdated prison infrastructures, and the construction of the new prison to remedy this would be concluded in September 2025, with prisoners to be relocated in 2026.

There were 26,132 persons with mental disabilities in the country in 2019, and the situation was roughly the same now. It was very important today for persons with mental disabilities to have access to independent living, and Latvia had 12 social service homes, with between 50 and 150 places to which persons could be admitted voluntarily and could leave freely. There was only one long-term facility, with approximately 200 beds, meant for persons with severe mental disorders, and this hospital was also only for voluntary treatment. Regarding treatment and rehabilitation, nowadays in all treatment centres there were muti-professional teams, and staff workers ensuring integrated healthcare. Great efforts were made to ensure there were recreational facilities at all hospitals.

There was no mandatory training for judges, except on children’s rights, and training on hate speech and hate crimes were mostly linked to the specialisation of judges. In Latvia, the media enjoyed independence, and investigative journalism thrived, holding the government and the judiciary to account. The most common form of corruption involved the use of administrative resources, the delegation said.

The delegation said amendments had been made to the Criminal Code in 2024, establishing accountability for acts of violence against immediate family or in partner relationships. The amendments introduced the punishment of imprisonment for up to three years if the perpetrator committed a violent act against a family member, spouse or former spouse. Cases of spousal rape were considered rape under the Criminal Code, and sanctions were higher if there were aggravating circumstances. It was ensured that these crimes were reviewed by the courts in a timely manner. More than 13 trainings had been conducted for judges, investigators, prosecutors and those who worked on family violence cases. Every year, at least 20 women were killed by their partner in Latvia. The State believed that, in many instances, these deaths were preventable. From 1 July, electronic monitoring of offenders could be applied in criminal proceedings, providing an opportunity to prevent both femicides and homicides.

The ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a significant step in Latvia and was a cornerstone policy for the country. Changing societal attitudes towards women and violence and shifting deeply ingrained cultural norms and stereotypes required public awareness campaigns, which took time to yield results. Real-life stories of survivors had been made accessible to the public to raise awareness of the issue and encourage others to come forward. Services were accessible and no proof was required to receive help.

In December 2023, preventive visits had been carried out to two prisons, to assess potential risks of violent behaviour. Conferences had been held in cooperation with the Ombudsman’s office and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of violent conduct, attended by representatives of the prison administration. There had been an increase in crimes committed by prison administration officials in 2025, but this was due to the mandate to increasingly investigate these kinds of crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert asked why Latvia did not systematically collect and publish data on the length and frequency of pretrial detention. What steps would be taken to address this gap? Could data be provided on the use of non-custodial alternatives to detention? How was it ensued that all detainees were fully informed of their rights and access to a lawyer from the outset of detention? Would the State implement mandatory audiovisual recording of all police interviews with detained persons? How was it ensured that detainees received timely and effective assistance from qualified lawyers, including during the initial critical hours of detention?

What specific safeguards existed to prevent undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges? How did the State party address reports of politicisation and corruption in the judicial system? What measures were taken to improve trust in the justice system? What was the current operational status of the academy of justice? What specific training programmes had been implemented for judges and prosecutors since it opened? What steps had been taken to ensure timely issuance of judgements? Could information be provided on the types and lengths of sentences provided to minors? How was it ensured the detention of minors was used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time?

Another Committee Expert said the overall national referral mechanism had not yet been established; why was this? How would the State implement the relevant European Parliament directive in time? How did the conflict in Ukraine impact trafficking in Latvia and different categories of victims, including victims of sexual exploitation and child trafficking? Were training activities organised for law enforcement in this regard? How did Latvia’s transition from a country of origin to country of transit and destination impact Government prevention efforts? What measures were being taken to promptly investigate, prosecute and punish all cases of trafficking? What remedies were provided to victims? How many cases had been raised against persons involved in human trafficking?

In mid-2024, the Ministry of Culture launched a study to ensure the safety of journalists in Latvia. What was its progress thus far? How were its recommendations being implemented? The Government informed the Committee that the criminal proceedings concerning serious bodily injuries inflicted to the journalist and publisher Leonids Jākobsons were terminated on 19 February 2025, as the authorities were unable to find the perpetrators. How often were similar cases involving infliction of serious bodily injuries terminated because of lack of success in finding perpetrators? How would the State ensure that similar incidents did not repeat, and that there was no impunity for perpetrators?

Could the delegation elaborate on the legal basis for the drastic revocation of TV Rain’s broadcasting licence on 6 December 2022, that was challenged before the Administrative Regional Court? The National Security Concept of 28 September 2023 served to prohibit the production of public television and radio content in Russian. What was the legal basis for this policy, and had there been any legal and administrative actions taken to implement it thus far?

Another Committee Expert said that in June 2023, Latvia established an enhanced border regime with restrictive measures, which had been extended to the end of 2025. Could the delegation confirm this? How did the State party justify prolonging these restrictions long after the formal state of emergency had ended? Credible reports indicated that from 2021 to 2025, the State border guard had engaged in 28,000 pushbacks to Belarus and other countries, without assessing the risks individuals would face. How did these pushbacks comply with the principle of non-refoulment? Refugees at the border were reportedly subjected to violence and abuse and left without water and food. What concrete actions had the State party taken to monitor the State border guard? How were the border guards trained to prevent ill-treatment of migrants?

How many official border crossing points were operating today? What steps were being taken to facilitate applications for persons seeking protection? What percentage of asylum seekers were detained and for how long? The Committee was concerned about the detention of children who sought asylum; would Latvia consider a policy of never detaining children for immigration reasons? The State had a good practice of providing free legal aid to refugees challenging asylum decisions, however reports stated it was not respected in practice. How did the State party uphold this commitment in practice?

The Committee welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State. The Committee also welcomed the reduction in the number of non-citizens. Would the State party consider amending its citizenship law to grant nationality to all children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless? Was the State party considering extending political rights to non-citizens?

The Committee appreciated the measures adopted to safeguard the rights of conscientious objectors following the re-introduction of compulsory military service for men under Law 75 on the State Defence Service. The Committee also noted that the term of Alternative Civil Service was equal in length to military service, which was an improvement. Would the State consider allowing the Conscription Control Commission to operate independently of the miliary? Were conscientious objectors assigned responsibilities in alternative civil services, as opposed to non-combat roles within the military? How would the State party respect the rights of conscientious objectors during emergencies and armed conflicts?

A Committee Expert said the Committee understood that the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections?

Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections? Would the State party be willing to permit their participation in elections? Where did the State party see the most need for further improvement regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities in elections? What measures had the State party taken to follow up on treaty body recommendations, including those calling on political parties to introduce quotas to promote women’s representation in political life?

The Committee had questions regarding the transition to Latvian as the exclusive language of instruction, eliminating Russian as a second language in schools and preschools. While this transition was envisaged a long time ago, its implementation had been rushed. How does the State party ensure that schools were ready within the limited timeframe, especially schools where many teachers lacked sufficient proficiency in Latvian? There were serious concerns about the lack of meaningful minority community consultation and participation during the law’s adoption. How many stakeholders were involved and how was active participation and meaningful dialogue ensured? The Committee was informed that national minority pupils at pre-school and primary education levels had a right to request education programmes on their language and cultural history. Did communities have to fund these programmes themselves? How were people made aware of these programmes and how easy was it to apply for them?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that while not all police interviews were recorded, this did not affect police investigations. All interviews with children were recorded. All interviews were documented in written form.

Legal aid was provided by the court administration. There had been just one case where a higher court judge had not been appointed by the parliament. Reports of corruption in the court system were legally investigated. The parliament adopted a law establishing a new judicial academy in 2024. In January this year, the newly established institution officially commenced its operations. The academy had been admitted as a member of the European Judicial Network. During this year, 106 events and trainings had already been held at the academy.

Latvia remained susceptible to labour exploitation, sham marriages, forced begging, as well as sexual exploitation. This year, just one criminal investigation had been launched so far in this regard. At the beginning of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a programme was established that strengthened the capacity of State border guards to identify possible victims of human trafficking. All unaccompanied minors had been given legal assistance. Since 2022, there had been one case of sexual exploitation of a Ukrainian woman.

Regarding the case of the grievous bodily harm reflected on the journalist Leonids Jākobsons, despite its best efforts, the State had been unable to identify the perpetrator, and the proceedings had been closed. However, should new information emerge, the criminal proceedings could be reopened, and investigations could resume. In a 2019 case involving a journalist who had been persecuted and harassed for over a year, the perpetrator was identified and sentenced to prison for two years. This emphasised that the State recognised the importance of journalists and were committed to ensuring their safety and security.

A study had been launched which looked at updating the legal definition of “the media”. Seminars were provided for journalists that helped them to protect themselves. Meetings were held with the police once a year, to help them support journalists. Materials were envisaged for judges to help them on cases involving journalists.

Latvia was a democratic State that promoted the right to a fair trial and access to justice. A case was ongoing regarding Russian propaganda channels spreading hate speech in Latvia. The Government could not assess the outcome of the case at this point.

No languages had been prohibited in Latvia. Statistics showed that only 54 per cent of Latvian youth knew Russian language. The official State language was the Latvian language.

Around 47 to 50 per cent of television programmes and 35 percent of radio programmes were available in Russian language, and 13 per cent of the printed press was in Russian language. A law was in place which obligated the public broadcaster to broadcast in minority languages. The public broadcaster independently decided on media content and in which languages it should be broadcast. Work was being done to promote the inclusion of more minorities.

The state of emergency situation at the border with Belarus had been ended, but a new “enhanced border protection regime” had been introduced and would be in force until the end of the year. During legislative amendments, the State had assessed a proportional and law-based solution, considering European Union court rulings in this field. A lot of work had been done to comply with international obligations and the principle of non-refoulment. A document had been developed to instruct personnel at the border on how to deal with these cases.

Significant training had been provided to border staff, with more than 1,000 border guards trained in 2024 on asylum rights. The State did not have information on 20 deaths registered at the border with Belarus. There had been a case in 2024 in which a dead body was found on the Latvian border. This year, there had been 63 applications for asylum so far. As a rule, asylum seekers were not detained in Latvia and were accommodated in open space centres. However, due to several circumstances, the law on asylum permitted the detention of asylum seekers, such as in the case of security threats. Each case was individually and thoroughly assessed. Minors under 14 years old were not detained; they were placed in different facilities. Efforts were taken to accommodate minors with their families when possible. State-provided legal assistance could be accessed once an asylum decision had been appealed.

Regarding conscientious objection, no one from the Ministry of Defence had interfered with the Conscription Control Commission, and changes were not considered. The State defence service law set basic criteria for alternative service. So far, just three applications had been received, including for religious and health reasons. Military service was for a fixed period and a solider could choose whether to extend their contract or not. International regulations set a two-month resignation notice for military service, which the State believed was a reasonable amount of time. A reserve solider who could not perform military service due to their beliefs could be enrolled in the national armed force reserves. The State was not considering amending paragraph five of the military law.

Latvia did not consider “non-citizens” to be stateless persons. All non-citizens had the right to naturalise. The number of Latvian non-citizens had decreased by around 77 per cent in recent years. After a change in regulations in 2020, more than 500 children had been automatically registered after birth. Several campaigns had been carried out on the possibility of acquiring Latvian citizenship.

If someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional. Russian language was still widespread in Latvia, justifying the need to strengthen the use of Latvian as the official State language. The Constitutional Court had taken article 27 of the Covenant into account, which recognised the obligation to ensure minority groups could use their mother tongue. It found amendments in the law complied with article 27.

The naturalisation procedure was fairly easy. The path for non-citizens was wide, short and easy to walk.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

The Committee asked follow-up questions regarding actions taken to implement the national security policy before the Constitutional Court; the permanence of the enhanced border regime; ill-treatment of migrants crossing the Belarus/Latvia border between 2021 and 2022; granting citizenship to children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless; providing for honourable discharges from military service; the exclusion of non-citizens from all elections; alternative programmes for minority languages in schools; and measures in place to ensure detention of minors was only implemented as a measure of last resort.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the public broadcaster was bound by media laws. Currently Belarussian authorities at the border were refusing to cooperate with Latvian authorities. These non-cooperation issues had brought about an increase in criminal activities across the border, including organised crime. This year, there had been 186 irregular migration cases across the border. An investigation had been launched in 2021 and 2022 regarding individuals who had attempted to cross the Belarussian border, which had analysed a significant amount of information. During the investigation, it was determined that injuries to migrants were not caused by the actions of border officials, but were likely obtained during the journey to cross the border.

Reasons for terminating a military contract prior to its conclusion were not specified in national laws. An agreement simply needed to be reached.

Only persons with Latvian citizenship had the right to vote. Using languages other than Latvian during political campaigning in the election period was not prohibited. The provision about using just the official language applied only to the pre-election period. Non-citizens who chose to keep their status still had the right to receive healthcare and work in the country.

Teachers were instructed on teaching methodologies in a linguistically diverse environment, and on how to teach students whose native language was not Latvian. There were targeted grants supporting minority languages and cultures.

As of 25 June this year, there were 27 inmates who were children. Four of these children were detained, with the rest serving their sentences on probation. This illustrated that incarceration of children in Latvia was a last resort.

Closing Statements

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. A wide range of topics had been addressed, including efforts to combat hate crimes, gender equality, and matters of national security. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order. These circumstances reaffirmed Latvia’s commitment to uphold the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Latvia appreciated the engagement and interest of the Committee.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues. Mr. Soh thanked all involved in the dialogue for their engagement and commitment.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR25.013E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – US-Ukraine agreement – E-001842/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The United States (US)-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund will be operated solely by Ukraine and the US. Nonetheless, in the preambles of the agreement between the governments of Ukraine and US on the establishment of the fund, the two parties would welcome further investments by EU investors in mining, energy, and related technology in Ukraine.

Based on the provisions put forward in the agreement between the governments of Ukraine and US on the establishment of the fund, the Commission is conducting a preliminary assessment of any implications on the operations of the Ukraine Facility.

Specifically, it is noted that the agreement acknowledges Ukraine’s current legal obligations towards the EU, including those taken under the Ukraine Facility.

Once more details are provided by Ukraine on the development of the fund, the Commission will undertake a more in-depth legal analysis on the subject.

Last updated: 2 July 2025

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Eligible spending under ReArm Europe – E-001294/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors.

In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence.

The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change.

The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence[1] was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances.

The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability.

Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation[2] to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation.

In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE.

Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the regulation.
- [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed5-36485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Implementation of the Migration Pact in the context of the Polish Government’s position – E-000547/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation[1] foresees a mandatory but flexible solidarity mechanism, whereby each Member State has full discretion to choose between the available forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support).

A reference key, based on the size of the population (50% weighting ) and of the gross domestic product of the Member States (50% weighting ), should be applied in accordance with the mandatory fair share principle for the operation of the solidarity mechanism enabling the determination of the overall contribution of each Member State.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also foresees possible deduction of solidarity contributions for Member States facing migratory pressure or a significant migratory situation.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also requires that e ach year, by 15 October, the Commission adopts an implementing decision determining whether a particular Member State is under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure during the upcoming year, or facing a significant migratory situation.

In doing so, the Commission will take into account qualitative and quantitative indicators, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the regulation, including the number of beneficiaries of temporary protection in a given Member State. M ilitary assistance provided to Ukraine is not among the indicators set by the regulation.

[1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians – B10-0304/2025

Source: European Parliament

Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Jutta Paulus, Mārtiņš Staķis
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0304/2025

European Parliament resolution on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war and the continued bombing of civilians

(2025/2710(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the UN Charter and its own international commitments, including the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B. whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and escalate indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments, combined with ground fighting, have continued throughout 2025; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been injured, tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced;

C. whereas while their exact numbers are unknown, thousands of Ukrainians, both military personnel and civilians, are likely to be held in captivity currently, in Russia and occupied Ukraine;

D. whereas the vast majority of Ukrainian prisoners, both civilian and military personnel, held by the Russian Federation are deprived of any recognised legal status or procedural safeguards, leaving them without rights, legal representation or the ability to contact their families; whereas in 90 % of cases, relatives do not know whether their loved ones are alive;

E. whereas there is documented evidence of repeated extrajudicial executions of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians by members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as other grave violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law instruments;

F. whereas the Russian authorities have launched thousands of politically motivated criminal prosecutions against Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees, often based on confessions extracted under torture and without credible evidence; whereas these fabricated charges commonly include terrorism, espionage and treason, with the charges of treason frequently following the forced imposition of Russian citizenship in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;

G. whereas families of Ukrainian detainees face institutional barriers to accessing legal recourse or filing official inquiries, as the Russian state requires the use of domestic digital identification platforms that are not accessible to non-citizens; whereas in some cases, relatives advocating publicly for detainees have seen their loved ones punished with extended sentences or re-arrested on additional charges;

H. whereas the death of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in Russian captivity highlights the grave and growing dangers faced by Ukrainian journalists held by Russian forces; whereas others, including Iryna Danylovych, Dmytro Khyliuk and Iryna and Heorhiy Levchenko, remain in detention under life-threatening conditions;

I. whereas the Russian authorities consistently deny POWs access to international organisations in an effort to hide the atrocities taking place, leaving POWs even more vulnerable to violations of international law; whereas the Geneva Conventions guarantee POWs the right to regular correspondence, access to medical care, and visits from international organisations; whereas Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian POWs amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity;

J. whereas the Russian authorities have detained large numbers of civilians in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine; whereas they target, among others, local authorities, civil servants and journalists; whereas the scale at which Russia is conducting these enforced disappearances against civilians is clearly in compliance with a coordinated state policy;

K. whereas in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, Russian-installed proxy paramilitary structures and de facto authorities have played a key role in implementing Russia’s policy of repression and terror against the Ukrainian population by systematically engaging in intimidation, arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances of civilians under the guise of administrative or security procedures;

L. whereas many victims of enforced disappearances are transferred either to local detention facilities or deported to Russia; whereas various forms of torture are reportedly commonplace in these detention facilities; whereas civilians regularly go missing for months if not years, with some dying in detention; whereas these acts also amount to crimes against humanity;

M. whereas since the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian Federation has systematically targeted Crimean Tatars with politically motivated prosecutions, enforced disappearances, intimidation and harassment; whereas Crimean Tatar leaders, journalists, civil society activists and religious figures have faced disproportionate repression, including under the guise of anti-extremism and antiterrorism charges; whereas these actions amount to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and aim to erase the identity and presence of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people;

N. whereas cases of punitive psychiatry, including forced institutionalisation, drugging and involuntary treatment of both children and adults, have been documented in at least 42 psychiatric institutions and psycho-neurological boarding schools located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; whereas Russian occupying authorities have revived Soviet-style psychiatric abuse as a tool of repression, targeting individuals for their perceived pro-Ukrainian views or their refusal to accept Russian citizenship; whereas such acts represent a serious breach of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

O. whereas the families are left traumatised as their loved ones are held incommunicado and the Russian authorities, in full violation of international law, refuse to provide information about people’s whereabouts;

P. whereas the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed, in its latest report of March 2025, that the enforced disappearances committed by the Russian authorities in a widespread and systematic manner against the civilian population, in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amount to crimes against humanity; whereas the same body documented countless cases proving that Russia’s use of sexual violence, including rape, as a form of torture is systemic in detention facilities and that this practice is clearly a deliberate policy, thus stressing that the Russian authorities committed the war crimes of rape and sexual violence as a form of torture;

Q. whereas the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, whose Ukraine Conflict Observatory has been documenting Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children using biometric and satellite data and supported six International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments, has had its funding cut by the Trump administration; whereas the observatory has ceased all its work collecting data crucial for achieving accountability as of 1 July 2025; whereas the observatory’s database contains records on more than 30 000 Ukrainian children allegedly abducted by Russia from over 100 locations;

1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

3. Decries Russia’s policy of widespread and systematic use of enforced disappearance, incommunicado detention, torture and other forms of ill treatment against Ukrainian civilian detainees and POWs; demands that Russia notify the Ukrainian Government of the status of all POWs and allow international humanitarian organisations unhindered access; stresses that, under international law, Russia must provide adequate medical care to all Ukrainians in captivity and directly repatriate seriously sick and wounded POWs; urges Russia to release all unlawfully detained civilians without delay;

4. Demands the immediate release of all Ukrainian civilians held in Russian captivity who do not fall under any category for lawful detention under international humanitarian law, with particular attention to women, children and elderly individuals; underlines that their continued detention places them at imminent risk and constitutes a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions;

5. Condemns the ongoing persecution of Crimean Tatars in illegally occupied Crimea, including politically motivated detentions, torture, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association; calls for the immediate release of all Crimean Tatars imprisoned on political grounds and urges the EU and international organisations to enhance monitoring and advocacy on behalf of the indigenous people of Crimea;

6. Calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to launch an urgent international campaign aimed at documenting and publicising evidence concerning the imprisonment of Ukrainian minors and elderly civilians in Russian detention, including the use of documented case studies compiled by civil society organisations; stresses the importance of visibility for accountability and rescue operations;

7. Demands immediate and unhindered access for international humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to all known and suspected sites where Ukrainian civilians are held, with particular attention to women, children and elderly people;

8. Insists on the immediate release of all Ukrainian journalists held in Russian captivity; calls for the international community to take urgent diplomatic and legal steps to secure their safety and freedom, and to ensure accountability for crimes committed against media professionals in the context of the war;

9. Strongly condemns the use of punitive psychiatry by the Russian occupying authorities in Ukraine, including the forced institutionalisation of civilians, especially children and individuals with pro-Ukrainian views, in psychiatric hospitals under inhumane and degrading conditions; calls for urgent international monitoring of psychiatric institutions in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and the immediate release of all individuals detained on politically motivated psychiatric grounds;

10. Insists that all perpetrators, in particular commanders and others within the Russian occupying forces ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of crimes under international law, are held accountable in accordance with international standards;

11. Calls for the EU and the broader international community to use all possible judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms, including universal jurisdiction, to pressure Russia to immediately cease its campaign of enforced disappearances and torture;

12. Calls for the EU and the Member States to step up support for Ukraine to enable it to address the widespread mental health and psychosocial needs resulting from the armed conflict, by ensuring access to the relevant services for those returning from captivity, allocating resources to those services and enhancing their institutional coordination, legal regulation, monitoring and evaluation;

13. Regrets the decision by the Trump administration to cut the funding of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab and is concerned about the consequent major gap in accountability efforts; welcomes the transfer of the lab’s data to Europol and calls for the EU and the Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to ensure the continuation of the observatory’s work;

14. Commends the work of the ICC on its ongoing investigation into the situation in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 onwards, encompassing any past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person; expresses concern about the worsening attacks on the ICC by the United States, and the impact this will have on the ICC’s ability to continue conducting its investigations; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute and on the EU Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

15. Stresses Europe’s responsibility to curb Russia’s aggression, both in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and also for the sake of Europe’s own security; calls therefore for the EU and its like-minded partners to increase their efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace; urges the Member States and like-minded partners, therefore, to provide Ukraine with more arms and ammunition to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks; notes, in this context, that a number of Member States are militarily neutral and urges them to increase their non-military support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Situation in Cernăuți (Chernivtsi), Ukraine – E-002545/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002545/2025
to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Rule 144
Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI)

On Tuesday 17 June 2025, 20 young Ukrainians, some with their faces covered, physically assaulted several Romanian priests in Cernăuți Cathedral. One of the attackers had originally entered the church in a wheelchair, only to participate in the violent attack subsequently. According to reports, Father Pavel Pavlenco, one of the priests, who has eight children, was taken to A&E, while others also suffered serious injuries such as broken ribs, head wounds and kidney damage. The attackers then barricaded themselves in the cathedral and occasioned major damage. After the incident, members of the Romanian community – including priests – gathered peacefully to protest, but they were brutally dispersed, physically assaulted and exposed to tear gas.

The Priests were assaulted, but Romanians have been discriminated against for years. They are not allowed to speak Romanian or to worship freely, and Romanian Orthodox churches have been shut down.

Thus far, no official statement has been issued in response to what happened in Cernăuți.

1.What is the Commission’s official stance on this incident?

2.Can events such as this lead to Ukraine’s accession to the EU being put on hold until crimes against minorities, and in particular the Romanian minority, cease and respect for human rights in Ukraine is restored?

Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Egypt: President El-Sisi Speaks with President of Ukraine Zelensky

Download logo

Today, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi received a phone call from President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky.

Spokesman for the Presidency, Ambassador Mohamed El-Shennawy, said the two Presidents discussed the latest developments in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. President El-Sisi emphasized the crucial importance of reaching diplomatic and political solutions, stressing the imperative to prioritize dialogue as a means of resolving the current crisis. The President reaffirmed Egypt’s full support for all efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement at the earliest time possible.

The call also focused on developments in the Middle East and ways to restore regional stability. The two sides underscored the necessity of upholding the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran, affirming the urgent need to resume negotiations as a pathway to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. President El-Sisi also reviewed Egypt’s ongoing efforts to secure a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and ensure the delivery of desperately-needed humanitarian aid and assistance.

President El-Sisi and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy also tackled ways to strengthen bilateral relations and explored prospects for cooperation across various fields, particularly in the economic, trade, and investment sectors, in a manner that serves the interests of both countries and their peoples.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

MIL OSI Africa –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine must stay at the forefront of the international agenda: UK Statement to the OSCE
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

Ukraine must stay at the forefront of the international agenda: UK Statement to the OSCE

UK Military Advisor, Lt Col Joby Rimmer, says amid global crises, including war in Iran, the UK urges continued focus on Ukraine.
Thank you, Madame Chair. The United Kingdom remains steadfast in our commitment to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. This unwavering support is rooted in the defence of sovereignty, international law, and the multilateral system. As Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression with resilience and determination, recent developments underscore both the urgency of sustained assistance and the growing strain on Russia’s military and economic apparatus.

On the battlefield, Ukraine continues to hold the line, and in several areas, it is pushing it back. In Sumy Oblast, Russian attempts to establish a buffer zone were reversed by Ukrainian forces in late June. On 30 June, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the liberation of Andriyivka and advances near Oleksiivka, halting Russia’s northern offensive. Across Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, Russian offensives remain stalled or inconclusive. Ukrainian counterattacks have blunted their momentum. Russia’s increasing reliance on small, dispersed assault groups, observed between 22-30 June, reflects not tactical ingenuity but strategic desperation. On 27 June, Ukraine’s Security Service and Special Operations Forces struck the Marinovka airfield in Russia’s Volgograd region, destroying two Su-34 fullback fighter jets and damaging two more.

While Russia may emphasise incremental battlefield gains, these claims frequently lack independent verification. What is verifiable reality is that Russia’s economy is buckling under the weight of its own aggression. Oil and gas revenues are falling, inflation is surging, and the rouble continues to depreciate. President Putin himself has admitted the economy is ‘overheating.’ Sanctions are biting hard, damaging Russia’s industrial base, widening the gap between military demand and production capacity, and forcing the Kremlin to rely on a dwindling National Wealth Fund to plug a ballooning deficit. Arms exports have collapsed, and production of advanced systems like the Su-57 fighter jet has been suspended due to parts shortages. This has driven Russia to search for sources elsewhere – China remains the decisive enabler of Russia’s war, and Iran has provided drones and ballistic missiles. In addition, over half of the artillery shells used by Russia since 2024 have come from North Korea. A telling sign of Moscow’s increasing dependence on foreign support.

So how does Russia respond? President Putin has escalated his campaign of terror from the skies. On June 29, Russian forces launched the largest air assault since the start of the full-scale invasion, firing over 500 aerial weapons in a single night. While most were intercepted, the attacks caused civilian casualties and widespread infrastructure damage. President Zelenskyy rightly condemned these strikes as further proof that Russia is not seeking peace, but destruction.

Finally, the Russian delegation will no doubt highlight recent NATO defence announcements as provocative. To clarify, again, in response to Russia’s increasing aggression across the Euro-Atlantic area, its illegal actions in Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, the United Kingdom is reinforcing its own defence and deterrence posture. Our procurement of F-35A aircraft and participation in NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission represent the most significant enhancement of our nuclear readiness in a generation. This is a strategic move to ensure NATO’s credibility and preparedness to respond to an increasingly volatile security environment.

Madame Chair, while the world faces multiple crises, from instability in the Middle East to tensions in the Indo-Pacific, we must not lose sight of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion is not just a conflict against Ukraine; it is a direct assault on the principles that underpin global peace and security. Let us be clear: Russia’s aggression will not succeed. Its economy is faltering, its military is overstretched, and its international isolation is deepening. Ukraine, by contrast, stands strong, resilient, united, and supported by a global coalition of democracies. The United Kingdom reaffirms its enduring commitment to Ukraine. We will stand with the Ukrainian people for as long as it takes.

Updates to this page

Published 2 July 2025

Invasion of Ukraine

UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals

Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine

Homes for Ukraine: record your interest

Find out about the UK’s response
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: President Meloni pays official visit to His Holiness Leo XIV

Source: Government of Italy (English)

The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, paid an official visit to His Holiness Leo XIV today. President Meloni was received in audience by the Holy Father in the private library of the Apostolic Palace. At the end of the meeting, President Meloni gifted the Pope a 17th century view of the Church of Santi Domenico e Sisto and of the ancient Dominican monastery that is home to the Angelicum, the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, where Leo XIV completed a significant part of his education.

The Italian delegation also included the Vice-Presidents of the Council of Ministers, Antonio Tajani and Matteo Salvini, and Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers Alfredo Mantovano.

President Meloni went on to meet with the Secretary of State of His Holiness, Cardinal Pietro Parolin, and the Secretary for Relations with States and International Organizations, Monsignor Paul Richard Gallagher. During the meeting, in the context of the excellent relations between Italy and the Holy See, both international and bilateral matters were addressed.

President Meloni reaffirmed her appreciation of the Apostolic See’s commitment to peace in Ukraine, in Gaza and in all crisis areas. She also focused on the importance of religious freedom and the protection of Christian communities in the Middle East that have suffered the consequences of the area’s crises and instability.
Lastly, there was shared acknowledgement of the excellent collaboration with Catholic religious organisations for cooperation in Africa, as part of the Mattei Plan.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Russia expects date of talks with Ukraine to be agreed soon – Russian President’s press secretary

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Moscow, July 2 (Xinhua) — Russia expects the third round of talks with Ukraine to be agreed upon soon, although the dates are not yet clear, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov told reporters.

“We expect that such clarity will come in the near future,” said D. Peskov, answering a question about the timing of the new round of negotiations.

The Russian president’s press secretary clarified that the date of the third round of negotiations has not yet been determined, adding that the agreement is being made on a mutual basis.

“This is a mutual process,” noted D. Peskov.

The second round of talks between Russia and Ukraine took place on June 2 in Turkey. The meeting in Istanbul lasted more than an hour. At the meeting, the parties exchanged memoranda on the settlement of the conflict. In addition, the parties agreed to exchange all seriously wounded and seriously ill prisoners of war on the principle of “all for all,” as well as to exchange prisoners of war under the age of 25 and the bodies of the dead. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine has not received official messages from the US about suspension of ammunition supplies – Defense Ministry

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Kyiv, July 2 (Xinhua) — Ukraine has not received any official notifications from the United States about the suspension or revision of the delivery schedules of previously approved military aid, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported on Telegram on Wednesday in response to media reports that the Pentagon had allegedly temporarily stopped supplying official Kyiv with some types of ammunition.

The Ministry of Defense noted that the department requested a telephone conversation with representatives of the United States to clarify all the details.

At the same time, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry invited the US Chargé d’Affaires in Ukraine, John Ginkel, to discuss American military aid and defense cooperation between the two countries.

During the meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Maryana Betsa thanked Washington for the security support provided to Kyiv since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict and stressed the critical importance of continuing the delivery of previously approved military assistance.

The day before, the media reported that the Pentagon had allegedly suspended the transfer of certain types of precision-guided munitions to Ukraine due to the depletion of US stockpiles. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: King’s Birthday Party 2025: His Majesty’s Ambassador Alyson King’s speech

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

King’s Birthday Party 2025: His Majesty’s Ambassador Alyson King’s speech

His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo Alyson King’s speech on the King’s Birthday Party delivered on 19 June.

Your Excellency the President of the Republic, represented here by his principal advisor in charge of the College of Environment, Urban Planning and Mobility, HE Ambassador Tosi Mpanu Mpanu,

Honourable Senators and Members of Parliament,

Your Excellencies, distinguished members of the national and provincial governments, and their representatives here present,

Madam SRSG and Head of MONUSCO,

Excellencies, my fellow Ambassadors and heads of international organisations,

Dear members of the diplomatic corps and international organisations,

Distinguished religious and civil authorities, members of political parties,

Dear partners,

Eminent representatives of civil society and the world of culture,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Distinguished guests,

Dear friends,

All protocol observed

Boyei malamu na moto nyonso! (Welcome to everyone!)

Thank you all for coming. Your presence helps to create a special atmosphere as we celebrate the official birthday of King Charles III. It’s also an opportunity to celebrate the links between the UK and the DRC.

The UK established its first diplomatic mission here in 1902, when a British consulate was built in the then capital, Boma.

But even though our relationship is 123 years old this year, I think we’re just getting started!

I’m going to repeat what I said last year:

We still do not know each other as well as we might. It remains my firm conviction that the more we know and understand each other, the more opportunities we will find to do good things together.

That’s enough recycling, at least for words!

The past year has been marked by undeniably negative events, and I’d like to say a few words about them before turning to more encouraging aspects.

In January, the battle for Goma began when Rwandan troops and the M23 attacked. Many civilians died, as did members of MONUSCO and SAMIDRC. Many people were forced to move – once again – and numerous human rights violations were committed by all the actors on the ground. I was forced to close our office in Goma.

A few days later, several embassies – both African and Western – and diplomatic residences in Kinshasa were attacked and looted. Perhaps the oldest principle of international public law is “don’t shoot the messenger”. Peaceful demonstration is an essential democratic right and freedom; as diplomats, we are there to understand and convey messages, particularly when the situation is difficult. But this type of violence is unacceptable and counter-productive. It delayed the international response to events in the east of the country rather than encouraging it.

Today, a record 5 million people live under occupation in the east of the DRC, under the administration of a UN-sanctioned rebel group.

I want to be very clear.

The UK Government condemns the actions of all illegal armed groups in eastern DRC, including the M23. The UK Government has expressed its deep concern about the support of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to the M23 in offensives that violate the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In response, the UK Government has announced a major reassessment of its policy towards Kigali, including the suspension of the majority of its financial support.

Security Council Resolution 2773, adopted unanimously by its 15 members, calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the M23 and the RDF. It has not yet been implemented. We welcome all the efforts currently being made to find a political solution to this situation.

At a time when the international system based on norms and international law is being called into question, whether in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan or the DRC, leadership is required more than ever.

This leadership must be both courageous and wise, ready to take the necessary difficult measures and brave reforms.

Against this backdrop, there are many reasons to be optimistic about relations between the UK and the DRC.

You’ll see many examples of our collaboration in this garden.

I’m delighted to welcome back some of our Chevening alumni, and even more delighted to announce that we are increasing the number of scholarships available to talented young Congolese leaders to study for a Masters degree, fully funded by the UK, in the UK.

Much of the UK’s work in the country is targeted at communities in the east. For example, new UK funding will provide clean water and sanitation to around 200,000 displaced people, in partnership with UNICEF and the SAFER consortium.

On this day, International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, I would like to underline the priority that the UK Government gives to supporting survivors of sexual violence and fighting impunity. I reiterate my congratulations to the DRC for being the first state in the world to condemn the crime of forced pregnancy. I hope we can work together to provide global leadership on these vital issues in the years ahead.

We congratulate the DRC on its election to the Security Council as of 1 January and look forward to working together on issues crucial to international peace and security.

In the field of health, our partnerships with UNICEF and the WHO are supporting the government’s response to the ongoing Mpox and cholera epidemics, and helping more than 4.4 million Congolese people. I was delighted to meet some Mpox survivors in Kinshasa recently; one young man thought he would never get out of hospital alive because he was so ill. Looking at him today, you’d never guess, he’s so healthy and cheerful.

On climate and the environment, the UK co-chairs the Donor College of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership in the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI). Our new £90 million action programme supports local communities around the Yangambi Biosphere Reserve, improving economic livelihoods while preserving forests and nature.

And I’m proud that our programme is also building the DRC’s capacity in climate science in collaboration with British universities.

I would like to salute the work of the Head of State, for his renewed commitment to economic reform. Tangible improvements to the business climate, such as simpler and more predictable procedures and taxation, as well as greater transparency, will attract foreign direct investment and lead to the creation of well-paid jobs.

British companies have shown their interest in the economic potential of the DRC. For example, British International Investment’s investment alongside DP World in the DRC’s first deep-water container port at Banana will open up new infrastructure and international trade opportunities for the country.

As a global centre of mining expertise, trade and finance, the UK is particularly well placed to support the DRC’s ambition to develop its mining sector and bring its critical minerals, which are vital to global economies, to all Congolese.

This evening, I’m delighted that several Congolese companies with links to the UK are here, and in particular several of them have been able to contribute to this fantastic event.

I would like to thank our generous sponsors: Socimex, Rawbank, Vodacom, G4S, Helios Towers, HJ Hospital, Médecins de Nuit, Diageo, Canalbox, Manga Flore Gardening Services, Centre Médical Diamant and BAM’s Clean, without whom this evening would not have been possible.

My thanks also go to my team who work tirelessly, not just for this event, but also for their dedication on a daily basis enabling the Embassy to function well and for us make a difference.

Dear guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Democratic Republic of Congo is an important partner and friend for the United Kingdom. In recent years, the ties of friendship between our two countries have grown stronger. H.E. President Felix Tshisekedi was one of the first heads of state to meet His Majesty King Charles III after his accession to the throne.

We salute the work of H.E. Mrs Judith Suminwa, the first female Prime Minister of the DRC, and all the members of the Government present here today.

My country’s wish is to embark on the next phase of this relationship, working in collaboration with the DRC’s leaders, civil society, businesses and health and climate experts.

I sincerely hope that we’ll get to know each other better and that we’ll achieve even more great things together.

Here’s to the next 123 years of friendship!

Feti malamu (Enjoy the party!)

Updates to this page

Published 2 July 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: ESET Research: Russia’s Gamaredon APT group unleashed spearphishing campaigns against Ukraine with an evolved toolset
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
- In 2024, Gamaredon refocused exclusively on targeting Ukrainian governmental institutions.
- The group significantly increased the scale and frequency of spearphishing campaigns, employing new delivery methods.
- Gamaredon introduced six new malware tools, leveraging PowerShell and VBScript, designed primarily for stealth, persistence, and lateral movement.
- Gamaredon operators managed to hide almost their entire C&C infrastructure behind Cloudflare tunnels.
- Gamaredon increasingly relied on third-party services (Telegram, Telegraph, Cloudflare, Dropbox) to protect its C&C infrastructure.
BRATISLAVA, Slovakia, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ESET Research has released a white paper about Gamaredon’s updated cyberespionage toolset, new stealth-focused techniques, and aggressive spearphishing operations observed across the previous year. Gamaredon, attributed by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) to the 18th Center of Information Security of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), has targeted Ukrainian governmental institutions since at least 2013. In 2024, Gamaredon exclusively attacked Ukrainian institutions. ESET’s latest research shows that the group remains highly active, consistently targeting Ukraine, but has notably adapted its tactics and tools. The group’s objective is cyberespionage aligned with Russian geopolitical interests. Last year, the group significantly increased the scale and frequency of spearphishing campaigns, employing new delivery methods, and one attack payload was used solely to spread Russian propaganda.

Gamaredon’s spearphishing activities significantly intensified during the second half of 2024. Campaigns typically lasted one to five consecutive days, with emails containing malicious archives (RAR, ZIP, 7z) or XHTML files employing HTML smuggling techniques. These files delivered malicious HTA or LNK files that executed embedded VBScript downloaders, such as PteroSand. In October 2024, ESET observed a rare case where spearphishing emails included malicious hyperlinks instead of attachments – a deviation from Gamaredon’s usual tactics. Furthermore, Gamaredon introduced another novel technique: using malicious LNK files to execute PowerShell commands directly from Cloudflare-generated domains, bypassing some traditional detection mechanisms.

Gamaredon’s toolset underwent several notable updates. While fewer new tools were introduced, substantial resources went into updating and improving existing tools. New tools were designed primarily for stealth, persistence, and lateral movement. Existing tools received major upgrades, including enhanced obfuscation, improved stealth tactics, and sophisticated methods for lateral movement and data exfiltration.

“A particularly intriguing finding was the discovery in July 2024 of a unique ad hoc VBScript payload, delivered by Gamaredon downloaders. This payload had no espionage functionality; rather, its sole purpose was to automatically open a Telegram propaganda channel named Guardians of Odessa, which spreads pro-Russian messaging targeting the Odessa region,” says ESET researcher Zoltán Rusnák, who tracks Gamaredon’s activities.

Additionally, throughout 2024, Gamaredon showed persistent dedication to evading network-based defenses. The group continued, albeit at a reduced scale, to leverage fast-flux DNS techniques, frequently rotating IP addresses behind its domains. Gamaredon increasingly relied on third-party services such as Telegram, Telegraph, Codeberg, Dropbox, and Cloudflare tunnels to obfuscate and dynamically distribute its C&C infrastructure.

“Despite observable capacity limitations and abandoning older tools, Gamaredon remains a significant threat actor due to its continuous innovation, aggressive spearphishing campaigns, and persistent efforts to evade detections. As long as the Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, we anticipate that Gamaredon will persist in evolving its tactics and intensify its cyberespionage operations against Ukrainian institutions,” concludes Rusnák.

For a more detailed analysis and technical breakdown of Gamaredon’s toolset, check out the latest ESET Research white paper, “Gamaredon in 2024: Cranking out spearphishing campaigns against Ukraine with an evolved toolset,” on WeLiveSecurity.com. Make sure to follow ESET Research on Twitter (today known as X), BlueSky, and Mastodon for the latest news from ESET Research.

About ESET

ESET^® provides cutting-edge digital security to prevent attacks before they happen. By combining the power of AI and human expertise, ESET stays ahead of emerging global cyberthreats, both known and unknown — securing businesses, critical infrastructure, and individuals. Whether it’s endpoint, cloud, or mobile protection, our AI-native, cloud-first solutions and services remain highly effective and easy to use. ESET technology includes robust detection and response, ultra-secure encryption, and multifactor authentication. With 24/7 real-time defense and strong local support, we keep users safe and businesses running without interruption. The ever-evolving digital landscape demands a progressive approach to security: ESET is committed to world-class research and powerful threat intelligence, backed by R&D centers and a strong global partner network. For more information, visit www.eset.com or follow our social media, podcasts and blogs.

The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: Half of Nord Security’s colocated servers use renewable energy: The company is striving for more

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

LONDON, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Nord Security, home to NordVPN, NordLayer, NordPass, NordLocker, NordStellar and Saily, has published its annual Impact Report, addressing all scopes of greenhouse gas emissions, social initiatives, key sustainability risks and impact. It reveals Nord Security’s efforts to advance its mission to protect life online and positively impact people, communities, and the environment.

“In this year’s Impact Report, we aim to show how we’ve helped individuals and businesses take back control of their digital lives. In 2024, we moved closer toward this goal by introducing powerful tools, launching new products, and rolling out key initiatives. Combined with our community engagement and educational efforts, we are reaching nearly every aspect of our users’ digital lives. Because for us, cybersecurity isn’t about protecting a single area – it’s about safeguarding users at every step of their digital journey,” says Nord Security co-founder Eimantas Sabaliauskas.

Below are some noteworthy highlights. The full report can be found here.

Tackling indirect emissions

In 2024, Nord Security calculated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the second time, and expanded reporting to include key categories within Scope 3 covering indirect emissions across the company’s value chain. The total amount of the company’s market-based greenhouse gas emissions for 2024 was 23,014 tCO2e*.

While around 97% of the company’s total emissions are outside the company’s direct control in the value chain, the company now collects and analyzes GHG emissions data across the value chain, and aims to identify opportunities to reduce emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. Nord Security has initiated engagement with key suppliers to promote transparency and collaboration on emission reduction efforts.

According to Nord Security, this assessment will help to identify opportunities to reduce emissions from the company’s own operations and make better decisions about energy procurement and efficiency measures.

In 2024, Nord Security colocated servers in 37 data centers around the world all of which are low-power servers and offer sufficient computing power with low power consumption and are ideal for energy-saving operation. Thirty-two out of 37 data centers utilized renewable energy, making 50% of total colocated servers energy renewable.

Moreover, Nord Security continuously strives to mitigate the adverse effects the company’s day-to-day operations may have on the environment. At this point, around 73% of employees work in BREEAM-certified offices. Energy-saving measures, such as temperature control via blind automation as well as time and motion-based lighting, are implemented across all buildings. These measures also include recycling and time-adjusted ventilation modes.

Supporting communities in-need

Product donations continue to be one of Nord Security’s mechanisms for supporting the nonprofit community. Over 2,600 accounts were donated to vulnerable groups and individuals online to help protect human rights, freedom of speech, and stand for inclusion and a safe digital world for all.

Nord Security continued to support the people of Ukraine, with a special focus on helping children and the elderly. Additionally, we also donated over €48K to NGOs working to help volunteers in Ukraine.

In keeping with our annual tradition of supporting NGOs and nonprofits in Lithuania, Nord Security collected donations for Niekieno Vaikai, an organization that improves the lives of vulnerable children, and Sidabrinė Linija, a non-profit that provides support to the elderly.

Assessing sustainability impacts, risks, and opportunities

Last year, Nord Security also went on a six-month quest in preparation for the new EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) rules by identifying and evaluating our key sustainability impacts, risks, and opportunities through a double materiality assessment.

Through the assessment Nord Security focused on two angles. The first one focused on what matters to the bottom line and identifies which environmental, social, or governance issues could affect a company’s revenues, costs, or reputation. The second considers Nord Security’s impact – how operations affect people and the environment.

Based on the outcomes of the assessment, Nord Security aims to better integrate sustainability risk assessment with enterprise risk framework already this year. Additionally, Nord Security is committed to continuous improvement, transparency, and aligning with the highest standards of sustainability.

* To put this in perspective, 1 tCO2e is roughly equivalent to the emissions generated by driving a gasoline-powered passenger vehicle for around 4,000 kilometers or charging more than 66,000 smartphones.

ABOUT NORD SECURITY

Nord Security is home to advanced security solutions that share the Nord brand and values, including the world’s most advanced VPN service NordVPN, the next-generation password manager NordPass, the file encryption tool NordLocker, threat exposure management platform NordStellar, and the business VPN/SASE solution NordLayer. Established in 2012, Nord Security’s products are now acknowledged by the most influential tech sites and IT security specialists. More information: nordsecurity.com.

More information: egidijus@nordsec.com

The MIL Network –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: Half of Nord Security’s colocated servers use renewable energy: The company is striving for more

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

LONDON, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Nord Security, home to NordVPN, NordLayer, NordPass, NordLocker, NordStellar and Saily, has published its annual Impact Report, addressing all scopes of greenhouse gas emissions, social initiatives, key sustainability risks and impact. It reveals Nord Security’s efforts to advance its mission to protect life online and positively impact people, communities, and the environment.

“In this year’s Impact Report, we aim to show how we’ve helped individuals and businesses take back control of their digital lives. In 2024, we moved closer toward this goal by introducing powerful tools, launching new products, and rolling out key initiatives. Combined with our community engagement and educational efforts, we are reaching nearly every aspect of our users’ digital lives. Because for us, cybersecurity isn’t about protecting a single area – it’s about safeguarding users at every step of their digital journey,” says Nord Security co-founder Eimantas Sabaliauskas.

Below are some noteworthy highlights. The full report can be found here.

Tackling indirect emissions

In 2024, Nord Security calculated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the second time, and expanded reporting to include key categories within Scope 3 covering indirect emissions across the company’s value chain. The total amount of the company’s market-based greenhouse gas emissions for 2024 was 23,014 tCO2e*.

While around 97% of the company’s total emissions are outside the company’s direct control in the value chain, the company now collects and analyzes GHG emissions data across the value chain, and aims to identify opportunities to reduce emissions in line with the Paris Agreement. Nord Security has initiated engagement with key suppliers to promote transparency and collaboration on emission reduction efforts.

According to Nord Security, this assessment will help to identify opportunities to reduce emissions from the company’s own operations and make better decisions about energy procurement and efficiency measures.

In 2024, Nord Security colocated servers in 37 data centers around the world all of which are low-power servers and offer sufficient computing power with low power consumption and are ideal for energy-saving operation. Thirty-two out of 37 data centers utilized renewable energy, making 50% of total colocated servers energy renewable.

Moreover, Nord Security continuously strives to mitigate the adverse effects the company’s day-to-day operations may have on the environment. At this point, around 73% of employees work in BREEAM-certified offices. Energy-saving measures, such as temperature control via blind automation as well as time and motion-based lighting, are implemented across all buildings. These measures also include recycling and time-adjusted ventilation modes.

Supporting communities in-need

Product donations continue to be one of Nord Security’s mechanisms for supporting the nonprofit community. Over 2,600 accounts were donated to vulnerable groups and individuals online to help protect human rights, freedom of speech, and stand for inclusion and a safe digital world for all.

Nord Security continued to support the people of Ukraine, with a special focus on helping children and the elderly. Additionally, we also donated over €48K to NGOs working to help volunteers in Ukraine.

In keeping with our annual tradition of supporting NGOs and nonprofits in Lithuania, Nord Security collected donations for Niekieno Vaikai, an organization that improves the lives of vulnerable children, and Sidabrinė Linija, a non-profit that provides support to the elderly.

Assessing sustainability impacts, risks, and opportunities

Last year, Nord Security also went on a six-month quest in preparation for the new EU Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) rules by identifying and evaluating our key sustainability impacts, risks, and opportunities through a double materiality assessment.

Through the assessment Nord Security focused on two angles. The first one focused on what matters to the bottom line and identifies which environmental, social, or governance issues could affect a company’s revenues, costs, or reputation. The second considers Nord Security’s impact – how operations affect people and the environment.

Based on the outcomes of the assessment, Nord Security aims to better integrate sustainability risk assessment with enterprise risk framework already this year. Additionally, Nord Security is committed to continuous improvement, transparency, and aligning with the highest standards of sustainability.

* To put this in perspective, 1 tCO2e is roughly equivalent to the emissions generated by driving a gasoline-powered passenger vehicle for around 4,000 kilometers or charging more than 66,000 smartphones.

ABOUT NORD SECURITY

Nord Security is home to advanced security solutions that share the Nord brand and values, including the world’s most advanced VPN service NordVPN, the next-generation password manager NordPass, the file encryption tool NordLocker, threat exposure management platform NordStellar, and the business VPN/SASE solution NordLayer. Established in 2012, Nord Security’s products are now acknowledged by the most influential tech sites and IT security specialists. More information: nordsecurity.com.

More information: egidijus@nordsec.com

The MIL Network –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: Radware Schedules Conference Call for Its Second Quarter 2025 Earnings

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

TEL AVIV, Israel, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Radware^® (NASDAQ: RDWR), a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments, will announce its second quarter results on Wednesday, July 30, 2025.

Conference Call Details
Radware management will host a call on Wednesday, July 30, 2025, at 8:30 AM EDT to discuss its second quarter 2025 results and outlook for the third quarter of 2025. Participants are advised to join the call approximately 15 minutes before the start time.

US: 1-877-704-4453 (toll free)
International: 1-201-389-0920

In addition, the call will be webcast live on the Company’s website at http://www.radware.com/ir/investor-events/.

A replay of the call will be available for seven days, starting two hours after the end of the call, on telephone number 1-844-512-2921 (toll free) or 1-412-317-6671. Access ID: 13754237.

About Radware
Radware^® (NASDAQ: RDWR) is a global leader in application security and delivery solutions for multi-cloud environments. The company’s cloud application, infrastructure, and API security solutions use AI-driven algorithms for precise, hands-free, real-time protection from the most sophisticated web, application, and DDoS attacks, API abuse, and bad bots. Enterprises and carriers worldwide rely on Radware’s solutions to address evolving cybersecurity challenges and protect their brands and business operations while reducing costs. For more information, please visit the Radware website.

Radware encourages you to join our community and follow us on: Facebook, LinkedIn, Radware Blog, X, and YouTube.

©2025 Radware Ltd. All rights reserved. Any Radware products and solutions mentioned in this press release are protected by trademarks, patents, and pending patent applications of Radware in the U.S. and other countries. For more details, please see: https://www.radware.com/LegalNotice/. All other trademarks and names are property of their respective owners.

Radware believes the information in this document is accurate in all material respects as of its publication date. However, the information is provided without any express, statutory, or implied warranties and is subject to change without notice.

The contents of any website or hyperlinks mentioned in this press release are for informational purposes and the contents thereof are not part of this press release.

Safe Harbor Statement
This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Any statements made herein that are not statements of historical fact, including statements about Radware’s plans, outlook, beliefs, or opinions, are forward-looking statements. Generally, forward-looking statements may be identified by words such as “believes,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” and similar expressions or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would,” “may,” and “could.” Because such statements deal with future events, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties, and actual results, expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, could differ materially from Radware’s current forecasts and estimates. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to: the impact of global economic conditions, including as a result of the state of war declared in Israel in October 2023 and instability in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, tensions between China and Taiwan, financial and credit market fluctuations (including elevated interest rates), impacts from tariffs or other trade restrictions, inflation, and the potential for regional or global recessions; our dependence on independent distributors to sell our products; our ability to manage our anticipated growth effectively; our business may be affected by sanctions, export controls, and similar measures, targeting Russia and other countries and territories, as well as other responses to Russia’s military conflict in Ukraine, including indefinite suspension of operations in Russia and dealings with Russian entities by many multi-national businesses across a variety of industries; the ability of vendors to provide our hardware platforms and components for the manufacture of our products; our ability to attract, train, and retain highly qualified personnel; intense competition in the market for cybersecurity and application delivery solutions and in our industry in general, and changes in the competitive landscape; our ability to develop new solutions and enhance existing solutions; the impact to our reputation and business in the event of real or perceived shortcomings, defects, or vulnerabilities in our solutions, if our end-users experience security breaches, or if our information technology systems and data, or those of our service providers and other contractors, are compromised by cyber-attackers or other malicious actors or by a critical system failure; our use of AI technologies that present regulatory, litigation, and reputational risks; risks related to the fact that our products must interoperate with operating systems, software applications, and hardware that are developed by others; outages, interruptions, or delays in hosting services; the risks associated with our global operations, such as difficulties and costs of staffing and managing foreign operations, compliance costs arising from host country laws or regulations, partial or total expropriation, export duties and quotas, local tax exposure, economic or political instability, including as a result of insurrection, war, natural disasters, and major environmental, climate, or public health concerns; our net losses in the past and the possibility that we may incur losses in the future; a slowdown in the growth of the cybersecurity and application delivery solutions market or in the development of the market for our cloud-based solutions; long sales cycles for our solutions; risks and uncertainties relating to acquisitions or other investments; risks associated with doing business in countries with a history of corruption or with foreign governments; changes in foreign currency exchange rates; risks associated with undetected defects or errors in our products; our ability to protect our proprietary technology; intellectual property infringement claims made by third parties; laws, regulations, and industry standards affecting our business; compliance with open source and third-party licenses; complications with the design or implementation of our new enterprise resource planning (“ERP”) system; our reliance on information technology systems; our ESG disclosures and initiatives; and other factors and risks over which we may have little or no control. This list is intended to identify only certain of the principal factors that could cause actual results to differ. For a more detailed description of the risks and uncertainties affecting Radware, refer to Radware’s Annual Report on Form 20-F, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the other risk factors discussed from time to time by Radware in reports filed with, or furnished to, the SEC. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date on which they are made and, except as required by applicable law, Radware undertakes no commitment to revise or update any forward-looking statement in order to reflect events or circumstances after the date any such statement is made. Radware’s public filings are available from the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or may be obtained on Radware’s website at www.radware.com.

CONTACTS
Investor Relations:
Yisca Erez, +972-72-3917211, ir@radware.com

Media Contact:
Gerri Dyrek, gerri.dyrek@radware.com

The MIL Network –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: US halts military aid to Ukraine

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

The Trump administration has halted part of military aid to Ukraine following a review of U.S. own stockpiles, the White House and Pentagon confirmed on Tuesday.

“This decision was made to put America’s interests first following a review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said in a statement.

The move came amid concerns about U.S. military stockpiles falling too low, multiple U.S. media outlets reported, citing informative sources.

Last month U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a memo ordering a review of the U.S. stockpile of munitions, in the aftermath of three years of aid to Ukraine, recent strikes on Yemen’s Houthi group and Iran.

The review determined that stocks were too low on some weapons previously pledged, according to media reports.

Elbridge Colby, the Defense Department undersecretary for policy, said the Pentagon will continue “to provide the president with robust options to continue military aid to Ukraine, consistent with his goal of bringing this tragic war to an end.”

“At the same time, the department is rigorously examining and adapting its approach to achieving this objective while also preserving U.S. forces’ readiness for Administration defense priorities,” Colby said in a statement.

After meeting with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky during the NATO summit at The Hague last week, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters that Ukraine is eager to get the Patriot air defense missiles from the United States.

“They do want to have the anti-missile missiles, OK, as they call them, the Patriots,” Trump said then. “And we’re going to see if we can make some available. We need them, too.”

“We’re supplying them to Israel, and they’re very effective, 100 percent effective. Hard to believe how effective. They do want that more than any other thing,” he said.

Some analysts suggest it is a signal that the Trump administration may further reduce aid to Ukraine. Hegseth skipped a meeting last month of an international group to coordinate military aid to Ukraine. It is the first time the U.S. defense secretary was not in attendance.

The United States has provided Ukraine with more than 66 billion U.S. dollars worth of weapons and military assistance since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in February 2022, according to an AP report.

MIL OSI China News –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO and Ukraine agree to exchange Military Police training expertise

Source: NATO

On 20 June 2025, NATO agreed to recognise the 25th Military Police Training Centre (MPTC) in Lviv, Ukraine as a NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre (PTEC).

PTECs form a global network of institutions offering courses and academic seminars to civilian and military staff from NATO Allied and partner countries. Their goal is to improve the professionalism of national personnel, increase the ability of military personnel to operate well together, and conduct education and training activities carried out within the framework of NATO partnership programmes and policies. Since the PTEC community was launched in 1999, Ukraine has been an active member, thanks to the participation of its International Peacekeeping and Security Centre (IPSC).

Despite the many challenges posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine, the 25th MPTC draws lessons learned from combat experience to refine courses and explore new training opportunities. It actively collaborates with the NATO Military Police community of interest and the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence, based in Bydgoszcz, Poland, to develop high-quality courses. This helps to strengthen training initiatives in the discipline of Military Policing.

Cooperation with NATO will also be enhanced through the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), also based in Bydgoszcz. The 25th MPTC will create synergies with the JATEC and add value by identifying and applying lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression. Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is characterised by the common objective of increasing interoperability. Ukrainian officials have highlighted that they see NATO as the right platform for their defence institutions to share their unique and state-of-the-art capabilities with Allies and like-minded partners.

Centres wishing to join the PTEC network must undergo thorough evaluation. Evaluation of the 25th MPTC in March by experts from NATO Headquarters, Allied Command Operations and other NATO and Allied entities was, exceptionally, conducted in Bydgoszcz due to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Representatives of the centre and NATO experts used the facilities of the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence. NATO experts concluded that the centre demonstrated high expertise, professionalism and familiarity with NATO standards. The MPTC in Lviv, Ukraine is now the 36th member of the network of Partnership Training and Education Centres.

MIL Security OSI –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Belgium and China vow to deepen ties and strengthen mutual trust

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BRUSSELS, July 2 (Xinhua) — Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, here on Tuesday, vowing to deepen exchanges and strengthen mutual trust with China.

B. De Wever noted that Belgium and China have a long history of exchanges, and Belgium plays an important role in cooperation between Europe and China.

Recalling his many visits to China, De Wever said he was deeply impressed by China’s development achievements. Despite differences in views, he stressed the importance of expanding exchanges and strengthening mutual trust in the current complex geopolitical environment.

Moreover, he reaffirmed Belgium’s commitment to multilateralism and to promoting the autonomy of Europe, expressing hope that the upcoming meeting of EU and Chinese leaders would bring positive results.

B. De Wever also stressed that Belgium firmly adheres to the one-China policy and this position will not change.

Wang Yi stressed Belgium’s unique role in the European integration process and China-EU relations as a founding member of the EU and the host country of the EU.

Wang Yi said China appreciates the rational and pragmatic China policy pursued by the new Belgian government and is willing to cooperate with it to further strengthen the traditional friendship and comprehensive partnership.

According to the Chinese diplomat, China remains committed to high-quality development and high-level opening-up, welcomes more Belgian enterprises in China, and hopes that Belgium will also provide Chinese companies investing in Belgium with a fair, safe and predictable business environment.

Wang Yi also noted that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU, which is of great significance for the connection between the past and the future. He added that the half-century of interaction between China and the EU has fully demonstrated that the two sides can achieve mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

In the complex and unstable international environment, China and the EU, as the two major powers, markets and civilizations in the world, should uphold the position of partners and the core idea of win-win cooperation, strengthen ties, deepen understanding and consolidate mutual trust, so as to jointly safeguard multilateralism and the free trade system. Together, they should serve as an “anchor of stability” in the world and act as reliable and strong partners that support and empower each other, Wang said.

The parties also exchanged views on issues, including Ukraine. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 2, 2025
Wimbledon: Sinner remains ice cool as Gauff, Pegula and Zverev join bonfire of seeds

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

World number one Jannik Sinner stayed ice cool to move serenely into the Wimbledon second round but it was a second successive day of upsets at a sizzling All England Club as a succession of seeded players crashed and burned on Tuesday.

American second seed Coco Gauff, chasing a French Open-Wimbledon double after her Paris triumph, was the day’s most surprising casualty, losing 7-6(3) 6-1 to Ukraine’s Dayana Yastremska as the sun set on a sultry day.

Gauff’s compatriot Taylor Fritz, the world number five, survived a five-set firefight by the skin of his teeth against big-serving Frenchman Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard.

But the same could not be said of 13 of the men’s seeds who fell at the first hurdle – a Wimbledon record since 32 seeds were introduced in 2001.

Nine seeds also perished in the women’s first round while the eight top-10 seeds to go out across both singles draws amounted to the highest at a Grand Slam in the professional era.

Germany’s Alexander Zverev was the most notable men’s casualty, the third seed losing 7-6(3) 6-7(8) 6-3 6-7(5) 6-4 to France’s Arthur Rinderknech in a marathon duel that began on Monday and was locked at one set apiece overnight.

“I’m not sure he’s ever played a match like that in his life,” said Zverev, who is still chasing a first Grand Slam title after 38 attempts.

Italian Lorenzo Musetti, seeded seventh, was bundled out on Court Two by Nikoloz Basilashvili – the same court where earlier American women’s third seed Jessica Pegula was sent packing 6-2 6-3 by Italian Elisabetta Cocciaretto.

A red-hot Sinner never looked like joining the exodus as he beat fellow Italian and close friend Luca Nardi 6-4 6-3 6-0 in a victorious return to the Grand Slam stage after his epic French Open final defeat by Carlos Alcaraz last month.

“I tried to put the friendship away for a couple of hours,” Sinner, who conceded only four points when he landed his first serve, told reporters.

Novak Djokovic closed out the day’s action on the main showcourt by getting past Frenchman Alexandre Muller 6-1 6-7(7) 6-2 6-2 despite being hampered by a stomach bug midway through his match. He will face Briton Dan Evans next.

After seven British players won singles matches on Monday – a professional era record at Wimbledon – home fans had more to cheer on Tuesday as fourth seed Jack Draper, his nation’s big hope, avoided any dramas by easing past Argentina’s Sebastian Baez who retired hurt trailing 6-2 6-2 2-1.

In total, 10 British players have reached round two.

KREJCIKOVA TESTED

Women’s defending champion Barbora Krejcikova was tested by promising 20-year-old Filipina Alexandra Eala but after a slow start she found her form to win 3-6 6-2 6-1 on her return to Centre Court after last year’s surprise triumph.

“I mean, what the hell (kind of tennis) she played in the first set?” said Krejcikova, praising her opponent.

“She was smashing the ball and cleaning the lines, so wow, wow. She’s going to be really good in a couple of years.”

Five-times Grand Slam champion Iga Swiatek, seeded eight, has yet to conquer Wimbledon but showed positive signs when she beat Polina Kudermetova 7-5 6-1 while Russian teenager Mirra Andreeva advanced after a 6-3 6-3 victory over Mayar Sherif.

Both might have expected Gauff to be a major obstacle but the world number two subsided against Yastremska.

“I feel like mentally I was a little bit overwhelmed with everything that came afterwards,” Gauff said about the spell following her Paris triumph last month.

“I didn’t feel I had enough time to celebrate and also get back into it.”

The women’s draw is now without three of its top five seeds after number five Zheng Qinwen of China, the Olympic champion, suffered a third successive Wimbledon first-round defeat, beaten 7-5 4-6 6-1 by Czech doubles specialist Katerina Siniakova.

“I believe if I get through the first match, I will start to play better and better (on grass),” Zheng said. “The problem is the first match for me is complicated.”

Many will lament the exit of Wimbledon dark horse Alexander Bublik, seeded 28th. The Kazakh showman is guaranteed entertainment with his array of trick shots but he was unable to avoid the exit door, as he was dragged into battle by Spaniard Jaume Munar and beaten 6-4 3-6 4-6 7-6(5) 6-2.

Late in the day yet another seed fell when Frenchman Ugo Umbert was beaten by veteran countryman Gael Monfils, again defying his 38 years to edge a five-setter.

American Fritz survived, though, letting out a huge roar as he beat Perricard 6-7(6) 6-7(8) 6-4 7-6(6) 6-4 in a match carried forward from Monday. Perricard’s consolation for losing the cliffhanger was a 153 mph serve – a Wimbledon record.

Tommy Paul took out Briton Johannus Monday with little fuss, the 13th seed cruising through 6-4 6-4 6-2, but it was the end of the road for fellow American and 30th seed Alex Michelsen who fell 6-2 3-6 6-3 3-6 7-6(6) to Serbia’s Miomir Kecmanovic.

Zeynep Sonmez became the first Turkish woman to reach the second round at the grasscourt Grand Slam when she battled past Romania’s Jaqueline Cristian 7-6(3) 6-3.

Victoria Mboko found out a few hours before she faced Magdalena Frech that she had entered the main draw as a Lucky Loser due to Anastasia Potapova’s withdrawal and the Canadian teenager rode her luck to stun the 25th seed 6-3 6-2.

Fourteen years after first adding her name to the Wimbledon honours board, twice champion Petra Kvitova performed her last dance on the lawns, the Czech losing 6-3 6-1 to American 10th seed Emma Navarro.

(Reuters)

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets delegation from 2025 Taiwan International Ocean Forum

Source: Republic of China Taiwan

Details
2025-06-30
President Lai meets Minister of State at UK Department for Business and Trade Douglas Alexander
On the morning of June 30, President Lai Ching-te met with Douglas Alexander, Minister of State at the Department for Business and Trade of the United Kingdom. In remarks, President Lai thanked the UK government for its longstanding support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Noting that two years ago, Taiwan and the UK signed an enhanced trade partnership (ETP) arrangement, the president said that today Taiwan and the UK have signed three pillars under the ETP, which will help promote bilateral economic and trade cooperation. He expressed hope of the UK publicly supporting Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) so that together we can create an economic and trade landscape in the Indo-Pacific characterized by shared prosperity and development. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, on behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend a warm welcome to Minister Alexander and wish a fruitful outcome for the 27th round of Taiwan-UK trade talks later today. Taiwan-UK relations have grown closer in recent years. We have not only continued to strengthen cooperation in such fields as offshore wind power, innovative technologies, and culture and education but also have established regular dialogue mechanisms in the critical areas of economics and trade, energy, and agriculture. The UK is currently Taiwan’s fourth-largest European trading partner, second-largest source of investment from Europe, and third-largest target for investment in Europe. Two years ago, Taiwan and the UK signed an ETP arrangement. This was particularly meaningful, as it was the first institutionalized economic and trade framework between Taiwan and a European country. Today, this arrangement is yielding further results. I am delighted that Taiwan and the UK have signed three pillars under the ETP covering investment, digital trade, and energy and net-zero. This will help promote bilateral economic and trade cooperation and advance industrial development on both sides. I also want to thank the UK government for its longstanding support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. This month, the UK published its Strategic Defence Review 2025 and National Security Strategy 2025, which oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. These not only demonstrate that Taiwan and the UK share similar goals but also show that security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region are inseparable from those of the transatlantic regions. In addition, last November, the House of Commons passed a motion which made clear that United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 neither established the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China over Taiwan nor determined Taiwan’s status in the United Nations. The UK government also responded to the motion by publicly expressing for the first time its position on UNGA Resolution 2758, opposing any attempt to broaden the interpretation of the resolution to rewrite history. For this, on behalf of the people of Taiwan, I once again want to extend my deepest gratitude. Taiwan and the UK have the advantage of being highly complementary in the technology sector. In facing the restructuring of global supply chains and other international economic and trade developments, I believe that Taiwan and the UK are indispensable key partners for one another. I look forward to the UK publicly supporting Taiwan’s accession to the CPTPP so that together, we can create an economic and trade landscape in the Indo-Pacific characterized by shared prosperity and development. In closing, I wish Minister Alexander a pleasant and successful visit. And I hope he has the opportunity to visit Taiwan for personal travel in the future. Minister Alexander then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great personal honor to meet with everyone today to discuss further deepening the UK-Taiwan trade relationship and explore the many opportunities our two sides can pursue together. He mentioned that he traveled to Taiwan in 2022 when he was a private citizen, a visit he thoroughly enjoyed, so he is delighted to be back to see the strength of the UK-Taiwan relationship and the strengthening of that relationship. He said that relationship is built on mutual respect, democratic values, and a shared vision for open, resilient, and rules-based economic cooperation. As like-minded partners, he pointed out, our collaboration continues to grow across multiple sectors, and he is here today to further that momentum. Minister Alexander stated that on trade and investment, he is proud that this morning we signed the ETP Pillars on Investment, Digital Trade, Energy and Net Zero, which will provide a clear framework for our future cooperation and lay the foundation for expanded access and market-shaping engagement between our two economies. The minister said he believes that together with our annual trade talks, this partnership will help UK’s firms secure new commercial opportunities, improve regulatory alignment, and promote long-term investment in key growth areas, which in turn will also support Taiwan’s efforts to expand high-quality trade relationships with trusted partners. Minister Alexander said that President Lai’s promotion of the Five Trusted Industry Sectors and the UK’s recently published industrial and trade strategies are very well-aligned, as both cover clean energy and semiconductors as well as advanced manufacturing. He then provided an example, saying that both sides plan to invest in AI infrastructure and compute power-creating opportunities for great joint research in the future. By combining our strengths in these areas, he said, we can open the door to innovative collaboration and commercial success for both sides. He mentioned that yesterday he visited the Taiwan Space Agency, commenting that in sectors such as satellite technology, green energy, and cyber security, British expertise and trusted standards can provide meaningful solutions. Noting that President Lai spoke in his remarks of the broader challenge of peace and security in the region, Minister Alexander stated that the United Kingdom has, of course, also continued to affirm its commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, along with its G7 partners. The UK-Taiwan relationship is strategic, enduring, and growing, he stated, and they reaffirm and remain firm in their longstanding position and confident in their ability to work together to support both prosperity and resilience in both of our societies. Minister Alexander said that, as Taiwan looks to diversify capital and build global partnerships, they believe the UK represents a strong and ambitious investment destination, particularly for Taiwanese companies at the very forefront of robotics, clean tech, and advanced industry. He pointed out that the UK’s markets are stable, open, and aligned with Taiwan’s vision of a high-tech, sustainable future, adding that he looks forward to our discussion on how we can further deepen our cooperation across all of these areas and more. The delegation also included Martin Kent, His Majesty’s Trade Commissioner for Asia Pacific at the UK Department for Business and Trade. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by British Office Taipei Representative Ruth Bradley-Jones.

Details
2025-06-27
President Lai confers decoration on former Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Chairman Ohashi Mitsuo
On the morning of June 27, President Lai Ching-te conferred the Order of Brilliant Star with Grand Cordon upon former Chairman of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Ohashi Mitsuo in recognition of his firm convictions and tireless efforts in promoting Taiwan-Japan exchanges. In remarks, President Lai stated that Chairman Ohashi cares for Taiwan like a family member, and expressed hope that Taiwan and Japan continue to deepen their partnership, bring about the early signing of an economic partnership agreement (EPA), and jointly build secure and stable non-red supply chains as we boost the resilience and competitiveness of our economies and jointly safeguard the values of freedom and democracy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Every meeting I have with Chairman Ohashi, with whom I have worked side by side for many years, is warm and friendly. I recall that when we met last year, Chairman Ohashi said that he often thinks about what Japan can do for Taiwan and what Taiwan can do for Japan, and that it is that mutual concern that makes us so close. This was a truly moving statement illustrating the relationship between Taiwan and Japan. Chairman Ohashi has also said numerous times that our bilateral relations may very well be the best in the entire world, and that in fact they may serve as a model to other countries. Indeed, Chairman Ohashi is himself an exemplary model for friendly relations between Taiwan and Japan. His spirit of always working tirelessly to promote Taiwan-Japan exchanges is truly admirable. Assuming the position of chairman of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in 2011, he served during the terms of former Presidents Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen, continuously making positive contributions to Taiwan-Japan relations. Over these past 14 years, Taiwan and Japan have signed over 50 major agreements, spanning the economy and trade, fisheries, and taxes, among other areas. In 2017, the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association and the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association underwent name changes, strengthening the essence and significance of Taiwan-Japan relations. These great achievements were all made possible thanks to the firm convictions and tireless efforts of Chairman Ohashi. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I am delighted to confer upon Chairman Ohashi the Order of Brilliant Star with Grand Cordon to express our deepest thanks for his outstanding contributions. Chairman Ohashi is not just a good friend of Taiwan, but someone who cares for Taiwan like a family member. When a major earthquake struck in 2016, he personally went to Tainan to assess the situation and meet with the city government. This outpouring of friendship and support across borders was deeply moving. As we look to the future, I hope that Taiwan and Japan can continue to deepen our partnership. In addition to bringing about the early signing of an EPA, I also hope that we can expand collaboration in key areas such as semiconductors, energy, and AI, continue building secure and stable non-red supply chains, and boost the resilience and competitiveness of our economies as well as peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. As Chairman Ohashi has said, the close bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Japan is one the world can be proud of. I would like to thank him once again for his contributions to deepening Taiwan-Japan ties. Taiwan will continue to forge ahead side by side with Japan, jointly safeguarding the values of freedom and democracy and mutually advancing prosperous development. I wish Chairman Ohashi good health, happiness, peace, and success in his future endeavors, and invite him to return to Taiwan often to visit old friends. Chairman Ohashi then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his kind words. He stated that the Taiwan-Japan relationship is not only worthy of praise; it can also serve as a superb model in the world for bilateral relations that is worthy of study by other countries. He added that this is the result of the collective efforts of President Lai as well as many other individuals. Chairman Ohashi said that the current international situation is rather severe, with wars and conflicts occurring between many neighboring countries. He said that there is a growing trend of nuclear weapon proliferation, emphasizing that use of such weapons would cause significant harm between nations. He also pointed out that some countries even use nuclear weapons as a threat, leading to instability and impacting the global situation. Chairman Ohashi said that neither Taiwan nor Japan possesses nuclear weapons, which is something to be proud of. That is why, he said, we can declare that a world without nuclear weapons is a peaceful world. He also mentioned that during his tenure as chairman of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, he consistently upheld this principle in his work. Chairman Ohashi said that the mission of the World Federalist Movement (WFM) is to promote world peace. He said that the WFM has branches in countries worldwide, with the WFM of Japan being one of the most prominent, and that it also aspires to achieve the goal of world peace. Having served as chairman of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association for 14 years, he said, he is now stepping down from this role and will serve as the chairman of the WFM of Japan, aiming to promote peace in countries around the world. Chairman Ohashi said that both Taiwan and Japan can take pride in our friendly bilateral relationship, emphasizing that if the good relationship between Japan and Taiwan could be offered as an example to countries around the world, there would be no more wars. He expressed his sincere hope that under President Lai’s leadership, Taiwan and Japan can work together to jointly promote world peace. Also in attendance at the ceremony was Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office Chief Representative Katayama Kazuyuki.

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2025-06-25
President Lai meets Japan’s former Economic Security Minister Kobayashi Takayuki
On the afternoon of June 25, President Lai Ching-te met with Kobayashi Takayuki, Japan’s former economic security minister and a current member of the House of Representatives. In remarks, President Lai expressed hope to combine the strengths of the democratic community to build resilient, reliable non-red supply chains, and ensure a resilient global economy and sustainable development. He also expressed hope that Taiwan and Japan can bring about the early signing of an economic partnership agreement (EPA), and that Japan will continue supporting Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), enhancing our own bilateral partnership, as doing so would create win-win situations and further contribute to regional economic security and stability. The following is a translation of President Lai’s remarks: I welcome Representative Kobayashi back to Taiwan for another visit after seven years. During his last visit, he was with a delegation from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Youth Division, and we met at the Executive Yuan. I am very happy to see him again today. Representative Kobayashi has long paid close attention to matters involving economic security, technological innovation, and aerospace policy. He also made a stunning debut in last year’s LDP presidential election, showing that he is truly a rising star and an influential figure in the political sphere. With this visit, Representative Kobayashi is demonstrating support for Taiwan with concrete action, which is very meaningful. Taiwan and Japan are both part of the first island chain’s key line of defense. We thank the many Japanese prime ministers, including former Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Suga Yoshihide, and Kishida Fumio, as well as current Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, for the many times they have highlighted the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait at important international venues, and for expressing opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. I hope that Taiwan and Japan can engage in more cooperation and exchanges to promote peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region in all aspects. In particular, China in recent years has been actively expanding its red supply chains, which threaten the global free trade system and advanced technology markets. Taiwan hopes to combine the strengths of the democratic community to build resilient, reliable non-red supply chains. In the semiconductor industry, for example, Taiwan has excellent advanced manufacturing capabilities, while Japan plays an important role in materials, equipment, and key technologies. I am confident that, given the experience that Taiwan and Japan have in cooperating, we can build an industrial supply chain composed of democratic nations to ensure a resilient global economy and sustainable development. I hope that Taiwan and Japan can bring about the early signing of an EPA in order to deepen our bilateral trade and investment exchanges and cooperation. I also hope that Japan will continue supporting Taiwan’s bid to join the CPTPP, enhancing our own bilateral partnership, as doing so would create win-win situations and further contribute to regional economic security and stability. Taiwan and Japan are democratic partners that share the values of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. I firmly believe that so long as we work together, we can certainly address the challenges posed by authoritarianism, and bring prosperity and development to the Indo-Pacific region. In closing, I welcome Representative Kobayashi once again. I am certain that this visit will help enhance Taiwan-Japan exchanges and deepen our friendship. Representative Kobayashi then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for taking the time to meet with him, and noting that this was his second visit to Taiwan following a trip seven years prior, when he came with his good friend from college and then-Director of the LDP Youth Division Suzuki Keisuke, now Japan’s minister of justice. Representative Kobayashi mentioned a Japanese kanji that he is very fond of – 絆 (kizuna) – which means “deep ties of friendship.” He emphasized that a key purpose of this visit to Taiwan was to reiterate the deep ties of friendship between Taiwan and Japan. In addition to deep historical ties, he said, Taiwan and Japan also enjoy a like-minded partnership in terms of economic, personnel, and friendship-oriented exchanges. He went on to say that at the strategic level, Taiwan and Japan also have deep ties of friendship, and that for Japan, it is strategically important that Taiwan not be isolated under any circumstances. Representative Kobayashi emphasized that cooperation between Taiwan and Japan, and even cooperation among Taiwan, Japan, and the United States, are more important now than ever, and that another important focus of this visit is the non-red supply chains referred to earlier by President Lai. He said that as Japan’s first economic security minister and the person currently in charge of the LDP’s policy on economic security, he is acutely aware of the important impact of economic security on national interests, and therefore looks forward to further exchanging views regarding Taiwan’s concrete steps to build non-red supply chains. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Deputy Representative Takaba Yo.

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2025-06-16
President Lai meets delegation led by Representative Bera, co-chair of US Congressional Taiwan Caucus
On the morning of June 16, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Representative Ami Bera, co-chair of the US Congressional Taiwan Caucus. In remarks, President Lai thanked the representatives in Congress for actively voicing support for Taiwan and proposing numerous Taiwan-friendly initiatives to strengthen Taiwan-US ties, helping expand Taiwan’s international space and continuing to place focus on peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The president said that we will continue to strengthen bilateral investment and industrial cooperation and create a more comprehensive environment for economic and trade exchanges to jointly enhance economic and developmental resilience. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to meet with the delegation and welcome Congressman Bera back to the Presidential Office. Last January, he visited after the presidential election, demonstrating the steadfast backing of the US Congress for democratic Taiwan. This time, as head of a delegation of new members of the House Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, he is continuing to foster US congressional support for Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend a sincere welcome to Congressman Bera and all our esteemed guests. Over the years, staunch bipartisan US congressional backing of Taiwan has been a key force for steadily advancing our bilateral relations. I thank the representatives in Congress for actively voicing support for Taiwan and proposing numerous Taiwan-friendly initiatives, thereby strengthening Taiwan-US ties, helping expand Taiwan’s international space, and continuing to place focus on peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. I want to emphasize that Taiwan has an unwavering determination to safeguard peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Over the past year, the government and private sector have been working together to enhance Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience and accelerate reform of national defense. The government is also prioritizing special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds three percent of GDP this year. I hope that Taiwan-US security cooperation will evolve beyond military procurement to a partnership that encompasses joint research and development and joint production, further strengthening cooperation and exchange in the defense industry. Regarding industrial exchanges, last month, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and Minister of Economic Affairs Kuo Jyh-huei (郭智輝) each visited Texas to see firsthand Taiwan-US collaboration in AI and semiconductors. And the delegation led by Executive Yuan Secretary-General Kung Ming-hsin (龔明鑫) sent by Taiwan to this year’s SelectUSA Investment Summit in Washington, DC, was again the largest of those attending. All of this demonstrates Taiwan’s commitment to working alongside the US to create mutual prosperity. In the future, we will continue to strengthen bilateral investment and industrial cooperation. And I hope that the legislation addressing the issue of Taiwan-US double taxation will become law this year. I want to thank Congressman Bera for co-leading a joint letter last November signed by over 100 members of Congress calling for such legislation. I believe that by creating a more comprehensive environment for economic and trade exchanges, Taiwan and the US can enhance economic and developmental resilience. In closing, I thank you all for making the long journey here to advance Taiwan-US relations. Let us continue working together to promote the prosperous development of this important partnership. Congressman Bera then delivered remarks, saying that on behalf of the delegation, it is an honor for him to be here once again, it being last January that he and Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart visited and congratulated President Lai on his election victory, noting that theirs was the first congressional delegation to do so. Congressman Bera said that this is an important time, not just for the US and Taiwan relationship, but for all relationships around the world. When we look at conflicts in Europe and in the Middle East, he said, it is incumbent upon democracies to hold the peace in Asia. He emphasized that is why it is important for them to bring a delegation of members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee, adding that he believes for all of them it is their first trip to Taiwan. Congressman Bera said that while this is a delegation of Democratic members of Congress, in a bipartisan way all of Congress continues to support the people of Taiwan. As such, in this visit he brings support from his co-chairs on the Taiwan caucus, Congressman Díaz-Balart and Congressman Andy Barr. He also took a moment to recognize the passing of Congressman Gerald Connolly, who was a longtime friend of Taiwan and one of their co-chairs on the caucus. Congressman Bera mentioned that there is always a special bond between himself and President Lai because they are both doctors, and as doctors, their profession is about healing, keeping the peace, and making sure everybody has a bright, prosperous future. In closing, he highlighted that it is in that spirit that their delegation visits with the president. The delegation also included members of the US Congress Gabe Amo, Wesley Bell, Julie Johnson, Sarah McBride, and Johnny Olszewski.

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2025-06-13
President Lai meets delegation led by French National Assembly Taiwan Friendship Group Chair Marie-Noëlle Battistel
On the morning of June 12, President Lai Ching-te met a delegation led by Marie-Noëlle Battistel, chair of the French National Assembly’s Taiwan Friendship Group. In remarks, President Lai thanked the National Assembly for its long-term support for Taiwan’s international participation and for upholding security in the Taiwan Strait, helping make France the first major country in the world to enact legislation to uphold freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. The president also said that exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and France are becoming more frequent, and that he hopes this visit by the Taiwan Friendship Group will inject new momentum into Taiwan-France relations and help build closer partnerships in the economy, trade, energy, and digital security. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to welcome Chair Battistel, who is once again leading a visiting delegation. Last year, Chair Battistel co-led a delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony for myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. This is her fourth visit, and first as chair of the Taiwan Friendship Group, which makes it especially meaningful. This delegation’s visit demonstrates strong support for Taiwan, and on behalf of the people of Taiwan, I want to express my sincerest welcome and thanks. France is a pioneer in promoting free and democratic values. These are values that Taiwan cherishes and is working hard to defend. I want to express gratitude to the French Parliament for their long-term support for Taiwan’s international participation, and for upholding security in the Taiwan Strait. The French Parliament’s two chambers have continued to strongly support Taiwan, with the passage of a resolution supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations in 2021, as well as the passage of the seven-year Military Programming Law in 2023. This has made France the first major country in the world to enact legislation to uphold freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. Through it all, the Taiwan Friendship Group has played a key role, and I want to thank all of our distinguished guests for their efforts. Over the past few years, Taiwan and France have continued to deepen cooperation in areas including the economy, technology, culture, and sports. At the Choose France summit held in Paris last month, Taiwanese and French enterprises also announced they will launch cooperation in the semiconductor and satellite fields. The VivaTech startup exhibition, now being held in France, also has many Taiwanese vendors participating. Exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and France, whether official or people-to-people, are becoming more and more frequent. I hope that this visit by the Taiwan Friendship Group will inject new momentum into Taiwan-France relations, building closer partnerships in the economy, trade, energy, and digital security. To address current geopolitical and economic challenges, Taiwan will continue to join forces with France and other like-minded countries to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and contribute our concerted efforts to global prosperity and development. Once again, I want to welcome our visitors to Taiwan. I hope to continue our joint efforts to create a more prosperous future for both Taiwan and France. Chair Battistel then delivered remarks, thanking President Lai for extending this invitation. Last year on May 20, she said, she and her delegation attended the presidential inauguration ceremony, so she was delighted to visit Taiwan once again with the French National Assembly’s Taiwan Friendship Group and bear witness to their friendship with Taiwan. Chair Battistel noted that this visit has given them an opportunity to strengthen Taiwan-France relations in areas including the economy, culture, the humanities, and diplomacy, and conduct exchanges with numerous heads of government agencies and research institutes. It has also been an opportunity, she said, to witness the importance of exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan in areas including energy, semiconductors, youth, and culture, and the impact created by important issues of mutual concern, including AI and disinformation, on the security of many countries. Chair Battistel praised Taiwan for its youth development efforts, and said that under the Taiwan Global Pathfinders Initiative, 30 Taiwanese young people have embarked on a visit to France, with itineraries including the United Nations Ocean Conference and the VivaTech exhibition, as well as the city of Toulouse, which is strategically important for the aerospace industry. Members of the group are also conducting exchanges at the French National Assembly, she said. Chair Battistel stated that the Taiwan-France partnership is growing closer, and that she hopes to continue to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation, as supporting peace for Taiwan supports peace around the world. The delegation also included Taiwan Friendship Group Vice Chair Éric Martineau, as well as National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Laetitia Saint-Paul and Deputies Marie-José Allemand and Claudia Rouaux. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by French Office in Taipei Deputy Director Cléa Le Cardeur.

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2025-05-20
President Lai interviewed by Nippon Television and Yomiuri TV
In a recent interview on Nippon Television’s news zero program, President Lai Ching-te responded to questions from host Mr. Sakurai Sho and Yomiuri TV Shanghai Bureau Chief Watanabe Masayo on topics including reflections on his first year in office, cross-strait relations, China’s military threats, Taiwan-United States relations, and Taiwan-Japan relations. The interview was broadcast on the evening of May 19. During the interview, President Lai stated that China intends to change the world’s rules-based international order, and that if Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted. Therefore, he said, Taiwan will strengthen its national defense, prevent war by preparing for war, and achieve the goal of peace. The president also noted that Taiwan’s purpose for developing drones is based on national security and industrial needs, and that Taiwan hopes to collaborate with Japan. He then reiterated that China’s threats are an international problem, and expressed hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war. Following is the text of the questions and the president’s responses: Q: How do you feel as you are about to round out your first year in office? President Lai: When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives. When I left medicine to go into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan. And when I was sworn in as president on May 20 last year, I was determined to strengthen the nation. Time flies, and it has already been a year. Although the process has been very challenging, I am deeply honored to be a part of it. I am also profoundly grateful to our citizens for allowing me the opportunity to give back to our country. The future will certainly be full of more challenges, but I will do everything I can to unite the people and continue strengthening the nation. That is how I am feeling now. Q: We are now coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and over this period, we have often heard that conflict between Taiwan and the mainland is imminent. Do you personally believe that a cross-strait conflict could happen? President Lai: The international community is very much aware that China intends to replace the US and change the world’s rules-based international order, and annexing Taiwan is just the first step. So, as China’s military power grows stronger, some members of the international community are naturally on edge about whether a cross-strait conflict will break out. The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost. Besides causing direct disasters to both Taiwan and China, the impact on the global economy would be even greater, with estimated losses of US$10 trillion from war alone – that is roughly 10 percent of the global GDP. Additionally, 20 percent of global shipping passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, so if a conflict breaks out in the strait, other countries including Japan and Korea would suffer a grave impact. For Japan and Korea, a quarter of external transit passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, and a third of the various energy resources and minerals shipped back from other countries pass through said areas. If Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted, and therefore conflict in the Taiwan Strait must be avoided. Such a conflict is indeed avoidable. I am very thankful to Prime Minister of Japan Ishiba Shigeru and former Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Suga Yoshihide, and Kishida Fumio, as well as US President Donald Trump and former President Joe Biden, and the other G7 leaders, for continuing to emphasize at international venues that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are essential components for global security and prosperity. When everyone in the global democratic community works together, stacking up enough strength to make China’s objectives unattainable or to make the cost of invading Taiwan too high for it to bear, a conflict in the strait can naturally be avoided. Q: As you said, President Lai, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is also very important for other countries. How can war be avoided? What sort of countermeasures is Taiwan prepared to take to prevent war? President Lai: As Mr. Sakurai mentioned earlier, we are coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII. There are many lessons we can take from that war. First is that peace is priceless, and war has no winners. From the tragedies of WWII, there are lessons that humanity should learn. We must pursue peace, and not start wars blindly, as that would be a major disaster for humanity. In other words, we must be determined to safeguard peace. The second lesson is that we cannot be complacent toward authoritarian powers. If you give them an inch, they will take a mile. They will keep growing, and eventually, not only will peace be unattainable, but war will be inevitable. The third lesson is why WWII ended: It ended because different groups joined together in solidarity. Taiwan, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific region are all directly subjected to China’s threats, so we hope to be able to join together in cooperation. This is why we proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we will strengthen our national defense. Second, we will strengthen economic resilience. Third is standing shoulder to shoulder with the democratic community to demonstrate the strength of deterrence. Fourth is that as long as China treats Taiwan with parity and dignity, Taiwan is willing to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China, and seek peace and mutual prosperity. These four pillars can help us avoid war and achieve peace. That is to say, Taiwan hopes to achieve peace through strength, prevent war by preparing for war, keeping war from happening and pursuing the goal of peace. Q: Regarding drones, everyone knows that recently, Taiwan has been actively researching, developing, and introducing drones. Why do you need to actively research, develop, and introduce new drones at this time? President Lai: This is for two purposes. The first is to meet national security needs. The second is to meet industrial development needs. Because Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines are all part of the first island chain, and we are all democratic nations, we cannot be like an authoritarian country like China, which has an unlimited national defense budget. In this kind of situation, island nations such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines should leverage their own technologies to develop national defense methods that are asymmetric and utilize unmanned vehicles. In particular, from the Russo-Ukrainian War, we see that Ukraine has successfully utilized unmanned vehicles to protect itself and prevent Russia from unlimited invasion. In other words, the Russo-Ukrainian War has already proven the importance of drones. Therefore, the first purpose of developing drones is based on national security needs. Second, the world has already entered the era of smart technology. Whether generative, agentic, or physical, AI will continue to develop. In the future, cars and ships will also evolve into unmanned vehicles and unmanned boats, and there will be unmanned factories. Drones will even be able to assist with postal deliveries, or services like Uber, Uber Eats, and foodpanda, or agricultural irrigation and pesticide spraying. Therefore, in the future era of comprehensive smart technology, developing unmanned vehicles is a necessity. Taiwan, based on industrial needs, is actively planning the development of drones and unmanned vehicles. I would like to take this opportunity to express Taiwan’s hope to collaborate with Japan in the unmanned vehicle industry. Just as we do in the semiconductor industry, where Japan has raw materials, equipment, and technology, and Taiwan has wafer manufacturing, our two countries can cooperate. Japan is a technological power, and Taiwan also has significant technological strengths. If Taiwan and Japan work together, we will not only be able to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and security in the Indo-Pacific region, but it will also be very helpful for the industrial development of both countries. Q: The drones you just described probably include examples from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Do our drones need to have cross-sea flight capabilities? President Lai: Taiwan does not intend to counterattack the mainland, and does not intend to invade any country. Taiwan’s drones are meant to protect our own nation and territory. Q: Former President Biden previously stated that US forces would assist Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. President Trump, however, has yet to clearly state that the US would help defend Taiwan. Do you think that in such an event, the US would help defend Taiwan? Or is Taiwan now trying to persuade the US? President Lai: Former President Biden and President Trump have answered questions from reporters. Although their responses were different, strong cooperation with Taiwan under the Biden administration has continued under the Trump administration; there has been no change. During President Trump’s first term, cooperation with Taiwan was broader and deeper compared to former President Barack Obama’s terms. After former President Biden took office, cooperation with Taiwan increased compared to President Trump’s first term. Now, during President Trump’s second term, cooperation with Taiwan is even greater than under former President Biden. Taiwan-US cooperation continues to grow stronger, and has not changed just because President Trump and former President Biden gave different responses to reporters. Furthermore, the Trump administration publicly stated that in the future, the US will shift its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The US secretary of defense even publicly stated that the primary mission of the US is to prevent China from invading Taiwan, maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific, and thus maintain world peace. There is a saying in Taiwan that goes, “Help comes most to those who help themselves.” Before asking friends and allies for assistance in facing threats from China, Taiwan must first be determined and prepared to defend itself. This is Taiwan’s principle, and we are working in this direction, making all the necessary preparations to safeguard the nation. Q: I would like to ask you a question about Taiwan-Japan relations. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, you made an appeal to give Japan a great deal of assistance and care. In particular, you visited Sendai to offer condolences. Later, you also expressed condolences and concern after the earthquakes in Aomori and Kumamoto. What are your expectations for future Taiwan-Japan exchanges and development? President Lai: I come from Tainan, and my constituency is in Tainan. Tainan has very deep ties with Japan, and of course, Taiwan also has deep ties with Japan. However, among Taiwan’s 22 counties and cities, Tainan has the deepest relationship with Japan. I sincerely hope that both of you and your teams will have an opportunity to visit Tainan. I will introduce Tainan’s scenery, including architecture from the era of Japanese rule, Tainan’s cuisine, and unique aspects of Tainan society, and you can also see lifestyles and culture from the Showa era. The Wushantou Reservoir in Tainan was completed by engineer Mr. Hatta Yoichi from Kanazawa, Japan and the team he led to Tainan after he graduated from then-Tokyo Imperial University. It has nearly a century of history and is still in use today. This reservoir, along with the 16,000-km-long Chianan Canal, transformed the 150,000-hectare Chianan Plain into Taiwan’s premier rice-growing area. It was that foundation in agriculture that enabled Taiwan to develop industry and the technology sector of today. The reservoir continues to supply water to Tainan Science Park. It is used by residents of Tainan, the agricultural sector, and industry, and even the technology sector in Xinshi Industrial Park, as well as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Because of this, the people of Tainan are deeply grateful for Mr. Hatta and very friendly toward the people of Japan. A major earthquake, the largest in 50 years, struck Tainan on February 6, 2016, resulting in significant casualties. As mayor of Tainan at the time, I was extremely grateful to then-Prime Minister Abe, who sent five Japanese officials to the disaster site in Tainan the day after the earthquake. They were very thoughtful and asked what kind of assistance we needed from the Japanese government. They offered to provide help based on what we needed. I was deeply moved, as former Prime Minister Abe showed such care, going beyond the formality of just sending supplies that we may or may not have actually needed. Instead, the officials asked what we needed and then provided assistance based on those needs, which really moved me. Similarly, when the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 or the later Kumamoto earthquakes struck, the people of Tainan, under my leadership, naturally and dutifully expressed their support. Even earlier, when central Taiwan was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, Japan was the first country to deploy a rescue team to the disaster area. On February 6, 2018, after a major earthquake in Hualien, former Prime Minister Abe appeared in a video holding up a message of encouragement he had written in calligraphy saying “Remain strong, Taiwan.” All of Taiwan was deeply moved. Over the years, Taiwan and Japan have supported each other when earthquakes struck, and have forged bonds that are family-like, not just neighborly. This is truly valuable. In the future, I hope Taiwan and Japan can be like brothers, and that the peoples of Taiwan and Japan can treat one another like family. If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem; if Japan has a problem, then Taiwan has a problem. By caring for and helping each other, we can face various challenges and difficulties, and pursue a brighter future. Q: President Lai, you just used the phrase “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” In the event that China attempts to invade Taiwan by force, what kind of response measures would you hope the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces take? President Lai: As I just mentioned, annexing Taiwan is only China’s first step. Its ultimate objective is to change the rules-based international order. That being the case, China’s threats are an international problem. So, I would very much hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war – prevention, after all, is more important than cure.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Croatian President Calls on West to Resume Dialogue with Russia

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

ZAGREB, July 2 (Xinhua) — Western leaders should resume dialogue with Russia to help end the conflict in Ukraine, Croatian President Zoran Milanovic said Tuesday after talks with Slovakian President Peter Pellegrini in Zagreb.

“There is no excuse for not having a dialogue,” Z. Milanovic noted at a joint press conference, adding that even during the Soviet era, negotiations were conducted between the West and the Soviet Union.

“The whole architecture of trust and mistrust was created to avoid a nuclear war. This is the whole philosophy of international relations, which is very thoughtful and deep. Everything is broken today,” he said, adding that “there is an impressive generation of incompetent people who are acting in a harmful way.”

P. Pellegrini, in turn, stated that neither of the two leaders believes that further military support will end the war in Ukraine, since it is impossible to defeat a nuclear power like Russia using military means.

P. Pellegrini stressed that NATO and the United States must find a common language with Russia on the issue of whether they can stop hostilities and agree on a post-war settlement of the situation in Ukraine.

He called on EU leaders, including Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, to enter into talks with Moscow and find a negotiated solution.

P. Pellegrini arrived in Croatia on Monday for an official visit. That same day, he and Z. Milanovic discussed bilateral economic cooperation, regional security and preparations for the next NATO summit. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 2, 2025
Quad ministers demand bringing Pahalgam terrorists to justice, renew commitment to counterterrorism

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Renewing their commitment to work together to fight terrorism, the Quad foreign ministers on Tuesday demanded that all those responsible for the “reprehensible” Pahalgam terror attack be immediately brought to justice and countries concerned cooperate with the authorities.

In a joint statement after their meeting on Tuesday, they said, “We call for the perpetrators, organisers, and financiers of this reprehensible act to be brought to justice without any delay and urge all UN Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law and relevant UNSCRs (Security Council Resolutions), to cooperate actively with all relevant authorities in this regard.”

“The Quad unequivocally condemns all acts of terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism, and renews our commitment to counterterrorism cooperation,” the statement said.

External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Foreign Ministers Penny Wong of Australia and Takeshi Iwaya of Japan representing the major democracies of the Indo-Pacific region met for their second ministerial meeting of the year.

They said, “We condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, which claimed the lives of 25 Indian nationals and one Nepali citizen, while injuring several others. We express our deepest condolences to the families of the victims and extend our heartfelt wishes for a swift and full recovery to all those injured.”

The statement did not name any country while calling for bringing the perpetrators of the massacre to justice, but the nation was obvious because The Resistance Front, which carried out the attack, is an arm of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is sheltered by Pakistan.

Before the ministers met, Jaishankar said, “India has every right to defend its people against terrorism, and we will exercise that right.”

“We expect our quad partners to understand and appreciate that,” he emphasised.

The top diplomats said they looked forward to the Quad summit to be hosted later this year by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which will be attended by US President Donald Trump and Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese of Australia and Shigeru Ishiba of Japan.

The ministers said that they “plan to launch the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership in Mumbai this year.”

“To ensure the Quad’s enduring impact, we are pleased to announce today a new, ambitious, and strong agenda focused on four key areas: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. Through this renewed focus, we will sharpen the Quad’s ability to leverage our resources to address the region’s most pressing challenges,” the ministers added.

The four areas are maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response.

While their joint statement repeatedly spoke of threats to countries in the region from the use of force and coercion by China, they did not name it.

“We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We express our serious concerns regarding dangerous and provocative actions, including interference with offshore resource development, the repeated obstruction of the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and the dangerous maneuvers by military aircraft and coast guard and maritime militia vessels, especially the unsafe use of water cannons and ramming or blocking actions in the South China Sea,” said the joint statement.

While China was not mentioned, it had carried out all those actions against the Philippines, Vietnam, and South Korea, and it has been involved in disputes with Malaysia over offshore oil drilling.

“These actions threaten peace and stability in the region”, they said. “We are seriously concerned by the militarisation of disputed features.”

The ministers expressed concern over the disruptions to the supply chain, particularly of critical minerals and said it was important to diversify supplies.

They announced a concrete measure to deal with this problem: “We are launching today the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, an ambitious expansion of our partnership to strengthen economic security and collective resilience by collaborating to secure and diversify critical minerals supply chains.”

To strengthen the Quad’s ability to carry out relief in natural disasters – a mission that gave initial shape to the group – the ministers said they plan to host the first Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network field training exercise this year.

It aims “to strengthen shared airlift capacity and leverage our collective logistics strengths to respond to natural disasters more rapidly and efficiently, providing support for regional partners,” the statement said.

They condemned North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programmes and demanded that it follow United Nations Security Council resolutions and end them.

They also expressed “grave concern over North Korea’s malicious cyber activity, including cryptocurrency theft and use of workers abroad to fund North Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.”

Pyongyang has sent its citizens to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine.

Closer to home, the ministers said they were “deeply concerned by the worsening crisis in Myanmar and its impact on the region.”

They called on the military regime and all groups involved “to implement, extend and broaden ceasefire measures.”

(With inputs from IANS)

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Zverev, Gauff among record Wimbledon seeds exodus

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Five top-10 seeds, including China’s Olympic champion Zheng Qinwen, crashed out of the first round at Wimbledon on Tuesday in a day of upsets and soaring temperatures.

Zheng, the No. 5 seed in the women’s singles draw, suffered her third consecutive first-round exit at the grass-court Grand Slam, falling to Czech doubles specialist Katerina Siniakova 7-5, 4-6, 6-1. The match was played as London endured its hottest day of the year, with temperatures surpassing 33 degrees Celsius.

“I should have done better in my service games,” said Zheng, who was broken twice after leading 5-3 in the opening set. “I don’t think the surface is a challenge for me. I just felt that I should raise my level in my service games today.”

Siniakova, 29, a 10-time women’s doubles Grand Slam champion, will face four-time major winner Naomi Osaka in the second round.

Carlos Alcaraz hits a return during the men’s singles first round match between Carlos Alcaraz of Spain and Fabio Fognini of Italy at Wimbledon Tennis Championship in London, Britain, June 30, 2025. (Xinhua/Zhao Dingzhe) (Xinhua/Zhao Dingzhe)

Second-seeded Coco Gauff and third-seeded Jessica Pegula were also knocked out of the women’s singles on a day filled with surprises.

Gauff, the reigning US Open champion who won last month’s French Open, was beaten 7-6 (3), 6-1 by Ukraine’s Dayana Yastremska.

“I’m obviously disappointed how the result went today,” said Gauff, 21. “Dayana started off playing strong. I think I couldn’t find my footing out there today.”

Gauff, a three-time fourth-round finisher at Wimbledon, added: “I really do want to do well here. I’m not someone who wants to write myself off grass this early in my career, but I definitely need to make changes if I want to be successful here.”

Pegula, meanwhile, was stunned by Italy’s Elisabetta Cocciaretto 6-2, 6-3 in just 58 minutes.

In the men’s draw, No. 3 seed Alexander Zverev of Germany fell 7-6 (3), 6-7 (8), 6-3, 6-7 (5), 6-4 to France’s Arthur Rinderknech.

Rinderknech, 29, called it the biggest win of his career. “When it’s on Center Court of Wimbledon against a guy like Sascha, who is No. 3 in the world and has been there for the last probably ten years, such a consistent player, and in five sets, I can’t really ask for more,” he said.

Seventh-seeded Lorenzo Musetti of Italy also suffered a shock defeat, losing to Georgian qualifier Nikoloz Basilashvili 6-2, 4-6, 7-5, 6-1. However, Musetti’s compatriot and world No. 1 Jannik Sinner advanced with ease, defeating fellow Italian Luca Nardi 6-4, 6-2, 6-0.

In the final match on Center Court, 24-time Grand Slam champion Novak Djokovic overcame a mid-match illness to defeat France’s Alexandre Muller 6-1, 6-7 (7), 6-2, 6-2.

The 38-year-old Serbian revealed he had been struggling with a stomach upset during the match. “The energy kicked back in after some doctor’s miracle pills and I managed to finish the match on a good note,” Djokovic said.

Monday’s opening day also saw early exits for No. 8 seed Holger Rune of Denmark and No. 9 seed Daniil Medvedev of Russia, both of whom were eliminated in the first round.

MIL OSI China News –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: Belgium, China vow to deepen ties, boost mutual trust

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Brussels on Tuesday, pledging to deepen exchanges and enhance mutual trust with China.

De Wever noted that Belgium and China have enjoyed a long history of exchanges, with vibrant local-level friendly communications, and that Belgium plays a gateway role in Europe-China cooperation.

Recalling his multiple visits to China, De Wever said he was deeply impressed by China’s development achievements. Despite differing perspectives, he stressed the importance of enhancing exchanges and increasing mutual trust in the face of the current complex geopolitical landscape.

Moreover, he reaffirmed Belgium’s commitment to multilateralism and support for a greater autonomous Europe while expressing the hope that the upcoming EU-China leaders’ meeting will yield positive results.

De Wever also stressed that Belgium firmly adheres to the one-China policy, and this stance will not change.

Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, highlighted Belgium’s unique role in the European integration process and China-EU relations as a founding member of the European Union (EU) and host of the EU headquarters.

Wang said that China appreciates the rational and pragmatic China policy pursued by the new Belgian government and is willing to work with Belgium to carry forward the traditional friendship and advance the all-round partnership of friendly cooperation between the two countries in a steady and sustained manner.

Meanwhile, Wang said China remains committed to high-quality development and high-level opening-up, welcoming more Belgian enterprises to China to develop their businesses and hoping that Belgium will likewise provide Chinese companies investing in Belgium with a fair, secure, and predictable business environment.

Wang also said this year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU, which carries significant meaning as a bridge between the past and the future. The half-century-long journey of China-EU engagement has fully demonstrated that the two sides can achieve mutual respect and win-win cooperation, he added.

Amid a complex and volatile international landscape, Wang said, China and the EU, as two major forces, markets, and civilizations in the world, should uphold the positioning as partners and the main theme of win-win cooperation, strengthening communication, enhancing understanding and consolidating mutual trust to jointly safeguard multilateralism and the free trade system. Together, they should serve as an “anchor of stability” of the world and act as reliable and strong partners who support and empower each other.

The two sides also exchanged views on issues including Ukraine.

MIL OSI China News –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Submissions: Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tara-Lyn Camilleri, Postdoctoral researcher of transgenerational effects, Monash University

Radu Bercan/Shutterstock

As war continues to rage in Gaza and Ukraine, there is concern about how the related trauma might be transmitted to future generations of people in those regions.

More generally, interest in the idea of transgenerational trauma has recently surged. For example, earlier this year, National Geographic magazine asked whether genes carry past family trauma.

But while this might be a catchy question, it’s also slightly misleading. Because while trauma can ripple across generations, shaped by how our bodies respond to their environments, its effects aren’t hard-coded in our genes.

Plastic minds and bodies

At the heart of this process is what’s known as phenotypic plasticity.

This is the capacity for organisms to produce different outcomes from the same genes, depending on their environment. These outcomes, called phenotypes, can include stress sensitivity and body shape.

One way different phenotypes can arise from the same genes is via epigenetics: small chemical changes to the DNA molecule that make particular genes more or less active. Think of these like a director’s notes on a script. These notes guide the cell on which lines to emphasise or soften, without changing the script itself.

But epigenetics is just one way this plasticity is expressed.

Understanding how trauma is passed across generations means looking beyond genes and cells to the environments that shape and influence them.

Human development is sculpted by lived experience, from caregiving and community to stress, safety and belonging.

These factors interact to produce lasting – but not always fixed – effects. By focusing on how they interact, rather than on single causes, we can better understand why trauma echoes across generations. This also helps us identify how that cycle might be disrupted.

Widespread in nature

Phenotypic plasticity is widespread in nature.

In honeybees, genetically identical larvae become queens or workers depending on what they eat while developing. In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape, making them harder for predators to grasp.

These aren’t genetic differences – they’re environmental effects on development.

In humans, early-life conditions similarly shape development. A child raised in an unsafe setting may develop heightened vigilance or stress sensitivity – traits that help in danger but can persist as anxiety or chronic stress in times of safety. This is known as environmental mismatch.

Across generations, plasticity becomes more complicated. In some of my past research, I studied how diet in one generation of fruit flies shaped health, reproduction and longevity in their offspring and grand offspring.

The results varied depending on diet, generation and trait. Traits that appeared to be useful in one generation weren’t always so in the next. This highlights how difficult transgenerational effects are to predict – precisely because of this plasticity.

In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape.
drakiragavon/iNaturalist, CC BY-ND

Too narrow an explanation

Epigenetics often reflect environmental exposures – such as stress, trauma, nutrition or caregiving. But they’re not necessarily permanent “scars”. Many are dynamic and can shift with changing environments – especially early in life.

Studies show that epigenetic patterns linked to early childhood adversity vary depending on later environments such as family stability and social support. This suggests the biological imprint of early stress is shaped by what happens next.

It’s tempting to treat epigenetics as the key to explaining inherited trauma – but that’s too narrow. Trauma can influence the next generation through altered hormones, immune function or in utero conditions – all of which shape brain development and stress reactivity.

Genetic variation also plays a major role. It doesn’t encode trauma itself, but it shapes traits such as sensitivity to threat or emotional regulation. These traits aren’t chosen – they arise from a web of biological and social influences beyond our control.

But how they unfold, and whether they’re amplified or softened, depends on the systems that surround us.

Connection to culture

Connection to culture plays an important role too.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, Māori-led initiatives that centre land, language and whakapapa (ancestral lineage) have shown promise in restoring wellbeing after generations of colonisation-related trauma.

For Holocaust survivors and descendants, connection to cultural identity through ritual and shared narrative can reduce the psychological burden of transmitted trauma.

But not all trauma is collective or institutional. Interventions such as trauma-informed parenting and early relational therapies have been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.

These psychological supports affect biology. Feeling safe in our relationships, having stable routines and a sense of meaning can reduce stress hormones, modulate immune function, and buffer against long-term disease risk.

In this way, culture, caregiving and connection are all biological interventions. When they soften the effects of earlier stress, they may help interrupt its transmission.

Trauma-informed parenting has been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.
fizkes/Shutterstock

Reframing inherited vulnerability

This matters, because it changes how we understand inherited vulnerability.

Rather than a permanent wound passed down through DNA, the effects of trauma are better understood as changeable responses shaped by context.

Thanks to plasticity, our biology is always in conversation with the environment – and when we change the context, we can change the outcome.

Tara-Lyn Camilleri receives funding from from Australian Graduate Women, a not-for-profit organisation that advocates for education and supports women in postgraduate education with scholarships. Her research has also been supported by Australian Research Council grants and Royal Society funding. She is a volunteer committee member for Graduate Women Victoria.

– ref. Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story – https://theconversation.com/trauma-is-carried-in-your-dna-but-science-reveals-a-more-complicated-story-259057

MIL OSI –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Submissions: Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story

Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Tara-Lyn Camilleri, Postdoctoral researcher of transgenerational effects, Monash University

Radu Bercan/Shutterstock

As war continues to rage in Gaza and Ukraine, there is concern about how the related trauma might be transmitted to future generations of people in those regions.

More generally, interest in the idea of transgenerational trauma has recently surged. For example, earlier this year, National Geographic magazine asked whether genes carry past family trauma.

But while this might be a catchy question, it’s also slightly misleading. Because while trauma can ripple across generations, shaped by how our bodies respond to their environments, its effects aren’t hard-coded in our genes.

Plastic minds and bodies

At the heart of this process is what’s known as phenotypic plasticity.

This is the capacity for organisms to produce different outcomes from the same genes, depending on their environment. These outcomes, called phenotypes, can include stress sensitivity and body shape.

One way different phenotypes can arise from the same genes is via epigenetics: small chemical changes to the DNA molecule that make particular genes more or less active. Think of these like a director’s notes on a script. These notes guide the cell on which lines to emphasise or soften, without changing the script itself.

But epigenetics is just one way this plasticity is expressed.

Understanding how trauma is passed across generations means looking beyond genes and cells to the environments that shape and influence them.

Human development is sculpted by lived experience, from caregiving and community to stress, safety and belonging.

These factors interact to produce lasting – but not always fixed – effects. By focusing on how they interact, rather than on single causes, we can better understand why trauma echoes across generations. This also helps us identify how that cycle might be disrupted.

Widespread in nature

Phenotypic plasticity is widespread in nature.

In honeybees, genetically identical larvae become queens or workers depending on what they eat while developing. In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape, making them harder for predators to grasp.

These aren’t genetic differences – they’re environmental effects on development.

In humans, early-life conditions similarly shape development. A child raised in an unsafe setting may develop heightened vigilance or stress sensitivity – traits that help in danger but can persist as anxiety or chronic stress in times of safety. This is known as environmental mismatch.

Across generations, plasticity becomes more complicated. In some of my past research, I studied how diet in one generation of fruit flies shaped health, reproduction and longevity in their offspring and grand offspring.

The results varied depending on diet, generation and trait. Traits that appeared to be useful in one generation weren’t always so in the next. This highlights how difficult transgenerational effects are to predict – precisely because of this plasticity.

In three-spined stickleback fish, early exposure to predators reshapes their stress physiology and body shape.
drakiragavon/iNaturalist, CC BY-ND

Too narrow an explanation

Epigenetics often reflect environmental exposures – such as stress, trauma, nutrition or caregiving. But they’re not necessarily permanent “scars”. Many are dynamic and can shift with changing environments – especially early in life.

Studies show that epigenetic patterns linked to early childhood adversity vary depending on later environments such as family stability and social support. This suggests the biological imprint of early stress is shaped by what happens next.

It’s tempting to treat epigenetics as the key to explaining inherited trauma – but that’s too narrow. Trauma can influence the next generation through altered hormones, immune function or in utero conditions – all of which shape brain development and stress reactivity.

Genetic variation also plays a major role. It doesn’t encode trauma itself, but it shapes traits such as sensitivity to threat or emotional regulation. These traits aren’t chosen – they arise from a web of biological and social influences beyond our control.

But how they unfold, and whether they’re amplified or softened, depends on the systems that surround us.

Connection to culture

Connection to culture plays an important role too.

In Aotearoa New Zealand, Māori-led initiatives that centre land, language and whakapapa (ancestral lineage) have shown promise in restoring wellbeing after generations of colonisation-related trauma.

For Holocaust survivors and descendants, connection to cultural identity through ritual and shared narrative can reduce the psychological burden of transmitted trauma.

But not all trauma is collective or institutional. Interventions such as trauma-informed parenting and early relational therapies have been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.

These psychological supports affect biology. Feeling safe in our relationships, having stable routines and a sense of meaning can reduce stress hormones, modulate immune function, and buffer against long-term disease risk.

In this way, culture, caregiving and connection are all biological interventions. When they soften the effects of earlier stress, they may help interrupt its transmission.

Trauma-informed parenting has been shown to improve outcomes in the next generation.
fizkes/Shutterstock

Reframing inherited vulnerability

This matters, because it changes how we understand inherited vulnerability.

Rather than a permanent wound passed down through DNA, the effects of trauma are better understood as changeable responses shaped by context.

Thanks to plasticity, our biology is always in conversation with the environment – and when we change the context, we can change the outcome.

Tara-Lyn Camilleri receives funding from from Australian Graduate Women, a not-for-profit organisation that advocates for education and supports women in postgraduate education with scholarships. Her research has also been supported by Australian Research Council grants and Royal Society funding. She is a volunteer committee member for Graduate Women Victoria.

– ref. Trauma is carried in your DNA. But science reveals a more complicated story – https://theconversation.com/trauma-is-carried-in-your-dna-but-science-reveals-a-more-complicated-story-259057

MIL OSI –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Update 299 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been informed of a drone attack that damaged several vehicles near the site’s cooling pond last week, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

Visiting near one of the areas of Friday’s purported attack, the IAEA team yesterday observed burnt grass and other charred vegetation, which the plant said was caused by a drone that crashed and caused a fire there.

In the latest such report highlighting constant dangers to nuclear safety during the military conflict, the ZNPP said six drones had been involved in the incident.

According to the plant’s information provided to the IAEA team, a group of personnel who were cleaning a nearby water reservoir at the time spotted the approaching drones and took cover, with no injuries. However, one of the drones hit the front of a truck and other vehicles were also damaged, the ZNPP said. Approximately one hour later, another drone crashed, causing the fire that burnt the vegetation, it added.

The incident occurred outside the site perimeter, around 600 metres from the nearest of the ZNPP’s six reactors.

The IAEA team members were yesterday shown the truck that was reportedly struck, but they could not confirm any damage as they were too far away from the vehicle. They also could not see any drone remains at that distance.

“If this report is confirmed, it would represent a completely unacceptable attack in the proximity of a major nuclear power plant. Whoever is behind such attacks is playing with fire. It must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said.

It comes just a few weeks after the IAEA team at the ZNPP heard repeated rounds of gunfire that appeared to be aimed at drones reportedly attacking the site’s training centre, also located just outside the site perimeter – on the opposite side to Friday’s reported attack. The training centre has been targeted several times this year, according to the ZNPP.

In February, a drone severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl plant in northern Ukraine, built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards.

Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – also regularly report of drones being detected near the respective sites.

“There are too many drones flying too close to Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, potentially threatening nuclear safety. As we saw in February, they can cause major damage at these facilities. Once again, I call for maximum military restraint in the vicinity of nuclear facilities,” Director General Grossi said.

MIL OSI NGO –

July 2, 2025