NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The President of Belarus and the US President’s Special Envoy for Ukraine met in Minsk

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    MINSK, June 22 (Xinhua) — A meeting between Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and U.S. Presidential Special Envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg took place in Minsk on Saturday. The conversation took place at the Palace of Independence with the participation of members of the delegations. The corresponding information was published by the press service of the Belarusian head of state on the same day.

    The agenda of the talks included international issues and the overall situation in the world, regional issues and Belarusian-American relations. “I am very glad, Mr. General, to meet with you. I very much hope that our conversation will be very sincere and open,” A. Lukashenko noted.

    In turn, K. Kellogg thanked the Belarusian side for the hospitality and the meeting. “We live in a very dangerous time, when the crises we face can sharply escalate, grow, if we are not wise and fair,” he said. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 22, 2025
  • India to evacute citizens of Nepal, Sri Lanka from Iran

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The Indian Embassy in Iran has said that it will make efforts to evacuate citizens of Nepal and Sri Lanka. The embassy noted that these efforts will be made at the request of the Governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka.

    “On request of the Governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka, the Indian Embassy’s evacuation efforts in Iran will also cover citizens of Nepal and Sri Lanka,” the Indian Embassy in Iran posted on X.

    The Indian government has launched Operation Sindhu to evacuate Indian nationals from Iran, given the deteriorating situation as a result of the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel.

    Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said on Saturday that, so far, 517 Indian nationals have returned to India from Iran under Operation Sindhu.

    Jaiswal stated that a special flight from Turkmenistan’s Ashgabat carrying Indians from Iran arrived in New Delhi on June 21.

    In a post on X, Jaiswal stated: “Operation Sindhu continues. A special evacuation flight from Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, landed in New Delhi at 0300 hrs on 21st June, bringing Indians from Iran home. With this, so far 517 Indian nationals from Iran have returned home under Operation Sindhu.”

    The conflict between Israel and Iran entered its ninth day on Saturday. The conflict began after Israel, on June 13, launched a massive airstrike on Iranian military and nuclear sites, dubbed “Operation Rising Lion.”

    In response, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched a large-scale drone and missile operation, “Operation True Promise 3,” targeting Israeli fighter jet fuel production facilities and energy supply centres.

    This is not the first time the Indian government has launched an operation to evacuate citizens from another country. In 2023, India launched Operation Kaveri to evacuate its citizens during violent military clashes in Sudan. Operation Ajay was launched in 2023 to evacuate Indian nationals from Israel during the Israel-Hamas conflict. Operation Ganga was launched in 2022 to evacuate Indian nationals when war erupted between Russia and Ukraine. 

    In 2021, the Indian government launched Operation Devi Shakti to evacuate citizens from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. Operation Samudra Setu was launched in 2020 to evacuate Indians via sea during the COVID-19 pandemic. Operation Raahat was conducted in 2015 to evacuate citizens amid the civil conflict in Yemen. In 2011, India launched Operation Safe Homecoming to bring home nationals during the Libyan civil war amid the Arab Spring.

    (ANI)

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sechin called the US the main beneficiary of the militarization of Europe

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Rosneft – Rosneft – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The United States of America is offering its European allies to guarantee increased defense spending, the beneficiary of which is the American military-industrial complex, said Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin at the Energy Panel during the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    “The US is offering its European allies to guarantee increased defense spending, the beneficiary of which is the American military-industrial complex. This country alone accounts for almost half of the world’s arms trade. The US does not advertise that the militarization of NATO “partners” for them is a shift in their own defense spending to their allies, an increase in the tax base and a reduction in the trade deficit,” he noted, delivering a keynote speech on the topic “The Odyssey of the World Economy in Search of the Golden Fleece. The New Face of Global Energy.”

    Describing this situation, Igor Sechin recalled the statement of the Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli: “The power of power lies in its secret.”

    He also recalled that this year NATO countries began to develop an agreement on a significant increase in military spending to 5% of GDP by 2032. In essence, the US is successfully achieving its goals by worsening Europe’s already difficult fiscal situation.

    According to him, steps to build up the Western military-industrial complex lead to the transfer of colossal resources from manufacturing industries. “For example, the production of one F-35 fighter requires 417 kilograms of rare earth metals. It is not surprising that in recent years a real hunt for these resources has unfolded. Ukraine alone has signed three agreements in this regard in four years: with the European Union, Great Britain and the United States,” the head of Rosneft specified.

    “But all these actions, both in Europe and in the US, are unlikely to become a panacea for all ills. There will always be an asymmetrical response,” Igor Sechin summed up.

    Department of Information and Advertising of PJSC NK Rosneft June 21, 2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Fact Sheets – Three Eastern Partnership neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – 20-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    The EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, established in 2009, covers six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It was created to support political, social and economic reform efforts in these countries with the aim of increasing democratisation and good governance, energy security, environmental protection, and economic and social development. All the members except Belarus participate in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.In June 2023 Moldova and Ukraine were granted EU candidate country status, followed by the decision of the European Council on 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with both countries. On 24 and 25 June 2024 the EU held the first Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, but the formal opening of negotiating clusters is still pending as of April 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Anand and United Arab Emirates’ Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs strengthen bilateral relationship

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 20, 2025- Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

    The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, met yesterday with His Highness Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

    The Ministers underscored the strength of the two countries’ bilateral relationship and expressed a shared ambition to continue building a durable partnership for the future. They noted their countries celebrated the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2024.

    The Ministers discussed opportunities to expand already strong economic ties and they committed to deepening their collaboration on trade, investment and innovation.

    The Ministers also exchanged views on key geopolitical challenges, expressing deep concern over the escalating conflict between Israel and Iran and emphasizing the need for de-escalation. They also discussed the ongoing conflict in Gaza, underscoring the importance of increased humanitarian aid, reducing tensions and creating conditions for regional peace, security and prosperity. Minister Anand thanked His Highness Sheikh Abdullah for the UAE’s critical role in mediating the exchange of prisoners of war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

    The Ministers agreed to stay in close contact and Minister Anand expressed her interest in reciprocating His Highness Sheikh Abdullah’s visit.

    Associated links

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Russian attacks on civilians are intensifying: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    Russian attacks on civilians are intensifying: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Ukraine.

    Colleagues, we are convened here again in response to Russia’s continuing and intensifying attacks against Ukraine.

    On 11 June, Russia struck a power station in Kherson, plunging the city into rolling blackouts and disrupting access to clean water.

    On 15 June, Russia reportedly damaged energy facilities in Poltava Oblast.

    And then, on the night of 16-17 June, Russia conducted a devastating assault on the city of Kyiv, the third largest nationwide strike of the war, raining hundreds of drones down on densely populated residential areas.

    The civilian death toll is at least 28, with hundreds injured.

    Attacks and civilian deaths have only continued in the nights following. These attacks are not decreasing and they’re not random. They are a part of a deliberate and intensifying campaign of violence, calculated to deepen the suffering of Ukraine’s people.

    On top of this, Russia continues to peddle false narratives, seeking to justify their full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But there can be no justification for what they have done.

    It has been 101 days since Ukraine agreed to an unconditional ceasefire. And it is now reported that Russian military casualties have reached 1 million. 

    These dreadful milestones keep piling up and yet Russia shows no sign of stopping. While Ukraine has actively engaged in genuine steps towards peace, Russia has engaged in destruction.

    Meanwhile, President Putin poses as a mediator of peace in the Middle East.

    We don’t need more false promises. 

    We need genuine peace.

    So again, we call on Russia to comply with international law, including the UN Charter.

    We call on Russia to agree to an unconditional ceasefire.

    Russia initiated this war; we call on Russia to end it.

    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL OSI NGO –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: IAEA Director General Grossi’s Statement to UNSC on Situation in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    (As prepared for delivery)

    Attacks on nuclear sites in the Islamic Republic of Iran have caused a sharp degradation in nuclear safety and security in Iran. Though they have not so far led to a radiological release affecting the public, there is a danger this could occur.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring closely the situation at Iran’s nuclear sites since Israel began its attacks a week ago. As part of its mission, the IAEA is the global nerve centre for information on nuclear and radiological safety, and we can respond to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

    Based on information available to the IAEA, the following is the current situation at Iran’s nuclear sites. Which I offer as a follow up to my most recent report to this Security Council.

    The Natanz enrichment site contains two facilities. The first is the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. Initial attacks on the 13th of June targeted and destroyed electricity infrastructure at the facility, including an electrical sub-station, the main electric power supply building, and emergency power supply and back-up generators. On the same day, the main cascade hall appears to have been attacked using ground-penetrating munitions.

    The second facility at Natanz is the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. It consists of aboveground and underground cascade halls. On the 13th of June the above-ground part was functionally destroyed and the strikes on the underground cascade halls were seriously damaging.

    The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels, indicating no external radiological impact on the population or the environment.

    However, within the Natanz facility there is both radiological and chemical contamination. It is possible that Uranium isotopes contained in Uranium Hexafluoride, Uranyl Fluoride and Hydrogen Fluoride are dispersed inside the facility. The radiation, primarily consisting of alpha particles, poses a significant danger if inhaled or ingested. This risk can be effectively managed with appropriate protective measures, such as using respiratory devices. The main concern inside the facility is chemical toxicity.

    Fordow is Iran’s main enrichment location for enriching uranium to 60%. The Agency is not aware of any damage at Fordow at this time.

    At the Esfahan nuclear site, four buildings were damaged in last Friday’s attack: the central chemical laboratory, a uranium conversion plant, the Tehran reactor-fuel manufacturing plant, and the enriched uranium metal processing facility, which was under construction.

    No increase of off-site radiation levels was reported. As in Natanz, the main concern is chemical toxicity.  

    The Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor under construction in Arak, was hit on the 19th of June. As the reactor was not operational and did not contain any nuclear material, no radiological consequence is expected. The nearby Heavy Water Production Plant is also assessed to have been hit, and similarly no radiological consequence is expected.

    As stated in the IAEA’s update of the 18th of June, at the Tehran Research Center, one building, where advanced centrifuge rotors were manufactured and tested, was hit. At the Karaj workshop, two buildings, where different centrifuge components were manufactured, were destroyed. There was no radiological impact, internally or externally.

    Let me now refer to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. This is the nuclear site in Iran where the consequences of an attack could be most serious. It is an operating nuclear power plant and as such it hosts thousands of kilograms of nuclear material. Countries of the region have reached out directly to me over the past few hours to express their concerns, and I want to make it absolutely and completely clear: In case of an attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant a direct hit could result in a very high release of radioactivity to the environment.

    Similarly, a hit that disabled the only two lines supplying electrical power to the plant could cause its reactor’s core to melt, which could result in a high release of radioactivity to the environment. In their worst-case, both scenarios would necessitate protective actions, such as evacuations and sheltering of the population or the need to take stable iodine, with the reach extending to distances from a few to several hundred kilometres. Radiation monitoring would need to cover distances of several hundred kilometres and food restrictions may need to be implemented.

    Any action against the Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor could also have severe consequences, potentially for large areas of the city of Tehran and its inhabitants. In such a case, protective actions would need to be taken.

    I will continue to provide public updates about the developments at all these sites and their possible health and environmental consequences.

    The Agency is, as madame Undersecretary kindly reminded, and will remain present in Iran and inspections there will resume, as required by Iran’s safeguards obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as soon as safety and security conditions allow.

    In this context, let me restate that the safety of our inspectors is of utmost importance. The host country has a responsibility in this regard, and we expect every effort to be made to ensure that their security and their communication lines with the IAEA headquarters will be maintained.

    As stated in my most recent report to the Agency’s Board of Governors and based on inspections conducted at the relevant facilities since then, Iran’s uranium stockpiles remain under safeguards in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. You may recall that more than 400kg of this stockpile is uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. It is essential that the Agency resumes inspections as soon as possible to provide credible assurances that none of it has been diverted.

    Importantly, any special measures by Iran to protect its nuclear materials and equipment must be done in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and the Agency.  

    Therefore, it is of paramount importance that the Agency’s inspectors are allowed to verify that all relevant materials, especially those enriched to 60%, are accounted for. Beyond the potential radiological risks, attacks on such materials would make this effort of course more difficult.

    Madame President,

    The IAEA has consistently underlined, as stated in its General Conference resolution, that armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place, and could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked.

    I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation threatens lives and delays indispensable work towards a diplomatic solution for the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon.

    Madame President,

    The presence, support, analysis and inspections of technical experts are crucial to mitigating risks to nuclear safety and security – that is true during peacetime and even more so during military conflict.

    For the second time in three years, we are witnessing a dramatic conflict between two UN and IAEA Member States in which nuclear installations are coming under fire and nuclear safety is being compromised. The IAEA, just as has been the case with the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, will not stand idle during this conflict.

    As I stated in this chamber just a few days ago, I am ready to travel immediately and to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including by deploying Agency nuclear safety and security experts, in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran, wherever necessary.

    For the IAEA to act, a constructive, professional dialogue is needed. I urge the Members of this Council to support us in making it happen sooner rather than later.

    The IAEA must receive timely and regular technical information about affected nuclear facilities and their respective sites. I urge in this regard the Iranian regulatory authorities to continue a constructive dialogue with the IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre, which has been operating 24/7 since the beginning of this conflict.

    Nuclear facilities and material must not be shrouded by the fog of war.

    Yesterday there was an incorrect statement to the media by an Israeli military official that Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been attacked. Though the mistake was quickly identified and the statement retracted, the situation underscored the vital need for clear and accurate communication, and the Agency’s unique role in providing it in a technically accurate and politically impartial way is obvious.

    Let me conclude by assuring the international community of the IAEA’s continued support at this very grave time.

    A diplomatic solution is within reach if the necessary political will is there. Elements for an agreement have been discussed. The IAEA can guarantee, through a watertight inspections system, that nuclear weapons will not be developed in Iran.  They can form the basis of a long-standing agreement that brings peace and avoids a nuclear crisis in the Middle East. This opportunity should not be missed. The alternative would be a protracted conflict and a looming threat of nuclear proliferation that, while emanating from the Middle East, would effectively erode the NPT and the non-proliferation regime as a whole.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova – P10_TA(2025)0131 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

    –   having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova(1),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

    –  having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

    –  having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A.  whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B.  whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C.  whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D.  whereas the Association Agreement(2), which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1.  Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2.  Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3.  Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4.  Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5.  Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6.  Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7.  Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2,02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1,5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8.  Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9.  Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10.  Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11.  Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12.  Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13.  Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14.  Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; commends the inclusion of roaming liberalisation in the updated EU–Moldova Association Agreement; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15.  Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16.  Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

    17.  Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18.  Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20.  Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21.  Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22.  Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23.  Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24.  Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25.  Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26.  Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27.  Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28.  Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29.  Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

    30.  Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31.  Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32.  Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33.  Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

    34.  Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35.  Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36.  Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, namely the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Althea) and the EU Training Mission in Somalia, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    o
    o   o

    38.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    (1) OJ L, 2025/535, 21.3.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/535/oj.
    (2) Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/492/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine and Russia again exchange prisoners within the framework of the Istanbul agreements

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, June 20 /Xinhua/ – Ukraine and Russia held a prisoner exchange on Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Telegram.

    According to him, during this procedure, Kyiv managed to secure the release of a group of Ukrainian servicemen, most of whom had been in Russian captivity for over two years. These are representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and the State Border Service.

    The head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, in turn, reported that this was the next stage of the exchange of prisoners within the framework of the agreements reached at the beginning of the month in Istanbul.

    On June 2, peace talks between Ukraine and the Russian Federation took place in Istanbul. The parties agreed to exchange prisoners according to the formula “all for all” for two categories of servicemen – seriously ill and those aged 18 to 25.

    The exact number of released persons will be announced after all stages of the exchange are completed. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s message on World Refugee Day [scroll down for French version]

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Download the video: 
    https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/downloads2.unmultimedia.org/public/video/evergreen/MSG+SG+/SG+WORLD+REFUGE+DAY+21+MAY+25/3399099_MSG+SG+WORLD+REFUGE+DAY+21+MAY+25.mp4
     

    Today, we recognize the millions of refugees forced to flee war, persecution, and disaster.

    Every individual carries a story of profound loss – of a family uprooted and a future upended.  

    Many face closed doors and a rising tide of xenophobia.

    From Sudan to Ukraine, from Haiti to Myanmar, a record number of people are on the run for their lives – while support is dwindling. 

    And host communities, often in developing countries, are shouldering the greatest burden.

    This is unfair and unsustainable.

    But even as the world falls short, refugees continue to show extraordinary courage, resilience and determination.

    And when given the chance, they contribute meaningfully – strengthening economies, enriching cultures, and deepening social bonds.

    On this World Refugee Day, solidarity must go beyond words.

    Solidarity must mean boosting humanitarian and development support, expanding protection and durable solutions such as resettlement, and upholding the right to seek asylum – a pillar of international law.

    It must also mean listening to refugees and ensuring they have a voice in shaping their futures.

    And it must mean investing in long-term integration through education, decent work, and equal rights.

    Becoming a refugee is never a choice.

    But how we respond is.

    So let us choose solidarity. Let us choose courage. Let us choose humanity.

    ***

    Aujourd’hui, nos pensées vont aux millions de réfugiés contraints de fuir les guerres, les persécutions et les catastrophes.

    Chaque personne réfugiée porte en elle l’histoire d’une perte insondable, d’une famille déracinée et d’un avenir bouleversé.

    Beaucoup se heurtent à des portes closes et font face à une montée de la xénophobie.

    Du Soudan à l’Ukraine, d’Haïti au Myanmar, un nombre record de personnes fuient pour sauver leur vie, alors même que l’aide s’amenuise.

    Ce sont les communautés d’accueil, souvent dans les pays en développement, qui supportent le plus lourd fardeau.

    Une telle situation est aussi injuste qu’intenable.

    Bien que le monde ne soit pas à la hauteur des circonstances, les réfugiés continuent de faire preuve d’un courage, d’une résilience et d’une détermination extraordinaires.

    Et lorsqu’on leur en donne la possibilité, ils apportent une contribution notable – en renforçant les économies, en enrichissant les cultures et en approfondissant les liens sociaux.

    En cette Journée mondiale des réfugiés, la solidarité doit aller au-delà des mots.

    Elle doit se traduire par un renforcement de l’aide humanitaire et de l’aide au développement, par l’élargissement de la protection et la fourniture de solutions durables telles que la réinstallation, et par le respect du droit de demander l’asile, qui est l’un des piliers du droit international.

    Elle passe également par l’écoute des réfugiés, qui doivent pouvoir s’exprimer sur la façon dont ils conçoivent leur avenir.

    Elle implique d’investir dans une intégration à long terme par l’éducation, le travail décent et l’égalité des droits.

    Devenir un réfugié n’est jamais un choix.

    Mais nous avons le choix de la réponse à apporter.

    Faisons donc le choix de la solidarité. Faisons le choix du courage. Faisons le choix de l’humanité.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 19 June 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

    Source: European Parliament

    Verbatim report of proceedings
     391k  736k
    Thursday, 19 June 2025 – Strasbourg
    1. Resumption of the sitting
      2. Institutional and political implications of the EU enlargement process and global challenges (debate)
      3. The United Kingdom accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (debate)
      4. Resumption of the sitting
      5. Voting time
        5.1. Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (RC-B10-0282/2025, B10-0282/2025, B10-0283/2025, B10-0287/2025, B10-0288/2025, B10-0289/2025, B10-0290/2025, B10-0295/2025) (vote)
        5.2. Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (RC-B10-0284/2025, B10-0280/2025, B10-0284/2025, B10-0285/2025, B10-0286/2025, B10-0296/2025, B10-0299/2025, B10-0300/2025) (vote)
        5.3. Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (RC-B10-0291/2025, B10-0281/2025, B10-0291/2025, B10-0292/2025, B10-0293/2025, B10-0294/2025, B10-0297/2025, B10-0298/2025) (vote)
        5.4. Welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability (A10-0104/2025 – Veronika Vrecionová) (vote)
        5.5. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (A10-0091/2025 – Anna Stürgkh) (vote)
        5.6. Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0277/2025, B10-0278/2025) (vote)
        5.7. The United Kingdom accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (B10-0273/2025) (vote)
      6. Resumption of the sitting
      7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
      8. Protecting bees: advancing the EU’s New Deal for Pollinators (debate)
      9. Oral explanations of vote (Rule 201)
        9.1. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (A10-0091/2025 – Anna Stürgkh)
        9.2. Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0277/2025, B10-0278/2025)
      10. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)
      11. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
      12. Dates of the next part-session
      13. Closure of the sitting
      14. Adjournment of the session

       

    SĒDI VADA: ROBERTS ZĪLE
    Priekšsēdētāja vietnieks

     
    1. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Sēde tika atsākta plkst. 09.00.)

     

    2. Institutional and political implications of the EU enlargement process and global challenges (debate)

     

      Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, the global balance of power is shifting rapidly, challenging our democratic values and institutions. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is a stark reminder of the importance of enlargement. Now, more than ever, a larger and stronger EU is a strategic imperative. It is clearly in the EU’s interests. Both the EU and future Member States should be ready at the time of accession.

    In March last year, the Commission therefore adopted a first communication of the pre‑enlargement policy reviews covering four strands: values, policies, budget and governance. That communication was our contribution to the discussion that led to the adoption by EU leaders of a roadmap for future work on enlargement and reform in June 2024.

    In July last year, President von der Leyen announced that the new college will present the pre‑enlargement policy reviews focusing on individual sectors such as the rule of law, the single market, food security, defence and security, climate and energy, and migration, as well as social, economic and territorial cohesion more broadly.

    As announced in our work programme for 2025, the Commission is currently carrying out in-depth policy reviews in view of future enlargement. Allow me to make a few comments without prejudging the outcome of the reviews, in particular on institutional reform.

    Mr President, honourable Members, I am aware that the question of institutional reform and treaty change has been key to Parliament in particular during the last legislature. In November 2023, this House adopted a resolution with proposals for amendments of the treaties. As President von der Leyen stated in her political guidelines, we need treaty change where it can improve our Union. So in order to prepare the Union for enlargement, we need to examine all options, starting with using the full potential of the current treaties.

    We first need to focus on what can already be done under the current treaties. In that regard, the Commission believes we need to extend the use of qualified majority voting in the Council in some areas, moving away from unanimity. This could in particular mean activating so-called passerelle clauses. The position of the Commission is well known: if the Union wants to play its role quickly, efficiently and therefore strategically, we need we need to decrease the number of decisions where unanimity is needed. But we also need to acknowledge the sensitivities among Member States on this topic. We have to discuss the question of unanimity with the objective of finding a way to address Member States’ legitimate concerns.

    We remain committed to engage in a constructive dialogue with both Parliament and the Council on these important matters. The Commission welcomes the ongoing reflections on these issues in the AFCO Committee, and in particular, the upcoming report on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations.

     
       

     

      Željana Zovko, u ime kluba PPE. – Poštovani predsjedavajući, u posljednja dva desetljeća Europska unija suočila se s nizom kriza: od financijske krize 2008., preko migrantske krize 2015., do pandemije COVID-a te rata u Ukrajini. Unatoč svemu, Europska unija je iz tih izazova izašla izgubivši samo jednu članicu, ali sačuvala je jedinstvo svojih temeljnih vrijednosti.

    Kao posljednja zemlja koja je pristupila Europskoj uniji, Hrvatska itekako dobro zna koliko je vrijedilo prolaziti kroz nužne reforme i ispunjavati kriterije za punopravno članstvo te na kraju, u ključnim trenucima imati zaštitu i sigurnost koju članstvo u Europskoj uniji donosi.

    S jedne strane imamo zemlje Istočnog partnerstva koje zbog svojih demokratskih težnji plaćaju visoku cijenu životima svojih građana zbog autoritativnih režima u susjedstvu. S druge strane, zemlje zapadnog Balkana koje su već prošle kroz ratna razaranja, a danas su žrtve birokratske inertnosti Europske unije i neriješenih povijesnih nesuglasica koje usporavaju njihovu integraciju i potkopavaju njihovu institucionalnu obnovu.

    Poštovane kolege, naš najveći izazov danas je nedostatak vizije. Vizije koja će Uniju vratiti njezinim izvorištima – ideji mira i sigurnosti, ne samo unutar Europske unije već i na njezinim granicama. Ako zemlje kandidatkinje ostavimo u rukama onih koji žele razgraditi Europu izvana i iznutra, mir i sigurnost više neće imati tko braniti. Naš ego mora odstupiti pred zajedničkom odgovornošću u odnosima stare i nove Europe.

    Često se postavlja pitanje je li moguće proširenje bez produbljenja. Ta dilema je apsurdna. Nijedan čovjek nije otok, kako je rekao engleski pjesnik John Donne. Tako ni jedna zemlja ne može sama. Od samih početaka europskog kontinenta stvarale su se unije s ciljem zaštite građana. Najuspješniji projekt u toj povijesti upravo je Europska unija, koja je kroz proces proširenja postala najpoželjnije mjesto za življenje. Kao što se naš mir brani na ukrajinskoj granici, tako se i naša sigurnost čuva na granicama zapadnog Balkana.

    Ovo nije mjesto na kojem odlučujemo tko je više, a tko manje privilegiran da bude Europljanin. Ovo je mjesto na kojem odlučujemo što mi možemo učiniti za Europsku uniju kako bi ostala kao projekt mira, solidarnosti i pomirenja.

     
       

     

      Kathleen Van Brempt, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, EU enlargement – when it’s done right – is a game changer. It brings peace, prosperity, strength across Europe. And today, with Russia tightening its grip in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries, the stakes are even higher.

    The momentum is real and we cannot afford to make the same mistakes we made in the past. So no shortcuts on our values. The rule of law, independent courts, freedom of speech, freedom of media, fundamental rights, democracy: they are non-negotiable. Even now – especially now – if a candidate country slides back on these values, we must act.

    When Serbia’s President shows up at Putin’s parade, while silencing democracy back home, the EU must respond. No more appeasement! Our credibility is on the line, and so is Serbia’s future.

    And at the same time – as you mentioned, Commissioner – we need to reform ourselves. We can’t demand from others when we ignore it ourselves. We need stronger tools to address democratic backsliding in the EU itself.

    And let’s be honest: enlargement means readiness on our side, too. As candidate countries prepare, so must we, by reforming our institutions in parallel, updating the EU budget, making it fit for a bigger Union and, yes, moving beyond unanimity, as you mentioned.

    Dear Commissioner, people also need to see the benefits of enlargement – both in the EU and in the candidate and future Member States. So let’s act: speed up access to the single market, give candidate countries observer seats in the EU institutions and let them be part of the project as they work towards full membership.

    And I would like you to convey the message to the Commissioner for Enlargement that she has the backing of the S&D Group to do all that in the coming months and years.

     
       

     

      Kinga Gál, a PfE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A Patrióták nem támogatják a bővítéspolitika geopolitikai érdekek szerinti gyorsítását. Ez hitelteleníti az Uniót a térség azon országainak szemében, mint a Nyugat-Balkán országai, amelyek évek óta kitartóan dolgoznak a tagság feltételeinek teljesítésén.

    Nem ez az első eset, hogy az Unió politikai iránytűje rossz irányba fordul, figyelmen kívül hagyva az európai polgárok valós érdekeit. Például szükséges lenne, hogy a Bizottság haladéktalanul készítsen egy átfogó hatástanulmányt Ukrajna esetleges csatlakozásának várható következményeiről. Ukrajna semmilyen csatlakozási kritériumnak nem felel meg. Egy háború sújtotta országról beszélünk, így a gyorsított csatlakozásával a háborút is importálnánk. Elégtelen például a nemzeti kisebbségi jogok helyzete. Az ukrán munkaerő beáramlása veszélyezteti a munkahelyeket, az agrártermékek tömeges beáradása és az agrártámogatások elvesztése pedig a gazdák megélhetését. Aránytalanul nagymértékben vonnának el kohéziós forrásokat más tagállamoktól.

    Az emberek feje felett nem születhetnek meg elhamarkodott döntések. Ezért kezdeményeztünk Magyarországon, Európában egyedülálló módon véleménynyilvánító népszavazást erről. Nem engedjük, hogy a kierőltetett ukrán uniós tagság árát a magyar emberek fizessék meg, mint ahogy azt sem engedhetjük meg, hogy újabb lopakodó hatáskörelvonással csorbuljon a szuverenitásunk. A bővítéspolitikában csak egyhangúsággal lehet döntéseket hozni, nem pedig a tagállamokat megkerülve, politikai alapon. Ez a tagállamok és az egész Unió alapvető érdeke.

     
       

     

      Alberico Gambino, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signora Commissaria, l’allargamento dell’Unione europea è una delle grandi sfide geopolitiche e politiche del nostro tempo. Non riguarda solo i paesi candidati. Riguarda il futuro dell’Europa stessa e la sua capacità di essere protagonista nello scenario globale, di difendere i suoi interessi e garantire stabilità.

    L’Italia ha sempre sostenuto con convinzione il cammino europeo dei Balcani occidentali e degli altri paesi candidati. Ma è giusto che questo percorso sia serio, graduale, basato su impegni concreti e su un’autentica volontà di avvicinamento ai valori e agli standard europei. Perché chi chiede di entrare nell’Unione deve dimostrare di voler essere parte integrante di una comunità politica, non solo economica.

    In questo processo strumenti come Twinning, TAIEX e il Fondo INCE, che l’Italia finanzia interamente, hanno un ruolo fondamentale. Progetti reali che aiutano questi paesi a costruire amministrazioni solide, capaci ed efficienti.

    Ma l’allargamento è anche una questione strategica, vista la situazione geopolitica che viviamo, piena di instabilità e di minacce ibride. Rafforzare i legami con i paesi del vicinato è anche un modo per rendere più sicura e resiliente l’Unione europea.

    L’Italia continuerà a contribuire con determinazione a questo percorso comune. In questo scenario è l’intera Europa che deve riaffermare il proprio ruolo da protagonista, promuovendo un allargamento che sia realmente utile, credibile e sostenibile.

     
       

     

      Sandro Gozi, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, chaque jour on fait le constat d’une Union pas assez efficace, pas assez puissante et pas assez démocratique. Ceci est d’autant plus vrai face aux défis de l’unification continentale et du nouveau désordre mondial. Comment pouvons-nous convaincre nos citoyens et nous-mêmes que tout d’un coup, l’Europe peut survivre à ces nouveaux défis sans résoudre les anciens problèmes?

    Nous avons besoin d’une Union plus efficace, avec moins de veto et plus de vote à la majorité, d’une Union plus puissante, avec plus de ressources pour une véritable Europe de la défense et des investissements. D’une Union plus démocratique avec une nouvelle loi électorale. Si les réformes sont nécessaires à 27, elles le deviennent encore plus dans une Union à 30, 32 ou davantage de pays. Il n’y a jamais eu un élargissement dans l’histoire de l’Union européenne qui n’a pas été précédé par des réformes institutionnelles et des réformes des traités.

    Donc, je dis à la Commission: plus de courage, plus de courage. Soyez explicites, vous savez bien que la réforme des traités est nécessaire. Assumez vos responsabilités et, ensemble, réformons l’Union pour unifier l’Europe.

     
       

     

      Daniel Freund, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Zwischen Trumps America First und Putins Angriffen auf Zivilisten in der Ukraine – es zeigt doch: Wir brauchen ein stärkeres Europa. Bei allen großen Fragen unserer Zeit, ob nun beim Kampf gegen den Klimawandel, dafür zu sorgen, dass auch die größten Konzerne ihren fairen Anteil an Steuern zahlen, und leider ja auch wieder bei der Frage, für die die Europäische Union mal gegründet wurde – die Frage von Stabilität, von Frieden, von Freiheit, von Demokratie auf diesem Kontinent –, bei all diesen Fragen können wir wenig bis gar nichts machen ohne eine starke Europäische Union. Kleinstaaterei ist ein Sicherheitsrisiko. Nur gemeinsam sind wir stark. Wir können auch den Verteidigungshaushalt von Estland oder Litauen verdoppeln, wir können ihn verdreifachen – es wird Putin nicht abschrecken.

    Was Putin abschrecken wird, ist, wenn wir in Europa stärker zusammenarbeiten – auch in Verteidigungsfragen. Und vor allen Dingen, wenn wir ein paar grundsätzliche Konstruktionsfehler der Europäischen Union endlich angehen. Die Einstimmigkeit abzuschaffen, die ist doch das größte Geschenk an Putin: Er muss nur einen einzigen von 27 Staats- und Regierungschefs bestechen, erpressen, irgendwie auf seine Seite ziehen.

    Wir müssen endlich bei der Demokratie Fortschritte machen. Denn wenn die Demokratie von außen und von innen angegriffen wird, dann müssen wir doch in der Europäischen Union damit reagieren, dass wir die EU demokratischer machen, dass wir endlich ein Initiativrecht bekommen für dieses Europäische Parlament, dass wir endlich wirkliche Europawahlen bekommen, dass wir endlich sehen können, was die Regierungen im Rat eigentlich genau machen, wo stimmen sie zu, wo lehnen sie ab. Und für all diese Fragen braucht es am Ende Vertragsänderungen, und das wollen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger; die Zustimmungswerte für die Europäische Union sind so hoch, wie wir sie noch nie gesehen haben in der Geschichte der Europäischen Union. Lassen Sie uns diesen Moment nutzen!

    Das Europäische Parlament hat ja bereits Vorschläge gemacht. Wir wollen die Verträge ändern. Und wenn wir es am Ende ernst meinen mit unserem Versprechen an die Ukraine, an den Balkan, an die Länder, die in die Europäische Union wollen, wenn wir dieses Versprechen ernst meinen, dann müssen wir die Verträge ändern. Und es ist der Rat, der blockiert, der heute nicht mal hier zu dieser Debatte auftaucht, Sonntagsreden hält, am Ende aber nicht das liefert, was die Bürgerinnen und Bürger wollen. Das müssen wir angehen.

     
       

     

      Anthony Smith, au nom du groupe The Left. – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, Madame la Commissaire, l’élargissement ne sera un succès que s’il est au service des peuples et de l’amélioration des conditions de vie, et non uniquement vu comme un outil géopolitique au service de votre logique bloc contre bloc, logique guerrière qui est à des années-lumière des aspirations des peuples d’Europe. La clé du succès de l’élargissement sera d’abord conditionnée par une Europe plus démocratique, avec des institutions au service des citoyens et non un marché au service des industriels.

    Mais, disons le d’emblée, votre Union européenne peut aujourd’hui se résumer à un ensemble de moyens permettant une concurrence libre et non faussée au service d’une vision impérialiste. Notre Europe, celle que nous défendons, porte un projet de paix, de partage des richesses, de démocratie, d’accueil et d’humanité. À l’heure où les extrêmes droites arbitrent les décisions de notre institution, nous ne pouvons que constater les régressions de toutes parts, acclamées par les conservateurs et par les libéraux.

    Voilà l’Europe que vous proposez aux peuples de notre continent, celle de la catastrophe climatique et de la pauvreté généralisée, celle de la corruption et des discriminations, bref, une union à l’image d’Orbán et de Nawrocki. L’accueil de nouveaux États doit se faire autour d’un socle commun ambitieux de droits sociaux dans lequel la démocratie sociale, et notamment la négociation collective, doivent jouer tout leur rôle. Sinon, c’est l’exploitation des travailleurs, la course au moins‑disant social et environnemental qui s’imposera.

    Cela exige que les aides de préadhésion servent aussi à construire cette Europe du commun, avec des institutions fortes, transparentes, intègres, des inspections efficaces, des systèmes judiciaires indépendants. L’élargissement doit être un levier de construction d’un continent plus juste, où les droits sociaux et les contre-pouvoirs démocratiques soient la règle, qui rejette la concurrence généralisée, le dumping social, la corruption. En un mot, pas d’élargissement sans projet social ambitieux.

     
       

     

      Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik, w imieniu grupy ESN. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo! Ostatnie rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej miało miejsce w 2013 r., gdy do Wspólnoty dołączyła Chorwacja. W kolejce do wejścia w tym momencie czeka 10 państw. Tylko pytanie: do czego jest ta kolejka? Od 2015 r. Unia Europejska pogrąża się w coraz większym kryzysie. To wtedy najeźdźcy napływali masowo do Europy, niszcząc bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Grecji i Włoch w nieodwracalny sposób. To była pierwsza fala uderzeniowa multikulti. Fala, której skutki odczuwamy do dziś.

    Od tego momentu Unia Europejska ma twarz Junckera, który pijany wychodził na międzynarodowe konferencje. Ma twarz Timmermansa, który zaciekle atakował Polskę i Węgry i bardzo agresywnie forsował szkodliwą, niebezpieczną, zieloną politykę. Unia Europejska ma twarz korupcji, autorytarnego zamordyzmu, moralnego zepsucia, lobbingu zagranicznego, niebezpieczeństwa, głupoty i nakrętek przymocowanych do plastikowych butelek. Unia Europejska ma twarz Ursuli von der Leyen, która nie nadąża za światowymi zmianami i pcha Europę ku samozagładzie.

    To nie jest ta sama Unia Europejska, do której Polska wchodziła w 2004 r. Wchodziliśmy na konkretnych zasadach, które dziś leżą w koszu, zastąpione autorytaryzmem i lewacką agendą. Dziś Unia Europejska przestaje być dobrym miejscem do życia. I pytanie: czy do takiej struktury rzeczywiście jakieś państwo chce wejść i powinno wejść? Najpierw trzeba Unię Europejską naprawić.

    Musimy wrócić do naszego DNA, do wspólnoty suwerennych państw narodowych. Cywilizacja życia musi wygrać z cywilizacją śmierci. Musimy ochronić nasze rodziny, nasze bezpieczeństwo i nasze granice. W przeciwnym razie po prostu nie będzie do czego wchodzić. I tyle.

     
       

     

      Rasa Juknevičienė (PPE). – Mr President, I’ll start with a Ursula von der Leyen quote: ‘EU enlargement is an investment in our collective security’. I completely agree. A bit late, but very true words.

    One of the reasons why Putin started this war is the grey areas of insecurity in Europe. If we had had such an understanding and decisions, at least immediately after the annexation of Crimea, there is a high probability that Ukraine would not be attacked today.

    Not too late. We have that chance. It is necessary to seek consensus in our societies that enlargement is as important for the future of the EU as defence. In essence, enlargement is an integral part of our defence union. The unification of the European continent on the basis of democracies is in our own interests. Either a larger, secure, strong EU or Russia and China closer to our borders.

    Such an understanding requires leaders in each Member State. That’s why I end my speech with a James Freeman Clark quote: ‘A politician thinks of the next election, a statesman of the next generation’. At least, let’s think about both, about the elections and about the next generations.

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       

     

      Juan Fernando López Aguilar (S&D). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, hace escasas fechas, el 12 de junio, se cumplieron cuarenta años de la adhesión de España y Portugal a las entonces Comunidades Europeas.

    Esto muestra con claridad el éxito de la política de ampliación, ¿verdad? Porque supuso no solamente un impulso a reformas políticas y a la modernización económica, sino también, y sobre todo, a la estabilización de las democracias en los dos países ibéricos, que contribuyeron desde su adhesión a mejorar la construcción europea.

    De modo que la política de cohesión debe muchísimo a España y Portugal. El refuerzo de la política agrícola y también la ciudadanía y el programa Erasmus tienen, por tanto, una deuda clara con esta adhesión.

    Pero, cuarenta años después, la Unión Europea creció. ¡Vaya si creció! Llegamos a ser veintiocho, y ahora somos veintisiete. Pero hay, al menos en estos momentos, candidatos en la lista de espera hasta sumar treinta y cinco.

    Y lo primero que hace falta es un ejercicio de realismo, no engañarse con placebos. Es una hipocresía que Turquía continúe formalmente en la lista de espera como país candidato, cuando es evidente que hace tiempo que abandonó toda expectativa y se ha cualificado como un actor regional por sí mismo.

    Pero hay otros países candidatos a los que hay que exigir, por supuesto, la adhesión a los valores europeos: artículo 2 del Tratado; esa idea europea de democracia que incluye pluralismo, que incluye pluralismo informativo, que incluye independencia judicial y estrategias contra la corrupción.

    Y, por eso, la adhesión tiene que ser muy exigente. Pero, para empezar, tiene que ser exigente para la propia Unión Europea. Y esto exige, si queremos ser treinta y cinco, cambiar los métodos de decisión. Porque, si el contraste entre nuestros objetivos y ambiciones proclamados y nuestro método de decisión disfuncional e impracticable es insoportable a veintisiete, ¿cómo será a treinta y cinco?

    Lo pone de manifiesto Hungría: cuando hace falta unanimidad, Hungría es el missing link, el eslabón fallido de la cadena, y obliga a todos los demás a formar una coalition of the willing para hacer lo que Hungría veta.

    Por tanto, es imprescindible un ejercicio de seriedad para que esa reforma institucional sea previa a toda ampliación de la construcción europea. Esa es la exigencia.

     
       

     

      António Tânger Corrêa (PfE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, caros colegas, o alargamento é estrategicamente essencial para a União Europeia.

    Nós falamos por nós próprios e por aquilo que Portugal ganhou em aderir à União Europeia, e queremos que os outros países candidatos também ganhem quando aderirem à União Europeia. Mas essa adesão tem de ser feita no estrito cumprimento dos critérios de Copenhaga e nos timings exatamente iguais uns aos outros. Não deve haver primeiras e segundas velocidades, não deve haver filhos e enteados nessa adesão, por um lado.

    Por outro lado, é preciso que nós arrumemos a casa –– a nossa casa europeia –– porque a nossa casa europeia, como qualquer outra casa, precisa de manutenção, e essa manutenção não tem sido feita. Essa manutenção é absolutamente necessária, antes de qualquer alargamento.

    Temos de rever os Tratados, temos de rever a nossa própria União e os princípios e valores pelos quais nos regemos, pois muitos anos se passaram desde o início deste grande projeto que é a União Europeia, e o mundo mudou. O mundo global mudou.

    Estrategicamente, temos outros desafios que não tínhamos nessa altura, e é preciso enfrentar esses desafios de uma forma mais moderna, mais proativa e, principalmente, de uma forma mais eficaz e ativa para nós próprios europeus.

    Portanto, queria deixar aqui esta mensagem e dizer sim ao alargamento, mas a um alargamento à medida do século XXI e não a um alargamento à medida do século XX.

     
       

     

      Ивайло Вълчев (ECR). – Г-н Зиле, г-жо Захариева, ще започна с един цитат от г-жа Марта Кос. Тя наскоро заяви, че Македония е цитирам „тъжна приказка“. Тя забрави обаче да спомене, че на Балканите ние имаме една поговорка: „Каквото си направиш сам и Господ не може да ти го направи“.

    Ситуацията, в която се намира Скопие в момента, е резултат единствено и само на техните собствени действия или по-право – бездействия. Днес Скопие можеше да бъде рамо до рамо с Тирана и Подгорица, можеха да бъдат здраво стъпили на своя европейски път. Не го направиха, защото в крайна сметка не искат. Няма отстъпки, които биха довели до това те да изпълнят своите вече поети ангажименти. Ето защо аз бих помолил госпожа Кос следващия път да попита правителството в Скопие директно: „Искате ли да бъдете част от Европейския съюз или не?“ Защото отговорът е прост: ако искате, просто изпълнете своите ангажименти. България вече направи компромиси и няма да отстъпи и на йота от тях, защото няма причина да вярва, че официално Скопие ще промени политиката си и говора си на омраза спрямо българите и България.

    Последните събития – присъдата срещу Любчо Георгиевски и тежкото състояние на македонските българи, са най добрата илюстрация за това защо искахме допълнителните условия от Скопие в преговорната рамка.

     
       

     

      Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, Madam Commissioner, in times of rising authoritarianism, in times where we see brutal warfare in our immediate neighbourhood on European soil, if we European states want to defend our way of life, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, we have to stand together and we have to speak with a united voice. And yes, for this, we need to rethink whether majority voting in terms of foreign policy should not be the next step for reforms.

    But we also have to see that most of these countries that are seeking accession are making great progress. And we have two candidate states that have a realistic chance to join this European Union until 2028: clearly Montenegro and maybe – if they keep the ambition – Albania. I want to say these are two countries that have been reliable partners, that have been sharing our CFSP, so foreign policy, standpoints. They have shown their commitment to the European Union and they have a realistic chance to come as 28th and 29th members into the European Union.

    Yes, we need reforms of the Treaty, but we also need a signal to the region that enlargement is possible based on merits, based on the rule of law, but that we’re acting in terms of enlargement and we’re not kicking the can down the road when it comes to reforms. So, let’s keep the door open for Montenegro and Albania. The region needs this signal.

     
       

     

      Li Andersson (The Left). – Arvoisa puhemies, oikeistolaiset voimat tekevät tällä hetkellä parhaansa muuttaakseen EU:n sellaiseksi, mitä se huonoimmillaan voi olla: vain markkinoiden ja suuryritysten unioniksi. Mutta Itä-Euroopassa ja Balkanilla monet katsovat meitä kuitenkin toisesta syystä. He hakevat turvallisuutta poliittisesta yhteistyöstä. He haluavat vahvaa suojaa oikeusvaltioperiaatteelle, ihmisoikeuksille ja riittäville ympäristövaatimuksille.

    Putinin autoritaarisuuden voimistuessa ihmiset ovat valmiita lähtemään kaduille puolustamaan oikeuttaan valita, vapauttaan ja eurooppalaisia arvoja, ja siksi laajentuminen on nyt niin tärkeä kysymys.

    Kysymys on myös Ukrainasta. Jos ja kun ukrainalaiset haluavat liittyä EU:hun, meidän on oltava valmiina toivottamaan heidät tervetulleeksi. Samalla meidän tulee varmistaa, että jäsenyyskriteerit täyttyvät. Me tarvitsemme avointa keskustelua laajentumisen tuomista muutoksista unionin päätöksentekoon ja budjettiin.

    Mutta aiempien laajentumisprosessien virheistä pitää myös oppia. Tarvitsemme parempia välineitä ja yhteisiä digitaalisia järjestelmiä rajatylittävän työvoiman hyväksikäytön torjumiseksi. Kun otetaan huomioon, kuinka kauan sisämarkkinoilla on ollut vapaata liikkuvuutta, on käsittämätöntä, ettemme ole edistyneet tämän pidemmälle tämän ongelman ratkaisussa.

     
       

     

      Thomas Geisel (NI). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Die Erweiterungsdiskussion schadet der Europäischen Union vor allem deshalb, weil sie unehrlich ist. Sie ist unehrlich, weil sie politisch motiviert ist. Über eine EU‑Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine beispielsweise würden wir ohne den russischen Angriffskrieg gar nicht diskutieren, denn sie würde das Ende der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik bedeuten – das will niemand, und deswegen wird es dazu auch nicht kommen.

    Die Diskussion ist auch unehrlich, weil wir sie uns nicht leisten können. Kein Mitgliedstaat wird bereit sein, seinen Beitrag zum EU‑Haushalt zu erhöhen oder auf Leistungen der Union zu verzichten. Wie auch, wenn 5 % der nationalen Etats für Verteidigungsausgaben ausgegeben werden sollen!

    Und sie ist drittens unehrlich, weil sie in Wahrheit keiner will, nicht einmal die Menschen in den Beitrittskandidatenländern. Schauen Sie sich doch nur die letzten Wahlergebnisse in Georgien und Moldawien an!

    Die Wachstumsschmerzen der Europäischen Union sind schon heute unverkennbar. Noch mehr Mitgliedsländer sind keine geeignete Therapie – im Gegenteil, dadurch werden sie weiter verschlimmert.

     
       

     

      Lukas Mandl (PPE). – Mr President, Commissioner, colleagues, we need a Europe with more strength to the outside and more freedom to the inside. And at the moment, we are experiencing an era when the European Commission contributes a lot to a Europe with more freedom to the inside: deregulation, simplification, competitiveness – that’s what we were thriving for for a long time and what’s happening now.

    But we also need a Europe with more strength to the outside for the sake of European values, for the sake of the interests of the Europeans of this generation and of generations to come, and that means fostering the enlargement process.

    We have to be aware of the fact that the so-called ‘methodologies’ of accession to the European Union just haven’t worked. They haven’t worked for many years. I remember at the beginning of the last mandate, here, we were more or less obliged to define a new methodology for the enlargement process. Did it help? No, not at all.

    While many European countries, nearly all of them, want to be part of the integrated Europe, of the European Union, the best shape our continent ever had in history, while this is the case on one side, on the other side, we are reluctant and stuck in bureaucracy, in so-called ‘methodologies’, when it comes to enlargement. We need a more holistic and a more visionary approach here.

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       

     

      Petras Gražulis (ESN), pakėlus mėlynąją kortelę pateiktas klausimas. – Gerbiamas pirmininke, pranešėjau, aš jau gal ketvirtą kartą klausiu ir negaunu atsakymo. Europos Parlamentas ir Europos Komisija labai myli Ukrainą ir nėra dienos, kad nepriimtume kokios nors rezoliucijos dėl meilės Ukrainai. Tačiau prezidentas Zelenskis neprašo rezoliucijų, prašo narystės Europos Sąjungoje. Kas kaltas, kad po šiai dienai nėra priimta Ukraina į Europos Sąjungą – Putinas, Trumpas, Ukraina ar Europos Sąjunga? Ir pasakykit, galų gale, kada nuo žodžių prieisite prie realių darbų?

     
       

     

      Кристиан Вигенин (S&D). – Г-жо Комисар, разширяването е не само исторически ангажимент, но и стратегически приоритет. То е инвестиция в сигурността, стабилността и просперитета на целия континент. Разширяването на Съюза обаче поставя пред нас и редица институционални предизвикателства: по-сложни механизми за взимане на решения, необходимост от адаптиране на бюджета и засилване на демократичната легитимност. В този контекст често се предлага премахването на принципа на единодушие като универсално решение. Но нека бъдем честни, това няма да отстрани най-съществения проблем –липсата на достатъчно доверие между страните членки. Договорите и сега предлагат редица инструменти като засилено сътрудничество, конструктивно въздържане, които можем да използваме. Те дават възможност да се премине към решение с квалифицирано мнозинство по всеки въпрос, стига това да се реши с единодушие.

    Промяната на договорите е сложен и бавен процес без гаранции за крайния резултат. Затова трябва да използваме максимално сегашната правна рамка, иначе има риск да отслабим Европейския съюз и да блокираме процеса на разширяване за неопределено време.

    Като представител на България – една от последните присъединили се държави, искам ясно да подчертая: отговорността, в случая, е двустранна. Кандидатките за членство също трябва да си свършат работата и да предприемат необходимите промени, за да прилагат европейските стандарти във всяка една сфера. Само така процесът ще запази подкрепата на гражданите, което е най-важно, както в страните кандидатки, така и в държавите членки, за да постигнем заедно едно демократично, солидарно и добро бъдеще за всеки един европеец.

     
       

     

      Anders Vistisen (PfE). – Mr President, before we open the door to yet another massive EU enlargement, let’s take a sober look at the facts. We are talking about eight candidate countries with a combined population of more than 90 million people, and at extra cost for the European taxpayers of above EUR 75 billion.

    And all the countries are below EU standards in all key areas. Take corruption: according to Transparency International, these countries rank among the worst in Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina is at 108th place, lower than countries like Algeria or Zambia. Ukraine and Serbia share 104th place, and Albania ranks 98th. By comparison, Denmark is number one!

    In terms of median income, these countries are light years behind: Ukraine has an average monthly salary of only EUR 380, Moldova EUR 330, and even the most developed, Montenegro, has an average below EUR 800.

    Opening the single market to these countries will only lead to massive social dumping and welfare tourism in Europe.

     
       

     

      Cristian Terheş (ECR). – Domnule președinte, stimați colegi, proiectul european a fost vizionar, inițiat de lideri creștini practicanți după Al Doilea Război Mondial. Ei au visat la o comunitate de state suverane unite prin libertatea circulației bunurilor, persoanelor, serviciilor și capitalului, o unire care să aducă prin prosperitatea tuturor, pacea ‑ și au reușit. De la șase state vest-europene fondatoare, această comunitate, începută în 1951, a tot crescut, iar cu fiecare extindere toate statele membre și-au consolidat stabilitatea, solidaritatea și bunăstarea.

    Din păcate, cortina de fier și ocupația sovietică a estului Europei au blocat peste 200 de milioane de europeni în afara acestui spațiu al libertății și prosperității. A fost nevoie să cadă comunismul și să treacă aproape 50 de ani de la înființare, pentru ca fostele state comuniste captive să înceapă să facă parte din această comunitate. Astăzi, integrarea Republicii Moldova, Ucrainei și a Balcanilor de Vest este pasul firesc al unui proiect politico-economic care a demonstrat că unitatea aduce forță și crește prosperitatea tuturor statelor membre.

     
       

     

      Reinier Van Lanschot (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, dear colleagues, what could the EU look like in 2030? A new European Union from Greenland in the Atlantic to Ukraine in the Black Sea, a new Union with more countries. For the countries joining, it means new opportunities, new freedoms and new responsibilities – 35 countries collaborating together. But we know the EU is already dysfunctional.

    There’s only one solution: reform, treaty reform. Let’s create a Europe 2.0 with a European Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, free from the oppressive veto, a Europe that speaks with one voice. This could become a reality by enlarging and reforming the Union – in other words, a new Europe that is bigger and better. Parliament voted for treaty reform already, but the Council refuses to act. They are not even present at this debate, only thinking about the next election, not thinking about the next generation.

     
       

     

      Alexander Sell (ESN). – Herr Präsident! Deutschland ist pleite. Die Rentenversicherung ist pleite, Kranken- und Pflegeversicherung – pleite, Arbeitslosenversicherung – pleite. Wir Deutschen zahlen mit die höchsten Steuern weltweit, 1000 Milliarden Euro im Jahr, und trotzdem fehlt es an allen Ecken und Enden. Brücken und Straßen verfallen, Schulen sind marode, über 7 Millionen Rentner haben weniger als 1000 Euro im Monat, Wohneigentum gibt es kaum. Gleichzeitig zahlen wir auch den höchsten Beitrag zur EU, mit weitem Abstand, fast 30 Milliarden Euro im Jahr, obwohl wir laut Europäischer Zentralbank eines der ärmsten Länder Europas sind.

    Aber statt die deutschen Steuerzahler zu entlasten, wollen Sie uns immer neue Lasten aufbürden. Moldawien, Albanien oder die Ukraine sollen jetzt Mitglied in der Europäischen Union werden, weil sich Frau von der Leyen mehr Gewicht auf der weltpolitischen Bühne erhofft. Das wird nicht funktionieren; wir Deutschen werden uns nicht länger ausplündern lassen. Wir werden Ihrem Größenwahnsinn den Geldhahn abdrehen. Darauf können Sie sich verlassen, denn dafür wird meine Partei gewählt. Sagen Sie bitte Ihrer Kommissionspräsidentin: Wer untergehen soll, der wird vorher hochmütig, und Hochmut kommt vor dem Fall.

     
       

     

      Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus (NI). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, stimați colegi, ieri au fost bătuți preoți la Cernăuți, în Ucraina, preoți ortodocși ai comunității românești. Anul trecut, mitropolitul Longhin Jar a fost bătut și este târât prin procese fictive de ani de zile. Minoritatea românească a fost întotdeauna oropsită în Ucraina. Eu acum nu înțeleg, statele acestea care urmează să adere la Uniunea Europeană nu trebuie să respecte drepturile minorităților? Tot timpul vorbim de minoritățile LGBT, dar nu vorbim de o minoritate atât de importantă, ca cea românească, de peste jumătate de milion de oameni din Ucraina.

    Au inventat încă și o limbă moldovenească. Nu există o limbă moldovenească, după cum nu există o republică moldovenească. Moldova este o regiune din România. Faptul că există o Republică Moldova, asta se întâmplă doar pentru că un bolșevic și cu un nazist au făcut un Pact Ribbentrop-Molotov și un Dictat de la Viena acum 85 de ani și pentru România acest pact nu este încă denunțat. Așa că, să nu fiu prost înțeles, eu sunt de acord ca Moldova să adere și am votat în acest sens la Uniunea Europeană, dar totuși, nu era mai simplu să se unească cu România? Era mult mai simplu, mă gândesc.

     
       

     

      Karlo Ressler (PPE). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, kolegice i kolege, ruski utjecaj, kineske investicije i protueuropski regionalni akteri koji ne dijele naše europske vrijednosti jačaju svoju prisutnost upravo ondje gdje Europa oklijeva. Vjerodostojnost europske politike proširenja gradi se upravo kroz čvršće partnerstvo s državama i akterima koji dijele težnju prema zajedničkoj budućnosti, ali isto tako i čvršćim politikama prema onima koji podrivaju Europu i koji podrivaju europske vrijednosti.

    U tom kontekstu, plan rasta za zapadni Balkan svakako predstavlja priliku za dublju integraciju i konkretne promjene, no bez jasne političke poruke, bez jasne težnje i traženja jasnog opredjeljenja, ostat će tek okvir bez sadržaja.

    Sjeverna Makedonija, država koja unatoč višestrukim preporukama Komisije još uvijek čeka početak pregovora, primjer je političke nepravde koja također potkopava vjeru u europski projekt. U Bosni i Hercegovini iscrpljuju se separatističke poruke, separatističke politike s jedne strane, ali isto tako nerealne unitarističke ambicije s druge. Crna Gora bori se za svoju europsku i prozapadnu orijentaciju.

    Naivno i u ovoj raspravi zvuče iluzije da će preglasavanje unutar Europske unije dovesti do većeg jedinstva. To nije moguće, to je kontraproduktivno ne samo za manje i srednje velike države članice nego isto tako i za cijelu Europu. Zbog toga moramo biti jasni, moramo biti prisutni, ali isto tako moramo zajedno raditi na uvažavanju svih stajališta.

    (Govornik je pristao odgovoriti na pitanje postavljeno podizanjem plave kartice.)

     
       

     

      Petras Gražulis (ESN), pakėlus mėlynąją kortelę pateiktas klausimas. – Gerbiamas Pirmininke. Aš jūsų, kolegos iš EPP partijos, klausiau, kada priimsite Ukrainą į Europos Sąjungą. Jis atsakė, kad reakcingas mano klausimas. O tų rezoliucijų, kaip ir minėjau, Ukrainos prezidentas Zelenskis, kurias mes kasdien priiminėjame, kaip mylime Ukrainą, neprašo. Tai gal jūs galite tada viešai visiems pasakyti, kad jūs nežadate priimti Ukrainos į Europos Sąjungą? Ir kas tai trukdo? Ar tai ne tokia veidmainystė, kada viena kalbam, o visiškai veiksmai yra kitokie? Tik rezoliucijomis mes mylim… (posėdžio pirmininkas iš kalbėtojo atima žodį)

     
       

     

      Karlo Ressler (PPE), odgovor na pitanje postavljeno podizanjem plave kartice. – Ne čini mi se dobronamjernim, zapravo, vaše pitanje. Ono što svakako možemo reći je da i Ukrajina, koja se bori i za svoju opstojnost, ali koja se bori tj. njezin narod i za europske vrijednosti, ima ambiciju ući u Europsku uniju. Kada i kako će se to dogoditi nije jednostavno odgovoriti, neće se u svakom slučaju dogoditi preko noći.

    Međutim, ono što postoji kao ambicija mislim da treba poštivati i s naše strane da moramo napraviti reda i kod politike proširenja. I u tom smislu, državi koja je sada u ratnom stanju trebamo učiniti sve da joj pomognemo, a nadamo se da će jednoga dana naši kolege ovdje dolaziti i iz Ukrajine.

     
       

     

      Tonino Picula (S&D). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, geopolitička situacija u svijetu je dobar argument u korist nastavka politike proširenja. Međutim, to ne znači da treba odstupati od „kopenhaških kriterija”, upravo suprotno – treba ih dosljedno provoditi u praksi.

    Europska unija treba pružati podršku samo stvarnim, a ne fiktivnim reformama, i odmah pozitivno reagirati kada se kriteriji ispune.

    Premda je proširenje opet strateški prioritet Europske unije, gotovo transakcijski se dugo odnosila prema ovoj politici, vođena pogrešnim uvjerenjem da će europskim novcem riješiti sve unutarnje probleme država kandidata.

    Tako na liste strateški važnih projekata stavljamo one koje građani ne podržavaju ili preporučujemo zatvaranje poglavlja o javnoj nabavi neposredno nakon sklapanja ugovora s trećom zemljom koji se izuzima od tih pravila.

    Inzistiranje na vladavini prava i europskim vrijednostima, ali usklađenom geopolitičkom orijentacijom, moraju biti temelji za nastavak politike proširenja.

    Ako se politika proširenja provodi na taj način, interna reforma institucija Europske unije ne bi trebala biti ni prepreka ni alibi za odgađanje novog proširenja Europske unije.

     
       

     

      Tomislav Sokol (PPE), pitanje koje je podizanjem plave kartice postavio. – Gospodine Picula, često se govori da je novo proširenje nemoguće bez institucionalnih reformi koje bi, između ostalog, značile ukidanje prava jednoglasnosti u Vijeću, dakle ukidanje prava veta za male države članice.

    Vi ste mnogo puta govorili o toj temi, ali znamo da postoje različiti pogledi na samo to pitanje. Recimo, predsjednik Republike Hrvatske Zoran Milanović je rekao da oni koji su za ukidanje prava veta čine veleizdaju ili nešto u tom smislu.

    Možete li mi Vi ovdje reći, jeste li Vi za ukidanje prava veta za male države članice, nešto što ide protivno njihovim nacionalnim interesima, ili ste za to da male države uspiju zaštititi svoja prava i dalje u Europskoj uniji? Hvala lijepa.

     
       

     

      Marjan Šarec (Renew). – Gospod predsednik, širitev Evropske unije danes ni več samo birokratski postopek, Je ključni geopolitični korak, ki pomeni utrjevanje stabilnosti, varnosti in demokratičnih vrednot Evropske unije.

    Države, ki že dokazujejo evropsko zavezanost, potrebujejo jasna sporočila in spodbudne korake iz Bruslja. Obljuba članstva v Evropski uniji mora biti resnična in zanesljiva. Sicer tudi sistem postavljanja zahtev ne deluje.

    Poznamo primere držav kandidatk, ki so sledile pomembnim reformam, nato pa obtičale v vmesnem prostoru. Severna Makedonija je kričeč primer.

    Medtem pa drugi akterji krepijo svoj vpliv in alternativne poti, ki lahko ogrozijo stabilnost in dragocene vrednote Evropske unije. Tiste vrednote, ki jih prepogosto jemljemo za samoumevne. To moramo znova in znova sporočati tudi evropskim državljankam in državljanom.

    Skupna prihodnost z državami kandidatkami pomeni močnejšo, varnejšo in bolj enotno Evropo.

     
       

     

      Marc Botenga (The Left). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, quand je vous entends parler de l’élargissement de l’Union européenne, ça a l’air chouette comme idée, mais je trouve que vous passez un peu vite sur les conséquences réelles que cela peut avoir sur les travailleurs. Parce que le salaire minimum en Ukraine n’arrive pas à 200 euros, je pense, en Moldavie, ça dépasse un peu les 300 euros.

    Dans le contexte des règles actuelles du marché européen, qui ne garantit même pas qu’aujourd’hui un travailleur qui va travailler dans un autre État membre ait droit aux mêmes règles de protection, à la même sécurité sociale qu’un autre, que va-t-il se passer dans le cadre d’un élargissement? Tout simplement que des entreprises – d’ailleurs, il y a pas mal de sociétés «boîtes aux lettres», comme on les appelle – vont en profiter pour faire baisser, pour faire empirer les conditions de travail des travailleurs un peu partout en Europe.

    Et ça, ça serait l’impact concret en Europe, aujourd’hui, d’un élargissement pour les travailleurs. Ne cachez pas ça, ne faites pas des rêves de grandeur sur combien l’Europe sera jolie à 200 États. C’est pas ça, ce que vivent les travailleurs. Les travailleurs veulent aujourd’hui que vous changiez cette Europe; non plus de la concurrence, mais de la coopération, de la sécurité sociale.

     
       

     

      Tomislav Sokol (PPE). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, povjerenice, kolegice i kolege, u izmijenjenim geopolitičkim okolnostima proširenje Europske unije je ponovno postalo aktualno. Međutim, jasno treba reći da se proces proširenja treba promatrati za svaku državu zasebno i temeljiti se isključivo na sposobnostima države kandidatkinje da usvoji europske standarde.

    Nažalost, po tom pitanju ne da ne vidimo napredak, nego, nažalost, uglavnom vidimo nazadovanje. Srbija je i dalje apsolutno najveći destabilizacijski faktor u jugoistočnoj Europi. Hegemonistička politika koju vodi Beograd ugrožava neovisnost i suverenost okolnih država te je jasno da ovakvoj Srbiji nije mjesto u Europskoj uniji.

    Nadalje, Bosna i Hercegovina razapeta je između bošnjačkog unitarizma i srpskog separatizma. U toj državi Hrvati su jedini narod koji istinski, bez fige u džepu gleda prema Europskoj uniji i zapadu.

    Crna Gora i Albanija, pak, najdalje su odmakle na europskom putu, s time da je Crna Gora ipak spremnija za zaključenje pregovora, iako je pred njom još uvijek puno posla.

    Međutim, ono što je važno reći je da proširenje Europske unije nema apsolutno nikakve veze s ukidanjem jednoglasnosti odlučivanja. Tvrdnja da je proširenje nemoguće bez ukidanja prava veta je naprosto netočna. 2004., kada je pravo veta bilo puno raširenije, dogodilo se najveće proširenje Europske unije u povijesti.

    Ukidanje prava veta i uvođenje preglasavanja negiralo bi temeljne dimenzije nacionalnog suvereniteta, povećalo podjele u Europskoj uniji te ugrozilo sam njezin opstanak. U konačnici, ako netko smatra da proširenjem uvodimo trojanskog konja u Uniju, onda do takvog proširenja vjerojatno ne treba niti doći. Europa mora ostati zajednica slobodnih suverenih naroda, a ne zajednica u kojoj veliki odlučuju umjesto malih.

     
       

     

      Francisco Assis (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, o processo de alargamento é intrínseco ao projeto europeu e até ao próprio espírito europeu que subjaz a esse projeto.

    Não foram só os países que foram entrando que beneficiaram das vantagens da integração europeia; os próprios países fundadores beneficiaram, desde logo, dessa vantagem.

    Basta olhar para o caso alemão: foi a sua integração nas instituições europeias que permitiu a sua reinserção na comunidade internacional após o tenebroso período nazi.

    Trata-se, afinal, de acolher agora no seio da UE novos países e novos povos. O novo alargamento que temos agora no horizonte deve inspirar-se no mesmo espírito de partilha e fraternidade. Mas dificilmente poderemos acomodar novos membros com a mesma arquitetura institucional e o mesmo acervo tratadístico.

    O problema é que andamos a navegar as águas tumultuosas dos últimos anos –– o Brexit, a pandemia, a crise energética, a invasão da Ucrânia –– com uma carta de marear desenhada há quase 15 anos para um clima previsível e pacificado.

    Nesse sentido, quero aqui recordar o pedido formal feito por esta Casa em 2022, e pela primeira vez na sua história, apelando ao Conselho para iniciar uma convenção para a revisão dos Tratados, em linha com as conclusões da Conferência sobre o Futuro da Europa. Esse pedido tem sido menosprezado pelo Conselho.

    Está, provavelmente, na hora de este Parlamento ser mais ouvido pelo Conselho Europeu.

     
       

     

      Marieke Ehlers (PfE). – Voorzitter, opnieuw klinkt de roep om méér Europese Unie. Meer landen, meer bureaucratie, maar minder inspraak voor de landen die deze Unie hebben opgebouwd. De eurocraten bestempelen uitbreiding als een noodzaak en zien het vetorecht als een hinderpaal. Terwijl het systeem kraakt in zijn voegen, stormt Brussel vooruit, alsof uitbreiding een morele plicht is en geen politieke keuze.

    De EU verder uitbreiden is als het toelaten van passagiers op een zinkend schip. Wat ons te wachten staat, is een versnelde weg richting een transferunie, omdat nieuwe lidstaten vrijwel zonder uitzondering netto-ontvanger zullen zijn. En wie draait op voor de kosten? Nettobetalers zoals Nederland.

    Als we dan ook nog het vetorecht afschaffen, creëren we een systeem waarin nettobetalers steeds meer betalen, maar steeds minder te zeggen hebben. Dit is niet het Europa waar wij voor gekozen hebben. Het is de hoogste tijd dat we het roer terugpakken, vóór onze belangen definitief overboord gaan.

     
       

     

      Małgorzata Gosiewska (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Rozszerzenie Unii Europejskiej o nowe państwa, takie jak Ukraina, jest uzasadnione z punktu widzenia geopolitycznego. Niesie jednak za sobą poważne konsekwencje gospodarcze, szczególnie dla takich krajów jak Polska. Już teraz obserwujemy wpływ rosnącej konkurencji ze strony Ukrainy w kluczowych sektorach, takich jak transport drogowy czy rolnictwo.

    W odpowiedzi na rosyjską agresję Unia Europejska w 2022 r. zliberalizowała dostęp Ukrainy do jednolitego rynku, całkowicie znosząc cła i kontyngenty oraz rezygnując z systemu licencji w transporcie drogowym. Działania te, oficjalnie motywowane solidarnością, wywołały istotne napięcia społeczne w państwach członkowskich. Największymi beneficjentami tych działań okazały się potężne agroholdingi, w tym te kontrolowane przez międzynarodowy kapitał.

    Twierdziliście, że troszczycie się o ukraińskich rolników, że to wyraz solidarności z walczącym krajem. W rzeczywistości było to wsparcie dla międzynarodowych graczy w umacnianiu ich pozycji na rynku europejskim kosztem naszych rolników, kosztem naszych przetwórców. Nie na tym polega solidarność międzynarodowa. Nie tak powinien przebiegać proces rozszerzania Unii Europejskiej.

     
       

     

      Илхан Кючюк (Renew). – Г-жо Комисар, от началото на дебата се опитвам да разбера за какво не е този дебат: не е „за“ или „против“ за политиката по разширяване, не е за Украйна, за Турция, не и за готовността на страните членки да бъдат част от Европейския съюз. То е за нещо друго: за институционалната и политическата подготвеност на Европейския съюз да приеме нови страни членки.

    Нека заедно да си зададем този въпрос и тук не гледам крайното ляво или крайното дясно, политическият център, който трябва да донесе необходимите реформи за бъдещето на Европейския съюз. Можем ли при тази институционална подредба да си позволим 35 държави в рамките на Европейския съюз? Отговорът е „не“. Погледнете само дебата, който тече в момента за Многогодишната финансова рамка. Искаме старите приоритети, искаме нови приоритети и на всичкото отгоре трябва да вземем решение в един Съюз с 35 държави в едно обозримо бъдеще. Как е възможно това?

    Погледнете санкционната политика на Европейския съюз. Колко пъти ние се проваляме в идеята си да имаме еднопосочно послание към нас в Европейския съюз и към тези, които искат да се присъединят към нас? И да ми кажете, че това е демократично? Орбан постоянно да ни изнудва за нещо. Не го приемаме. Трябва да има реформа …

    (Председателят отнема думата на оратора)

     
       

     

      Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Wenn wir über EU‑Erweiterungsstrategien reden, dann müssen wir viel mehr über den Umwelt‑, Klima‑ und auch den Tierschutz sprechen. Es ist schockierend, dass in vielen Berichten zu Kandidatenländern diese Themen nur am Rande oder, wie im Falle des Tierschutzes, gar nicht erwähnt werden. Selbstverständlich müssen alle Kandidatenländer Kriterien in Bezug auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Korruptionsbekämpfung usw. erfüllen, aber es ist inakzeptabel, dass in Ländern wie der Türkei, Albanien, dem Kosovo, Moldau, Serbien oder auch Bosnien streunende Hunde und Katzen brutal getötet werden. Es gibt einen chronischen Mangel an Tierheimen, keine Maßnahmen zur Populationskontrolle wie Kastrationsprogramme und keine Aufklärungs‑ und Sensibilisierungskampagnen für die Bevölkerung.

    Darüber hinaus dürfen Abfallwirtschaft und Umweltschutz bei Beitrittskandidaten nicht vernachlässigt werden. Profit darf dort niemals vor der Umwelt stehen, wie es im Fall des Lithiumabbaus im Jadar‑Tal in Serbien oder beim Bau des Flughafens in einem Naturschutzgebiet in der Vjosa-Narta in Albanien der Fall ist. Wir müssen diesen Ländern eine klare Botschaft vermitteln, dass Tierschutz- und Umweltschutzstandards ebenso wichtig sind. Diesen Stellenwert sollten sie auch hier im Parlament bekommen.

     
       

     

      Андрей Ковачев (PPE). – Г-жо Комисар, пред лицето на нарастващата заплаха от Русия и усилващото се влияние на Китай, интеграция на страните кандидат членки в нашия Съюз е наложителна като стратегическа инвестиция в обединена и силна Европа. В този исторически момент разширяването на Европейския съюз е един от най-силните ни външнополитически инструменти. Но ако този инструмент не се използва внимателно, ако правим компромиси със собствените си принципи и ценности, ще подкопаем бъдещето си, като се опитваме да изградим нещо единно, а в същото време внесем повече разединение в Европейския съюз.

    И тук бих искал да се спра на актуалния пример с Република Северна Македония. За съжаление, манипулативното интерпретиране от страна на министър-председателя г-н Мицковски на проектотекстове на този Парламент води до повече напрежение и повече разединение, освен че поставя в неудобно положение докладчиците.

    Г-н Мицковски, в проектотекстовете, които явно Вие имате, никъде Европейският парламент не сертифицира многовековна идентичност или език. Това не е институт по история или академия на науките. Затова пък има международноправни договори и това е договорът между България, където има платформа, това е мултидисциплинарната академична комисия, където тези две решения трябва да бъдат взети от специалистите. Затова призовавам: вместо да инвестираме толкова много време и енергия – дипломатична и финансова в лобизъм и борба, да се концентрираме в изпълнение на преговорната рамка, започване на преговори, договорите между двете страни и разбира се, взаимно уважение между нас.

    Тук не мога да не кажа и крещящия например за присъдата срещу Любчо Георгиевски, един македонски българин, който беше осъден на първа инстанция само за това, че във Фейсбук поста си беше цитирал историческа личност и истината за нашата обща история.

     
       

     

      Thijs Reuten (S&D). – Mr President, Commissioner, colleagues, if enlargement is the EU’s strongest geopolitical tool, we must urgently make it credible again.

    History shows enlargement works only when domestic reformers see real rewards and when backsliding carries consequences, when citizens feel tangible benefits, and when EU institutions and Member States speak with one voice – clearly, consistently and honestly, to reinforce local ownership.

    Instead, what we see is shifting goalposts, appeasement and double standards, especially on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Georgia. This Parliament has sounded the alarm again and again. Reforms cannot succeed without deep democratic transformation. And yet, too often, the EU enables autocrats, excuses kleptocrats and ignores those fighting for the rule of law.

    Citizens are not blind. They won’t wait forever. Enlargement processes have a shelf life and we are close to the expiry date. And meanwhile, Russia and China are more than happy to fill the vacuum we are leaving.

    So let’s be honest, with ourselves and our partners. We need a hard look at what has worked, what has not and what needs fixing. And we need to show enlargement is real by ensuring that at least two countries can join the Union before 2030.

    Let enlargement become the transformative force it was meant to be, fulfilling the promise of a united Europe as we started working on over 75 years ago.

     
       

     

      Csaba Dömötör (PfE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Úgy beszélnek itt az ukrán bővítésről, mintha már eldöntött tény lenne. Gyorsított eljárást akarnak, és a bővítési biztos azt is elmondta, hogy a Bizottságnál ezer ember dolgozik ezen. Ráadásul, amint ma is hallhattuk, ki akarják iktatni a tagállami vétó lehetőségét. Igazán demokratikus, mondhatom.

    Egyvalamiről azonban nem beszélnek. A gazdasági következményekről.

    Az itteni Költségvetési Bizottságnak vannak számításai, amelyek szerint a kohéziós források 24%-kal, az agrártámogatások pedig 15%-kal csökkennének a mostani tagországokban.

    Azután történne ez, hogy Európa elköltött 150 milliárd eurót a háborúra.

    Miért gondolják azt itt, hogy az európai emberek minden pénzügyi terhet elbírnak? Ki fog a szemükbe nézni és bevallani, hogy milyen terhekkel járna mindez?

    Magyarországon már több mint kétmillióan vettek részt az ukrán tagságról szóló szavazáson. Mi megkérdeztük, hogy mit gondolnak a bővítésről azok, akik a számlát állják.

    A választól egy kicsit félve teszem fel a kérdést: Önök meg merik ezt tenni?

     
       

     

      Claudiu-Richard Târziu (ECR). – Domnule președinte, stimați colegi, extinderea Uniunii Europene este un proiect cu implicații strategice și istorice profunde. Avem datoria să sprijinim aspirațiile europene ale unui stat precum Republica Moldova, care împărtășește cu România aceeași limbă și cultură, și destin istoric.

    Din punctul nostru de vedere, ajutorul acordat Moldovei în procesul de integrare este mai mult decât un obiectiv de politică externă, este o datorie față de identitatea și dreptul istoric al națiunii române. Dar tocmai pentru că ne pasă atât de mult, trebuie să spunem adevărul: Uniunea Europeană nu este astăzi pregătită instituțional pentru o extindere masivă. Fără o reformă reală a mecanismelor decizionale, a alocării bugetare, fără un control democratic real, riscăm să transformăm extinderea într-o nouă amenințare pentru stabilitatea Uniunii.

    Așadar, susținem extinderea, dar cerem o reformă serioasă și o consolidare a proceselor decizionale în structurile Uniunii, respect pentru suveranitatea statelor membre și o viziune clară asupra viitorului european.

     
       

     

      Petras Auštrevičius (Renew). – Mr President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, history has shown us the value of European unification and the importance of preparing EU institutions to address emerging challenges. Although managing a union of 30 or more members may seem challenging, these are the same concerns we had 20 years ago, prior to the big bang enlargement.

    However, improving the EU’s institutional functioning and political processes cannot be postponed or made dependent on enlargement, budgeting or other issues.

    Colleagues, I find today’s debate, with the extreme focus on enlargement only, a bit misleading. It’s too narrow. Let’s look broader, face all the challenges we have. We must look into a long, be ready to face any future challenges to the security and prosperity of our citizens in the long term, when our bold actions will bear fruit, and seize the opportunity to improve the efficiency of EU decision-making and policy implementation. So let’s look at the broader picture.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin agus a Choimisinéir, tá sé tábhachtach dóchas a thabhairt do thíortha a bhfuil ag teastáil uathu teacht isteach san Aontas, because enlargement is one of the EU’s greatest achievements. It has extended peace, democracy and shared prosperity across Europe, making it stronger, more united and better equipped to face global challenges. Ireland has always backed enlargement, but on principle. Accession must be earned: each candidate must meet our agreed standards in the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. That remains essential.

    The strategic case is clearer than ever. Russia’s war in Ukraine shows that peace in Europe cannot be assumed. Bringing in countries like Ukraine and Moldova, and the Western Balkans, once ready, serves both their interests and ours. It strengthens our security, economy and global influence. We cannot let radical voices hijack this debate with fearmongering about migration or budgets. That distorts the truth.

    Past enlargements reduced poverty, grew trade and created new opportunities, including for Ireland, which has been transformed and modernised since we joined in 1973. Conversely, the United Kingdom has suffered greatly since it left the European Union a few years ago. The path ahead must be rigorous, but the door must stay open.

    Míle buíochas á Uachtaráin, agus go n-éirí libh. Maith thú.

     
       

     

      Marc Angel (S&D). – Mr President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, every single enlargement of our Union has been a major success story, and enlargement has now become a geopolitical necessity to protect ourselves and our neighbours against interference from autocratic regimes.

    It is important and good that enlargement is, again, high on the agenda. War on our continent, the rise of fascism, the shift in transatlantic relations – all this reminds us that enlargement is in our own strategic interest.

    There will be no shortcuts on EU values and fundamental principles. Accession to the EU must always remain a merit-based process and, therefore, as EU institutions and Member States, we must support the candidate countries.

    We also have homework to do: institutional and financial reforms are needed to absorb new members. Our Union is barely functioning at the current state with 27, so what about 30, 32 or 35? We need to change our way of working so that every citizen, every worker, every business and society as a whole can continue to benefit from our European project.

    So let’s have the courage to adopt targeted treaty changes, move away from unanimity, deepen the social dimension of our Union and strengthen the union of equality, and we must live up to our promises to citizens and to the candidate countries.

     
       

     

      Pascale Piera (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, l’élargissement de l’Union européenne devait être un catalyseur de progrès, nous promettait Ursula von der Leyen. Qui peut encore le croire?

    Si l’élargissement de l’Union européenne est un catalyseur, c’est celui de la dilapidation de l’argent public. Des milliards dont on perd la trace, alors qu’on enjoint aux peuples européens de se serrer la ceinture. Une note du Conseil européen chiffre le coût de cet élargissement à la somme de 264 milliards d’euros sur sept ans.

    Si l’élargissement de l’Union européenne est un catalyseur, c’est celui de l’instabilité et de l’insécurité pour nos concitoyens avec les gangs venus de pays qui ne respectent pas nos lois. Ne soyons pas dupes.

    L’élargissement, et notamment celui à l’Ukraine, est enfin le catalyseur de la destruction de notre agriculture. En cas d’adhésion, l’Ukraine deviendrait le premier bénéficiaire de la politique agricole commune, avec 10 à 12 milliards d’euros d’aides par an, c’est 20 % du budget de la PAC.

    Cette concurrence si déloyale, venue de pays qui ne respectent ni nos normes environnementales ni nos normes sociales, c’est un crime organisé contre notre agriculture et nous n’accepterons pas cela.

     
       

     

      Mario Mantovani (ECR). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, l’allargamento dell’Unione europea è un processo di grande rilevanza strategica, che va affrontato con realismo e con rigore, soprattutto alla luce delle crescenti sfide economiche e geopolitiche.

    L’ingresso di nuovi Stati membri comporta senza dubbio opportunità per promuovere e consolidare quei valori di democrazia e di libertà propri di questa Unione, ma anche opportunità di crescita ed espansione dei mercati e rafforzamento del proprio peso politico europeo.

    In quest’ottica occorre una revisione delle politiche comuni, affinché non diventino strumenti di ridistribuzione di inefficienza, ma leve per innovazione, produttività e sviluppo dell’occupazione.

    È altresì essenziale una governance economica, che garantisca condizioni eque di concorrenza del mercato interno e garantisca la tutela degli investimenti comunitari che faremo in quei paesi.

    In conclusione, un allargamento non governato indebolisce, un allargamento accompagnato da riforme aiuta l’Unione europea.

     
       

       

    PRESIDE: ESTEBAN GONZÁLEZ PONS
    Vicepresidente

     
       

     

      Mika Aaltola (PPE). – Arvoisa puhemies, arvoisat kollegat, Eurooppa on uhattuna. Vapautemme on vaakalaudalla. Laajentuminen ei ole hyväntekeväisyyttä. Se on kylmää, kovaa, strategista harkintaa.

    Vahvan Ukrainan tuominen joukkoomme on suoraan meidän turvallisuutemme tae. Venäjän uhka vaanii porteillamme odottaen otollista hetkeä. Suomi tietää tämän historiansa kautta. Meillä on puolet EU:n ja Naton Venäjä-rajasta. Suomi on se valli, jonka on kestettävä, tai kansojen vapaus on vaakalaudalla. Samoin on Ukrainan laita. Yhtenäisyys on voimaa. Integroimalla Ukrainan lähetämme Putinille selkeän viestin: emme anna periksi, emme pelkää.

    Muistakaamme Winston Churchilliä, jonka muistoksi täällä on rakennus nimettynä. Hän ymmärsi integraation geopoliittisen syvän ytimen: padota idän uhkaa ja torjua totalitarismin vaaroja. Meidän on ymmärrettävä, että EU ei ole pelkkä rauhanprojekti, vaan ytimessä on pelote, jonka pitää ylläpitää rauhaa. Epäröinnin aika on ohi. Meidän on toimittava – tarvittaessa myös ilman Yhdysvaltoja.

     
       

     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Gerbiamas posėdžio pirmininke, gerbiama komisare, kolegos. Europos Sąjunga trūkčioja vietoje. Pasauliniai iššūkiai ir Europos Sąjungos piliečiai reikalauja stipresnės ir veiksmingesnės Europos ir veiksmų. Europos Parlamentas dar 2023 m. pateikė konkrečius pasiūlymus Europos Vadovų Tarybai su rekomendacijomis, atsižvelgdamas ir į piliečių, ir į Konferencijos dėl ateities siūlymus, ir į Rusijos karą prieš Ukrainą. Ukrainos pergalės laidas yra jos narystė Europos Sąjungoje – šimtu procentų. Vadovų Tarybai perduoti pasiūlymai reikalauja veiksmų iš jos pusės. Komisijos Pirmininkės, Draghi, Lettos pranešimuose yra pasakyta, kad sutarčių keitimas yra būtinas viskam – ir investicijoms, ir taip toliau. Europoje yra tik dvi rūšys valstybių – mažos ir tos, kurios nesupranta, kad jos yra mažos. Ir čia nacionalistai ir patriotai nesupranta šito ir patys kalba niekus tam, kad Europos Sąjungą atvestų į dar didesnę krizę. Todėl mums reikia žengti abu žingsnius – ir sutarčių keitimą, ir plėtrą, sinchronizuoti, daryti pagal kriterijus. Ir tik toks kelias sustiprins Europos Sąjungą kaip pasaulinį žaidėją.

    (Kalbėtojas sutiko atsakyti į mėlynosios kortelės klausimą)

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Herr Kollege, danke, dass Sie die Frage annehmen! Ich weiß nicht, aus welchem Land Sie kommen, aber ich komme aus dem größten Mitgliedsland, dem stärksten Mitgliedsland der EU, und ich stelle nicht fest, dass die Bürger meines Landes in der Mehrheit mehr EU wollen. Also das zur Einordnung.

    Sie haben gesprochen vom Sieg der Ukraine, und der Sieg der Ukraine hängt von deren Mitgliedschaft in der EU ab. Ist Ihnen eigentlich bewusst, dass Sie dort eines der größten korrupten Regimes derzeit an der Regierung haben, die zusammen mit Bandera, also mit ehemaligen Faschistenverehrern, die Regierung bilden? Wollen Sie wirklich dieses Land um den Preis dieser Gemeinschaft in die …

    (Der Präsident entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

     
       

     

      Marie Dauchy (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, qui oserait dire que l’Union européenne est une institution qui fonctionne? Aucune crise, qu’elle soit migratoire, sanitaire ou économique, n’a été résolue par le secours de l’Union. Pire encore, sur le pacte vert, sur la montée de l’islamisme ou sur les délocalisations, vous n’avez été qu’un accélérateur du chaos.

    Comme l’URSS à la fin de sa vie qui pensait résoudre les problèmes du communisme par plus de communisme, vous persistez à croire que l’Union réglera les échecs de l’Union et vous vous acharnez à nous imposer votre modèle que le peuple refuse. Vous voulez encore élargir cette machine folle à des pays comme la Turquie ou la Moldavie, qui ne partagent ni notre culture ni nos intérêts.

    Ce que les Français attendent, ce n’est pas plus d’intégration, c’est plus de protection. Et ce que l’histoire retiendra, c’est que votre idéologie aura détruit l’idée européenne bien plus sûrement que tous vos adversaires réunis.

     
       

     

      Hildegard Bentele (PPE). – Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union ist kein Selbstzweck, sie ist ein strategisches Angebot für Frieden, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Am Beginn von Beitrittsverhandlungen steht eine erste, einladende politische Entscheidung der EU, sie sind aber kein technokratischer Automatismus; sie beruhen auf klaren Bedingungen und auf politischem Willen. Wenn es dabei auch um Geopolitik gehen sollte, dürfen wir uns nicht hinter den einzelnen Verhandlungskapiteln verstecken.

    Gerade auf dem Westbalkan ist Vertrauen ein knappes Gut. Wenn wir es verspielen, gefährden wir die europäische Perspektive dieser Region. Das Beispiel Serbien zeigt, wie schwierig das Gleichgewicht ist. Einerseits steht der Kurs der serbischen Führung zu Russland und zum Kosovo in direktem Widerspruch zu unseren europäischen Werten, andererseits sprechen geostrategische Überlegungen dafür, Serbien enger an Europa zu binden, etwa als potenziellen Partner im Bereich kritischer Rohstoffe. Doch gerade in diesem sensiblen Sektor sind funktionierende, unabhängige Institutionen sowie das Vertrauen und die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung für das Gelingen gemeinsamer Projekte entscheidend.

    Die EU sollte hier sehr viel entschiedener auftreten. Sie könnte in den Augen der Bevölkerung viel an Ansehen gewinnen, wenn sie denn über den Hebel des Beitrittsprozesses ganz klar auf Korruptionsbekämpfung, Pressefreiheit und Rechtsstaatlichkeit dringen würde, die ja auch für eine echte, gesunde wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und damit für die Zukunftsfähigkeit des Landes entscheidend sind. Wir müssen Handlungsbereitschaft, Glaubwürdigkeit und strategische Verlässlichkeit zeigen – nur dann werden wir als der Partner wahrgenommen, der wir sein wollen und sein müssen.

    (Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Frau Kollegin, vielen Dank! Sie sprachen vom Frieden in der EU. Ich nehme das im Barbarossa-, also im Verteidigungsausschuss, ganz anders wahr: Dort wird in regelmäßiger Einheit von Kriegstüchtigkeit, Kriegsfähigkeit gesprochen. Ihr Parteichef und unser Bundeskanzler sprach davon, dass aktuell Israel die Drecksarbeit für uns mache. Wie passt denn das zusammen, einmal die Rhetorik Krieg, Aufrüstung, Kriegstüchtigkeit und das Friedensgesäusel, was Sie gerade hier präsentieren? Wie passt das zusammen?

     
       

     

      Nicola Zingaretti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l’Europa è l’unico processo della storia che ha unito 450 milioni di persone, non perché costrette, ma perché convinte, contro le guerre, senza violenza, ma proponendo la forza della democrazia. Passare da 6 a 27 Stati ha rappresentato uno straordinario processo che ha garantito pace, prosperità e benessere.

    L’Europa dunque ci è servita ad arrivare fino a qui, ma la sua crescita senza riforme e un salto in avanti nell’integrazione rappresenta un rischio per la sua stessa esistenza. Quindi bene continuare ad aprirsi, ma è fondamentale rilanciare i suoi valori, un’identità comune europea e darsi regole nuove per essere più efficaci: riforma del diritto di veto, politica estera e di difesa davvero comuni, nuove risorse proprie destinate a investimenti per il nostro sistema produttivo e modello sociale e quindi riforme verso gli Stati Uniti d’Europa.

    L’Europa non è una cappa, come dicono i nazionalisti, è lo scudo che ci ha permesso di esistere da persone libere. Ma ora, per non tradire la sua storia, deve cambiare ed andare avanti. E se non si vuole andare avanti in 27, con cooperazioni rafforzate, cominciamo con chi ci sta a cambiare questa Europa.

     
       

     

      Alexandre Varaut (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, l’Union européenne aime à croire qu’elle incarne le sens de l’histoire et qu’il ne peut pas en être autrement. La gifle du Brexit, qui démentait cette prétention de la manière la plus nette, l’a un temps sonnée, mais l’étrange illusion a repris. Elle s’est même aggravée, comme le prouve le débat de ce matin, qui associe l’élargissement de l’Union aux défis mondiaux. Cette association est une plaisanterie. Qui peut croire que l’Union européenne cherche à s’émanciper de la tutelle américaine?

    Lorsque les États-Unis ont menacé de s’emparer par la force du Groenland, l’Union européenne n’a rien fait, sinon acheter tout de suite davantage d’armes aux Américains en pensant les amadouer. Et même si l’Union européenne s’émancipait, il ne faut pas que ce soit pour devenir elle-même un bloc qui écraserait les peuples et les nations qui la composent.

    À ce messianisme politique et à cette boulimie impuissante, nous opposons un pragmatisme qui s’appuie sur la raison. Les peuples européens sont une famille que rapprochent des liens civilisationnels naturels. Poursuivre l’intégration ne sera envisageable qu’une fois le cadre intégrateur lui-même redressé. Réparons l’Europe d’abord, voyons le reste après.

     
       

     

      Davor Ivo Stier (PPE). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, uspjeh proširenja ovisi o četiri ključna čimbenika: političkoj volji država članica, volji kandidata, apsorpcijskom kapacitetu Unije i administrativnom kapacitetu kandidata. Situacija je tu različita i zato pristup mora ostati individualan.

    U slučaju Ukrajine suočavamo se s problemom donošenja odluka u Vijeću, a njezino članstvo vjerojatno traži i prilagodbu nekih europskih politika poput poljoprivredne. No, EU bi strateški pogriješio ako ne bi uočio da unatoč ratu, Ukrajina pokazuje kapacitet za EU reforme i svaki dan na bojištu pokazuje privrženost europskoj ideji.

    Moldova također pokazuje snažnu političku volju, dok je proces s Gruzijom morao biti zaustavljen zbog potpunog nedostatka političke volje vlasti.

    Kod Srbije problem je također u političkoj volji, no u ovom slučaju bilo bi kontraproduktivno zaustaviti pregovore. Ali moramo biti svjesni da sama Srbija zasad ne želi ispuniti ključne kriterije, posebice u vanjskoj politici i u području vladavine prava. Stoga, umjesto grandioznih izjava i nerealnih očekivanja i kasnijih frustracija, puno je bolje prihvatiti realnost da je Srbija država koja se ne želi svrstati s Europskom unijom, a tu ni opozicija ne nudi jasnu alternativu. I stoga, na temelju te realnosti moramo pragmatično oblikovati naše odnose.

    No, EU mora istovremeno više učiniti da takva nesvrstana politika Beograda ne utječe negativno na BiH, Crnu Goru, Kosovo i Sjevernu Makedoniju i na njihov europski put.

    Na kraju, važno je nastaviti s novim tempom pregovora s Albanijom. Ona postaje lider u procesu i tu treba inzistirati na kriterijima, ali ostati ambiciozan za završetak pregovora u ovom mandatu.

     
       

     

      Vilija Blinkevičiūtė (S&D). – Pirmininke, pone komisare, kolegos. Mano šalies Lietuvos prisijungimas prie Europos Sąjungos prieš dvidešimt vienerius metus išgelbėjo šalį nuo Ukrainos likimo. Mes tapome stipresni tiek ekonomiškai, tiek politiškai bei labiau atsparūs išorės grėsmėms. To paties tikisi ir Ukraina, Moldova, Balkanų šalys. Taipogi plėtra yra reikalinga ir Europos Sąjungai. Todėl Europos Sąjunga privalo būti pasirengusi plėtrai, kaip ir tos šalys, kurios siekia narystės. Tačiau plėtra tikrai nebus įmanoma be sutarčių keitimo, be išsamių institucinių reformų. Matome, kad dabar jau yra sudėtinga Taryboje greitai priimti sprendimus. Kai kurie sprendimai yra vilkinami, kai kurios valstybės naudojasi veto teise vien dėl savo siaurų interesų, ir tai tikrai neprisideda prie Europos Sąjungos gebėjimo laiku ir veiksmingai reaguoti bei prisitaikyti prie pokyčių. Kad išliktume reikšmingi politiniame žemėlapyje, privalome keistis patys, keisti savo institucijas ir užtikrinti greitą ir veiksmingą sprendimų priėmimą.

     
       

     

      Liudas Mažylis (PPE). – Pirmininke, komisare, kolegos. Svarstydami įstrigusios plėtros šiandieninę būklę, turime sau atsakyti – ar yra politinė valia plėtrai. Kai ji būdavo, tai ir institucinės problemos išsispręsdavo. Sakome, kad šiandien europinių institucijų veiklą trikdo viena valstybė narė ar netgi vienas politikas, ir daro tai sistemiškai, o mes nerandame teisinių būdų tam įveikti. Bet, kita vertus, tai liudytų apie „beveik konsensusą“. Panašiai būta daugelį kartų: ir de Golio sukelta tuščios kėdės krizė, ir Danijos išlygos Mastrichto sutarčiai, ir Konstitucijos Europai sustojęs ratifikavimas, ir poros valstybių užsispyrimas neatsitraukti nuo QMV pagal Nicos sutartį. O triumfuodavo daugumos sutarimas.

    Per tai visa ligšiolinė plėtros istorija beveik išimtinai – sėkmės istorija. Europa kaskart tapdavo ir stipresnė, ir labiau integruota. Struktūriniai fondai, sanglauda – tasai pozityvas radosi kaip tik per plėtros iššūkius.

    Be abejo, būtų idealu iš anksto eksplicitiškai sutarti dėl palankiausios institucinės sąrangos, bet prisiminkime ratifikavimo trikdžius, ypač, kai, nepaisant oficialios valstybės pozicijos, ji būdavo paneigiama referendumais. Man tikrai skaudu, kad tiesioginės išmokos Lietuvos ūkininkams per mažos, bet tokia gi ir būna derybų dėl narystės kaina.

    Dėl institucinės sąrangos diskutuokime, bet netrukdykime brandinti politinę valią plėtrai.

     
       

     

      Łukasz Kohut (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Kto stoi w miejscu, ten się cofa. Dlatego Europa musi ruszyć z kopyta! Prawdziwym celem Unii na 2035 rok powinien być konkret, czyli przyłączenie Islandii i Norwegii do Unii – oczywiście, jeżeli społeczeństwa tych krajów będą za.

    Europa potrzebuje nowego, mocnego impulsu. Unia powinna pokazać, że jest atrakcyjna nie tylko dla biedniejszych, ale także dla zamożnych krajów. Bo rozszerzenie to nie tylko Wschód i Południe – dalsza integracja to powinna być przede wszystkim Północ.

    To Północ jest kluczowa dla bezpieczeństwa Europy. Norwegia to żelazny sojusznik z NATO, z którym łączą nas nie tylko wspólne wartości, ale także wspólne zagrożenie – agresywna Rosja.

    Flagi NATO-wskie w Sztokholmie i w Helsinkach to był czarny sen Putina, który się ziścił. Warto być konsekwentnym. Pora, żeby kolejny sen o europejskich flagach w Oslo i w Reykjaviku się spełnił. To jest możliwe.

     
       

       

    Solicitudes incidentales de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»)

     
       

     

      Sunčana Glavak (PPE). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, kolegice i kolege, proširenje Europske unije nije samo tehnički proces, to je duboka politička odluka s dalekosežnim posljedicama. U vremenu kada se Europa suočava s ratom na istoku, pritiscima s juga i rastućim globalnim rivalstvima, proširenje je i ulaganje u sigurnost.

    Hrvatska je najmlađa članica Europske unije, ali ima i posebnu odgovornost da bude most između Unije i naših susjeda. U Bosni i Hercegovini, primjerice, i Crnoj Gori žive aktivne hrvatske zajednice koje nisu samo most identiteta već i most povjerenja. Njihova integracija, pravna i kulturna vidljivost moraju ostati dio europske agende.

    Ako proširenje ne napreduje, prostor neće ostati prazan i ispunit će ga drugi koji nemaju interes za demokraciju, već za utjecaj. Zato moramo ubrzati integracijske procese, ali uz jasna pravila, institucionalnu sigurnost i političku volju.

    Ako želimo da Europa ostane globalni akter, a ne birokratski projekt, proširenje mora biti strateški prioritet, ali uz paralelnu reformu institucija i jačanje unutarnje kohezije. Jer ako se ne širimo, to znači da stagniramo, a stagnacija u geopolitici znači povlačenje. Europa se ne smije povući.

     
       

     

      Viktória Ferenc (PfE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Pontosan egy éve megkezdődtek a csatlakozási tárgyalások Ukrajnával, és a magyar diplomácia sikere nyomán a Nyugat-Ukrajnában élő kárpátaljai magyar közösség védelmében megfogalmazott tizenegy pontból álló javaslatainkat beépítették az általános csatlakozási tárgyalási keretbe. Ezzel a kárpátaljai magyarság jogainak védelme hivatalosan is Ukrajna csatlakozási folyamatának részévé vált.

    Csalódottan látjuk azonban, hogy az elmúlt 365 nap során nem történt érdemi előrelépés ebben a kérdésben, csupán látszatintézkedések történtek. A nemzeti kisebbségek jogainak védelmére irányuló cselekvési tervet ugyan elfogadta a kijevi vezetés, azonban diszkriminatív módon a kárpátaljai magyar közösség legnagyobb érdekvédelmi szervezetét nem vonták be a tárgyalásokba. Így Önök, kollégáim, amikor az európai uniós vezetők, politikusok szemet hunynak Ukrajna nemzeti kisebbségeit érintő kirakatintézkedései fölött, sőt támogatják azokat, veszélybe sodorják az uniós intézmények hitelességét, és valójában Önök saját maguk akadályozzák Ukrajna valódi demokratizálását.

     
       

     

      Lukas Sieper (NI). – Mr President, dear people of Europe, it really drives me crazy when some people here in this debate say that the EU was never able to fix the big problems of our time, when it’s the same people that, when we ask for a strong and robust financial mandate for the European Union, say no. When we asked to unify the European Union’s competences on cross-border challenges, they say no. So the same people that sabotage the constant updating of this Union now claim that this Union is not able to solve anything and therefore should not be extended.

    The second thing that drives me crazy every time I hear it is when they say, ‘Oh, we cannot do this enlargement because it will cost us money’, and they throw around these big numbers. I’m a jurist; I do not come from the economy, but what I understand is that you have to invest if you want to grow your business. And investing in enlargement is investing in the future of Europe, of the European Union.

     
       

       

    (Fin de las intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»))

     
       

     

      Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you for this debate, and comments certainly confirmed the importance and necessity to reflect on how to prepare the Union for enlargement.

    And I also think that this debate confirmed that most of you support enlargement, and it shows that an enlarged Union will be a stronger and more efficient Union.

    But to do so, we should really reflect on how we prepare our Union for environment. As I mentioned in my introduction, actually, later this year, the Commission will present the communication on pre-enlargement policy review. And we are always ready to debate with this House, how best to ensure that the Unions remains able to take decisions fast, swiftly, efficiently in benefits of our citizens.

    So once again, thanks for this debate, it was really very, very needed, and we are going to present the pre-enlargement policy review later this year.

     
       

     

      President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner.

    The debate is closed.

     

    3. The United Kingdom accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (debate)

     

      Ilhan Kyuchyuk, author. – Mr President, Madam Commissioner, dear colleagues, on 27 June 2024, the United Kingdom signed and ratified the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters, known as the Judgments Convention, which has also been signed by Uruguay, Israel, Costa Rica, Russia, the United States and Ukraine. The Judgments Convention entered into force on 1 September 2023, one year after the first two parties deposited their instruments of ratification.

    In accordance with Article 29(2) of the Judgments Convention, the EU can notify the depositary, before 27 June 2025, that the ratification by the UK does not have the effect of establishing treaty relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union. If no such notification is issued – that is, if the EU tacitly accepts the UK’s accession – the Judgments Convention will begin to apply between the two parties on 1 July 2025.

    Parliament understands that the Commission’s assessment of the UK’s accession is positive and that the Commission would be in favour of tacitly accepting it. However, the significance of private international law rules for EU citizens in this particular area also has a political and legal impact, not only on the area of judicial cooperation but also beyond, bearing in mind the relevance of relations between the UK and the European Union in a volatile international context.

    With respect for each EU institution’s prerogatives and Parliament’s consistent position, a statement would allow the Commission to tacitly accept the UK’s accession to the Judgments Convention on the EU’s behalf, under the relevant provisions of that Convention.

    Given the deadline laid down in the Judgments Convention, the need for the EU institutions to act without delay to ascertain the EU’s acceptance of the UK’s accession to the Convention, and Parliament’s intention to make an appropriate statement in this regard, could the Commission confirm its assessment of the UK’s accession to the Convention?

    Secondly, Madam Zaharieva, having regard to the commitments made here in November 2024 by Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič with regard to third countries’ accession to conventions and respect for Article 218(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, what concrete steps does the Commission intend to take in future to ensure that Parliament’s prerogatives relating to third countries’ accession to the Judgments Convention are always fully and formally respected under the Treaties, and what timetable does it envisage for taking these steps?

     
       

     

      Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you for this debate on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.

    In its written assessment of the United Kingdom’s certification of the Judgments Convention, which the Commission transmitted to the Committee of Legal Affairs of the European Parliament and to the Council, the Commission concluded that the UK has systematic capability to apply the Judgments Convention and to deal satisfactorily with individual problematic cases.

    The Commission therefore sees no obstacle for the European Union to establish Treaty relations with the United Kingdom based on the Judgments Convention.

    As regards the procedure to be followed when a third country joins the Judgments Convention, this issue was discussed during the process leading to the EU accession to the Judgments Convention with the European Parliament consent and on several occasions after that. The Judgments Convention is based on the principle of the acceptance of accession by other contracting parties, and only envisages an objection procedure in exceptional cases.

    The Commission therefore takes the view that formal decisions under Article 218 of the Treaty are required only where the EU intends to object to the establishment of such Treaty relations. This approach is in line with the need to implement the EU obligations under international law in good faith.

    At the same time, the Commission is committed to consulting Parliament and to take its views into account in full compliance with the Treaties and, notably, the duty of sincere cooperation. This is why, when deciding whether to propose an objection decision, we committed to consistently inform the Parliament of each intended accession of a third country to the Judgments Convention, taking full account of the views expressed by this House.

    I therefore look forward to the Parliament’s views in the debate today.

     
       

     

      Axel Voss, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Es ist mir eine große Freude, unter Ihrer Aufsicht heute hier auch entsprechend vortragen zu können. Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, lassen Sie mich eines bitte klarstellen: Es geht hier nicht nur um die Bereitschaft des Vereinigten Königreiches, dem Übereinkommen über Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen beizutreten; wir sind uns, glaube ich, alle darüber einig, dass Großbritannien dazu in der Lage ist. Die eigentliche Frage ist, wie die Kommission mit dem Beitritt von Drittstaaten umgeht und ob sie die Rolle des Parlaments entsprechend respektiert.

    Die schriftliche Bewertung, die wir erhalten haben, folgt nicht dem Verfahren gemäß Artikel 218 Absatz 6 AEUV. Es gibt keinen Vorschlag an den Rat, kein Ersuchen um die Zustimmung des Parlaments, lediglich eine Informationsnotiz. Das mag der derzeitigen Praxis durchaus entsprechen, aber ist eben nicht wirklich geltendes Recht. Und der Gerichtshof hatte ja bereits schon einmal klargestellt: Selbst eine sogenannte Nichtbeanstandung stellt ein internationales Abkommen dar. Also, das Parlament muss einbezogen werden, und das ist keine freiwillige Entscheidung.

    Deshalb hat der Rechtsausschuss eine Anfrage zur mündlichen Beantwortung mit der Entschließung eingebracht, um die Kommission aufzufordern, ihren rechtlichen Ansatz zu bestätigen, und sie daran zu erinnern, dass Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse des Parlaments in diesem Bereich auch nicht umgangen werden sollten. Wir unterstützen natürlich den Beitritt des Vereinigten Königreiches, aber diese Unterstützung darf eben nicht zulasten eines ordnungsgemäßen Verfahrens gehen.

     
       

     

      Ana Catarina Mendes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, caros colegas, julgo que a Cimeira, de 19 de Maio de 2025, entre a União Europeia e o Reino Unido marca uma nova etapa das nossas relações após o Brexit de reforço da nossa cooperação em diversas áreas.

    Seja o reforço na área da segurança e da juventude, que deve ser mesmo feito, seja o reforço no domínio da política de defesa e segurança –– sabemos como o contexto internacional o exige ––, seja o reforço das históricas relações com o Reino Unido.

    Assim, desse ponto de vista, e da parte do S&D, queria deixar aqui um sublinhado de congratulação pelo êxito desta cimeira, mas também pelo regresso às boas relações de cooperação, de solidariedade e de vizinhança, se quisermos, com o Reino Unido.

    É nesse quadro que se insere esta vontade expressa do Reino Unido de aderir à Convenção de Haia, que também quero aqui, em nome do S&D, saudar. Aquilo que se espera, como o colega anterior aqui disse, é saber qual é a posição da Comissão e se a Comissão, tão brevemente quanto possível, aceita esta vontade expressa e confirma com brevidade a sua avaliação favorável da aceitação da adesão do Reino Unido à Convenção de Haia.

    No entanto, como o colega anterior também disse, Senhora Comissária, é preciso que as relações institucionais sejam respeitadas; o artigo 218.º, parágrafo seis, estabelece muito claramente que este Parlamento tem também um papel a desempenhar neste contexto, não apenas para aplaudir, não apenas para saudar, mas sobretudo para estar empenhado e comprometido no reforço desta relação.

    Por isso, Senhora Comissária, a minha intervenção visa solicitar que a boa cooperação institucional continue a existir e que não se ignore o papel extraordinário que o Parlamento Europeu também pode ter na ratificação desta Convenção por parte do Reino Unido, a qual, volto a dizer, saúdo com grande alegria.

     
       

     

      Dainius Žalimas, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Mr President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, we cannot defend the rule of law externally, failing to follow it in our own decision-making. The third country’s accession to the Judgements Convention is a test of our compliance with the EU Constitution, the founding Treaties. The EU acceded to the Judgements Convention with Parliament’s consent. Indeed, the consent to be bound by international agreements is a typical function of a democratic parliament. This consent has to be required also when the convention’s scope – including scope of application – is changed, for example by the accession of third countries.

    However, as in the case of Ukraine’s accession, we are again confronted with the Commission’s refusal to recognise this inherent function of the Parliament as provided by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this way, the Commission undermines the principle of representative democracy, including institutional balance and accountability to EU citizens. The Commission, as a guardian of the Treaties, must fully respect them without improvisation beyond its mandate.

    Therefore, with today’s oral question and resolution, we not only support the accession of the UK, but we also are defending our parliamentary prerogatives and the rule of law.

     
       

     

      Ville Niinistö, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Mr President, today we welcome a step forward for Justice Beyond Borders. The UK’s accession to the Hague Convention is not just good news, it’s a win for legal certainty for businesses, families and individuals on both sides of the Channel.

    But let’s be clear: this debate is not about the UK today. It is about us, about our role as Parliament in shaping how the EU builds binding legal ties with the rest of the world.

    We believe in the rule of law. We believe that judgments recognised across borders must be rooted in fairness, due process and human rights. And we also believe that the European Parliament must have a say when those decisions impact millions of Europeans. The Commission should take the legal role of the co-legislators properly into account in this ratification process.

    That’s why we are here today, to make sure our democratic role isn’t sidelined, to ensure that Parliament’s voice is heard, respected and empowered. Let’s build bridges, yes, but let’s build them strong, transparent and with full democratic oversight, because Europe works best when it works together.

     
       

     

      Mary Khan, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Dieser Antrag zeigt, wie internationale Zusammenarbeit auch ohne Brüsseler Bevormundung funktionieren kann. Großbritannien ist nicht mehr Teil der EU. Das haben wir der Geduld und Durchsetzungsfähigkeit eines freien Volkes zu verdanken; darauf können die Briten auch stolz sein. Und dennoch gelingt es, auf Augenhöhe Rechtssicherheit zu schaffen.

    Ein souveräner Staat, ein völkerrechtlicher Vertrag, klare Regeln, ganz ohne milliardenteuren Beamtenapparat, ohne Ideologie – genau das ist unser Weg. Wir müssen die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf das Wesentliche reduzieren: Binnenmarkt, Schutz der Außengrenzen und freiwillige bilaterale Verträge zwischen souveränen Nationalstaaten.

    Stattdessen erleben wir eine EU, die sich zu einem politischen Superstaat aufbläht, der Milliarden kostet und sich immer tiefer in nationale Entscheidungen einmischt. Wir stimmen zu, weil es zeigt, wie echte Partnerschaft aussieht: rechtsstaatlich, freiwillig und souverän.

     
       

       

    (Se suspende la sesión a las 11:16 horas).

     
       

       

    VORSITZ: KATARINA BARLEY
    Vizepräsidentin

     

    4. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Die Sitzung wird um 12:00 Uhr wieder aufgenommen.)

     

    5. Voting time

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgt die Abstimmungsstunde.

     

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die folgende Abstimmung betrifft die Medienfreiheit in Georgien, insbesondere den Fall von Msia Amaghlobeli (siehe Punkt 5.1 des Protokolls).

     

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die folgende Abstimmung betrifft den Fall von Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran (siehe Punkt 5.2 des Protokolls).

     

       

    – Vor der Abstimmung über Änderungsantrag 3:

     
       

     

      Matthieu Valet (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, mes chers collègues, en tant que coordinateur du groupe des Patriotes pour l’Europe au sein de la sous-commission des droits de l’homme, je propose d’ajouter un amendement oral à la résolution sur le Mali, dont le texte, à notre sens, ne dénonce pas avec suffisamment de clarté le terrorisme islamiste. Cet amendement vise ainsi à rendre hommage et à honorer le sang versé de nos 58 soldats français, ainsi que celui de nos partenaires européens tombés dans la lutte contre les terroristes islamistes au Mali et pour la liberté que nous défendons tous ici au sein de ce Parlement.

    Je propose donc la formulation suivante: «considérant que l’Union européenne et plusieurs États membres ont déployé des efforts et perdu des vies dans la lutte contre le djihadisme, à la demande des anciennes autorités maliennes, dont 58 soldats français, cinq soldats néerlandais, deux soldats allemands, un soldat espagnol et un soldat portugais». Je vous remercie. Cela sera un signal fort pour nos soldats qui, souvent si jeunes, s’engagent pour nos libertés et tombent pour défendre des démocraties.

     
       

       

    (Das Parlament lehnt es ab, den mündlichen Änderungsantrag zur Abstimmung zu stellen.)

     

    5.4. Welfare of dogs and cats and their traceability (A10-0104/2025 – Veronika Vrecionová) (vote)

       

    – Nach der Abstimmung:

     
       

       

    (Das Parlament billigt den Antrag auf Rücküberweisung an den Ausschuss.)

     

    5.5. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (A10-0091/2025 – Anna Stürgkh) (vote)

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die folgende Abstimmung betrifft Stromnetze als Rückgrat des Energiesystems der EU (siehe Punkt 5.5 des Protokolls).

     

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die folgende Abstimmung betrifft den Deal für eine saubere Industrie (siehe Punkt 5.6 des Protokolls).

     

    5.7. The United Kingdom accession to the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (B10-0273/2025) (vote)

       

    (Damit ist die Abstimmungsstunde geschlossen)

     
       

       

    (Die Sitzung wird um 12:34 Uhr unterbrochen.)

     

    6. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Die Sitzung wird um 15.01 Uhr wieder aufgenommen.)

     

    7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Das Protokoll der gestrigen Sitzung und die angenommenen Texte sind verfügbar.

    Gibt es Einwände dagegen? Das ist nicht der Fall.

    Das Protokoll ist somit genehmigt.

     

    8. Protecting bees: advancing the EU’s New Deal for Pollinators (debate)

     

      Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, pollination is a free but invaluable service that insects provide. Without it, our food security, our livelihoods and nature would be threatened.

    Yet, pollinator populations have dramatically declined in the recent decades. Populations of 1 in 3 bee, butterfly and hoverflies species are collapsing. Many species are on the verge of extinction. This has a direct impact on the productivity and competitiveness of the EU’s agriculture sector and on our food security.

    As highlighted in the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy, in the EU pollinators initiative and in the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, we need to take urgent action to restore pollinator populations. To step up efforts and reverse this decline of pollinators, we reinforced two years ago the EU pollinators initiative by revising its action plan. We have also enshrined a target to reverse the decline of pollinators by 2030 in the Nature Restoration Regulation.

    Together, those efforts constitute the new deal for pollinators – our response to society’s demand to take decisive action. This demand was manifested in the European citizens’ initiative ‘Save bees and farmers’. This House has been a strong and vocal advocate of the EU pollinator agenda. I thank you for that and for the opportunity to update you today on the progress in the implementation of the new deal for pollinators.

    We are currently implementing more than 40 actions through the revised EU pollinators initiative. These actions aim to mitigate the drivers of pollinator decline, generate knowledge, foster Member States’ actions and mobilise society.

    Agriculture is the essential sector. It depends on pollinators the most, and at the same time it exerts the highest pressure on them. That is why we have been working closely with Member States to increase support for pollinator‑friendly farming under the common agricultural policy.

    We want to support farmers to restore nature and pollinator populations, including through the development of nature credits and through enhanced farm advisory services. We are working on strengthening the pesticide authorisation process to increase protection of pollinators from the use of pesticides. We are also supporting Member States in reducing the risk in use of pesticide by increasing the uptake of integrated pest management and availability of low-risk plant protection products.

    EU sales of pesticides in 2023 were at the lowest level since the start of Eurostat data series in 2011. Still, the work is not over. Despite our efforts, pesticide use remains a major driver of pollinator decline. We count on your continued support for strict regulatory framework on pesticides. Meanwhile, we have substantially improved our understanding of pollinator decline through comprehensive assessment of pollinator species and the European ‘red list’ and thanks to numerous projects launched through Horizon Europe.

    We are currently preparing a delegated act on pollinator monitoring, as required under the Nature Restoration Regulation. I call on Parliament and Member States to support a robust scientific monitoring method. Good data will enable smart and well-guided investment in the restoration of pollinators and ecosystems, yielding substantial savings in the long term.

    In addition, the preparatory action for the European Biodiversity Observation Coordination Centre, initiated by Parliament will help Member States implement a monitoring system for pollinators.

    To conclude, a word on our outreach efforts. We have built a strong and dedicated community of experts from Member States, authorities and stakeholder organisations through our working group on pollinators. We also continue to strongly support citizens’ engagement, especially youth engagement in actions for pollinators.

    Youth is our future and the future needs pollinators. That is why in the coming months we will launch the Young Citizens Assembly on Pollinators, the European Fund for Youth Action on Pollinators and ‘buzzing schools’. This is part of the pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. I thank you for your support and the overall commitment to the EU’s action on pollinators.

     
       

     

      Tomislav Sokol, u ime kluba PPE. – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, povjerenice, kolegice i kolege, Europska komisija je 2023. predstavila novi plan za oprašivače s ključnim ciljem preokrenuti alarmantan pad broja divljih kukaca oprašivača u Europi. Ova mjera nije samo ekološka, ona je duboko strateška. Bez oprašivača nema ni sigurnosti hrane ni zdravog okoliša. Podržavam ovu inicijativu i naglašavam važnost zaštite prirodnih staništa i poticanja biološke raznolikosti.

    Međutim, novi plan za oprašivače mora ići ruku pod ruku sa strategijom za europske pčelare koji svakodnevno vode borbu s nelojalnom konkurencijom, uvoznicima patvorenog i nekvalitetnog meda iz trećih zemalja, a tu su podaci porazni. Naime, prema istraživanjima, gotovo svaka druga staklenka meda na europskom tržištu sadrži krivotvoreni med. Naši pčelari koji proizvode kvalitetan prirodni med ne mogu konkurirati damping cijenama, nedefiniranim standardima i lažnim deklaracijama.

    Zato smo u prošlom mandatu izmjenom Direktive o medu uspjeli zabraniti zavaravajuće označavanje mješavina meda i uvesti obvezu navođenja točnog postotka i zemlju porijekla svake komponente mješavine meda. To je velik korak za transparentnost i zaštitu potrošača, ali i za opstanak naših pčelara.

    Međutim, ne smijemo stati na tome. Moramo koristiti trgovinske i carinske mehanizme, pojačati kontrole na granicama, uvesti strože nadzore uvoza i zatražiti uključivanje interesa pčelara u trgovinske sporazume s trećim državama.

    Također, novi plan za oprašivače neće biti djelotvoran bez borbe protiv upotrebe štetnih pesticida i novih genskih tehnika kojima ne smijemo dozvoliti da naruše sigurnost hrane i zdravlje potrošača. Zato je ključno poticati lokalnu proizvodnju hrane i prirodan uzgoj.

    S tim u vezi, treba već sada analizirati učinke strategije „od polja do stola”, za koju sam bio izvjestitelj Kluba EPP-a u odboru IMCO, i predložiti njezinu nadopunu u svjetlu izazova s kojima se pčelari susreću. Kolegice i kolege, zaštitimo pčele, ali i interese naših pčelara.

     
       

     

      Günther Sidl, im Namen der S&D-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, geschätzte Frau Kommissarin! Es ist höchste Zeit, dass wir hier im Europäischen Parlament wieder über die Bienen reden, denn die Biene ist eine der nützlichsten und wichtigsten Tierarten, die es gibt, und braucht unseren besonderen Schutz. Aber genau den hat sie derzeit leider nicht – im Gegenteil. Die Probleme, denen die Bienen gegenüberstehen, werden immer größer. Die milden Winter befördern das Milbenwachstum und damit die Krankheitsübertragung auf die Bienen, was alleine dieses Jahr zu immensen Verlusten geführt hat; Verlustraten von 30 % sind keine Seltenheit. Aber selbst die Bienenvölker, die den Winter überstehen, haben keine rosigen Aussichten, denn sie müssen sich ihre Nahrung zwischen immer größeren Monokulturen und pestizidbelasteten Pflanzen suchen. Kurz gesagt: So kann es nicht weitergehen!

    Wir brauchen endlich ein ernsthaftes Programm zum Schutz der Bienen. Ich bin froh, dass die EU‑Kommission dieses Thema aufgreift, aber ich hoffe, Sie verstehen, dass ich skeptisch bin. Denn bis jetzt war die Kommission nicht die große Beschützerin der Bienen, sonst hätte sie nicht ein ums andere Mal den Einsatz von Pestiziden wie Glyphosat zugelassen, sonst hätten Sie schon längst mit der Praxis der Notfallzulassungen für problematische Mittel aufgeräumt. Ich verstehe, dass Landwirte Ertragssicherheit brauchen, aber wenn wir das nur mit Mitteln erreichen, die den Bienen schaden, hat am Ende niemand etwas davon.

    Wir müssen endlich allen klarmachen, und es muss uns allen klar sein, dass Pestizide nicht die alleinige Lösung sind, sondern ein gravierendes Problem. Ein Problem, das sich überall festsetzt – in Böden, in Gewässern, in unserem Trinkwasser und letztlich auch in unserem Körper, und genau da haben Umweltgifte und Ewigkeitschemikalien nichts zu suchen. Suchen wir endlich nach einer Lösung, die allen hilft: der Natur, den Bienen und damit auch uns.

    Wir brauchen endlich eine europäische Forschungsstrategie für wirksame und ökologische Pestizidalternativen. Nur damit geben wir der Landwirtschaft neue Instrumente in die Hand, mit denen sie nachhaltig und ertragssicher arbeiten kann. Packen wir das Problem an den Wurzeln und geben wir unserer Umwelt eine echte Chance, sich zu erholen!

     
       

     

      Valérie Deloge, au nom du groupe PfE. – Madame la Présidente, Madame la Commissaire, chers collègues, la Commission européenne présente aujourd’hui un nouveau pacte pour les pollinisateurs. Le constat est partagé par tous. Les abeilles, les syrphes, les papillons disparaissent à un rythme inquiétant. Ce déclin fragilise notre agriculture, notre souveraineté alimentaire et la biodiversité en Europe. Mais à y regarder de plus près, ce texte reflète surtout les travers habituels de la technocratie bruxelloise: des objectifs déconnectés des réalités agricoles, une avalanche de directives et un transfert toujours plus massif de responsabilités des États membres vers l’Union européenne.

    On demande aux agriculteurs français de renoncer à certains traitements, d’intégrer des bandes fleuries, de diversifier leurs cultures et c’est une bonne chose si on les accompagne. Mais pendant ce temps, on continue d’importer sans vergogne des produits agricoles venus de pays qui utilisent des substances interdites chez nous. Où est la cohérence? Où est la justice?

    Soyons clairs protéger les pollinisateurs, c’est aussi défendre l’avenir de notre agriculture. Il ne s’agit pas de choisir entre les abeilles et les agriculteurs, mais de sortir de cette logique de punition et d’hypocrisie. La pollution qui menace les insectes pollinisateurs ne vient pas uniquement des champs. Elle vient aussi de l’air que nous respirons, des polluants persistants, des microplastiques, des métaux lourds et d’un effet cocktail de substances chimiques dont l’Union européenne ne mesure pas encore sérieusement les interactions. Ce sont autant de facteurs qui affaiblissent les insectes, mais aussi la santé humaine.

    Et là, le texte de la Commission reste timide. Il traite longuement des pesticides, mais presque rien n’est dit sur l’impact des grandes zones industrielles, de la pollution de l’air ou de la charge chimique globale. Or, les agriculteurs ne doivent pas devenir les boucs émissaires d’un système de production mondialisé qui échappe à tout contrôle. Il est temps de changer votre logiciel, inspirez-vous des États membres qui sont les plus vertueux en la matière, comme la France. Oubliez votre vision vision en silo et réfléchissez plutôt à une approche globale sur les polluants invisibles.

    Au delà des produits phytosanitaires, c’est toute la question de la qualité de notre air qui doit se poser. Soutenez les agriculteurs qui ont déjà pris conscience du problème et œuvrez déjà à protéger les habitats des pollinisateurs. Encouragez la recherche sur les alternatives aux intrants chimiques pour ne pas que nos agriculteurs se retrouvent privés de solutions. Il est temps de défendre à la fois nos agriculteurs et la biodiversité avec des politiques réalistes, cohérentes et souveraines.

     
       

     

      Thomas Waitz, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, Commissioner, yes, indeed, our pollinators are declining. And why is it so? It was just mentioned by the far right: it’s because of chemical pollution, because of pesticides. Well, the Commission came up with the so-called Sustainable Use Directive to reduce pesticides. But do you remember why it failed? It was very much on the right side of the House that the Sustainable Use Directive was actually killed here in the House. Yes, it was you guys. This would have been one of the main measures that we would have needed to take to reduce the decline of pollinators.

    And it’s not just honeybees – I’m a beekeeper and a farmer at the same time – it’s also about wild pollinators. The Commission – under the rule of simplification – has reduced the fallow land that we need for wild pollinators. Is there real support for organic farming? Because this is the way of farming that safeguards natural pollinators, wild pollinators and our bees as well.

    Is there real support for beekeepers in the European Union? Well, let’s see the new CAP proposal. We need real support for beekeepers because, due to climate crisis and pesticides, it’s harder and harder to keep a beekeeper’s business going. I can say that from my very own experience. But I’m ready to work on this, and I’m happy to contribute if there are concrete proposals to safeguard wild pollinators and bees.

     
       

     

      Sebastian Everding, im Namen der Fraktion The Left. – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Honigbienen haben für die Biodiversität keinerlei Relevanz. Auch wenn uns Schulbücher und Medien oftmals ein anderes Bild vermitteln und die meisten Menschen beim Wort Biene direkt an die Honigbiene denken: Diese ist nicht bedroht; allein in Deutschland sind rund 100 000 Imker um sie bemüht. Auf der anderen Seite steht die Hälfte der 561 Wildbienenarten als vom Aussterben bedroht auf der Roten Liste. Reden wir über Bestäuber, dann müssen wir schwerpunktmäßig über Wildbienen, über Wespen, Schmetterlinge und Fliegen reden. Honigbienen können diese maximal ergänzen, aber niemals ersetzen. Wenn sich Unternehmen Honigbienen aufs Dach stellen, ist das mehr Greenwashing als ein Beitrag zum Artenschutz.

    Viele Menschen haben die Problematik erkannt und möchten Insekten helfen. Sie kaufen gutgläubig sogenannte Insektenhotels, gefüllt mit Holzwolle, mit Tannenzapfen, mit Baumrinde, weil dies Natürlichkeit vermittelt. Aber diese sind ganz oft ein Fall für den Biomüll, werden nicht angenommen und können im schlimmsten Fall sogar Insekten schaden. Hier müssen ganz dringend nachvollziehbare Siegel für die Orientierung geschaffen werden.

    Vergesst Biene Maja, kümmert Euch um die Gehörnte Mauerbiene, die Dunkelfransige Hosenbiene, schafft Lebensräume und Blühstreifen und verbietet Pestizide wie Glyphosat!

     
       

     

      Marcin Sypniewski, w imieniu grupy ESN. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Szanowni Państwo! Nie wiem, czy widzieli państwo komedię „Człowiek kontra pszczoła” z Rowanem Atkinsonem w roli głównej. Tam główny bohater, goniąc jedną pszczołę, demoluje cały dom. A dzisiaj jednak to nie pszczoła przeszkadza człowiekowi, a człowiek, a konkretnie również unijna polityka, przeszkadza pszczołom. Pszczoła nie ma swojego biura w Brukseli. Nie zatrudnia żadnego lobbysty. Nie pisze sprawozdań i nie czeka na kolejną dyrektywę, na kolejny plan, kolejny ład. Ona po prostu żyje, zapyla i robi to, co umie najlepiej – wspiera naturę i daje ludziom zdrową żywność.

    Tymczasem w Unii tworzymy pakty, strategie, zielone łady, konsultacje, a zapominamy, że najlepszym sojusznikiem pszczoły nie jest żaden biurokrata, tylko po prostu pszczelarz i rolnik – ten, który wie, że bez zapylaczy nie będzie żadnych plonów. Chcecie ratować pszczoły, to przestańcie w końcu szkodzić rolnikom. Przestańcie wspierać konkurencję spoza Unii. Nie zamęczajcie ich kolejnymi regulacjami, zakazami i sprawozdawczością. Przestańcie karać ich za to, że chcą produkować żywność, a nie wypełniać arkusze Excela. Pszczoły potrzebują ciszy, spokoju, równowagi w krajobrazie, a nie chaosu legislacyjnego. Potrzebują lasów, łąk, pasiek, nie – Zielonego Ładu, który niszczy to, co miał chronić. Nie powielajmy scenariusza z filmu, w którym człowiek niszczy wszystko, żeby pozbyć się jednej pszczoły. Chrońmy naturę razem z tymi, którzy ją naprawdę rozumieją – z rolnikami i pszczelarzami.

     
       

     

      Liudas Mažylis (PPE). – Pirmininke, komisare, kolegos. Noriu pacituoti, ką šioje tribūnoje kalbėjau dėl apdulkintojų 2019 m. gruodžio 17 d.: „biologinės įvairovės nykimo prevencija turi būti grindžiama mokslu ir ambicingais, bet įvykdomais tikslais“. Taip pat griežtai siūliau Bee Guidance atnaujinimą ir jog naujoms augalų apsaugos priemonėms būtų vykdomi chroninio toksiškumo tyrimai. Tiriamas poveikis ne tik bitėms, bet ir kitiems apdulkintojams.

    Per tą laiką priimtas New Deal for Pollinators, atnaujintas Bee Guidance, o 2023-iaisiais Reglamentas dėl gamtos atkūrimo suteikė apdulkintojams – tarp jų ir bitėms – teisinį apsaugos statusą. Tai reikšmingas žingsnis, kuris įpareigoja valstybes nares stebėti jų populiacijas pagal standartizuotą metodiką; iki 2030 m. turi būti sustabdytas apdulkintojų nykimas, vėliau – užtikrintas jų tvarus gausėjimas. Svarbus klausimas – Europos raudonasis sąrašas bitėms. Jis turi būti atnaujintas ir atspindėti dabartines rūšių būklės tendencijas. Be kita ko, minėtam tikslui grėsmę kelia invazinės rūšys. Tokios rūšies kaip Azijos vapsva viena kolonija per sezoną gali sunaikinti iki 90 tūkstančių apdulkintojų. Tad jau būtų laikas imtis atitinkamų veiksmų, grįstų rizikos vertinimu. Pesticidų atveju žiediniai bandymai vienišėms bitėms yra žingsnis pirmyn, tačiau vis dar trūksta ilgalaikių tyrimų kolonijų lygmeniu. Subletaliniai ir chroniniai poveikiai, deja, tebelieka neįvertinti. O juk tik visapusiški tyrimai suteiks galimybę priimti mokslu pagrįstus sprendimus. Teigiamai vertinu tai, kad duomenų bazės apie bites tampa vis plačiau prieinamos ir vis dėlto jos turi būti ne tik atviros, bet ir išsamios, nuolat atnaujinamos bei integruotos į sprendimų priėmimą – tiek sudarant Europos raudonąjį bičių sąrašą, tiek planuojant buveinių atkūrimą. Pasikartosiu, kad tik remdamiesi patikimais moksliniais duomenimis galime pasiekti savo tikslų ir sustabdyti bičių nykimą.

     
       

     

      Maria Noichl (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Ja, die Kommission ist derzeit unterwegs mit einem Banner „Bienenschutz″; dieses Banner „Bienenschutz“ soll ganz oben stehen. Es ist aber wichtig zu sagen, dass die jüngsten Vorschläge der Kommission zur europäischen Agrarpolitik genau im Gegensatz stehen. Bienenpolitik wird nicht in Ihrem Ausschuss oder in Ihrer Kommission gemacht, sondern Bienenpolitik – die echte Bienenpolitik – wird im Agrarausschuss gemacht. Wenn im Agrarausschuss weiterhin Deregulierung voranschreitet, wenn im Agrarausschuss weiterhin die Bestäuber-, die Biodiversitätsstrategie und andere Dinge, aber auch die Naturwiederherstellungsrichtlinie an die Wand gefahren werden – denn die wird momentan massiv angegriffen im Agrarausschuss –, wenn die Vereinfachungspakete keine Vereinfachungspakete, sondern Bienenangriffspakete sind, dann merken wir, dass der Agrarausschuss der Ausschuss ist, der für die Bienengesundheit zu sorgen hat.

    Wir alle wissen, dass die Hauptursache für den Rückgang der Bienen die landwirtschaftliche Intensivhaltung ist. Wir alle wissen, dass die Aufgabe der extensiven landwirtschaftlichen Systeme ein Problem ist, dass der Klimawandel, aber auch die invasiven Arten, die Urbanisierung und die Intensivierung der Forstwirtschaft alles Gründe sind. Diesen Gründen wird man nur zuvorkommen.

    Man wird die Bienen nicht mit kleinen Bienen‑Hotspots, sondern nur mit einer flächendeckenden, guten, nachhaltigen Landwirtschaft in ganz Europa unterstützen können. Deswegen: Bienenpolitik ist Landwirtschaftspolitik, Landwirtschaftspolitik ist Bienenpolitik. Ein großes Banner oben drüber hilft uns nichts, wir brauchen es jeden Tag.

     
       

     

      Tilly Metz (Verts/ALE). – Frau Präsidentin! Der Schutz von Bienen und anderen Bestäubern muss eine Priorität für die EU sein. 78 % der heimischen Pflanzenarten und 84 % der Nutzpflanzen sind entweder teilweise oder vollständig auf Insekten zur Bestäubung angewiesen, aber wenn wir so weitermachen wie bisher, fördern wir den dramatischen Rückgang von bestäubenden Wildinsekten massiv. Die öffentliche Meinung ist eindeutig. Mit der erfolgreichen Europäischen Bürgerinitiative Save bees and farmers fordern Bürgerinnen und Bürger eine bienenfreundliche Landwirtschaft, frei von giftigen Pestiziden, nicht nur der Bienen wegen, sondern wegen der Zukunft von Landwirtinnen und Landwirten, die auf ein funktionierendes Ökosystem angewiesen sind.

    Klimawandel, der Verlust und die Verschlechterung der Lebensräume, massive Auswirkungen von Pestiziden auf die Umwelt, auf unsere Gesundheit – das sind alles Phänomene, die mit konservativen Politiken und Handlungsunwilligkeit nicht angegangen werden können. Wir brauchen einen zukunftsgerichteten EU‑Pakt für Bestäuber, eine gemeinsame Agrarpolitik, die für Landwirtinnen und Landwirte und die Umwelt funktioniert, und klare Vorschriften zur Pestizidreduzierung.

     
       

     

      Valentina Palmisano (The Left). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, le api, oltre ad essere preziosi impollinatori, sono sentinelle della salute ambientale. Quando spariscono è l’intero ecosistema a lanciare un grido d’allarme. Oggi quel grido è fortissimo. A novembre 2023 questo Parlamento ha accolto con favore il nuovo patto europeo per gli impollinatori e oggi dobbiamo dare seguito a quell’impegno.

    Le principali minacce degli impollinatori sono ben conosciute: l’agricoltura intensiva, l’uso dei pesticidi, la perdita di habitat, così come sono conosciute anche le misure per contrastarle. Serve solo il coraggio politico di applicarle con coerenza e in tempi rapidi. Dobbiamo incentivare pratiche agricole amiche delle api, rafforzare la tutela degli apicoltori nella PAC, limitare l’uso di pesticidi, salvaguardare gli impollinatori selvatici, rafforzare il programma LIFE, che già oggi finanzia degli strumenti efficaci per proteggere gli habitat e le biodiversità.

    Ci sono anche esperienze urbane da valorizzare, ad esempio il progetto UrBees, nato a Torino, dimostra che le api possono aiutarci a monitorare l’ambiente e a costruire comunità più consapevoli.

    Ecco, proteggere gli impollinatori significa proteggere l’equilibrio tra natura, agricoltura e salute pubblica. È una responsabilità che ci riguarda tutti. Oggi abbiamo gli strumenti e il dovere per agire.

     
       

     

      Anja Arndt (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Der neue Deal für Bestäuber ist der nächste zentralistische Irrsinn aus Brüssel. Dieselbe Kommission, die Landwirte mit Auflagen überschüttet, vernichtet mit ihrer eigenen Energiewende selbst massenhaft Insekten. Jedes Windrad tötet jedes Jahr 40 Millionen Insekten, und wir haben in der Europäischen Union 280 000 Windräder. Unsere Windkraftanlagen töten also jedes Jahr hochgerechnet 9 Billionen Insekten. Bevor Brüssel neue Vorschriften erlässt, sollte die Kommission ihre eigenen Fehler kritisch aufarbeiten.

    Der neue Deal für Bestäuber ist nichts anderes als ein weiteres Bürokratiemonster, das nationale Kompetenzen ignoriert und Landwirte drangsaliert. Statt echter Hilfe soll ein teures, EU‑weites Überwachungssystem eingeführt werden, ohne praktischen Nutzen für Insekten. Gleichzeitig will man die Pestizideinsätze einfach mal pauschal halbieren, und das wurde hier schon angesprochen, dass das letztes Jahr zum Glück abgewendet wurde. Ohne Rücksicht auf die Landwirte soll das geschehen, regionale Unterschiede sollen nicht berücksichtigt werden oder die Ernährungssicherheit unserer Bürger.

    So etwas muss gestoppt werden. Deutschland braucht deshalb die AfD, und Europa braucht die ESN.

    (Die Rednerin lehnt eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ von Lukas Sieper ab.)

     
       

     

      Pär Holmgren (Verts/ALE). – Fru talman! Här står jag, klockan är ganska exakt halv fyra på torsdagseftermiddagen. Jag är näst sista talaren i den sista debatten i Strasbourg den här veckan, om något så extremt viktigt som bin och pollinering.

    Det är verkligen pollinering och andra liknande ekosystemtjänster som är helt avgörande för vår matförsörjning, för att vi ska kunna arbeta med klimatanpassning och faktiskt också för att vi ska kunna lindra effekterna av själva den globala uppvärmningen i sig.

    Men de allra flesta av mina kollegor är på väg hem. Många sitter säkert redan på sina flygplan på väg till sina hemländer. En torsdag eftermiddag som det här så blir det för mig, och säkert för många andra gröna, mer övertydligt än vanligt, att det är i princip inga andra av mina kollegor som bryr sig om de här helt grundläggande, viktiga existentiella frågorna: klimat, biologisk mångfald, pollinering, ekosystemtjänster.

    Vi måste se till att försörja och försvara dem så att vi faktiskt har ett fungerande samhälle även i framtiden.

     
       

     

      Younous Omarjee (The Left). – Madame la Présidente, Madame la commissaire, elles ne parlent pas, mais sans elles, le monde se tairait. Et pourtant, déjà les abeilles meurent massivement et leur bourdonnement s’épuise dans le vacarme de nos pesticides et d’un choix d’un modèle agricole productiviste et intensif dont nous savons aujourd’hui qu’il faut tourner la page. Chaque ruche qui se vide, c’est un champ qui s’épuise. Une fleur qui ne fructifie pas et, en totalité, une promesse de vie qui s’évanouit. Les abeilles tissent en vol l’équilibre du vivant, des couleurs et des saisons aussi.

    J’appelle donc la Commission européenne à ne pas céder au sabordage du Pacte vert européen et à bannir les substances les plus dangereuses et à soutenir les pratiques agroécologiques. Il est tout à fait vital que les insectes demeurent, il est vital d’interdire ce qui les tue, d’aimer et de protéger ce qui permet la vie.

     
       

       

    Spontane Wortmeldungen

     
       

     

      Alexander Jungbluth (ESN). – Sehr geehrte Frau Präsidentin, danke für das erhaltene Wort! Ich möchte mich ganz kurz auf Herrn Waitz beziehen. Herr Waitz hat ja eben angedeutet, dass irgendwie die Rechten schuld seien, dass die Bienen sterben; belegt haben Sie das Ganze irgendwie nicht. Deshalb möchte ich Ihnen einmal etwas belegen, nämlich, es gibt ja eine Studie des Zentrums für Luft‑ und Raumfahrttechnik (DLR), geschrieben von Herrn Dr. Franz Trieb, und Herr Dr. Franz Trieb hat in dieser Studie festgestellt, dass im Jahr durchschnittlich etwa 1200 Tonnen Insekten durch Windräder sterben. Wir sprechen hier von Milliarden von Insekten, die jährlich durch Windräder sterben. Insofern möchte ich an dieser Stelle einmal feststellen: Grüne Politik ist eben nicht nur für die Wirtschaft tödlich, sondern eben leider auch für Bienen.

     
       

     

      Lukas Sieper (NI). – Frau Präsidentin, liebe Menschen Europas! Ich persönlich finde in diesem Europäischen Parlament immer die Debatten am interessantesten, wo sich eigentlich alle einig sind, wo aber auch gleichzeitig der allergrößte Unsinn erzählt wird. Alle sind sich hier einig, dass die Bienen gerettet werden müssen, auf die eine oder die andere Art. Manche sagen, die Landwirtschaft ist schuld, andere sagen, die Pestizide sind schuld.

    Frau Kommissarin, ich möchte Ihnen ganz kurz sagen: Das, was ich am besten finde an dem Vorschlag, den Sie da machen, ist die urbane Begrünung. Denn das ist ja der Lebensraum, aus dem wir die Tiere quasi komplett vertrieben haben, und wenn wir da wieder ein bisschen mehr Grün in die Städte holen – das ist nicht nur für die mentale Gesundheit der Menschen gut, das ist auch für die Natur gut. Also möchte ich, da sich eigentlich alle einig sind, das Haus hier dazu aufrufen, ein bisschen mehr diese ideologischen Grabenkämpfe sein zu lassen.

    Das Witzigste, was ich gehört habe, der größte Schuss ist das mit den Windrädern. Es ist wirklich so dermaßen bescheuert zu sagen, Windräder sind böse, weil dadurch Tiere sterben. Rechnen Sie doch mal durch, wenn Sie so gerne mit Zahlen um sich schmeißen, wie viele Tiere sterben, wenn der Klimawandel einmal so richtig reinknallt bei uns! Dann ist nämlich gar nichts mehr mit der Biodiversität. Also, stehen wir zusammen, halten wir uns an die Ratio! Schönes Wochenende!

     
       

     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Nie jestem ani skrajnym prawicowcem, ani skrajnym lewicowcem. Jestem zwyczajnie konserwatystą. Konserwatyści mają spokojne spojrzenie na to wszystko, co dzieje się wokół nas. Bardzo lubimy mądrych rolników, mądrych pszczelarzy, mądrych naukowców, tych, którzy są także praktykami, którzy potrafią wnosić swoje doświadczenie do oceny każdej sytuacji.

    I tu chcę zwrócić uwagę Państwa na wielką niekonsekwencję Unii Europejskiej. Mianowicie, jeśli dzisiaj otwieramy w Unii Europejskiej rynek na produkty z Ameryki Południowej, to pamiętajmy, że tam są karczowane lasy, tam są niszczone łąki, gdzie właśnie są siedliska zapylaczy. I tam będą ginąć te zapylacze. Tam będzie przyrost pestycydów. A my będziemy mówić, że mamy żywność z Ameryki Południowej w ramach umowy z Merkosurem. To jest wielki błąd i myślę, że wszystkie środowiska też na to powinny zwrócić uwagę. Słuchajmy mądrych rolników, mądrych pszczelarzy. Życie będzie lepsze.

     
       

       

    (Ende der spontanen Wortmeldungen)

     
       

     

      Ekaterina Zaharieva, Member of the Commission. – Frau Präsidentin, dear Members of the Parliament, thank you once again for your continuous commitment to advance the implementation of the new deal of pollinators.

    It’s really a game changer, this new deal, and we are at a crucial moment of its implementation. I think we need to keep the momentum, ensuring that the Member States and the stakeholders continue implementing the actions that we agreed. We are not there yet, unfortunately: 2030 is not far away and we have a long way to go to stop – and ultimately reverse – the decline of pollinators in the EU.

    Societal expectations are high: the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Save bees and farmers’ – which gathered more than 1 million statements of support – has sent us a clear message, which is: ‘act now, act decisively’.

    The Commission is committed to meet those expectations, and for that, we need your support.

     
       

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die Aussprache ist geschlossen.

     

    9. Oral explanations of vote (Rule 201)

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Als nächster Punkt der Tagesordnung folgen die Erklärungen zur Abstimmung.

     

    9.1. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (A10-0091/2025 – Anna Stürgkh)

     

      Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, toimivat sähköverkot pitävät Euroopan turvallisena. Ilman niitä huoltovarmuutemme ja resilienssimme romahtaisivat. Rajatylittävällä sähkönjakelulla on tässä myös tärkeä rooli. Toimivuudesta vastaavat kuitenkin aina jäsenvaltiot itse – jäsenvaltiot, jotka vieläpä osaavat hoitaa jakelunsa esimerkillisen loistokkaasti.

    Fingridin tilastojen mukaan kantaverkkojen luotettavuusaste Suomessa oli viime vuonna 99,9995 prosenttia – päätähuimaavan hieno luku. Olisiko se ollut näin korkea, jos sähköverkoista olisikin vastanneet virkamiehet Brysselissä eikä Suomen olosuhteet parhaiten tuntevat kotimaiset toimijat? Ei varmasti, sanon minä.

    Kaikkein parasta Euroopan huoltovarmuudelle on antaa jäsenvaltioiden hoitaa asiansa ja tehdä sellaista kansainvälistä yhteistyötä, mistä kaikki osapuolet varmasti hyötyvät. Tämän vuoksi päätin äänestää esitystä vastaan, sillä vaikka siirtäisimmekin sähköä kauas, tulee päätäntävallan säilyä lähellä.

     

     

      Cristian Terheş (ECR). – Doamnă președintă, stimați colegi, m-am abținut la votul privind rezoluția Clean Industrial Deal pentru că, deși conține câteva idei aparent bune, nu abordează cauza reală a scumpirii energiei în UE. Sub lozinci înșelătoare precum „energie verde”, „regenerabilă” sau „decarbonizare”, se ascund politici ideologice care au transformat Europa în regiunea cu cea mai scumpă energie din lume. Așa zisa decarbonizare accelerată s-a făcut, în fapt, prin închiderea accelerată a capacităților tradiționale de producție energetică pe bază de cărbune sau gaz, ce nu au fost înlocuite cu surse stabile, sustenabile și accesibile de energie.

    Energia solară sau eoliană, pretins curată, se produce intermitent. Ce să facă europenii însă când nu e soare sau când nu bate vântul? Mai grav, s-au respins amendamente în acest raport care recunoșteau energia nucleară drept curată. După ce Germania și-a închis centralele atomice, acum importă energie din Franța, produsă în centrale atomice. Aceasta nu e tranziție verde, ci o sinucidere economică a Europei, asistată politic și birocratic de la Bruxelles.

    Sub pretextul „verdelui”, distrugeți competitivitatea Europei pe altarul unei iluzii de sorginte marxistă, care a împins și condamnat deja milioane de europeni la sărăcie. Opriți această nebunie utopică înainte să fie prea târziu!

     
       

     

      Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR). – Arvoisa puhemies, tänään meillä oli pitkä lista äänestettävänä erilaisia tarkistuksia Clean Industrial Deal -päätöslauselmaan ja jouduin pettymään. Olisin odottanut, että tämä olisi ollut paljon kunnianhimoisempi teollisuuden hyväksi ja teollisuuden palauttamiseksi Eurooppaan.

    Viime kaudella puhuttiin Green Dealistä. Huomattiin, että siinä mentiin pikkaisen väärään suuntaan nimenomaan teollisuuden näkökulmasta, ja tällä kaudella nyt sitten ollaan puhuttu tästä Clean Industrial Dealistä. Mutta tässä päätöslauselmassa, jota käsiteltiin tänään ja josta äänestettiin, oli niin paljon – kuten harmikseni jouduin huomaamaan – vihreätä agendaa, vääränlaista ideologista agendaa, ei markkinaehtoista säätelyä, että valitettavasti jouduin tulemaan siihen johtopäätökseen, että en voi tämän paperin puolesta äänestää. Ehkä ensi kaudella me voimme saada päätöslauselman nimeltään pelkästään Industrial Deal.

     

    10. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)

       

    (Schriftliche Erklärungen zur Abstimmung werden auf die den Mitgliedern vorbehaltenen Seiten auf der Website des Parlaments aufgenommen.)

     

    11. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Das Protokoll dieser Sitzung wird dem Parlament zu Beginn der nächsten Sitzung zur Genehmigung vorgelegt.

    Wenn es keine Einwände gibt, werde ich die in der heutigen Sitzung angenommenen Entschließungen den in diesen Entschließungen genannten Personen und Gremien übermitteln.

     

    12. Dates of the next part-session

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Die nächste Tagung findet vom 7. bis zum 10. Juli 2025 in Straßburg statt.

     

    13. Closure of the sitting

       

    (Die Sitzung wird um 15.41 Uhr geschlossen.)

     

    14. Adjournment of the session

     

      Die Präsidentin. – Ich erkläre die Sitzungsperiode des Europäischen Parlaments für unterbrochen.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Rise of global food insecurity – E-001091/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU delivers a comprehensive response to global food insecurity[1]. Between 2021 and 2024, it provided EUR 4.9 billion in emergency food assistance and supported the restoration of supply chains through the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes[2], which have enabled the export of approximately 84 million tonnes of grain, reaching global markets — including Africa — and backed the Ukrainian ‘Grain from Ukraine’ humanitarian initiative.

    Additionally, with EUR 3.4 billion in food autonomy, the EU is advancing a rights-based approach, land rights and agriculture under the Global Gateway[3] framework.

    Through multilateral efforts, it promotes transparent and fair trade for food and nutrition security — ensuring that its implementing partners safeguard beneficiaries from violence, coercion, deprivation and abuse.

    The United States (U.S.) has been an ally in the fight against global hunger. In September 2022, similarly to the EU, the U.S. allocated USD 2.9 billion in aid for food insecurity, adding to the USD 6.9 billion it had already committed. In 2024, the U.S. was the largest contributor to World Food Programme operations.

    There has recently been a shift in the U.S. administration’s approach and the U.S. made no commitments at the recent Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit[4] in March 2025. Given the current U.S. position, it is challenging at the moment to identify opportunities for future joint action.

    The EU emphasises the selection of reliable, evidence-based food security initiatives, capturing early warnings and market fluctuations.

    Amid growing resource constraints, the EU enhances coordination with global partners, in a Team Europe approach. Strengthening multilateral partnerships can prevent duplication and ensure targeted interventions.

    • [1] Council conclusions of 16 December 2024: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16901-2024-INIT/en/pdf; List of Council conclusions — Consilium: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/public-register/council-concl/?page=2.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en.
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway_en.
    • [4] EU pledges EUR 3.4 billion to combat global malnutrition at 2025 N4G Paris Summit: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_867 and Team Europe pledges EUR 6.5 billion at N4G Paris Summit to fight global malnutrition: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/team-europe-pledges-eu65-billion-n4g-paris-summit-fight-global-malnutrition-2025-03-28_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group increases 2025 financing ceiling to record €100 billion to step up investments in security and defence, energy grids and Europe’s tech leadership

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The 27 Member States endorse plan to increase new financing to record of up to €100 billion in 2025.
    • Revised ceiling includes 3.5% of total financing for European security and defence. EIB Board also approves landmark project for construction of military base in Lithuania.
    • EIB Group shareholders launch largest EU programme to fund Europe’s technological leadership and approve first wave of new instruments to support cleantech.
    • EIF Board approves deal with German Export Credit Agency to provide a pan-European guarantee for companies trading with Ukraine.

    The shareholders of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, the EU Member States, approved a record-high financing ceiling of €100 billion for this year and new programmes to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, technological leadership and security.

    The EIB Board of Governors, made up of European Union Finance Ministers, endorsed the 2025 financing ceiling at a meeting today in Luxembourg. The Boards of Directors of the EIB and of the European Investment Fund (EIF) gave the green light earlier this week to the increase in financing for security and defence, energy grids and the new TechEU programme to boost Europe’s technological leadership. They also approved flagship projects including to support Ukraine’s economy and the construction of a major military base in Lithuania.

    “The unanimous support of our shareholders, the 27 Member States, for our proposals to provide record financing for defence, energy security and tech leadership, shows the key role of the EIB Group to support Europe’s strategic priorities,” said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño. “In a world where everything everywhere is changing all at once, the EU is a beacon of clarity, confidence and stability.”

    The EIB Group’s new 2025 financing ceiling of €100 billion follows a mid-year review of the organisation’s operational plan, which includes an increase to 3.5% of total financing for the European security and defence sector, record financing of more than €11 billion for power grids and storage in Europe, and greater support for EU technological and industrial innovation.

    TechEU programme

    The EIB Group is launching the EU’s largest financing programme to date in support of innovation and tech leadership to attract talent, capital and investment in Europe. TechEU will provide €70 billion in EIB Group equity, quasi-equity, loans and guarantees in 2025-2027 and crowd in private capital to generate at least €250 billion in investments.

    TechEU is complementing the “Startup and Scaleup Strategy” of the European Commission to support higher risk projects and innovative companies throughout their investment journey.  

    TechEU provides more support for supercomputing, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, critical raw materials, green industries such as offshore wind, health, security and defence technologies, robotics and advanced materials. It will target innovative companies at every stage of their development – from initial ideas to stock listings.

    Clean Industrial Deal

    The EIB Board has also approved the first wave of instruments under TechEU to support Europe’s leadership in cleantech, in line with the EU Clean Industrial Deal, including the reinforcement of cross guarantees for wind energy production, and three new instruments to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness:

    • A €1.5 billion package to provide counter-guarantees through partner banks to grid component manufacturers to ensure sustainable supply, giving companies greater certainty to ramp up production of electricity networks across Europe. This will facilitate the integration of renewable energy into the grid and the delivery of affordable power to EU businesses and households. 
    •  To help ensure predictable and affordable energy costs for businesses and accelerate investments in green energy, the EIB and European Commission are launching a €500 million pilot programme to support the take-up of more corporate power purchase agreements (PPAs). The EIB will counter-guarantee, through partner banks, part of the PPAs undertaken by mid-sized as well as larger energy-intensive companies for the long-term purchase of electricity generation from clean sources.
    • To provide liquidity and working capital for highly innovative small and medium-sized enterprises active in developing green technologies, the EIB and Commission are launching a €250 million CleantechEU guarantee scheme.
    • A €1.5 billion top-up to a successful EIB programme supporting European wind turbine and component manufacturers.

    New chairs

    Czech Finance Minister Zbyněk Stanjura will take over as new chair of the Board of Governors for one year with immediate effect.  

    “The EIB has a key role in supporting European priorities from defence to energy security or affordable housing,” said Czech Finance Minister Zbyněk Stanjura. “I am delighted to take over the chair of the Board of Governors. I look forward to working closely with President Calviño and other EU Finance Ministers to support the EIB, as it steps up its activities to help tackle the many challenges Europe is facing.”

    “The EIB has impressively demonstrated its ability to support European objectives in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment and to effectively fulfil its increasing responsibilities in support of security and defence, green and digital transitions and economic growth in Europe, while safeguarding bank’s operational and financial position,” said Bulgarian Finance Minister Temenuzhka Petkova, who chaired the Board of Governors during the past 12 months. “I would like to express my appreciation to President Calviño, the institution and send my best wishes to the new chair, my dear colleague Zbyněk Stanjura.”

    The Board of Governors also welcomed Katja Pluto as new chair of the Audit Committee, succeeding Nuno Gracias Fernandes. In addition, the Audit Committee presented its annual report.

    Energy security, defence and global partnerships

    Before the Board of Governors, this week’s EIB and EIF Boards of Directors approved new operations totalling €12.8 billion to strengthen Europe’s defence capabilities, competitiveness, energy security and partnerships worldwide. This includes initiatives under the EIB Group Clean Industrial Deal package and support for the development in Lithuania of the Rūdninkai military base, for the German Bundeswehr brigade, a key project to enhance North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations and regional security.

    The EIB Board approved three solar photovoltaic plants in Romania, water infrastructure in Ireland and the Netherlands, electricity grids in Germany and education facilities in Finland. In addition, the EIB is strengthening Europe’s global partnerships by backing renewable energy in Colombia, sustainable waterway transport in Nigeria and water sanitation services in Tanzania.

    The European Investment Fund (EIF) Board approved a guarantee transaction with the German national export credit agency to strengthen support for German companies exporting to Ukraine, as well as two guarantee transactions with Ukrainian banks to improve access to finance for more than 1,500 Ukrainian businesses. This follows the first signature in May with the Danish Export Credit Agency to provide a pan-European guarantee for companies exporting to Ukraine.

    In addition, the EIF approved investments in four infrastructure funds that will support greenfield data centres, wireless and fibre investments, decarbonization of the shipping sector, sustainable mobility, and student housing.

    Statements around the EIB Board of Governors will be available on EBS.

    Background information  

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. The EIB finances investments in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.   

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.     

    By fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the EU targets cohesion regions, where per-capita income is below the EU average, while almost 60% of annual EIB Group investments supports climate action and environmental sustainability. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the organisation’s headquarters for media use are available here.  

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – SEDE meets with Moldovan Minister of Defence and NATO Military Committee Chair – Committee on Security and Defence

    Source: European Parliament

    SEDE meeting 26 June 2025 © Adobe Stock

    Following up on SEDE’s recent visit to the Republic of Moldova, SEDE Members will host on 26 June, Anatolie Nosatîi, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Moldova, to discuss the latest security and defence developments in the country, in particular the spill-over of Russia’s ongoing military aggression against Ukraine and increased hybrid war activities. They will also talk about EU-Moldova security and defence cooperation, which has significantly increased over the years, namely

    through European Peace Facility assistance and the EU Partnership Mission. On the same day, the Chair of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, will address the SEDE Committee. In the context of important summits this week, including the NATO Hague Summit, discussions will focus on strengthening European security in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the critical importance of EU-NATO pillars for a the Transatlantic Alliance. This exchange of view will be held in association with the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Ellomay Capital Announces the Closing of the Investment by Clal Insurance in Ellomay Capital’s 198 MW Italian Solar Portfolio

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ellomay Capital Ltd. (NYSE American; TASE: ELLO) (“Ellomay” or the “Company”), a renewable energy and power generator and developer of renewable energy and power projects in Europe, Israel and the USA, today announced the closing of the investment transaction with  Clal Insurance Company Ltd. (“Clal”), a leading Israeli institutional investor, in the Company’s 198 MW solar portfolio of operating projects and projects under construction and development in Italy. In consideration for its investment in the Italian solar portfolio, Clal received a 49% interest in the portfolio.

    For more information concerning the transaction and agreements with Clal, including the warrant to purchase ordinary shares of the Company issued to Clal upon consummation of the transaction, see Item 4 of the Company’s annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2024, submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 30, 2025.

    Ran Fridrich, CEO and a board member of Ellomay, commented: “We are pleased to announce the successful consummation of our collaboration with Clal on the 198 MW Italian solar portfolio. This transaction marks a significant milestone in Ellomay’s strategic growth and development plan. We see this partnership with Clal as a strong vote of confidence in Ellomay’s vision, its portfolio, and its leadership team. We extend our sincere thanks to both teams for their dedication and hard work in bringing this complex transaction to a successful close.”

    About Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Ellomay is an Israeli based company whose shares are listed on the NYSE American and on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “ELLO”. Since 2009, Ellomay focuses its business in the renewable energy and power sectors in Europe, the USA and Israel.

    To date, Ellomay has evaluated numerous opportunities and invested significant funds in the renewable, clean energy and natural resources industries in Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Texas, USA, including:

    • Approximately 335.9 MW of operating solar power plants in Spain (including a 300 MW solar plant in owned by Talasol, which is 51% owned by the Company) and 51% of approximately 38 MW of operating solar power plants in Italy;
    • 9.375% indirect interest in Dorad Energy Ltd., which owns and operates one of Israel’s largest private power plants with production capacity of approximately 850MW, representing about 6%-8% of Israel’s total current electricity consumption;
    • Groen Gas Goor B.V., Groen Gas Oude-Tonge B.V. and Groen Gas Gelderland B.V., project companies operating anaerobic digestion plants in the Netherlands, with a green gas production capacity of approximately 3 million, 3.8 million and 9.5 million Nm3 per year, respectively;
    • 83.333% of Ellomay Pumped Storage (2014) Ltd., which is involved in a project to construct a 156 MW pumped storage hydro power plant in the Manara Cliff, Israel;
    • 51% of solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 160 MW that commenced construction processes;
    • Solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 134 MW that have reached “ready to build” status; and
    • Solar projects in the Dallas Metropolitan area, Texas, USA with an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW that connected to the grid and additional 22 MW that are under construction.

    For more information about Ellomay, visit http://www.ellomay.com.

    Information Relating to Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial risks and uncertainties, including statements that are based on the current expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release regarding the Company’s plans and objectives, expectations and assumptions of management are forward-looking statements. The use of certain words, including the words “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “expect,” “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the Company’s forward-looking statements. Various important factors could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those that may be expressed or implied by the Company’s forward-looking statements, including changes in electricity prices and demand, regulatory changes increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in the supply and prices of resources required for the operation of the Company’s facilities (such as waste and natural gas) and in the price of oil, the impact of the war and hostilities in Israel and Gaza, the impact of the continued military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, technical and other disruptions in the operations or construction of the power plants owned by the Company and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. These and other risks and uncertainties associated with the Company’s business are described in greater detail in the filings the Company makes from time to time with Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F. The forward-looking statements are made as of this date and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Contact:
    Kalia Rubenbach (Weintraub)
    CFO
    Tel: +972 (3) 797-1111
    Email: hilai@ellomay.com

    The MIL Network –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Additional funding for the Migration and Asylum Pact – P-001446/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission adopted a decision to provide a total of EUR 3 billion from the thematic facility under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)[1] and the thematic facility under the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (BMVI)[2].

    The purpose is to support Member States in the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and in hosting displaced persons from Ukraine.

    In addition, Member States eligible to receive additional mid-term allocations under the AMIF[3] and the BMVI[4] programmes may use those additional resources to address their specific needs, including in relation to the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum.

    It is for the Member States to determine the co-financing rates for the EU contribution, which can vary from 75% to 100% across the different types of actions implemented under their programmes.

    The Commission will receive information on the level of co-financing from each Member State once the amended national programmes are approved.

    The Commission is supporting the Member States and is in close and continued dialogue with national authorities at various levels to translate the provisions of the Pact on Migration and Asylum into practice.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Decision of 8.5.2025 amending Implementing Decision C(2022) 8340 final on the financing of components of the Thematic Facility under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and adoption of the Work Programme for 2023, 2024 and 2025, C(2025)2688 final, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/fd09746e-956c-4f67-81df-574fc127e4cd_en?filename=AMIF-eighth-revised-2023-2025-work-programme-substantial_en.pdf.
    • [2] Commission Implementing Decision of 8.5.2025 amending Implementing Decision C(2022) 8993 final on the financing of the components of the Thematic Facility under the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, and adoption of the work programme for the years 2023, 2024 and 2025, C(2025)2696 final, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/536832ee-6088-4d79-97e4-e18be84f7360_en?filename=BMVI-sixth-revised-2023-2025-work-programme-substantial_en.pdf.
    • [3] Commission Implementing Decision of 25.4.2025 on the mid-term allocations for 2025, 2026 and 2027 for Member States’ programmes under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund established by Regulation (EU)2021/1147 of the European Parliament and the Council, C(2025)1750 final, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/62751ea0-57df-4f0d-ad0a-3b07d0bbc947_en?filename=AMIF-BMVI-ISF-mid-term-allocations-per-MS-for-2025-2026-2027_en.pdf.
    • [4] Commission Implementing Decision of 25.4.2025 on the mid-term allocations for 2025, 2026 and 2027 for Member States’ programmes under the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2025)1800 final, DECISION on the mid-term allocations for 2025, 2026 and 2027 for Member States’ programmes under the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Violation of EU sanctions against Solovyev by Italian news platforms – E-001677/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Persons subject to individual restrictive measures (sanctions), including the Russian journalist mentioned in the question, are subject to an asset freeze, a prohibition to receive funds or economic resources and a travel ban[1].

    The Commission oversees the implementation of EU sanctions as per Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014[2]. The enforcement of sanctions is primarily the responsibility of national authorities, and the Commission supports Member States in their efforts to ensure compliance, including through monitoring, the issuance of guidance and continuous information-exchange with the relevant national competent authorities of the Member States. Member States shall take all necessary steps to ensure adherence to EU sanctions in their jurisdiction.

    The EU is taking a number of initiatives aimed at promoting media pluralism and tackling pro-Russian disinformation. These include inter alia the European Democracy Action Plan[3], the enforcement of the Digital Services Act[4] and the EU vs Disinfo platform[5].

    On the sanctions side, some Russian media outlets are already subject to a broadcasting ban according to Article 2f of Council Regulation 833/2014[6] as they have been instrumental in preparing and supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and for their participation in Russia’s systematic information manipulation and disinformation under the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the Russian Federation.

    Any restrictive measure falls under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and must be agreed unanimously by the Council.

    • [1] Article 2, Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014; https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014R0269-20250316.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj/eng.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ga/ip_20_2250.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:4625430.
    • [5] https://euvsdisinfo.eu/.
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 20, 2025
  • Resilient and rising: India in global economic big league

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    If we compare growth projections with actual data, Indian economy looks all set to achieve milestones well ahead of schedule. The journey to become the world’s fourth-largest economy, to graduate to third-largest and, ultimately, to attain developed-nation status now appears firmly on track for the coming years.

    The projections-versus-reality data confirm the resilience of its economy, putting it on the growth track, be it swift recovery after the COVID-19 crisis and its global after-effects or other global conflict points. The resilience gives Indian economy a positive push needed for the economic surge. India has emerged as the fastest-growing major economy, keeping inflation largely in check, even as the price pressure marker climbed worldwide and hit a 40-year high in the United States.

    The economic resilience that helps India endure negative outcomes – headwinds such as persistent trade frictions—including reciprocal tariff measures by the United States and global debate around it—and geopolitical shocks such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel–Hamas conflict, and broader West Asian turbulence including the recently started Israel–Iran war.

    While these events are sending aftershocks through a global economy still battered by the pandemic, India’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals, strong infrastructure build-out, healthy financial sector and vast domestic market—underpinned by solid consumer demand, consistent policy, and an improving business climate—the underlying factors behind its resilience—have helped it weather the storm.

    While the global economy, on a whole, decelerates, India has managed to sustain a growth rate above 6 per cent year after year—an unparalleled feat for a major economy in the current gloomy economic scenario.

    Remains a Bright Spot

    Borge Brende, President and Chief Executive Officer of the World Economic Forum, remarked in a recent television interview that India remains a bright spot among the world’s major economies, citing its young, tech-savvy workforce. His interview was done after a WEF analysis that warned that the 2025 global economic outlook was clouded by deep uncertainty. Back in January 2024, he had described India as a bright spot amid global doom.

    The International Monetary Fund echoes this view. Its 2023 World Economic Outlook named India the bright spot in an otherwise gloomy global economic scenario, stressing that the country will be a key driver of growth in the years ahead.

    The World Bank is very bullish on India’s economic growth and will remain so, said Auguste Tano Kouame, the World Bank Country Director for India, in February 2025. India is the shining light in the world, according to World Bank analysts.

    The World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP), a report released by the United Nations on 15 May 2025, states that while the global economy is slowing down, India remains the only bright spot—a point the IMF had made back in 2022.

    Positive projections followed by assessments—that have been reiterated in credible analytic reports by different global agencies.

    An Economic Resilience that Performs

    According to an EY projection, India is expected to surpass Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027. The assessment, “India — towards becoming the third-largest economy in the world”, states that India is expected to surpass both Japan and Germany in nominal GDP terms by 2027. The projection to surpass Japan’s economy comes two years in advance—by the 2025 financial year. The EY analysis also estimates that India’s economy will cross the USD 5 trillion mark by that year, with a projected GDP size of USD 5.2 trillion.

    According to the assessment, which compares nominal and PPP international dollar GDPs of six major economies—the United States, China, Japan, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom—from 2022 to projections until 2028—India leads in GDP growth rate. The country is projected to have an 8.7% compound nominal growth rate (between 2022 and 2028), outstripping China’s growth rate of 7.2%, and more than double the United States’ growth rate of 4.1% for the same period.

    In PPP international dollar terms, India is already the third-largest economy, ahead of Japan and Germany, and is fast closing the gap with the United States and China. The EY analysis says India’s PPP economy is expected to register a growth rate of around 8.5% a year and will add nearly USD 7.5 trillion to its economy between 2022 and 2028—equivalent to Japan’s entire current annual PPP output in 2028. By 2028, India will further narrow this gap with China, the country with the largest economy globally in PPP international dollar terms.

    The report further predicts that by 2027, in PPP terms, the United States’ economy will be just 1.7 times larger than the Indian economy, while another EY assessment estimates that by the late 2040s, with a real growth rate of 6 to 7%, India will surpass the United States to become the world’s second-largest economy in PPP terms.

    Another assessment, released by Morgan Stanley in March 2025, suggests India will become the third-largest economy in the world by 2028. According to the global financial services firm, India’s economy is expected to reach USD 4.7 trillion by 2026, overtaking Japan to become the fourth-largest economy. When compared with real data, the country is expected to achieve this milestone sooner.

    By 2028, India is projected to surpass Germany to become the third-largest economy globally, at USD 5.7 trillion. The analysis further states that India’s share in the world’s GDP, currently at 3.5%, is projected to rise to 4.5% by 2029.

    The growth rate of the last quarter—or real GDP growth rate from January 2025 to March 2025—further confirms the resilient nature of the Indian economy. The real growth rate for the last quarter was calculated at 7.4%, outperforming expectations. In nominal GDP terms, the Indian economy was estimated to have expanded by 10.8%. A composite annual growth rate for the year 2024–25, in real GDP terms for the country, was estimated at 6.5%, in line with expectations, while in nominal terms it was estimated at 9.8%.

    According to projections made in another EY analysis, the country’s GDP has the potential to cross the threshold of USD 5 trillion by 2026, USD 10 trillion by 2033, USD 20 trillion by 2042, and USD 30 trillion by 2047 in market exchange terms—a dataset that matches with projections made in India on its developmental journey to become a developed nation by 2047. In PPP terms, by 2047, India’s economy is expected to cross the USD 40 trillion-threshold. Its share in the world GDP is expected to reach 19.6% by that financial year.

    India’s per capita GDP in PPP terms, which was 50% of the world’s average per capita GDP in 2022–23, is expected to become equal to it by the 2040s and 1.5 times higher by 2057.

    According to a Goldman Sachs economic research report released in December 2022 on long-term economic forecasts, China, the US, India, Indonesia, and Germany are projected to be the world’s five largest economies in real GDP terms. By 2075, India is expected to replace the United States to become the second-largest economy behind China.

     

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UNECE Executive Secretary in Kyiv at launch of work on Ukraine’s State Housing Policy Strategy and to advance support for green recovery

    Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

    In Kyiv amid some of the deadliest and most devastating attacks on Ukraine’s capital, a UNECE team led by Executive Secretary Tatiana Molcean has expressed renewed solidarity with the people of Ukraine and full support to national and local recovery efforts. 

    Faced with acute damage to its ageing housing stock, Ukraine is looking not only to restore what was lost but to rethink and rebuild its housing systems, institutions, and approaches to reflect the needs of a modern, resilient, and inclusive country. 

    The housing sector has been among the hardest hit: an estimated 13% of all housing stock in the country has been damaged or destroyed, affecting more than 2.5 million households, according the joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4) commissioned by the Ukrainian Government, the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the UN.  

    UNECE is supporting the government to prepare for the recovery of the housing sector through the development of the State Housing Policy Strategy. The Strategy is guided by the draft Law “On the Basic Principles of Housing Policy”, which was prepared with UNECE support through the UN4UkrainianCities initiative. 

    This week in Kyiv, UNECE joined the World Bank and other partners  for the launch of the development of the Strategy, which will be a decisive step for the entire housing policy system — from mechanisms for addressing housing needs to the management of housing stock, from support for internally displaced persons to the restoration of damaged housing. Specifically, the Strategy will define directions, mechanisms, key changes, and indicators for monitoring progress, and outline the scope of needs and planned funding sources.  

    The aim of the project is to ensure that Ukraine’s State Housing Policy Strategy reflects both domestic needs and international commitments, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. UNECE will support the government through recommendations on policy design, housing delivery mechanisms, and institutional reforms that are grounded in international experience. 

    In Kyiv, UNECE Executive Secretary Tatiana Molcean emphasized that “Ukraine’s State Housing Policy Strategy can serve as a foundation for an updated housing policy that goes beyond regulatory changes and establishes a long-term, integrated vision — and, ultimately, contributes to a better quality of life for millions of Ukrainians.” She highlighted UNECE’s longstanding partnership with Ukraine in this area.  

    The Strategy will focus on: the international and national context; housing stock (condition), including on the extent of destruction and recovery; exercising the right to housing; financing and construction of new housing; housing stock management; restoration of the housing stock; affordability of housing; transparency of housing policy. 

    The UN4UkrainianCities initiative, launched by UNECE and funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and supported by GIZ, works in close cooperation with the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine and the cities of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv. It focuses on building back better in Ukraine and the two cities, including by developing a new, modern housing policy that can be effectively implemented at the local level.  

    Supporting a green and resilient recovery  

    Expressing UNECE’s readiness to continue supporting the green recovery of Ukraine, Ms. Molcean discussed with Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, Ms. Svitlana Grynchuk, the country’s strong engagement despite the extreme challenges posed by the war, harnessing in particular UNECE’s Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Since 2022, Ukraine has acceded to the UNECE Industrial Accidents Convention and the GMO amendment under the Aarhus Convention, and signed a bilateral agreement with Romania on the Implementation of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention). UNECE is also supporting Ukraine’s transition to a climate-resilient and net-zero economy — by integrating green policies, financial mechanisms and stakeholder collaboration — through the Platform for Action on the Green Recovery of Ukraine, established jointly with UNEP and OECD. 

    In meetings with Ukrainian high-level officials, the Executive Secretary further reaffirmed commitment to supporting Ukraine to address challenges in housing and other areas of UNECE expertise, in particular in energy and environmental protection. She met with Deputy Minister for Development of Communities and Territories, Ms. Natalia Kozlovska, First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Ms. Y.Svyrydenko, and Deputy Chair of Verkhovna Rada, Ms. Olena Kondratyuk, as well as heads of Verkhovna Rada Committees. 

    Photo credit: Press Service of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine 

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 20, 2025
  • Several injured in Russia’s overnight attack on Ukraine’s Odesa

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    At least 14 people were injured when Russian drones attacked the Ukrainian Black Sea city of Odesa overnight, damaging high-rise buildings and railway infrastructure, local authorities said on Friday.

    Odesa is Ukraine’s largest Black Sea port, key for imports and exports, and has been under constant missile and drone attacks by Russia since the war began.

    “Despite the active work of air defence forces, there is damage to civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, a higher education institution, a gas pipeline and private cars,” local governor Oleh Kiper said on Telegram messenger.

    Kiper released photos of burning houses and charred high-rise buildings.

    Local emergencies service said that during the attack there were at least 10 drone strikes on residential buildings, causing massive fires.

    Ukraine’s air force said on Friday that Russia had launched 86 drones on Ukraine overnight.

    The military noted its air defence units shot down 34 drones while another 36 drones were lost – in reference to the Ukrainian military using electronic warfare to redirect them – or they were drone simulators that did not carry warheads.

    However, the military reported that drones hit 8 locations.

    Ukrainian state railways Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Odesa railway station was damaged during the attack, with power wires and rails damaged.

    Russian drones also attacked Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine overnight, damaging several private and multi-storey houses, Kharkiv officials said.

    (Reuters)

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: PM Luxon meets with President Xi Jinping

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
    “My meeting with President Xi was a valuable opportunity to reflect on the depth and breadth of this important relationship, and to reaffirm our bilateral ties,” Mr Luxon says.
    “I outlined how our strong and innovative economic relationship has grown to cover a broad range of areas. Our trade and economic links are complementary and contribute to prosperity in both countries. These links also directly support New Zealand’s ambition to grow our economy.
    “We discussed the diversity of our people-to-people ties – from business, education, to cultural and science – and how they help build mutual understanding. I also welcomed progress made in increasing aviation links and tourism connections between our two countries.”
    Mr Luxon emphasised the importance of open, direct dialogue at the leader level to navigate some challenging regional and global developments. 
    “Engaging to share perspectives is more important than ever in a rapidly changing world. Where we have different views, our comprehensive and mature relationship allows New Zealand and China to speak frankly and constructively.
    “I raised the importance to New Zealand of the international rules-based system, as well as the key role that China can play in helping to resolve global challenges, such as the war in Ukraine,” Mr Luxon says. 
    Mr Luxon reaffirmed New Zealand’s direct interest in the maintenance of peace, security and prosperity in the Pacific, our enduring support for Pacific-led priorities, and the central role of the Pacific Islands Forum. 
    “I also discussed the necessity of a stable region and reduced tensions in the Indo-Pacific” Mr Luxon says.
    While in Beijing, Mr Luxon will also meet with Premier Li Qiang and National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for June 20, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on June 20, 2025.

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    West Australian miners flexed their muscle to block a federal EPA last year. Will it be different this time?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Diane Dowdell, PhD Candidate in Sustainable Mining, The University of Queensland CUHRIG/Getty This week, Environment Minister Murray Watt met with groups representing business, the environment, renewable energy and First Nations communities in a bid to restart Labor’s stalled environmental reforms. There was one group in the room

    Eugene Doyle: How centrifugal forces have been unleashed in Iran
    COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle The surprise US-Israeli attack on Iran is literally and figuratively designed to unleash centrifugal forces in the Islamic Republic. Two nuclear powers are currently involved in the bombing of the nuclear facilities of a third state. One of them, the US has — for the moment — limited itself to handling

    Technology to enforce teen social media ban is ‘effective’, trial says. But this is at odds with other evidence
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lisa M. Given, Professor of Information Sciences & Director, Social Change Enabling Impact Platform, RMIT University MAYA LAB/Shutterstock Technologies to enforce the Australian government’s social media ban for under 16s are “private, robust and effective”. That’s according to the preliminary findings of a federal government-commissioned trial that

    A new special tribunal will investigate Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Will it be effective?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria, Lecturer in Criminal Law and International Law, Curtin University Earlier this year, the European Union, the Council of Europe, Ukraine and an international coalition of states agreed to establish a new special tribunal. The tribunal will eventually be tasked with holding Russia accountable for the

    6 things Australia must do if it’s serious about tackling school bullying
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Vanessa Miller, Lecturer in Education (Classroom Management), Southern Cross University Wander Women/ Getty Images Bullying is arguably one of the most serious issues facing Australia’s schools. About one in four students between Year 4 and Year 9 report being bullied regularly. This can have serious and lasting

    Keith Rankin Analysis – America’s imperial ‘gifts’: ‘Crusader Democracy’ and ‘Christian Nationalism’
    Analysis by Keith Rankin. The United States has always fancied itself as the founder of modern democracy (aka ‘Democracy’). And, although that country has been self-absorbed for most of its history, it has always sensed that Democracy was its greatest export. ‘America’ became involved in Africa and the ‘Middle East’ very early in its history.

    Many elite athletes live below the poverty line. Tax-deductible donations won’t solve the problem
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle O’Shea, Senior Lecturer, School of Business, Western Sydney University Australia’s Jaclyn Narracott competes in the women’s skeleton at the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. Joe Klamar/AFP via Getty Images As the end of the 2024-25 financial year nears, the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), in partnership with the

    Bribe or community benefit? Sweeteners smoothing the way for renewables projects need to be done right
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law, Griffith University Louise Beaumont/Getty When a renewable energy developer announces a new project, there’s one big question mark – how will nearby communities react? Community pushback has scuttled many renewables projects. Sometimes, communities are angry landowners hosting

    Despite decades of cost cutting, governments spend more than ever. How can we make sense of this?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Lovering, Lecturer in International Relations, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington Getty Images Recent controversies over New Zealand’s Ka Ora, Ka Ako school lunch program have revolved around the apparent shortcomings of the food and its delivery. Stories of inedible meals, scalding packaging and

    Is there any hope for a fairer carve-up of the GST between the states?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Saul Eslake, Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow, University of Tasmania When the Western Australian state government handed down its state budget on Thursday, it showed a balance sheet solidly in the black with a A$2.5 billion surplus. But, as it has for seven years, the state has received an outsized

    Jaws at 50: the first summer blockbuster is still a film that bites – even when the shark didn’t work
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Will Jeffery, Sessional Academic, Discipline of Film Studies, University of Sydney Photo by Sunset Boulevard/Corbis via Getty Images When I was eight years old, on a Saturday night before surf lifesaving training, my dad put on the film Jaws and it changed my life forever. Unlike the

    New cases of meningococcal disease have been detected. What are the symptoms? And who can get vaccinated?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Archana Koirala, Paediatrician and Infectious Diseases Specialist; Clinical Researcher, University of Sydney Two Tasmanian women have been hospitalised with invasive meningococcal disease, bringing the number of cases nationally so far this year to 48. Health authorities are urging people to watch for symptoms and to check if

    Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra On Wednesday, Opposition Leader Sussan Ley will front the National Press Club. So why is that a big deal? For one thing, her predecessor Peter Dutton never appeared there as opposition leader. For another, it’s a formidable forum for a

    A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran
    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Why New Zealand has paused funding to the Cook Islands over China deal
    BACKGROUNDER: By Christina Persico, RNZ Pacific bulletin editor/presenter;Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific; and Don Wiseman, RNZ Pacific senior journalist New Zealand has paused $18.2 million in development assistance funding to the Cook Islands after its government signed partnership agreements with China earlier this year. This move is causing consternation in the realm country, with one local

    Egyptian crackdown on Gaza blockade busters but Kiwi activists vow to ‘defeat genocide’
    SPECIAL REPORT: By Saige England in Ōtautahi and Ava Mulla in Cairo Hope for freedom for Palestinians remains high among a group of trauma-struck New Zealanders in Cairo. In spite of extensive planning, the Global March To Gaza (GMTG) delegation of about 4000 international aid volunteers was thwarted in its mission to walk from Cairo

    The 28 Days Later franchise redefined zombie films. But the undead have an old, rich and varied history
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christopher White, Historian, The University of Queensland The history of the dead – or, more precisely, the history of the living’s fascination with the dead – is an intriguing one. As a researcher of the supernatural, I’m often pulled aside at conferences or at the school gate,

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for June 20, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on June 20, 2025.

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    Mark Brown: Cook Islands ‘not consulted’ on NZ-China agreements
    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown has suggested a double standard, saying he was “not privy to or consulted on” agreements New Zealand may enter into with China. New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has paused $18.2 million in development assistance to the Cook Islands due to a lack

    West Australian miners flexed their muscle to block a federal EPA last year. Will it be different this time?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Diane Dowdell, PhD Candidate in Sustainable Mining, The University of Queensland CUHRIG/Getty This week, Environment Minister Murray Watt met with groups representing business, the environment, renewable energy and First Nations communities in a bid to restart Labor’s stalled environmental reforms. There was one group in the room

    Eugene Doyle: How centrifugal forces have been unleashed in Iran
    COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle The surprise US-Israeli attack on Iran is literally and figuratively designed to unleash centrifugal forces in the Islamic Republic. Two nuclear powers are currently involved in the bombing of the nuclear facilities of a third state. One of them, the US has — for the moment — limited itself to handling

    Technology to enforce teen social media ban is ‘effective’, trial says. But this is at odds with other evidence
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lisa M. Given, Professor of Information Sciences & Director, Social Change Enabling Impact Platform, RMIT University MAYA LAB/Shutterstock Technologies to enforce the Australian government’s social media ban for under 16s are “private, robust and effective”. That’s according to the preliminary findings of a federal government-commissioned trial that

    A new special tribunal will investigate Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Will it be effective?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria, Lecturer in Criminal Law and International Law, Curtin University Earlier this year, the European Union, the Council of Europe, Ukraine and an international coalition of states agreed to establish a new special tribunal. The tribunal will eventually be tasked with holding Russia accountable for the

    6 things Australia must do if it’s serious about tackling school bullying
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Vanessa Miller, Lecturer in Education (Classroom Management), Southern Cross University Wander Women/ Getty Images Bullying is arguably one of the most serious issues facing Australia’s schools. About one in four students between Year 4 and Year 9 report being bullied regularly. This can have serious and lasting

    Keith Rankin Analysis – America’s imperial ‘gifts’: ‘Crusader Democracy’ and ‘Christian Nationalism’
    Analysis by Keith Rankin. The United States has always fancied itself as the founder of modern democracy (aka ‘Democracy’). And, although that country has been self-absorbed for most of its history, it has always sensed that Democracy was its greatest export. ‘America’ became involved in Africa and the ‘Middle East’ very early in its history.

    Many elite athletes live below the poverty line. Tax-deductible donations won’t solve the problem
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle O’Shea, Senior Lecturer, School of Business, Western Sydney University Australia’s Jaclyn Narracott competes in the women’s skeleton at the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics. Joe Klamar/AFP via Getty Images As the end of the 2024-25 financial year nears, the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC), in partnership with the

    Bribe or community benefit? Sweeteners smoothing the way for renewables projects need to be done right
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Hugh Breakey, Deputy Director, Institute for Ethics, Governance & Law, Griffith University Louise Beaumont/Getty When a renewable energy developer announces a new project, there’s one big question mark – how will nearby communities react? Community pushback has scuttled many renewables projects. Sometimes, communities are angry landowners hosting

    Despite decades of cost cutting, governments spend more than ever. How can we make sense of this?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Lovering, Lecturer in International Relations, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington Getty Images Recent controversies over New Zealand’s Ka Ora, Ka Ako school lunch program have revolved around the apparent shortcomings of the food and its delivery. Stories of inedible meals, scalding packaging and

    Is there any hope for a fairer carve-up of the GST between the states?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Saul Eslake, Vice-Chancellor’s Fellow, University of Tasmania When the Western Australian state government handed down its state budget on Thursday, it showed a balance sheet solidly in the black with a A$2.5 billion surplus. But, as it has for seven years, the state has received an outsized

    Jaws at 50: the first summer blockbuster is still a film that bites – even when the shark didn’t work
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Will Jeffery, Sessional Academic, Discipline of Film Studies, University of Sydney Photo by Sunset Boulevard/Corbis via Getty Images When I was eight years old, on a Saturday night before surf lifesaving training, my dad put on the film Jaws and it changed my life forever. Unlike the

    New cases of meningococcal disease have been detected. What are the symptoms? And who can get vaccinated?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Archana Koirala, Paediatrician and Infectious Diseases Specialist; Clinical Researcher, University of Sydney Two Tasmanian women have been hospitalised with invasive meningococcal disease, bringing the number of cases nationally so far this year to 48. Health authorities are urging people to watch for symptoms and to check if

    Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra On Wednesday, Opposition Leader Sussan Ley will front the National Press Club. So why is that a big deal? For one thing, her predecessor Peter Dutton never appeared there as opposition leader. For another, it’s a formidable forum for a

    A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran
    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Why New Zealand has paused funding to the Cook Islands over China deal
    BACKGROUNDER: By Christina Persico, RNZ Pacific bulletin editor/presenter;Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific; and Don Wiseman, RNZ Pacific senior journalist New Zealand has paused $18.2 million in development assistance funding to the Cook Islands after its government signed partnership agreements with China earlier this year. This move is causing consternation in the realm country, with one local

    Egyptian crackdown on Gaza blockade busters but Kiwi activists vow to ‘defeat genocide’
    SPECIAL REPORT: By Saige England in Ōtautahi and Ava Mulla in Cairo Hope for freedom for Palestinians remains high among a group of trauma-struck New Zealanders in Cairo. In spite of extensive planning, the Global March To Gaza (GMTG) delegation of about 4000 international aid volunteers was thwarted in its mission to walk from Cairo

    The 28 Days Later franchise redefined zombie films. But the undead have an old, rich and varied history
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christopher White, Historian, The University of Queensland The history of the dead – or, more precisely, the history of the living’s fascination with the dead – is an intriguing one. As a researcher of the supernatural, I’m often pulled aside at conferences or at the school gate,

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

    As Israel continues its attacks on Iran, US President Donald Trump and other global leaders are hardening their stance against the Islamic Republic.

    While considering a US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, Trump has threatened Iran’s supreme leader, claiming to know his location and calling him “an easy target”. He has demanded “unconditional surrender” from Iran.

    Meanwhile, countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and Australia have toughened their rhetoric, demanding Iran fully abandon its nuclear program.

    So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

    Has Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ fully collapsed?

    Iran has long relied on a network of allied paramilitary groups across the Middle East as part of its deterrence strategy. This approach has largely shielded it from direct military strikes by the US or Israel, despite constant threats and pressure.

    This so-called “axis of resistance” includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as Hamas in Gaza, which has long been under Iran’s influence to varying degrees. Iran also supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria before it was toppled last year.

    These groups have served both as a regional buffer and as a means for Iran to project power without direct engagement.

    However, over the past two years, Israel has dealt significant blows to the network.

    Hezbollah — once Iran’s most powerful non-state ally — has been effectively neutralised after months of attacks by Israel. Its weapons stocks were systematically targeted and destroyed across Lebanon. And the group suffered a major psychological and strategic loss with the assassination of its most influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

    In Syria, Iranian-backed militias have been largely expelled following the fall of Assad’s regime, stripping Iran of another key foothold in the region.

    That said, Iran maintains strong influence in Iraq and Yemen.

    The PMF in Iraq, with an estimated 200,000 fighters, remains formidable. The Houthis have similarly sized contingent of fighters in Yemen.

    Should the situation escalate into an existential threat to Iran — as the region’s only Shiite-led state — religious solidarity could drive these groups to become actively involved. This would rapidly expand the war across the region.

    The PMF, for instance, could launch attacks on the 2,500 US troops stationed in Iraq. Indeed, the head of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the PMF’s more hardline factions, promised to do so:

    If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation.

    Iran itself could also target US bases in the Persian Gulf countries with ballistic missiles, as well as close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows.

    Will Iran’s regional and global allies step in?

    Several regional powers maintain close ties with Iran. The most notable among them is Pakistan — the only Islamic country with a nuclear arsenal.

    For weeks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has tried to align Iran more closely with Pakistan in countering Israel’s actions in Gaza.

    In a sign of Pakistan’s importance in the Israel-Iran war, Trump has met with the country’s army chief in Washington as he weighs a possible strike on its neighbour.

    Pakistan’s leaders have also made their allegiances very clear. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has offered Iran’s president “unwavering solidarity” in the “face of Israel’s unprovoked aggression”. And Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently said in an interview Israel will “think many times before taking on Pakistan”.

    These statements signal a firm stance without explicitly committing to intervention.

    Yet, Pakistan has also been working to de-escalate tensions. It has urged other Muslim-majority nations and its strategic partner, China, to intervene diplomatically before the violence spirals into a broader regional war.

    In recent years, Iran has also made diplomatic overtures to former regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to improve relations.

    These shifts have helped rally broader regional support for Iran. Nearly two dozen Muslim-majority countries — including some that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel — have jointly condemned Israel’s actions and urged de-escalation.

    It’s unlikely, though, that regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey would support Iran materially, given their strong alliances with the US.

    Iran’s key global allies, Russia and China, have also condemned Israel’s strikes. They have previously shielded Tehran from punitive resolutions at the UN Security Council.

    However, neither power appears willing — at least for now — to escalate the confrontation by providing direct military support to Iran or engaging in a standoff with Israel and the US.

    Theoretically, this could change if the conflict widens and Washington openly pursues a regime change strategy in Tehran. Both nations have major geopolitical and security interests in Iran’s stability. This is due to Iran’s long-standing “Look East” policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy.

    However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly.

    Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad’s regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia’s closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn’t want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration.

    China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts.

    Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war? – https://theconversation.com/who-are-irans-allies-and-would-any-help-if-the-us-joins-israel-in-its-war-259265

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

    As Israel continues its attacks on Iran, US President Donald Trump and other global leaders are hardening their stance against the Islamic Republic.

    While considering a US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, Trump has threatened Iran’s supreme leader, claiming to know his location and calling him “an easy target”. He has demanded “unconditional surrender” from Iran.

    Meanwhile, countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and Australia have toughened their rhetoric, demanding Iran fully abandon its nuclear program.

    So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

    Has Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ fully collapsed?

    Iran has long relied on a network of allied paramilitary groups across the Middle East as part of its deterrence strategy. This approach has largely shielded it from direct military strikes by the US or Israel, despite constant threats and pressure.

    This so-called “axis of resistance” includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as Hamas in Gaza, which has long been under Iran’s influence to varying degrees. Iran also supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria before it was toppled last year.

    These groups have served both as a regional buffer and as a means for Iran to project power without direct engagement.

    However, over the past two years, Israel has dealt significant blows to the network.

    Hezbollah — once Iran’s most powerful non-state ally — has been effectively neutralised after months of attacks by Israel. Its weapons stocks were systematically targeted and destroyed across Lebanon. And the group suffered a major psychological and strategic loss with the assassination of its most influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

    In Syria, Iranian-backed militias have been largely expelled following the fall of Assad’s regime, stripping Iran of another key foothold in the region.

    That said, Iran maintains strong influence in Iraq and Yemen.

    The PMF in Iraq, with an estimated 200,000 fighters, remains formidable. The Houthis have similarly sized contingent of fighters in Yemen.

    Should the situation escalate into an existential threat to Iran — as the region’s only Shiite-led state — religious solidarity could drive these groups to become actively involved. This would rapidly expand the war across the region.

    The PMF, for instance, could launch attacks on the 2,500 US troops stationed in Iraq. Indeed, the head of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the PMF’s more hardline factions, promised to do so:

    If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation.

    Iran itself could also target US bases in the Persian Gulf countries with ballistic missiles, as well as close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows.

    Will Iran’s regional and global allies step in?

    Several regional powers maintain close ties with Iran. The most notable among them is Pakistan — the only Islamic country with a nuclear arsenal.

    For weeks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has tried to align Iran more closely with Pakistan in countering Israel’s actions in Gaza.

    In a sign of Pakistan’s importance in the Israel-Iran war, Trump has met with the country’s army chief in Washington as he weighs a possible strike on its neighbour.

    Pakistan’s leaders have also made their allegiances very clear. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has offered Iran’s president “unwavering solidarity” in the “face of Israel’s unprovoked aggression”. And Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently said in an interview Israel will “think many times before taking on Pakistan”.

    These statements signal a firm stance without explicitly committing to intervention.

    Yet, Pakistan has also been working to de-escalate tensions. It has urged other Muslim-majority nations and its strategic partner, China, to intervene diplomatically before the violence spirals into a broader regional war.

    In recent years, Iran has also made diplomatic overtures to former regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to improve relations.

    These shifts have helped rally broader regional support for Iran. Nearly two dozen Muslim-majority countries — including some that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel — have jointly condemned Israel’s actions and urged de-escalation.

    It’s unlikely, though, that regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey would support Iran materially, given their strong alliances with the US.

    Iran’s key global allies, Russia and China, have also condemned Israel’s strikes. They have previously shielded Tehran from punitive resolutions at the UN Security Council.

    However, neither power appears willing — at least for now — to escalate the confrontation by providing direct military support to Iran or engaging in a standoff with Israel and the US.

    Theoretically, this could change if the conflict widens and Washington openly pursues a regime change strategy in Tehran. Both nations have major geopolitical and security interests in Iran’s stability. This is due to Iran’s long-standing “Look East” policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy.

    However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly.

    Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad’s regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia’s closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn’t want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration.

    China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts.

    Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war? – https://theconversation.com/who-are-irans-allies-and-would-any-help-if-the-us-joins-israel-in-its-war-259265

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: A new special tribunal will investigate Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Will it be effective?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria, Lecturer in Criminal Law and International Law, Curtin University

    Earlier this year, the European Union, the Council of Europe, Ukraine and an international coalition of states agreed to establish a new special tribunal.

    The tribunal will eventually be tasked with holding Russia accountable for the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It’s expected to start operating in 2026.

    Human rights organisations, international lawyers and some (mostly European) states have long been calling for the establishment of such a tribunal. Oleksandra Matviichuk, a Ukrainian human rights lawyer, called the establishment of the tribunal:

    an important breakthrough for the international justice community and especially for the millions of Ukrainians who have been harmed by the Russian aggression.

    However, important questions remain about if it could truly hold senior Russian officials accountable.

    So, how will this new special tribunal work, and will it be effective – or necessary?

    How does the special tribunal fill the gaps left by the ICC and ICJ?

    This tribunal is separate to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

    The ICC can prosecute individuals charged with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Russian war on Ukraine. So far, it has issued arrest warrants against four Russian senior officials, including President Vladimir Putin.

    Because Russia is not a member state to the court, the court can’t exercise legal authority over what’s known in international law as a crime of aggression (when leaders of a state launch or plan a war). For the ICC to be able to exercise this jurisdiction, the aggressor state also must be a member state of the court.

    The ICJ is a different court altogether. It primarily deals with and adjudicates disputes between states, not limited to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It can’t hold individuals accountable, and can only exercise jurisdiction over a dispute if both states to a dispute agree.

    While the ICC seeks to establish individual criminal responsibility, the ICJ may establish state responsibility for a violation of international law.

    Currently, there are also two cases between Ukraine and Russia before the ICJ.

    Neither deals with the question of the legality of Russia’s use of force in its invasion in February 2022. Both Ukraine and Russia would need to consent to bring this issue before the court.

    So, is a new tribunal necessary?

    Yes, because the crime of aggression currently can’t be addressed by any other international court or tribunal.

    Given the limitations of what the ICJ and ICC can do, a dedicated tribunal seems the obvious solution to hold those responsible for the illegal use of force against Ukraine accountable.

    And it’s not uncommon for specialised tribunals with limited jurisdiction over a specific situation to be created.

    Other historical examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

    Given the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the new special tribunal would complement the court’s existing investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    Who is running the new tribunal and how will it work?

    The exact content and specifics of this new tribunal will remain unknown until the draft statute of the tribunal is published. That’s a document that outlines details including the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the applicable definition of aggression and how the tribunal will function.

    At this stage, the Council of Europe has confirmed the tribunal will work within its legal framework and principles. It will be funded by an international coalition of supportive states.

    A management committee of members and associate members of the tribunal will be responsible for the election of the tribunal’s judges and prosecutors. The management committee is made up of the Council of Europe’s council of ministers and Ukraine.

    Diplomatic discussions are still ongoing at this point, but the legal process for establishing the special tribunal can begin now.

    Will this special tribunal be more effective?

    Political, legal and practical challenges for the special tribunal remain. It’s unclear if the most senior Russian state officials can and will be able to be brought to trial for the crime of aggression.

    Nothing, so far, suggests the statute of the tribunal will contain an exception to state immunity enjoyed by heads of state, heads of governments and foreign ministers while in power.

    That means these office holders can only be prosecuted if they are no longer in power or the Russian government expressly waives their immunity.

    It’s also unclear whether states will be willing to arrest those sought by the special tribunal.

    The ICC has long faced this challenge trying to get states to act on its arrest warrants.

    Hungary, for instance, did not arrest Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he visited in April, despite an ICC arrest warrant for alleged crimes against humanity in connection with the war in Gaza.

    For the special tribunal to be effective, according to Oleksandra Matviichuk, it:

    must not become a remote and hollow entity that does not engage with the Ukrainian victims.

    Overall, much remains unclear. Will this new special tribunal be able to hold the likes of Putin accountable for the crime of aggression? Or will it become another empty promise?

    Yvonne Breitwieser-Faria does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. A new special tribunal will investigate Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Will it be effective? – https://theconversation.com/a-new-special-tribunal-will-investigate-russias-aggression-against-ukraine-will-it-be-effective-257823

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 20, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 35 36 37 38 39 … 174
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress