NewzIntel.com

Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

    As Israel continues its attacks on Iran, US President Donald Trump and other global leaders are hardening their stance against the Islamic Republic.

    While considering a US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, Trump has threatened Iran’s supreme leader, claiming to know his location and calling him “an easy target”. He has demanded “unconditional surrender” from Iran.

    Meanwhile, countries such as Germany, Canada, the UK and Australia have toughened their rhetoric, demanding Iran fully abandon its nuclear program.

    So, as the pressure mounts on Iran, has it been left to fight alone? Or does it have allies that could come to its aid?

    Has Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ fully collapsed?

    Iran has long relied on a network of allied paramilitary groups across the Middle East as part of its deterrence strategy. This approach has largely shielded it from direct military strikes by the US or Israel, despite constant threats and pressure.

    This so-called “axis of resistance” includes groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq, the Houthi militants in Yemen, as well as Hamas in Gaza, which has long been under Iran’s influence to varying degrees. Iran also supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria before it was toppled last year.

    These groups have served both as a regional buffer and as a means for Iran to project power without direct engagement.

    However, over the past two years, Israel has dealt significant blows to the network.

    Hezbollah — once Iran’s most powerful non-state ally — has been effectively neutralised after months of attacks by Israel. Its weapons stocks were systematically targeted and destroyed across Lebanon. And the group suffered a major psychological and strategic loss with the assassination of its most influential leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

    In Syria, Iranian-backed militias have been largely expelled following the fall of Assad’s regime, stripping Iran of another key foothold in the region.

    That said, Iran maintains strong influence in Iraq and Yemen.

    The PMF in Iraq, with an estimated 200,000 fighters, remains formidable. The Houthis have similarly sized contingent of fighters in Yemen.

    Should the situation escalate into an existential threat to Iran — as the region’s only Shiite-led state — religious solidarity could drive these groups to become actively involved. This would rapidly expand the war across the region.

    The PMF, for instance, could launch attacks on the 2,500 US troops stationed in Iraq. Indeed, the head of Kata’ib Hezbollah, one of the PMF’s more hardline factions, promised to do so:

    If America dares to intervene in the war, we will directly target its interests and military bases spread across the region without hesitation.

    Iran itself could also target US bases in the Persian Gulf countries with ballistic missiles, as well as close the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows.

    Will Iran’s regional and global allies step in?

    Several regional powers maintain close ties with Iran. The most notable among them is Pakistan — the only Islamic country with a nuclear arsenal.

    For weeks, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has tried to align Iran more closely with Pakistan in countering Israel’s actions in Gaza.

    In a sign of Pakistan’s importance in the Israel-Iran war, Trump has met with the country’s army chief in Washington as he weighs a possible strike on its neighbour.

    Pakistan’s leaders have also made their allegiances very clear. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has offered Iran’s president “unwavering solidarity” in the “face of Israel’s unprovoked aggression”. And Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently said in an interview Israel will “think many times before taking on Pakistan”.

    These statements signal a firm stance without explicitly committing to intervention.

    Yet, Pakistan has also been working to de-escalate tensions. It has urged other Muslim-majority nations and its strategic partner, China, to intervene diplomatically before the violence spirals into a broader regional war.

    In recent years, Iran has also made diplomatic overtures to former regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to improve relations.

    These shifts have helped rally broader regional support for Iran. Nearly two dozen Muslim-majority countries — including some that maintain diplomatic relations with Israel — have jointly condemned Israel’s actions and urged de-escalation.

    It’s unlikely, though, that regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey would support Iran materially, given their strong alliances with the US.

    Iran’s key global allies, Russia and China, have also condemned Israel’s strikes. They have previously shielded Tehran from punitive resolutions at the UN Security Council.

    However, neither power appears willing — at least for now — to escalate the confrontation by providing direct military support to Iran or engaging in a standoff with Israel and the US.

    Theoretically, this could change if the conflict widens and Washington openly pursues a regime change strategy in Tehran. Both nations have major geopolitical and security interests in Iran’s stability. This is due to Iran’s long-standing “Look East” policy and the impact its instability could have on the region and the global economy.

    However, at the current stage, many analysts believe both are unlikely to get involved directly.

    Moscow stayed on the sidelines when Assad’s regime collapsed in Syria, one of Russia’s closest allies in the region. Not only is it focused on its war in Ukraine, Russia also wouldn’t want to endanger improving ties with the Trump administration.

    China has offered Iran strong rhetorical support, but history suggests it has little interest in getting directly involved in Middle Eastern conflicts.

    Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Who are Iran’s allies? And would any help if the US joins Israel in its war? – https://theconversation.com/who-are-irans-allies-and-would-any-help-if-the-us-joins-israel-in-its-war-259265

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russia is ready to continue negotiations on settlement in Ukraine – Russian President V. Putin

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 19 (Xinhua) — Russia wants the conflict in Ukraine to end as soon as possible and is ready to continue settlement talks that began in Istanbul in 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a meeting with heads of international news agencies on the sidelines of the 28th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which is being held in St. Petersburg from June 18 to 21.

    “In 2022, it seems strange, but we agreed on everything with them. Do you understand? The draft agreement was prepared. It touched on denazification issues, and territorial issues. We found formulations that generally suited both us and Ukraine. No, then those who want to increase defense spending now came: in Europe and overseas. They said – no need. We need to defeat Russia on the battlefield. Everything we agreed on was thrown in the trash. And that’s it. And we began to achieve this wonderful goal,” V. Putin said.

    “And now the situation is: no, you know, let’s negotiate. Let’s do it. But let’s open these packages and negotiate. But we can’t sit there day and night for a whole year. Therefore, we are ready to continue these negotiations,” the Russian president noted.

    According to him, it is necessary not only to end the Ukrainian conflict in its current form, but to find a solution for the long-term historical perspective.

    “We need to find a solution that would not only put an end to today’s conflict, but would create conditions for the non-recurrence of such situations over a long historical period,” the Russian leader emphasized. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New Russia sanctions target enablers of war, including Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Foreign Minister Winston Peters has announced new sanctions on crucial enablers of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.

    This latest round of sanctions targets actors involved in Russia’s military-industrial complex, supporters from North Korea, Iran, and Belarus, as well as vessels that are part of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’.

    “New Zealand must continue to hold Russia and its enablers accountable. Military support from actors in North Korea, Iran, and Belarus has helped Russia sustain its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine,” Mr Peters said.

    These new sanctions target a further 18 individuals and entities who have been assisting Russia’s war efforts.

    In addition, 27 ‘shadow fleet’ vessels have also been designated. Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ enablers are involved in illegal activities to avoid sanctions, including through the transport of Russian oil at above the G7 Plus oil price cap, which New Zealand adopted last year.

    “The designation of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ reflects a joint effort with likeminded international partners to prevent sanctions evasion and to maintain the pressure on Russia in support of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine,” Mr Peters says.

    Since the Russia Sanctions Act entered into force in March 2022, New Zealand has imposed sanctions on more than 1,800 individuals, entities, and shipping vessels, along with a range of trade measures. 

    More information about sanctions, travel bans, and export controls against Russia, as well as diplomatic, military and economic support to Ukraine, can be found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website here

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Hegseth Testifies Before Senate Committee on Base Defense, Importance of Air Superiority in Conflicts

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)
    ***Click here to download video. Click here for audio.***
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) held a hearing today to review the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) budget request for Fiscal Year 2026. During the hearing, members received testimony from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine; and Bryn Woollacott MacDonnell, who is performing the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer.
    U.S. Senator Kevin Cramer, Chairman of the SASC Airland Subcommittee, asked the witnesses about the importance of protecting U.S. military bases from attacks and the strategic role air superiority plays in modern conflicts.
    [embedded content]
    Cramer noted the Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran licensed its nuclear aspirations, creating a serious problem still affecting our nation.
    Regarding the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran, Cramer asked Gen. Caine about the importance of air superiority over Iran and in future fights.
    “Well, sir, we could spend hours talking about the advocacy of air power,” said Gen. Caine. “I think the freedom of maneuver that it creates is a great example of that. If you look at the two theaters right now, with the Israeli Air Force striking at will at this point, over Iran, juxtaposed with the challenges that we’re having with a frozen forward line of troops in Europe, is a great case study of it. You know, the great thinkers, air power thinkers, are looking at the advancement in technologies from both theaters, the advancement of first person view drones and things like that. I think folks are going to have to think clearly about what does the future of air superiority look like, and how does it evolve to make sure that we’re protecting those essential teammates that are on the ground fighting in order to prevent frozen FLOTs, forward lines of troops, in the future.”
    Cramer said there have been two recent examples of covert operations where drones act deep within enemy territory to destroy critical capabilities which were previously considered safe from harm.  
    Ukraine recently conducted a surprise drone attack called “Operation Spider’s Web” against Russia, targeting airfields in multiple regions across the country. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reported this attack showcased Ukraine’s “tactical ingenuity” and “illuminated the broader technological and strategic shifts reshaping modern warfare.” 
    “We’ve seen some pretty spectacular displays of the ability to go […] covertly, deep within the enemy’s territory, and take out some pretty significant assets, both in Russia and in Iran,” said Cramer. “A lot of us fear we’re vulnerable, as well. You spoke very briefly, a reference, I think, in response to one of Senator Gillibrand’s questions about the importance of policy. So, when we talk about the United States itself and our bases here in the country, policy is a bigger challenge than weapons, to be honest. But what about responsibility?”
    Cramer questioned Hegseth about ways DOD is ensuring American military bases are protected from attacks. He also asked which services are responsible for a base’s air defense and for leading the effort on capabilities to counter this kind of attack.
    “Senator, you’re right to ask the question,” said Hegseth. “We met on this very topic two days ago, because you’re right, we’ve already made initial efforts, but I liken it to the effort that was made around IEDs [improvised explosive devices] in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it couldn’t be a service only response. It needed to be across the joint force. It needed to be immediate, and the capabilities had to be prepared to adapt in real time to adjustments the enemy was making, and you saw that in […] counter-IED technology. We need the same type of effort in counter-UAS, not just forward deployed, because right now you do it with what you have, but also at home, considering the authority. So, that is something the Department is doing in real time.” 
    Earlier today, Cramer introduced the Protect Our Bases Act with Senate Banking Committee Chairman Tim Scott (R-SC), which would strengthen national security by ensuring the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) can effectively review foreign land purchases near sensitive military, intelligence, and national laboratory sites. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: From the Paris Air Show, Shaheen Pens Wall Street Journal Op-Ed Warning Trump’s Trade Policy Threatens Our National Defense and Global Alliances

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, DC) – After co-leading a bipartisan Congressional delegation to the Paris Air Show, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal warning that President Trump’s trade policy threatens American national defense and global alliances. In her piece, Shaheen argues that the president’s tariff policy threatens our relationships around the globe, exacerbates existing supply chain disruptions and threatens American defense readiness. You can read her op-ed here.

    In part, Shaheen writes: “While Beijing closely watches the war in Ukraine, it has also escalated confrontations in the South China Sea and conducted aggressive military exercises over the Taiwan Strait. In the face of these rising threats, our ability to produce and deliver weapons at scale—coordinated with our allies—is more critical than ever.”

    Shaheen concludes: “The Trump administration’s trade policies have weakened the alliances we rely on. Congress should reassert our leadership by re-examining its moves and exercising congressional oversight. If we’re going to be ready for the challenges ahead, we must treat American trade policy as a core pillar of American national security.”

    The op-ed is available here and in full below:

    Trump’s Tariffs Weaken America’s Military

    Eighty years ago, the U.S. Army Air Forces staged an exhibition beneath the Eiffel Tower. Thousands of Parisians gathered to admire the B-17 Flying Fortress—an American-built aircraft that helped liberate Europe from Nazi occupation. Primitive by today’s standards, those bombers were the product of a national industrial base operating at full capacity. They were deployed by a trans-Atlantic alliance that shared logistics, intelligence and purpose. That model of coordination is what we need now—but it’s being tested by a trade agenda that favors confrontation over cooperation.

    As I co-lead the congressional delegation to this week’s Paris Air Show, the world’s largest defense aerospace expo, I find myself asking: Is the greatest obstacle to America’s security not China or Russia but our own trade policy?

    The U.S. defense industry’s capacity to meet the demand for arms was already stretched thin by the Covid pandemic and conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. The Trump administration further disrupted supply chains and increased production costs through more than 50 tariff announcements and a patchwork of shifting duties. The imposition of these tariffs has pressured allies to respond in kind. This cycle worsens supply-chain disruptions, driving up costs and causing delays in defense production.

    President Trump imposed 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum earlier this month. Regardless of any exemptions the administration offers, building a modern America-class amphibious assault ship requires 45,000 tons of steel. The net effect of this trade policy will be higher costs across the board, from military aircraft and lightweight armor plating to submarine repairs and shipbuilding.

    Tariffs will also affect small, specialized components like those used in jet engines, night vision systems, and landing gear. When I recently met with a New Hampshire company that makes ball bearings for the aerospace industry, executives told me tariffs have driven up their costs and extended their production time—concerns industry leaders echoed in Paris.

    These delays and rising costs don’t only slow American readiness; they erode our allies’ trust in the U.S. as a dependable partner. The strain is already evident. Although the F-35 fighter jet is “the pinnacle of aerial combat technology,” in Vice President JD Vance’s words, several North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies have signaled they may reconsider participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

    Demand for American-made weapons remains strong, especially from front-line nations like Poland. It is racing to acquire Himars rocket launchers and Abrams tanks. But even as the Trump administration pressures allies to spend more on defense, its trade policies and combative rhetoric are sowing doubt about the reliability of parts, maintenance and pricing. That’s prompting U.S. partners to reassess their long-term defense commitments. President Emmanuel Macron underscored this shift when he said, “My goal is to persuade EU countries that rely on U.S. weapons to choose European alternatives.”

    European leaders have legitimate cause for concern, and their increased defense spending reflects it. Vladimir Putin has reoriented Russia’s economy around the war in Ukraine, churning out more than 1,400 Iskander ballistic missiles a year and at one point signing up 1,000 new recruits a day. His effort is backed by North Korea, Iran and, most significantly, China.

    While Beijing closely watches the war in Ukraine, it has also escalated confrontations in the South China Sea and conducted aggressive military exercises over the Taiwan Strait. In the face of these rising threats, our ability to produce and deliver weapons at scale—coordinated with allies—is more critical than ever.

    The administration argues that reliance on foreign imports undermines American defense readiness and that tariffs will protect U.S. industries. But the defense industrial base has evolved over generations, and restructuring it would take decades—time we simply don’t have.

    Russia, China and Iran may feel distant to many Americans. But for those of us with family who served in World War II—or who confront national-security challenges daily in government service—the risks are clear and they are growing.

    As the B-17 displayed in Paris that summer of 1945 symbolized a robust industrial base united with steadfast allies, today’s defense readiness depends on a similarly coordinated approach—one that can’t thrive amid tariffs that alienate our closest partners.

    We need a smarter, more unified strategy. Tariffs on our closest allies aren’t only damaging our economy, they’re undermining our shared defense readiness. At a minimum, the administration should provide answers on how these tariffs are affecting our defense supply chains. I’ve asked Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth for this information but received no response.

    The Trump administration’s trade policies have weakened the alliances we rely on. Congress should reassert our leadership by re-examining its moves and exercising congressional oversight. If we’re going to be ready for the challenges ahead, we must treat American trade policy as a core pillar of American national security.

    Last week, Shaheen pressed U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on the impacts of the administration’s tariffs on steel and aluminum on the defense industrial base, supply chain lead times and our overall military readiness. The exchange followed a letter sent to Hegseth in April where Shaheen raised concerns about how the President’s trade war harms defense supply chains and ultimately weakens America’s military readiness. The Senator expressed how tariffs on imports will increase prices for the Department of Defense’s defense acquisitions – harming its purchasing power and further raising costs on small businesses.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

    Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

    Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

    Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

    As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

    Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

    A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

    Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

    The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

    Kakuma refugee camp

    Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

    When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

    Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

    Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

    Consequences of aid cut

    The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

    1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

    Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

    Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

    2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

    Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

    But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

    3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

    4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

    5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

    Implications

    The study carries two major policy implications.

    First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

    Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

    Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

    Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

    – ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

    Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

    Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

    Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

    As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

    Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

    A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

    Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

    The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

    Kakuma refugee camp

    Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

    When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

    Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

    Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

    Consequences of aid cut

    The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

    1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

    Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

    Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

    2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

    Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

    But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

    3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

    4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

    5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

    Implications

    The study carries two major policy implications.

    First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

    Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

    Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

    Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

    – ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-UA trade agreement – E-002387/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002387/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    Please provide information about the progress and state of play of the negotiations on the new EU-Ukraine trade conditions following the expiry of the transitional provisions under Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1132 of 3 June 2025 amending Implementing Regulations (EU) 2020/761 and (EU) 2020/1988 as regards tariff quotas for products originating in Ukraine in 2025.

    • 1.Will negotiations with Ukraine be concluded by the end of July?
    • 2.What new trade rules can be expected?
    • 3.Will trade rules based on the DCFTA be continued as from 1 January 2026?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 18 June 2025 Donors making a difference: refugees and migrants

    Source: World Health Organisation

    Today, more than one billion people, about one in eight globally, are on the move, driven by war, conflict, disasters, environmental degradation or economic instability. Migration and displacement are powerful social determinants of health, shaping how and whether people can access the health conditions they need to survive and thrive.

    Climate change, recognized as a “threat multiplier”, worsens food insecurity, disrupts livelihoods, and fuels further displacement. Whether by choice or forced, being on the move is a part of human life, but for many, it brings disproportionate exposure to risk, inequality, and exclusion from basic health services.

    Refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) frequently face unsafe journeys and precarious living conditions, often with limited access to clean water, adequate nutrition, sanitation, or shelter. Their susceptibility to communicable diseases is increased by the environmental risk factors related to their precarious living and working conditions. Many also face barriers to managing noncommunicable diseases, accessing maternal and newborn care, or receiving mental health support.

    Thanks to the support of donors and partners, WHO works with governments and communities to deliver inclusive, equitable, and context-sensitive health services to people on the move. This includes immunization, disease surveillance, chronic disease management, reproductive and mental health care, support for health system resilience, amongst other efforts.

    These contributions are grounded in the recognition that health is a human right, and that universal health coverage must be inclusive of all people, regardless of migratory status. The stories presented below show how rapid, compassionate action can protect lives and advance dignity, equity, and resilience, especially in times of crisis.

    Landmark cholera vaccination campaign offers hope to Rohingya refugee camps

    A young girl receives the OCV vaccine in one of the remote blocks of camp. Photo by: WHO/Mehnaz Manzur

    Cholera has been endemic in Bangladesh for decades, with seasonal peaks. It has remained a major health concern in the Rohingya refugee camps since 2017.

    In a major joint effort, the Government of Bangladesh, with support from WHO, UNHCR, and health sector partners, launched a landmark cholera vaccination campaign in the Rohingya refugee camps on 12 January 2025. This initiative focused on children aged one year and older, following a rise in cholera cases detected through WHO’s disease monitoring system in both the camps and nearby host communities.

    The five-day vaccination campaign aimed to reach 943 174 people across 33 camps and Bhasan Char Island. Over 1 700 community health workers, supervisors, and health sector partners visited 194 907 households to administer the single-dose Euvichol Plus vaccine.

    Read the full story.

    Delivering lifesaving health services for flood-displaced families in Nigeria

    Delivering lifesaving health services for flood-displaced families in Nigeria. Photo by: WHO/Nigeria

    Borno state, in northeastern Nigeria, was severely impacted by recent floods, in September 2024, which displaced over 400 000 people. Almost 90 000 people in vulnerable situations were forced to take shelter in temporary camps with limited access to food, clean water and health services.

    Displaced populations are at especially high risk from malnutrition, and diseases such as cholera, malaria and measles in a region where health systems are already fragile and strained.

    Recognizing urgent health need, WHO, with financial support from USAID and the Government of Germany, deployed five mobile health teams made up of 35 public health experts, to provide routine immunization, maternal care and clinical services. So far, 34 camps and over 93 000 households have been reached and informed about how to prevent epidemic-prone diseases and adopt healthy household practices.

    Read the full story.

    Bringing health care closer to displaced communities in Somalia

    WHO drought response activities in affected districts in Somalia. Photo by: WHO/Somalia

    Somalia experienced a severe drought in 2022-2023. Donors responded swiftly with increased funding to save lives by treating severe acute malnutrition and the prevention and management of disease outbreaks.

    This support enabled WHO to meet urgent health needs while also investing in the long-term capacity of local health services. For example, the Sinkadheer health centre in Al-Adalada camp, west of Mogadishu, provides a full range of services through the Integrated Health and Nutrition Programme. The centre helps ensure access to essential health care for families who might otherwise face financial or logistical barriers to treatment.

    Supported by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the German Federal Foreign Office, and other partners, the programme continues to improve health outcomes for Somali mothers and children, promoting dignity and resilience in the context of displacement. Each day, the centre serves around 200 patients, primarily from nearby internally displaced communities, offering primary health care, nutritional support, and services to prevent malnutrition.

    Read the full story.

    Bridging gaps in health and nutrition services for IDPs and crisis-affected communities in Ethiopia

    Bridging gaps in health and nutrition services for IDPs and crisis-affected communities in Amhara, Ethiopia. Photo by: WHO/Ethiopia

    Since November 2021, Ethiopia’s Amhara region has faced complex and protracted humanitarian crises driven by internal armed conflict, multiple disease outbreaks, and climate-related shocks- including drought and floods. The region also witnessed a growing influx of people fleeing conflict in neighbouring Sudan. Nearly a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living across 38 collective sites and host communities, alongside hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees.

    To ensure access to essential health services for displaced and crisis-impacted populations, WHO, in collaboration with regional government authorities, deployed Mobile Health and Nutrition Teams. As displacements increased, the number of mobile teams was scaled up to 19 in April 2024, comprising 132 health workers. This increase was made possible through support from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF), and the People and Government of Japan.

    These teams have provided over 124 250 medical consultations, including referrals for patients requiring specialized care. Services include primary health care, immunizations, maternal and child health support, nutritional care, mental health and psychosocial support, and first-line assistance for survivors of gender-based violence. They also address both communicable and noncommunicable diseases, helping ensure that health care is available and accessible to all.

    Read the full story.

    Health on the frontlines: caring for Haiti’s displaced population

    A mobile clinic organized at the Lycée Argentine Bellegarde IDP site. Photo by: WHO/PAHO

    Since February 2024, Haiti has faced an escalating security crisis from escalating gang violence, political instability, and a humanitarian emergency, placing further strain on the country’s already overstretched health system. This has significantly disrupted access to health care for millions in Haiti.

    The crisis has most severely affected people living in precarious conditions, including the approximately 86 000 individuals residing across 84 IDPs sites of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.

    To help maintain access to essential services, mobile clinics have been established by the Ouest Department’s health authorities with the support from PAHO/WHO and other partners such as UNCERF. Disease surveillance activities have also been reactivated, including for cholera, through the deployment of surveillance and response teams to each site- helping to detect and respond efficiently to potential outbreaks.

    Read the full story.

    Support for public health emergency preparedness and response in Niger

    WHO medicines and medical supplies donation in Diffa, Niger. Photo by: WHO/Niger

    In March 2024, WHO delivered 16 tons of medicines and medical supplies valued at nearly 100 million FCFA (US$ 170 000) to health facilities across eight regions of Niger, which host large numbers of IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

    This donation, funded through UNCERF and WHO’s own resources, include medical consumables and treatment kits for pneumonia, meningitis, malaria, diphtheria, cholera, and other common illnesses.

    “This donation comes at a crucial time when our health system in the Diffa region is under significant pressure. We will be able to strengthen access to quality health care and save the lives of the people of Diffa, who are already facing emergencies related to the growing number of IDPs, refugees and returnees,” said Colonel-Major Dr Garba Hakimi, Minister of Public Health, Population and Social Affairs.

    Read the full story (French).

    Lessons from Malta: advancing refugee and migrant health

    Valetta from waterfront. Photo by: WHO/Marc Gallego

    As an island located at the heart of the Mediterranean, Malta has long been a transitional stop for people on the move. Today, it is home to over 11 000 refugees and 2 000 asylum seekers, primarily from Bangladesh, Libya, Syria, Sudan and Ukraine.

    With co-funding from the European Union, WHO, in partnership with Malta’s Ministry for Health and Active Ageing, hosted the first Knowledge Forum on Refugee and Migrant Health in Malta in April 2024.

    The Forum brought together government officials, humanitarian organizations, civil society, United Nations agencies, and other stakeholders to share knowledge, exchange experiences, identify opportunities for collaboration, and advance the implementation of WHO’s European Region Action Plan for Refugee and Migrant Health 2023–2030.

    Read the full story.

    Acknowledgments

    The donors and partners acknowledged in this story are (in alphabetical order) European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), European Union, Germany, Japan, United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

    Thank you also to UNHCR for its strong partnership in responding to the needs of refugees.

    WHO’s work is made possible through all contributions of our Member States and partners. WHO thanks all donor countries, governments, organizations and individuals who are contributing to the Organization’s work, with special appreciation for those who provide fully flexible contributions to maintain a strong, independent WHO.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump breaks from western allies at G7 summit as US weighs joining Iran strikes

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    Working alongside western democratic allies has not been a natural fit for Donald Trump. The US president left the recently concluded G7 summit in Canada early, with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron assuming this was to work on addressing the most severe escalation between Iran and Israel in decades.

    But Trump offered little communication with other G7 members, which include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, of what his plans were. He said he had to leave the summit “for obvious reasons”, though failed to elaborate on what he meant.

    After exiting the summit, he lambasted Macron on social media. Trump wrote: “Wrong! He has no idea why I am now on my way to Washington, but it certainly has nothing to do with a Cease Fire”. Trump continued by saying his exit was due to something “much bigger than that”, adding: “Emmanuel always gets it wrong.”

    This has prompted discussion over whether US forces may join Israel’s strikes on Iran. Despite initially distancing the US from the Israeli attacks, Trump said on June 17: “We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran.”

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    He has since demanded Tehran’s “unconditional surrender”, while also issuing a chilling threat to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, describing him as an “easy target”.

    The pressure campaign employed by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to convince Trump that the time is right for a military assault on Iran seems to be working.

    Exploiting Trump’s impulsive nature, Netanyahu may soon be able to convince Trump to give Israel what it needs to destroy Iran’s underground uranium enrichment sites: a 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bomb and a B-2 bomber to carry it.

    The US’s western allies have been left scrambling to interpret Trump’s social media posts and figure out the real reason he left the G7 summit early.

    The only aircraft capable of carrying ‘bunker-buster’ bombs is the B-2.
    Mariusz Lopusiewicz / Shutterstock

    This wasn’t the first time that Trump has left a G7 forum early. In 2018, the last time such a meeting was held in Canada, Trump also left early after Macron and the then Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, promised to confront Trump over the imposition of tariffs on US allies.

    The latest G7 summit also wasn’t the first time Trump has treated traditional US allies with suspicion. Trump has cast doubt on US willingness to defend Nato allies if they don’t pay more for their own defence. He has repeatedly threatened to leave the alliance and has frequently denigrated it – even calling alliance members “delinquent”.

    Trump thinks the US gains an advantage by abandoning relationships with “free riders”. But experts have made clear alienating allies makes the US weaker. While the alliance system has given the US unprecedented influence over the foreign policies of US allies in the past, Trump’s pressure to increase their defence spending will make them more independent from the US in the long-term.

    Trump seems to prefer a world guided by short-term self-interest at the expense of long-term collective security. Indeed, with an “America first” agenda, multilateral cooperation is not Trump’s strong suit. With the G7, Trump is yet again making clear that he does not fit in, nor does he want to.

    Because the G7 is small and relatively homogenous in membership, meetings between members are supposed to promote collective and decisive decision-making. However, even the task of coming up with a joint statement on the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel proved challenging.

    Trump eventually joined other leaders in calling for deescalation in the Middle East, and the G7 was in agreement that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons. But Trump’s social media activity since then has left US allies in the dark over what role the US might play in the conflict.

    Trump also alarmed G7 members with calls for Russia to return to the forum. He claimed that the war in Ukraine would not have happened had Moscow not been ejected from the former G8 grouping in 2014.

    Then, on his way out of the summit, Trump bragged to reporters that Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, “doesn’t speak to anybody else” but him. Trump added that Putin was insulted when Russia was thrown out of the G8, “as I would be, as you would be, as anybody would be”.

    Following weeks of frustration over Russia’s refusal to engage in serious peace talks about ending the war in Ukraine, Trump seems to have returned to being Putin’s most loyal advocate.

    Hostility toward multilateralism

    During Trump’s first term, he pushed multilateralism to the brink. But he did not completely disengage. The US withdrew from the Paris climate accords, the nuclear deal with Iran, negotiations for a trade deal with Pacific nations, and imposed sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court.

    However, when multilateral initiatives served Trump’s short-term objectives, he was willing to get on board. A trade deal struck with Canada and Mexico that Trump described as “the most important” ever agreed by the US. He said the deal would bring thousands of jobs back to North America.

    The second Trump administration has been even more hostile to multilateralism. Not only has the trade deal with Canada and Mexico been undermined by Trump’s love of tariffs, his administration has been more antagonistic toward almost all of the US’s traditional allies. In fact, most of Trump’s ire is reserved for democracies not autocracies.

    In contrast to the G7, where he clearly felt out of place, Trump was in his element during his May trip to the Middle East. Trump has a more natural connection to the leaders of the Gulf who do not have to adhere to democratic norms and human rights, and where deals can get done immediately.

    Trump left the Middle East revelling in all of the billion dollar deals he made, which he exaggerated were worth US$2 trillion (£1.5 trillion). The G7, on the other hand, doesn’t offer much to Trump. He sees it as more of a nuisance.

    The G7 forum is supposed to reassure the public that the most powerful countries in the world are united in their commitment to stability. But Trump’s antics are undermining the credibility of that message. It is these antics that risk dragging the west into a dangerous confrontation with Iran.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump breaks from western allies at G7 summit as US weighs joining Iran strikes – https://theconversation.com/trump-breaks-from-western-allies-at-g7-summit-as-us-weighs-joining-iran-strikes-259214

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Tax challenges facing the European defence union – 18-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Confronted with warfare on the European continent since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU Member States, along with other European partners, have backed the need for a substantial increase in defence spending. This budgetary challenge has in turn raised important questions about the role of taxation in financing these efforts.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

    Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

    Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

    Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

    As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

    Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

    A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

    Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

    The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

    Kakuma refugee camp

    Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

    When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

    Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

    Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

    Consequences of aid cut

    The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

    1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

    Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

    Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

    2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

    Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

    But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

    3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

    4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

    5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

    Implications

    The study carries two major policy implications.

    First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

    Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

    Olivier Sterck receives research funding from the IKEA Foundation, the World Bank, and The Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO).

    Vittorio Bruni is affiliated with Oxford University

    – ref. What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

    Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

    Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

    Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

    As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

    Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

    A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

    Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

    The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

    Kakuma refugee camp

    Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

    When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

    Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

    Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

    Consequences of aid cut

    The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

    1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

    Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

    Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

    2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

    Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

    But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

    3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

    4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

    5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

    Implications

    The study carries two major policy implications.

    First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

    Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

    – What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture
    – https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the OSCE Troika to condemn Russia’s intensified attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Statement by the OSCE Troika to condemn Russia’s intensified attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine

    Statement by the OSCE Troika to condemn Russia’s intensified attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine | OSCE

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    Home Newsroom News and press releases Statement by the OSCE Troika to condemn Russia’s intensified attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure across Ukraine

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Montenegro and Moldova: Parliament welcomes EU membership progress

    Source: European Union 2

    MEPs welcome Montenegro´s objective to join the EU in 2028 and praise Moldova’s EU membership efforts in resolutions adopted on Wednesday.

    Importance of political stability in Montenegro

    Parliament calls for political stability in Montenegro and substantial progress regarding electoral and judicial reforms as well as the fight against organised crime and corruption. In a report adopted by 470 votes in favour. 102 against and 77 abstentions, MEPs stress that Montenegro remains the leading candidate in the EU enlargement process and point to the overwhelming support of its citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028. Parliament welcomes the country’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including EU sanctions against Russia, and commends Montenegro for its support for the international rules-based order at the United Nations.

    Fight against foreign interference

    Parliament is however seriously concerned by malign interference, cyber-attacks, hybrid threats, disinformation campaigns and efforts to destabilise Montenegro, including attempts to influence its political processes and public opinion. These discredit the EU and undermine the country’s progress towards EU membership.

    The rapporteur on Montenegro Marjan Šarec (Renew Europe, Slovenia) said: “It is important to note that the adoption of necessary legislation involved cooperation between both coalition and opposition parties. This reflects a high level of awareness that the European path is the only right one for Montenegro, with no viable alternative. Montenegro’s achievements thus far provide a solid foundation for addressing future challenges, which are numerous and far from easy. The fight against organised crime and corruption, judicial reform, and the prevention of influence from third countries are of critical importance for meeting democratic standards.”

    MEPs praise Moldova’s EU membership efforts

    Commending Moldova’s exemplary commitment to advancing its progress towards EU membership, a report approved by MEPs by 456 votes in favour to 118 against with 51 abstentions recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase. Cooperation has intensified alongside sustained efforts by the government in Chișinău to align Moldova’s laws with those of the EU (the so-called “EU acquis”). Despite significant internal and external challenges, such as the effects of Russia’s continuing war against neighbouring Ukraine and Moscow’s interference in Moldova’s democratic processes, MEPs welcome the Moldovan government’s progress on meeting the EU’s enlargement requirements and the country’s ambition to open negotiations on more enlargement-related issues. MEPs call on the European Commission to enhance its support for Moldova to achieve these objectives.

    Russian interference in Moldova’s democratic processes
    MEPs note that in both Moldova’s recent constitutional referendum on European integration and the 2024 presidential election Moldovans reaffirmed their support for EU membership and the government’s pro-European reform agenda. Despite being subject to a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies, MEPs say both the referendum and the election were held professionally and “with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication”. They also note that the country’s parliamentary elections in autumn 2025 will be crucial for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory and warn about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks.

    The rapporteur on Moldova Sven Mikser (S&D, Estonia) said: “We commend Moldova’s strong commitment to EU integration and acknowledge the country’s strategic importance for Europe. The Moldovan authorities have demonstrated remarkable determination to pursue reforms and align with EU values despite facing major challenges and external pressure by the Kremlin and its proxies.”

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney to attend the Canada-EU Summit and the NATO Summit

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, announced that he will travel to Brussels, Belgium, and The Hague, the Netherlands, from June 22 to 25, 2025, to participate in the Canada-European Union (EU) Summit and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit.

    At the Canada-EU Summit, the Prime Minister will meet with the EU presidents to deepen the Canada-EU relationship across all sectors, including diversifying trade and commerce, defending rules-based trade, and bolstering defence and security partnerships.

    At the NATO Summit, Prime Minister Carney will engage Allies to meet evolving threats in a more dangerous and divided world. Canada’s new government is rebuilding, rearming, and reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces – reaching the 2 per cent target this year and accelerating defence investments in the months and years to come. Leaders will also support Ukraine to achieve a just and lasting peace.

    Canada will arrive at these summits with a plan to lead, and with new investments to build our strength in service of our values.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK Armed Forces recognise Poland’s Second World War contribution at ceremony in Warsaw

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Press release

    UK Armed Forces recognise Poland’s Second World War contribution at ceremony in Warsaw

    UK Defence Minister Lord Coaker, Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz pay tribute to the extraordinary courage displayed by Polish paratroopers during one of the most famous allied operations of the Second World War.

    Lord Coaker with Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Copyright reserved to the Polish Ministry of Defence.

    • UK honours Polish courage during Second World War in first-of-its-kind commemoration in Poland
    • Historic event reinforces UK and Poland relationship and Britain’s commitment to European security
    • New security deal between the two countries to be signed later this year The United Kingdom has recognised the contribution of Polish personnel as part of the allied war effort during the Second World War at a moving ceremony in Poland.

    Lord Coaker, pictured left, with Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, pictured right. Copyright reserved to the Polish Ministry of Defence.

    Today, during an historic ceremony at Wilanów Palace in Warsaw, UK Defence Minister Lord Coaker, Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz paid tribute to the extraordinary courage displayed by Polish paratroopers during one of the most famous allied operations of the Second World War.

    The event is the first formal standalone commemoration to mark the heroism of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, during Operation Market Garden in 1944 – the allied operation which aimed to hasten the end of the Second World War by opening up new routes for advancing troops into Germany.

    The event symbolised the enduring bond between British and Polish forces forged during the darkest days of the Second World War. During the ceremony Lord Coaker and Deputy Prime Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz inspected troops and received a salute, before giving speeches focussed on the shared values and sacrifices that have bound the two nations together.

    Copyright reserved to the Polish Ministry of Defence.

    Speaking from Wilanów Palace, Defence Minister Lord Coaker said:

    At a time when Britain and Poland’s Armed Forces are once again working together to protect Europe’s security and deter those who threaten peace, the generation of heroes from both countries who fought side-by-side during the Second World War remain an enduring source of pride and inspiration.

    Today, we acknowledge the extraordinary contribution of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade which Major General Sosabowski created and led into battle.

    During the events of 1944, Allied forces aimed to seize a series of crucial bridges in the Netherlands through a combination of airborne attack and ground advances, often regarded as one the of most daring and ambitious operations of the entire war.

    Major General Ollie Kingsbury, Colonel Commandant of The Parachute Regiment, presented a banner to Brigadier General Michał Strzelecki, Commander 6th Polish Airborne Brigade – the proud descendants of the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade – signifying the enduring and historic bond between our armed forces. Members of The Parachute Regiment, British Army and the Polish 6th Airborne Brigade also formed a guard of honour during the ceremony.

    Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, said:

    General Stanisław Sosabowski and his soldiers, fighting side-by-side with British paratroopers, laid the foundation for today’s cooperation, also military, as well as for strong ties between our nations. On my own behalf and on behalf of the soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces, I thank you for honouring our heroes. It constitutes an important gesture, which demonstrates our unity and shared values that have connected us for over 80 years.

    Temporary Military Assistant to the Minister of State in the House of Lords, pictured left, with the UK’s Defence Attaché to Poland Chris Brown, pictured right. Copyright reserved to the Polish Ministry of Defence.

    The event comes at a time of unprecedented cooperation between the UK and Poland on defence and security matters. Announced by the Prime Minister in January, the two nations are set to sign a new security and defence treaty later this year, building on strong bilateral ties which have seen over 20 British operational deployments to Poland since February 2022.

    Both countries remain steadfast allies in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression and are working together to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank.

    Lord Coaker’s visit also follows the publication of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review, which underscores Britain’s commitment to European security.

    The review sets out the UK’s vision to move to warfighting readiness, create a more lethal integrated military force, and strengthen UK leadership in NATO. Additionally, it will put service personnel at the heart of our defence plans by renewing the nation’s contract with those who serve and having a whole of society approach to our national resilience.

    Updates to this page

    Published 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Poised to Deliver Its NextGen Satellite and Technology Transfer for Malaysia’s Earth Observation Satellite Program

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic, Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in satellite manufacturing and high-resolution Earth observation data, is pleased to announce that Uzma Berhad, and by extension Satellogic as Uzma’s Technology Partner, has been selected as the successful bidder to lead the Malaysian High-Resolution Earth Observation Satellite Project (MHREOSP) for the Government of Malaysia.

    As a technology partner, Satellogic will design, develop, assemble, integrate and test a state-of-the-art high resolution satellite with active involvement of Malaysian personnel. This newest evolution of Satellogic’s proven platform, is built on the extensive heritage from over 50 NewSat satellites and features key upgrades, including superior National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scales (NIIRS) ratings, larger optics and enhanced sensor design, to deliver 50cm resolution across all spectral bands. Final integration and testing are planned to take place in Malaysia in collaboration with Uzma and local parties to support meaningful homegrown capacity development.

    This collaboration builds on the successful deployment of UzmaSAT-1 and underscores Satellogic’s commitment to delivering agile space solutions to its customers around the world. “Satellogic brings proven satellite technology and a commitment to agile innovation that aligns with our goals and the nation’s space aspirations, supporting the Malaysia Space Exploration 2030 Action Plan,” said Dato’ Kamarul Redzuan Muhamed, Group CEO of Uzma Berhad. “With the Government’s guidance, Satellogic’s expertise, and our homegrown talents, we are enabling Malaysia to leap forward in its geospatial intelligence capabilities and supporting the long-term sustainability of our national infrastructure and environment by nurturing local talent through knowledge sharing, technology transfer, and exposure to satellite technology. We look forward to help grow the ecosystem further, guided by the Malaysian Government and its agencies, including Malaysia’s Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), MYSA, the Public-Private Partnership Unit (UKAS), and Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT).”

    The selection strengthens Satellogic’s expanding presence in Asia and reinforces its mission to democratize access to state-of-the-art space technology.
    “This partnership harnesses the power of commercial space to strengthen national sovereignty through proprietary space access,” said Emiliano Kargieman, CEO & Co-Founder of Satellogic. “We’re proud to support Malaysia’s forward-looking vision for space and to work alongside Uzma and GeospatialAI in delivering capabilities that will drive national resilience and innovation”

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s strategic realignment as a U.S. company, and the visibility and high growth opportunities it will provide in connection therewith. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ
    from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, including due to challenges created by macroeconomic concerns, geopolitical uncertainty (e.g., trade relationships), financial market fluctuations and related factors, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties, including SpaceX, to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services and the inability of these vendors and manufacturers to meet our needs, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third pirates for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, including those related to artificial intelligence and machine learning, (xv) our ability to identify suitable acquisition candidates or consummate acquisitions on acceptable terms, or our ability to successfully integrate acquisitions, (xvi) competition for EO services, (xvii) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xviii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xix) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch, (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules and (xxvi) the anticipated benefits of the domestication may not materialize. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Contacts

    Investor Relations:

    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development 

    ryan.driver@Satellogic.com

    Media Relations:

    Satellogic

    pr@Satellogic.com

    Uzma Berhad

    communications@uzmagroup.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Poised to Deliver Its NextGen Satellite and Technology Transfer for Malaysia’s Earth Observation Satellite Program

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic, Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in satellite manufacturing and high-resolution Earth observation data, is pleased to announce that Uzma Berhad, and by extension Satellogic as Uzma’s Technology Partner, has been selected as the successful bidder to lead the Malaysian High-Resolution Earth Observation Satellite Project (MHREOSP) for the Government of Malaysia.

    As a technology partner, Satellogic will design, develop, assemble, integrate and test a state-of-the-art high resolution satellite with active involvement of Malaysian personnel. This newest evolution of Satellogic’s proven platform, is built on the extensive heritage from over 50 NewSat satellites and features key upgrades, including superior National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scales (NIIRS) ratings, larger optics and enhanced sensor design, to deliver 50cm resolution across all spectral bands. Final integration and testing are planned to take place in Malaysia in collaboration with Uzma and local parties to support meaningful homegrown capacity development.

    This collaboration builds on the successful deployment of UzmaSAT-1 and underscores Satellogic’s commitment to delivering agile space solutions to its customers around the world. “Satellogic brings proven satellite technology and a commitment to agile innovation that aligns with our goals and the nation’s space aspirations, supporting the Malaysia Space Exploration 2030 Action Plan,” said Dato’ Kamarul Redzuan Muhamed, Group CEO of Uzma Berhad. “With the Government’s guidance, Satellogic’s expertise, and our homegrown talents, we are enabling Malaysia to leap forward in its geospatial intelligence capabilities and supporting the long-term sustainability of our national infrastructure and environment by nurturing local talent through knowledge sharing, technology transfer, and exposure to satellite technology. We look forward to help grow the ecosystem further, guided by the Malaysian Government and its agencies, including Malaysia’s Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), MYSA, the Public-Private Partnership Unit (UKAS), and Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT).”

    The selection strengthens Satellogic’s expanding presence in Asia and reinforces its mission to democratize access to state-of-the-art space technology.
    “This partnership harnesses the power of commercial space to strengthen national sovereignty through proprietary space access,” said Emiliano Kargieman, CEO & Co-Founder of Satellogic. “We’re proud to support Malaysia’s forward-looking vision for space and to work alongside Uzma and GeospatialAI in delivering capabilities that will drive national resilience and innovation”

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s strategic realignment as a U.S. company, and the visibility and high growth opportunities it will provide in connection therewith. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ
    from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, including due to challenges created by macroeconomic concerns, geopolitical uncertainty (e.g., trade relationships), financial market fluctuations and related factors, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties, including SpaceX, to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services and the inability of these vendors and manufacturers to meet our needs, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third pirates for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, including those related to artificial intelligence and machine learning, (xv) our ability to identify suitable acquisition candidates or consummate acquisitions on acceptable terms, or our ability to successfully integrate acquisitions, (xvi) competition for EO services, (xvii) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xviii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xix) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch, (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules and (xxvi) the anticipated benefits of the domestication may not materialize. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Contacts

    Investor Relations:

    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development 

    ryan.driver@Satellogic.com

    Media Relations:

    Satellogic

    pr@Satellogic.com

    Uzma Berhad

    communications@uzmagroup.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI China: G7 summit ends in disputes

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The Group of Seven (G7) summit wrapped up in Canada on Tuesday with no joint communique but some stark frictions.

    Several statements, or the leaders’ commitments, were issued after the summit, which included driving secure, responsible and trustworthy AI adoption across public and private sectors, powering AI now and into the future, and closing digital divides; boosting cooperation to unlock the full potential of quantum technology to grow economies, solve global challenges and keep communities secure.

    The attendees also committed to mounting a multilateral effort to better prevent, fight and recover from wildfires, which are on the rise around the world; protecting the rights of everyone in society, and the fundamental principle of state sovereignty, by continuing to combat foreign interference, with a focus on transnational repression; and countering migrant smuggling by dismantling transnational organized crime groups.

    In his final remarks at the closing news conference, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney said that the discussions over the past two days were marked by a range of differing opinions, frank conversations and strategic exchanges.

    “There is a great amount of direct dialogue and discussion, very frank exchanges, very strategic exchanges, differences of opinion on a number of issues, but an effort to find common solutions to some of these problems,” said Carney, also chair of this year’s summit.

    He said this is particularly valuable “at a time when multilateralism is under great strain.”

    There was no joint statement on Ukraine, although Carney announced new Canadian support for Ukraine’s defense and another set of sanctions on Russia. Carney invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to attend the event in person and made support for the country one of the summit’s key discussion topics on Tuesday.

    Leaders met for the final day of the summit in Kananaskis in Canada’s province of Alberta without U.S. President Donald Trump, who suddenly left Canada on Monday night, saying that escalations in the Middle East forced his early exit from the G7 event.

    As he left, the summit published a statement that the resolution of the Iranian crisis can lead to a broader de-escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, even a ceasefire in Gaza.

    The remaining G7 leaders had a working lunch with visiting non-G7 leaders on energy security. In the statement, the leaders said that they remain vigilant to the implications of the Iran-Israel aerial conflict for international energy markets and that they will stand ready to coordinate to safeguard market stability.

    Hundreds of protesters took to the streets in downtown Calgary and Banff during the summit, calling on the summit to address a variety of issues, including Trump’s threat to annex Canada.

    Originally scheduled to begin on the weekend, the summit was shortened to two days and officially started on Monday.

    French President Emmanuel Macron announced Tuesday that next year’s summit will take place in Evian, a French spa town known for its mineral water.

    The G7 is an informal bloc comprising seven of the world’s advanced economies — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States — along with the European Union.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ban Belarus: UEFA’s ‘neutral’ policy does not go far enough

    Source: Scottish Greens

    18 Jun 2025 Human Rights Sport

    Human rights violators should not be platformed in sport.

    More in Human Rights

    UEFA must go further than allowing Belarus to play behind closed doors, and ban them from competing while the country continues to violate human rights and enable Russian war crimes, say Scottish Greens. 

    Scotland fans will not be able to attend the World Cup qualifier game in Hungary this September, because UEFA decided that Belarus matches must be played on ‘neutral’ grounds and behind closed doors due to their ongoing support of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

    Scottish Greens co-leader Patrick Harvie MSP wrote to UEFA President Aleksander Čeferin earlier this month, urging the football body to ban Belarus from all competitions.

    Mr Harvie said:

    “UEFA rightly banned Russia for their criminal domestic and international record, and they must follow suit with those countries who enable war and have a shocking history of human rights violations, like Belarus does. 

    “The continued participation of Belarusian sports teams in UEFA competitions flies in the face of the organisation’s own supposed values, particularly its RESPECT campaign, which promotes fairness, dignity and human rights in football.

    “Football is a globally uniting sport. UEFA’s platform holds a massive reach, and that can be used as a force for good to show that human rights and peace is the way forward. By allowing Belarus to continue competing, even behind closed doors, it sends the wrong message to the world. They must become a sporting pariah like Russia has become. 

    “Scotland fans may be disappointed in skipping the game, but morally it is the right thing to do.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Lord Chancellor speech at the Council of Europe

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Lord Chancellor speech at the Council of Europe

    The Rt Hon Shabana Mahmood MP spoke about evolving the European Convention on Human Rights to restore public confidence in the rule of law.

    It is a privilege to be here in Strasbourg – the living symbol of Europe’s post-war promise: that freedom, dignity and the rule of law would never again be aspirations, but guarantees.  

    It was here we took our first steps together, to create from the ashes of war a Europe bound not only by treaties and peace, but by shared principles.

    The United Kingdom is proud of the role it has played in keeping that promise.

    We helped found this council. We helped draft the Convention. And I can confirm that we remain firmly committed to both.

    But commitment is not the same as complacency.

    And across the continent, trust is being tested. Rules are increasingly being broken and undermined.

    And the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law – once widely assumed – now face distortion, doubt, even hostility.

    In this context, the recent letter from nine European leaders demonstrates a desire for open conversation about the future of the Convention.

    And I welcome that dialogue.

    But as the Secretary General has said, that discussion needs to happen amongst us as member States.

    He went on to say that we must ensure that the Convention holds liberty and security, and justice and responsibility, in balance.

    I agree and I want to reflect today on what that means.

    Because our Convention was never meant to be frozen in time.

    It has been amended, extended and interpreted over decades – responding to new threats, new rights, and new realities.

    And we must consider doing so again. That is why the UK is not only open to this conversation, we are already actively pursuing it in how we implement the convention domestically – not to weaken rights, but to update and strengthen them.

    This is not a retreat from principle. It is the very essence of the rule of law.

    In these increasingly turbulent times, that phrase is often repeated, sometimes diluted.

    But the rule of law is not a vague ideal.

    It means simply that laws are clear and apply to all; that power is exercised within limits; and that everyone – government included – is bound by the rules.

    That principle runs through the United Kingdom’s legal tradition.

    It’s why my parents chose to make their lives there – because they believed in a country where institutions were independent, where power was accountable, and where justice didn’t depend on who you were, but on what was right.

    And it is not only our tradition.

    Every nation in this Council shares the practice of using written rules to underpin our democratic societies – we pay our taxes, respect others’ property and uphold due process.

    These rules bind not just people within a state, but the behaviour of states towards one another – as was made clear at the Luxembourg Ministerial.

    I commend strongly the speed with which the Council expelled Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the extensive work to set up the Register of Damage and towards creating a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression.

    These are not symbolic acts. They are proud declarations that the rule of law still matters.

    To support this, I can today announce our contribution of €100,000 to the Council of Europe Ukraine Action Plan.

    This will support Council of Europe activities that are strengthening democratic governance and the rule of law in Ukraine.

    When I came in this morning, the Ukrainian and Council of Europe flags were at half-mast, and it is a sobering reminder of the daily horrors that the Ukrainian people are suffering.

    But the successes of our Convention cannot be taken for granted. Because when rules are broken with impunity, trust collapses – not just in states, but in the idea of democracy itself.

    And across Europe, public confidence in the rule of law is fraying.

    There is a growing perception – sometimes mistaken, sometimes grounded in reality – that human rights are no longer a shield for the vulnerable, but a tool for criminals to avoid responsibility.

    That the law too often protects those who break the rules, rather than those who follow them.

    This tension is not new. The Convention was written to protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the state.

    But in today’s world, the threats to justice and liberty are more complex.

    They can come from technology, transnational crime, uncontrolled migration, or legal systems that drift away from public consent.

    Again, I commend the good work that is going on.

    We must work together with the Secretary General to ensure that the Democratic Pact helps meet these challenges and builds on existing work such as the Reykjavik Principles on Democracy, the Venice Commission, and GRECO.

    But when the application of rights begins to feel out of step with common sense – when it conflicts with fairness or disrupts legitimate government action – trust begins to erode.

    We have seen this in the UK in two particularly sensitive areas: immigration and criminal justice.

    If a foreign national commits a serious crime, they should expect to be removed from the country.

    But we see cases where individuals invoke the right to family life – even after neglecting or harming those very family ties.

    Or take prison discipline. Being in custody is a punishment. It means some privileges are lost.

    But dangerous prisoners have been invoking Article 8 to try to block prison staff from putting them in separation centres to manage the risk they pose.

    It is not right that dangerous prisoners’ rights are given priority over others’ safety and security.

    That is not what the Convention was ever intended to protect.

    To be clear, this is not a critique of the Court of Human Rights.

    It was my pleasure yesterday to meet the new President of the Court, and he and his colleagues have my full support in their role of interpreting and applying the Convention.

    But when legal outcomes feel disconnected from public reasonableness, it is our job to respond.

    Because when people come to believe that rights only exist to protect the rule-breaker – not the rule-follower – those who would undermine the entire idea of universal human rights – the populists – will seize the space we leave behind.

    So, what should we do?

    We cannot leave these questions to the courts alone.

    If judges are being asked to solve political problems that parliaments avoid, we weaken both institutions. 

    That is why reform must be a shared political endeavour amongst us as member States – to preserve our Convention by renewing its moral and democratic foundation.

    None of us can walk away from that discussion.

    In the UK, we are restoring the balance we pledged at the birth of our Convention: liberty with responsibility, individual rights with the public interest. 

    There must be consequences for breaking the rules.

    Which is why we are clarifying how Convention rights – particularly Article 8 – operate in relation to our immigration rules. The right to family life is fundamental. But it has too often been used in ways that frustrate deportation, even where there are serious concerns about credibility, fairness, and risk to the public.

    We’re bringing clarity back to the distinction between what the law protects and what policy permits.

    Prisoners claiming a right to socialise – under Article 8 – is not just a legal stretch. It damages the public perception of human rights altogether. 

    These are the reforms we are pursuing at home. The question for all of us now is whether the Convention system, as it stands, has the tools to resolve these tensions in a way that keeps the public with us. 

    As I have said, our Convention has evolved before, through new protocols, new rights, and new interpretations. Always to reflect changing times, while staying true to its purpose.

    The rule of law and human rights are part of one system of thought. 

    But when rights feel remote from fairness, or we appear to protect the rule-breaker over the rule-follower, trust disintegrates – and with it, the foundations of democracy. 

    That is why this dialogue matters. Because the Convention matters so much.

    We can preserve rights by restoring public confidence in them rather than give ground to populism.

    The European Convention on Human Rights is one of the great achievements of post-war politics.

    It has endured because it has evolved.

    Now, it must do so again – as the Secretary General said, so it is strong and relevant

    And as it is our convention, it is our responsibility. It will not always be easy. But this is a conversation we need to have.

    I look forward to that conversation, today and in the months to come.

    Updates to this page

    Published 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Press Arrangements for IAEA Board of Governors Meeting 9-13 September 2024

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The IAEA Board of Governors will convene its regular September meeting at the Agency’s headquarters starting at 10:30 CEST on Monday, 9 September, in Board Room C, Building C, 4th floor, in the Vienna International Centre (VIC).

    Board discussions are expected to include, among others: nuclear and radiation safety; nuclear security; strengthening the Agency’s activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications; verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic; NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran; nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine; transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT; application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East; and the restoration of sovereign equality of Member States in the IAEA.

    The Board of Governors meeting is closed to the press.

    Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will open the meeting with an introductory statement which will be released to journalists after delivery and posted on the IAEA website. The IAEA will provide video footage here and will make photos available on Flickr. 

    Press Conference:

    Director General Grossi is expected to hold a press conference at 13:00 CEST on Monday, 9 September, in the Press Room of the M building.

    A live video stream of the press conference will be available. The IAEA will provide video footage here and will make photos available on Flickr. 

    Photo Opportunity:

    There will be a photo opportunity with the IAEA Director General and the Chair of the Board, Ambassador Holger Federico Martinsen of Argentina, before the start of the Board meeting, on 9 September at 10:30 CEST in Board Room C, in the C building in the VIC.

    Press Working Area:

    The Press Room on the M-Building’s ground floor will be available as a press working area starting from 9:00 CEST on 9 September.

    Accreditation:

    All journalists interested in covering the meeting in person must register with the Press Office by 16:00 CEST on Thursday, 5 September. Please email press@iaea.org.  We encourage those journalists who do not yet have permanent accreditation to request it at UNIS Vienna.

    Please plan your arrival to allow sufficient time to pass through the VIC security check.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Statement to United Nations Security Council

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    (As prepared for delivery)

    I thank the President of the Security Council in allowing me the opportunity today to update you on IAEA activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support for the IAEA’s efforts.

    I have addressed the Council on the situation in Ukraine five times before, on 4 March, 11 August, 6 September, 27 October in 2022, and 30 May last year.

    It is now nearly two years since the beginning of the war, and I remind you that it is the first time in history that a war is being fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

    This includes several of Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants and other facilities that have come under direct shelling. All NPPs have lost off-site power at some point.

    Furthermore, one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, the Zaporizhzhya NPP, has been under Russian operational control with the presence of Russian troops on-site for almost all of that time.

    And as you know the IAEA has been closely monitoring the situation and assisting Ukraine every single day since the start of the war.

    Shortly after the start of the war, I elaborated the Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. These are:

    1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained.
    2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times.
    3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure.
    4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.
    5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites.
    6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures.
    7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others.

    And in my previous update to the Council on 30 May I reported that, as a result of intensive consultations with the leadership of Ukraine, as well as of the Russian Federation, I had further established five concrete principles for the ZNPP in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant, namely:

    1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
    2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
    3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
    4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
    5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

    I said that these commitments are essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to observe them.

    I was pleased that at that meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.

    Furthermore, I said that the experts on the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ), who have been on-site since 1 September 2022, would report to me on the observance of these principles and that I would report publicly on any violations.

    Now nine months later, I wish to report today on the nuclear safety security and safeguards situation in Ukraine, and the Agency’s continued activities including the Agency’s assessment against the seven pillars and our monitoring of these five principles.

    Mr. President,

    Firstly, I wish to report on the scope and extent of our activities over nearly two years,

    There has been a total of 102 missions to Ukraine. I have personally led eight of them, including three to ZNPP and I will shortly be leading another one to ZNPP within the next two weeks.

    We have the 15th ISAMZ team of our dedicated and courageous international staff at the ZNPP, a plant that is still on the front lines of this war and our staff who still have to cross that front line to undertake this vital work. 37 of our staff have been part of these teams at ZNPP, a number of them more than once.

    For a year we have had other dedicated IAEA experts stationed at every other major Ukrainian nuclear site: Rivne NPP, South Ukraine NPP, Khmelnytskyy NPP and at the Chornobyl NPP – their presence allowing us to provide the international community with reliable information on the nuclear safety and security situation at each of those sites as well. More than 100 of our staff have been part of these teams, totalling more than 3662 person-days of our staff in Ukraine.

    Since I last addressed you, thanks to the generosity of Member States, the Agency has purchased armoured vehicles and recruited additional staff, security officers and drivers, and now manages our own security for the missions, thereby relieving some of the pressures on the United Nations Departments of Safety and Security and Operational Support.

    We continue to facilitate an international assistance package now totalling more than €8.5 million with 34 deliveries of vital equipment to Ukraine, and I again thank Member States for their contributions.

    We have developed a proposal for the Agency to provide advice, training, and equipment in the area of the safety and security of radioactive sources in Ukraine.

    We have put together a programme of health care assistance including through equipment and psychological support for all Ukrainian nuclear workers.

    I also announced the new programme for assistance of the Kherson Oblast aimed at managing the adverse impact associated with the flooding after the Kakhovka dam destruction and we work with Ukraine to identify their immediate needs in this area.

    In addition to our work on nuclear safety and security we are also continuing our vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine, ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Based on these activities the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

    And we are keeping the world informed of the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites with now well over 200 web statements and updates, 9 reports and multiple briefings, including to the United Nations General Assembly and to your distinguished selves at the Security Council. Thanks to this, the international community has at its disposal timely, technically sound and objective information, thus avoiding the risks associated with lack of information and misinformation, including misperceptions which might lead to decisions with serious implications.

    Mr. President,

    The nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP – in particular – continues to be extremely fragile.

    The plant’s six reactors have been shut down since mid-2022 – five of them in cold shutdown and one in hot shutdown. But the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.

    Although the plant has not been shelled for a considerable time, significant military activities continue in the region and sometime in the vicinity of the facility, with our staff reporting rockets flying overhead close to the plant, thereby putting at risk the physical integrity of the plant.

    The plant needs secure and uninterrupted sources of external cooling water. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam in early June last year, just days after I last reported to the Council, led to a large reduction in the water level of the reservoir. Consequently, the depth of the water in the reservoir was no longer sufficient to supply water and considerable efforts on site were needed, including the drilling of wells on site, to provide sufficient cooling water for the six shutdown reactor units.

    The plant has been operating on significantly reduced staff, who are under unprecedented psychological pressure – which despite the reactors being shut-down is not sustainable.

    The reduced number of qualified and trained operating personnel and the challenging supply chain has had a negative impact on the maintenance of equipment which is essential for maintaining the safety of the plant.  

    And there have now been eight occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel.

    The plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power, and sometimes just one, or for a period the backup power was not properly configured. This demonstrates the highly precarious situation regarding essential off-site power.

    There are occasions when the team has not had timely access to some areas of the plant. The IAEA teams need access in order to be able to effectively conduct their assessment of the situation regarding nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP and to reflect on the new developments.

    Turning now to the five concrete principles, the Agency has been monitoring observance of these principles, and there have been no indications that the five concrete principles are not being observed. Nevertheless, in line with the evolving situation, the Agency needs to have timely access to all areas of the ZNPP of significance for nuclear safety and security, to monitor that all five concrete principles are being observed at all times.

    We also should not forget the other nuclear facilities in Ukraine which are operating, most of the reactor units at full capacity. Although our teams continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained, they are also confirming the looming threat of military conflict and at some plants having to take shelter on several occasions. I wish to remind the Council that the availability of off-site power is essential to ensure their safe operation.

    Mr. President,

    A nuclear accident has not yet happened. This is true. But complacency could still lead us to tragedy. That should not happen. We must do everything in our power to minimize the risk that it does. And I am grateful for the continuing support from Member States – including financial support.

    And we must be clear about the nature of the five principles established in this very chamber on 30 May last year. They are not an arms control or armistice agreement. They are not the solution to all the tragic problems this war has brought.

    Instead, they are a creative, practical arrangement which has a very defined aim: to save Ukraine, Europe, and the world from a major nuclear accident with significant radiological consequences.

    So far, this limited but crucial objective has been achieved. But we should not be complacent – we should take nothing for granted. Utmost restraint is a must, from all sides.

    I am asking this Council for continued support for the seven pillars and the five principles, and for the IAEA’s role in monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.

    And I thank the Council, and you Mr President, for inviting me today thereby demonstrating its continuing focus on this critical issue.

    The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal for updates, clarifications and action, where so required, to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.

    Thank you, Mr President.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: United Nations Security Council Update

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi

    (As prepared for delivery)

    I thank the President of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to update you on the IAEA’s activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support of the IAEA’s efforts.

    It has been more than two years since the war began, the first ever to be fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

    The IAEA has been monitoring the situation closely and assisting Ukraine every day since the start of the war. IAEA staff are continuously present, monitoring the situation at all five of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which remains under Russian operational control.

    Today my statement will focus on the recent grave violations of the five concrete principles that I first established in this very chamber on 30 May. These five concrete principles are there to prevent a nuclear accident and to maintain the integrity of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.  Let me remind them what they are:  

    1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
    2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
    3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
    4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
    5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

    On 30 May last year I said here that observing these principles was essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and that I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to commit to them.

    At our meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.

    Nevertheless, Madame President, over the past ten days, the first of these principles has been violated repeatedly in what marks a step-change increase in risk to nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

    On Sunday, 7 April, the International Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ) confirmed the first attacks since November 2022 to directly target ZNPP.

    The ISAMZ team was able to inspect the location of one direct strike at the apex of the containment dome of the Unit 6 reactor building.  Whilst the damage to the structure is superficial, the attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment. 

    The other two attacks were in close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty.

    Agency experts at the site have been informed by ZNPP of a drone strike against the site’s oxygen and nitrogen production facility; two attacks on the training centre located just outside the site perimeter and reports of a drone shot down above the turbine hall of Unit 6. 

    These reckless attacks must cease immediately. Though, fortunately,  they have not led to a radiological incident this time, they significantly increase the risk at Zaporizhzhya NPP, where nuclear safety is already compromised.

    I am not only concerned about the attacks themselves, but also the context in which they have occurred. For several months before these direct attacks there had already been an increase in isolated drone incursions in the vicinity of the facility and in the nearby town of Energodar.

    In other areas of nuclear safety degradation, the plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power. There have been at least four occasions in the past year when the plant has had only one line of external power supply, with the precarity lasting for periods of up to four months.

    Let me put it plainly. Two years of war are weighing heavily on nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Every one of the IAEA’s 7 pillars of nuclear safety and security have been compromised.  We cannot sit by and watch as the final weight tips the finely balanced scale.   

    Even though the plant’s six reactors are now in cold shutdown, with the final unit shifting into that status two days ago following the IAEA’s recommendation, the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.

    The Agency will continue closely to follow the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and provide technically viable alternatives in a context of rapid changes and challenges.

    Our work at this facility remains essential. This has been recognized by all, irrespective of their side in this conflict. But to be effective, the IAEA teams need timely access to assess the condition of the plant and evaluate the cumulative impact that more than 26 months in a war zone have had on nuclear safety.

    Madame President,

    We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident. We must not allow complacency to let a roll of the dice decide what happens tomorrow. We must do everything in our power today to minimize the risk of an accident.

    The five principles established in this very chamber one year ago must be adhered to. They are there to prevent a major nuclear accident with potentially significant radiological consequences.

    The latest attacks represent a flagrant violation of these crucial principles and must stop.

    I am asking this Council for its steadfast support for the five principles and the IAEA’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which they help to underpin. And I am asking for your continued support of the IAEA’s role monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.  

    Despite huge challenges, the IAEA has kept open the indispensable lines of communication and will continue doing so. The support of your nations and of the Council as a whole is a necessity.

    I thank the Council for inviting me today, thereby demonstrating your continuing commitment to this critical issue.

    The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.

    Thank you, Madame President.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    When we met the last time, at ICONS 2020, many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security. A global pandemic was in the making and a war – in Ukraine – for first time soon would be fought among the facilities of one of Europe’s biggest nuclear power programmes.

    Meanwhile, profound technological advances have been made. Assessing their impact on nuclear security is a crucial task. Artificial Intelligence, and unmanned vehicles pose both a threat to nuclear security and offer new tools with which to enhance it. In the nuclear field itself, Small Modular Reactors promise new opportunities for applications such as desalination and power brought to remote communities via barge, but also require us to consider new security elements.

    The use of nuclear science and technology, often facilitated by the IAEA, has come on in leaps and bounds. Climate change and the drive for energy security are fuelling a desire for nuclear power. At this past Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP28, world leaders – those whose states use nuclear power and those whose do not – for the first time in nearly 30 years of COP meetings agreed nuclear power must be part of the transition to net zero. More than 20 countries have signed a pledge towards tripling nuclear power capacity and at the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Summit in March heads of state agreed on the urgent need for conducive financial conditions. 

    Nuclear security is relevant throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and is part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power. Nuclear power programmes require national nuclear security threat assessments and “security by design”. Nurturing relevant research and a strong security culture are key, not only in countries with NPPs.

    The use of life-saving and life-affirming applications of nuclear science and technology is growing, from cancer patients gaining access to radiotherapy to farmers benefiting from new crop varieties developed with the help of irradiation. IAEA initiative such as Rays of Hope: Cancer care for all; Nutec Plastics; Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC); and Atoms4Food are key vehicles facilitating wider access.

    All these opportunities to use nuclear and radioactive material depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime. For countries new to using nuclear and radioactive material, this means building up legal infrastructure, practices and culture that bolster nuclear security.  Nationally and across borders, collaboration and laser-focused vigilance are key to preventing groups with malicious intent from using nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic and harm.

    The threats to nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities are real and varied. The international nuclear security threat landscape keeps evolving. Today, anyone can type a few words into a computer and generative AI can create images of nuclear Armageddon, meaning it is now possible to spread panic about radiation fallout without a nuclear device. Risk scenarios include theft of nuclear and other radioactive material for use in improvised devices and sabotage at nuclear installations or during transport of nuclear and radioactive material. The risk of cyber-attacks requires the implementation of computer security programmes by those who use nuclear power and those who don’t. Risks come from outsiders and from those within the fold who are disgruntled or have been corrupted.

    Nuclear security is the national responsibility of individual states, but it also benefits enormously from close collaboration and the enabling role of the IAEA.  ICONS, which started in 2013, has been the place for ministers, policymakers, senior officials, and experts to gather to assesses current priorities, prepare for new challenges, and engage in scenario-based policy discussions. ICONS 2024, presided over by the co-presidents, HE Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and HE Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, covers the themes of policy, law and regulation; technology and infrastructure for prevention, detection and response; capacity building; and cross-cutting areas, such as the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety. ICONS is the most important high-level international meeting on nuclear security. At this time of heightened tensions, it is imperative that there remains a unity of purpose and that nuclear security does not become a political football.

    This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. The IAEA is at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges, including war. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security have broad international support. They have brought crucial clarity at a time of war and are testament to the adaptiveness of the IAEA and the security regime.

    Those seven pillars are backed up by an enormous ongoing effort by the IAEA to support Ukraine, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhya NPP on the front lines of the war. When there were allegations of nuclear security breaches, the IAEA was there to investigate with impartiality and science. We set the facts straight that no nuclear material had been diverted, cutting through the fog of war, and diffusing a tense situation.   

    Not all our efforts require quite as much courage as our experts have shown in Ukraine, nor do they make international headlines. But every day, the IAEA – the Secretariat and the Member States – work together fastidiously to underpin nuclear security, never resting, always learning.

    Radioactive sources are extensively used in many domains, including medicine, industry, agriculture and research. An incident in one State can have far-reaching consequences for others, so security for one is security for all. That means supporting States with no, or less developed nuclear security infrastructure makes everyone safer. That support, which often comes via the IAEA, includes making lawmakers aware of their responsibilities.

    Nuclear Security requires the implementation of appropriate and robust legislative regulatory frameworks. In 2022, the first Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) was held under the auspices of the IAEA. Reflecting the global importance of the legal framework and of nuclear security, parties managed to agree an outcome document and for the IAEA convene a subsequent conference. Since 2020, 14 new parties have joined the A/CPPNM bringing the total to 136. Five new Parties joined the CPPNM, bringing that total to 164. In addition to the A/CPPNM, political commitment to legally non-binding instruments, like the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance, is a strong indication of radiation safety and nuclear security culture.

    But legal frameworks are just the beginning. They must be implemented. The IAEA plays a central role in assisting its Members States so they are able to do that. Last year we inaugurated the most visible symbol of our collaboration: the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This first-of-its-kind space, made possible by 15 donors, is a cornerstone for capacity building amid the growing need for sophisticated hands-on nuclear security training using advanced, specialized equipment. The NSTDC is part of a wide range of services offered by the IAEA, including peer reviews, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), of which there have now been more than 100, and Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS), a service we launched in 2022. Our Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) now has 145 members and has enabled the reporting of more than 600 incidents in which nuclear or radioactive material went out of regulatory control.  Almost 8,000 people have benefited from our training in nuclear security, and we continue to work very hard to remove barriers that prevent talent from entering the field.  In March 2021, we launched the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) to support the achievement of gender equality in nuclear security. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme financially supports women pursuing a master’s degree in nuclear subjects and offers them internships, while our Lise Meitner offers women in the early and middle part of their career enriching opportunities within the field.   

    As the use of nuclear and other radioactive material around the world increases, more and more States are needing to increase their level of nuclear security. Nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety – we must put it on equal footing in terms of reliability of funding and the robustness of implementation.

    At ICONS 2024 we are – as the name of the conference indicates – “shaping the future”, not only of nuclear security, but of the world our children will inherit. That is because nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is an enabler to providing, through nuclear science and technology, the clean energy; cutting-edge medicine; nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General Statement on Developments in the Russian Federation

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The IAEA has been monitoring the situation on the reported military activities taking place in the vicinity of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).

    This NPP has six units of two different reactor types: RBMK-1000 and VVER-510. Two of the RBMK-1000 are in shutdown and two are fully operational. The two VVER-510 units are under construction.

    In view of the reportedly significant military activity, I wish to remind all parties of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. Additionally, I emphasize the five concrete principles to help to ensure nuclear safety and security which have been established for the Zaporizhzhya NPP in the context of the current conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and which are equally applicable in this situation. These include, among others, the imperative to ensure the physical integrity of a nuclear power plant. This is valid irrespective of where an NPP is situated.

    At this juncture, I would like to appeal to all sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident with the potential for serious radiological consequences. I am personally in contact with the relevant authorities of both countries and will continue to be seized of the matter. I will continue to update the international community as appropriate.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: IAEA Director General’s Speech at the Nobel Peace Prize Forum

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    Nobel’s spotlight on our perilous path and how we change course

    I want to start by congratulating Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha for their Nobel Peace Prize.

    As a young diplomat almost 40 years ago, I was fortunate to be part of a UN disarmament fellowship programme and to visit Hiroshima. There, fellows had an opportunity to meet the hibakusha and I had a conversation with an ailing victim. I have carried to every meeting, to every negotiation, and to every posting, the memory this woman’s silent testimony. When I asked her about that morning in 1945, she struggled to express the horror in words. She tried to articulate some words but stayed silent. Looking at me, right into my eyes. The look in her eyes has stayed with me ever since, like a powerful reminder, a secret mandate, to work so that her suffering is never repeated.

    For decades after the Second World War, the international community has been dealing with this unique dilemma: we built robust norms and passed nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Instead of dozens of countries armed with nuclear weapons, as was the concern in the 1960s, there are less than ten. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons have shrunk from tens of thousands to thousands.

    But on its journey through the perils of the atomic age, the world has come to a crucial crossroads. Our deep psychological connection caused by collectively seeing the horror of the consequences of nuclear war seems to be evaporating, taking with it our joint resolve to do everything possible to prevent a repetition.

    Like a giant spotlight, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has lit up our path ahead. It has done it, by reminding us of the past, and of the consequences of ignoring the perils of nuclear weapons use.

    Context of conflicts

    To understand the important challenges we face, we must look at the global context, at what is happening around the world.  

    War has returned to Europe, and it directly involves a nuclear weapon state. The conflict in Ukraine is also an indirect confrontation between the world’s biggest nuclear weapon states, the first since the end of the Cold War. But nuclear exercises and open references to the use of nuclear weapons in the theatre of this war are increasing the risks and can not be ignored.

    In the Middle East, the conflict of the past year has ignited smoldering tensions between Israel and Iran and led to the unprecedented step of direct exchanges and attacks between the two. Here there is also a nuclear weapons dimension. On one side, the assumed presence of nuclear weapons looms in the background. On the other, the very real potential of nuclear proliferation is raising the stakes.

    We find ourselves in a harmful loop: the erosion of the restraints around nuclear weapons is making these conflicts more dangerous. Meanwhile, these conflicts are contributing to the erosion of the restraints. The vicious circle dynamic is in motion.

    An unfortunate change of direction

    Doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons are being revised or reinterpreted. The quantity and quality of nuclear weapon stockpiles are being increased. 

    And in some non-nuclear weapon states – states that are important in their region – leaders are asking “why not us?”. And they are asking this openly!

    At the start of the nuclear arms race, J Robert Oppenheimer described the USSR and the US as “two scorpions in a bottle” each capable of killing the other, but only by risking their own life.

    Oppenheimer’s blunt statement would later be developed and elaborated under the roof of deterrence and the more sophisticated concept of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD.

    Today, independent of the vantage point of the observer, there is widespread concern that the risk of mutual destruction through nuclear war is higher than it has been for more than a generation.

    Lessons from history

    But it does not have to be this way. We can do better. History has shown that effective dialogue among superpowers has, more often than not, led to confidence and, as a result, also to arms limitation and even disarmament. At certain moments in history, world leaders took the right decisions, to tone down, or, to use today’s parlance, to de-escalate. Let’s see:

    The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis happened thanks to the direct engagement of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and US President John F Kennedy. Decades later, at the Geneva Summit of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan agreed a crucial axiom: “Nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” They met again the next year in Reykjavik and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals followed. Nuclear weapon reductions and the elimination of a whole category of weapon, through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty, were agreed. These steps towards rapprochement took leadership and courage. They often happened despite skepticism and voices against them.

    Diplomacy and dialogue (and the duty of nuclear weapon states)

    A return to diplomacy and dialogue is urgently needed, and this, not only in things nuclear. Shutting the other side out has never solved a problem and almost certainly aggravates it. Top leadership involvement is simply indispensable when nuclear weapons are involved. President Trump took the initiative and talked to Kim Jong Un. More of this is needed. Some have said these talks were ill prepared. I say, this is important. Nuclear weapon policy and limitations does not work bottom up. It is of course the other way around.

    We must be proactive in building the trust and protections that lower the risk of close calls and of brinkmanship, especially during today’s tensions. Not taking active steps means we rely on luck – or the assumption that the other side will show restraint – to save us from nuclear war. The longer you rely on luck, the more likely it is to run out.

    Conflict and tensions compel nations to arm themselves. Diplomacy and compromise create conditions in which they can disarm.

    The road to a nuclear weapon-free world is long and winding. The disarmament landscape is complex, and it’s worth acknowledging that. This does not diminish the responsibility nuclear weapons states have to make progress. After all, they committed themselves to this goal back in 1968, through the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Steps can be taken to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons, both in their production and the scenarios for their use.

    Nuclear weapon states, through their actions at home and on the world stage, have a responsibility to avoid a scenario in which more countries seek nuclear weapons. Pushing ahead with increases in arsenals leads to despair, cynicism, and a growing skepticism about the value of past commitments. Disengagement and unilateralism fuel sentiments of vulnerability in other countries, and with that, the notion nuclear weapons could be the ultimate protection against outside threats.

    Engagement among the five permanent members of the Security Council is indispensable. Such engagement can take many different shapes, starting with direct contact among themselves, bilaterally or as a group. This dialogue, which still exists, has been reduced to a very low level, virtually without real impact. Perhaps its revival could be assisted by an international organization, or facilitated with the support of a respected, impartial leader. Therefore, it’s essential that the United Nations, other international organizations, and their leaders work effectively to ensure their continued relevance amid the changing needs of their stakeholders.

    Do not make things worse (by falling for the siren call of proliferation)

    The IAEA has played its indispensable technical role during past attempts of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Middle East. As the difficult experiences in Iraq, Libya and Syria remind us, the draw of nuclear weapons is real and so is the geopolitical and military response.

    Today’s tensions are prompting even leaders of important counties that, so far, are in good standing with the NPT to ask: “Why shouldn’t we have a nuclear weapon too?”

    To this, I would say, “Do not make things worse.” Acquiring a nuclear weapon will not increase national security, it will do the opposite. Other countries will follow. And this will contribute to the unravelling of a nonproliferation regime that has had its ups and downs – and it still has its limitations – but none-the-less it has served humanity extraordinarily well. The problem and challenge to the NPT regime may come from those nuclear armed but also those who, while not having nuclear weapons, may feel the NPT has failed as a catalyst to disarmament.

    Weakening the non-proliferation treaty under the argument that progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow and more drastic approaches are required, would be totally misguided and may make us throw away existing international measures committing nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in this field.

    I come from a non-nuclear weapon state. I understand the frustration that some people feel about the “haves” and “have-nots” of nuclear weapons. But I have also seen the legacy of peace and prosperity left by leaders who resisted that siren call. In the 1980s, vision, resolve and dialogue meant Brazil and Argentina changed course and did not go down the path to nuclear arms. Today, Latin America is a nuclear weapon free zone.

    Multilateral leaders: step up by stepping in

    Many wonder whether there’s still a role for multilateralism in guiding us through this maze of conflicting interests. Yes, there is. During difficult times in the past, international organizations have had a big impact on peace and security. But it only happens when leaders of these organizations get off the side lines and use their mandate and their own good offices effectively.

    We prove our relevance in extraordinary times.   

    Each organization has different tools, a different mandate, a different membership, and each of their leaders will determine how to act. I can speak for the IAEA.  We have nuclear science at our core, and we are the world’s nuclear weapons watchdog. Let me give you an example:

    For almost three years, Ukraine, the world and the IAEA have been confronted with a completely unprecedented situation – never before has a military conflict involved the seizure of a nuclear power plant and been fought among the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

    At the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s biggest nuclear power plant – the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, with nearly 6 gigawatts of installed capacity – was taken by Russia. This established a hotspot in the middle of a combat zone. The chance of an incident – or accident – causing terrible radiological consequences became real.

    Observing this from the outside was never, in my mind, an option. Staying on the sidelines and later reflecting on “lessons learned” may have been the more traditional – or expected – path for an international organization. But to me this would have been a dereliction of duty. So, we leaned into our core mission, crossed the front lines of war, and established a permanent presence of IAEA experts at all Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. That makes us the only international organization operating independently in occupied territory. We are informing the world of what’s going on and reducing the chance that a radiological incident enflames the conflict and causes even more devastation.

    We did the same by going to Kursk when a Russian nuclear reactor was at risk of coming into the line of fire. I am in constant communication with both sides.

    I have been meeting with President Zelenskyy, and President Putin regularly. Nuclear safety and security during this conflict must have the buy-in and continued involvement of both leaders. Talking to only one of them would not achieve this important goal. At the same time, I am keeping an open dialogue with leaders on all continents and briefing the UN Security Council. When it comes to nuclear safety in Ukraine it has been possible to build a level of agreement that is rare during the divisions of this conflict. Where there is agreement, there is hope for more agreement.

    Ukraine is not our only hotspot.

    In Iran, the IAEA’s job is to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of a growing nuclear programme. Iran has now enriched uranium to a level that is hard to justify. It has not yet answered the IAEA’s questions completely and it has made our work more difficult by taking away some of our cameras and blocking some of our most experienced safeguards inspectors from going into the country. This has caused concern and led to a pattern of mistrust and recriminations. In diplomacy, progress often requires prompting, catalyzing, and suggesting ways forward. This presents a role for an impartial, honest and effective broker. It is a role I, in my capacity as the IAEA’s Director General, have been playing. In fact, I returned from my latest visit to Tehran just a few weeks ago where I presented alternatives and ideas to reduce the growing tensions, and hopefully to retain Iran within the NPT and the non-proliferation norms.

    The danger of playing it safe

    When it comes to working on behalf of peace and security, playing it safe is dangerous.

    Silence and indifference can be deadly.

    Dag Hammerskjold, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, said: “It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.”

    A new path

    This week, the Norwegian Nobel Committee looked beyond today’s conflicts. In its own way, it did not play it safe. Instead, it shined a light on the horrors of nuclear war and the people who have been warning us about them for many decades.

    In doing that, the Nobel Committee, Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha have illuminated the danger of the path we are now on.

    We have to make a new path.

    First, the leaders of the nuclear weapon states must recognize the need for a responsible management of their nuclear arsenals. Experiences from the past confirm that even at times of crisis and conflict it has been possible to recognize the unique terminal power of these weapons and the responsibility that comes with it. What Kennedy, Khrushchev, Reagan, Gorbachev, or Trump did by reaching out to a nuclear-armed adversary, sets a precedent, a useful one. Such contacts, either bilateral or at the P5 level could possibly be facilitated by a competent broker. These are the first steps to bringing down the tone so that nuclear sabre rattling recedes and the commitments to the unequivocal undertakings to move towards a nuclear free world can be fulfilled.

    Secondly, an iron-clad resolve to observe and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime needs to be adopted. Nuclear weapon and nuclear non-weapon states must work together to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    We need to walk through perilous times by recognizing limitations and keeping our eyes on our common objectives.

    Nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed on the nuclear armed.

    Realism is not defeatism. Diplomacy is not weakness.

    Difficult times call for enlightened leadership, at the national level, and at the international level as well.

    Putting the international system back on track is within our reach. World leaders, including those at the top of the multilateral system, have a duty and an irrevocable responsibility to work towards this.  

    Personally, I am convinced. Perhaps, because the secret mandate I received that day in Hiroshima from a hibakusha burns in me, stronger than ever. Thank you.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Update 295 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The IAEA team based at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) today heard repeated rounds of gunfire that appeared to be aimed at drones reportedly attacking the site’s training centre, followed by the sound of multiple explosions, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

    It was the fourth time this year that the training centre, located just outside the site perimeter, was reportedly targeted by unmanned aerial vehicles.

    “Drones flying close to nuclear power plants could threaten their safety and security, with potentially serious consequences. As I have stated repeatedly during the war, such incidents must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said.

    The IAEA team on site reported hearing at least five explosions between 11:30am and 13:45pm local time, each preceded by gunfire. Additional gunfire was heard around 14:00pm. The ZNPP told the IAEA team that all incidents involved “drone neutralization” near the training centre premises. There were no immediate reports of any damage to the centre.

    Last month, the IAEA team also heard bursts of gunfire, coinciding with a purported drone attack on the same training centre. In mid-April this year, a drone was reportedly shot down and crashed near the ZNPP’s training centre, just over three months after another reported drone attack on the centre.

    Drones are also frequently detected near Ukraine’s other nuclear sites.

    In February, a drone severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl plant in northern Ukraine, built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards.

    Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – also regularly report of drones being detected near the respective sites.

    MIL OSI NGO –