Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with President Macron of France: 16 June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    PM meeting with President Macron of France: 16 June 2025

    The Prime Minister met French President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit this afternoon.

    The Prime Minister met French President Emmanuel Macron at the G7 Summit this afternoon.

    Discussing the Middle East, they both agreed on the need to find a route to peace through diplomacy and dialogue. They agreed that this should be a key focus for G7 partners in the next two days.

    They looked ahead to the upcoming UK-France Summit in July and agreed that their teams should pursue high-ambition outcomes that deliver for the British and French people. 

    Migration should be a key focus given the deteriorating situation in the Channel, they confirmed – adding that they should continue to work closely with other partners to find innovative ways to drive forward progress.

    They also agreed that the summit presents an opportune moment to further enhance our existing defence and security co-operation. 

    Both leaders looked ahead to discussing Ukraine at the G7 tomorrow and underscored their enduring support for securing a just and lasting peace and keeping up the pressure on Putin.

    Updates to this page

    Published 17 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • EU readies ban on Russian gas imports by end of 2027

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The European Commission is set to propose on Tuesday a ban on EU imports of Russian gas and liquefied natural gas by the end of 2027, using legal measures to ensure the plan cannot be blocked by EU members Hungary and Slovakia.

    The proposals will set out how the European Union plans to fix into law its vow to end decades-old energy relations with Europe’s former top gas supplier Russia, made after Moscow’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    An internal Commission summary of the upcoming proposal, seen by Reuters, said it would fix into law a ban on imports of Russian pipeline gas and LNG from January 1, 2026, with longer deadlines for certain contracts.

    Short-term Russian gas deals signed before June 17, 2025 would have a one-year transition period, to June 17, 2026, it said.

    Imports under existing long-term Russian contracts would then be banned from January 1, 2028 – effectively ending the EU’s use of Russian gas by this date, the summary said.

    Companies including TotalEnergies TTEF.PA and Spain’s Naturgy NTGY.MC have Russian LNG contracts extending into the 2030s.

    EU LNG terminals would also be gradually banned from providing services to Russian customers, and companies importing Russian gas would have to disclose information on their contracts to EU and national authorities, Reuters previously reported.

    The plans could still change before they are published.

    EU energy commissioner Dan Jorgensen said on Monday the measures were designed to be legally strong enough for companies to invoke the contractual clause of “force majeure” – an unforeseeable event – to break their Russian gas contracts.

    “Since this will be a prohibition, a ban, the companies will not get into legal problems. This is force majeure, as it [would be] if it had been a sanction,” Jorgensen told reporters.

    NO VETO

    Slovakia and Hungary, which have sought to maintain close political ties to Russia, still import Russian gas via pipeline and say switching to alternatives would increase energy prices. They have vowed to block sanctions on Russian energy, which require unanimous approval from all EU countries, and have opposed the ban.

    To get around this, the Commission’s proposals will use an EU legal basis that can be passed with support from a reinforced majority of countries and a majority of the European Parliament, EU officials said.

    While most other EU countries have signalled support for the ban, officials said some importing countries have raised concerns about the risk to companies of financial penalties or arbitration for breaking contracts.

    Around 19% of Europe’s gas still comes from Russia, via the TurkStream pipeline and LNG shipments – down from roughly 45% before 2022. Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Spain are among those that import Russian LNG.

    “We fully support this plan in principle, with the aim of ensuring that we find the right solutions to provide maximum security for businesses,” French industry minister Marc Ferracci told reporters on Monday.

    (Reuters)

     

  • MIL-Evening Report: The Middle East is a major flight hub. How do airlines keep passengers safe during conflict?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Natasha Heap, Program Director for the Bachelor of Aviation, University of Southern Queensland

    Screenshot June 17 2025, Courtesy of Flightradar24

    The Middle East is a region of intense beauty and ancient kingdoms. It has also repeatedly endured periods of geopolitical instability over many centuries.

    Today, geopolitical, socio-political and religious tensions persist. The world is currently watching as longstanding regional tensions come to a head in the shocking and escalating conflict between Israel and Iran.

    The global airline industry takes a special interest in how such tensions play out. This airspace is a crucial corridor linking Europe, Asia and Africa.

    The Middle East is now home to several of the world’s largest international airlines: Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad Airways. These airlines’ home bases – Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi, respectively – have become pivotal hubs in international aviation.

    Keeping passengers safe will be all airlines’ highest priority. What could an escalating conflict mean for both the airlines and the travelling public?

    Safety first

    History shows that the civil airline industry and military conflict do not mix. On July 3 1988, the USS Vincennes, a US navy warship, fired two surface-to-air missiles and shot down Iran Air Flight 655, an international passenger service over the Persian Gulf.

    More recently, on July 17 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine as the battle between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists continued.

    Understandably, global airlines are very risk-averse when it comes to military conflict. The International Civil Aviation Organization requires airlines to implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS).

    One of the main concerns – known as “pillars” – of the SMS is “safety risk management”. This includes the processes to identify hazards, assess risks and implement risk mitigation strategies.

    The risk-management departments of airlines transiting the Middle East region will have been working hard on these strategies.

    Headquartered in Montreal, Canada, the International Civil Aviation Organization has strict requirements and protocols to keep passengers safe.
    meunierd/Shutterstock

    Route recalculation

    The most immediate and obvious evidence of such strategies being put in place are changes to aircraft routing, either by cancelling or suspending flights or making changes to the flight plans. This is to ensure aircraft avoid the airspace where military conflicts are flaring.

    At the time of writing, a quick look at flight tracking website Flightradar24 shows global aircraft traffic avoiding the airspace of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. The airspace over Ukraine is also devoid of air traffic.

    Rerouting, however, creates its own challenges. Condensing the path of the traffic into smaller, more congested areas can push aircraft into and over areas that are not necessarily equipped to deal with such a large increase in traffic.

    Having more aircraft in a smaller amount of available safe airspace creates challenges for air traffic control services and the pilots operating the aircraft.

    More time and fuel

    Avoiding areas of conflict is one of the most visible forms of airline risk management. This may add time to the length of a planned flight, leading to higher fuel consumption and other logistical challenges. This will add to the airlines’ operating costs.

    There will be no impact on the cost of tickets already purchased. But if the instability in the region continues, we may see airline ticket prices increase.

    It is not just the avoidance of airspace in the region that could place upward pressure on the cost of flying. Airliners run on Jet-A1 fuel, produced from oil.

    If Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, the “world’s most important oil transit chokepoint”, this could see the cost of oil, and in turn Jet-A1, significantly increase. Increasing fuel costs will be passed on the paying passenger. However, some experts believe such a move is unlikely.

    A major hub

    The major aviation hubs in the Middle East provide increased global connectivity, enabling passengers to travel seamlessly between continents.

    Increased regional instability has the potential to disrupt this global connectivity. In the event of a prolonged conflict, airlines operating in and around the region may find they have increased insurance costs. Such costs would eventually find their way passed on to consumers through higher ticket prices.

    The Middle East is a major connecting hub for global aviation.
    Art Konovalov/Shutterstock

    Passenger confidence

    Across the globe, airlines and governments are issuing travel advisories and warnings. The onus is on the travelling public to stay informed about changes to flight status, and potential delays.

    Such warnings and advisories can lead to a drop in passenger confidence, which may then lead to a drop in bookings both into and onwards from the region.

    Until the increase in instability in the Middle East, global airline passenger traffic numbers were larger than pre-pandemic figures. Strong growth had been predicted in the coming decades.

    Anything that results in falling passenger confidence could negatively impact these figures, leading to slowed growth and affecting airline profitability.

    Despite high-profile disasters, aviation remains the safest form of transport. As airlines deal with these challenges they will constantly work to keep flights safe and to win back passenger confidence in this unpredictable situation.

    Natasha Heap does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The Middle East is a major flight hub. How do airlines keep passengers safe during conflict? – https://theconversation.com/the-middle-east-is-a-major-flight-hub-how-do-airlines-keep-passengers-safe-during-conflict-259034

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • PM Modi arrives in Calgary for G7 Summit

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Calgary, Canada on Tuesday (local time) to participate in the G7 Summit, where he will meet with global leaders and share India’s views on key international challenges.
     
    As part of his ongoing three-nation tour — which began in Cyprus and will conclude in Croatia — PM Modi said that he would highlight the concerns of the Global South during the Summit. In a post on X, the Prime Minister said, “Landed in Calgary, Canada, to take part in the G7 Summit. Will be meeting various leaders at the Summit and sharing my thoughts on important global issues. Will also be emphasising the priorities of the Global South.”
     
    Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that PM Modi will participate in G7 discussions on the future of energy security. These discussions will focus on diversification, technological innovation, infrastructure, and investment, aimed at ensuring access and affordability in a changing global landscape.
     
    “At the invitation of PM @MarkJCarney, PM @narendramodi arrives in Alberta, Canada for the G7 Summit,” Jaiswal wrote on X. “PM will be participating in @G7 discussions on energy security… and will also hold several bilateral meetings on the sidelines.”
     
    PM Modi’s arrival in Canada comes at a time of diplomatic recalibration between the two nations, following a period of strained relations.
     
    Other invitees to the G7 meeting are Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil, and Lee Jae-Myung of South Korea, and Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese of Australia and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa.
     
    The G7 Summit is an annual gathering of leaders from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union. This year’s edition marks PM Modi’s sixth straight attendance at the Summit.
     
    (ANI)
  • PM Modi arrives in Calgary for G7 Summit

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Calgary, Canada on Tuesday (local time) to participate in the G7 Summit, where he will meet with global leaders and share India’s views on key international challenges.
     
    As part of his ongoing three-nation tour — which began in Cyprus and will conclude in Croatia — PM Modi said that he would highlight the concerns of the Global South during the Summit. In a post on X, the Prime Minister said, “Landed in Calgary, Canada, to take part in the G7 Summit. Will be meeting various leaders at the Summit and sharing my thoughts on important global issues. Will also be emphasising the priorities of the Global South.”
     
    Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that PM Modi will participate in G7 discussions on the future of energy security. These discussions will focus on diversification, technological innovation, infrastructure, and investment, aimed at ensuring access and affordability in a changing global landscape.
     
    “At the invitation of PM @MarkJCarney, PM @narendramodi arrives in Alberta, Canada for the G7 Summit,” Jaiswal wrote on X. “PM will be participating in @G7 discussions on energy security… and will also hold several bilateral meetings on the sidelines.”
     
    PM Modi’s arrival in Canada comes at a time of diplomatic recalibration between the two nations, following a period of strained relations.
     
    Other invitees to the G7 meeting are Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil, and Lee Jae-Myung of South Korea, and Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese of Australia and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa.
     
    The G7 Summit is an annual gathering of leaders from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union. This year’s edition marks PM Modi’s sixth straight attendance at the Summit.
     
    (ANI)
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New Zealand’s Foreign Policy Reset: Progress & Reflections

    Source: New Zealand Government

    [Keynote speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) national conference, Takina Convention Centre, Wellington]

    Good afternoon.

    National Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Dr James Kember, Executive Director Dr Hamish McDougall, members of the Diplomatic Corps, distinguished guests. 

    It is a pleasure to speak here today at the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs’ Annual Conference.

    The NZIIA contributes to, and facilitates, discussion and debate about New Zealand’s foreign policy, and we thank you for hosting us. 

    In May last year, it was the NZIIA that hosted us in Parliament for a speech that addressed the challenges we face in a more fractious world and outlined how the Coalition Government was bringing more energy, more urgency and a sharper focus to our foreign policy.

    Just over a year later, we thought we’d reflect on the Government’s Foreign Policy Reset, where progress has been made, and the foreign policy themes we have accentuated in the year since we last spoke to you.

    This is also the time for a clear-eyed appraisal of New Zealand’s strategic circumstances, and the sharply deteriorating international outlook, as evidenced by the protracted illegal war in Ukraine and in the catastrophic escalation of the conflict in the Middle East. 

    Twenty-five years ago, New Zealand enjoyed a world that was becoming more open, more democratic, and more free. Trade liberalisation was gathering pace. Effective multilateralism helped underpin a liberal- oriented international rules-based system.

    Turning to the world of today – and looking out to tomorrow – the changes are stark. Uncertainty is now pervasive across the globe. We face an international operating environment under serious strain, one that poses complex challenges while exposing structural weaknesses in that operating environment.

    While geography remains a constant, distance is no buffer. There is no opting out from the geopolitical realities we face. So, this is a timely reminder of what is at stake, and why our foreign policy matters for all New Zealanders. 

    Foreign policy can often be perceived as far removed from New Zealanders’ daily lives. But recognising how our foreign and trade policy underpins New Zealanders’ security and prosperity is crucial to the open and mature national conversation we must continue to have in our vibrant democracy.

    While operating for the most part quietly and in the background, our foreign and trade policy helps deliver outcomes that matter for all of us.

    From the export dollars our farmers and manufacturers earn in key markets and helping to remove barriers for our exporters.

    • To new international market opportunities being opened for our innovative services firms.
    • To the international rules that provide us with our Exclusive Economic Zone and its resources, preserve Antarctica as a zone of peace and science, and which govern behaviours in outer space and cyber space.
    • To the international security partnerships that enable us to tackle common threats, such as the flow of illegal drugs into our country, or terrorist threats.
    • To the standards that underpin everyday fundamentals we all rely on, whether international air and sea shipping, our telecommunication devices, or biosecurity measures.
    • And to the opportunities for young New Zealanders to travel and work overseas and return with new skills and experiences.

    So while foreign and trade policy may seem abstract, how we act in the world matters for New Zealanders every day.

    This fundamental link between how we advance our interests abroad, and our security and prosperity at home, is why the Coalition Government prioritises foreign policy as a crucial instrument to achieve both. That, after all, is how we maintain support from the taxpayers who underwrite our efforts.

    This demands being present, engaged, and explaining ourselves. There remains no substitute for in-person diplomacy, relationship building, and educating the public about the choices we face. 

    Now, our critics complain that we are leading a radical repositioning of our foreign policy. But only in one very narrow and important respect are they right. We have radically increased the tempo of our diplomacy, in recognition of our predecessors’ torpor, but also because of the sheer magnitude of the challenges we face. 

    Since being sworn into office in November 2023, we have visited 46 countries, several more than once, met with well over 100 Presidents, Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers, and had over 400 political engagements. 

    Through this engagement we are better informed about the world around us, as are counterparts about New Zealand’s foreign policy perspectives and the values that underpin them.

    And we continue the important duty of communicating New Zealand’s foreign policy priorities to the public and explaining the nature of our changing strategic circumstances and the choices that flow from them.

    We push ourselves to work harder, and explain ourselves better, because New Zealand has understood these past 80 years, that as a small state geographically isolated from the great landmasses of Asia, Europe and the Americas, only through the conduct of a highly active foreign policy can we advance our national interests, defend our region, and make it more prosperous.

    Foreign Policy Reset: Progress

    Distinguished guests, in our speech to you last year we outlined the six priorities that form the Government’s foreign policy reset. Today’s speech is an opportunity to recap the ambition that Cabinet set out and highlight key areas of effort and progress.

    First, we are significantly increasing our focus and resources applied to South and Southeast Asia. 

    With 34 outward Prime Ministerial and Ministerial visits to the region since February 2024 – advancing new business and investment opportunities, while expanding defence and security cooperation, and upgrading a range of key relationships – we are investing in the wider region, commensurate with its strategic and economic significance.

    In 2025, we have upgraded our Viet Nam relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and we are working hard to similarly achieve upgrades in our ASEAN and Singapore relationships.

    It was a pleasure to again visit India last month, and to contribute to this important and growing relationship, including welcoming the negotiations underway towards a comprehensive free trade agreement.

    Complementing this investment in South and Southeast Asia, the Government also remains focused on the depth and breadth of our important relationships across North Asia. Our bilateral relationship with China is New Zealand’s largest trade relationship. It’s proven mutually beneficial and significant for both countries.  The relationship is supported by regular people exchange, including political dialogue, business, education and tourism links. And we are pleased that with the Prime Minister visiting China this week we will have completed reciprocal visits between our respective counterparts over the past two years.

    Our long-standing political connections enable frank and comprehensive discussions on areas of disagreement, including those that stem from our different histories and different systems. Indeed, it is a sign of healthy relationships that we can and do express disagreement on important issues. 

    Japan and Korea are two likeminded democracies in the Indo-Pacific, who view the region and the world in the same way we do and are increasingly central to achieving our interests.

    Second, we are renewing and reinvigorating meaningful engagement with traditional and likeminded partners. 

    Our circumstances underscore the importance of an even deeper strategic partnership with Australia as well as other partners with which we share a deep history and enduring interests.

    Consultations with Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong in Adelaide last month highlighted that New Zealand has no closer or more important partner that Australia, our one formal ally, with whom we share interests across the full expanse of regional and international issues.

    We have grown the important partnership with the United Kingdom, including advancing trade opportunities and reiterating our shared commitment to tackling international security challenges. 

    Similarly, enhanced engagement with the European Union and its member states is a significant focus for New Zealand.

    The change in the US Administration in January has inevitably generated changes in the priorities and direction of US foreign policy. But the significance of the US’ continued role in the security and stability in the Indo-Pacific and as an essential economic partner remains, and this continues to be the focus of our engagement, including during discussions with Secretary Rubio in Washington and Admiral Paparo, Commander of US INDOPACOM in Honolulu.

    Third, we are sustaining a deeper focus on the Pacific, working in collaboration with Pacific Leaders to protect and advance our interconnected security, economic, social and environmental interests.

    In a more complex global environment, coming together as a region is even more important.  Which is why Pacific regionalism sits at the core of our Pacific approach, with the Pacific Islands Forum at its centre. 

    We will always be members of the same Pacific family. A series of cross-party Parliamentary delegations into the region, alongside our exhaustive travel around Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, have demonstrated that New Zealand’s commitment to the region spans the political spectrum and is foundational to who we are as a country.

    Our Pacific-focused International Development Cooperation programme – reshaped to achieve more impact by doing fewer, bigger, projects better – is helping to build climate and economic resilience, strengthen governance and security, and to lift heath, education and connectivity.

    Fourth, we are targeting our multilateral engagement on priority global and transboundary issues, working to defend and preserve core principles of international law that underpin our security and prosperity.

    Respect for the UN Charter principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition on the use of force is essential to avoid a return to a world where the exercise of hard power reigns supreme.

    Where these principles are flagrantly violated, such as in Russia’s continued illegal invasion of Ukraine, we must stand against such aggression and lend our efforts to achieving a just and sustainable peace.

    New Zealand’s response to the Israel-Hamas conflict is also grounded in upholding international law, including international humanitarian law.

    While the multilateral system has served us all well for many decades, it most certainly is not without flaws. We recognise that defending, strengthening, and modernising the rules-based system also means supporting reform of multilateral institutions. 

    We actively support efforts to make these institutions more responsive, efficient and effective to ensure they are focused on making a difference for our citizens, and we feel an urgency around necessary reform.   

    Fifth, we are supporting new groupings that advance and defend our interests and capabilities. 

    The relationship between the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries – Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand – is an example of this new support. 

    Deeper political-level engagement between NATO and the IP4, begun by predecessor governments, has allowed us to raise the profile of shared strategic challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific, and to drive enhanced cooperation on priority areas including cyber, artificial intelligence, and defence capability.

    This effort will be given further momentum next week, when the Prime Minister travels to The Hague for engagements with fellow IP4 partners and NATO countries, during the NATO Summit.

    And sixth, we are working hard to advance the Government’s goal of seriously lifting New Zealand’s export value over the next decade. 

    This means harnessing every potential gain from our trade and economic agenda; promoting New Zealand as a place to do business; and creating opportunities for our world-class exporters. 

    This Government has conducted eleven successful trade missions, as we work towards the target of 20 missions involving New Zealand businesses during this Parliamentary term.

    New trade agreements concluded with the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf Cooperation Council will open doors and provide greater certainty as well as create more chances for our exporters to grow and diversify their businesses. 

    As will our efforts to leverage and expand existing trade agreements – such as through the United Kingdom’s accession last year to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

    Mid-term reflections

    In recent speeches we have outlined that the priorities identified in the foreign policy reset are underpinned by three key concepts:

    • The realism that informs the Government’s foreign policy.
    • Our view of the crucial role that diplomacy needs to play in our troubled world.
    • And our unshakeable belief that small states matter and that all states are equal.

    In fashioning foreign policy responses, the realist tendency is to err on the side of prudence. That is, we are careful in what we say, and when and how we say it. 

    We leave it to the small cabal of ill-informed critics of our foreign policy approach to shout impotently at clouds. They are good at that. Take AUKUS. In our speech to the NZIIA last year we were candid about what AUKUS Pillar 2 was, why the Ardern/Hipkins Governments launched work on it, and we laid out the necessary pre-conditions for participation. 

    A year on, there is nothing new to report, which you might think says something about the current dynamic, but still critics insist dark clouds have formed around our independent foreign policy. Their arguments were ill-informed and rubbish then. They’re ill-informed and rubbish now.

    We said we would update New Zealanders on Pillar 2 when there was something new to say. And we will.       

    In conditions of great uncertainty and disorder, such as we are currently experiencing, prudence is a both a logical and necessary guiding principle for a small state like New Zealand.

    We see our responsibility to the New Zealand people, in conducting foreign policy, as making cool-headed calculations of the country’s own strengths and weaknesses as we fashion our responses to events large or small that impact upon New Zealand’s interests.

    For a small state like New Zealand, the role of diplomacy is a crucial instrument of our foreign policy. In our complex geostrategic environment never has effective diplomacy been more needed. 

    Summing up our wide foreign policy discussions in our National Statement to the United Nations last year, we said it has never been more apparent just how much diplomacy and the tools of statecraft matter in our troubled world. 

    Since war and instability is everyone’s calamity, diplomacy is the business of us all. We have observed that at this moment in time the ability to talk with, rather than at, each other has never been more needed. 

    Those who share our values, and even those who do not, gain from understanding each other’s position, even when we cannot agree. From understanding comes opportunity and from diplomacy comes compromise, the building block of better relations between nations. We said we need more diplomacy, more engagement, more compromise. 

    As Churchill also said in his later years, “meeting jaw-to-jaw is better than war.”

    The inherent tensions and imbalances in the global order – between the desire for a rules-based order that protects small states against aggression, and the unjustified exercise of power by certain Great Powers – have only grown over the last past eight decades. 

    Yet small states matter now as much as they did then. New Zealand holds the foundational belief that all states are equal and that our voices matter as much as more powerful states. Adopting a prudential approach to our diplomacy also means not reacting to everything that happens around us. 

    In closing, it’s fitting to return to the broad theme of the event – New Zealand’s foreign policy in a contested world.

    The outlook is challenging, to say the least, and we – government and public alike – must grapple with the reality of the fraught strategic circumstances that New Zealand faces.

    We have many friends in the world, but no-one owes New Zealand a living. It is incumbent upon us to chart our course, assert our priorities, cultivate our partnerships, and pursue our interests with the vigour we have injected into our diplomatic efforts these past 18 months.

    Amidst serious challenges and risk, there are also opportunities. Realising these means that we must continue to bring energy, urgency and a sharper focus to our foreign policy. 

    Through the Foreign Policy Reset, we are focused on doing exactly that and ensuring that we continue to deliver security and prosperity for all New Zealanders.

    Thank you

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • Will share my thoughts on important global issues, says PM Modi ahead of G7 Summit

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Calgary, Canada on Tuesday (local time) to participate in the G7 Summit, where he will meet with global leaders and share India’s views on key international challenges.
     
    As part of his ongoing three-nation tour — which began in Cyprus and will conclude in Croatia — PM Modi said that he would highlight the concerns of the Global South during the Summit. In a post on X, the Prime Minister said, “Landed in Calgary, Canada, to take part in the G7 Summit. Will be meeting various leaders at the Summit and sharing my thoughts on important global issues. Will also be emphasising the priorities of the Global South.”
     
    Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that PM Modi will participate in G7 discussions on the future of energy security. These discussions will focus on diversification, technological innovation, infrastructure, and investment, aimed at ensuring access and affordability in a changing global landscape.
     
    “At the invitation of PM @MarkJCarney, PM @narendramodi arrives in Alberta, Canada for the G7 Summit,” Jaiswal wrote on X. “PM will be participating in @G7 discussions on energy security… and will also hold several bilateral meetings on the sidelines.”
     
    PM Modi’s arrival in Canada comes at a time of diplomatic recalibration between the two nations, following a period of strained relations.
     
    Other invitees to the G7 meeting are Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, Claudia Sheinbaum of Mexico, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil, and Lee Jae-Myung of South Korea, and Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese of Australia and Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa.
     
    The G7 Summit is an annual gathering of leaders from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, and the European Union. This year’s edition marks PM Modi’s sixth straight attendance at the Summit.
     
    (ANI)
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tuesday, June 17, 2025

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Note: All times local

    Kananaskis, Alberta

    8:00 a.m. The Prime Minister will welcome the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mark Rutte.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    • Pooled photo opportunity

    8:15 a.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Mark Rutte.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    8:45 a.m. The Prime Minister will welcome the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    • Pooled photo opportunity

    8:55 a.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    9:30 a.m. The Prime Minister will participate in the G7 working breakfast on a strong and sovereign Ukraine with G7 leaders and invited guests.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    10:30 a.m. The Prime Minister will participate in the G7 closing session.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Closed to media

    11:00 a.m. The Prime Minister will welcome outreach countries and international organizations.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    • Pooled photo opportunity

    11:15 a.m. The Prime Minister will participate in a G7 family photo with outreach countries, international organizations, and invited guests.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    • Pooled photo opportunity

    11:30 a.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    11:50 a.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the President of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    1:00 p.m. The Prime Minister will participate in the G7 working luncheon on energy security with outreach countries and international organizations.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    • Pooled photo opportunity

    4:05 p.m. The Prime Minister will hold a G7 Presidency press conference.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Country Golf Course

    Open to media

    4:40 p.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    5:15 p.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Jae Myung.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    5:40 p.m. The Prime Minister will meet with the President of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum.

    Pomeroy Kananaskis Mountain Lodge

    Note for media:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Previews SAC-D Hearing on FY 26 Budget Request for the Intelligence Community

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell

    Washington, D.C.U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, issued the following statement in advance of the June 17th closed hearing with Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Lieutenant General William J. Hartman, Acting Director of the National Security Agency:

    “U.S. national security depends on the professionalism, objectivity, and integrity of a well-resourced intelligence community. As I’ve observed before, fighting conflict is far costlier than deterring it. And the costs of strategic surprise – the failure of intelligence – can be catastrophic. That’s why the defense subcommittee takes very seriously its responsibility to equip the IC for an array of sensitive and evolving missions.

    “In return, we expect the nation’s seniormost intelligence officials to provide candid observations on the challenges facing both the IC and the decisionmakers their work informs. I look forward, in particular, to thorough assessments of U.S. interests in ongoing conflicts:

    “I will expect Director Gabbard, Director Ratcliffe, and General Hartman to address the current state of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the potential consequences of an outcome that strengthens Vladimir Putin, and the potential damage to U.S. alliances and partnerships of withholding further support to Ukraine.

    “Likewise, I will expect them to assess Israel’s ongoing response to Iran’s decades-long war against America, Israel, and our Arab partners, and the stakes of allowing Iran to continue its nuclear enrichment operations and support for terrorist proxies.

    “Even more broadly, I will expect the leaders of the IC to demonstrate their grasp of the undeniable alignment and coordination of America’s adversaries. I expect them to outline how Chinese economic support for Iran and Iranian material support for Russia’s war informs the global assessments they offer to the Commander-in-Chief.

    “Allies and partners from Europe to Japan are looking to the United States to meet this coordinated aggression with a coordinated response. Retreating from this mantle of leadership will not strengthen or advance American interests.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Previews SAC-D Hearing on FY 26 Budget Request for the Intelligence Community

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell

    Washington, D.C.U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, issued the following statement in advance of the June 17th closed hearing with Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Lieutenant General William J. Hartman, Acting Director of the National Security Agency:

    “U.S. national security depends on the professionalism, objectivity, and integrity of a well-resourced intelligence community. As I’ve observed before, fighting conflict is far costlier than deterring it. And the costs of strategic surprise – the failure of intelligence – can be catastrophic. That’s why the defense subcommittee takes very seriously its responsibility to equip the IC for an array of sensitive and evolving missions.

    “In return, we expect the nation’s seniormost intelligence officials to provide candid observations on the challenges facing both the IC and the decisionmakers their work informs. I look forward, in particular, to thorough assessments of U.S. interests in ongoing conflicts:

    “I will expect Director Gabbard, Director Ratcliffe, and General Hartman to address the current state of Russia’s war in Ukraine, the potential consequences of an outcome that strengthens Vladimir Putin, and the potential damage to U.S. alliances and partnerships of withholding further support to Ukraine.

    “Likewise, I will expect them to assess Israel’s ongoing response to Iran’s decades-long war against America, Israel, and our Arab partners, and the stakes of allowing Iran to continue its nuclear enrichment operations and support for terrorist proxies.

    “Even more broadly, I will expect the leaders of the IC to demonstrate their grasp of the undeniable alignment and coordination of America’s adversaries. I expect them to outline how Chinese economic support for Iran and Iranian material support for Russia’s war informs the global assessments they offer to the Commander-in-Chief.

    “Allies and partners from Europe to Japan are looking to the United States to meet this coordinated aggression with a coordinated response. Retreating from this mantle of leadership will not strengthen or advance American interests.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: G7 summit kicks off with emerging disagreements among leaders

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The Group of Seven (G7) leaders met for the first day of the two-day summit in Kananaskis in the province of Alberta, Canada, on Monday with emerging disagreements.

    According to CNN, U.S. President Donald Trump does not intend to sign a joint statement calling for de-escalation between Israel and Iran.

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa held a press conference Sunday night saying that Israel has a right to defend itself and that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon.

    French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer were also hoping to finalize a consensus among the leaders about the Middle East situation.

    Trump’s decision not to sign on to the statement set up an immediate divide with his counterparts, said the report, although a senior Canadian official said that European leaders are still engaged in the hopes of reaching a consensus.

    In the meantime, trade issues are to dominate discussions with Trump, and observers are watching to see whether he will soften his position.

    After meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Trump was asked what is holding up a trade-security deal with Canada, and he replied that it’s not a matter of it being held up, but rather “different concepts.”

    “I have a tariff concept and Mark has a different concept,” Trump said. “We will see if we can get to the bottom of it today.”

    “I think Mark has a more complex idea, but also very good. We are going to look at both and we’ll see what we will come out with,” said Trump.

    Trump also said it was a mistake to boot Russia from the G8 table, making it the current G7 and that there wouldn’t be war in Ukraine if Russia hadn’t been ejected.

    The G7 summit unveiled its slimmed-down agenda on Sunday, prioritizing discussions on the global economy and energy security.

    Originally scheduled to begin over the weekend, the summit has been shortened to two days and officially started on Monday.

    The G7 is an informal bloc comprising seven of the world’s advanced economies — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain, and the United States — along with the European Union.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney meets with President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, met with the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the President of the European Council, António Costa, at the 2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta.

    The Prime Minister emphasized the close and growing relationship between Canada and the European Union (EU). The leaders and their officials are engaged to expand the Canada-EU free trade relationship, defend rules-based trade, and deepen co-operation on shared defence and security challenges.

    Prime Minister Carney, President von der Leyen, and President Costa discussed critical minerals and underscored the importance of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine.

    The leaders will meet again at the forthcoming Canada-EU Summit.

    Associated Link

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: WATCH: Sherrill Slams Hegseth for Operational, Managerial, and Budgetary Incompetence at the Department of Defense

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11)

    WASHINGTON, DC — In a high-profile House Armed Services Committee hearing today, Congresswoman Mikie Sherrill (NJ-11) confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over what she called “months of dangerous dysfunction and incompetence” at the Department of Defense. 

    Just five months into Hegseth’s tenure, Sherrill laid out a searing case against his operational, managerial, and budgetary failures that are undermining national security and putting our service members at risk. And Hegseth failed to substantively answer any of Rep. Sherrill’s questions.

    Click here to listen to Sherrill’s full remarks. 

    Full remarks, as delivered:

    Rep. Sherrill:
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Hegseth, Chairman Caine, thank you both for being here today. Mr. Secretary. Your testimony over the last several days before Congress, I’ve heard you speak about all of your supposed accomplishments from your time at the Pentagon. I have to say, your training at Fox News has let you spin months of dangerous dysfunction and incompetence into catchy phrases like restoring the warrior ethos and increasing lethality.

    But the truth is, it’s really been chaos at the Pentagon under your leadership. You’ve clearly shown you’re unable to manage the Department of Defense. But what I’m most concerned about are three specific areas: Your operational incompetence, your managerial incompetence, and your budgetary incompetence. So let’s start with operational. According to news reports, in your first week on the job, you got confused in a National Security Council meeting and thought President Trump wanted you to stop all aid to Ukraine.

    In a well-functioning administration, you would have asked for clarification before making that seismic policy shift, but instead you ordered vital military aid heading to the frontlines turned around, costing the U.S. millions of dollars and depriving Ukrainian soldiers of equipment they needed to fight Russia. So, Mr. Secretary, can you explain how exactly you misunderstood such a monumental presidential order?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    One of many fake news headlines we’ve dealt with.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    So President Trump told you to halt military aid to Ukraine on January 30th.

    Secretary Hegseth:
    As is often the case, highly ideological and very ill informed reporters love to speculate about things they know nothing about, in order to spear President Trump and myself.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    So it sounds like actually the reporting is correct, because I will say if it wasn’t, why if it wasn’t a mistake, why did aid restart only a few days later?

    Secretary Hegseth
    Again, we would take complete issue with what would some call reporting and others call a hatchet job.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    So why did aid start just a couple days later?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    I’m saying the reporting is inaccurate, ma’am.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    I don’t think that’s correct. So let’s move on to your managerial incompetence. I think we can see why you misunderstood the president because you’re obviously misunderstanding my questions. Less than a month into the job, you fired the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, CQ Brown, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Lisa Franchetti, without cause. And to this day, you still have not provided an adequate explanation for removing them.

    As far as I can tell, you fired CQ Brown because he was Black and Lisa Franchetti because she is a woman. So nearly four months later, we still don’t have a new nominee for Chief of Naval Operations. News reports, and you can contest it, but I’d love to hear your answer, say that you haven’t nominated someone because qualified admirals keep turning the position down.

    So tell me, Mr. Secretary, when will Congress receive your nomination for the next Chief of Naval Operations?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    Ma’am, with all due respect, I would suggest not believing every headline you read.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    With all due respect, I’d like your nomination. When will we see it?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    There is not a single admiral or any military official has turned down a position that’s been–

    Rep. Sherrill:
    So when will we see your nominee for the Chief of Naval Operations?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    In due time, for all the right reasons.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    Again, I think we’ve seen the managerial incompetence. Okay, let’s move on to budgetary incompetence. You missed the deadline to submit a draft defense budget to Congress, which makes it impossible for us to complete our work on the NDAA or appropriations. It makes it more likely you’ll receive delays in funding you need for new acquisitions programs, and other priorities.

    Additionally, you’re blowing money on poorly conceived operations and vanity projects. For President Trump, retrofitting the Qatari jet to serve as Air Force One will cost about $400 million. The parade in DC this weekend will cost upwards of $40 million. Your bombing campaign in Yemen cost about 1 billion, and a week later they were having missile strikes in Israel.

    Your operations in LA will cost tens of millions of dollars, and you claim to be cutting costs at the Pentagon. But all I see are wasted dollars better spent addressing our most pressing threats like China. So, Mr. Secretary, what priorities have you cut funding for to pay for these projects?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    Ma’am, I would just say your list, left off securing the southern border.

    Rep. Sherrill:
    So, Mr. Secretary, what priorities have you cut funding for to pay for these projects?

    Secretary Hegseth:
    We make trade offs every day, and I would imagine what we want to spend on is quite different than what the previous administration did. Changes quickly and they’re reflected in this budget. And we’re very proud of them.

    Rep. Sherrill : 
    I think the American people can see why I’m so concerned about this incompetence. Thank you. And I yield back.
     

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Monday, 16 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    44 The human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians
        – Motions for resolutions Wednesday, 2 July 2025, 13:00
        – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 July 2025, 19:00
        – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Monday, 7 July 2025, 20:00
    16 Strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy
    Denis Nesci (A10-0092/2025
        – Amendments by the rapporteur, 71 MEPs at least; Alternative motions for resolutions Wednesday, 11 June 2025, 13:00
    Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 13 June 2025, 12:00
    Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 16 June 2025, 19:00
    Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 17 June 2025, 19:00
    Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 18 June 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The official approval of Romanian as a language of instruction in schools in the Odesa region, and respect for the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine – P-001600/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The rights of minorities are fundamental values of the EU and are part of the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the EU.

    In June 2024, the Commission confirmed that Ukraine had fulfilled the requirement to enact a law addressing the remaining Venice Commission recommendations from June and October 2023 linked to respectively the law on national minorities and to the laws on state language, media and education[1].

    As part of the accession process, the Commission conducted a screening of Ukraine’s alignment with the EU acquis in the field of fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Subsequently, the EU invited Ukraine, in the negotiating framework, to prepare an Action Plan on national minorities[2].

    The Commission consistently conveys the message, in bilateral contacts with Ukrainian counterparts, that it is expected that Ukraine will continue to implement the adopted legislation adequately and effectively at national and regional level, in line with European standards and as part of a constructive mutual dialogue with the representatives of national minorities.

    The Commission will continue to follow closely the Ukraine government’s ongoing dialogues with representatives of minorities, including the representatives of Ukraine’s Romanian national minority and in the field of education.

    The Commission is also assisting Ukraine in its reform efforts, by supporting the project ‘Support for implementing European standards relating to anti-discrimination and rights of national minorities in Ukraine’ implemented by the Council of Europe[3].

    • [1] https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2023)021-e
      and https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2023)028-e.
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/25/eu-opens-accession-negotiations-with-ukraine/.
    • [3] https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/support-for-implementing-european-standards-relating-to-anti-discrimination-and-rights-of-national-minorities-in-ukraine.
    Last updated: 16 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Submission of REPowerEU roadmap – E-001655/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Since the Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. For this purpose, the Commission adopted the REPowerEU Plan[1] in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean energy transition, diversify energy supplies, and enhance EU energy independence.

    Despite a significant progress that was collectively achieved in the EU, energy imports from Russia still remain in the EU system . Dependency on Russian energy imports possess a threat to the EU’s economic security due to weaponisation of energy supplies by Russia. With the REPowerEU Roadmap, adopted on 6 May 2025[2], the Commission is fully committed to stop relying on Russian energy.

    The Roadmap will enable the phase out of Russian energy imports, in a coordinated, stepwise and secure manner as we advance on the EU’s energy transition. As outlined in the Roadmap, concrete measures will be presented in legislative proposals by the Commission mid- June.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/news/roadmap-fully-end-eu-dependency-russian-energy-2025-05-06_en.
    Last updated: 16 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Ukrainian preschool with children from displaced families reopens after EU-backed renovation

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • “Berizka preschool in Ukrainian village of Ulaniv southwest of Kyiv reopens after major renovation supported by EU.
    • Renovation financed through EIB’s Ukraine Recovery Programme to restore critical social infrastructure in Ukrainian communities.

    The “Berizka” preschool in the Ukrainian village of Ulaniv reopened after a major upgrade supported by the European Union lending arm – the European Investment Bank (EIB). The €420,000 renovation highlights the EU’s commitment to restoring social infrastructure in Ukraine.

    Berizka, serves more than 110 children aged two to six, including many children from internally displaced families. It is one of 100 educational institutions across Ukraine being renovated with support of the EIB. The building is now equipped with full thermal insulation and energy-efficient windows and doors – upgrades that are especially important amid Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, by reducing electricity consumption and utility costs.

    The preschool also has a new metal roof, renovated porches and two ramps that ensure easier entry for people, including children and parents with limited mobility. It offers an environment, where children and their families can feel a sense of normalcy and stability despite the war.

    EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who oversees the Bank’s operations in Ukraine said: “The renovated preschool shows how the EIB supports Ukraine’s long-term recovery: we invest in resilient, energy-efficient infrastructure that strengthens local communities and ensures continuity of vital services for people.”

    The renovation took place between May 2024 and June 2025 under the “Ukraine Early Recovery Programme” – a joint EU-EIB initiative implemented in cooperation with the Ukrainian Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and Ministry of Finance as well as the Vinnytsia Oblast Military Administration and the Ulaniv Village, with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

    This is one of seven EIB-backed recovery projects in Vinnytsia region, with a combined investment value of €7.6 million. These projects include the reconstruction of four schools, two water and wastewater facilities and one community and administrative services center. In 2024 alone, three projects were completed, including two schools in Stryzhavka and a sewer system in Zhmerynka.

    Head of Cooperation at the EU Delegation to Ukraine Stefan Schleuning said: “Berizka preschool in Vinnytsia Oblast is a powerful example of how EU support, channelled through the EIB’s recovery programmes, is already making a tangible difference. Together with Ukraine, we are restoring essential services, strengthening communities, and building for the future of the next generation.”

    Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine – Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said: “Restoring access to education is a shared priority with our European partners. Together, we’re rebuilding social infrastructure and introducing modern energy-efficient solutions that make communities more resilient.”

    First Deputy Head of the Vinnytsia Regional Military Administration Natalia Zabolotna said: “This preschool is the fourth EU- and EIB-supported recovery project completed in our region over the past two years. These results are possible thanks to the strength and dedication of local workers, who continue delivering essential services despite the war.”

    Head of Ulaniv Village Council Oleksandr Hotsulyak said: “For our village, this preschool is essential. Thanks to support from the EU and the EIB, over 110 children, including those from displaced families — now have a modern, comfortable space to learn and grow. Investing in early childhood education lays the foundation for children’s resilience, recovery, and long-term development.”

    UNDP Resident Representative in Ukraine Jaco Cilliers said: “By connecting Ukrainian communities with EIB financing mechanisms, UNDP helps ensure that recovery efforts are truly community-led, with local leaders determining how EU support can best serve their reconstruction priorities.”

    Background information

    The EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has supported Ukraine’s economy since day one of the Russian invasion, providing €3 billion in financing to date, with €2.3 billion already disbursed. The EIB continues to focus on securing Ukraine’s energy supply, restoring damaged infrastructure and maintaining essential public services across the country. Under a guarantee agreement signed with the European Commission, the EIB is set to invest at least €2 billion more in urgent recovery and reconstruction. This funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 and is fully aligned with the priorities of the Ukrainian government.

    EIB recovery programmes in Ukraine

    The reconstruction of the preschool in Ulaniv village was carried out under the Ukraine Recovery Programme, one of three recovery programmes supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). As of June 2025, the EIB has provided €740 million across these programmes to support Ukraine’s recovery. The funding helps the government to restore essential services in communities across the country – including schools, kindergartens, hospitals, housing, heating and water systems. These EIB-backed programmes are further supported by €15 million in EU grants to facilitate implementation. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, coordinates and oversees programme implementation, while local authorities and self-governments are responsible for managing recovery sub-projects. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Ukraine provides technical assistance to local communities, supporting project implementation and ensuring independent monitoring for transparency and accountability. More information about the programmes is available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU support for a trilateral Romania-Ukraine-Moldova Chamber of Commerce – E-002278/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002278/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gheorghe Falcă (PPE)

    In May 2022, the Commission launched the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, a strategic initiative to ensure the swift export of agricultural goods from Ukraine via EU transport routes. As then Transport Commissioner Adina Vălean noted, the goal was to move 20 million tonnes of agricultural products within three months. By February 2025, the Solidarity Lanes had become essential, facilitating 70 % of Ukrainian imports, 40 % of non-agricultural exports and 20 % of grain-related trade – demonstrating their ongoing role as a secure alternative to Black Sea routes.

    The cooperation between Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova within this framework has proven key to Ukraine’s economic resilience and future reconstruction. Given the shared European perspective of Moldova and Ukraine, it is important to explore how this cooperation might be deepened.

    • 1.Is the Commission open to supporting the establishment of a trilateral Chamber of Commerce between Romania, Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen economic ties under the Solidarity Lanes framework?
    • 2.Could the Commission consider targeted support – financial, logistical or technical – for structured exchanges and working visits among businesses and institutions in the EU, Ukraine and Moldova, to foster long-term cooperation and promote regional stability?

    Supporters[1]

    Submitted: 4.6.2025

    • [1] This question is supported by Members other than the author: Daniel Buda (PPE), Dan Barna (Renew), Mircea-Gheorghe Hava (PPE), Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (PPE)
    Last updated: 16 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU humanitarian and development aid for Cuba – E-002282/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002282/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Arkadiusz Mularczyk (ECR)

    Given the European Union’s robust sanctions regime against Russia in response to the country’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, and the reported involvement of thousands of Cuban soldiers fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, how does the Commission reconcile its continued provision of significant humanitarian and development support to Cuba with its stated commitment to upholding international law and deterring actors who facilitate or participate in Russia’s war effort?

    Submitted: 5.6.2025

    Last updated: 16 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Iran-Israel conflict: Foreign Secretary statement

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Oral statement to Parliament

    Iran-Israel conflict: Foreign Secretary statement

    The Foreign Secretary made a statement to the House of Commons on 16 June, updating on the Israel-Iran conflict.

    With permission, Mr Speaker, I will remind the House that the Foreign Office has been responding to two crises this past week.

    My Honourable Friend, Minister Falconer, will update on the Government’s extensive efforts to assist those who lost loved ones in Thursday’s devastating Air India plane crash.

    Just nine days ago, I was in Delhi, strengthening our friendship.

    Our nations are mourning together. My thoughts are with all those suffering such terrible loss.

    With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will now turn to the Middle East.

    Early last Friday morning, Israel launched extensive strikes across Iran. Targets including military sites, including the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz, and key commanders and nuclear scientists.

    The last 72 hours has seen Iranian ballistic missile and drone strikes across Israel, killing at least twenty-one Israelis and injuring hundreds more.

    And Israeli strikes have continued, including on targets in Tehran, with the Iranian authorities reporting scores of civilian casualties. 

    Prime Minister Netanyahu has said his operations will “continue for as many days as it takes to remove the threat”.

    Supreme Leader Khameini has said Israel “must expect severe punishment”.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, in such crisis our first priority is of course the welfare of British nationals.

    On Friday, we swiftly stood up a crisis team in London and the region, and yesterday I announced that we now advise against all travel to Israel as well as our long-standing travel of not travelling to Iran.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, today I can update the House that we are asking all British nationals in Israel to register their presence with the FCDO, so that we can share important information on the situation and leaving the country.

    And I can announce today that we are further updating our Travel Advice to signpost border crossing points, and sending Rapid Deployment Teams to Egypt and Jordan to bolster our consular presence near the border with Israel, which has already been supporting British nationals on the ground.

    Israel and Iran have closed their airspace until further notice, and our ability therefore to provide support in Iran is extremely limited. British nationals in the region should closely monitor our Travel Advice for further updates.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, the situation remains fast-moving. We expect more strikes in the days to come. This is a moment of grave danger for the region.

    I want to be clear, the United Kingdom was not involved in the strikes against Iran. This is a military action conducted by Israel.

    It should come as no surprise that Israel considers the Iranian nuclear programme an existential threat.

    Khameini said in 2018 that Israel was a “cancerous tumour” that should be “removed and eradicated”.

    We have always supported Israeli security – that’s why Britain has sought to prevent Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon through extensive diplomacy.

    We agree with President Trump when he says negotiations are necessary and must lead to a deal.

    That has long been the view, Mr Speaker, of the so-called ‘E3’ – Britain, France and Germany – with whom we have worked so closely on this issue. 

    The view of all of the G7 who have backed the efforts of President Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff.

    And for more than two decades, the cross-party view in this House.

    Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton and Lord Hague of Richmond led diplomatic efforts on the issue.

    Baroness May of Maidenhead and the former Right Honourable Member for Uxbridge did too, and this Government has continued to pursue negotiations, joining France and Germany in five rounds of talks with Iran this year alone.

    Ours is a hard-headed realist assessment of how best to tackle this grave threat. Fundamentally, no military action can put and end to Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, just last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors passed a non-compliance resolution against Iran, the first such IAEA finding in fourteen years.

    The Director-General’s Comprehensive Report details Iran’s failure to declare nuclear materials. Iran remains the only state without nuclear weapons accumulating uranium at such dangerously high levels. Its total enriched stockpile is now 40 times the limit in the JCPoA, and their nuclear programme is part of a wider pattern of destabilising activity.

    The Government has taken firm action in response.

    When they transferred ballistic missiles for use in Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, we imposed extensive sanctions including against Iran Air, and cancelled our bilateral air services agreement.

    In the face of unacceptable IRGC threats here in the UK – with some twenty foiled plots since 2022 – the CPS has for the first time charged Iranian nationals under the National Security Act, and we have placed the Iranian state, including the IRGC, on the enhanced tier of the new Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, a widening war would have grave and unpredictable consequences, including for our partners in Jordan and the Gulf.

    The horrors of Gaza worsening, tensions in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq rising, the Houthi threat continuing.

    That’s why the Government’s firm view, as it was last October in the ballistic missile attack on Israel, is that further escalation in the Middle East is not in Britain’s interests, nor the interests of Israel, Iran or the region.

    There are hundreds of thousands of British nationals living in the region. And with Iran a major oil producer, and one fifth of total world oil consumption flowing through the Straits of Hormuz, escalating conflict poses real risks for the global economy.

    As missiles rain down, Israel has a right to defend itself and its citizens. But our priority now is de-escalation.

    Our message to both Israel and Iran is clear. Step back. Show restraint. Don’t get pulled ever deeper into a catastrophic conflict, whose consequences nobody can control.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, the Prime Minister chaired COBR on the situation last Friday and spoke to PM Netanyahu, President Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

    He is now at the G7 Summit in Canada, discussing with our closest allies how to ease tensions.

    And the Government has deployed additional assets to the region, including jets for contingency support to UK forces and potentially our regional allies concerned about the escalating conflict.

    In the last 72 hours, my Honourable Friend the Minister for the Middle East and I have been flat out trying to carve out space for diplomacy.

    I have spoken to both Israeli Foreign Minister Sa’ar and Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, underlining Britain’s focus on de-escalation.

    I have also met Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal. I’ve had had calls with US Secretary Rubio, EU High Representative Kallas and my counterparts from France and Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.

    These conversations are part of a collective drive to prevent a spiralling conflict.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, this new crisis has arisen as the appalling situation in Gaza continues.

    This weekend, hospitals in Gaza reported over 50 people were killed and more than 500 injured while trying to access food.

    This Government will not take our eye off the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.

    We will not stop calling for aid restrictions to be lifted and an immediate ceasefire.

    We will not forget about the hostages.

    This morning, I met Yocheved Lifschitz and her family, whose courage and dignity in the face of Hamas’ barbarism was a reminder of the plight of those still cruelly held in Gaza.

    We will not stop striving to free the hostages and end that war.

    Madam Deputy Speaker, our vision remains unchanged.

    An end to Iran’s nuclear programme and destabilising regional activity.

    Israel, secure in its borders and at peace with its neighbours.

    A sovereign Palestinian state, as part of the two-state solution.

    Diplomacy is indispensable to each of these goals. Britain will keep pressing all sides to choose a diplomatic path out of this crisis.

    I commend this statement to the House.

    Updates to this page

    Published 16 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: Imperial Petroleum Inc. Declares Dividend on Series A Preferred Shares

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATHENS, Greece, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Imperial Petroleum Inc. (Nasdaq: IMPP) (the “Company”), a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil, and drybulk seaborne transportation services, today announced a dividend of $0.546875 per share on its 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Stock (the “Series A Preferred Shares”), payable on June 30, 2025 to holders of record as of June 25, 2025. The dividend payment relates to the period from the last dividend payment date for the Series A Preferred Shares on March 30, 2025, through June 29, 2025.

    There are 795,878 Series A Preferred Shares outstanding as of the date hereof. The Series A Preferred Shares trade on the Nasdaq Capital Market under the ticker symbol “IMPPP.”

    ABOUT IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.

    IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. is a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil and drybulk seaborne transportation services. The Company owns a total of seventeen vessels on the water – seven M.R. product tankers, two suezmax tankers, three handysize drybulk carriers, three supramax drybulk carriers and two kamsarmax drybulk vessels – with a total capacity of 1,082,800 deadweight tons (dwt), and has contracted to acquire an additional two supramax drybulk carriers of 111,200 dwt aggregate capacity. Following these deliveries, the Company’s fleet will count a total of 19 vessels with an aggregate capacity of 1.2 million dwt. IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.’s shares of common stock and 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Stock are listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market and trade under the symbols “IMPP” and “IMPPP,” respectively.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Matters discussed in this release may constitute forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. The forward-looking statements in this release are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. believes that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. cannot assure you that it will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the strength of world economies and currencies, geopolitical conditions, including any trade disruptions resulting from tariffs and other protectionist measures imposed by the United States or other countries, general market conditions, including changes in charter hire rates and vessel values, charter counterparty performance, changes in demand that may affect attitudes of time charterers to scheduled and unscheduled drydockings, changes in IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC’s operating expenses, including bunker prices, drydocking and insurance costs, ability to obtain financing and comply with covenants in our financing arrangements, actions taken by regulatory authorities, potential liability from pending or future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, the conflicts in the Middle East, potential disruption of shipping routes due to ongoing attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or accidents and political events or acts by terrorists. Risks and uncertainties are further described in reports filed by IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Company Contact:

    Fenia Sakellaris

    IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.

    E-mail: info@imperialpetro.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Imperial Petroleum Inc. Declares Dividend on Series A Preferred Shares

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATHENS, Greece, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Imperial Petroleum Inc. (Nasdaq: IMPP) (the “Company”), a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil, and drybulk seaborne transportation services, today announced a dividend of $0.546875 per share on its 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Stock (the “Series A Preferred Shares”), payable on June 30, 2025 to holders of record as of June 25, 2025. The dividend payment relates to the period from the last dividend payment date for the Series A Preferred Shares on March 30, 2025, through June 29, 2025.

    There are 795,878 Series A Preferred Shares outstanding as of the date hereof. The Series A Preferred Shares trade on the Nasdaq Capital Market under the ticker symbol “IMPPP.”

    ABOUT IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.

    IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. is a ship-owning company providing petroleum products, crude oil and drybulk seaborne transportation services. The Company owns a total of seventeen vessels on the water – seven M.R. product tankers, two suezmax tankers, three handysize drybulk carriers, three supramax drybulk carriers and two kamsarmax drybulk vessels – with a total capacity of 1,082,800 deadweight tons (dwt), and has contracted to acquire an additional two supramax drybulk carriers of 111,200 dwt aggregate capacity. Following these deliveries, the Company’s fleet will count a total of 19 vessels with an aggregate capacity of 1.2 million dwt. IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.’s shares of common stock and 8.75% Series A Cumulative Redeemable Perpetual Preferred Stock are listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market and trade under the symbols “IMPP” and “IMPPP,” respectively.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Matters discussed in this release may constitute forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance, and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. The forward-looking statements in this release are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. believes that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. cannot assure you that it will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the strength of world economies and currencies, geopolitical conditions, including any trade disruptions resulting from tariffs and other protectionist measures imposed by the United States or other countries, general market conditions, including changes in charter hire rates and vessel values, charter counterparty performance, changes in demand that may affect attitudes of time charterers to scheduled and unscheduled drydockings, changes in IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC’s operating expenses, including bunker prices, drydocking and insurance costs, ability to obtain financing and comply with covenants in our financing arrangements, actions taken by regulatory authorities, potential liability from pending or future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, the conflicts in the Middle East, potential disruption of shipping routes due to ongoing attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or accidents and political events or acts by terrorists. Risks and uncertainties are further described in reports filed by IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC. with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Company Contact:

    Fenia Sakellaris

    IMPERIAL PETROLEUM INC.

    E-mail: info@imperialpetro.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Israel, Iran and the US: why 2025 is a turning point for the international order

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Brian Brivati, Visiting Professor of Contemporary History and Human Rights, Kingston University

    Israel’s large-scale attack against Iran on June 13, which it conducted without UN security council approval, has prompted retaliation from Tehran. Both sides have traded strikes over the past few days, with over 200 Iranians and 14 Israelis killed so far.

    The escalation has broader consequences. It further isolates institutions like the UN, International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), which have found themselves increasingly sidelined as Israel’s assault on Gaza has progressed. These bodies now appear toothless.

    The world appears to be facing an unprecedented upending of the post-1945 international legal order. Israel’s government is operating with a level of impunity rarely seen before. At the same time, the Trump administration is actively undermining the global institutions designed to enforce international law.

    Other global powers, including Russia and China, are taking this opportunity to move beyond the western rules-based system. The combination of a powerful state acting with impunity and a superpower disabling the mechanisms of accountability marks a global inflection point.

    It is a moment so stark that we may have to rethink what we thought we knew about the conduct of international relations and the management of conflict, both for the Palestinian struggle and the international system of justice built after the second world war.


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    The Israeli government is, in addition to its preemptive air campaign against Iran’s nuclear programme, advancing with impunity on three other fronts. It is tightening its hold on Gaza, with the prospect of a lasting occupation increasingly possible.

    Senior Israeli ministers have also outlined plans for the annexation of large parts of the occupied West Bank through settlement expansion. This is now proceeding unchecked. Israel confirmed plans in May to create 22 new settlements there, including the legalisation of those already built without government authorisation.

    This is being accompanied by provocative legislation such as a bill that would hike taxes on foreign-funded non-governmental organisations. The Israeli government is also continuing its attempts to reduce the independence of the judiciary.

    Hardline elements of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet say they will collapse the government if he changes course.

    The ICJ moved with urgency in response to Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank. In January 2024, it found evidence that Palestinians in Gaza were at risk of genocide and ordered Israel to implement provisional measures to prevent further harm.

    Then, in May 2024, as Israeli forces pressed an offensive, the ICJ issued another ruling ordering Israel to halt its military operation in the southern Gazan city of Rafah immediately. It also called on Israel to allow unimpeded humanitarian access to the Gaza Strip.

    The court went further in July, issuing a landmark advisory opinion declaring Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory illegal. The ICC took bold action by issuing arrest warrants for Netanyahu, his former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and the leaders of Hamas.

    Disregarding international law

    These dramatic attempts to enforce international law failed. Israel only agreed to a temporary ceasefire in Gaza in January 2025 when Washington insisted, demonstrating that the only possible brake on Israel remains the US.

    But the second Trump administration is even more transactional than the first. It prioritises trade deals and strategic alliances – particularly with the Gulf states – over the enforcement of international legal norms.

    In January, Trump issued an executive order authorising sanctions on the ICC over the court’s “illegitimate” actions against the US and its “close ally Israel”. These sanctions came into effect a little over a week before Israel launched its strikes on Iran.

    Trump then withdrew the US from the UN human rights council and extended a funding ban on Unrwa, the UN relief agency for Palestinian refugees.

    A further executive order issued in February directed the state department to withhold portions of the US contribution to the UN’s regular budget. And Trump also launched a 180-day review of all US-funded international organisations, foreshadowing further exits or funding cuts across the multilateral system.

    In May 2025, the US and Israel then advanced a new aid mechanism for Gaza run by private security contractors operating in Israeli-approved “safe zones”. Aid is conditional on population displacement, with civilians in northern Gaza denied access unless they relocate.

    This approach, which has been condemned by humanitarian organisations, contravenes established humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality.

    In effect, one pillar of the post-war order is attacking another. The leading founder of the UN is now undermining the institution from within, wielding its security council veto to block action while simultaneously starving the organisation of resources. The US vetoed a UN security council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza on June 4.

    The implications of this turning point in the international order are already playing out across the globe. Russia is continuing its war of aggression in Ukraine despite rulings from the ICJ and extensive evidence of war crimes. It knows that enforcement mechanisms are weak and fragmented and the alternative Trumpian deal making can be played out indefinitely.

    And China is escalating military pressure on Taiwan. It is employing grey-zone tactics, that do everything possible in provocation and disinformation below the threshold of open warfare, undeterred by legal commitments to peaceful resolution.

    These cases are symptoms of a collapse in the credibility of the post-1945 legal order. Israel’s policy in Gaza and its attack on Iran are not exceptions but the acceleration. They are confirmation to other states that law no longer constrains power, institutions can be bypassed, and humanitarian principles can be used for political ends.

    Brian Brivati is executive director of the Britain Palestine Project. He is writing this article in a personal capacity.

    ref. Israel, Iran and the US: why 2025 is a turning point for the international order – https://theconversation.com/israel-iran-and-the-us-why-2025-is-a-turning-point-for-the-international-order-258044

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why is Stalin back in the Moscow metro?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jeremy Hicks, Professor of Post-Soviet Cultural History and Film, Queen Mary University of London

    A statue of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was unveiled in the Taganskaya metro station in Moscow in May, recreating a mural that was dismantled decades ago. It is the first such statue to be erected in central Moscow since Stalin’s death in 1953 and marks a disturbing new stage in Russia’s authoritarian path.

    Tens of millions of people died as a direct result of Stalin’s policies between 1924 and his death. These policies included the forced collectivisation of agriculture, the Gulag labour camp system and the “great terror” – a wave of mass arrests between 1937 and 1938, including of key figures in the army.

    Yet ultimate victory over Nazi Germany in 1945, with the support of Britain and the US, redeems Stalin in the eyes of Russia’s current rulers. For the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, this victory was one of the crowning achievements of the Soviet Union and remains a unifying force in modern Russia.

    De-Stalinisation, which from 1956 to the late 1960s saw the dismantling of Stalin’s policies and legacy, meant no statues of him were erected from his death until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But 110 monuments have been built since then (at the last count in 2023), with 95 of them erected in the Putin era. The rate of construction multiplied after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.


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    These statues initially tended to be in peripheral parts of the Russian Federation, such as Yakutia, North Ossetia and Dagestan, and not in city centres. The renaming by presidential decree of the airport in Volgograd as Stalingrad in April 2025, to echo the city’s wartime name, was thus a significant moment.

    But the statue in the Moscow metro, an architectural gem in the centre of Russia’s capital that is used by millions of people each day, is an even more important symbolic statement.

    ‘Stalinwashing’

    Stalin’s reputation in Russia continues to recover. According to a poll from 2015, 45% of the Russian population thought the deaths caused by Stalin’s actions were justified (up from 25% in 2012). By 2023, 63% of Russians had an overall positive view of his leadership.

    This reflects the view promoted in schools and amplified by the Russian media, where criticism of Stalin is rare. Even the 2017 British comedy, The Death of Stalin, was banned in Russia for fear of popping the bubble of public approval.

    The purpose of rehabilitating Stalin is about boosting support for Putin’s regime, training Russians’ conformity reflex, and instilling pride in their history. But it also has external ramifications.

    With the partial exception of Georgia, his birthplace, Stalin is widely reviled by Russia’s neighbours which were often the victims of Stalin’s repressive policies. This is especially true of Ukraine. A famine known to Ukrainians as the Holodomor was deliberately imposed there between 1932 and 1933 as part of collectivisation and killed as many as 3.8 million people.

    As a result, his death unleashed de-Stalinisation accompanied by the destruction of his statues all over eastern Europe. This began during the 1956 Budapest uprising and was followed by later such reactions in Prague and elsewhere.

    The statue of Stalin in Budapest was torn down by demonstrators in 1956.
    Fortepan adományozó / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA

    After the uprisings were put down, Stalin’s place was typically taken by the less controversial Vladimir Lenin, the revolutionary leader who founded the Soviet Union.

    But since the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine, which culminated in the ousting of pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, Ukrainians have also been pulling down statues of Lenin. Other Soviet-era symbols have also been torn down in a wave of demonstrations known as Leninopad or Leninfall.

    This is what has informed the latest intensification of Stalin-washing. The Ukrainian refutation of the symbolic heritage of the Soviet Union seems to have supercharged the Russian embrace of it, Stalin included.

    Russia has restored statues of Lenin in the Ukrainian territories it occupies. And it has now also started erecting statues of Stalin, notably in the southeastern city of Melitopol, where a statue was unveiled in May to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory in the second world war.

    This is against the law in Ukraine, where there is a ban on pro-Communist (and pro-totalitarian) symbolism. Russian forces have meanwhile been destroying memorials to the Holodomor in a battle over the meaning of the Soviet legacy.

    Russia’s military strength

    The re-elevation of Stalin promotes a narrow interpretation of his rule, stressing Russia’s military strength. Modern statues typically portray Stalin in a military uniform and evoke a sense of him as a victorious wartime leader.

    In fact, some of the appeal of the symbol of Stalin lies in welfare provisions of his leadership where, despite imposing an often cruelly authoritarian system, education and healthcare were free for all. The same can be said for his use of fear as a work incentive. Russians sometimes still denounce complacent or inept officials with the imprecation: “If only Stalin was here to sort you out” (Stalina na vas net in Russian).

    Nevertheless, it is the imperial version of Stalin that dominates, vindicating Russian refusal to reckon with its colonial past as the centre of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s record is sometimes defended within Russia on the basis that Winston Churchill, for instance, remains a British national hero despite a bloody past (such as his role in the Bengal famine of 1943).

    While there is an element of truth in this, the difference is that Churchill’s shortcomings and complicity in the death toll attributable to the British empire are publicly discussed. Such criticism of Stalin is not permitted in Russia. Even the new statue in Moscow was erected under cover of the night, evading public scrutiny and debate.

    The fact that the UK subjects its historical heroes to scrutiny is what distinguishes it from Russia, and defines it as democratic. At least for the time being.

    Jeremy Hicks is a member of the UK Labour Party

    ref. Why is Stalin back in the Moscow metro? – https://theconversation.com/why-is-stalin-back-in-the-moscow-metro-258006

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine Confirms Receipt of Over 6,000 Bodies of Victims from Russia

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Kyiv, June 16 /Xinhua/ — As part of the agreements reached at peace talks in Istanbul, Turkey, Ukraine has received 6,057 bodies from Russia, which the Russian side claims belong to Ukrainian servicemen, the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (CHPW) of Ukraine reported on Monday in its Telegram.

    The repatriation of remains took place in several stages. The final stage took place earlier on Monday. The bodies of 1,245 victims were handed over to Ukraine.

    Law enforcement agencies and expert services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine will identify the returned remains.

    KSHVOV expressed gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross for assistance in the repatriation of bodies.

    The exchange of remains of the dead is part of the agreements reached on June 2 at peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russia has handed over more than 6,000 bodies of dead Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen to Ukraine — Russian presidential aide

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 16 /Xinhua/ — Russia has fulfilled the agreements reached in Istanbul and handed over to Ukraine 6,060 bodies of the killed servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), said Vladimir Medinsky, aide to the Russian president and head of the Russian delegation at the talks with Ukraine, on Monday.

    “Russia has fulfilled the promises made in Istanbul: a total of 6,060 bodies of fallen officers and soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been handed over to the Ukrainian side,” he wrote on his Telegram channel.

    V. Medinsky also noted that the bodies of 78 dead Russian soldiers were received from the Ukrainian side.

    This information was confirmed by the Russian Ministry of Defense. As noted in the military department’s Telegram channel, Russia fulfilled the agreements by implementing a “large-scale humanitarian action.”

    “We are ready at this stage to transfer another 2,239 bodies of deceased Ukrainian Armed Forces servicemen to the Ukrainian side,” the Russian Defense Ministry added.

    According to media reports, on June 11, Russia handed over 1,212 bodies of fallen soldiers to Ukraine, and from June 13 to 15, it handed over 1,200 bodies daily to Ukraine. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian and Turkish presidents condemn Israel’s operation against Iran in phone call

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 16 (Xinhua) — Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have condemned Israel’s operation against Iran. The leaders agreed that the relevant departments of the two countries will maintain close cooperation to resolve the situation through diplomatic means, according to a report on the telephone conversation between the two leaders posted on the Kremlin website on Monday.

    “The main focus is on the sharply aggravated situation in the Middle East. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned Israel’s military action against Iran, undertaken in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law,” the statement said.

    “Both sides expressed the most serious concern about the ongoing escalation of the Iranian-Israeli conflict, which has already led to a large number of casualties and is fraught with serious long-term consequences for the entire region. The leaders spoke in favor of an immediate cessation of hostilities and the settlement of contentious issues, including those related to the Iranian nuclear program, exclusively by political and diplomatic means,” the Kremlin website notes.

    The leaders of Russia and Turkey also discussed the situation in Ukraine and exchanged views on current issues on the bilateral agenda, “including the energy sector.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Law enforcement representatives from Ukraine build knowledge around Advance Passenger Information and passenger data systems during OSCE study visit to the United Kingdom

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Law enforcement representatives from Ukraine build knowledge around Advance Passenger Information and passenger data systems during OSCE study visit to the United Kingdom

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    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Klaas Knot: How is the water? Continuing our work to preserve financial stability

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Thank you. I want to start by telling you a little story. Some of you may know it.

    There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way. The older fish nods at them and says “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” And the two young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and says “What the hell is water?”

    This parable was famously used by the American writer David Foster Wallace in a commencement speech in 2005. Now, just like Wallace, I don’t plan to present myself here as the wise, older fish explaining to you what water is. The point of the fish story is merely that, like he said: ‘the most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about.’

    Now, Wallace was speaking to a class of graduates about the benefits of a liberal arts education in life. To have his idea being used by some central bank technocrat at a conference on financial stability would probably be his worst nightmare come true. But although it may seem a stretch, I think his idea applies to our world too. Because financial stability is an obvious and important reality. Its impact is universal. Financial stability affects households, businesses, governments-and ultimately, the trust that underpins our economies. It’s the basis of everything in economic life.

    Because of its universal impact, financial stability seems like a natural state. We take out our phone and we pay. And the bread that we buy costs the same as it did last week. And when we wake up in the morning our savings are still in our bank account. Financial stability is something that seems to be just there, unconditionally. But it really isn’t. It is something we must continuously work for. It demands vigilance, coordination, and above all, the political will to act before the crisis hits. I know that you are aware of this. But many people tend to forget.

    As this is my last address in my capacity as Chair of the FSB, let me take this opportunity to look back a bit, take stock. And ask: where do we stand? How is the water?

    In truth, it has been anything but calm. Over the past years, we have experienced quite some waves in the financial system: the dash for cash during the onset of the Covid pandemic, the commodity market turmoil following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the failure of Archegos Capital Management in March 2021, and the market volatility associated with the recent trade tariff announcements. Central banks had to intervene in some of these episodes to support market functioning and the supply of credit to the economy. And in each case, parts of the non-bank financial sector played a central role in amplifying the stress.

    Non-bank financial intermediation, or NBFI, has grown into a critical part of the financial system. Its rise has been driven by regulatory shifts, search for yield, technological innovation, and demographic trends leading to asset accumulation.

    The NBFI sector brings real benefits. NBFIs offer a diversified source of funding and much needed competition for banks. But they also have vulnerabilities-liquidity mismatches and the inability of some market players to prepare for them, leverage, and growing interconnectedness with banks. Historically, regulation of this sector focused on investor protection, market integrity, and other mandates. But those don’t fully capture the systemic risks. We needed a financial stability lens.

    That’s what the FSB brought to the table. Our work to date has included policy recommendations to enhance money market fund resilience, to address structural liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds, and to enhance liquidity preparedness for margin calls. Later this month, we will deliver policy recommendations to the G20 to address financial stability risks arising from leverage in NBFI.

    Have we made a difference? The recent bout of tariff-related volatility in global markets could serve as a test. We saw a global sell-off in equity markets and historic trading volumes. Typical correlations between certain asset classes broke down. We saw some deleveraging and large margin and collateral calls. Yet – the system held. That is encouraging. But let’s be honest: we can’t credit our reforms just yet. Because the FSB’s recommendations have not yet been implemented in full. And recommendations alone don’t reduce systemic risk. Implementation does. That means authorities must not only put them into national laws and regulations, they must also have the capacity to operationalise them.

    One of the biggest challenges we face in NBFI is data. We need better data. More data. And better use of that data. There is a reason why the non-bank sector was formerly called “shadow banking”. It’s opaque. There are gaps. And those gaps mean we often don’t see the vulnerabilities-until it’s too late. The quality and timeliness of non-bank data are essential for identifying and assessing vulnerabilities and for designing and calibrating effective policies. We must address these data challenges. We can’t keep relying on crises to reveal what we should have seen coming.

    That’s why a high-level group within the FSB is now exploring how to close those data gaps-to support risk monitoring, policy design and implementation, and cross-border cooperation.

    And let’s be clear: we can’t just copy-paste banking rules onto the NBFI sector. It’s too diverse and different from banks. We need to look at both non-bank entities and activities. But our goal should be clear: a level playing field across the financial system. Not by weakening bank rules-but by strengthening the resilience of the non-bank sector.

    Which brings me to the banking sector. During my tenure as FSB Chair, we witnessed something unprecedented: the failure of a global systemically important bank. The demise of Credit Suisse, together with the failure of three US regional banks, was a stark reminder that bank failures are not relics of the past. It brought lessons for banks and financial authorities. In some areas, our work to make the banking sector more resilient is not yet complete. Take the final Basel III standards. These are designed to strengthen the resilience of banks to withstand losses. And yet-they still have not been implemented in many jurisdictions. The Credit Suisse case also highlighted that more than 15 years after the Global Financial Crisis, authorities still face challenges in dealing with failing banks.

    So yes, we’ve made progress. But we’re not done. And in the meantime, we must protect what we’ve already built.

    Because let’s not forget: during all the recent episodes of financial stress the banking system held up. In fact, during the pandemic, banks acted as shock absorbers. Not shock amplifiers. They absorbed losses. They kept credit flowing. They helped keep the economy afloat. That’s no small feat.

    And I believe that is largely thanks to the reforms we put in place after the global financial crisis. The years of hard work. The tough decisions. The commitment to resilience.

    But now, more than 15 years later, we’re hearing familiar calls again-for deregulation. But also calls for simplification. And let me be clear: those two are not the same.

    I understand the desire to simplify. Banking regulation and supervision has become overly complex. Over the past 15 years, a great deal of regulation has been introduced from various angles -global, EU, national. Micro and macro. New risks added, old ones rarely removed. There’s overlap. There’s friction. And yes, sometimes, there’s a lack of supervisory proportionality for smaller institutions. That’s worth looking into.

    But keep in mind that, beyond some point, simple rules are less risk-sensitive. And that means they have to be stricter. You want simpler rules? Sure, but those rules must then be calibrated at a more prudent level. That is the general thinking behind the standardised approach of Basel III. That is also the thinking behind the leverage ratio.

    Most importantly, what we must avoid is confusing simplification with deregulation. Deregulation means effectively lowering buffers by relaxing the rules. That would both reduce resilience in the banking system and increase the likelihood of financial crises. We cannot afford to undo the progress we have made. Especially not now, in this time of unusually high uncertainty, both on the economic and political front. That would be a big mistake. As the late Rudiger Dornbusch used to say: ‘The crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would have thought.’

    Which brings me to my next point. The developments in both the bank and non-bank sectors are unfolding against a backdrop of major structural shifts-shifts that could reshape financial stability as we know it. I am talking here about technology, about payments, and climate risk.

    Technological innovation is transforming the financial sector. It’s adding new layers of complexity. And it’s doing so at speed.

    The period leading up to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was marked by balance sheet expansion and financial product innovation. But over the past 15 years, the focus has shifted toward technological innovation. The FSB has been watching this closely. It’s our job to harness the benefits while mitigating the risks.

    And yes, the benefits are real. Technology has made financial services faster, more accessible, more efficient. And in some areas, like AI, we have only started to see its full impact. But it also brings new risks. Why? Because of the speed and scale of adoption. For example in cyberattacks. Because of the growing interconnections with the traditional financial system. Because of the concentration of services in a few key providers.

    Technology creates new interdependencies. And it can accelerate the pace at which a crisis unfolds. Technological innovation is perhaps most visible in the payments space, where new platforms and digital assets are rapidly reshaping how value moves across borders and between users.

    These dynamics are most visible in crypto-assets. This fast-growing market has seen more than its fair share of bankruptcies, liquidity crises and outright fraud, even as its links with traditional finance continue to grow. At the FSB, we have long maintained that crypto does not yet pose a systemic risk, but recent developments suggest we may be approaching a tipping point. Barriers for retail users have dropped significantly, particularly with the introduction of crypto ETFs. The interlinkages with the traditional financial system continue to grow. Stablecoin issuers, for example, now hold substantial amounts of U.S. Treasuries. This is a segment we must monitor closely.

    The crypto ecosystem will continue to evolve-and so must our regulatory frameworks. Jurisdictions are actively developing these, and the FSB’s recommendations offer a common foundation. This is especially important given the inherently cross-border nature of crypto. Effective implementation must extend beyond the G20, supported by strong regulatory and supervisory cooperation.

    Now, part of crypto’s rise can be traced to the shortcomings of cross-border payments. This is a complex, technical issue. But solving it has real-world benefits-for people, for businesses, for economies. This is the goal of the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-Border Payments. The aim of the roadmap is to bring about cheaper, faster and more transparent and inclusive cross-border payment services for the benefit of citizens and businesses worldwide.

    We’ve made progress. The FSB, the CPMI, and others have done a lot of work. However, our goals are ambitious. And while they have driven changes by both the private and public sectors, we continue to see significant challenges, particularly in certain regions and payment corridors. As we move toward crafting a strategy for the next phase of work, we are seeking to clarify the issues that continue to impede progress. We will continue to work with the private sector to get it done.

    Next to technology and payments, we face another growing challenge-one that’s no longer on the horizon, but right at our doorstep. I’m talking about climate change. Now, climate change may originate outside the financial sector-but its impact on financial stability is very real.

    Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent. And as they occur, the risks to financial systems continue to rise. These events test the ability of financial institutions to manage risk and maintain services-especially in the most vulnerable regions. That’s why we must keep strengthening risk management practices. And why we must build resilience-across the entire global financial system.

    The FSB’s Climate Roadmap, launched in 2021 and endorsed by the G20, gives us a coordinated path forward. It focuses on four key areas: firm-level disclosures, data, vulnerability analysis, and regulatory and supervisory tools.

    These four pillars are not standalone. They’re connected. They build on each other.

    For example: consistent, reliable corporate disclosures are the foundation. They help close data gaps. They help firms-and authorities-understand climate-related risks. Better data leads to better analysis. And better analysis leads to better policy.

    And we are making progress. More jurisdictions and companies are adopting climate-related disclosures. New global standards on sustainability assurance are boosting trust in those disclosures. Tools like climate risk dashboards and scenario analyses help us understand vulnerabilities. International bodies are issuing guidance on how to integrate climate risks into existing regulatory and supervisory frameworks. And across the global financial community, we’re seeing knowledge shared, capacity built, and good practices identified.

    But let’s be honest-challenges remain. Especially when it comes to implementation. The groundwork is there. But now, the focus must shift to action-by firms and by authorities. We still lack reliable, granular, and comparable data. That makes it hard to fully assess and manage climate-related risks.

    And let’s face it-traditional financial stability tools weren’t built for this. They’re not always fit for purpose when it comes to forward-looking, long-horizon risks like climate change. That’s why developing robust, climate-specific analytical approaches must remain a top priority.

    Because climate risk isn’t just an environmental issue. It’s a financial one. And it’s one we can’t afford to ignore.

    Let me wrap up.

    Financial stability is an international public good. Every single issue I have mentioned today – NBFI, banking, crypto, payments, climate – they all cross borders. And so must our response be.

    If we want to meet today’s challenges to financial stability, we have to continue to work together. And we need to stay committed to the international bodies we have built to underpin that cooperation, such as the Basel Committee and the FSB. In a fragmented world, global cooperation is harder. But it is also more essential. During the global financial crisis, policymakers acted swiftly and in unison. We must preserve that capacity.

    Because for society, financial stability is like what water is for fish. We barely notice it-until it’s gone. Preserving financial stability is continuous hard work. It is complicated, it is technical, it is not glamorous. Calibrating risk weights for banks doesn’t make headlines. It doesn’t fill the streets with protestors. Therefore, it doesn’t always get the attention it deserves from policy makers, among all the other issues they have on their plate.

    But make no mistake: a stable financial system is the foundation for almost all public policy. When financial stability is lost, everything else falls apart. Governments can’t focus on education, or healthcare, or climate. They’re too busy drawing up rescue plans for an economy in free fall.

    So we have to continue our work. Which means maintaining our ambition as policy makers to take the agreed policies all the way through to implementation. Let’s keep our eyes on the water. And let’s keep it safe and stable.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI: Westhaven Announces Non-Brokered Private Placement With Eric Sprott and Earthlabs, for Gross Proceeds of $3.16 Million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. NEWS WIRE SERVICES OR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Westhaven Gold Corp. (TSX-V:WHN) (“Westhaven” or the “Company”) is pleased to announce that the Company has arranged a non-brokered private placement (the “Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $3,160,000 from the sale of 8,333,333 units of the Company (each, a “Unit”) at a price of $0.12 per Unit, and 12,500,000 flow-through units of the Company to be sold on a charitable flow-through basis (each, a “Charity FT Unit”, and collectively with the Units, the “Offered Securities”) at a price of $0.1728 per Charity FT Unit.

    Eric Sprott and Earthlabs Inc. are expected to be the subscribers for the Units and the end purchaser of Charity FT Units, following the charitable flow through donations in the Offering.

    Ken Armstrong, President and CEO of Westhaven, commented: “We are pleased to welcome Eric Sprott as a new shareholder of Westhaven, as well as the continued support of Earthlabs. This financing represents a strong endorsement of Westhaven’s approach to advance the Company’s Spences Bridge Gold Belt properties, particularly the Shovelnose gold project located adjacent to well-established transportation and power infrastructure, less than 2.5 hours by car from Vancouver in southern British Columbia. Proceeds of this private placement will allow the Company to expand our summer exploration drilling program to at least 5,000m and advance work towards realizing the potential outlined in a recently completed preliminary economic assessment of a high grade, high margin underground gold mining opportunity at the South Zone, FMN and Franz gold deposits at Shovelnose (please see news release dated March 3rd, 2025 for details).”

    Each Unit will consist of one common share of the Company (each, a “Unit Share”) and one-half of one common share purchase warrant (each whole warrant, a “Warrant”). Each Charity FT Unit will consist of one share that will qualify as a “flow-through share” within the meaning of subsection 66(15) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) and one half of one Warrant. Each whole Warrant shall entitle the holder to purchase one common share of the Company (each, a “Warrant Share”) at a price of $0.18 at any time on or before that date which is 24 months after the closing date of the Offering.

    The Company intends to use the net proceeds from the sale of the Units for working capital and general corporate purposes. The gross proceeds from the issuance of the Charity FT Units will be used for Canadian exploration expenses on the Company’s projects in British Columbia and will qualify as “flow-through mining expenditures”, as defined in subsection 127(9) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the “Qualifying Expenditures”), which will be incurred on or before December 31, 2026 and renounced to the subscribers with an effective date no later than December 31, 2025 in an aggregate amount not less than the gross proceeds raised from the issue of the Charity FT Units.

    The private placement is expected to close on or around July 3, 2025, and is subject to certain conditions including, but not limited to, receipt of all necessary approvals including the approval of the TSX Venture Exchange. All securities issuable in connection with the Offering will be subject to applicable resale restrictions in accordance with Canadian securities legislation and the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange.

    A finder’s fee, consisting of a cash payment of $66,823 and 250,000 non-transferable broker warrants will be paid to Red Cloud Securities Inc. in respect of the private placement. Each broker warrant can be exercised to acquire one common share at a price of $0.12 for a period of 24 months post-closing.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any of the securities in the United States. The securities have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “U.S. Securities Act”), or any state securities laws and may not be offered or sold within the United States or to or for the account or benefit of a U.S. person (as defined in Regulation S under the U.S. Securities Act) unless registered under the U.S. Securities Act and applicable state securities laws or an exemption from such registration is available.

    On behalf of the Board of Directors

    WESTHAVEN GOLD CORP.

    “Ken Armstrong”

    Ken Armstrong, President and CEO

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    About Westhaven Gold Corp.

    Westhaven is a gold-focused exploration and development company targeting low sulphidation, high-grade, epithermal style gold mineralization within the Spences Bridge Gold Belt in southern British Columbia. Westhaven controls ~61,512 hectares (~615 square kilometres) within four gold properties spread along this underexplored belt. The Shovelnose Gold project is the most advance property, with a recently updated 2025 Preliminary Economic Assessment that validates the Project’s potential as a robust, low cost and high margin 11-year underground gold mining opportunity with average annual life-of-mine gold production of 56,000 ounces and having a Cdn$454 million after-tax NPV6% and 43.2% IRR (base case parameters of US$2,400 per ounce gold, US$28 per ounce silver and CDN/US$ exchange rate of $0.72). Initial capital costs are projected to be Cdn$184 million with a payback period of 2.1 years. Please see Westhaven’s news release dated March 3, 2025 for details of the updated PEA. Shovelnose is situated off a major highway, near power, rail, large producing mines, pipelines and within commuting distance from the city of Merritt, which result in lower cost exploration and development.

    Qualified Person: The technical and scientific information in this news release has been reviewed and approved by Peter Fischl, P.Geo, who is a Qualified Person for the Company under the definitions established by National Instrument 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects.

    Westhaven trades on the TSX Venture Exchange under the ticker symbol WHN. For further information, please call 604-681-5558 or visit Westhaven’s website at www.westhavengold.com.

    Forward Looking Statements:

    This press release contains “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable Canadian and United States securities laws, which is based upon the Company’s current internal expectations, estimates, projections, assumptions and beliefs. The forward-looking information included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release. Such forward-looking statements and forward-looking information include, but are not limited to, statements concerning the Company’s expectations with respect to the Offering; the use of proceeds of the Offering; completion of the Offering and the date of such completion. Forward-looking statements or forward-looking information relate to future events and future performance and include statements regarding the expectations and beliefs of management based on information currently available to the Company. Such forward-looking statements and forward-looking information often, but not always, can be identified by the use of words such as “plans”, “expects”, “potential”, “is expected”, “anticipated”, “is targeted”, “budget”, “scheduled”, “estimates”, “forecasts”, “intends”, “anticipates”, or “believes” or the negatives thereof or variations of such words and phrases or statements that certain actions, events or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might” or “will” be taken, occur or be achieved.

    Forward-looking information involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors which may cause the actual results, performance, or achievements of the Company to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Such risks and other factors include, among others, and without limitation: that the Offering may not close within the timeframe anticipated or at all or may not close on the terms and conditions currently anticipated by the Company for a number of reasons including, without limitation, as a result of the occurrence of a material adverse change, disaster, change of law or other failure to satisfy the conditions to closing of the Offering; the Company will not be able to raise sufficient funds to complete its planned exploration program; that the Company will not derive the expected benefits from its current program; the Company may not use the proceeds of the Offering as currently contemplated; the Company may fail to find a commercially viable deposit at any of its mineral properties; the Company’s plans may be adversely affected by the Company’s reliance on historical data compiled by previous parties involved with its mineral properties; mineral exploration and development are inherently risky industries; the mineral exploration industry is intensely competitive; additional financing may not be available to the Company when required or, if available, the terms of such financing may not be favourable to the Company; fluctuations in the demand for gold or gold prices generally; the Company may not be able to identify, negotiate or finance any future acquisitions successfully, or to integrate such acquisitions with its current business; the Company’s exploration activities are dependent upon the grant of appropriate licenses, concessions, leases, permits and regulatory consents, which may be withdrawn or not granted; the Company’s operations could be adversely affected by possible future government legislation, policies and controls or by changes in applicable laws and regulations; there is no guarantee that title to the properties in which the Company has a material interest will not be challenged or impugned; the Company faces various risks associated with mining exploration that are not insurable or may be the subject of insurance which is not commercially feasible for the Company; the volatility of global capital markets over the past several years has generally made the raising of capital more difficult; inflationary cost pressures may escalate the Company’s operating costs; compliance with environmental regulations can be costly; social and environmental activism can negatively impact exploration, development and mining activities; the success of the Company is largely dependent on the performance of its directors and officers; the Company’s operations may be adversely affected by First Nations land claims; the Company and/or its directors and officers may be subject to a variety of legal proceedings, the results of which may have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business; the Company may be adversely affected if potential conflicts of interests involving its directors and officers are not resolved in favour of the Company; the Company’s future profitability may depend upon the world market prices of gold; dilution from future equity financing could negatively impact holders of the Company’s securities; failure to adequately meet infrastructure requirements could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s business; the Company’s projects now or in the future may be adversely affected by risks outside the control of the Company; the Company is subject to various risks associated with climate change, the Company is subject to general global risks arising from epidemic diseases, the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, rising inflation and interest rates and the impact they will have on the Company’s operations, supply chains, ability to access mining projects or procure equipment, supplies, contractors and other personnel on a timely basis or at all is uncertain; as well as other risk factors in the Company’s other public filings available at www.sedarplus.ca. Readers are cautioned that this list of risk factors should not be construed as exhaustive. Although the Company believes that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking information are reasonable, there can be no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. The Company cannot guarantee future results, performance, or achievements. Consequently, there is no representation that the actual results achieved will be the same, in whole or in part, as those set out in the forward-looking information. The Company undertakes no duty to update any of the forward-looking information to conform such information to actual results or to changes in the Company’s expectations, except as otherwise required by applicable securities legislation. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking information. The forward-looking information contained in this offering document is expressly qualified by this cautionary statement.

    The MIL Network