Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI USA: Wagner Advances American National Security Interests During Visit to Europe and Middle East

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Ann Wagner (R-MO-02)

    Washington, D.C. – House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Open-Source Intelligence Chairman Ann Wagner (R-MO) recently returned from a congressional delegation (CODEL) to Europe and the Middle East. The purpose of the CODEL was to hear from key U.S. allies on the security challenges they are facing and strengthen U.S. global alliances through strategic engagements. Chair Wagner and the delegation were hosted at a series of meetings with high-ranking country leaders. 

    In the United Kingdom, Chair Wagner met with the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Foreign Secretary. They discussed shared security concerns with the U.S., including the desire to end the war in Ukraine and address Iran’s persistent fueling of terrorism throughout the world by way of its proxies: Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah. 

    In Jordan, the delegation met with His Majesty King Abdullah II and his key high-ranking officials to discuss their top national security concerns and how they view changes in the region. 

    Lastly, the delegation visited Israel during Holocaust Remembrance Day and joined a powerful remembrance ceremony. Chair Wagner met with family members of the hostages taken on October 7th by Hamas terrorists and reinforced the U.S. support for Israel’s efforts to return the hostages. Additionally, the delegation had the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu and discuss his continued efforts to return the Israeli hostages, defeat Hamas, and achieve stability in the Middle East. 

    “I held an informative meeting in London with intelligence officials on our shared mission to stand up against the ongoing threats Russia, China, and Iran pose to innocents worldwide.  Our nations comprise a vital partnership where we share intelligence that keeps us ahead of our adversaries so we can confront threats before they reach us here at home. While in London, I was also able to have a productive meeting with St. Louis companies with business overseas where we spoke on our mutual economic interests.  As Chair of the Open-Source Intelligence Subcommittee, in addition to my duties as Co-Chair of the Abraham Accords Caucus, I especially appreciated meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel to underscore our commitment to helping Israel destroy Hamas, deter Iran, and ensure greater stability in the Middle East.  The threats facing the United States are real and they have the potential to threaten the very stability of our world that keeps our children safe,” said Chair Wagner. ” Our allies know the United States is a key partner for economic and security matters, but it was also encouraging to hear them recognize that the United States cannot shoulder the burdens of the world alone. Under the leadership of President Trump, nations across the globe are stepping up to protect our shared interests and defend against our adversaries.”

    View pictures from Chair Wagner’s CODEL here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tuberville Calls Out Democrats for Trying to Distract from President Trump’s Wins

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Tommy Tuberville (Alabama)
    “To my Democrat colleagues, instead of wasting our time objecting every time President Trump breathes, maybe you should get outside of D.C. and go connect with the American people. I can promise you they don’t give a rip about an airplane.”
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) went to the Senate floor to object to Senate Democrats’ attempts to distract from the numerous wins President Trump has delivered for the American people in the past 72 hours.
    Read excerpts from the speech below or watch on YouTube or Rumble.

    “Reserving the right to object. As usual, our Democrat colleagues are losing their minds over this situation. But let’s just talk about the facts.
    First of all, this is not a done deal. It’s not happened yet. It’s all talk. But, if reports are accurate, the government of Qatar is considering gifting the United States Department of Defense with an American-made Boeing 747—I’ll repeat that—an American-made Boeing 747 plane for temporary use as Air Force One. It is not for the President’s personal use and he will not be using it after he leaves office. It is customary and totally normal for foreign countries to give our government gifts. The DOJ has already said that this does not violate any law.
    So, why are my colleagues and the woke media having a full-blown meltdown over this situation? Perhaps this is because in the past 72 hours, President Trump has delivered so many wins you can’t count them all. 
    On Sunday, he negotiated a deal with China, [resulting in China] dropping tariffs [by] 50%. On Monday, he secured the release of the last remaining American hostage in Hamas. Edan Alexander has been through hell the past 584 days, and it took President Trump to bring him home. Today, President Trump just announced hundreds of billions of dollars in new investment from the Middle East. And on Thursday, he is forcing a face-to-face meeting between Putin and Zelensky to end this brutal war in Ukraine.
    You’d think the media would be celebrating all these wins, along with my colleagues, but as usual, the Trump Derangement Syndrome is getting in the way. I’m convinced that the media and some of my colleagues would rather President Trump lose on everything and our country lose on everything than [see President Trump] be successful. 
    Whether you are a Republican or Democrat, we are all Americans. Sometimes I think we forget that. And we should all be able to celebrate any time a president delivers a win for the American taxpayers.
    And by the way, we are $37 trillion dollars in debt. If another country wants to give us a free plane, saving the taxpayers of this country $400 million dollars, the only thing we should say is ‘thank you.’
    Democrats are rudderless right now. They’re looking for something to hang their hats on. They see that President Trump has done more in four months than President Biden did in four years. So, they wanna make a plane gift from Qatar the next so-called ‘perfect phone call.’
    To my Democrat colleagues, instead of wasting our time objecting every time President Trump breathes, maybe you should get outside of D.C. and go connect with the American people. I can promise you they don’t give a rip about an airplane. They care about their lives and this economy and the things that have been destroyed for the past four years that President Trump is trying to put back together.
    For these reasons, Mr. President, I object.”
    Senator Tommy Tuberville represents Alabama in the United States Senate and is a member of the Senate Armed Services, Agriculture, Veterans’ Affairs, HELP and Aging Committees.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: R.T. Erdogan Meets NATO Chief, Reiterates Support for Russia-Ukraine Ceasefire

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    ANKARA, May 14 (Xinhua) — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte here on Tuesday, his office said.

    R.T. Erdogan said Türkiye was stepping up diplomatic efforts to achieve a fair and lasting peace, noting that he had spoken with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

    R. T. Erdogan stressed that Türkiye maintains a neutral position towards the conflict and called for not missing the opportunity to establish peace.

    Speaking about Turkey’s relations with NATO, the president said Ankara attaches great importance to the North Atlantic alliance and will once again assume command of NATO forces in Kosovo. He also called for closer cooperation between NATO allies in the fight against terrorism.

    M. Rutte noted that his meeting with R. T. Erdogan is taking place as part of preparations for the NATO summit, which will take place next month.

    “Türkiye is a loyal and capable ally. We also discussed Ukraine, where there is a real opportunity to move towards peace,” he wrote on social media X. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine has completed all necessary procedures to launch an investment fund with the US – Deputy Prime Minister

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, May 14 /Xinhua/ — Ukraine has completed all the necessary procedures to launch a joint recovery fund with the United States, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Ukraine Yulia Svyrydenko announced on Facebook on Tuesday.

    She added that she had conveyed a corresponding note to the US Chargé d’Affaires in Ukraine, Julie Davis.

    The US Embassy in Kyiv welcomed this step by the Ukrainian side in its Telegram channel and expressed hope for “further joint movement forward.”

    On April 30, Ukraine and the United States signed an agreement on mineral resources. It provides for the creation of an investment fund for the restoration of Ukraine. Official Kyiv will contribute 50 percent of the state budget revenues from new licenses for the right to use mineral resources to the fund. Washington must also make contributions in cash or new military aid to Ukraine. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi holds talks with Brazilian president

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese President Xi Jinping holds talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is on a state visit to China, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)

    Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is on a state visit to China, in Beijing on Tuesday.

    Xi said that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil last year, the two sides jointly announced the elevation of bilateral relations to a China-Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.

    He called on the two sides to vigorously advance the construction of a China-Brazil community with a shared future, continuously deepen the alignment of development strategies, and jointly promote strengthened solidarity and cooperation among Global South countries.

    Xi stressed that China and Brazil should maintain strategic mutual trust, provide mutual support on issues concerning each other’s core interests and major concerns, and strengthen exchange at all levels and in all respects.

    He called on the two countries to expand cooperation, deepen the effective alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative with Brazil’s development strategy, give full play to the role of the various cooperation mechanisms between the two countries, strengthen cooperation in traditional fields such as infrastructure, agriculture and energy, and expand new areas of cooperation in energy transition, aerospace, the digital economy and artificial intelligence.

    He said that China and Brazil should enhance cultural and people-to-people exchanges, provide more convenience for personnel exchanges between the two sides, and strengthen cooperation on culture, education, tourism, and media, and at the sub-national level.

    He emphasized that the two sides should adhere to multilateral coordination. As the biggest developing country in the Eastern and Western hemispheres respectively, they should enhance coordination and cooperation within multilateral mechanisms, uphold multilateralism, improve global governance, maintain the international economic and trade order, and resolutely oppose unilateralism, protectionism and bullying, Xi added.

    Brazil is willing to deepen strategic cooperation with China and promote the construction of a Brazil-China community with a shared future, Lula said.

    Brazil stands ready to align its development strategy with the Belt and Road Initiative to enhance cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, infrastructure, aerospace and finance, Lula added. He also called on the two countries to expand exchange in areas of the youth and culture, and to enhance exchange and friendship between the two peoples.

    Protectionism and tariff abuse cannot promote development and prosperity. Instead, they will lead to chaos. China’s resolute stance in addressing global challenges gives strength and confidence to all countries, Lula noted, adding that Brazil is willing to strengthen strategic coordination with China in international affairs, work with China to safeguard the common interests of the Global South, and safeguard international fairness and justice.

    At the Great Hall of the People, the two heads of state witnessed the signature of 20 cooperation documents covering the fields of development-strategy alignment, science and technology, agriculture, the digital economy, finance, inspection and quarantine, and media.

    The two heads of state also met with the press together.

    China and Brazil issued a joint statement on strengthening the construction of a China-Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet, and on jointly upholding multilateralism, as well as a joint statement on the Ukraine crisis.

    Prior to the talks, Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, held a welcome ceremony for Lula and his wife, Rosângela Lula da Silva, at the square outside the east gate of the Great Hall of the People.

    Xi and Peng also hosted a welcome banquet for Lula and his wife on Tuesday evening. 

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    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese FM meets Brazilian guests in Beijing

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mauro Vieira, and Celso Amorim, special advisor to the president of Brazil, in Beijing, capital of China, May 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, met with his Brazilian counterpart Mauro Vieira, and Celso Amorim, special advisor to the president of Brazil, in Beijing on Monday.

    Both sides reviewed the frequent exchanges between the two heads of state in recent years, and made preparations for Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s visit to China, especially the important talks about to be held between the two heads of state.

    They unanimously agreed to promote the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future in accordance with the strategic guidance of the two heads of state, adhere to multilateralism, safeguard common international rules and the legitimate rights and interests of the Global South, and make contributions to promoting world peace, stability and development.

    The two sides also exchanged views on the Ukraine crisis and other issues, expressing support for direct dialogue and negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and pledged to play their role in the Group of Friends for Peace to gather more international consensus for promoting the political settlement of the crisis.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Brazil issue joint statement on Ukraine crisis

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China and Brazil issued a joint statement on the Ukraine crisis on Tuesday, welcoming Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to open peace talks and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s positive response.

    The statement said that China and Brazil hope that Russia and Ukraine will begin a direct dialogue as soon as possible, which is the only way to end the conflict.

    It said that China and Brazil commend recent signals of willingness to engage in dialogue on the Ukraine crisis, and expect relevant parties to initiate fruitful negotiations, build a greater consensus to achieve a political settlement, and address the legitimate concerns of all parties. China and Brazil believe it is necessary to find a solution to the Ukraine crisis by examining its root cause, with the aim of reaching a fair, lasting and binding peace agreement.

    The statement said that to achieve that goal, China and Brazil in May 2024 called on all relevant parties to create the conditions for the resumption of dialogue, and launched the Group of Friends for Peace at the United Nations in September of the same year, with the aim of uniting the countries of the Global South.

    China and Brazil are willing to work with the rest of the Global South to continue making active efforts to resolve the crisis, the statement said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Erdogan meets NATO chief, reiterates support for Russia-Ukraine ceasefire

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (R) shakes hands with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte during their meeting at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, Türkiye, on May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Ankara on Tuesday, according to the Turkish presidency.

    Erdogan said that Türkiye is stepping up its diplomatic efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace, noting that he has spoken with both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said a statement issued by the presidency.

    Erdogan emphasized that Türkiye maintains its neutral stance in the conflict and urged that the opportunity for peace should not be missed.

    On Türkiye-NATO relations, Erdogan said that Türkiye places great importance on NATO and will once again assume command of the NATO Kosovo Force. He also called for greater cooperation among NATO allies in the fight against terrorism.

    Rutte, for his part, noted that his meeting with Erdogan comes as preparations are underway for next month’s NATO summit.

    “Türkiye is a staunch and capable ally. We also discussed Ukraine, where there is a real window of opportunity for progress towards peace,” he wrote in a post on social media platform X. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump says US to lift Syria sanctions, inks arms deal with Saudi Arabia

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    U.S. President Donald Trump on Tuesday secured a 600-billion-U.S. dollar investment commitment from Saudi Arabia in Riyadh and vowed to lift sanctions on Syria.

    Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (R) meets with visiting U.S. President Donald Trump in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 13, 2025. (Saudi Press Agency/Handout via Xinhua)

    According to a White House statement, the investment commitment involves agreements spanning various sectors, including “energy security, defense industry, technology leadership, and access to global infrastructure and critical minerals.”

    Among the deals was “the largest defense sales agreement in history — nearly 142 billion dollars,” the statement said.

    As part of the defense agreement, the United States will provide Saudi Arabia with “state-of-the-art warfighting equipment and services from over a dozen U.S. defense firms.”

    “This deal represents a significant investment in Saudi Arabia’s defense and regional security, built on American systems and training,” the statement added.

    Speaking later at an investment forum, the U.S. president announced that he would lift sanctions on Syria.

    “I will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance,” Trump said, noting that the United States had taken the first steps toward normalizing relations with Damascus.

    While praising ties with Saudi Arabia, Trump expressed hope that the kingdom would join the Abraham Accords.

    The Abraham Accords, brokered by the United States during Trump’s first term in office, aimed to normalize relations between Israel and Arab nations.

    U.S. efforts to promote normalization between Israel and Arab countries stalled amid Washington’s support for Israel’s military offensive in Gaza, which has killed more than 52,900 Palestinians since October 2023 and drawn widespread regional criticism.

    On potential peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, Trump said Secretary of State Marco Rubio would travel to Türkiye later this week to join the negotiations.

    Trump is on a four-day trip to the Middle East from Tuesday to Friday, his first major foreign visit since taking office in January. Saudi Arabia is the first stop of his tour, which will also include Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Schatz: No President Should Take $400 Million Gift From A Foreign Country

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Hawaii Brian Schatz

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawai‘i), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today took to the Senate floor to condemn a luxury airplane gift, valued at $400 million, that President Donald Trump announced he will receive from the government of Qatar. According to reports, Trump intends to designate the plane as Air Force One while in office and then transfer it to a foundation for personal use following the end of his term. Schatz also announced he will be asking for a vote in the Senate to condemn this action.

    “I cannot believe I have to say this, but a president should not take a $400 million gift from a foreign country,” said Senator Schatz. “The Emoluments Clause. It’s a fancy phrase, but a simple idea: No foreign gifts.”

    “Air Force One is not just a random luxury airplane,” continued Senator Schatz. “It is a symbol of — and a projection of — American power… It represents not just the weight of the presidency, but America itself — generations of history and international leadership. But in one fell swoop, Donald Trump is selling out one of the most iconic symbols of American power that we have.”

    “This week, several of my colleagues and I will be asking the Senate to vote to condemn this action,” concluded Senator Schatz. “There should be 100 of us that agree on this fundamental principle: No president should take free stuff from a foreign government. And certainly nothing worth $400 million.”

    The full text of his remarks can be found below. Video is available here.

    I cannot believe I have to say this, but a president should not take a $400 million gift from a foreign country.

    It doesn’t matter which president, what party. It doesn’t matter which foreign country. It doesn’t matter if there is or is not a legal justification. No president should take a $400 million gift from a foreign country.

    I shouldn’t have to explain why — but it is a high principle literally enshrined in the Constitution because people who we have representing us should know, not think, but know, that their representatives are focused on them and this country only, that our loyalties not be divided, that our minds are not wandering elsewhere.

    The Emoluments Clause. It’s a fancy phrase, but a simple idea: No foreign gifts.

    If a foreign government offers you anything — but especially something close to half a billion dollars—the answer is, ‘No, thank you.’ End of story. Very simple. End of story. ‘I cannot take that.’

    First of all, because I cannot take that because I cannot have divided loyalties. I’m going into the region; I cannot take a $400 million gift before I begin negotiations with you. But it is explicitly prohibited by the United States Constitution. And the gift in is that the country of Qatar is going to literally provide a luxury aircraft — not just any luxury aircraft to the President of the United States, but Air Force One.

    And why does this matter? Air Force One is not just a random luxury airplane. It is a symbol of — and a projection of — American power. It has flown 15 different presidents. It carried President John F. Kennedy’s body after his assassination, and saw President Johnson be sworn in under unprecedented circumstances, it rushed President George W. Bush back to Washington after the Twin Towers were struck, and just two years ago, it flew President Joe Biden for a secret trip to Ukraine during the war.

    When people see Air Force One on TV, when they see it land in other countries— whether in London, or Tokyo, or Brazil — they immediately know that America has arrived. It represents not just the weight of the presidency, but America itself — generations of history and international leadership.

    But in one fell swoop, Donald Trump is selling out one of the most iconic symbols of American power that we have, and what people will now see is the most powerful man on Earth flying around in a plane paid for by a foreign government. It is disgusting. It is wildly corrupt. And just because they are doing the corruption in plain sight does not make it any less damning or sad or gross.

    This week, several of my colleagues and I will be asking the Senate to vote to condemn this action. There should be 100 of us that agree on this fundamental principle: No president should take free stuff from a foreign government. And certainly nothing worth $400 million.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Brazil issue joint statements

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 13 — China and Brazil on Tuesday issued a joint statement on strengthening the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet and jointly upholding multilateralism, and a joint statement on the Ukraine crisis.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum.

    The following is the full text of the speech:

    Writing a New Chapter in Building

    A China-LAC Community with a Shared Future

    Keynote Address by H.E. Xi Jinping

    President of the People’s Republic of China

    At the Opening Ceremony

    Of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Beijing, May 13, 2025

    Your Excellency President Gustavo Petro,

    Your Excellency President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,

    Your Excellency President Gabriel Boric,

    Your Excellency President Dilma Rousseff,

    Delegates of CELAC Member States,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Friends,

    It gives me great pleasure to meet so many old and new friends from Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries in Beijing. On behalf of the Chinese government and people, I extend a warm welcome to you all.

    In 2015, LAC delegates and I attended the opening ceremony of the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the China-CELAC Forum. Ten years on, with dedicated nurturing of both sides, the Forum has grown from a tender sapling into a towering tree. This fills me with deep pride and satisfaction.

    Although China and the LAC region are geographically distant, the bonds of our friendship stretch back through centuries. As early as in the 16th century, Nao de China, or “Ships of China,” laden with friendship, shuttled across the Pacific, marking the dawn of interactions and exchanges between China and the LAC region. From the 1960s onward, as New China established diplomatic ties with some LAC countries, exchanges and cooperation between the two sides became closer and closer. Since the turn of the century and in particular in recent years, China and LAC countries have ushered in a historic era of building a shared future.

    We stand shoulder to shoulder and support each other. China appreciates the long-standing commitment of LAC countries that have diplomatic ties with China to the one-China principle. China firmly supports LAC countries in pursuing development paths suited to their national conditions, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, and opposing external interference. In the 1960s, mass rallies and demonstrations took place across China in support of the Panamanian people’s rightful claim to sovereignty over the Panama Canal. In the 1970s, during the Latin American campaign for 200-nautical-mile maritime rights, China voiced its resolute and unequivocal support for the legitimate demands of developing countries. For 32 consecutive times since 1992, China has consistently voted for the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.

    We ride the tide of progress together to pursue win-win cooperation. Embracing the trend of economic globalization, China and LAC countries have deepened cooperation in trade, investment, finance, science and technology, infrastructure, and many other fields. Under the framework of high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, the two sides have implemented more than 200 infrastructure projects, creating over a million jobs. The China-LAC satellite cooperation program has set a model for high-tech South-South cooperation. The inauguration of Chancay Port in Peru has established a new land-and-sea connectivity link between Asia and Latin America. China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Last year, trade between China and LAC countries exceeded US$500 billion for the first time, an increase of over 40 times from the beginning of this century.

    We unite in tough times to conquer challenges through mutual support. China and LAC countries have collaborated on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief and on joint response to hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural disasters. Since 1993, China has dispatched 38 medical teams to the Caribbean. When the pandemic of the century struck, China was among the first to offer assistance to LAC countries, providing over 300 million doses of vaccines and nearly 40 million units of medical supplies and equipment, and sending multiple teams of medical experts. All this helped protect the lives of hundreds of millions across the region.

    We uphold solidarity and coordination and rise to global challenges with resolve. Together, China and LAC countries champion true multilateralism, uphold international fairness and justice, advance global governance reform, and promote multipolarization of the world and greater democracy in international relations. We have worked together to address global challenges like climate change, and advance progress in global biodiversity governance. China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, which has been endorsed by more than 110 countries, contributing our wisdom and strength to resolving international hotspot issues.

    Facts have shown that China and LAC countries are advancing hand in hand as a community with a shared future. This community of ours is founded upon equality, powered by mutual benefit and win-win, invigorated by openness and inclusiveness, and dedicated to the people’s well-being. It exhibits enduring vitality and holds immense promise.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    The century-defining transformation is accelerating across the globe, with multiple risks compounding one another. Such developments make unity and cooperation among nations indispensable for safeguarding global peace and stability and for promoting global development and prosperity. There are no winners in tariff wars or trade wars. Bullying or hegemonism only leads to self-isolation. China and LAC countries are important members of the Global South. Independence and autonomy are our glorious tradition. Development and revitalization are our inherent right. And fairness and justice are our common pursuit. In the face of seething undercurrents of geopolitical and bloc confrontation and the surging tide of unilateralism and protectionism, China stands ready to join hands with our LAC partners to launch five programs that advance our shared development and revitalization, and contribute to a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    The first is Solidarity Program. China will work with LAC countries to support each other on issues bearing on our respective core interests and major concerns. We must enhance exchanges in all fields, and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues. In the next three years, to facilitate our exchanges on national governance best practices, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China. China supports the efforts by LAC countries in increasing their influence on the multilateral stage. We will work with LAC countries to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    The second is Development Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative. We will resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation. We should foster greater synergy between our development strategies, expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and bolster cooperation in traditional areas such as infrastructure, agriculture and food, and energy and minerals. We should expand cooperation in emerging areas such as clean energy, 5G telecommunications, the digital economy and artificial intelligence, and carry out the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership. China will increase imports of quality products from LAC countries, and encourage its enterprises to expand investment in the LAC region. We will provide a RMB66 billion yuan credit line to support LAC countries’ development.

    The third is Civilization Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Civilization Initiative. We should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, and champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom. We should enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue. We should deepen cultural and artistic exchanges and cooperation, and hold the Latin American and Caribbean Arts Season. We should strengthen exchanges and cooperation in cultural heritage fields such as joint archaeological projects, conservation and restoration of ancient and historic sites, and museum exhibitions. We should also carry out collaborative studies of ancient civilizations and enhance cooperation to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property.

    The fourth is Peace Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Security Initiative. China supports the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace and the Declaration of Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The two sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region. China will organize law enforcement training programs tailored to the needs of CELAC member states, and do our best to provide equipment assistance.

    The fifth is People-to-People Connectivity Program. In the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program. We will initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, actively promote vocational education cooperation programs such as Luban Workshop, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education. We will also launch an exhibition of Chinese films and TV programs under The Bond, and work with LAC countries to translate and introduce 10 premium TV dramas and audiovisual programs annually to each other. China will host the China-LAC tourism dialogue with LAC countries. To facilitate friendly exchanges, China has decided to implement a visa exemption for five LAC countries as the first step, and will expand this policy coverage at proper times.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    As an 11th-century Chinese poet wrote, “Life’s greatest joy comes from finding kindred spirits.” Latin America has a similar proverb which goes, “The one who has a friend has a treasure.” No matter how the world changes, China will always stand by LAC countries as a good friend and a good partner. Let us march forward together on our paths toward modernization, working together to write a new chapter in building a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI: Freehold Royalties Announces First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CALGARY, Alberta, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Freehold Royalties Ltd. (Freehold or the Company) (TSX:FRU) announces first quarter results for the period ended March 31, 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • $91 million in revenue;
    • $68 million in funds from operations ($0.42/share) (1)(3);
    • $44 million in dividends paid ($0.27/share)(2);
    • 10,635 bbls/d of total liquids production, an 8% increase from previous quarter driven by continued execution of our U.S. expansion strategy and heavy oil growth in Canada;
    • 16,248 boe/d of total production, a 6% increase from previous quarter with a 65% weighting to oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs), an increase from 63% in Q1-2024;
    • Gross drilling of 322 wells, up 12% from Q4-2024;
    • Robust leasing with 25 new leases signed (14 in Canada; 11 in the U.S.) contributing $3.9 million in revenue with the U.S. contributing a record $3.3 million in lease bonus; and
    • $59.29/boe average realized price ($72.64/boe in the U.S. and $49.26/boe in Canada);
      • 47% pricing premium on Freehold’s U.S. production reflecting higher liquids weighting, higher quality crude oil and reduced transportation costs to get product to market.

    President’s Message

    Freehold’s Q1-2025 production of 16,248 boe/d is at the highest levels in our corporate history, in step with the high quality acquisition work completed in late 2024. The deliberate and strategic build out of our North American royalty portfolio has resulted in a balanced revenue base with Canada contributing 46% of revenue in Q1-2025 and the U.S. contributing 54%. On a volume basis the U.S. represented 43% of our production with premium pricing and higher liquids weighting driving an outsized revenue contribution. Our focus on acquiring mineral title interests in prospect rich basins has contributed to the record level of leasing this quarter in our core U.S. operating areas.

    Freehold’s oil weighted portfolio, underpinned by premium operators in select basins across North America, delivered significant value to the Company and our shareholders with $68 million of funds from operations(3) in the quarter, or $0.42/share. Included in our funds from operations was record leasing results with $3.9 million in revenue, including $3.3 million in U.S. leasing revenue. Notably, the majority of the U.S. leases signed in Q1-2025 are targeting the deeper Barnett formation of the Permian basin that is in the early stages of development.

    Liquids production increased 8% over Q4-2024 and 15% compared to Q1-2024. The increase is largely attributed to the December 2024 Midland basin acquisition and continued growth in our heavy oil portfolio which grew 7% over Q4-2024 and is up 19% compared to Q1-2024. Our U.S. portfolio continues to be led by consistent drilling activity by some of the highest quality payors in North America who are executing on their multi-year growth plans.

    We are maintaining our production guidance range of 15,800 boe/d to 17,000 boe/d for 2025E. The global macro environment has shifted since the end of the first quarter and how that may impact operator plans for the remainder of 2025 is unknown at this point. The industry is in excellent shape to manage commodity price volatility due to the capital discipline and prudent balance sheet management approach over the past number of years. Contributing to this is our positioning in the lowest break-even plays across North America under investment grade operators who take a long term, measured view to capital planning.

    David M. Spyker, President and Chief Executive Officer

    Dividend Announcement

    The board of directors of Freehold has declared a monthly dividend of $0.09 per share to be paid on June 16, 2025, to shareholders of record on May 30, 2025. The dividend is designated as an eligible dividend for Canadian income tax purposes.

    Operating and Financial Highlights

          Three Months Ended
    FINANCIAL ($ millions, except as noted) Q1-2025 Q4-2024 Q1-2024
    West Texas Intermediate (US$/bbl) 71.42   70.27   76.96  
    AECO 7A Monthly Index (Cdn$/Mcf) 2.02   1.46   2.07  
    Royalty and other revenue 91.1   76.9   74.3  
    Funds from operations (3) 68.1   61.3   54.4  
    Funds from operations per share, basic ($) (1)(3) 0.42   0.40   0.36  
    Dividends paid per share ($) (2) 0.27   0.27   0.27  
    Dividend payout ratio (%) (3) 65 % 66 % 75 %
    Long-term debt 294.3   300.9   223.6  
    Net debt (5)(6) 272.2   282.3   210.5  
    Net debt to trailing funds from operations (times) (5) 1.1x
      1.2x   0.9x  
    OPERATING        
    Total production (boe/d) (4) 16,248   15,306   14,714  
    Canadian production (boe/d)(4) 9,278   9,437   9,593  
    U.S. production (boe/d)(4) 6,970   5,869   5,121  
    Oil and NGL (%) 65 % 65 % 63 %
    Petroleum and natural gas realized price ($/boe) (4) 59.29   53.80   54.81  
    Cash costs ($/boe) (3)(4) 7.00   5.93   7.19  
    Netback ($/boe) (3) (4) 53.01   47.25   46.62  
    ROYALTY INTEREST DRILLING (gross / net)        
    Canada 92 / 3.9
      110 / 3.6   132 / 5.9  
    U.S. 230 / 0.8
      178 / 0.6   168 / 0.5  

    (1) Calculated based on the basic weighted average number of shares outstanding during the period
    (2) Based on the number of shares issued and outstanding at each record date
    (3) See Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures
    (4) See Conversion of Natural Gas to Barrels of Oil Equivalent (boe)
    (5) Net debt and net debt to trailing funds from operations are capital management measures

    First Quarter Summary

    • Average production of 16,248 boe/d, an increase of 10% over the first quarter of 2024 with year-over-year liquids growth of 15% to 10,635 bbls/d:
      • Light and medium oil was up 13% over Q1-2024 to 6,880 bbls/d, largely due to the high quality, oil weighted U.S. acquisitions completed in 2024; and
      • Heavy oil was up 19% over Q1-2024 to 1,552 bbls/d as Mannville Stack and Clearwater production on Freehold’s lands hit record highs in the first quarter.
    • Royalty and other revenue totalled $91.1 million, up 18% over the prior quarter and 23% year-over-year. Other revenue included $3.9 million in lease bonus consideration and lease rental revenue, a quarterly record for Freehold.
    • Freehold’s corporate realized price was $59.29/boe, an increase of 9% compared to Q4-2024 and 8% from Q1-2024 due to higher commodity prices and higher weighting to liquids production.
    • Funds from operations totalled $68.1 million ($0.42 per share)(1).
    • Freehold closed $13.8 million of land purchases in the first quarter, including $11 million of high quality undeveloped mineral title lands in our core Midland and Delaware basin properties.
    • Dividends declared for Q1-2025 of $44.3 million ($0.27 per share). Freehold’s dividend payout ratio(1) was 65% for Q1-2025. Freehold’s dividend remains sustainable at oil and natural gas prices well below current commodity price levels.
    • Net debt(1)(2) of $272.2 million at the end of Q1-2025 was reduced by $10.1 million compared to year end 2024, representing 1.1 times trailing funds from operations(2) during the period. Freehold remains conservatively levered.

    (1) See Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures
    (2) Net debt and net debt to trailing funds from operations are capital management measures

    Q1-2025 Drilling and Leasing Activity

    In total, 322 gross wells (4.7 net wells) were drilled on Freehold’s royalty lands in Q1-2025, a 12% increase (12% on a net basis) compared to the previous quarter. The increase in drilling reflects the expansion of the Company’s U.S. asset base and the positioning of our assets in areas across North America that continue to attract drilling capital.

    On a gross basis, essentially all drilling was oil focused. Approximately 29% of gross wells drilled in Q1-2025 were in Canada and 71% targeted Freehold’s U.S. royalty acreage.

      Three Months Ended
      Q1-2025 Q4-2024 Q1-2024
      Gross Net (1) Gross Net (1) Gross Net (1)
    Canada 92 3.9 110 3.6 132 5.9
    United States 230 0.8 178 0.6 168 0.5
    Total 322 4.7 288 4.2 300 6.4

    (1)  Equivalent net wells are aggregate of the numbers obtained by multiplying each gross well by our royalty interest percentage; U.S. wells on Freehold’s lands generally come on production at approximately 10 times the volume that of an average Canadian well in our portfolio.

    Canada

    Canadian net drilling was up over the previous quarter despite the decline on a gross basis as higher interest wells in the Viking and mineral title drilling in southeast Saskatchewan and the Mannville Stack made up a higher percentage. Q1-2025 drilling in Canada was led again by oil weighted plays including Viking (33 gross wells), southeast Saskatchewan (12 gross wells) and Mannville Stack (9 gross wells).

    During Q1-2025, Freehold entered into 14 new leases with seven counterparties totalling approximately $0.6 million in bonus and lease rental revenue. The majority of the new leasing was focused in southeast Saskatchewan and the Mannville Stack.

    U.S.

    During Q1-2025, 230 gross (0.8 net) wells were drilled on our U.S. lands, up 29% on a gross basis and 33% on a net basis from previous quarter due to a larger footprint in the Midland basin following the December 2024 acquisition and increased activity in the Eagle Ford basin. Approximately 90% of Q1-2025 drilling was focused in the Permian basin and 10% in the Eagle Ford basin.

    U.S. wells typically come on production at approximately ten times that of an average Canadian well in the Company’s portfolio, making equivalent net well additions much more valuable in the U.S. compared to Canada. However, a U.S. well can take upwards of six to twelve months on average from initial license to first production, compared to three to four months in Canada.

    In Q1-2025, Freehold entered into 11 new U.S. leases with four counterparties, totalling $3.3 million of bonus and lease rental revenue. Leasing activity was predominantly focused on Freehold’s mineral title interests in the Midland and Delaware basins with one lease in the Haynesville basin.

    Normal Course Issuer Bid (NCIB) Application

    The Company plans to implement an NCIB, pursuant to which Freehold would be permitted to acquire up to 10% of its issued and outstanding common shares that comprise the public float (less common shares held by directors, executive officers and principal securityholders (holders holding greater than 10% of the issued and outstanding Shares) of the Company), through the facilities, rules and regulations of the TSX.

    The NCIB will be subject to receipt of certain approvals, including acceptance of the notice of intention to commence an NCIB by the TSX. The NCIB will commence following receipt of all such approvals and will continue until the earlier of: (i) a period of up to one-year; or (ii) the date on which the Company has acquired all common shares sought pursuant to the NCIB. Further particulars of the NCIB will be described in a subsequent press release when approved by the TSX.

    Freehold believes establishing a NCIB as part of its capital management strategy is in the best interests of the Company and provides an opportunity to deliver value to shareholders. Decisions regarding utilizing the NCIB will be based on market conditions, share price, best use of funds from operations and other factors including debt repayment and options to expand our portfolio of royalty assets.

    Annual Meeting of Shareholders

    Freehold’s annual meeting of shareholders (the AGM) will be conducted in person and via live audio webcast at 3:00 PM (MDT) on Wednesday May 14, 2025 at the Calgary Petroleum Club. Further details are available on our website at https://freeholdroyalties.com/investors/events-and-presentations.

    Conference Call Details

    A webcast to discuss financial and operational results for the period ended March 31, 2025, will be held for the investment community on Wednesday May 14, 2025, beginning at 7:00 AM MT (9:00 AM ET).

    A live audio webcast will be accessible through the link below and on Freehold’s website under “Events & Presentations” on Freehold’s website at www.freeholdroyalties.com. To participate in the conference call, you can register using the following link: Live Audio Webcast URL: https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/6y39yhx4.

    A dial-in option is also available and can be accessed by dialing 1-800-952-5114 (toll-free in North America) participant passcode is 5153824#.

    For further information contact

    Freehold Royalties Ltd.
    Todd McBride, CPA, CMA                     
    Investor Relations                                 
    t. 403.221.0833                                      
    e. tmcbride@freeholdroyalties.com    
     Nick Thomson, CFA
    Investor Relations & Capital Markets
    t. 403.221.0874                                          
    e. nthomson@freeholdroyalties.com
    Select Quarterly Information
      2025   2024 2023  
    Financial ($millions, except as noted) Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2
    Royalty and other revenue 91.1   76.9   73.9   84.5   74.3   80.1   84.2   73.7  
    Net Income (loss) 37.3   51.1   25.0   39.3   34.0   34.3   42.3   24.3  
    Per share, basic ($) (1) 0.23   0.33   0.17   0.26   0.23   0.23   0.28   0.16  
    Cash flows from operations 62.9   59.1   64.1   47.6   52.5   70.7   53.7   49.9  
    Funds from operations 68.1   61.3   55.7   59.6   54.4   62.8   65.3   53.0  
    Per share, basic ($) (1)(3) 0.42   0.40   0.37   0.40   0.36   0.42   0.43   0.35  
    Acquisitions & related expenditures 13.9   277.0   1.8   11.5   121.5   2.1   1.2   3.2  
    Dividends paid 44.3   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7  
    Per share ($) (2) 0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27  
    Dividends declared 44.3   41.9   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7   40.7  
    Per share ($) (2) 0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27   0.27  
    Dividend payout ratio (%) (3) 65 % 66 % 73 % 68 % 75 % 65 % 62 % 77 %
    Long-term debt 294.3   300.9   205.8   228.0   223.6   123.0   141.2   152.0  
    Net debt (5) 272.2   282.3   187.1   199.1   210.5   100.9   113.4   136.9  
    Shares outstanding, period end (000s) 164.0   164.0   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7  
    Average shares outstanding, basic (000s) (6) 164.0   153.4   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7   150.7  
    Operating                
    Light and medium oil (bbl/d) 6,880   6,296   6,080   6,551   6,094   6,308   6,325   6,093  
    Heavy oil (bbl/d) 1,552   1,516   1,315   1,348   1,300   1,182   1,127   1,167  
    NGL (bbl/d) 2,203   2,066   1,972   1,902   1,884   1,878   1,678   1,845  
    Total liquids (bbl/d) 10,635   9,878   9,367   9,801   9,278   9,368   9,130   9,105  
    Natural gas (Mcf/d) 33,678   32,564   31,447   32,524   32,617   32,968   32,851   33,372  
    Total production (boe/d) (4) 16,248   15,306   14,608   15,221   14,714   14,863   14,605   14,667  
    Oil and NGL (%) 65 % 65 % 64 % 64 % 63 % 63 % 63 % 62 %
    Petroleum & natural gas realized price ($/boe) (4) 59.29   53.80   54.36   59.74   54.81   57.94   61.55   54.05  
    Cash costs ($/boe) (3)(4) 7.00   5.93   5.42   9.80   7.19   4.73   5.10   7.19  
    Netback ($/boe) (3)(4) 53.01   47.25   47.78   49.44   46.62   52.59   55.63   46.07  
    Benchmark Prices                
    West Texas Intermediate crude oil (US$/bbl) 71.42   70.27   75.09   80.57   76.96   78.32   82.26   73.78  
    Exchange rate (Cdn$/US$) 1.43   1.40   1.37   1.37   1.35   1.36   1.34   1.34  
    Edmonton Light Sweet crude oil (Cdn$/bbl) 95.32   94.90   97.85   105.29   92.14   99.69   107.89   94.97  
    Western Canadian Select crude oil (Cdn$/bbl) 84.30   80.75   83.95   91.63   77.77   76.96   93.05   78.76  
    Nymex natural gas (US$/Mcf) 3.79   2.86   2.24   1.96   2.33   2.98   2.64   2.17  
    AECO 7A Monthly Index (Cdn$/Mcf) 2.02   1.46   0.81   1.44   2.07   2.70   2.42   2.40  

    (1) Calculated based on the basic weighted average number of shares outstanding during the period
    (2) Based on the number of shares issued and outstanding at each record date
    (3) See Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures
    (4) See Conversion of Natural Gas to Barrels of Oil Equivalent (boe)
    (5) The 2023 reported balances have been restated due to the retrospective adoption of IAS 1 (see note 3d of December 31, 2024 audited consolidated financial statements)
    (6) Weighted average number of shares outstanding during the period, basic

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release offers our assessment of Freehold’s future plans and operations as of March 12, 2025, and contains forward-looking statements that we believe allow readers to better understand our business and prospects. These forward-looking statements include our expectations for the following:

    • 2025 production guidance;
    • our expectation regarding continued growth of our total liquid production through continued execution of our U.S. expansion strategy and heavy oil growth in Canada;
    • our expectation that our U.S. portfolio will continue to be led by consistent drilling activity by the highest quality payors in North America who are executing on their multi-year growth plans;
    • our expectation that the industry is in excellent shape to manage commodity price volatility due to the capital discipline and prudent balance sheet management approach over the past number of years;
    • our expectation that while some growth directed capital may be pared down, there will not be a slow down in core activity on our lands;
    • our expectation Freehold’s dividend remains sustainable at oil and natural gas prices materially below current commodity price levels;
    • our expectation that the positioning of our assets in areas across North America will continue to attract drilling capital despite volatility in commodity prices;
    • our expectation that U.S. wells typically come on production at approximately ten times that of an average Canadian well in the Company’s portfolio, making net well additions much more valuable in the U.S. compared to Canada;
    • our expectations that a U.S. well can take upwards of six to twelve months on average from initial license to first production, compared to three to four months in Canada;
    • our expectations that we will apply for an commence a NCIB once approval is granted; and
    • other similar statements.

    By their nature, forward-looking statements are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, some of which are beyond our control, including general economic conditions, volatility in market prices for crude oil, NGL and natural gas, risks and impacts of tariffs (or other retaliatory trade measures) imposed by Canada or the U.S. (or other countries) on exports and/or imports into and out of such countries, inflation and supply chain issues, the impacts of the ongoing Israeli-Hamas-Hezbollah and potentially the broader Middle-East region, and Russia-Ukraine wars and any associated sanctions as well as OPEC+ curtailments on the global economy and commodity prices, geopolitical instability, political instability, industry conditions, volatility of commodity prices, future production levels, future capital expenditure levels, currency fluctuations, imprecision of reserve estimates, royalties, environmental risks, taxation, regulation, changes in tax or other legislation, competition from other industry participants, inaccurate assumptions on supply and demand factors affecting the consumption of crude oil, NGLs and natural gas, inaccurate expectations for industry drilling levels on our royalty lands, the failure to complete acquisitions on the timing and terms expected, the failure to satisfy conditions of closing for any acquisitions, the lack of availability of qualified personnel or management, stock market volatility, our inability to come to agreement with third parties on prospective opportunities and the results of any such agreement and our ability to access sufficient capital from internal and external sources. Risks are described in more detail in our Annual Information Form for the year-ended December 31, 2024, available at www.sedarplus.ca.

    With respect to forward-looking statements contained in this news release, we have made assumptions regarding, among other things, future commodity prices, future capital expenditure levels, future production levels, future exchange rates, future tax rates, future legislation, the cost of developing and producing our assets, the quality of our counterparties and the plans thereof, our ability and the ability of our lessees to obtain equipment in a timely manner to carry out development activities, our ability to market our oil and gas successfully to current and new customers, the performance of current wells and future wells drilled by our royalty payors, our expectation for the consumption of crude oil and natural gas, our expectation for industry drilling levels, our expectation for completion of wells drilled, our ability to obtain financing on acceptable terms, shut-in production, production additions from our audit function, our ability to execute on prospective opportunities and our ability to add production and reserves through development and acquisition activities. Additional operating assumptions with respect to the forward-looking statements referred to above are detailed in the body of this news release.

    You are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of such information, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, may prove to be imprecise and, as such, undue reliance should not be placed on forward-looking statements. Our actual results, performance, or achievement could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these forward-looking statements. We can give no assurance that any of the events anticipated will transpire or occur, or if any of them do, what benefits we will derive from them. The forward-looking information contained in this document is expressly qualified by this cautionary statement. To the extent any guidance or forward-looking statements herein constitute a financial outlook, they are included herein to provide readers with an understanding of management’s plans and assumptions for budgeting purposes and readers are cautioned that the information may not be appropriate for other purposes. Our policy for updating forward-looking statements is to update our key operating assumptions quarterly and, except as required by law, we do not undertake to update any other forward-looking statements.

    You are further cautioned that the preparation of financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which are the Canadian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for publicly accountable enterprises, requires management to make certain judgments and estimates that affect the reported amounts of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. These estimates may change, having either a positive or negative effect on net income, as further information becomes available and as the economic environment changes.

    To the extent any guidance or forward-looking statements herein constitutes a financial outlook, they are included herein to provide readers with an understanding of management’s plans and assumptions for budgeting purposes and readers are cautioned that the information may not be appropriate for other purposes. You are further cautioned that the preparation of financial statements in accordance with IFRS requires management to make certain judgments and estimates that affect the reported amounts of assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. These estimates may change, having either a positive or negative effect on net income, as further information becomes available and as the economic environment changes.

    Conversion of Natural Gas to Barrels of Oil Equivalent (BOE)
    To provide a single unit of production for analytical purposes, natural gas production and reserves volumes are converted mathematically to equivalent barrels of oil (boe). We use the industry-accepted standard conversion of six thousand cubic feet of natural gas to one barrel of oil (6 Mcf = 1 bbl). The 6:1 boe ratio is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip. It does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead and is not based on either energy content or current prices. While the boe ratio is useful for comparative measures and observing trends, it does not accurately reflect individual product values and might be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. As well, given that the value ratio, based on the current price of crude oil to natural gas, is significantly different from the 6:1 energy equivalency ratio, using a 6:1 conversion ratio may be misleading as an indication of value.

    Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures
    Within this news release, references are made to terms commonly used as key performance indicators in the oil and gas industry, which do not have any standardized means prescribed by Canadian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). We believe that net revenue, netback, dividend payout ratio, funds from operations per share and cash costs are useful non-GAAP financial measures and ratios for management and investors to analyze operating performance, financial leverage, and liquidity, and we use these terms to facilitate the understanding and comparability of our results of operations. However, these as terms do not have any standardized meanings prescribed by GAAP, such terms may not be comparable with the calculations of similar measures for other entities. This news release also contains the capital management measures net debt and net debt to trailing funds from operations, as defined in note 14 to the unaudited consolidated financial statements as at and for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    Net revenue, which is calculated as revenues less ad valorem and production taxes (as incurred in the U.S. at the state level, largely Texas, which do not charge corporate income taxes but do assess flat tax rates on commodity revenues in addition to property tax assessments) details the net amount Freehold receives from its royalty payors, largely after state withholdings.

    The netback, which is also calculated on a boe basis, as average realized price less production and ad valorem taxes, operating expenses, general and administrative expense, cash-based management fees, cash-based interest charges and share-based payouts, represents the per boe netback amount which allows us to benchmark how changes in commodity pricing, net of production and ad valorem taxes, and our cash-based cost structure compare against prior periods.

    Cash costs, which is calculated on a boe basis, is comprised by the recurring cash-based costs, excluding taxes, reported on the statements of operations. For Freehold, cash costs are identified as operating expense, general and administrative expense, cash-based interest charges, cash-based management fees and share-based compensation payouts. Cash costs allow Freehold to benchmark how changes in its manageable cash-based cost structure compare against prior periods.

    The following table presents the computation of Net Revenue, Cash costs and the Netback:

    $/boe Q1-2025 Q4-2024 Q1-2024
    Royalty and other revenue   62.29     54.59     55.47  
    Production and ad valorem taxes   (2.28)     (1.41)     (1.66)  
    Net revenue $60.01   $53.18   $53.81  
    Less:      
    General and administrative expense   (3.41)     (3.02)     (3.58)  
    Operating expense   (0.13)     (0.19)     (0.15)  
    Interest and financing cash expense   (3.31)     (2.67)     (2.79)  
    Management fee-cash settled   (0.05)     (0.05)     (0.06)  
    Cash payout on share-based compensation   (0.10)         (0.61)  
    Cash costs   (7.00)     (5.93)     (7.19)  
    Netback $53.01   $47.25   $46.62  

    Dividend payout ratios are often used for dividend paying companies in the oil and gas industry to identify dividend levels in relation to funds from operations that are also used to finance debt repayments and/or acquisition opportunities. Dividend payout ratio is a supplementary measure and is calculated as dividends paid as a percentage of funds from operations.

           
    ($000s, except as noted) Q1-2025 Q4-2024 Q1-2024
    Dividends paid $44,269   $40,687   $40,686  
    Funds from operations $68,050   $61,332   $54,362  
    Dividend payout ratio (%)   65%     66%     75%  

    Funds from operations per share, which is calculated as funds from operations divided by the weighted average shares outstanding during the period, provides direction if changes in commodity prices, cash costs, and/or acquisitions were accretive on a per share basis. Funds from operations per share is a supplementary measure.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Westport Fuel Systems Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Westport Fuel Systems Inc. (“Westport“) (TSX:WPRT / Nasdaq:WPRT) reported financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025, and provided an update on operations. All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated.

    “We continue to make significant strides in transforming Westport and sharpening our strategic focus. Our priorities remain clear: driving success through Cespira, our HPDI joint venture with Volvo Group; pursuing operational excellence through initiatives to streamline processes and reduce costs; and positioning Westport at the forefront of the alternative fuel shift.

    These priorities are guiding us as we work towards a brighter future. We’re seeing the impact of our efforts in our recent results – we significantly improved our net loss to $2.5 million in Q1 of 2025 from a net loss of $13.6 million in Q1 of 2024. This was supported by a $3.5 million increase in gross profit and an $8.1 million decrease in operating expenses. We also reported a substantial improvement in adjusted EBITDA as compared to the same period of the prior year.

    Looking to the future, with the announcement of the proposed sale of our light-duty business, Westport is realigning to focus on the hard-to-decarbonize applications primarily in long-haul and heavy-duty trucking where our unique HPDI and high-pressure technologies offer significant growth potential. Critically, this transaction is designed to provide immediate cash proceeds that bolster our balance sheet and fund growth opportunities in Cespira and the High-Pressure Controls & Systems business.

    Now, the conversation has changed. Our attendance at the Advanced Clean Transportation Expo or ACT Expo, the largest showcase of clean transportation technologies in North America, validated our view that the market recognizes that the internal combustion engine utilizing alternative fuels is an affordable solution that also decarbonizes long-haul, heavy-duty transport. Westport is the clean-tech innovation company to help drive this change. Through Cespira, the HPDI fuel system does the on-engine work to our High Pressure Controls and Systems business where our components do the off-engine work we are providing OEMs with simplified solutions to decarbonize.

    Volvo recently highlighted that demand for their gas-powered trucks that utilize HPDI technology has been increasing, with sales up more than 25% in 2024, a trend that we saw continue into Q1 with Cespira delivering improved revenue driven by increased volumes as compared to Q1 of 2024. While we remain focused on scaling our alternative fuel solutions, including LNG, CNG, RNG, and hydrogen systems, we are matching the cleanest gaseous fuels with the most efficient engine technologies. We are committed to delivering practical, commercially viable low-carbon solutions today and providing sustainable, high-performance solutions that help our customers achieve their goals now and for years to come.”

    Dan Sceli, Chief Executive Officer

    Q1 2025 Highlights

    • Revenues decreased 9% to $71.0 million compared to the same period in 2024, primarily driven by decreased sales volumes in our Heavy-Duty OEM and High-Pressure Controls & Systems segments. This was partially offset by increased sales in our Light-Duty segment in the quarter. In Q1 2024, our Heavy-Duty OEM segment included the financial results of the HPDI business which are now accounted for as part of the Cespira joint venture.
    • Net loss of $2.5 million for the quarter compared to net loss of $13.6 million for the same quarter last year. The decrease in net loss was driven by a $3.5 million increase in gross profit, decrease in operating expenditures by $8.1 million; change in foreign exchange gain or loss by $2.3 million and an increase in loss from investments accounted for by the equity method of $3.8 million.
    • Adjusted EBITDA[1] of nil  compared to negative $6.6 million for the same period in 2024.
    • Cash and cash equivalents were $32.6 million at the end of the first quarter. Cash used in operating activities during the quarter was $4.9 million with net cash used by working capital of $8.1 million, partially offset by operating income of $1.7 million. Investing activities included the collection of $10.5 million in a holdback receivable related to our previous sale of CWI to Cummins in 2022, capital contribution into Cespira of $4.7 million and purchase of capital assets of $3.1 million. Cash used in financing activities was attributed to net debt repayments of $3.9 million in the quarter.

    [1] Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation is a non-GAAP measure. Please refer to NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES in Westport’s Management Discussion and Analysis for the reconciliation.

    Consolidated Results      Over /   
    ($ in millions, except per share amounts)     (Under)   
      1Q25 1Q24 %  
    Revenue $ 71.0   $ 77.6   (9 )%
    Gross Profit(2)   15.2     11.7   30 %
    Gross Margin(2)   21 %   15 %  
    Income (loss) from Investments Accounted for by the Equity Method(1)   (3.8 )     (100 )%
    Net Loss   (2.5 )   (13.6 ) 82 %
    Net Loss per Share – Basic   (0.14 )   (0.79 ) 82 %
    Net Loss per Share – Diluted   (0.14 )   (0.79 ) 82 %
    EBITDA (2)   (0.1 )   (9.2 ) 99 %
    Adjusted EBITDA (2)       (6.6 ) 100 %

    (1) This includes income or loss primarily from our investments in Cespira and Minda Westport Technologies Limited
    (2) Gross margins, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures. Please refer to GAAP and NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES for the reconciliation to equivalent GAAP measures and limitations on the use of such measures.

    Segment Information

    Light-Duty

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $64.2 million compared with $63.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. Light-Duty revenue increased by $0.9 million compared to the prior year and was primarily driven by increase in sales in our light-duty OEM and DOEM businesses. The light-duty OEM business had an increase in sales from its Euro 6 program compared to the prior year. In the first quarter of 2024, DOEM had a significant decrease in sales to a customer. This was partially offset by lower sales in our IAM, electronics and fuel storage businesses compared to the prior year.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 increased by $1.6 million to $14.0 million, or 22% of revenue, compared to $12.4 million, or 20% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by a change in sales mix with an increase in sales to European customers and a reduction in sales to developing regions.

    High Pressure Controls & Systems

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $1.4 million compared with $2.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease in revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 compared to the prior year was primarily driven by the hydrogen industry slowdown impacting demand for hydrogen components.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 decreased by $0.2 million to $0.2 million, or 14% of revenue, compared to $0.4 million, or 17% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by lower sales volumes increasing the per unit manufacturing costs in the quarter.

    Heavy-Duty Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”)

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $5.4 million, compared to $11.9 million for the prior year. The decrease in revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 is a result of the continuation of the business in Cespira. The revenue earned in the current quarter was from our services provided under the transitional service agreement with Cespira that is expected to end by Q2 2026.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 increased by $2.1 million to $1.0 million, or 19% of revenue, compared to negative $1.1 million or negative 9% of revenue, for the same prior year period. The Heavy-Duty OEM segment received $0.9million in credits from component suppliers for inventory sold in the quarter.

    Selected Cespira Statements of Operations Data

    We account for Cespira using the equity method of accounting. However, due to its significance to our long-term strategy and operating results, we disclose certain Cespira’s financial information in notes 7 and 17 of our interim financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    The following table sets forth a summary of the financial results of Cespira for the three months ended March 31, 2025 .

    (in millions of U.S. dollars)   Three months ended March 31,   Change
          2025       2024     $   %
    Total revenue   $ 16.7     $     $ 16.7     %
    Gross profit   $ 0.5     $     $ 0.5     %
    Gross margin1     3 %     %        
    Operating loss   $ (7.1 )   $     $ (7.1 )   %
    Net loss attributable to the Company   $ (3.9 )   $     $ (3.9 )   %

    1Gross margin is non-GAAP financial measure. See the section ‘Non-GAAP Financial Measures’ for explanations and discussions of these non-GAAP financial measures or ratios.

    Revenue

    Cespira revenues for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were $16.7 million. In the prior year, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment, which included our HPDI business, had revenues of $11.9 million. This was primarily driven by an increase in HPDI fuel systems sold in the period.

    Gross Profit

    Gross profit was $0.5 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. In the prior year, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment had negative $1.1 million in gross profit primarily driven by the increase in sales volumes compared to the prior year and reductions in manufacturing cost.

    Operating loss

    Cespira incurred operating losses of $7.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. Cespira continues to incur operating losses as it scales its operations and expand into other markets.

    Q1 2025 Conference Call
    Westport has scheduled a conference call for May 14, 2025, at 7:00 am Pacific Time (10:00 pm Eastern Time) to discuss these results. To access the conference call please register at
    https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BI73bcac200e5f4652873668cf803d72ed

    The live webcast of the conference call can be accessed through the Westport website at
    https://investors.wfsinc.com/.

    Participants may register up to 60 minutes before the event by clicking on the call link and completing the online registration form. Upon registration, the user will receive dial-in info and a unique PIN, along with an email confirming the details.

    The webcast will be archived on Westport’s website at https://investors.wfsinc.com.

    Financial Statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis

    To view Westport financials for the first quarter ended March 31st, 2025, please visit https://investors.wfsinc.com/financials/

    About Westport Fuel Systems

    At Westport Fuel Systems, we are driving innovation to power a cleaner tomorrow. We are a leading supplier of advanced fuel delivery components and systems for clean, low-carbon fuels such as natural gas, renewable natural gas, propane, and hydrogen to the global automotive industry. Our technology delivers the performance and fuel efficiency required by transportation applications and the environmental benefits that address climate change and urban air quality challenges. Headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, with operations in Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, we serve our customers in approximately 70 countries with leading global transportation brands. At Westport Fuel Systems, we think ahead. For more information, visit www.wfsinc.com.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements, including statements regarding future strategic initiatives and future growth, future of our development programs (including those relating to HPDI and Hydrogen), our expectations for 2024 and beyond, including the demand for our products, and the future success of our business and technology strategies. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on both the views of management and assumptions that may cause our actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, levels of activities, performance or achievements expressed in or implied by these forward looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and assumptions include those related to our revenue growth, operating results, industry and products, the general economy, conditions of and access to the capital and debt markets, solvency, governmental policies and regulation, technology innovations, fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, operating expenses, continued reduction in expenses, ability to successfully commercialize new products, the performance of our joint ventures, the availability and price of natural gas and hydrogen, new environmental regulations, the acceptance of and shift to natural gas and hydrogen vehicles,fuel emission standards, the development of competing technologies, our ability to adequately develop and deploy our technology, the actions and determinations of our joint venture and development partners, the effects and duration of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, supply chain disruptions as well as other risk factors and assumptions that may affect our actual results, performance or achievements or financial position discussed in our most recent Annual Information Form and other filings with securities regulators. Readers should not place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they were made. We disclaim any obligation to publicly update or revise such statements to reflect any change in our expectations or in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statements may be based, or that may affect the likelihood that actual results will differ from those set forth in these forward-looking statements except as required by National Instrument 51-102.

    Contact Information
    Investor Relations
    Westport Fuel Systems
    T: +1 604-718-2046

    GAAP and Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Our financial statements are prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“U.S. GAAP”). These U.S. GAAP financial statements include non-cash charges and other charges and benefits that may be unusual or infrequent in nature or that we believe may make comparisons to our prior or future performance difficult. In addition to conventional measures prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Westport and certain investors use EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as an indicator of our ability to generate liquidity by producing operating cash flow to fund working capital needs, service debt obligations and fund capital expenditures. Management also uses these non-GAAP measures in its review and evaluation of the financial performance of Westport. EBITDA is also frequently used by investors and analysts for valuation purposes whereby EBITDA is multiplied by a factor or “EBITDA multiple” that is based on an observed or inferred relationship between EBITDA and market values to determine the approximate total enterprise value of a company. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures also provide additional insight to investors and securities analysts as supplemental information to our U.S. GAAP results and as a basis to compare our financial performance period-over-period and to compare our financial performance with that of other companies. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures facilitate comparisons of our core operating results from period to period and to other companies by, in the case of EBITDA, removing the effects of our capital structure (net interest income on cash deposits, interest expense on outstanding debt and debt facilities), asset base (depreciation and amortization) and tax consequences. Adjusted EBITDA provides this same indicator of Westports’ EBITDA from continuing operations and removing such effects of our capital structure, asset base and tax consequences, but additionally excludes any unrealized foreign exchange gains or losses, stock-based compensation charges and other one-time impairments and costs which are not expected to be repeated in order to provide greater insight into the cash flow being produced from our operating business, without the influence of extraneous events.

    Segment Information

    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are intended to provide additional information to investors and analysts and do not have any standardized definition under U.S. GAAP, and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for measures of performance prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA exclude the impact of cash costs of financing activities and taxes, and the effects of changes in operating working capital balances, and therefore are not necessarily indicative of operating profit or cash flow from operations as determined under U.S. GAAP. Other companies may calculate EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA differently.

    Segment earnings or losses before income taxes, interest, depreciation, and amortization (“Segment EBITDA”) is the measure of segment profitability used by the Company. The accounting policies of our reportable segments are the same as those applied in our consolidated financial statements. Management prepared the financial results of the Company’s reportable segments on basis that is consistent with the manner in which Management internally disaggregates financial information to assist in making internal operating decisions. Certain common costs and expenses, primarily corporate functions, among segments differently than we would for stand-alone financial information prepared in accordance with GAAP. These include certain costs and expenses of shared services, such as IT, human resources, legal, finance and supply chain management. Segment EBITDA is not defined under US GAAP and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies and should not be considered a substitute for net earnings or other results reported in accordance with GAAP. Reconciliations of reportable segment information to consolidated statement of operations can be found in section “NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES & RECONCILIATIONS” within this press release.

      Three months ended March 31, 2025
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Cespira   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 64.2   $ 1.4     $ 5.4   $ 16.7     $ 87.7
    Cost of revenue   50.2     1.2       4.4     16.2       72.0
    Gross profit   14.0     0.2       1.0     0.5       15.7
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   3.0     1.0       0.1     3.1       7.2
    General & administrative   4.1     0.3       0.1     2.7       7.2
    Sales & marketing   2.3     0.1           0.3       2.7
    Depreciation & amortization   0.7     0.1           0.7       1.5
        10.1     1.5       0.2     6.8       18.6
    Equity income (note 8)   0.1                     0.1
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization   1.9     0.1           1.6       3.6
    Segment EBITDA $ 5.9   $ (1.2 )   $ 0.8   $ (4.7 )   $ 0.8
      Three months ended March 31, 2024
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 63.3   $ 2.4     $ 11.9     $ 77.6  
    Cost of revenue   50.9     2.0       13.0       65.9  
    Gross profit   12.4     0.4       (1.1 )     11.7  
    Operating expenses:              
    Research & development   3.6     1.3       2.8       7.7  
    General & administrative   3.7     0.2       1.8       5.7  
    Sales & marketing   2.1     0.2       0.5       2.8  
    Depreciation & amortization   0.6     0.1       0.1       0.8  
        10.0     1.8       5.2       17.0  
    Equity income                    
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization   1.5     0.1       1.4       3.0  
    Segment EBITDA $ 3.9   $ (1.3 )   $ (4.9 )   $ (2.3 )
    Gross Profit    
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars) 1Q25   1Q24
    Three months ended  
    Revenue $ 71.0     $ 77.6  
    Less: Cost of revenue   55.8       65.9  
    Gross profit   15.2       11.7  
    Gross margin %   21.4 %     15.1 %
      Three months ended March 31, 2025
      Total Segment   Less: Cespira   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 87.7   $ 16.7   $     $ 71.0  
    Cost of revenue   72.0     16.2           55.8  
    Gross profit   15.7     0.5           15.2  
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   7.2     3.1           4.1  
    General & administrative   7.2     2.7     1.9       6.4  
    Sales & marketing   2.7     0.3     0.3       2.7  
    Depreciation & amortization   1.5     0.7           0.8  
        18.6     6.8     2.2       14.0  
    Equity income (loss)   0.1         (3.9 )     (3.8 )
      Three months ended March 31, 2024
      Total Segment   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 77.6   $   $ 77.6
    Cost of revenue   65.9         65.9
    Gross profit   11.7         11.7
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   7.7         7.7
    General & administrative   5.7     4.7     10.4
    Sales & marketing   2.8     0.4     3.2
    Depreciation & amortization   0.8     0.2     1.0
        17.0     5.3     22.3
    Equity income          
    Reconciliation of Segment EBITDA to Loss before income taxes   Three months ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Total Segment EBITDA   $ 0.8     $ (2.3 )
    Adjustments:
    Depreciation & amortization     2.0       3.0  
    Cespira’s Segment EBITDA     (4.7 )      
    Cespira’s equity loss     3.9        
    Corporate and unallocated operating expenses     2.2       5.3  
    Foreign exchange loss     (0.5 )     1.8  
    Interest on long-term debt and accretion of royalty payable     0.7       0.8  
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     (0.9 )     (0.3 )
    Loss before income taxes   $ (1.9 )   $ (12.9 )
    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA        
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars)   1Q25   1Q24
    Three months ended    
    Loss before income taxes   $ (1.9 )   $ (12.9 )
    Interest expense (income), net     (0.2 )     0.5  
    Depreciation and amortization     2.0       3.2  
    EBITDA     (0.1 )     (9.2 )
    Stock based compensation (recovery)     0.3       0.3  
    Unrealized foreign exchange (gain) loss     (0.5 )     1.8  
    Severance costs           0.5  
    Restructuring costs     0.3        
    Adjusted EBITDA   $     $ (6.6 )
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share amounts)
    March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024
     
        March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
    Assets        
    Current assets:        
    Cash and cash equivalents (including restricted cash)   $ 32,637     $ 37,646  
    Accounts receivable     66,634       73,054  
    Inventories     63,214       53,526  
    Prepaid expenses     6,551       5,660  
    Total current assets     169,036       169,886  
    Long-term investments     40,052       39,732  
    Property, plant and equipment     45,314       41,956  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     19,249       19,019  
    Intangible assets     5,174       5,277  
    Deferred income tax assets     10,261       9,695  
    Goodwill     2,996       2,876  
    Other long-term assets     3,163       3,180  
    Total assets   $ 295,245     $ 291,621  
    Liabilities and shareholders’ equity        
    Current liabilities:        
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities   $ 93,127     $ 88,123  
    Current portion of operating lease liabilities     2,750       2,624  
    Current portion of long-term debt     13,225       14,660  
    Current portion of warranty liability     4,013       3,861  
    Total current liabilities     113,115       109,268  
    Long-term operating lease liabilities     16,560       16,433  
    Long-term debt     17,915       19,067  
    Warranty liability     1,603       1,456  
    Deferred income tax liabilities     4,063       4,029  
    Other long-term liabilities     4,391       4,343  
    Total liabilities     157,647       154,596  
    Shareholders’ equity:        
    Share capital:        
    Unlimited common and preferred shares, no par value        
    17,326,732 (2024 – 17,282,934) common shares issued and outstanding     1,246,408       1,245,805  
    Other equity instruments     9,081       9,472  
    Additional paid in capital     11,516       11,516  
    Accumulated deficit     (1,098,726 )     (1,096,275 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (30,681 )     (33,493 )
    Total shareholders’ equity     137,598       137,025  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 295,245     $ 291,621  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations and Comprehensive Income (Loss) (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share and per share amounts)
    Three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024
     
        Three months ended March 31,
          2025       2024  
    Revenue   $ 70,955     $ 77,574  
    Cost of revenue     55,730       65,851  
    Gross profit     15,225       11,723  
    Operating expenses:        
    Research and development     4,052       7,693  
    General and administrative     6,397       10,353  
    Sales and marketing     2,758       3,287  
    Foreign exchange (gain) loss     (456 )     1,820  
    Depreciation and amortization     740       1,043  
          13,491       24,196  
    Income (loss) from operations     1,734       (12,473 )
             
    Income (loss) from investments accounted for by the equity method     (3,799 )     31  
    Interest on long-term debt     (676 )     (812 )
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     869       341  
    Loss before income taxes     (1,872 )     (12,913 )
    Income tax expense     579       735  
    Net loss for the period     (2,451 )     (13,648 )
    Other comprehensive income (loss):        
    Cumulative translation adjustment     3,641       (430 )
    Ownership share of equity method investments’ other comprehensive loss     (829 )      
          2,812       (430 )
    Comprehensive income (loss)   $ 361     $ (14,078 )
             
    Loss per share:        
    Net loss per share – basic and diluted   $ (0.14 )     (0.79 )
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:        
    Basic and diluted     17,322,681       17,220,540  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars)
    Three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024
     
        Three months ended March 31,
          2025       2024  
    Operating activities:        
    Net loss for the period   $ (2,451 )   $ (13,648 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities:        
    Depreciation and amortization     1,930       3,247  
    Stock-based compensation expense     212       331  
    Unrealized foreign exchange (gain) loss     (456 )     1,820  
    Deferred income tax (recovery)     (33 )     (40 )
    Loss (income) from investments accounted for by the equity method     3,799       (31 )
    Interest on long-term debt     22       22  
    Change in inventory write-downs     223       413  
    Change in bad debt expense     (33 )     (121 )
    Other           (248 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:        
    Accounts receivable     (2,072 )     12,526  
    Inventories     (7,502 )     (7,434 )
    Prepaid expenses     (415 )     (400 )
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities     2,840       4,725  
    Warranty liability     (963 )     (1,020 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities     (4,899 )     142  
    Investing activities:        
    Purchase of property, plant and equipment     (3,142 )     (4,893 )
    Proceeds on sale of assets     82       135  
    Proceeds from holdback receivable     10,450        
    Capital contributions to investments accounted for by the equity method (note 7)     (4,686 )      
    Net cash used in investing activities     2,704       (4,758 )
    Financing activities:        
    Repayments of operating lines of credit and long-term facilities     (3,918 )     (17,689 )
    Drawings on operating lines of credit and long-term facilities           11,848  
    Net cash used in financing activities     (3,918 )     (5,841 )
    Effect of foreign exchange on cash and cash equivalents     1,104       (494 )
    Net decrease in cash and cash equivalents     (5,009 )     (10,951 )
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period (including restricted cash)     37,646       54,853  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period (including restricted cash)   $ 32,637     $ 43,902  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minister welcomes Zelenskyy-Putin meeting to end fighting in Ukraine

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Published on May 13, 2025

    Statements to the press by M. Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, on the sidelines of his visit to Calvados department (Caen, May 12, 2025)

    Can you confirm that you had a call today with Marco Rubio and other foreign-minister counterparts? And what was the nature of these discussions?

    THE MINISTER – Yes, at President Macron’s request, I spoke to my counterpart the US Secretary of State [and] the foreign ministers of the European countries present in Kyiv at the weekend, then the Ukrainian minister. We reiterated our desire to see an immediate, unconditional 30-day ceasefire. And then we signalled our support for the idea of a meeting on Thursday between President Zelenskyy of Ukraine and President Putin of Russia.

    Vladimir Putin declared today that any ultimatum was unacceptable. What do you say to him?

    THE MINISTER – I say that Vladimir Putin proposed a direct meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to it. Vladimir Putin must now keep to his part of the bargain. He must turn up in Istanbul on Thursday for a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Then, in order for discussions to take place calmly and lead to peace, there absolutely must be a ceasefire, because you can’t negotiate while under attack from bombs or drones.

    If this doesn’t happen, what sanctions could there be?

    THE MINISTER – We’re preparing to put in place particularly powerful, massive sanctions that would force Vladimir Putin to observe a ceasefire if he didn’t move towards one. These sanctions would be coordinated with the American sanctions that the American senators have prepared, with 500% tariffs on oil imports and on countries importing Russian oil today.

    And France, specifically?

    THE MINISTER – We adopt sanctions at European level. We’ve adopted 17 sanctions packages targeting Russian entities and individuals helping to circumvent the sanctions, helping to destabilize European public opinion, and also the financial institutions, the energy institutions. What we’re preparing are additional sanctions that will be massive and target the energy and financial sectors.

    Can you give details of these sanctions on the oil sectors, for example?

    THE MINISTER – A number of sanctions have already been adopted, and at the weekend, following the discussions that took place in Kyiv, we asked the European Commission to prepare further, even more substantial sanctions to force Vladimir Putin to begin a peace process.

    On gas and oil?

    THE MINISTER – On oil, in particular, which now accounts for 25% of Russia’s budget.

    Donald Trump said he’s ready to join the negotiations. Is that a good thing?

    THE MINISTER – He’s obviously welcome. He was the one from the outset who proposed an unconditional 30-day ceasefire in the air, at sea and on land – a proposal accepted by the Ukrainians two months ago now, and which Vladimir Putin must now in turn accept./.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Participation in the Olympic Games as a framework for peace and mutual understanding – E-001810/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001810/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

    The Olympic Games are a timeless symbol of peace and international concord, promoting respect, cooperation and solidarity between nations across the world. The Olympic Truce, which has its roots in ancient Greece, recalls the power of sport in bridging differences or at least in providing an arena of coexistence, even in times of war. The Games provide a framework for accord and the hope of a more peaceful world. As Greeks, we know that the periodically expressed European positions on excluding Russian and Belarusian athletes go against the Olympic spirit.

    On 14 June 2024, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a statement on the alignment of certain countries on restrictive measures against Russia. The statement was part of the restrictive measures imposed by the EU on Russia.

    In October 2024, the relevant Vice-President of the European Commission stated that athletes from Russia and Belarus who have supported or participated in the aggression against Ukraine should not participate in international sporting events. At the same time, there is an exclusion of Russian and Belarusian athletes from most European events.

    Does the Commission consider that participation in the Olympic Games and all major sporting events contributes to peace and understanding between nations or not?

    Submitted: 6.5.2025

    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    –  having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    –  having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    –  having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    –  having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    –  having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    –  having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

    –  having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    –  having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

    –  having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    –  having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    –  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    –  having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    –  having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    –  having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

    –  having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

    –  having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A.  whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B.  whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C.  whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E.  whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F.  whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G.  whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H.  whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I.  whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J.  whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K.  whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L.  whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M.  whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N.  whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O.  whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P.  whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q.  whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R.  whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

    S.  whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    T.  whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    U.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

    2.  Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3.  Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4.  Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5.  Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6.  Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7.  Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8.  Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9.  Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10.  Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11.  Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12.  Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13.  Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14.  Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15.  Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16.  Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

    17.  Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    18.  Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    19.  Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    20.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

    21.  Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    22.  Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    23.  Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

    24.  Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    25.  Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

    26.  Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    27.  Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    28.  Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    29.  Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    30.  Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    31.  Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    32.  Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    33.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    34.  Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

    35.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    36.  Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    37.  Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    38.  Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    39.  Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    40.  Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    41.  Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    42.  Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    43.  Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    44.  Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    45.  Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    46.  Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    47.  Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    48.  Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    49.  Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    50.  Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    51.  Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    52.  Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    53.  Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

    54.  Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    55.  Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    56.  Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    57.  Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

    58.  Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    59.  Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    60.  Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    61.  Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    o
    o   o

    62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    (1) OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
    (3) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
    (4) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
    (7) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
    (8) OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
    (9) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: Joint Undertakings – P10_TA(2025)0089 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    Texts adopted
     296k  91k
    Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg
    Discharge 2023: Joint Undertakings

    1. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    2. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    3. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    4. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    5. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    6. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    7. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    8. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    9. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488(5), and in particular Article 19 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 256, 19.7.2021, p. 3, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1173/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    10. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488(5), and in particular Article 19 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 256, 19.7.2021, p. 3, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1173/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    11. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it(5), and in particular Article 5 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2007/198/oj.
    (6) OJ L 122, 10.5.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/715/oj.

    12. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Decision No 2007/198/Euratom of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it(5), and in particular Article 5 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council,(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Director of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2007/198/oj.
    (6) OJ L 122, 10.5.2019, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/715/oj.

    13. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    14. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    15. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    16. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    17. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regarding to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    18. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking (before 21.9.2023 Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking) for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regarding to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Chips Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    19. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    20. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    21. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Grants the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

    3.  Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    22. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the final annual accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

    –  having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

    –  having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

    –  having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    1.  Approves the closure of the accounts of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023;

    2.  Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Executive Director of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

    (1) OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
    (3) OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (6) OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

    23. European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2025 with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the EU joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

    A.  whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking were set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(1), the latter being referred to as the Single Basic Act (SBA);

    B.  whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014; whereas the Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking was transformed into the Chips Joint Undertaking in July 2023 pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1782 of 25 July 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking(2);

    C.  whereas the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy was established in April 2007 by the Council Decision of 27 March 2007 establishing the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and conferring advantages upon it (2007/198/Euratom)(3);

    D.  whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking was set up by Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488(4);

    E.  whereas the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for the development of modernised air traffic management (ATM) in Europe and for the acceleration through research and innovation of the delivery of the Digital European Sky;

    F.  whereas the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in order to transform aviation towards a sustainable and climate neutral future;

    G.  whereas the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on interdisciplinary, sustainable, and patient-centric health research and innovation;

    H.  whereas the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership in the field of hydrogen and fuel cells technology research and innovation;

    I.  whereas the Chips Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation in key digital technologies essential for Europe’s competitive leadership in digital economy, in particular in the electronic components and systems sector;

    J.  whereas the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on research and innovation for a sustainable and competitive circular bio-based industries sector;

    K.  whereas the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership for research and innovation in the railway sector;

    L.  whereas the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership enabling the pooling of resources for the development and deployment of high-performance computing in Europe;

    M.  whereas the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on strengthening Europe’s technological leadership and its strategic alignment with the telecommunications industry and fostering the uptake of digital solutions;

    N.  whereas the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking is a public-private partnership focusing on reducing the socioeconomic burden of infectious diseases in sub-Saharan Africa thanks to new and improved health technological applications as well as improving the preparedness and response to infectious diseases for global purposes;

    O.  whereas the aim of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy is to provide the Union’s contribution to the ITER international fusion energy project, to implement the broader approach agreement between Euratom and Japan, and to prepare for the construction of a demonstration fusion reactor and related facilities;

    General

    1.  Notes that the role of the joint undertakings should be to support research and innovation activities in the areas of transport, energy, health, circular bio-based industries, key electronic components, supercomputing, and network systems; calls on the joint undertakings to promote the transformation of scientific knowledge into marketable innovations, and to establish mechanisms to ensure that their activity leads to an increase in European competitiveness in the world;

    2.  Underlines that under the current multiannual financial framework, according to the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), joint undertakings are expected to receive a combined budget of EUR 17 billion from the Union cash contribution and to leverage EUR 21,1 billion of contributions from other members;

    3.  Notes that the nature of joint undertakings is based on public-private partnerships that steer investment and leverage public and private funds to fund common goals; reminds, in that regard, that the contributions of private members must meet established targets in order for such partnerships to remain mutually beneficial; calls on joint undertakings which allow in-kind contributions to additional activities (IKAA) to avoid, where possible, an excessive reliance on such contributions in order to meet established targets;

    4.  Acknowledges the significant contributions of the joint undertakings in advancing research, innovation, and technology development across various sectors, including aviation, rail, and air traffic management, as integral to achieving the Union’s strategic objectives of sustainability, digital transformation, and competitiveness.

    5.  Welcomes the annual report of the Court on the European Union’s joint undertakings for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’); underlines that the mission of the Court is crucial for the sound implementation of the Union budget and for oversight of the budget;

    6.  Welcomes the fact that the Court provided the discharge authority with an annual report on EU Joint Undertakings which contains a specific statement of assurance for each of the joint undertakings as regards their annual accounts and underlying transactions; shares the view that in addition to the legal provisions binding the Court, the institutional framework of joint undertakings renders these worthy of specific attention from the Court; calls for the continuation of this good practice; welcomes the good cooperation of joint undertakings with the Court during the drafting of the Court’s report and welcomes the explanations provided on some of the observations and emphases of matter made in the replies provided by the joint undertakings;

    7.  Welcomes the fact that two joint undertakings attained financial autonomy during the financial year 2023, namely the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking on 24 October 2023 and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on 23 November 2023; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court audited these two joint undertakings for the first time, in addition to the nine joint undertakings the Court had already audited for the financial year 2022;

    8.  Stresses its awareness that some joint undertakings were affected significantly during the financial year 2023 by important events with an impact likely to alter their performance; emphasises, more precisely, that:

       (a) Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had a significant impact on the Union economy and on supply chains, affecting greatly the activities of some joint undertakings;
       (b) the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is still felt throughout Europe today and during the financial year 2023, still constituted a massive shock to economic and administrative activities;
       (c) the high levels of inflation caused by the two aforementioned events had an impact on the supplies and delivery time for the joint undertakings;

    9.  Acknowledges the benefits of joint undertakings, the importance of public-private cooperation in fostering innovation, promoting research and development and the economic benefits of the partnerships; notes that by pooling resources and expertise from both sectors, public and private, joint undertakings can face the challenges more effectively; underlines the importance of transparency, accountability and efficient use of public funds by joint undertakings;

    10.  Recognises the value of initiatives fostering stakeholder engagement and participation, such as open calls for expressions of interest and joint calls across the joint undertakings, as instrumental in leveraging the collective expertise and resources; draws particular attention to the joint call for proposals launched by Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking – the first joint call of its kind from joint undertakings aimed at developing an integrated air and rail network for a sustainable multimodal transport system;

    11.  Recalls that joint undertakings must conduct their operations according to sound financial management, thereby contributing effectively to Union policy objectives as well as to the sound implementation of the Union budget; nevertheless is concerned with a series of elements, in light of the findings of the Court, as presented in this resolution;

    Annual accounts

    12.  Notes that the Court’s report finds that the 2023 annual accounts of the eleven joint undertakings audited present fairly, in all material respects, their financial position as of 31 December 2023, the results of their operations and cash flows, and changes in net assets for the year ended, in accordance with their financial regulations and the accounting rules adopted by the Commission’s accounting officer; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the reliability of the annual accounts of the joint undertakings;

    13.  Notes that the Court’s report finds that the underlying transactions to the annual accounts are legal and regular in all material respects; notes furthermore that as a result, the Court issued unqualified audit opinions on the legality and regularity of both the revenue and the payments underlying the accounts of the joint undertakings;

    14.  Takes note of the fact that, in the view of the Court, insufficient guidance was provided to the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking on their first-time annual accounts, especially as regards the need for clarity in distinguishing the financial resources managed by the Commission before they attained their financial autonomy and by the joint undertakings after they attained it; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that accounting guidelines should be developed in a clear and comprehensible way which should specify the rules for the presentation of the first annual accounts of new joint undertakings and that these guidelines should include instructions on how to separate the financial resources implemented by the Commission from those implemented by a joint undertaking after it attained its financial autonomy; notes that the risk to the reliability of annual accounts was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, for which the risk to reliability was deemed to be medium, due to the complexities brought about by the transfer of budget appropriations and assets from the responsibility of the Commission to the responsibility of the joint undertaking;

    15.  Takes note of the fact that the annual accounts of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy are produced on the basis of the baseline of the ITER project in place in 2023 but that the latter is the subject of an ongoing revision, the result of which is likely to result in significant changes for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its estimated total cost at completion; underlines that the joint undertaking concerned should take all actions necessary to ensure that the future baseline and its consequences for the need for Union cash contributions to the joint undertaking do not constitute a liability for the Union budget; notes from the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that at the time of the hearing and according to the joint undertaking concerned, it was too early to provide an estimate of the financial impact of this revision; is furthermore concerned by the delays impacting the ITER project, due to factors beyond the joint undertaking’s control;

    16.  Is concerned by the potential impact that the reorganisation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy will have on its activities, notably the short to medium-term instabilities and operational risks for the joint undertaking; welcomes the awareness of the joint undertaking concerned of these issues and the explanation provided on its views on the situation; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the fact that the risk for business continuity has so far been mitigated thanks to a strong reliance on existing programmes and projects; welcomes the flexibility brought along by the new matrix structure;

    17.  Takes note of the fact that the risk to the legality and regularity of revenue was deemed to be low for all joint undertakings;

    Budgetary and financial management

    18.  Notes that the total available budget in 2023 for the eleven joint undertakings audited by the Court amounted to EUR 4,25 billion in commitment appropriations and EUR 3,87 billion in payment appropriations, according to the Court, which considers that the total available budget includes unused appropriations from previous years, which the joint undertakings entered again in the budget of the current year and assigned revenues and reallocations to the next year; notes more precisely that:

       (a) the total available budget in 2023 for the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 111,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 158,8 million in 2022) and EUR 241,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 146,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92 % for commitment appropriations and 81 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure and operating expenditure, which reached 55 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;
       (b) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 269 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 411,2 million in 2022) and EUR 486,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 415,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 98,58 % for commitment appropriations and 51,18 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; notes in particular that the execution rates of its two operational expenditure titles stand at 80,50 % and 81,11 % respectively for payment appropriations; furthermore stresses the low execution rate of its payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 60,52 %; deeply regrets the important amount allocated to title 5 of its budget for unused payment appropriations of EUR 177 million, which has a technical execution rate of 0 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;
       (c) The total available budget in 2023 for the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 223,2 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 272,4 million in 2022) and EUR 225,9 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 174,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 92,65 % for commitment appropriations and 90,29 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 68,67 % and 67,30 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;
       (d) The total available budget in 2023 for the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 268,9 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 314,3 million in 2022) and EUR 327,8 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 118,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 96,62 % for commitment appropriations and 85,43 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020 which reached 69,41 %; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to infrastructure expenditure, which reached 71,21 % and 60,60 % respectively; notes the explanations of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;
       (e) The total available budget in 2023 for the Chips Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 835,7 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 261,4 million in 2022) and EUR 518,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 222,2 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Chips Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 37 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 36 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the Chips Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the Chips Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;
       (f) The total available budget in 2023 for the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 227,4 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 264,2 million in 2022) and EUR 137,4 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 80,3 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97,6 % for commitment appropriations and 90,3 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rates of commitment and payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to salaries, which reached 64 % and 57 % respectively, as well as the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its administrative expenditure dedicated to other administrative expenditure, which reached 54 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget;
       (g) The total available budget in 2023 for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 102,6 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 171,4 million in 2022) and EUR 120,3 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 180,8 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 97 % for commitment appropriations and 82 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were no severe issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; nevertheless stresses the low execution rate of payment appropriations for the part of its operational expenditure financed under Horizon 2020, which reached 67 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; points out that Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking postponed final payments to 2024 due to technical issues experienced by beneficiaries; takes notice of the several projects that did not fully claim their budgets, reducing the need for operational payments by approximately EUR 4,1 million; calls on the joint undertaking concerned to elaborate a plan on how to improve the accounting reporting obligations; highlights the importance of supporting the joint undertaking given rail’s inherent advantages in terms of environmental performance, land use, energy consumption, and safety;
       (h) The total available budget in 2023 for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 1136 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 1374,5 million in 2022) and EUR 1058 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 629,9 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 83% for commitment appropriations and 19 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the extremely low execution rate of payment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 19 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking but deeply regrets such a low execution rate; moreover stresses the low execution rate of its commitment and payment appropriations dedicated to administrative expenditure, which reached 45 % and 42 % respectively; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, in relation to the increased funding that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking benefited from in 2023 and which the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking had to implement, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on the reasons behind this slow execution rate;
       (i) The total available budget in 2023 for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 134,7 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 122,9 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 99 % for commitment appropriations and 89 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;
       (j) The total available budget in 2023 for the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking amounted to EUR 136,4 million in commitment appropriations and EUR 2,2 million in payment appropriations; understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 100 % for commitment appropriations and 47 % for payment appropriations; deems that given the short period of time during which the joint undertaking had attained financial autonomy in the financial year 2023, there are no sufficient grounds on which the European Parliament could express its view on the quality of the financial management of the joint undertaking while doing so in good faith; nevertheless notes that due to this situation, the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure was deemed as medium for the joint undertaking;
       (k) The total available budget in 2023 for the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy amounted to EUR 807 million in commitment appropriations (compared to EUR 981,2 million in 2022) and EUR 631,5 million in payment appropriations (compared to EUR 844 million in 2022); understands furthermore that according to the report on budgetary and financial management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, its total budget execution rate for the financial year 2023 reached 73 % for commitment appropriations and 95 % for payment appropriations, indicating that there were serious issues related to the pace of implementation of the budget; in particular, stresses the low execution rate of commitment appropriations dedicated to operational expenditure, which reached 70 %; notes the explanation of the joint undertaking and takes note of the resulting transfers made back to the initially planned Euratom and ITER Host State contributions and generally calls on the joint undertaking to ensure a healthy pace of implementation for each section of its budget; takes note of the fact that these elements, which are related to delays and implementation difficulties, led the Court to consider the risk to budget management to be medium for this joint undertaking;

    19.  Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards unused appropriations in the implementation of programmes of certain joint undertakings and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations, as the accumulation of unused appropriations leads to cash surpluses, which are therefore not available to the Union for the financing of other activities and programmes; underlines that this is not in line with the principle of sound financial management and has resulted in a total of EUR 1,5 billion of cash surplus for the financial year 2023; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertakings concerned should develop corrective mechanisms to reduce their cash surpluses to a reasonable level and subsequently align their cash requests for each financial year with their estimated spending needs, in coordination with the Commission; is aware of possibilities under the financial rules of the joint undertakings concerned for unused appropriations to be entered in the estimate of revenue and expenditure of up to the three financial years following their reception; is nevertheless concerned more precisely with:

       (a) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 178 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 237 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the adjustments announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;
       (b) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the Chips Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional EU financial contributions of EUR 196 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 438 million at the end of 2023; takes note however of the explanation of the joint undertaking; nevertheless repeats its call for the Chips Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations and welcomes the ambition announced by the joint undertaking for 2024;
       (c) the shortcomings in the cash planning of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, following the request for additional Union financial contributions of EUR 488,6 million in excess of cash needs for planned payment in 2023, resulting in a cash surplus of EUR 840,7 million at the end of 2023; understands the situation faced by the joint undertaking which led to this surplus and welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, notably as regards the expectations for projects related to Artificial Intelligence to provide an opportunity for an important cash-out; nevertheless repeats its call for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of similar situations;

    20.  Stresses that all joint undertakings shall strengthen internal financial controls and public transparency mechanisms, ensuring that funds are distributed efficiently and in a manner consistent with EU strategic objectives;

    21.  Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards the contribution of members to certain joint undertakings, in particular as regards the possibility that some joint undertakings could not meet their contribution targets or only do so through high reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities and calls on the joint undertakings concerned to take all actions necessary to prevent these situations from arising in the future; underlines that meeting contribution targets is the responsibility and obligation of the concerned joint undertakings and that failing to meet contribution targets goes against the founding idea of joint undertakings; is concerned, more precisely, with:

       (a) the situation of the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, whose operational contribution target of its member Eurocontrol only reached a level of 70 %, which resulted in the joint undertaking not having the planned contributions at its disposal to fully implement its part of Horizon 2020; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be medium or high for this joint undertaking, as it was deemed to be low;
       (b) the situation of the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, which performed well in reaching its contribution target under Horizon 2020, however notably did so through a revision of the balance between the targets for in-kind contributions to operational activities and for in-kind contributions to additional activities, the latter being raised to EUR 2 444,5 million, which corresponds to 90 % of the overall target; underlines that such a reliance on in-kind contributions to additional activities presents a risk to the implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme; underlines the substantial impact of the revision performed by the joint undertaking; takes notes of the explanation of the joint undertaking and of the fact that additional activities contribute to the overall objectives of the joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses that this constitutes an excessive reliance on in-kind contribution to additional activities to meet established targets and calls on the joint undertaking to avoid the reoccurrence of such a situation; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking;
       (c) the situation of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, whose contribution from private members under Horizon 2020 only reached a reported amount of EUR 18,4 million against a target of EUR 420 million, which constitutes a severe difference; notes furthermore that such a situation might occur again under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe as the contribution target for private members has increased significantly to EUR 900 million while the financing arrangements that caused difficulties for private members under Horizon 2020 remain in place; takes note of the fact that these elements led the Court to consider the risk to programme implementation to be high for this joint undertaking; understands from the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control that this issue is being dealt with in cooperation with the Governing Board; nevertheless echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should support the Commission’s reassessment of the current target in order to ensure that it can attain its contribution target for private members under Horizon Europe and Digital Europe and stresses once again that reaching contribution targets should not simply be considered as an ambition but as a duty;

    22.  Underlines that to promote better efficiency, the Single Basic Act of the joint undertakings provides for an obligation for joint undertakings to achieve synergies via the establishment of back-office arrangements operating in a series of identified areas; understands that four areas have been identified as a priority by the joint undertakings concerned, namely accounting activities, legal activities, information and communication technologies and human resources; particularly welcomes in that regard:

       (a) the fact that the back-office arrangements dedicated to accounting activities have been operational since December 2022 and were therefore in operation for the entirety of financial year 2023, which could be observed in the production of the annual accounts as well as the fact that the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating these back-office arrangements;
       (b) the fact that the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of common recruitment, the legal framework of human resources and the digitalisation of human resources;
       (c) the fact that the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking and the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of Information and Communication Technologies services;
       (d) the fact that the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking took the lead in operating back-office arrangements for the management of administrative procurements;
       (e) the fact that joint undertakings are further implementing the joint strategic ICT plan of the joint undertakings located in the White Atrium building;

    23.  Calls on the joint undertakings concerned by the obligation under the Single Basic Act to keep reporting on their establishment of back-office arrangements, to provide clear information on which joint undertakings operate tasks for other joint undertakings in certain areas, to include as soon as possible communication, logistics, events and meeting room management as well as the support for audit and anti-fraud strategies on the list of priorities and to provide information on the areas to be considered for the establishment of back-office arrangements in the future, once arrangements in the areas identified as a priority have been concluded;

    Procurement and tenders

    24.  Echoes the Court’s concerns as regards procurement procedures and calls on joint undertakings to ensure that the compliance with relevant legal provisions and the necessary complexity of certain procurement procedures do not lead to an increased risk to the legality and regularity of operational expenditure; is concerned, more precisely, by:

       (a) the situations of the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking and of the Chips Joint Undertaking, for both of which the Court observed weaknesses in the design and evaluation of one significant procurement procedure; takes notes of the fact that this element did not however lead the Court to consider the risk to operational control expenditure to be medium or high for this joint undertaking; nevertheless stresses the fact that such weaknesses may result in irregular contracts and payments if not addressed in future procurement procedures; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertakings to take action on these specific cases and to improve their procurement processes;
       (b) the fact that the Court has evaluated the risk to operational contract expenditure to be medium for the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy because of their complex procurement procedures for high-value contracts;

    25.  Underlines the financial exposure of the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking to a supplier facing difficulties which is evaluated by the joint undertaking as ranging from a potential low impact of EUR 0 to an estimated maximum impact of EUR 88 million; understands from the annual accounts of the joint undertaking that this situation is being carefully scrutinised; calls on the joint undertaking to take all actions necessary to minimise financial liabilities; welcomes the additional information provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control, especially as regards the additional guarantees requested by the joint undertaking concerned to minimise this financial liability as well as the explanation provided on the key role of this specific supplier;

    26.  Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to increase transparency and to include clear quantitative data on gender balance among the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to intensify their efforts to promote gender equality at all levels and to ensure that gender balance remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

    27.  Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution of experts selected to work with the joint undertakings; calls on all joint undertakings to include clear quantitative data on the geographical distribution of the experts selected in their future Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that geographical distribution remains a horizontal priority in all activities related to procurement, grants and tenders and to provide explanations when sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

    28.   Calls for a fair and equitable geographical distribution of funding from the joint undertakings, ensuring that regions with lower innovation capacity and SMEs receive adequate support;

    Staff and recruitment

    29.  Is concerned with the state of play of recruitment within the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, which received 39 additional posts to be recruited by the end of the financial year 2023 in order to implement the significant funds received under the current multiannual financial framework but which only managed to recruit 21 additional staff; is furthermore concerned with the assessment of the Court which determined that the recruitment procedures of the joint undertakings were not sufficiently transparent due to a lack of clear and previously agreed upon scoring-grids to assess candidates and their qualifications as well as due to a lack of sufficient documentation on the underlying decision-making process; regrets that in the view of the Court, this situation may have resulted in a lack of equal treatment of candidates; reminds that it is paramount to avoid the application of double standards during the recruitment process and requests for all necessary actions to be taken in this regard; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use its increased staff effectively to achieve its recruitment target by the end of 2024 and that, in order to increase the transparency of its recruitment procedures and to substantiate the decision-making processes of the selection committee, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking should use a pre-agreed scoring grid during the pre-selection phase, in line with the practice of other joint undertakings and Union bodies; welcomes the readiness of the joint undertaking to integrate recommendations for improvements;

    30.   Emphasises the need for a coherent and fair staffing policy across all Joint Undertakings to ensure adequate and inclusive working conditions, career development opportunities, and work-life balance for staff; calls for the implementation of measures to prevent excessive reliance on temporary contracts and precarious employment; underlines the importance of mental health support structures, flexible working arrangements, and fair internal promotion opportunities to improve staff well-being;

    31.  Calls on all joint undertakings to implement concrete measures to improve gender balance in leadership positions and decision-making bodies, including setting gender balance targets and regularly monitoring progress; stresses the need to address gender pay gaps and ensure equal opportunities for career advancement;

    32.  Takes note of the fact that the Court considered the risk to the legality and regularity of administrative expenditure to be low for all joint undertakings except for the Chips Joint Undertaking and the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking for which it was deemed to be medium due to their high recruitment level, as well as for the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking, due to their recent financial autonomy;

    33.  Is concerned with the situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy as regards different aspects related to the management of human resources observed by the Court, especially as regards the use of external service providers, notably:

       (a) the important reliance of the joint undertaking on external service providers, as it was observed that near to half of the staff of the joint undertaking consisted of external service providers (361 external service providers and 429 statutory staff in 2023) which makes that situation a critical issue with a potential large-scale impact on the capacity of the joint undertaking to manage its human resources in a sustainable manner while ensuring a capacity for retention of knowledge and institutional memory, which also allow for financial gains in the long run;
       (b) the fact that the joint undertaking did not adopt a unique formal definition of external service providers, which resulted in a lack of clarity in its assessment of their impact on statutory staff needs; notes furthermore that the risk register of the joint undertaking did not include all the potential risks related to a high level of reliance on external service providers in the long term, which might prevent the internal control of the joint undertaking from having adequate mitigating measures put in place to address those risks;
       (c) the findings of the audit conducted on this matter by the Commission’s internal audit service which revealed that the joint undertaking had not set up a centralised function for the coordination and management of external service providers, nor had it set up a methodology for assessing its aggregate human resources needs, and in particular its needs for external service providers; underlines that it was observed that the joint undertaking’s decision on the use of external service providers was therefore based on budgetary concerns rather than human resources needs;
       (d) the lack of transparency in the reporting of the joint undertaking on its human resources; particularly as regards the presentation of permanent and non-permanent staff figures, given that 224 of the 386 temporary and contract staff had in reality an indefinite contract and could therefore have been considered as permanent staff from a practical point of view; calls on the joint undertaking to underline such nuances in the future in its reporting on human resources;
       (e) echoes the Court’s recommendation for action which recommends that the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy should establish a centralised coordination and management function for external service providers and adopt a comprehensive methodology to regularly assess its total human resources needs based on the expected workload and required skills and that the joint undertaking concerned should also supplement its risk register with the most important risks deriving from its high level of use of external service providers in the long run;
       (f) welcomes the commitments made by the joint undertaking and welcomes its explanation of the challenges leading to an important use of external service providers; is nevertheless concerned with this important dependency and the related risks; calls on the joint undertaking to provide more detailed information in the future on the decision-making processes leading to the use of external service providers;

    34.  Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on gender balance among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that gender balance remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to persist in their efforts to enhance it, in order to ensure a fair representation of society within their staff and to promote a healthy and productive working environment and to provide explanations when gender balance cannot be achieved;

    35.  Takes note of the fact that the levels of detail and the level of accessibility vary when it comes to the quantitative data provided by the joint undertakings on the geographical distribution within their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their Annual Activity Reports; calls on all joint undertakings to include a clear section dedicated to quantitative data on geographical distribution among their staff and within their governing bodies and structures in their future Annual Activity Reports, including the disaggregation of data between different levels of responsibility and different types of contract; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that a satisfactory geographical distribution remains an objective at all levels of responsibility and to provide explanations when a sufficient geographical distribution cannot be achieved;

    36.  Welcomes the work of the EU Agencies Network (EUAN) and its Working Group on Diversity and Inclusion which led to the EUAN Charter on Diversity and Inclusion; invites joint undertakings to adopt this Charter;

    37.   Underlines that joint undertakings shall ensure that funded projects contribute to social well-being and inclusivity, respect workers’ rights and labour conditions and align with the principles of a just transition to sustainable technologies;

    Management and control systems

    38.  Welcomes the work of the Court on the examination of grant payments made by the ten joint undertakings implementing research and innovation projects, especially as regards its complementary audit of a sample of grant payments at beneficiary level under Horizon 2020; is concerned with the results of this examination which showed that there were persistent systemic errors, especially as regards declared personnel and equipment costs; calls for correction of the systemic errors;

    39.  Underlines that the Court found one case of quantified and serious error in payments under Horizon 2020 for the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Innovative Health Initiative Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Circular Bio-based Europe Joint Undertaking, as well as for the Europe’s Rail Joint Undertaking; welcomes the initiatives taken in this regard to raise awareness at beneficiary level; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure the legality and regularity of operational expenditure and underlines that the Court deemed the risk to the interim and final grant payments of the joint undertakings to be medium;

    40.   Calls on the Commission to implement: i) mandatory financial training for beneficiaries of the joint undertakings to prevent recurrent accounting errors; ii) automated verification tools to enhance accuracy in personnel cost calculations; iii) stronger ex-ante audit procedures to ensure proper use of Union funds;

    41.  Welcomes the fact that according to the extrapolation of the Court for all joint undertakings, the average error rate is just below the materiality threshold of 2% for grant expenditure, as well as the fact that the residual error rates calculated by the Commission’s common audit service were also below the materiality threshold;

    42.  Takes note of the fact that the number of Horizon Europe and Digital Europe interim payments was too small to feature in the sample audited by the Court in 2023;

    43.  Takes note of the fact that there were several changes to the internal control framework of joint undertakings under Horizon Europe, notably the fact that the Commission no longer intends to make specific representative ex-post audits on behalf of individual Horizon Europe stakeholders, such as joint undertakings; notes furthermore that the Commission plans to apply the same change to grant payments under Digital Europe;

    44.  Is concerned with the lack of communication, collaboration and coordination between the risk management of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy and its internal audit functions, as well as with the related lack of an integrated risk management process and the fact that the joint undertaking could not provide satisfactory evidence that it regularly uses risk management information when planning internal audit activities; echoes the Court’s recommendation for action in this regard which recommends that the joint undertaking concerned implement an integrated risk management process in its internal control framework in order to manage its risks effectively; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

    45.  Underlines the importance of implementing a comprehensive and up to date business continuity plan and disaster recovery plan for the joint undertakings; regrets in that regard that at the end of the financial year 2023, the joint undertakings, with the exception of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy, did not have a satisfactory policy in place in this regard; welcomes the plans of the joint undertaking to take action on this issue;

    46.  Points out that the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking and the Global Health EDCTP3 Joint Undertaking still had not fully implemented the Commission’s internal control framework and calls on these two joint undertakings to fully implement that framework;

    Fraud, ethics and conflicts of interests

    47.  Takes note of the fact that the Court made one notification of suspected fraud to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) during its audit of the financial year 2023; understands that the case was later dismissed by OLAF as no fraud was observed in relation to the staff matter concerned; welcomes the diligence of the Court and the cooperation within the anti-fraud architecture;

    48.  Underlines the importance of implementing an internal control policy on sensitive functions for the joint undertakings; stresses that such a policy can prevent and mitigate the risk of inappropriate or fraudulent action; regrets that at the end of the financial year 2023, the Single European Sky ATM Research 3 Joint Undertaking, the Clean Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, the Chips Joint Undertaking, the European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking as well as the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy did not yet have a policy in that regard; stresses the critical nature of this situation and urges the joint undertakings to take action without unnecessary delays;

    49.  Takes note of the situation in the Chips Joint Undertaking referred to by the Court, which saw one of its former senior staff members who had left the joint undertaking recently take up a new occupational activity without prior notice to the joint undertaking concerned; calls on the joint undertaking concerned and all other joint undertakings to conduct active monitoring of the new occupational activities of former senior staff members as well as of staff members occupying a sensitive function; welcomes the additional information provided by the joint undertaking concerned on this specific case;

    50.   Calls on all joint undertakings to enhance their transparency policies, particularly regarding potential conflicts of interest; urges joint undertakings to publish declarations of interest for their members of boards of management, scientific committees, and external experts, ensuring that any financial, professional, or personal ties to entities benefiting from funding from the joint undertakings are disclosed; insists on the introduction of a mandatory ‘cooling-off’ period for senior staff of the joint undertakings before they can take up employment in organisations that receive funding from the joint undertakings;

    51.  Takes note of the information reported by the joint undertakings on their activities related to prevention, detection, and correction of fraud; calls on all joint undertakings to strengthen their role and identify their weaknesses by engaging further in anti-fraud discussions and to report on such elements and to include in their future reports a clear presentation of the legal framework and policies put in place in this regard;

    Remarks on the follow-up of joint undertakings to the previous discharge exercise

    52.  Welcomes the fact that joint undertakings have produced a follow-up report to the European Parliament resolutions with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the joint undertakings for the financial year 2022; notes that these reports provide the views of the joint undertakings on the issues underlined by the European Parliament to a satisfactory extent;

    53.  Welcomes the fact that the Court’s report also includes an analysis of the follow-up of joint undertakings to previous observations and recommendations for actions published by the Court; notes in this regard that out of 37 observations not sufficiently addressed at the end of 2022, 16 were closed and 21 remained open at the end of 2023; furthermore notes that out of the 15 recommended actions in the annual reports of 2021 and 2022, 9 had been fully implemented, 2 in most respects, 3 in some respects and 1 not implemented at all; understands that some recommendations that still need to be implemented further mainly relate to human resources issues which the joint undertakings can only implement in cooperation with the Directorate-General for Budget of the Commission and once applications are ready to be implemented; understands that the recommendations that had to be implemented before the end of 2023 were implemented in due time;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that the Court has now provided a deadline for implementation for each of its open recommendations for action, which were defined in cooperation with the joint undertakings to ensure their feasibility; calls on all joint undertakings to continue to report back to the Court and the European Parliament on these issues;

    55.   Notes with concern the persistent challenges related to cost overruns, delays, and governance issues in the implementation of the ITER project; calls for improved financial oversight and enhanced budgetary transparency, including more detailed public reporting on cost developments, spending efficiency, and progress toward key project milestones; stresses the need for stricter auditing mechanisms to ensure that Union contributions to the project are effectively utilised; urges the joint undertaking to strengthen internal governance by ensuring regular and independent evaluations of project risks and by increasing accountability mechanisms for senior management;

    Other priorities for the joint undertakings

    56.  Is aware of the administrative and budgetary constraints of joint undertakings and in respect of these constraints, calls on joint undertakings to better disseminate their contribution to research and innovation activities through accessible communication material intended for academic and research institutions, public and private organisations and European and national authorities; calls for this accessible communication material to promote the opportunities for procurement contracts and grants offered by the joint undertakings in the area of research and innovation activities;

    57.  Calls on joint undertakings to proactively engage in communication activities in order to reach a wide range of EU citizens in a pedagogical effort to present their contribution to common goals and the need for institutionalised partnerships that involve private members;

    58.   Calls on the joint undertakings to establish the cooperation with universities in order to reach out to young European graduates to strengthen their future recruitment processes;

    59.  Calls on joint undertakings to continue to report effectively and to the extent of their capacity on their contribution to employment and to the competitiveness of the European economy, in light of the necessity for all important stakeholders of the European Union in the area of research and innovation to focus on the reindustrialisation of the European Union;

    60.  Calls on joint undertakings to continue to ensure a sufficient level of participation of private firms, especially of small and medium-sized enterprises, which constitute the strongest asset of the European economy;

    61.  Calls on joint undertakings to report effectively on their contribution to horizontal priorities of the budget of the European Union;

    62.  Calls on all joint undertakings to continue to act with diligence in the conduct of their activities when dealing with international stakeholders, especially in light of the regime of restrictive measures put in place by the European Union; underlines the particular situation of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy in this regard and welcomes the explanations provided during the hearing of the joint undertaking concerned in the Committee on Budgetary Control on measures put in place to prevent any issues in the framework of the ITER project;

    63.  Calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making a good use of possible synergies with other entities from the European Union, such as agencies, in all relevant areas and in order to increase the efficiency and impact of their operations; calls on all joint undertakings to ensure that their staff are making good use of the platform that constitutes the EU Agencies Network (EUAN);

    64.   Emphasises the need for digital sovereignty in research funded by the Union; in that regard puts special emphasis on the Chips Joint Undertaking, Euro European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, and the Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking who shall prioritise projects that enhance Union autonomy in semiconductor manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity; asks the Commission to ensure that projects funded by joint undertakings: i) are not excessively reliant on third-country suppliers for critical technologies; ii) contribute to the Union’s industrial resilience and strategic independence; iii) foster domestic R&D in key digital sectors;

    Call for a follow-up

    65.  Calls on each joint undertaking considered for the granting of discharge for the financial year 2023 to produce an individual follow-up report on all actions taken to address the specific issues mentioned in this resolution and to submit this follow-up report signed by the (Executive) Director of the joint undertaking to the European Parliament by no later than 30 September 2025;

    66.  Underlines that follow-up reports may also contain the general views of the joint undertakings on this resolution and on other matters relevant for the discharge authority; expects the joint undertakings to draft this report with a comprehensive approach, to touch on all issues addressed by the European Parliament concerning their activities, and to do so in good faith and cooperation.

    (1) OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17–119, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
    (2) OJ L 229, 18.9.2023, p. 55–62, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1782/oj.
    (3) OJ L 90, 30.3.2007, p. 58–72, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2007/198/oj.
    (4) OJ L 256, 19.7.2021, p. 3–51, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1173/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increasing customs duties on products imported from Russia and the impact on the agricultural sector in the EU – P-001208/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission proposal referred to by the Honourable Member[1] aims at gradually phasing out the EU’s dependence on Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers through a transitional approach. This involves measured annual increases of customs duties on Russian imports over a period of three years, minimising the risk of a surge in fertiliser prices. The Commission expects the measure to result in a gradual and orderly replacement of Russian nitrogen-based fertilisers with alternatives, including domestically produced ones, thus contributing to fair competition in the EU fertilisers market and supporting a stable, long-term role of the EU fertilisers industry in ensuring the EU food security.

    The proposal mandates the Commission to monitor nitrogen-based fertiliser prices. The Commission will continue assessing the situation and take appropriate measures to prevent the price increase. These measures may include, among others, proposing the temporary suspension of tariffs on affected goods imported from sources other than Russia and Belarus.

    The Commission is not proposing to modify customs duties on imports from Russia of other products. The Commission would like to note that some of the products referred to by the Honourable Member are already subject to import restrictions as part of the sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine under Regulation 833/2014[2], in particular potash fertilisers and crustaceans. Any decision to impose or amend these sanctions is for the Council to take by unanimity.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2025)34&lang=en.
    • [2] Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/2025-02-25 .
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Brazilian President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 13 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks in Beijing on Tuesday with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is on a state visit to China.

    Xi Jinping recalled that last year, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, the two sides jointly announced the upgrading of bilateral ties to a China-Brazil community of shared future for a fairer world and a more sustainable planet.

    The Chinese President called on both sides to vigorously advance the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future, consistently strengthen the alignment of development strategies, and jointly promote solidarity and cooperation among countries in the Global South.

    Xi Jinping stressed that China and Brazil should maintain strategic mutual trust, support each other on issues related to the two sides’ core interests and major concerns, and strengthen exchanges at all levels and in all areas.

    The Chinese leader called on the two countries to expand cooperation, deepen the effective alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative with Brazil’s development strategy, make full use of various cooperation mechanisms between the two countries, strengthen cooperation in traditional areas such as infrastructure, agriculture and energy, and explore new areas of cooperation including energy transition, digital economy, artificial intelligence, aviation and space.

    China and Brazil, Xi Jinping continued, should expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges, provide more facilities for people-to-people exchanges, and step up cooperation in culture, education, tourism, media, and at the local level.

    The two sides should maintain active interaction in multilateral forums, the Chinese leader noted, adding that as the largest developing countries in the Eastern and Western hemispheres respectively, China and Brazil should strengthen coordination and cooperation in multilateral mechanisms, uphold multilateralism, improve global governance, safeguard the international trade and economic order, and firmly oppose unilateralism, protectionism and bullying.

    L. I. Lula da Silva, for his part, stated that Brazil expects to deepen strategic cooperation with China and promote the construction of a Brazilian-Chinese community with a shared destiny.

    Brazil is willing to align its development strategy with the Belt and Road Initiative and expand cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, infrastructure, space and finance, the president said. He also called on the two countries to expand youth and cultural exchanges and strengthen ties and friendship between the two peoples.

    As L.I. Lula da Silva pointed out, protectionism and abuse of tariffs cannot promote development and prosperity, but instead lead to chaos. He stressed that China’s resolute stance in confronting global challenges gives strength and confidence to all countries. According to him, Brazil is ready to strengthen strategic cooperation with China in international affairs, cooperate to protect the common interests of the Global South, and uphold international fairness and justice.

    At the Great Hall of the People, the heads of the two states attended the signing of 20 documents on cooperation in such areas as the alignment of development strategies, science and technology, agriculture, digital economy, finance, customs control and quarantine supervision, and the media.

    The heads of the two states also met with the press together.

    China and Brazil on Tuesday issued a joint statement on strengthening the joint construction of a China-Brazil community of shared future for a fairer world and a more sustainable planet and jointly safeguarding multilateralism, as well as a joint statement on the Ukraine crisis.

    Before the talks, Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan held a welcoming ceremony for Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his wife Rosangela Lula da Silva. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Satellogic Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial Results and Provides Business Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Revenue of $3.4 million in 1Q 2025

    Domestication to U.S. Completed

    Awarded $30 Million Contract for AI-First Constellation and Closed $20 Million Registered Direct Offering

    NEW YORK, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Satellogic Inc. (NASDAQ: SATL), a leader in sub-meter resolution Earth Observation (“EO”) data collection, today provided a business update and reported its financial results for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    “The year is off to a great start with our recent announcements in April related to our $30 million low latency, near-daily AI-first constellation contract, our sovereign defense and intelligence imagery sales to Brazil and Singapore, and the closing of a registered direct offering in which we received $20 million in gross proceeds, which further strengthened our liquidity position. These milestones, coupled with the completion of our domestication during the first quarter, positions Satellogic to focus on significant growth opportunities, underscoring the value of our data insights and technology,” said Satellogic CEO, Emiliano Kargieman.

    Rick Dunn, Chief Financial Officer, added, “In terms of financial results, we ended the quarter with $17.7 million of cash on hand (which does not include the proceeds from the aforementioned offering) and continued to reduce our cash used in operations by $5.4 million, or 53%, compared to the three months ended March 31, 2024. Our revenue also increased modestly by 2% to $3.4 million compared to the prior year period.”

    “We expect that our revenue for 2025 will largely be dependent on closing opportunities within our Space Systems line of business, which we anticipate will contribute considerable per unit cash flow and strong gross margin. As we look to 2025 and beyond, management continues to focus on near-term growth opportunities and moving the Company forward on a path to profitability,” concluded Dunn.

    Financial Results for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

    • Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025, increased by $0.1 million, or 2%, to $3.4 million, as compared to revenue of $3.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase was driven primarily by a $0.4 million increase in imagery ordered by new and existing Asset Monitoring customers, partially offset by a $0.4 million decrease in revenue generated from the Space Systems business line. Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 included $2.6 million attributable to our Asset Monitoring line of business, $0.4 million attributable to our Space Systems line of business, and $0.4 million attributable to our CaaS line of business compared to $2.2 million, $0.7 million and $0.4 million, respectively, in the prior period.
    • Cost of Sales, exclusive of depreciation, decreased $0.1 million, or 5%, to $1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025 from $1.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by lower Space Systems costs on lower sales volume, partially offset by higher outsourced ground station costs. However, as a percentage of revenue, our cost of sales were 37% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, as compared to 39% for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Selling, General and Administrative expenses decreased $2.9 million, or 31%, to $6.5 million during the three months ended March 31, 2025, from $9.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by a $0.5 million decrease in professional fees consisting mainly of the accrued advisory fee pursuant to the Liberty Subscription Agreement and professional fees related to the secured convertible notes in 2024, partially offset by professional fees related to our domestication in 2025. The decrease was also partially driven by decreases in salaries, wages, stock-based compensation and other benefits as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024 and other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024.
    • Engineering expenses decreased $1.9 million, or 43%, to $2.5 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025 from $4.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease was driven primarily by a decrease in salaries, wages, and other benefits and stock-based compensation as a result of the Company’s workforce reductions in 2024. The decrease was also partially driven by other expense reductions resulting from continued cash control measures during 2024, including the termination of our high-throughput plant lease in the Netherlands.
    • Net loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025, increased by $17.4 million to $32.6 million, as compared to a net loss of $15.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by an increase in the change in fair value of financial instruments ($21.6 million) and other (expense) income, net ($1.6 million) offset by increases in revenue and decreases in operating costs.
    • Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025, improved by $3.1 million to $6.1 million, from an Adjusted EBITDA loss of $9.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, primarily due to year-over-year increases in revenue and decreases in operating expenses.
    • Cash and Cash Equivalents were $17.7 million at March 31, 2025, compared to $22.5 million at December 31, 2024.
    • Net cash used in operating activities was $4.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to $10.1 million for the three months ended December 31, 2024. This decline in net cash used by operations was primarily due to workforce reduction and overall cost control initiatives.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    We monitor a number of financial performance and liquidity measures on a regular basis in order to track the progress of our business. Included in these financial performance and liquidity measures are the non-GAAP measures, Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA. We believe these measures provide analysts, investors and management with helpful information regarding the underlying operating performance of our business, as they provide meaningful supplemental information regarding our performance and liquidity by removing the impact of items that we believe are not reflective of our underlying operating performance. The non-GAAP measures are used by us to evaluate our core operating performance and liquidity on a comparable basis and to make strategic decisions. The non-GAAP measures also facilitate company-to-company operating performance comparisons by backing out potential differences caused by variations such as capital structures, taxation, depreciation, capital expenditures and other non-cash items (i.e., embedded derivatives, debt extinguishment and stock-based compensation) which may vary for different companies for reasons unrelated to operating performance. However, different companies may define these terms differently and accordingly comparisons might not be accurate. Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA are not intended to be a substitute for any GAAP financial measure. For the definitions of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA and reconciliations to the most directly comparable GAAP measure, net loss, see below.

    We define Non-GAAP EBITDA as net loss excluding interest, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. We did not incur amortization expense during the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023.

    We define Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA as Non-GAAP EBITDA further adjusted for professional fees related to the secured convertible notes, other expense (income), net, changes in the fair value of financial instruments and stock-based compensation. Other expense (income), net includes foreign exchange gain or loss and other non-operating income and expenses not considered indicative of our ongoing operational performance.

    The following table presents a reconciliation of Non-GAAP EBITDA and Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA to its net loss for the periods indicated.

      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars)   2025       2024  
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Interest expense         9  
    Income tax expense   715       1,433  
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Non-GAAP EBITDA $ (29,179 )   $ (10,891 )
    Professional fees related to Secured Convertible Notes         971  
    Other expense (income), net   167       (1,401 )
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   22,361       752  
    Stock-based compensation   595       1,446  
    Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA $ (6,056 )   $ (9,123 )
     

    About Satellogic

    Founded in 2010 by Emiliano Kargieman and Gerardo Richarte, Satellogic (NASDAQ: SATL) is the first vertically integrated geospatial company, driving real outcomes with planetary-scale insights. Satellogic is creating and continuously enhancing the first scalable, fully automated EO platform with the ability to remap the entire planet at both high-frequency and high-resolution, providing accessible and affordable solutions for customers.

    Satellogic’s mission is to democratize access to geospatial data through its information platform of high-resolution images to help solve the world’s most pressing problems including climate change, energy supply, and food security. Using its patented Earth imaging technology, Satellogic unlocks the power of EO to deliver high-quality, planetary insights at the lowest cost in the industry.

    With more than a decade of experience in space, Satellogic has proven technology and a strong track record of delivering satellites to orbit and high-resolution data to customers at the right price point.

    To learn more, please visit: http://www.satellogic.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the U.S. federal securities laws. The words “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “could”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intends”, “may”, “might”, “plan”, “possible”, “potential”, “predict”, “project”, “should”, “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. These forward-looking statements are based on Satellogic’s current expectations and beliefs concerning future developments and their potential effects on Satellogic and include statements concerning Satellogic’s strategic realignment as a U.S. company, and the visibility and high growth opportunities it will provide in connection therewith. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks and uncertainties. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve, and must not be relied on by an investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict and will differ from assumptions. Many actual events and circumstances are beyond the control of Satellogic. Many factors could cause actual future events to differ materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release, including but not limited to: (i) our ability to generate revenue as expected, including due to challenges created by macroeconomic concerns, geopolitical uncertainty (e.g., trade relationships), financial market fluctuations and related factors, (ii) our ability to effectively market and sell our EO services and to convert contracted revenues and our pipeline of potential contracts into actual revenues, (iii) risks related to the secured convertible notes, (iv) the potential loss of one or more of our largest customers, (v) the considerable time and expense related to our sales efforts and the length and unpredictability of our sales cycle, (vi) risks and uncertainties associated with defense-related contracts, (vii) risk related to our pricing structure, (viii) our ability to scale production of our satellites as planned, (ix) unforeseen risks, challenges and uncertainties related to our expansion into new business lines, (x) our dependence on third parties, including SpaceX, to transport and launch our satellites into space, (xi) our reliance on third-party vendors and manufacturers to build and provide certain satellite components, products, or services and the inability of these vendors and manufacturers to meet our needs, (xii) our dependence on ground station and cloud-based computing infrastructure operated by third pirates for value-added services, and any errors, disruption, performance problems, or failure in their or our operational infrastructure, (xiii) risk related to certain minimum service requirements in our customer contracts, (xiv) market acceptance of our EO services and our dependence upon our ability to keep pace with the latest technological advances, including those related to artificial intelligence and machine learning, (xv) our ability to identify suitable acquisition candidates or consummate acquisitions on acceptable terms, or our ability to successfully integrate acquisitions, (xvi) competition for EO services, (xvii) challenges with international operations or unexpected changes to the regulatory environment in certain markets, (xviii) unknown defects or errors in our products, (xix) risk related to the capital-intensive nature of our business and our ability to raise adequate capital to finance our business strategies, (xx) uncertainties beyond our control related to the production, launch, commissioning, and/or operation of our satellites and related ground systems, software and analytic technologies, (xxi) the failure of the market for EO services to achieve the growth potential we expect, (xxii) risks related to our satellites and related equipment becoming impaired, (xxiii) risks related to the failure of our satellites to operate as intended, (xxiv) production and launch delays, launch failures, and damage or destruction to our satellites during launch, (xxv) the impact of natural disasters, unusual or prolonged unfavorable weather conditions, epidemic outbreaks, terrorist acts and geopolitical events (including the ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, in the Gaza Strip and the Red Sea region) on our business and satellite launch schedules and (xxvi) the anticipated benefits of the domestication may not materialize. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the foregoing factors and the other risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Satellogic’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other documents filed or to be filed by Satellogic from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Satellogic assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. Satellogic can give no assurance that it will achieve its expectations.

    Contacts

    Investor Relations:

    Ryan Driver, VP of Strategy & Corporate Development
    ryan.driver@satellogic.com

    Media Relations:

    Satellogic
    pr@satellogic.com

    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE LOSS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except share and per share amounts)   2025       2024  
    Revenue $ 3,387     $ 3,328  
    Costs and expenses      
    Cost of sales, exclusive of depreciation shown separately below   1,237       1,305  
    Selling, general and administrative   6,485       9,389  
    Engineering   2,493       4,387  
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Total costs and expenses   12,902       17,926  
    Operating loss   (9,515 )     (14,598 )
    Other (expense) income, net      
    Interest income, net   177       204  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments   (22,361 )     (752 )
    Other (expense) income, net   (167 )     1,401  
    Total other (expense) income, net   (22,351 )     853  
    Loss before income tax   (31,866 )     (13,745 )
    Income tax expense   (715 )     (1,433 )
    Net loss available to stockholders $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Other comprehensive loss      
    Foreign currency translation gain (loss), net of tax   257       (137 )
    Comprehensive loss $ (32,324 )   $ (15,315 )
           
    Basic net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (0.34 )   $ (0.17 )
    Basic weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   96,655,349       90,331,496  
    Diluted net loss per share for the period attributable to holders of Common Stock $ (0.34 )   $ (0.17 )
    Diluted weighted-average Common Stock outstanding   96,655,349       90,331,496  
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    UNAUDITED
     
      March 31,   December 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except per share and par value amounts)   2025       2024  
    ASSETS      
    Current assets      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 17,716     $ 22,493  
    Restricted cash   305        
    Accounts receivable, net of allowance of $148 and $148, respectively   1,799       1,464  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   4,274       3,907  
    Total current assets   24,094       27,864  
    Property and equipment, net   25,802       27,228  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   6,538       877  
    Other non-current assets   4,968       5,722  
    Total assets $ 61,402     $ 61,691  
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ (DEFICIT) EQUITY      
    Current liabilities      
    Accounts payable $ 3,742     $ 3,754  
    Warrant liabilities   14,902       11,511  
    Earnout liabilities   1,992       1,501  
    Operating lease liabilities   989       363  
    Contract liabilities   6,308       5,871  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   13,661       11,621  
    Total current liabilities   41,594       34,621  
    Secured Convertible Notes at fair value   96,590       79,070  
    Operating lease liabilities   5,812       516  
    Other non-current liabilities   498       516  
    Total liabilities   144,494       114,723  
    Commitments and contingencies      
    Stockholders’ (deficit) equity      
    Preferred stock, $0.0001 par value, 5,000,000 shares authorized, 0 shares issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023          
    Class A Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 385,000,000 shares authorized, 84,451,437 shares issued and 83,883,614 shares outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and 83,000,501 shares issued and 82,432,678 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2024          
    Class B Common Stock, $0.0001 par value, 15,000,000 shares authorized, 13,582,642 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024          
    Treasury stock, at cost, 567,823 shares as of March 31, 2025 and 567,823 shares as of December 31, 2024   (8,603 )     (8,603 )
    Additional paid-in capital   358,511       356,247  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (314 )     (571 )
    Accumulated deficit   (432,686 )     (400,105 )
    Total stockholders’ (deficit) equity   (83,092 )     (53,032 )
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ (deficit) equity $ 61,402     $ 61,691  
    SATELLOGIC INC.
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    UNAUDITED
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars)   2025       2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:      
    Net loss $ (32,581 )   $ (15,178 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash used in operating activities:      
    Depreciation expense   2,687       2,845  
    Operating lease expense   421       538  
    Stock-based compensation   595       1,446  
    Change in fair value of financial instruments, net of interest paid on Secured Convertible Notes   20,691       752  
    Foreign exchange differences   (188 )     (643 )
    Loss on disposal of property and equipment   28       78  
    Expense for estimated credit losses on accounts receivable, net of recoveries         16  
    Non-cash change in contract liabilities   (46 )     (501 )
    Other, net         56  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    Accounts receivable   (21 )     (932 )
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   830       (377 )
    Accounts payable   569       1,764  
    Contract liabilities   438       (25 )
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   2,024       601  
    Operating lease liabilities   (169 )     (555 )
    Net cash used in operating activities   (4,722 )     (10,115 )
    Cash flows from investing activities:      
    Purchases of property and equipment   (1,913 )     (1,942 )
    Net cash used in investing activities   (1,913 )     (1,942 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:      
    Proceeds from issuance of Common Stock under ATM Program, net of transaction costs   1,143        
    Payments for withholding taxes related to the net share settlement of equity awards   (375 )     (184 )
    Proceeds from exercise of stock options   916        
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   1,684       (184 )
    Net (decrease) increase in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash   (4,951 )     (12,241 )
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   177       542  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – beginning of period   23,682       24,603  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash – end of period $ 18,908     $ 12,904  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: authID Reports Financial and Operating Results for the First Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DENVER, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — authID® (Nasdaq: AUID) (“authID” or the “Company”), a leading provider of biometric identity verification and authentication solutions, today reported financial and operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 vs. First Quarter 2024 Financial Summary

    • Total revenue for the quarter increased to $0.30 million, compared to $0.16 million a year ago.
    • Operating expenses were $4.7 million, compared to $3.3 million a year ago.
    • Net loss was $4.3 million, or $0.40 per share, compared to a loss of $3.1 million, or $0.32 per share a year ago.
    • Adjusted EBITDA Loss of $3.9 million (non-GAAP measure as defined below), compared with $2.4 million a year ago.
    • Gross bARR (Booked Annual Recurring Revenue) of $0.01 million (non-GAAP measure as defined below), compared with $0.10 million a year ago.

    “I’m incredibly excited about authID’s growth prospects in 2025 and beyond,” said Rhon Daguro, authID’s Chief Executive Officer. “We have solidified our foundation to become a leader in the evolving and fast-growing biometric authentication market while making progress on our ambitious 2025 goals. We are continuing to advance our conversations with key enterprise and platform partner prospects in order to achieve our bookings targets and are intensifying our focus on the large enterprise and large channel OEM segments as we move through the second quarter.

    “We recently secured nearly $9 million in capital through two financing rounds to improve our balance sheet, broaden our investor base and provide us with additional expertise and support as we scale our business and invest in new opportunities. Through these efforts we have also created an advisory board comprised of two new expert advisors, Eric Swider and Donald Nitti. Both leaders have extensive experience in different industry and government sectors where authID’s biometric identity solutions can address critical needs.

    “As we move through the year, we continue to expect to close multiple Fortune 500 and multi-national customers in 2025, and we are currently in the late stages of our sales cycle with these potential customers. I’m pleased with our momentum to date and remain confident that we will sign new customers and drive significant growth towards our $18 million bookings target for 2025.”

    Recent Business and Operational Highlights

    • Secured nearly $9 million dollars after expenses from existing and new shareholders through two registered direct offerings, while also creating an advisory board comprised of two new expert advisors, Eric Swider and Donald Nitti.
    • Signed a paid live production trial agreement with a Global Fortune 500 prospect to deliver authID’s solution in a controlled rollout. Upon completion, authID expects to secure a longer-term agreement.
    • Advanced to final stages with a Global Fortune 500 biometric hardware provider to embed authID into a solution offering reusable, interoperable identity credentials for employee workforces.
    • Confirmed as the selected vendor by one of the largest identity fraud platforms and are in the final stages of contract negotiations.
    • Launched efforts into the Public Sector by providing a reuseable identity platform for removing the barriers between siloed systems for government workforces.
    • Began integration with a blockchain-based data privacy and security platform to validate identity of data owners through privacy preserving biometrics which bring authID’s technology into smart cities in South America and India to start.
    • Identified new opportunities in the Indian banking sector with our Indian partner to protect high value transactions and account access with authID’s PrivacyKey technology
    • Successfully delivered a proof of concept and entered into contract negotiations with a Fortune 500 prospect to deliver identity verification and biometric solutions.
    • Named “Best ID Management Platform” Award in 2025 FinTech Breakthrough Awards for the third time. authID was recognized for its groundbreaking biometric identity verification technology, which has set a new standard for precision, speed, and data privacy in the fintech industry, as well as the verification landscape at large.

    Financial Results for the First Quarter Ended March 31, 2025

    Total revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $0.30 million, compared with $0.16 million a year ago.

    Operating expenses for the three months ended March 31, 2025, were $4.7 million, compared to $3.3 million a year ago. The 2025 increase is primarily due to increased headcount investment in sales and R&D.

    Net loss for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $4.3 million, of which non-cash charges were $0.5 million, compared with a net loss of $3.1 million a year ago, of which non-cash charges were $0.8 million

    Loss per share for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $0.40, compared with $0.32 a year ago.

    Adjusted EBITDA loss was $3.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, compared with $2.4 million a year ago. The increase in Adjusted EBITDA loss is primarily driven by the increase in headcount investment in sales and R&D. Please refer to Table 1 for reconciliation of net loss to Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP measure).

    Remaining Performance Obligation (RPO) as of March 31, 2025, was $13.85 million, of which $1.01 million is held as deferred revenue and $12.84 million is related to other non-cancellable contracted amounts, compared to RPO of $4.03 million as of March 31, 2024. The Company expects to recognize the full RPO of $13.85 million over the entire life of the contracts, which are typically signed with a 3-year term.

    The gross amount of Booked Annual Recurring Revenue or bARR, (a non-GAAP measure, as defined below), signed in the first quarter of 2025 was $0.01 million, down from $0.10 million of gross bARR a year ago. The net amount of bARR was negative $0.13 million compared to $0.10 million of net bARR signed in the comparable period in 2024. The Q1 bARR is comprised of $0 million in Committed Annual Recurring Revenue (cARR) and $0.01 million in estimated Usage Above Commitments (UAC).

    The net amount of bARR reflects the deduction of the bARR of contracts previously included in reported bARR, due to certain customers experiencing delays in Production Go-Live timing and volume ramping. See below for further definition and explanation of ARR and bARR, non-GAAP measures.

    Conference Call

    A conference call and webcast will be held today at 5.00 p.m. EDT, hosted by authID Chief Executive Officer, Rhon Daguro and Chief Financial Officer, Ed Sellitto to discuss the financial results and provide a corporate update. To participate on the live conference call, please access this registration link and you will be provided with dial-in details. To avoid delays, participants are encouraged to dial into the conference call 15 minutes ahead of the scheduled start time. A live webcast of the call will be available at webcast registration and on the “Events & Presentations” page of the Company’s website at investors.authid.ai. Only participants on the live conference call will be able to ask questions.

    A replay of the event and a copy of the presentation will also be available for 90 days at authID’s Investor Relations site.

    About authID Inc.

    authID (Nasdaq: AUID) ensures enterprises “Know Who’s Behind the Device™” for every customer or employee login and transaction through its easy-to-integrate, patented biometric identity platform. authID powers biometric identity proofing in 700ms, biometric authentication in 25ms, and account recovery with a fast, accurate, user-friendly experience. With our ground-breaking PrivacyKey Solution, authID provides a 1-to-1-billion false match rate, while storing no biometric data. authID stops fraud at onboarding, blocks deepfakes, prevents account takeover, and eliminates password risks and costs, through the fastest, most frictionless, and most accurate user identity experience demanded by today’s digital ecosystem.

    For further information please visit authid.ai

    Investor Relations Contacts
    authID Investor Relations
    investor-relations@authID.ai

    Media Contacts
    Walter Fowler
    1-631-334-3864
    wfowler@nexttechcomms.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This Press Release includes “forward-looking statements.” All statements other than statements of historical facts included herein, including, without limitation, those regarding the future results of operations, growth and sales, potential contract signings, booked Annual Recurring Revenue (bARR) (and its components cARR and UAC), Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR), cash flow, cash position and financial position, business strategy, plans and objectives of management for future operations of both authID Inc. and its business partners, are forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements are based on a number of assumptions regarding authID’s present and future business strategies, and the environment in which authID expects to operate in the future, which assumptions may or may not be fulfilled in practice. Actual results may vary materially from the results anticipated by these forward-looking statements as a result of a variety of risk factors, including the Company’s ability to attract and retain customers; successful implementation of the services to be provided under new customer contracts and their adoption by customers’ users; the Company’s ability to compete effectively; changes in laws, regulations and practices; the increase in international tariffs and uncertainty over international trading conditions, changes in domestic and international economic and political conditions, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, inflationary pressures, changes in interest rates, and others. See the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2024 filed at www.sec.gov and other documents filed with the SEC for other risk factors which investors should consider. These forward-looking statements speak only as to the date of this release and cannot be relied upon as a guide to future performance. authID expressly disclaims any obligation or undertaking to disseminate any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements contained in this release to reflect any changes in its expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions, or circumstances on which any statement is based.

    Non-GAAP Financial Information

    The Company provides certain non-GAAP financial measures in this statement. These non-GAAP key business indicators, which include Adjusted EBITDA, bARR and ARR should not be considered replacements for and should be read in conjunction with the GAAP financial measures.

    Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA, when viewed with our results under GAAP and the accompanying reconciliations, provides useful information about our period-over-period results. Adjusted EBITDA is presented because management believes it provides additional information with respect to the performance of our fundamental business activities and is also frequently used by securities analysts, investors, and other interested parties in the evaluation of comparable companies. We also rely on Adjusted EBITDA as a primary measure to review and assess the operating performance of our company and our management.

    Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP financial measure that represents GAAP net loss adjusted to exclude (1) interest expense and debt discount and debt issuance costs amortization expense, (2) interest income, (3) depreciation and amortization, (4) stock-based compensation expense (stock options) and certain other items management believes affect the comparability of operating results.

    Please see Table 1 below for a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA – continuing operations to net loss – continuing operations, the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP.

     
     TABLE 1
    Reconciliation of Loss from Continuing Operations to Adjusted EBITDA Continuing Operations.
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    Loss from continuing operations $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
                   
    Addback:              
                   
    Interest expense, net   12,712       13,138  
    Other income   (51,544 )     (108,920 )
    Depreciation and amortization   30,192       43,408  
    Stock compensation   454,339       722,971  
    Adjusted EBITDA continuing operations (Non-GAAP)   (3,893,768 )     (2,386,980 )
     

    Management believes that bARR and ARR, when viewed with our results under GAAP, provide useful information about the direction of future growth trends of the Company’s revenues. We also rely on bARR as one of several primary measures to review and assess the sales performance of our Company and our management team in connection with our executive compensation. The Company defines Booked Annual Recurring Revenue or bARR, as the amount of annual recurring revenue represented by the estimated amounts of annual recurring revenue we believe will be earned under such contracted orders, looking out eighteen months from the date of signing of each customer contract. This estimate is comprised of two components (1) Committed Annual Recurring Revenue (cARR), which represents the minimum amounts that customers are contractually committed to pay each year over the life of the contract and (2) Usage Above Commitments (UAC), which represents our estimate of the rate of annual recurring revenue arising from actual usage of our services above the contractual minimums, that we believe the Customer will achieve after 18 months. The net amount of bARR reflects the deduction of the bARR of contracts previously included in reported bARR, which were subject to attrition, or other downward adjustments during the quarter.

    The company defines Annual Recurring Revenue or ARR, as the amount of recurring revenue recognized during the last three months of the relevant period as determined in accordance with GAAP, multiplied by four.

    bARR may be distinguished from ARR, as bARR does not take specifically into account the time to implement any contract for authID’s services, nor for any ramp in adoption, or seasonality of usage of our biometric products but is based on the assumption that 18 months after signing these matters will have been generally resolved. Furthermore, bARR is based on estimates of future revenues under particular contracts, whereas ARR, whilst also forward-looking, is based on historical revenues recognized in accordance with GAAP during the relevant period. A reconciliation of bARR to a GAAP measure is not provided as there is no comparable GAAP measure and we believe that any attempt at such reconciliation may be confusing to investors. bARR and ARR have limitations as analytical tools, and you should not consider them in isolation from, or as a substitute for, analysis of our results as reported under GAAP. Some of these limitations are:

    • bARR & ARR should not be considered as predictors of future revenues but only as indicators of the direction in which revenues may be trending. Actual revenue results in the future as determined in accordance with GAAP may be significantly different to the amounts indicated as bARR or ARR at any time.
    • bARR and ARR are to be considered “forward-looking statements” and subject to the same risks, as other such statements (see note on “Forward-Looking Statements” above).
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    Revenues, net $ 296,256     $ 157,378  
                   
    Operating Expenses:              
    General and administrative   2,645,700       2,062,361  
    Research and development   1,998,663       1,204,968  
    Depreciation amortization   30,192       43,408  
    Total operating expenses   4,674,555       3,310,737  
                   
    Loss from operations   (4,378,299 )     (3,153,359 )
                   
    Other Income (Expense):              
    Interest expense, net   (12,712 )     (13,138 )
    Other income   51,544       108,920  
    Other income (expense), net   38,832       95,782  
                   
    Net loss before income taxes   (4,339,467 )     (3,057,577 )
    Income tax expense          
    Net Loss $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
                   
                   
    Net Loss Per Share – Basic and Diluted operations $ (0.40 )   $ (0.32 )
                   
    Weighted Average Shares Outstanding – Basic and Diluted   10,920,909       9,450,220  
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
     
        March 31,
    2025
          December 31,
    2024
     
    ASSETS   (Unaudited)          
    Current Assets:              
    Cash $ 2,866,347     $ 8,471,561  
    Accounts receivable, net   1,028,564       97,897  
    Contract assets   487,551       426,859  
    Deferred contract costs   595,359       617,918  
    Other current assets, net   623,475       460,192  
    Total current assets   5,601,296       10,074,427  
                   
    Intangible assets, net   185,226       213,718  
    Goodwill   4,183,232       4,183,232  
    Total assets $ 9,969,754     $ 14,471,377  
                   
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY              
    Current Liabilities:              
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses $ 811,934     $ 1,715,410  
    Commission liability   191,519       459,657  
    Severance liability   325,000       325,000  
    Convertible debt, net         240,884  
    Deferred revenue   1,011,448       215,237  
    Total current liabilities   2,339,901       2,956,188  
                   
    Total liabilities $ 2,339,901     $ 2,956,188  
                   
    Commitments and Contingencies (Note 8)              
                   
    Stockholders’ Equity:              
    Common stock, $0.0001 par value, 150,000,000 shares authorized as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024; 10,920,909 shares issued and outstanding as of March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024   1,092       1,092  
    Additional paid-in capital   185,766,847       185,312,508  
    Accumulated deficit   (178,147,996 )     (173,808,529 )
    Accumulated comprehensive income   9,910       10,118  
    Total stockholders’ equity   7,629,853       11,515,189  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 9,969,754     $ 14,471,377  
     
    authID INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:              
                   
    Net loss $ (4,339,467 )   $ (3,057,577 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss with cash flows from operations:              
    Stock-based compensation   454,339       722,971  
    Depreciation and amortization expense   30,192       43,408  
    Amortization of debt discounts and issuance costs   4,116       4,115  
                   
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:              
    Accounts receivable   (930,667 )     (237,506 )
    Contract assets   (60,692 )     (49,713 )
    Deferred contract cost   22,559       (3,417 )
    Other current assets   (163,283 )     (9,521 )
    Commission liability   (268,138 )     (40,950 )
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   (903,476 )     (495,357 )
    Deferred revenue   796,211       176,019  
    Net cash flows from operating activities   (5,358,306 )     (2,947,528 )
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:              
    Purchase of intangible assets   (1,700 )      
    Net cash flows from investing activities   (1,700 )      
                   
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:              
    Repayment of convertible notes   (245,000 )      
    Net cash flows from financing activities   (245,000 )      
                   
    Effect of Foreign Currencies   (208 )     (3,359 )
                   
    Net Change in Cash   (5,605,214 )     (2,950,887 )
    Cash, Beginning of the Period   8,471,561       10,177,099  
    Cash, End of the Period $ 2,866,347     $ 7,226,212  
                   
    Supplemental Disclosure of Cash Flow Information:              
    Cash paid for interest $ 13,137     $ 9,023  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CRC25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Metsola calls to “re-launch Europe as a global power”

    Source: European Parliament

    In a keynote speech at the event “Europe at the crossroads” on Tuesday, Parliament President Metsola outlined her vision for a smarter, stronger and safer Europe.

    The President argued that “the time of hypothetical crossroads is over. There is only one path left: forward and together”. She called for a different Europe, which is more realistic, more self-critical and supportive of its industries, with less regulation and more innovation. A Europe wary of populists and more in tune with what citizens expect. She made the case for a change in mind-set and a shift in priorities. President Metsola called on the European Union and the European Parliament to do things differently and to work faster, with confidence, as well as be braver in its decisions.

    A manifesto for change

    She cautioned that after the last European elections, “the political centre may well have held – just – but in an era of hyper-polarisation, ignoring the clanging alarm bells that went off would be foolhardy. “

    “We need the resolve – the political courage – to show that we are still a continent on the rise. To prove we are open for business. For ideas. For new ways to tackle old problems. That’s how we defy the cynics and defeat those determined to see Europe fail.”

    A smarter Europe

    “A smarter Europe is one that recognises that our way of individual freedoms and social safety nets depends on our competitiveness. One where it is possible to turn an idea into a business, to find investment, to fail and to begin again, and again. Where start-ups can scale up easily. Where bureaucracy is cut drastically – even in small things like ensuring road safety without over complicating peoples’ lives.”

    She pleaded for Europe to rise “to rise to the hype and ensure that we allow our businesses, our researchers, our engineers, our coders and our patent-holders, the space they need to compete, to innovate and to lead.”

    On the need to simplify and cut back regulation, she said: “Europe’s simplification agenda needs to signal the start of a new Europe and with the upcoming MFF, trigger an economic boom.”

    President Metsola argued that this European Parliament is fundamentally different from the one of 2019: “We reformed, we move faster without reducing our scrutiny and legislative obligations. It is why MEPs question attempts to tone down the involvement of the European Parliament on critical, often divisive issues. Europe is nothing without its people. Using Treaty provisions like Article 122 is not Smarter Europe, but the opposite. We will always insist on strengthening of Parliament’s right of initiative.”

    A stronger Europe

    “A strong Europe is an outward looking Europe that can sense opportunities and chase them down”. Speaking specifically about trade with the US, Metsola said: “A comprehensive deal should be the end goal of negotiations with the United States. There is no greater alliance, no stronger ‘meeting of democratic minds’, in the history of the modern world that has shaped so many lives and created so much prosperity. We must keep building and reinforcing it, while remaining ready for any scenario”.

    “Adapting must mean that we are capable of not shying away from the benefits of forging a new, closer, relationship not only with the US but with Canada and with the United Kingdom. Yes, Brexit still means Brexit. Yes, the realities of geography are what they are. But extraordinary times call for extraordinary moments and we need to get out of our traditional comfort zones. Ensuring a strong strategic partnership with the United Kingdom will benefit us all and boost transatlantic cooperation.”

    A safer Europe

    Referring to defence, Metsola said: “Spending more on defence and security is the first step. But throwing money at the problem will not solve it alone. Bringing our defence industries together, is the smart move forward. Of course, that means finding synergies between national security policies but more importantly, it means resisting the temptation of short-term gains in favour of a long-term, strategic approach.”

    “Every Member State now understands that for Europe to control its own destiny it must be able to operate in a world that that is more dangerous and unstable than before. We need to be ready as we double down on our efforts for peace and on our continued support for Ukraine. It was the message symbolised so importantly by President Macron, Chancellor Merz, Prime Minister Tusk and Prime Minister Starmer’s Europe Day visit to Ukraine.”

    Ending with a positive outlook, the President argued that “Europe is still the greatest political project in history. It is still the best place in the world to live and start a family in. We have no short of capacity, talent, capital, people and innovators – to lead and renew.”

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU action in response to the illegal activities of the Houthi movement in the Red Sea – E-001127/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has repeatedly condemned[1] the Houthi threats and attacks against commercial ships, as unacceptable violations of international law threatening maritime security, peace and stability in the region. The EU underlined that they must stop, notably through the High Representative/Vice-President’s declaration on behalf of the EU and its Member States of 12 January 2024[2], welcoming the 10 January 2024 United Nations Security Council resolution 2722[3] condemning the Houthi attacks.

    The EU has taken good note of the latest United States (US) designations of Houthi individuals and entities and is currently analysing their potential impact. The EU implements the United Nations Yemen sanctions through its Council Decision 2014/932[4]. This includes the Houthis (Ansar Allah), 12 Houthi commanders and influential figures, as well as a targeted arms embargo. Moreover, in 2024, the EU designated individuals and entities for their support to the Houthis under its sanctions regime regarding Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region[5].

    The EU is committed to continue its engagement in the Red Sea through its defensive maritime operation EUNAVFOR ASPIDES, ensuring the protection of maritime routes and international navigational rights. Operation ASPIDES mandate has been recently extended until 2026[6]. Operation ASPIDES also proceeds with some exchange of information with US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian and other maritime actors in the region, including Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

    The EU also remains the key contributor to the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen, which aims to facilitate the unimpeded free-flow of commercial items.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ep-plenary-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-houthi-attacks-red-sea_en.
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/12/yemen-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-welcoming-the-un-security-council-resolution-strongly-condemning-houthi-attacks-on-red-sea-shipping/ . See also the EU Spokesperson’s statements of 5 and 13 December 2023: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/yemen-statement-spokesperson-houthi-attacks-red-sea_en , https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/yemen-statement-spokesperson-houthi-attacks-ships-red-sea_en .
    • [3] http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2722.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0932 .
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02023D1532-20241118 .
    • [6] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/02/14/red-sea-council-prolongs-the-mandate-of-operation-aspides/ .
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Final draft agenda – Thursday, 22 May 2025 – Brussels

    Source: European Parliament

    16 Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023
    Gheorghe Falcă (A10-0063/2025
        – Amendments Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00
    11 Amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
    Antonio Decaro
        – Amendments; rejection Monday, 19 May 2025, 13:00
    8 Modification of customs duties applicable to imports of certain goods originating in or exported from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus
    Inese Vaidere
        – Amendments; rejection Monday, 19 May 2025, 13:00
    27 Granting equivalence to Moldova and Ukraine for field inspections and seed production
    Veronika Vrecionová (A10-0043/2025
        – Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00
    28 Amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation as regards securities financing transactions under the net stable funding ratio
        – Amendments; rejection Wednesday, 14 May 2025, 13:00
    Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 20 May 2025, 16:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Replacement of Ukraine with Türkiye as Russian gas transit hub – E-000818/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    One of the Commission’s primary energy policy objective is to successfully implement the RepowerEU plan[1], which entails phasing out Russian energy imports to the EU. The expiry of the gas transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine end of 2024 resulted in the reduction of Russian gas imports to the EU by approximately 15 billion cubic meters per year. To ensure security of supply, the Commission has prepared for months, together with Member States, in anticipation of the end of transit via Ukraine, focusing on securing alternative routes and supplies. Notably, the Commission identified and incentivised Member States to utilise four diversification routes[2] with sufficient capacity, via Germany, Italy, Poland, and Greece. By doing so, the Commission effectively facilitated the EU’s transition towards a more diversified and resilient energy landscape, acting first and foremost in the interest of Member States with fewer supply alternatives.

    The Commission did not intervene in Ukraine’s sovereign decision not to renew its transit agreement with Russia, neither did it intervene in the redirection of volumes via the Turkstream. The end of transit has caused Russia to lose approximatively USD 6.5 billion[3] per year, when the loss of revenues from the transit is estimated at USD 450 million for Ukraine per year.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.
    • [2]  https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/e8a46964-f29b-44f8-9410-689f9e34463b_en.
    • [3] ‘Breaking the link: The cost of shutting down Europe’s last Russian gas pipeline’, 13 January 2025, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Last updated: 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Chinese troops participating in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 is a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

    Xi’s own attendance of the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Russia, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia. It signified that Beijing wants this support to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.

    Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by the two leaders and their joint declaration anything but part of a well established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.

    This trend has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains – above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.




    Read more:
    Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance


    On May 8, in the wake of Xi and Putin’s meetings in Moscow, Russia and China released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere”.

    They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.

    A Chinese read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. Xi reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council”.

    This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing are – as well as Putin and Xi personally – is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.

    For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.

    However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between Xi and Putin, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.

    Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.

    China’s diplomatic clout is also helpful for Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.

    In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further its broader agenda of restoring its erstwhile status as a great power.

    In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.

    A doubled-edged sword

    Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran. These are two key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and January 2025, respectively.

    Tehran simply sent its ambassador to Moscow to attend. However, it may have compensated Putin in a different and materially more significant way.

    According to reports, Iran is readying a delivery of launchers to enable Russia to use the short-range ballistic missiles already delivered last year. This would further add to Russia’s reliance on Iranian hardware in Ukraine, which has so far been most visible in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.

    North Korea dispatched a military delegation led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok. Kim is widely considered the commander of North Korean forces fighting alongside Russian troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a possible bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia.

    Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation in a statement on April 28. This acknowledgment came two days after he had announced the defeat of Ukrainian forces there in a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov.

    The demonstration of Russia’s close relationships with its three core allies – China, Iran and North Korea – is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clearly indicates that Putin is far from isolated on the international stage.

    But it also signals that Russia has become a lot more dependent on these relationships than would befit Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great-power status. Neither can be much comfort to Ukraine and its allies, unfortunately.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out – https://theconversation.com/russia-china-ties-on-full-display-on-victory-day-but-all-is-not-as-well-as-putin-is-making-out-256385

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: McConnell Remarks at CSIS Global Security Forum on Defense Innovation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kentucky Mitch McConnell

    Washington, D.C.U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, addressed the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Global Security Forum today in Washington, D.C. Below are the Senator’s remarks as prepared for delivery:

    “If I told you that the West’s greatest strategic adversary was outpacing America in critical sectors like shipbuilding, hypersonic weapons, and unmanned systems…

    “If I told you this adversary was helping the largest state sponsor of terrorism skirt sanctions and pour more resources into the proxies who sow chaos across the Middle East, target U.S. personnel, and shut down a major artery of global trade…

    “If I told you that both of them – along with an erratic, nuclear-armed hermit kingdom – were helping a neo-Soviet imperialist wage an unprovoked war in the backyard of America’s closest allies and trading partners…

    “And if I told you that this has been going on for years…You might expect to see a greater sense of urgency in Washington.

    “Instead, the chasm between the threats we face and what we’re doing to meet them is wide. And it ought to terrify us.

    “A Chinese authoritarian calls American hegemony the product of ‘fascist forces.’ A Russian despot calls the former a ‘dear friend.’ And yet, as our adversaries drew closer together, influential members of both parties have chosen to pick fights with our allies and partners or consoled themselves with the naïve fantasy that we can retreat to Fortress America while spending a historically tiny fraction of our GDP on defense.

    “Now that I have your attention… I’m grateful for the opportunity to be with all of you today. There’s a great deal to discuss. We’re here, in particular, to talk about innovation. That’s time well spent.

    “America won the Cold War thanks in part to the way we exploited our technological military and economic advantage over the Soviet Union. Back then, we recognized that investing in technological superiority to deter conflict was less costly than fighting one. As a share of GDP, defense spending hit 37% at the height of World War II, 13.8% during Korea, and 9.1% during Vietnam. The Reagan buildup hit 6%. All told, the Cold War drove an annual average of 7.5%. That level of spending didn’t just keep the peace; it ushered in an unprecedented period of prosperity for the United States and the free world. It was worth it.

    “Today, we’re spending less than half of what we did during the Reagan build-up – 3% — and we’re getting less for it. Every year, a smaller and smaller percentage goes to buy actual military capabilities.

    “In and out of government, talented people are still thinking about what tomorrow’s battlefield will look like, and what it will require of America’s military and of our allies. And there are conversations worth having about harnessing these talents more effectively. About keeping American and Western technologies at the cutting edge. About making sure that future capabilities don’t die on the vine (or in the Valley of Death).

    “The bureaucracies and processes that slow the development, acquisition, and integration of new weapons systems are in desperate need of reform. But advanced, autonomous systems have not supplanted the traditional ways of war. Presence, personnel, logistics, and mass still matter. And neglect for the fundamental realities of hard power has left us playing from behind in some important ways.

    “Today, we must do multiple things at once. First, our approach to innovation across industry must be: yes, and we should continue to encourage new entrants into the defense ecosystem. But we shouldn’t be blind to their challenges of fielding novel combat-capable systems at scale.

    “Of course, many technologies don’t pan out. Many startups fail. They are worth the investment and the risk. Legacy defense manufacturers are also still critical, and it’s naïve to pretend otherwise. But that doesn’t mean glossing over the need for the primes to pick up the pace.

    “We need talented engineers, patriotic developers, and highly-skilled employees on the job across the defense enterprise. It’s yes, and. If we pretend otherwise, the only ones who stand to gain are America’s adversaries.

    “A lot of ink has been spilled about the technologies and concepts transforming modern war…about unmanned and autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and the gray zone. But the experience of modern war in eastern Europe and the Middle East reminds us that the depth of our magazines remains as decisive as any single cutting-edge capability. Quantity has a quality all its own.

    “One of the greatest strategic challenges we’re facing today is the prospect of high-end conflict or simultaneous conflicts in different theatres that would strain the depth of our arsenal and the resilience of our supply lines. Victory would depend on delivering at scale and in time. Our magazines aren’t deep enough to fight such a war. And if we don’t make overdue investments in expanding our production capacity, we may not have the time to manufacture it.

    “So, when we talk about innovation, let’s talk about innovating our mass and our speed. Let’s talk about our supply chains. The only capabilities that can make a difference on the battlefield are the ones that can get there at the speed and scale of relevance. This, of course, is not hypothetical. Just look at Ukraine. Necessity is the mother of invention, and our friends have developed what arguably the world’s foremost drone innovation sector. But even more remarkable is the sustained speed with which Ukrainian producers are honing and refining unmanned systems in real time. As Russian countermeasures emerge and render previous capabilities obsolete, they’re producing new iterations to stay on the cutting edge.

    “American manufacturers – whether new startups or legacy primes – should ask themselves if they could keep up with such a pace. On the shortcomings of our defense industrial base, there’s plenty of blame to go around. Congress has a clear constitutional role in which we are all too often delinquent. Regular order appropriations are what give industry and the department the certainty they need to plan for the future. And we haven’t been holding up that end of the bargain. But the department has more authorities than it sometimes cares to acknowledge – middle-tier acquisition pathways, Other Transaction Authority, and the Defense Production Act, to name a few. And when these tools aren’t used the way they were designed, it’s unreasonable to expect improved outcomes on acquisitions and procurement of actual military capabilities.

    “Our industry partners, for their part, are right that inconsistent demand signals make their work harder. Services for too long have short-changed purchases of critical munitions.

    “I don’t know of an example where the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee has rejected a request for multi-year procurement authority for munitions. On the other hand, the services have – for reasons of their own – downplayed the munitions requirements of combatant commanders.

    “To be fair, under perennial budgetary constraints from above, it’s not surprising that the services have made tough decisions to protect their core modernization and acquisition programs.

    “Since Russia’s 2022 escalation of its war against Ukraine, the global demand for essential capabilities like long-range munitions and missile defense interceptors has only gone up – even if upward trends in annual defense budgets have lagged. And producers of these capabilities do bear responsibility of their own for not having planned sooner to meet the inevitable demand.

    “But let’s be absolutely clear: nothing undermines the prospects of innovation and reform like anemic topline spending. Nothing signals more unmistakably that America is unserious than asking allies to double their investments in hard power while we propose to cut our own.

    “If the administration recognizes – as it says it does – the grave stakes of major-power competition, OMB’s budget proposal for the coming year fails to show it. And no amount of budgetary sleight of hand will be able to prove otherwise. That said, this administration can still avoid the self-inflicted crises of credibility that dogged its predecessor. Our adversaries and allies alike are still watching closely for real signs of political will and measurable shifts in the balance of hard power.

    “American politicians have criticized partners who used special funds to mask shortcomings in annual defense spending. Well, we should be careful not to mistake our budget reconciliation for long-term commitment, either.

    “I support the use of reconciliation to make a significant, one-time investment in defense. But pretending that this procedure – or, for that matter, a year spent under a continuing resolution – can make up for failures on predictable, full-year appropriations is as dangerous as it is profoundly unserious. Reconciliation spending may fund short-term operations or investments, but without sustained annual growth, it risks creating massive cliffs in sustainment, personnel, and procurement costs.

    “We’re all familiar with the headwinds of rising mandatory costs and inflation, the real drivers of our budget deficit. This is also true at the Defense Department, where such costs eat up a larger and larger share of the defense budget, crowding out procurement, readiness, and modernization costs. Making urgent, nimble, innovative discretionary investments won’t get any easier if we cut the topline in real terms or force the defense enterprise to innovate for today’s challenges with yesterday’s dollars. But you know as well as I do that the consequences of missing opportunities for innovation here at home aren’t limited to here at home. Coming up short on America’s topline commitment to the national defense sends an unmistakable signal to the allies and partners who, for decades, have bet big on American technologies and American leadership.

    “We should not be surprised to see our friends rethinking their integration with American-made platforms… or, for that matter, American-led security architecture. Least of all, I must say, when we pick fights with them over trading balances. This is particularly true in Europe, where we seem to be punishing NATO allies even though they’ve finally made exactly the kind of defense investments President Trump demanded in 2018.

    “In response to Putin’s aggression, European allies are becoming the stronger, more capable partners the President had urged them to become. NATO allies are sharing more of the burden of collective security. And in the near term, that’s meant a gusher of foreign investment in American-made capabilities. By the tens of billions of dollars, allies have flocked to buy American – an endorsement of American leadership.

    “Even as our allies develop more high-end technologies of their own, close partnership is as essential as ever. I was proud to support the expansion of the trans-Atlantic alliance to include Sweden and Finland – not as hungry customers for American technologies but as highly-capable industrial economies that recognize the value of interoperability and coproduction.

    “There’s little question that our adversaries are working hard to split American and its European allies. If we’re making their job easier, we’re doing something wrong. As history begs us to recall, we don’t get to pick and choose which conflicts will threaten our interests and for how long they will last. And we will rely on friends to help us deter and contain aggression in the coming years, from the Indo-Pacific to Eastern Europe. Going it alone will only increase costs for taxpayers and risks to our warfighters. We should be working more closely with allies worldwide to protect our economies and supply chains from the PRC. If we push these friends away, we shouldn’t expect them to keep buying American.

    “Our allies’ desire for interoperability is a tremendous asset. Take the CH-47 Chinook helicopter – an aging airframe in need of a major update. More than a decade ago, the Canadian government, which has long been delinquent on defense spending, footed the development costs for a new variant, saving U.S. taxpayer dollars and putting an important, updated platform on the apron for the U.S. Army.

    “But let’s be clear: if we let the single most important metric of America’s will to fight and win wane further, we should not expect many allies and partners to make major investments of their own like this…certainly not like the hundred-plus billion in orders under contract right now with U.S. defense producers from our friends in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

    “Our friends understand, as our own leaders once did, that the threats to our shared interests are not contained neatly within continents. Just as Asian allies feel threatened by Russia’s war in Ukraine, Baltic and Nordic allies are guarding against China’s meddling in northern waters. As Russia and China deepen their strategic cooperation, France and the United Kingdom are projecting power into the Indo-Pacific.

    “We should welcome, not discourage, our allies’ contributions to global security.

    “If America chooses to deny unmistakable ties – between the threats we face and between the West’s interests – we will live in a lonely state of denial. The time to signal our enduring commitment is right now.

    “I ought to close on an uplifting note. We have no shortage of bright minds thinking about how to deter and defeat threats to America and to the systems we lead that underpin our peace and prosperity. And for decades now, one of the best has been behind the wheel here at CSIS. I’d like to add my name to the well-deserved chorus of praise for Dr. John Hamre and his leadership – both in and out of government. When the time comes to hand off the reins of this proud institution, he’ll be able to do so with great pride and with confidence that while the challenges we face are urgent and grave, we have the talent and capacity to meet them – much of it right here in this room.

    “Thank you all.”

    MIL OSI USA News