Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Security: Environmental Crimes Bulletin – April 2025

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    View All Environmental Crimes Bulletins


    In This Issue:


    Cases by District/Circuit


    District/Circuit Case Name Conduct/Statute(s)
    District of Alaska United States v. Jason Christenson Tampering with a Monitoring Device/Clean Air Act
    United States v. Matanuska Diesel, LLC, et al. Tampering with a Monitoring Device/ Clean Air Act, Conspiracy
    Western District of Arkansas United States v. Redemption Repairs & Performance Tampering with a Monitoring Device/Clean Air Act
    Southern District of California United States v. Dumitru Cicai Pesticide Smuggling
    United States v. Sarmad Ghaled Dafer, et al. Monkey Smuggling/ Conspiracy
    Southern District of Florida United States v. Royce Gillham Biofuel Credits/Conspiracy, False Claims, Wire Fraud
    Southern District of Georgia United States v. Justin Taylor Tampering with a Monitoring Device/Conspiracy, Tax
    District of Maryland United States v. Idrissa Bagayoko Pesticide Sales/FIFRA, HMTA
    District of Massachusetts United States v. John D. Murphy Dog Fighting/Animal Welfare Act
    Eastern District of Michigan United States v. Tribar Technologies, Inc. Wastewater Discharges/Clean Water Act
    District of Montana United States v. Mold Wranglers, et al. Lead Paint Abatement/False Claims Act/Toxic Substances Control Act, Knowing Endangerment
    United States v. Melanie Ann Carlin Lead Paint Disclosures/Toxic Substances Control Act
    District of New Jersey United States v. Johnnie Lee Nelson, et al. Dog Fighting/Animal Fighting Venture, Conspiracy
    United States v. Antonio Pereira, et al. Scallop Harvesting/ Conspiracy, Obstruction
    Eastern District of New York United States v. Charles Limmer Butterfly Smuggling/ Conspiracy
    United States v. John Waldrop, et al. Bird Mounts/Conspiracy, Endangered Species Act
    Southern District of New York United States v. Jose Correa Asbestos Removal/Clean Air Act
    District of Oregon United States v. Chamness Dirt Works, Inc., et al. Asbestos Removal/Clean Air Act
    United States v. J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc. et al. Hazardous Waste Treatment and Emissions/Clean Air Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, False Statement
    Middle District of Pennsylvania United States v. Ryan Spencer Tampering with a Monitoring Device/Clean Air Act, Conspiracy
    Western District of Pennsylvania United States v. Dale A. Smith Ginseng Sales/ Conspiracy, Lacey Act
    District of Rhode Island United States v. Onill Vasquez Lozada, et al. Cockfighting/Animal Welfare Act
    District of South Carolina United States v. Lauren DeLoach Sperm Whale Teeth and Bones/Lacey Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act
    Northern District of Texas United States v. Dlubak Glass Company Hazardous Waste Storage/False Statement
    Southern District of Texas United States v. Priscilla Sanchez Monkey Smuggling/Lacey Act
    Western District of Texas United States v. Aghorn Operating, Inc., et al. Employee Death/Clean Air Act, False Statement, Safe Drinking Water Act, Worker Safety
    Western District of Virginia United States v. Coby Brummett Ginseng Digging/ Unauthorized Removal Natural Product from Park
    Eastern District of Washington United States v. Pavel Ivanovich Turlak, et al. Tampering with a Monitoring Device/Clean Air Act, Conspiracy, False Claims, Wire Fraud
    Western District of Washington United States v. Joel David Ridley Eagle Killing/Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, Firearm
    Northern District of West Virginia United States v. Michael Kandis Reptile Trafficking/Lacey Act

    Recently Charged


    United States v. Ryan Spencer

    • No. 1:25-CR-00100 (Middle District of Pennsylvania)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorneys RJ Powers and Ron Sarachan
    • AUSA David Williams

    On April 4, 2025, prosecutors filed an information charging Ryan Spencer with conspiring to impede the lawful functions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and to violate the Clean Air Act (CAA), as well as substantive CAA violations (18 U.S.C. § 371; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(C)).

    Between 2013 and March 2024, Spencer, a Service Manager at Pro Diesel Werks, LLC, along with Pro Diesel Werks owner Roy Ladell Weaver and others, disabled the hardware emissions control systems on the diesel vehicles of Pro Diesel Werks’ customers (a practice referred to as a “delete” or “deleting”), defeating the systems’ ability to reduce pollutant gases and particulate matter emitted into the atmosphere. The information further alleges that Spencer and his co-conspirators also tampered with the emissions diagnostic systems on the vehicles to prevent the diagnostic system software from monitoring the emission control system hardware deletes (a practice referred to as a “tune” or “tuning”).

    On February 19, 2025, a grand jury indicted Weaver and Pro Diesel Werks on similar charges.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: Middle District of Pennsylvania | Dauphin County Man Charged With Violations of Clean Air Act and Conspiring to Defraud the United States and Violate the Clean Air Act | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Joel David Ridley

    • No. 2:25-mj-00175 (Western District of Washington)
    • AUSA Celia Ann Lee

    On April 7, 2025, a court unsealed a complaint charging Joel David Ridley, a member of the Lummi Nation, with violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act and for illegally possessing a firearm (16 U.S.C. § 668(a); 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)).

    According to the complaint, on February 23, 2025, a witness on the Lummi Reservation heard a gunshot while walking his dog. As he walked home, the witness heard a second shot and saw a person pick up an eagle from the ground. As the witness was on the phone with police, he saw another eagle fall from a tree on his property. The eagle was badly injured. Police captured the surviving eagle and later transported it to the Humane Society.

    Shortly after meeting with the witness, police encountered an SUV in the area that matched the description provided by the reporting party.  A records check revealed the vehicle belonged to Ridley. When police responded to the residence, they observed a dead eagle in the back seat of Ridley’s vehicle.

    Police obtained a search warrant for Ridley’s vehicle and found a dead eagle and a .22 caliber Savage rifle concealed between the rear seats. Ridely is prohibited from possessing firearms due to a prior conviction.

    Both juvenile bald eagles were taken to the Washington State Humane Society and found to have suffered gunshot wounds. The surviving eagle had to be euthanized.

    While the Lummi Tribe is permitted to possess, distribute, and transport bald or golden eagles found dead within Indian Country, the permit does not authorize the taking of eagles by gunshot, poison, or trapping.

    The Lummi Nation Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: Western District of Washington | Member of Lummi Nation charged federally with illegal firearms possession and killing protected bald eagles | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Dumitru Cicai

    • No. 3:25-mj-01628 (Southern District of California)
    • AUSA Emily Allen

    On April 8, 2025, prosecutors filed a complaint charging Dumitru Cicai with smuggling twenty-four one-liter bottles of “Taktic” pesticide into the United States (18 U.S.C. § 545).

    On March 31, 2025, Cicai drove into the United States at the San Ysidro Port of Entry. Cicai told the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) primary inspection officer that he had nothing to declare. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the primary officer discovered multiple pieces of natural wood branches in the vehicle’s trunk and large bottles concealed in black bags.

    When questioned by the secondary CBP officer, Cicai said he only had wood to declare, nothing else. Upon closer inspection, officers found 24 bottles of pesticide labeled “Taktic.”

    “Taktic” contains the active ingredient amitraz at an emulsifiable concentration of 12.5 percent. Under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations, amitraz in this form is a cancelled and unregistered pesticide in the United States.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation. 


    United States v. Jason Christenson

    • No. 3:25-CR-00030 (District of Alaska)
    • AUSA Ainsley McNerney
    • RCEC Karla Perrin

    On April 25, 2025, prosecutors filed an information charging Jason Christenson with tampering with a Clean Air Act (CAA) monitoring device and CAA false statements (42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c)(2)(C), (c)(2)(A)).

    Between October 2019 and March 2024, Christenson tampered with monitoring methods required to be maintained under the CAA by altering the emissions control equipment on approximately 170 diesel trucks. Christenson and his business, Elite Diesel Performance, also modified the onboard diagnostic systems of the vehicles to prevent them from detecting the fact that this equipment had been removed.

    On May 1, 2021, Christenson submitted a response to a Request for Information sent by the Environmental Protection Agency that contained false statements. Specifically, for the question asking whether he or his business had manufactured, sold, or installed any defeat devices, Christenson responded ‘no.’ In truth, he had installed more than 100 defeat devices on diesel trucks between January 2019 and January 2021.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.


    Guilty Pleas


    United States v. Priscilla Sanchez

    • No. 5:25-CR-00254 (Southern District of Texas)
    • AUSA Torie Sailor

    On April 1, 2025, Priscilla Sanchez pleaded guilty to violating the Lacey Act for attempting to import five spider monkeys, a protected species, into the United States from Mexico (16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2), 3373(d)(1)(A)). Sentencing is scheduled for July 1, 2025.

    On January 13, 2025, Sanchez attempted to enter the U.S. at the Port of Entry, near Laredo, Texas, driving an SUV. Customs and Border Protection officers referred her to secondary screening. Officers discovered a duffle bag with five monkeys wearing diapers concealed inside of it. Authorities confirmed they were spider monkeys, which are protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. Sanchez admitted to keeping monkeys at her house and selling them for between $300 and $500 each. She also knew it was illegal to do so.

    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, and Customs and Border Protection conducted the investigation.

    Case photo of monkeys seized by CBP agents.


    United States v. Lauren DeLoach

    • No. 9:25-CR-00164 (District of South Carolina)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Ryan Connors
    • AUSA Winston Holliday
    • AUSA Elle Klein

    On April 10, 2025, Lauren DeLoach pleaded guilty to violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Lacey Act trafficking for importing and selling sperm whale teeth and bones (16 U.S.C. §§ 1372(a)(4)(B), 3372(a)(1), 3373(b)(1)(B)).

    DeLoach operated a home decoration store in St. Helena Island, South Carolina. Between September 2021 and September 2024, he imported sperm whale parts to South Carolina, with at least 30 shipments coming from Australia, Latvia, Norway, and Ukraine. DeLoach instructed suppliers to label the items as “plastic” or “resin” so they would not be seized by U.S. Customs authorities. DeLoach acknowledged selling the teeth and bones from July 2022 through September 2024, in violation of the Lacey Act. He sold at least 85 items on eBay worth more than $18,000, and agents seized approximately $20,000 worth of sperm whale parts from DeLoach’s residence while executing a search warrant.

    Laboratory analysis confirmed the teeth and bones belonged to sperm whales, which are a protected species.

    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: District of South Carolina | South Carolina Man Pleads Guilty for Illegally Importing and Selling Sperm Whale Teeth and Bones | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Dale A. Smith

    • No. 1:21-CR-00031 (Western District of Pennsylvania)
    • AUSA Paul Sellers

    On April 21, 2025, Dale A. Smith pleaded guilty to conspiracy and to violating the Lacey Act for illegally purchasing American ginseng (18 U.S.C. § 371; 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2)(B), 3373(d)(l)(B)).

    As the owner and operator of Alleghany Mountain Ginseng, Smith possessed licenses to deal wild American ginseng in Pennsylvania and New York. Between September 2018 and January 2020, he purchased wild ginseng in Pennsylvania from buyers who informed him that they harvested it from New York without required certifications. Smith then submitted falsified Ginseng Dealer Quarterly Reports stating he purchased legally harvested ginseng from Pennsylvania, when in fact the ginseng came from New York.

    The United States Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Matanuska Diesel, LLC, et al.

    • No. 3:23-CR-00109 (District of Alaska)
    • AUSA Jennifer Ivers
    • RCEC Karla Perrin

    On April 23, 2025, Brendan Trevors entered into a pretrial diversion agreement, pleading guilty to conspiracy to violate the Clean Air Act (18 U.S.C. § 371). The charge will be dismissed in 18 months if Trevors complies with all the conditions in the agreement. This includes paying a $16,000 fine and restoring his vehicle back to original emission control parameters.

    Between July 2020 and June 2022, Matanuska Diesel, LLC, company owner Mackenzie Spurlock, and former co-owner Trevors, removed air pollution control equipment and tampered with federally mandated monitoring devices on diesel vehicles. The process of removing emissions control systems and reprogramming a vehicle’s onboard diagnostic system is known as “deleting” and “tuning.” These unlawful modifications result in a significant increase in pollutants emitted by the vehicle. The defendants tampered with approximately nine trucks, charging between $1,200 and $5,000 for those services.

    Matanuska and Spurlock are scheduled for trial to begin on October 20, 2025, for conspiring to violate the CAA and multiple substantive CAA violations (18 U.S.C. § 371; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(C)).

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Onill Vasquez Lozada, et al.

    • No. 1:24-CR-00075 (District of Rhode Island)
    • ECS Assistant Chief Stephen DaPonte
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Gary Donner
    • AUSA John McAdams

    On April 29, 2025, Onill Vasquez Lozada pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing, sponsoring, and exhibiting birds in an animal fighting venture in violation of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1), (b), (d); 18 U.S.C. § 49(a)). Sentencing is scheduled for July 29, 2025.

    Lozada is one of six defendants charged with violating the Animal Welfare Act in connection with a cockfighting operation. According to the indictment, on March 6, 2022, Miguel Delgado hosted a series of individual cockfights, known as “derbies,” at his Providence home. Delgado is also charged with sponsoring and exhibiting roosters in an animal fighting venture on multiple dates, buying and transporting sharp instruments, or “gaffs,” for use in the cockfights, and unlawfully possessing roosters for use in an animal fighting venture.

    Antonio Ledee Rivera and Lozada were charged with unlawfully possessing roosters in April 2021 for use in an animal fighting venture and for sponsoring and exhibiting roosters at a March 2022 derby at Delgado’ s home. Rivera was also charged in connection with an earlier derby at Delgado’ s home.

    Germidez Kingsley Jamie, Jose Rivera, and Luis Castillo are charged with sponsoring and exhibiting roosters at an animal fighting venture at the March 2022 derby. Jamie and Jose Rivera are also charged with one count of buying and transporting gaffs for use in an animal fighting venture.

    The Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General, the Postal Inspection Service, the Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigation, and the Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals conducted the investigation. The following agencies also assisted: the U.S. Marshals Service; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Rhode Island State Police; Massachusetts State Police; Animal Rescue League of Boston’s Law Enforcement Division; and Providence, Woonsocket, and Attleboro, MA, Police Departments.


    United States v. Michael Kandis

    • No. 5:25-CR-00005 (Northern District of West Virginia)
    • ECS Trial Attorney Lauren Steele
    • AUSA Max Nogay

    On April 30, 2025, Michael Kandis pleaded guilty to a Lacey Act Trafficking offense (16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(2)(A), 3373(d)(2)).

    Kandis is a reptile dealer in Wheeling, West Virginia. Indiana Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) conservation officers became acquainted with Kandis through a long-term investigation in which they operated in a covert capacity at various reptile shows throughout the Midwest.

    During their investigation, the IDNR officers conducted several wildlife transactions involving Kandis. In October 2019, Kandis purchased 47 snakes from undercover officers, 25 of which were bullsnakes, for a total price of $1,415. The sale was conducted in Noblesville, Indiana. Bullsnakes are a native species in Indiana, and it is illegal to sell them under Indiana law. Kandis later transported the snakes from Indiana to West Virginia to sell.

    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement and the Indiana Department of Natural Resources conducted the investigation.


    Sentencings


    United States v. Pavel Ivanovich Turlak, et al.

    • No. 2:24-CR-00057 (Eastern District of Washington)
    • AUSA Dan Fruchter
    • AUSA Jacob Brooks
    • RCEC Gwendolyn Brooks

    On April 2, 2025, a court sentenced Pavel Ivanovich Turlak, and his Spokane-based trucking companies: PT Express, LLC; Spokane Truck Service, LLC; and Pauls Trans, LLC. They previously pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally violate Clean Air Act (CAA) emissions controls and to fraudulently obtaining hundreds of thousands of dollars in COVID-19 relief funding (42 U.S.C. § 7413 (c)(2)(C);18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, 287). All defendants will complete five-year terms of probation, with the companies subject to an environmental compliance plan. All defendants are jointly and severally responsible for $317,389 in restitution to the Small Business Administration.

    Between August 2017 and November 2023, Turlak purchased illegal “delete tune” packages from Ryan Hugh Milliken and his company, Hardaway Solutions, LLC. They designed this software to disable and defeat emissions controls and monitoring systems required under the CAA. Turlak loaded the delete tunes into the trucks used by his own businesses, as well as trucks of co-conspirators who were customers of Spokane Truck Service, LLC. Milliken created and sold custom software delete tunes to Turlak for vehicles based on specifications Turlak outlined. Turlak then charged as much as $3,500 to diesel truck owners to “delete” and “tune” their vehicles by tampering with their pollution monitoring devices.

    In addition to violating the CAA, Turlak fraudulently obtained hundreds of thousands of dollars in COVID-19 relief funding. Between March 2020 and August 2021, Turlak fraudulently applied for and received more than $300,000 in federal funding that was designated to go to eligible small businesses during the pandemic. Turlak and his businesses were not eligible to receive this funding due to their ongoing participation in this criminal conspiracy.

    Milliken and Hardaway Solutions pleaded guilty in November 2024 to conspiracy and to violating the CAA (18 U.S.C. § 371; 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(C)). They were sentenced in January 2025 to complete five-year terms of probation, during which the company will be responsible for implementing an environmental compliance plan. Both defendants are jointly and severally responsible for paying a $75,000 fine.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation with assistance from the EPA National Enforcement Investigations Center, the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General, and the Spokane Police Department.


    United States v. Charles Limmer

    • No. 1:23-CR-00405 (Eastern District of New York)
    • AUSA Sean M. Sherman

    On April 3, 2025, a court sentenced Charles Limmer to two years of home detention. Limmer pleaded guilty to conspiracy after prosecutors charged him with Endangered Species Act, Lacey Act, and smuggling violations for trafficking in numerous specimens of butterflies (18 U.S.C. § 371). This protected species is known as “birdwings” due to their exceptional size, angular wings, and birdlike flight. As part of the plea, Limmer forfeited 1,600 specimens.

    Limmer obtained a license in 2016 to import and export wildlife.  After Limmer and his business violated numerous import/export regulations, the Fish and Wildlife Service suspended his license.

    Between October 2022 and September 2023, Limmer and others imported and exported at least 59 illegal shipments containing wildlife, valued at approximately $216,000. They falsely labelled the wildlife as “decorative wall coverings” or “origami paper creations.”

    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Idrissa Bagayoko

    • No. 1:23-CR-00265 (District of Maryland)
    • AUSA Kimberly Phillips
    • RCEC Kertisha Dixon
    • RCEC David Lastra

    On April 3, 2025, a court sentenced Idrissa Bagayoko to time served, followed by one year of supervised release to include three months’ home confinement for transporting and selling unregistered pesticides. Bagayoko also will pay $5,640 in restitution to reimburse the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the cost of destroying unregistered pesticides.

    A jury convicted Bagayoko in November 2024 on two counts for transporting and selling the unregistered pesticide Sniper DDVP. The jury found Bagayoko guilty of violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) (7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(a)(1) (A), 136l(b)(1)(B); 49 U.S.C. § 5124).

    Bagayoko owned and operated Maliba Trading, LLC. According to evidence presented at trial, on September 29, 2021, Bagayoko drove from New York to Maryland and sold two boxes of Sniper DDVP to an individual in Maryland. Police later stopped Bagayoko in Elkton, Maryland, with 18 additional boxes of Sniper DDVP containing a total of 1,728 bottles.

    Samples taken from the bottles revealed the presence of dichlorvos. EPA has classified dichlorvos as a probable human carcinogen. In total, the defendant transported more than 330 pounds of dichlorvos (a reportable quantity) without requisite shipping papers.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General, and the Elkton Maryland Police Department conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: District of Maryland | New York Business Owner Sentenced for Illegally Transporting and Selling Probable Carcinogen | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Redemption Repairs & Performance

    • No. 4:24-CR-40016 (Western District of Arkansas)
    • AUSA Sydney Stanley

    On April 3, 2025, a court sentenced Redemption Repairs & Performance (RRP) to pay a $50,000 fine and complete a three-year term of probation.

    RRP pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Air Act (CAA) for modifying and deleting the emissions control systems of diesel engines and tampering with and rendering inaccurate the vehicles’ onboard diagnostic (OBD) systems (42 U.S.C § 7413(c)(2)(C)).

    RRP is a truck repair shop specializing in diesel engine repairs and performance located in Texarkana, Arkansas. Between May 2020 and October 2022, the company falsified, tampered with, and rendered inaccurate monitoring devices required to be maintained and followed under the CAA. After removing or altering the emission control equipment on diesel trucks, RRP modified the diesel trucks’ OBD systems to prevent detection of the removal and disabling of the equipment. The company performed this service on approximately 50 vehicles, charging between $2,600-$2,700 per truck.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation. 


    United States v. Chamness Dirt Works, Inc., et al.

    • No. 3:24-CR-00430 (District of Oregon)
    • AUSA Bryan Chinwuba
    • RCEC Karla Perrin

    On April 3, 2025, a court sentenced Ryan Richter, Ronald Chamness, Horseshoe Grove, LLC, and Chamness Dirt Works, Inc., for violations of the Clean Air Act (CAA).

    Property management company Horseshoe Grove pleaded guilty to violating the CAA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) for asbestos work practice standards (42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(h),7413(c)(1)). Horseshoe Grove’s owner and operator Ryan Richter pleaded guilty to a CAA negligent endangerment violation (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4)). Construction and demolition company Chamness Dirt Works pleaded guilty to violating the CAA NESHAP for asbestos, and company owner and president, Ronald Chamness, pleaded guilty to a CAA negligent endangerment violation (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4)).

    Horseshoe Grove and Chamness Dirt Works were sentenced to complete three-year terms of probation. Richter and Ronald Chamness were each sentenced to five-year terms of probation and ordered to remediate the impacted site in accordance with stipulated conditions of probation. No fine was sought against the parties due to the cost of remediating the site to remove any remaining asbestos. The approximate cost of the remediation was $175,000.

    In November 2022, Horseshoe Grove acquired a property in The Dalles, Oregon, which included a mobile home park and two dilapidated apartment buildings. The previous owner provided the new buyers with an asbestos survey from December 2021, which identified more than 5,000 square feet of friable chrysotile asbestos within the two deteriorating buildings, with levels ranging from two percent to 25 percent. The survey also noted non-friable asbestos in various building materials, including siding and flooring, throughout the apartments. Despite these findings, Horseshoe Grove failed to implement the necessary precautions for asbestos removal.

    In March 2023, Chamness Dirt Works began demolishing the two asbestos-laden structures without following proper removal procedures. Chamness did not engage a certified asbestos abatement contractor, did not wet the asbestos-containing debris, and dumped the material in a regular landfill.

    Horseshoe Grove paid Chamness Dirt Works a total of $49,330 for the demolition, which did not meet the required safety standards.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.


    United States v. John Waldrop, et al.

    • No. 1:23-CR-00378 (Eastern District of New York)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Ryan Connors
    • AUSA Anna Karamigios

    On April 9, 2025, the court sentenced Dr. John Waldrop and Toney Jones for their involvement in the largest seizure of bird mounts in U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) history. Waldrop pleaded guilty to conspiracy to smuggle wildlife and Endangered Species Act (ESA) violations. He was ordered to pay a $900,000 fine and will complete a three-year term of probation (18 U.S.C. § 371; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(e), 1540(b)(1)). This is one of the largest fines ever imposed in an ESA case. Jones was sentenced to complete a six-month term of probation for violating the ESA (16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(e), 1540(b)(1)).

    Over a period of five years, Waldrop illegally imported thousands of museum-quality taxidermy bird mounts and preserved eggs to build a personal collection. His collection of 1,401 taxidermy bird mounts and 2,594 eggs included:

    • Four eagles protected by the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
    • 179 bird and 193 egg species listed in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and
    • 212 bird and 32 egg species protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

    This included extremely rare specimens such as three eggs from the Nordmann’s greenshank, an Asian shorebird with only 900 to 1,600 remaining birds in the wild.

    Between 2016 and 2020, Waldrop imported birds and eggs without the required declarations and permits. After USFWS inspectors at John F. Kennedy International Airport and elsewhere intercepted several shipments, Waldrop recruited Jones, who worked on his Georgia farm, to receive the packages. Jones also deposited approximately $525,000 in a bank account that Waldrop then used to pay for the imports and hide his involvement. Waldrop and Jones used online sales sites such as eBay and Etsy to buy birds and eggs from around the world, including Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

    In total, Waldrop spent more than $1.2 million to illegally build this collection. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Waldrop abandoned his collection, which was distributed to the USFWS forensic laboratory, the Smithsonian, and other museums and universities.

    The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: Office of Public Affairs | Two Men Sentenced in Largest-Ever Bird Mount Trafficking Case | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. John D. Murphy

    • No. 1:24-CR-10074 (District of Massachusetts)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Matthew Morris
    • AUSA Danial Bennett
    • AUSA Kaitlin Brown
    • ECS Paralegal Jonah Fruchtman

    On April 9, 2025, a court sentenced John D. Murphy to nine months’ incarceration, and three months and one day of home confinement, followed by three years’ supervised release. Murphy was also ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. Murphy pleaded guilty to violating the Animal Welfare Act for possessing dogs to use in an animal fighting venture (7 U.S.C. § 2156(b)).

    Prosecutors charged Murphy after investigators identified him on recorded calls discussing dog fighting in a separate investigation. Subsequent court-authorized searches of his Facebook accounts revealed Murphy’s extensive involvement in dogfighting.

    On June 7, 2023, authorities executed a search warrant at Murphy’s residence and another home, seizing 13 pit bull-type dogs. Several dogs exhibited scarring consistent with animal fighting. Authorities also recovered equipment used in fights, including syringes, anabolic steroids, a skin stapler, forceps, and equipment and literature for training dogs.

    The investigation revealed that Murphy often communicated with other dogfighters via Facebook and posted dogfighting-related photos to his Facebook account. Additionally, Murphy posted videos depicting pit bull-type dogs tethered to treadmills commonly used to physically condition dogs for fighting.

    The U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General conducted the investigation with assistance from the following agencies: Homeland Security Investigations; U.S. Customs and Border Protection; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service; U.S. Marshals Service; Maine State Police; New Hampshire State Police; Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor; Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals; and Police Departments in Hanson, Boston, and Acton, Massachusetts.

    Related Press Release: District of Massachusetts | Massachusetts Man Sentenced to More Than a Year in Prison for Dogfighting | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Jose Correa

    • No. 1:24-CR-00685 (Southern District of New York)
    • AUSA Alexandra Rothman

    On April 10, 2025, a court sentenced Jose Correa to pay a $10,000 fine and complete a two-year term of probation. Correa pleaded guilty to violating the Clean Air Act for negligently releasing asbestos into the ambient air (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4)).

    Between November and December 2022, Correa removed asbestos-containing floor tiles and mastic from a supermarket in Manhattan without hiring an asbestos abatement contractor. Instead, the material was removed by construction workers who were not provided with protective gear, thereby releasing asbestos into the ambient air and placing the workers in imminent danger of death and serious bodily injury.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Coby Brummett

    • No. 1:24-PO-00040 (Western District of Virginia)
    • AUSA Corey Hall

    On April 11, 2025, a court sentenced Coby Brummett to 30 days’ incarceration with credit for time served. Brummett was also ordered to pay more than $6,200 in restitution for illegally digging and removing ginseng from within the boundaries of Cumberland Gap National Historical Park. Additionally, Brummett is banned from the Park for three years (36 C.F.R. § 2.1(c)(3)).

    An investigation by Park Service rangers determined that Brummett dug up more than 300 ginseng roots from within the confines of the park.

    The restitution will be paid to the National Park Service, which conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: Western District of Virginia | Virginia Man Sentenced for Ginseng Poaching at National Park | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Royce Gillham

    • No. 2:24-CR-14046 (Southern District of Florida)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Adam Cullman
    • AUSA Daniel Funk

    On April 11, 2025, a court ordered Royce Gillham to pay $2,857,029 in restitution to ACT Fuels.

    This is in addition to the court’s sentence of 37 months’ incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release, ordered on March 14, 2025. Gillham, the former general manager of a biofuel producer based in Fort Pierce, Florida, pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit wire fraud and conspiring to make false claims (18 U.S.C.§ 371).

    This biofuel company produced and sold renewable fuel and fuel credits and claimed to turn various feedstocks into biodiesel. When reporting the number of gallons produced to the Internal Revenue Service and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Gillham and his employer vastly overstated their production volume in an effort to generate more credits. When auditors sought more information from the company, Gillham and his co-conspirators gave them false information about their fuel production and customers.

    The scheme generated more than $7 million in fraudulent EPA renewable fuels credits and sought over $6 million in fraudulent tax credits connected to the purported production of biodiesel.

    ACT Fuels purchased the fraudulent fuel credits in question and had to buy replacement credits when authorities found that Gillham’s company produced fraudulent renewable identification numbers or RINs.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Mold Wranglers, et al.

    • No. 6:24-CR-00025 (District of Montana)
    • AUSA Ryan Weldon

    On April 14, 2025, a court sentenced Mold Wranglers, Inc., a Kalispell-based hazardous material mitigation company, to pay a $50,000 fine, and complete a two-year term of probation, to include an environmental compliance plan. The company also will pay $348,000 in restitution to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Mold Wranglers pleaded guilty to a False Claims Act conspiracy for filing false claims with the VA for lead paint abatement work that was never performed (18 U.S.C. § 286).

    Between 2018 and 2019, Mold Wranglers claimed it performed lead abatement work at the Freedom’s Path Fort Harrison facility. The project consisted of converting residential units for low-income veterans and their families. Mold Wranglers submitted documentation to the VA for work including painting over lead-based paint with encapsulating paint. However, the company failed to comply with federal regulations governing lead work, as its employees were not certified to handle lead, and it did not notify the Environmental Protection Agency of the work as required.

    Additionally, Mold Wranglers applied the encapsulating paint in a manner inconsistent with the manufacturer’s specifications.

    The agreement the company made with the VA specified it was not performing an actual abatement but merely “aesthetically repairing the paint and finishing the homes.” Despite this agreement, the company submitted 11 false payment requests, claiming to have performed lead abatement work, and received a total of $456,000 in federal funds for work that did not meet the necessary standards for lead abatement.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and Office of Inspector General, The Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: District of Montana | Helena real estate agent convicted of felony and fined $150,000 for failing to provide lead-based paint disclosures for veterans residing in Fort Harrison rental housing | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Melanie Ann Carlin

    • No. 6:24-CR-00024 (District of Montana)
    • AUSA Ryan Weldon

    On April 14, 2025, a court sentenced Melanie Ann Carlin to pay a $150,000 fine and complete a three-year term of probation. Carlin pleaded guilty to violating the knowing endangerment provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act for failing to provide required lead-based paint disclosures to veterans residing at Freedom’s Path Fort Harrison in Helena, Montana (15 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(2)(A)). Carlin’s actions led to the exposure of veterans and their families to dangerous levels of lead, a hazardous substance known to cause serious health issues, particularly for children.

    Carlin owns a property management company called 406 Properties, Inc. She was responsible for overseeing rental units at Freedom’s Path, a housing facility with units built prior to 1978. The facility provided affordable homes for veterans and their families. Between September 2019 and September 2021, Carlin knowingly failed to provide mandated lead disclosures. Carlin knew that the property was built before 1978, which meant that the presence of lead paint was likely.

    In 2019, after receiving an email from the Montana Department of Commerce about lead paint concerns, Carlin signed and submitted forms for the units, falsely indicating that they were either free of lead paint or built after 1978. Despite having first-hand knowledge that lead paint was present in the buildings, Carlin continued to neglect her duty to disclose this information to tenants.

    In September 2021, an 18-month-old child living in one of the units ingested lead paint chips.

    Subsequent medical tests revealed the child had dangerously high blood lead levels and required lead poisoning treatment. Carlin admitted to agents that she knew about the lead paint disclosure requirement but failed to give residents the required notice. Carlin’s failure to act placed veterans and their families at imminent risk of serious harm.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, The Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted the investigation.

    Related Press Release: District of Montana | Helena real estate agent convicted of felony and fined $150,000 for failing to provide lead-based paint disclosures for veterans residing in Fort Harrison rental housing | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Aghorn Operating, Inc., et al.

    On April 15, 2025, Aghorn Operating, Inc., Trent Day, and Kodiak Roustabout, Inc., entered guilty pleas and were sentenced in relation to Worker Safety, Clean Air Act (CAA) and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) violations. Day pleaded guilty to a CAA negligent endangerment charge and was sentenced to serve five months’ incarceration, followed by one year of supervised release (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4)). Aghorn pleaded guilty to CAA negligent endangerment and an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) willful violation count for the death of an employee, Jacob Dean, and his wife, Natalee Dean (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4); 29 U.S.C. § 666(e)). Aghorn was sentenced to pay a $1 million fine and complete a two-year term of probation. Kodiak pleaded guilty to making a materially false statement (18 U.S.C. §1001) regarding well integrity testing that is required under the SDWA and was sentenced to pay a $400,000 fine and complete a one-year term of probation.

    Aghorn owns and operates oil wells and leases in Texas. Kodiak performed oilfield support and maintenance services for Aghorn. Day was a vice president for both Aghorn and Kodiak. The CAA and OSHA charges stem from the defendants releasing hydrogen sulfide that caused the deaths of Aghorn employee, Jacob Dean, and his wife, Natalee Dean. Both victims were overcome by hydrogen sulfide at Aghorn’s facility in Odessa. Aghorn and Day later obstructed the investigation into the Deans’ deaths. The SDWA-related violation stems from false statements made by Kodiak regarding the mechanical integrity of Aghorn injection wells in forms and pressure charts filed with the State of Texas Railroad Commission. In addition to the fine, Aghorn will guarantee that at least 33 tests conducted for Aghorn wells during its year of probation are witnessed or conducted by a third party.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation, with assistance from the Texas Railroad Commission, Ector County Environmental Enforcement, and the Odessa Fire Department.

    Related Press Release: Office of Public Affairs | Oilfield Company, Its Executive, and a Support Services Company Plead Guilty and Are Sentenced for Worker Safety, Clean Air Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act Violations Resulting in the Death of an Employee and His Spouse | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Justin Taylor

    • No. 6:24-CR-00013 (Southern District of Georgia)
    • AUSA Darron J. Hubbard

    On April 15, 2025, a court sentenced Justin Taylor to complete a five-year term of probation and pay $279,642 in restitution to the Internal Revenue Service. Taylor pleaded guilty to conspiracy to tamper with a monitoring device and filing a fraudulent tax return (18 U.S.C. § 371; 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)).

    Between January 2018 and January 2021, Taylor worked as a mechanic. Using a high-powered computer that supported diagnostic tools for heavy-duty logging equipment, Taylor performed emission-control “deletes” for more than 200 owners of diesel engines.

    The changes Taylor made to the emission controls on those machines disabled the electronic monitoring devices and methods required under the Clean Air Act. Taylor routinely charged $2,000 for this service, earning more than $1.2 million during this period while reporting only $166,853 in income.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Johnnie Lee Nelson, et al.

    • No. 1:23-CR-00787 (District of New Jersey)
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Ethan Eddy
    • AUSA Michelle Goldman

    On April 16, 2025, a court sentenced Johnnie Lee Nelson to complete a two-year term of probation to include one year of home confinement. Nelson also will perform 100 hours of community service. Nelson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess, train, and transport dogs for an animal fighting venture and to sponsor and exhibit dogs in an animal fighting venture (18 U.S.C. § 371).

    On March 23, 2019, officers responded to an emergency call at an auto body garage in Upper Deerfield Township, New Jersey. They found a fighting pit in the garage, along with two pit bull-type dogs, still fighting, that had been placed into an inoperable car on a lift in the garage as the participants fled on foot. The dogs later died from injuries they sustained while fighting. Officers also found an uninjured pit bull-type dog in a car just outside the garage, along with a rudimentary veterinary suture and skin staple kit in a bag.

    Evidence revealed that Nelson’s co-defendant, Tommy Watson, organized the fight, and that their dog was scheduled for the next fight on deck. They jointly possessed and trained this dog for this particular fight, as shown by cell phone video evidence. Nelson and Watson participated in a dog fighting operation they called “From Da Bottom Kennels.” From Da Bottom Kennels and others live-streamed dog fight videos from that garage via the Telegram app. Watson is scheduled for trial to begin on June 4, 2025.

    The U.S. Department of Agriculture Office of Inspector General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Sarmad Ghaled Dafer, et al.

    • Nos. 3:24-CR-00615, 23-CR-01879 (Southern District of California)
    • AUSA Sabrina L. Feve
    • AUSA Robert Miller
    • Former AUSA Melanie Pierson

    On April 18, 2025, a court sentenced Sarmad Ghaled Dafer to four months’ incarceration, followed by three years’ supervised release, to include 180 days of home confinement. Dafer also will pay $23,502 in restitution to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to reimburse costs for quarantining three Mexican spider monkeys at the San Diego Zoo. Dafer is jointly and severally responsible along with co-defendant Sarkon Yonan Hanna for the restitution.

    On August 14, 2023, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers stopped a man and woman attempting to drive a van into the United States from Mexico. During an initial inspection, a CBP officer discovered an animal carrier hidden behind the rear seat that contained live monkeys. The CBP officer referred the occupants and vehicle for a secondary examination. Officers found three baby spider monkeys hidden in the van. The officers seized the monkeys and placed them in quarantine.

    A search of the co-conspirator’s phone led to evidence that Dafer purchased and coordinated the smuggling of monkeys across the border on three occasions, between June 2022 and August 2023.

    Baby Mexican spider monkeys continue to nurse throughout their first year and ordinarily are not fully weaned and independent until they turn two. Most baby Mexican spider monkeys will continue to stay close to their mothers until they are approximately four years old.

    Dafer’s Facebook messages and photos show that he intentionally sought baby monkeys to make the smuggling process easier. He even posted a photo of a baby spider monkey under a heat lamp in a small cage. This suggests that Dafer knew that the baby monkey he was selling had been prematurely separated from its mother.

    Mexican spider monkey mothers will not voluntarily relinquish their young and the entire troop of spider monkeys will try to defend the mother and baby from perceived threats. Consequently, to capture the babies, poachers will typically have to kill or harm the mother and entire troop. In this case, genetic analysis confirmed the three babies each had different mothers.

    Dafer pleaded guilty to conspiracy, and Hanna pleaded guilty to smuggling (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 545.) Hanna was sentenced on March 14, 2025, to time served, followed by two years’ supervised release, along with the restitution. Hanna was in the car that attempted to smuggle the three monkeys into the United States from Mexico on August 14, 2023.

    Homeland Security Investigations, Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation. 

    Case photo of two of the three monkeys rescued by CBP.

    Related Press Release: Southern District of California | Wildlife Trafficker Sentenced for Smuggling Baby Spider Monkeys | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Antonio Pereira, et al.

    • Nos. 3:24-CR-00824, 3:25-CR-00001 (District of New Jersey)
    • ECS Trial Attorney Christopher Hale
    • AUSA Kelly Lyons

    On April 22, 2025, a court sentenced Antonio Periera to pay a $4,000 fine and complete a two-year term of probation. Periera and co-defendant Darren McClave pleaded guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. § 371). McClave is scheduled for sentencing on June 30, 2025.

    McClave, a captain of a clam vessel based out of New Jersey, participated in a scheme to illegally harvest and sell excess scallops, violating federal fishing regulations. While clam vessels are allowed to take a limited quantity of scallops as bycatch, McClave routinely exceeded these limits and sold the surplus to Pereira, a seafood dealer. To cover up the overfishing, McClave and Pereira worked together to falsify the Fishing Vessel Trip Reports and Dealer Reports required by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Law Enforcement conducted the investigation.


    United States v. J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc. et al.

    • No. 6:24-CR-00441 (District of Oregon)
    • ECS Trial Attorney Stephen Foster
    • ECS Trial Attorney Rachel M. Roberts
    • AUSA William M. McLaren
    • RCEC Karla G. Perrin
    • ECS Law Clerk Maria Wallace

    On April 22, 2025, a court sentenced J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc., and J.H. Baxter & Co., a California Limited Partnership, collectively, to pay a total of $1.5 million in criminal fines. In addition, both companies were ordered to serve five-year terms of probation. The companies’ president, Georgia Baxter-Krause, was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration, followed by one year of supervised release.

    The two companies (collectively J.H. Baxter) were responsible for a wood treatment facility in Eugene, Oregon. Both pleaded guilty to charges of illegally treating hazardous waste and knowingly violating the Clean Air Act (CAA) (42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)). Baxter-Krause pleaded guilty to two counts of making false statements in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(3)).

    J.H. Baxter used hazardous chemicals to treat and preserve wood at its Eugene facility. The wastewater from the wood preserving processes was hazardous waste. J.H. Baxter operated a wastewater treatment unit to treat and evaporate the waste. For years, however, when the facility accumulated too much water on site, employees transferred this water to a wood treatment retort to “boil it off,” greatly reducing the volume. J.H. Baxter would then remove the waste that remained, label it as hazardous waste, and ship it offsite for disposal.

    J.H. Baxter was never issued a RCRA permit to treat its waste in this manner. The facility was also subject to CAA emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants. However, employees were directed to open all vents on the retorts, allowing discharges to the surrounding air.

    State inspectors requested information about J.H. Baxter’s practice of boiling off hazardous wastewater. On two separate occasions, Baxter-Krause made false statements in response to these requests regarding the dates the practice took place, and which retorts were used. The investigation determined that Baxter-Krause knew J.H. Baxter maintained detailed daily production logs for each retort.

    J.H. Baxter boiled off hazardous process wastewater in its wood treatment retorts on 136 days. Baxter-Krause was also aware that during this time the company used four of its five retorts to boil off wastewater.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation with assistance from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality and the Oregon State Police. 

    Related Press Release: Environment and Natural Resources Division | United States v. J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc. et al. | United States Department of Justice


    United States v. Dlubak Glass Company

    • No. 3:24-CR-00533 (Northern District of Texas)
    • ECS Trial Attorney Lauren Steele
    • ECS Senior Trial Attorney Gary Donner

    On April 29, 2025, a court sentenced Dlubak Glass Company (DGC) to pay a $100,000 fine and complete a four-year term of probation. The company pleaded guilty to making a false statement regarding the storage of hazardous waste (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)).

    DGC is in the business of processing and recycling glass products, including CRT (cathode ray tube) glass. CRTs have three components: a panel, a funnel, and a neck. Both the panel and the funnel are made of glass. CRT funnel glass contains significant amounts of lead, while panel glass typically contains lead in much lower quantities. Because of the presence of lead, used CRTs that are transported, stored, or disposed of can be considered a characteristic hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

    DGC operated facilities in several states, including locations in Arizona, Texas, and Oklahoma. Pursuant to a Consent Order, DGC agreed to ship all the CRT glass at its Arizona facility offsite for recycling or disposal as hazardous waste. DGC later shipped approximately 4,000 tons of CRT glass from Yuma, Arizona, to its Texas facility, telling regulators that it would recycle the material by incorporating it into commercial products.

    When Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) inspected DGC’s Texas facility they observed piles of CRT glass onsite. DGC’s plant manager told inspectors that the only CRT glass present at the location was “processed panel glass containing no lead.” Dlubak employees later repeated this assertion in a follow-up meeting with TCEQ. However, further investigation determined that the glass in question was composed of both panel and funnel glass, a fact which DGC was aware of when it made these statements to TCEQ.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division conducted the investigation.


    United States v. Tribar Technologies, Inc.

    • No. 2:24-CR-20552 (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • ECS Senior Counsel Kris Dighe
    • AUSA Karen Reynolds
    • RCEC Sasha Reyes

    On April 29, 2025, a court sentenced Tribar Technologies, Inc. (Tribar), to pay a $200,000 fine, complete a five-year term of probation and enact an environmental compliance plan. Tribar also will pay $20,000 in restitution to the City of Ann Arbor, Michigan.

    The company pleaded guilty to negligently violating a pretreatment standard under the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(d) and 1319(c)(1)(A)).

    Tribar manufactures automobile parts and presently operates five active plants in southeast Michigan. Plant 5 is a chrome plating facility located in Wixom, Michigan. It uses an electroplating process to apply chrome finishing to plastic automotive parts. Plant 5 generates wastewater that contains chromium compounds, including hexavalent chromium, a known carcinogen.

    On July 23, 2022, Plant 5 accumulated approximately 15,000 gallons of untreated wastewater containing high concentrations of hexavalent chromium. This wastewater had higher levels of pollutants than the wastewater typically generated from Plant 5 operations. During the week beginning July 25, 2022, Plant 5 employees attempted to treat this wastewater in a holding tank to reduce the amount of hexavalent chromium before putting it into the Plant 5 wastewater treatment system. By the end of the week, the wastewater still contained high concentrations of hexavalent chromium.

    On July 29, 2022, an employee discharged approximately 10,000 gallons of insufficiently treated wastewater from the holding tank into the Plant 5 wastewater treatment system. This discharge activated wastewater treatment system alarms, indicating that the wastewater required further treatment before it could be discharged to the Wixom sanitary sewer system. The employee disabled approximately 460 alarms and discharged the wastewater to the Wixom sanitary sewer system, and ultimately to the Wixom publicly owned treatment works, without completing the treatment necessary to remove chromium from the wastewater, as required by Tribar’s Industrial Pretreatment Program Permit.

    The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Criminal Investigation Division, the Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes and Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted the investigation. 


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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: HighPeak Energy, Inc. Announces First Quarter 2025 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FORT WORTH, Texas, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — HighPeak Energy, Inc. (“HighPeak” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: HPK) today announced financial and operating results for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, provided an updated 2025 development outlook and increased production guidance.

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights

    • Sales volumes averaged approximately 53.1 thousand barrels of crude oil equivalent per day (“MBoe/d”), representing a 6% increase from the fourth quarter 2024.
    • Net income was $36.3 million, or $0.26 per diluted share and EBITDAX (a non-GAAP financial measure defined and reconciled below) was $197.3 million, or $1.40 per diluted share. First quarter 2025 adjusted net income (a non-GAAP financial measure defined and reconciled below) was $42.7 million, or $0.31 per diluted share.
    • Lease operating expenses averaged $6.61 per Boe, excluding workover expenses, representing a 3% decrease compared to the fourth quarter 2024.
    • Generated free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure defined and reconciled below) of $10.7 million, reduced long-term debt by $30 million and paid $0.04 per share in dividends.
    • Realized increased drilling and completion efficiency gains, which translated to drilling and completing four additional wells during the first quarter.

    Recent Events

    • Narrowed 2025 production guidance range and increased the midpoint.
    • On May 12, 2025, the Company’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per common share outstanding payable in June 2025.

    Statement from Jack Hightower, Chairman and CEO:

    In March, we discussed our four pillars of success for 2025 which include: 1) improving corporate efficiency, 2) maintaining capital discipline, 3) optimizing our capital structure, and 4) delivering shareholder value. I would like to take this opportunity to update our shareholders on where we stand and the progress we have made to date.

    Improving Corporate Efficiency
    HighPeak delivered another strong quarter of results, beating production guidance and consensus estimates, while also realizing higher levels of operating efficiencies in our development program. We drilled over 25% faster than our previous expectations, which translated to drilling and completing four additional wells during the first quarter. We are running smoother and more efficiently than ever before, while continuing to keep development costs in line with internal expectations.

    Maintaining Capital Discipline
    Due to the global economic uncertainty and its impact on oil prices, we have moderated our development program by laying down one rig for four months, May through August. Despite the pause, we remain on track to drill and complete the same number of wells in our 2025 guidance because of the gains made through operational efficiencies.

    As detailed on our March conference call, the majority of our 2025 infrastructure capex was first-quarter weighted. Factoring in drilling and completing four additional wells, we accomplished an outsized portion of our planned annual development activity during the first quarter. Going forward, we expect our quarterly capital expenditures to be materially lower and the total for the year to fall within our 2025 guided capex range. Although our operations are running much more efficiently, this is not the proper time to accelerate development activity from our original plan. Additionally, we have complete flexibility from a land and operations perspective to reduce the budget and leave a rig down for longer than the current plan if conditions warrant.

    Optimizing our Capital Structure
    We remain committed to optimizing our capital structure and remain poised to execute our plan once the market has stabilized. We are in a healthy financial position with no near-term debt maturities and are taking proactive steps to keep our balance sheet strong as we navigate this turbulent market.

    Shareholder Value
    Given the current global macro-economic backdrop, this is a time to remain nimble and prudent, which our high-quality asset base allows. As large owners of the Company, management is fully aligned with shareholders and has a long-term outlook on value creation. While markets may be volatile, it is important to remember the fundamental value of our asset base is still strong.

    First Quarter 2025 Operational Update

    HighPeak’s sales volumes during the first quarter of 2025 averaged 53.1 MBoe/d, a six percent increase over the fourth quarter 2024. First quarter sales volumes consisted of approximately 72% crude oil and 86% liquids.

    The Company averaged two drilling rigs and one frac crew during the first quarter, drilled 16 gross (16.0 net) horizontal wells and turned-in-line 13 gross (12.9 net) producing wells. On March 31, 2025, the Company had 28 gross (28.0 net) horizontal wells in various stages of drilling and completion.

    The Company updated its 2025 production guidance range to 48,000 – 50,500 Boe/d.

    HighPeak President, Michael Hollis, commented, “Our strong first quarter production is allowing us to narrow our guided range and increase the midpoint. This speaks to our strong well performance and the high quality of our long lived oily inventory. As seen in the last few commodity price cycles, HighPeak is realizing deflationary cost pressures on both the capex and opex fronts. With our increased operational efficiency, we are doing more with less and at a lower overall cost.”

    First Quarter 2025 Financial Results

    HighPeak reported net income of $36.3 million for the first quarter of 2025, or $0.26 per diluted share, and EBITDAX of $197.3 million, or $1.40 per diluted share. HighPeak reported adjusted net income of $42.7 million for the first quarter of 2025, or $0.31 per diluted share.

    First quarter average realized prices were $71.64 per Bbl of crude oil, $24.21 per Bbl of NGL and $2.34 per Mcf of natural gas, resulting in an overall realized price of $53.84 per Boe, or 75% of the weighted average of NYMEX crude oil prices, excluding the effects of derivatives. HighPeak’s cash costs for the first quarter were $11.94 per Boe, including lease operating expenses of $6.61 per Boe, workover expenses of $0.83 per Boe, production and ad valorem taxes of $3.17 per Boe and G&A expenses of $1.33 per Boe. As a result, the Company’s unhedged EBITDAX per Boe was $41.90 per Boe, or 78% of the overall realized price per Boe for the quarter, excluding the effects of derivatives.

    HighPeak’s first quarter 2025 capital expenditures to drill, complete, equip, provide facilities and for infrastructure were $179.8 million.

    Hedging

    Crude oil. As of March 31, 2025, HighPeak had the following outstanding crude oil derivative instruments and the weighted average crude oil prices and premiums payable per Bbl:

                          Swaps     Collars, Enhanced Collars
    & Deferred
    Premium Puts
     
    Settlement
    Month
      Settlement
    Year
      Type of
    Contract
      Bbls
    Per
    Day
      Index   Price per
    Bbl
        Floor or
    Strike
    Price per
    Bbl
        Ceiling
    Price per
    Bbl
        Deferred
    Premium
    Payable
    per Bbl
     
    Crude Oil:                                                  
    Apr – Jun   2025   Swap     5,500   WTI Cushing   $ 76.37     $     $     $  
    Apr – Jun   2025   Collar     7,989   WTI Cushing   $     $ 64.38     $ 88.55     $ 2.00  
    Apr – Jun   2025   Put     9,000   WTI Cushing   $     $ 65.78     $     $ 5.00  
    Jul – Sep   2025   Swap     3,000   WTI Cushing   $ 75.85     $     $     $  
    Jul – Sep   2025   Collar     7,000   WTI Cushing   $     $ 65.00     $ 90.08     $ 2.28  
    Jul – Sep   2025   Put     9,000   WTI Cushing   $     $ 65.78     $     $ 5.00  
    Oct – Dec   2025   Collar     5,000   WTI Cushing   $     $ 60.00     $ 72.80     $  
    Jan – Mar   2026   Collar     5,000   WTI Cushing   $     $ 60.00     $ 72.80     $  
     

    The Company’s crude oil derivative contracts detailed above are based on reported settlement prices on the New York Mercantile Exchange for West Texas Intermediate pricing.

    Natural gas. As of March 31, 2025, the Company had the following outstanding natural gas derivative instruments and the weighted average natural gas prices payable per MMBtu.

    Settlement Month   Settlement
    Year
      Type of
    Contract
      MMBtu
    Per Day
      Index   Price per
    MMBtu
     
    Natural Gas:                          
    Apr – Jun   2025   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.43  
    Jul – Sep   2025   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.43  
    Oct – Dec   2025   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.43  
    Jan – Mar   2026   Swap     19,667   HH   $ 4.43  
     

    HighPeak added the following natural gas swaps in April 2025.

    Settlement Month   Settlement
    Year
      Type of
    Contract
      MMBtu
    Per Day
      Index   Price per
    MMBtu
     
    Natural Gas:                          
    Jan – Mar   2026   Swap     10,333   HH   $ 4.30  
    Apr – Jun   2026   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.30  
    Jul – Sep   2026   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.30  
    Oct – Dec   2026   Swap     30,000   HH   $ 4.30  
    Jan – Mar   2027   Swap     19,667   HH   $ 4.30  
     

    Dividends

    During the first quarter of 2025, HighPeak’s Board of Directors approved a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share, or $5.0 million in dividends paid to stockholders during the quarter. In addition, in May 2025, the Company’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.04 per share, or approximately $5.0 million in dividends, to be paid on June 25, 2025, to stockholders of record on June 2, 2025. 

    Conference Call

    HighPeak will host a conference call and webcast on Tuesday, May 13, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. Central Time for investors and analysts to discuss its results for the first quarter of 2025. Conference call participants may register for the call here. Access to the live audio-only webcast and replay of the earnings release conference call may be found here. A live broadcast of the earnings conference call will also be available on the HighPeak Energy website at www.highpeakenergy.com under the “Investors” section of the website. A replay will also be available on the website following the call.

    When available, a copy of the Company’s earnings release, investor presentation and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q may be found on its website at www.highpeakenergy.com.

    About HighPeak Energy, Inc.

    HighPeak Energy, Inc. is a publicly traded independent crude oil and natural gas company, headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas, focused on the acquisition, development, exploration and exploitation of unconventional crude oil and natural gas reserves in the Midland Basin in West Texas. For more information, please visit our website at www.highpeakenergy.com.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    The information in this press release contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. When used in this document, the words “believes,” “plans,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “forecasts,” “intends,” “continue,” “may,” “will,” “could,” “should,” “future,” “potential,” “estimate” or the negative of such terms and similar expressions as they relate to HighPeak Energy, Inc. (“HighPeak Energy” or the “Company”) are intended to identify forward-looking statements, which are generally not historical in nature. The forward-looking statements are based on the Company’s current expectations, assumptions, estimates and projections about the Company and the industry in which the Company operates. Although the Company believes that the expectations and assumptions reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable as and when made, they involve risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict and, in many cases, beyond the Company’s control. For example, the Company’s review of strategic alternatives may not result in a sale of the Company, a recommendation that a transaction occur or result in a completed transaction, and any transaction that occurs may not increase shareholder value, in each case as a result of such risks and uncertainties.

    These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, the results of the strategic review being undertaken by the Company’s Board and the interest of prospective counterparties, the Company’s ability to realize the results contemplated by its 2025 guidance, volatility of commodity prices, political instability or armed conflicts in crude or natural gas producing regions such as the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine or Israel and Hamas, product supply and demand, the impact of a widespread outbreak of an illness, such as the coronavirus disease pandemic, on global and U.S. economic activity, competition, OPEC+ policy decisions, potential new trade policies, such as tariffs, could adversely affect the Company’s operations, business and profitability, inflationary pressures on costs of oilfield goods, services and personnel, the ability to obtain environmental and other permits and the timing thereof, other government regulation or action, the ability to obtain approvals from third parties and negotiate agreements with third parties on mutually acceptable terms, litigation, the costs and results of drilling and operations, availability of equipment, services, resources and personnel required to perform the Company’s drilling and operating activities, access to and availability of transportation, processing, fractionation, refining and storage facilities, HighPeak Energy’s ability to replace reserves, implement its business plans or complete its development activities as scheduled, access to and cost of capital, the financial strength of counterparties to any credit facility and derivative contracts entered into by HighPeak Energy, if any, and purchasers of HighPeak Energy’s oil, natural gas liquids and natural gas production, uncertainties about estimates of reserves, identification of drilling locations and the ability to add proved reserves in the future, the assumptions underlying forecasts, including forecasts of production, expenses, cash flow from sales of oil and gas and tax rates, quality of technical data, environmental and weather risks, including the possible impacts of climate change, cybersecurity risks and acts of war or terrorism. These and other risks are described in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Current Reports on Form 8-K and other filings with the SEC. The Company undertakes no duty to publicly update these statements except as required by law.

    Reserve engineering is a process of estimating underground accumulations of hydrocarbons that cannot be measured in an exact way. The accuracy of any reserve estimate depends on the quality of available data, the interpretation of such data and price and cost assumptions made by reserve engineers. Reserves estimates included herein may not be indicative of the level of reserves or PV-10 value of oil and natural gas production in the future. In addition, the results of drilling, testing and production activities may justify revisions of estimates that were made previously. If significant, such revisions could impact HighPeak’s strategy and change the schedule of any further production and development drilling. Accordingly, reserve estimates may differ significantly from the quantities of oil and natural gas that are ultimately recovered.

    Use of Projections

    The financial, operational, industry and market projections, estimates and targets in this press release and in the Company’s guidance (including production, operating expenses and capital expenditures in future periods) are based on assumptions that are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies, many of which are beyond the Company’s control. The assumptions and estimates underlying the projected, expected or target results are inherently uncertain and are subject to a wide variety of significant business, economic, regulatory and competitive risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in the financial, operational, industry and market projections, estimates and targets, including assumptions, risks and uncertainties described in “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements” above. These projections are speculative by their nature and, accordingly, are subject to significant risk of not being actually realized by the Company. Projected results of the Company for 2025 are particularly speculative and subject to change. Actual results may vary materially from the current projections, including for reasons beyond the Company’s control. The projections are based on current expectations and available information as of the date of this release. The Company undertakes no duty to publicly update these projections except as required by law.

    Drilling Locations

    The Company has estimated its drilling locations based on well spacing assumptions and upon the evaluation of its drilling results and those of other operators in its area, combined with its interpretation of available geologic and engineering data. The drilling locations actually drilled on the Company’s properties will depend on the availability of capital, regulatory approvals, commodity prices, costs, actual drilling results and other factors. Any drilling activities conducted on these identified locations may not be successful and may not result in additional proved reserves. Further, to the extent the drilling locations are associated with acreage that expires, the Company would lose its right to develop the related locations.

    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet Data
    (In thousands)
        March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
     
    Current assets:              
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 51,619     $ 86,649    
    Accounts receivable     78,356       85,242    
    Inventory     8,706       10,952    
    Prepaid expenses     8,301       4,587    
    Derivative instruments     5,620       7,582    
    Total current assets     152,602       195,012    
    Crude oil and natural gas properties, using the successful efforts method of accounting:              
    Proved properties     4,140,881       3,959,545    
    Unproved properties     71,359       70,868    
    Accumulated depletion, depreciation and amortization     (1,293,949 )     (1,184,684 )  
    Total crude oil and natural gas properties, net     2,918,291       2,845,729    
    Other property and equipment, net     3,141       3,201    
    Other noncurrent assets     19,047       19,346    
    Total assets   $ 3,093,081     $ 3,063,288    
                   
    Current liabilities:              
    Current portion of long-term debt, net   $ 120,000     $ 120,000    
    Accounts payable – trade     66,473       74,011    
    Accrued capital expenditures     53,240       35,170    
    Revenues and royalties payable     27,993       26,838    
    Other accrued liabilities     22,065       22,196    
    Derivative instruments     8,275       5,380    
    Operating leases     821       719    
    Advances from joint interest owners           316    
    Total current liabilities     298,867       284,630    
    Noncurrent liabilities:              
    Long-term debt, net     902,844       928,384    
    Deferred income taxes     242,337       232,398    
    Asset retirement obligations     15,058       14,750    
    Operating leases     581       670    
    Commitments and contingencies              
                   
    Stockholders’ equity              
    Common stock     13       13    
    Additional paid-in capital     1,166,786       1,166,609    
    Retained earnings     466,595       435,834    
    Total stockholders’ equity     1,633,394       1,602,456    
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 3,093,081     $ 3,063,288    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (in thousands)
        Quarter Ended March 31,
     
        2025   2024
     
    Operating revenues:            
    Crude oil sales   $ 246,424     $ 282,369    
    NGL and natural gas sales     11,024       5,395    
    Total operating revenues     257,448       287,764    
    Operating costs and expenses:            
    Crude oil and natural gas production     35,562       30,271    
    Production and ad valorem taxes     15,152       14,402    
    Exploration and abandonments     264       498    
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization     109,325       130,850    
    Accretion of discount     244       239    
    General and administrative     6,345       4,685    
    Stock-based compensation     177       3,798    
    Total operating costs and expenses     167,069       184,743    
    Other expense           1    
    Income from operations     90,379       103,020    
    Interest income     810       2,392    
    Interest expense     (36,988 )     (43,634 )  
    Loss on derivative instruments, net     (7,927 )     (53,043 )  
    Income before income taxes     46,274       8,735    
    Provision for income taxes     9,939       2,297    
    Net income   $ 36,335     $ 6,438    
                 
    Earnings per share:            
    Basic net income   $ 0.26     $ 0.05    
    Diluted net income   $ 0.26     $ 0.05    
                 
    Weighted average shares outstanding:            
    Basic     123,913       125,696    
    Diluted     127,213       129,641    
                 
    Dividends declared per share   $ 0.04     $ 0.04    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands)
        Quarter Ended March 31,
     
        2025
      2024
     
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:            
    Net income   $ 36,335     $ 6,438    
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash provided by operations:            
    Provision for deferred income taxes     9,939       1,688    
    Loss on derivative instruments     7,927       53,043    
    Cash paid on settlement of derivative instruments     (3,071 )     (5,148 )  
    Amortization of debt issuance costs     2,034       2,053    
    Amortization of discounts on long-term debt     2,426       2,453    
    Stock-based compensation expense     177       3,798    
    Accretion expense     244       239    
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization     109,325       130,850    
    Exploration and abandonment expense     4       274    
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:            
    Accounts receivable     6,886       (14,414 )  
    Prepaid expenses, inventory and other assets     (1,314 )     (4,722 )  
    Accounts payable, accrued liabilities and other current liabilities     (13,860 )     (5,113 )  
    Net cash provided by operating activities     157,052       171,439    
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:            
    Additions to crude oil and natural gas properties     (179,819 )     (147,698 )  
    Changes in working capital associated with crude oil and natural gas property additions     25,172       1,705    
    Acquisitions of crude oil and natural gas properties     (2,517 )     (2,171 )  
    Proceeds from sales of properties     570          
    Other property additions           (59 )  
    Net cash used in investing activities     (156,594 )     (148,223 )  
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:            
    Repayments under Term Loan Credit Agreement     (120,000 )     (30,000 )  
    Dividends paid     (4,957 )     (5,050 )  
    Dividend equivalents paid     (531 )     (530 )  
    Repurchased shares under buyback program           (8,764 )  
    Debt issuance costs           (7 )  
    Net cash used in financing activities     (35,488 )     (44,351 )  
    Net decrease in cash and cash equivalents     (35,030 )     (21,135 )  
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period     86,649       194,515    
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period   $ 51,619     $ 173,380    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Summary Operating Highlights
        Quarter Ended March 31,  
        2025   2024  
    Average Daily Sales Volumes:              
    Crude oil (Bbls)     38,222       39,959    
    NGLs (Bbls)     7,724       5,147    
    Natural gas (Mcf)     43,096       27,733    
    Total (Boe)     53,128       49,729    
                   
    Average Realized Prices (excluding effects of derivatives):              
    Crude oil per Bbl   $ 71.64     $ 77.65    
    NGL per Bbl   $ 24.21     $ 24.94    
    Natural gas per Mcf   $ 2.34     $ 1.33    
    Total per Boe   $ 53.84     $ 63.59    
                   
    Margin Data ($ per Boe):              
    Average price, excluding effects of derivatives   $ 53.84     $ 63.59    
    Lease operating expenses     (6.61 )     (6.30 )  
    Expense workovers     (0.83 )     (0.39 )  
    Production and ad valorem taxes     (3.17 )     (3.18 )  
    General and administrative expenses     (1.33 )     (1.04 )  
        $ 41.90     $ 52.68    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Earnings Per Share Details
        Quarter Ended March 31,  
        2025   2024  
    Net income as reported   $ 36,335     $ 6,438    
    Participating basic earnings     (3,542 )     (605 )  
    Basic earnings attributable to common shareholders     32,793       5,833    
    Reallocation of participating earnings     47       1    
    Diluted net income attributable to common shareholders   $ 32,840     $ 5,834    
                   
    Basic weighted average shares outstanding     123,913       125,696    
    Dilutive warrants and unvested stock options     1,146       1,786    
    Dilutive unvested restricted stock     2,154       2,159    
    Diluted weighted average shares outstanding     127,213       129,641    
                   
    Net income per share attributable to common shareholders:              
    Basic   $ 0.26     $ 0.05    
    Diluted   $ 0.26     $ 0.05    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Reconciliation of Net Income to EBITDAX, Discretionary Cash Flow and Net Cash Provided by Operations
    (in thousands)
     
        Quarter Ended March 31,  
        2025   2024  
    Net income   $ 36,335     $ 6,438    
    Interest expense     36,988       43,634    
    Interest income     (810 )     (2,392 )  
    Income tax expense     9,939       2,297    
    Depletion, depreciation and amortization     109,325       130,850    
    Accretion of discount     244       239    
    Exploration and abandonment expense     264       498    
    Stock based compensation     177       3,798    
    Derivative related noncash activity     4,856       47,895    
    Other expense           1    
    EBITDAX     197,318       233,258    
    Cash interest expense     (32,528 )     (39,128 )  
    Other (a)     550       1,558    
    Discretionary cash flow     165,340       195,688    
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities     (8,288 )     (24,249 )  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   $ 157,052     $ 171,439    
    (a)     Includes interest income net of current tax expense, other expense and operating portion of exploration and abandonment expenses.
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Reconciliation of Net Cash Provided by Operations and Free Cash Flow
    (in thousands)
        Quarter Ended March 31,  
        2025   2024  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   $ 157,052     $ 171,439    
    Add back: net change in operating assets and liabilities     8,288       24,249    
    Operating cash flow before working capital changes     165,340       195,688    
    Additions to crude oil and natural gas properties     (179,819 )     (147,698 )  
    Changes in working capital associated with crude oil and natural gas property additions     25,172       1,705    
    Free cash flow   $ 10,693     $ 49,695    
     
    HighPeak Energy, Inc.
    Unaudited Reconciliation of Net Income to Adjusted Net Income
    (in thousands, except per share data)
        Quarter Ended
    March 31, 2025
     
        Amounts   Amounts per Diluted Share  
    Net income   $ 36,335     $ 0.26    
    Derivative loss, net     7,927       0.06    
    Stock-based compensation     177       0.00    
    Income tax adjustment for above items *     (1,741 )     (0.01 )  
                       
    Adjusted net income   $ 42,698     $ 0.31    
                   
    * Assuming 21% statutory tax rate              
     

    Investor Contact:

    Ryan Hightower
    Vice President, Business Development
    817.850.9204
    rhightower@highpeakenergy.com

    Source: HighPeak Energy, Inc.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Amplify Energy Announces First Quarter 2025 Results, Beta Development Update and Updated Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (NYSE: AMPY) (“Amplify,” the “Company,” “us,” or “our”) announced today its operating and financial results for the first quarter of 2025 and updated full-year 2025 guidance for the Company.

    Beta Development Program Update

    • Amplify initiated a development drilling program in the prolific Beta oilfield in 2024 to demonstrate the significant upside potential of the asset and generate strong incremental cash flows for the Company, with results to date proving out the viability and long-term potential of the program
    • Completed the C54 well in mid-April 2025
      • Drilled well utilizing lessons learned from 2024 program including the implementation of a managed pressure drilling system
      • IP20 was approximately 800 Bopd, which has been the strongest initial well performance in the program
      • With the C54 online, the three wells completed in the D-Sand (our primary target formation) are all projected to have greater than 90% IRR at $60/bbl oil prices
    • Completed the C48 well in mid-February 2025 as the first C-Sand completion
      • Initially planned as a D-Sand completion, but due to drilling complications elected to complete the shallower C-Sand
      • Current production rate of approximately 100 BOPD
      • Well exhibits lower oil gravities and reservoir pressures than the D-Sand completions
      • Future injection support in the area to increase reservoir pressure and deliverability is expected to prove the C-Sand as a viable future target zone
    • With the recent completions of the C48 and C54, the field now has four new development wells online, which, after offsetting the asset’s base decline, have increased Beta production by approximately 35% since early 2024
    • Based on Beta development success, at year-end 2024 Amplify had 25 SEC Proved Undeveloped (“PUD”) locations (21 D-Sand locations) with approximately $144 million in PV-10 value1
      • D-Sand completions to date are significantly outperforming the type curve utilized in SEC PUD value/reserves indicating material upside above the current valuation estimate
      • Substantial future development remains at Beta beyond the current SEC PUD locations which are based on conservative volumetric and recovery factor assumptions

    First Quarter Highlights

    • During the first quarter of 2025, the Company:
      • Achieved average total production of 17.9 MBoepd
      • Generated net cash provided by operating activities of $25.5 million and a net loss of $5.9 million
      • Delivered Adjusted EBITDA of $19.4 million and Adjusted Net Income of $3.8 million
      • Generated $6.3 million in net proceeds from the sale of undeveloped Haynesville acreage in East Texas
        • In May 2025, sold additional Haynesville interests generating $1.5 million in proceeds
      • Generated $0.9 million of Adjusted EBITDA at Magnify Energy Services, Amplify’s wholly owned subsidiary (“Magnify”)
      • As of March 31, 2025, Amplify had $125.0 million outstanding under the revolving credit facility
        • Net debt to Last Twelve Months (“LTM”) Adjusted EBITDA of 1.3x2

    (1)   2024 Year End reserves are evaluated at flat pricing: (NYMEX WTI, HH) – $65.00, $4.00

    (2)   Net debt as of March 31, 2025, consisting of $125 MM outstanding under its revolving credit facility with ~$0 MM of cash and cash equivalents, and LTM Adjusted EBITDA as of the first quarter of 2025.

    Martyn Willsher, Amplify’s President and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “Amplify’s strong first quarter operating and financial results continue to demonstrate the significant value derived from the Company’s portfolio of assets. At Beta, we brought online two wells this year, which strengthen our conviction about the prolific untapped value that remains in the reservoir. In East Texas and the Eagle Ford, we anticipate our non-operated development projects will begin producing in the second quarter, with improved natural gas prices driving strong economics for our East Texas wells. Also, in East Texas, we recently monetized a portion of our undeveloped acreage with Haynesville rights in two separate transactions for net proceeds of $7.8 million dollars, while retaining an interest in over 30 gross locations to realize upside value in future periods.”

    Mr. Willsher continued, “In light of recent market volatility and a material reduction in oil prices, we conducted a comprehensive review of our remaining uncommitted 2025 capital budget and have elected to temporarily defer three development projects at Beta resulting in capital savings of approximately $15 million in 2025. While our Beta development projects have strong economics at current oil prices, we have flexibility on the timing of these projects and are committed to maintaining strong free cash flow and a healthy balance sheet for our investors. Our diversified portfolio of mature, low-decline assets and robust hedge book protect our cash flow profile during commodity downturns, allowing us the flexibility to scale up or down investments in either oil or gas projects depending on market conditions.”

    Mr. Willsher concluded, “Going forward, Amplify intends to focus on prudent management of its existing asset base to maximize free cash flow and is conducting a thorough review of additional operating and overhead cost-saving opportunities. The Company will also continue to evaluate portfolio optimization opportunities, which could enable us to accelerate Beta development.”

    Key Financial Results

    During the first quarter of 2025, the Company reported a net loss of approximately $5.9 million. The net loss was primarily attributable to a non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives during the period partially offset by a gain on the sale of East Texas properties. Excluding the impact of the non-cash unrealized loss on commodity derivatives, the East Texas divestiture, and additional other one-time impacts, Amplify generated Adjusted Net Income of $3.8 million in the first quarter of 2025.

    First quarter 2025 Adjusted EBITDA was $19.4 million, a decrease of approximately $2.4 million from the prior quarter. The decrease was primarily due to higher lease operating expense and general and administrative expense that are typically higher in the first quarter offset by stronger gas price realizations compared to the prior quarter.

    Free cash flow was negative $7.2 million for the first quarter, which was in-line with expectations, due to planned capital investments.

         
         
         
      First Quarter Fourth Quarter
    $ in millions  2025   2024 
    Net income (loss) ($5.9 ) ($7.4 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities $25.5   $12.5  
    Average daily production (MBoe/d) 17.9   18.5  
    Total revenues excluding hedges $72.1   $69.0  
    Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure) $19.4   $21.8  
    Adjusted net income (loss), (a non-GAAP financial measure) $3.8   $5.1  
    Total capital $23.1   $15.3  
    Free Cash Flow (a non-GAAP financial measure) ($7.2 ) $2.9  
         

    Revolving Credit Facility and Liquidity Update

    As of March 31, 2025, Amplify had total debt of $125 million under its revolving credit facility. Net debt to LTM Adjusted EBITDA was 1.3x (net debt as of March 31, 2025). The borrowing base is redetermined on a semi-annual basis with the next redetermination expected in the second quarter of 2025.

    Corporate Production and Pricing

    During the first quarter of 2025, average daily production was approximately 17.9 Mboepd, a decrease of 0.6 Mboepd from the prior quarter. The decrease in production was driven by natural gas and NGL volumes affected by a gas imbalance adjustment in East Texas and adverse weather in Oklahoma, causing widespread power outages. These temporary production issues were factored into the production guidance previously presented for 2025.

    The Company’s product mix for the quarter was 46% crude oil, 16% NGLs, and 38% natural gas.

        Three Months   Three Months
        Ended   Ended
        March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
             
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
      Bairoil 280     293  
      Beta 315     308  
      Oklahoma 393     436  
      East Texas / North Louisiana 570     609  
      Eagle Ford (Non-op) 49     60  
      Total – MBoe 1,607     1,706  
      Total – MBoe/d 17.9     18.5  
      % – Liquids 62 %   62 %
             

    Total oil, natural gas and NGL revenues for the first quarter of 2025 were approximately $70.3 million, before the impact of derivatives. The Company realized a net gain on commodity derivatives of $0.5 million during the first quarter. Oil, natural gas and NGL revenues, net of realized hedges, decreased $0.4 million for the first quarter compared to the prior quarter.

    The following table sets forth information regarding average realized sales prices for the periods indicated:

      Crude Oil ($/Bbl) NGLs ($/Bbl) Natural Gas ($/Mcf)
      Three Months
    Ended
    March 31,
    2025
      Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    March 31,
    2025
      Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
      Three Months
    Ended
    March 31,
    2025
      Three Months
    Ended
    December 31,
    2024
                           
    Average sales price exclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 67.82   $ 66.82   $ 25.24     $ 23.46     $ 3.87   $ 2.52  
    Realized derivatives   0.49     1.43                 0.04     0.76  
                           
    Average sales price with realized derivatives exclusive of certain deductions from revenue $ 68.31   $ 68.25   $ 25.24     $ 23.46     $ 3.91   $ 3.28  
    Certain deductions from revenue           (1.78 )     (1.37 )     0.02     (0.01 )
                           
    Average sales price inclusive of realized derivatives and certain deductions from revenue $ 68.31   $ 68.25   $ 23.46     $ 22.09     $ 3.93   $ 3.27  
                           

    Costs and Expenses

    Lease operating expenses in the first quarter of 2025 were approximately $37.4 million, or $23.28 per Boe, a $2.3 million increase compared to the prior quarter and in-line with internal projections. Lease operating expenses are expected to decrease in the second half of 2025 after cost savings projects are completed in Bairoil, and fewer expense workovers are conducted later in the year. Lease operating expenses do not reflect $0.9 million of income generated by Magnify in the first quarter.

    Severance and ad valorem taxes in the first quarter were approximately $4.4 million, a decrease of $1.0 million compared to $5.4 million in the prior quarter. Lower production taxes were primarily due to lower production and a one-time benefit from reversing a prior accrual for waste emissions charges. Severance and ad valorem taxes as a percentage of revenue were approximately 6.2% in the first quarter. The Company anticipates that taxes as a percentage of revenue will remain within its previously announced guidance range for 2025.

    Amplify incurred $4.3 million, or $2.67 per Boe, of gathering, processing and transportation expenses in the first quarter, compared to $4.5 million, or $2.62 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Cash G&A expenses in the first quarter were $7.3 million, down 7% compared to the first quarter of 2024, and in-line with expectations. The Company anticipates that quarterly cash G&A expenses will be significantly lower throughout the remainder of the year primarily due to annual year-end processes that impact various cost drivers in the first quarter. The Company expects costs to be in line with our previously announced guidance range.

    Depreciation, depletion and amortization expense in the first quarter totaled $8.5 million, or $5.29 per Boe, compared to $8.4 million, or $4.93 per Boe, in the prior quarter.

    Net interest expense was $3.5 million in the first quarter, a decrease of $0.2 million compared to $3.7 million in the prior quarter.

    Amplify recorded minimal current income tax expense for the first quarter of 2025.

    Capital Investment Update

    Cash capital investment during the first quarter of 2025 was approximately $23.1 million. During the first quarter, the Company’s capital allocation was approximately 55% for development drilling, recompletions and facility projects at Beta, and approximately 30% for non-operated development projects in East Texas and the Eagle Ford, with the remainder distributed across the Company’s other assets.

    The following table details Amplify’s capital invested during the first quarter of 2025:

      First Quarter
      2025 Capital
      ($ MM)
    Bairoil $ 1.3
    Beta $ 12.7
    Oklahoma $ 1.4
    East Texas / North Louisiana $ 3.4
    Eagle Ford (Non-op) $ 3.9
    Magnify Energy Services $ 0.3
    Total Capital Invested $ 23.1
       

    2025 Operations & Development Plan

    Amplify has adjusted its 2025 operations and development plan for the current lower commodity price environment. The Company is electing to reduce discretionary development capital at Beta for the second half of 2025, while our previously committed non-operated projects in East Texas and the Eagle Ford are expected to be completed and brought online in the second quarter.

    Amplify’s current plan is to complete three wells at Beta in 2025, including the C48 and C54 wells, which were brought online in mid-February and mid-April, respectively. Amplify intends to drill and complete its next Beta well in the third quarter, which will be a D-Sand completion drilled in the same fault block as the recently completed C54 and the C59, which was completed in October 2024 and is still producing greater than 500 bopd. With the exceptional economics at Beta, Amplify will consider adding back development wells later this year should commodity prices improve.

    Other capital at Beta for 2025 includes $8 million to upgrade a two-mile pipeline that ships all produced fluid from platform Eureka to platform Elly, facility upgrades and capital workovers. Additional information regarding the Beta development plan can be found in the Company’s investor presentation under the investor relations section of the website.

    In East Texas, we are participating in the completion of four non-operated development projects, which we expect to be online in late second quarter. Operators in the area are taking advantage of strong natural gas prices and favorable economics, and the Company anticipates more activity in this area. For the Company’s operated assets, the team is focused on prudent management of the field, such as optimizing field compression, artificial lift enhancement, and equipment insourcing, which is expected to improve the production profile and lower lease operating costs.

    Also in East Texas, as previously announced, Amplify sold 90% of its interest in certain units with Haynesville rights in Harrison County, Texas, in addition to 11 gross operated wells, and purchased a 10% interest in adjacent acreage, generating $6.3 million in net proceeds from the sale. This transaction also established an area of mutual interest (“AMI”) with the counterparty covering 10,000 gross acres. We estimate the AMI has more than 30 potential gross drilling locations.

    In May 2025, Amplify completed a separate transaction, which monetized 90% of its interests in three additional units with Haynesville rights in Panola and Shelby Counties, finalizing a separate AMI consisting of seven total units. Amplify also retained a 10% working interest with the ability to participate in any well drilled within the boundary of the AMI. Upon closing the transaction, Amplify generated approximately $1.5 million in proceeds.

    From November 2024 to present, Amplify has generated proceeds of $9.2 million related to Haynesville acreage transactions, while retaining a 10% working interest in two newly created AMIs in the Haynesville play of East Texas.

    In the Eagle Ford, we are participating in 14 gross (0.7 net) new development wells and two gross (0.4 net) recompletion projects. These non-operated wells, with highly accretive forecasted returns, have been completed and are scheduled to come online in early May. The Company is also evaluating additional development opportunities recently offered by our partners in fields where we have interests.

    Updated Full-Year 2025 Guidance

    Based on recent reductions to crude oil prices, Amplify has decided to modify its capital plans in order to maintain positive free cash flow in 2025. As a result of these modifications, we are providing updated guidance. The following guidance is subject to the cautionary statements and limitations described under the “Forward-Looking Statements” caption at the end of this press release. Amplify’s updated 2025 guidance is based on its current expectations regarding capital investment and full-year 2025 commodity prices for crude oil of $61.75/Bbl (WTI) and natural gas of $3.60/MMBtu (Henry Hub), and on the assumption that market demand and prices for oil and natural gas will continue at levels that allow for economic production of these products. Additionally, the Company expects to invest approximately 95% of its capital in the first three quarters of the year primarily in connection with the Beta development program and for non-operated development projects in East Texas and the Eagle Ford.

    A summary of the guidance is presented below:

      March 5, 2025
      March 7, 2025
      Previous Guidance   Updated Guidance
                   
      FY 2025E   FY 2025E
                   
      Low   High   Low   High
                   
    Net Average Daily Production              
    Oil (MBbls/d) 8.5 9.4   8.3 8.9
    NGL (MBbls/d) 3.0 3.3   3.0 3.3
    Natural Gas (MMcf/d) 45.0 51.0   45.0 50.0
    Total (MBoe/d) 19.0 21.0   19.0 20.5
                   
    Commodity Price Differential / Realizations (Unhedged)              
    Oil Differential ($ / Bbl) ($3.25) ($4.25)   ($3.25) ($4.25)
    NGL Realized Price (% of WTI NYMEX) 27% 31%   27% 31%
    Natural Gas Realized Price (% of Henry Hub) 85% 92%   85% 92%
                   
    Other Revenue              
    Magnify Energy Services ($ MM) $4 $6   $4 $6
    Other ($ MM) $2 $3   $2 $3
    Total ($ MM) $6 $9   $6 $9
                   
    Gathering, Processing and Transportation Costs              
    Oil ($ / Bbl) $0.65 $0.85   $0.65 $0.85
    NGL ($ / Bbl) $2.75 $4.00   $2.75 $4.00
    Natural Gas ($ / Mcf) $0.55 $0.75   $0.55 $0.75
    Total ($ / Boe) $2.25 $2.85   $2.25 $2.85
                   
    Average Costs              
    Lease Operating ($ / Boe) $18.50 $20.50   $18.50 $20.50
    Taxes (% of Revenue) (1) 6.0% 7.0%   6.0% 7.0%
    Cash General and Administrative ($ / Boe) (2)(3) $3.40 $3.90   $3.40 $3.90
                   
    Adjusted EBITDA ($ MM) (2)(3) $100 $120   $80 $110
    Cash Interest Expense ($ MM) $12 $18   $12 $18
    Capital Investment ($ MM) $70 $80   $55 $70
    Free Cash Flow ($ MM) (2)(3) $10 $30   $10 $20
                   

    (1) Includes production, ad valorem and franchise taxes
    (2) Refer to “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for Amplify’s definition and use of cash G&A, Adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow, non-GAAP measures (cash income taxes, which are not included in free cash flow, are expected to range between $0 – $1 million for the year)
    (3) Amplify believes that a quantitative reconciliation of such forward-looking information to the most comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP cannot be made available without unreasonable efforts. A reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures would require Amplify to predict the timing and likelihood of future transactions and other items that are difficult to accurately predict. Neither of these forward-looking measures, nor their probable significance, can be quantified with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Accordingly, a reconciliation of the most directly comparable forward-looking GAAP measures is not provided.

    Hedging

    Amplify maintains a robust hedge book to support its cash flow profile and provide downside protection in weak commodity environments. Recently, the Company added to its hedge position, further protecting future cash flows.

    Amplify executed crude oil swaps covering the first half of 2026 at a weighted average price of $62.55 per barrel and the first half of 2027 with a weighted average price of $61.93 per barrel. The Company also added natural gas swaps covering 2026 at a weighted average price of $4.12 per MMBtu, collars for the first quarter of 2026 with a weighted average floor of $4.50 per MMBtu and a weighted average ceiling of $5.73 and natural gas collars for 2027 with a weighted average floor of $3.57 per MMBtu and a weighted average ceiling of $4.58 per MMBtu.

    The following table reflects the hedged volumes under Amplify’s commodity derivative contracts and the average fixed floor and ceiling prices at which production is hedged for April 2025 through December 2027, as of May 12, 2025:

      2025   2026   2027
               
    Natural Gas Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   560,000     515,000     137,500
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 3.75   $ 3.80   $ 4.01
               
    Natural Gas Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (MMBtu)   500,000     517,500     437,500
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 3.90   $ 4.11   $ 4.21
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 3.50   $ 3.58   $ 3.56
               
    Oil Swaps:          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   141,444     125,500     30,667
    Weighted Average Fixed Price ($) $ 70.61   $ 66.40   $ 61.93
               
    Oil Collars:          
    Two-way collars          
    Average Monthly Volume (Bbls)   45,333        
    Weighted Average Ceiling Price ($) $ 80.20        
    Weighted Average Floor Price ($) $ 70.00        
               

    Amplify has posted an updated investor presentation containing additional hedging information on its website, www.amplifyenergy.com, under the Investor Relations section.

    Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q

    Amplify’s financial statements and related footnotes will be available in its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, which Amplify expects to file with the SEC on May 12, 2025.

    About Amplify Energy

    Amplify Energy Corp. is an independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition, development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas properties. Amplify’s operations are focused in Oklahoma, the Rockies (Bairoil), federal waters offshore Southern California (Beta), East Texas / North Louisiana, and the Eagle Ford (Non-op). For more information, visit www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Conference Call

    Amplify will host an investor teleconference tomorrow at 10 a.m. Central Time to discuss these operating and financial results. Interested parties may join the call by dialing (888) 999-3182 at least 15 minutes before the call begins and providing the Conference ID: AEC1Q25. A telephonic replay will be available for fourteen days following the call by dialing (800) 654-1563 and providing the Access Code: 52458798. A transcript and a recorded replay of the call will also be available on our website after the call.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Terminology such as “may,” “will,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “project,” “intend,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “pursue,” “target,” “outlook,” “continue,” the negative of such terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These statements include, but are not limited to, statements about the Company’s expectations of plans, goals, strategies (including measures to implement strategies), objectives and anticipated results with respect thereto. These statements address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future, including things such as projections of results of operations, plans for growth, goals, future capital expenditures, competitive strengths, references to future intentions and other such references. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause the Company’s actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. These include risks and uncertainties relating to, among other things: the Company’s evaluation and implementation of strategic alternatives; risks related to the redetermination of the borrowing base under the Company’s revolving credit facility; the Company’s ability to satisfy debt obligations; the Company’s need to make accretive acquisitions or substantial capital expenditures to maintain its declining asset base, including the existence of unanticipated liabilities or problems relating to acquired or divested business or properties; volatility in the prices for oil, natural gas and NGLs; the Company’s ability to access funds on acceptable terms, if at all, because of the terms and conditions governing the Company’s indebtedness, including financial covenants; general political and economic conditions, globally and in the jurisdictions in which we operate, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, trade wars and the potential destabilizing effect such conflicts may pose for the global oil and natural gas markets; expectations regarding general economic conditions, including inflation; and the impact of local, state and federal governmental regulations, including those related to climate change and hydraulic fracturing, and potential changes in these regulations. Please read the Company’s filings with the SEC, including “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, and if applicable, the Company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K, which are available on the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://www.amplifyenergy.com/investor-relations/sec-filings/default.aspx or on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov, for a discussion of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those in such forward-looking statements. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. All forward-looking statements in this press release are qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Except as required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future results or otherwise.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    This press release and accompanying schedules include the non-GAAP financial measures of Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted Net Income (Loss), free cash flow, net debt, PV-10 and cash G&A. The accompanying schedules provide a reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures to their most directly comparable financial measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered as alternatives to GAAP measures such as net income, operating income, net cash flows provided by operating activities, standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows, or any other measure of financial performance calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP. Amplify’s non-GAAP financial measures may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies because they may not calculate such measures in the same manner as Amplify does.

    Adjusted EBITDA. Amplify defines Adjusted EBITDA as net income (loss) plus Interest expense, net; Income tax expense (benefit); DD&A; Accretion of AROs; Loss or (gain) on commodity derivative instruments; Cash settlements received or (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments; Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives; Losses or (gains) on sale of properties; Share-based compensation expenses; Exploration costs; Acquisition and divestiture related costs; Loss on settlement of AROs; Bad debt expense; and Pipeline incident loss. Adjusted EBITDA is commonly used as a supplemental financial measure by management and external users of Amplify’s financial statements, such as investors, research analysts and rating agencies, to assess: (1) its operating performance as compared to other companies in Amplify’s industry without regard to financing methods, capital structures or historical cost basis; (2) the ability of its assets to generate cash sufficient to pay interest and support Amplify’s indebtedness; and (3) the viability of projects and the overall rates of return on alternative investment opportunities. Since Adjusted EBITDA excludes some, but not all, items that affect net income or loss and because these measures may vary among other companies, the Adjusted EBITDA data presented in this press release may not be comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to Adjusted EBITDA are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Adjusted Net Income (Loss). Amplify defines Adjusted Net Income (Loss) as net income (loss) adjusted for unrealized loss (gain) on commodity derivative instruments, acquisition and divestiture-related expenses, unusual and infrequent items, and the income tax expense or benefit of these adjustments using our federal statutory tax rate. Adjusted Net Income (Loss) excludes the impact of unusual and infrequent items affecting earnings that vary widely and unpredictably. This measure is not meant to disassociate these items from management’s performance but rather is intended to provide helpful information to investors interested in comparing our performance between periods. Adjusted Net Income (Loss) is not considered to be an alternative to net income (loss) reported in accordance with GAAP.

    Free cash flow. Amplify defines free cash flow as Adjusted EBITDA, less cash interest expense and capital expenditures. Free cash flow is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it serves as an indicator of the Company’s success in providing a cash return on investment. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to free cash flow are net income and net cash provided by operating activities.

    Net debt. Amplify defines net debt as the total principal amount drawn on the revolving credit facility less cash and cash equivalents. The Company uses net debt as a measure of financial position and believes this measure provides useful additional information to investors to evaluate the Company’s capital structure and financial leverage.

    PV-10. PV-10 is a non-GAAP financial measure that represents the present value of estimated future cash inflows from proved oil and natural gas reserves that are calculated using the unweighted arithmetic average first-day-of-the-month prices for the prior 12 months, less future development and operating costs, discounted at 10% per annum to reflect the timing of future cash flows. The most directly comparable GAAP measure to PV-10 is standardized measure. PV-10 differs from standardized measure in its treatment of estimated future income taxes, which are excluded from PV-10. Amplify believes the presentation of PV-10 provides useful information because it is widely used by investors in evaluating oil and natural gas companies without regard to specific income tax characteristics of such entities. PV-10 is not intended to represent the current market value of our estimated proved reserves. PV-10 should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the standardized measure as defined under GAAP. As GAAP does not prescribe a comparable GAAP measure for PV-10 of reserves adjusted for pricing sensitives, it is not practicable for us to reconcile PV-10 to a standardized measure or any other GAAP measure.

    Cash G&A. Amplify defines cash G&A as general and administrative expense, less share-based compensation expense; acquisition and divestiture costs; bad debt expense; and severance payments. Cash G&A is an important non-GAAP financial measure for Amplify’s investors since it allows for analysis of G&A spend without regard to share-based compensation and other non-recurring expenses which can vary substantially from company to company. The GAAP measures most directly comparable to cash G&A is total G&A expenses.

    Contacts

    Jim Frew — Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    (832) 219-9044
    jim.frew@amplifyenergy.com

    Michael Jordan — Director, Finance and Treasurer
    (832) 219-9051
    michael.jordan@amplifyenergy.com

    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)

    Amplify Energy Corp.      
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Statements of Operations Data      
             
        Three Months   Three Months
        Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
             
    Revenues:      
      Oil and natural gas sales $ 70,341     $ 67,189  
      Other revenues   1,709       1,832  
      Total revenues   72,050       69,021  
             
    Costs and Expenses:      
      Lease operating expense   37,417       35,100  
      Pipeline incident loss   396       2,405  
      Gathering, processing and transportation   4,286       4,468  
      Exploration   6       10  
      Taxes other than income   4,384       5,356  
      Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,494       8,418  
      General and administrative expense   10,815       9,486  
      Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,183       2,156  
      Realized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   (503 )     (4,052 )
      Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   14,820       13,357  
      (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (6,251 )     (1,367 )
      Other, net   (3 )     334  
      Total costs and expenses   76,044       75,671  
             
    Operating Income (loss)   (3,994 )     (6,650 )
             
    Other Income (Expense):      
      Interest expense, net   (3,519 )     (3,684 )
      Other income (expense)   115       (113 )
      Total other income (expense)   (3,404 )     (3,797 )
             
      Income (loss) before reorganization items, net and income taxes   (7,398 )     (10,447 )
             
    Income tax benefit (expense) – current   (1 )     2,132  
    Income tax benefit (expense) – deferred   1,538       886  
             
      Net income (loss) $ (5,861 )   $ (7,429 )
             
    Earnings per share:      
      Basic and diluted earnings (loss) per share $ (0.15 )   $ (0.19 )
             
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Operating Statistics      
               
          Three Months   Three Months
          Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per unit data) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
               
    Oil and natural gas revenue:      
      Oil Sales $ 49,982   $ 50,817
      NGL Sales   6,157     6,602
      Natural Gas Sales   14,202     9,770
      Total oil and natural gas sales – Unhedged $ 70,341   $ 67,189
               
    Production volumes:      
      Oil Sales – MBbls   737     760
      NGL Sales – MBbls   263     299
      Natural Gas Sales – MMcf   3,647     3,883
      Total – MBoe   1,607     1,706
      Total – MBoe/d   17.9     18.5
               
    Average sales price (excluding commodity derivatives):      
      Oil – per Bbl $ 67.82   $ 66.82
      NGL – per Bbl $ 23.46   $ 22.09
      Natural gas – per Mcf $ 3.89   $ 2.52
      Total – per Boe $ 43.76   $ 39.37
               
    Average unit costs per Boe:      
      Lease operating expense $ 23.28   $ 20.57
      Gathering, processing and transportation $ 2.67   $ 2.62
      Taxes other than income $ 2.73   $ 3.14
      General and administrative expense $ 6.73   $ 5.56
      Realized gain/(loss) on commodity derivatives $ 0.31   $ 2.38
      Depletion, depreciation, and amortization $ 5.29   $ 4.93
               
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Asset Operating Statistics      
             
        Three Months   Three Months
        Ended   Ended
        March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
             
    Production volumes – MBOE:      
      Bairoil   280       293  
      Beta   315       308  
      Oklahoma   393       436  
      East Texas / North Louisiana   570       609  
      Eagle Ford (Non-op)   49       60  
      Total – MBoe   1,607       1,706  
      Total – MBoe/d   17.9       18.5  
      % – Liquids   62 %     62 %
             
    Lease operating expense – $M:      
      Bairoil $ 13,732     $ 11,800  
      Beta   13,305       12,113  
      Oklahoma   3,856       3,948  
      East Texas / North Louisiana   4,981       5,887  
      Eagle Ford (Non-op)   1,542       1,351  
      Total Lease operating expense: $ 37,416     $ 35,099  
             
    Capital expenditures – $M:      
      Bairoil $ 1,322     $ 190  
      Beta   12,733       10,001  
      Oklahoma   1,445       168  
      East Texas / North Louisiana   3,449       2,758  
      Eagle Ford (Non-op)   3,905       2,125  
      Magnify Energy Services   263       82  
      Total Capital expenditures: $ 23,117     $ 15,324  
             
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited              
    Balance Sheet Data              
                       
    (Amounts in $000s) March 31, 2025
      December 31, 2024
                       
    Assets              
      Cash and Cash Equivalents $     $  
      Accounts Receivable   35,893       39,713  
      Other Current Assets   24,296       32,064  
        Total Current Assets $ 60,189     $ 71,777  
                       
      Net Oil and Gas Properties $ 400,770     $ 386,218  
      Other Long-Term Assets   292,680       289,081  
        Total Assets $ 753,639     $ 747,076  
                       
    Liabilities              
      Accounts Payable $ 19,863     $ 13,231  
      Accrued Liabilities   40,343       43,413  
      Other Current Liabilities   18,658       11,494  
        Total Current Liabilities $ 78,864     $ 68,138  
                       
      Long-Term Debt $ 125,000     $ 127,000  
      Asset Retirement Obligation   131,158       129,700  
      Other Long-Term Liabilities   15,680       13,326  
        Total Liabilities $ 350,702     $ 338,164  
                       
    Shareholders’ Equity              
      Common Stock & APIC $ 440,266     $ 440,380  
      Accumulated Earnings (Deficit)   (37,329 )     (31,468 )
        Total Shareholders’ Equity $ 402,937     $ 408,912  
                       
    Selected Financial Data – Unaudited      
    Statements of Cash Flows Data      
           
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
           
           
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ 25,501     $ 12,455  
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities   (21,497 )     (19,379 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities   (4,004 )     6,924  
           
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)      
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures    
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow      
             
        Three Months   Three Months
        Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
             
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
      Net cash provided by operating activities $ 25,501     $ 12,455  
      Changes in working capital   (5,372 )     4,770  
      Interest expense, net   3,519       3,684  
      Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       159  
      Amortization and write-off of deferred financing fees   (315 )     (315 )
      Exploration costs   6       10  
      Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,629       1,424  
      Plugging and abandonment cost   171       754  
      Current income tax expense (benefit)   1       (2,132 )
      Pipeline incident loss   396       2,405  
      (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (6,251 )     (1,367 )
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 19,444     $ 21,847  
             
    Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Cash Provided from Operating Activities:    
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 19,444     $ 21,847  
      Less: Cash interest expense   3,545       3,598  
      Less: Capital expenditures   23,117       15,324  
    Free Cash Flow: $ (7,218 )   $ 2,925  
             
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)      
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures    
    Adjusted EBITDA and Free Cash Flow      
             
        Three Months   Three Months
        Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
             
    Reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income (Loss):      
      Net income (loss) $ (5,861 )   $ (7,429 )
      Interest expense, net   3,519       3,684  
      Income tax expense (benefit) – current   1       (2,132 )
      Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (1,538 )     (886 )
      Depreciation, depletion and amortization   8,494       8,418  
      Accretion of asset retirement obligations   2,183       2,156  
      (Gains) losses on commodity derivatives   14,317       9,305  
      Cash settlements received (paid) on expired commodity derivative instruments   503       4,052  
      Amortization of gain associated with terminated commodity derivatives   159       159  
      Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,629       1,424  
      Share-based compensation expense   1,890       1,686  
      (Gain) loss on sale of properties   (6,251 )     (1,367 )
      Exploration costs   6       10  
      Loss on settlement of AROs   (3 )     334  
      Bad debt expense         28  
      Pipeline incident loss   396       2,405  
    Adjusted EBITDA: $ 19,444     $ 21,847  
             
      Reconciliation of Free Cash Flow to Net Income (Loss):      
      Adjusted EBITDA: $ 19,444     $ 21,847  
      Less: Cash interest expense   3,545       3,598  
      Less: Capital expenditures   23,117       15,324  
      Free Cash Flow: $ (7,218 )   $ 2,925  
             
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)      
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures    
    Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted Net Income (Loss)      
               
          Three Months   Three Months
          Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s, except per share data) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
               
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income (Loss):      
      Net income (loss) $ (5,861 )   $ (7,429 )
      Unrealized (gain) loss on commodity derivatives   14,820       13,357  
      Acquisition and divestiture related costs   1,629       1,424  
      Non-recurring costs:      
        Income tax expense (benefit) – deferred   (1,538 )     (886 )
        Gain on sale of properties   (6,251 )     (1,367 )
      Tax effect of adjustments   971       (12 )
        Adjusted net income (loss) $ 3,770     $ 5,087  
               
    Selected Operating and Financial Data (Tables)          
    Reconciliation of Unaudited GAAP Financial Measures to Non-GAAP Financial Measures      
    Cash General and Administrative Expenses          
               
      Three Months   Three Months
      Ended   Ended
    (Amounts in $000s) March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
               
    General and administrative expense $ 10,815   $ 9,486
    Less: Share-based compensation expense   1,890     1,686
    Less: Acquisition and divestiture costs   1,629     1,424
    Less: Bad debt expense       28
    Less: Severance payments      
    Total Cash General and Administrative Expense $ 7,296   $ 6,348
               

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Don Davis Joins Global Security Leaders at the London Defence Conference 2025

    Source: US Congressman Don Davis (NC-01)

    London, U.K.  Congressman Don Davis (NC-01), a U.S. Air Force veteran and the vice ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, participated in a panel at the London Defence Conference 2025 entitled “Facing China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK),” focused on emerging threats to the post-World War II global order and the strengthening alliance between CRINK nations. The conference took place during the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe (VE) Day marking the end of World War II.

    With its theme of “Alliances,” the London Defence Conference 2025 comes at a crucial moment in global affairs. The U.S.-led network of alliances is facing internal strains and threats to its continued existence. The panel discussions on these topics took place among former heads of state, members of the U.S. Congress, members of the British Parliament, and non-government foreign policy experts.

    “The importance of these discussions is growing as we face emerging global threats. Our shared defense remains essential for safeguarding democracies around the world,” said Congressman Don Davis. “As we commemorate the 80th anniversary of VE Day, we are reminded of the enduring value of our allies. We must maintain unity in addressing threats posed by countries such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other global extremists.”

    During the “Facing CRINK” panel, participants addressed emerging threats  to the post-World War II global order and emphasized the importance of reinforcing alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

    Specific topics included Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, belligerence from the People’s Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific, and Iran’s malign actions in the Gulf. Panelists discussed best practices for uniting the free world and ensuring internal political divisions do not divide the West against common foes.

    Congressman Don Davis serves as the vice ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee and sits on the Subcommittees on Tactical Air and Land Forces and Readiness. He graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1994, a co-chair of the For Country Caucus and is a veteran of the U.S. Air Force.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Court of Justice of the European Union – P10_TA(2025)0080 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IV – Court of Justice of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0050/2025),

    A.  whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B.  whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the Union, having the task of ensuring compliance with Union law by overseeing the uniform interpretation and application of the Treaties and ensuring the lawfulness of measures adopted by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies;

    C.  whereas the CJEU helps preserving the values of the Union and, through its case-law, works towards the building of Europe;

    D.  whereas the CJEU comprises two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court;

    E.  whereas Parliament and Council amended Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the CJEU (the ‘Statute’)(1) in 2024 with respect to the transfer of preliminary rulings in specific areas to the jurisdiction of the General Court;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the CJEU falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the CJEU’s budget of approximately EUR 0,5 billion represents approximately 3,9 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’) examined a sample of 70 transactions under the heading ‘Administration’, 10 more than were examined in 2022; the Court further states that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for approximately 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology (IT), and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3.  Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4.  Notes that the Court’s report did not identify any specific issues concerning the CJEU;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the budget allocated for the CJEU in 2023 amounted to EUR 486 025 796, which represented an increase of 3,9 % compared to 2022; notes that this increase was mainly related to salary adjustments forecasted for 2023; stresses that the budget of the CJEU is essentially administrative, with around 75 % of the appropriations related to expenditure for its members and staff, and almost all of the rest related to expenditure for buildings and IT;

    6.  Notes that the overall implementation rate of the budget at the end of 2023 was 97,72 %; notes that five transfers were submitted to the budgetary authority in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation to reinforce the budget lines for ‘Energy consumption’, ‘Purchases, work, servicing and maintenance of equipment and software’ and ‘buildings’ from other budget lines, mainly the budget line for staff ‘Remuneration and allowances’; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure for the CJEU, including through rising inflation and salary adjustments, strongly increasing energy costs and costs for a number of goods and services;

    7.  Notes with satisfaction that the authorising officer by delegation declared that the resources allocated had been used for the purpose intended and in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and that the control procedures put in place provided the necessary guarantees as to the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions;

    8.  Notes that the average payment time stood at 23,1 days in 2023 compared to 24,32 days in 2022; calls on the CJEU to continue its efforts to reduce the time for payment, particularly considering that 81 % of invoices were received electronically in 2023;

    9.  Notes that the CJEU’s mission budget, which stood at EUR 638 000 for both staff and Members in 2023, continued to decrease by 3,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022; notes that 85,1 % of the appropriations for missions in 2023 were used compared to 46,6 % in 2022 due to the persistent travel restrictions in application at that time;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    10.  Notes the significant steps taken by the CJEU in 2023 towards its judicial reform which has led to the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court; notes that a political agreement with Parliament and Council was reached at the end of 2023 in view of the amendment to the Statute of the CJEU and with a view to improving the functioning of the CJEU against the background of a steady increase in the caseload and in the complexity and sensitive nature of questions raised; notes that, further to the adoption of the reform in 2024, detailed rules and procedures were adopted in order to complete the reform and allow the implementation of the new regulatory framework as of 1 October 2024;

    11.  Notes that, in 2023, the Court of Justice ruled on five cases concerning the principle of primacy in the context of four preliminary rulings brought by the courts in Germany, Ireland, Poland, and Romania, as well as one infringement case concerning Poland; stresses the fundamental importance of the principle of primacy of Union law, which ensures the uniform interpretation and application of Union law across all Member States and safeguards the rule of law as a core value of the Union; strongly reaffirms that the primacy of Union law is the cornerstone of the Union’s legal order and highlights the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the Union. Furthermore, notes that the General Court ruled on six cases related to measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law by the Hungarian government, which systematically undermines core Union values; urges the Commission to take decisive enforcement actions against any Member State that challenges or disregards the binding nature of CJEU rulings; highlights that, in cases relating to the investigation of the Union budget, the principles of due process and fundamental rights must be fully respected by all competent authorities;

    12.  Notes that Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union states that “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions […]”;

    13.  Condemns any national measures or legislative actions that seek to undermine the codification and enforcement of CJEU judgments; calls for the establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism to track Member State compliance with CJEU rulings and recommends linking compliance with EU funding disbursement under the rule of law conditionality framework;

    14.  Notes that 821 new cases were submitted to the Court of Justice in 2023, compared to 806 in 2022, out of which 63 % were references for preliminary ruling and 28,6 % were appeals against decisions of the General Court; notes that the General Court saw a major increase of cases with 1 271 new cases in 2023 compared to 904 in 2022, including an exceptional series of 404 joint cases submitted in October 2023; notes that in 2023 for the General Court, 37 % of the new cases, including the series of 404 joint cases, concerned actions relating to institutional law, 24,3 % concerned actions relating to intellectual property and 6 % concerned disputes between institutions of the Union and their staff; notes that the total number of pending cases remains stable when compared to previous years: considering the previously mentioned 404 cases as a single case, 2 587 cases were pending at the end of 2023, compared to 2 585 at the end of 2022 and 2 541 at the end of 2021;

    15.  Notes that the Court of Justice closed 783 cases in 2023, compared to 808 in 2022, and that the General Court closed 904 cases in 2023, compared to 858 in 2022;

    16.  Welcomes the decrease in the average length of proceedings for the cases closed by the Court of Justice, whereas in 2023 that average was 16,1 months, compared to 16,4 months in 2022; notes that the average duration for the cases closed by the General Court was 18,2 months, compared to 16,2 months in 2022, which the General Court explained was due to the nature and related complexity of the proceedings managed in 2023;

    17.  Notes the decrease in the average time taken to deal with direct actions before the Court of Justice (from 23,5 months in 2022 to 20,8 months in 2023) and with references for preliminary rulings (from 17,3 months to 16,8 months); notes that, as regards the litigation before the Court of Justice, there was a significant increase in the number of direct actions, in particular in the field of the environment, and that the questions referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in 2023 related principally to the area of freedom, security and justice, followed by taxation, consumer protection and transport; notes that, as regards the litigation before the General Court, there was an increase of cases in the fields of intellectual property and economic and monetary policy, including banking;

    18.  Notes with satisfaction the high use rate of e-Curia in 2023, with 10 502 e-Curia accounts being registered: 94 % of lodgements before the General Court were made via e-Curia, which is the same as in 2022, while the use rate of e-Curia at the Court of Justice went up to approximately 89 %, compared to 87 % in 2022;

    19.  Appreciates the progress made in digitising the judicial archives with a view to preserving documents for future consultation and facilitating access for researchers and the public by means of a digital portal;

    20.  Welcomes the performance-based approach developed by the CJEU, allowing the CJEU to take decisions based on performance outcomes and the level of achievement of its objectives, measured through a set of workload and operational indicators; notes that the key performance indicators used by the CJEU cover a wide range of specific areas in support of the five management objectives relating to the proper functioning of the CJEU, digitalisation and emerging technologies, openness and transparency, multilingualism and human resources management;

    21.  Notes that the internal control framework of the CJEU was subject to an in-depth evaluation in 2022-2023, which confirmed its soundness; notes that, as part of that evaluation, the financial control circuits were adapted in order to make the controls more efficient;

    22.  Notes that the main internal audits carried out in 2023 concerned the CJEU’s expenditure on the cleaning of buildings, the effectiveness of the internal control system to safeguard the CJEU’s IT assets and the staff selection procedures; notes that an internal audit also carried out a study on the use of artificial intelligence in the area of justice in relation to the implementation of a “strategy for integrating tools based on artificial intelligence into the operation of the CJEU”; notes that, in many cases, the services of the CJEU took actions to implement the internal audit recommendations before the formal finalisation of the internal audits and that those actions were considered satisfactory by the internal auditor;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the CJEU employed 1340 officials (58 %), 765 temporary agents (33 %) under Articles 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Staff of the EU, and 198 contract agents (9 %); notes that, at the end of 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan stood at 97,11 %; notes further that the annual turnover of staff was 7,8 % in 2023, which was particularly due to the 20 % of those staff who left the CJEU by taking retirement;

    24.  Notes that the Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and 11 Advocates General and that no new Judge or Advocate General took office in 2023; notes further that the General Court is composed of 54 Judges and that two new Judges, one woman and one man, took office during 2023; notes further that a new Registrar for the General Court was elected in 2023;

    25.  Welcomes the CJEU’s detailed responses to the questionnaire from Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control, provided as part of the current discharge procedure, particularly regarding staff distribution at the end of 2023; notes that the gender composition of the Court of Justice and the General Court continues to be very unbalanced; expresses its appreciation of the letter from the President of the General Court to the President of the Conference of the Representatives of the Member States in 2024, calling on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of Judges and Advocates General; calls on Member States to take the need for gender balance into account when nominating candidates for the replacement of judges;

    26.  Takes note that, of the 2 303 officials and agents serving at the end of 2023, 61 % are women; welcomes the fact that the proportion of women in administrative positions is 55 %, and especially the fact that, in managerial posts, the proportion has increased to 43 %, compared to 40 % in 2022 and 2021, confirming the upward trend recorded since 2018 (41 % in 2020, 39 % in 2019 and 37,5 % in 2018); notes however that representation of women was the highest in assistant grades, whereas it was the lowest in senior management positions; calls on the CJEU to ensure a greater representation of women in senior management positions and take further measures to promote gender balance at all levels; welcomes the efforts deployed by the CJEU in favour of equality, inclusion and diversity, especially at recruitment stage;

    27.  Calls on the CJEU to publish an annual Gender and Diversity Report to provide transparency on gender representation at all levels of the institution, including Judges, Advocates General, and administrative staff, as well as to provide for concrete measures of improving gender parity in senior positions;

    28.  Welcomes that all Union nationalities are represented in the staff of the CJEU, but notes that certain nationalities are more represented than others; welcomes the continued efforts of the CJEU to promote a better geographical balance among its staff, in particular by fostering the visibility and attractiveness of its job vacancies, creating and offering more favourable job conditions to attract temporary agents from certain less-represented Member States and communicating widely to varied audiences on the job opportunities at the CJEU in 2023; notes that a significant effort was made to attract many talented young people from different Member States though the CJEU’s internship programme; invites the CJEU to examine whether trainees are proportionally represented from all member states;

    29.  Urges the CJEU to promote a multilingual working environment, recognizing its potential to enhance the fair distribution of nationalities among its staff; calls on all EU institutions to uphold and ensure the principle of multilingualism;

    30.  Welcomes the work done by the High Level Interinstitutional Group on enhancing the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work for staff; calls on the CJEU to maintain and enhance cooperation with other Luxembourg-based institutions across different initiatives; notes with appreciation that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations in order to allow the granting of a housing allowance to staff at lower grades, as recommended by the High Level Interinstitutional Group; asks that Parliament be updated on the progress of such initiatives intended to improve the attractiveness of Luxembourg as a place of work;

    31.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU implemented several initiatives to promote physical and mental wellbeing of staff through specialised workshops and awareness-raising activities; notes that the teleworking scheme, which entered into force on 1 May 2022, was assessed positively by the managers, among whom 92 % replied that the productivity of staff teleworking was either equivalent or better than prior to the existence of the teleworking scheme; notes that, with a view to achieving a better work and personal-life balance, in 2023, the CJEU renewed the possibility for its staff to telework from outside the place of employment up to 10 days per year, especially during the judicial vacations;

    32.  Welcomes the ongoing awareness-raising, information and training campaigns aiming at promoting inclusion, mutual respect, cooperation and support for people with disabilities and their helpers;

    33.  Notes that the number of working days of sick leave was 20 198 in 2023, corresponding to a reduction of 14,78 % compared to 2022; notes with concern that the medical service reported 11 cases of burnout in 2023; welcomes a thorough analysis of diagnostic reports undertaken by the CJEU to identify instances of professional burnout and the CJEU’s focus on preventive measures, especially the reinforcement of its medical and social workers’ team, the prevention of psychosocial risks in the workplace and the introduction of awareness-raising activities for management on the right to disconnect and the risks of over-performance; encourages the CJEU to maintain focus on this problem in order to prevent any further cases associated with burnout and inform the Parliament of the measures taken in this regard;

    34.  Notes that an administrative enquiry was launched in 2023 on an alleged case of sexual harassment concerning a member of staff and that this case was closed in 2024 with a sanction; expresses concern that a procedure of assistance for alleged harassment concerning a judge was also filed in 2023 but no harassment was established in that case; notes that an interdepartmental working group, established in March 2023, therefore ahead of the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, examined the rules and procedures in place in the CJEU to prevent harassment and made some recommendations with a view to improving these rules and procedures; encourages the CJEU to follow up and continue to show no tolerance for harassment in the workplace by introducing mandatory training on unconscious bias and ethical standards for all judges and senior officials to prevent abuse of power;

    Ethical framework

    35.  Notes with satisfaction that, as requested in previous discharge recommendations, the new code of conduct on the rights and obligations of officials and other servants of the CJEU reflecting the CJEU’s values and commitment to ethics was drawn up in 2023 and adopted in March 2024; notes that the code of conduct includes provisions on conflict of interests, duty of loyalty, duty of confidentiality and discretion, outside activities, occupational activities after leaving the service and publications and also applies to seconded national experts and trainee judges hosted under the European Judicial Training Network; notes that, in 2023, awareness-raising activities and revamped training on the code of conduct were organised for staff and managers, with a particular focus on newcomers; calls for a mandatory training for all staff on a regular basis and asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of the code of conduct;

    36.  Notes that, before the code of conduct entered into force, two potential cases of conflict of interest were declared and handled in accordance with the procedures in place, with the aim of ensuring that the new members of staff concerned were not involved in the management of files that they knew from a previous job;

    37.  Notes that, further to the adoption of the code of conduct for Members and former Members of the CJEU, the declaration of interests of the Members have been published online to avoid any potential conflict of interest in the handling of cases; notes that the CJEU is constantly reassessing its internal rules on this matter with a view to updating those rules and to ensuring the highest possible standards of ethical behaviour; calls on the CJEU to establish an independent ethics committee to oversee compliance with the code of conduct and investigate potential breaches; calls for mandatory annual ethics training for all CJEU personnel, including Judges and Advocates General to preserve the integrity of the CJEU; asks the CJEU to inform Parliament about the results of any further assessment of the effectiveness of that measure aimed at the prevention of conflicts of interest;

    38.  Welcomes the publication of the declarations of interests of the Members of the CJEU but calls for the introduction of a standard pre-appointment screening process to identify and mitigate potential conflicts of interest at an early stage; urges the Council to establish transparent guidelines for Member States when nominating candidates for judicial positions at the CJEU;

    39.  Urges the CJEU to introduce a mandatory recusal policy for judges in cases where they have past professional affiliations with litigants appearing before the CJEU; calls for stricter conflict-of-interest screening for judges and high-ranking staff, including regular updates to financial disclosure requirements; asks for the publication of real-time recusal decisions in cases where judges declare a conflict of interest, ensuring greater transparency in the judicial process and reinforcing public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the CJEU;

    40.  Notes that in 2023, all Members of the CJEU were resident of Luxembourg in accordance with Article 14 of the Statute;

    41.  Notes that the list of external activities carried out by the Members of both the Court of Justice and the General Court has been published on the CJEU website since 2018; further notes that the list is difficult to read for the general public and recommends its revision to ensure greater clarity and informativeness; notes that the prior authorisation by the general meeting of the Court of Justice or by the plenary conference of the General Court is only granted when the external activity is compatible with the requirements of the code of conduct and with the Members’ obligations to be available for judicial activities; asks the CJEU to inform the discharge authority about any initiatives to improve the readability of the information related to external activities, in line with previous discharge recommendations;

    42.  Notes that the rules governing Members’ travels, missions and use of drivers and cars, as updated in 2021, provide that only the running costs resulting from the car use for purposes related to the execution of a mission order or to the exercise of his or her mandate within a limit of 10 000 km are borne by the CJEU; reiterates its opinion that the use of the car fleet outside of the strict performance of the duties of the Members of the CJEU should not take place under any circumstances, notes that the CJEU reported to be in discussion with other institutions in order to obtain a harmonised set of rules for the use of official vehicles, while respecting the autonomy of each institution; invites all Union institutions to agree on a single system to be applied horizontally, which would reduce the confusion and increase transparency and efficiency in the use of public money; asks the CJEU to keep Parliament informed of any progress in this matter;

    43.  Notes that an OLAF case, referred to in previous discharge resolutions, which dealt with the conduct of a member of staff that might have constituted a serious failure to comply with their obligations, was closed in 2023; notes that the CJEU is not aware of any new OLAF investigation or recommendation in 2023;

    44.  Notes that the CJEU did not report any cases of fraud, corruption or misuse of Union funds in 2023; notes that the CJEU’s anti-fraud strategy is an integral part of its integrated internal control and risk management framework, with a particular focus on the risks of improper disclosure of information;

    Transparency and access to justice for citizens

    45.  Welcomes the CJEU’s engagement to enhance transparency, access to justice and public openness, thus contributing to foster public trust in the Union institutions;

    46.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU consolidated the streaming service for hearings of the Court of Justice and of the General Court on the Curia website, thus facilitating the access of citizens to the judicial activities of the CJEU; welcomes the improvement of the CVRIA website, in terms of its structure, functionalities and content; welcomes that the delivery of judgments of the Court of Justice, the reading of opinions of the Advocates General, the hearings of the Grand Chamber and certain hearings of chambers sitting with five Judges have been broadcast live on the Curia website since 2023; calls on the CJEU to further improve transparency by broadcasting all hearings of both the Court of Justice and the General Court on its website and permanently storing them online;

    47.  Welcomes that, further to the reform of its Statute, the CJEU will publish statements of case or written observations lodged in preliminary ruling proceedings after the closure of such proceedings, except in cases of objection to the publication of a person’s statement of case or observation; underlines that such publication will improve transparency and access to justice for citizens and calls on the CJEU to publish all documents related to a file on its website; calls on the CJEU to implement a procedure that could be used by any person to access in house all the documents related to a case;

    48.  Notes that rules on the use of videoconferencing were adopted by the General Court in April 2023 and by the Court of Justice in September 2024, according to which a party may request the use of videoconferencing where security or other serious reasons prevent that party’s representative from participating in a hearing in person;

    49.  Notes that the rules laid down by the CJEU decision of 26 November 2019 concerning public access to documents held by the CJEU in the exercise of its administrative function do not apply to judicial documents for which access is governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice or the Rules of Procedure of the General Court; notes that the CJEU registered 21 requests of public access to administrative documents in 2023 and granted access to administrative documents in 12 cases; notes that the European Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration on the part of the CJEU in 2023;

    50.  Invites the CJEU to simplify the process of finding specific rulings on e-curia; welcomes efforts to make the interface more client-friendly and intuitive;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    51.  Notes that compared to 2022 the budget expenditure increased by 10,9 % for IT projects, by 13 % for IT equipment, by 59 % for cybersecurity projects and by 72 % for cybersecurity services, licences and equipment in 2023;

    52.  Notes that the implementation of major digitalisation projects under the digital transformation strategy remained a priority for the CJEU in 2023, such as the development of the integrated case management system (SIGA), the promotion of the use of the e-Curia application for the lodging and notification of procedural documents by electronic means, the adoption of eSignature and the adoption of HAN/Ares electronic document record and management system; notes that the CJEU tracks the return on investment in digitalisation projects in terms of costs and resources efficiency and asks the CJEU to keep the discharge authority informed of its findings in that area;

    53.  Notes that, as part of its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with vulnerability, the CJEU has continued to implement the “accessibility by design” approach for any change and evolution of its IT systems; notes that, following an audit of the Curia website, the CJEU started to improve the site’s accessibility to a wide range of users, such as people with visual impairments, hearing impairments or learning disabilities;

    54.  Notes that the CJEU implemented several projects based on artificial intelligence (AI), such as the automation of document analysis for references to applicable legislation and assistance with invoice verification through robotic processes and hearing transcription, in line with its new AI integration strategy adopted in June 2023; underlines that it is of vital importance that AI is used in a manner which fully preserves the independence, the quality and the serenity of the legal processes, is in full consideration of ethical matters and is used under human oversight and allowing human intervention in order to avoid negative consequences or risks, or stop the system if it does not perform as intended; notes that, as part of that strategy, the CJEU set up an AI management board composed of members of the Court of Justice and of the General Court to oversee the ethical aspects of AI use within the CJEU and to set clear boundaries for its application; welcomes the staff guidelines on the use of AI issued by the board; welcomes the initiatives in place to upskill employees in digital competencies through the training path developed in cooperation with the Interinstitutional Committee for Digital Transformation (ETA); emphasises that the digitalisation of justice and the adoption of emerging technologies such as AI will offer significant advantages for the efficient functioning of the CJEU; recommends however that the CJEU anticipate the associated cybersecurity risks and strengthen even more its collaboration with the EU Agency for Cybersecurity and CERT-EU;

    55.  Notes that no EDPS enquiries were communicated to the CJEU in 2023; notes that, in 2023, EDPS had not addressed any specific recommendation to the CJEU following its investigation regarding the use of cloud services by Amazon web services; notes that EDPS published a decision in 2023 confirming compliance of the CJEU’s use of cloud videoconferencing services with data protection law; reiterates however its concerns regarding the use of external cloud services, given the growing threats about cybersecurity and digital sovereignty;

    56.  Welcomes the CJEU adoption of a cyber roadmap in 2023 and strengthening of its cybersecurity operational capabilities to better protect its systems against the increasing number of cyberattacks; underlines furthermore that a robust cybersecurity strategy is an essential tool to fight against foreign interferences aiming to undermine the integrity of the European Institutions; notes that the CJEU has taken various measures to reinforce its cybersecurity preparedness and ability to recover from security incidents, including through its participation in the governance of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board and through a combination of cybersecurity controls and tools in line with the recommendations of CERT-EU; notes that the budgetary authority approved for the financial year 2025 the necessary appropriations for two additional posts in order to reinforce the CJEU’s staff capacities in the field of cybersecurity;

    57.  Welcomes the measures taken, such as cybersecurity audits, staff training and rapid incident response protocols, to protect the CJEU’s technological infrastructure from cyber threats; stresses that the digitisation of justice and the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence will bring many benefits in terms of the smooth functioning of the CJEU, but also entail risks that the CJEU needs to pre-empt and protect itself against; suggests in this regard that the CJEU develop a cybersecurity strategy and step up collaboration with other Union institutions, in particular ENISA (the EU Agency for Cybersecurity), on the prevention of cyber-attacks, the number and sophistication of which are growing exponentially in Europe;

    58.  Welcomes the initiative to assign fictitious names to anonymised cases, by using a computerised automatic name generator, in order to strengthen the protection of personal data and facilitate the identification of individual cases;

    59.  Notes with satisfaction the amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, which will clarify and simplify judicial procedures, including the possibility of using videoconferencing for hearings, electronic signature of decisions and the designation of pilot cases;

    Buildings

    60.  Notes that, following-up on the cross services reflection about the most efficient use of the CJEU’s premises, that was concluded in 2023, pilot projects were launched; notes that the results of those projects, together with other factors, such as environmental and budgetary aspects, quality of justice, well-being at work, inclusion, accessibility and the attractiveness of the CJEU, will be taken into account in the final decision on the use of the CJEU’s buildings; asks that Parliament be kept informed about the implementation of those conclusions and the consequences for the organisation of the workspace;

    61.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU further pursued its comprehensive initiative to increase accessibility and inclusion for persons with disabilities, with the aim of guaranteeing access to the CJEU, physically or virtually, to all individuals, participants in proceedings and visitors; notes further that, in 2023, the CJEU started to make an inventory of its infrastructure with a view to complying with the new national accessibility legislation as of 1 January 2032; asks that Parliament be kept informed about further initiatives in this area;

    Environment and sustainability

    62.  Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the CJEU continued to significantly reduce its energy consumption and carbon footprint compared to 2015, which is the baseline for the implementation of the CJEU’s eco-management and audit scheme strategy, thanks to energy-saving measures and optimisation of its heating, cooling and lighting infrastructures; notes that heating consumption was reduced by 33,5 %, electricity by 28,7 %, water by 20,1 %, office paper by 63 %, office and canteen waste by 43 % and greenhouse gas emissions by 30,2 % in 2023 compared to 2015; welcomes that the CJEU applied green procurement criteria in 10 calls for tender above EUR 60 000; welcomes the CJEU’s commitment to the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS); encourages the CJEU to continue its efforts in reducing its environmental impact, with a strategy to reach carbon neutrality by 2035;

    63.  Welcomes that the CJEU has taken several initiatives to support and increase sustainable mobility for its staff and Members, including subsidies for public transportation, subsidies for self-service bicycles, improved bike parking facilities and improved facilities for hybrid and electrical cars;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    64.  Welcomes the budgetary savings achieved through cooperation with other institutions and in particular the shared applications and hosting services based on service-level agreements with the Commission as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures, which have allowed the CJEU to optimise costs and resources;

    65.  Welcomes the efforts of the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) in training national judges on EU law; notes with appreciation that, in line with the CJEU’s declaration entitled “Supporting the EJTN to shape a sustainable European judicial culture”, the CJEU and the EJTN sought to increase the diversity of long-term trainees in 2023, with the aim of ultimately increasing their number to one per Member State; notes that the measures taken have already been successful since the CJEU has trainees from some Member States which previously did not actively participate in the programme; notes that 15 remunerated traineeships were offered for the year 2023-24; calls on the CJEU to further develop its knowledge-sharing initiatives, including joint case-law databases and virtual collaboration platforms to support national courts in complex legal interpretations;

    66.  Emphasises that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; welcomes that currently all trainees at the CJEU receive a grant during their stay, mainly from the CJEU and, in some specific cases, from other sources; take notes that the CJEU only accepts a few trainees (less than 10 per year) paid by other sources, and for short periods (on average 2 months); welcomes that in such cases, the CJEU administration carefully checks that these trainees receive a grant, allowance or remuneration for this traineeship, paid directly by their employer or academic institution;

    67.  Appreciates that the CJEU fully cooperates with OLAF, the Court, the EDPS and the European Ombudsman; notes that, in 2023, the CJEU has continued to work towards maintaining the established dialogue with national courts, and in particular with the constitutional and supreme courts, and that the CJEU hosted a number of meetings, including the annual meeting of national judges; encourages deeper cooperation between the CJEU and national courts to strengthen uniform application of Union law; recommends establishing a permanent judicial exchange programme for judges from Member States to work alongside their CJEU counterparts, fostering best practices in the interpretation of Union law;

    Communication

    68.  Notes that, in 2023, the CJEU strengthened its efforts to engage with Union citizens by enhancing its outreach on social media; notes that, at the end of 2023, the number of subscribers to the CJEU’s LinkedIn account increased by 32 % and the number of followers on the CJEU’s two accounts on X (formerly Twitter) by 9 %,while the views on its YouTube channel increased by 84,96 % compared to the previous year;

    69.  Welcomes the CJEU’s efforts to enhance strategic communication and transparency towards Union citizens on the judicial activities of the CJEU, especially through the organisation of an open day, the offer for visitors, in particular the special virtual visits, in which 800 students participated in 2023, and the review of the drafting of its press releases and online publications in an accessible style, about matters of media interest or which have an impact on the lives of citizens.

    (1) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, OJ L, 2024/2019, 12.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2019/oj.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Slovak and Serbian leaders’ Moscow visit, EU statement

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    Regarding the Slovak and Serbian leaders’ visit to Moscow for this year’s May-end World War II celebrations, the EU states that Russia has used this event for propaganda and justification for their full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The EU does not legitimise Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine and remains united in its support for Ukraine.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiSZKNs-EJs

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘EPPO’) – P10_TA(2025)0087 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2025),

    A.  whereas the EPPO is the independent public prosecution office of the Union, responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union, for significantly enhancing the Union’s capacity to safeguard taxpayer funds, and for bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, criminal offences provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371(1) and indicated by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939(2);

    B.  whereas the competence of the EPPO encompasses several types of fraud, and includes cross-border VAT fraud with a total damage of at least EUR 10 million, money laundering, corruption, organised crime and other offences for which the EPPO performs prosecutorial functions before the competent courts of the participating Member States;

    C.  whereas the EPPO is one of the component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and, as such, its actions are coordinated with and complementary to those of the other components of the architecture, to achieve streamlined, efficient coordination that enhances the overall effectiveness of the architecture;

    D.  whereas the EPPO intervenes when national authorities could investigate and prosecute crimes but where the prerogatives of national authorities stop at the borders of their country, and other organisations like Eurojust, OLAF and Europol do not have the necessary powers to carry out the relevant criminal investigations and prosecutions;

    E.  whereas the procedural acts of the EPPO are subject to judicial review by the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) has, by way of preliminary rulings or judicial reviews of those acts, residual power to ensure a consistent application of Union law;

    F.  whereas the EPPO is composed of a central level, with its headquarters in Luxembourg, consisting of the European Chief Prosecutor, 22 European Prosecutors (one per participating Member State), the Administrative Director, and a decentralised, national- level consisting of the European delegated prosecutors (EDPs) in the 22 participating Member States;

    G.  whereas at the central level the European Chief Prosecutor and the 22 European Prosecutors compose the College of the EPPO (the ‘College’) and supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the EDPs at the national level, who operate with complete independence from their national authorities;

    H.  whereas, under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO Administrative Director, acting as the authorising officer of the EPPO, is to implement its budget under its own responsibility and within the limits authorised in the budget and shall send each year to the budgetary authority all information relevant to the findings of any evaluation procedures;

    I.  whereas, in accordance with Article 50(2) of the EPPO’s Financial Rules, the Accounting Officer of the Commission is also to act as Accounting Officer of the EPPO and is responsible for the preparation of the annual accounts, which are consolidated with those of the Union;

    J.  whereas, under the current framework, the final annual accounts are scrutinised by the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) and it is with the Council to recommend and to the European Parliament to decide whether to grant discharge to EPPO’s Administrative Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for a given financial year;

    K.  whereas the scrutiny over the management of the EPPO resources and related expenditure cannot ignore the examination of operational activities, their consequences and impact and the methods of their execution;

    L.  whereas the EPPO has been operating autonomously in the implementation of its budget only since 24 June 2021 and it has started its operational activities, necessitating continuous evaluation to ensure resources align with operational effectiveness, on 1 June 2021, which is also the dies a quo for the five-year term indicated in Article 119 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 upon reaching which the Commission will have to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council and to national parliaments an evaluation report on the implementation and impact of such Regulation, and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices, together with its conclusions;

    M.  whereas, in accordance with Article 119(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the Commission is to submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council if it concludes that it is necessary to have additional or more detailed rules on the setting up of the EPPO, its functions or the procedure applicable to its activities, including its cross-border investigations;

    1.  Welcomes the positive opinion of the Court on the reliability of the EPPO’s accounts for the year ended 31 December 2023 and on the legality and regularity of the underlying revenue and payments;

    2.  Recalls the Parliament’s strong support for the establishment of the EPPO; acknowledges the EPPO as an independent Union body; stresses the EPPO’s important role in the protection of the Union’s financial interests and as an essential component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and of a wider Union system based on integrity, accountability, transparency and the sound financial management of resources; commends the EPPO for its work in investigating, prosecuting, and ensuring justice for crimes affecting the Union budget, such as fraud, corruption, and cross-border VAT fraud;

    3.  Highlights the critical necessity of promptly dedicating necessary resources to ensure the timely conclusion of the ongoing investigation into the acquisition of the COVID-19 vaccine in the Union, especially considering the substantial public interest in this matter, coupled with the fact that the investigation already commenced in 2022 and to this date no decision has been publicly announced;

    4.  Notes that it is possible to compare only the two most recent budgetary and operational performances of the EPPO, for the period 2022 to 2023, following the EPPO’s financial autonomy in June 2021; observes that, in that context, the budgetary increases related to the EPPO’s activities remain very difficult to estimate because of the EPPO’s recent establishment, the unique characteristics of the EPPO and its main activities, the unpredictable level of fraud detection, the wide variety of its cases, its lack of discretion with regard to pursuing prosecutions coupled with its reliance on the resources and procedural constraints of national judicial systems, the lack of a fixed correlation between the number and the costs of investigations, and the magnitude of the Union’s financial interests that are to be protected; also observes that it is difficult to estimate the expenditure for the caseload related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) because of its unprecedented manner of implementation and high volume of resources;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the overall final budget allocated to the EPPO for 2023 was EUR 65,9 million, substantially increased (by 14,7 %) from the EUR 51,2 million that was allocated in 2022, while the 2021 budget (EUR 26,2 million) related to a period prior to the EPPO’s financial autonomy; observes that the EPPO’s budget includes the reinforcement, granted by the budgetary authority at the request of the EPPO in June 2023, by EUR 500 000 (the request also included human resources related to the essential enhancement of the EPPO’s security capacity, leading to the grant of eight additional establishment plan posts); appreciates that no budget was returned in 2023, compared to 10 % (EUR 5,9 million) of the initial budget in 2022 and 21 % (EUR 9,5 million) in 2021; re-iterates the need for the EPPO to be provided with sufficient resources to adequately fulfil its mandate;

    6.  Welcomes the increasing level of budget implementation, which was 99,6 % in 2023 (compared to 98,1 % in 2022 and 97,4 % in 2021); appreciates that the overall execution rate for payments progressed in 2023 reaching 85,3 % (compared to 76,6 % and 71 % in 2022 and 2021) and the average payment time decreased to 17 days compared to 23,8 in 2022 and 21,0 in 2021); observes that the electronic invoicing module (e-invoicing) was rolled out in June 2023 and it will contribute to further reducing administrative burdens, time-to-payment and the overall processing costs; encourages a further refinement of operational processes to maximise efficiency;

    7.  Understands that, because the budget endowment requests were only partially met, the EPPO focused its financial resources on the intake of additional EDPs, which has an impact on the EPPO’s capacity to lead the increasing number of investigations and prosecutions, on the need to improve the security standing of the organisation and on the maintenance of its case-management System (CMS), which could have negatively affected the management of cross-border investigations; underlines the importance of additional funding and strengthening its staffing to enable the EPPO to effectively combat organised crime, protect the Union’s financial interests, and uphold the rule of law, which are key Union priorities; calls for a dedicated increase in funding within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to ensure it can continue to meet its objectives and obligations;

    8.  Is aware that, following the achievement of its financial autonomy, in June 2021, the EPPO prioritised the operational expenditure related to investigation, prosecution and security measures, and that this has resulted in limiting the non-operational expenditure to essential level support services; remarks that, in this context, a total of EUR 28 312 075 was allocated on operational expenditure lines (Title 3), representing 43 % of the EPPO’s final budget 2023 (compared to EUR 21 047 346, which was 41 % in 2022); observes that the main cost drivers for these activities were the EDPs’ remuneration (51 % of the operational activities compared to 42 % in 2022), followed by operational ICT activities like maintenance and development of the EPPO’s CMS (19 % compared to 28 % in 2022), and the linguistic services (translation and interpretation related activities) (14 %, the same as in 2022);

    9.  Notes that the remuneration of the EDPs reached EUR 14,5 million (compared to EUR 8,7 million in 2022), which represents the main operational expenditure because of the increased number of EDPs in place over 2023; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO, which was announced in 2024; notes that it did not affect the 2023 expenditure and concerns the 2024 budget only marginally, due to the late and gradual intake of two European Prosecutors and a number of EDPs; understands that a more solid cost estimation will not be possible until 2025; welcomes the inclusion in the programme of the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government, as the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay;

    10.  Observes that costs for missions and operational meetings increased further in 2023 (mission costs were EUR 1 175 000 in 2023 and EUR 980 000 in 2022; operational meeting in 2023 were EUR 659 752 compared to EUR 170 000 in 2022), in line with the increasing level of intensity of investigations;

    11.  Is aware that the costs for translation services are expected to further increase, in line with the EPPO’s increasing caseload, and recognises the need for additional resources for translation; welcomes both the internal guidance developed on the use of translation services, with a view to reinforcing control over costs and including the recommendation to use machine translation services whenever possible, and the use of national service providers of the limit allowed by the current Regulation to address the problem; observes, in that regard, that while Article 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 provides for translation services required for the administrative functioning of the EPPO at the central level to be provided by the Union’s Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, it also provides for different handling of operational and urgent matters and empowers EDPs to decide on the arrangements for translations for the purpose of investigations in accordance with applicable national law;

    12.  Notes that in 2023 the EPPO signed 234 specific contracts under existing framework contracts, for a total of more than EUR 11 million, with a significant increase in the use of EPPO framework contracts (82 specific contracts for a value of more than EUR 6,5 million) due, to a great extent, to the use of the EPPO’s framework contract for the Provision of Services in the Field of Information Systems; observes that only one contract, concerning the EPPO’s CMS, was awarded via a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice for reasons of extreme urgency;

    13.  Observes that carry-over of appropriations from the previous exercise in 2022 amounted to EUR 10 969 680 (24,4 % of the EPPO’s 2022 final budget), of which 84,8 % was consumed (EUR 9 307 392) and 15,2 % was cancelled (compared to 21,4 % in 2022) and notes that forecasts indicate another carry-over in 2024, pending completion of the deliverables, for payment appropriations (the carry-over from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 9 392 989); understands that partial cancellation is a consequence of the progressive establishment of the EPPO’s administrative practices following the financial autonomy it achieved in 2021; notes that carry-over appropriations cancelled for approved budgets of 2022 and 2023 could be neither used with existing or new contracts nor synchronised with the principle of annuality, while the planning of the corresponding expenses, mainly related to translation, meetings, missions and external contractors, could not be accurate due to a lack of any historical data and figures and the rapid evolving of the organisation; appreciates that the continuous strengthening of the EPPO’s administrative capacity is progressively addressing those issues and that, while a fully estimation cannot be made in advance because of the nature of the EPPO’s operational activity, the expected level of cancelled appropriations will diminish in 2024;

    14.  Notes that in 2023 two budget transfers were adopted by the European Chief Prosecutor, on a proposal drawn up by the Administrative Director, and that they were notified to the College for information, for a total transferred between titles of EUR 1,2 million;

    15.  Acknowledges the need for adequate budget flexibility, to address unexpected operational needs such as, in 2023, the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures, or other global challenges and understands that the EPPO made use of its Financial Rules by timely reallocation of appropriations via budget amendments (one in June and one in November) and via budget transfers (one in September and one in December);

    16.  Reiterates its observation on the obsolete 2017 Legislative Financial Statement which is deemed to be no longer fit-for-purpose due to a significantly underestimated workload; recalls its previous resolution, underlining that the absence of a mid-term budgetary review obliges the EPPO to wait until the very end of the budgetary adoption process to have clarity on what resource level it can implement in the subsequent year, and it limits the EPPO’s capacity to anticipate budget implementation preparatory activities as well as the options that should be made available to achieve maximum flexibility in the development of an organisational infrastructure for a project as innovative as the EPPO; notes that this, in particular, affects the early launch of recruitment, delaying the progress towards full occupancy among others and the overall absorption capacity of the EPPO;

    17.  Maintains that the budgetary and human resources allocated to the EPPO are expected to be adequate to allow the efficient and successful carrying out of its mandate and the normal handling of the related administrative procedures; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the EPPO budgetary framework in close cooperation with the EPPO to find adequate ways to support it in its work; calls on the Commission to allocate additional resources, justified by the growing number of complex cases, and emphasises that these should not be dependent on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 or of the EPPO mandate, but rather on the importance of the fight against organised crime and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the next MFF;

    18.  Emphasises that the activities of the EPPO contribute to the protection of the Union’s financial interests and are also expected to recover amounts from the Union’s budget that were not used for its intended purpose due to criminal activities; believes that the amounts resulting from seizing and confiscating measures adopted by the EDPs in the Member States could, after the deduction of costs incurred by the Member States’ authorities to implement those measures, flow back into the Union Budget in accordance with Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; considers that the potential revenue resulting from seizing and confiscating measures should be accounted for in the Union Budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow those amounts to enter into the Union Budget;

    19.  Acknowledges that the EPPO clearly contributes to European added value in terms of coordination and cooperation with the Member States in investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union and that the EPPO has been achieving the goals set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 in that regard; expects Member States to comply with legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that in several instances Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as national cases, which are within the competence of the EPPO; notes that questions of competence between the national authorities and the EDPs have come up in several cases across several countries; is aware that, according to Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, cases of disagreement about the EPPO’s competences are to be decided by the same national judicial authority who is responsible for determining the competent body for prosecution at national level; regrets that in many participating Member States the procedures in force and the national authorities entrusted with the decisions on such cases regarding conflicts of competence are not set in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, stresses that in cases of conflicts of competence between the EPPO and a national prosecution authority, the national authority competent to decide on the attribution of competence could come to a conclusion without requesting a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice and could, instead adopt a decision that is binding on the EPPO and points out that this is against the spirit of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, which provides that, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; believes that the current situation lacks legal clarity; encourages all Member States to work more closely with the EPPO; emphasises that the competence of the EPPO is clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2), and in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, and that all Member States are to comply with that Regulation; notes that when Member States have doubts about the competence of the EPPO in a particular case, there is the possibility of submitting a preliminary question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and Article 42(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 ; urges the Commission, where there is a breach of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to submit the case to the Court of Justice; notes with concern that the question of competence can cause a halt to the investigation; is concerned about potential loss of evidence when cases are paused; calls on the Commission to collect information regarding cases regarding conflicts of competence for the evaluation report that will be submitted in 2026;

    20.  Reiterates that Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 is to be implemented properly and underlines that the peculiar characteristics of prosecution and investigation expenditure, including the exceptional cases of the EPPO’s operational expenditure governed by that provision, have to be taken into account; understands that, in 2023, a first financing agreement was signed in the framework of a pilot for the reimbursement of claims made under Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to cover exceptionally costly investigation measures carried out at national level on behalf of the EPPO; appreciates that the corresponding payment was audited by the Court during the 2023 audit and was deemed legal and regular;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    21.  Welcomes that, during 2023, the College met 22 times and adopted 73 decisions, among which are the anti-fraud strategy 2023-2025, the anti-harassment policy for staff and for members of the College or the EDPs;

    22.  Acknowledges that the EPPO continued its efforts to set in place a system to monitor efficiency gains and cost savings, and notes that in 2023 it launched a review of the budget and activities’ strategic and operational planning and monitoring processes and of the recruitment processes, to make gains in speed and acquired competences; points out that, overall, the internal control systems in force are effective;

    23.  Notes that, to further develop the EPPO’s assurance framework, the internal auditor of the EPPO for non-operational matters (IAS) initiated, in 2023, a limited review of the EPPO’s building blocks of assurance; believes that this engagement, scheduled to be finalised during the course of 2024, will provide recommendations to build a stronger capacity for the Authorising Officer to issue a credible declaration of assurance;

    24.  Welcomes the benchmarking exercise carried out by the Internal Audit Capability (IAC) by comparing the deployed human resources of the EPPO with a set of other Union entities and national prosecution offices, against a standardised set of pillars which includes administrative support and operational activities; observes that, in 2023, the IAC tested the internal oversight environment and ran the first internal audit as an analysis of the working environment and internal controls of the EPPO’s decentralised office in Sofia, Bulgaria;

    25.  Reiterates its view that the IAS and the IAC should coordinate their actions with a view to advising and assisting the EPPO in the establishment of its main core processes and the achievement of its objectives;

    26.  Notes that the EPPO has developed its own purchase capacity, resulting from its own specifically run procurement processes launched in 2023, and manages its own specific contracts and order forms with regard to the implementation of existing framework contracts that were signed in 2023; observes that the EPPO continues, in parallel, to operate its purchase capacity through service level agreements with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by joining inter-institutional contracts with various market operators;

    27.  Is aware that in 2023 the Administrative Director established the minimum standards (assessment criteria) for each of the 17 internal control principles based on the COSO 2013 Control-Integrated Framework and established by the EPPO Internal Control Framework (ICF) as building blocks of the EPPO internal control system; observes that out of 72 compliance criteria, 51 are observed as fulfilled, 20 have some elements in place but further development is desirable and only in the case of one criterion has no significant implementation has been noted; appreciates that, since its adoption by the College on March 2021, 71 % of the adopted ICF assessment have been successfully implemented whereas additional effort needs to be made for the full implementation of the remaining 29 %;

    28.  Welcomes that, on 1 March 2023, an updated version of the EPPO Anti-Fraud Strategy 2023-2025 was adopted setting the objectives to counter fraud at all levels of the organisation in connection with a dedicated action plan which is part of the EPPO internal control environment and is monitored on a regular basis; appreciates the annual review of the Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan by the EPPO Internal Control Officer, reporting the results of that review to the Administrative Director;

    29.  Is aware that, in line with the EPPO’s financial rules, the EPPO ensures an adequate level of financial transactions and procurement procedures via ex post controls on financial transactions (payments, commitments and recovery orders) and on procurement procedures for the period 1 January to 31 December 2023;

    30.  Observes the increase in crime reports submitted to the EPPO (4 187 in 2023 compared to 3 318 in 2022 and 2 832 in 2021) and, as a result, the increase in open investigations (1 371 in 2023 compared to 865 in 2022 and 567 in 2021) and in the estimation of damage (EUR 19,27 billion in 2023 compared to 14,1 billion in 2022 and 5,4 billion in 2021); remarks that reports from private parties (2 494, which is 29 % more than in 2022) and from national authorities (1 562, which is 24 % more than in 2022) represent the biggest share of operational input received, while regrets that reports from other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies remained very low (108), suggesting that no significant improvement in terms of detection and reporting was achieved from their side; notes that the number of indictments (139 in 2023 compared to 87 in 2022 and 5 in 2021) together with the freezing orders obtained by the EPPO (EUR 1,5 billion compared to EUR 359,1 million in 2022 and EUR 147 million in 2021) are indicative of the growing performance level of the EPPO;

    31.  Notes that, compared with 2022, the caseload of the EPPO almost doubled in 2023, reaching up to 1 927 active investigations; commends the fruitful activities of the EPPO in 2023, which included 139 indictments, 339 VAT-related cases and over 200 investigations on the implementation of NextGenerationEU; further notes that the EPPO started to bring more perpetrators of Union fraud to justice in front of national courts;

    32.  Notes that, in 2023, 48 cases concluded with a court conviction (compared to 20 cases in 2022) and that EUR 60 million was the amount confiscated (compared to EUR 2 million in 2021); underlines the importance of a systematic reporting on the follow-up to these cases in terms of the financial measures adopted (confiscation and recovery) to get a clearer understanding of the impact of the EPPO’s actions; welcomes the actions undertaken by the EPPO and the Commission to streamline their communications and make them adequate in relation to the needs of possible administrative procedures for the adoption of measures to restore the Union’s budget affected by financial crimes; reiterates its call on the Commission to assist the EPPO in monitoring and follow-up activities, in such a way that the EPPO’s limited resources are not diverted from their investigative and prosecutorial tasks; encourages the EPPO, where possible and appropriate, to engage in better cooperation with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust and Europol, or using – via OLAF- the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services established in the Member States to monitor the results of its investigations;

    33.  Underlines the essential role of asset recovery in the creation of a credible deterrent to organised crime; welcomes the EPPO’s participation in international networks to advance its asset recovery operations further; stresses the need for the Commission to invite the EPPO to participate in the newly created cooperation network on asset recovery and confiscation; notes that the timely and effective investigation and prosecution of fraud-related crimes can generate significant savings for the budget of the Union and the budgets of the Member States;

    34.  Is concerned about the increasing number of EPPO investigations regarding the implementation of Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) (there were 233 investigations at the end of 2023, compared to 15 investigations at the end of 2022) and their relevant estimated financial damage (EUR 1,86 billion); is particularly concerned that, despite the high number of investigations, there is currently no obligation on Member States to report RRF cases to the Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS); recalls the obligation to report all the cases of fraud affecting RRF to the EPPO and stresses that such cases are also relevant for EDES-related measures; stresses that the EPPO’s workload, initially underestimated, has significantly increased and is expected to continue growing particularly due to the rising number of RRF-related cases and that relevant analyses suggest a possible exponential grow in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years; calls on the EPPO to systematically analyse and identify fraud patterns in Member States where multiple RRF cases have been detected, and to communicate these patterns to Member States, the Commission and the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the objective of enhancing preventative measures to mitigate the risk of fraud; calls on the EPPO, the Commission and OLAF to cooperate closely with the aim of minimising, as much as possible, the impact of such fraudulent misbehaviours on the Union’s budget and safeguarding the achievements of the RRF’s goals; recalls the call on the Commission to provide adequate guidance to the EPPO on how to support and foster the adoption of the remedial measures which follow the EPPO’s independent investigation and prosecution of fraud affecting the RRF and to keep the budgetary authority informed regarding the available options;

    35.  Understands that the EPPO reacted to Parliament’s call for a better monitoring system and enhanced follow-up of investigations and prosecutions by launching a project on digital statistical tools which would allow better use of the data that it processes, and the development of a strategic analysis capacity to identify the patterns of fraud; shares the EPPO’s view that the success of those efforts are directly linked to the available resources and calls on the Commission to take these activities and the related costs into consideration for the future proposals on Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and on budgetary endowments;

    36.  Appreciates the EPPO’s efforts in the setting up key performance indicators (KPIs) for both operational and administrative activities with specific targets due to its peculiar business model; maintains its remark on the need for operational activities to include reference to the amounts seized, confiscated and eventually recovered to the Union’s budget, the safeguard of which is ultimately the raison d’être of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture of which the EPPO is an important component; understands that monitoring and follow-up action, including reporting on the recovery results, are not in the EPPO’s remit and require resources and specific prerogatives that are not part of the EPPO’s mission; asks the Commission to support the EPPO in identifying indicators linked to the achievement of that essential task, stressing that a better monitoring system, and more data of good granularity and aggregated in cluster per typology of misconduct, sector of interest or geographical area, could allow making more tangible the impact of the EPPO’s investigations and allow the identification of patterns of fraud;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    37.  Observes the upward trend in the number of staff, increasing from 58 in 2020, to 122 in 2021, 217 by the end of 2022 and 238 by the end of 2023; is aware that, for 2023, the EPPO requested from the budgetary authority the suppression of 20 contract agent posts and the creation of 20 temporary agent posts, which was granted and implemented by the EPPO in the same year, resulting in the total number of staff remaining unchanged (248, out of with 171 TAs, 48 CAs and 29 SNEs), with a different allocation of posts (191 TAs, 28 CAs and 29 SNEs); points out, however, that following certain security weaknesses identified, the EPPO requested in May 2023 an amending budget and additional posts to enhance the physical, information and cyber security at central and decentralised levels and that out of 21 security posts identified, only eight posts (1 AD 9, 4 AD 6 and 3 AST 3) were granted in November 2023 for further security implementations which was finalised in 2024;

    38.  Points out that, in 2023, the occupancy rate at the central office was 92,97 %, of which 238 were members of staff compared to 256 budgeted posts; notes that out of 140 posts for the EDPs, 130 were on the post at the end of 2023 and another 10 started at the beginning of 2024, reaching 100 % of occupancy rate; observes that the EPPO reinforced its capacity to run timely and transparent recruitment procedures by concluding 24 selection procedures in 2023, on-boarding 45 statutory staff members and 8 new European Prosecutors while 35 new EDPs were appointed;

    39.  Notes that, by December 2023, staff turnover (TAs and CAs) was at 4,62 %(3), recording a total of 11 resignations throughout the year, mainly justified by leaving to another institution (four cases) and for more senior positions offered in other Union institutions (seven cases); observes that the main underlying cause for this turnover is the specificity of the Luxembourg labour market, which has a very limited talent pool and small offer of specialised skills;

    40.  Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to satisfy the EPPO’s requests for additional posts; believes that the workload perspectives indicates that further resources are needed, especially considering the backlog and additional RRF-related cases and far-reaching VAT fraud and also considering that the administrative and central support functions are expected to grow, in line with the larger operational population; points out the risk of underestimating needs and capacities; remarks that the cost of interim staff and external service providers working intra-muros in 2023 reached EUR 4 235 242; encourages the Commission and the EPPO to find a sustainable long-term solution which allows for continuity, preserves confidentiality and retains built-in competences; appreciates that the EPPO’s additional operational needs are exhaustively integrated in the EPPO Single Programming Document 2024-2026 and in EPPO budget requests;

    41.  Notes with concern that the Luxembourg labour market is very competitive, that the financial conditions offered by the Union administration are not attractive compared to the local market (subject to diverse salary indexations throughout the year), and do not take due account of the high cost of living in Luxembourg, which has become even more difficult because of the inflation rate and the increased cost of housing; notes that the EPPO cannot offer a career path for its members of staff to become Union Officials and that its posts are therefore even less attractive than those in the four other Union institutions operating from Luxembourg; emphasises that this results either in a very limited number of applications for vacant posts or in the rejection by the selected candidates of the employment offer once received, due to the high cost of living; calls on the EPPO and the Commission to implement measures that enhance the EPPO’s attractiveness for highly skilled professionals with international experience, such as the housing allowance for lower-grade staff approved by the budgetary authority for 2025, as recommended by the High-Level Interinstitutional Group; notes the overrepresentation of certain nationalities among staff;

    42.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, geographical and gender balance was adequately pursued overall across the 238 members of staff (with 137 men and 101 women); maintains that the nationality breakdown of the EPPO population is constantly monitored by those hiring new members of staff, in seeking to ensure balance, especially, in light of the uneven distribution of applicants, and with Italy (34), Romania (33), Greece (26) and Belgium (24) being more represented across the 26 different nationalities; encourages the EPPO to adopt proactive measures to ensure a balanced representation of nationalities among its staff, reflecting the diversity of the participating Member States; expresses concerns over the gender distribution among senior management positions (four men to one woman) and calls for this issue to be addressed in the framework of the overall diversity strategy; calls for the publication of an annual report, disaggregated by gender, nationality, and employment category, including concrete measures to close gaps in recruitment and career advancement and to monitor and address imbalances;

    43.  Is aware that the decision to implement a strategy on Diversity and Inclusion was made in 2023, with the development of the strategy to be executed in the course of 2024; encourages the EPPO to progress with its adoption and to periodically launch surveys among its staff, by promoting peer-review with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust, OLAF and Europol; understands that the EPPO’s policy on Diversity & Inclusion will be based on the EU Agencies Network Charter on Diversity & Inclusion, adopted in March 2023, and believes that it will in general encourage diversity to make the workplace more attractive to candidates with specific needs; reiterates its request to the EPPO to adopt its Charter on Diversity and Inclusion without delay, in light of the increase in staff during 2023;

    44.  Remarks that, including TAs, CAs, SNEs and EDPs, 341 out of 396 staff (compared to 275 out of 332 in 2022) were deployed in investigative activities by the end of 2023 (that is 86,10 % compared to 82,83 % in 2022 and 86 % in 2021) while 55 members of staff (compared to 57 in 2022) were engaged in administrative support and control functions;

    45.  Welcomes the appointment of 8 new European Prosecutors and 35 new EDP’s to the EPPO in 2023; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence, which flows from a merit-based and objective appointment procedure; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard;

    46.  Maintains that the appointment of EDPs is a shared responsibility of the EPPO and the Member States; stresses that the appointment procedure must always comply with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and the principle of national procedural autonomy;

    47.  Underlines the need for greater career development opportunities for EDPs to attract and retain experienced professionals; calls for improved employment conditions, including a clear career progression path and the standardisation of social security and pension arrangements across participating Member States, ensuring that national salary discrepancies do not deter qualified candidates from applying;

    48.  Appreciates that, in the course of 2023 and beginning 2024, the number of EDPs reached the initially foreseen number of 140; welcomes the decision to align the remuneration of EDPs with that of EU Officials of equivalent level of responsibility, rather than 80 % of the salary of EU Officials, as originally provided for; takes the view that this decision increases the attractiveness of the EDP’s function, paving the way to the recruitment of more experienced national prosecutors whose national salary was higher than the remuneration offered by the EPPO, and in the meantime reduces the administrative burden on the EPPO for the implementation of Article 16(1) of the Conditions of Employment of the EDPs, which provides that, in the case of total net remuneration lower than the national salary, a top-up amount is provided to ensure that the remuneration matches the previous level;

    49.  Underlines that the selection process for European Prosecutors and EDPs is not managed autonomously by the EPPO, because European Prosecutors are nominated by the Member States and then appointed by the European Council, whereas EDPs are nominated by the Member States and appointed by the College; maintains that the application of qualified candidates to the EDP positions could increase and the process could become more selective by adopting a clear career perspective and more favourable administrative discipline on social security and health insurance coverage; reiterates that the creation of a specific status for EDPs would be consistent with the nature of their judicial function and contribute on making those posts more appealing; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the event of amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    50.  Understands that each Member State is obliged (under Article 96(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939) to put in place arrangements of legislative or administrative nature to maintain the affiliation and coverage of the EDPs, including any contributions to the relevant national social security, pension and insurance schemes, but a number of Member States have not yet fully complied with this obligation; therefore calls on the Commission to propose an effective solution to the social security and health insurance coverage gap of the EDPs at the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    51.  Notes that five complaints about the appointment of EDPs were introduced before the Court of Justice until 2023, of which three were closed (either dismissed or withdrawn) and one was dismissed, but an appeal is currently pending before the Court of Justice, and the last action for annulment of the decision of the College rejecting the nomination as EDP of a person nominated by a Member State was admitted in July 2024 on the grounds of a lack of sufficient reasoning in the College’s decision and an analysis is on-going on the manner in which the annulment is to be implemented; observes that there are no new complaints before the General Court concerning appointments to the EPPO;

    52.  Notes that the EPPO’s learning and development strategy was launched in 2023, aiming to promote a culture of continuous learning and facilitate the continuous assessment and adaptation of the staff’s evolving learning needs, together with the pilot learning needs analysis;

    53.  Notes, as regards measures and policies in place to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of staff, that in 2023 all measures were subject to revision and consultation by all involved stakeholders (the staff committee, members of staff in general, and management), seeking to find a balance between expectations and reality of the EPPO as a growing and rapidly changing organisation; observes that there the EPPO operates a flexitime scheme and a work-from-home standard scheme, which provides for one day of telework per week as a basis and a maximum of three days per week, plus extensions accepted in light of serious health or family constraints; remarks that current framework also includes 10 days’ work from outside the place of employment in a given year, to be used without link to other days of leave; believes that the EPPO’s current working conditions allow staff to take advantage of digital solutions by integrating a good level of autonomy in the management of working patterns, facilitating the conciliation of private and work life and promoting team morale and spirit; welcomes the on-going development of a policy on well-being which shall contain a section on well-being for staff benefiting from telework;

    54.  Highlights that, as suggested by Parliament, in the second semester of 2023 an open consultation on flexible working arrangements took place, and the decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 underwent an ex post revision; notes that in consideration of the input of all stakeholders, on December 2023 the Administrative Director incorporated updates to the provisions; notes that changes included the enlargement of the notion of ‘place of telework’ (from 2 to 2,5 hours’ time/distance radius around the EPPO’s central office), and the introduction of hybrid working arrangements for interim agency staff; observes that no further change was adopted by College decisions, taking into account that the Administrative Director decisions had already enacted the conclusions of the staff consultations;

    55.  Notes that, following Parliament’s calls, a staff satisfaction (engagement) survey is planned in the first quarter of 2025; understands that the EPPO’s staff committee has also run a staff priorities survey, and encourages a more intensive dialogue to enhance the work-life conditions;

    56.  Welcomes that no case of burnout or harassment have been reported and that the number of long-term sick leave is very limited; welcomes the EPPO’s awareness of its duty to ensure promotion and preservation of health and wellbeing across staff, as well as the monitoring practices to earn such understanding which take into account untaken annual leave, the carry-over of annual leave and absences, the number of staff on long-term sick leave and the length of the absences; recalls the importance of establishing a clear and structured procedure for reporting cases of harassment by the European Chief Prosecutor and by the European Prosecutors, as well as its divulgation to all the staff;

    57.  Observes that, in early 2023, the EPPO’s central office carried out a traineeship pilot and the EPPO legal service sector hosted two trainees followed by two more in March and September 2023 for remunerated, in-person, five-month traineeships; notes that, based on the positive conclusions of the pilot, a traineeship policy was drafted and has been approved in 2024, followed by a first cycle of effective trainees the same year; welcomes the initiative to launch an experimental relationship-building with the local university and if successful, calls for its expansion to additional universities across the EU, which could offer interesting perspectives to further develop the early talent programmes for diversity; stresses that the high cost of living in Luxembourg poses a considerable obstacle for potential trainees; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in the Union to be paid;

    58.  Welcomes the intense activity of the staff committee, the final adoption of its internal rules of procedure, the launch of the first staff committee open day, the launch of the first EPPO-wide staff survey, the participation of its representatives in the selection procedures, the retroactive revision of all general implementing provisions adopted by the EPPO before the establishment of the staff committee, the submission of input on internal reorganisation, working time and hybrid working, implementing rules and the improvement of working conditions;

    59.  Understands that the EPPO is progressing towards the finalisation of a business continuity plan, which is included in the Union’s administration management standards, and urges the EPPO to adopt it without further delay;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    60.  Understands that the EPPO’s ethical framework is being gradually built up; observes that the core values of that ethical framework are clearly set out in codes of conduct, which outline the standards of behaviour expected of employees at all levels; also observes that the ethical framework depends on the EPPO’s code of good administrative behaviour, its anti-fraud strategy and a training programme on ethics, which encompasses harassment, whistleblowing, the prevention of conflicts of interest and other ethical issues; regrets that members of staff of the EPPO are not required to attend that training programme, which would ensure a consistent understanding and application of the EPPO’s codes of conduct; calls on the EPPO to remedy the situation;

    61.  Notes the EPPO’s engagement in awareness-raising actions among staff about ethical framework and related matters; encourages the EPPO to make mandatory the attendance of such sessions by European Prosecutors and EDPs at their taking over of duties; believes that internal dialogue needs to be intensified;

    62.  Notes that no effective cases of conflict of interest were detected in 2023; is aware that dedicated conflict of interest declaration forms have been established and conflict of interest rules are in force for the members of College, the EDPs, the members of staff of the operational units, and other sensitive posts; welcomes the ongoing development of a structured conflict of interest policy and calls on the EPPO to finalise its adoption; calls for the implementation of a mandatory annual refreshment of an ethics and integrity training course for all EPPO personnel;

    63.  Urges the EPPO to enhance its internal integrity framework by mandating public disclosure of all financial interests and external activities of senior officials, including members of the College; calls for a periodic audit of these disclosures to identify and mitigate potential risks of undue influence;

    64.  Understands that the EPPO seeks to prevent revolving doors in particular by endorsing the strict application of the provisions of the Staff Regulations, which are set out in all contracts of the EPPO, including ad hoc exit forms that indicate the obligations that apply after termination of engagement; welcomes in this regard the adoption, in 2023, of the Guidelines for the EPPO Staff on Outside Activities and Assignments, which apply to activities that are not considered to relate to hobbies of leisure activities outside the remit of the EPPO;

    65.  Calls for the introduction of a more robust revolving door policy, including an extended cooling-off period of at least two years for senior EPPO officials before they can engage in private-sector employment related to EPPO investigations; requests that the EPPO conducts an annual review of compliance with these post-employment restrictions;

    66.  Calls the EPPO to adopt a dedicated whistleblowing and anti-retaliation procedure to integrate the implementing rules to the Staff Regulations adopted by the College (College Decision 2021/077 laying down guidelines on whistleblowing applicable within the EPPO) and to accompany Article 45.12 of the EPPO Financial Rules (establishing the actions to be undertaken in the circumstances) in order to ensure a safe and protected workplace; welcomes the initiative of intensifying internal communication on the first network of confidential counsellors and on the anti-harassment provisions and to all National European Delegated Prosecutors’ Assistants (NEDPAs) on whistleblowing mechanism for breaches against the EPPO mandate;

    Digitalisation, Cybersecurity and data protection

    67.  Deplores the situation of the EPPO in the area of its IT autonomy, which is adversely affected by the decision of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Digital Services (‘DG Digital Services’, formerly DIGIT) to discontinue the provision of digital workplace services; points out that EPPO IT autonomy requires additional human and financial resources which so far have not been granted because of the limitation imposed by the overall available budgetary resources in the concerned lines; regrets that, on grounds of the risks to its operational activities, the EPPO had to establish its own digital service capacity to accommodate the additional human resources that it was granted in light of the participation of Poland and Sweden;

    68.  Notes that the EPPO’s initial approach was to prioritise resources on the setting and working of essential digital services linked to its operational activities, such as its case-management system, while acknowledging that the EPPO’s digital services, which, at least in part, diverge from those of the Commission, would have needed, in the mid-term, a tailored approach; observes that the interruption of service by the Commission occurs in the crucial phase of the consolidation of the EPPO’s establishment;

    69.  Understands that, in 2023, the EPPO’s IT, Security and Corporate Services unit continued the implementation of two major programmes: the IT Autonomy Programme, to offer a complete catalogue of administrative IT services fully managed internally, and the EPPO’s CMS programme, to further develop the digitalisation of the organisation in its core business area; acknowledges that in 2023 the EPPO continued to prepare to gradually transition from a digital workplace provided by DG Digital Services to an EPPO-owned and operated solution; is aware that the resources needed to implement this change, although were included in the EPPO’s budget request for 2023, were not granted by the budgetary authority; notes that following DG Digital Service’s announcement, the EPPO started negotiation to seek a solution which has not yet been achieved;

    70.  Appreciates that Commission has temporarily extended the provision of IT services until June 2025 but maintains that the outsourcing of those services is a suboptimal solution in the current situation; understands that not only security and confidentiality-related arguments, but also purely financial aspects, suggest to reconsider the decision, because the outsourcing would appear much more costly than the in-house solution, and the adoption of the latter, after DG Digital Services cease providing their services, would be managed by the EPPO; stresses that, to implement the preferable in-house solution, the complex administrative aspects, the EPPO lack of experience and the de-centralised configuration of the EPPO with EDPs and NEDPAs in several locations across the Union, will require a more relevant budget and a lengthy transition period;

    71.  Reiterates its call on DG Digital Services to not interrupt its support to the EPPO until such a time as the EPPO has its own reliable IT system; deems it to be essential to avoid loss of data and to keep the EPPO fully operational in the transition between IT services providers; maintains that clear communication and operational coordination on the transition is to be ensured involving the highest decision-making levels of the Commission and the EPPO; asks the Commission and the EPPO to agree upon a gradual passage of competences for a smooth and continuous transition in the period after the extension, which could be extended beyond June 2025;

    72.  Observes that EPPO’s requests for permanent additional posts to fill the gap stemming from the discontinuation of DG Digital Services were refused, in January 2023, when EPPO requested 45 establishment plan, and at the end of February 2024, when a request for an amending budget 2024 for EUR 2,98 million and 37 established plan posts was also rejected; notes that the solution of recruiting intra-muros contractors could be a part of an interim solution to address DG Digital Service’s discontinuation, but while that approach would offer immediate operational continuity, it should not be conceived as a definitive solution for the EPPO, taking into account the extremely sensitive nature of its activities and the need to ensure continuity and reliability of its digital services, as well as the highest level of security of its IT infrastructure, systems and equipment; shares the view that the rejection of the EPPO’s budgetary requests is indicative of differences in the assessment of the problem, which has an adverse impact on the EPPO’s operational activities and represents a potential reputational risk for the Union in the case it results in weakening the EPPO’s operational capacity;

    73.  Understands that each EDP has to use any national and the EPPO’s CMS, which are different data bases governed by different access rights; believes that this situation increases the daily complexity in the data management; is also aware that to make it possible the processing and exchange of information between the central services of the EDPs and the EPPO, all the casefiles need to be digitalised by the EDPs using national digital tools and in compliance with national law; appreciates, in this regard, the formal creation of the NEDPA status in the official organisation chart which allows granting access to NEDPAs (staff of the national office) directly to the EPPO’s CMS, like that unburdening the EDPs of administrative tasks and creating the basis for more accuracy and consistency of case data between the two case-management systems; takes the view that the way towards integration between the EPPO’s CMS and national case-management systems would be facilitated by appropriate revision of regulation and that these steps would increase the effectiveness of EPPO investigations; notes, however, that such integration could be primarily a matter of compatible technological solutions used in the different Member States and linked to the actual level of digitalisation of judiciary proceedings in those Member States; observes that the burden of the inherent costs is currently shared, with the national budget covering the costs of the equipment needed for interaction with the national case-management systems, and the EPPO budget covering hardware and the setting of a digital working environment that is secured to the same standard as EPPO central office staff and which is considered part of the operational communication costs provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    74.  Understands that interoperability is material to achieving efficient data exchange and cooperation and that in order to adopt minimum common data exchange agreements and the implementation of judicial interoperability tools, an e-CODEX EPPO Use Case Project, initiated in 2023, involved several workshops with the e-CODEX Consortium to align on technical and functional requirements; regrets that, after several workshops with e-CODEX Consortium, the project was paused to allow the transition to the new e-CODEX programme manager, eu-LISA, and due to lack of EPPO resources with expertise in this area; calls on the Commission to act as a facilitator for further progressing in the project and to factor also those actions in the EPPO’s budgetary needs estimate;

    75.  Is aware of the increased threat to the EPPO’s IT structural integrity stemming from the aggressiveness of organised crime, combatted by the EPPO, and resulting in the need to step up physical and digital security; notes that in 2023 the EPPO focused on enhancing its security governance; appreciates the EPPO decision to create a dedicated unit to address cyber and physical security; observes that the EPPO prepared a framework including new processes, roles and responsibilities and policies to increase the security of the digital systems used for the handling of operational and administrative data; understands that several risk assessments were carried out to assess the security framework of the digital systems which suggested the implementation of additional technical and governance measures to enhance the EPPO’s security environment; remarks that the policy framework was improved in the circumstance, with a security strategy and global information security policy proposed in 2023 and formally approved and adopted in 2024;

    76.  Observes that the EPPO completed, in 2023, the set-up of security contact points in all participating Member States to enhance cooperation on security matters for staff and EPPO offices located in those Member States; welcomes the service level agreement is in place with CERT-EU that provides support and monitoring for specific services for incident response-related matters; underlines that the deployed system to assess risk and to report incidents is well structured and training is provided effectively; appreciates the external assessment performed for physical security whose findings translated in a roadmap for improvement by the host country;

    77.  Praises the significant progress made in 2023 towards the implementation of a backup data centre and the deployment of an associated disaster recovery scenario; appreciates, in that regard, the EPPO’s development of its own case-management ecosystem the components of which are all hosted in the EPPO data centre and managed by the EPPO’s staff, guaranteeing the EPPO control, retention and ownership of systems and data processed;

    78.  Acknowledges the EPPO’s need for up-to-date equipment and IT systems to deal with increasingly complicated crimes frequently involving digital elements and digital methodologies; stresses as well the urgency of developing a strong cybersecurity framework, given the growing risks posed by highly tech-savvy criminal networks and potential foreign interferences, through cyberattacks; supports the EPPO in its request for resources to be allocated to protecting its cybersecurity and calls for the swift implementation of a robust cybersecurity strategy to safeguard EPPO’s operations and data integrity;

    79.  Stresses that the nature of the EPPO’s activities entails the need for specific oversight and dedicated attention to the protection of personal data; takes the view that the EPPO and the EDPS should engage in continuous dialogue to ensure the usability of the data for the investigation and prosecution and, at the same time, ensure respect for the protection of personal data; understands that the requirements relating to data protection handling stems from Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and from Regulation (EU) 2018/1725(4) and that those requirements are complemented and implemented by College decisions, adopted after consulting the EDPS; appreciates the decision to provide mandatory training for all members of staff, including dedicated data protection training essential to the access to the EPPO’s CMS;

    Buildings and security

    80.  Observes that, thanks to the lease agreement by which Luxembourg authorities provide the building currently hosting the EPPO’s headquarters (the TOB building) on a rent-free basis, the costs are limited to a service charge fee of EUR 716 724 per year; notes that, in 2023, EUR 248 103 was paid to the same Luxembourg authorities for security installations in the two additional floors (9 and 10) delivered to the EPPO in Q1 2023;

    81.  Welcomes, having regard to physical security, the allocation – with amending budget 2023 and the budget 2024 – of the resources needed to have a proportionate capacity to deliver enhanced security services (21 additional posts to enhance its security capability) and the EPPO’s efforts towards the continuous improvement and efficiency alignment of the physical security processes; maintains the proper functioning of the EPPO implies that prosecutors and staff have to be protected to be able to pursue their mission to its full extent, without threats, influence or pressure;

    Environment and sustainability

    82.  Believes that the Luxembourg authorities providing the EPPO’s headquarters should consider their sustainability and energetic performance; calls on the EPPO to engage in discussions with the Luxembourg authorities to explore specific actions for improving the environmental footprint of its premises, including the installation of renewable energy sources such as solar panels, the introduction of CO2 offsetting measures and implementation of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme to evaluate, report, enhance organisations’ environmental performance and to save energy; calls on the Commission to facilitate dialogue between the EPPO and the local host authorities to ensure the optimal use of resources and the alignment of EPPO’s operations with the Union’s sustainability;

    83.  Notes that the EPPO’s central office is integrated in the Luxembourg network of free public transport making it easily reachable through low environmental impact means, at no cost for staff and visitors and that the central office underground car park provides a dedicated zone for bike parking; understands that exchanges are ongoing concerning the installation of charging stations for e-vehicles in the same underground car park;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    84.  Maintains that the EPPO’s role as a major operational component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture can be effectively pursued only with intense cooperation with and support from its partners and stakeholders; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard and encourages the EPPO to continue its communication and coordination efforts with the several partners whose action has been designed to be reciprocal and complementary;

    85.  Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify and streamline their operational cooperation and share knowledge amongst the involved actors; appreciates the first international conference allowing exchange of views between EPPO prosecutors and OLAF investigators, hosted by Parliament in 2024; emphasises that the revision of the regulatory frameworks of OLAF and EPPO provides the opportunity to reconsider many aspects of their working together in the light of the experiences earned in those first years of EPPO operational activity, having specific regard to the opening of complementary OLAF investigations and administrative investigations in support of the EPPO, as well as OLAF’s increased role in detecting and reporting fraud to the EPPO in support of the recovery of the damage to the Union budget; believes that the dialogue and cooperation within the antifraud architecture could be made more effective by the setting of a regular inter-institutional forum with a view to optimising the efficiency and efficacy of the available resources in action;

    86.  Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify operational dialogue and improve coordination; underlines the importance of full and effective data-sharing between the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, and Europol to ensure seamless cooperation in the fight against cross-border fraud; calls for the establishment of a joint working group to oversee data integration and case management efficiency among these bodies;

    87.  Encourages continued and enhanced cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF, in line with their respective regulations, and the obligation on OLAF to report, without undue delay, suspicions of criminal contact to the EPPO, in order to enable it to tackle fraud, corruption and financial crime affecting the Union’s financial interests; supports the further development of joint initiatives, information sharing and coordinated actions between the EPPO and OLAF, as such cooperation is vital in strengthening the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the Union’s fight against financial crime and to ensuring the effective and efficient use of Union resources;

    88.  Commends the close cooperation in 2023 between the EPPO and the Court of Auditors, resulting in the timely transmission of information on suspicions of criminal offences falling within the EPPO’s competences;

    89.  Expects that the working group established with the Commission, and the meetings on the implementation of the Commission-EPPO Working Arrangement, will ensure that EPPO notifications for the purpose of administrative recovery, as provided for by Article 103(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 will duly and effectively enable the Commission to maximise recovery to the Union budget, while complying with the confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigative actions; stresses that, in this specific regard, no feedback has been yet provided by either party, preventing the legislators from earning a comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues, including the specific amounts recovered annually by the Commission from Member States in cases of damage to the Union budget; highlights that the recovery of funds by national authorities remains under the Commission’s responsibility, as mentioned in the Mission Letter to the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, while the EPPO does not hold a mandate to follow up on the recovery process; calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation and inform both the Commission and the EPPO of final confiscations; urges a revision of the relevant Regulations to clarify the EPPO’s role in the recovery process; and urges the EPPO and the Commission to adopt an agreed upon form of reporting to Parliament; understands that this could require appropriate development of the EPPO’s CMS, and asks the Commission to prioritise the allocation of resources to the EPPO to meet that need;

    90.  Welcomes the strengthened cooperation with Europol; observes that the ODIN (Operational Digital Infrastructure Network) programme would enable the full exploitation of the amount of data collected by the EPPO in its investigations (more than 1000 terabytes and growing); notes that, in that framework, the EPPO has identified possible crimes outside its competences, including organised crime, drug trafficking, illicit cigarette production, investment fraud, illegal gambling and prostitution (non-PIF offences), and others which have resulted in the transmission of several files as key evidence to ongoing national investigations and that 28 new cases have been initiated by national prosecution offices to further investigate those non-PIF offences, which are outside the EPPO’s remit; understands that for this and other analyses, however, cooperation with Europol suffers from limitations stemming from national procedural criminal law and accessibility of the EPPO data owned; underlines that the EPPO’s existing competence to investigate organised crime and money laundering linked to fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests should be supported through adequate resources and efficient cooperation with Europol; considers that while cooperation with Europol needs to be even further enhanced, it cannot fully substitute the development of the EPPO’s internal analytical platform, which remains vital to a fast interpretation of the data collected during its investigations and the setting of operational strategies in cross-border cases requiring access to the EPPO’s entire CMS; recalls that, in its upcoming evaluation report, the Commission should carefully analyse to which categories of crimes the EPPO’s mandate needs to be extended, in order to take full advantage of its potential; welcomes the EPPO’s call for enhanced cooperation with Union institutions;

    91.  Is concerned about the increasing number of cases concerning the RRF; appreciates the timely information provided to the Commission and to the relevant Parliament Committees on this matter; believes that the large number of active cases involving RRF funds justifies an intensification of the exchanges held with, in particular, the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the aim of identifying possible oversight or control gaps or fraud patterns and to allow the Commission to keep up to date its performance monitoring mechanisms and to enforce the reduction and recovery measures recently designed; reiterates that RRF funds are Union and not national funds and are under the jurisdiction of the EPPO and encourages the Commission and other Union’s bodies and authorities to increase the detection efforts and report to the EPPO every relevant situation;

    92.  Welcomes that the EPPO signed Working Arrangement with Parliament in November 2024, establishing clear modalities of cooperation for the purpose of protecting the Union’s financial interests;

    93.  Notes that, in 2023, the EPPO continued to rely on inter-institutional contracts and bilateral agreements (SLAs) to purchase goods and services at a lower cost; observes that, at the end of 2023, the EPPO had 80 active membership in inter-institutional framework contracts and 22 service-level agreement or other bilateral agreements with other Union’s entities with the aim of maximising budgetary savings from the contractual instruments in place, in line with the principles of sound financial management;

    94.  Strongly welcomes the participation of Poland and Sweden in the EPPO; is aware that this will have an impact on the EPPO’s budgetary needs, and supports the EPPO’s request which aims to equip the EPPO with the necessary resources to take advantage of the participation of Poland and Sweden to its operational activities; notes that while Ireland and Denmark continue to exercise their opt-out from the EPPO under Protocols No 21 and 22 TFEU, Hungary is the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    95.  Observes that, in 2023, no major improvement towards participation into the EPPO has occurred with the Irish authorities; reminds that their refusal to cooperate with the EPPO in executing several requests for mutual legal assistance sent by the EDPs had resulted in the EPPO reporting the situation to the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(5); appreciated the following decision of the Irish authorities to amend their domestic legislation providing the legal framework for mutual legal assistance to the EPPO and underlines that from 1 November 2023 it provides mutual legal assistance to the EPPO based on this unilateral recognition; notes that no exchanges occurred with the Irish inter-agency working group established to examine Ireland’s potential future participation in the EPPO; urges the Commission, the EPPO and the Irish authorities to engage in a constructive dialogue to find an effective way of cooperation;

    96.  Maintains that any lack of cooperation with the EPPO by any of the Member States, whether they are participating in the enhanced cooperation that established the EPPO, creates niches of immunity and privilege that make the defence of the financial interests of the Union uneven and inefficient at best; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States concerned to make any possible effort to integrate the current scenario with the few but still very important missing components, promoting the extension of the participation in the EPPO by the other still non-participating Member States in such a way that strengthens the effectiveness of the protection of the Union and national budgets; calls on the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO and urges the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against any Member State that systematically obstructs EPPO-led investigations; takes the view that membership of the EPPO should be a precondition for receiving Union funds;

    97.  Condemns the recently reported systematic espionage organized by the Hungarian government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission into the potential misuse of Union funds by ELIOS, a company linked to the Hungarian Prime Minister’s son-in-law; emphasizes that OLAF and the EPPO, as cornerstone institutions of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, are regrettably exposed to such threats not only from third countries but also within EU Member States; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of Union institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union’s institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent such unacceptable violations in the future;

    Communication

    98.  Observes that the EPPO engages in continuous efforts to enhance internal and external communication; appreciates the actions carried out via social network platforms and encourages the EPPO to maintain its proactive and transparent approach;

    99.  Believes that explanations about the EPPO’s interventions and operations and about their background, when reported in the media and posted on social networks, would contribute to reinforcing the reputation of the institutions amongst citizens and raise awareness in taxpayers about the complexity of the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    100.  Maintains that proper and accurate communication from the EPPO would also increase the involvement of civil society and increase submission of potential investigative input; understands that the EPPO asks to have the reporting option included in every standard presentation for external audiences or at conferences and seminars, when possible and appropriate; notes that, in 2023, the EPPO’s corporate website underwent a complete redesign, with the primary focus on enhancing accessibility and user-friendliness, and that the option to report a crime is now prominently displayed at the top of every webpage together with a banner highlighting this feature in the homepage;

    101.  Observes that the level of the EPPO’s resources that are devoted to communication are limited, and that, in view of the need to establish the EPPO’s digital autonomy, management of the EPPO website will have to be brought in-house, requiring additional resources, after DG Digital Services cease providing that service; underlines that the increasing volume and the sensitivity of EPPO investigations calls for attention in exchanges with the media, journalists, citizens and academia; reiterates its call on the EPPO to clearly strike the best possible balance between transparency and public interest on the one hand and confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigation on the other, and to ensure the neutrality of its communications about its activities;

    102.  Recalls the importance of transparency in the EPPO’s interactions with external actors; calls for the establishment of a mandatory public register of all meetings between EPPO officials and representatives of third parties, including lobbyists and national government representatives, in order to prevent undue influence and reinforce public trust in the EPPO’s independence;

    Effect of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

    103.  Recalls that EPPO competences extend to Union funds even when used in third countries; believes that the working arrangements with the Ukrainian competent authorities could effectively enhance the level of protection of the Union’s financial interests following the relevant commitments undertaken to support Ukraine and its population; welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities on anti-corruption measures, but recalls that the country is still subject to high rate of corruption and fraud, demanding extra precaution to be taken and further anti-corruption measure in order to successfully reach transparency goals; is aware that transmission of evidence has occurred in execution of mutual legal assistance requests and welcomes the perspective of activating a joint task force with the Ukrainian authorities to coordinate investigations; reminds the Commission and other Union institutions bodies, offices and agencies of the importance of detection and timely submission of investigative input to the EPPO.

    (1) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (2) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017, implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (3) According to the Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2023, the turnover rate was 5,9 % for temporary and contract agents.
    (4) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).
    (5) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Ninth report on economic and social cohesion – P10_TA(2025)0098 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    –  having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(1) (Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency(9),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)(10),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE(12),

    –  having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    –  having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    –  having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    –  having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024(13), and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report(15),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    –  having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024(16),

    –  having regard to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU)(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    –  having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A.  whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B.  whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4,4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1,3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU(26);

    C.  whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24,6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D.  whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions(27), to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E.  whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F.  whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G.  whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H.  whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I.  whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J.  whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K.  whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L.  whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M.  whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N.  whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O.  whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q.  whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R.  whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions(28), which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S.  whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021(29), meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1.  Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2.  Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3.  Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4.  Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5.  Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6.  Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7.  Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8.  Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria(30) such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9.  Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10.  Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12.  Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13.  Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14.  Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15.  Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16.  Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17.  Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18.  Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19.  Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20.  Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21.  Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid(31), through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22.  Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23.  Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24.  Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25.  Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26.  Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1058/oj.
    (3) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1059/oj.
    (4) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    (5) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1056/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (7) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 5, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/460/oj.
    (8) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/558/oj.
    (9) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/461/oj.
    (10) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2221/oj.
    (11) OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/562/oj.
    (12) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 23, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2039/oj.
    (13) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2024.
    (14) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, February 2024.
    (15) OJ C, C/2024/4668, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4668/oj.
    (16) European Parliament: Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Streamlining EU Cohesion funds – addressing administrative burdens and redundancy, 2024.
    (17) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (18) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (19) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 26.
    (20) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 125.
    (21) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.
    (22) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 100.
    (23) OJ C, C/2024/4207, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4207/oj.
    (24) OJ C, C/2024/4225, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4225/oj.
    (25) OJ C, C/2024/6562, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6562/oj.
    (26) European Commission, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op.cit.
    (27) European Commission: Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
    (28) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and Directorate-General for Communication, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU Regional Policy, Flash Eurobarometer 531, 2023.
    (29) Flash Eurobarometer 531, op. cit.
    (30) European Court of Auditors, Rapid case review – Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, March 2019.
    (31) Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Guidelines on regional State aid’ (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market – P10_TA(2025)0107 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments(1),

    –  having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘the 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report’ (COM(2025)0026),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification (COM(2025)0047),

    –  having regard to the question to the Commission on the old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market (O-000012/2025 – B10‑0264/2025),

    –  having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas the European Union’s ability to compete and prosper in the global economy is vital, especially amid the current geopolitical challenges and climate and other environmental crises; whereas its current, medium and long-term competitiveness relies on a fully integrated and efficient single market that allows European businesses to innovate and prosper and prioritises the reduction of administrative burdens;

    B.  whereas the single market, comprising nearly 450 million citizens and 23 million businesses, generates a gross domestic product (GDP) of EUR 17 trillion, positioning the EU among the world’s three largest economies and contributing approximately one-sixth of global economic output;

    C.  whereas the Draghi report demonstrated that compliance costs resulting from various pieces of legislation remain very high for European companies, therefore hindering European innovation capacity;

    D.  whereas it remains crucial to improve the functioning of the single market by addressing persisting fragmentation through common, harmonised EU policies, more efficient implementation and enforcement, and the simplification of EU rules; whereas reducing administrative burdens and costs, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), can help foster innovation and support European businesses; whereas unlocking the full potential of the single market requires overcoming persistent barriers to the free movement of goods and services;

    E.  whereas the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and whereas evolving trends in global e-commerce are exerting additional pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities;

    F.  whereas geopolitical shifts and global economic transformations are reshaping supply chains, requiring the EU to adapt its single market policies; whereas the EU has set the highest standards for product safety and consumer protection, both offline and online;

    G.  whereas attention has been drawn to a growing number of cases reported across the EU in which goods and services offer reduced quantity or quality, despite stable or rising prices;

    Old and enduring challenges

    1.  Reaffirms that the single market has been a cornerstone of European economic integration, enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital and people; stresses, however, that there are long-standing and emerging challenges that necessitate ambitious reforms without harming European competitiveness or imposing unnecessary administrative burdens on companies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate efforts towards implementing these reforms and to eliminate remaining unjustified obstacles to the free movement of goods and services, while ensuring a high level of consumer protection;

    2.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain strong consumer protection while also providing for competition rules that are innovation-friendly, future-proof and proportionate; emphasises the need to ensure legal certainty and consistency and minimise regulatory complexity and fragmentation, which could disproportionately affect SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups;

    3.  Highlights that ongoing barriers and regulations have constrained the development of the single market, as noted in the Draghi report; calls for a shift towards a regulatory approach that empowers companies to grow, innovate and lead internationally, thereby restoring the single market as a true engine of growth and competitiveness;

    4.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that future legislative initiatives are consistently guided by the strategic priorities outlined in its communications and competitiveness strategy;

    5.  Underscores that, as demonstrated by the Letta and Draghi reports, there is still untapped potential in the services sector; calls for further action in this sector to address the significant obstacles that persist, starting from setting ambitious targets in the upcoming single market strategy; notes that services account for three quarters of EU GDP, represent two thirds of employment and create 9 out of 10 new jobs in the EU economy; notes also, however, that services are still the least developed segment of the EU single market;

    6.  Welcomes the proposal for a regulation on a public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (COM(2024)0531), which should lead to simplification and strengthened enforcement; notes also that digitalisation could significantly reduce administrative burdens for cross-border services and ensure better access for businesses and consumers; calls, in this regard, for a single declaration portal and the digitalisation of A1 forms for cross-border services;

    7.  Stresses the importance of the effective recognition of professional qualifications and the removal of unjustified barriers to the free movement of professionals in order to make EU professional services globally competitive in future decades; encourages the Commission to remain vigilant in pursuing infringement procedures where Member States do not comply with EU legislation on the recognition of qualifications;

    8.  Stresses that single market rules should safeguard access to public services and preserve consumer rights as well as other overriding reasons of public interest; adds that any assessment to evaluate restrictions in the single market for services should include qualitative criteria;

    9.  Notes the role that EU public procurement can play in overcoming barriers to market entry, supporting sustainable and resilient industrial ecosystems, high quality jobs and value creation in the EU;

    10.  Acknowledges that the new legislative framework (NLF) has contributed to consistency in EU product legislation and that since its adoption, the industry sector, supply chains and products have experienced important transformations in the light of the digital and green transition, but also changes in market dynamics; notes that the 2022 evaluation of the NLF identified critical challenges, such as potential foreign influence, illegal practices, inadequacies in addressing digitalisation and the circular economy, and potential updates to obligations and definitions for certain economic operators to reflect new market realities;

    11.  Stresses that addressing these issues and making the NLF future-proof is essential to ensure coherence, reduce costs and ensure free movement of goods; calls, therefore, for an update to the NLF in order to streamline product rules, promote digitalisation and simplify compliance and market surveillance procedures; considers that the NLF should promote the use of Digital Product Passports as a means of demonstrating product conformity and complying with information requirements;

    12.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify EU rules and make them easier to implement, and to significantly reduce administrative burdens, in particular for SMEs, which play a vital role in sustaining local communities and economies; stresses the importance of ensuring legal certainty and consistency for businesses, as well as predictability for long-term investments, which are essential to boost competitiveness, innovation and resilience and to deliver fast and meaningful improvements for consumers and businesses; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to prevent actions that could compromise the level playing field in the internal market;

    13.  Calls on the Commission to facilitate the activities of SMEs and small mid-caps within the single market, notably with a dedicated simplification omnibus;

    14.  Recognises that inconsistent and fragmented enforcement of EU laws across the Member States continues to distort competition and undermine the single market’s integrity; adds that primary responsibility for enforcement of EU rules lies with the Member States; invites the Commission to make full use of its enforcement powers; calls for improved monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at EU level, such as harmonised rules on minimum levels of checks, harmonised methodologies to conduct these checks and joint inspections, in order to ensure the uniform application of EU law and, where applicable, swift redress for consumers;

    15.  Stresses the importance of maintaining a competitive and dynamic economic environment by safeguarding consumers’ rights and enforcing digital competition rules to address unfair business practices that distort market conditions; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to increase the capacity of market surveillance authorities and customs authorities to ensure effective enforcement of single market rules, particularly in respect of e-commerce and imports from non-EU countries;

    16.  Recalls that territorial supply constraints in the retail and wholesale segments fragment the single market, limit consumer choice and contribute to significant price disparities across the Union, particularly affecting the prices of basic consumer goods; highlights that while competition law penalises some of these practices effectively, many fall outside its scope; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose measures to address the issue, including stronger enforcement against anti-competitive distribution agreements, in order to safeguard fair competition, thereby ensuring the integrity of the single market;

    17.  Calls on the Commission to investigate the causes for the differentiated levels of the inflation of basic goods and consumer price increases observed in some EU Member States;

    18.  Considers that the single market is a key tool in times of crisis if the Member States can act in a coordinated way; considers that the recently adopted Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act(2) will be crucial to ensure coordination in order to prevent shortages and ensure the smooth functioning of the single market, including the free movement of essential goods and services throughout the EU;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to empower consumers to easily exercise their passenger rights by establishing national enforcement bodies, which should be granted harmonised investigation and enforcement powers and which should be able to efficiently process individual complaints and related fines;

    20.  Highlights that e-commerce measures targeting geo-blocking, notably the Geoblocking Regulation(3), have been successful in creating a framework for a less fragmented single market and enhancing consumer choice for online shopping; notes with concern that the implementation of the regulation has been inadequate;

    21.  Notes that the European Accessibility Act(4) will become applicable across all EU Member States as of 28 June 2025; stresses the importance of its full and effective implementation by the Member States in order to ensure the harmonisation of accessibility requirements for products and services, thereby guaranteeing their accessibility to persons with disabilities across the EU internal market;

    Emerging commercial practices

    22.  Highlights that the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and has created advanced opportunities and challenges and risks for users; acknowledges that the Digital Markets Act(5) (DMA) and the Digital Services Act(6) (DSA) constitute key legislative instruments ensuring fair competition, contestability and fairness in digital platforms, while also fostering consumer protection and a safer, more trustworthy and more transparent digital environment in the digital economy; calls for proper enforcement of the EU’s new technology legislation to ensure genuine, autonomous and informed consumer choice, protection and fair competition;

    23.  Considers it essential to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of these two legislative acts and urges the Commission to conclude its ongoing investigations in the framework of the DSA and the DMA;

    24.  Stresses that the implementation of the DSA must fully respect freedom of expression; underlines that actions against illegal content must not restrict lawful speech and calls for transparent enforcement to protect an open and democratic digital space;

    25.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act(7) maintains a risk-based, innovation-friendly approach, ensuring that compliance requirements are proportionate to the actual risks posed by AI applications while respecting the need to ensure a high level of protection of health, safety and fundamental rights;

    26.  Welcomes the Commission’s ‘digital fairness’ fitness check of consumer law and the upcoming public consultation; underlines that some issues remain unaddressed concerning the protection of consumers online, leading to an imbalance between consumers and traders within the digital economy; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act; believes that digital addiction, online gambling, protection of minors online and persuasive technologies used by online actors, such as targeted advertising, influencer advertising and dark patterns, should fall under the Digital Fairness Act, which should close legal loopholes and be consistent with current legal instruments in order to better protect consumers online, taking into account the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens;

    27.  Notes that evolving trends in global e-commerce and supply chain restructuring are placing greater pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities; highlights that the volume of unsafe and illicit products sold on e-commerce platforms, in particular from non-EU countries, has been increasing in recent years; highlights the significance of Digital Product Passports in these processes; calls, therefore, for a reinforced market surveillance framework and a revision of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation(8) and calls on the Council to swiftly adopt its position in order to enable the adoption of the revised Union Customs Code and the establishment of an EU customs authority in 2026;

    28.  Calls on the Member States to allocate sufficient technical, human and financial resources to national authorities; calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure sufficient funds and expertise to strengthen customs authorities and market surveillance across the Union and to intensify joint activities and EU testing;

    29.  Emphasises the need to strengthen consumer protection in both online and offline markets, ensuring transparency in advertising and pricing, especially concerning dynamic pricing, ensuring fair business practices and stronger safeguards against fraud to foster consumer trust in cross-border commerce and the highest level of protection;

    30.  Stresses that attention has increasingly been drawn to instances where goods and services offer less in terms of quantity or quality while prices remain the same or increase; calls on the Commission to assess the scale and underlying causes of such practices and to explore appropriate measures to enhance transparency and consumer awareness;

    31.  Underlines that environmental sustainability and fair-trade considerations are increasingly shaping commercial practices by playing an important role in consumers’ purchasing decisions and consequently driving businesses towards sustainability; adds that transparency and information for consumers on environmental aspects as well as on socially-responsible and ethical production processes allow consumers to adopt sustainable consumption patterns;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain their level of ambition in this regard and work further on EU-wide labelling schemes; recalls that the objective of the Green Claims Directive is to establish a tool to protect consumers against greenwashing by establishing requirements for substantiation and verification;

    33.  Highlights the need to further combat misleading advertising and greenwashing and to strengthen the second-hand market; notes, however, that restrictive sustainability rules may have a negative impact on European competitiveness;

    34.  Highlights that some growing trends in e-commerce raise concerns with regard to goods from non-EU countries not fulfilling EU safety and sustainability requirements, thus negatively impacting SMEs in the EU; welcomes the Commission communication on ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ and asks the Commission to swiftly implement the recommendations contained therein;

    35.  Emphasises that harmonised technical standards are essential for the free movement of goods within the single market, ensuring product safety, quality and performance across the Member States; highlights that standards must reflect the interests, policy objectives and values of the Union by taking into account the views of all stakeholders; adds that the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling(9) acknowledges the added value of harmonised standards that form part of EU law because of their legal effects and establishes that they should be made freely accessible; underlines the need to improve the agility of the standardisation framework, particularly for emerging green and digital value chains, and to help industry to maintain competitive positions in key technology markets;

    36.  Considers that the EU must increase its efforts to set up a new mechanism with the Member States and national standardisation bodies to share information, coordinate and strengthen the European approach to international standardisation activities; calls for swift action to update the EU standardisation framework in order to speed up the standardisation process to ensure the rapid publication of harmonised standards that grant presumption of conformity and are aligned with international standards to support global trade while encouraging greater industry participation, particularly from SMEs;

    37.  Stresses the need to reinforce the external dimension of the single market to safeguard the EU’s strategic autonomy and global influence and welcomes the gradual integration of EU candidate countries to the single market with a view to their future EU membership; emphasises that the EU’s high regulatory standards can serve as a global benchmark and must be effectively enforced to ensure a level playing field for European businesses; calls on the Commission to intensify regulatory dialogues and political cooperation with other relevant non-EU countries in order to identify common challenges and try to build joint actions, especially concerning e-commerce, digital rules and consumers;

    38.  Reiterates its call for innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement currently in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes;

    Conclusions

    39.  Recognises that geopolitical tensions, climate change, challenges to EU competitiveness and economic disparities pose significant risks to the integrity of the single market; calls for a robust, coordinated and strategic policy response to strengthen the single market;

    40.  Calls for the continued evolution of the single market to address both remaining unjustified barriers and emerging commercial challenges; takes the view that eliminating regulatory fragmentation, promoting simplification, significantly reducing administrative burdens, enhancing enforcement and ensuring resilient supply chains are critical to maintaining the EU’s competitive edge and fair market conditions and enhancing the single market; underlines the importance of consulting all relevant stakeholders in these processes;

    41.  Emphasises the importance of digital transformation, the circular economy and adaptability to global economic shifts in securing the EU’s long-term economic dynamism;

    42.  Reiterates that strengthening the internal and external dimensions of the single market is essential for preserving the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness;

    43.  Urges the Commission, therefore, to reflect the foregoing in the forthcoming new single market strategy, scheduled for June 2025, in the 2030 consumer agenda, scheduled for the end of 2025, and in the Digital Fairness Act, scheduled for 2026;

    o
    o   o

    44.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 8.
    (2) Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (OJ L, 2024/2747, 8.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2747/oj).
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ L 60I, 2.3.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/302/oj).
    (4) Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/882/oj).
    (5) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj).
    (9) Judgment of 5 March 2024, Public.Resource.Org Inc. v Right to Know CLG, C‑588/21 P, EU:C:2024:201.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

    –  having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

    –  having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

    –  having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

    –  having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

    A.  whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

    B.  whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

    C.  whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

    D.  whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

    E.  whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

    F.  whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

    G.  whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

    H.  whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

    I.  whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

    J.  whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

    K.  whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

    L.  whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

    M.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

    1.  Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

    2.  Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

    3.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

    4.  Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

    5.  Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

    6.  Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

    7.  Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    8.  Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

    9.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

    10.  Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

    11.  Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    12.  Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

    A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

    13.  Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

    Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

    14.  Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

    15.  Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

    16.  Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

    17.  Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

    18.  Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

    19.  Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

    20.  Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

    21.  Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

    22.  Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

    23.  Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

    24.  Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

    25.  Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

    26.  Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

    27.  Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

    28.  Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

    29.  Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

    30.  Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

    31.  Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

    32.  Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

    33.  Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

    34.  Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

    35.  Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

    The green and digital transitions

    36.  Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

    37.  Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

    38.  Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

    39.  Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

    Security, defence and preparedness

    40.  Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

    41.  Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

    42.  Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

    43.  Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

    44.  Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

    45.  Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

    46.  Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

    47.  Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

    48.  Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

    49.  Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

    50.  Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

    51.  Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

    52.  Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

    53.  Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

    54.  Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

    55.  Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

    56.  Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

    External action and enlargement

    57.  Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

    58.  Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

    59.  Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

    60.  Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

    61.  Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

    62.  Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

    63.  Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

    64.  Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

    65.  Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

    66.  Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

    67.  Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

    68.  Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

    69.  Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

    70.  Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

    Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

    71.  Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

    72.  Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

    73.  Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

    74.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

    75.  Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

    76.  Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

    A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

    78.  Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

    79.  Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

    80.  Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

    81.  Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

    82.  Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

    83.  Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

    84.  Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

    85.  Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

    86.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

    A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

    87.  Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

    88.  Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

    89.  Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

    90.  Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

    91.  Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

    A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

    92.  Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

    93.  Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

    94.  Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    95.  Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

    96.  Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

    97.  Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

    A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

    98.  Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

    99.  Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

    100.  Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

    101.  Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

    102.  Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

    103.  Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

    104.  Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

    105.  Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

    106.  Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

    107.  Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

    108.  Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

    A long-term budget that is more results-focused

    109.  Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

    110.  Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

    111.  Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

    112.  Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

    113.  Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

    114.  Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

    115.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

    A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

    116.  Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

    117.  Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

    118.  Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

    119.  Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

    120.  Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

    121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

    A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

    122.  Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

    123.  Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    124.  Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

    125.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

    126.  Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

    127.  Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

    128.  Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

    A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

    129.  Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

    130.  Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

    131.  Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

    132.  Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

    133.  Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

    134.  Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

    135.  Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

    o
    o   o

    136.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (4) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (7) OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
    (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (10) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (11) OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
    (12) Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Opening Keynote by Commissioner Kubilius At The European Union-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Speech Brussels, 12 May 2025 Last week we celebrated 80 years of victory in World War Two. And today, what we need to remember that victory in World War Two was not only a victory of armies. It was also a victory of factories. And the same is true today. Peace through strength will come from production power and brain power.

    To stop Putin, we need to produce more. We need to innovate more. And we need to do that together – in the EU and with Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

    –  having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

    –  having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

    –  having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

    –  having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

    –  having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

    –  having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C.  whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D.  whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E.  whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F.  whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G.  whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2.  Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3.  Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4.  Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5.  Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6.  Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7.  Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8.  Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9.  Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10.  Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11.   Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12.  Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14.  Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

    15.  Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    16.  Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    17.  Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    18.  Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    19.  Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    20.  Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    21.  Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    22.  Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    23.  Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    24.  Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    25.  Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    26.  Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    28.  Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    29.  Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    30.  Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    31.  Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    32.  Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    33.  Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    34.  Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    35.  Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    36.  Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    37.  Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    38.  Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    39.  Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    40.  Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    42.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    43.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    44.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    45.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    46.  Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    47.  Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    48.  Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    49.  Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    50.  Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    51.  Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    52.  Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    53.  Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    54.  Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    55.  Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    56.  Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    57.  Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    58.  Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    59.  Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    60.  Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    61.  Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    62.  Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

    (1) OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
    (2) OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
    (3) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (5) OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
    (6) OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
    (7) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (8) Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
    (9) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (10) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

    –  having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

    –   having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

    –   having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

    –  having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

    –  having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

    –  having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B.  whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C.  whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D.  whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E.  whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F.  whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G.  whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H.  whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I.  whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J.  whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K.  whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L.  whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M.  whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N.  whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O.  whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2.  Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3.  Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4.  Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5.  Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6.  Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7.  Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8.  Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9.  Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10.  Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11.  Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13.  Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14.  Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15.  Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16.  Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17.  Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18.  Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19.  Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20.  Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21.  Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22.  Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23.  Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24.  Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25.  Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26.  Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27.  Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

    28.  Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    29.  Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

    30.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    31.  Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

    32.  Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    33.  Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    34.  Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    35.  Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    36.  Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    37.  Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

    38.  Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    39.  Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    40.  Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    41.  Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    42.  Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    43.  Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

    44.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    45.  Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    46.  Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    47.  Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    48.  Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    49.  Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    50.  Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    51.  Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    52.  Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    53.  Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    54.  Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    55.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    56.  Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    57.  Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    58.  Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    59.  Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    60.  Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    61.  Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    62.  Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    63.  Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    64.  Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    65.  Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    66.  Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    67.  Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    68.  Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    69.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    70.  Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    71.  Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    72.  Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    73.  Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    74.  Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    75.  Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    76.  Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    o
    o   o

    77.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    (1) OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
    (7) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (9) Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: UN80 Initiative, Gaza, Myanmar & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Stephane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    UN80
    Secretary-General Travels
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Gaza
    Lebanon/Israel
    Myanmar
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    India/Pakistan
    Kurdistan Workers’ Party
    Ukraine
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    State of Climate in Africa
    Haiti
    Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
    Beyond GDP
    DESA Event
    International Days
    Financial Contribution

    UN80
    The Secretary-General briefed the Member States this morning on his UN80 initiative, telling them that, as the UN celebrates its 80th anniversary, the initiative is anchored in equipping our organization in an era of extraordinary uncertainty.
    He told the Member States that the liquidity crisis we now face is not new, but today’s financial and political situation adds even greater urgency to our efforts.  We must rise to this moment. 
    Mr. Guterres said that the UN80 Initiative is structured around three key workstreams: to rapidly identify efficiencies and improvements under current arrangements; to review the implementation of all mandates given to us by Member States; and to consider the need for structural changes and programme realignment across the UN system.
    He noted that all Secretariat entities in New York and Geneva have been asked to review their functions to determine if any can be performed from existing, lower-cost locations, or may otherwise be reduced or abolished.
    On mandates, he said that we have already completed an identification of all mandates reflected in the programme budget—and will soon do so for the rest of the system. The review has so far identified over 3,600 unique mandates for the Secretariat alone. After this analytical work, relevant entities and departments will be invited to identify opportunities for improvements or consolidation of efforts.
    On structural reforms, the Secretary-General said that we have already got the ball rolling by soliciting the views of a number of UN senior leaders. Their initial submissions –nearly 50 in all– show a high level of ambition and creativity.
    He added that we know that some of these changes will be painful for our UN family. Staff and their representatives are being consulted and heard. Our concern is to be humane and professional in dealing with any aspect of the required restructuring.

    SECRETARY-GENERAL TRAVELS
    This afternoon the Secretary-General will be traveling to Germany to attend the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial that will kick off tomorrow, Tuesday in Berlin.
    He will be joined by Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support Atul Khare, and Under-Secretary-General for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance Catherine Pollard.
    During the high-level opening ceremony tomorrow morning, the Secretary-General is scheduled to deliver remarks that will focus on the future of peacekeeping. He will underscore the importance of the work of our Blue Helmets and the sacrifices they make.
    He will touch upon contributions to peacekeeping during these tough times for the financing of our work across the board.
    And just to note that this meeting provides a platform for delegations to announce substantial pledges in support of closing capability gaps and adapting peace operations to better respond to existing challenges and new realities.
    While there, the Secretary-General will hold bilateral meetings with German officials, including the Chancellor of Germany Friedrich Merz, as well as other leaders and officials attending this global event. He will also have media engagements there.
    Following the Ministerial meeting in Germany, the Secretary-General will be heading to Iraq for the League of Arab States Summit, which is taking place in Baghdad on 17 May.
    While in Iraq, the Secretary-General will be holding meetings with Iraqi officials and leaders from the region attending the summit. He will discuss a wide range of topics and issues mainly pertaining to the region, as you can imagine.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=12%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVQnnyRP4oA

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Ukrainian President signs law on ratification of minerals agreement with US

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, May 12 (Xinhua) — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has signed a bill on ratification of the minerals agreement with the United States, according to the bill’s card, updated on Monday by the Verkhovna Rada press service.

    The agreement was signed on April 30 in Washington. It provides for the creation of an investment fund for the restoration of Ukraine. Official Kyiv will contribute 50 percent of the state budget revenues from new licenses for the right to use subsoil resources to the fund. Washington must also make contributions in cash or new military aid to Ukraine.

    On May 8, the agreement was approved by the Verkhovna Rada. The document is expected to enter into force after an exchange of notes between Kiev and Washington that each side has completed its internal procedures. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • Russia Revokes Accreditation of 6 British Diplomats

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Russia has revoked the accreditation of six British diplomats in Moscow, accusing them of spying and sabotage. Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia has accused British diplomats of working to ensure Moscow’s defeat in the conflict with Ukraine.

    The FSB claimed to have documents showing a British foreign office department in London was coordinating what it called, the escalation of the political and military situation and was tasked with ensuring Russia’s strategic defeat against Ukraine.

    Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said, the activities of the British embassy in Moscow have gone well beyond diplomatic convention and accused it of carrying out deliberate activity designed to harm the Russian people.

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM meeting with Prime Minister Kristersson of Sweden: 12 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    PM meeting with Prime Minister Kristersson of Sweden: 12 May 2025

    The Prime Minister welcomed the Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson to Downing Street this afternoon. 

    The Prime Minister welcomed the Prime Minister of Sweden Ulf Kristersson to Downing Street this afternoon.

    Following the successful Joint Expeditionary Force meeting in Oslo last week and the Coalition of the Willing call in Kyiv on Saturday, the leaders underlined that now more than ever it is vital to be united on defence and security.

    They agreed to continue support for Ukraine and put the pressure on Putin to accept the ceasefire deal on the table – without conditions. The Prime Minister thanked Prime Minister Kristersson for Sweden’s contribution to Operation Interflex – the training programme for Ukrainians in the UK.

    On trade, defence and civil nuclear, the leaders agreed to closer working.

    They both looked forward to discussing migration, security and defence at the European Political Community meeting later this week.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 12 May 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    PM call with Prime Minister Carney of Canada: 12 May 2025

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, this evening.

    The Prime Minister spoke to the Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, this evening.

    The Prime Minister began by congratulating Prime Minister Carney on his fantastic election win.  

    The leaders reflected on the opportunities to deepen the friendship between the two countries, including through economic cooperation and technology ties to deliver for working people in both the UK and Canada.

    Discussing the Coalition of the Willing call in Kyiv on Saturday, the Prime Minister thanked Prime Minister Carney for joining, and leaders underlined the need to increase pressure on President Putin to agree to an unconditional ceasefire.

    Looking ahead, the Prime Minister said he was looking forward to travelling to Canada for the G7 Summit next month, which would be another important moment to stand in solidarity with Ukraine.

    The leaders agreed to stay in close touch.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: UK’s India trade deal offers wider access to a surging economy – and could make food imports cheaper

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sangeeta Khorana, Professor of International Trade Policy, Aston University

    India’s economy is growing rapidly. Radiokafka/Shutterstock

    After more than three years and 14 rounds of negotiations, the UK and India have finally announced a free trade agreement (FTA). UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer will formally sign the deal on a visit to India later this year. This is the biggest and most economically significant bilateral trade deal the UK has struck since leaving the EU. It will have implications for both businesses and workers.

    In 2024, the UK’s trade with India was worth £43 billion – £17.1 billion of exports and £25.5 billion of imports. Government modelling estimates that trade between the nations will increase by as much as 39% and the UK’s GDP will expand by £4.8 billion or 0.1 percentage points per year as a result.

    India’s economy is growing fast. It is expected to expand by 6% annually, becoming the world’s third largest economy by 2028 after the US and China. This certainly makes the deal with the UK very timely.

    With a population of more than 1.4 billion and a growing middle class, the country offers huge market potential. Its import demand is predicted to grow by 144% between 2021 and 2035. This combination of strong economic growth and increasing numbers of citizens with disposable cash makes a compelling case for the deal.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. Join The Conversation for free today.


    Both the UK and India have agreed to reduce tariffs under the deal. India will immediately lower its 150% tariffs on Scotch whisky and gin to 75%, and then to 40% within ten years. Tariffs on foodstuffs such as lamb, salmon and cheeses will fall from around 30% to zero.

    Simplified trade rules, including faster customs processing, reduced barriers such as complex labelling requirements, and enhanced support for small businesses should bring gains for companies. Timely customs clearance will support exports of perishable items like Scottish salmon, where delays reduce the product’s shelf life. Similarly, exporters of things like biscuits and cheese will benefit from streamlined paperwork and be able to compete in India’s growing market.

    There will no longer be limits on the number of UK businesses allowed to provide telecommunications, environmental and construction services. And UK businesses will not need to set up a company in India or be a resident in India to supply their services in these sectors.

    Once the FTA comes into force, which could take up to a year, the UK will allow 99% of Indian imports duty-free access into the UK. The sectors set to benefit most are footwear, textiles and clothing, as well as processed prawns, basmati rice and ready meals. These reductions will mean lower prices for UK consumers, given tariffs on clothing and footwear are 12% and 16% respectively.

    Clothing and textile imports to the UK will have tariff-free access.
    Yevhen Prozhyrko/Shutterstock

    Tariffs on luxury cars will also be reduced from more than 100% to 10% under quotas on both sides. The FTA locks in zero tariffs on industrial machinery, advanced materials for use in hi-tech industries, and components for electric vehicles. This will position British suppliers inside a manufacturing market ranked the world’s second-most attractive after China.

    In terms of workers, there were well publicised fears that the agreement might lead to UK workers being undercut by Indian counterparts. Plans for a so-called “double contribution convention” grants a three-year exemption from national insurance contributions for Indian employees temporarily working in the UK. But this is a reciprocal deal and is likely to apply only to workers who are seconded from one country to the other, so should not result in UK workers being more expensive to hire.

    And although no changes to immigration policy are planned, the FTA will offer easier movement for skilled workers. UK providers of services like construction and telecoms will have access to India’s growing market.

    Both countries have committed to encouraging the recognition of professional qualifications. A professional services working group for UK and Indian government officials will provide a forum to monitor and support this initiative.

    Timing is everything

    Against a backdrop of rising protectionism and geopolitical tensions, the UK-India FTA stands out as a strategic deal. It is also a significant milestone in Britain’s Indo-Pacific “tilt”. This approach gives UK firms a hedge against over-reliance on any single region or country-centric supply chains, to keep trade flowing in the event of more US tariff shocks, for example.

    With the US fixation on tariffs, and global supply chains facing continued disruption, securing preferential access to the world’s fastest-growing major economy is a strategic win for the UK. From India’s perspective, the trade deal is aligned with its rise as a “China-plus-one” manufacturing hub (where businesses diversify to ensure they do not invest only in China).

    The UK and India share historical ties that are underpinned by cultural, educational and people-to-people links. The UK-India FTA marks a new phase in this relationship, where shared economic interests define a forward-looking partnership between the two countries.

    And in terms of its ongoing talks with the EU, India could use the agreement to showcase its willingness to negotiate ambitious trade deals. For the UK, given its own upcoming trade and cooperation talks with the EU, the FTA with India demonstrates that new partnerships can be built while maintaining vital European ties.

    Sangeeta Khorana has received funding from UK-ESRC, EU and other international organisations. She is affiliated with Chartered Institute of Export and International Trade as a Trustee Director.

    ref. UK’s India trade deal offers wider access to a surging economy – and could make food imports cheaper – https://theconversation.com/uks-india-trade-deal-offers-wider-access-to-a-surging-economy-and-could-make-food-imports-cheaper-256387

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Life Moments, in partnership with Relevant Software, launches AI Coaching Agent for financial institutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LVIV, Ukraine, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Life Moments, a UK fintech company that helps financial organisations deliver best-in-class customer engagement, has launched an AI Coaching Agent in partnership with Relevant Software. Customers can use the agent for major financial decisions, such as buying a home, investing, or setting sustainability goals, with personalised guidance broken into clear, practical steps.

    Built for banks, wealth managers, insurers, and pension providers, it enables firms to embed white-labelled conversational AI agents into existing Life Moments Coaching solutions, as well as integrate them directly into a firm’s core app or website. Coaching solutions currently include:

    • Money Coach – uses customer intentions, knowledge, and learning preferences to deliver tailored financial education and next best actions.
    • Investment Coach – guides users through the investing journey based on their knowledge, investment stage, and risk comfort.
    • Sustainable Business Coach – supports SMEs on their sustainability journey and equips firms with actionable data for reporting and informed strategy.

    Unlike open AI tools, the Life Moments AI Agent operates within a secure, controlled environment with built-in compliance guardrails, designed to align with FCA guidelines. It uses only pre-approved content and adapts answers based on in-platform user data. Every output is auditable, brand-safe, and consistent with internal policies. The agent does not rely on any unverified or external sources, can be fully adjusted to match each firm’s tone and workflow, and captures all customer interactions to support regulatory reporting.

    “Our new AI Coaching solution takes our customer engagement offering to the next level,” said Ben Leonard, CEO and Co-Founder of Life Moments. “This is a truly differentiated feature that allows Financial Services firms to combine their trusted status with the power of AI and deliver real value for their customers.”

    Life Moments developed the platform together with Relevant Software, a trusted technology provider. They chose Relevant Software as a technology partner because of their deep expertise in fintech and hands-on experience in AI consulting. During the collaboration, Relevant Software not only supported development but also identified specific ways AI could bring real value to the business.

    “Relevant Software played a key role in the technical design and build of our platform and underlying infrastructure. As the platform continues to evolve, our five-year collaboration has deepened, strengthening our partnership as we work together to enhance its capabilities and support future growth.” – Paul Carse, CTO and Co-Founder of Life Moments

    The solution is now live on Life Moments’ own first-time buyer app, FirstHomeCoach, with several UK financial services firms preparing to launch their versions of the agent soon.

    About Life Moments

    Life Moments offers digital engagement tools that enable financial services firms to support their customers through key life events. For further information about its suite of products, please visit life-moments.co.uk.

    About Relevant Software

    Relevant Software is a global software development company that helps businesses turn ideas into scalable digital products. With 200+ projects delivered and a 9.8 NPS, they specialize in AI, fintech, and end-to-end product development. Learn more at relevant. software.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Weimar+ Joint Statement on Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    News story

    Weimar+ Joint Statement on Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security

    Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom plus the EU High Representative, following their meeting in London

    We met in London on 12 May to discuss Russian aggression against Ukraine and Euro-Atlantic security. 

    On Ukraine, we reiterated our solidarity with the Ukrainian people, our sympathy for the victims of recent attacks by Russia, and our full support for Ukraine’s security, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. 

    We welcomed US-led peace efforts and the prospect of further talks this week.  So far, Russia has not shown any serious intent to make progress.  It must do so without delay.  We joined Ukraine in calling for an immediate, full, unconditional 30-day ceasefire to create space for talks on a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.

    Any peace will only last if it is based on international law including the UN Charter and Ukraine is able to deter and defend against any future Russian attack. 

    We discussed how we would further step up European efforts to support Ukraine in its ongoing defence against Russia’s war of aggression.  Ukraine should be confident in its ability to continue to resist successfully Russian aggression with our support. 

    Strong Ukrainian armed forces will be vital.  We agreed to work with Ukraine on initiatives to strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces, restock munitions and equipment, and further enhance industrial capacity.  

    We are committed to robust security guarantees for Ukraine.  This includes exploring the creation of a coalition of air, land and maritime reassurance forces that could help create confidence in any future peace and support the regeneration of Ukraine’s armed forces.  And we will work on new reconstruction and recovery commitments, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome on 10-11 July, to ensure that Ukraine’s future security is underpinned by a vibrant economy.

    We agreed to pursue ambitious measures to reduce Russia’s ability to wage war by limiting Kremlin revenues, disrupting the shadow fleet, tightening the Oil Price Cap, and reducing our remaining imports of Russian energy.  We will keep Russian sovereign assets in our jurisdictions immobilised until Russia ceases its aggression and pays for the damage caused.

    On Euro-Atlantic security, we reaffirmed that NATO is the bedrock of our security and prosperity.  The Alliance has secured peace for over 75 years.  A strong, united NATO, based on a strong transatlantic bond, an ironclad commitment to defend each other, and fair burden-sharing, is essential to maintain this. 

    European countries must play a still greater role in assuring our own security.  We will further strengthen NATO and the contribution of European Allies by stepping up security and defence expenditure to meet the requirement to deter and defend across all domains in the Euro-Atlantic area. 

    We will use all feasible levers to strengthen our collective defence capability and production and reinforce Europe’s technological and industrial base. To that end, we will build on work in NATO, the EU and likeminded groups to achieve these goals.

    An enhanced security and defence relationship between the UK and EU is key to improving the lives of our people and making our continent more safe and secure, as will enhanced cooperation between NATO and the EU on the basis of the three Joint Declarations, and greater co-operation with Ukraine.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Media Release – Hammond Memorial 18 May 2025 – 12.05.2025 Monday 12 May 2025

    Source: Channel Islands – States of Alderney

    Press Release

    12 May 2025

    Hammond Memorial Service – Sunday 18 May 2025

    The annual Service of Remembrance will be held at the Hammond Memorial for all those who so tragically lost their lives during the occupation of the Island between 1940-1945.

    It is an opportunity to reflect upon the hardship and the suffering of those whose lives were cut short by the cruelties at the hands of the occupying forces. There are constant reminders across the Island of those dark days. The Service will be held at 4pm on Sunday 18 th May at the Hammond Memorial.

    All faiths on the Island will be represented, along with members of our community and young people from our school. The Service will be even more poignant this year, given the terrible suffering that is being endured by the people of the Ukraine.

    By attending this Service we can demonstrate as a community our support for the brave people fighting on behalf of democratic principles enjoyed by all civilized societies. Attending the Service on Sunday will be representatives of the Collectif Saint-Jean, 24 Janvier 1943 (Saint-Jean Association 24 January 1943).

    At the request of the Association a plaque has recently been added to the existing plaques at the Hammond Memorial to honour the residents of Marseille, who were rounded up in January 1934, some of whom 2 were transported to Alderney during the Occupation. A representative of the Association will lay a wreath in their memory.

    All are welcome to demonstrate the importance of the event both here and across the world.

    Ends

    Please contact Gill Trousdale in the President’s Office by email president.alderney@gov.gg or telephone 01481 820001

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Return of Ukrainian children forcibly transferred and deported by Russia – P10_TA(2025)0096 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

    –  having regard to the UN Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN Convention on the rights of the child, and the Genocide Convention (CPPCG),

    –  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas since February 2022 around 20 000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to the Russian Federation and Belarus or detained in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, with only 1 293 returned and 624 confirmed dead, according to President Zelenskyy’s ‘Bring Kids Back UA’ initiative; whereas according to the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) the real figures are probably much higher, as these transfers and deportations continue;

    B.  whereas international law prohibits forcible transfer to an occupied territory or deportation from an occupied territory to the territory of the occupier, which is a war crime under the Rome Statute and may amount to genocide under the CPPCG;

    C.  whereas on 17 March 2023 the ICC issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova for their responsibility for the war crime of unlawful transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children;

    1.  Strongly condemns the violent actions of the Russian Federation and the complicity of Belarus in the mistreatment of Ukrainian children, including murder, forced transfer and deportation, illegal adoption, sexual abuse and exploitation, forced Russification and militarisation; stresses that these acts form part of a genocidal strategy to erase Ukrainian identity;

    2.  Urges the EU to hold those responsible to account and to sanction individuals and entities implicated in these crimes;

    3.  Demands that these crimes cease immediately and that Russia reports the identities and whereabouts of all deported Ukrainian children and ensures their well-being and safe and unconditional return;

    4.  Urges Russian federal and local authorities to grant international organisations, such as the ICRC, OHCHR and UNICEF, access to all deported Ukrainian children;

    5.  Regrets that the ICRC is failing to fulfil its mission to protect Ukrainian children deported to Russia and Belarus or located in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories;

    6.  Denounces the forced imposition of Russian citizenship on deported children and their state-sponsored adoption by Russian families as part of a deliberate policy of forced assimilation;

    7.  Calls for the EU to closely cooperate with and support Ukrainian authorities, international and non-governmental organisations in their efforts to document all missing and deported Ukrainian children; urges the international community, including the United States, to maintain HRL’s funding and the EU to ensure its continuation;

    8.  Emphasises that any genuine peace deal must include the repatriation of these children and accountability for forcible transfers and deportations;

    9.  Urges the international community to hold Russia accountable by reinforcing coordination through the ICC, the ICJ, and the Special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine;

    10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the VP/HR, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the President, Government and parliament of Ukraine, and to the United States, Russia and Belarus.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Economic and Social Committee – P10_TA(2025)0082 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0054/2025),

    A.  whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B.  whereas the European Economic and Social Committee (the ‘Committee’) is an advisory body of the Union providing a forum for consultation, dialogue and consensus among representatives of the various economic, social and civil components of organised civil society from the Member States;

    C.  whereas the Committee contributes to the Union decision-making process and, by ensuring links between Union policies and economic, social and civic circumstances, it pursues its missions of better law making, participatory democracy from the bottom up and the promotion of European values;

    D.  whereas the consultation of the Committee by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative while enjoying a wide area for referral as defined by the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, allowing it to be consulted by Parliament;

    E.  whereas the Committee’s commission for financial and budgetary affairs (CAF) is the Committee’s supervisory body for all budgetary procedures and, in particular, the establishment of the budget estimates, the budget implementation, the annual activity report, the discharge and the follow up to the annual report of the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’);

    F.  whereas in the last years the Committee has taken initiatives to attract and retain skilled staff, optimise its organisational structure and working methods and promote a respectful working environment, in the context of a limited budget;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the Committee falls under MFF heading 7 ‘European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the budget of the Committee represented 1,29 % of MFF heading 7 appropriations;

    2.  Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), examined a sample of 70 transactions under Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3.  Notes from the Court’s report that administrative expenditure includes expenditure on human resources including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the fact that the Court concluded, as it did in previous years, that, overall, administrative spending is low risk; notes that the Court did not identify any specific issue concerning the Committee in 2023;

    Budgetary and financial management

    4.  Notes that the final adopted budget for the Committee was EUR 158 767 970 in 2023, representing an overall increase of 4,1 % compared to 2022; notes from the Committee’s replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’) and the Committee’s annual activity report for 2023 (the ‘Annual report’) that the remuneration and allowances budget line (expenses with Committee’s staff and Members) increased by 8,4 % between 2022 and 2023 due to the inflation; notes from the Questionnaire that the budget for outside assistance for the operation, development and maintenance of software systems increased by 33,70 % from 2022 to 2023 due to the Committee having made the implementation of its digital strategy for 2024-2026 a priority in 2023; notes that, otherwise, the distribution of appropriations across other budget lines in the Committee’s 2023 budget remained comparable to previous years’ distribution;

    5.  Notes with satisfaction that the rate of the Committee’s budget implementation of current year commitment appropriations increased further from 96,12 % in 2022 to 98,70 % in 2023, leaving behind the lower budgetary implementation in previous years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related travel restrictions; notes further that the current year payment appropriations execution rate increased from 88,12 % in 2022 to 90,67 % in 2023; notes that the average payment time in 2023 was 20,14 days, higher than in 2022 (i.e. 18,34 days);

    6.  Notes that the carry-over of appropriations from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 13 827 713 (i.e. approx. 8,70 % of the Committee’s budget for 2023), which represents a decrease from the previous year’s level of EUR 20 162 518 (i.e. approx. 13 % of the Committee’s budget for 2022); notes further with appreciation that the rate of implementation of the appropriations carried over from 2022 to 2023 was 86,76 % in 2023, compared to 76,91 % in 2022; encourages the Committee to continue the efficient use of the provided funds;

    7.  Notes that the Committee’s own services launched 12 negotiated procedures below EUR 60 000 in 2022, mainly for case studies, studies and logistical support; notes that the Committee also launched six procurement procedures with the joint services shared with the European Committee of the Regions (the ‘CoR’) mainly in the field of logistics and maintenance;

    8.  Notes that, in 2023, the Committee continued to improve the cost-effectiveness of its activities, including through hybrid work, increased teleworking, full dematerialisation of financial circuits and reduced energy consumption; notes from the Questionnaire that the Committee achieved financial savings of EUR 65 000 in 2023 due to a reduction in energy consumption; commends the Committee for having signed a new framework contract for medical checks that provides for lower prices, increased flexibility and better service overall than the previous contract; acknowledges the significant budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the Committee through interinstitutional cooperation, notably the joint services with the CoR and the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures led by other institutions; notes from the Questionnaire that the total cost incurred by the Committee for the outsourcing of specific services to the Commission increased from EUR 743 600 in 2022 to EUR 793 000 in 2023;

    9.  Recalls that the Council decision of 25 May 2023 set the allowance for remote attendance of members of the Committee at non-statutory meetings at EUR 145 per remote meeting per day, which represents 50 % of the daily allowance for physical participation in 2023; considers that despite remote attendance being an important instrument for modern institutions given that, inter alia, it reduces the costs of meetings and allows broader participation, the allocation of an allowance for remote attendance of meetings, even if reduced and intended only for some types of events, is difficult to understand for the public, even more so when taking into consideration the difference paid to the members of the Committee and members of the CoR for remote attendance; notes with satisfaction from the Committee’s follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the Committee’s budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up report’) that the application of that decision has already produced budgetary savings of EUR 1 677 000 due to lower travel costs and allowances paid, as well as environmental savings of some 553,66 tons of CO2, due to less travel in 2023; notes from the Annual report that the number of reimbursed meetings days attended remotely was 2006 (6 259 in 2022), with an average duration of 3 hours per meeting for a total cost of EUR 294 930 in 2023 (EUR 922 925 in 2022); welcomes multiple checks carried out by the Committee to prove the remote attendance of members prior to the payment of the allowance;

    10.  Notes that the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to put pressure on the Committee’s budget in 2023, through rising inflation and salary adjustments, challenges in building projects due to delays and higher raw material prices, the indexation of rental contracts (+10,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022), as well as indexation of maintenance and security service contracts (+13,50 % in 2023 compared to 2021); notes in particular that the energy costs increased from EUR 726 000 to EUR 3 125 000 between 2021 and 2022, before decreasing to EUR 1 923 391 in 2023; acknowledges the 2 % cap for non-salary-related expenses; commends in this context the Committee for its initiative in addressing challenges at budgetary level by e.g. implementing energy-saving strategies through short-term, as well as medium- and long-term measures, thus not needing an amending budget in 2023;

    11.  Notes a decrease in the current year appropriations for budget line 1004 (expenditure for Member’s travel, including subsistence and meetings allowances) from EUR 19,790 million in 2022 (of which EU 15,895 million were paid) to EUR 19,761 million in 2023 (of which EU 18,344 million were paid); notes with satisfaction an improvement in the implementation rate of those appropriations from 80,31 % in 2022 to 92,83 % in 2023; notes that the Committee President participated in 35 missions totalling EUR 71 926 in 2023 against 26 missions totalling EUR 38 042 in 2022;

    12.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology of the Committee and the CoR allocates some 3 % of its IT budget to cybersecurity which is far from the 10 % target provided for in the relevant legislation; calls on the co-legislators and the Commission to take this into account in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    13.  Notes from the Annual report that, as part of its annual work programme for 2023, the Committee had a total of 31 objectives designed for all entities of its administration and, as part of the general secretariat’s strategy for 2021-2025, the Committee has five core values and five key strategic objectives; notes from the Questionnaire that the number of opinions produced and participations in high-level meetings are key indicators for measures the Committee’s performance; takes note from the Questionnaire that the Committee has performance indicators in various areas, such as IT, HR, translation and communication; asks the Committee to include in its future reporting a list of all key performance indicators and objectives, per activity, as well as the target ( %) set for achieving them and the level ( %) of their achievement;

    14.  Notes that the Committee pursues its mission through opinions, which refer to legislative proposals made by the Commission (referrals), own-initiative opinions, which call on the Union institutions to take action, and exploratory opinions, which feed into the Commission’s work on its planned initiatives, and that the Committee’s positions can be highlighted in resolutions or included in evaluation and information reports; commends the Committee for its performance in assisting Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the legislative cycle in 2023; notes in that context that, in 2023, the Committee adopted 213 opinions and reports, an increase from 202 in 2022 and organised 146 hearings and 23 conferences, compared to 116 and 29 in 2022, respectively; notes that Committee’s members participated in 429 high-level meetings, summits and conferences in 2023 compared to 345 in 2022;

    15.  Appreciates that the Committee has taken action in 2023 to improve the visibility and impact of its work in connection with the format of its opinions, the methodology for follow-up opinions, cooperation with Parliament and the Commission and other projects of transversal nature, as well as innovative initiatives such as the EU Youth test, the enlargement candidate member initiative and the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, among other;

    16.   Commends the initiatives undertaken by the Committee aimed at fostering the active engagement of youth in the policy-making process;

    17.  Welcomes the pilot project implemented between September 2022 and April 2023 with the aim of strengthening the follow-up of selected opinions in respect of all institutions, whereas 19 opinions were selected for reinforced follow-up under that project; notes from the Questionnaire the overall positive results of that pilot project, such as improving the Committee’s capacity to undertake follow-up actions, improved prioritisation of Committee’s work and increased outreach and impact of the opinions selected;

    18.  Highlights that the efficient management of limited resources remained a key challenge throughout 2023 due to staffing constraints, compounded by increased activities under a continuous stable staffing policy; notes the Committee’s plan to introduce a new approach to strategic workforce planning and staff allocation, leveraging data collection on staff skills, active listening across the organisation, and reflections on strategic priorities by the Committee’s political bodies; invites the Committee to keep the Parliament informed of the outcome of this new plan, as this it could inspire other institutions who face similar, recurrent challenges resources wise;

    19.  Notes with regard to internal control standards (ICS), that the 2023 compliance exercise showed improvements compared to 2022; notes in that context that compliance, namely the extent to which the requirements of the 16 ICS are implemented, increased from 80,30 % in 2022 to 87,40 % in 2023, while effectiveness, namely the extent to which the implementation of those requirements works as intended, increased from 74 % in 2022 to 78,10 % in 2023; notes further that the 2023 annual risk assessment exercise showed that the application of internal controls decreased inherent risks (in category ‘critical’ and ‘very important’) by 53 %, from 40 to 19, in 2023;

    20.   Notes that a restructuration of the Internal Audit Service (IAS) took place in 2023, strengthening its compliance with international audit standards and streamlining and documenting all its process;

    21.  Notes that, in the area of financial transactions, the Committee’s internal audit service (IAS) adopted a new decision on the assessment of risks for the implementation of a simplified procedure in the beginning of 2023; notes further that the Committee’s Bureau adopted a new internal audit charter and an audit committee charter including procedural rules in 2023;

    22.  Notes from the Annual report and the Questionnaire that in 2023, the IAS launched four audits, namely on meeting authorisations, selecting the consultative commission on Industrial change, strategic cycle and duration and distance allowances for Committee’s members; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of those audits and implement all open recommendations resulted from previous audits (on institutional deadlines, interpreting, verification, ethics and integrity, statutory rights and payment times);

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee was employing 707 staff members, compared to 706 in 2022; notes further that 49 contract agents and 130 temporary agents (of which 52 recruited in 2023) were employed in 2023 (compared to 50 contract agents and 128 temporary agents in 2022); notes, in addition, that the Committee was employing 12 interim agents and 10 external staff working intra muros, excluding external services providers in the fields of logistics and IT; takes note that the occupation rate was 95,50 % in 2023 compared to 95,10 % in 2022 and the staff turnover rate was 7 % in 2023;

    24.  Welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Committee to improve its HR framework with a view to becoming an attractive employer and workplace, where every individual is valued and can fully develop their potential; notes that as part of implementing its HR strategy for 2023-2025, the Committee delivered on several key milestones in 2023, with new decisions being adopted on working conditions (hybrid working, overtime, special leave), diversity and inclusion strategy and action plan for 2023-2027, staff mobility and the methodology on sensitive posts, as well as on staff appraisal and promotions system, among other; notes with satisfaction the positive results of the staff satisfaction survey published in May 2023, whereby both staff and managers expressed high levels of satisfaction with various HR related, matters in particular on working arrangements, a topic on which it appears the Committee has found the perfect balance;

    25.  Notes that the Committee became a net importer of talent (from other institutions) for the second consecutive year as a result of implementing a targeted attractiveness and retention plan; acknowledges nevertheless persistent challenges due to reliance on temporary agents amid a shortfall of EPSO reserve lists, posing risks to expertise retention; underlines the importance of permanent staff in maintaining skills, continuity and productive working environment; recommends the Committee to implement initiatives to respond to those challenges by, for example, organising internal competitions;

    26.  Notes that with a view to better distributing its scarce resources, an external HR mapping audit, commissioned by the Committee, was finalised in 2023; notes with concern that the results of that audit confirmed the heavy workload in many different services across the Committee, thus putting at risk the fulfilment of the Committee’s mission and obligations; calls on the Committee to implement that audit’s recommendations, including revising the appraisal and performance system by 2025, adopting the new working conditions decision, and conducting regular staff engagement monitoring; stresses the importance of strategic workforce planning to optimize resource allocation, ensure alignment with the high-level priorities set by political authorities and continue its cost-efficiency efforts;

    27.  Notes that in 2023 the positive trends initiated in 2022 in relation to recruitment of staff continued; commends the Committee for the actions taken in this area such as the alignment of publication of vacancy posts with the publication of new EPSO reserve lists or the publication of job opportunities on the Committee’s website and Linkedin, among other; asks the Committee to keep Parliament informed of the outcome of its pilot project on employer branding activities; underlines that the on-boarding of newcomers constitutes an important factor of strategic alignment by ensuring that staff are informed of the rules and strategies in place in an institution; commends the Committee for having strengthened the on-boarding of new staff members in 2023 through an updated welcome booklet and on-boarding letter, a welcome pack with eco-friendly goodies, a feedback loop on the on-boarding experience, improved welcome session timing, a revamped Newcomers’ Corner, and on-boarding tips for managers;

    28.  Recalls that the Committee adopted Decision 282/23A, effective 1 January 2024, establishing a flexible, trust-based hybrid working policy while offering staff an improved work-life balance and enhancing adaptability and efficiency; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority about the developments in this regard in timely manner;

    29.  Welcomes the appointment of a female Secretary-General in January 2024 as a positive development towards achieving gender balance; regrets however that the percentage of women in senior management remained low in 2023, with only two out of seven senior management positions currently being held by women; welcomes nevertheless that the Committee considers the gender balance of its staff and in particular in the senior management as an important factor and invites the Committee to swiftly improve the situation at the highest levels of the Committee, by ensuring a balanced representation in line with the Committee’s commitments to diversity and inclusion;

    30.  Regrets that the Committee was unable to provide data on cases of burnout in 2023 and rejects the Committee’s position expressed in its follow-up report whereby burnout as such is not a recognised medical diagnosis and the reasons for burnout may be manifold; recalls the importance of statistical data on burnout with the aim ofhelping to take decisions on staff well-being, which should be also based on lessons learned from past very unfortunate experiences, and on external evaluations of the current framework; acknowledges data protection constraints but stresses the value of anonymised statistical data to support informed managerial decisions; notes with concern the findings highlighting heavy workloads in several services due to limited human resources; welcomes the adoption of new working arrangements as a positive step, but encourages the Committee to take further steps to ensure the publication of anonymised data on burnout cases;

    31.  Notes that, in 2023, the Committee was employing staff members from all Member States, with some of them being overrepresented (e.g. Belgium, Italy.); notes that in 2023 24 % of managers employed by the Committee were from the 13 Member States that joined the Union after 2004, which represents a slight increase compared to 21 % in 2022 and 19 % in 2021; reiterates its encouragement to the Committee to continue to take action to reach a proper geographical distribution within its staff, with a particular focus on management level;

    32.  Welcomes the Committee’s efforts to create a healthy work environment for its staff members; commends particularly the emphasis placed by the Committee on mental and physical health of staff, and the efforts made with regard to awareness-raising about health-related issues; notes the Committee’s measures on the management of sick leave, such as medical part-time and extended remote working, to ensure that staff on long-term sickness related absence return to work in a timely fashion, as well as an increase in the percentage of staff with no absences from 27 % in 2022 to 30 % in 2023; observes with satisfaction that the Committee arranged a free of charge skin cancer screening campaign on the Committee’s premises where 104 staff members over four days were consulted by external dermatologists in 2023;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    33.  Welcomes the adoption of the new diversity and inclusion strategy, effective until 2027; commends the specific awareness-raising actions on disability undertaken in early 2024; notes with satisfaction that diversity and inclusion training remains mandatory for managers and recommended for staff; acknowledges the Committee’s strong commitment to fostering a fully inclusive workplace; encourages the Committee to take further steps to monitor the representation of employees with disabilities and ensure the publication of anonymised data in this regard;

    34.  Notes that the Committee continued its internal reform process with the adoption of a decision on the general implementing provisions on administrative investigations and implementing rules for disciplinary proceedings in 2023; commends the Committee for having taken this last step necessary to fully implement the measures for a reinforced ethical framework of the Committee; notes from the Follow-up report that the Committee and the internal auditor have agreed on an action plan relating to the audit of the Committee’s ethics and integrity, with eight recommendations implemented and closed and two recommendations still open to be implemented by March 2025; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in this matter;

    35.  Notes that the Committee continued to train staff and raise awareness about topics related to whistleblowing, conflicts of interest and other ethical issues in 2023: notes in this context with satisfaction the results of the staff engagement survey carried out in 2023 showing a high awareness rate among staff, with regard to the Committee’s ethical framework, in particular on the networks of confidential counsellors (93 %) and ethics counsellors (83 %); observes that the Committee organised 12 training sessions on those topics with a total participation of 79 staff members in 2023; commends the Committee for organising compulsory training on respect and dignity at work for all staff, including managers;

    36.  Notes that one harassment complaint was reported in 2023 and closed the same year, as a result of investigation and mediation by the Committee, without sanctions being imposed; recalls that the Committee is a civil party in the ongoing legal proceedings initiated by Belgian national authorities against a former member accused of misconduct that is currently before the Belgian courts; asks the Committee to inform Parliament about developments in that case; believes that fostering a culture of respect and dignity, supported by a zero-tolerance policy on harassment, is crucial to prevent future allegations and to ensure a safe and inclusive working environment within the Committee;

    37.  Reiterates that a zero-tolerance policy against harassment is needed to protect the wellbeing of staff and is a duty of any employer; reminds that in addressing harassment claims a lesson learned approach should be put in place in order to avoid any possible wrongdoing; still considers that an external and independent investigation into the case currently under legal proceeding would be beneficial to improve the Committee’s reaction to similar cases;

    38.  Appreciates the Committee’s readiness to cooperate with the Union’s investigative bodies, namely the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Ombudsman; notes that two OLAF cases were opened in 2023, both of which were dismissed in the same year: one for lack of sufficient evidence and the other referred to the Committee for follow-up; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the progress made in the second case; notes further that the Ombudsman opened an enquiry in 2023 in relation to the management of a case involving allegations of harassment; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that enquiry;

    39.  Notes with satisfaction the Committee’s work towards more transparency in its activities in 2023; notes in that context the adoption of a decision broadening the range of documents available online via the Transparency Register, such as the Committee’s meeting minutes and attendance lists, as well as a decision requesting the Committee’s members to meet only registered stakeholders, publish their list of meetings and attach their “legislative footprint” to their opinions; appreciates that the Committee publishes online information on its annual budget, performance indicators, expenditure or public procurement; calls for the publication of all meetings held by EESC members with third parties;

    40.  Notes with satisfaction that the Committee has put solid rules and procedures in place to prevent conflicts of interests and avoid revolving doors with regard to staff who engage in outside activities or members who take on jobs after no longer being a Committee member; notes in this context that the Committee has introduced a new “Declaration of financial interests form” in 2023; notes that the form is to be declared by members, delegates, alternates and advisors for both their remunerated and non-remunerated posts or activities outside the Committee; commends further the Committee for its involvement in 2023 in the political negotiations to create the Inter-institutional Ethics Body tasked with setting ethical standards to strengthen transparency and integrity;

    41.  Notes that the Committee Bureau, on 21 March 2023, adopted several transparency measures in accordance with the principles laid down with respect to the EU Transparency Register, such as a recommendation for office-holding members to only meet with registered stakeholders, the obligation for office holding members to publish their lists of meetings and a voluntary ‘legislative footprint’ for rapporteurs; notes that several actions were taken to implement the Bureau decision, including the issuing of a service note laying down practical modalities for the implementation of the decision, an awareness training campaign, and the provisions of template messages to be included in correspondence between Committee members and external stakeholders encouraging to join the EU Transparency Register (if applicable);

    42.  Urges the EESC to implement real-time tracking of declared conflicts of interest, requiring all members and senior staff to publicly disclose financial interests, assets, and external affiliations annually, to prevent undue influence on decision-making;

    43.  Notes an absence of cases in areas of fraud, conflicts of interest and whistleblowing in 2023; notes that the effectiveness of the Committee’s anti-fraud measures was reviewed in order to develop an anti-fraud strategy which is still missing despite several requests from Parliament in its discharge resolutions to take action to improve the overall anti-fraud system; recalls the importance of a comprehensive anti-fraud strategy and calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the outcome of that exercise that should have culminated with the adoption of an anti-fraud strategy in 2024;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    44.  Notes that the combined IT budget of both the Committee and the CoR was EUR 12 700 000 in 2023, compared to EUR 11 712 000 in 2022, i.e. an increase of 8,4 %, whereas EUR 350 000 of that budget (or 3 % thereof) was paid for cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that 6,24 % of the Committee’s total budget for 2023 represented expenditure for actions implementing the new ‘Digital Strategy 2024-2026’ (DS2026) prepared by the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology (DIIT) in 2023;

    45.  Notes that DS2026 envisions a future where technology integrates with the Committee’s core mission, focusing on efficiency, speed, and continuous digital evolution, putting both administration and members at the centre of digital transformation and aiming to improve service delivery, empowerment, and adaptability; notes that DS2026 is structured around eight objectives, eight key principles and four major projects such as the adoption of Ares and EdiT which are expected to be rolled out in 2026 and 2025, respectively; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire the progress made by DIIT in implementing DS2026 in 2023, with actions taken such as the adoption of staff guidelines on artificial intelligence, integration of amendment flows with translation tools and establishment of a project management office, among many other;

    46.  Notes from the Annual report the Committee’s actions in the area of protection of personal data and its processing; notes that in 2023 the Committee created a new online version of its register of records and a new joint register of records with the CoR, whereas the former had 121 records and the latter had 25 records at the end of 2023; notes further that the Committee adopted a new procedure for handling data breaches, published a data protection guide and implemented several awareness-raising initiatives for its staff and members in 2023; notes lastly that the EDPS launched one enquiry in 2023 related to the management of an external audit, and continued an older enquiry on the use of cloud services under the Cloud II contracts by Union institutions, whereas for both enquiries the conclusions are still pending; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the follow-up on these matters;

    47.  Notes that the Committee finalised in 2023 its project for the equipment of all its meetings rooms, whereas an additional 14 such rooms were equipped with technologies that make them fully operational in hybrid mode; appreciates that the Committee conducted all procurement procedures for high value contracts in a fully digitalised way, used the Qualified electronic signature for any type of contractual agreements and provided trainings to staff on the transition to the Public Procurement Management Tool system and the Funding and Tenders Portal in 2023;

    48.  Commends the Committee for its concrete actions to ensure its staff acquire the necessary digital skills in an increasingly digitalised workplace in 2023; notes in this context the activities, such as “mini-hackatons”, organised in the framework of a peer-to-peer network established with the CoR to foster better use and understanding of collaborative digital tools, as well as peer-to-peer coaching and experience exchanges; notes that the outcome of those activities was integrated into the Committee’s training offer;

    49.  Notes that in October 2023 guidelines for staff members on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) were adopted, that an information session was provided for all staff members, highlighting opportunities and challenges, and that further communication to staff members was provided through knowledge-based articles on the Committee’s intranet to raise awareness;

    50.  Notes that the work continued adopting and applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework within both the Committee and the CoR in 2023, whereas the actions taken that year focused on some of that framework’s principles, i.e. protect and detect principles; notes that mitigation strategies are implemented using the “Essential Eight” Cybersecurity Framework; notes further that the Committee did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023, but it did encounter brief Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Committee’s externally hosted corporate websites at the end of 2022 and the start of 2024;

    51.  Urges the EESC to increase its cybersecurity budget to at least 10 % of its total IT expenditures in line with EU cybersecurity directives, ensuring enhanced protection against cyber threats, especially for sensitive data related to policy and budgetary matters;

    Buildings

    52.  Acknowledges receipt of the Committee’s report of 3 June 2024 informing the discharge authority about the Committee’s building policy, in compliance with Article 266(1) of the Union’s Financial Regulation; notes with satisfaction from that report that the Committee, with the CoR, achieved one of the major priorities of their 2017 Building Strategy, i.e. “geographical concentration of the buildings”; notes further that this achievement already brought savings due to the lower cost of renting the entire VMA compared to the three buildings previously rented; understands that those savings are approx. EUR 1,8 million, which,- according to that report, is equivalent to the rent paid for the B100 building; notes that the Committee is currently working on the update of its 2017 long-term building strategy, and that this work should be finished by the end of 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of this exercise;

    53.  Welcomes the finalisation of renovations (i.e. fitting-out works) of the newly acquired VMA building, which included the installation of smart energy saving technologies; supports the Committee’s plan to carry out technical and environmental audits of all its buildings, whereas the outcome of those audits should allow for the identification of all technical installations and building components that need to be fully or partially renovated or kept as they are, thereby aligning with the European Green Deal objectives; invites the Committee to update the discharge authority on the outcome of those audits and their follow-up;

    54.  Notes that the task force on “new ways of working”, established in 2022, issued a first prospective report in 2023, focusing on the available office spaces and possible optimisation options; notes the Committee’s plan to continue that exercise with a participatory process with staff members to co-design the future workspaces; invites the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on this matter;

    55.  Welcomes the commitment of the Committee and the CoR to systematically apply the “design for all” principle to their infrastructure, ensuring accessibility of their building by design; notes that the two committees took a range of different measures to ensure accessibility of their buildings to people with various kinds of disabilities in 2023, including upon modernisation of its elevators in the JDE building;

    Environment and sustainability

    56.  Welcomes the Committee’s green practices and commends the further reduction of gas, electricity and water consumption and carbon emissions and an increase in the recycling rate in connection with the Committee’s activities in 2023 compared to 2019; notes a slight deterioration, compared to 2019 levels, of the rate of waste volume, from -66 % in 2022 to -56 % in 2023 due to higher office presence;

    57.  Notes that the energy efficiencies and emissions reductions have been achieved through investments in innovative energy-efficient building installations, including through smart energy saving technologies installed in the VMA building, the purchase of 100 % green electricity, the introduction of (customised) environmental criteria in all tender procedures with value of EUR 60 000 or more, the use of paperless workflows and other measures such as reducing the operating hours for lighting, reducing the winter reference temperature in all buildings to 19 degrees or closing buildings in periods of low staff presence, among many other measures; notes that the reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption corresponds to a 3,4 % rate and a financial gain of EUR 65 395;

    58.  Notes from the Follow-up report that the smart energy saving technologies installed in the recently renovated VMA building contributed to a reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption (gas and electricity) of 20 % to 30 % in 2023; reiterates however its call on the Committee to provide the Parliament with an update on the return on investments of those technological installations;

    59.  Welcomes that the Committee adopted an energy-saving strategy, with short-, medium- and long-term measures; notes in this context that the Committee started an environmental audit of all its buildings in order to identify, among other, the level of the energy performance of the current structures and pieces of equipment, as well as estimate the environmental return of the necessary investments compared to the overall costs (maintenance, consumption etc.) over a 30-year period; notes further that studies on energy efficiency measures are planned for 2024 and 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on those matters;

    60.  Recalls that in 2022, the electricity produced by Committee’s solar panels was 15,5 MWH or 0,25 % of the Committee’s yearly consumption, whereas in 2023 the same figure decreased to 5,75 MWh; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that the Committee is leading by example with regard to measures and actions taken in favour of sustainable mobility;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    61.  Commends the close cooperation established by the Committee with the CoR at administrative level, through the new cooperation agreement signed in 2022, whereby the two committees share premises and joint services in the areas of translation, infrastructure, logistics, security, procurement, financial management and IT, while maintaining full institutional autonomy; welcomes the positive development in 2023 when the two committee further agreed on the development and funding of a shared communication area with joint-audio visual facilities in the JDE building; asks the Committee to identify and inform the Parliament on the budgetary savings made during the first year of implementing that agreement in the audio-visual area; reiterates its call on the Committee to pursue and expand that cooperation in other areas with a view to avoiding duplication and further rationalising the operating costs of services available in the premises shared by the Committee and the CoR; invites the Committee and the CoR to explore the possibility of setting up a single administration for their joint services, keeping separate directorates or units for the services dealing with matters related to their specific and independent mandates; encourages the Committee and the CoR to continue their efforts to develop further cooperation and synergies;

    62.  Observes that budgetary savings and efficiency gains continued to be realised through active cooperation between the Committee and other Union institutions in 2023, including by organising the Committee’s plenary sessions on Commission and Parliament premises, where the venues and associated services are provided either free of charge or at rates below external market prices;

    63.  Notes with satisfaction that the Committee and Parliament re-negotiated in 2023 and signed in 2024 their inter-institutional agreement, whereas the agreement aims to provide more relevant and timely contributions throughout the legislative cycle and to reinforce bilateral cooperation; welcomes that the new Protocol of Cooperation of the Committee with the Commission, signed in 2022, already brought improvements to the Committee’s impact for example at pre-legislation phase through exploratory opinions; encourages the further reinforcement of political, legislative, and communication synergies between the Committee and Parliament, particularly in the context of the European Citizens’ Initiative and the European Semester;

    64.  Reiterates its appreciation for the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as for the Committee’s participation in inter-institutional procurement procedures led by other institutions, whereby the Committee continued to benefit from synergies in the area of IT, corporate travel, insurance, transportation, translation and audio-visual equipment in 2023;

    65.  Notes the Committee’s role in reinforcing the links with and between the national economic and social councils (NESCs) of the Member States; notes from the Questionnaire the measures that the Committee has taken to reinforce the network of and the online community with the NESCs, such as the establishment of joint working groups and exchange programmes, working on collaborative IT platform, and participation in common events, among others; calls for continued cooperation on topics of common interest and the exchange of good practices, emphasising the vital role of civil society in addressing the Union’s current challenges;

    Communication

    66.  Notes that the Committee’s overall budget for communication in 2023 was EUR 2,15 million, an increase compared to EUR 1,5 million in 2022; notes that this budget was primarily allocated to the four flagship events organised in 2023 (European Citizens’ initiative, Your Europe, Your Say! The organic food awards and the 14th Civil Society Prize), the improvement and/or revamping of the Committee’s social media, external website and audio-visual production, as well as for media and press publications; commends the Committee for its communication activities delivering on this communication priorities for 2023, such as the Blue Deal initiative, COP28, the resolution on democracy, and the Committee’s 65th anniversary, among others;

    67.  Commends the Committee for its efforts in connection with its strategic communication in 2023; notes that the Committee adopted a new communication strategy aimed at strengthening its image and outreach; notes that, as part of that strategy, the Committee web-streamed its main events, mostly in all Union languages, introduced new communication tools such as the ‘Reporting from the plenary’ video series focused its communication resources on the Committee’s flagship events for 2023 and deployed special efforts to increase its outreach on social media;

    68.  Calls on the EESC to strengthen its monitoring and reporting on labour rights, social inclusion, and human rights violations within EU-funded programs, ensuring greater accountability in its advisory functions and policy recommendations;

    69.  Notes that the number of the social media followers on the Committee’s corporate platforms increased substantially by 25,000 in 2023; notes that by the end of 2023, the Committee reached 61 416 followers on X, which is an increase of 5 % compared to 2022, 61 761 followers on LinkedIn, which is an increase of 30 % compared to 2022, 46 868 followers on Facebook, which is an increase of 5,3 % compared to 2022 and 17 428 followers on Instagram, which is an increase of 45 % compared to 2022;

    70.  Welcomes the Committee’s positive approach towards the use of open-source solutions for its online communication; notes that in July 2023, the Committee opened its first account on the EU Voice Mastodon platform, a decentralised, free and open-source social media network that connects users in a privacy-oriented and advertising-free environment; observes throughout the second half of 2023, that the Committee actively communicated on the Mastodon account, feeding it every working day with posts on its activities and priorities and raising awareness about the Union; takes note of the Committee’s decision to discontinue its presence on that platform as of 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Plenary round-up – May I 2025 – 08-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Highlights of the May I 2025 plenary session included the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe, and Parliament statements on freedom, democracy and security as Europe’s heritage. Parliament also observed a minute of silence in memory of the late Pope Francis. Members held several debates on Council and Commission statements: on European Union support for a just, sustainable and comprehensive peace in Ukraine; a unified EU response to unjustified US trade measures; and preparation of the EU-UK summit. Debates also followed statements by High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission, Kaja Kallas, on protecting Greenland’s right to decide its own future and maintain the rules-based world order, and an urgent assessment of the applicability of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba. A debate also took place on President Erdoğan’s illegal visit to the occupied areas of Cyprus. Members also debated Council and Commission statements on the resilience and interconnection of energy grid infrastructure in the EU; high retail food prices; Malta’s ‘golden passport’ scheme; the fine against TikTok and citizens’ rights on social media platforms; EU action on treating and preventing diseases such as cancer, cardiovascular neurological diseases and measles.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Data Protection Supervisor – P10_TA(2025)0085 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0053/2025),

    A.  whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources (HR);

    B.  whereas data protection is a fundamental right, protected by Union law and enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

    C.  whereas Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that compliance with the rules relating to the protection of individuals, with regard to the processing of personal data concerning them, is to be subject to control by an independent authority;

    D.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 provides for the establishment of an independent authority, the European Data Protection Supervisor (the ‘EDPS’), responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the right to data protection and privacy, and tasked with ensuring that the institutions and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union embrace a strong data protection culture;

    E.  whereas the EDPS carries out its functions in close cooperation with fellow Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as part of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), and it serves the public interest while being guided by principles of impartiality, integrity, transparency, pragmatism and respects Union legislation;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the EDPS falls under MFF Heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that the budget of the EDPS represented 0,18 % of MFF Heading 7 appropriations;

    2.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report (the ‘Court’s report’) for the financial year 2023, examined a sample of 70 transactions under MFF Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3.  Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on HR including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the Court’s renewed opinion that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

    4.  Notes from the Court’s report that in 2023 it audited a salary payment of an official who had last made a declaration concerning rights to family and child allowance in 2020; echoes the Court’s concern that delays in receiving and verifying such declarations increase the risk of ineligible payments;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the final adopted budget for the EDPS was EUR 22 711 559 in 2023, which represents an increase of 12,06 % compared to 2022; notes that the budget of the EDPS also covers the work of the independent Secretariat of the EDPB; notes from the Annual report of the EDPS for 2023 (the ‘Annual Report’) that the adopted budget of the EDPB was EUR 7,67 million in 2023, including EUR 300 000 granted by means of an amending budget which was needed due to an increase in litigation activities in 2023;

    6.  Acknowledges that the budget monitoring and planning efforts of the EDPS in the financial year 2023 resulted in a budget implementation rate of current year commitment appropriations of 96 % in 2023 (slightly lower than in 2022 when that rate was 98 %); further notes from the report on the EDPS annual accounts for 2023 that the current year payment appropriations execution rate was 84 % (lower than 88 % in 2022); notes in addition, from EDPS replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’), that the execution rate of payment appropriations overall was 91,33 % in 2023 (lower than 94,09 % in 2022);

    7.  Notes further that the amount of carry-overs (C8) from 2023 to 2024 was EUR 2 517 942,67 or 11,08 % of the total budget for 2023, compared to EUR 1 827 354,23 or 9,01 % of the total budget for 2022; notes that the execution rate of the C8 budget in 2023 was 76,65 % (higher than 73,77 % in 2022);

    8.  Welcomes an improvement in the average time to pay from 25 days in 2022 to 19 days in 2023, with 97,50 % of payments processed on time; notes that that improvement is also due to the EDPS having solved an old bug with the electronic payment system for invoices linked to mission costs; notes further a significant increase in the number of payments from 799 in 2022 to 1335 in 2023; observes in that context that the number of transactions is still lower than pre-pandemic levels due to changes in the way of working (such as hybrid meetings or virtual events for experts);

    9.  Notes that the effects of illegal Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure on the EDPS in 2023, including through rising inflation and the consequent increase in energy costs, with the most affected budget lines being staff salaries, building security and rental costs, mission costs and services provided by external staff; commends in that context the EDPS for having re-adjusted its priorities and having implemented internal reallocation within budget chapters; understands that budgetary optimisation was necessary in order to successfully manage the indexation of staff salaries and rental costs, as well as an increase in the costs of external lawyer support services due to an increased number of EDPS binding decisions which led to a bigger number of cases to be defended before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with the help of external legal assistance; regrets in that context that the EDPS had to postpone some of its activities, such as a feasibility study on artificial intelligence; calls on the EDPS to abide to the competences of its mandate with a collaborative approach with the Union institutions and agencies and to avoid initiating any legal action, especially those which are manifestly inadmissible, in order to avoid negative repercussions on the management of resources, which do not allow the EDPS to carry out its activities as an Institution;

    10.  Expresses concern about the significant increase in EDPS staff mission costs, from EUR 28 789 in 2021 and EUR 176 903 in 2022, to EUR 284 580 in 2023; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively; notes that the EDPS ceased making public the number of missions funded by organisers, as well as information on which unit or sector participated in each mission, thus reducing transparency regarding mission expenses; calls on the EDPS to reinstate this practice; encourages the EDPS to promote the use of video-conferencing tools where suitable, as this could contribute to lowering the number of missions and reducing costs; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    11.  Notes that the EPDS used nine key performance indicators (KPIs) to monitor its performance in 2023, in alignment with the main objectives of the EDPS Strategy 2020-2024 which is implemented through the Annual Management Plan; notes from the Annual Report that the EDPS over-delivered in almost all areas, as indicated by the results of KPIs for 2023, except for one KPI (the number of EDPS followers on some social media accounts); notes with concern that the EDPS encountered considerable challenges due to a growing workload and intricate data protection issues arising from the rapidly evolving digital landscape, as well as due to the extension of the EDPS mandate to supervisory activities (such as audits and investigations) and replies to consultations and prior consultations, all in the context of a limited budget; notes from the EDPS’ follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the EDPS’ budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up Report’) that several legislative developments in the last two years have impacted the work and resources of the EDPS, due to the extension of Eurojust’s mandate, new information to be received by Europol under the Digital Services Act, the roll out of the new Union’s large-scale databases and interoperability framework in the justice and home affairs field and the entry into force of the Artificial Intelligence Act (the ‘AI Act’); calls on the Commission and on the budgetary authority to take those matters into consideration during the annual budgetary procedure;

    12.  Welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS strengthened its ability to assess and prepare for emerging technological trends and their potential impact on privacy and data protection; notes that this was achieved through a foresight-based approach, with a focus on monitoring developments in areas such as large language models, digital identity wallets, the internet of behaviours, extended reality, and deep fake detection; welcomes in that context the publication by the EDPS of its third TechSonar initiative on emerging technologies; congratulates moreover the EDPS for having been awarded the GPA Global Privacy and Data Protection Awards 2023 in the category of innovation;

    13.  Notes that 2023 was marked by several organisational changes or updates that were needed in order to respond and adapt to the evolving data protection challenges; welcomes in this context the appointment of a Secretary-General from 1 July 2023; notes in addition the transition of two sectors into units such as ‘Information and Communication’ and ‘Governance and Internal Control’ and the creation of three new specialised sectors under the ‘Technology and Privacy’ (T&P) unit: ‘Systems Oversight and Audit’, ‘Technology Monitoring and Foresight’ and ‘Digital Transformation’;

    14.  Emphasises the role of the EDPS in supervising the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; notes with concern the length of proceedings before the EDPS, as the EDPS did not close a single investigation in 2023, but in comparison to the previous year, in 2023, the number of notifications beyond the 72 hours significantly decreased;

    15.  Notes that the EDPS received 420 complaints, i.e. 53 more than in 2022, out of which 73 were admissible and 347 inadmissible in 2023; notes that the EDPS issued a final decision, opinion or reply in 31 out of 73 complaint cases received in 2023 within 44 days on average and responded to all 347 inadmissible complaints received; notes that, out of all admissible complaints (ongoing and received in 2023), 55 cases were finalised in 2023, which represents an increase of 17 % compared to 2022; acknowledges the efforts made by the EDPS to reduce the high number of complaints by developing a dynamic tool on the EPDS’ website, although the volume of complaints remained challenging due to limited resources in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the EDPS developed various procedural tools and policies to enhance its investigatory processes in 2023; commends in that context the EDPS for having amended its Rules of Procedure, whereby the “review procedure” is replaced by a “preliminary assessment” in order to safeguard the right to be heard of all the involved parties, thus contributing to a fair and timely handling of complaints and investigations;

    16.  Underlines the important role of consultation and advice of EDPS in the legislative process; notes that, pursuant to Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the EDPS responded to 80 formal legislative consultations and its advice took the form of 54 opinions (27 in 2022), 26 formal comments (49 in 2022) and 34 informal comments (30 in 2022) to the Commission and to the co-legislators in response to legislative consultation requests in 2023; commends the EDPS for its input with regard to the AI Act, in particular EDPS’ own-initiative opinion on the AI Act and advice on the AI liability rules, as well as for EDPS’ input to the GPA resolution on generative AI systems; acknowledges a significant increase (+93 %) of consultation requests over the last five years;

    17.  Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS carried out eight investigations and five pre-investigations, marking a significant increase compared to previous years; notes that in 2023 the EDPS was actively involved in a total of 13 investigations and seven pre-investigations, either launched in 2023 or carried over from prior years; notes that the EPDS continued two complex and resource-intensive formal investigations from 2021 into the use by European Union Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (EUIBAs) of cloud services from non-EU/EEA entities, including a focus on the Commission’s use of Microsoft 365; urges the finalisation of those investigations on time because of their significant impact on the working of institutions; notes further that the EDPS also launched five investigations based on complaints about EUIBAs’ websites, focusing in a broad way on privacy and data protection issues, with preliminary assessments expected in 2024;

    18.  Urges the EDPS to prioritise and enhance procedures for handling the personal data of minors under 15, particularly in the context of Europol’s systems, where such individuals may be marked as suspects; recognises the heightened vulnerability of that group and the need for robust safeguards;

    19.  Notes that the EDPS investigated the Commission’s alleged use of micro-targeting on platform X and continued two pre-investigations: one case concerning EUIBAs’ use of Trello cloud service, which was closed in 2023 and another one on EUIBAs’ use of profiling, which was carried out in 2024; notes that a total of six investigations and four pre-investigations (one pre-investigation in 2022) were launched in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (FSJ), reflecting a significant increase from 2022; notes the EDPS’ concerns with regard to the challenges that may arise in the case of investigations where joint action between national authorities and EUIBA’s is needed; notes in addition that, as part of its audit plan for 2023, the EDPS audited the following bodies: the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the European Medicines Agency;

    20.  Recalls that in 2022 the EDPS brought an action for annulment of two provisions of the amended Europol Regulation before the General Court, which was later rejected; notes that meanwhile the EDPS decided to appeal the order of the General Court in case T-578/22(1), believing the issues raised should be addressed at the highest level; regrets that the EDPS did not realise the manifest inadmissibility of its appeal, even if the institution did not intend to challenge an act by Europol, but a retroactive change in the legal framework aimed at neutralising the effects of the EDPS’ enforcement actions; calls on the institution to cooperate with Union institutions and agencies, before initiating legal proceedings that prevent the fulfilment of its mandate and the use of its resources for purposes for which they were intended; notes further that the EDPS also followed up on the implementation of its Order of 3 January 2022, including checks on Europol’s reporting; regrets that the final report on that matter was communicated by the EDPS only on 22 July 2024;

    21.  Notes that, after the pilot implementation of the new risk management framework at the EDPS in late 2022, an anonymous satisfaction survey was conducted in May 2023 to assess its effectiveness and gather additional suggestions; notes further that the survey results were positive, leading to the formal adoption of the framework on 26 June 2023;

    22.  Notes that the internal audit service (IAS) carried out an audit on the methodology for the planning of EDPS audits in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the audit was concluded with two recommendations for which the EDPS submitted an action plan to the IAS; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed on a regular basis on the progress made in that matter;

    23.  Recalls the Treaty on the European Union that the EU and its institutions shall promote solidarity and equality between women and men;

    HR, equality and staff well-being

    24.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the EDPS had 129 members of staff, compared to 127 in 2022; notes that the EDPS employed 50 contract staff (CA) under Article 3(b) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (52 CA in 2022), 7 temporary agents (TA) under Article 2(b) and 2(c) (6 TA in 2022) and used the services of 12 external services providers (EXT) working intra-muros in 2023 (8 EXT in 2022); encourages the EDPS to continue its efforts towards a more balanced geographical representation among all Member States specifically at managerial level; welcomes the increased diversity of nationalities represented, but notes with regret the continued underrepresentation of women in senior management positions; calls for the adoption of a gender parity roadmap, including proactive recruitment measures and leadership training programs for female staff members;

    25.  Notes that the EDPS had 23 nationalities (from the Member States) represented among its staff in 2023, which is an improvement in comparison with 22 nationalities in 2022; notes with dissatisfaction the over-representation of five nationalities and an underrepresentation of other nationalities; urges the EDPS to continue its efforts to achieve a balanced geographical distribution of nationals from all Member States within its staff, by improving communication, fostering visibility, and enhancing job conditions to attract underrepresented nationalities;

    26.  Observes that, in 2023, the EDPS maintained a workforce comprising 65 % women and 35 % men, consistent with trends from previous years; regrets the absence of women in senior management roles, despite achieving gender parity among the six middle management positions; urges the EDPS to intensify its efforts to ensure gender-balanced representation across all staff levels, and invites the EDPS to promote the application of women also with a view to the next election of the Supervisor by Parliament;

    27.  Notes a high occupancy rate of the establishment plan of 95,65 % but also a high turnover rate of 13 % in 2023; notes that most of the unfilled positions were a result of candidates being unsuitable, given the EDPS’ need for highly specialised profiles and the small pool of eligible candidates; welcomes the addressing of those challenges through republication with a wider or more targeted dissemination of the vacancy or by redrafting the requirements; welcomes the steps taken by the EDPS regarding the hiring process; calls on the EDPS to continue to address the challenges in finding suitable candidates and to keep the discharge authority informed about improvements on staff recruitment and turnover;

    28.  Notes that, in the second half of 2023, the EDPS’ HR team launched a pilot for a new on-boarding process for newcomers, with sessions that cover, inter alia, presentations of core units’ work, ethics, procurement procedures and information security, whereas three on-boarding sessions were offered in 2023; invites the EDPS to continue offering to newcomers “on-boarding” and to all members of staff mandatory sessions that remind the importance of principles such as ethics, conflicts of interest, transparency, internal control and anti-fraud, as they have become the standard in the Union institutions; notes moreover that 12 individual sessions were offered for EDPS and EDPB staff, six sessions of group coaching in which participants (manager level) learned from each other, as well as a one-year team coaching with a designer for leadership development at the European School of Administration in 2023;

    29.  Notes, from the Questionnaire, that the EDPS offers flexible and hybrid working arrangements, that are well-received by members of staff who can benefit, inter alia, from parental leave, time credits, part-time work or working from abroad for a limited number of days per year; notes that, in 2023, the majority of staff made use of those working conditions, whereas 86,30 % of staff made use of teleworking arrangements in 2023; considers that the building infrastructure should be optimised to reflect that high rate of teleworking, which could contribute to reducing operational costs and ensuring more efficient use of office space; welcomes the EDPS’ continued efforts to actively improve physical and mental well-being of its staff;

    30.  Commends the EDPS for carrying out several awareness-raising actions during the year 2023 with information sharing on elimination of racial discrimination, International Women’s Day, EU diversity month and learning about neurodiversity; notes that currently the EDPS does not employ staff with disabilities but has an equal opportunities clause included in all EDPS vacancy notices and actively encourages applications from candidates with disabilities;

    31.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS considers confidential any information on burnout cases, including the number thereof; disagrees with that opinion and calls the EDPS to provide the discharge authority with the number of burnout cases on a yearly basis; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, there were no harassment cases reported at the EDPS; welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to provide an anti-harassment presentation delivered by one of the EDPS’ confidential counsellors, as part of the induction training called the ‘EDPS Welcome Day’; commends the publication of the decision on anti-harassment and the role of the confidential counsellors on the EDPS’ intranet;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    32.  Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS focused its efforts on increasing staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework by organising mandatory dedicated training sessions for all staff and induction trainings for EDPS/EDPB newcomers, appointing a new ethics officer and participating in the ‘Comité Paritaire des Questions Statuaries’ working group on ethics; welcomes the establishment of a mailbox by the EPDS, where members of staff can submit their requests regarding any ethics related inquiries, as well as the use of Commission’s Ethics module in Sysper; encourages the EDPS to continue raising awareness and organising surveys to assess the level of staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework;

    33.  Welcomes the overall high level of transparency achieved by the EDPS concerning its activities, in particular as regards the publication of the agenda and the declaration of interests of the Supervisor and of the Head of EDPS Administration, in line with the Supervisor’s code of conduct of 2019; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS has adopted two codes of conduct, whereas one of them applies to the Supervisor and the other one applies to the EDPS staff; understands that in cases when the Secretary-General is called to replace the Supervisor, the latter’s code of conduct also applies to the Secretary-General;

    34.  Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS has never been involved in any investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) since its establishment;

    35.  Notes that, out of five inquiries opened by the Ombudsman in 2023 concerning the EDPS, four were closed without any further inquiry; notes that, for one enquiry, the decision was still pending and expected for Q4 2024; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed as to the outcome of this enquiry;

    36.  Regrets that the EDPS has still not formally joined the Union’s Transparency Register (TR); nevertheless notes from the Follow-up Report that, with a view to formally joining the TR, the EDPS has launched an internal assessment on transparency measures, whereas, in 2023, exploratory meetings and exchanges of the EDPS with secretariat of the TR took place; calls on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that assessment exercise; reiterates its call on the EDPS to join and use the TR, including for the proactive disclosure of meetings with any third parties, to ensure transparency in EDPS’ regulatory and advisory functions;

    37.  Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EPDS established internal rules applicable to the hearing of persons that could be affected by an EDPS final decision adopted in own-initiative investigations and inquiries in order to ensure the proper exercise of their fundamental right to be heard in such proceedings; commends the EPDS for publishing a new factsheet on EDPS Investigations and a new EDPS Investigation Policy as well as for ensuring that all financial reports, including annual budgets, accounting and audit reports, are made publicly accessible through a Union institution website and other official channels, as the EPDS takes a leading role in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions;

    38.  Notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that no cases of conflicts of interest, whistleblowing or fraud were reported in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the EDPS has set up a framework to prevent conflicts of interest at the level of senior management and staff through codes of conduct, awareness raising and declarations of absence of conflicts of interest and confidentiality; notes that, in addition to the mandatory introduction to the ethical framework of the EDPS for all new members of staff, new members of staff are also introduced to the EDPS’ anti-fraud strategy;

    39.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS has internal rules on whistleblowing, which define safe routes and channels through which staff may raise concerns about fraud, corruption or any other serious wrongdoing, without prejudice to the confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower and of the information reported; notes that, so far, there has never been a whistleblowing case reported to the EDPS;

    40.  Urges the EDPS to publicly disclose any recusals due to conflicts of interest in its enforcement decisions, ensuring full transparency in regulatory oversight and decision-making;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    41.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the 2023 budget for IT equipment and projects was 9,5 % lower compared to 2022; notes that that decrease was primarily because no new IT feasibility studies were being commissioned in 2023, as opposed to 2022 where such studies represented a substantial portion of the IT budget; notes further that other cost elements remain relatively stable between the two years, including general IT services and maintenance;

    42.  Notes from the Follow-up Report and the Questionnaire the conclusions of the IT feasibility study carried out in 2022, whereby there are gaps between what the IT tools and services provided by the Commission and Parliament can offer and the specific needs of the EDPS; notes that those gaps should be addressed by developing in-house capabilities and applications for which a minimum of five IT staff and partial outsourcing EDPS was deemed necessary; regrets that, due to budgetary constraints, implementation of the recommendations of the study remained on hold; calls on the EDPS to consider a step-by-step approach by starting with those recommendations and projects that would require fewer resources;

    43.  Commends the progress made in 2023 by the EDPS in digitalising its workflows and processes, with the introduction of ARES, the qualified digital signature (e-IDAS) and a collaborative platform (Nextcloud) for drafting documents and video-conferencing, as well as updates to the tool (Website Evidence Collector) that automates the collection of personal data processing on websites of data controllers and processors, the adoption of the acceptance environment of EU Send Web, a service/channel to exchange sensitive non-classified information with other EUIBAs and further progress made towards implementing services that cannot be outsourced, such as the form and the electronic workflow to manage data breach notifications; notes nevertheless issues with regard to the use and maintenance of the e-procurement system;

    44.  Welcomes the EDPS’s focus on ensuring that external contractors meet the necessary moral and ethical standards expected of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, particularly in light of the previous use of external companies by EDPS that, according to Yale University’s ranking, continue to operate in Russia;

    45.  Acknowledges that the EDPS successfully relies on many of the administrative systems used by the Commission, particularly in the field of HR and business administration processes, as well as on some of Parliament’s services, including the provision of laptops, network infrastructure and video-conferencing; commends the fact that the project to improve the quality and performance of the computers provided to EDPS staff, in collaboration with Parliament, with a view to the generalisation of hybrid work, has been completed;

    46.  Acknowledges the leading role of EDPS in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions, while working closely with bodies such as European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and cybersecurity hubs such as CERT-EU; urges it to develop a structured audit framework for cybersecurity risks within Union bodies; notes that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to improve its readiness to protect personal data and sensitive information against cyber-attacks in view of the rapidly changing cybersecurity threat landscape; commends in that context the EDPS for reviewing its security policies and methodologies in preparation for the impact of the Cybersecurity Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841(2)); notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS introduced a request for two additional full-time equivalents to cover cybersecurity infrastructure in connection with EDPS’s obligations under that Regulation as well as the EDPS’ role as a member of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB); notes further with appreciation that the EPDS upgraded its Information Security Policy and the EDPS Acceptable Use Policy to address specific cybersecurity threats in relation to teleworking, use of personal mobile devices and banning of dangerous applications (TikTok); notes that the EDPS did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023; calls for annual public reporting on detected threats, response measures, and institutional cyber resilience;

    47.  Commends the EDPS for updating cybersecurity training for all staff and revamping the security training model for newcomers; appreciates that the EPDS has been proactive in raising awareness about cyber security risks, for instance by preparing fact sheets, conducting surveys with EUIBAs and running awareness campaigns; encourages the EDPS to ensure that staff receives compulsory training on the safe and ethical use of AI tools to enhance their understanding and mitigate potential risks;

    Buildings

    48.  Notes that in 2023, as in 2022, the EDPS and EDPB were the sole tenants of Parliament’s building where they were located, following the move of the Ombudsman at the end of 2021 and that by renting their premises from the Parliament rather than the private market the EDPS intends to keep the rental and maintenance costs at a reasonable level; notes that the EDPS had to request an additional EUR 81 856,84 for paying rental costs to Parliament, given that the indexation rate was 8,82 % and thus higher than the 2 % ceiling for administrative expenditures;

    49.  Notes that, in terms of accessibility of its building, the EDPS relies on the decisions taken and implemented by Parliament, as part of their building policy; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS employs staff with physical impairments due to serious illness; welcomes the commitment of the EDPS to explore the possibilities of hiring trainees with reduced mobility or disabilities;

    Environment and sustainability

    50.  Notes that the EDPS has not joined the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) but has implemented several measures to reduce its environmental footprint, such as regulating the temperature automatically and centrally, turning lights off automatically when there is no movement in the room, purchasing eco-friendly products and services and automating the workflows with the introduction of ARES; notes from the Follow-up Report that according to the information received by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Infrastructure and Logistics, responsible for the management of the building rented by the EDPS, solar panels are installed on that building; asks the EDPS to inform the discharge authority to report on the share (%) of the solar-panel produced electricity in the EDPS’ total energy consumption needs per year; calls further on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of any new developments regarding the EMAS certification process;

    51.  Notes that the EPDS has not assessed its carbon footprint in 2023; welcomes, however, that the EDPS continues to apply measures that reduce the carbon footprint by reducing the travel of journey to the office through teleworking possibilities, reimbursing 50 % of staff’s monthly/annual subscriptions for the use of public transport, encouraging the staff to favour videoconferencing and train travel for short distances, managing the cycle for invoices electronically and achieving an entirely paperless selection procedure and appraisal exercise as regards HR;

    52.  Urges the EDPS to adopt the EMAS to systematically monitor and improve its environmental footprint, particularly in terms of energy consumption, waste reduction, and sustainable office policies;

    53.  Notes that the EDPS addresses sustainability-related risks (such as environmental, social and governance risks) in a comprehensive way through an annual risk assessment exercise; welcomes in that context that the EDPS adopted its new risk management process in 2023, which should help the EDPS to target and better analyse those risks and consequently better calibrate mitigating actions;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    54.  Welcomes the budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the EDPS through inter-institutional cooperation, particularly the conclusion of service-level agreements with Parliament for the rental of its premises and the use of IT system applications, hardware supplies and maintenance and with the Commission for HR and business administration processes, as well as through participation in large interinstitutional framework contracts in areas such as IT consultancy, interim services and office supplies; commends in addition the EDPS for maintaining a structured cooperation with the Ombudsman, the Agency for Fundamental Rights and CERT-EU through memorandums of understanding;

    55.  Notes that the EDPS participates in meetings of various interinstitutional bodies; welcomes in this context the participation of the EPDS in meetings of the Heads of Administration and the Interinstitutional Online Communication Committee, led by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication; acknowledges that interinstitutional cooperation with EDPS, in his supervisory role, is of key importance for the other Union institutions to enhance their level of compliance with the data protection legal framework;

    56.  Calls for closer cooperation between the EDPS, the Court of Auditors, OLAF, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to develop common protocols for fraud detection in digital data and financial transactions within EU institutions; stresses the need for joint audits on AI-based fraud risks;

    57.  Welcomes the pivotal role played by the EDPS in 2023 in the coordination of the Data Protection Authorities of the Member States (DPAs) to promote consistent data protection across the Union; notes that the EDPS joined 26 DPAs in a coordinated enforcement action on the role and tasks of data protection officers (DPOs), assessing their compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725; notes the continued active involvement of the EPDS in the Coordinated Supervision Committee (CSC) within the area of FSJ addressing issues such as handling complaints against Europol and enhancing cooperation processes; appreciates furthermore all the other steps taken to improve cooperation between the EDPS and the DPAs such as the conduction of a joint Europol inspection with national authorities (Poland and Lithuania) and the participation in the coordinated supervisory action on processing minors’ data in Europol systems, the participation in an operational visit to the European Delegated Prosecutor’s office in Lisbon under a Working Arrangement with Portugal’s DPA and the coordination of an onsite inspection in Lesvos with Greece’s DPA to verify data collection practices during Joint Operations by Frontex; acknowledges that those interinstitutional engagements help the EDPS align with best practices of Union institutions and benefit from the exchange of information with peer departments;

    Communication

    58.  Notes that the budget for public communication and promotional activities in 2023 amounted to EUR 468 000, which represented an increase of 54 % compared to 2022;

    59.  Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS organised several communication events online as well as in person in 2023, aimed at raising awareness of EDPS’ role and mission among a wider public and the importance of respecting Union data protection rules, such as Data Protection Day, the EDPS Trainees’ conference (twice a year), the EDPS Seminar on the essence of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, and other international events;

    60.  Notes that the EDPS communicates online via its website and its social media accounts on X (ex-twitter) (29 400 followers), LinkedIn (71 000 followers), YouTube (2 900 followers), EU-Voice (5 900 followers) and EU-Video (750 followers);

    61.  Notes that the pilot project of the platforms EU Voice and EU Video (free and open-source social media networks, privacy-oriented and based on Mastodon and PeerTube software) continued in 2023; welcomes in that context the EDPS’ contribution to the Union’s strategy on data and digital sovereignty in order to promote the Union’s independence in the digital world and compliance with the data protection legal framework.

    (1) Order of the General Court of 6 September 2023, EDPS v Parliament and Council, T-578/22, ECLI:EU:T:2023:522.
    (2) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European Union-Ukraine Defence Industry Forum

    Source: European Commission – Justice

    European Commission Speech Brussels, 12 May 2025 Last week we celebrated 80 years of victory in World War Two. And today, what we need to remember that victory in World War Two was not only a victory of armies. It was also a victory of factories. And the same is true today. Peace through strength will come from production power and brain power.

    To stop Putin, we need to produce more. We need to innovate more. And we need to do that together – in the EU and with Ukraine.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins Sunday Morning Futures on Fox News to Discuss Trade Negotiations, Debt Ceiling, Spending Cuts

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty
    NASHVILLE, TN—Today, United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Appropriations, Banking, and Foreign Relations Committees and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, joined Sunday Morning Futures on Fox News to discuss President Donald Trump’s ongoing trade negotiations, what to do about the debt ceiling, and the efforts to cut spending in the federal government via budget reconciliation.

    *Click the photo above or here to watch*
    Partial Transcript
    Hagerty on the trade negotiations with China: “I worked on trade deals extensively. Not only the two trade deals we did with the U.S. and Japan, but also with the team that negotiated the phase one China trade deal, which China did not abide by. David’s right. I’m so glad he’s going to his post now. He’s going to be a great ambassador representing the America’s interest with China. What’s happening in Switzerland right now, I’m very excited about. I think there’s great potential there. It has to get resolved. And with ambassadors or leaders like David in the field, I think we’re going to have every opportunity then to hold China to account, because that’s going to be a critical aspect of this. They have not followed through on their prior agreements with us. We need to make certain that what we strike with them today, what we strike over the weekend and in the days to come, is something that we can ascertain, we can hold them accountable to, and that we can verify.”
    Hagerty on the debt ceiling: “I have a lot [of] faith in President Trump’s ability to get long-term effect achieved here. You’ve seen the DOGE effort. There’s a massive deregulation thrust underway. Every conversation is about efficiency, cutting costs, getting more for less. It’s going to take President Trump a little bit of time, though. You know how much stimulus was unleased into this economy. We’ve got to give President Trump the headroom to sort this out. And so, President Trump has asked for an extension of the debt ceiling. I’m more than inclined to grant him what he needs to give him the time and the runway to actually get our economy to a far better place, a much more efficient and effective place. At the same time, shoring up some of the problems that have been left to us by this Biden administration. That’s been outgoing.”
    Hagerty on the need to cut wasteful, fraudulent, and abusive spending in the federal government: “From my standpoint, and certainly having been a senator who served on the executive branch in the State Department and have seen the actual dispensation of this foreign aid, there’s a tremendous amount of opportunity to clean this up. And I think if I talk to my constituents here in Tennessee, they’ve been very clear to me. We need to be fixated on and focused on America right now, shoring up what’s wrong here, rather than sending our aid dollars overseas. And when you looked at some of the specifics of where our aid dollars were going, it was absolutely disgraceful. This organization has run amok. I applaud Secretary of State [Marco] Rubio for getting his arms around this, for taking control of it. And we certainly do need to start cutting back. We need to cut back there. We need many other places where President Trump is fixated. Again, he needs a little bit of headroom to get that done. I’m willing to support that. But this is exactly the type of thing that the American public expects to see from us […] I think as more information comes out and more of my colleagues see the abject waste that has gone on in places like USAID, I think it’s going to become easier and easier for them to realize and get their arms around cutting some of these programs. Now granted, these programs have constituencies that are very vocal in Washington. They’ve been lobbying very hard. But again, transparency will make a big difference for my colleagues. I certainly hope to see even more of it. I think that’ll make it a lot easier to get to where we need to be. That takes time.”
    Hagerty on Japan’s opportunity for a trade deal: “Japan certainly has the opportunity to be next. They’re the third largest economy in the world. They have every incentive to step up and take part in what I think will be a transformative situation across the globe. Japan could be a real leader here if you think about their opportunity to join us from an economic standpoint, from a national security standpoint, again, our largest presence in Indo-Pacific region is our partnership with Japan. We have more U.S. Military station there than anywhere else in the region. Again, I can’t put myself in their shoes.”
    Hagerty on the India-Pakistan conflict: “That’s a top shelf issue. When you see two nuclear powers like Pakistan and India going at it, it’s top concern. That’s why President Trump was immediately on it. JD Vance stepped up in a remarkably admirable way to leverage his personal relationship with [Prime Minister] Modi. I’ve seen President Trump and Modi together. They have a great personal relationship, but it’s these relationships and also the gravity of the situation that, I think, has helped bring this to a quick resolve. I only wish [former President] Joe Biden had used his political capital to do the same thing with Ukraine and Russia.”
    Hagerty on the need for major spending cuts in the reconciliation package: “The Senate is actually talking more like two trillion in cuts. We’re very focused on it. The reason the threshold is lower in the Senate is because there’s certain rules there that you can’t exceed or you can’t fall below. Again, we’re leaving ourselves leeway to get it done, but every one of my colleagues that I’ve spoken with wants to see an even greater number of cuts in this package.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘Fighting more frequent now’ – researcher warns of escalating West Papua conflict

    By Caleb Fotheringham, RNZ Pacific journalist

    The escalation of violence in West Papua is on par with some of the most intense times of conflict over the past six decades, a human rights researcher says.

    The United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) claims that Indonesia killed at least one civilian and severely injured another last Tuesday in Puncak Regency.

    In a statement, ULMWP interim president Benny Wenda said Deris Kogoya, 18, was killed by a rocket attack from a helicopter while riding his motorbike near Kelanungin Village.

    Jemi Waker, meanwhile, sustained severe violent injuries, including to both his legs.

    The statement said Waker had refused to go to hospital, fearing he would be killed if he went.

    Human Rights Watch researcher Andreas Harsono said that over the past month he had received an unusually high number of messages accompanied by gruesome photos showing either Indonesian soldiers or civilians being killed.

    “The fighting is much more frequent now,” Harsono said.

    More Indonesian soldiers
    “There are more and more Indonesian soldiers sent to West Papua under President Pradowo.

    “At the same time, indigenous Papuans are also gaining more and more men, unfortunately also boys, to join the fight in the jungle.”

    He said the escalation could match similarly intense periods of conflict in 1977, 1984, and 2004.

    A spokesperson for Indonesia’s Embassy in Wellington said they could not confirm if there had been a military attack in Puncak Regency on Tuesday.

    However, they said all actions conducted by Indonesia’s military were in line with international law.

    They said there were attacks in March and April of this year, instigated by an “armed criminal group” targeting Indonesian workers and civilians.

    Harsono said if the attack was on civilians, it would be a clear breach of human rights.

    Confirmation difficult
    However, he said it was difficult to confirm due to the remoteness of the area. He said it was common for civilians to wear army camouflage because of surplus Indonesian uniforms.

    ULMWP’s Benny Wenda said West Papuans were “a forgotten, voiceless people”.

    “Where is the attention of the media and the international community? How many children must be killed before they notice we are dying?”

    Wenda compared the lack of attention with the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Palestine conflict that was getting more media attention.

    He said Indonesia had banned media “to prevent journalists from telling the world what is really going on”.

    The Indonesian Embassy spokesperson said foreign journalists were not allowed in the area for their own safety.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: India-Pakistan ceasefire shouldn’t disguise fact that norms have changed in South Asia, making future de-escalation much harder

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Farah N. Jan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

    A member of the Indian Border Security Force stands guard near the India-Pakistan border. Narinder Nanu/AFP via Getty Images

    India and Pakistan have seen the scenario play out before: a terror attack in which Indians are killed leads to a succession of escalatory tit-fot-tat measures that put South Asia on the brink of all-out war. And then there is a de-escalation.

    The broad contours of that pattern have played out in the most recent crisis, with the latest step being the announcement of a ceasefire on May 10, 2025.

    But in another important way, the flare-up – which began on April 22 with a deadly attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in which 26 people were killed – represents significant departures from the past. It involved direct missile exchanges targeting sites inside both territories and the use of advanced missile systems and drones by the two nuclear rivals for the first time.

    As a scholar of nuclear rivalries, especially between India and Pakistan, I have long been concerned that the erosion of international sovereignty norms, diminished U.S. interest and influence in the region and the stockpiling of advanced military and digital technologies have significantly raised the risk of rapid and uncontrolled escalation in the event of a trigger in South Asia.

    These changes have coincided with domestic political shifts in both countries. The pro-Hindu nationalism of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has heightened communal tensions in the country. Meanwhile Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Gen. Syed Asim Munir, has embraced the “two-nation theory,” which holds that Pakistan is a homeland for the subcontinent’s Muslims and India for Hindus.

    Newspapers with front page articles on the India-Pakistan conflict are displayed on May 8, 2025.
    Narinder Nanu/AFP via Getty Images

    This religious framing was even seen in the naming of the two countries’ military operations. For India, it is “Operation Sindoor” – a reference to the red vermilion used by married Hindu women, and a provocative nod to the widows of the Kashmir attack. Pakistan called its counter-operation “Bunyan-un-Marsoos” – an Arabic phrase from the Quran meaning “a solid structure.”

    The role of Washington

    The India-Pakistan rivalry has cost tens of thousands of lives across multiple wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. But since the late 1990s, whenever India and Pakistan approached the brink of war, a familiar de-escalation playbook unfolded: intense diplomacy, often led by the United States, would help defuse tensions.

    In 1999, President Bill Clinton’s direct mediation ended the Kargil conflict – a limited war triggered by Pakistani forces crossing the Line of Control into Indian-administered Kashmir – by pressing Pakistan for a withdrawal.

    Similarly, after the 2001 attack inside the Indian Parliament by terrorists allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi, averting war.

    And after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which saw 166 people killed by terrorists linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, rapid and high-level American diplomatic involvement helped restrain India’s response and reduced the risk of an escalating conflict.

    As recently as 2019, during the Balakot crisis – which followed a suicide bombing in Pulwama, Kashmir, that killed 40 Indian security personnel – it was American diplomatic pressure that helped contain hostilities. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later wrote in his memoirs, “I do not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.”

    A diplomatic void?

    Washington as peacemaker made sense: It had influence and a vested interest.

    During the Cold War, the U.S. formed a close alliance with Pakistan to counter India’s links with the Soviet Union. And after the 9/11 terror attacks, the U.S. poured tens of billions of dollars in military assistance into Pakistan as a frontline partner in the “war on terror.”

    Simultaneously, beginning in the early 2000s, the U.S. began cultivating India as a strategic partner.

    A stable Pakistan was a crucial partner in the U.S. war in Afghanistan; a friendly India was a strategic counterbalance to China. And this gave the U.S. both the motivation and credibility to act as an effective mediator during moments of India-Pakistan crisis.

    Today, however, America’s diplomatic attention has shifted significantly away from South Asia. The process began with the end of the Cold War, but accelerated dramatically after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. More recently, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have consumed Washington’s diplomatic efforts.

    Since President Donald Trump took office in January 2025, the U.S. has not appointed an ambassador in New Delhi or Islamabad, nor confirmed an assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs – factors that must have hampered any mediating role for the United States.

    And while Trump said the May 10 ceasefire followed a “long night of talks mediated by the United States,” statements from India and Pakistan appeared to downplay U.S. involvement, focusing instead on the direct bilateral nature of negotiations.

    Should it transpire that Washington’s role as a mediator between Pakistan and India has been diminished, it is not immediately obvious who, if anyone, will fill the void. China, which has been trying to cultivate a role of mediator elsewhere, is not seen as a neutral mediator due to its close alliance with Pakistan and past border conflicts with India. Other regional powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to step in during the latest crisis, but both lack the power clout of the U.S. or China.

    This absence of external mediation is not, of course, a problem in itself. Historically, foreign interference – particularly U.S. support for Pakistan during the Cold War – often complicated dynamics in South Asia by creating military imbalances and reinforcing hardline positions. But the past has shown external pressure – especially from Washington – can be effective.

    Breaking the norms

    The recent escalation unfolded against the backdrop of another dynamic: the erosion of international norms since the end of the Cold War and accelerating after 2001.

    America’s “war on terror” fundamentally challenged international legal frameworks through practices such as preemptive strikes against sovereign states, targeted drone killings and the “enhanced interrogation techniques” of detainees that many legal scholars classify as torture.

    More recently, Israel’s operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria have drawn widespread criticism for violations of international humanitarian law – but have resulted in limited consequences.

    Security forces patrol the street near the Wuyan area of Pampore in south Kashmir on May 7, 2025.
    Faisal Khan/Anadolu via Getty Images

    In short, geopolitical norms have been ebbed away and military actions that were once deemed red lines are crossed with little accountability.

    For India and Pakistan, this environment creates both opportunity and risk. Both can point to behaviors elsewhere to justify assertive actions that they have undertaken that, in previous years, would have been deemed a step too far – such as attacks on places of worship and sovereignty violations.

    Multi-domain warfare

    But what truly distinguished the latest crisis from those of the past is, I believe, its multi-domain nature. The conflict is no longer confined to conventional military exchanges along the line of control – as it was for the first five decades of the Kashmir question.

    Both countries largely respected the line of control as a de facto boundary for military operations until the 2019 crisis. Since then, there has been a dangerous progression: first to cross-border airstrikes into each other’s territories, and now to a conflict that spans conventional military, cyber and information spheres simultaneously.

    Reports indicate Chinese-made Pakistani J-10 fighter jets shot down multiple Indian aircraft, including advanced French Rafale jets. This confrontation between Chinese and Western weapons represents not just a bilateral conflict but a proxy test of rival global military technologies – adding another layer of great-power competition to the crisis.

    In addition, the use of loitering drones designed to attack radar systems represents a significant escalation in the technological sophistication of cross-border attacks compared to years past.

    The conflict has also expanded dramatically into the cyber domain. Pakistani hackers, claiming to be the “Pakistan Cyber Force,” report breaching several Indian defense institutions, potentially compromising personnel data and login credentials.

    Simultaneously, social media and a new right-wing media in India have become a critical battlefront. Ultranationalist voices in India incited violence against Muslims and Kashmiris; in Pakistan, anti-India rhetoric similarly intensified online.

    Cooler voices prevailing … for now

    These shifts have created multiple escalation pathways that traditional crisis management approaches weren’t designed to address.

    Particularly concerning is the nuclear dimension. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is that it will use nuclear weapons if its existence is threatened, and it has developed short-range tactical nuclear weapons intended to counter Indian conventional advantages. Meanwhile, India has informally dialed back its historic no-first-use stance, creating ambiguity about its operational doctrine.

    Thankfully, as the ceasefire announcement indicates, mediating voices appear to have prevailed this time around. But eroding norms, diminished great power diplomacy and the advent of multi-domain warfare, I argue, made this latest flare-up a dangerous turning point.

    What happens next will tell us much about how nuclear rivals manage, or fail to manage, the spiral of conflict in this dangerous new landscape.

    Farah N. Jan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. India-Pakistan ceasefire shouldn’t disguise fact that norms have changed in South Asia, making future de-escalation much harder – https://theconversation.com/india-pakistan-ceasefire-shouldnt-disguise-fact-that-norms-have-changed-in-south-asia-making-future-de-escalation-much-harder-256285

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz