Source: European Central Bank
Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an MNI Connect webcast
Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2025
Today I would like to discuss the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for our monetary policy.
In recent years, the monetary policy debate has mainly focused on our interest rate decisions. This is for good reason. In response to the biggest inflation shock in a generation, we embarked on the fastest tightening of monetary policy in the ECB’s history through rate hikes.
During this tightening phase, we used policy rates as the primary tool for setting our monetary policy stance, while normalising our balance sheet in a measured and predictable way. We initiated the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase programmes and recalibrated our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).[1] As a result, the size of our balance sheet has fallen by more than a quarter from its peak.
Policy rates remain our primary instrument and will therefore continue to attract the most attention. But we should not underestimate the important role that our balance sheet policies have played over time as a component of our overall monetary policy stance and in ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. This still holds true today as we make our monetary policy less restrictive.
Inflation has now fallen substantially to levels close to 2%. Our latest projections foresee it converging towards our target over the medium term, and the risks to the inflation outlook – once sharply skewed to the upside – have now become more balanced.
At the same time, the euro area’s economic recovery remains weak – especially in the near term. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside and, if they materialise, may derail the recovery, with implications for the inflation outlook.
Against this background, the Governing Council has gradually been reducing the degree of monetary policy restriction by cutting policy rates towards neutral territory. While our direction is clear, we are very attentive to incoming information in view of the prevailing uncertainty about the economic environment. We continue to make decisions on a meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent basis. This gives us the option to adapt our interest rate path if necessary to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.
However, given the importance of financial conditions in determining the inflation outlook, we also need to consider the role played by the reduction of our balance sheet. In the tightening phase our rate decisions and balance sheet policies complemented each other, but they are now going in opposing directions.
This divergence has important implications across at least two dimensions.
First, it contributes to a steepening of the yield curve. Our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, the gradual runoff of our asset purchase portfolios exerts upward pressure on long-term and, to a lesser extent, intermediate yields. This has been compounded by recent spillovers from the US.[2]
Second, it may affect credit supply. Declining levels of central bank liquidity could constrain banks’ ability to extend credit, resulting in tighter credit conditions and potentially slowing down the investment and consumption that are critical for economic recovery.
In setting the policy stance, we therefore need to consider the impact of the overall set of financial conditions resulting from our interest rate and balance sheet policies. In other words, we need to strike the right balance if we are to achieve our inflation aim without an undue negative impact on incomes and employment. A rate cut has a more contained easing effect when the balance sheet is simultaneously reduced. This has implications when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.
We also need to consider the potential risks to the transmission of our monetary policy. In the past, abundant levels of liquidity have acted as a safeguard against spikes in liquidity needs that emerged regardless of where our rates stood. With this in mind, we need to carefully monitor the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity, mindful of the potential implications for financial stability.
Today, I would like to take stock of the ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies, explaining why they remain a vital part of our monetary policy toolbox. I will then discuss the implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for our monetary policy in the current environment.
The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies
At the ECB, balance sheet policies have served a dual purpose over time, allowing us to deliver on our price stability mandate amid exceptionally difficult circumstances.
First, during periods when interest rates approached their effective lower bound and inflation remained below target, the ECB used asset purchases to support an accommodative monetary policy stance.
For instance, the ECB launched its asset purchase programme (APP) in 2015 to stimulate the economy and inflation at a time when deflationary threats loomed large. Asset purchases and the associated provision of central bank liquidity worked in several ways – including through the portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate and credit channels – to generate a significant upward effect on both economic activity and inflation.[3]
Second, balance sheet policies have been pivotal to ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy, in both tightening and easing phases.
At times when we were lowering our policy rates, our TLTROs, launched in 2014, provided banks with long-term funding on favourable terms to incentivise them to lend to firms and households. This led to a persistent compression in lending rates and an increase in loan volumes over time.[4]
But balance sheet policies were also instrumental in ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy at times when we were increasing our policy rates. The announcement of our Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) in 2022 allowed us to embark on the fastest rate hiking cycle in our history without sparking financial fragmentation in the euro area.
Of course, the stance and transmission functions of our balance sheet policies do not operate in isolation. There can be beneficial interactions between the two.
As rates increased, for example, euro area banks had sufficient liquidity to manage any maturity mismatches that arose. This – alongside strengthened regulation and supervision – helped them to emerge unscathed from the market turbulence in March 2023 that saw the collapse of three regional banks in the United States.
The proportionate use of balance sheet policies in an evolving economic landscape
The substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet required careful monitoring of potential side effects. That is why the principle of proportionality lies at the core of how we use our balance sheet instruments.[5]
In its 2021 strategy review, the Governing Council assessed that its use of balance sheet measures – alongside negative interest rates and forward guidance – had indeed been proportionate, taking into account any side effects, for instance on inequality and the financial sector.[6]
Some concerns, however, require a more nuanced perspective.
For example, there is little evidence to suggest that excessive risk appetite may be attributable to larger central bank balance sheets. If this were the case, we should have seen less risk-taking in markets as central banks began to withdraw their market footprint.
But the opposite has been the case. Today equity markets are near all-time highs. This may be due to “animal spirits”[7], which have also been observed outside periods of central bank balance sheet growth. We saw them at play, for instance, during the dot-com bubble – a period when the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio hit its historic peak and central bank balance sheets were distinctly lean.
Moreover, as the Eurosystem gradually reduces its footprint in sovereign bond markets by reducing its holdings of euro area government bonds, concerns about the size of the balance sheet are becoming less and less justified (Chart 1).[8]
Going forward, an evolving economic landscape suggests that balance sheet policies could be increasingly useful as monetary policy instruments. Let me highlight two developments that are particularly relevant here.
First, the non-bank financial sector has grown considerably over time and is becoming increasingly relevant in the funding of the real economy.
In the euro area, the financial assets of non-banks have more than doubled since the global financial crisis.[9] Compared with banks, non-banks are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases.[10] Given that non-banks adjust their portfolios more actively in response to changes in interest rates, this also increases the need for sufficient liquidity in the system to facilitate these adjustments.
Second, geopolitical fragmentation means that the global economy is becoming more shock prone and subject to higher levels of uncertainty (Chart 2).
In this environment, we need to remember that the euro area is subject to fragmentation risk. A key lesson from the sovereign debt crisis is that balance sheet policies have been instrumental in making the euro area a more “normal” jurisdiction from the perspective of monetary policy.
As we navigate an increasingly complex economic landscape, the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity represents an inflection point that also requires close monitoring.
In this environment, banks’ liquidity needs are met via a broad mix of instruments under our new operational framework. These include our short-term main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and will also include – at a later stage – structural longer-term credit operations and a structural portfolio of securities.[11]
However, the decline in excess liquidity warrants careful monitoring, as it could exert additional tightening pressures on financial and financing conditions, potentially exceeding the intended policy stance.
The implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment
It is in this context that I would like to talk about the implications of our balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment.
The ECB’s balance sheet has been reduced at a faster pace than those of central banks in other major economies during their tightening cycles (Chart 3). So far, much of this decline can be attributed to banks’ repayments of TLTRO loans.[12]
Looking ahead, however, any further reduction in the size of our balance sheet will stem from the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase portfolios, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.
As in the past, the normalisation of our balance sheet has implications for our monetary policy stance and the possible risks to monetary policy transmission.
The monetary policy stance
Let me start with the implications for our monetary policy stance.
Our reaction function for rate decisions is built around three well-known criteria: (i) the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.
Inflation has fallen by around three-quarters from its peak in late 2022 (Chart 4). The disinflation process is well on track, and our staff projections see inflation averaging 2.1% this year, 1.9% next year and 2.1% in 2027.
Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. In particular, the ECB’s measure of the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI)[13] – a more forward-looking indicator of underlying inflationary pressures that tends to better predict future inflation – stood at 2.1% in December, and 2.0% when excluding energy.
Domestic inflation remains high, as wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But our wage tracker is signalling a significant moderation in wage growth, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.
It is the third leg of our reaction function – the strength of monetary policy transmission – that I would like to discuss in more detail, however.
As we cut interest rates, new borrowing for firms and households is becoming less expensive. But financing conditions continue to be tight – in part because our monetary policy remains restrictive and past rate hikes are still working their way through the economy.[14]
While credit continues to expand, lending to firms and households remains subdued by historical standards. In December, the annual growth rate of lending to firms was roughly two-thirds below its historical average.[15] Growth in housing loans increased gradually but also remained muted overall, at around one-fifth of its long-term average (Chart 5).[16]
At the same time, the recent gradual recovery in lending has not kept pace with the nominal growth of the economy, as reflected in the continued decline of the loan-to-GDP ratio (Chart 6).
While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting our monetary policy stance, the normalisation of our balance sheet may also affect the stance through two key channels.
First, while our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve, our quantitative tightening exerts upward pressure on long-term maturities and, to a lesser extent, intermediate ones. This serves to tighten financial conditions.[17]
Indeed, the runoff of the asset portfolios of central banks has arguably been one of several factors contributing to a steepening of sovereign yield curves in recent months – akin to a reversal of the duration risk channel previously associated with central banks through quantitative easing (Chart 7).
At its peak in early 2022, the impact of current and expected Eurosystem bond holdings in our asset portfolios lowered ten-year sovereign bond yields by around 175 basis points.[18] Due to quantitative tightening, however, the easing impact has now fallen to around 75 basis points and is expected to further reduce over time (Chart 8).
According to ECB research, an expected €1 trillion reduction in bond holdings may raise long-term risk-free interest rates by about 35 basis points (Chart 9).[19]
Second, an environment marked by declining levels of central bank liquidity may constrain banks’ ability to extend credit.
Research documents the strong relationship between loan supply and structural sources of liquidity, such as reserves obtained through credit easing programmes or those injected through quantitative easing interventions.
More specifically, a €1 change in non-borrowed reserves or credit easing reserves is associated with a corresponding change in credit of approximately 15 cents or 10 cents respectively.[20] In other words, a €500 billion drop in non-borrowed reserves – similar to the one expected in 2025 as a result of the decline in our APP and PEPP holdings – is associated with a €75 billion decline in credit supply, equivalent to about 0.6 percentage points of downward pressure on loans to the non-financial private sector.[21]
Accordingly, as central bank liquidity declines, we may see tighter credit conditions in the economy. This could slow down investment and consumption, with firms cutting back on capital expenditure and consumers reducing purchases of big-ticket items that require financing.[22]
Incoming data suggest that euro area GDP growth will remain subdued in the short term. Industrial production decreased notably in December and surveys indicate that manufacturing is continuing to contract, whereas services activity is expanding at a moderate pace (Chart 10).
Given the uncertain economic environment, we are yet to see a sustained rebound in investment (Chart 11).[23] And while we continue to expect consumption to be the main driver of the recovery, rising real incomes have not yet encouraged households to increase their spending in a commensurate manner (Chart 12).[24] In the face of subdued domestic demand, our latest staff projections forecast a slower economic recovery than had been forecast in the September projections.[25]
Moreover, geopolitical risks may create further headwinds for the recovery, which we will need to monitor carefully. Forthcoming findings from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) suggest that consumers’ concerns about geopolitical risks are negatively affecting economic sentiment – leading to more pessimistic expectations, more elevated income uncertainty and, ultimately, a lower propensity to consume.
We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. As we gradually cut rates towards neutral territory, we need to be mindful of the fact that we now have two monetary policy tools working in opposing directions, given our ongoing quantitative tightening. This is a first in our history at the ECB.
We therefore need to ensure that we factor in the tightening of our balance sheet when calibrating our rate cuts to achieve our inflation aim. This is because the stance effects stemming from our rate cuts will be somewhat dampened by the tightening induced by the normalisation of our balance sheet.
This is an important consideration when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.
Risks to the transmission of our monetary policy
Similarly, we need to be mindful of the possible risks to the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy in view of the prevailing uncertainty and potential risks to financial stability.
This cautious approach is crucial, especially given historical precedents where central banks faced unexpected challenges.
In late 2019, for instance, the Federal Reserve System was unexpectedly forced to temporarily reverse its balance sheet retrenchment due to liquidity challenges in financial markets.[26] In 2022 the Bank of England halted quantitative tightening and launched emergency gilt purchases to safeguard financial stability after pension funds’ liability-driven investment strategies exposed systemic risks.[27]
Recent bouts of market volatility also underscore that we should remain alert to the emergence of financial stability risks that may endanger transmission. Last August several factors converged to spark substantial market volatility.[28] The VIX, a market index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, recorded its largest ever one-day spike (Chart 13).[29]
Faced with such episodes of volatility, the further decline in our balance sheet must remain on a gradual and predictable path to avoid financial amplification effects.[30] This is especially important in an environment where euro area banks are already tightening their credit standards, especially for firms and consumer credit, due to higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (Chart 14).[31]
Our balance sheet policy instruments continue to be a crucial item in our toolbox. The expectation that we will use them if necessary protects the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and reduces the likelihood that we will need to use these tools in the first place.
Moreover, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, even in the context of excess liquidity, we need to remain prudent and be ready to step in should another shock emerge. We should maintain the flexibility to swiftly expand liquidity facilities if stressful conditions arise.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies to date demonstrates their importance both for the monetary policy stance and for the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. They are a vital part of our toolkit.
While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting the monetary policy stance, we should also consider the role played by quantitative tightening in influencing overall financial and financing conditions – be it through the yield curve or through the bank lending channel.
To strike the right balance, we should ensure that our rate decisions adequately compensate for the tightening induced by the reduction of our balance sheet.
Thank you.
