Category: Vehicles

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorneys for Southwestern Border Districts Charge More than 1400 Illegal Aliens with Immigration-Related Crimes During the Second week in May as part of Operation Take Back America

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Since the inauguration of President Trump, the Department of Justice is playing a critical role in Operation Take back America, a nationwide initiative to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    Last week, the U.S. Attorneys for Arizona, Central California, Southern California, New Mexico, Southern Texas, and Western Texas charged more than 1400 defendants with Criminal violations of U.S. immigration laws.

    The Southern District of California filed 176 border-related cases this week, including charges of assault on a federal officer, bringing in aliens for financial gain, reentering the U.S. after deportation, and importation of controlled substances. These included Two complaints which charged five people with participating in a human smuggling event that led to the deaths of at least three migrants, including a 14-year-old boy from India. His 10-year-old sister is still missing at sea and presumed dead; their father is in a coma and mother is also hospitalized.

    The Central District of California filed criminal charges against 34 defendants this week who allegedly were found in the U.S. following removal. Many of the defendants charged were previously convicted of felonies before they were removed from the United States.

    The District of New Mexico charged approximately 300 defendants with border-related crimes, including 91 defendants charged with Illegal Reentry After Deportation (8 U.S.C. 1326). In addition, 209 individuals charged with Illegal Entry (8 U.S.C. 1325) were also charged with violation of a military security regulation (50 U.S.C. 797) because they unlawfully entered the National Defense Area in New Mexico.

    The Southern District of Texas filed a total of 300 cases, charging 302 people from May 2-8 in continuing efforts to secure the southern border. As part of the cases, 93 face allegations of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 193 people face charges of illegally entering the country, while 11 cases allege various instances of human smuggling with the remainder involving other immigration-related crimes.

    The Western District of Texas filed 316 new immigration and immigration-related criminal cases from May 2 through May 8. Among the new cases, Cirilo Delgado-Alderete, Dilan Karim Valenzuela-Baca, and Antelmo Eligio Ramirez-Bernardo were arrested at an alleged stash house in Anthony, New Mexico. According to an affidavit, U.S. Border Patrol and Homeland Security Investigations agents observed three vehicles that had been identified as being used to smuggle illegal aliens to Albuquerque, New Mexico, parked at the residence. When agents questioned Ramirez-Bernardo, a Guatemalan national, they allegedly discovered he possessed a key to the residence on his keychain. Agents then located 25 individuals inside the residence who admitted to being citizens of Mexico, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Pakistan without documentation to be in the U.S. Two of the individuals, Delgado-Alderete and Valenzuela-Baca, were identified as alleged stash house caretakes and drivers to harbor and transport the illegal aliens. Delgado-Alderete, Valenzuela-Baca, and Ramirez-Bernardo are charged with one count of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and one count of conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens.  The drivers allegedly picked up aliens in El Paso before transporting them to New Mexico.

    The District of Arizona brought immigration-related criminal charges against 314 defendants. Specifically, the United States filed 117 cases in which aliens illegally re-entered the United States, and the United States also charged 166 aliens for illegally entering the United States.  In its ongoing effort to deter unlawful immigration, the United States filed 25 cases against 31 individuals responsible for smuggling illegal aliens into and within the District of Arizona.

    We are grateful for the hard work of our border prosecutors in bringing these cases and helping to make our border safe again.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Westport Fuel Systems Reports First Quarter 2025 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Westport Fuel Systems Inc. (“Westport“) (TSX:WPRT / Nasdaq:WPRT) reported financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025, and provided an update on operations. All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise stated.

    “We continue to make significant strides in transforming Westport and sharpening our strategic focus. Our priorities remain clear: driving success through Cespira, our HPDI joint venture with Volvo Group; pursuing operational excellence through initiatives to streamline processes and reduce costs; and positioning Westport at the forefront of the alternative fuel shift.

    These priorities are guiding us as we work towards a brighter future. We’re seeing the impact of our efforts in our recent results – we significantly improved our net loss to $2.5 million in Q1 of 2025 from a net loss of $13.6 million in Q1 of 2024. This was supported by a $3.5 million increase in gross profit and an $8.1 million decrease in operating expenses. We also reported a substantial improvement in adjusted EBITDA as compared to the same period of the prior year.

    Looking to the future, with the announcement of the proposed sale of our light-duty business, Westport is realigning to focus on the hard-to-decarbonize applications primarily in long-haul and heavy-duty trucking where our unique HPDI and high-pressure technologies offer significant growth potential. Critically, this transaction is designed to provide immediate cash proceeds that bolster our balance sheet and fund growth opportunities in Cespira and the High-Pressure Controls & Systems business.

    Now, the conversation has changed. Our attendance at the Advanced Clean Transportation Expo or ACT Expo, the largest showcase of clean transportation technologies in North America, validated our view that the market recognizes that the internal combustion engine utilizing alternative fuels is an affordable solution that also decarbonizes long-haul, heavy-duty transport. Westport is the clean-tech innovation company to help drive this change. Through Cespira, the HPDI fuel system does the on-engine work to our High Pressure Controls and Systems business where our components do the off-engine work we are providing OEMs with simplified solutions to decarbonize.

    Volvo recently highlighted that demand for their gas-powered trucks that utilize HPDI technology has been increasing, with sales up more than 25% in 2024, a trend that we saw continue into Q1 with Cespira delivering improved revenue driven by increased volumes as compared to Q1 of 2024. While we remain focused on scaling our alternative fuel solutions, including LNG, CNG, RNG, and hydrogen systems, we are matching the cleanest gaseous fuels with the most efficient engine technologies. We are committed to delivering practical, commercially viable low-carbon solutions today and providing sustainable, high-performance solutions that help our customers achieve their goals now and for years to come.”

    Dan Sceli, Chief Executive Officer

    Q1 2025 Highlights

    • Revenues decreased 9% to $71.0 million compared to the same period in 2024, primarily driven by decreased sales volumes in our Heavy-Duty OEM and High-Pressure Controls & Systems segments. This was partially offset by increased sales in our Light-Duty segment in the quarter. In Q1 2024, our Heavy-Duty OEM segment included the financial results of the HPDI business which are now accounted for as part of the Cespira joint venture.
    • Net loss of $2.5 million for the quarter compared to net loss of $13.6 million for the same quarter last year. The decrease in net loss was driven by a $3.5 million increase in gross profit, decrease in operating expenditures by $8.1 million; change in foreign exchange gain or loss by $2.3 million and an increase in loss from investments accounted for by the equity method of $3.8 million.
    • Adjusted EBITDA[1] of nil  compared to negative $6.6 million for the same period in 2024.
    • Cash and cash equivalents were $32.6 million at the end of the first quarter. Cash used in operating activities during the quarter was $4.9 million with net cash used by working capital of $8.1 million, partially offset by operating income of $1.7 million. Investing activities included the collection of $10.5 million in a holdback receivable related to our previous sale of CWI to Cummins in 2022, capital contribution into Cespira of $4.7 million and purchase of capital assets of $3.1 million. Cash used in financing activities was attributed to net debt repayments of $3.9 million in the quarter.

    [1] Adjusted earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation is a non-GAAP measure. Please refer to NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES in Westport’s Management Discussion and Analysis for the reconciliation.

    Consolidated Results      Over /   
    ($ in millions, except per share amounts)     (Under)   
      1Q25 1Q24 %  
    Revenue $ 71.0   $ 77.6   (9 )%
    Gross Profit(2)   15.2     11.7   30 %
    Gross Margin(2)   21 %   15 %  
    Income (loss) from Investments Accounted for by the Equity Method(1)   (3.8 )     (100 )%
    Net Loss   (2.5 )   (13.6 ) 82 %
    Net Loss per Share – Basic   (0.14 )   (0.79 ) 82 %
    Net Loss per Share – Diluted   (0.14 )   (0.79 ) 82 %
    EBITDA (2)   (0.1 )   (9.2 ) 99 %
    Adjusted EBITDA (2)       (6.6 ) 100 %

    (1) This includes income or loss primarily from our investments in Cespira and Minda Westport Technologies Limited
    (2) Gross margins, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP measures. Please refer to GAAP and NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES for the reconciliation to equivalent GAAP measures and limitations on the use of such measures.

    Segment Information

    Light-Duty

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $64.2 million compared with $63.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. Light-Duty revenue increased by $0.9 million compared to the prior year and was primarily driven by increase in sales in our light-duty OEM and DOEM businesses. The light-duty OEM business had an increase in sales from its Euro 6 program compared to the prior year. In the first quarter of 2024, DOEM had a significant decrease in sales to a customer. This was partially offset by lower sales in our IAM, electronics and fuel storage businesses compared to the prior year.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 increased by $1.6 million to $14.0 million, or 22% of revenue, compared to $12.4 million, or 20% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by a change in sales mix with an increase in sales to European customers and a reduction in sales to developing regions.

    High Pressure Controls & Systems

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $1.4 million compared with $2.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease in revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 compared to the prior year was primarily driven by the hydrogen industry slowdown impacting demand for hydrogen components.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 decreased by $0.2 million to $0.2 million, or 14% of revenue, compared to $0.4 million, or 17% of revenue, for the same prior year period. This was primarily driven by lower sales volumes increasing the per unit manufacturing costs in the quarter.

    Heavy-Duty Original Equipment Manufacturer (“OEM”)

    Revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was $5.4 million, compared to $11.9 million for the prior year. The decrease in revenue for the three months ended March 31, 2025 is a result of the continuation of the business in Cespira. The revenue earned in the current quarter was from our services provided under the transitional service agreement with Cespira that is expected to end by Q2 2026.

    Gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 increased by $2.1 million to $1.0 million, or 19% of revenue, compared to negative $1.1 million or negative 9% of revenue, for the same prior year period. The Heavy-Duty OEM segment received $0.9million in credits from component suppliers for inventory sold in the quarter.

    Selected Cespira Statements of Operations Data

    We account for Cespira using the equity method of accounting. However, due to its significance to our long-term strategy and operating results, we disclose certain Cespira’s financial information in notes 7 and 17 of our interim financial statements for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    The following table sets forth a summary of the financial results of Cespira for the three months ended March 31, 2025 .

    (in millions of U.S. dollars)   Three months ended March 31,   Change
          2025       2024     $   %
    Total revenue   $ 16.7     $     $ 16.7     %
    Gross profit   $ 0.5     $     $ 0.5     %
    Gross margin1     3 %     %        
    Operating loss   $ (7.1 )   $     $ (7.1 )   %
    Net loss attributable to the Company   $ (3.9 )   $     $ (3.9 )   %

    1Gross margin is non-GAAP financial measure. See the section ‘Non-GAAP Financial Measures’ for explanations and discussions of these non-GAAP financial measures or ratios.

    Revenue

    Cespira revenues for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were $16.7 million. In the prior year, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment, which included our HPDI business, had revenues of $11.9 million. This was primarily driven by an increase in HPDI fuel systems sold in the period.

    Gross Profit

    Gross profit was $0.5 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. In the prior year, the Heavy-Duty OEM segment had negative $1.1 million in gross profit primarily driven by the increase in sales volumes compared to the prior year and reductions in manufacturing cost.

    Operating loss

    Cespira incurred operating losses of $7.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025. Cespira continues to incur operating losses as it scales its operations and expand into other markets.

    Q1 2025 Conference Call
    Westport has scheduled a conference call for May 14, 2025, at 7:00 am Pacific Time (10:00 pm Eastern Time) to discuss these results. To access the conference call please register at
    https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BI73bcac200e5f4652873668cf803d72ed

    The live webcast of the conference call can be accessed through the Westport website at
    https://investors.wfsinc.com/.

    Participants may register up to 60 minutes before the event by clicking on the call link and completing the online registration form. Upon registration, the user will receive dial-in info and a unique PIN, along with an email confirming the details.

    The webcast will be archived on Westport’s website at https://investors.wfsinc.com.

    Financial Statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis

    To view Westport financials for the first quarter ended March 31st, 2025, please visit https://investors.wfsinc.com/financials/

    About Westport Fuel Systems

    At Westport Fuel Systems, we are driving innovation to power a cleaner tomorrow. We are a leading supplier of advanced fuel delivery components and systems for clean, low-carbon fuels such as natural gas, renewable natural gas, propane, and hydrogen to the global automotive industry. Our technology delivers the performance and fuel efficiency required by transportation applications and the environmental benefits that address climate change and urban air quality challenges. Headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, with operations in Europe, Asia, North America, and South America, we serve our customers in approximately 70 countries with leading global transportation brands. At Westport Fuel Systems, we think ahead. For more information, visit www.wfsinc.com.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements, including statements regarding future strategic initiatives and future growth, future of our development programs (including those relating to HPDI and Hydrogen), our expectations for 2024 and beyond, including the demand for our products, and the future success of our business and technology strategies. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on both the views of management and assumptions that may cause our actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, levels of activities, performance or achievements expressed in or implied by these forward looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and assumptions include those related to our revenue growth, operating results, industry and products, the general economy, conditions of and access to the capital and debt markets, solvency, governmental policies and regulation, technology innovations, fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, operating expenses, continued reduction in expenses, ability to successfully commercialize new products, the performance of our joint ventures, the availability and price of natural gas and hydrogen, new environmental regulations, the acceptance of and shift to natural gas and hydrogen vehicles,fuel emission standards, the development of competing technologies, our ability to adequately develop and deploy our technology, the actions and determinations of our joint venture and development partners, the effects and duration of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, supply chain disruptions as well as other risk factors and assumptions that may affect our actual results, performance or achievements or financial position discussed in our most recent Annual Information Form and other filings with securities regulators. Readers should not place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they were made. We disclaim any obligation to publicly update or revise such statements to reflect any change in our expectations or in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statements may be based, or that may affect the likelihood that actual results will differ from those set forth in these forward-looking statements except as required by National Instrument 51-102.

    Contact Information
    Investor Relations
    Westport Fuel Systems
    T: +1 604-718-2046

    GAAP and Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Our financial statements are prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“U.S. GAAP”). These U.S. GAAP financial statements include non-cash charges and other charges and benefits that may be unusual or infrequent in nature or that we believe may make comparisons to our prior or future performance difficult. In addition to conventional measures prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, Westport and certain investors use EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as an indicator of our ability to generate liquidity by producing operating cash flow to fund working capital needs, service debt obligations and fund capital expenditures. Management also uses these non-GAAP measures in its review and evaluation of the financial performance of Westport. EBITDA is also frequently used by investors and analysts for valuation purposes whereby EBITDA is multiplied by a factor or “EBITDA multiple” that is based on an observed or inferred relationship between EBITDA and market values to determine the approximate total enterprise value of a company. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures also provide additional insight to investors and securities analysts as supplemental information to our U.S. GAAP results and as a basis to compare our financial performance period-over-period and to compare our financial performance with that of other companies. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures facilitate comparisons of our core operating results from period to period and to other companies by, in the case of EBITDA, removing the effects of our capital structure (net interest income on cash deposits, interest expense on outstanding debt and debt facilities), asset base (depreciation and amortization) and tax consequences. Adjusted EBITDA provides this same indicator of Westports’ EBITDA from continuing operations and removing such effects of our capital structure, asset base and tax consequences, but additionally excludes any unrealized foreign exchange gains or losses, stock-based compensation charges and other one-time impairments and costs which are not expected to be repeated in order to provide greater insight into the cash flow being produced from our operating business, without the influence of extraneous events.

    Segment Information

    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are intended to provide additional information to investors and analysts and do not have any standardized definition under U.S. GAAP, and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for measures of performance prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA exclude the impact of cash costs of financing activities and taxes, and the effects of changes in operating working capital balances, and therefore are not necessarily indicative of operating profit or cash flow from operations as determined under U.S. GAAP. Other companies may calculate EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA differently.

    Segment earnings or losses before income taxes, interest, depreciation, and amortization (“Segment EBITDA”) is the measure of segment profitability used by the Company. The accounting policies of our reportable segments are the same as those applied in our consolidated financial statements. Management prepared the financial results of the Company’s reportable segments on basis that is consistent with the manner in which Management internally disaggregates financial information to assist in making internal operating decisions. Certain common costs and expenses, primarily corporate functions, among segments differently than we would for stand-alone financial information prepared in accordance with GAAP. These include certain costs and expenses of shared services, such as IT, human resources, legal, finance and supply chain management. Segment EBITDA is not defined under US GAAP and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies and should not be considered a substitute for net earnings or other results reported in accordance with GAAP. Reconciliations of reportable segment information to consolidated statement of operations can be found in section “NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES & RECONCILIATIONS” within this press release.

      Three months ended March 31, 2025
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Cespira   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 64.2   $ 1.4     $ 5.4   $ 16.7     $ 87.7
    Cost of revenue   50.2     1.2       4.4     16.2       72.0
    Gross profit   14.0     0.2       1.0     0.5       15.7
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   3.0     1.0       0.1     3.1       7.2
    General & administrative   4.1     0.3       0.1     2.7       7.2
    Sales & marketing   2.3     0.1           0.3       2.7
    Depreciation & amortization   0.7     0.1           0.7       1.5
        10.1     1.5       0.2     6.8       18.6
    Equity income (note 8)   0.1                     0.1
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization   1.9     0.1           1.6       3.6
    Segment EBITDA $ 5.9   $ (1.2 )   $ 0.8   $ (4.7 )   $ 0.8
      Three months ended March 31, 2024
      Light-Duty   High-Pressure Controls & Systems   Heavy-Duty OEM   Total Segment
    Revenue $ 63.3   $ 2.4     $ 11.9     $ 77.6  
    Cost of revenue   50.9     2.0       13.0       65.9  
    Gross profit   12.4     0.4       (1.1 )     11.7  
    Operating expenses:              
    Research & development   3.6     1.3       2.8       7.7  
    General & administrative   3.7     0.2       1.8       5.7  
    Sales & marketing   2.1     0.2       0.5       2.8  
    Depreciation & amortization   0.6     0.1       0.1       0.8  
        10.0     1.8       5.2       17.0  
    Equity income                    
    Add back: Depreciation & amortization   1.5     0.1       1.4       3.0  
    Segment EBITDA $ 3.9   $ (1.3 )   $ (4.9 )   $ (2.3 )
    Gross Profit    
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars) 1Q25   1Q24
    Three months ended  
    Revenue $ 71.0     $ 77.6  
    Less: Cost of revenue   55.8       65.9  
    Gross profit   15.2       11.7  
    Gross margin %   21.4 %     15.1 %
      Three months ended March 31, 2025
      Total Segment   Less: Cespira   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 87.7   $ 16.7   $     $ 71.0  
    Cost of revenue   72.0     16.2           55.8  
    Gross profit   15.7     0.5           15.2  
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   7.2     3.1           4.1  
    General & administrative   7.2     2.7     1.9       6.4  
    Sales & marketing   2.7     0.3     0.3       2.7  
    Depreciation & amortization   1.5     0.7           0.8  
        18.6     6.8     2.2       14.0  
    Equity income (loss)   0.1         (3.9 )     (3.8 )
      Three months ended March 31, 2024
      Total Segment   Add: Corporate & unallocated   Total Consolidated
    Revenue $ 77.6   $   $ 77.6
    Cost of revenue   65.9         65.9
    Gross profit   11.7         11.7
    Operating expenses:
    Research & development   7.7         7.7
    General & administrative   5.7     4.7     10.4
    Sales & marketing   2.8     0.4     3.2
    Depreciation & amortization   0.8     0.2     1.0
        17.0     5.3     22.3
    Equity income          
    Reconciliation of Segment EBITDA to Loss before income taxes   Three months ended March 31,
        2025       2024  
    Total Segment EBITDA   $ 0.8     $ (2.3 )
    Adjustments:
    Depreciation & amortization     2.0       3.0  
    Cespira’s Segment EBITDA     (4.7 )      
    Cespira’s equity loss     3.9        
    Corporate and unallocated operating expenses     2.2       5.3  
    Foreign exchange loss     (0.5 )     1.8  
    Interest on long-term debt and accretion of royalty payable     0.7       0.8  
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     (0.9 )     (0.3 )
    Loss before income taxes   $ (1.9 )   $ (12.9 )
    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA        
    (expressed in millions of U.S. dollars)   1Q25   1Q24
    Three months ended    
    Loss before income taxes   $ (1.9 )   $ (12.9 )
    Interest expense (income), net     (0.2 )     0.5  
    Depreciation and amortization     2.0       3.2  
    EBITDA     (0.1 )     (9.2 )
    Stock based compensation (recovery)     0.3       0.3  
    Unrealized foreign exchange (gain) loss     (0.5 )     1.8  
    Severance costs           0.5  
    Restructuring costs     0.3        
    Adjusted EBITDA   $     $ (6.6 )
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share amounts)
    March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024
     
        March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
    Assets        
    Current assets:        
    Cash and cash equivalents (including restricted cash)   $ 32,637     $ 37,646  
    Accounts receivable     66,634       73,054  
    Inventories     63,214       53,526  
    Prepaid expenses     6,551       5,660  
    Total current assets     169,036       169,886  
    Long-term investments     40,052       39,732  
    Property, plant and equipment     45,314       41,956  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets     19,249       19,019  
    Intangible assets     5,174       5,277  
    Deferred income tax assets     10,261       9,695  
    Goodwill     2,996       2,876  
    Other long-term assets     3,163       3,180  
    Total assets   $ 295,245     $ 291,621  
    Liabilities and shareholders’ equity        
    Current liabilities:        
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities   $ 93,127     $ 88,123  
    Current portion of operating lease liabilities     2,750       2,624  
    Current portion of long-term debt     13,225       14,660  
    Current portion of warranty liability     4,013       3,861  
    Total current liabilities     113,115       109,268  
    Long-term operating lease liabilities     16,560       16,433  
    Long-term debt     17,915       19,067  
    Warranty liability     1,603       1,456  
    Deferred income tax liabilities     4,063       4,029  
    Other long-term liabilities     4,391       4,343  
    Total liabilities     157,647       154,596  
    Shareholders’ equity:        
    Share capital:        
    Unlimited common and preferred shares, no par value        
    17,326,732 (2024 – 17,282,934) common shares issued and outstanding     1,246,408       1,245,805  
    Other equity instruments     9,081       9,472  
    Additional paid in capital     11,516       11,516  
    Accumulated deficit     (1,098,726 )     (1,096,275 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss     (30,681 )     (33,493 )
    Total shareholders’ equity     137,598       137,025  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 295,245     $ 291,621  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations and Comprehensive Income (Loss) (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars, except share and per share amounts)
    Three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024
     
        Three months ended March 31,
          2025       2024  
    Revenue   $ 70,955     $ 77,574  
    Cost of revenue     55,730       65,851  
    Gross profit     15,225       11,723  
    Operating expenses:        
    Research and development     4,052       7,693  
    General and administrative     6,397       10,353  
    Sales and marketing     2,758       3,287  
    Foreign exchange (gain) loss     (456 )     1,820  
    Depreciation and amortization     740       1,043  
          13,491       24,196  
    Income (loss) from operations     1,734       (12,473 )
             
    Income (loss) from investments accounted for by the equity method     (3,799 )     31  
    Interest on long-term debt     (676 )     (812 )
    Interest and other income, net of bank charges     869       341  
    Loss before income taxes     (1,872 )     (12,913 )
    Income tax expense     579       735  
    Net loss for the period     (2,451 )     (13,648 )
    Other comprehensive income (loss):        
    Cumulative translation adjustment     3,641       (430 )
    Ownership share of equity method investments’ other comprehensive loss     (829 )      
          2,812       (430 )
    Comprehensive income (loss)   $ 361     $ (14,078 )
             
    Loss per share:        
    Net loss per share – basic and diluted   $ (0.14 )     (0.79 )
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:        
    Basic and diluted     17,322,681       17,220,540  
    WESTPORT FUEL SYSTEMS INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (unaudited)
    (Expressed in thousands of United States dollars)
    Three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024
     
        Three months ended March 31,
          2025       2024  
    Operating activities:        
    Net loss for the period   $ (2,451 )   $ (13,648 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash provided by (used in) operating activities:        
    Depreciation and amortization     1,930       3,247  
    Stock-based compensation expense     212       331  
    Unrealized foreign exchange (gain) loss     (456 )     1,820  
    Deferred income tax (recovery)     (33 )     (40 )
    Loss (income) from investments accounted for by the equity method     3,799       (31 )
    Interest on long-term debt     22       22  
    Change in inventory write-downs     223       413  
    Change in bad debt expense     (33 )     (121 )
    Other           (248 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:        
    Accounts receivable     (2,072 )     12,526  
    Inventories     (7,502 )     (7,434 )
    Prepaid expenses     (415 )     (400 )
    Accounts payable and accrued liabilities     2,840       4,725  
    Warranty liability     (963 )     (1,020 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities     (4,899 )     142  
    Investing activities:        
    Purchase of property, plant and equipment     (3,142 )     (4,893 )
    Proceeds on sale of assets     82       135  
    Proceeds from holdback receivable     10,450        
    Capital contributions to investments accounted for by the equity method (note 7)     (4,686 )      
    Net cash used in investing activities     2,704       (4,758 )
    Financing activities:        
    Repayments of operating lines of credit and long-term facilities     (3,918 )     (17,689 )
    Drawings on operating lines of credit and long-term facilities           11,848  
    Net cash used in financing activities     (3,918 )     (5,841 )
    Effect of foreign exchange on cash and cash equivalents     1,104       (494 )
    Net decrease in cash and cash equivalents     (5,009 )     (10,951 )
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period (including restricted cash)     37,646       54,853  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period (including restricted cash)   $ 32,637     $ 43,902  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Security: ICYMI-Deputy Secretary Edgar: “An Illegal Immigrant Killed Two Teenagers In My Community. Under The Trump Administration, He Will Face Justice”

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    ICYMI-Deputy Secretary Edgar: “An Illegal Immigrant Killed Two Teenagers In My Community. Under The Trump Administration, He Will Face Justice” 

    Oscar Ortega-Anguiano is set to be released from prison after serving just three-and-a-half years of his 10-year sentence for the killing of Anya Varfolomeev and Nikolay Osokin 

    WASHINGTON – Today, the Washington Examiner published Homeland Security Deputy Secretary Troy Edgar’s Op-Ed in the Washington Examiner titled, “An Illegal Immigrant Killed Two Teenagers In My Community. Under the Trump Administration, He Will Face Justice.”  

    The Op-Ed highlights the story of Anya Varfolomeev and Nikolay Osokin, two 19-year-olds that were killed in 2021 by an illegal alien who was driving under the influence in the Deputy Secretary’s home state of California.  

    Recently, it was revealed that Oscar Ortega-Anguiano—the teens’ killer—is set to be released from a California state prison after serving just three-and-a-half years of a 10-year sentence. However, the Trump administration is intervening to ensure Ortega-Anguiano does not walk free.  

    The worst call you could ever receive as a parent is one telling you that your teenage son or daughter has been in a car accident. It’s a lifechanging call that would go down as one of the worst days of your life. It could be even worse though: What if you also found out that the driver that caused the accident was in our country illegally? This tragic circumstance is a reality for the parents of Anya Varfolomeev and Nikolay Osokin. 

    At just 19 years old, these two young people from Orange County, California had their whole lives ahead of them. Varfolomeev was a bright young woman, who was a dedicated ballerina and scout. Osokin was a gifted student at Pepperdine University who excelled in both music and academics. But in November 2021, their lives were senselessly stolen in a fiery crash caused by a criminal illegal alien who should have never been in this country in the first place.  

    Oscar Eduardo Ortega-Anguiano was driving drunk, high on drugs, and speeding at nearly 100 mph on the 405 freeway when he crashed into a vehicle carrying Varfolomeev and Osokin. Even worse, Ortega-Anguiano was a repeat criminal, with a track record that includes multiple felonies and convictions for driving without a license. Despite being deported, he re-entered our country illegally twice.  

    Now, four years later, Ortega-Anguiano is set to be released from California state prison after serving just 3.5 years of his 10-year sentence. I’ve spoken to Anya’s father, and he is outraged. So am I.  

    This story hits especially close to home because I served as mayor and city council member of Los Alamitos for over a decade, and this tragic incident happened in our community. It also represents so much that is wrong with our broken immigration system. As Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, I work relentlessly under the leadership of President Donald Trump and Secretary Kristi Noem to carry out their priorities to protect our communities from brutal criminals who should not be loose on American streets.  

    Under the Trump administration, DHS is enforcing our nation’s immigration laws and seeking to punish criminals to the fullest extent of the law, and this has my direct attention. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has placed a detainer for Ortega-Anguiano with the California Department of Corrections. If state authorities do not honor the ICE detainer, federal agents will take custody of Ortega-Anguiano and deport him immediately upon release. The U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California has also filed a felony immigration charge against Ortega-Anguiano, which could put him behind bars for an additional 20 years.  

    Under the secretary’s leadership, the department is also giving support to victims by reopening the ICE’s Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement office. VOICE was first launched in 2017 by the Trump administration as a dedicated resource for those who have been victimized by crime that has a nexus to immigration. The Biden administration shuttered the office, leaving victims and their families without access to key resources and support services–but we will not allow their stories to be silenced any longer.  

    Every day, the Trump Administration is working to prevent these tragedies from happening in another town, to another family. We owe it to Anya and Nikolay, and every family like theirs, to never stop fighting for justice and safety. That starts with removing the worst of the worst– and making sure they never return.  

    Not in my town. Not in any American town.  

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Security News: U.S. Attorneys for Southwestern Border Districts Charge More than 1400 Illegal Aliens with Immigration-Related Crimes During the Second week in May as part of Operation Take Back America

    Source: United States Department of Justice 2

    Since the inauguration of President Trump, the Department of Justice is playing a critical role in Operation Take back America, a nationwide initiative to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    Last week, the U.S. Attorneys for Arizona, Central California, Southern California, New Mexico, Southern Texas, and Western Texas charged more than 1400 defendants with Criminal violations of U.S. immigration laws.

    The Southern District of California filed 176 border-related cases this week, including charges of assault on a federal officer, bringing in aliens for financial gain, reentering the U.S. after deportation, and importation of controlled substances. These included Two complaints which charged five people with participating in a human smuggling event that led to the deaths of at least three migrants, including a 14-year-old boy from India. His 10-year-old sister is still missing at sea and presumed dead; their father is in a coma and mother is also hospitalized.

    The Central District of California filed criminal charges against 34 defendants this week who allegedly were found in the U.S. following removal. Many of the defendants charged were previously convicted of felonies before they were removed from the United States.

    The District of New Mexico charged approximately 300 defendants with border-related crimes, including 91 defendants charged with Illegal Reentry After Deportation (8 U.S.C. 1326). In addition, 209 individuals charged with Illegal Entry (8 U.S.C. 1325) were also charged with violation of a military security regulation (50 U.S.C. 797) because they unlawfully entered the National Defense Area in New Mexico.

    The Southern District of Texas filed a total of 300 cases, charging 302 people from May 2-8 in continuing efforts to secure the southern border. As part of the cases, 93 face allegations of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 193 people face charges of illegally entering the country, while 11 cases allege various instances of human smuggling with the remainder involving other immigration-related crimes.

    The Western District of Texas filed 316 new immigration and immigration-related criminal cases from May 2 through May 8. Among the new cases, Cirilo Delgado-Alderete, Dilan Karim Valenzuela-Baca, and Antelmo Eligio Ramirez-Bernardo were arrested at an alleged stash house in Anthony, New Mexico. According to an affidavit, U.S. Border Patrol and Homeland Security Investigations agents observed three vehicles that had been identified as being used to smuggle illegal aliens to Albuquerque, New Mexico, parked at the residence. When agents questioned Ramirez-Bernardo, a Guatemalan national, they allegedly discovered he possessed a key to the residence on his keychain. Agents then located 25 individuals inside the residence who admitted to being citizens of Mexico, Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Pakistan without documentation to be in the U.S. Two of the individuals, Delgado-Alderete and Valenzuela-Baca, were identified as alleged stash house caretakes and drivers to harbor and transport the illegal aliens. Delgado-Alderete, Valenzuela-Baca, and Ramirez-Bernardo are charged with one count of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and one count of conspiracy to harbor illegal aliens.  The drivers allegedly picked up aliens in El Paso before transporting them to New Mexico.

    The District of Arizona brought immigration-related criminal charges against 314 defendants. Specifically, the United States filed 117 cases in which aliens illegally re-entered the United States, and the United States also charged 166 aliens for illegally entering the United States.  In its ongoing effort to deter unlawful immigration, the United States filed 25 cases against 31 individuals responsible for smuggling illegal aliens into and within the District of Arizona.

    We are grateful for the hard work of our border prosecutors in bringing these cases and helping to make our border safe again.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – State of the automotive industry in Europe – E-002579/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission undertook a thorough analysis of the economic, social and environmental impacts before proposing amendments to the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans in 2021[1] and considered the developments in other regions of the world, including China. The Commission continues to monitor the progress towards zero-emission road mobility and it will submit its first biennial report by the end of 2025.

    On 5 March 2025, the Commission put forward an Action Plan for the European automotive sector[2], which builds on a Strategic Dialogue launched by the President of the Commission[3]. The action plan includes a package of measures to further support the EU battery industry, including financing under the Innovation Fund, looking into direct production support to companies producing batteries and non-price criteria for components such as resilience requirements. This complements the existing public support, which has been essential to the development of the EU battery industry, including the two battery-related Important Projects of Common European Interest[4], alongside the support provided by Member States through the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework[5].

    During his hearing, the Commissioner for Energy and Housing highlighted the role of nuclear energy in supporting decarbonisation and competitiveness in Europe. Nuclear energy is, and will continue to be, an integrated part of the EU energy mix. The planned EU Clean Energy Investment Strategy will address the investment needs for nuclear energy and will be underpinned by a Nuclear Illustrative Programme. Moreover, the Commission facilitates the development and deployment of small modular reactors in Europe within the dedicated Industrial Alliance[6].

    • [1] Impact assessment accompanying Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the EU’s increased climate ambition.
    • [2] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/document/download/89b3143e-09b6-4ae6-a826-932b90ed0816_en?filename=Communication%20-%20Action%20Plan.pdf .
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_378 .
    • [4] https://www.ipcei-batteries.eu/.
    • [5] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/temporary-crisis-and-transition-framework_en.
    • [6] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/industry/industrial-alliances/european-industrial-alliance-small-modular-reactors_en.
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    –  having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    –  having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    –  having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    –  having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    –  having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    –  having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

    –  having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    –  having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

    –  having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    –  having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    –  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    –  having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    –  having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    –  having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

    –  having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

    –  having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A.  whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B.  whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C.  whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E.  whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F.  whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G.  whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H.  whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I.  whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J.  whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K.  whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L.  whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M.  whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N.  whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O.  whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P.  whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q.  whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R.  whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

    S.  whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    T.  whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    U.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

    2.  Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3.  Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4.  Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5.  Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6.  Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7.  Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8.  Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9.  Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10.  Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11.  Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12.  Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13.  Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14.  Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15.  Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16.  Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

    17.  Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    18.  Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    19.  Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    20.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

    21.  Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    22.  Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    23.  Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

    24.  Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    25.  Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

    26.  Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    27.  Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    28.  Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    29.  Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    30.  Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    31.  Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    32.  Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    33.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    34.  Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

    35.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    36.  Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    37.  Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    38.  Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    39.  Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    40.  Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    41.  Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    42.  Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    43.  Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    44.  Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    45.  Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    46.  Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    47.  Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    48.  Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    49.  Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    50.  Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    51.  Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    52.  Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    53.  Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

    54.  Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    55.  Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    56.  Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    57.  Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

    58.  Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    59.  Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    60.  Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    61.  Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    o
    o   o

    62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    (1) OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
    (3) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
    (4) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
    (7) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
    (8) OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
    (9) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Truck broken down, SH2 Aongatete

    Source: New Zealand Police

    Motorists are advised of delays on State Highway 2, Aongatete after a truck broke down.

    Reports came in to Police around 8:15am, of the incident in the northbound lane about 500m north of Wright Road.

    There are no injuries but motorists are advised there is significant traffic build-up as a result, and are urged to delay travel if possible.

    ENDS

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Reconciliation Recommendations of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    Legislation Summary

    H. Con. Res. 14, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2025, instructed the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure to recommend legislative changes that would decrease deficits by a specific amount over the 2025-2034 period. As part of the reconciliation process, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure approved legislation on April 30, 2025, with provisions that would decrease deficits.

    Estimated Federal Cost

    In CBO’s estimation, the reconciliation recommendations of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure would decrease deficits by $36.6 billion over the 2025‑2034 period. The estimated budgetary effects of the legislation are shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation fall within budget functions 400 (transportation), 500 (education, training, employment, and social services), 700 (veterans benefits and services), and 800 (general government).

    Return to Reference

    Table 1.

    Estimated Budgetary Effects of Reconciliation Recommendations Title X, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

       

    Budget Authority

    28,780

    67

    -36

    -35

    -35

    -36

    -35

    -35

    -35

    -35

    28,741

    28,565

    Estimated Outlays

    -612

    537

    1,643

    3,810

    5,061

    4,389

    3,925

    3,675

    3,355

    1,975

    10,439

    27,758

     

    Increases in Revenues

       

    Estimated Revenues

    0

    423

    1,742

    3,405

    5,230

    7,064

    8,815

    10,660

    12,556

    14,414

    10,800

    64,309

     

    Net Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficit

    From Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues

       

    Effect on the Deficit

    -612

    114

    -99

    405

    -169

    -2,675

    -4,890

    -6,985

    -9,201

    -12,439

    -361

    -36,551

    Basis of Estimate

    For this estimate, CBO assumes that the legislation will be enacted in summer 2025. CBO’s estimates are relative to its January 2025 baseline and cover the period from 2025 through 2034. Outlays of appropriated amounts were estimated using historical obligation and spending rates for similar programs. CBO’s estimate incorporates administrative and judicial action as of April 10, 2025, the date that H. Con. Res. 14 was approved by the Congress.

    Direct Spending

    Enacting the bill would increase direct spending by $27.8 billion over the 2025-2034 period (see Table 2), CBO estimates. Most of that amount would result from specified direct appropriations for activities of the Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), offset by a reduction in direct spending from funds rescinded from transportation projects and programs involving federal buildings.

    Coast Guard Assets Necessary to Secure the Maritime Border and Interdict Migrants and Drugs

    Section 100001 would appropriate $21.2 billion for the Coast Guard to acquire, procure, and improve equipment and facilities, as follows:

    • $14.6 billion for vessels, including offshore patrol cutters, polar security cutters, and arctic security cutters;
    • $3.2 billion for shoreside infrastructure;
    • $2.0 billion for aircraft; and
    • $1.5 billion for other activities, including $500 million to acquire, procure, or construct a floating dry dock at the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, Maryland.

    Based on historical spending patterns for similar projects, and using information from the Coast Guard, CBO estimates that enacting section 100001 would increase outlays by $19.6 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Changes to Mandatory Benefits Programs to Allow Selected Reserve Orders for Preplanned Missions to Secure Maritime Borders and Interdict Persons and Drugs

    Section 100002 would authorize the Coast Guard to place members of the Selected Reserve on active duty under certain circumstances. That time would count toward the reservists’ entitlement for benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill; those benefits are paid from mandatory appropriations. Accounting for the increased benefits some reservists and their dependents would receive and using information from the Coast Guard, CBO estimates that each year, 250 reservists, on average, would accrue about six months of additional active duty that would be counted toward their eligibility.

    Using information from the Department of Veterans Affairs, CBO estimates that the longer time reservists spend on active duty would increase direct spending by $9 million over the 2025-2034 period.

    Vessel Tonnage Duties

    Section 100003 would increase tonnage duties on vessels entering the United States. Those charges are levied by Customs and Border Protection and recorded in the budget as offsetting receipts (that is, as reductions in direct spending). In general, the bill would increase tonnage duty rates by 125 percent relative to rates under current law. In 2024, the government collected about $33 million in such charges.

    CBO estimates that the higher rate would increase collections (and reduce direct spending) by about $38 million per year relative to current law, totaling $343 million over the 2025‑2034 period.

    Registration Fee on Motor Vehicles

    Section 100004 would appropriate $104 million in 2026 to support states as they implement systems for collecting registration fees for electric and hybrid vehicles. Those collections are discussed below in the section on Revenues.

    Based on historical spending patterns for similar programs, CBO estimates that enacting this section would increase outlays by $102 million over the 2025-2034 period.

    Motor Carrier Data

    Section 100006 would appropriate $5 million to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to create a public website for tracking motor carriers’ compliance with the agency’s operating requirements. The provision also would allow FMCSA to collect fees from entities that access the website, which could be spent without further appropriation. Those collections are discussed below in the section on Revenues.

    CBO estimates that enacting this section would increase outlays by $20 million over the 2025-2034 period, reflecting spending of the direct appropriation ($5 million) and the collected fees ($15 million).

    Rescissions

    Section 100007 would rescind funds from seven programs established under the 2022 reconciliation act with the following purposes:

    • Support development of sustainable aviation fuel;
    • Support projects to improve walkability, safety, and transportation access in disadvantaged communities;
    • Convert General Services Administration (GSA) facilities to high-performing green buildings;
    • Install low-carbon materials in GSA facilities;
    • Support use of emerging technologies for environmental programs in GSA facilities;
    • Support environmental review for transportation projects; and
    • Support development of low-carbon transportation materials.

    CBO estimates that enacting this section would reduce budget authority by $5.2 billion and outlays by $4 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Air Traffic Control Staffing and Modernization

    Section 100008 would appropriate $12.5 billion for the FAA to construct, acquire, improve, and operate various facilities and equipment as follows:

    • $7.8 billion for radar and telecommunications systems;
    • $2.2 billion for air traffic control facilities;
    • $1.0 billion for air traffic controller recruitment, retention, and training; and
    • $1.6 billion for other activities, including runway safety projects and unstaffed infrastructure.

    Based on historical spending patterns for similar projects and using information from the FAA, CBO estimates that enacting this section would increase outlays by $12.0 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts Appropriations

    Section 100009 would appropriate $257 million for the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, increasing outlays by the same amount over the 2025-2034 period.

    Revenues

    Enacting the bill would increase revenues by $64 billion over the 2025-2034 period (see CBO estimates that enacting sections 100004 and 100005 would increase revenues, on net, by $64 billion over the 2025-2034 period.

    Motor Carrier Data

    Section 100006 would authorize FMCSA to charge an annual fee of $100 for access to a website that would track motor carriers’ compliance with FMCSA’s operating requirements. Under the provision, brokers and similar entities would be considered to have exercised reasonable and prudent care in engaging motor carriers if they use the website to verify a carrier’s compliance status.

    When they are collected by the federal government under its sovereign authority, fees are considered revenues. CBO considers a determination that an entity has acted in a “reasonable and prudent” manner as a matter of law to be an exercise of sovereign authority, so those access fees would be considered revenues.

    Based on expected participation rates, and accounting for the offset for indirect taxes, CBO estimates that the collection of access fees would increase federal revenues, on net, by $12 million over the 2025-2034 period.

    Uncertainty

    Many of CBO’s estimates for the budgetary effects of enacting title X are subject to uncertainty because they rely on underlying projections and other estimates that are themselves difficult to estimate.

    Several areas in particular are difficult to estimate:

    • The amounts collected in tonnage duties under section 100003 could vary from CBO’s estimates because the volume of goods imported into the United States is uncertain. CBO also cannot predict changes in tariffs or certain other factors that would affect the volume of imported goods.
    • Revenues collected for registrations of electric and hybrid vehicles under section 100004 could differ from estimated amounts if states begin to collect fees more quickly or slowly than CBO expects, or if there are more or fewer registrations than expected under current law.

    Pay-As-You-Go Considerations

    The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in Chief, Income Security Cost Estimates Unit

    Ann E. Futrell
    Acting Chief, Natural and Physical Resources Cost Estimates Unit

    David Newman
    Chief, Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans’ Affairs Cost Estimates Unit

    Joshua Shakin
    Chief, Revenue Projections Unit

    Kathleen FitzGerald
    Chief, Public and Private Mandates Unit

    Christina Hawley Anthony
    Deputy Director of Budget Analysis

    H. Samuel Papenfuss 
    Deputy Director of Budget Analysis

    Chad Chirico 
    Director of Budget Analysis

    Phillip L. Swagel

    Director, Congressional Budget Office

    Table 2.

    Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues Under Reconciliation Recommendations Title X, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

       

    Sec. 100001, Coast Guard Assets Necessary to Secure the Maritime Border to Interdict Migrants and Drugs

                     

    Budget Authority

    21,207

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    21,207

    21,207

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    270

    850

    1,760

    2,280

    2,880

    3,020

    3,170

    3,390

    2,010

    5,160

    19,630

    Sec. 100002, Changes to Mandatory Benefits Programs to Allow Selected Reserve Orders for Preplanned Missions to Secure Maritime Borders and Interdict Persons and Drugs

                     

    Budget Authority

    *

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    4

    9

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    1

    4

    9

    Sec. 100003, Vessel Tonnage Duties

                       

    Budget Authority

    *

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -39

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -152

    -343

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -39

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -38

    -152

    -343

    Sec. 100004, Registration Fee on Motor Vehiclesa

                       

    Budget Authority

    0

    104

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    104

    104

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    19

    39

    25

    19

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    102

    102

    Sec. 100006, Motor Carrier Data

                       

    Budget Authority

    5

    0

    1

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    10

    20

    Estimated Outlays

    0

    4

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    2

    10

    20

    Section 100007, Rescissions

                       

    Sec. 100007(a), Repeal of Funding for Alternative Fuel and Low-Emission Aviation Technology Program

                       

    Budget Authority

    -210

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -210

    -210

    Estimated Outlays

    -1

    -47

    -67

    -49

    -39

    -5

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -203

    -208

    Sec. 100007(b), Repeal of Funding for Neighborhood Access and Equity Grant Program

                       

    Budget Authority

    -2,400

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -2,400

    -2,400

    Estimated Outlays

    -181

    -353

    -466

    -407

    -226

    -90

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -1,633

    -1,723

    Sec. 100007(c), Repeal of Funding for Federal Building Assistance

                       

    Budget Authority

    -46

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -46

    -46

    Estimated Outlays

    -11

    -11

    -24

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -46

    -46

    Sec. 100007(d), Repeal of Funding for Use of Low-Carbon Materials for Federal Building Assistance

                       

    Budget Authority

    -421

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -421

    -421

    Estimated Outlays

    -104

    -104

    -213

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -421

    -421

    (Continued)

    Table 2.

    Estimated Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues Under Reconciliation Recommendations Title X, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, as Ordered Reported on April 30, 2025

    (Continued)

     

    By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars

       
     

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    2031

    2032

    2033

    2034

    2025-2029

    2025-2034

     

    Increases or Decreases (-) in Direct Spending

       

    Sec. 100007(e), Repeal of Funding for General Services Administration Emerging Technologies

                     

    Budget Authority

    -277

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -277

    -277

    Estimated Outlays

    -175

    -52

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -227

    -227

    Sec. 100007(f), Repeal of Environmental Review Implementation Funds

                       

    Budget Authority

    -55

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -55

    -55

    Estimated Outlays

    -4

    -8

    -11

    -9

    -5

    -2

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -37

    -39

    Sec. 100007(g), Repeal of Funding for Low-Carbon Transportation Materials Grants

                     

    Budget Authority

    -1,800

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -1,800

    -1,800

    Estimated Outlays

    -136

    -265

    -349

    -305

    -170

    -68

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -1,225

    -1,293

     

    Subtotal, Sec. 100007

                       
     

    Budget Authority

    -5,209

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -5,209

    -5,209

     

    Estimated Outlays

    -612

    -840

    -1,130

    -770

    -440

    -165

    0

    0

    0

    0

    -3,792

    -3,957

    Sec. 100008, Air Traffic Control Staffing and Modernization

                       

    Budget Authority

    12,520

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    12,520

    12,520

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    1,030

    1,840

    2,780

    3,200

    1,710

    940

    540

    0

    0

    8,850

    12,040

    Sec. 100009, John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts Appropriations

                       

    Budget Authority

    257

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    257

    257

    Estimated Outlays

    *

    91

    79

    50

    37

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    257

    257

    Total Changes

                           

    Budget Authority

    28,780

    67

    -36

    -35

    -35

    -36

    -35

    -35

    -35

    -35

    28,741

    28,565

    Estimated Outlays

    -612

    537

    1,643

    3,810

    5,061

    4,389

    3,925

    3,675

    3,355

    1,975

    10,439

    27,758

     

    Increases in Revenues

       

    Sec. 100004, Registration Fee on Motor Vehiclesa

                       

    Estimated Revenues

    0

    423

    1,741

    3,404

    5,229

    7,063

    8,813

    10,658

    12,554

    14,412

    10,797

    64,297

    Sec. 100006, Motor Carrier Data

                       

    Estimated Revenues

    0

    0

    1

    1

    1

    1

    2

    2

    2

    2

    3

    12

    Total Changes

                           

    Estimated Revenues

    0

    423

    1,742

    3,405

    5,230

    7,064

    8,815

    10,660

    12,556

    14,414

    10,800

    64,309

     

    Net Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficit

    From Changes in Direct Spending and Revenues

       

    Effect on the Deficit

    -612

    114

    -99

    405

    -169

    -2,675

    -4,890

    -6,985

    -9,201

    -12,439

    -361

    -36,551

    a.Includes amounts for section 100005, Deposit of Registration Fee on Motor Vehicles.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto, Ernst, Case, Radewagen Work to Strengthen Strategic Relationships with Pacific Islands, Counter Chinese Aggression in the Region

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto
    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) and Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Congressman Ed Case (D-Hawaii-01), and Delegate Aumua Amata Radewagen (R-A.S.). introduced a bipartisan, bicameral bill aimed at strengthening the United States’ strategic partnerships with Pacific Island nations, supporting sustainable development, and combating the increasing Chinese aggression in the region. The Pacific Partnership Act would help the U.S. establish a clear, comprehensive strategy to support diplomatic, security, and economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region.
    “Supporting our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific is essential to combating the Chinese Communist Party’s influence and to our long-term national security,” said Senator Cortez Masto. “This bipartisan bill is critical to strengthening our ties with our allies in the Pacific and ensuring they become enduring global relationships.”
    “Strengthening America’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific is critical to deterring Chinese aggression,” said Senator Ernst. “This bipartisan legislation equips us to work with nations in the Pacific that serve as the first line of defense against the Chinese Communist Party and keep Americans safe at home.”
    “Our Pacific Partnership Act responds directly to the reality that our country’s and world’s future lies in the Indo-Pacific, and that the islands of the Pacific are our indispensable partners in charting that future,” said Congressman Case. “The Pacific Islands are under increasingly severe economic, environmental and geopolitical stress, and we must expand our generational engagement to assist them where they most need assistance. The Pacific Partnership Act, molded directly on the Pacific Islands’ own blueprint to their collective future, is our roadmap to expanded engagement as well.”
    “Thank you to Senator Cortez Masto, Senator Ernst, and Congressman Case for their focus on these important partnerships that are close to home for my congressional district in the South Pacific,” said Congresswoman Radewagen. “We need sustained U.S. engagement for enduring partnerships in the Pacific Islands, keeping China’s influence in check, and strengthening mutual development opportunities.”
    The U.S. has a longstanding relationship with the Pacific Islands, and they play a crucial role in U.S. national security, facilitating military operations in support of American allies and partners. Nevada – through the National Guard – collaborates with the Republic of Fiji, the Kingdom of Tonga, and the Independent State of Samoa under the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program, strengthening security cooperation globally. 
    The Pacific Partnership Act would strengthen these crucial ties by creating a “Strategy for Pacific Partnership”. This strategy, crafted by the President and presented to Congress every four years, would outline U.S. involvement in the Pacific Islands and highlight combined efforts to combat regional challenges including natural disasters, security threats, and economic development. 
    Read the full bill here.
    Senator Cortez Masto has led efforts in Congress to stand up to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence and protect the American national and economic security. She introduced the PASS Act to ban individuals and entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea from purchasing agricultural land and businesses located near U.S. military installations or sensitive sites and the Strengthening Exports Against China Act, which would incentivize economic growth by eliminating barriers for American businesses competing directly with China in emerging industries like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. She’s also introduced bipartisan legislation to strengthen the domestic supply chain for rare-earth magnets, which are critical components of cell phones, computers, defense systems, and electric vehicles, but are almost exclusively made in China.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: District of Arizona Charges 314 Individuals for Immigration-Related Criminal Conduct

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    PHOENIX, Ariz. – During the week of enforcement operations from May 3, 2025, through May 9, 2025, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona brought immigration-related criminal charges against 314 defendants. Specifically, the United States filed 117 cases in which aliens illegally re-entered the United States, and the United States also charged 166 aliens for illegally entering the United States.  In its ongoing effort to deter unlawful immigration, the United States filed 25 cases against 31 individuals responsible for smuggling illegal aliens into and within the District of Arizona.

    These cases were referred or supported by federal law enforcement partners, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ICE ERO), ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), U.S. Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

    Recent matters of interest include:

    United States v. Marco Antonio Ruelas-Solis: On May 3, 2025, Marco Antonio Ruelas-Solis, of Mexico, was found in possession of an FNS-9C 9-millimeter pistol and 40 rounds of 9-millimeter ammunition while target shooting along Forest Road 403 in the Tonto National Forest in Maricopa County. Ruelas-Solis was charged with Possession of a Firearm by Alien Unlawfully Present in the United States and Reentry of a Removed Alien. [Case Numbers: MJ-25-0178; MJ-25-6183]

    United States v. Clayton Line Wilhite: On May 4, 2025, Clayton Line Wilhite was arrested and charged with Transportation of an Illegal Alien after he failed to yield at an immigration checkpoint. After Wilhite failed to yield, law enforcement officers from Border Patrol and Customs and Border Protection responded to the scene and attempted to effectuate a stop. Wilhite led officers on a short vehicle chase before striking another car from behind and pulling over. Two illegal aliens from Mexico then exited the vehicle and tried to flee but were detained by agents. Wilhite remained in the driver’s seat and was arrested without further incident. [Case number: MJ-25-07795]

    A criminal complaint is simply a method by which a person is charged with criminal activity and raises no inference of guilt. An individual is presumed innocent until evidence is presented to a jury that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    These cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    RELEASE NUMBER:    2025-076_May 9 Immigration Enforcement

    # # #

    For more information on the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, visit http://www.justice.gov/usao/az/
    Follow the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Arizona, on X @USAO_AZ for the latest news.

     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Phil Scott Issues Executive Order to Pause Electric Vehicle Sales Requirements

    Source: US State of Vermont

    Montpelier, Vt. – Governor Phil Scott today issued Executive Order 04-25, directing the Agency of Natural Resources to pause enforcement of a multi-state plan requiring vehicle manufacturers to meet certain electric vehicle (EV) sales targets for passenger cars and medium- and heavy-trucks.

    “I continue to believe we should be incentivizing Vermonters to transition to cleaner energy options like electric vehicles. However, we have to be realistic about a pace that’s achievable. It’s clear we don’t have anywhere near enough charging infrastructure and insufficient technological advances in heavy-duty vehicles to meet current goals,” said Governor Scott. “We have much more work to do, in order make it more convenient, faster, and more affordable to buy, maintain and charge EV’s. When we do, it’s more likely everyday Vermonters will make the switch.”

    Governor Scott remains committed to addressing climate change, including advocating for more charging infrastructure, which is key to supporting Vermonters in making EVs viable and reducing transportation emissions. When it comes to transitioning to a low-carbon future, mandates are not going to be the total answer.  Using common sense and incentivizing technological advancements is necessary to overall success and this compliance flexibility is intended to reflect this reality.

    Specific details can be found in the Governor’s Executive Order which can be found by clicking here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tuberville Introduces Legislation to Help Disabled Veterans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alabama Tommy Tuberville
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) introduced the Automotive Support Services to Improved Safe Transportation (ASSIST) Act, which would help disabled veterans make the vehicle modifications they need to travel safely by giving the VA greater flexibility to offer financial assistance for a wider range of necessary adaptations.
    “We take things like driving or riding in a vehicle for granted, but for some veterans, operating a vehicle can be challenging without the proper modifications,” said Senator Tuberville.“Alabama is home to more than 400,000 veterans, and we want to ensure that each of them has the necessary resources to lead safe, independent lives. The ASSIST Act is a commonsense piece of legislation that would give veterans access to needed vehicle modifications such as ramps and device lifts. I’m proud to lead the ASSIST Act in the Senate and will continue fighting to help the heroes who have sacrificed so much for us.”BACKGROUND:As Alabama’s voice on the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, the ASSIST Act follows a series of bills Senator Tuberville has introduced to make small, yet meaningful changes to how the VA delivers care and benefits to veterans. Last week, the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs passed the ASSIST Act unanimously out of committee.
    Currently, the VA is restricted to funding only a limited list of adaptive equipment, such as wheelchair tie-downs, van lifts, and raised roofs. This unintentionally limits, and in many cases prevents all together, some veterans from being able to make necessary modifications to their vehicles such as ramp and kneeling systems, mobility device lifts, and ingress or egress accessibility modifications. The ASSIST Act fixes this gap in assistance and would help ensure veterans are able to continue traveling safely and freely. 
    MORE:
    Tuberville, VA Secretary Doug Collins Discuss Streamlining Processes to Improve Outcomes for Veterans
    Tuberville, Lee Introduce Legislation to Repurpose Woke USAID Funding to Improve Veterans’ Homes
    Tuberville, Boozman Introduce Legislation to Support Defrauded Veterans
    Tuberville Reintroduces Legislation to Expand Treatment Options for Veterans
    Tuberville Introduces Legislation to Ensure Community Care Access for Veterans
    Tuberville, Moran Introduce Legislation to Improve Access to Care for Veterans
    Senator Tommy Tuberville represents Alabama in the United States Senate and is a member of the Senate Armed Services, Agriculture, Veterans’ Affairs, HELP and Aging Committees.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office Filed 176 Border-Related Cases

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    SAN DIEGO – Federal prosecutors in the Southern District of California filed 176 border-related cases this week, including charges of assault on a federal officer, bringing in aliens for financial gain, reentering the U.S. after deportation, and importation of controlled substances.

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California is the fourth-busiest federal district, largely due to a high volume of border-related crimes. This district, encompassing San Diego and Imperial counties, shares a 140-mile border with Mexico. It includes the San Ysidro Port of Entry, the world’s busiest land border crossing, connecting San Diego (America’s eighth largest city) and Tijuana (Mexico’s second largest city).

    In addition to reactive border-related crimes, the Southern District of California also prosecutes a significant number of proactive cases related to terrorism, organized crime, drugs, white-collar fraud, violent crime, cybercrime, human trafficking and national security. Recent developments in those and other significant areas of prosecution can be found here.

    A sample of border-related arrests this week:

    • On May 8, Ismael Castro-Gonzalez, a Mexican national, was arrested and charged with Assault on a Federal Officer and Attempted Entry of a Removed Alien. According to a complaint, two Border Patrol agents were attacked by Castro and others when they attempted to rescue Castro, who was hanging from barbed wire on the border wall with a broken ladder nearby. The agents were pelted with rocks by other immigrants, including one who was sitting atop the wall. One agent grabbed Castro’s right hand and forced him to release the wire. Once he broke Castro’s grip, the agent was able to pull Castro from the wire and take him to the ground, where Castro continued to struggle and attempted to tackle the agent. As they fell to the ground, Castro started reaching for the agent’s gun and collapsible steel baton.  The two agents were able to subdue Castro and arrest him. Castro was previously deported to Mexico on June 29, 2022, through the San Ysidro Port of Entry.
    • On May 6, Rosa Cervantez, a U.S. citizen, was arrested and charged with Importation of a Controlled Substance. According to a complaint, Cervantez attempted to cross the border in the SENTRI lane at the Calexico West Port of Entry but a Customs and Border Protection officer discovered 36 plastic-wrapped packages hidden in a spare tire well of her car containing 85 pounds of fentanyl and more than 2 pounds of cocaine.
    • On May 7, Salvador Hernandez, a U.S. citizen, was arrested and charged with Importation of a Controlled Substance. According to a complaint, Hernandez attempted to smuggle three pounds of methamphetamine through the pedestrian lanes of the Otay Mesa Port of Entry. Customs and Border Protection officers found three packages concealed in Hernandez’s waistline secured with Saran Wrap.
    • On May 7, Jose Tomas Lopez-Navarro of Honduras was arrested and charged with Attempted Entry after Deportation. According to a complaint, Lopez-Navarro submitted a counterfeit passport to a Customs and Border Patrol officer when asking to be admitted to the U.S. at the San Ysidro Pedestrian East Port of Entry. Lopez-Navarro had been previously removed from the U.S. to Honduras on February 4, 2025.

    Also recently, a number of defendants with criminal records were convicted by a jury or sentenced for border-related crimes such as illegally re-entering the U.S. after previous deportation. Here are a few of those cases:

    • On April 30, Abner Leon-Mote, a Mexican national who was previously convicted of felony Assault with a Deadly Weapon in April 2018, was found guilty by a jury of Attempted Reentry of Removed Alien for again entering the U.S. illegally. Sentencing is scheduled for July 29, 2025 and Leon-Mote faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
    • On May 5, Omar Laveaga-Flores, a Mexican national who was previously convicted of an illegal entry offense in Arizona in 2022, was sentenced in federal court to 60 days in custody for again entering the U.S illegally.
    • On May 8, Juan Melgoza-Soto and Santiago Alfredo Gonzalez Hara, previously removed Mexican nationals, were sentenced in federal court to 73 days in custody for bringing an undocumented alien into the United States from Mexico.
    • On May 9, Martin Josue Gutierrez, a U.S. citizen, was sentenced to six months in custody for Transportation of Certain Aliens. The defendant had seven undocumented individuals in a truck, including several under a tarp in the bed of the truck, and failed to yield during an attempted vehicle stop by law enforcement.

    Pursuant to the Department’s Operation Take Back America priorities, federal law enforcement has focused immigration prosecutions on undocumented aliens who are engaged in criminal activity in the U.S., including those who commit drug and firearms crimes, who have serious criminal records, or who have active warrants for their arrest. Federal authorities have also been prioritizing investigations and prosecutions against drug, firearm, and human smugglers and those who endanger and threaten the safety of our communities and the law enforcement officers who protect the community.

    The immigration cases were referred or supported by federal law enforcement partners, including Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ICE ERO), Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), with the support and assistance of state and local law enforcement partners.

    Indictments and criminal complaints are merely allegations and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Memphis Men Sentenced to Federal Imprisonment for Participation in 2021 Business Robbery

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    Memphis, TN – Three Memphis men have been sentenced to a total of over 30 years in federal prison after being convicted of a business robbery that occurred in the fall of 2021. Joseph C. Murphy, Jr., Interim United States Attorney for the Western District of Tennessee, announced the sentences today.

    According to the information presented in court, Anthony Lewis, 36Kyle Walker, 22, and Aramis Smith, 34, participated in an armed robbery in the early morning of November 10, 2021.  Walker and Lewis entered a gas station on Summer Avenue in Memphis, while Smith waited outside in the getaway car.  Walker and Lewis approached the lone clerk as she was stocking the shelves. Walker grabbed her and brandished a firearm as he made threats and pushed her to the registers.  Lewis moved to the doorway and stood as a lookout as Walker forced the clerk to empty the register.  The trio fled with approximately $100.  

    Unbeknownst to the robbers, a good Samaritan saw the robbery in progress, called 911 and provided a description of the getaway vehicle.  Dispatchers relayed the robbery in progress call to Memphis Police Department officers; and undercover officers with the Violent Crime Unit (VCU) observed the suspect vehicle fleeing the scene.  VCU officers followed the suspect vehicle on I-240 as they coordinated additional units to arrive and make a traffic stop. When marked units were in place, officers attempted to stop the suspect vehicle with lights and sirens; but the vehicle fled.  Ultimately, the suspect vehicle wrecked on the off-ramp immediately before the Hernando DeSoto Bridge; and officers engaged in a brief foot pursuit with two of the suspects before they were all taken into custody.

    All three men pled guilty to one count of business robbery. Walker and Lewis also pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence.   

    Senior United States District Court Judge John T. Fowlkes, Jr. sentenced Walker to 125 months of imprisonment on August 31, 2023, and Smith to 120 months of imprisonment on February 21, 2024.  Lewis was sentenced to 147 months on May 1, 2025 by United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Judge Andre B. Mathis.  Additionally, on May 8, 2025, Judge Fowlkes sentenced Lewis to an additional 24 months in federal prison as a result of his Supervised Release Violation based on this case and a prior federal conviction.   There is no parole in the federal system.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Safe Streets Task Force and the Memphis Police Department investigated this case.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Greg Wagner and Lynn Crum prosecuted this case on behalf of the government.  Former Assistant United States Attorney Courtney Lewis also assisted in prosecuting this case on behalf of the United States.

    ###

    For more information, please contact the media relations team at USATNW.Media@usdoj.gov. Follow the U.S. Attorney’s Office on Facebook or on X at @WDTNNews for office news and updates.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sacramento breaks ground on project to transform underutilized state land into affordable housing community

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 13, 2025

    What you need to know: Sacramento’s Monarch housing project is the latest affordable housing site brought to fruition under Governor Newsom’s executive order to develop excess and underutilized state lands into affordable new homes.

    SACRAMENTO — Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the groundbreaking of Monarch in Sacramento – the city’s third affordable housing community created on excess state land. The Monarch community will transform a former state-owned storage warehouse into 241 homes for low- to extremely low-income Sacramentans and is made possible by Governor Newsom’s executive order to identify and prioritize underutilized state property for clean, innovative, and cost-effective housing.

    “Today’s groundbreaking in Sacramento illustrates the life-altering possibilities of converting excess and underutilized state lands into thriving local communities. With 32 housing developments currently awarded, California’s Excess Sites program provides the innovative boost needed to help alleviate the state’s affordable housing shortage.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    First-in-the-nation program

    Governor Newsom’s Excess Sites Program was the first housing initiative nationwide to release all state land identified as suitable and available for affordable housing development.

    The Department of General Services (DGS) and the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) partner to administer the Excess Sites Program, identifying state-owned land available and suitable for housing, and making a public digital inventory of these properties. In February 2025, Governor Newsom revamped and streamlined the Excess Sites Program by announcing a Developer Interest Submission Portal, making it easier for developers to submit proposals on state excess sites projects – improving the speed and efficiency with which state land is leased for affordable housing.

    “Thanks to California’s Excess Sites Program, 20 previously under-utilized state properties will soon be transformed into 4,300 housing units, including the 241 homes at the Monarch,” said Business, Consumer Services and Housing Agency Secretary Tomiquia Moss. “Through continued investments in the Excess Sites program, the state is encouraging infill development, building affordable homes, and promoting healthier communities for future generations of Californians.”

    About the project

    Monarch will bring much-needed affordable housing to a vibrant and growing mixed-use neighborhood in close proximity to transit, parks, restaurants, and shopping. 20 units will be reserved for people exiting or at risk of homelessness, with supportive services provided by Lutheran Social Services. 

    Rendering of the Monarch housing development

    “Monarch will ensure a safe haven for hundreds of Sacramentans whose access to secure housing is especially needed,” said Government Operations Agency Secretary Nick Maduros. “A stable home and proximity to amenities will allow Monarch’s residents to thrive and contribute to the renaissance taking place in this area of downtown.”

    Monarch will include 3,428 square feet of retail space, 264 secured bicycle parking spaces, and 33 vehicle parking spots.

    “Projects like Monarch are helping to breathe new life into city centers,” said HCD Director Gustavo Velasquez. “It is extremely gratifying to help make the Governor’s vision for state lands a reality, as properties that are not needed for a government purpose can advance the greater good of making affordable housing available in high-resource areas that connect Californians to opportunity and community.” 

    Monarch received $10 million in funding from HCD’s Local Government Matching Grant program to match the $3.3 million in funding from the City of Sacramento, waived impact fees from the City and County of Sacramento, and an $8 million gap loan from CADA, one of the site’s developers. Another $4 million was contributed by the California Housing Finance Agency through its Mixed-Income Program. The community is expected to welcome residents in the Spring of 2027.

    “This is yet another significant partnership between DGS and CADA to create an affordable housing project here in Sacramento under the Governor’s Executive Order,” said DGS Director Ana M. Lasso. “It is so inspiring to see excess state-owned property repurposed to create living spaces that strengthen the local community here in the capital city.”

    Since Governor Newsom launched the Excess Sites Program through his executive order, 32 housing development projects have been awarded totaling 4,300 homes in various phases of development. This pipeline includes 234 homes that are already constructed and occupied with another 424 homes currently under construction. 

    Transforming underutilized state land

    In 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom issued an executive order calling on HCD and DGS to address the state’s affordable housing crisis by identifying underutilized state-owned sites for the development of affordable housing, taking into account factors such as proximity to job centers, amenities, and public transit. The order has since been utilized to create hundreds of affordable homes, including:

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  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Enables Construction Technology for Moon and Mars Exploration

    Source: NASA

    One of the keys to a sustainable human presence on distant worlds is using local, or in-situ, resources which includes building materials for infrastructure such as habitats, radiation shielding, roads, and rocket launch and landing pads. NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate is leveraging its portfolio of programs and industry opportunities to develop in-situ, resource capabilities to help future Moon and Mars explorers build what they need. These technologies have made exciting progress for space applications as well as some impacts right here on Earth. 
    The Moon to Mars Planetary Autonomous Construction Technology (MMPACT) project, funded by NASA’s Game Changing Development program and managed at the agency’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is exploring applications of large-scale, robotic 3D printing technology for construction on other planets. It sounds like the stuff of science fiction, but demonstrations using simulated lunar and Martian surface material, known as regolith, show the concept could become reality. 

    With its partners in industry and academic institutions, MMPACT is developing processing technologies for lunar and Martian construction materials. The binders for these materials, including water, could be extracted from the local regolith to reduce launch mass. The regolith itself is used as the aggregate, or granular material, for these concretes. NASA has evaluated these materials for decades, initially working with large-scale 3D printing pioneer, Dr. Behrokh Khoshnevis, a professor of civil, environmental and astronautical engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.  
    Khoshnevis developed techniques for large-scale extraterrestrial 3D printing under the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program. One of these processes is Contour Crafting, in which molten regolith and a binding agent are extruded from a nozzle to create infrastructure layer by layer. The process can be used to autonomously build monolithic structures like radiation shielding and rocket landing pads. 
    Continuing to work with the NIAC program, Khoshnevis also developed a 3D printing method called selective separation sintering, in which heat and pressure are applied to layers of powder to produce metallic, ceramic, or composite objects which could produce small-scale, more-precise hardware. This energy-efficient technique can be used on planetary surfaces as well as in microgravity environments like space stations to produce items including interlocking tiles and replacement parts. 
    While NASA’s efforts are ultimately aimed at developing technologies capable of building a sustainable human presence on other worlds, Khoshnevis is also setting his sights closer to home. He has created a company called Contour Crafting Corporation that will use 3D printing techniques advanced with NIAC funding to fabricate housing and other infrastructure here on Earth.  
    Another one of NASA’s partners in additive manufacturing, ICON of Austin, Texas, is doing the same, using 3D printing techniques for home construction on Earth, with robotics, software, and advanced material.  

    [embedded content]
    Construction is complete on a 3D-printed, 1,700-square-foot habitat that will simulate the challenges of a mission to Mars at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The habitat will be home to four intrepid crew members for a one-year Crew Health and Performance Analog, or CHAPEA, mission. The first of three missions begins in the summer of 2023.

    The ICON company was among the participants in NASA’s 3D-Printed Habitat Challenge, which aimed to advance the technology needed to build housing in extraterrestrial environments. In 2021, ICON used its large-scale 3D printing system to build a 1,700 square-foot simulated Martian habitat that includes crew quarters, workstations and common lounge and food preparation areas. This habitat prototype, called Mars Dune Alpha, is part of NASA’s ongoing Crew Health and Performance Exploration Analog, a series of Mars surface mission simulations scheduled through 2026 at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston.  
    With support from NASA’s Small Business Innovation Research program, ICON is also developing an Olympus construction system, which is designed to use local resources on the Moon and Mars as building materials. 
    The ICON company uses a robotic 3D printing technique called Laser Vitreous Multi-material Transformation, in which high-powered lasers melt local surface materials, or regolith, that then solidify to form strong, ceramic-like structures. Regolith can similarly be transformed to create infrastructure capable of withstanding environmental hazards like corrosive lunar dust, as well as radiation and temperature extremes.  
    The company is also characterizing the gravity-dependent properties of simulated lunar regolith in an experiment called Duneflow, which flew aboard a Blue Origin reusable suborbital rocket system through NASA’s Flight Opportunities program in February 2025. During that flight test, the vehicle simulated lunar gravity for approximately two minutes, enabling ICON and researchers from NASA to compare the behavior of simulant against real regolith obtained from the Moon during an Apollo mission.    
    Learn more: https://www.nasa.gov/space-technology-mission-directorate/  

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  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom seeks injunction to immediately stop Trump tariffs

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 13, 2025

    What you need to know: California today filed a request for a preliminary injunction to immediately stop President Trump’s unlawful tariffs while the state’s lawsuit proceeds. Tariffs are not only expected to impact trade, but the upcoming state revenues and budget.

    SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom and Attorney General Rob Bonta today will file a motion for a preliminary injunction to stop the Trump Administration’s illegal tariffs. The injunction was filed as part of California’s lawsuit challenging President Trump’s use of emergency powers to enact broad-sweeping tariffs that hurt states, consumers, and businesses. 

    The tariffs challenged under California’s lawsuit are projected to, at a minimum, cost California consumers $25 billion and result in the loss of over 64,000 jobs. However, the total cost of President Trump’s tariffs is projected to cost California households upwards of $40 billion. 

    “President Trump has overstepped his authority, and now families, businesses, and our ports are literally paying the price. As the largest economy in the nation, California has the most to lose from President Trump’s weak and reckless policies.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    “Last fall, Americans at the voting booth demanded lower prices. Now, Trump’s chaotic tariff war is threatening to skyrocket the cost of living for families, lower wages, slash jobs, and throw business owners and innovators into a spiral of uncertainty,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “Let me be clear, uncertainly and unpredictability are bad for business, bad for the economy, and bad for California. California is set to experience an outsized share of losses due to our larger economy, workforce, and exposure to trade. We are pulling out all the stops and will today ask the court to immediately halt these illegal tariffs while California argues it’s case.”

    Attorney General Rob Bonta

    As the largest economy in the nation — and the fourth largest in the world — President Trump’s illegal tariffs are having a profound impact on California’s budget and how the state can meet the needs of its residents.

    Economic dominance threatened by recklessness

    California is the backbone of the nation’s economy. California’s gross domestic product was $4.1 trillion in 2024. The state drives national economic growth and also sends over $83 billion more to the federal government than it receives in federal funding. California is the leading agricultural producer in the country and is also the center for manufacturing output in the United States, with over 36,000 manufacturing firms employing over 1.1 million Californians. The Golden State’s manufacturing firms have created new industries and supplied the world with manufactured goods spanning aerospace, computers and electronics, and, most recently, zero-emission vehicles.

    Impacts on trade and ports 

    California engaged in nearly $675 billion in two-way trade in 2024, supporting millions of jobs throughout the state. The impacts of the President’s tariff policies are already having an outsized impact on the state’s nation-leading ports, leaving California workers with fewer shifts unloading and transporting the goods. A decline of just 1% in cargo to the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach would wipe away 2,769 jobs and endanger as many as 4,000 others, one study found.  

    The increased costs associated with these tariffs will also have ripple effects throughout the supply chain, impacting not only longshoremen but also truckers, manufacturers, and retailers throughout the state and nation.

    Impacts on the state budget 

    California is expected to lose a staggering $7.8 billion in tax revenue from personal income tax, capital gains, and corporate revenue as a result of the tariffs’ impact on California taxpayers. This extraordinary loss of essential revenue is exacerbated by the unpredictable and chaotic approach to imposing tariffs, which has made it extremely difficult for California and its agencies to effectively budget, plan for the future, and properly serve Californians.

    The harms from the current tariffs and their uncertain nature are reflected in California’s recently downgraded economic projection for the 2025-2026 Governor’s Budget.  Specifically, this forecast projected increased unemployment and near-term inflation and considerably downgraded projected wage and business income growth, as well as job and personal income growth. These fiscal impacts from tariffs have immediate and devastating effects on California’s budget, which in turn could yield deep cuts to the state’s programs and services.

    Impacts on state services 

    Additionally, many agencies, including the California Department of Health Care Services and California Department of Public Health, contract with vendors to purchase critical goods which were manufactured outside the United States, including over $8 billion in pharmaceuticals, $300 million in diabetes related supplies, $3 million in pediatric and adult flu vaccines, $700,000 in disease testing kits, among other critical goods.  The President’s tariffs confront California with significantly increased costs to retain access to these essential goods through its contracts. 

    In addition to the forthcoming preliminary injunction, California will also be filing an amicus brief as early as today in the Court of International Trade in the case Oregon v. Trump, a case challenging President Trump’s illegal imposition of so called “emergency” tariffs.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protective equipment for motorcyclists and road safety – E-001776/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001776/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Flavio Tosi (PPE)

    As of July 2025, airbags will be compulsory for learners wishing to obtain a category A motorcycle licence in Spain, a move designed to bring down the number of road deaths among motorcyclists, a group that is at particular risk of being involved in serious or lethal accidents.

    Because fatality rates among users of powered two-wheeled motor vehicles have remained high (this group accounts for around 20 % of all road deaths in the EU[1]), advanced personal protective equipment like airbags will be key to improving road safety.

    Given that the EU has powers in the fields of vehicle safety and driving licences, and in the light of the recent revision of the CBE Directive[2]:

    • 1.Will the Commission push for the adoption of advanced protective equipment for motorcyclists (including airbags) by means of legislative initiatives and recommendations at the EU level?
    • 2.Will it provide financial support for the adoption of these devices through European funds and road safety programmes?
    • 3.How will the Commission promote and disseminate best practices for reducing vulnerable road user fatalities among the Member States?

    Submitted: 2.5.2025

    • [1] https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/eu-road-fatalities-drop-3-2024-progress-remains-slow-2025-03-18_en?utm.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/3237 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Directive (EU) 2015/413 facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road-safety-related traffic offences.
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Man Who Supplied Illegal Drugs in Eastern Washington Sentenced to More Than 16 Years in Federal Prison

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

    Spokane, Washington – Acting United States Attorney Richard R. Barker announced that United States District Judge Thomas O. Rice sentenced David Velasquez Jr., age 32, to 200 months in federal prison for Conspiracy to Distribute 400 Grams or More of Fentanyl. Judge Rice also imposed 5 years of supervised release.

    According to court documents and information presented at the sentencing hearing, In November 2022, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) developed information that Velasquez was the source of supply for a large amount of illegal drugs in Eastern Washington. FBI agents later learned that Velasquez and a man named David Fulmer had met multiple times in Utah for the purpose of transporting drug shipments from Arizona to Eastern Washington. Velasquez provided Fullmer with at least 10,000 fentanyl-laced pills during each meeting. Fullmer later was arrested and sentenced to federal prison on drug trafficking charges.

    On September 19, 2023, the FBI obtained a federal arrest for Velasquez and on October 13, 2023, Velasquez’s phone was tracked to Iowa. He was subsequently pulled over driving a truck near Dallas County, Iowa. He was arrested and law enforcement recovered 39,095 fentanyl pills hidden in the truck’s tailgate. Two loaded handguns were found in the glove compartment and a third handgun was found under the rear seat.

    “Fentanyl is a deadly drug that continues to devastate communities across Eastern Washington and the nation,” stated Acting U.S. Attorney Barker. “Mr. Velasquez trafficked tens of thousands of fentanyl-laced pills into our region, putting numerous lives at risk. My office will continue to hold drug traffickers accountable, and we are committed to working with our law enforcement partners to keep Eastern Washington communities safe.”

    “Mr. Velasquez was the source of large amounts of Fentanyl flowing into the Spokane area.” said W. Mike Herrington, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Seattle field office. “Knowing this poison can easily kill its users, countless lives may have been saved by taking him off the streets. The FBI and our partners will continue the work of keeping these illegal drugs out of the communities we all call home.”

    This case was investigated by the FBI. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Nowles Heinrich and Patrick J. Cashman.

    2:23-cr-00102-TOR

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: New-Wes-Valley — New-Wes-Valley RCMP responds to report of dangerous driver; man flees from police and is arrested

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    A 24-year-old man from Valleyfield was arrested by New-Wes-Valley RCMP on May 10, 2025, following a report of a dangerous driver in Centreville.

    At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, RCMP received a report of a dangerous driver in Centreville. Police responded and the described vehicle, a red Chevrolet Impala, was located on Route 320. A traffic stop was conducted, however, the vehicle failed to stop and fled in a dangerous manner. In the interest of public safety, officers did not pursue the vehicle.

    A short while later, the vehicle was located on a dirt road and again failed to stop for police. As a result of damages that the vehicle sustained while driving in a dangerous manner, it eventually came to a stop and was inoperable.

    The driver, who was arrested for flight from police and dangerous operation, was driving while suspended. He was found in possession of a small quantity of methamphetamine. The vehicle, which was unregistered, held a status with Motor Registration Division of being scrapped or unroadworthy. The licence plate that was attached to the car belonged to another vehicle.

    The man is set to appear in court in July 2025, to face criminal charges of dangerous operation, flight from police and possession of a controlled substance. A number of charges under the Highway Traffic Act are anticipated.

    RCMP NL continues to fulfill its mandate to protect public safety, enforce the law, and ensure the delivery of priority policing services in Newfoundland and Labrador.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Trumbull Man Charged with Defrauding Amazon of More Than $3 Million

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    Marc H. Silverman, Acting United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, and Anish Shukla, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the New Haven Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), today announced that a federal grand jury in New Haven has returned a 13-count indictment charging AMEER NASIR, 24, of Trumbull, with offenses stemming from a fraud scheme against Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”).

    The indictment was returned on May 7, 2025.  Nasir was arrested yesterday, appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge S. Dave Vatti in Bridgeport, and was released on a $300,000 bond.

    As alleged in the indictment, Amazon Logistics, an Amazon subsidiary, contracts with various interstate trucking businesses to transport both empty trailers and trailers containing heavy loads of freight between cities and between warehouses and fulfillment centers operated by Amazon.  Nasir registered 23 trucking businesses with Amazon Logistics.  One of the accounts was created in the name of Nasir’s business, Pak Express Transport, LLC, and others were created fraudulently using the names and identifying information of other trucking or transportation companies without the knowledge of the operators of those companies.  Between approximately December 2019 and February 2021, Nasir used these accounts to sign up for more than 1,000 transportation assignments with Amazon Logistics, manipulated information in Amazon Logistics’ transportation management system to misrepresent that he had completed trailer movements when he had not, and submitted fraudulent invoices to Amazon Logistics that were subsequently paid.  Through this scheme, Nasir defrauded Amazon of more than $3 million.

    The indictment charges Nasir with 13 counts of wire fraud, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years on each count.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Silverman stressed that an indictment is not evidence of guilt.  Charges are only allegations, and a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    This matter is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with assistance from Amazon.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Elena L. Coronado.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: ESS Launches the H.E.L.P.® Alert Network™ 

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Emergency Safety Solutions (ESS), a leader in modernizing roadway safety with advance warning technologies, today announced the launch of the H.E.L.P.® Alert Network™ — a breakthrough in real-time hazard communication. This vertically integrated, collaborative alerting and communications network delivers life-saving alerts and enhanced situational awareness, dramatically improving safety for all road users by overcoming the limitations of outdated hazard lights and fragmented connected vehicle technologies.

    “The H.E.L.P. Alert Network represents a groundbreaking leap forward in how we protect vulnerable vehicles and individuals on the road,” said Tim VanGoethem, ESS Chief Product Officer. “By empowering a broader community of vehicles and systems to communicate with each other in real time, we’re working with our customers and network partners to deliver critical, life-saving awareness precisely where – and when – it’s needed most.”

    The H.E.L.P. Alert Network collects, algorithmically calculates and distributes critical hazard data from connected vehicles, roadway work zones, fleet platforms and emergency systems — then delivers trusted, relevant information to navigation apps and in-vehicle displays with exceptional speed and accuracy.

    This system enables smarter decision-making across the entire roadway ecosystem, giving both human drivers and autonomous systems more time to react — and more accurate information to act on. 

    A Unified Network for Safer Roadways 

    The H.E.L.P. Alert Network includes three coordinated service pillars: 

    • Notification Partner Network: Vehicles, devices, and platforms that detect and transmit critical hazard data, including disabled and vulnerable vehicles equipped with ESS’ globally patented H.E.L.P.® Digital AlertsTM, work crew vehicles, commercial fleet vehicles, DOT and municipal infrastructure, emergency response vehicles, and wrong way drivers. 
    • Protect Partner Network: Calculates and then distributes accurate, relevant and timely location of roadway hazards to mobile and embedded navigation platforms, in-dash displays, mobile devices, and autonomous vehicle systems as real-time alerts so that approaching drivers can safely avoid them. 
    • Response Partner Network: Shares incident and event information with Traffic Management Centers, 9-1-1 providers, public safety networks and incident response platforms to facilitate faster, more informed emergency response in situations where every second matters. 

    With its patented safety technologies now deployed in market, ESS is expanding H.E.L.P. and actively bidding projects with commercial fleets, Department of Transportation fleets, OEMs and beyond – advancing public safety and extending protection across America’s roadways.

    Innovation Where It Counts 

    ESS’s H.E.L.P. safety features are redefining hazard communication for the modern roadway, replacing outdated systems that fail to keep pace with today’s transportation systems. 

    • H.E.L.P.® Lighting Alerts: High-visibility flash pattern dramatically increases visibility of stationary and vulnerable vehicles – proven to induce behavior change in oncoming drivers by prompting them to slow down and move over. 
    • H.E.L.P.® Digital Alerts: Disabled and vulnerable vehicle alerts that are delivered to oncoming motorists via mobile navigation applications and in-cabin displays to warn approaching drivers of potentials dangers ahead. 

    These connected vehicle features work together to enhance situational awareness, reduce collisions, and increase protection for not just drivers – but also passengers, pedestrians and roadside workers alike.  

    Advantages for OEMs, Fleets, Public Safety and Beyond 

    The H.E.L.P. Alert Network offers flexible deployment models tailored to the distinct needs of each customer segment ESS serves — including passenger and commercial vehicle OEMs, commercial fleets, emergency response teams, roadway work crews, and partners in connected infrastructure and communications.  

    With several leading automotive OEMs, commercial fleets and state DOT fleets already using ESS’ safety features as well as a rapidly growing roster of network partners, the H.E.L.P. Alert Network is connecting people, vehicles and infrastructure to save lives. 

    About ESS 

    Emergency Safety Solutions (ESS) is a certified minority-owned company revolutionizing roadway safety through its patented H.E.L.P.® technologies. ESS delivers advanced lighting and real-time digital alerts as advance warnings to protect vulnerable passenger and commercial vehicles, emergency responders, and roadway workers. With the launch of the H.E.L.P. Alert Network™, ESS is building a globally connected roadway safety community that helps prevent crashes and save lives. Learn more at www.ess-help.com

    Media Contact:Craig Keller | ESS Communications | ckeller@ess-help.com | 847-476-7543 

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/3f2ef5c4-9e50-4773-be7f-5192f535e179

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: VERB Publishes Management’s Prepared Remarks From Its First Quarter 2025 Earnings Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LAS VEGAS, May 13, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Verb Technology Company, Inc. (Nasdaq: VERB) (“VERB” or the “Company”), Transforming the Landscape of Social Commerce, Social Telehealth and Social Crowdfunding with MARKET.live; LyveCom; VANITYPrescribed; GoodGirlRx; and the GO FUND YOURSELF TV Show, today filed its Form 10-Q reporting financial and operating results for the quarter ending March 31, 2025 and held an earnings conference call at 1 p.m. ET to discuss these results. Prepared remarks during the conference call of Rory J. Cutaia, the Company’s Chairman & CEO, are provided below.

    Management Prepared Remarks

    VERB 2025 First Quarter Financial Results Conference Call

    Tuesday, May 13, 2025, 1 p.m. ET

    Company Participant
    Rory J. Cutaia, CEO

    Operator:

    Good afternoon and welcome to the first quarter 2025 Financial Results Conference Call for Verb Technology Company, Inc. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. Please be advised, the call is being recorded at the Company’s request.

    On our call today is Rory J. Cutaia, Verb’s Founder, Chairman and CEO.

    Before we begin, I’d like to remind everyone that statements made during this conference call will include forward-looking statements under the Safe Harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which involve risks and uncertainties that can cause actual results to differ materially. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, except as required by law, as the underlying facts and circumstances may change. Verb Technology Company disclaims any obligations to update these forward-looking statements, as well as those contained in the Company’s current and subsequent filings with the SEC.

    I would now like to turn the call over to Rory J. Cutaia, CEO. Rory?

    Rory:

    Thank you moderator, and thanks to everyone for joining us today for our first quarter 2025 financial results and business update conference call.

    So for those of you who have reviewed our 10-Q filed this morning or the summarized results in the press release we issued this morning – well – you already know – right – you know the Company is firing on all cylinders – I’m talking about a 12 cylinder finely tuned exotic sports roadster – yeah – we had a crazy good quarter. This is the VERB we’ve envisioned – this is the VERB we’ve manifested and this is the VERB we have worked so hard to deliver. And the best part – the really best part – is this is just the beginning.

    I’ve got to hand it to my management team – they never stopped believing – through all the trials and tribulations – and we’ve had more than our share – they stuck it out with me – we drew strength from one another – and no matter what – we never gave up. I appreciate them all so very much – and our amazing Board of Directors – and now that we’ve begun to hit our stride – they’re all feeling it – they know where we’re taking this vehicle – and for those of you listening to this who have stuck it out with us and for those of you thinking about joining us – from here on out, it’s going to be a fun ride.

    We’re cashed-up, zero debt – insanely under-valued – and each VERB division is performing very, very well.

    I’m not going to take your time reading the 10-Q or reiterating everything we discussed about the Company just 6 weeks or so ago when we reported our 2024 results – but I will definitely enjoy sharing some of our team’s accomplishments in the first 3 months of this year.

    Let’s start with revenue – but first let me provide some context:

    In Q1 of 2024 we reported revenue of just $7,000; In Q4 of 2024 we reported revenue of $723,000 – definitely a great quarter and the first full quarter after we instituted a number of changes to our business model – and for the entirety of 2024 – we reported a total of $895,000.

    But in Q1 of 2025 we reported $1.3 Million – that’s 80% revenue growth over the prior quarter and approximately 46% growth over all 4 quarters of revenue of 2024 combined.

    And while we were busy signing and launching a plethora of new clients, we identified what we believe is the hottest AI social commerce technology company in the market and negotiated the terms of an $8.5 Million cash and stock acquisition, signed a comprehensive term sheet, and then rapidly drove the deal to a closing – all while actively integrating their AI technology into our own platform.

    We used about $4.2 Million in cash closing the acquisition – but I liked having a robust – zero debt – cashed-up balance sheet – so being an opportunist we identified a funding opportunity with extraordinary – shareholder friendly terms – negotiated it, documented it and closed it. A non-dilutive, non-convertible, non-voting, preferred stock deal with just a 9% annual dividend – and with that we added $5 Million back onto the balance sheet.

    This deal is with a trusted financial partner with whom we’ve now done several very successful deals. I do feel sorry for other companies doing terrible – horrible financings – steep discounts to market price, pre-funded warrants, triple warrant coverage – decimating cap tables and rendering many of these companies unfinanceable going forward who ultimately get shorted into oblivion. You see it every day. Tough times for a lot of companies and I’m very grateful that we’re in such a strong cash position and we’ve been able to maintain a super clean cap table – no warrant overhang and a very tight float and obviously not desperate to find a source of capital.

    In fact, with our cash on hand, no debt, and growing revenue across all business units, we expect to be able fund operations easily into 2028 and beyond.

    As to the growth behind MARKET.live, we’ve signed many very high profile clients and continue to do so. I’ve been asked why we aren’t announcing them – which we’d have to do multiple times a month – but the answer is most of these deals are where we’re white labeling our platform for these well-known brands and our contract prohibits us from announcing the names. I wish I could – if I could, I doubt our stock would still be trading for 50% of our net cash – with zero value given for all our business units – it’s crazy – just crazy.

    I’ve also been asked why we don’t see as many livestreams from MARKET.live as we used to and that’s because our new technology allows us to stream directly from our clients’ own websites and multicast their streams across multiple social media channels simultaneously. This is really the killer app, drawing so many more clients, because it allows these brands to own the customer relationship while still streaming over other social platforms. We’re also seeing strong, strong growth in shoppable ads, among many other areas of our MARKET.live and now Lyvecom business units.

    Our telehealth platforms, VanityPrescribed and GoodGirlRX continue to grow month over month adding recurring subscription-based revenue. And our Go Fund Yourself, crowd funding TV show is developing an almost cult-like following and more and more issuers are applying to be on the show, forcing us to become much more selective, and to accommodate the demand we’re now shooting multiple episodes twice a month. Issuers pay to be on the show. We’re about to launch Season 2 on Cheddar.

    In closing, I refer you to our Form 10-Q filed today for greater details concerning our Q1 2025 financial results as well as the press release distributed today summarizing those results for additional information I’ve not covered in my conference call today.

    So thank you for your interest in VERB and for taking the time to listen to our Q1 2025 financial results. I presume you can tell how excited we are about the business – really excited – and oh yes – I do indeed expect Q2 results to be even better than this Q1 – so stand by.

    Operator: This concludes the conference call. You may now disconnect.

    About VERB

    Verb Technology Company, Inc. (Nasdaq: VERB), is transforming the landscape of social commerce, social telehealth and social crowdfunding with MARKET.live, LyveCom, VANITYPrescribed, GoodGirlRx, and the GO FUND YOURSELF TV Show. The Company operates multiple business units, each of which leverages the Company’s social commerce technology and video marketing expertise.

    MARKET.live, together with recently acquired AI social commerce technology innovator LyveCom, is a multi-vendor, livestream social shopping platform that allows brands and merchants to deliver a true omnichannel livestream shopping experience across their own websites, apps, and social platforms. Advanced AI capabilities power real-time user-generated-content creation, automated video content repurposing for high conversion video ads, and AI-powered virtual live shopping hosts that are virtually indistinguishable from human hosts, capable of real-time audience engagement. Brands utilize the Company’s proprietary AI model trained on tens of thousands of video commerce interactions to automate content creation and intelligent tools designed to optimize merchandising strategies and increase conversion rates.

    GO FUND YOURSELF TV Show is a revolutionary interactive social crowd funding platform for public and private companies seeking broad-based exposure for their crowd-funded Regulation CF and Regulation A offerings. The platform combines a ground-breaking interactive national TV show with MARKET.live’s back-end capabilities allowing viewers to tap, scan or click on their screen to facilitate an investment, in real time, as they watch companies presenting before the show’s panel of “Titans”. Presenting companies that sell consumer products are able to offer their products directly to viewers during the show in real time through shoppable onscreen icons.

    VANITYPrescribed.com and GoodGirlRx.com are telehealth portals, intended to redefine telehealth by offering a seamless, digital-first experience that empowers individuals to take control of their healthcare needs. They were designed and developed to disrupt the traditional healthcare model by providing tailored healthcare solutions at affordable, fixed prices – without hidden fees, membership costs, or inflated pharmaceutical markups. GoodGirlRx.com, a partnership with Savannah Chrisley, a well-known lifestyle personality and advocate for health and wellness, offers customers access to convenient, no-hassle telehealth services and pharmaceuticals, including the new weight-loss drugs, with fixed pricing regardless of dosage, breaking away from the industry’s traditional model of excessive pricing and pharmaceutical gatekeeping.

    The Company is headquartered in Las Vegas, NV and operates full-service production and creator studios in the Los Angeles, California vicinity.

    For more information, please visit: www.verb.tech

    Follow VERB here:

    Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/VerbTechCo

    X: https://twitter.com/VerbTech_Co

    LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/verb-tech

    YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0eCb_fwQlwEG3ywHDJ4_KQ

    Sign up for E-mail Alerts here: https://ir.verb.tech/news-events/email-alerts

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS
    Statements contained in this press release that are not statements of historical fact are forward-looking statements as defined in Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. In some cases, these forward-looking statements can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “designed,” “expect,” “may,” “will,” “should” and other comparable terms. Forward-looking statements include statements regarding VERB’s intentions, beliefs, projections, outlook, analyses or current expectations and the other risk factors and other cautionary statements included in VERB’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, and its subsequent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including subsequent periodic reports on Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K. All forward-looking statements made in this press release speak only as of the date of this press release and are based on management’s assumptions and estimates as of such date. Except as required by law, VERB undertakes no obligation to update or revise forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events, changed conditions or otherwise after the date of this press release.

    Investor Relations Contact: investors@verb.tech
    Media Contact: info@verb.tech

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Be Bear Aware

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on May 13, 2025

    Warmer weather attracts nature-lovers and our wildlife neighbors – bears! These foragers are out of hibernation and are busy searching for food. As you enjoy the outdoors, be mindful of your surroundings.

    Black bears are common in Saskatchewan, with most found in the northern forest region. However, their range stretches southward into the aspen parkland and other areas including the Touchwood Hills, the Qu’Appelle Valley and the South Saskatchewan River Valley. 

    Bears are intelligent and curious animals. Their excellent sense of smell makes it easy for them to find food, even from miles away. When attractants like food waste, pet food, or bird seed are left out, bears may be attracted to the area and become habituated. Black bears are food motivated and will return to areas where they have found easy meals in the past. Managing attractants helps to keep both bears and people safe.

    Here are some helpful tips to follow if you encounter a bear:

    • Never feed or approach a bear or cubs.
    • Hike in groups and make noise by talking loudly or singing.
    • Stay calm – don’t run! 
    • Make a wide detour, calmly back away, speak in a firm deep voice and avoid direct eye contact with the bear.
    • Move towards a vehicle, building, tree, rock, or other cover.
    • Do not climb a tree, black bears are excellent climbers.
    • If the bear continues to follow, drop articles of clothing such as a jacket or hat to distract the bear.
    • Get out your bear spray and prepare to use it. 
    • In most cases, black bears will threaten but not attack.  If attacked – defend yourself – do not play dead. 

    And remember: keep bears at a distance by managing attractants and being bear aware – your safety starts with smart choices!

    If a bear or any other wildlife poses an immediate risk to people’s safety, call 911. To report an encounter with aggressive wildlife, call the Turn in Poachers and Polluters (TIPP) line at 1-800-667-7561. Concerns regarding bears or other nuisance wildlife can be reported to the Ministry of Environment by calling 1-800-567-4224 or email center.inquiry@gov.sk.ca. 

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Pfluger Hosts the 2025 Pfluger Student Leadership Conference

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11)

    Rep. Pfluger Hosts the 2025 Pfluger Student Leadership Conference

    Killeen, May 13, 2025

    KILEEN, TX — Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11) hosted 8th-grade students from Killeen ISD at Texas A&M University-Central Texas for the 2025 Pfluger Student Leadership Conference in Killeen last week. The conference featured personnel from NASA and Fort Cavazos. It also included a static display tour, a NASA space suit presentation, a leadership dialogue between Rep. Pfluger and Lt. General Kevin Admiral, comments from Glenn Hegar, the incoming Chancellor of the Texas A&M University System, and more.

    “It was wonderful spending the day with so many young and inspiring leaders who want to make a difference in our communities. Our students are the future of this nation, and it is incredibly important to facilitate experiences like this for them. I sincerely appreciate everyone who took the time to speak at the conference, and those who helped make the day possible,” said Rep. Pfluger.

    Pictures from the day are available for broadcast and distribution HERE

    Check out this story highlighting the Conference:

    Hundreds of eighth graders from across Killeen middle schools attended a student leadership conference Friday hosted by U.S. Rep. August Pfluger at Texas A&M University-Central Texas.

    Pfluger, who represents a House district stretching from Killeen to Midland, sat down with III Corps commander Lt. Gen. Kevin Admiral for a dialogue about leadership and to answer questions from students.

    Middle school student leaders also took the stage to participate with their own presentations.

    Also included in the event was a static display of military vehicles by the Army’s III Armored Corps, a presentation on space travel by personnel from NASA.

    Read the full story HERE.

    Check out Rep. Pfluger’s interview on KWTX:

     

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Collins Leads Letter Calling for the Department of Justice to Establish a Task Force on Staged Accident Fraud

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Collins (R-Georgia 10th District)

    Washington, DC – Representative Mike Collins (GA-10) led a letter today to Attorney General Pam Bondi requesting the establishment of a specialized task force dedicated to investigating and prosecuting staged accident fraud.

    “Criminal elements are launching an assault against America’s truckers, in the courtroom and on our roads. Staged accidents take advantage of truckers’ high insurance coverage and make them prime targets for criminals looking for a quick payday, saddling truckers with millions of dollars in inflated damages, increasing insurance premiums for all Americans, and driving up the costs for every transported good,” said Rep. Mike Collins. “These fraudsters and their co-conspirators need to be held accountable for their actions and put in jail for making every one of us less safe on the roads.”

    Rep. Patronis said, “Staged accidents and insurance fraud are not victimless crimes, and they drive up premiums for every hardworking Floridian. My office stands ready to work hand-in-hand with Attorney General Pam Bondi, fraud investigators, and congressional colleagues to protect consumers by rooting out these fraudsters and holding them accountable. We must send a clear message – if you commit insurance fraud, you will be caught, and you will be prosecuted.”

    “Staged accident fraud raises insurance rates and jeopardizes the safety of motorists. The criminal networks behind these fraud schemes must be pursued, dismantled, and prosecuted to protect our communities and curb rising insurance costs,” said Rep. Gooden.

    “Fraudulent insurance claims from staged vehicle accidents are rapidly increasing, negatively impacting public safety, driving up consumer costs, and raising insurance premiums. I am glad to join my colleagues in requesting that Attorney General Pam Bondi create a task force to put an end to these organized fraudsters’ schemes. No one in this country should be able to profit off breaking the law and the time to end it is now,” said Rep. Tony Wied.

    “Enhanced public awareness campaigns, increased enforcement, and stricter penalties for offenders are essential to deter these scams. Holding these criminal enterprises accountable for their actions will send a signal that the Administration is serious about restoring law and order,” said Rep. Tom Barrett.

    “Staged vehicle accidents enable scammers to endanger lives, drive up insurance premiums, and diminish public trust in the safety of our roads,” said Rep. Grothman. “Staging a crash is not an opportunity to make a quick cash grab; it’s a federal crime with serious consequences. I’m proud to join Representative Mike Collins in urging the DOJ to create a task force to crack down on these fraudulent scammers, ensure our roads are safe, and minimize costs for hardworking Americans.”

    “We commend Rep. Collins and his colleagues for their leadership on this effort. This task force will bring much-needed coordination and oversight to address a growing problem of insurance fraud. These schemes put the driving public at risk and contribute to higher costs for American consumers. We are pleased to see Congressional focus on this important matter,” said Uber Head of Federal Affairs Javi Correoso.

    “When con artists seeking a big payday intentionally collide with commercial motor vehicles, their reckless disregard for safety puts innocent truck drivers and the motoring public at risk.  These unscrupulous individuals perpetuate their selfish actions by filing frivolous lawsuits against honest trucking companies, raising costs for consumer goods and inflating insurance premiums,” said American Trucking Associations Senior Vice President of Legislative Affairs Henry Hanscom.  “ATA strongly encourages Attorney General Bondi to crack down on this dangerous lawlessness by establishing a specialized task force dedicated to holding these criminals accountable, and we thank Congressman Collins for spearheading this effort to protect America’s hardworking truckers.”

    “Staged accidents are not victimless crimes. These are calculated, premeditated assaults that endanger lives, destroy livelihoods, and compromise highway safety. To add insult to injury, criminals abuse the legal system for profit through false accusations and lawsuits, which contribute to skyrocketing insurance premiums for small trucking businesses,” said Lewie Pugh, Executive Vice President, Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. “OOIDA and our 150,000 members support Representative Collins’ efforts to protect law-abiding truckers from sophisticated criminal fraud schemes that exploit the hardworking men and women behind the wheel.”

    Background

    There has been a rise of con-artists defrauding the insurance industry by intentionally colliding with commercial vehicles in order to win damages from lawsuits. This form of insurance fraud poses a threat to public safety, drives up consumer costs, and strains the insurance system. States such as Louisiana, Florida, New York, and Georgia have uncovered elaborate conspiracies to defraud insurance companies that involve plaintiff attorneys, medical providers, and recruiters, many of whom are tied to organized crime and human trafficking.

    With decades of experience in the Georgia trucking industry, Rep. Mike Collins brings firsthand knowledge of this rising problem to Congress.

    This follows Collins’ introduction of the Staged Accident Prevention Act, which makes staging a vehicular accident a federal crime.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Summerfield Man Pleads Guilty to Ponzi Scheme and Tax Fraud

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    Winston-Salem, NC – William Lamar Rhew, III of Summerfield pled guilty today, May 6, 2025, to wire fraud, money laundering, securities fraud, tax evasion, and failure to file tax return in connection with a $20 million Ponzi scheme, announced Acting United States Attorney Randall S. Galyon.  

    According to court documents, from November 2017 to December 2023, Rhew defrauded at least 117 investors of at least $24 million.  He induced victims to invest with his company Chadley Capital, LLC which would allegedly buy accounts receivable at a discount, sell them for a profit, and provide consistently high rates of return on investment.  Rhew touted the company’s increasing deal flow and underwriting standards and, in offering materials, claimed $300 million in transactions in 2023, consistent returns in excess of 20% per year, and nearly 74% total growth over 24 months.  All of Rhew’s representations were false.  Instead of investing victims’ funds as promised, Rhew used their money to pay his personal expenses including the purchases of a boat, a beach house, and luxury cars, and to make “interest” and “withdrawal” payments to other victim-investors as part of the Ponzi scheme.  In addition, for Tax Years 2018 through 2022, Rhew willfully failed to report nearly $9 million in income to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  As part of the plea agreement, Rhew has agreed to pay restitution to the victims in the amount of $14,868,815.67 and to the IRS in the amount of $3,056,936.

    Sentencing is scheduled to take place on August 22, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, before United States District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder. At sentencing, Rhew faces a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison, a period of supervised release of up to three years, and monetary penalties.

    “Sadly, we see an abundance of investment fraud schemes in which perpetrators exploit people who know and trust them,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Galyon. “We are committed to pursuing justice for victims in these cases but encourage the public to beware of any investment opportunity that sounds too good to be true, no matter who is promoting it.”

    “Today’s guilty plea represents the dedication of our agency in ensuring the actions of one individual are not at the expense of others,” said Special Agent in Charge Donald “Trey” Eakins, Charlotte Field Office, IRS Criminal Investigation. “In this case, the defendant not only victimized his investors, but he also defrauded American taxpayers by concealing his income from the IRS and evading his tax liability. IRS Criminal Investigation’s special agents will continue to use their financial expertise to find and investigate these types of investor fraud schemes alongside our law enforcement partners.”

    “It’s unlikely fraudsters will be up front and admit they’re taking your money and pumping it into a Ponzi scheme.  But there are warning signs: investors should be wary anytime you’re guaranteed high returns with little or no risk,” said FBI Charlotte Special Agent in Charge Robert M. DeWitt.  “Hopefully, the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility will offer some comfort and closure to the victims.”

    “This guilty plea marks another significant victory in the pursuit of justice for the citizens of North Carolina,” said the Director of the NC SBI. “The victims in this case are hardworking men and women, many of whom are small business owners.  The Financial Crimes Investigations Unit of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation will continue to work diligently to combat fraud against the citizens of our great state.  The SBI would like to thank the IRS and FBI for their efforts in ensuring justice for the victims involved in this case.”
        
    The case was investigated by the Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation. It is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Laura Jeanne Dildine.

    ###
     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Armed Robbery of Marijuana Stash House in Oklahoma City Lands Four Men in Federal Prison for 25 Years Collectively

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    OKLAHOMA CITY – WILLIAM LEWIS DANIELS, 26, of Texas, has been sentenced to serve 96 months in federal prison for interference with commerce by robbery, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and being a drug user in possession of a firearm, announced U.S. Attorney Robert J. Troester.

    On July 31, 2024, Daniels was charged by Superseding Information with interference with commerce by robbery, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and being a drug user in possession of a firearm. According to public record, on February 8, 2024, officers with the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) responded to a reported armed robbery at a metro home. Victims in the home told authorities that three men, later identified as Daniels and codefendants JORDON ISAIH WATSON, 26, and KELDON SHERROD WILLIAMS, 27, both of Texas, entered the home and ordered the victims onto the floor where their hands were restrained with zip-ties. The victims told police that one of the defendants, later identified as Daniels, had a firearm and held them at gunpoint. The defendants then ransacked the house and stole more than $36,000 in cash, more than 600 pounds of marijuana stuffed into trash bags, and other items. OCPD officers quickly determined the residence was a black-market marijuana stash house. Security footage from an adjacent property showed four vehicles leaving the stash house after the robbery, including a getaway car driven by codefendant BRANDON MICHAEL NORMAN, 26, of Florida, and a car that Daniels stole from the victims. The stolen car was later located by OCPD officers in a nearby business parking lot, where the perpetrators met and swapped out vehicles.

    Authorities pulled over two of the suspect vehicles shortly thereafter without incident, and arrested Watson, Williams, and Norman. Daniels, however, led authorities on a high-speed chase in his personal vehicle down Interstate 235 during rush hour traffic, wrecked his vehicle, and fled briefly on foot before he was arrested. Between the three vehicles, OCPD recovered 690 pounds of marijuana, $40,710.00 in cash, and one firearm.

    On August 7, 2024, Daniels pleaded guilty to the Superseding Information, and admitted he took cash and marijuana from the victims, possessed marijuana which he intended to distribute to others, and possessed a firearm despite knowing he was an unlawful user of a controlled dangerous substance.

    At the sentencing hearing on May 1, 2025, U.S. District Judge Bernard M. Jones sentenced Daniels to serve 96 months in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release. In announcing his sentence, Judge Jones noted the serious and violent nature of the offenses, the need to protect the public, and the need to adequately deter others from engaging in similar criminal conduct which endangers the community.

    Watson, Williams, and Norman have each been sentenced after pleading guilty to interference with commerce by robbery and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, with Watson sentenced to serve 96 months, Williams sentenced to serve 60 months, and Norman sentenced to serve 48 months in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release for each defendant.

    This case is the result of an investigation by the FBI Oklahoma City Field Office and the Oklahoma City Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Drew E. Davis prosecuted the case.

    Reference is made to public filings for additional information. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Stephenville — Bay St. George RCMP seeks public’s assistance locating stolen vehicle that fled from police (UPDATED)

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Update: The stolen vehicle was located. The investigation into the theft and flight from police is continuing.

    Bay St. George RCMP is seeking assistance from the public in locating a stolen vehicle that fled from police in Stephenville on the evening of May 1, 2025.

    Shortly before 8:30 p.m. last night, Bay St. George RCMP attempted to conduct a traffic stop on Gallant Street in Stephenville. The vehicle failed to stop for police and fled the area in a dangerous manner. In the interest of public safety, police did not pursue the vehicle.

    A short time later, at approximately 9:15 p.m., police received a report of a stolen vehicle from a residential property on Hillview Avenue in Stephenville which occurred sometime earlier that day. The stolen vehicle, a 2018 brown Mazda CX5 SUV, with NL licence plate JHC530, matched the vehicle that fled from police. An image of a similar vehicle is attached.

    The investigation is continuing.

    Bay St. George RCMP asks the public to check for possible surveillance footage of the vehicle on Thursday, May 1, 2025. Anyone having information about the current location of the stolen vehicle, the driver, or any other information about this incident is asked to contact police at 709-643-2118. To remain anonymous, contact Crime Stoppers: #SayItHere 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), visit www.nlcrimestoppers.com or use the P3Tips app.

    MIL Security OSI