Category: Weather

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy Announces $6.8 Million for Terrebonne Parish School Recovery Following Hurricane Ida

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA) announced Louisiana will receive $6,764,853.59 from the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for school recovery efforts following Hurricane Ida.
    “Education is opportunity,” said Dr. Cassidy. “This funding helps Terrebonne Parish give students the tools they need to succeed and strengthen the community for the future.”
    The Terrebonne Parish School Board will receive $6,764,853.59 in federal funding for repairs at the Louis Miller Vo-Tech campus and the School for Exceptional Children, both of which were heavily damaged during Hurricane Ida.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tillis Helps Secure Helene Recovery Funding for North Carolina

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for North Carolina Thom Tillis

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Senator Thom Tillis applauded the U.S. Economic Development Administration’s (EDA) announcement of its Fiscal Year 2025 Disaster Supplemental Notice of Funding Opportunity, which allocates approximately $1.45 billion in federal funding for disaster-impacted communities, including those in Western North Carolina affected by Helene. 

    “This critical EDA funding will help ensure that communities in Western North Carolina still reeling from the impacts of Helene have the resources they need to recover and rebuild stronger than before,” said Senator Tillis. “I remain fully committed to making sure North Carolina receives its fair share of this funding and that Western North Carolina is made whole again.” 

    The announcement follows a bipartisan letter led by Senator Tillis and members of North Carolina’s congressional delegation to the Trump Administration urging the U.S. Economic Development Administration to issue a Notice of Funding Opportunity as quickly as possible. 

    Background:

    Senator Tillis has been pushing for federal assistance for Western North Carolina since the moment Helene made landfall.

    On October 1, 2024, Senator Tillis led a bipartisan letter to Senate Appropriations Chair Patty Murray (D-WA) and Vice Chair Susan Collins (R-ME) on the devastation caused by Hurricane Helene and the urgent need to pass an appropriations package to support the millions of Americans affected by the storm.  

    On October 16, 2024, Senator Tillis led a bipartisan group of senators in urging the White House to rapidly submit a government funding request to Congress that will fully cover costs associated with clean-up and recovery following Hurricanes Helene and Milton so that affected communities could begin to heal. The Senators called for Congress to return to Washington from the October in-state work period to approve federal disaster relief legislation. 

    On October 23, 2024, The Hill published an op-ed by Senator Tillis addressed to members of Congress to step up and be proactive with long-term disaster recovery assistance.   

    On October 29, 2024, Senator Tillis and his colleagues announced plans to introduce legislation that would replenish the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program with families and small businesses across WNC unable to get loans approved until then. The Senators outlined their plan to seek passage of the legislation when Congress returned to session.

    On November 14, 2024, Senator Tillis attempted to pass legislation to replenish the SBA Disaster Loan Program through a unanimous consent request on the Senate floor, but was blocked by another Senator. 

    On November 15, 2024, Senator Tillis led a bipartisan letter to request that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) immediately send a supplemental appropriation request to Congress to support the communities we represent, which were devastated after Hurricanes Helene and Milton. The OMB sent the request to Congress a few days later.

    On November 18, 2024, Senator Tillis introduced the standalone RELIEF Act to provide Hurricane relief to small businesses impacted by Hurricane Helene.  

    On November 20, 2024, Senator Tillis called on Congress to quickly pass Hurricane Helene relief during his testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee.  

    On November 21, 2024, Senator Tillis met with Governor Cooper, Governor-Elect Stein, members of the North Carolina Congressional Delegation and the North Carolina General Assembly, and local leaders from Western North Carolina to discuss efforts to provide federal assistance to North Carolinians affected by the devastation caused by Hurricane Helene. 

    On December 5, 2024, Senator Tillis joined Fox News’ Your World with Neil Cavuto where he discussed the urgent need for Congress to provide federal assistance to North Carolinians affected by the devastation caused by Hurricane Helene.  

    On December 10, 2024, Senator Tillis hosted N.C. Senate President Pro Tempore Phil Berger, N.C. House of Representatives Speaker-elect Destin Hall, State Senators Bill Rabon and Ralph Hise, and State Representative Dudley Greene to discuss efforts to provide immediate assistance to North Carolinians affected by Hurricane Helene’s devastation.   

    On December 18, 2024, Senator Tillis committed to filibustering any continuing resolution that did not include disaster aid for Western North Carolina. 

    On December 21, 2024, Senator Tillis voted to pass a bipartisan government funding bill that included more than $100 billion in disaster relief for states and communities hit by natural disasters, including North Carolina during Hurricane Helene.

    On January 7, 2025 Senator Tillis announced $1.65 billion in Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds to help rebuild communities devastated by Hurricane Helene.  

    On January 24, 2025, Senator Tillis released a statement thanking President Trump for his visit to Western North Carolina to survey the devastation left behind by Helene. 

    On January 31, 2025, Senator Tillis introduced the Disaster Mitigation and Tax Parity Act of 2025, legislation that excludes from gross income, for income tax purposes, any qualified catastrophe mitigation payment made under a state-based catastrophe loss mitigation program. 

    On March 11, 2025 Senator Tillis reintroduced the Disaster Assistance Simplification Act, bipartisan legislation to simplify the application process for federal disaster recovery assistance. 

    On April 1, 2025 Senator Tillis sent a letter urging U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins to work with Congress to quickly distribute the more than $23 billion Congress passed in December to assist farmers, ranchers and rural Americans in responding to devastating natural disasters in 2023 and 2024.

    On April 3, 2025 Senator Tillis (R-NC) introduced the FEMA Independence Act, bipartisan legislation to restore the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as an independent cabinet-level agency and improve efficiency in federal emergency response efforts. 

    On April 24, 2025 Senator Tillis introduced the Helene Recovery Small Business Act and the Loans in Our Neighborhoods (LIONs) Act of 2025, legislation that would provide much-needed relief to small businesses as they work to recover from the devastation of Helene.

    In addition to Senator Tillis’ legislative efforts the Senator has met with local leaders, residents, and elected officials across Western North Carolina including in: Asheville, Black Mountain, Boone, Burnsville, Canton, Clyde, Fairview, Flat Rock, Hendersonville, Hot Springs, Marshall, Morganton, Spruce Pine, Swannanoa, Waynesville and Wilkesboro.   

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Nanette Barragán Leads Letter Demanding Protections for Multilingual Weather Alerts and Forecasts

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Nanette Diaz Barragán (CA-44)

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    June 4, 2025

    Rep. Nanette Barragán Leads Letter Demanding Protections for Multilingual Weather Alerts and Forecasts

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Nanette Barragán (CA-44) led a letter to National Weather Service (NWS) Director Ken Graham urging immediate action to protect and strengthen access to multilingual weather alerts and forecasts. The letter was co-led by the current and most recent chairs of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC), Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC), and Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)— key caucuses whose members represent communities most impacted by language-access failures.

    Rep. Barragán’s letter follows a recent disruption in the NWS’s multilingual alert services, which occurred when NWS allowed its contract with a third-party translation firm to lapse. Although the service has since been restored, the letter highlights that the gap placed millions of Americans with limited English proficiency at risk and exposed dangerous vulnerabilities in the country’s emergency communication system.

    “Ensuring that all Americans, regardless of the language they speak, have access to life-saving weather information is not optional—it is a core responsibility of the National Weather Service,” said Rep. Barragán. “In a nation as diverse as ours, language access must be treated as an essential component of emergency preparedness and public communication— not an expendable service.”

    In the letter, CHC, CAPAC, and CBC members posed specific questions to the NWS about how it plans to prevent future lapses, evaluate translation service providers, and ensure inclusive outreach to limited-English-proficient communities. The lawmakers also pressed for transparency on the criteria used to select which languages are included in multilingual alerts and how the agency plans to update those lists to reflect shifting demographics.

    Nearly 68 million people in the U.S. speak a language other than English at home— roughly one in five Americans, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The letter underscores that access to accurate weather information in one’s language is essential, not just during emergencies, but also for everyday decisions that affect safety, health, and economic security.

    Rep. Barragán has long championed language accessibility and continues to lead efforts in Congress to ensure that language is never a barrier to safety or survival. 

    The letter was signed by the following Tri-Caucus leaders and members: Reps. Adriano Espaillat, Judy Chu, Grace Meng, Steven Horsford, Yvette Clarke, Robin Kelly, Maxwell Frost, Debbie Dingell, Dan Goldman, Sydney Kamlager-Dove, Danny Davis, Raja Krishnamoorthi, Robert Menendez, Nydia Velázquez, Lizzie Fletcher, Kevin Mullin, Doris Matsui, Frederica Wilson, Gilbert Cisneros, Andrea Salinas, Dave Min, Emilia Sykes, Jill Tokuda, Robert Garcia, Sara Jacobs, and Senator Ben Ray Luján.

    The full letter to NWS Director Graham can be found here and below:

    Director Graham:

    We write to express our serious concern regarding the National Weather Service’s (NWS) recent decision to discontinue the translation of weather alerts and forecasts into languages other than English. This change, purportedly prompted by the lapse of a contract with a third-party provider, created a dangerous gap in access to information for the many Americans who rely on multilingual alerts and forecasts to stay safe during critical emergencies and make everyday decisions that impact their families, livelihoods, and our nation’s economy.

    We are relieved that multilingual translation services have now been restored. However, the disruption highlighted the vulnerabilities in the current system and the unacceptable risk created by lapses in language access. For tens of millions of Americans, receiving weather alerts in a language they understand can mean the difference between life and death. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 68 million people in the United States speak a language other than English at home.[1]That number has nearly tripled since 1980 and now represents one in five Americans.[2]For these individuals and families, multilingual alerts are critical for preparing for severe weather events, which increase in frequency and intensity every year. The absence of accessible warnings can—and likely will—lead to avoidable tragedy. ​

    The real-world consequences of inaccessible alerts are not hypothetical. Take, for example, the 2021 deadly tornado outbreak that hit Mayfield, Kentucky, a city with a large Spanish-speaking population. According to news coverage of the outbreak, a Spanish-speaking family in the impacted area had initially ignored a tornado alert delivered only in English because they could not read the warning.[3]It was not until the family received a Spanish-language alert that they quickly took shelter​ on the first floor of their home—shortly before the second floor of their home was wiped out. If they had not received the alert in Spanish, the outcome could have been fatal.[4]Communities across the United States — including speakers of Vietnamese, Chinese, Tagalog, Korean, French, Haitian Creole, and many African languages — also face significant barriers during emergencies when alerts are not available in their primary language. No one should be left without life-saving information simply because of the language they speak.

    Beyond the immediate risk to public safety, this abrupt lapse in translation services also risked creating operational challenges for those on the front lines of weather communication. During the lapse, local meteorologists and alert originators—who rely on NWS-provided multilingual content—were forced to fill the gap themselves. Unfortunately, on-site translation is something not many have the staff or resources to do quickly and accurately. Many communities that rely on NWS-provided multilingual content are unlikely to continue sending multilingual weather alerts should NWS’s centralized translation support halt or lapse again.

    Multilingual access to weather forecasts is not only critical during emergencies—it is equally vital for day-to-day planning and economic stability. Families rely on accurate, understandable forecasts to decide whether it’s safe to send their children to school or for parents to travel to work. Businesses across key sectors—including agriculture, construction, transportation, energy, and tourism—depend on timely weather information to operate safely and efficiently. When forecasts are delivered in clear, accessible language, they empower individuals and industries alike to make informed decisions, reduce risk, and maintain productivity. Stripping away multilingual access undermines this everyday functionality and places non-English-speaking communities and families at a great disadvantage.

    Ensuring that all Americans—regardless of the language they speak—have access to life-saving weather information is not optional; it is a core responsibility of the NWS. In a nation as diverse as ours, language access must be treated as an essential component of emergency preparedness and public communication—not an expendable service.

    In light of the recent disruption and the restoration of multilingual services, we respectfully request responses to the following questions no later than August 1, 2025, to better understand how NWS plans to ensure long-term, uninterrupted language access for all communities:

    What is the scope of the new contract for multilingual translation services? Does it include options for renewal or extension to ensure service continuity beyond the initial term?

    What safeguards has NWS put in place to prevent future gaps in translation services, particularly during contract transitions or vendor changes?

    Has NWS conducted a risk assessment or after-action review to identify what led to the previous lapse and how similar disruptions can be avoided in the future? If so, what were the findings and resulting action steps?

    Is there a contingency plan or backup system in place to provide uninterrupted translation services in the event of a contract lapse, provider failure, or other unexpected disruption?

    How does NWS evaluate and monitor the performance and reliability of its language service providers? Are there benchmarks or quality assurance measures to ensure timely and accurate translations in all covered languages?

    What criteria does NWS use to determine which languages are included in its multilingual alerts? How frequently is this list updated to reflect demographic shifts and community needs?

    How is NWS engaging with non-English-speaking communities and local emergency managers to ensure that multilingual weather communication is effective, culturally appropriate, and broadly accessible?

    We strongly urge NWS to institutionalize safeguards to prevent future interruptions to multilingual services and to treat language access as a permanent, non-negotiable aspect of public safety.

    We stand ready to support your efforts to secure the necessary resources to sustain and strengthen language access in weather communications. The safety, preparedness, and economic resilience of our communities depend on it.

    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Managing Uncertainty in Ecosystems through Scenario Planning

    Source: US Geological Survey

    Iconic giant sequoia trees in California, once thought to be nearly invincible, are now facing unprecedented threats from climate change. Drought, wildfire, and pests, all intensified by rising temperatures, have damaged or killed thousands of these ancient trees in recent years. In just the past decade, sequoias have suffered major foliage dieback in 2014, insect-related deaths in 2017, and catastrophic fires in 2020-2021.  

    Ecosystems are complex. Plants, animals, fungi, and microbes interact with one another and their surroundings (e.g., soil, air, water) in complicated ways. Traditionally, land managers tried to maintain ecosystems as they had existed in the past, but as ecosystems experience new and extreme conditions, their many inter-connected parts are responding in new ways. For example, forests are turning into grasslands or shrublands after wildfires and woody plants are moving into wetlands. How can park and forest managers deal with this type of unprecedented change?  

    One powerful tool for dealing with uncertainty is scenario planning. This approach helps managers map out a range of possible futures, including the extreme and/or unlikely ones, so that they can prepare for as much as possible. At Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks – home of many of the largest sequoias – early scenario planning has already been helpful, with proactive prescribed burns helping reduce the severity of recent wildfires. 

    North Central CASC supported researchers summarize some management considerations from a recent publication into the following three elements: 

    1. Embrace multiple possibilities, not just the most likely 
    1. Consider how ecological changes may unfold over time, not just the final outcome 
    1. Prepare for sudden or surprising disruptions 

    While climate forecasts are widely available, ecological forecasts are limited. Uncertainty won’t go away, but developing ecological forecasting tools through scenario planning can help managers navigate uncertainty to make smart investments and decisions that protect the natural benefits these ecosystems provide for recreation, clean water, and more.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Unprecedented heat in the North Atlantic Ocean kickstarted Europe’s hellish 2023 summer. Now we know what caused it

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew England, Scientia Professor and Deputy Director of the ARC Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science, UNSW Sydney

    Westend61/Getty Images

    In June 2023, a record-breaking marine heatwave swept across the North Atlantic Ocean, smashing previous temperature records.

    Soon after, deadly heatwaves broke out across large areas of Europe, and torrential rains and flash flooding devastated parts of Spain and Eastern Europe. That year Switzerland lost more than 4% of its total glacier volume, and severe bushfires broke out around the Mediterranean.

    It wasn’t just Europe that was impacted. The coral reefs of the Caribbean were bleaching under severe heat stress. And hurricanes, fuelled by ocean heat, intensified into disasters. For example, Hurricane Idalia hit Florida in August 2023 – causing 12 deaths and an estimated US$3.6 billion in damages.

    Today, in a paper published in Nature, we uncover what drove this unprecedented marine heatwave.

    A strange discovery

    In a strange twist to the global warming story, there is a region of the North Atlantic Ocean to the southeast of Greenland that has been cooling over the last 50 to 100 years.

    This so-called “cold blob” or “warming hole” has been linked to the weakening of what’s known as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation – a system of ocean currents that conveys warm water from the equator towards the poles.

    During July 2023 we met as a team to analyse this cold blob – how deep it reaches and how robust it is as a measure of the strength of the Atlantic overturning circulation – when it became clear there was a strong reversal of the historical cooling trend. The cold blob had warmed to 2°C above average.

    But was that a sign the overturning circulation had been reinvigorated? Or was something else going on?

    A layered story

    It soon became clear the anomalous warm temperatures southeast of Greenland were part of an unprecedented marine heatwave that had developed across much of the North Atlantic Ocean. By July, basin-averaged warming in the North Atlantic reached 1.4°C above normal, almost double the previous record set in 2010.

    To uncover what was behind these record breaking temperatures, we combined estimates of the atmospheric conditions that prevailed during the heatwave, such as winds and cloud cover, with ocean observations and model simulations.

    We were especially interested in understanding what was happening in the mixed upper layer of water of the ocean, which is strongly affected by the atmosphere.

    Distinct from the deeper layer of cold water, the ocean’s surface mixed layer warms as it’s exposed to more sunlight during spring and summer. But the rate at which this warming happens depends on its thickness. If it’s thick, it will warm more gradually; if it’s thin, rapid warming can ensue.

    During summer the thickness of this surface mixed layer is largely set by winds. Winds churn up the surface ocean and the stronger they are the deeper the mixing penetrates, so strong winds create a think upper layer and weak winds generate a shallower layer.

    Sea surface temperature anomaly (°C) for the month of June 2023, relative to the 1991–2020 reference period.
    Copernicus Climate Change Service/ECMWF

    Thinning at the surface

    Our new research indicates that the primary driver of the marine heatwave was record-breaking weak winds across much of the basin. The winds were at their weakest measured levels during June and July, possibly linked to a developing El Niño in the east Pacific Ocean.

    This led to by far the shallowest upper layer on record. Data from the Argo Program – a global array of nearly 4,000 robotic floats that measure the temperature and salinity in the upper 2,000 metres of the ocean – showed in some areas this layer was only ten metres deep, compared to the usual 20 to 40 metres deep.

    This caused the sun to heat the thin surface layer far more rapidly than usual.

    In addition to these short term changes in 2023, previous research has shown long-term warming associated with anthropogenic climate change is reducing the ability of winds to mix the upper ocean, causing it to gradually thin.

    We also identified a possible secondary driver of more localised warming during the 2023 marine heatwave: above-average solar radiation hitting the ocean. This could be linked in part with the introduction of new international rules in 2020 to reduce sulfate emissions from ships.

    The aim of these rules was to reduce air pollution from ship’s exhaust systems. But sulfate aerosols also reflect solar radiation and can lead to cloud formation. The resultant clearer skies can then lead to more ocean warming.

    Early warning signs

    The extreme 2023 heatwave provides a preview of the future. Marine heatwaves are expected to worsen as Earth continues to warm due to greenhouse gas emissions, with devastating impacts on marine ecosystems such as coral reefs and fisheries. This also means more intense hurricanes – and more intense land-based heatwaves.

    Right now, although the “cold blob” to the southeast of Greenland has returned, parts of the North Atlantic remain significantly warmer than the average. There is a particularly warm patch of water off the coast of the United Kingdom, with temperatures up to 4°C above normal. And this is likely priming Europe for extreme land-based heatwaves this summer.

    Global ocean temperatures on June 2 2025. A patch of abnormally warm water is visible off the southern coast of the United Kingdom.
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    To better understand, forecast and plan for the impacts of marine heatwaves, long-term ocean and atmospheric data and models, including those provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the United States, are crucial. In fact, without these data and models, our new study would not have been possible.

    Despite this, NOAA faces an uncertain future. A proposed budget for the 2026 fiscal year released by the White House last month could mean devastating funding cuts of more than US$1.5 billion – mostly targeting climate-based research and data collection.

    This would be a disaster for monitoring our oceans and climate system, right at a time when change is severe, unprecedented, and proving very costly.

    Matthew England receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Alex Sen Gupta receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Andrew Kiss receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Zhi Li receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    ref. Unprecedented heat in the North Atlantic Ocean kickstarted Europe’s hellish 2023 summer. Now we know what caused it – https://theconversation.com/unprecedented-heat-in-the-north-atlantic-ocean-kickstarted-europes-hellish-2023-summer-now-we-know-what-caused-it-258061

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Slams Lutnick for Decimation of NOAA, Illegal Cancellation of Digital Equity Act Funding, More

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ***WATCH: Senator Murray’s Q&A with Sec. Lutnick***

    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, questioned Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick at a Senate Appropriations Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee hearing on the president’s fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Department. Senator Murray slammed what’s happening at the Department and President Trump’s thoughtless tariffs, and grilled Secretary Lutnick on the Department’s decision to completely eliminate the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund in the budget request, the Department’s failure to submit required budget justifications to the Committee, and the Trump administration’s decision to cancel billions of dollars of funding from Senator Murray’s Digital Equity Act which passed with overwhelming bipartisan support.

    In opening comments, Vice Chair Murray said:

    “You know, over the law few months, I am deeply concerned because we have seen: mass firings at NOAA that are really, seriously jeopardizing the weather forecasting that we all count on; funds have been frozen; grants and contracts have been abruptly cancelled; and agencies that were created by Congress in a bipartisan way have been shuttered unilaterally—really ignoring the law—and sweeping, thoughtless tariffs that are crunching small businesses and raising costs for families.

    “And we have even seen President Trump illegally block some emergency funding House Republicans included in their yearlong CR which has cut off funding your Department counts on for trade fairness, export controls, NOAA satellites, and more.

    “So, needless to say: I don’t think any of this helps advance the Department’s mission to spur economic growth and strengthen America’s competitiveness, and it does leaves me very seriously concerned about whether the Department is going to be able to carry out its job.

    “Now, before I turn to my questions, I do want to quickly raise your decision to cancel $48 million in Tech Hub funding for the American Aerospace Materials Manufacturing Center in Eastern Washington and Idaho—alongside several other hubs. We had a chance to talk about this yesterday, but I want you to know I have a lot more questions than I think you answered.

    “This hub is really a partnership of industry, academia, the military, and governments at all levels. Cancelling that funding and further delaying progress at the tech hub really damages our defense industrial base and limits our ability to compete with China, as I told you yesterday. So, that is unacceptable, and I look forward to you resolving that as soon as possible.”

    [TRUMP REQUESTS TO ELIMINATE SALMON RECOVERY PROGRAM]

    Senator Murray began by explaining how important NOAA is to our nation’s fisheries and how important salmon are to Washington state’s way of life, calling out President Trump’s request to zero out funding for a key salmon program: “Now, I do want to ask you while you’re here, one of the agencies you oversee is NOAA. It is absolutely essential to supporting sustainable fisheries, protecting our natural resources, and making sure that we have accurate weather forecasts. Cutting away at NOAA—as you have been doing and as your budget proposes to do further—is going to do serious harm. Among other cuts, your budget would completely eliminate the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund. That would be a catastrophic failure—it would abandon our communities, our Tribes, and our industries who rely on salmon. And across the Pacific Northwest, salmon are not just fish—they are a way of life, and they are foundational to our economy and our culture. So, I would like you to explain quickly why you proposed that cut, and I want to ask you, did you consult with our Tribes or fishing communities who count on it before making that decision?”

    Secretary Lutnick replied, “The issues are that we do the same thing in multiple ways in NOAA. We have not cut any hydrologists, which are the people who study the water.”

    “You eliminated the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund. That is what I’m precisely asking you about. Did you talk to our tribes or fishermen before you did that?” Senator Murray pressed.

    “Of course,” responded Secretary Lutnick.

    Senator Murray said, “Well, I have spoken to the tribes, I’ve talked to the scientists, I’ve talked to the fishermen. No one—no one—in the Pacific Northwest supports those cuts. And I want everyone to know I will not vote for an appropriations bill that eliminates that funding.”

    [LACK OF TRANSPARENCY]

    Senator Murray then asked about the Department failure to present full budget justifications to Congress, “Now, staying on NOAA facilities like the Northwest Fishery Science Center, which is in Seattle, are really in dire need of investment. For this reason, this CJS Appropriations Subcommittee has long included language requiring the Secretary of Commerce to include the cost estimates for NOAA construction projects of more than $5 million, in the congressional budget justification materials, as well as the 5-year cost estimates for those projects. Are you aware of that requirement?”

    “My understanding is we filed our budget according to the CR with exact precision,” Secretary Lutnick replied.

    “Well, have you submitted the Department’s FY26 congressional budget justification? It did not include the list of projects, which it’s required to do,” asked Senator Murray.

    Secretary Lutnick continued to dodge, “My understanding is the CR had certain obligations for us, and we followed them with precision. That’s my understanding.”

    Senator Murray pushed back, “Well, the fact is that you are required by law to submit the NOAA PAC [Procurement, Acquisition and Construction] construction list to Congress with the budget. That wasn’t done. Can we get that list by Friday?”

    “I’ll happily take a look at it. And if it’s required, of course, I will send it,” said Secretary Lutnick.

    Senator Murray responded, “Okay. It is required.”

    [ATTACKS ON DIGITAL EQUITY ACT]

    Senator Murray turned her questions about President Trump’s recent announcement he is illegally planning to cancel Digital Equity Act grants, “Mr. Secretary, I wrote a law, it was called the Digital Equity Act, to help close the digital divide—and it passed with overwhelming bipartisan support. Now, the Administration has arbitrarily cancelled billions of dollars for the Digital Equity Act, claiming it’s unconstitutional. This is a program that every state, Democrat and Republican, has applied for—every single state in the country. It distributes laptops in Iowa. It helped people get back online after Hurricane Helene washed away computers and phones in western North Carolina. It’s a program in rural Alabama where they taught seniors—including some who have never used a computer—how to use the internet. I want to ask you, has the Supreme Court declared this bipartisan law unconstitutional? Has any judge?”

    Secretary Lutnick sidestepped the question, “It will go through the courts and the courts will decide.”

    “No one has declared this unconstitutional—no one. Your job, Mr. Secretary, is to carry out the law that Congress has passed. You don’t get to keep laptops from our kids, because the President doesn’t care about kids in rural communities. My advice to you here—it is a law, it is not unconstitutional, and I would urge you to get those digital equity dollars out the door and save everyone the legal fees, because the law is very clear,” emphasized Senator Murray.

    [TRUMP’S THOUGHTLESS TRADE WAR]

    Senator Murray concluded by saying, “I just have a few seconds left, and I before I finish, I do want to underscore my state, Washington state, is one of the most trade dependent states in the nation. 40% of our jobs are connected to international trade and President Trump and your Department continue to pursue this chaotic tariff policy that businesses in my state stand to lose billions of dollars. I have heard from businesses across my state, from manufacturers, from small retailers. They are struggling to absorb the cost increases on everything from napkins to car parts. And this uncertainty has really left them scrambling which has delayed investments and caused serious supply chain disruptions, especially at our ports. These actions, in addition, have really harmed our relationships with our key allies like Canada. I heard Senator Collins here earlier talking about Maine being their neighbor—it is our neighbor in Washington state. They are one of our biggest trading partners. And let me be clear, this is causing chaos, disruption, anger. And we have got to get this resolved because farmers, our people and our small businesses and our communities, are really hurting.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Woodside’s North West Shelf approval is by no means a one-off. Here are 6 other giant gas projects to watch

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samantha Hepburn, Professor, Deakin Law School, Deakin University

    GREG WOOD/AFP via Getty Images

    The federal government’s decision to extend the life of Woodside’s North West Shelf gas plant in Western Australia has been condemned as a climate disaster.

    The gas lobby claims more gas is needed to secure energy supplies, pointing to predicted gas shortages in parts of Australia in the short term. But given most proposed gas projects are directed at the export market, the problem is likely to persist.

    And the science is clear: no fossil fuel projects can be opened if the world is to avoid catastrophic climate change.

    Despite this, a slew of polluting gas projects are either poised to begin operating in Australia, or lie firmly in the sights of industry.

    How Australia’s gas contributes to climate change

    Gas production in Australia harms the climate in two ways.

    The first is via “fugitive” emissions – leaks and unintentional releases that occur when gas is being extracted, processed and transported. These emissions are typically methane, which traps more heat in the atmosphere per molecule than carbon dioxide.

    Fugitive emissions count towards Australia’s greenhouse gas accounts, comprising about 6% of our total emissions.

    So, government approval for new gas projects undermines Australia’s commitment to reaching net-zero emissions. Labor enshrined this goal in legislation in its previous term of government, and all states and territories have also adopted it.

    The second climate harm occurs when Australia’s gas is burned for energy overseas. Those emissions do not count towards our national emissions accounts, but they substantially contribute to global warming.

    Under national environment law, the federal government is not required to consider the potential harm a project might cause to the global climate. This loophole means fossil fuel developments can continue to win government backing.

    Below, I outline six of the biggest gas projects Australia has in the pipeline.

    1. Barossa Gas Project

    This A$5.6 billion project by energy giant Santos is located in the Timor Sea, about 300km north of Darwin. The Australian government’s offshore energy regulator approved it in April this year.

    The project will extract gas from the Barossa field and transport it to a liquified natural gas (LNG) facility in Darwin for processing and export.

    The venture would reportedly be among the worst polluting oil and gas projects in the world. On one estimate, it would release about 380 million tonnes of climate pollution over its 25-year life.

    2. Scarborough Pluto Train 2

    Pluto Train 2 is an extension of Woodside’s existing Scarborough project, centred around a gas field about 375km off WA’s Pilbara coast. A 430-kilometre pipeline would connect that gas to a second LNG train at a facility near Karratha. “Train” refers to the unit in a plant that turns natural gas into liquid.

    The project has federal and state approval. It is about 80% complete and scheduled to begin operating by next year. According to Climate Analytics, the expansion would create about 9.2 million tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent each year.

    3. Surat Phase 2

    This coal seam gas project in Gladstone, Queensland, would be operated by Arrow energy – a joint venture between Shell and PetroChina.

    It involves substantially expanding existing gas fields by building up to 450 new production wells. The project is expected to supply 130 million cubic feet of gas each day at its peak, and has been opposed by environment groups.

    4. Narrabri Gas Project

    This $3.6 billion Santos project in northwest New South Wales involves drilling up to 850 coal seam gas wells over 95,000 hectares. The National Native Title Tribunal last month ruled leases for the project could be granted, leaving Santos only a few regulatory barriers to clear.

    Environmental groups and Traditional Owners say the project threatens water resources, biodiversity and Indigenous sites. However, the tribunal found the project’s benefits to energy reliability outweighed those concerns.

    5. Beetaloo Basin

    The Beetaloo Basin is located 500km southeast of Darwin. It covers 28,000 kilometres and is estimated to contain up to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas. A number of companies are vying for the right to develop the huge resource.

    It is predicted to emit up to 1.2 billion tonnes over 25 years. A CSIRO report says Beetaloo could be tapped without adding to Australia’s net emissions. However, experts say the report was too optimistic and relies far too heavily on carbon offsets.

    6. Browse Basin

    Browse Basin, 425 kilometres north of Broome off WA, is considered Australia’s biggest reserve of untapped conventional gas.

    Woodside plans to develop the Browse gas fields, but the area is remote and difficult to access. According to the ABC, Woodside’s North West Shelf project is considered the last hope for extracting the valuable resource.

    Environmental groups say the project, if approved, would emit 1.6 billion tonnes of climate pollution – three times Australia’s current annual emissions.

    The basin is also located near the pristine Scott Reef, a significant coral reef ecosystem.

    A major disconnect

    The projects listed above, if they proceed, weaken Australia’s efforts to reach its emission reduction goals. And their overall climate impact is truly frightening.

    The re-elected Labor government has pledged to revisit attempts to reform national environment laws. This presents a prime opportunity to ensure the climate harms of fossil fuel projects are key to environmental decision making.

    Samantha Hepburn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Woodside’s North West Shelf approval is by no means a one-off. Here are 6 other giant gas projects to watch – https://theconversation.com/woodsides-north-west-shelf-approval-is-by-no-means-a-one-off-here-are-6-other-giant-gas-projects-to-watch-257899

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Skipping straws, biking to work: do our small actions still matter for the planet?

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Soon after I first joined Greenpeace in the 2010s, I realized I had a steep learning curve ahead of me. I just didn’t expect that learning eco-conscious living (weighing the environmental impact of everyday choices such as what to eat, bring, do, or throw away) would feel like such a crash course. Back then it was about walking the talk, as is expected of everyone in environmental campaigning. It felt mandatory, and I often felt obliged to be performative.

    I still remember where the unease came from. I’d known quite a bit about how massive the climate crisis was and how deeply it’s tied to systems that were already failing us in the Global South. Basically, we’re just trying to survive the climate crisis and all other symptoms of unjust, oppressive systems, in an economy that limits our choices (do you know how insufferable it is to commute in Metro Manila, how dangerous it could be to bike, or how largely inaccessible and expensive plant-based meals are?) And yet somehow, we are the ones expected to go the extra mile to save the planet? That didn’t sit right with me. 

    This conflictedness only deepened as I learned more about the “grand narrative of guilt” pushed by corporations. These are tropes that are, when placed alongside reality, paradoxical at best (think recycling and carbon footprints when only 9% of plastic waste has ever been recycled, and just 57 companies were responsible for 80% of global fossil fuel and cement-related CO₂ emissions from 2016 to 2022). 

    There should be no doubt that these narratives were designed to deflect responsibility for corporations’ massive environmental, social, cultural, and economic impacts and shift the attention onto us instead. After years of exposure, this messaging sticks in one’s head like the voice of a controlling, gaslighting ex: How much plastic packaging is in that bag of groceries? Was that vacation really worth the environmental cost of flying? You say you care about the planet, so why are you still eating meat?

    Surely we wouldn’t want to play into the corporate guilt-tripping narrative. At one point, I wondered if the best act of defiance might be to live our most convenient lives unapologetically and focus all our energy on actions that more directly contribute to driving system change. By this, I mean civic and public engagement efforts such as signing petitions, joining protests, or voting for environmentally conscious leaders.

    Yet one of our constant reminders at Greenpeace is this: every action counts. And each time I am reminded, I don’t doubt it. Perhaps because even though I know the narrative of individual responsibility is marred by greedy intentions, it still wouldn’t feel right to dismiss personal action completely. I’ve seen small actions spark change in people again and again, from a community leader forming a flood response group, to a youth activist organizing artivism workshops or meetups for exchanging climate stories. 

    Over time, I realized personal actions are not meant to carry the weight of the world, just as they’re not the end goal. Even so, when done consistently and taken as part of something larger, they are powerful and can push the needle toward systemic change, in more ways than one. Here are some little epiphanies on my end:

    Habits can start or hasten culture shifts. Everyday habits like refusing single-use plastic, choosing to bike to work, or eating less meat can shift culture. Culture shifts don’t always have to start in boardrooms or policy halls. In fact, they usually begin in communities, where an individual or a group quietly leads by example, and challenges what’s normal. 

    A gateway to deeper engagement. Lifestyle shifts can lead to deeper involvement in the advocacy, especially as people seek like-minded friends and learn more about the issues. And the more they know about the campaigns, the more confident they become and the more willing to share their time and energy to the cause.

    Walking the talk as a strategy. For many of us in environmental campaigning, walking the talk is not just a moral stance. It is a strategic choice that strengthens our credibility and demonstrates integrity. It shows that our demands for change are reflected in the way we live and act. This kind of alignment matters, and is also why we call on the national government to turn their climate pronouncements on the international stage into consistent and concrete action at home.

    Igniting creative resistance. The saying “necessity is the mother of invention” holds true in movement building as well. When faced with challenges, including environmental ones, people find ways to be resourceful. They collaborate, adapt, and respond. And whether intentionally or not, many end up contributing through the skills, talents, and tools they have in support of collective action.

    Reclaiming identity through agency. Realizing one’s agency often begins at a personal level. Along the way, individual actions can become a means to reconnect with culture and history, to affirm one’s values, and to commit to the kind of person one aspires to be. It also becomes a way of unlearning environmentally harmful practices promoted by corporations. For example, sari-sari store (small neighborhood store) owners who joined Greenpeace’s Kuha Sa Tingi project reconnected with the original Filipino “tingi” culture (the practice of buying goods in small, affordable, quantities) through reuse and refill systems.

    Making power listen. Collective personal actions can create pressure for decision-makers, institutions, and even corporations to act. They may not replace structural change, but they send clear signals, if not outright communicate, public demand for solutions which in due course can unlock systemic change. 


    You might want to check out Greenpeace Philippines’ petition called Courage for Climate, a drive in support of real policy and legal solutions in the pursuit of climate justice.

    Courage for Climate

    The climate crisis may seem hopeless, but now is the time for courage, not despair. Join Filipino communities taking bold action for our planet.

    Make an Act of Courage Today!

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy – A10-0092/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy

    (2024/2105(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ (COM(2024)0450),

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on EU border regions: living labs of European integration[1],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion[2],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 15 March 2023 on targets and tools for a smart rural Europe[3],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 1 December 2022 on enhancing Cohesion Policy support for regions with geographic and demographic handicaps  (Article 174 TFEU)[4],

     having regard to Articles 39, 174, 175 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[10],

     having regard to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds[11],

     having regard to Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services,

     having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2017 on women and their roles in rural areas[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the role of cohesion policy in promoting innovative and smart transformation and regional ICT connectivity[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2022 on a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas – towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[15],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 June 2021 entitled ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040’ (COM(2021)0345),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

     having regard to the Commission report of 17 June 2020 on the impact of demographic change (COM(2020)0241),

     having regard to the Commission green paper of 27 January 2021 on ageing – fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations (COM(2021)0050),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 – Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 November 2021 entitled ‘EU Soil Strategy for 2030 – Reaping the benefits of healthy soils for people, food, nature and climate’ (COM(2021)0699),

     having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018,

     having regard to general recommendation No 34 (2016) of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the rights of rural women, adopted on 7 March 2016,

     having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the EU action plan for organic agriculture[16],

     having regard to the study commissioned by Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development entitled ‘The future of the European Farming Model: Socio-economic and territorial implications of the decline in the number of farms and farmers in the EU’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in April 2022,

     having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2018 on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives[19],

     having regard to the Commission report of August 2019 entitled ‘Evaluation of the impact of the CAP on generational renewal, local development and jobs in rural areas’[20],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 26 January 2022 entitled ‘A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[21],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘How post-27 LEADER and CLLD programming could contribute to better implementation of the long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[22],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas’[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on generational renewal in the EU farms of the future[24],

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market, published in April 2024,

     having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development, entitled ‘EU Cohesion Policy in non-urban areas’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in September 2020,

     having regard to the declaration on the future of rural areas and rural development policy in the European Union, adopted by the Rural Pact Coordination Group on 12 December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0092/2025),

    A. whereas, currently, 137 million European citizens – nearly one in three – live in rural areas, which account for approximately 83 % of the EU’s territory; whereas one third of the population of rural areas lives in a border region; whereas 77 % of land used for farming (134 million hectares) and 79 % of forest (148 million hectares) are located in rural areas;

    B. whereas according to Eurostat, average income in rural areas is 87.5 % of average income in urban areas;

    C. whereas there are still disparities in cohesion policy funding between urban and rural areas, with urban areas receiving three times more cohesion funding than rural areas[25];

    D. whereas since 1991, in rural areas, the LEADER method, subsequently covered by the community-led local development policy instrument (CLLD) through local action groups (LAGs), has demonstrated that it can mobilise and empower local actors around innovative and tailored strategies;

    E. whereas rural areas are a cornerstone of the European economy, home to many ‘hidden European Champions’, and are integral to Europe’s cultural diversity; whereas they are essential for food production and security, serving as guardians of our landscapes, living rural heritage, social and cultural traditions; whereas they play a key role in promoting the strategic autonomy of the EU through the agricultural sector, which remains a strategic priority of the EU; whereas rural areas symbolise many of the aspects that make Europe attractive and liveable;

    F. whereas the promotion of minority languages can enhance awareness of local specificities, increasing the attractiveness of tourism and fostering economic activities linked to culture, education, craftsmanship and traditional products;

    G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a shift in perception among the public, who have recognised the potential of rural areas as a solution to the challenges arising from crises by providing a safer, more sustainable and reliable living environment;

    H. whereas cohesion policy funds alone cannot answer the increasing needs and challenges faced by rural areas in the EU; whereas greater synergies and complementarities with other EU policies, in particular with the common agricultural policy (CAP), must be ensured in order to maximise the impact of investments in rural areas, advancing the modernisation of agriculture and the development of essential services and infrastructure;

    I. whereas over 40 % of land in rural areas is used for agriculture yet sadly the contribution of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to rural regions has decreased, both in economic and employment terms, to 12 % of all jobs and 4 % of gross value added;

    J. whereas Parliament’s study on the future of the European farming model notes that the EU could lose 6.4 million farms by 2040, falling from 10.3 million in 2016 to 3.9 million;

    K. whereas, in accordance with Articles 174, 175 and 349 TFEU, the EU aims to reduce development gaps between the different regions and coordinate its policies, including using the European Structural and Investment Funds to achieve the objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion, with a particular focus on rural areas;

    L. whereas all regions must remain eligible for funding in future cohesion policy, even strong regions facing significant transformation challenges;

    M. whereas regional actors have a deeper understanding of which projects should be prioritised for support through cohesion funds, ensuring that resources are allocated in a way that best meets the specific needs of their territories;

    N. whereas cohesion policy funds to rural areas should be further simplified with the objective of reducing administrative burdens, not only for the final beneficiaries but also for the relevant authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    O. whereas rural areas in particular are facing demographic and structural challenges, such as ageing, population decline, brain drain, growing inequalities between men and women, disparities with urban areas, structural changes in the agricultural and forestry sectors, the consequences of natural disasters, the increase of energy and transport prices, a lack of services and infrastructure, in particular for vulnerable people and persons with disabilities, the impact of these challenges on income level and on the labour market, with a consequent higher unemployment rate, and a persistently large digital gap;

    P. whereas demographic challenges are particularly acute in the EU farming population, with the majority of farmers being over 50 years old;

    Q. whereas strengthening cohesion in rural areas requires the adoption of measures and initiatives aimed at supporting families, also by helping young people and parents in balancing family and professional life, thereby contributing to the sustainable development of those communities;

    R. whereas Europe’s rural areas and European farmers already play a crucial role in the climate transition, as they are the most affected by climate change both economically and socially, and whereas thanks to their efforts, some of the adverse impact of agriculture on the environment has been significantly reduced over the years; whereas the EU agricultural sector significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 24 % between 1990 and 2021 and it is responsible for 72 % of renewable energy production and holds 78 % of the untapped potential;

    S. whereas demographic changes do not affect all countries and regions equally, but have a greater impact on less developed regions, as they exacerbate existing territorial and social imbalances; whereas solutions must be found for regional imbalances and for the uneven pace of convergence between regions, some of which remain stuck in a development trap; whereas less developed regions require particular attention and support, as is the case with the EU’s rural areas and the outermost regions, due to their specific characteristics;

    T. whereas the overall percentage of the population living in rural areas has fallen significantly across the EU over the past 50 years, particularly as a result of ageing and emigration; whereas the highest percentage of people over the age of 65 is found in rural areas[26]; whereas estimates suggest that by 2033 the population of Europe’s rural areas will have shrunk by 30 million people compared with 1993;

    U. whereas the lack of or poor access to healthcare, water services, affordable housing, transport, digital infrastructure, education, financial services and recreational and cultural activities worsen the reputation of regions, and particularly rural, borderland, inland, cross-border, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as places to live and work, especially for women, young people, ageing populations and minorities; whereas cross-border areas are particularly affected by the lack of regional connectivity in terms of transport and digital infrastructure; whereas rural areas are strongly affected by the lack of stable employment opportunities, which forces young people, in particular women, to migrate;

    V. whereas the availability and quality of water play a critical role in ensuring equitable, sustainable and productive rural livelihoods;

    W. whereas greater emphasis should be placed on preventive measures to strengthen the resilience of Europe’s rural areas to natural disasters; whereas an integrated approach to water resources management is essential both to prevent floods and to cope with droughts, in particular through a coherent use of EU funds;

    X. whereas rural areas, especially in eastern, southern and Mediterranean Europe, are the most directly affected by energy poverty and face specific challenges related to desertification, forest fires, climate change and its associated asymmetrical risks, water resource scarcity and weak infrastructure, which require a targeted approach within cohesion policy;

    Y. whereas rural areas are home to the majority of the EU’s biodiversity, yet protected habitats and species remain in poor conservation status and continue to decline due to climate change and the degradation of soil and water quality, with a negative impact on natural resources; whereas biodiversity loss has severe economic consequences for the agricultural sector and negatively affects the attractiveness of rural tourism;

    Z. whereas the clean energy transition, the diversification of the economy and the expansion of renewable energy sources present significant opportunities for rural and less developed regions, allowing them to leverage their natural resources and geographic advantages and to exploit their full potential for the future production of renewable energy;

    AA. whereas these areas bear the brunt of depopulation, and whereas it is mainly young people leaving them as a result of job shortages and dim career prospects, and this fuels the rural exodus, resulting in an increased share of older residents and a greater risk of social isolation;

    AB. whereas rural areas have the highest share (12.6 %) of young people aged 15-29[27] not in employment, education or training (NEETs);

    AC. whereas generational renewal is one of the nine key objectives of the CAP;

    AD. whereas farms, dairy farms, wine-growers and olive oil producers across Europe go out of business every day, and few farms like these are managed by farmers below the age of 35; whereas the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities and also risks for economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as for European agriculture;

    AE. whereas the way we produce food has shaped the landscapes that define Europe; whereas dynamic rural areas foster quality food production which in turn supports their economy; whereas reinvigorating these connections between food and territory and revitalising rural areas will be essential for the future of farming in Europe;

    AF. whereas a robust cohesion policy is essential to guaranteeing the effective application of the ‘right to stay’ principle in rural areas, which requires action on many levels, including by fostering economic stability and preventing depopulation; stresses that ensuring access to a basic set of public goods and services for all citizens, especially young people, regardless of where they live, is crucial; whereas it is necessary, to this end, to promote targeted investment in infrastructure, services, education, and innovation;

    1. Welcomes the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ and agrees with its overarching objectives;

    2. Takes note of the four areas of action underpinning the rural vision and the 30 actions making up the EU rural action plan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to place its implementation at the top of the agenda;

    3. Stresses the key role rural areas have to play in shaping the economic models and the social and territorial organisation of the various Member States, particularly as the cradle of agricultural and food production, but also as custodians of an irreplaceable cultural and landscape heritage; notes, however, that their significance remains under-appreciated and inadequately funded; believes that the EU has a duty to push for a true revival and regeneration of these areas, going to extra lengths to endow our rural areas with the right tools to overcome the considerable long-term challenges they are facing and which are having an ever greater impact on regional competitiveness and social cohesion, in order to preserve European diversity and ensure that the Union’s progress does not come at the expense of rural areas and their populations;

    4. Considers it important to develop short supply chains and to promoting the use of labelling schemes to acknowledge the quality and variety of traditional products from rural areas; stresses that public canteens, such as school and hospital canteens, can play a significant role in the development of short agrifood supply chains;

    5. Recognises the key role of small and medium-sized towns as development centres in rural regions and calls on the Commission and the Member States to specifically strengthen their economic, social and infrastructural functions, revitalise city centres, better utilise synergies between rural areas and large metropolitan regions, and ensure more balanced territorial development;

    6. Stresses the urgent need for measures to combat poverty in rural areas by developing targeted strategies to improve social security, create economic opportunities, and support particularly vulnerable populations, in order to break the cycle of poverty;

    7. Stresses that rural areas are key players in mitigating the effects of climate change; emphasises the need for increased investment in research and innovation for rural areas, particularly in the fields of sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, digital transformation and innovative mobility solutions, to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of rural regions and create energy self-sufficiency and new employment opportunities; encourages the sustainable management of forests and the prevention of forest fires, also by promoting the use of biomass which is gathered without harm to forest ecosystems;

    8. Calls for the expansion of renewable energy in rural areas based on their potential to reduce energy costs with the involvement of civil society and local communities; emphasises the need for financial incentives, measures such as renewable energy communities and simplified administrative processes to boost regional energy independence and sustainability while avoiding negative impacts on food production, land availability and prices, as well as on social cohesion; calls for a dedicated financing mechanism for the installation of photovoltaic, wind and other renewable energy sources;

    9. Calls for increased support for the preservation, restoration and conversion of older buildings, including historical buildings, churches and other places of worship, sports halls and schools in rural areas to improve energy efficiency, sustainability and safety; urges investments in the modernisation of public infrastructure while preserving historical structures where possible; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote targeted policies that support the renovation and energy-efficient retrofitting of rural housing, financial incentives for first-time rural homebuyers, in particular for young people and families, and the development of sustainable and affordable housing projects adapted to the needs of local communities that contribute to the attractiveness and revitalisation of these regions;

    10. Asks the Commission to assess and to implement Article 174, 175 and 349 TFEU in full to close the development gap among regions, including in relation to infrastructure, and to see to it that all EU policies not only apply the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, but also that they follow a more assertive ‘promote cohesion’ approach wherever possible, particularly in rural areas and in areas particularly affected by industrial transition, demographic challenges and depopulation, and those at risk of depopulation, such as outermost regions, islands, border, cross-border and mountain regions;

    11. Calls on the Commission to devise a rural strategy for the post-2027 programming period; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure the incorporation of a rural dimension in relevant policies and to make sure that the strategy promotes the economic and social development of rural areas and to allocate specific resources to the modernisation of agriculture, supporting rural small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-up and promoting short supply chains in order to make rural areas more connected, competitive, resilient and attractive to young people and investors, thereby ensuring balanced and sustainable development in the long term and enhancing the quality of life; stresses, in this regard, the importance of having a truly effective rural proofing mechanism at EU level so to assess the potential of all relevant policies and to mitigate any possible negative impacts they may have on rural areas;

    12. Stresses that in order to ensure the long-term prosperity of rural areas and support a strong agricultural sector to maintain this prosperity in rural areas, it is essential to strengthen the synergies between EU Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research and innovation programme, and the CAP in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    13. Calls on the Commission to present, by 2027, a report on the application of the rural proofing mechanism to policies and interventions at EU level, as well as the results obtained;

    14. Calls on the Commission to prioritise focused investments and policy measures to support the transition to a new generation of farmers in order to modernise EU agriculture and create more opportunities in rural areas;

    15. Highlights the crucial role of cohesion policy for the development of rural areas as a decentralised, powerful tool for economic and social development, allowing all regions to tackle these specific challenges of the Union; underlines in this regard that cohesion policy should continue to be a key pillar of the MFF post-2027, with an allocation that is maintained at a minimum threshold equivalent to the current MFF 2021-2027 levels, ensuring its fundamental role in reducing regional disparities and shaping a more resilient and competitive Europe that leaves no one behind; calls for the option of providing adequate resources for rural and mountainous areas to be explored in the next cohesion policy framework and complementing GDP at regional level with other indicators; recalls that the fundamental principles of cohesion policy, such as partnership, multi-level-governance, a place-based approach and shared management, must be respected in order to foster development and to meet the specific needs and challenges of rural areas with a particular focus on tools supporting sustainable growth and development and youth and female employment, including among victims of violence against women, and improving services and infrastructure;

    16. Believes that smart specialisation and economic diversification strategies could promote more opportunities in rural areas; emphasises, in particular, the key importance of integrating the concept of smart villages into cohesion policy and of explicitly supporting the development of smart villages, with flexible funding and an integrated approach, as an innovative tool for enhancing the quality of life and revitalising rural areas and services through digital and social innovation and initiatives such as the promotion of working spaces in order to attract workers, including remote workers, and to contribute to revitalising local economies;

    17. Encourages initiatives that promote economic and social sustainability, including support for rural entrepreneurship, rural tourism and new business models based on innovation and digitalisation;

    18. Calls on the Commission to ensure a strong and holistic focus on the development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, in such a way that all policy initiatives are consistent with the goal of reducing territorial disparities; believes it is essential to devise long-term strategies to support rural areas, centred on the principles of cohesion and sustainability and providing the necessary tools to address demographic, social and economic challenges, in order to ensure that these areas do not become forgotten places, but rather key players in Europe’s future without needing to continually depend on extraordinary measures; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to support the significant development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, and to commit to setting up local info points and offering a platform and financial support to enable Member States to exchange information and best practice on funding possibilities, with a view to providing local authorities with effective support and assisting with resource management and the implementation of development initiatives; emphasises, furthermore, that the effective participation of regional, local and rural authorities and a strong administrative capacity are crucial for the reduction of the excessive administrative burden and complex requirements for recipients and for the effective execution of cohesion policy funds; highlights that multi-funding still appears difficult in some countries and calls on the Commission to enhance complementarities between the EAFRD and cohesion policy funds;

    19. Stresses the need for an integrated European strategy for the revitalisation of rural areas, including through the development of bio-districts, recognising their potential to diversify the rural economy by targeting fiscal, economic and social measures to maintain the active population; also highlights the value of introducing incentives for the relocation of health, education and public administration professionals, as well as the importance of partnerships between local authorities and the private sector for the creation of new jobs;

    20. Underlines that expanding integrated territorial investment (ITI) plans and unlocking their full potential could establish them as a cornerstone for integrated regional, local, and rural development; emphasises that strengthening ITIs’ role in rural areas is essential to foster territorial cohesion, enhance connectivity and drive inclusive economic growth by supporting key sectors such as agriculture, rural SMEs, tourism and renewable energy; calls, furthermore, for greater flexibility in ITI implementation, increased financial allocations and reinforced synergies with other EU funding mechanisms, including LEADER and CLLD, key instruments for fostering bottom-up participatory rural development and for keeping and restoring living and thriving local rural economies, to maximise impact and actively involve regional and local authorities and civil society in line with the partnership principle;

    21. Suggests that all relevant Directorates-General of the Commission conduct a territorial impact assessment of their respective policies at least twice per programming period; believes that these evaluations would establish a more precise baseline and identify ways to integrate the characteristics of rural areas into EU policies more effectively;

    22. Calls on the Member States to make full use of all measures supporting rural, inland, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as cross-border regions and regions at the EU’s external borders, including those bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine which are most affected by the war, to mitigate economic disruption and to secure their future and prosperity; welcomes the new BRIDGEforEU Regulation and asks the Member States to implement it, enhancing the cooperation between cross-border regions to enable economies of scale when providing basic services and infrastructure in the rural areas affected;

    23. Stresses the diversity of the EU’s rural areas, for which the long-term vision calls for solutions that are tailored to the needs and resources of rural areas while reinforcing long-term strategies for sustainable growth; underlines in this regard the need to fully involve local and regional authorities, which are best placed to identify current challenges and needs at the regional and local levels; highlights the importance of maintaining a decentralised model for the programming and implementation of cohesion policy based on the principle of partnership and multi-level governance and a place-based bottom-up approach; calls, therefore, for the strong involvement of regional and local authorities to ensure more direct access for local and regional authorities to cohesion policy funds, reducing bureaucratic complexity and shortening disbursement times, through more streamlined procedures, intuitive digital platforms and increased technical support for local beneficiaries; proposes encouraging the use of pre-financing and advance payment schemes for small projects in rural areas;

    24. Stresses that centralisation may lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays in fund absorption, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of EU investments in rural development;

    25. Highlights that the management approach to rural areas’ development policies needs to be coordinated, integrated and multi-sectoral in its implementation and that reinforcing a multi-level approach in line with the subsidiarity principle is essential to ensure its success;

    26. Highlights that resilience is essential to enable authorities at local and regional levels to mitigate, adapt to and recover from sudden challenges, ensuring community well-being, security and long-term sustainability;

    27. Calls for an adequate share of cohesion policy funding to be allocated to the border regions and calls in this regard for the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) to be granted a higher degree of autonomy in selecting projects and using funds, in particular by designating EGTCs as managing authorities for Interreg programmes, strengthening their institutional and financial capacity; recommends furthermore that EGTCs be granted a more significant role in achieving policy objective 5, namely bringing Europe closer to its citizens;

    28. Underlines the need to strengthen democratic and political participation in rural areas by promoting active civic engagement and digital tools; calls on the Commission to support initiatives that foster local democratic processes to improve cohesion between urban and rural regions;

    29. Highlights the need for rural areas to be able to provide essential high-quality services of general interest to the public to improve their livelihood and to harness their strengths to achieve sustainable development, for which they should receive sufficient financial support; underlines, to that end, the need to provide equal access, in particular to vulnerable people and people with disabilities, to all healthcare services, transport and connectivity services, including innovative mobility solutions, specific plans for affordable housing, water services, education and training services, digital infrastructure, and other basic services such as postal and banking services, ensuring their accessibility and affordability in order to guarantee proper living conditions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate access to funding and tailored support measures for social economy initiatives that address local needs and contribute to regional development and, at the same time, to reinforce the financial support offered to rural SMEs, in particular through easing access to financial resources, cooperatives and local value chains that foster economic diversification;

    30. Stresses the strategic importance of water resources for rural areas and highlights the need to provide sufficient resources, under the cohesion policy and in rural development programmes, for maintaining and upgrading the water network; recommends, in particular, the inclusion of measures to combat leakage, improve the efficiency of supply systems and promote the sustainable use of water resources in rural areas;

    31. Regards it as essential to place greater emphasis on preventive measures to enhance the resilience of Europe’s rural areas in the face of natural disasters; believes that an integrated approach to managing water resources is paramount in order to simultaneously prevent floods and tackle drought – two growing threats in many rural regions – within both agriculture and the food sector; acknowledges that depending on the context, building dams and reservoirs or upgrading existing facilities is a priority, while striking a balance between built infrastructure and relatively low cost soft measures, not least because they can be a clean source of energy; notes that although cohesion policy already supports initiatives in this area, additional projects and increased investment are needed, in line with national and regional risk management strategies, to ensure that rural areas are better prepared for, and able to withstand, climate-related extreme weather events;

    32. Stresses the growing threat of climate risks such as natural disasters, desertification and water scarcity for many rural areas in Europe, particularly in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean basin; calls on the Commission to promote forward looking adaptation strategies at national, regional and local levels, including water management, resilient infrastructure and disaster preparedness, and calls for investments in innovative water infrastructure, such as the reuse of treated wastewater and smart irrigation systems, and the construction of reservoirs for rainwater harvesting;

    33. Notes that rural areas suffer from limited access to essential healthcare services, with a shortage of facilities and medical personnel, and therefore calls for improved access to quality healthcare, including mental health services;

    34. Calls on the Member States and local authorities to safeguard essential services that are vital to the development of rural areas by refraining from imposing economic constraints on healthcare in rural areas, as this would lead to the closure, or a fall in the number of, first-aid facilities and basic hospital structures, which should be strengthened;

    35. Calls on the Commission and Member States to develop a plan for mobile medical units and for telemedicine, the strengthening of medical services including medical spa services, community health nurses and digital health solutions and incentives for doctors working in rural and remote areas;

    36. Calls on the Commission to incorporate specific measures targeting areas identified as rural into its eHealth strategy, in order to provide local healthcare units with practical support for technological upgrades, and to promote the services such units offer; stresses that Member States should also be offered a screening programme targeting rural areas and that administrative support should also be put in place to assist with the drawing up of plans and prevention registers; calls on the Member States to take into account the particular characteristics of these areas and to encourage rural pharmacies to be set up, in order to specifically adapt pharmacy networks to a rural area, with coordination arrangements for medicines and medical devices supply, with the aim of streamlining and adapting the needs of healthcare units to the individual area; calls on the Member States to improve the provision of primary care and support services among these pharmacies termed ‘rural’;

    37. Highlights the key role that infrastructure development has to play in the economic and social growth of rural areas, given the need for transport systems, particularly public ones, with the capacity to improve connectivity and access to essential services, for energy networks, including renewables, and for suitable digital connectivity infrastructure; notes, in particular, that the quality of transport and digital connectivity should be improved so that people have easy access to labour, schools, hospitals, public services and job opportunities; underlines that road, rail and maritime transport links need to be developed or upgraded through EU co-funded programmes to reduce the isolation of rural areas, in particular from urban centres, narrowing the existing gap, and to facilitate sustainable mobility of people and goods; calls for a comprehensive strategy to improve mobility in rural areas, with a strong focus on sustainability, the expansion of charging infrastructure and the promotion of e-mobility; emphasises the need for targeted investments in public transport, shared mobility solutions and alternative transport models to ensure accessibility and connectivity for rural populations;

    38. Stresses that the digital divide between rural and urban areas remains significant, hindering equal opportunities for all residents; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate investments in broadband connectivity, including 5G, better mobile coverage, high-speed internet networks, digital farming solutions and rural innovation hubs, ensuring that digital transformation benefits rural communities, while paying special attention to the regions less prepared for this transformation, including remote areas and outermost regions; stresses that these investments are crucial to enhancing productivity, supporting small farms’ entrepreneurship, facilitating remote working, accessing e-services and online teaching and ensuring that rural areas remain competitive in the digital age; stresses the need for digital literacy and vocational training initiatives to support the integration of digital technologies into the rural economy and to bridge the existing technological and economic divides;

    39. Stresses the importance and interconnectedness of military mobility, rural infrastructure development and regional security; underlines the overlap between the EU military mobility network and the Trans-European Transport Network;

    40. Calls for strategies to address vacant buildings and promote alternative housing concepts in rural areas, including affordable housing, renovation projects and intergenerational living; emphasises the need for incentives to repurpose empty properties, support community-driven housing initiatives and ensure sustainable, inclusive living spaces;

    41. Stresses the importance of promoting priority policies that support young people, as the main actors of the rural exodus, and calls on the Commission to ensure them an effective application of the ‘right to stay’ through targeted measures, designed to stem the demographic decline in rural areas and to encourage talented people to remain there; believes that individuals who wish to contribute to the development of their local communities should be provided with ample opportunities, and that it is therefore urgent to eliminate barriers and the significant disparities between young people in urban and rural areas in terms of access to high quality education, economic independence, social and political engagement, and intergenerational social interaction; calls for concrete measures and targeted funding programmes, including a brain drain action plan from the Commission, to support young people and young entrepreneurs, providing them with all the tools and resources they need to help them to access agricultural lands, jobs and business opportunities; notes that such measures should include improved access to public services, educational and cultural facilities, access to housing, low-interest loans and, with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, tax-related incentives to help young people build a stable future in line with their aspirations, without needing to abandon their place of origin, and creating incentives to settle down in or return to rural areas; considers it necessary, therefore, to promote measures to diversify the rural economy by harnessing local potential, including in areas outside agriculture and tourism, and to create quality jobs;

    42. Highlights the importance of boosting vocational education and training while also fostering youth-led initiatives and non-formal learning for young people to develop specific skills related to the economy of rural areas, as a tool for social cohesion and quality employment, with a view to combating depopulation in those areas;

    43. Highlights the key role of awareness raising and knowledge-sharing campaigns in advancing various education campaigns and programmes, and the importance of making them an integral part of school curricula; stresses the increasingly worrying data on early school leaving and to that end, calls on national and local authorities to reorganise their school systems to guarantee the right to education in their territories, bearing in mind the serious and objective difficulties they may face; calls on the Member States and local authorities, therefore, not to merge existing schools management structures in those areas;

    44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide for new subsidised credit facilities that can support young entrepreneurs and women in their activities, including alternative forms of guarantees for access to credit; calls for financial support to empower young farmers, ensuring growth in rural economies;

    45. Welcomes the new EUR 3 billion loan financing package from the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group for agriculture, forestry and fisheries across Europe as a tangible initiative to close the funding gaps for SMEs in agriculture and the bio-economy and facilitate financing for young farmers and women; calls on the EIB Group to explore new forms of support to provide liquidity for actors along agricultural and rural value chains;

    46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote local start-ups and incentive programmes for the return of young people and for the purchase and renovation of housing by young people in rural areas;

    47. Calls on the Commission to establish a European fund for youth entrepreneurship in rural areas, with a special focus on regions affected by high youth unemployment and brain drain; notes that this fund should support rural start-ups, innovative agriculture, sustainable tourism and digitalisation through dedicated financial instruments and tax incentives;

    48. Draws attention to the need for universal equal access to measures enabling everyone to develop the high-quality skills they need to achieve their professional goals, and to vocational and educational training; laments the fact that in rural areas, in many fields, the work of women is currently not rewarded with equal opportunities and conditions, as they often face extra challenges, including limited access to job opportunities, a lack of adequate measures to help them juggle work and family, and a shortage of childcare facilities; emphasises the need to foster an environment conducive to female employment, with support for all families, ensuring high quality early childhood education and care systems and parental support;

    49. Calls for increased support for women in rural areas, particularly through measures to improve access to employment, education, healthcare and social infrastructure, as well as protection from violence and violence prevention, to promote their economic and social participation; emphasises that targeted programmes should be created to support female entrepreneurs in rural regions in order to strengthen their economic independence;

    50. Stresses that support for women in rural areas is imperative for a variety of reasons, including promoting gender equality, fostering economic growth, advancing community development, reducing poverty and ensuring environmental sustainability; highlights that women play a multilevel role in rural development, as workers, farmers and business owners, and stresses that their importance in rural areas and local economies is often overlooked; stresses that special attention should be paid to women in rural areas when designing structural social support and regional development programmes; highlights that addressing these barriers is crucial for empowering women and unlocking their full potential in rural communities;

    51. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to boost awareness regarding existing and future EU funding possibilities for women entrepreneurs in rural areas and to make it easier for them to access financial support; encourages the Member States and regional and local authorities to make use of the existing EU structural and investment funds to promote women entrepreneurs;

    52. Calls for gender-equality employment policies and targeted measures to promote a better work-life balance in rural areas, including flexible working models, digital work opportunities, improved leisure and education offerings, and the promotion of community-based care and support structures for families;

    53. Urges the Commission to adopt measures to protect the family farming model that underpins the rural territory, is more environmentally friendly and guarantees food security in the EU; stresses the need for a EU system of incentives to limit the accumulation of agricultural land in private investment funds and the consequent increase in land prices; insists on the protection of small and medium-sized farms by strengthening the role of cooperatives and professional farmers in EU policies; furthermore, encourages the Member States to implement concrete measures to support these farms by simplifying access to credit, modernising rural infrastructure and giving impetus to agricultural cooperatives;

    54. Stresses the key role played by agriculture and the agri-food sector in food production, ensuring food security in the EU and job creation – a role worth championing since as it constitutes a mainstay of the local economy and is a key factor in ensuring sustainable land management, and also drives the growth and development of inland and rural areas, which often enjoy international recognition for their outstanding typical products; notes that it is necessary to help farmers innovate and diversify, while at the same time fostering farm competitiveness; believes that the transition to a more sustainable model requires a balanced approach, mindful of local specificities and the economic needs of rural communities, without imposing changes liable to hinder their long-term development; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to take strong and targeted action by reducing excessive regulatory burdens and ensuring fair market conditions, to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and encourage generational renewal; calls for adequate support to promote food self-sufficiency and crop diversification; highlights in particular the specific structural challenges of the outermost regions and their rural areas;

    55. Urges the Commission and the Member States, in order to strengthen food security and ensure that European farmers do not face unfair competition from products that do not meet the same environmental, animal welfare and food security standards, to enforce strict equivalence of production standards for agricultural products imported into the EU and calls  on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that trade agreements uphold European agricultural standards and ensure a level playing field for EU farmers;

    56. Acknowledges that the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities as well as risks for EU agriculture; emphasises that the number of farms in the EU decreased between 2005 and 2020 by about 37 % and calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to take action to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and support their revenues and competitiveness, in order to stem the desertion of these areas and encourage generational renewal;

    57. Points to the need to simplify administrative procedures for accessing EU funds by reducing red tape for farmers and small rural businesses and improving coordination between the institutional levels involved in the management of funds in order to ensure that resources are provided more efficiently and in a more timely manner;

    58. Points also to the need to provide these areas, as well as businesses and farm and forest holders, with sufficient financial support, including support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment, with a view to increasing European competitiveness;

    59. Is fully aware that rural areas play a key role in the green and digital transitions; underlines that the transitions have to be implemented gradually, along the lines of achievable goals; calls in this regard for EU funding to be better linked with environmental sustainability and biodiversity protection;

    60. Highlights the need to support rural communities in European regions that have been most adversely affected by the trade in or export of Ukrainian agricultural products;

    61. Points to the importance of compensatory measures for farmers and rural businesses to ensure that the ecological transition is fair and practical and does not lead to new socio-economic disparities; highlight that for this transition to be successful, the full involvement and collaboration of all stakeholders, in particular farmers and foresters, will be key;

    62. Highlights that promoting agriculture is a necessary component of any strategy for rural development, but that on its own it is not sufficient, as not all people in rural areas are employed in the agricultural sector or live in agricultural structures;

    63. Recognises that tourism is frequently a major source of income for rural, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as in the Mediterranean region, with the potential to encourage job creation and entrepreneurship and to draw in growing numbers of visitors curious to discover their nature, traditions and cultural heritage through the unique experiences on offer; believes, for that reason, that tourism should be supported through investment in the rural economy, in synergy with the agricultural, fishing, food and cultural sectors, and that the EU should promote the co-existence and further development of these sectors;

    64. Highlights that rural and agro-tourism can be a complementary activity to agriculture, offering opportunities for diversifying farm incomes and benefiting the development of rural areas, and that resources should therefore be allocated to the development of tourism and HoReCa activities;

    65. Underlines the need to promote rural tourism in a way that is sustainable; highlights the importance of optimising the economic benefits of tourism for rural areas, while minimising the potential negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems;

    66. Emphasises the importance of protecting and promoting linguistic minorities in the rural areas of the EU, recognising them as an integral part of Europe’s cultural heritage and as a driver of regional development; therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate cohesion policy resources to support projects for linguistic promotion, training, cultural tourism and local entrepreneurship connected to the linguistic and cultural traditions of the regions;

    67. Urges the Commission and the Member States to boost tourism in rural and depopulated areas or areas at risk of depopulation, by financing initiatives that enhance historic villages and traditional local products and establishing new green paths and other nature trails, as well as a label recognising outstanding environments in rural and nature tourism along similar lines to the ‘blue flag’ awarded to beaches;

    68. Notes that in some Member States, municipalities play a crucial role as drivers of regional economic development, benefiting from substantial tax revenues generated by their local economies; highlights that these revenues can motivate municipalities to invest EU cohesion funds in increasing their future tax base, promoting long-term local economic growth and securing long-term tax revenues; to this end, calls on the Commission, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, to initiate a dialogue on the potential benefits of sharing taxes on economic activities with municipalities;

    69. Insists that excessive bureaucracy should not prevent farmers from focusing on sustainable food production and rural economic development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include a strong rural dimension in the future cohesion policy regulations and to promote better regulation as a matter of priority, in order to reduce administrative burdens and to take steps to ensure the competitiveness of rural businesses, particularly SMEs, cooperatives and citizen-led communities, and to promote easier and more efficient access to funds, cost reductions and simplified application and evaluation processes for EU funding, especially for small beneficiaries; reaffirms that optimising procedures, cutting red tape and enhancing transparency are vital to improving access to the available resources; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide adequate advisory services and technical assistance to managing authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    70. Calls for a more integrated approach between EU industrial and cohesion policies, ensuring that regional development strategies are aligned with industrial transition efforts, particularly in northern, sparsely populated areas;

    71. Emphasises the importance of SMEs in technological sectors for rural digitalisation and economic resilience; calls on the Commission to ensure that public measures support local businesses and foster proximity-based economies, avoiding criteria that may disadvantage smaller enterprises;

    72. Stresses the need for better alignment between existing territorial development instruments and Structural Funds, including initiatives such as Harnessing Talent and the Covenant of Mayors;

    73. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

     having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

     having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

     having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

     having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

     having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

     having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

     having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

     having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

     having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

     having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

     having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Palestine, Sudan, South Sudan & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (4 June 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Senior Personnel Appointment    
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    Libya
    Bangladesh
    Yemen
    Human Rights/Climate
    International Day
    Programming Note

    SENIOR PERSONNEL APPOINTMENT    
    The Secretary-General is appointing Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL. We expect him to take up his position on the 24th of June.
    Major General Abagnara succeeds Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz of Spain.  The Secretary-General extends his sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz for his dedication, for his leadership of UNIFIL during one of the mission’s most challenging periods.
    Major General Abagnara brings to the position over 36 years of military service, including extensive leadership roles within the Italian Armed Forces.  
    Most recently, he served as Commander and Chair of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, where he oversaw multinational coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, today urged Israel to open all of the crossings into Gaza, let in lifesaving aid at scale from all directions, and lift the restrictions on what and how much aid we can bring in. 
    He noted that dozens of Gazans were declared dead at hospitals yesterday after Israeli forces said they had opened fire. Mr. Fletcher said this is the outcome of a series of deliberate choices that have systematically deprived two million people of the essentials they need to survive.  
    Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tell us the latest figures indicate that in the past three weeks, more than 100,000 people were forced to flee in the governorates of North Gaza and Gaza. 
    UN partners working in health say that more medical facilities are suspending their operations.
    On Monday, the remaining staff and patients at the Indonesian Hospital, in North Gaza, were evacuated.
    As a result, not a single hospital remains functional in North Gaza.  
    Today in Gaza City, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Suzanna Tkalec visited Al Ahli hospital, which has sustained multiple attacks since the beginning of the war. Ms. Tkalec heard from staff about the challenges they are facing every day. They stressed that preventable deaths are occurring due to shortages of critical supplies, including antibiotics. The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator called for the protection of health facilities, the unrestricted flow of assistance into Gaza, and support for our work and our partners’ work to deliver at scale to alleviate the suffering of people.
    Meanwhile, we and our partners continue to send supplies to Kerem Shalom crossing, where the Israeli authorities scan them before they can enter Gaza.
    For today, we submitted over 130 pre-cleared truckloads for a second and final Israeli clearance, but only 50 of them – which were carrying flour – were approved to enter the Israeli side of the Kerem Shalom crossing. 
    UN teams on the ground are also working hard to collect supplies from Kerem Shalom and bring them closer to the people who need them inside Gaza. But these attempts are facing major hurdles. Just yesterday, one attempt was denied access altogether and another one did manage to retrieve just over a dozen truckloads carrying flour. Overall, since the crossing reopened, we’ve been able to collect fewer than 400 truckloads, even though every day we have tried to coordinate access and secure safe routes through the Israeli-militarized zone in the south. 
    And that denied attempt to access Kerem Shalom was one of the six access denials our teams faced just yesterday across the Gaza Strip, out of a total of 13 attempts. These denials prevented our teams from carrying out interventions as critical as trucking water to those who need it. 
    Another of yesterday’s six denied access attempts was to retrieve fuel, which is so urgently needed. OCHA warns that without immediate access to fuel that is already inside Gaza but located in hard-to-reach areas that are either militarized or subject to displacement orders, more critical services will have to suspend operations soon.  
    And as you know, this afternoon at 4 p.m., the members of the Security Council of the United Nations will meet not far from here to discuss the situation in Gaza.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7x3xY06V9s

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Potential revision of combustion-enhancing fuel additives under Directive 98/70/EC – E-001384/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Delivering on the EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 and the climate neutrality target by 2050, enshrined in the European Climate Law[1], call for ambitious policies and action to ensure a swift and sufficient decrease in emissions from all sectors, including transport.

    This transition will also contribute to reducing Europe’s reliance on imported fossil fuels. The transport sector needs to contribute to such objectives with a reduction of 90% of its emissions by 2050.

    Concerning certain fuel additives, which might have combustion enhancing properties, they would not be able to deliver the necessary emissions reductions.

    The Fuel Quality Directive[2] (FQD) aims to ensure a single market for fuels used in the European Union for both road vehicles and non-road mobile machinery, as well as a high level of environmental and health protection in the use of those fuels.

    The FQD regulates requirements for fuels by setting limitations in Articles 3 and 4 and corresponding Annexes I and II for certain parameters and chemical compounds, without any other restriction to the chemical composition of fuels.

    The Commission conducted a technical study[3] in 2023, which did not identify a need for regulatory changes as regards additives.

    Finally, the Commission fosters innovation through a broad range of financial and regulatory means aimed at advancing zero-emission mobility and the decarbonisation of transport fuels and energy sources, such as the Renewable Energy Directive[4].

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0080.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01998L0070-20181224&from=EN.
    • [3] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0dd983bf-ee82-11eb-a71c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kennedy announces $6.8 million in Hurricane Ida aid for Houma schools

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator John Kennedy (Louisiana)
    WASHINGTON – Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.), a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, today announced a $6,764,854 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant for the Terrebonne Parish School Board.
    “Hurricane Ida hit Houma hard, but the community has worked tirelessly to rebuild. This $6.8 million grant will help cover the costs of demolishing, relocating and renovating school facilities due to severe damage from the storm,” said Kennedy.
    The FEMA aid will fund the following:
    $6,764,854 to the Terrebonne Parish School Board to relocate the Hurricane Ida-damaged Louis Miller Vo-Tech campus to its Fletcher Building in Houma, La., and demolish its Ida-damaged School for Exceptional Children facility and renovate its existing Elysian Fields campus.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Up to $2 Million Reward Offers Each for Information Leading to Arrests and/or Convictions of Malicious Cyber Actors from China

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    Today, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing two reward offers under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $2 million each for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions, in any country, of malicious cyber actors Yin KeCheng and Zhou Shuai, both Chinese nationals residing in China. 

    Yin and Zhou were identified as associated with an advanced persistent threat group (APT27), who are also known to private sector security researchers as “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” “Iron Tiger,” “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.”  Yin and Zhou are longtime members of the eco-system China uses to perpetuate its malicious cyber activity.  They enrich themselves financially as hackers for hire for a myriad of Chinese entities.

     An FBI investigation of APT27, which began in approximately 2014, resulted in two separate indictments, announced today by the Department of Justice.  Yin is charged individually for cybercrime activity occurring from roughly 2013 to 2015, while Yin and Zhou are charged together in a separate conspiracy related to computer network intrusion activity occurring from roughly 2018 to 2020.  Yin and Zhou are each charged with wire fraud, money laundering, aggravated identity theft, and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

    Today’s reward offers are authorized by the Secretary under the TOCRP, which supports law enforcement efforts to disrupt transnational crime globally.  The reward offers also complement the announcement today of a Treasury sanctions action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) against Zhou and his company Shanghai Heiying Information Technology.   The combined actions represent a whole of government effort to combat malicious cyber actors.

    If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at yin_zhou_info@fbi.gov.  If you are located outside of the United States, you can also visit the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.  If you are in the United States, you can also contact your local FBI field office.

    ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Oregon DEQ opens application period for clean truck and infrastructure grants

    Source: US State of Oregon

    tarting today, diesel fleet and equipment owners can apply for a variety of grants to support efforts to reduce dirty transportation emissions across the state under the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality’s 2025 Clean Trucks and Infrastructure program.

    Details on the clean truck and infrastructure grants are as follows:

    • Diesel Emissions Mitigation Grants and Federal Diesel Emissions Reduction Funding
      • Total: Approximately $9 million
      • Focus: To swap older diesel vehicles, engines or equipment for similar, newer, cleaner zero-emission vehicles, technologies or retrofit exhaust controls.
      • Eligibility: Oregon businesses, organizations, local governments and individuals with medium- and heavy-duty diesel fleets, model year 1992 – 2009.
      • Contact: Rhett Lawrence, AQ program analyst: rhett.lawrence@deq.oregon.gov
    • Oregon DEQ Clean Trucks Grant Program
      • Total: Approximately $4.8 million
      • Focus: To scrap and replace diesel vehicles with new zero-emission vehicles.
      • Eligibility: Oregon businesses, organizations, local governments and individuals with medium- and heavy-duty diesel fleets, model year 1992 and newer.
      • Contact: Rhett Lawrence, AQ program analyst: rhett.lawrence@deq.oregon.gov
    • Oregon Zero-Emission Fueling Infrastructure Grants
      • Total: Approximately $3 million
      • Focus: To develop plans and install charging infrastructure for medium- and heavy-duty zero-emissions vehicle fleets.
      • Eligibility: Oregon businesses, organizations, local governments and individuals planning to install private and/or public charging infrastructure.
      • Contact: Tracie Weitzman, AQ program analyst: tracie.weitzman@deq.oregon.gov

    More than $34 million is available to help purchase new zero-emissions trucks, replace or retrofit older, more polluting diesel engines, or develop medium- and heavy-duty zero-emission vehicle charging and fueling infrastructure projects. Total funding includes approximately $17 million available for the new Zero-Emissions Rebates for Oregon Fleets program, also known as the ZERO Fleet Program, which will announce its open application period soon. Submissions for programs opening today are due by 5 p.m. (PDT) on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025.

    “We recognize that transitioning from older diesel vehicles to cleaner technologies can be challenging for many companies,” said Oregon DEQ Air Quality Transportation Strategies Section Manager Rachel Sakata. “This significant investment will support that transition, reduce harmful air pollution and help protect the health of communities across the state.”

    Owners of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles requiring retrofits under DEQ’s Diesel Retrofit Compliance Program may also apply for funding to support the installation of diesel particulate filters. In addition, non-road equipment and fleet owners, i.e., those with diesel-powered machinery or vehicles involved in construction, may be interested in applying for a grant. If the project is awarded funding, it will improve the emissions profile for pursuing certification under DEQ’s Diesel Emissions Identification Program.

    DEQ is offering two opportunities for applicants to learn more about the grants and process through two virtual webinars. They are as follows:

    • Clean Truck and Infrastructure Grants Webinar #1
      • Wednesday, June 11, 2025
      • 10 – 11 a.m. (PDT)
      • Microsoft Teams: Join the meeting now
        • Meeting ID: 234 081 780 139 3
          • Passcode: KB6ES9Jo
        • Phone #: 503-446-4951
          • Phone conference ID: 720 897 622#
    • Clean Truck and Infrastructure Grants Webinar #2
      • Wednesday, June 18, 2025
      • 3 – 4 p.m. (PDT)
      • Microsoft Teams: Join the meeting now
        • Meeting ID: 271 031 021 708 6
          • Passcode: 6tT9o2CC
        • Phone #: 503-446-4951
          • Phone conference ID: 925 484 402#

    Attendees are encouraged to bring questions, as there will be a Q&A section.

    The 2025 application period is the only opportunity this year to apply for the clean truck and infrastructure grants. Previous award recipients can apply for additional funds.

    DEQ has approximately $72 million in funding assigned for grants through the Environmental Mitigation Trust Fund after Volkswagen was found to have cheated on emissions standards. There is $8 million available for this year’s Diesel Emissions Mitigation Grants. In addition, last summer, DEQ was awarded the Climate Equity and Resilience Through Action Grant, which provides additional funding for the Clean Trucks and Zero-Emission Fueling Infrastructure grants and the ZERO Fleet Rebates.

    Links to a helpful User Guide on each grant’s web page. Applications, regardless of the grant, should be submitted through the DEQ Grants web portal. Submissions for programs opening today must be received by DEQ no later than 5 p.m. (PDT) on Friday, Aug. 15, 2025.

    For more information specifically on the grants, please contact the program analysts listed above or email dieselgrants@deq.oregon.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: A First Nations power authority could transform electricity generation for Indigenous nations

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Christina E. Hoicka, Canada Research Chair in Urban Planning for Climate Change, Associate Professor of Geography and Civil Engineering, University of Victoria

    First Nations across British Columbia have developed renewable electricity projects for decades. Yet they’ve experienced significant barriers to implementing, owning and managing their own electricity supply. That’s because there have been few procurement policies in place that require their involvement.

    While municipalities are allowed to own and operate electricity utilities in B.C., First Nations are not. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA) in B.C. requires that First Nations are provided with opportunities for economic development without discrimination.

    Many First Nations in B.C. view the development of renewable electricity projects on their lands (like hydro power, solar panels, wind turbines and transmission lines) as a way to achieve social, environmental and economic goals that are important to their community.

    These goals may include powering buildings in the community, creating economic development and local jobs, earning revenue, improving access to affordable and reliable electricity or using less diesel.

    Our new study shares the story of a coalition of First Nations and organizations that advocated for changes to electricity regulations and laws to give Indigenous communities more control to develop renewable electricity projects. Our interviews with knowledge holders from 14 First Nations offer insight into motivations behind their calls for regulatory changes.

    The coalition includes the Clean Energy Association of B.C., New Relationship Trust, Pembina Institute, First Nations Power Authority, Nuu-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council, and the First Nations Clean Energy Working Group.

    Models for a First Nations power authority

    Almost all electricity customers in B.C. are served by BC Hydro, the electric utility owned by the provincial government.

    The coalition argues that applying DRIPA to the electricity sector should allow First Nations to form a First Nations power authority. Such an organization would provide them with control over the development of electricity infrastructure that aligns with their values and would also help B.C. meet its greenhouse gas reduction targets.

    In the Re-Imagining Social Energy Transitions CoLaboratory (ReSET CoLab) at the University of Victoria, we analyzed regulatory documents from the B.C. Utilities Commission, and advocacy documents and presentations for discussion developed by the coalition.

    We identified six proposed First Nations power authority (Indigenous Utility) models:

    A capacity building point-of-contact model streamlines the development of renewable electricity projects to sell power to the provincial utility. For example, the First Nations Power Authority in Saskatchewan was formed for this purpose by SaskPower.

    This would be the most conformative model. It would provide vital networks and connections to First Nations while allowing BC Hydro and the British Columbia Utilities Commission to maintain full control over the electricity sector.

    In the second model, called a “put” contract, a B.C. First Nations Power Authority represents First Nations wishing to develop renewable electricity projects. Whenever the province needs to build new electricity generation projects to meet growing electricity demand, a portion of the new generation is developed by the First Nations authority.

    In the third model, First Nations build and operate electricity transmission and distribution lines to allow remote industrial facilities and communities to connect to the electricity grid. This is called “Industrial Interconnection.”

    For example, the Wataynikaneyap Power Transmission line in Ontario is a 1,800-kilometre line that provides an electricity grid connection for 17 previously remote nations. Twenty-four First Nations own 51 per cent of the line, while private investors own 49 per cent.

    In the fourth model, the B.C. First Nation Power Authority acts as the designated body for various opportunities in the electricity sector, such as the development of electricity transmission, distribution, generation or customer services. This model is referred to as “local or regional ‘ticket’ opportunities.”

    Fifth, the First Nation Power Authority develops renewable electricity projects and distributes electricity from these projects to customers as a retailer, or under an agreement through the BC Hydro electricity grid. For example, Nova Scotia Power’s Green Choice program procures renewable electricity from independent power producers to supply to electricity customers.

    Sixth, new utility is formed in B.C., owned by First Nations, that owns and operates electricity generation, transmission and distribution services and offers standard customer services in a specific region of B.C. (called a “Regional Vertically-Integrated Power Authority”).

    Most of these models would require changes to regulations. The sixth and most transformative model would provide First Nations with full decision-making control over electricity generation, transmission and distribution. It would also give them the ability to sell to customers and require extensive changes in electricity regulation.

    Improving living standards

    First Nations knowledge-holders told us that a lack of reliable power, high electricity rates, lack of control over projects on their traditional lands and the need for resilience in the face of climate events were motivations for taking electricity planning into their own hands.

    They also expressed that varied factors motivate community interest in renewable energy: improving the quality of life for community members; financial independence; mitigating climate change; protecting the environment; reducing diesel use and providing stable and safe power for current and future generations.

    First Nations are already seeking to capitalize on the benefits of renewable energy by developing their own projects within the current regulatory system.

    Most of those we spoke to see a First Nations power authority in B.C. as a means to provide opportunities for economic development without discrimination — and to achieve self-determination, self-reliance and reconciliation by addressing the root causes of some of the colonial injustices they face by obtaining control over the electricity sector on their lands.

    This article was co-authored by David Benton, an adopted member and Clean Energy Project Lead of Gitga’at First Nation and Kayla Klym, a BSc student in Geography at the University of Victoria.

    For this research project, Dr. Christina E. Hoicka received funding from Natural Resources Canada Clean Energy for Rural and Remote Communities Program (CERRC), Capacity Building Stream funding program. The research was conducted in partnership for the Clean Energy Association of British Columbia, and the New Relationship Trust. This work was also supported by the New Frontiers in Research Fund Global NFRFG-2020-00339 and the Canada Research Chair Secretariat CRC-2020-00055.

    Anna Berka is affiliated with Community Power Agency, a not-for-profit workers co-operative working to ensure a fair and accessible energy transition for all.

    Adam J. Regier and Sara Chitsaz do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. A First Nations power authority could transform electricity generation for Indigenous nations – https://theconversation.com/a-first-nations-power-authority-could-transform-electricity-generation-for-indigenous-nations-254982

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: End of an Era: Landsat 7 Decommissioned After 25 Years of Earth Observation

    Source: US Geological Survey

    These Landsat 7 images showcase the first and last captures of the Las Vegas area, taken on July 4, 1999, and May 28, 2024, respectively. The images highlight the city, the surrounding desert landscape, and Lake Mead, using shortwave infrared (SWIR), near-infrared (NIR), and red bands to emphasize differences in vegetation, water, and urban growth. The final image, marking the satellite’s 25th anniversary, stands as a tribute to Landsat 7’s quarter-century legacy of Earth observation.

    While Landsat 7’s long watch over Earth comes to an end, Landsat 8, launched in 2013, and Landsat 9, launched in 2020, continue to work together to create a complete snapshot of Earth every eight days. Their successor—Landsat Next—is currently planned to launch in the early 2030s and provide even greater coverage and detail.

    Launched in 1999 as a joint mission of the USGS and NASA, Landsat 7 significantly enhanced Earth observations and provided a key part of the Landsat program’s five decade-plus record of imaging the planet’s surface. The satellite’s imagery will remain archived at the USGS Earth Resources Observation and Science Center, continuing to support scientific discovery and decision-making for the future.

    “The Landsat satellites have delivered over 50 years of extraordinary science data, economic value and national security benefits by informing decisions in every sector of the economy—from monitoring drought in the West to guiding disaster recovery,” said Sarah Ryker, USGS Acting Director. “For 25 of those years, Landsat 7’s data helped farmers, land managers, city planners, and scientists, as well as communities around the world better understand and manage land, water, and other natural resources.”

    Landsat 7 achieved many milestones over its 25 years of operation and was the first Landsat to downlink data to the newly established USGS ground station in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. It was also the first Landsat satellite to be fully operated 24/7 by the USGS after being launched by NASA. 

    Its Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus sensor delivered improved high-resolution imagery that expanded its capabilities, capturing critical historical events such as the aftermath of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The satellite also contributed to important projects, including the Landsat Image Mosaic of Antarctica, and inspired the “Earth As Art” collection, showcasing stunning visuals of the planet. 

    After ending its official mission in 2024, the USGS prepared Landsat 7 for decommissioning to follow responsible space practices and U.S. policies on keeping space clear of debris. The final steps included carefully lowering the satellite’s orbit to decrease the risk of collisions and ensuring that all energy sources, such as fuel and batteries, are depleted to prevent the satellite from accidentally turning back on or creating debris. As Landsat 7 begins this decommissioned phase, it will drift silently in orbit for about 55 years before reentering Earth’s atmosphere. 

    To learn more about Landsat 7’s distinguished mission, visit: LINK TO CENTER STORY

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mining in Motion Outlines Strategies for Formalizing Ghana’s Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining (ASGM) Sector

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    ACCRA, Ghana, June 4, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Industry leaders at the Mining in Motion 2025 summit spotlighted Ghana’s ongoing efforts to formalize its artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector.

    Participants on an India Gold Metaverse-sponsored session – titled Case Studies in ASGM Formalization: Learning from Successes and Addressing Challenges – emphasized that formalization has the potential to catalyze sustainability, build stronger communities and drive long-term economic growth.

    “We need regulatory and legislative changes that support small-scale miners and ensure that revenue from their contributions translates into real economic, social and communal growth,” stated Martin Ayisi, CEO of the Minerals Commission of Ghana.

    Ayisi called for bold regulatory and financial interventions in the sector, stressing the urgent need for investment in geological investigations and sustainable technologies to prevent encroachment on protected areas and improve sector-wide outcomes.

    From an regional perspective, Cisse Vakaba, Advisor to the President on Mining, Ivory Coast, emphasized the foundational role of geology in building a viable ASGM sector. He stressed that state support must go beyond issuing permits to include geological surveys, professional training, community engagement and digital tools for traceability.

    “I really think that the basis for small mines is the geological aspect. This is the aspect where we have to work, to see the areas where they can exploit,” Vakaba stated, adding, “The State must provide support. It’s not enough to issue a title, a permit. We need to support prospecting and geological research.”

    Meanwhile, Melissa Correa Vélez, Program Manager, Swiss Better Gold, highlighted the human-centered approach necessary to make formalization efforts successful. Velez – through Swiss Better Gold’s Boots on the Ground initiative – advocates for programs, including technical support and community-oriented training, that extend beyond legal structures to genuinely improve livelihoods and environmental stewardship.

    “If you want to work with artisanal miners, work with them. Keep the miners interested in being responsible. If the miners lose interest because of the challenges, they will become illegal,” Velez stated.

    For his part, Kwaku Afrifa Nsiah-Asare, Lawyer and Entrepreneur, Typhoon Greenfield Development, emphasized that government support will be a requisite for ASGM formalization in Ghana, speaking candidly on social and financial challenges in the sector.

    “By doing everything properly, the Minerals Commission of Ghana has been extremely supportive and made it worthwhile for us to do business. It’s about partnerships and leadership in government,” Nsiah-Asare stated.

    Bringing a tech-forward perspective, Lamon Rutten, Managing Director and CEO of India Gold Metaverse, spoke to the transformative potential of digital innovation in the ASGM value chain.

    “Blockchain technologies and AI can help improve artisanal and small-scale mining operations. Tools like geo-tracking, radio-frequency identification-equipped machinery and internet-of-things devices allow us to trace ore sources. If you really want to develop small-scale mining, work with local banks. Let them understand the sector and they will help drive sustainable growth,” Rutten said.

    During the presentation, the panelists agreed that projects including the Ghana Land Restoration and Small-Scale Mining Project – a joint initiative with the World Bank – are setting a precedent. By offering financial and technical support, simplifying license through District Mining Committees, and organizing miners into Community Mining Schemes, Ghana is building an ASGM sector that is increasingly legal, sustainable and community driven.

    Organized by the Ashanti Green Initiative – led by Oheneba Kwaku Duah, Prince of Ghana’s Ashanti Kingdom – in collaboration with Ghana’s Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, World Bank, and the World Gold Council, with the support of Ghana’s Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, the summit offers unparalleled opportunities to connect with industry leaders.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    As AI and digital technologies advance, the European cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, presenting new challenges that require stronger partnerships and enhanced solutions. Ransomware groups and state-sponsored actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea continue to grow in scope and sophistication, and European cyber protection cannot afford to stand still.

    That is why, today, in Berlin, we are announcing a new Microsoft initiative to expand our longstanding work to help defend Europe’s cybersecurity. Implementing one of the five European Digital Commitments I shared in Brussels five weeks ago, we are launching a new European Security Program that adds to the company’s longstanding global Government Security Program.

    This new program expands the geographic reach of our existing work and adds new elements that will become critical to Europe’s protection. It puts AI at the center of our work as a tool to protect traditional cybersecurity needs and strengthens our protection of digital and AI infrastructure.

    We are launching the European Security Program with three new elements:

    • Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with European governments;
    • Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience; and
    • Expanding our partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle the networks cybercriminals use.

    We are making this program available to European governments, free of charge, including all 27 European Union (EU) member states, as well as EU accession countries, members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the UK, Monaco, and the Vatican.

    Together, these efforts reflect Microsoft’s long-term commitment to defending Europe’s digital ecosystem—ensuring that, no matter how the threat landscape evolves, we will remain a trusted and steadfast partner to Europe in securing its digital future.

    The need for new steps – the current threat environment

    Microsoft continues to observe persistent threat activity targeting European networks from nation state actors, with Russian and Chinese activity being particularly prolific in Europe. Unsurprisingly, Russia continues to be especially focused on targets in Ukraine and European nations providing support to Ukraine. Nation-state actors, including those engaging in malicious activity from Iran and North Korea, are predominantly pursuing espionage objectives in Europe through credential theft or the exploitation of vulnerabilities to gain access to corporate and government networks. Several campaigns, including those from China, have also targeted academic institutions, compromising accounts to access sensitive research data or conduct geopolitical espionage against think tanks. Cybercriminals continue to develop Ransomware-as-a-Service beyond nation-state threats. We have seen the emergence of illicit websites rapidly gaining followings by leaking ransomware insights to be used by criminal groups to conduct attacks across Europe.

    The rise of AI is also augmenting and evolving threat actor behavior. Microsoft has observed AI use by threat actors for reconnaissance, vulnerability research, translation, LLM-refined operational command techniques, resource development, scripting techniques, detection evasion, social engineering, and brute force attacks. This is why Microsoft now tracks any malicious use of new AI models we release and proactively prevents known threat actors from using our AI products. This also underscores the importance of secure development and rigorous testing of AI models, leveraging AI to benefit cyber defenders, and close public-private partnerships to share the latest insights about AI and cybersecurity.

    Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with governments

    Microsoft’s Government Security Program (GSP) has long provided governments with confidential security information and resources to help them better understand our products and the evolving threat landscape, particularly threats from nation-state actors. Building on existing efforts, our new European Security Program will increase the flow and expand access to actionable threat intelligence to European governments. Tailored to discrete national threat environments using AI insights, and delivered, when possible, in real time, this program is designed to help governments stay ahead of advancing cyber threats through:

    • Leveraging threat intelligence insights – Microsoft tracks the most sophisticated nation-state cyber activity, offering timely insights into evolving global threats. We use AI to support our analysis, which has improved our visibility and accelerated our ability to share the latest intelligence on the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by advanced persistent threat actors, including the malicious use of AI. By providing more information and faster, Microsoft will help European governments strengthen their cyber resilience and enable proactive defense.
    • Expanding cybercrime reporting – The Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) plays a critical role in detecting and disrupting global cybercriminal infrastructure, generating invaluable real-time intelligence in the process. As part of this new effort, we are expanding the availability of this intelligence to trusted European partners to support rapid response and coordinated enforcement action through the Cybercrime Threat Intelligence Program (CTIP).
    • Providing foreign influence operations updates – The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) continues to monitor influence operations in Europe, which are increasingly using AI to mislead and deceive with deepfake synthetic media. MTAC also uses AI to look for commonalities across operations and will provide regular intelligence briefings on foreign influence, offering timely insights into the tactics, narratives, and digital platforms leveraged by state-affiliated actors. These briefings help policymakers and security stakeholders stay ahead of evolving disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats targeting democratic institutions and public trust.
    • Identifying vulnerabilities and prioritizing security communications – Microsoft is committed to proactive and transparent security communications, particularly in the face of emerging threats and evolving vulnerabilities. We provide customers with timely, actionable intelligence through structured programs such as the Threat Microsoft Security Update Guide, Vulnerability Reporting process, and Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management. As part of this expanded commitment, we will offer prioritized notice of security communications, including vulnerability remediation guidance to our European Security Program partners, helping to enhance situational awareness and enabling faster responses.

    Participating governments will have a dedicated Microsoft point of contact to coordinate responses and escalate concerns. These efforts are designed to improve situational awareness and to support faster, more coordinated action across borders.

    Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience

    Digital resilience—the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to cyber threats and disruptions—requires more than technology. It requires investment in people, institutions, and partnerships. As part of the European Security Program, we are investing additional resources to further our work with European governments, civil society, and innovators to strengthen local capabilities and build long-term resilience. Highlights include:

    • Strengthening public-private collaboration – Microsoft has launched a new pilot program with Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), embedding Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) investigators at EC3 headquarters in The Hague to enhance intelligence sharing and operational coordination. Through this enhanced collaboration, we will enable joint investigations, identify faster threat identification, and be better positioned to disrupt cybercriminal activity targeting European institutions and citizens more effectively.
    • Supporting civil society and defending against ransomware – Microsoft has renewed our three-year partnership with the CyberPeace Institute to support NGOs and to promote accountability for bad actors, including nearly 100 Microsoft employees volunteering their time and expertise to help defend the most vulnerable in cyberspace. We will continue to support the Institute’s efforts to trace ransomware origins, identify safe havens, and uncover potential links to nation-state actors.
    • Expanding cybersecurity support to the Western Balkans – Through a new collaboration with the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre (WB3C), Microsoft will scale cybersecurity in a region where malicious actors have long sought to destabilize countries bordering the EU. Microsoft stands firmly in defense of Ukraine and is now extending that commitment with WB3C to help scale cybersecurity capabilities in a geopolitically sensitive and digitally under-resourced region, aligning with broader European cybersecurity priorities.
    • Advancing AI security and innovation – Microsoft is investing additional resources to support research, expand the cybersecurity talent pipeline, and test advanced AI-assisted security tools in real-world environments using Microsoft’s security stack and Azure and Copilot capabilities. We’re working with the UK’s Laboratory for AI Security Research (LASR), a public-private partnership established to advance AI security in support of UK’s national security and economic prosperity. Together, we’re launching a joint research program focused on AI-cybersecurity challenges with a focus on critical infrastructure and agentic AI security, with an initial investment from Microsoft and research-collaboration between LASR and Microsoft Security Research Center.
    • Securing open-source innovation Through the recently launched GitHub Secure Open Source Fund, we will support open-source projects that underpin the digital supply chain, catalyze innovation, and are critical to the AI stack. By raising the security posture for European projects such as Log4J and Scancode, which are critical to the IT systems of governments and companies across the continent, the program aims to reduce future security vulnerabilities. Ensuring these tools can continuously withstand and sustainably defend against sophisticated cyber threats is essential to strengthening cyber resilience.

    These new and enhanced initiatives reflect our belief that cybersecurity is a collective endeavor—and that Europe’s digital resilience must be built from the ground up.

    Expanding partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle cybercriminal networks

    Finally, as part of our European Security Program we are expanding our partnerships with law enforcement and regional actors to proactively identify new and innovative ways to disrupt malicious and criminal activity.

    For instance, last month, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) worked with Europol and others to take down Lumma, a prolific infostealer malware used to steal passwords, financial data, and crypto wallets. In just two months, Lumma infected nearly 400,000 devices globally, many of them in Europe. The operation seized or blocked over 2,300 command-and-control domains. Off the back of this action, we are working with Europol to identify new opportunities to continue to meaningfully disrupt and deter cybercrime.

    Lumma-infected devices by country in Europe

    To accelerate future takedowns, we also launched the Statutory Automated Disruption (SAD) Program in April 2025. This initiative automates legal abuse notifications to hosting providers, enabling faster removal of malicious domains and IP addresses. Focused initially on Europe and the U.S., SAD raises the cost of doing business for cybercriminals and makes it harder for them to operate at scale.

    In addition, we’re working with local internet service providers to help remediate affected users and ensure governments have greater visibility into emerging threats.

    The DCU has long played a leading role in proactively combating cyber threats, including those originating from nation-state actors. Since 2016, Microsoft has filed seven legal actions to spotlight and disrupt nation-state threat actors from countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which we refer to internally by the weather-themed names Blizzard, Typhoon, Sandstorm, and Sleet, respectively. Most recently, in September 2024, Microsoft initiated a disruption action against the Russian actor Star Blizzard, mentioned above, known for hacking political targets surrounding UK’s 2022 elections and targeting NATO countries to advance its geopolitical interests involving Ukraine. Microsoft exposed the Russian actors and directly seized over 140 malicious domains in total, substantially blunting ongoing campaigns and forcing Star Blizzard to significantly alter its attack methods to other platforms, which Microsoft Threat Intelligence thereafter publicly exposed in a security blog. We will continue to act against those seeking to harm customers, governments, and individual users. These efforts are part of our broader strategy to partner with law enforcement across Europe. We are already working on coordinated disruptions to protect the digital ecosystem, and we stand ready to provide robust incident response services during crises, ensuring our partners and customers are never alone in the face of cyber adversity.

    We also believe that deterrence is a critical pillar of modern cybersecurity. The EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox plays a vital role in this effort, helping to coordinate crisis response and send a clear message that malicious activity will not go unanswered—legally, operationally, or reputationally.

    Taken together, operations like the Lumma disruption, the launch of SAD, and future coordinated disruptions are helping to prevent cybercriminals and state actors from establishing malicious infrastructure in Europe.

    * * *

    At Microsoft, our commitment to Europe is deep, enduring, and unwavering. We believe that Europe’s digital future is one of the most important opportunities of our time—and protecting that future is a responsibility we share. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with European governments, institutions, and communities to defend against threats, build capacity, and strengthen resilience. We are proud to be a trusted partner to Europe, and we will continue to work every day to earn trust through transparency, collaboration, and a steadfast commitment to protecting what matters most.

    Tags: Brad Smith, cybersecurity, Digital commitments, Europe

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Travelling Gallery’s 2025 tour continues with SEEDLINGS: Diasporic Imaginaries

    Source: Scotland – City of Edinburgh

    Continuing Travelling Gallery’s 2025 programme is a group exhibition exploring ways to connect with our worlds through other-than-human perspectives. Challenging the boundaries between culture and nature, the exhibition looks to destabilise colonial systems, categories, and hierarchies, that tend to favour scientific theory and marginalise ancestral knowledges and indigenous cosmologies.

    Curated with Jelena Sofronijevic, and featuring work by artists Emii Alrai, Iman Datoo, Remi Jabłecki, Radovan Kraguly, Zeljko Kujundzic, Leo Robinson, and Amba Sayal-Bennett, the exhibition brings together a variety of contemporary artistic practices, including drawing, printmaking, sculpture and film, that reimagine our collective understandings and visions of places and times.

    Common across the works in the exhibition is the use of the seed as a means to think about and connect themes concerning ecologies, environments, and migration. For some, the seed represents a world of its own, a self-contained body or cell, capable of crossing borders. For others, it serves as a starting point for alternative possibilities and ways of being. Many of the artists have researched specific seeds, in their ‘native’ soils, and displaced in banks and libraries. The potato is offered as an incidental ‘root’ to many of their works. In the film, Kinnomic Botany (2022), Iman Datoo draws upon research in the Commonwealth Potato Collection at the James Hutton Institute near Dundee, the UK’s largest collection of potato seeds, to challenge dominant taxonomies or ways of classifying lives.

    More speculative connections can be made between Remi Jabłecki and Radovan Kraguly’s practices. The former’s futuristic sculptures remind us of the otherworldly, even alien qualities of these most earthly and everyday British crops, with the artist using them as a means to think about transformation and personal growth. Kraguly’s prints,though as detailed as scientific and botanical illustrations, are similarly cosmic, avoiding categorisation in their ambiguous representations and titles. Reflecting on relations of control between humans and nature, his works also illustrate the role of different pastoral and agricultural environments in the formation of the artist’s own identity and early adoption of ‘climate politics’, connecting his formative experiences growing up on a farm in the former Yugoslavia, to his later practice in rural Wales.

    Amba Sayal-Bennett’s architectural sculptures Kern (2024) and Phlo (2024) are part of the artist’s investigations into rubber, a commodity once so highly demanded its value surpassed that of silver. In a mission facilitated by the British government, Henry Wickham stole and trafficked 70,000 rubber seeds from the Amazon rainforest in Brazil in 1876. Transported to Kew Gardens in London, they were then dispersed to British colonies for cultivation. Its plural uses and potential for profit led to its proliferation across the globe – yet the soil in India refused to take the seeds, which the artist puts forward as a form of environmental resistance to the colonial project. Artist Emii Alrai, by contrast, focusses on excavation, exploring archaeology, Western museological structures, and the complex process of ruination.

    Scotland has proved fertile land for many of the artists’ practices, yet, for some, SEEDLINGS presents the first opportunity to experience their works in these contexts. Born in Subotica, Yugoslavia (now Serbia), Zeljko Kujundzic lived and worked in Edinburgh between 1948 and 1958, before moving with his partner and frequent collaborator, Ann, and their children, to British Columbia (BC). His developed, complex work in ceramic sculpture, often featuring the thunderbird, a mythological bird-like spirit widespread in North American indigenous and First Nation cultures and storytelling, is deeply rooted in these early experiences. Yet his part in Edinburgh’s growing artistic community, and work with artists and writers like Ian Hamilton Finlay, Nannie Katharin Wells, Bernard Leach, and Joan Faithfull, has, thus far, been walked over, in more conventional art histories. A selection of archive materials concerning his invention of the solar kiln, unearthed from public and private collections across the UK and Canada, are presented here for the first time – the exhibition itself seeking to germinate future research.

    The exhibition will also include a newly commissioned essay, How does a tree fit inside a seed?, exploring the artists’ works, both individually, and as constellated in the exhibition, by the curator Jelena Sofronijevic. The text journeys through the construction and overlapping uses of terms like ‘native’ and, ‘invasive’, ‘indigenous’, ‘naturalisation’, and ‘dispersal’, to challenge binaries between beings, and consider ideas of home, identity, and belonging in the context of diasporas.
    Launching in Edinburgh on Calton Hill (outside the Collective Gallery) on Friday 6 June from 11am to 5pm, the exhibition will tour to arts venues, community centres, high streets and schools across Scotland including in the Western Isles, Glasgow, Falkirk,Clackmannanshire, North Lanarkshire, Scottish Borders before culminating at Edinburgh Art Festival in August.

    It is accompanied by a series of interventions on social media, highlighting the artists’ connections to the places of our tour, and a number of talks, tours, and workshops, including with artist Leo Robinson.

    Details of confirmed tour dates and venues can be found on the Travelling Gallery website. 

    Louise Briggs, Curator, Travelling Gallery said:

    It has been a real pleasure to work with Jelena Sofronijevic on this exhibition and to be introduced to the work of a number of artists, many of whom have interesting connections to Edinburgh and Scotland through their work & research as well as their personal & professional lives. This exhibition continues to explore our annual theme looking at The Environment and Climate Emergency. We hope SEEDLINGS will offer visitors a new way of thinking about our relationship with, and connection to nature and may encourage them to perhaps think about our worlds and our interconnectedness in different ways.

    Culture and Communities Convener Margaret Graham, said: 

    The Travelling Gallery is a unique and fantastic example of how art can and should be accessible for all. I’m delighted that, with our support, the Gallery has been able to remove barriers to art by taking powerful and thought-provoking exhibitions into communities across Scotland.

    This year’s exhibition not only invites us to engage with outstanding contemporary works but also encourages us to reflect on the world through different lenses. With such a talented group of artists involved, I encourage everyone to visit when the gallery sets off this week.

    Additional thanks go to: All of the exhibiting artists; Nena Kraguly; Family and Friends of Kujundzic; The City of Edinburgh Council; Creative Scotland; City Art Centre, Edinburgh; Government Art Collection; Ingleby Gallery; Carbon 12 Gallery; Palmer Gallery; and the University of British Columbia Library Rare Books and Special Collections, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
     
     
     

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Canada: BC Hydro launches new actions to power B.C.’s clean-energy future

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    BC Hydro has launched two requests for expressions of interest (RFEOI) to explore the next era of the province’s power potential, expand clean-energy resources and advance energy efficiency.

    These actions are critical to ensuring a stable, reliable electricity system that supports new housing, businesses and industries while keeping energy costs affordable for people.

    “We have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to lead the world in clean energy and we’re acting with urgency to make sure every British Columbian benefits,” said Adrian Dix, Minister of Energy and Climate Solutions. “By expanding our clean-power supply and increasing energy efficiency, we’re securing our power grid, building a resilient electricity system and creating sustainable jobs that drive economic growth.”

    The first RFEOI focuses on expanding B.C.’s long-term capacity to meet peak electricity demand as consumption patterns evolve. BC Hydro is seeking ideas on capacity and baseload energy projects, including geothermal, pumped storage and hydroelectric resources. Capacity and baseload projects can reliably deliver firm power and provide backup for intermittent energy projects, such as wind and solar that rely on external, uncontrollable conditions such as the wind blowing or the sun shining to deliver power.

    The second RFEOI targets innovation in energy efficiency by identifying partners capable of delivering market-ready technologies that help conserve energy in homes and buildings. Through the RFEOI, BC Hydro seeks to collaborate with industry leaders and forward-thinking organizations to help people in British Columbia save energy and lower costs.

    Energy efficiency is the cleanest and least expensive way to meet increasing demand for power. The energy-efficiency RFEOI supports BC Hydro’s comprehensive Power Smart energy savings program and complements BC Hydro’s $700 million expanded Energy Efficiency Plan, which increases investments in tools, technologies and rebates. These initiatives encourage energy-conscious decisions and help customers reduce electricity consumption. BC Hydro estimates that this plan will save customers $80 million annually and deliver more than 2,000 gigawatt-hours of electricity savings by 2030, the equivalent of powering more than 200,000 homes.

    “We are looking beyond the near term and opening up exploration of the next chapter of B.C.’s energy future by advancing the dialogue with industry participants and potential partners around clean-technology investments and expanding our leading energy-efficiency programs,” said Chris O’Riley, president and CEO of BC Hydro. “With BC Hydro’s long-standing legacy of delivering clean, reliable power, these initiatives will drive growth, sustainability and energy security, creating new opportunities across British Columbia.”

    The information gathered from both RFEOIs will guide future energy planning and procurement strategies. Submissions will close in September 2025.

    Both initiatives are part of the recently announced Clean Power Action Plan, an ambitious strategy to strengthen energy security, enhance system resilience and accelerate the transition to clean power. The plan also includes:

    • launching a second call for power to acquire a target of as much as 5,000 gigawatt-hours per year of energy from large, clean and renewable projects, which builds on the success of the 2024 call for power and resulted in 10 new renewable-energy projects, with First Nations asset ownership between 49% and 51%, capable of powering about 500,000 new homes;
    • investing more than $12 million from the B.C. Innovative Clean Energy fund in a targeted three-year call for new, made-in-B.C. clean-energy technologies that will combat climate change and create sustainable jobs; and
    • streamlining connections to B.C.’s grid to enable new homes and businesses to access clean electricity faster and less expensively.

    Through these actions, BC Hydro is reinforcing its commitment to delivering clean, reliable energy, supporting British Columbia’s transition to a low-carbon economy and ensuring electricity remains affordable, sustainable and accessible to all residents.

    Quick Facts:

    • The following BC Hydro actions will power more than one million new homes in the coming years: 
      • adding the Site C hydroelectric dam, which will generate enough electricity to power 500,000 homes and increase supply by 8%;
      • bringing new renewable wind and solar projects into service from the recent call for power, collectively powering 500,000 homes and boosting supply by 8%; and,
      • expanding investments in energy efficiency, expected to save 2,000 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, enough to power 200,000 homes.

    Learn More:

    To learn more about the Province’s plans to power B.C.’s potential, visit: https://www.bchydro.com/poweringpotential

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Global: The atmosphere is getting thirstier and it’s making droughts worse – new study

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Solomon Gebrechorkos, Reserach Fellow in Climate Change Attribution, University of Oxford

    luchschenF/Shutterstock

    Droughts are becoming more severe and widespread across the globe. But it’s not just changing rainfall patterns that are to blame. The atmosphere is also getting thirstier.

    In a new study published in Nature, my colleagues and I show that this rising “atmospheric thirst” – also known as atmospheric evaporative demand (AED) – is responsible for about 40% of the increase in drought severity over the last four decades (1981-2022).

    Imagine rainfall as income and AED as spending. Even if your income (rainfall) stays the same, your balance goes into deficit if your spending (AED) increases. That’s exactly what’s happening with drought: the atmosphere is demanding more water than the land can afford to lose.

    As the planet warms, this demand grows – drawing more moisture from soils, rivers, lakes, and even plants. With this growing thirst, droughts are getting more severe even where rain hasn’t significantly declined.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The process of AED describes how much water the atmosphere wants from the surface. The hotter, sunnier, windier and drier the air is, the more water it requires – even if there isn’t less rain.

    So even in places where rainfall hasn’t changed much, we’re still seeing worsening droughts. This thirstier atmosphere is drying things out faster and more intensely and introducing more stress when this water is not available.

    Our new analysis reveals that AED doesn’t just make existing droughts worse – it expands the areas affected by drought. From 2018 to 2022, the global land area experiencing drought rose by 74%, and 58% of that expansion was due to increased AED.

    Our study highlights that the year 2022 stood out as the most drought-stricken year in over four decades. More than 30% of the world’s land experienced moderate to extreme drought conditions. In both Europe and east Africa, the drought was especially severe in 2022 – this was driven largely by a sharp increase in AED, which intensified drying even where rainfall hadn’t dropped significantly.

    Crop yields are severely affected by water stress.
    Scott Book/Shutterstock

    In Europe alone, widespread drying had major consequences: reduced river flows hindered hydropower generation, crop yields suffered due to water stress, plus many cities faced water shortages. This put unprecedented pressure on water supply, agriculture and energy sectors, threatening livelihoods and economic stability.

    My team’s new research brings clarity to the dynamics of drought. We used high-quality global climate data, including temperature, wind speed, humidity and solar radiation – these are the key meteorological variables that influence how much water the atmosphere can draw from the land and vegetation. The team combined all these ingredients to measure AED – essentially, how “thirsty” the air is.

    Then, using a widely recognised drought index that includes both rainfall and this atmospheric thirst, we could track when, where and why droughts are getting more severe. With this metric, we can calculate how much of that worsening is due to the atmosphere’s growing thirst.

    The future implications of this increasing atmospheric thirst are huge, especially for regions already vulnerable to drought such as western and eastern Africa, western and south Australia, and the southwestern US where AED was responsible for more than 60% of drought severity over the past two decades.

    Without factoring in AED during drought monitoring and planning, governments and communities may underestimate the true risk they face. With global temperatures expected to rise further, we can expect even more frequent and severe droughts. We need to prepare. That involves understanding and planning for this growing atmospheric thirst.

    Driving drought

    Knowing what is causing droughts in each specific location enables smarter climate adaptation. AED must be a central part of how we monitor, model and plan for drought.

    Identifying the specific drivers of drought is essential for tailoring effective ways to cope with drought. If droughts are mainly due to declining rainfall, then the focus should be on water storage and conservation. But if AED is the main driver – as it is in many places now – then strategies must address evaporative loss (i.e. the amount of water lost from the surface and plants to the atmosphere) and plant water stress. This might involve planting drought-resistant crops, constructing irrigation systems that use water more efficiently, improving soil health or restoring habitats to keep moisture in the land.

    As our research shows, rising AED – driven by global warming – is intensifying drought severity even where rainfall hasn’t declined. Ignoring it means underestimating risk.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Solomon Gebrechorkos receives funding from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO; grant no. 201880) and the UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC; grant no. NE/S017380/1).

    ref. The atmosphere is getting thirstier and it’s making droughts worse – new study – https://theconversation.com/the-atmosphere-is-getting-thirstier-and-its-making-droughts-worse-new-study-258022

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Calland, Emeritus Associate Professor in Public Law, UCT. Visiting Adjunct Professor, WITS School of Governance; Director, Africa Programme, University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, University of Cambridge

    With the Trump administration slashing US Agency for International Development budgets and European nations shifting overseas development aid budgets to bolster defence spending, the world has entered a “post-aid era”.

    But there is an opportunity to recast development finance as strategic investment: “country platforms”.

    Country platforms are government-led, nationally owned mechanisms that bring together a country’s climate priorities, investment needs and reform agenda, and align them with the interests of development partners, private investors and implementing agencies. They function as a strategic hub: convening actors, coordinating funding, and curating pipelines of projects for investment.

    Think of them as the opposite of donor-driven fragmentation. Instead of dozens of disconnected projects driven by external priorities, a country platform enables governments to set the agenda and direct finance to where it is needed most. That could be renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, or nature-based solutions.

    Country platforms are a current fad. They were the talk of the town at the 2025 Spring meetings of multilateral development banks in Washington DC. Will they quickly fade as the next big new idea comes into view? Or can they escape the limitations and failings of the finance and development aid ecosystem?

    The Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, on which I serve, is striving to find new ways to ramp up finance – both public and private – in quality and quantity. I agree with those who argue that country platforms could be the innovation that unlocks the capital urgently needed to tackle climate overshoot and buttress economic development.

    The model is already being tested. More than ten countries have launched their platforms, and more are in the pipeline.

    For African countries, the opportunity could not be more timely. African governments are racing to deliver their Nationally Determined Contributions. These are the commitments they’ve made to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of climate change mitigation targets set out in the Paris Agreement. Implementing these plans is often being done under severe fiscal constraints.

    At the same time global capital is looking for investment opportunities. But it needs to be convinced that the rewards will outweigh the risks.

    Where it’s being tested

    In Africa, South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership has demonstrated both the potential and the complexity of a country platform. Egypt and Senegal also have country platforms at different stages of implementation. Kenya and Nigeria are exploring similar mechanisms. The African Union’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy calls for country platforms across the continent.

    New entrants can learn from countries that started first.

    But country platforms come in different shapes and sizes according to the context.

    Another promising example is emerging through Mission 300, an initiative of the World Bank and African Development Bank, working with partners like The Rockefeller Foundation, Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet, and Sustainable Energy for All. It aims to connect 300 million people to clean electricity by 2030.

    Central to this initiative are Compact Delivery and Monitoring Units. These are essentially country platforms anchored in electrification. They reflect how a well-structured country platform can make an impact. Twelve African countries are already moving in this direction. All announced their Mission 300 compacts at the Africa Heads of State Summit in Tanzania.

    This growing cohort reflects a continental commitment to putting energy-driven country platforms at the heart of Africa’s development architecture.

    Why now – and why Africa?

    A well-functioning country platform can help in a number of ways.

    Firstly, it can give the political and economic leadership a clear goal. The platform can survive elections and show stability, certainty and transparency to the investment world.

    Secondly, national ownership and strategic alignment can reduce risk and build confidence. That would encourage investment.

    Thirdly, it builds trust among development partners and investors through clear priorities, transparency, and national ownership.

    Fourthly, it moves beyond isolated pilot projects to system-level transformation – meaning structural change. The transition in one sector, energy for example, creates new value chains that create more, better and safer jobs. Country platforms put African governments in charge of their own economic development, not as passive recipients of climate finance.

    The country sets its investment priorities and then the match-making with international climate finance can begin.

    Making it work: what’s needed

    Developing the data on which a country bases its investment and development plans, and blending those with the fiscal, climate and nature data, is complex. For this reason country platforms require investment in institutional capacity, cross-ministerial collaboration, and strong coordination between finance ministries, environment agencies and economic planners. And especially, in leadership capability.

    African countries must take charge of this capacity and capability acceleration.

    Second, development partners can respond by providing money as well as supporting African leadership, aligning with national strategies, and being willing to co-design mechanisms that meet both investor expectations and local realities.

    Capacity is especially crucial given the scale of Africa’s needs. According to the African Development Bank, Africa will require over US$200 billion annually by 2030 to meet its climate goals. Donor aid will provide only a fraction of this. It will require smart, coordinated investment and careful debt management. Country platforms provide the structure to govern the process.

    Seizing the opportunity

    Country platforms represent one of the most promising innovations in climate and development finance architecture. Properly designed and led, they offer African countries the opportunity to take ownership of their climate and development futures – on their own terms.

    Country platforms could be the “buckle” that finally enables the supply and demand sides of climate finance to come together. It will require commitment, strategic and technical capability, and, above all, smart leadership.

    Richard Calland works for the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership. He is also an Emeritus Associate Professor at the University of Cape Town and an Adjunct Visiting Professor at the University of Witwatersrand School of Governance. He serves on the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, Chairs of the Board of Sustainability Education and is a member of the Board of Chapter Zero Southern Africa.

    ref. Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms – https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-a-post-aid-world-the-case-for-country-platforms-257994

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Calland, Emeritus Associate Professor in Public Law, UCT. Visiting Adjunct Professor, WITS School of Governance; Director, Africa Programme, University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, University of Cambridge

    With the Trump administration slashing US Agency for International Development budgets and European nations shifting overseas development aid budgets to bolster defence spending, the world has entered a “post-aid era”.

    But there is an opportunity to recast development finance as strategic investment: “country platforms”.

    Country platforms are government-led, nationally owned mechanisms that bring together a country’s climate priorities, investment needs and reform agenda, and align them with the interests of development partners, private investors and implementing agencies. They function as a strategic hub: convening actors, coordinating funding, and curating pipelines of projects for investment.

    Think of them as the opposite of donor-driven fragmentation. Instead of dozens of disconnected projects driven by external priorities, a country platform enables governments to set the agenda and direct finance to where it is needed most. That could be renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, or nature-based solutions.

    Country platforms are a current fad. They were the talk of the town at the 2025 Spring meetings of multilateral development banks in Washington DC. Will they quickly fade as the next big new idea comes into view? Or can they escape the limitations and failings of the finance and development aid ecosystem?

    The Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, on which I serve, is striving to find new ways to ramp up finance – both public and private – in quality and quantity. I agree with those who argue that country platforms could be the innovation that unlocks the capital urgently needed to tackle climate overshoot and buttress economic development.

    The model is already being tested. More than ten countries have launched their platforms, and more are in the pipeline.

    For African countries, the opportunity could not be more timely. African governments are racing to deliver their Nationally Determined Contributions. These are the commitments they’ve made to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of climate change mitigation targets set out in the Paris Agreement. Implementing these plans is often being done under severe fiscal constraints.

    At the same time global capital is looking for investment opportunities. But it needs to be convinced that the rewards will outweigh the risks.

    Where it’s being tested

    In Africa, South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership has demonstrated both the potential and the complexity of a country platform. Egypt and Senegal also have country platforms at different stages of implementation. Kenya and Nigeria are exploring similar mechanisms. The African Union’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy calls for country platforms across the continent.

    New entrants can learn from countries that started first.

    But country platforms come in different shapes and sizes according to the context.

    Another promising example is emerging through Mission 300, an initiative of the World Bank and African Development Bank, working with partners like The Rockefeller Foundation, Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet, and Sustainable Energy for All. It aims to connect 300 million people to clean electricity by 2030.

    Central to this initiative are Compact Delivery and Monitoring Units. These are essentially country platforms anchored in electrification. They reflect how a well-structured country platform can make an impact. Twelve African countries are already moving in this direction. All announced their Mission 300 compacts at the Africa Heads of State Summit in Tanzania.

    This growing cohort reflects a continental commitment to putting energy-driven country platforms at the heart of Africa’s development architecture.

    Why now – and why Africa?

    A well-functioning country platform can help in a number of ways.

    Firstly, it can give the political and economic leadership a clear goal. The platform can survive elections and show stability, certainty and transparency to the investment world.

    Secondly, national ownership and strategic alignment can reduce risk and build confidence. That would encourage investment.

    Thirdly, it builds trust among development partners and investors through clear priorities, transparency, and national ownership.

    Fourthly, it moves beyond isolated pilot projects to system-level transformation – meaning structural change. The transition in one sector, energy for example, creates new value chains that create more, better and safer jobs. Country platforms put African governments in charge of their own economic development, not as passive recipients of climate finance.

    The country sets its investment priorities and then the match-making with international climate finance can begin.

    Making it work: what’s needed

    Developing the data on which a country bases its investment and development plans, and blending those with the fiscal, climate and nature data, is complex. For this reason country platforms require investment in institutional capacity, cross-ministerial collaboration, and strong coordination between finance ministries, environment agencies and economic planners. And especially, in leadership capability.

    African countries must take charge of this capacity and capability acceleration.

    Second, development partners can respond by providing money as well as supporting African leadership, aligning with national strategies, and being willing to co-design mechanisms that meet both investor expectations and local realities.

    Capacity is especially crucial given the scale of Africa’s needs. According to the African Development Bank, Africa will require over US$200 billion annually by 2030 to meet its climate goals. Donor aid will provide only a fraction of this. It will require smart, coordinated investment and careful debt management. Country platforms provide the structure to govern the process.

    Seizing the opportunity

    Country platforms represent one of the most promising innovations in climate and development finance architecture. Properly designed and led, they offer African countries the opportunity to take ownership of their climate and development futures – on their own terms.

    Country platforms could be the “buckle” that finally enables the supply and demand sides of climate finance to come together. It will require commitment, strategic and technical capability, and, above all, smart leadership.

    – Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms
    – https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-a-post-aid-world-the-case-for-country-platforms-257994

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Extreme weather’s true damage cost is often a mystery – that’s a problem for understanding storm risk, but it can be fixed

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By John Nielsen-Gammon, Regents Professor of Atmospheric Sciences, Texas A&M University

    Hail can be destructive, yet the cost of the damage often isn’t publicly tracked. NOAA/NSSL

    On Jan. 5, 2025, at about 2:35 in the afternoon, the first severe hailstorm of the season dropped quarter-size hail in Chatham, Mississippi. According to the federal storm events database, there were no injuries, but it caused $10,000 in property damage.

    How do we know the storm caused $10,000 in damage? We don’t.

    That estimate is probably a best guess from someone whose primary job is weather forecasting. Yet these guesses, and thousands like them, form the foundation for publicly available tallies of the costs of severe weather.

    If the damage estimates from hailstorms are consistently lower in one county than the next, potential property buyers might think it’s because there’s less risk of hailstorms. Instead, it might just be because different people are making the estimates.

    Hail damage in Dallas in June 2012.
    Rondo Estrello/Flickr, CC BY-SA

    We are atmospheric scientists at Texas A&M University who lead the Office of the Texas State Climatologist. Through our involvement in state-level planning for weather-related disasters, we have seen county-scale patterns of storm damage over the past 20 years that just didn’t make sense. So, we decided to dig deeper.

    We looked at storm event reports for a mix of seven urban and rural counties in southeast Texas, with populations ranging from 50,000 to 5 million. We included all reported types of extreme weather. We also talked with people from the two National Weather Service offices that cover the area.

    Storm damage investigations vary widely

    Typically, two specific types of extreme weather receive special attention.

    After a tornado, the National Weather Service conducts an on-site damage survey, examining its track and destruction. That survey forms the basis for the official estimate of a tornado’s strength on the enhanced Fujita scale. Weather Service staff are able to make decent damage cost estimates from knowledge of home values in the area.

    They also investigate flash flood damage in detail, and loss information is available from the National Flood Insurance Program, the main source of flood insurance for U.S. homes.

    Tornadoes in May 2025 destroyed homes in communities in several states, including London, Ky.
    AP Photo/Timothy D. Easley

    Most other losses from extreme weather are privately insured, if they’re insured at all.

    Insured loss information is collected by reinsurance companies – the companies that insure the insurance companies – and gets tabulated for major events. Insurance companies use their own detailed information to try to make better decisions on rates than their competitors do, so event-based loss data by county from insurance companies isn’t readily available.

    Losing billion-dollar disaster data

    There’s one big window into how disaster damage has changed over the years in the U.S.

    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, compiled information for major disasters, including insured losses by state. Bulk data won’t tell communities or counties about their specific risk, but it enabled NOAA to calculate overall damage estimates, which it released as its billion-dollar disasters list.

    From that program, we know that the number and cost of billion-dollar disasters in the United States has increased dramatically in recent years. News articles and even scientific papers often point to climate change as the primary culprit, but a much larger driver has been the increasing number and value of buildings and other types of infrastructure, particularly along hurricane-prone coasts.

    Critics in the past year called for more transparency and vetting of the procedures used to estimate billion-dollar disasters. But that’s not going to happen, because NOAA in May 2025 stopped making billion-dollar disaster estimates and retired its user interface.

    Previous estimates can still be retrieved from NOAA’s online data archive, but by shutting down that program, the window into current and future disaster losses and insurance claims is now closed.

    Emergency managers at the county level also make local damage estimates, but the resources they have available vary widely. They may estimate damages only when the total might be large enough to trigger a disaster declaration that makes relief funds available from the federal government.

    Patching together very rough estimates

    Without insurance data or county estimates, the local offices of the National Weather Service are on their own to estimate losses.

    There is no standard operating procedure that every office must follow. One office might choose to simply not provide damage estimates for any hailstorms because the staff doesn’t see how it could come up with accurate values. Others may make estimates, but with varying methods.

    The result is a patchwork of damage estimates. Accurate values are more likely for rare events that cause extensive damage. Loss estimates from more frequent events that don’t reach a high damage threshold are generally far less reliable.

    The number of severe hail reports in southeast Texas listed in the National Centers for Environmental Information’s storm events database is strongly correlated with population. The county with the most reports and greatest detail in those reports is home to Houston. Hailstorms in the three easternmost counties are rarely associated with damage estimates.
    John Nielsen-Gammon and B.J. Baule

    Do you want to look at local damage trends? Forget about it. For most extreme weather events, estimation methods vary over time and are not documented.

    Do you want to direct funding to help communities improve resilience to natural disasters where the need is greatest? Forget about it. The places experiencing the largest per capita damages depend not just on actual damages but on the different practices of local National Weather Service offices.

    Are you moving to a location that might be vulnerable to extreme weather? Companies are starting to provide localized risk estimates through real estate websites, but the algorithms tend to be proprietary, and there’s no independent validation.

    4 steps to improve disaster data

    We believe a few fixes could make NOAA’s storm events database and the corresponding values in the larger SHELDUS database, managed by Arizona State University, more reliable. Both databases include county-level disasters and loss estimates for some of those disasters.

    First, the National Weather Service could develop standard procedures for local offices for estimating disaster damages.

    Second, additional state support could encourage local emergency managers to make concrete damage estimates from individual events and share them with the National Weather Service. The local emergency manager generally knows the extent of damage much better than a forecaster sitting in an office a few counties away.

    Third, state or federal governments and insurance companies can agree to make public the aggregate loss information at the county level or other scale that doesn’t jeopardize the privacy of their policyholders. If all companies provide this data, there is no competitive disadvantage for doing so.

    Fourth, NOAA could create a small “tiger team” of damage specialists to make well-informed, consistent damage estimates of larger events and train local offices on how to handle the smaller stuff.

    With these processes in place, the U.S. wouldn’t need a billion-dollar disasters program anymore. We’d have reliable information on all the disasters.

    John Nielsen-Gammon receives funding from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the State of Texas.

    William Baule receives funding from NOAA, the State of Texas, & the Austin Community Foundation.

    ref. Extreme weather’s true damage cost is often a mystery – that’s a problem for understanding storm risk, but it can be fixed – https://theconversation.com/extreme-weathers-true-damage-cost-is-often-a-mystery-thats-a-problem-for-understanding-storm-risk-but-it-can-be-fixed-257105

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why climate is an everyday story – but media coverage still spikes around special environment days and UN summits

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sanam Mahoozi, PhD Candidate in Journalism, City St George’s, University of London

    Lake Urmia, Iran. Sebastian Castelier/Shutterstock

    Climate change is already happening. But 36% of the world’s population still disputes the realities of its origins and impacts. When the science is clear but public understanding lags, more lives and livelihoods are put at risk.

    The media can act as a bridge between climate solutions and public understanding. A global analysis by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found that the news media remain the primary source of climate change information, with 31% of people getting it from television and 24% from websites and social media platforms.

    Despite all of this, the mainstream media around the world is not doing enough to shoulder the responsibility of preparing the public for the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. Research indicates that climate change coverage spikes around UN climate summits (Cops) and events like World Water Day, but drops off in between.

    That means the stories being told about the environment get the most attention during certain months and consistently less coverage throughout the rest of the year.

    I study how the media reports on climate change in authoritarian countries like Iran and across the Middle East and north Africa, a region where heat indices surpass 55°C and severe water shortages persist.

    As part of my PhD research, I found that international media reporting of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations is sporadic, with coverage often increasing around political and environmental events.

    Reporting on environmental issues in countries facing conflict, war and political tensions is challenging, as the topic often falls low on the media’s list of priorities.

    Climate stories tend to peak around special environment days or UN climate summits.
    arda savasciogullari/Shutterstock

    When it comes to Iran, most of the news making headlines is focused on its nuclear development programme, problems with the west and violations of human rights. The fact that thousands of Iranians die each year from thirst, air pollution and heatwaves rarely makes it into international media, and when it does, it’s usually tied to a political event like protests or US economic sanctions.

    For the past few years, I have been researching and writing for news outlets about the Iranian government’s failure to take action towards mitigating climate change. While discussing the issue with climate scientists, I learned that Iran is among the top ten countries globally contributing to carbon emissions.

    I also learned that, along with Yemen and Libya, Iran is the only country left to ratify the Paris agreement, a treaty that aims to keep global temperatures to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial times.

    However, when I analysed the media coverage, there was not nearly enough mention of this throughout the year. Most articles were published in November, around the time the UN usually holds its annual climate summits, like the UN climate summit, Cop29, hosted by Azerbaijan last year.

    This is a trend I’ve realised through my research and reporting. When the media only covers environmental issues in countries like Iran during political upheavals or climate summits, the world remains largely unaware of these ongoing challenges the rest of the time.

    Here’s the problem: just in the past few months, millions of Iranians across the country have been suffering through crippling sand and dust storms, drought and land subsidence, issues that have been exacerbated by climate change.

    My PhD research into how the media covers the environment in authoritarian regimes is supported by other studies. I found that articles about water and climate issues in Iran and the Middle East tend to peak around environmental protests and UN climate change summits.

    My study shows that Iran received the highest amount of environmental coverage during the 2021 protests in the southwestern province of Khuzestan concerning the lack of water and drought.

    The bigger picture

    When journalists, editors and media outlets delay reporting on the impact of climate change in countries like Iran, we miss the full scale of the damage. As a result, there’s less pressure on authorities to change policies or prepare the public for the growing environmental challenges like forced migration, hunger, and conflict.

    If these countries are more vulnerable to climate change and their governments are doing little to solve the problem, this urgency must be reflected in the media.

    This can be achieved if news organisations publish more stories that explore the root causes of environmental problems and include insights from experts who can offer solutions.

    If even one story can help save a lake, river or wetland from drying up, that’s a pretty powerful effect.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Sanam Mahoozi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why climate is an everyday story – but media coverage still spikes around special environment days and UN summits – https://theconversation.com/why-climate-is-an-everyday-story-but-media-coverage-still-spikes-around-special-environment-days-and-un-summits-256286

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Amalgamated Bank Joins Nearly $1 Billion Aggregate Financing with Greenbacker’s 674 MW Cider Solar Farm, Powering New York’s Largest Solar Project to Date

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amalgamated Bank, a subsidiary of Amalgamated Financial Corp. (Nasdaq: AMAL), today announced the successful closing of a $15 million commitment as part of a nearly $1 billion aggregate financing to support the construction and operation of Greenbacker Renewable Energy Company LLC’s (“Greenbacker”) utility-scale 674 MWdc (megawatts of direct current) “Cider” solar farm, the largest solar project in New York State.

    Cider is located on approximately 2,500 acres in Genesee County, New York, the state where both Greenbacker and Amalgamated Bank are headquartered. Greenbacker broke ground on the solar project—its largest to date—in late 2024, and commenced major construction activities at the site in spring 2025.

    “The Cider project and associated financing, including the new partnership with Amalgamated Bank, underscores Greenbacker’s commitment to building a more resilient energy system in New York,” said Carl Weatherley-White, Greenbacker’s interim Chief Financial Officer. “Together we are driving forward a sustainable future that delivers affordable, homegrown, clean power and meaningful economic benefits to local communities.”

    Cider’s construction is expected to support hundreds of clean energy jobs. The project is slated to enter commercial operation by the end of 2026, when it is projected to generate enough clean electricity to power over 120,000 New York homes annually.

    “We are proud to partner with Greenbacker on the Cider project, a landmark achievement for renewable energy in New York,” said Sam Brown, Chief Banking Officer at Amalgamated Bank. “This project stands as a testament to our collective mission to deliver impactful, scalable clean energy solutions. Additionally, Greenbacker’s dedication to partnering with local organized labor further underscores our unwavering support for unions and our commitment to fostering strong, sustainable communities.”

    Greenbacker’s portfolio has produced over 12 million megawatt – hours of clean energy and abated more than 8 million metric tons of carbon since 2016, reinforcing its commitment to energy transition investments across the country.

    About Greenbacker Renewable Energy Company
    Greenbacker Renewable Energy Company LLC is a publicly reporting, non-traded limited liability sustainable infrastructure company that both acquires and manages income-producing renewable energy and other energy-related businesses, including solar and wind farms, and provides asset management services to other renewable energy investment vehicles. We seek to acquire and operate high-quality projects that sell clean power under long-term contracts to high-creditworthy counterparties such as utilities, municipalities, and corporations. We are long-term owner-operators, who strive to be good stewards of the land and responsible members of the communities in which we operate. Greenbacker conducts its asset management business through its wholly owned subsidiary, Greenbacker Capital Management, LLC, an SEC-registered investment adviser. We believe our focus on power production and asset management creates value that we can then pass on to our shareholders—while facilitating the transition toward a clean energy future. For more information, please visit www.greenbackercapital.com.

    About Amalgamated Bank:
    Amalgamated Bank, the wholly owned banking subsidiary of Amalgamated Financial Corp. (Nasdaq: AMAL), is a mission-driven New York-based full-service commercial bank and a chartered trust company with a combined network branches in New York City, Washington D.C., San Francisco, and Boston. Amalgamated Bank provides commercial and retail banking products, investment management and trust and custody services, and lending services. Since their founding in 1923, Amalgamated Bank is diligent in fulfilling their mission to be America’s socially responsible bank, empowering organizations and individuals to advance positive change. The businesses that Amalgamated Bank focus’ on are generally mission aligned with our core values, including sustainable companies, clean energy, nonprofits, and B Corporations. www.amalgamatedbank.com.

    Media Contacts:  
    Chris Larson
    Media Communications
    Greenbacker
    646.569.9532
    c.larson@greenbackercapital.com

    Ayele Ajavon
    Head of Communication
    Amalgamated Bank
    929.979.5811
    Media@amalgamatedbank.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Manchester Culture Awards 2025 – nominations now open!

    Source: City of Manchester

    The Manchester Culture Awards are back for 2025 with nominations opening this week for the prestigious awards that recognise the city’s cultural and creative highlights over the last year, as well as some of the city’s top talent working in the arts.

    The awards were launched in 2018 by the city council to acknowledge Manchester’s rapidly growing reputation for culture and the arts, with the annual awards recognising the very best of culture, creativity, and the arts in the city from the grassroots up.

    More than 350 nominations were received last year recognising individuals, events, and organisations big and small that together help make Manchester the vibrant and exciting place for culture and the arts it is.

    Nominations for this year’s awards open this week on Wednesday 4 June, with nominations accepted across eleven different categories including Young Creative of the Year, Best Event, and Best Performance, alongside other awards that shine a spotlight on some of the important themes of our times such as climate change, equality and social justice, and health and wellbeing.

    This year will also once again see a special award made in partnership with the Manchester Evening News.  The Cultural Welcome Award will be presented to an organisation or venue that provides a great welcome to everyone – whether as audience members, visitors, or participants.

    Nominees for each of the awards must either be based in the city of Manchester or have a strong track record of delivering activity for the benefit of people who live in or visit the city, or that benefits the local economy.  Nominations are welcome from the professional, amateur and community sector, as well as members of the public.

    All nominations must reflect activity that has taken place between 1 April 2024 and 31 March 2025, apart from the Cultural Welcome Award, which recognises achievement over a number of years.

    To be recognised for a Manchester Culture Award, nominees must be involved in one or more of the following: visual art, music, theatre, performance, dance, film and broadcast media, literature, digital art, photography, craft, or heritage arts.

    The award categories are:

    Bright Spark: Young Creative of the Year 

    A young person (aged 13–25) who is inspiring future generations of Mancunians and others through their creativity or is supporting others to be creative. 

    Excellence in Creative Health and Wellbeing

    Fantastic creative activity that helped people feel better in their body and/or mind. 

    Champions of Equality and Social Justice 

    Making change and creating opportunities for equality and diversity to thrive.

    Our Planet: Action on Climate Change 

    Taking action to positively benefit the environment and support climate change, or raising awareness and encouraging others to act.  

    Igniting Creativity: Culture, Education and Talent Development 

    Doing great work supporting others to develop their learning, creativity, skills and talents.

    Making it Happen: Best Business Partnership 

    A partnership that supports culture and helps it flourish in Manchester. 

    The Best Event 

     A brilliant creative or cultural event that deserves recognition. 

    The Best Performance 

    A standout performance, in any art form, that was amazing and captivated the audience. 

    The Best Exhibition

    An arts or heritage exhibition that inspired and left a lasting impact on visitors. 

    Independent Creative Award 

    A person working independently in the creative sector who is inspiring and innovating through their artform and projects

    The Cultural Welcome Award – in association with the Manchester Evening News

    An organisation or venue that provides a great welcome to everyone; whether as audience members, visitors, or participants

    A number of Special Recognition Awards for significant contributions to culture over a number of years will also be made on the night.  Previous recipients of Special Recognition Awards include poet Lemn Sissay, former Halle Music Director Sir Mark Elder, former Director of HOME Dave Moutrey OBE, poet performance artist dramatist and writer SuAndi OBE, and DJ Paulette.

    Councillor Garry Bridges, Deputy Leader, Manchester City Council, said: “Culture and creativity is a massive part of what makes Manchester the vibrant and exciting place that it is and makes a major contribution to the city’s economy – which is one of the fastest growing in Europe.

    “The incredible number of nominations we’ve had every year since the awards first began shows what an appetite for culture and the arts there is in the city. And with such a richly diverse talent pool of artists and creatives living and working here it’s no surprise that we’re a city that embraces culture and the arts.

    “The creative scene in Manchester is amazing and we can’t wait to see what this year’s nominations bring.”

    Nominations open on Wednesday 4 June and close at midnight on Friday 4 July.

    Judging will take place over the summer ahead of this year’s awards ceremony which will be held at the Hilton Hotel Deansgate on Saturday 22 November.

    Find out more information about the awards and make a nomination

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Video: Sudan, Guatemala  & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (3 June 2025)

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Sudan
    Commissioner of the International Commission Against Impunity/Guatemala 
    Ninth Austrian World Summit
    Human Rights/Climate Emergency
    Deputy Secretary-General/Travels
    Gaza
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Syria
    Ukraine
    South Sudan
    Democratic Republic of the Congo
    Photo Exhibition
    World Bicycle Day
    Financial Contribution
    Briefings – Today

    SUDAN
    You will have seen the horrific developments in Sudan in which five members of a UN humanitarian convoy were killed last night and several more were injured during an attack near Al Koma in North Darfur.
    I can tell you that we condemn in the strongest terms this horrendous act of violence against humanitarian personnel who literally put their lives at risk attempting to reach vulnerable children and families in the famine-impacted areas.
    This joint WFP-UNICEF 15-truck convoy had travelled over 1,800 km (just about 1,118 miles) from Port Sudan, and they were carrying food and nutrition supplies. The Agencies were negotiating access to complete the journey to El Fasher when it was attacked. The route was shared in advance, and parties on the ground were notified and aware of the location of the trucks.
    Multiple trucks were burned in the attack, and critical humanitarian supplies were damaged. It is devastating the supplies have not reached the civilians in need. This is the first UN humanitarian convoy that was going to make it to El Fasher in over a year.
    All attacks on humanitarian personnel, their facilities and vehicles must stop. They are a violation under international humanitarian law. And we call for an urgent investigation and for the perpetrators to be held to account.
    We call for safe, secure operating conditions and for international humanitarian law to be respected by all parties, not just in Sudan, but in all conflict-impacted countries. Under international humanitarian law, aid convoys must be protected, and parties have the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need.
    And for those who were killed in line of duty in Sudan, we extend our condolences to their families and loved ones, and we wish a speedy recovery for the wounded. Shirin

    COMMISSIONER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGAINST IMPUNITY/GUATEMALA 
    The Secretary-General is concerned about the announcement by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Guatemala regarding the issuance of arrest warrants against former Commissioner of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), Iván Velásquez, former CICIG Head of Investigations Luz Adriana Camargo — now Colombia’s Attorney General — along with 24 other former CICIG national staff and independent justice officials who collaborated with CICIG.
    The Secretary-General reiterates that the Commission’s international personnel, under the terms of the agreement between the UN and the Government of Guatemala regarding the establishment of the Commission, enjoys immunity from legal process with respect to acts done in the performance of their mission which continues even after the completion of their employment with CICIG. He recalls that under this agreement, the Government of Guatemala agreed to protect the personnel of CICIG – whether international or national – from abuse, threats, reprisals or acts of intimidation in virtue of their work for CICIG. 
    The Secretary-General reiterates his concern at the numerous reports that criminal prosecution is being carried out against those who sought to shed light on cases of corruption and worked to strengthen rule of law and the justice system in Guatemala.

    NINTH AUSTRIAN WORLD SUMMIT
    Today, the Secretary-General addressed the Ninth Austrian World Summit via a video message. He pointed out that we face a triple-whammy of woe, with pollution clogging rivers, contaminating land, and poisoning our ocean, the biodiversity being destroyed at record pace and record levels of greenhouse gases catastrophically disrupting our climate.
    The Secretary-General warned that no country, whether rich or poor, can escape these crises, and no country can solve them alone. But together, he said, we can reap the rewards of action, from cheap, secure power, to better health.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/ossg/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=03+June+2025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfQFjOD3ATM

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: GPDRR 2025 highlights: Tuesday 3 June 2025

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    The human cost of disasters includes lost livelihoods, homes, and cultural ties to landscapes. Where livelihoods are already fragile and being eroded, a disaster-induced displacement of even a few days can damage economic opportunities for years to come. So, the human dimension of recovery remains central to discussions as delegates convened for a second day in several preparatory events for the 8th Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GPDRR), namely: the World Resilient Recovery Conference, the Third Stakeholder Forum on DRR, and the Global Early Warning for All Multistakeholder Forum (EW4All).

    The GPDRR official programme was launched with a high-level roundtable event at lunchtime and a formal opening ceremony in the afternoon, followed by an official reception.

    Official programme

    Opening

    Kamal Kishore, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, and head of UNDRR, opened the event highlighting the exceptional urgency and importance of delivering on the Sendai Framework. He underscored how communities were coming together and the need to learn from their initiatives, imagination, and resourcefulness, and called for commitment from all actors.

    Recalling the recent loss of a Swiss village to a glacier landslide, Amina J. Mohammed, United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, commented that “early warning saves lives but cannot save glaciers from disappearing.” She stressed that disasters and their cascading effects annually cost up to USD 3.2 trillion and noted that record-breaking disasters make entire regions uninsurable. She called for risk-informed development across all sectors; scaled-up public and private investments in resilience; and national financial frameworks that align with adaptation needs.

    Ignazio Cassis, Minister, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, observed that, “Risk today is everywhere. Fires are where wetlands were centuries ago.” Noting that the GPDRR2025 is the last Global Platform before the 2030 deadline, he urged that countries deliver on the Sendai Framework, apply science and artificial intelligence, and adopt risk mitigation metrics to mobilize and foster resources.

    Amina J. Mohammed, UN Deputy Secretary-General.

    After a musical performance on the Hang Drum and a choreographed presentation by Sendai4Youth, Patricia Danzi, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, opened the Eighth Session of the GPDRR.

    Enhancing national DRR governance by 2030—A dialogue among national platforms for DRR

    In opening remarks to this high-level event, Kishore observed that the risk landscape platform is becoming increasingly complex. He recommended strengthening national DRR platforms and embedding risk reduction into national policies and frameworks; ensuring sustainable and predictable finance with policies matching sustainable long-term plans; and having a common risk assessment framework to support national entities with proper data and analytics.

    Speaking on behalf of the host country, Franziska Schmid, Swiss National Platform for Natural Hazards (PLANAT), described the work of PLANAT and highlighted challenges, including overlapping reporting mechanisms and strategies among national government entities focused on resilience. She stressed the importance of addressing duplication, developing appropriate tools, such as hazard maps and building permits, and ensuring crisis management provisions are actually functional.

    Discussions then followed in a roundtable format, moderated by Paola Albrito, UNDRR. Albrito invited delegates to: describe the demonstrated impact of their National Platforms for DRR, share lessons learned, identify remaining gaps in DRR governance, and highlight ways and opportunities to boost Sendai Framework implementation by 2030.

    View of the room during the Dialogue Among National Platforms for DRR.

    In their interventions, many called for collaboration among regional and country partners. Speakers included the Deputy Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tajikistan, as well as many ministers and high-level government representatives. They highlighted lessons and challenges, including: enhancing preparedness through strengthening and modernizing approaches; improving planning and promoting concrete analyses from real-life situations at the grassroots; and mobilizing adequate financing and developing technical expertise to adequately prepare communities.

    All interventions are recorded here.

    Third Stakeholder Forum on DRR

    The Stakeholder Forum continued its deliberations throughout the day, concluding in the afternoon with reflections by supporters and participants of the Stakeholder Engagement Mechanism.

    Spotlight session—Early warning for all

    Moderator Rebecca Murphy, Global Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), invited the UNDRR Stakeholder Forum and the Multi-Stakeholder EW4All communities to combine efforts in crafting action points for the 2025 Global Platform on DRR.

    In the keynote, Gavin White, Risk-informed Early Action Partnership (REAP), summarized common themes in Early Warning, noting that: preparing for disasters is about inclusiveness, honest communication and trusting the person who is providing the guidance; and early warning systems (EWS) can act as a bridge overcoming the silo approaches among different DRR stakeholders. Panelists suggested that: while no system can predict with 100% certainty what shape hazards will take, it is crucial to build trust and understand local contexts; response planners should establish appropriate actions to follow early warnings; emergency systems must be tailored to communities’ experiences so that people can distinguish between different disasters and respond uniquely to each threat; both elderly and youth can inform EWS and response planning; and conflict zones require unique solutions that consider the fragility and power dynamics within communities.

    Bridging the gap: Critical media’s role in strengthening alerts and enhancing disaster preparedness

    Giacomo Mazzone, Media Saving Lives, moderated the session. Matthieu Rawolle, EBU Media Intelligence Service, shared examples of how terrestrial radio networks remained uninterrupted and accessible during disasters, and are used to inform the public and facilitate emergency response, especially when mobile phone and internet services are interrupted. He concluded that radio is an essential communication medium in times of crisis and requires investment.

    Raditya Jati, Deputy Minister of System and Strategy, National Disaster Management Authority, Indonesia, emphasized the need for media to go beyond reporting on casualties and housing collapse, and to incorporate education for people to prepare for disasters.

    Event rooms remained full throughout the day.

    Noting that UNDRR is the first UN agency that recognized media’s role in crises, Natalia Ilieva, Asia-Pacific Broadcasting Union, described the Media Saving Lives collaboration between the World Broadcasting Unions and UNDRR that focuses on shifting media perspectives from reactive to proactive reporting, showing the real causes for disasters and instructing people on how to avoid harm. Grégoire Ndjaka, African Broadcasting Union, highlighted the reach of radio in Africa extending to places without electricity supply. Orengiye Fyneface, African Broadcasting Union, discussed trust challenges with journalism as a disaster information source in Africa, pointing to bureaucratic hurdles that prevent journalists from reaching scientists.

    Shaping a sustainable tomorrow: Aligning the Sendai Midterm Review with the Pact for the Future

    Abraham Bugre, University of Regina, moderated this session. In her opening remarks, Toni-Shae Freckleton, UNDRR, called for transitioning from short-term responses to long-term prevention. She stated that the Pact for the Future embeds DRR and resilience building.

    Juan Carlos Uribe Vega, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) highlighted gaps in understanding localization and the importance of local-level governance. Jekulin Lipi Saikia, GNDR, called for a focus on listening to and working with communities, improving financial access, and increasing citizen science. Amber Fletcher, University of Regina, emphasized the role of community-driven actions, citizen science, and community engagement in reaching the diverse range of local voices. In the ensuing discussion, attendees identified communication disconnection, lack of funding, and localization among the persistent gaps between global networks and local realities.

    Closing session

    Tanjir Hossain, UNDRR Stakeholder Engagement Mechanism (SEM), moderated the closing session. Jamie Cummings, SEM, recalled her own experience of disaster when Hurricane Helene struck her hometown of Asheville, North Carolina. Describing how volunteers had operated a traditional Appalachian mule brigade to transport life-saving medications to mountain communities after roads were destroyed, she reflected that, “communities who know the land most, hold the solutions.” Martin Schuldes, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), stressed that “the substance and spirit” of the conference must translate into concrete action.

    Jilhane El Gaouzi, African Union Commission, urged all concerned to “be realistic and speed up implementation,” given that only five years remain until the Sendai Framework deadline.

    View of the panel during the Closing Session of the Stakeholder Forum.

    World Resilient Recovery Conference

    At the opening of this one-day event, Mutale Nalumongo, Vice-President, Zambia, highlighted Zambia’s promotion of climate-resilient agriculture through promotion of drought-tolerant crop varieties, access to weather-based insurance and investment in EWS, including advisories to farmers. Following further opening remarks by speakers, two plenaries and several thematic sessions took place during the day.

    Plenary 1—Taking stock of current recovery practices

    Carolina Fuentes Castellanos, Director, Santiago Network Secretariat, moderated the session.

    Sujit Mohanty, UNDRR, noted the high costs of reconstruction and the difficulties of countries that are perpetually in a state of recovery from one disaster after another, pointing to the need to address institutional fragmentation.

    Renato Umali Solidum, Jr., Department of Science and Technology, Philippines, advocated for greater cohesion between DRR and climate action as being “two sides of the same coin.” He called for transparent grant-based governance to reach at-risk commuities and address both slow-onset and sudden disasters.

    Leon Lundy, Minister of State Office, The Bahamas, highlighted the launch of The Bahamas’ National Disaster Risk Management Authority. He drew attention to the 2022 Act mandating public body disaster plans, including continuity plans, restoration timelines, and staff redeployment protocols to ensure essential services can be maintained or rapidly restored after a disaster.

    Krishna Swaroop Vatsa, National Disaster Management Authority, India, highlighted allocation of 30% of the Authority’s funds for recovery and reconstruction, which are released through an assessment-based process.

    Fuentes Castellanos offered countries the Secretariat’s support for structuring technical assistance requests.

    Plenary 2—From commitment to action: Leadership for resilient recovery

    Shivangi Chavda, GNDR, moderated the session.

    Guangzhe Chen, World Bank, described the World Bank’s recent transition to supporting infrastructure resilience efforts. He invited countries to access the Bank’s preparedness and response toolkit to strengthen their disaster reduction policies, citing recent examples from Malawi, Albania, and Madagascar.

    On financial instruments, panelists explored ways to distribute more rapid financial support, including through multi-dimensional approaches.

    On displacement following disasters, Rania Sharshr, International Organization for Migration (IOM), emphasized that one of the greatest needs of governments is access to reliable and accurate data on how displaced people have been impacted, and guidance on how to integrate these people into existing communities.

    The session concluded with the presentation of the Resilient Recovery Framework by Abhilash Panda, UNDRR.

    Thematic sessions

    Further sessions took place through the day. Besides the three sessions reported here, delegates took part in other Stakeholder Forum sessions on governance mechanisms, unlocking financial potential, housing reconstruction, and multi-hazard EWS.

    Restoring livelihood: Solutions for disaster-induced displacement and resilient recovery

    Mona Folkesson, UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), moderated the session.

    Emad Adly, Arab Network for Environment and Development, highlighted water scarcity as a key issue for the region and local-level coordination as a key challenge. Alexandra Bilak, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), cited experience from the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake in Nepal to show how livelihood erosion influences the severity of displacement.

    Ibrahim Osman Farah, Vice President, Somali Regional State, Ethiopia, described livelihood restoration during return and resettlement of internally displaced persons, through ensuring cultural access to land, water, schools, and income-generating opportunities as long-term resilience-based approaches.

    Tasneem Siddiqui, University of Dhaka, recounted how students were a driving force for the university’s Refugee and Migration Research Unit, which now has formed Adaptation Committees in many local areas and supports implementation of national policies on livelihood diversification and skills training. She urged treating displacement not as a humanitarian issue, but as a human rights one.

    Aslam Perwaiz, Executive Director, Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, emphasized skill development with local communities and SMEs to create livelihood options for displaced communities.

    Driving resilience: The critical role of private sector’s operational readiness for resilient recovery

    Moderator, Cedrick Moriggi, Corporate Chief Resilience Officer Network, emphasized connecting the corporate world with the UNDRR world. Ommid Saberi, International Finance Corporation, recommended investing in the “economics of families,” or small businesses, saying even small government incentives can mobilize large funds from the private sector. Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, University of Geneva, said human rights are the enablers for resilience. Jonathan Rake, Swiss Re Solutions, highlighted the need for the private sector to engage locally and to develop and combine social programmes with parametric solutions. Chris Ulatt, Octopus, said upfront investment to boost resilience is the right move, but observed that few investors will remain for the duration of an investment. Kerry Hinds, Department of Emergency Management, Barbados, described an audit tool to ascertain risks and priorities for public-private partnerships, noting the tool helps standardize and trigger business continuity protocols for disaster risk management.

    Turning experience into action: learning from large-scale disasters

    Dilanthi Amaratunga, Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System, moderated the session.

    Banak Joshua Dei Wal, South Sudan’s DRR Focal Point, highlighted the need to work together and identify risks for Sendai Framework implementation to be effective.

    Saini Yang, Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR), emphasized that China’s National Flood Prevention System has proven effective, with more than an 80% decrease in flood mortality rates over the last 20 years.

    Trevor Bhupsingh, Public Safety Canada, highlighted Canada’s Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.

    Guy Gryspeert, Honeywell, defined resilience as the capability of preventing a crisis by having awareness and planning in place.

    Ali Hamza Pehlivan, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Türkiye, highlighted the usefulness of their National Disaster Response Plan during the 2023 earthquake. Makiko Ohashi, Cabinet Office of Japan, noted the utility of planning on the assumption that a mega-disaster may occur at any time and of reviewing DDR plans in the aftermath of disasters.

    Participants engage in discussions between sessions throughout the day.

    Global Early Warning for All (EW4All) Multistakeholder Forum

    After thematic sessions during the day, EW4All concluded its discussions. Gavin White, Risk-Informed Early Action Partnership, moderated the closing session. Panelists highlighted the importance of focusing on preparedness and developing trust, the need to shift perspectives toward a systemic approach to EWS, and the need to increase private funding.

    In closing remarks, Andrea Hermenejildo, Deputy Secretary General for Risk Management, Ecuador, stressed EWS is not only a technical issue, but also involves social justice. Paola Albrito, Director, UNDRR, emphasized that EW4All is both needed and achievable. Noting the central role of local communities, she underlined that resilience is built with communities.

    Doreen Bogdan-Martin, Secretary-General, International Telecommunication Union, underlined that scaling-up EWS requires partnerships and breaking silos across economic sectors, UN agencies and industries.

    Jagan Chapagain, Secretary-General, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), stressed that inclusive action and investment in EW4All is essential.

    Celeste Saulo, Secretary-General, World Meteorological Organization (WMO), stated that having EWS in just 108 countries is neither sufficient nor acceptable, and called for closing this “justice gap” by providing EWS worldwide and accelerating the transformation needed to protect every person on Earth.

    MIL OSI United Nations News