Category: Weather

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova – A10-0096/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova

(2025/2025(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova [1],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

– having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

– having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

A. whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

B. whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

C. whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

D. whereas the Association Agreement [2], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

1. Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

2. Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

3. Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

4. Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

5. Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

6. Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

Socio-economic reforms

7. Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan, which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2.02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1.5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

8. Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

9. Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

10. Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

11. Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

12. Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

13. Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

14. Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

15. Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

16. Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

Human rights

17. Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

18. Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

19. Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

20. Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

21. Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

Energy, environment and connectivity

22. Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

23. Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

24. Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

25. Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

Rule of law and good governance

26. Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

27. Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

28. Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

29. Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

30. Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

31. Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

32. Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

33. Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

34. Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

35. Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

36. Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

37. Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

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38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system – A10-0091/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system

(2025/2006(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757),

– having regard to the Commission report of January 2025 entitled ‘Investment needs of European energy infrastructure to enable a decarbonised economy’[1],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy – Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector’ (COM(2025)0095),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 [2] (the CEF Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 [3] (the TEN-E Regulation),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity [5],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 [6] (the Renewable Energy Directive),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings [7],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design [8],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design [9] (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council [10], which reflects the EU’s electricity interconnection targets,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on ‘Advancing Sustainable Electricity Grid Infrastructure’, as approved by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council at its meeting on 30 May 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on a comprehensive European approach to energy storage [11],

– having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration [12],

– having regard to the report of January 2023 by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on electricity transmission and distribution tariff methodologies in Europe,

– having regard to the report of 19 December 2023 by ACER entitled ‘Demand response and other distributed energy resources: what barriers are holding them back?’,

– having regard to the report of April 2025 by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) entitled ‘Bidding Zone Review of the 2025 Target Year’[13],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0091/2025),

A. whereas electricity grids are essential for the Union to achieve its clean energy transition and to deliver renewable energy while supporting economic growth and prosperity; whereas inefficiencies and lack of full integration negatively impact energy prices for consumers and companies;

B. whereas in light of the growing demand for electricity, significant investments and upgrades are required, along with regulatory oversight, to increase cross-border and national-level transmission capacity and modernise infrastructure, ensuring a decarbonised, flexible, more decentralised, digitalised and resilient electricity system;

C. whereas poor connectivity and grid bottlenecks are among the main reasons the EU cannot fully benefit from the significant installed capacities of wind and solar energy, thereby ensuring affordable prices for households and industry; whereas the lack of strong interconnection between regions with different natural and climatic characteristics leads to the overproduction of energy and administrative limitation on renewable production in some regions, while other regions are struggling with insufficient supply and high prices;

D. whereas transmission system operators (TSOs) are essential for integrating offshore renewable energy into the EU grid, in particular for those connected to more than one market; whereas, if TSOs fail to provide the agreed grid capacity, compensation should be paid to developers for lost export capacity, funded by congestion income; whereas such compensation should be shared fairly among TSOs and align with principles of non-discrimination and maximising cross-border trade; whereas this highlights the importance of maintaining a functioning interconnector backbone, as failures in interconnector capacity may result in costs for both producers and TSOs;

E. whereas Europe will only reach its decarbonisation objectives if there is a coordinated, pan-European approach to electricity system planning, connecting borders, sectors and regions;

F. whereas the planning of electricity transmission and distribution networks must be coordinated to ensure the effective development of the EU electricity system;

G. whereas the EU electricity grid was built for a 20th century economy based on centralised, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation, and must be modernised to meet the demands of a digitalised economy with increased levels of electrification and a higher share of decentralised and variable renewable energy sources;

H. whereas cross-border interconnectors, transmission and distribution grid infrastructure are critical for integrating renewables, reducing costs for European consumers and increasing the security of energy supply;

I. whereas distribution level grid projects are already eligible for funds under the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy (CEF-E); whereas, however, only a small share has been allocated to distribution grids under the most recent Projects of Common Interest (PCI) list; whereas CEF-E should better reflect the role of distribution grids for the achievement of EU energy and climate targets;

J. whereas ENTSO-E has calculated that cross-border electricity investment of EUR 13 billion per year until 2050 would reduce system costs by EUR 23 billion per year;

K. whereas the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle is a fundamental principle of EU energy policy and is legally binding; notes that the correct implementation of this principle will significantly reduce energy consumption, thereby lowering the need for investment in electricity grids and interconnectors;

L. whereas keeping the EU energy policy triangle of sustainability, security of supply and affordability in balance is key to a successful energy transition and to a reliable European energy system;

M. whereas energy network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability;

N. whereas energy system flexibility needs are expected to double by 2030, in light of an increased share of renewables; whereas demand-side flexibility is therefore crucial for grid stability; whereas individual citizens, businesses and communities participating in the electricity market may bring manifold benefits to the grids, such as enhanced system efficiency, resilience, investment optimisation, improved social acceptance and lower energy costs; whereas serious delays and inconsistencies in implementing existing EU provisions on citizens’ energy, demand flexibility and smart network operations remain a concern;

O. whereas although recycling meets between 40 % and 55 % of Europe’s aluminium and copper needs, further measures to extend recycling capacity, waste collection and supply chain efficiency must be considered;

P. whereas the Commission and High Representative’s joint communication entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ highlights the importance of ensuring the secure supply of spare cable parts and the stockpiling of essential material and equipment;

Q. whereas the electricity system blackout experienced in the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025 illustrated how important it is to increase the energy grid’s resilience by ensuring that it is well maintained, protected and balanced at all times, including through flexible system services and enhanced cross-border interconnections, to allow for an agile recovery in the event of system failure;

R. whereas national and regional level system operators hold important responsibilities, particularly in the area of energy supply security; whereas all tasks of a regulatory nature should be performed by regulatory agencies acting in the public interest; whereas, however, alongside these responsibilities, a strengthened role for regulators and ACER in the planning processes can contribute to addressing shortcomings, such as ENTSO-E’s current 10-year network development plan (TYNDP) grid planning, as identified in the grid monitoring report; whereas, while acknowledging the TSOs’ responsibilities in drawing up these scenarios, ACER’s early involvement in the drawing-up process could help to ensure that the guidelines for the drawing-up of the scenarios are followed in accordance with the TEN-E Regulation;

S. whereas interconnection development will contribute to further integrating the EU electricity market, which not only increases system flexibility and resilience, but also unlocks economies of scale in renewable electricity production;

T. whereas the energy workforce will need to increase by 50 % to deploy the requisite renewable energy, grid and energy efficiency technologies [14];

U. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the EU’s economy, entrepreneurship and innovation, comprising 99 % of businesses, providing jobs to more than 85 million EU citizens and generating more than 58 % of the EU’s GDP;

V. whereas increasing decentralised electricity generation and demand response are important to reduce reliance on centralised production, which may be easily targeted by physical threats or cyberthreats, or compromised by climate-related events;

1. Calls on the Member States to fully explore, optimise, modernise and expand their electricity grid capacity, including transmission and distribution; considers electricity grids to be the central element in the EU’s transition to a competitive, net zero economy by 2050, one that is capable of accommodating high volumes of variable renewable energy technologies and/or evolving demand sources driven by increased levels of electrification and the advancement of digital technologies; notes the Member States’ prerogative to determine their own energy mix;

2. Calls on the Commission, the Member States, ACER, EU DSO Entity [15] and ENTSO-E [16] to implement the actions of the EU grid action plan, the action plan for affordable energy, the reform of the EU’s electricity market design and the Renewable Energy Directive without delay;

3. Points out that the completion of the EU’s energy market integration will save up to EUR 40 billion annually, and that a 50 % increase in cross-border electricity trade could increase the EU’s annual GDP by 0.1 %[17];

Relevance of electricity grids for the European energy transition

4. Welcomes the Commission’s communication on grids [18]; underlines the expected increase in electricity consumption of 60 % by 2030, the rising need to integrate a large share of variable renewable power into the grid, and the need for grids to adapt to a more decentralised, digitalised and flexible electricity system, including the optimisation of system operations and the full utilisation of local flexibility resources, demand response and energy storage solutions to complement wholesale markets and enhance grid resilience, resulting in an additional 23 GW of cross-border capacity by 2025 and a further 64 GW of capacity by 2030; notes that over 40 % of the Union’s distribution grids are over 40 years old and need to be updated [19];

5. Reiterates that, by 2030, the Union needs to invest around EUR375 to 425billion in distribution grids, and, overall, EUR 584 billion, in transmission and distribution electricity grids [20], including cross-border interconnectors and the adaptation of distribution grids to the energy transition;

6. Notes with concern that in 2023 the costs of managing transmission electricity grid congestion in the EU were EUR 4.2 billion [21] and continue to rise, and that curtailment is an obstacle to increasing the share of renewable energy sources; notes that this figure does not include the distribution electricity grid; stresses that in 2023 nearly 30 TWh of renewable electricity were curtailed across several Member States due to insufficient grid capacity; further notes the sharp increase in annual hours of negative electricity prices, rising from 154 in 2018 to 1 031 as of September 2024 [22], largely driven by grid congestion at borders, and the lack of sufficient storage, flexibility and demand response in the electricity market to temporally match variable renewable electricity supply with electricity demand; stresses that addressing these issues could help to absorb surplus supply, thereby maximising the use of existing grid infrastructure, but that existing market and regulatory frameworks often fail to provide adequate incentives for achieving this;

7. Highlights that a failure to modernise and expand the EU’s electricity grid, alongside the rapid deployment of the high volumes of variable renewable energy required to deliver on its targets, has and will continue to result in high levels of dispatch-down (instructions to reduce output); believes that the dispatch-down of renewables, caused by grid congestion and curtailment, represents an unacceptable waste of high-value renewable electricity and money; calls on the Commission, as part of its forthcoming European Grids Package, to set out an EU strategy to vastly reduce the dispatch-down of renewable electricity;

8. Highlights the role of smart grids in improving congestion management and optimising the electricity distribution of renewables; stresses their contribution to network flexibility by integrating digital tools that facilitate demand-side response and collective self-consumption; underlines that better grid management enhances energy resilience, reduces curtailments and secures supply during peak demand periods;

9. Highlights that the electricity grid infrastructure is a priority for achieving the EU’s strategic autonomy and its climate and energy targets; notes the Clean Industrial Deal’s commitment to electrification with a key performance indicator of a 32 % economy-wide electrification rate by 2030, which would necessitate a significant and continuous update and deployment of grids; regrets that delays in responding to requests for connection to grids result in a slower pace of electrification, even in Member States where generation from renewables is rapidly increasing;

10. Highlights, in particular, the crucial role that energy communities can play in supporting local economies; regrets that energy communities and smaller operators face disproportionate barriers to grid access and grid funding access due to regulatory hurdles and resource constraints; calls, therefore, on the Member States that are lagging behind in this regard to fully implement the Clean Energy Package, Fit for 55 and Renewable Energy Directive provisions, empowering citizens, municipalities, SMEs and companies to actively participate in the electricity market, in particular by developing enabling frameworks for renewable energy communities and the promotion of energy-sharing schemes; calls for grid-related EU and national level funding to take into account the specific needs of projects promoted by energy communities;

Regulatory situation and challenges

11. Is convinced that regulatory stability is a key condition for unlocking private investments in the electricity grid and, where feasible, enabling the affordable electrification of the EU’s economy, and reiterates the need to implement already adopted legislation before assessing potential new reviews;

12. Underlines that integrated grid planning across sectors at local, regional, national and EU levels will lead to increased system efficiency and reduced costs; calls, therefore, on the Commission and on the Member States to work towards integrated planning and to ensure that electricity network development plans are aligned with the 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for all voltage levels; notes that a strengthened governance framework would help to ensure alignment between grid development plans and national and EU level policy objectives; recognises that, while the Member States are required to report on their contributions to EU targets through the NECPs, there is currently no equivalent obligation on TSOs to systematically report at EU level;

13. Underlines that the TEN-E Regulation and the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) are powerful tools in the development of the Union’s cross-border energy infrastructure; regrets the shortcomings in the current TYNDP for European electricity infrastructure, which results in investment interests falling short of cross-border needs [23], and that grid planning does not fully leverage cross-border and cross-sectoral savings [24]; further regrets delays regarding to the completion of PCIs; urges the Commission to introduce more coordinated, long-term cross-sectoral planning to deliver the related savings and benefits across the EU; highlights that such coordinated planning could better inform cost sharing of infrastructure across the Member States; notes that, although the TEN-E Regulation enables smart electricity grid projects with a cross-border impact to obtain PCI status, even if such projects do not cross a physical border, the PCI list in 2023 included only five such projects; strongly believes, therefore, that the PCI process needs to be strengthened, simplified and streamlined for more clarity and transparency; calls on the Member States to fully complete the PCIs; calls on the Commission to urgently propose a targeted revision of the TEN-E Regulation in order to (1) introduce a robust planning process that combines system operators’ responsibilities with a strengthened role for ACER by mandating ACER to request amendments to the scenarios and the TYNDP, (2) ensure scenarios are drawn up in line with the decarbonisation agenda and enable easier access for smart electricity grid projects, and (3) introduce a simplified application process for small and medium-sized distribution system operators (DSOs);

14. Emphasises that network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability; proposes, therefore, extending the time frame for network development plans to 20 years; highlights that grid investment is urgently required by the EU’s competitive agenda and should not be delayed;

15. Additionally notes that the EU will continue to have strong electricity links with its neighbouring countries and therefore believes the Commission should enhance such cooperation with neighbouring countries through PMIs with non-EU countries, as provided for in the TEN-E Regulation;

16. Strongly emphasises that CEF-E has proven to be the crucial instrument for co-financing cross-border energy infrastructure and insists on its continuation; welcomes the inclusion of offshore electricity grid projects in the Commission’s most recent allocation of grants under CEF-E;

17. Considers the lack of detailed, reliable and comparable data on national and EU grid planning an obstacle to more efficient grids; calls therefore on the Member States to thoroughly implement the relevant provision in the Electricity Directive [25], in particular Article 32, and to encourage smaller DSOs to apply this Article’s provision;

18. Welcomes the EU DSO Entity’s report on good practices on Distribution Network Development Plans [26] (DNDPs), which calls on the Member States to include cost-benefit analyses in their DNDPs, in order to evaluate investment opportunities; urges the Commission to develop guidelines based on this report, in cooperation with the EU DSO Entity, to harmonise and increase transparency of national development planning for distribution grids, to publish a European overview of the DNDPs and to require all transmission and distribution operators to provide energy regulators with the necessary data about their current and future grid hosting capacity information and grid planning, to enable energy regulators to properly scrutinise grid planning; calls on the Member States to implement Article 31(3) of Directive 2024/1711, which requests grid operators to publish information on the capacity available in their area of operation, in order to ensure transparency and enable stakeholders to make informed investment decisions; calls on the Commission to develop a centralised online repository for all transmission plans and DNDPs;

19. Highlights the significant risk posed by curtailment to the viability of renewable energy investment, especially considering that many Member States fail to compensate market participants for curtailed electricity volumes, despite the requirements set out in Articles 12 and 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943; regrets the lack of transparency, availability and data granularity regarding curtailed renewable energy volumes and congestion management costs;

20. Highlights the value of putting clear metrics in place to measure whether the EU is on track to deliver the grid expansion and reinforcements needed to meet its 2050 objectives; notes that such metrics could include reductions in renewable energy curtailment, lower grid development costs relative to the amount of capacity delivered, increases in the efficient use of existing infrastructure, a reduction in losses and lower raw material intensity;

21. Notes the work done by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity on harmonised definitions of available grid hosting capacity for system operators and to establish an Union-wide overview thereof; believes that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) could benefit from clear legislative provisions as to how Member States can prioritise grid connections, so as to abandon the ‘first-come, first-served’ principle; therefore asks the Commission to amend Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 on the internal market for electricity, as part of the implementation review that the Commission must complete by 31 December 2025, and to consequently introduce transparent priority connection criteria to be chosen and further defined by the Member States for (1) generation connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, social value, and for (2) consumer connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, public interest or its strategic and/or social value, and grid optimisation; calls on the NRAs and the Member States to provide clear prioritisation rules according to their local and national specificities to allow the ‘first-come, first-served’ approach to be abandoned by disincentivising applications for connection that are not substantiated by a solid project, that are speculative or where the developer cannot show sufficient commitment to the realisation of a project;

22. Underlines that improved cross-border interconnections offer substantial cost-saving potential at the system level, with annual reductions in generation costs estimated at EUR 9 billion up to 2040, while requiring annual investments of EUR 6 billion in cross-border infrastructure and storage capacity;

23. Regrets that some Member States did not achieve the 10% interconnection target by 2020 and urges them to strive to achieve the current 15% interconnection target for 2030, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, since interconnection capacity is crucial for the functioning of the EU’s internal electricity market, leading to significant cost savings at system level and decreasing generation costs by EUR 9 billion annually to 2040 [27]; regrets that the 32 GW of cross-border capacity needed by 2030 remains unaddressed [28]; deplores the delays and uncertainties regarding several interconnection projects; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose, by June 2026 at the latest, a binding interconnection target for 2036 based on a needs assessment; stresses the need for cooperation with non-hosting Member States and for the EU and its neighbouring countries to be involved in negotiations, in order to ensure the projects’ finalisation;

24. Highlights the need to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity infrastructure; stresses that grid expansion should not be delayed by lengthy permitting procedures or excessive reporting requirements; therefore welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive, specifically Article 16f thereof, and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting [29] to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures for grid and renewable energy projects, especially the principle of public overriding interest for grid projects; notes, however, that some of the Member States have not seen a material improvement in project permitting timelines, despite the ambitious frameworks set out at EU level; therefore urges the Member States to implement these measures without delay and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive, and regularly assess if revised permitting provisions are sufficient to deliver on the EU’s objectives; additionally calls on the Commission to set out guidelines for the Member States to include a principle of tacit approval in their national planning systems, as described in Article 16a of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that reinforcing administrative capacity, including through adequate staffing of planning and permitting authorities, will accelerate permitting procedures;

25. Encourages the Member States to draw up plans to designate dedicated infrastructure areas for grid projects, as outlined in Article 15e of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that such plans are essential to account for local specificities and ensure respect for protected areas; emphasises that these plans should be closely coordinated with the designation of acceleration areas for renewables, to ensure a streamlined, efficient and integrated approach to energy infrastructure development;

26. Notes that often documents need to be submitted in paper form; calls on the Member States to increase the digitalisation of these processes in order to accelerate permitting procedures; calls on the Commission and the Member States to revise all EU legislation relevant to permitting, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive [30], with a view to introducing mandatory digital application, submission and processing requirements;

27. Highlights the importance of public acceptance and public engagement when developing new grid projects and calls on the Commission to develop a set of best practices to be shared among the Member States in this regard; highlights the critical importance of effective communication with citizens and communities regarding grid projects and reinforcement; notes that local-level support can help to accelerate the delivery of critical infrastructure and thus meet national and EU level objectives; urges the swift implementation of the EU’s pact for engagement with the electricity sector and coordination with national signatories (TSOs, DSOs, NRAs) to guarantee early, meaningful and regular public participation in grid projects;

28. Calls for the convening of a TAIEX [31] Group on Permitting within the forthcoming European Grids Package to support the Member States in addressing administrative bottlenecks, enhancing regulatory capacity and accelerating project approvals through the sharing of best practices and cross-border coordination;

29. Welcomes the initiatives announced under the Action Plan for Affordable Energy; recommends that the Commission extend the ‘tripartite contract for affordable energy for Europe’s industry’ to smaller energy producers, including energy communities, SMEs and businesses, leveraging flexibility and demand response, and link the outcome of these cooperation structures with grid planning processes at national and EU level, in order to optimise planning, investment and grid utilisation from the outset;

30. Highlights the need for improvements to be made to the public procurement framework, in order to tackle the challenges to grid operators regarding supply chains; therefore welcomes the Commission communication on the Clean Industrial Deal and the announcement by the Commission of a forthcoming review of the Public Procurement Directives [32]; stresses public procurement’s potential for the continued development of a strong EU manufacturing supply chain for electricity grid equipment, software and services; encourages the Commission to promote resilience, sustainability and security in public procurement procedures for grid operators; advocates for greater consistency between EU regulations on public procurement; calls on the Commission to adapt EU rules on public procurement with a view to harmonising and simplifying functional tendering specifications, in order to ramp up the production capacities of grid components;

31. Believes that adequate standardisation and common technical specifications are necessary for achieving economies of scale, and to speed up technological development; considers, additionally, that it is essential to ensure the right level of standardisation so that manufacturers’ capacity to innovate is not reduced;

32. Reiterates the need to consider new business models between equipment manufacturers and operators, such as long-term framework agreements that encourage the shift from one-off ‘grid projects’ to sustained and structured ‘grid programmes’, which result in more predictable planning for grid technology manufacturers; calls for the streamlining of tendering processes for the provision of grid equipment and services;

33. Stresses that this forthcoming revision of the Public Procurement Directives will allow the inclusion of sustainability, resilience and European preference criteria in EU public procurement processes for strategic sectors, in line with the provisions set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 [33]; calls for grids and related technologies to be explicitly recognised as strategic sectors, to ensure their eligibility under the revised framework; underlines that strengthening European preference in public procurement processes is essential for reducing the EU’s dependence on non-EU suppliers, enhancing supply chain security, and fostering a resilient EU industrial base capable of supporting the energy transition; welcomes the introduction by the European Investment Bank (EIB) of a ‘Grids Manufacturing Package’ to support the European supply chain with at least EUR 1.5 billion in counter-guarantees for grid component manufacturers; calls for further similar financial instruments to be developed to provide long-term investment certainty and to accelerate the scaling-up of European production capacity;

Financing

34. Notes that over the past five years, global investment in power capacity has increased by nearly 40 %, while investment in grid infrastructure has lagged behind; notes that estimates of investment that the EU will need to make in its grid over the 2025-2050 period range from EUR 1 950 billion to EUR 2 600 billion [34];

35. Observes with concern that the budget allocated under CEF-E has been insufficient to expedite all PCI and PMI categories; notes that with a EUR 5.84 billion budget for 2021-2027, the programme has restricted capacity and may struggle to keep pace with investment needs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase the CEF-E envelope and the percentage of CEF-E funds dedicated to electricity infrastructure as a separate adequate resource, when proposing the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to ensure that projects both at the distribution and at the transmission levels with an EU added value are eligible for budget allocated under CEF-E; encourages the Commission to further explore co-financing possibilities between CEF-E and the Renewable Energy Financing Mechanism;

36. States that EU funding is predominantly allocated to transmission grids with relatively insignificant allocations to distribution grids, despite their significant role in the EU energy transition, demonstrated by the fact that, between 2014 and 2020, CEF-E funded around EUR 5.3 billion worth of projects, of which around EUR 1.7 billion went to transmission grids and EUR 237 million to smart distribution grids; notes that the last PCI list only contained five smart electricity projects;

37. Deeply regrets that, whereas regional funds such as the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund or the Recovery and Resilience Facility provide for grid investments in principle, in practice they are underutilised for grid projects; regrets also that the evaluation criteria applied to the assessment of projects submitted in response to the EU Innovation Fund’s calls for proposals prevent funding for the demonstration and manufacturing of grid technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a proportionate amount of such funding is also spent on grid investment;

38. Calls on the Member States to simplify access to the EU funds managed by the Member States for grid operators, for instance through the establishment of a one-stop-shop in those Member States in which a large share of DSOs are of a small or medium size;

39. Calls on the Commission to propose a dedicated funding instrument, such as one based on revenues from the market-based emission reduction scheme, to allow the Member States to support decentralised and innovative grid projects with a clear EU added value, including smaller projects, ensuring its effective use by the Member States for these purposes;

40. Emphasises the need for regulatory frameworks to attract private investment and ensure cost-reflective tariffs, in addition to public funding mechanisms;

41. Is convinced that anticipatory investments and forward-looking investments will help to address grid bottlenecks and prevent curtailment; points out that the EMD Regulation sets out regulatory elements for anticipatory investments but lacks a harmonised definition and implementation across the Union; calls on the Member States to swiftly implement the aforementioned provisions of the EMD Regulation and remove national legal barriers, on NRAs to remove barriers as regards regulatory incentives and disincentives, and on the Commission to urgently provide guidance regarding the approval of anticipatory investments, as announced in its Action Plan for Grids [35]; believes that further harmonisation in this respect might be beneficial; calls for detailed cost-benefit analyses and scenario-based planning to assess the likelihood of future utilisation, and recommends a two-step approval process for projects with a higher risk level by first approving smaller budgets for studies or planning, followed by a second approval for the more costly steps, in order to reduce the risk of stranded assets;

42. Acknowledges that grid investments from capital markets can be incentivised by providing market-oriented conditions, such as suitable rates of return and a robust regulatory framework; emphasises that the EU and the Member States should encourage private investments by providing risk mitigation tools or Member State guarantees; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further strengthen financing and de-risking initiatives and tools, such as counter-guarantees, to support additional electricity grid expansion and modernisation at affordable rates for system operators; emphasises the relevance of ensuring that the EU’s electricity grid is financed and therefore owned by public and private capital only from EU actors, or previously screened non-EU investors, in view of the criticality of the infrastructure;

43. Underlines that, while investment decisions should be guided by efficiencies, including energy and cost efficiency, investments should not only be focused on capital expenditure, and that investments optimising, renewing and modernising the existing infrastructure should be equally considered; therefore welcomes Article 18 of the EMD Regulation, which calls for tariff methodologies to give equal consideration to capital and operational expenditure, and remunerate operators to increase efficiencies in the operation and development of their networks, including through energy efficiency, flexibility and digitalisation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to thoroughly implement its provisions and to focus on ensuring fair and timely compensation to system operators for the costs borne by them;

44. Notes that the electrification of the EU economy, where technically and economically feasible, would help to drive down network tariffs by spreading the costs across a wider range of users; highlights, therefore, the importance of ensuring that the development of the future network is fully aligned with demand projections driven by increases in the level of electrification; is concerned by experts’ forecasts of network tariff increases of around 50% to 100% by 2050 [36]; stresses, therefore, the need for instruments and incentives that support grid operators in efficiently managing available grid capacity, including through procuring flexibility services, with a view to reducing imminent grid investment needs; highlights that flexible connection agreements, flexible network tariffs and local flexibility markets contribute to grid efficiency; invites NRAs to promote these flexible tariffs that allow consumers to easily react to price signals while shielding vulnerable households and businesses from price peaks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively address bottlenecks in tariffs, connection fees and regulations to facilitate cross-border and offshore hybrid grid investment;

45. Calls on the Member States to implement the relevant EU legal framework to unlock demand-side flexibility by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, enabling access to data from all metering devices and ensuring efficient price signals, to allow industries and households to optimise their consumption and reduce their electricity bills, and at the same time help reduce operational costs and the need for additional grid investment;

46. Stresses that the relaxation of network tariffs and certain charges, which could have the effect of lowering electricity prices, as proposed in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, has to be accompanied by a plan to replace the sources of the funds needed for grid investment with alternatives, in order to avoid facing underinvestment of the grids in the future;

47. Highlights the importance of minimising the additional costs on consumers’ bills resulting from the investments required to deliver the grid modernisation and expansion needed to meet the EU’s climate and competitiveness goals; asks the Commission to work with the Member States to develop a coordinated set of best practices for investments and equitable network tariff composition, with a strong emphasis on increasing transparency and removing non-energy related charges from the tariffs;

48. Points out that transmission infrastructure and availability of cross-zonal capacities are vital for an integrated market and for the exchange of low-marginal cost renewable energies, while respecting system security; notes that the EMD Regulation sets a minimum 70 % target of capacities available for cross-zonal trade by 2025 but Member States are far from reaching it; therefore urges the Member States and their TSOs to speed up their efforts to maximise cross-zonal trading opportunities, to ensure an efficient internal electricity market, appropriate investment decisions and renewable energy integration; regrets that achieving this target has often resulted in re-dispatch costs; notes that existing cost sharing mechanisms, such as cross-border cost allocation (CBCA), inter-transmission system operator (TSO) compensation and re-dispatching cost sharing, are limited and difficult to implement, which does not encourage cross-border investments, such as in offshore grids; calls on the Commission to holistically review and improve these mechanisms to ensure that they reflect the shared benefits of infrastructure and address the diversity of electricity flows, whether internal or cross-border, including a fair and balanced cost-benefit sharing mechanism for cross-border infrastructure projects that is based on objective criteria;

49. Takes note of the report of April 2025 by ENTSO-E on potential alternative bidding zone configurations based on location marginal pricing simulations provided by TSOs;

Grid-enhancing technologies, digitalisation, innovative solutions and resilience

50. Underlines that grid-enhancing technologies, digital solutions, ancillary services and data management technologies, as well as smart energy appliances, often leveraging artificial intelligence, can significantly increase the efficiency of existing grid capacities and maximise the use of existing assets, reducing the requirement for new infrastructure, for instance by providing real-time information on energy flows; therefore insists that these technologies and innovative solutions must be explored; urges NRAs to incentivise TSOs and DSOs to rely more on such technologies, weighing up the costs and benefits of their use versus grid expansion and by using remuneration schemes based on benefits rather than costs, and to benchmark the TSOs and DSOs on their uptake of such technologies; invites the Commission to further promote such innovative technologies when assessing projects that apply for EU funding;

51. Welcomes the work accomplished by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity in developing the TSO/DSO Technopedia [37] so far, and calls on the Commission to mandate the biannual updating of the Technopedia to accurately reflect the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of technologies included;

52. Urges the Commission and the Member States to further enable and increase the digitalisation of the European electricity system, enabling the optimisation of the operation of its power system and reducing pressure on the supply chain; underlines that data sharing and data interoperability are essential for grid planning and optimisation; encourages the Member States, the NRAs, the EU DSO Entity and ACER to continue to accelerate their work on the monitoring system based on indicators measuring the performance of smart grids (‘smart grid indicators’), as set out in the Electricity Directive;

53. Stresses the urgent need to enhance the security of critical electricity infrastructure, including interconnectors and subsea cables at risk of sabotage, and increase its resilience to extreme weather events, climate change and physical and digital attacks; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation at national, regional and EU levels;

54. Stresses the growing risk of coordinated cyberattacks targeting the EU’s entire electricity network; recalls the importance of the rapid implementation of cybersecurity and other related network codes and the related legislation, such as the NIS 2 Directive [38] and the Cybersecurity Act [39], and encourages the Commission to correct, in upcoming legislative reviews, the status of physical grid equipment, including remotely controllable grid equipment, such as inverters, which is currently not held to a high enough cybersecurity standard, especially in cases where the manufacturer is required, under the jurisdiction of a non-EU country, to report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to the authorities of that non-EU country; calls for enhanced EU level cooperation between all parties to strengthen preparedness and resilience; considers that NRAs should acknowledge the costs incurred by operators in adopting cybersecurity and resilience measures, and provide incentives for investments pertaining to increasing the resilience of the energy infrastructure to cyberthreats, and physical and hybrid threats, including climate adaptation measures;

55. Underlines the need to step up efforts to protect existing and future critical undersea and onshore energy infrastructure; considers that the EU should play a broader role in preventing incidents that threaten this infrastructure, in promoting surveillance and in restoring any damaged infrastructure using state of the art technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find solutions to increase the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including solutions to financing such measures and technologies;

56. Recognises that new high-voltage electricity grid projects provide a multifunctional and cost-efficient opportunity to integrate additional security measures (i.e. sensors, sonar, etc.) and environmental solutions (i.e. bird deflectors, fire detectors, nature corridors, etc.) if planned in a holistic manner; asks the Commission to develop guidelines for NRAs to ensure that initial grid project planning is carried out and financed with these elements in mind;

57. Urges the Commission, DSOs and TSOs to develop an EU-owned Common European Energy Data Space, based on technical expertise and practice utilising the available data [40] and based on a common set of rules ensuring the secure, transparent portability and interoperability of energy data, where harmonised data is safely managed, exchanged and stored in the EU; stresses that this Common European Energy Data Space should facilitate data pooling and sharing through appropriate governance structures and data sharing services, supporting critical energy operations including transmission and distribution; underlines that European TSOs, DSOs and other previously screened electricity grid actors must be able to securely and smartly operate the grid, optimising its use by integrating flexibility and innovative technologies, in line with key principles of interoperability, trust, data value and governance; notes that data exchange arrangements must also take into account interactions with non-EU parties;

58. Recognises the potential of flexibility as a necessary tool for optimising system operations, maintaining the stability of the system and empowering consumers by incentivising them to shift their consumption patterns; stresses the importance of implementing appropriate measures to guarantee efficient price signals that incentivise flexibility, including from all end-consumers, and ensuring that all resources contribute to system security, including by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, smart energy-efficient buildings, and enabling access to data from all metering devices; asks NRAs to recognise flexibility innovations and pilot projects in the system, insofar as these do not negatively impact the grid’s overall balance and stability, in order to continue incentivising innovation;

59. Calls on NRAs to work closely with TSOs and DSOs to assess the flexibility potential, and needs of the national systems in current and future planning, taking into consideration the presence of industry, large consumers, large generators and storage; highlights in particular the critical role that storage assets, including long-duration electricity storage, capable of providing up to 100 hours of electricity, can play in providing congestion management services to the grid; notes that in order to provide these essential system services, investors in storage assets require stable, long-term revenue models, similar to the way in which support schemes have successfully provided revenue certainty for renewable generation assets;

Supply chain, raw materials and the need for skills

60. Notes with concern that global growth in the demand for grid technologies has put pressure on supply chains and the availability of cables, transformers, components and critical technologies; highlights the findings in the February 2025 International Energy Agency report, ‘Building the Future Transmission Grid’[41], that it now takes two to three years to procure cables and up to four years to secure large power transformers, and that average lead times for cables and large power transformers have almost doubled since 2021;

61. Is concerned about the long lead times for many grid technology components and remains determined to maintain European technology leadership in grid technology, emphasising the need for innovation to develop, demonstrate and scale European high-capacity grid technologies and innovative grid-enhancing technologies;

62. Stresses that critical and strategic raw materials are essential for grid infrastructure, with aluminium and copper demand set to rise by 33 % and 35 % respectively by 2050 [42]; takes note of the Commission decision recognising certain critical raw materials projects as strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act [43], in order to secure access to these key materials and diversify sources of supply; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance recycling, and support strategic partnerships and trade agreements to this end;

63. Highlights the need to strengthen grid supply chains to increase the supply of grid technologies at affordable costs, and thereby limit the costs borne by consumers via network charges; calls for a strategic approach to acquiring energy technologies, components or critical materials related to grids, in order to avoid developing dependencies on single suppliers outside of the EU;

64. Believes that holistic, coordinated, long-term grid planning across the entire European energy system is needed to solve the supply chain capacity bottleneck, and that such planning provides manufacturers with essential transparency and predictability for adequately planning manufacturing capacity increases; considers that such planning must be reliable and enable new business models, such as long-term framework agreements and capacity reservation contracts;

65. Urges the maximum standardisation of key electricity grid equipment, insofar as is technically possible, via a joint technical assessment by the Commission, DSOs, TSOs and industry, covering all voltage levels in order to scale up production, lower prices and delivery times, and promote the interoperability of systems;

66. Stresses the urgent need to address labour shortages in the energy sector; notes that the Commission has projected that the energy workforce needs to significantly increase in order to deploy renewable energies, upgrade and expand grids, and manufacture energy efficiency, grid and other relevant technologies; regrets the shortages of electrical mechanics and fitters reported in 15 of the Member States, increasing the staffing needs of DSOs and TSOs; highlights that the energy workforce must grow by 50 % by 2030 to support the deployment of renewables [44], grid expansion and energy efficiency, with an estimated 2 million additional jobs required in electricity distribution by 2050; calls for training, upskilling and reskilling initiatives, prioritising grid-related skills to close skills gaps; welcomes university-business partnerships and targeted EU skills academies for strategic sectors, including grids; encourages DSOs and TSOs to diversify their workforce, including by increasing women’s participation;

67. Reiterates that the Member States and the EU should cooperate to adapt the relevant skills programmes and develop best practices to fulfil the growing skills demand across all educational levels, with a strong emphasis on encouraging gender balance in the sector;

68. Highlights the crucial role of SMEs and EU businesses in supplying the technology sector for the electricity grid; points out the need to access affordable electrification, limiting the costs related to the supply chain and ensuring a skilled workforce;

Offshore

69. Acknowledges the strategic relevance of offshore development in delivering the EU’s objectives of energy autonomy, increased use of renewable energy, a resilient and cost-effective electricity system and climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the importance of fully utilising the potential of Europe’s five sea basins for offshore energy generation; highlights the particular significance of the North Seas (covering the geographical area of the North Seas, including the Irish and Celtic Seas), which offer favourable conditions and the highest potential, with an agreed target of 300 GW of installed offshore generation capacity by 2050 within the framework of the North Seas Energy Cooperation; welcomes the progress made in this regard; emphasises the need to develop a meshed offshore grid, including hybrid interconnectors, particularly in the North Seas, to fully harness offshore potential and improve electricity market integration; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen regional cooperation on grid planning and energy cooperation across all sea basins with the EU’s neighbouring countries, in particular the UK and Norway, specifically in offshore wind energy development and the planning and manufacturing of electricity grids;

70. Highlights the need for a stable and predictable regulatory framework that ensures the most optimal trading arrangements to provide the required investor confidence to support the development and interconnection of offshore grid and offshore wind projects, ensuring market efficiency and efficient cross-border flows, including with non-EU countries; underlines the necessity of strengthening national grids where required to maximise the benefits of offshore energy; acknowledges that combining offshore transmission with generation assets (offshore hybrids) will be an integral part of an efficient network system, as this comes with several advantages for the European energy system but still lacks the right regulatory framework to incentivise necessary investment;

Cooperation with non-EU countries

71. Calls on the Member States to increase cooperation and coordination with like-minded non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; recalls that the development of electricity infrastructure to harness the offshore wind potential of the North Seas is a shared priority for both the EU and the UK;

72. Highlights the need for a pragmatic and cooperative approach to EU-UK electricity trading; calls on the Commission to work closely with the UK administration to agree on a mutually beneficial trading arrangement that strengthens security of supply and the pathway to net zero for both jurisdictions; additionally, believes that efficiencies of trading arrangements can be improved further; calls on the Commission to engage with its UK counterparts constructively on this matter;

Outermost regions

73. Stresses the unique challenges faced by the EU’s outermost regions and other areas not connected to the European electricity grid; highlights their reliance on imports and high vulnerability to electricity blackouts and extreme climate hazards; notes the importance of developing resilient and autonomous energy systems through local grid development and cleaner energy production; calls on the Commission to address these regions’ specific needs in the European Grids Package and to propose additional financial support to improve the autonomy of their energy systems, and address their lack of interconnection and absence of broader grid connection benefits;

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74. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro – A10-0093/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro

(2025/2020(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part [1], which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

– having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

– having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

– having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

– having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

– having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

– having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

– having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

– having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

– having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

– having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [4],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement [5],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

B. whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

C. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

D. whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

E whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

F whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

G. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

2. Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

3. Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

4. Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

5. Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

6. Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

7. Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

8. Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

9. Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

10. Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

Democracy and the rule of law

11. Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

12. Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

13. Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

14. Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [6]; urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

15. Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

16. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

17. Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

18. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

19. Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

20. Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

21. Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

22. Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

23. Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

24. Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

25. Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

26. Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

27. Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

28. Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

29. Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

30. Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

31. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

32. Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

33. Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

34. Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

35. Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

36. Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

37. Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

38. Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

39. Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

40. Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

41. Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

42. Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

43. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

44. Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

45. Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

46. Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

47. Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

48. Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

Socio-economic reforms

49. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

50. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

51. Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

52. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

53. Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

54. Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

55. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

56. Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

57. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

58. Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

59. Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

60. Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

61. Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

62. Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

63. Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

°

° °

64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: ‘Farming the Flood’ shows Dartmoor farmers adapting to nature
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

‘Farming the Flood’ shows Dartmoor farmers adapting to nature

Farmers are turning flood challenges into environmental opportunities in this new documentary.
‘Farming the Flood’ shows complex issues in a positive way and how farming can become resilient to climate and biodiversity issues.

‘Farming the Flood’ showcases farmers using nature-based techniques to combat flooding, created in partnership with the Dartmoor Headwaters Project.

The film demonstrates the role farmers can play in increasing resilience to flooding whilst restoring biodiversity, while aligning with their business interests.

‘Farming The Flood’, which will be released live to the public via YouTube on June 5, follows local British farmers in Dartmoor implementing natural flood management techniques to protect communities while enhancing biodiversity.

Made by South West-based filmmaker Harrison Wood and Dartmoor farmer Nick Viney of Leewood Studios, the film tells the stories of farmers who are actively shaping sustainable land management across the UK.

The film has been jointly funded in partnership with Dartmoor Headwaters Project and Dartmoor National Park Authority.

Filmmakers Harrison Wood and Nick Viney

The Dartmoor Headwaters Project is a partnership of the Environment Agency, Dartmoor National Park authority and Devon County council. The Dartmoor Headwaters Project offers farmers and landowners in the Okement, Bovey, Dean Burn, Mardle, Erme, Yealm, Colleybrook, and Blackbrook catchments support to design, fund and deliver nature-based solutions.

Pamela Woods of Dartmoor National Park said:

The effects of flooding can be devastating, causing significant damage to homes, businesses, roads and nature. By 2070 we are predicted to experience 30% more rainfall, resulting in 41% higher river flows.

The film conveys complex issues in a positive way while showing how support and funding can help people deliver nature and climate-based solutions.

It is wonderful to see the vital role moorland farmers play in mitigating the risks of flooding. We hope people enjoy and learn from ‘Farming the Flood’.

Dartmoor, where the uplands play a crucial role in flood mitigation, from reintroducing wetlands to grazing that restores ecosystems while supporting farms. Photo: Harrison Wood

Tom Dauben, flood and coastal risk management senior advisor at the Environment Agency, said:

Whilst Dartmoor’s rivers and farms are the subject of this film, it highlights the really important role famers across the country can play to increase resilience of the environment and communities to the threats of the climate and biodiversity crisis.

Every field has a part to play in tackling these issues, and it’s great to showcase some of the work being done locally by farmers, landowners and managers in the film.

The documentary explores the crucial role uplands can play in flood mitigation, showcasing practical solutions from reintroducing wetlands and floodplain meadows to innovative grazing techniques that restore ecosystems while maintaining productive farms.

These techniques slow water flow, reduce downstream flooding, and enhance carbon capture and storage – delivering multiple benefits for communities, wildlife and farmers themselves, including making river catchments resilient to climate change pressures such as increased flood risk and heightened risk of drought.

Nick Viney interviewing water ecosystem and wetland expert, Professor Edward Maltby. Photo: Harrison Wood

Harrison Wood, filmmaker, said:

The farmers featured in this film aren’t waiting for top-down solutions – they’re acting now.

By working with nature rather than against it, they’re demonstrating how farming can be a key player in tackling environmental challenges.

Co-director Nick Viney, a landscape restoration specialist with decades of experience in nature recovery, provided expert context for these pioneering approaches throughout the film.

‘Farming The Flood’ highlights that many of these initiatives are accessible through government and private grants, making them available to farmers of all backgrounds and scales.

To learn more about the Headwaters Project, please visit Dartmoor Headwaters Natural Flood Management Project or contact headwatersnfm@dartmoor.gov.uk.

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MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AMENDMENTS 029-031 – REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism – A10-0085/2025(029-031)

Source: European Parliament

AMENDMENTS 029-031
REPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD))
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro

Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AMENDMENTS 028-028 – REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism – A10-0085/2025(028-028)

Source: European Parliament

AMENDMENTS 028-028
REPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD))
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro

Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AMENDMENTS 013-015 – REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism – A10-0085/2025(013-015)

Source: European Parliament

AMENDMENTS 013-015
REPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD))
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro

Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AMENDMENTS 026-027 – REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism – A10-0085/2025(026-027)

Source: European Parliament

AMENDMENTS 026-027
REPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD))
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro

Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: AMENDMENTS 009-012 – REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism – A10-0085/2025(009-012)

Source: European Parliament

AMENDMENTS 009-012
REPORT
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
(COM(2025)0087 – C10-0035/2025 – 2025/0039(COD))
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Rapporteur: Antonio Decaro

Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Greater Oxford: One council. Local decisions. A better place to live.
Source: City of Oxford

A Greater Oxford Council would bring decisions closer to the people they affect and enable improved services, more affordable homes, better transport connections, protected green spaces, and new, secure jobs.

The government has asked councils across England for proposals on simplifying the structure of local government in their regions.

In March, Oxford City Council put forward outline proposals that would see Oxfordshire’s six councils abolished and replaced with three new councils:
- Greater Oxford Council – covering Oxford and its Green Belt
- Northern Oxfordshire Council – covering most of the existing Cherwell and West Oxfordshire districts
- Ridgeway Council – covering most of the existing South Oxfordshire and Vale of White Horse districts combined with existing West Berkshire unitary (based on the proposals being developed by those councils, but with those villages within the Green Belt closest to the city becoming part of Greater Oxford)
All three councils would have natural geographic and demographic connections, local accountability to residents, and would be viable under the government’s plans.

Today, Oxford City Council has announced new details of its proposals, including a new boundary map for Oxfordshire, ahead of public engagement on the plans in June and July.

The last time local government was reorganised in Oxfordshire was in 1974.

For more information about the Greater Oxford proposals, visit greateroxford.org.

Greater Oxford boundaries

A Greater Oxford Council would cover Oxford and the communities within its Green Belt that are naturally linked to the city by work, transport and leisure.

View an interactive map showing the proposed Greater Oxford Council and the Green Belt.

Greater Oxford would cover a region with a population of about 240,000 people today, rising to about 345,000 by 2040.

The Greater Oxford boundary closely follows the line of Oxford’s Green Belt.

Currently, almost all of Oxford’s Green Belt – which was created in 1975 – sits outside the city’s administrative boundaries.

The Greater Oxford proposals would give local residents control of the Green Belt for the first time.

The government has been clear that some of the ‘Grey Belt’ – defined as “poor quality” areas of the Green Belt – in England should be developed to help deliver 1.5 million new homes over the next five years.

This will be a big change for Oxfordshire.

Rather than incrementally building around every town and village across the county, as is currently the case, Greater Oxford can ensure that high-quality, suitably dense and sustainable developments are built near to existing jobs and community facilities, with good public transport.

Benefits to Greater Oxford

New homes

Oxford is one of the least affordable places to live in the country. Average house prices are 13 times average salaries, and 3,500 households are on the waiting list for council homes. It’s little different in the villages around the city, where house prices are linked to the Oxford housing market and 100s of households also wait for affordable social housing.

The city’s current administrative boundaries are tightly drawn around existing homes and businesses, meaning there is little space to deliver the number of homes needed.

Greater Oxford would enable genuinely affordable homes, including new council homes, to be built at appropriate densities near to existing jobs and community facilities that have good public transport.

It would also mean that Oxford could tackle the housing crisis without the need to build homes in neighboring authorities, giving the Northern Oxfordshire and Ridgeway councils full control of their own housing needs.

The proposals would see over 40,000 new homes built within Greater Oxford by 2040.

If the new council follows Oxford City Council’s current planning policies, 40% of these new homes – over 16,000 homes – would be required to be new council homes.

Economic growth

Oxford has one of the fastest growing and most successful local economies in the UK.

Oxford is a net contributor to the UK’s economy – generating £7.6bn annually – has been ranked on of country’s top performing cities by PwC, including attraction of overseas investment, for many years.

The city has huge unmet demand for labs, innovation space, offices and hotels, but the current administrative boundaries – which are tightly drawn around existing homes and businesses – means Oxford’s economy is being artificially restricted.

The Greater Oxford proposals would see the creation of 5.9m–9.6m sq ft of research and development space and 2.1m–3.2m sq ft of other commercial space. This would create between 17,900 and 29,100 new jobs in Greater Oxford, which would generate up to £2bn a year for the UK’s economy.

The Greater Oxford proposals would also bring decision-making on apprenticeships and skills training back to the local level. The new council would look to increase apprenticeship and training opportunities in Greater Oxford, so local people have a proper share in the area’s growing success.

Transport

The transport system in the Greater Oxford region is in crisis.

There is chronic congestion in and around Oxford, which is impacting the financial sustainability of the city’s bus companies.

Greater Oxford would give local residents full control over Oxford’s transport for the first time in 50 years. The transport network has been run by Oxfordshire County Council since 1974.

The proposals would provide additional bus services to villages around the city by extending existing routes.

Having one council for Greater Oxford would also mean planning and transport could be properly integrated. Currently, the services are run by separate councils.

Environment

The Thames and Cherwell rivers and their tributaries flow through the heart of Greater Oxford, surrounded by vast green spaces and natural beauty. It is key that we protect and enhance these spaces.

The creation of a Greater Oxford Council would strengthen the control that Oxford and the main population centres around it have over the Green Belt. We would work to strengthen protection for valuable green spaces, proposals that would help wildlife to flourish, enhance biodiversity, improve the quality of our air and water, and help mitigate the impacts of climate change. This will build on the successes of the Zero Carbon Oxford Partnership, recently expanded to Oxfordshire, which came out of the pioneering Citizen’s Assembly on Climate Change.

Our proposal would see the creation of a more resilient, more connected, network of nature and wildlife corridors, as well as continued support of the vital conservation and nature recovery initiatives – such as those in the Bernwood-Otmoor-Ray area at Bernwood Forest, the River Ray, and the Otmoor Basin.

It would also facilitate wider ecosystem benefits, including flood regulation, nature recovery and carbon storage, which are essential in protecting our homes and environment from the increasing impacts of climate change.

Green spaces are also just as important as urban spaces in fostering healthy communities and improving well-being. The Greater Oxford proposals would also give residents improved access to nature and the landscapes of our region, ensuring they can be enjoyed by everyone.

Communities

At the moment, only city residents can take advantage of Oxford City Council’s community services offer, which includes:
- Free swimming for under 17s in Oxford’s swimming pools – Barton Leisure Centre, Ferry Leisure Centre, Leys Pools and Leisure Centre, and Hinksey Outdoor Pool
- Free youth clubs and activities, including summer holiday activities, as part of the Oxford Youth Ambition programme
- Heavily discounted leisure centre membership for people on qualifying benefits, including those on carer’s allowance, foster carers and those on disability allowance
Under the proposals, all Greater Oxford residents – including residents of Berinsfield, Botley, Kennington, Kidlington and Wheatley – will be able to take advantage of the offer.

The aim would also be to extend the offer to Abbey Sports Centre in Berinsfield, Kidlington and Gosford Leisure Centre, and Park Sports Centre in Wheatley.

Next steps

Oxford City Council will carry out public engagement on its Greater Oxford proposals in June-July, including public events in Berinsfield, Botley, Kennington, Kidlington and Wheatley.

Following the public engagement, Oxford City Council will draw up its final Greater Oxford proposals, which will be submitted to the Government in November.

The final decision on local government reorganisation across England, including in Oxford and Oxfordshire, will be made by the Government in 2026.

New councils are expected to be created in 2028.

Oxford City Council carried out an initial survey on its proposals in February, which found 82% think the current two-tier local government arrangements could be improved, and 67% think councils should not be too large, so they can better meet the needs of local residents.

Comment

“Oxford’s council services are currently split between Oxford City Council and Oxfordshire County Council. This is confusing for residents and means decisions affecting the Greater Oxford area can be made by councillors from Chipping Norton or Henley.

“Greater Oxford will bring local decisions under one roof and closer to the people they affect – helping us build more affordable homes, provide new bus connections, protect green spaces and enhance biodiversity, and create new, secure jobs for our children and grandchildren.

“Our proposals will bring better services and help make Greater Oxford a fairer place to live, work and visit.”

Councillor Susan Brown, Leader of Oxford City Council
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UNECE study identifies pathways for digital and green energy transition in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

The transition to clean energy in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia necessitates a comprehensive overhaul of power systems, with investment needs estimated at $150 billion by 2030. However, by embracing digitalization across all sectors – from generation and transmission to distribution and end-use – and integration with renewable energy, these countries could reduce their carbon emissions by up to 70% and energy costs by as much as 80%, subject to system-wide optimization, outlines the UNECE study “Integrating twin transition with legacy energy systems”

The study analyses opportunities and challenges for a digital transformation of energy systems in Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, where about 60% of the total energy mix today comes from natural gas and coal.

The study underscores that digital solutions and innovations such as Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, Digital Twins, and Virtual Power Plants, offer significant opportunities in managing and integrating distributed, often variable renewable energy-based resources. It also highlights potential to optimize legacy systems and enhance both cybersecurity and grid resilience.

This will require robust policy measures and initiatives to boost investments in advanced, resilient grids. It will also necessitate increased support for innovation and research, strategic planning and massive professional training.

Overcoming challenges

The study identifies key challenges to be addressed in the region’s largely outdated energy systems:
- Ageing energy infrastructure, much of which was built during the Soviet era. For example, in Belarus, over 60% of the thermal power plants are over 30 years old, resulting in high maintenance costs; in Georgia, the average age of electricity transmission lines exceeds 30 years, resulting in transmission losses estimated at 12%.
- Energy security risks due to dependence on fossil fuel imports. For example, the Republic of Moldova imports approximately 70% of its electricity, primarily from Romania and Ukraine; in Belarus, about 50% of energy needs are met through natural gas imports from the Russian Federation.
- Limited financial resources to invest in modernizing energy systems. For instance, Albania has struggled to secure funding for proposed solar and wind projects totalling approximately $300 million; in Belarus only about 5% of the necessary investments have been secured for planned RE installations; financial constraints limit modernization of ageing hydropower infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan.
- Lack of skilled workforce. For example, in Georgia, around 30% of energy sector professionals lack formal training in RE technologies.
- Climate and health impacts. For instance, Belarus emits approximately 8 million tonnes of CO2 annually from its energy sector alone, with coal-fired plants being significant contributors. North Macedonia’s reliance on coal contributes to air pollution levels among the highest in Europe.
Key strategies identified in the study include:
- Cross-border infrastructure projects, such as Trans-Caspian high-voltage direct current lines, are vital for enhancing regional energy trade and digital connectivity;
The report identifies three priority action areas: (1) scaling energy efficiency through retrofitting that embraces digital technologies; (2) promoting hybrid energy models that combine gas with hydrogen; and (3) advancing smart grids, standardization, and regional integration.

Importantly, the study promotes a human-centered approach to digitalization that balances innovation with ethical considerations and prioritizes equity, social considerations, and long-term sustainability for a just transition.

From research to action

The study was showcased during a workshop “Assessing the readiness of the energy sector to implement smart digital energy-efficient technologies in Belarus in view of climate change mitigation” held in Minsk, Belarus, and online on 22 May 2025. The hybrid workshop, organized by UNECE in cooperation with UNDP Belarus and the Department of Energy Efficiency of the State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus, brought together over 100 participants including government officials, energy sector representatives, and international experts, to explore how smart digital tools can support energy efficiency, clean mobility, and climate action in Belarus.

For more information about UNECE work on Energy Efficiency, please visit: https://unece.org/sustainable-energy/energy-efficiency

Photo credit: Adobe Stock Images by Sergii.

MIL OSI United Nations News –
June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Unlocking billions in private capital to tackle climate change

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Case study

Unlocking billions in private capital to tackle climate change

The UK’s International Climate Finance (ICF) mobilises billions in public and private funding for clean energy projects in developing countries.

UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer speaks at the Climate Investment Funds roundtable at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan. Picture by Simon Dawson, No 10 Downing Street.

Public finance alone is not going to fund the global energy transition. That’s why we need innovative solutions to mobilise private investment to tackle climate change.

The Climate Investment Funds’ Capital Market Mechanism (CCMM) demonstrates how the UK is playing a leading role in mobilising the necessary finance to support developing countries in their efforts to cut carbon emissions, build renewables and adapt to climate change.

Launched by the UK Prime Minister at COP29, the mechanism is designed to unlock billions in climate finance by leveraging future loan repayments from previous investments. It could mobilise up to $75 billion in public and private funding for new clean energy projects in developing countries and reduce global emissions.

Read more about UK International Climate Finance.

Updates to this page

Published 4 June 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Protecting mangroves in Madagascar and Indonesia

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Case study

Protecting mangroves in Madagascar and Indonesia

The UK’s International Climate Finance (ICF) supports mangrove conservation to reduce the impacts of climate change, protect biodiversity and boost livelihoods.

Mangrove monitoring in Madagascar for the Blue Forest Initiative. Source: Leah Glass, Blue Ventures.

Mangrove forests, found in tropical and sub-tropical coastal areas, are a vital home for endangered species such as the white breasted sea eagle and olive ridley turtles. They also support coastal communities that depend on them for their livelihoods.

Crucially, mangroves play a key role in tackling climate change, with the ability to store up to 4 times more carbon than rainforests.

However, mangrove forests have been in severe decline for decades. To address this, the UK government is funding the Blue Forest Initiatives programme, led by the UK non-profit Blue Ventures, to protect, restore and sustainably manage mangrove forests in Madagascar and Indonesia.

The community-led programme is working to prevent deforestation and overfishing while supporting the livelihoods of up to 70,000 people.

With a goal of protecting approximately 80,000 hectares of mangrove forests – an area larger than the size of 100,000 football pitches, the programme is expected to save 1.7 million tonnes of carbon dioxide from being released.

By securing the future of these critical ecosystems, the UK is not only combatting climate change but also safeguarding biodiversity and tackling extreme poverty.

Read more about UK International Climate Finance.

Updates to this page

Published 4 June 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Helping communities adapt to storms in Bangladesh

Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Case study

Helping communities adapt to storms in Bangladesh

The UK’s International Climate Finance (ICF) supports AI-based forecasting to boost extreme weather preparedness in Bangladesh.

UK International Climate Finance supports AI-based forecasting to increase extreme weather preparedness in Bangladesh.

Extreme weather events such as storms are getting more frequent and intense all over the world due to a more unstable climate. For many Bangladeshi coastal communities, tidal surges can be devastating for people’s livelihoods.

CLARE (Climate, Adaptation and Resilience), a research programme on climate adaptation and resilience jointly run by the UK and Canada, is piloting an innovative AI-based forecasting system to provide early warnings and help with long-term planning against storms.

When Cyclone Remal hit in 2024, displacing over 120,000 people, the project was able to provide timely information by identifying 30 at-risk embankment points. This allowed local people to effectively mobilise resources in real-time and strengthen embankments to limit damage.

Once completed, the AI model is set to be adopted by government and humanitarian groups across the country.

The project shows how we’re providing value for money by helping communities adapt to the impacts of climate change. Using data from tide stations and drone surveys, the project will aim to provide highly accurate forecasts for tidal surges.

Read more about UK International Climate Finance.

Updates to this page

Published 4 June 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Supporting farmers to go green in Zambia

Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Case study

Supporting farmers to go green in Zambia

The UK’s International Climate Finance (ICF) backs sustainable farming and eco-tourism in Zambia to cut emissions and create jobs.

People working on Zambia Integrated Forest Landscapes Project.

Since 2018, the UK has been supporting the Zambia Integrated Forest Landscapes Project (ZIFL Programme) to support rural communities in the Eastern Province of Zambia, one of the poorest regions of Africa.

In June 2024, Zambia signed an ERPA (Emission Reductions Purchase Agreements). This agreement will ensure local people receive payments in exchange for reducing emissions.

With a goal to cut emissions by 30 million tonnes, equivalent to the UK’s annual emissions from livestock farming, the project has already trained over 100,000 farmers in sustainable techniques like crop rotation and agroforestry.

As well as cutting carbon, the project is also working with the Luambe and Lukusuzi National Parks to help build roads and campsites, creating rural jobs through eco-tourism and ensuring the protection of wildlife.

UK International Climate Finance supports the Zambia Integrated Forest Landscapes Project.

People working on Zambia Integrated Forest Landscapes Project.

Read more about UK International Climate Finance.

Updates to this page

Published 4 June 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

June 4, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Extreme weather events have slowed economic growth, adding to the case for another rate cut

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Stella Huangfu, Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Sydney

Australia’s economy slowed sharply in the March quarter, growing by just 0.2% as government spending slowed and extreme weather events dampened demand. That followed an increase of 0.6% in the previous quarter.

The national accounts report from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) showed annual growth steady at 1.3%, below market forecasts for an improvement to 1.5%.

The result is also weaker than the Reserve Bank of Australia’s forecasts.

The ABS said: “Extreme weather events further dampened domestic demand and reduced exports”, with the impact particularly evident in mining, tourism and shipping.

This report on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be a key consideration for the Reserve Bank’s next meeting on July 7–8, helping shape its decision on whether to cut rates again. In May, the central bank cut the cash rate by 0.25% to 3.85%.

On balance, the softer than expected pace of growth makes another rate cut in July a bit more likely.

Private demand drives growth as public spending slumps

Household spending slowed to 0.4% in the quarter from 0.7%. Essential spending led the way, with a sharp 10.2% rise in electricity costs due to a warmer-than-usual summer and reduced electricity bill rebates. Food spending also increased as Queenslanders stocked up ahead of Tropical Cyclone Alfred.

Investment also contributed to growth, though its composition shifted. Private investment rose 0.7%, driven by a rebound in house building and strong non-dwelling construction, particularly in mining and electricity projects. But business investment in equipment and machinery slumped.

Public investment fell 2.0%, ending a run of positive growth since September 2024. This decline, which detracted 0.1 percentage points from GDP, reflected the completion or delay of energy, rail and road projects.

“Public spending recorded the largest detraction from growth since the September quarter 2017”, the ABS said.

Disappointing trade performance

Exports unexpectedly became the main drag on growth in the March quarter, marking a sharp turnaround from December 2024.

Total exports fell 0.8%, led by a drop in services – particularly travel – due to weaker foreign student arrivals and lower spending. Goods exports also declined as bad weather disrupted coal and natural gas shipments, and demand from key markets like China and Japan softened.

The growth outlook is soft

Given the weaker-than-expected growth in the March quarter, Australia’s economic outlook remains soft.

A disappointing sign in the report was another fall in GDP per head of population, known as GDP per capita. This measure declined by 0.2%, after just one quarterly rise and seven previous quarters of a “per capita recession”, when population growth outpaces economic growth.

The household saving rate continue to rise in the March quarter, back to pre-COVID levels at 5.2%. This is because income grew faster than spending, and households remain cautious amid economic uncertainty. Additional government support also boosted savings.

The economic slowdown reflects weak household spending and a notable pullback in public sector investment. With domestic demand under strain, short-term growth prospects appear limited as the economy continues to adjust to past interest rate hikes and the early effects of the recent cuts.

The Reserve Bank began cutting official rates in February – its first move after 13 consecutive hikes between May 2022 and November 2023 – but the impact has yet to flow through. The next GDP figures, due on September 3, will offer a clearer picture of how the February and May rate cuts are shaping the recovery.

Trade tensions add uncertainty

Global conditions have become more unsettled, with rising trade tensions and shifting geopolitical alliances putting pressure on international trade. Renewed tariff threats – particularly from the US – are disrupting global supply chains. For export-reliant Australia, this increases the risk of weaker trade volumes and greater exposure to external shocks.

At the same time, China’s post-pandemic recovery is losing momentum, dragged down by weak consumer demand and a struggling property sector.

Given Australia’s close trade ties with China, any sustained slowdown there poses a clear threat to export earnings and broader economic growth. Together, these global headwinds are adding to the uncertainty surrounding Australia’s economic outlook.

A balancing act on rates

With demand soft and the economy losing momentum, the Reserve Bank may cut interest rates again at its July meeting to help boost growth. Key sectors like household spending, public services and mining have been under pressure. A further rate cut could support confidence and encourage more spending.

However, the monthly inflation report for April adds uncertainty. While headline inflation held steady at 2.4% over the year to April, underlying measures ticked higher.
The monthly rate excluding volatile items such as fuel and fresh food rose to 2.8%, up from 2.6%. That suggests price pressures are becoming more widespread.

These mixed signals leave the RBA facing a delicate balancing act. Upcoming data, particularly the employment report on June 19 and the May monthly inflation indicator on June 25, will be critical in determining whether inflation is easing enough to justify another cut or showing signs of persistence that call for caution.

Stella Huangfu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Extreme weather events have slowed economic growth, adding to the case for another rate cut – https://theconversation.com/extreme-weather-events-have-slowed-economic-growth-adding-to-the-case-for-another-rate-cut-257962

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI New Zealand: French authorities block Greenpeace ship from participating in UN Ocean Conference

Source: Greenpeace

French authorities have blocked Greenpeace International’s ship Arctic Sunrise from entering the port of Nice, where the “One Ocean Science Congress” and the UN Ocean Conference are being hosted. This was retaliation against Greenpeace France, highlighting the weaknesses of the French network of Marine Protected Areas last month in the Mediterranean Sea, in an expedition on board the Arctic Sunrise.

Greenpeace International will write a formal letter of complaint to the United Nations, deploring the behaviour of the hosting French government. Civil society participation is a core element of the UN Ocean Conference.

The presence of the Arctic Sunrise in Nice would coincide with the 40th anniversary of the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by French secret services in Auckland.

Greenpeace Aotearoa spokesperson Ellie Hooper says, “It’s ironic that so close to the 40th anniversary of the French Government’s attempt to silence Greenpeace here in Auckland by bombing the Rainbow Warrior, the French Government is again trying to shut us down by blocking our ship from entering Nice.”

“But just like we were not silenced then, neither will we be silenced now. Climate change, ecosystem collapse, and accelerating species extinction pose an existential threat, and our work has never been more important.”

The Arctic Sunrise had been invited by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to participate in the “One Ocean Science Congress” and in the Ocean wonders parade taking place right before the UN Ocean Conference.

Greenpeace International had intended to deliver the messages of three million people calling for a moratorium on deep sea mining to the politicians attending the conference. The ship’s entry to Nice has now been blocked.

Mads Christensen, Greenpeace International’s Executive Director, says, “The French authorities’ attempt to silence fair criticism ahead of this UN Ocean Conference is clearly a political decision and is utterly unacceptable. Greenpeace and our ships have been working peacefully to protect the oceans for decades. The Arctic Sunrise highlighted the failure of the French government to properly protect its Marine Protected Areas – where bottom trawling is still permitted – and now we are being punished.

“France wants this to be a moment where they present themselves as saviours of the oceans, while they want to silence any criticism of their own failures in national waters. We will not be silenced. We believe the voices of the three million calling for a stop to deep sea mining must be heard in Nice. Greenpeace and the French government share the same objective to get a moratorium on deep sea mining, which makes the ban of the Arctic Sunrise from Nice even more absurd.”

Millions of people around the world have joined Greenpeace’s campaign to stop deep sea mining from starting. In 2023, the Arctic Sunrise crew took action at sea to bear witness to the threat of the deep sea mining industry. They peacefully protested against The Metals Company, which had been publicly accused of “environmental piracy” by the French government a few weeks ago, given their attempt to bypass international law by requesting an exploitation permit through President Trump’s administration.

Right now, the Rainbow Warrior is in the Tasman Sea to expose the damage being done to ocean life there and will be in New Zealand to mark the anniversary of the bombing in Auckland on 10 July.

Onboard photographer Fernando Pereira died in the attack, which came soon after Operation Exodus, in which the Greenpeace flagship had evacuated victims of American nuclear tests on Rongelap Atoll and was preparing to oppose French nuclear tests on Mururoa Atoll.

Following the first-ever deep sea mining licence application by The Metals Company to the United States, Greenpeace says that now is the time to resist and stop this industry from starting.

This UN Ocean Conference will be a key moment to galvanise support ahead of the July meeting of the International Seabed Authority, the UN regulator.

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dan Goldman Leads House Democrats in Demanding Federal Budget Fully Fund Public Broadcasting

Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

Funding Request Comes Amid Trump Administration’s Continued Attacks on Public Journalism

Goldman is Co-Chair of the Bipartisan Public Broadcasting Caucus

Read the Letter Here

Washington, D.C – Co-Chair of the Congressional Public Broadcasting Caucus Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10), alongside Congresswoman Lizzie Fletcher (TX-07) and Congresswoman Doris Matsui (CA–07) led 103 of their House Democratic colleagues in writing to the House Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert Aderholt and Ranking Member Rosa DeLauro to request the federal government’s budget for the 2026 Fiscal Year fully fund public programming, including $535 million for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s (CPB) two-year advance, level funding of $31 million for the Department of Education’s Ready To Learn grant program, and level funding of $60 million for public broadcasting Interconnection system.

The letter comes as the Trump administration continues to attack public journalism’s editorial independence and crack down on public broadcasting nationwide. This month, the administration issued an unlawful Executive Order directing CPB to cease all funding for NPR and PBS, which support local TV and radio news outlets across the country. Goldman’s letter highlights the critical role that CPB plays not only in ensuring all Americans have access to trusted and reliable news, but also emergency response tools for state and local municipalities and educational programming for kids of all ages.

“Without federal support for public broadcasting, many localities would struggle to receive timely, reliable local news and educational content, especially remote and rural communities that commercial newsrooms are increasingly less likely to invest in. In states such as Alaska, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Texas, rural public radio stations are often the only weekly or daily news source in their communities. Even in places with other daily or weekly news sources, those outlets may not be directing resources toward original or locally based stories, leaving it to public stations to fill the gap,” the Members wrote.

CPB-funded public media reaches nearly 99.7% percent of the American population, and its funding funds over 1,500 public television and radio stations across the country, supporting approximately 20,000 local jobs. The members also emphasize the load-bearing role that the CPB-funded public broadcasting infrastructure plays in individual states’ emergency response.

“Between January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024, nearly 8,500 Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEAs) were issued by federal, state, and local authorities and transmitted over the PBS Warning, Alert, and Response Network (PBS WARN) system. Additionally, National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Radio Satellite System enable local public radio stations to issue text and image alerts and other information to mobile phones, “connected car” smart dashboards, HD radios, and online streams. In fact, NPR has been named as a resource in at least 20 states’ emergency plans,” the Members continued.

Founded in 1967 as a private, non-profit corporation, the CPB’s structure shields its content decisions from political influence and is compelled by law to uphold “strict adherence to objectivity and balance.” In addition to emergency response systems and local journalism, federal funding for CPB also enables public broadcasting to support educational content that parents nationwide rely on to help their children learn, averaging 16 million monthly users and more than 350 million monthly streams across digital platforms, allowing people at all income levels and from all parts of the country to access consistent, high-quality, educational content for free.

“We urge you to continue your support for our nation’s local public broadcasting stations with level funding of $535 million for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s two-year advance, level funding of $31 million for the Ready To Learn grant program, and level funding of $60 million for public broadcasting Interconnection,” the Members concluded.

Read the letter here or below:

Dear Chairman Aderholt and Ranking Member DeLauro:

Thank you for the strong bipartisan support that the Labor, Health and Human Services and Education Subcommittee has provided to our local public broadcasting stations through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), the Ready To Learn program, and public media’s interconnection system. As you craft the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies appropriations bill, we request that you maintain this legacy and continue to support strong funding for these critical programs.

Corporation for Public Broadcasting

Objectivity and balance and diversity of thought in public broadcasting are essential to serving the public interest and preserving the public’s trust. That’s why in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Congress authorized the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a private, nonprofit corporation wholly independent of the federal government, to steward the federal government’s investment in public media. This structure shields content decisions from political influence and the statute compels CPB to uphold “strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.”

For more than 50 years, Congress has provided funding for the CPB with strong bipartisan support. Since 1976, Congress provides such funding as a two-year advance appropriation, serving as a firewall that protects public media’s independence from politically motivated interference. It makes possible the long-term planning required to ensure public media’s educational and public affairs programming meets the highest academic and journalistic standards and has become the bedrock for CPB’s longstanding public-private partnership in service to all Americans.

Federal funding for the CPB is the foundation of public media’s national-local, public-private partnership. Distributed according to a statutory formula, CPB’s administrative expenses are capped at 5% and approximately 70% of all CPB’s two-year advance are distributed to eligible public media stations. CPB funds more than 1,500 public television and radio stations across the country, supporting approximately 20,000 local jobs, and representing the only locally licensed, controlled, and directed media in America. With CPB funding, public media reaches nearly 99.7% percent of the American population living in rural, small town, and urban communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and four commonwealths and territories. Every $1 of federal funding contributing to that programming, generates $7 from local sources — a tremendous return on the taxpayer investment.

This federal funding is critical to the work of all local public broadcasting stations to provide essential services and programming to local communities; enable local journalism that address current issues in an objective, fair, and balanced manner; facilitate local public safety and emergency alert services, and support educational services to millions of students, teachers, parents and caregivers. Unlike commercial media, public media operates under a unique statutory mandate to serve the public interest, focusing on educational and cultural enrichment and public safety, not profit.

Without federal support for public broadcasting, many localities would struggle to receive timely, reliable local news and educational content, especially remote and rural communities that commercial newsrooms are increasingly less likely to invest in. In states such as Alaska, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Texas, rural public radio stations are often the only weekly or daily news source in their communities. Even in places with other daily or weekly news sources, those outlets may not be directing resources toward original or locally based stories, leaving it to public stations to fill the gap.

We request level funding of $535 million for CPB’s two-year advance.

Public Safety

Covering nearly 99 percent of the U.S. population, public broadcasting stations play an irreplaceable role as an emergency response tool that states and localities depend on.

Public television stations provide critical redundancy through the PBS Warning, Alert, and Response Network (PBS WARN) which sends geo-targeted Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) messages issued by more than 1,600 local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal authorities from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to cellular carriers, all along public media infrastructure. Between January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024, nearly 8,500 WEAs were issued by federal, state, and local authorities and transmitted over the PBS WARN system. Additionally, National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Radio Satellite System enable local public radio stations to issue text and image alerts and other information to mobile phones, “connected car” smart dashboards, HD radios, and online streams. In fact, NPR has been named as a resource in at least 20 states’ emergency plans, for example, in Florida, “The National Test will be relayed to the three Primary Entry Point stations in Florida: WOKV (690 AM) – Jacksonville, WFLF (540 AM) – Orlando, WAQI (710 AM) – Miami.” Natural disasters do not stay within the lines of human-drawn state borders – that is why it’s imperative that federal emergency communications coordinated through the CPB-funded PBS WARN and Public Radio Satellite System are able to get comprehensive information to those at risk in real time.

In addition to transmitting emergency alerts, public radio stations provide flexible, live coverage of emergencies and connect lifesaving information to first responders and residents during unfolding events. During Hurricanes Helene and Milton, even as many other news sources lost power and internet, Blue Ridge Public Radio remained online in the Asheville, North Carolina area and delivered hourly local updates and statements from public officials to the more than 500,000 people impacted by power outages in the region. In Florida, a network of 14 public media stations across the state began coverage of Hurricane Helene a week before its major landfall, granting residents direct access to real-time weather alerts and updates across all platforms and apps. In Texas, Houston Public Media was able to utilize its over-the-air signal to connect first responders and residents in the Gulf Coast region with lifesaving information during the May Derecho and Hurricane Beryl last year.

Without public media, the federal and state governments would have to decide between funding replacement emergency alerting systems or forgo ensuring that all residents have access to life-saving information. For rural communities, large expanses and low population density would raise substantial financial barriers.

Education

Public broadcasting networks also support educational content that parents nationwide rely on to help their children learn, averaging 16 million monthly users and more than 350 million monthly streams across digital platforms. Public media is committed to providing education services to all Americans. Public broadcasting allows people at all income levels and from all parts of the country—rural and urban—to have access to consistent, high-quality, educational content for free.

Through a unique partnership among the U.S. Department of Education, CPB, and PBS, the Ready To Learn program funds the development of educational television and digital media targeted at preschool and early elementary school children and their families. More than 100 studies have demonstrated that this program’s research-based content builds and improves the early literacy and math skills for children, ages two to eight. For the majority of American children (60% in 2020) who don’t have the means or opportunity to attend preschool, Ready To Learn content provides an essential “school readiness” experience.

We are requesting level funding of $31 million in FY 2026 to continue the impact of Ready to Learn created content and the scope of local station outreach to the kids, families, teachers, and schools that need it most.

Community Connection

Local public broadcasting stations are some of the last locally controlled and locally operated media in the country, especially in more rural and remote areas. The local focus of the stations builds civic leadership, strengthens the fabric of our local communities, and ensures that invaluable culture and unique local voices are preserved for generations to come.

For example, West Virginia Public Broadcasting partners with educators and local libraries in Boone County to deliver high-quality early childhood education to area children, setting them up for future success. The station also produces its broadcast music program, Mountain Stage, showcasing local and regional music that is distributed by NPR for a national audience. Across the country, South Dakota Public Broadcasting is streaming state legislative meetings, making state government accessible to every South Dakotan. These services serve state interests, often saving states money by offering higher quality services at lower costs.

Interconnection

All of these services depend on public broadcasting’s interconnection system – the satellite and digital infrastructure and supporting operations that provide every local public media station across the country with access to programming from national, regional, and independent content providers and the capability to share their local content with others. This system ensures that cellular customers can receive geo-targeted emergency alerts and warnings, enabling public media to be the fail-safe for reliable public safety services, even when power grids and internet services are down. 

Level funding of $60 million in FY 2026 for the interconnection system is essential to support its system-wide infrastructure while also efficiently address growing needs in the system, including: cybersecurity, content delivery networks, and data management, among others.

We urge you to continue your support for our nation’s local public broadcasting stations with level funding of $535 million for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting’s two-year advance, level funding of $31 million for the Ready To Learn grant program, and level funding of $60 million for public broadcasting Interconnection.

Thank you for your consideration and attention to this important request.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: NC Health and Human Services Secretary Dev Sangvai Visits Walter B. Jones Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment Center and Longleaf Neuro-Medical Treatment Center

Source: US State of North Carolina

Headline: NC Health and Human Services Secretary Dev Sangvai Visits Walter B. Jones Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment Center and Longleaf Neuro-Medical Treatment Center

NC Health and Human Services Secretary Dev Sangvai Visits Walter B. Jones Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment Center and Longleaf Neuro-Medical Treatment Center
jawerner
Tue, 06/03/2025 – 16:30

North Carolina Health and Human Services Secretary Dev Sangvai today visited two state operated healthcare facilities, Longleaf Neuro-Medical Treatment Center (NTC) and Walter B. Jones Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment Center (ADATC), dedicated to providing critical specialized care to people in eastern North Carolina.

Secretary Sangvai’s first stop was Longleaf NTC in Wilson, one of three state operated healthcare facilities which serves adults with chronic and complex medical conditions that co-exist with neurodevelopmental, and/or neurocognitive disorders and/or a diagnosis of severe and persistent mental illness. He was joined by State Health Director and Chief Medical Officer Dr. Lawrence Greenblatt; Deputy Secretary for Licensing and Facilities Karen Burkes; Deputy Chief Medical Officer and Chief Psychiatrist Dr. Carrie Brown; and Longleaf NTC leadership. During the visit, they toured a resident hall and two recently completed renovation projects in the kitchen and outdoor verandah.

The facility faces several challenges including staffing shortages and retention, particularly with nursing positions. Currently, the overall staffing vacancy rate is more than 43% with over 200 open positions. Longleaf NTC relies heavily on contract staffing to support staff shortages, and long-term investments are needed to help further support the workforce.

“The health care workforce in North Carolina is vital to the health of our communities,” said NC Health and Human Services Secretary Dev Sangvai. “Together we will work toward solutions, like increased pay and retention efforts, to fill these critical positions and ensure people continue to receive the care they need.”

Leadership also highlighted successes including the facility’s return to normal operations after taking in residents of Black Mountain Neuro-Medical Treatment Center who were displaced during Hurricane Helene.

Secretary Sangvai then toured and met with staff at Walter B. Jones ADATC in Greenville, one of two substance use disorder treatment centers operated by the NCDHHS Division of State Operated Healthcare Facilities (DSOHF). They visited a newly opened residential unit, cafeteria and Opioid Treatment Center at the facility.

Walter B. Jones ADATC leaders cited hiring and recruitment challenges among their top concerns, including the inability to offer competitive wages. Currently, the staffing vacancy rate is more than 38% with over 55 open positions. These workforce challenges limit the facility’s operating capacity which is currently at 35 beds out of 42 total.

“State operated healthcare facilities are the backbone to providing critical and complex services to some of the most vulnerable people in North Carolina,” said Secretary Sangvai. “If we want to create a healthier North Carolina, we must retain positions to attract and maintain staff and providers in these vital facilities.”

Current North Carolina House and Senate budget proposals eliminate hundreds of NCDHHS positions. Any reductions in the workforce at NCDHHS DSOHF facilities would limit the ability to staff and operate more beds and could permanently reduce the number of patients able to be served if it becomes law.

Jun 3, 2025

MIL OSI USA News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Curious Kids: can spiders swim?

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Leanda Denise Mason, Vice Chancellor Research Fellow in Conservation Ecology, Edith Cowan University

A great raft spider (_Dolomedes plantarius_). Salparadis/Shutterstock

Can spiders swim?

Waubra Preschool students, Victoria, Australia

What a great question!

Most spiders don’t swim by choice. But they sure can survive in water when they need to. From floating like a boat, to paddling like a rower, to carrying their own scuba bubbles, spiders have developed brilliant ways to deal with water.

Let’s dive into the science in some more detail, and look at how spiders handle getting their paws wet, with examples from our local bush.

Spiders can run across water

Water has surface tension – this acts like a kind of invisible skin that can hold up small, light objects.

Many spiders are tiny and have water-repellent hairs on their legs, so they can stand or run on water without sinking.

For example, fishing spiders wait at the water’s edge and scuttle across the surface to grab insects, tadpoles or even small fish.

If prey escapes underwater, this spider can even hide beneath the water’s surface briefly, then come back up.

Spiders can hold their breath underwater for days

Spiders don’t have gills, so they can’t get oxygen from water like fish do. But they have evolved clever strategies for staying alive if they stay in the water for a long time.

For example, the Australian Sydney funnel-web spider often falls into backyard swimming pools. People might see one and think it drowned, but it can actually survive underwater for hours by holding its breath much longer than a human could.

That’s because it breathes much more slowly than we do. Like many spiders, it has both tracheae (tiny air tubes) and book lungs (they look like a book with many pages) for breathing. Some spiders can close these and become watertight, to hold their breath for a long time.

Some trapdoor spiders have been recorded only taking a breath every six minutes.

Do not burst their bubble

Some spiders take the air with them like a scuba diver.

On the Great Barrier Reef coast, a little intertidal spider called Desis bobmarleyi actually lives part of its life under seawater. At high tide, it hides in a silk-lined air pocket in coral or shells. It uses the long hairs on its legs and body to trap a bubble around itself so it can breathe underwater between the tides. When the tide goes out, this spider comes out to hunt on the wet reef.

And in other parts of the world, there’s the famous diving bell spider, the only spider that spends its whole life entirely underwater.

It weaves an underwater silk web that it fills with air – like an underwater house. This spider can stay underwater for more than a day at a time by letting its air-bubble vessel actively pull oxygen from the water.

Can you spot Desis bobmarleyi among the corals?
coenobita/iNaturalist, CC BY

Flood proofing, trapdoor spider style

Some spiders sit tight and make their homes flood-proof. Remember those trapdoor spiders we mentioned? Trapdoor spiders live snug in burrows underground with a silken lid on top (like a little trapdoor).

In areas that get sudden heavy rains, a trapdoor spider might build its burrow with a raised entrance – a bit like a chimney – so water flows around or over it rather than straight in.

Some Australian trapdoor spiders in the outback clay pans have been found to build thick muddy silk doors that fit perfectly like a bath plug into the surrounding soil. The water just goes straight over the top.

Even if water does get in, some trapdoor spiders can seal their bodies and essentially hold their breath. They don’t swim in their flooded burrows, but they can wait out a flood without drowning.

Some trapdoor spiders have been recorded only taking a breath every six minutes.
Dr Leanda Mason

What to do with a soggy spider

If you ever find a spider struggling in water – say in a swimming pool or even in a bucket – you can help as long as you’re careful.

First, always ask an adult before trying to assist a spider. Nobody has died in Australia in 60 years from spider venom. But some (such as the Sydney funnel-web) can still be fatal, so you must be sure not to touch or provoke it.

A good way to save a spider in a pool is to use a net or a scoop with a long handle. Gently lift the spider out and put it on the ground away from the water. The spider might look dead at first, but don’t be surprised if it “comes back to life” as it dries out – just like trapdoor spiders do.

And remember: never poke a spider with your bare hands, even if it seems lifeless. Spiders such as funnel-webs can still bite underwater or right after being rescued, and they will defend themselves if they feel threatened. So, play it safe and use tools or ask an adult or a spider expert to help.

If anyone is bitten, get an adult to seek medical attention immediately.

Next time you’re exploring nature (or even looking into the toilet), keep an eye out for our eight-legged friends and how they interact with water. You might spot a little spider boat captain or an air-bubble diver right in your backyard.

Leanda Denise Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Curious Kids: can spiders swim? – https://theconversation.com/curious-kids-can-spiders-swim-257832

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Greenpeace USA’s “Dirty Dems” called out in Capitol Rotunda

Source: Greenpeace Statement –

SACRAMENTO, CA (June 3, 2025)—Today, as legislators are in session moving bills toward key legislative deadlines, Greenpeace USA activists deployed banners in the Capitol Rotunda naming nine Democrats who take large sums of money from the oil and gas industry and receive failing grades on progressive issues. Activists also took to the Legislative Swing Space, hand-delivering letters, posting flyers, and handing out postcards – reminding all legislators that their corporate donors and voting records are matters of public interest.

These activities in the Capitol come as a continuation of Greenpeace USA’s ongoing “Dirty Dems” campaign, a collaboration with California Working Families Party and Courage California that holds California State legislators accountable for their damaging connections to the oil and gas industry and their failure to support critical climate, economic justice, and progressive priorities.

Photos from today’s event will be available at this link [later this evening].

Amy Moas, Ph.D., Greenpeace USA Senior Climate Campaigner, said: “Today, we’re in Sacramento putting legislators on notice – the Assembly Members and Senators who take the most money from the oil and gas industry and have a poor voting record on progressive issues will be exposed. Real leadership is about accountability to California’s communities who are suffering in the face of the mounting climate crisis – not to the corporate donors writing checks.

“The Dirty Dems we’ve named have turned their backs on the people who elected them. But by no means are they the only culprits in California’s Legislature selling out their communities to corporate donors instead of protecting them. There are elected officials on both sides of the aisle who must do better – everyone in Sacramento needs to put communities first.

“The toxic oil and gas industry continues to make record profits while we suffer the costs. Every dollar these legislators take from corporate cronies contributes to bigger wildfires, hotter heatwaves, more climate devastation, and more harm to our most vulnerable communities. We need brave bold action from our legislators to address the climate crisis. It is time the polluters who created this mess pay to clean it up.”

“Dirty Dems” Class of 2025

Nine legislators have been named in the “Dirty Dems” Class of 2025: Jasmeet Bains, Mike Gipson, Melissa Hurtado, Stephanie Nguyen, Blanca Pacheco, James Ramos, Blanca Rubio, Susan Rubio, and Esmeralda Soria. You can read more about each of their campaign donations and voting records here.

Holding the Legislators Accountable

Thousands of candidates and elected officials have already signed what’s known as the “No Fossil Fuel Money Pledge,” showing that people who refuse to take corporate donations can – and will – win. Find out more about the pledge and those who have already signed here.

###

Contact: Greenpeace USA, [email protected]

Greenpeace USA is part of a global network of independent campaigning organizations that use peaceful protest and creative communication to expose global environmental problems and promote solutions that are essential to a green and peaceful future. Greenpeace USA is committed to transforming the country’s unjust social, environmental, and economic systems from the ground up to address the climate crisis, advance racial justice, and build an economy that puts people first. Learn more at www.greenpeace.org/usa.

MIL OSI NGO –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: In first-of-its-kind initiative, California deploys mobile air monitoring to protect underserved communities from pollution

Source: US State of California Governor

Jun 3, 2025

What you need to know: The state will use specially equipped vehicles to collect block-by-block air quality data in 64 communities heavily burdened by pollution. The results will help create local solutions to improve air quality and public health.

SACRAMENTO – While the Trump administration rolls back pollution protections across the country, Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the launch of California’s Statewide Mobile Monitoring Initiative (SMMI), a first-of-its-kind program delivering hyper-local air pollution data to guide air quality improvement efforts in California.

“While the federal government threatens to take us back to the days of smoggy skies and clogged lungs, California continues to lead the way. We’re deploying first-of-their-kind vehicles to monitor pollution levels at a block-by-block level, delivering critical air quality information to communities across the state.”

Governor Gavin Newsom

Starting in June, the pilot project will deploy mobile air monitoring equipment to 64 communities throughout the state, with a particular focus on communities that have long faced environmental disparities. The project spearheaded by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) will use sensor-equipped vehicles from Aclima and mobile laboratories operated by researchers from the University of California, Berkeley, University of California, Riverside, and Aerodyne to collect and analyze data on local pollution levels.

The initiative is part of California Climate Investments, a statewide effort that puts billions of Cap-and-Invest dollars to work reducing greenhouse gas emissions, strengthening the economy, and improving public health and the environment — particularly in disadvantaged communities.

More than 60% of the mobile monitoring will serve priority populations, including low-income communities and communities facing disproportionate pollution burdens. The 64 communities were consistently nominated for focused action under the Community Air Protection Program, underscoring the state’s commitment to protecting the health of Californians in areas most burdened by air pollution.

“By meeting communities where they are and listening to their concerns, we’re building an air quality monitoring system that integrates the lived experiences of the people most impacted by air pollution,” said CARB Executive Director Dr. Steven Cliff. “The Statewide Mobile Monitoring Initiative represents an unprecedented opportunity to gather the detailed information we need to better protect public health in neighborhoods that have historically borne the brunt of environmental injustice.”

Monitoring will take place in the 64 communities over the next year. The project is expected to end in June 2026, when the collected data will become publicly available. Final results will be shared with the 64 communities, the general public, and the Board. CARB, local air districts, stakeholders, and community stakeholders will use the data to help guide efforts to address existing and emerging pollution concerns. The data is also expected to inform future regulatory programs, academic research, and applications for grants such as the Community Air Grants Program.

The program is guided by a robust community engagement framework. More than 40 community-based organizations across California have partnered with CARB to identify local air quality concerns and ensure community voices shape monitoring efforts from the ground up.

California’s clean air leadership

Over the last 50 years, the state’s clean air efforts have saved $250 billion in health costs through reduced illness and reduced diesel-related cancer risk by nearly 80 percent.

The state continues to set clean energy records. Last year, California ran on 100% clean electricity for the equivalent of 51 days – with the grid running on 100% clean energy for some period two out of every three days. Since the beginning of the Newsom Administration, battery storage is up to over 15,000 megawatts – a 1,900%+ increase.

Press releases, Recent news

Recent news

Jun 2, 2025

News To the People of California,Recent years have seen a troubling spike in reported hate crimes and manifestations of bigotry. In response, California launched a robust anti-hate agenda that includes significant investments and actions to support and protect all the…

Jun 1, 2025

News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom and Acting Governor Eleni Kounalakis issued the following statement regarding the death of Baldwin Park Police Department Officer Samuel Riveros:“We mourn the tragic loss of one of California’s brave law enforcement officers,…

May 31, 2025

News Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 2025, as “Mental Health Awareness Month.”The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below: PROCLAMATIONDuring Mental Health Awareness Month, we recognize the…

MIL OSI USA News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: June 03, 2025 Lawmakers Call for an Increase in Federal Funding toFully Support Urban Search & Rescue Efforts Washington, D.C. – A bipartisan coalition of lawmakers is calling for more robust federal support to help ensure that when a disaster strikes, members of the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System (US&R) can respond. These heroic task forces… Read More

Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Kevin Mullin California (15th District)

Washington, D.C. – A bipartisan coalition of lawmakers is calling for more robust federal support to help ensure that when a disaster strikes, members of the National Urban Search & Rescue Response System (US&R) can respond. These heroic task forces deploy to communities across America that need additional help during dangerous crises like wildfires, hurricanes and building collapses, but their work has been underfunded for years.

For the second year in a row, a coalition of lawmakers led by Representatives Kevin Mullin (CA-15), Young Kim (CA-40), and Jill Tokuda (HI-02) – and which has grown to over 40 members of Congress from across the country – are urging Congress to include a modest, but desperately-needed, $16 million increase for a total of $56 million in funding for US&R.

America’s US&R Response System includes 28 task forces strategically located across 19 states, and are composed of highly-trained emergency personnel from local fire departments. They are expected to respond to devastating national disasters well beyond their border without commensurate funding from the Federal government to maintain their operations.

US&R task force members respond to the 911 terrorist attacks in 2001.

US&R has helped communities receive immediate, life-saving assistance during catastrophic events such as the Maui and Los Angeles wildfires, Hurricanes Milton and Katrina, the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, the Northridge Earthquake, and many other extreme crises. These task forces play a vital role in national disaster response efforts and the lawmakers are seeking full funding for the task forces in the Fiscal Year 2026 budget to properly support this heroic work. Last year, the House passed an Appropriations bill with the requested level of funding, but Congress ultimately did not pass full-year spending bills. They are repeating the effort this year.

“Ensuring our US&R task forces are fully funded means ensuring communities across America can depend on them when disaster strikes,” said Rep. Kevin Mullin. “I’m proud that California Task Force 3 is based out of Menlo Park Fire in my congressional district. The time and effort that is put into hosting and maintaining a task force for deployment at a moment’s notice is no small task. These teams represent the gold standard in emergency response and provide lifesaving services to those who are experiencing an unfathomable emergency. Their readiness comes at a cost, and providing adequate federal funding will help us stay prepared and save lives.”

“Urban Search and Rescue teams from across the country are often among the first to help communities and families during times of great loss. Nearly two years after the devastating Maui wildfires, I can still vividly recall US&R teams entering the burn zone while the ground was still hot enough to melt shoes,” said Rep. Jill Tokuda. “I will always be grateful for the comfort and closure they provided, which is why I’m so proud to have joined my colleagues Representatives Kevin Mullin and Young Kim in advocating for increased funding for the US&R system in this year’s appropriations bills. We never know when disaster will strike, but when it does, all Americans deserve to know that US&R will come to their aid.”

“First responders need the proper resources to keep our communities safe during a major disaster, including deadly wildfires and flood events,” said Rep. Young Kim. “The National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System consists of 28 vital task forces made up of federal, state, and local emergency personnel who are on call for rapid deployment to provide emergency medical care and search collapsed buildings. I support our US&R task forces’ lifesaving work and appreciate Orange County Fire Authority Chief Fennessy’s leadership as Western Representative for 9 US&R task forces. I will do my part to protect this program that saves lives.”

US&R task force members during Hurricane Katrina.

US&R Leaders Speak Out for Federal Support

“When disaster strikes, our US&R assets are the backbone of the response effort,” said Joseph R. Downey, Chief of Rescue Operations with Fire Department of the City of New York (NY-TF1), and US&R Task Force Representative-National. “With our extensive training and experience, we form a reliable and adaptable force that operates at the heart of every federal disaster response. New York City, with the largest Fire and Police Departments in the country, received much needed assistance from US&R task forces in response to the 9-11 attacks on the WTC and Hurricane Sandy. Our task forces have consistently gone above and beyond to support the mission, but the lack of funding is hindering our ability to respond effectively. With increased labor and equipment costs, along with the expansion of our mission scope and more frequent deployments, we need your help now more than ever.”

“FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams, sponsored by local government fire agencies like Menlo Park Fire Protection, provide vital, highly trained surge resources to communities that have been struck by catastrophic disasters,” said Mark Lorenzen, Fire Chief, Menlo Park Fire Protection District (CA-TF3). “They are critical in both life saving measures as well as helping move jurisdictions forward to recovery. The teams are struggling financially to cover increasing costs while federal funding lags well behind inflation. I am thankful for the bipartisan efforts of our legislators, including Rep. Kevin Mullin who helped lead this effort to bridge the funding gap to ensure our sustainability.”

“Over the past eight months alone, California Task Force 5 (CA-TF5) activated on a wide range of incidents — from Hurricanes Helene and Milton on the east coast to the Palisades and Eaton Fires in Los Angeles — and on each deployment, the investments made in the program were returned beyond measure in the form of lives saved, families rescued, and communities protected,” said Brian Fennessy, Fire Chief of the Orange County Fire Authority (CA-TF5). “As the home of one of only 28 such task forces in the nation, we are grateful for the elected officials, including our own Rep. Young Kim, who not only recognize the program’s importance, but also work to secure increased funding to expand its life-saving services.”

“Ohio Task Force 1 (OH-TF1) has been deployed by FEMA nearly 40-times in the past 25 years,” said Evan W. Schumann, OFE, Program Manager (OH-TF1). “Our canine handlers and dogs have been deployed to such events as the State of Washington landslide in 2014, the Kentucky Flooding in 2022, and the Hawaii Wildland Fire. To remain ready to respond to any disaster, OH-TF1 spent 11,696 hrs. of training in 2023 and over 2,647 hrs. of service time (doing work without compensation). The associated personnel costs of OH-TF1’s 2023 activities were almost all uncompensated by federal funding and born on the backs of OH-TF1’s Participating Agencies or team members. I am grateful to Reps. Mullin, Kim and Tokuda for leading the charge to increase funding for the Urban Search & Rescue program that will provide us greater support.”

Read the full letter here.

This letter was signed by Reps. Gabe Amo (RI-01), Becca Balint (VT-At Large), Wesley Bell (MO-1), Ami Bera (CA-6), Brendan Boyle (PA-2), André Carson (In-7), Emanuel Cleaver (MO-5), Jasmine Crockett (TX-30), Gabe Evans (CO-8), Brian Fitzpatrick (PA-1), Mike Flood (NE-1), Jared Golden (ME-2), Daniel Goldman (NY-10), Maggie Goodlander (KY-3), Julie Johnson (TX-32), William Keating (MA-9), Timothy Kennedy (NY-26), Jennifer Kiggans (VA-2), Young Kim (CA-40), John Larson (CT-1), Stephen Lynch (MA-8), Seth Magaziner (RI-2), Nicole Malliotakis (NY-11), Doris Matsui (CA-7), Dave Min (CA-47), Seth Moulton (MA-6), Kevin Mullin (CA-15), Jimmy Panetta (CA-19), Chris Pappas (NH-1), Scott Peters (CA-50), Brittany Pettersen (C0-7), Ayanna Pressley (MA-7), Maria Salazar (FL-27), Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-5), Greg Stanton (AZ-4), Suhas Subramanyam (VA-10), Jill Tokuda (HI-2), Lori Trahan (MA-3), Derek Tran (CA-45), Frederica Wilson (FL-24).

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: As Hurricane season begins WFP raises the alarm on Haiti

Source: World Food Programme

This is a summary of what was said by WFP Regional Coordinator in Latin America and the Caribbean, Lola Castro, to whom quoted text may be attributed – at the UN Noon Briefing in New York today

NEW YORK/ PANAMA CITY: As the United Nations World Food Programme Regional Coordinator in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2021, I have frequently visited Haiti over the past four years.

Our WFP team and partners on the ground have seen this crisis slowly unfolding and we’ve been sounding the alarm about the ever-deteriorating humanitarian situation for far too long.  Immense humanitarian efforts are already underway, but the situation continues to degrade.

Food security update

Hunger in Haiti has never been worse: 5.7 million people – more than half of the country’s population – don’t have enough to eat. This includes more than two million people who are facing emergency levels of hunger (IPC 4) and 8,400 people living in temporary sites for displaced people who are experiencing extreme hunger, severe acute malnutrition and the risk of starvation (IPC5).

Haiti is one of five countries in the world where people are facing catastrophic levels of hunger. It’s really dramatic to have this in the Western hemisphere. We cannot imagine the situation in the sites housing displaced people.

Last week I visited the suburban commune of Petionville, in the southeast of Port-au-Prince, where WFP was providing emergency food assistance to thousands of people displaced by violence by armed groups in Kenscoff, a rural mountainside community. These are people who used to come and sell their food in the city. Their story bears testimony of food systems and supply chains breaking down as a result of the expansion of armed groups. Not only were these families forced to flee when criminals took control over their farmland, they now rely on WFP to survive. Conflict has also disrupted agricultural activities and commercial flow of food.

As a woman of course I am watching the situation for women and girls. We’re also extremely worried about the widespread violence that women and girls face in Haiti. With more than 6,000 cases of gender-based violence reported so far this year, Port-au-Prince is one of the most dangerous places in the world for women and girls. Food assistance lessens their vulnerability to abuse.

Running out of resources for emergency response and school meals

Violence, displacement and economic collapse are driving Haiti to the verge of total collapse. We are extremely concerned that growing humanitarian needs are outpacing resources to respond to this crisis.

WFP has significantly scaled up operations in Haiti, reaching over 1.35 million people until March 2025 and we continue providing support. But now we only have stocks and cash to support crisis-affected populations until July. This includes assistance to displaced people as well as to those living in areas facing IPC 4, emergency levels of hunger. Severe funding gaps are threatening the continuity of essential programmes that help anchor communities and prevent further deterioration. Among these, WFP’s flagship school meals programme—a key stabilizing force in the country—is at immediate risk.

This academic year, we’ve managed to provide daily meals to 550,000 schoolchildren, 70 percent of which were sourced from Haitian farmers. Without urgent funding, up to 50 percent of these schoolchildren will not receive meals in the next academic year. What is important is that this food is purchased mostly locally, from smallholder farmers, women and men still producing in areas of rural Haiti. We really need to ensure these children can continue going to school and we can continue to support these farmers to have normal livelihoods.

The Humanitarian Response Plan for Haiti in 2025 is only 8 percent funded and we’re halfway through the year. WFP alone needs US$ 46.4 million over the next six months, to sustain its emergency response and address the root causes of hunger and malnutrition.  

Lack of preparedness for hurricane season

On top of the dire situation I have already described, we have now officially entered the Atlantic Hurricane Season, which runs from June to November.

This year, for the first time ever, WFP has no prepositioned food stocks in Haiti, nor the cash liquidity to mount a swift humanitarian response in the case of a hurricane or extreme weather event. In previous years, we’ve always had in-country resources to be able to support between 250,000 and 500,000 people in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Unless resources are made available, WFP will have no capacity to respond—there are no contingency supplies, no logistical buffer, and no lifeline for the most vulnerable.

At this moment when half of all Haitians are already going hungry, a single storm could push millions into a humanitarian catastrophe.

WFP expanding operational capacity

Against all these odds, I want to stress that WFP remains fully operational in Haiti.

During my visit last week, I went to our logistics hub in Cap Haitien and witnessed first-hand that, despite the extremely challenging context, WFP’s operational capacity has grown. We have more warehousing space and are receiving food through the port.

Also, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) remains a vital lifeline for the humanitarian community, ensuring the delivery of critical assistance and enabling the continuity of operations across the country. UNHAS continues to be the only safe and cost-effective option for humanitarian workers and the diplomatic community to get in and out of Port-au-Prince.

Our priority in Haiti is to continue providing first-line emergency food assistance to save lives, while also addressing the root causes of hunger. To hold the line on hunger, we’re calling on the international community to provide urgent support – and above all, the country needs peace.

# # #

The United Nations World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization, saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

Follow us on Twitter @wfp_media

MIL OSI United Nations News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Australia: State of the Climate 2024: Increased fire weather, marine heatwaves and sea levels

Source: Australia Safe Travel Advisories

31/10/2024

The State of the Climate Report 2024 has found Australia’s weather and climate has continued to change, with an increase in extreme heat events, longer fire seasons, more intense heavy rainfall, and sea level rise.

The report, prepared every two years, was released today by Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, and the Bureau of Meteorology.

It draws on the latest national and international climate research, monitoring, and projection information to describe changes and long-term trends in Australia’s climate.

Scientists found the oceans around Australia are continuing to warm, with increases in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere leading to more acidic oceans, particularly south of Australia.

CSIRO Research Manager Dr Jaci Brown said warming of the ocean has contributed to longer and more frequent marine heatwaves, with the highest average sea surface temperature on record occurring in 2022.

“Increases in temperature have contributed to significant impacts on marine habitats, species and ecosystem health, such as the most recent mass coral bleaching event on the Great Barrier Reef this year,” Dr Brown said.

“Rising sea levels around Australia are increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

“Global mean sea level is increasing, having risen by around 22 centimetres since 1900. Half of this rise has occurred since 1970.

“The rates of sea level rise vary across the Australian region, with the largest increases in the north and south-east of the Australian continent.”

The amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues to increase, contributing to climate change, with 2023 the warmest year on record globally.

Dr Karl Braganza, Climate Services Manager at the Bureau of Meteorology, said Australia is continuing to warm, with eight of the nine warmest years on record occurring since 2013.

“This warming has led to an increase in extreme fire weather, and longer fire seasons across large parts of the country,” Dr Braganza said.

The report describes the shift toward drier conditions between April to October across the southwest and southeast, and reduced rainfall in southwest Australia now seems to be a permanent feature of the climate.

“The lower rainfall in the cooler months is leading to lower average streamflow in those regions, which can impact soil moisture and water storage levels and increase the risk of drought. Droughts this century have been significantly hotter than those in the past,” Dr Braganza said.

“However, when heavy rainfall events occur, they are becoming more intense, with an increase of around 10 per cent or more in some regions.

“The largest increases are in the north of the country, with 7 of the 10 wettest wet seasons since 1998 occurring in northern Australia.”

Although Australian emissions have declined since 2005, Australia is projected to see continued warming over the coming decades, with more extremely hot days and fewer extremely cool days.

The rate of emissions decline will need to accelerate from now to meet Australia’s 2030 emissions targets.

State of the Climate 2024 is the eighth report in a series published every two years by CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology. The findings highlight the importance of ongoing monitoring and help to inform and manage climate risk.

The 2024 report can be found on the CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology websites.

ENDS

MIL OSI News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Is the 2040 intermediate climate target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 90 % legally and economically feasible? – E-001551/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
EU climate policies have been highly effective, with EU net territorial emissions meeting the 2020 target already in 2019 ahead of 2020 and being 37% below 1990 levels in 2023[1].

Consumption-based emissions can be beyond the EU legislator’s jurisdiction. Still, this footprint as estimated by the Directorate-General for Statistics (ESTAT) declined by 14% between 2010 and 2022 while the gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 19%[2].

The EU is implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)[3] to address carbon leakage and actively engages with partners to support them in creating effective policies to reduce their territorial emissions, including through effective carbon pricing mechanisms.

The Impact Assessment[4] accompanying the communication on the 2040 target[5]^. provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the recommended target in accordance with the Better Regulation requirements[6] and considers all the elements listed in the article 4(5) of the European Climate Law[7].

As highlighted in the communication, investments in the energy system are estimated at about 3.2% of the GDP in 2031-2050, the majority of which would be needed in any case to modernise the EU’s energy system.

In addition, it shows that decarbonisation of the economy will generate major co-benefits, including sharp cuts in fossil fuels imports, significantly improved economic resilience and strategic autonomy, and reduced healthcare costs and mortality due to air pollution. The cost of inaction and corresponding damages have also been assessed.

The impact assessment also considered different global climate policy contexts depending on the evolution of climate policy by major relevant players.

[1] 2024 Climate Action Progress Report, COM(2024) 498 final.

[2] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nama_10_gdp/default/table?lang=en&category=na10.nama10.nama_10_ma.

[3] Regulation (EU) 2023/956.

[4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52024SC0063.

[5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2024%3A63%3AFIN.

[6] https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/better-regulation_en.

[7] Regulation (EU) 2021/1119.
Last updated: 3 June 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: SPC Tornado Watch 359 Status Reports

Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The strategic defence review means three new approaches for the UK

Source: The Conversation – UK – By David J. Galbreath, Professor of War and Technology, University of Bath

The UK government’s new strategic defence review has laid out a blueprint aimed at making Britain “secure at home, strong abroad”.

The review represents a change in how the government thinks about the UK’s defence amid a rapidly changing geopolitical picture. The Labour government launched the review in July 2024 shortly after taking office, as a first step in reassessing UK armed forces in the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Prime Minister Keir Starmer acknowledged at the time: “We live in a more dangerous and volatile world.”

The government has accepted the review’s 62 recommendations. The most eye-catching parts are investment and development of new weapons: expanding the UK’s nuclear capabilities, drone swarms and long-range missile systems, new F-35 and updated Typhoon fighter jets and autonomous weapon systems.

Unlike past reviews, this one was conducted by experts outside of the government: former Nato secretary general Lord Robertson, former US National Security Council member and former White House adviser Fiona Hill, and retired British Army officer General Sir Richard Barrons.

In addition to practical measures of investment and expansion, the review lays out the more difficult changes that are needed to respond to security challenges, namely Russian threats to Europe. Here are three key aspects to understand.

1. War-fighting ready

The review says the UK must be “ready to fight and win” a full-scale war. Importantly, it suggests that the UK is no longer in an era of going to war when it chooses – but instead is facing the possibility of being forced into war.

Academic Mary Kaldor made the distinction between the two types of wars in her book New Wars and Old Wars, stating that old wars are “wars of necessity”, and new wars are “wars of the willing”. Published a few years after the end of the cold war, it’s easy to see why Kaldor made this distinction.

But the strategic review paints a different picture – that wars of necessity are once again the UK’s primary security concern. This means the UK must be on a different war footing than it has been since 1991.

As such, the government and the UK armed forces will have to change and become more innovative to meet this challenge. To do this, the review lays out plans for an “integrated force” model (rather than joint forces). It describes this approach as leading to “a more agile and lethal combat force”.

The review also calls for a “whole society approach”, including expanding the voluntary under-18 cadet forces, protecting national infrastructure and public outreach.

2. Pace of innovation

The review includes a host of recommendations for digital innovation and munitions production, and suggests that the defence industry could be an even bigger contributor to growing the economy. But, it notes, the UK’s defence industry is currently “stuck in cold war-era procurement cycles” and processes.

It points to a need to speed up planning and procurement and improve partnerships with the commercial sector.

Many digital innovations are being driven by industry in the US and China, such as the work on AI, nanotechnologies, robotics and automation. The challenge for the UK will be how to build good relationships with those countries on innovation which does not have a strong presence in UK digital industries.

Keir Starmer and Defence Secretary John Healey visit the warship HMS Glasgow.
Lauren Hurley/Number 10/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

3. Nato first

The reelection of Donald Trump in 2024 shocked many into thinking that the trans-Atlantic relationship was fast dissolving, though the change has been going on for some time . This review acknowledges that in setting out a “Nato first” approach:

There is an unequivocal need for the UK to redouble its efforts within the Alliance and to step up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security more broadly – particularly as Russian aggression across Europe grows and as the United States of America adapts its regional priorities.

It states that Europe and the transatlantic area will be the UK’s primary reference for security. This marks a shift from the previous “Indo-pacific tilt” defence focus laid out in the 2021 integrated review.

The Nato-first approach seems to be at odds with the direction of Nato’s largest and most powerful member, the US. Since the end of the 1990s, US presidents have repeatedly sought to realign US grand strategy towards China and away from Europe. Had the Russian Federation not invaded Crimea in 2014, the Obama administration may have been able to carry out this pivot.

As it stands, with the second Trump presidency and its repeated calls for increasing defence spending from European states (in addition to what has often been seen as less than resolute intentions towards Russia), one might think Nato should be counting its days, rather than being placed at the centre of a new strategic review.

However, regardless of Trump’s actions, the UK will still matter for Washington for the foreseeable future, because it remains an ally and it does defence well. Nato still remains the way to do coalition-building because it has been around for so long and has built up the institutions to do high-level defence cooperation and coordination.

The review recognises the direction of travel for Washington, and how much it requires the UK and other European governments to invest in their own defence.

David J. Galbreath has received funding from the UKRI.

– ref. The strategic defence review means three new approaches for the UK – https://theconversation.com/the-strategic-defence-review-means-three-new-approaches-for-the-uk-258002

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: UN Green Climate Fund to Allocate $280 Million to Kazakhstan for Eco-Projects

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

ALMATY, June 3 (Xinhua) — The United Nations Green Climate Fund (GCF) will finance environmental projects in Kazakhstan worth $280 million, the Kazinform news agency reported on Tuesday.

The Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources of Kazakhstan, Yerlan Nysanbayev, announced the new financing program during parliamentary hearings on the implementation of the best available technologies.

According to the minister, the funds received will be used to develop renewable energy sources, stimulate the introduction of low-carbon technologies in the industrial sector, and support the development of electric vehicles.

E. Nysanbaev said that in 2024, in order to promote green projects for the UN GCF, a country program was prepared, including 7 projects aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the energy sector, increasing the sustainability of centralized water supply systems in rural areas, modernizing livestock farms, and supporting private sector initiatives in the field of green financing.

The total budget for these projects is more than $1 billion, of which the fund is expected to provide $630 million in funding. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 4, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Air pollution kills 42,000 South Africans in one year. Big polluters must be held accountable
Source: Greenpeace Statement –

SOUTH AFRICA, 3 June 2025 – A new report released today by Greenpeace Africa and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reveals a devastating and avoidable public health crisis. In 2023 alone, 42,000 South Africans lost their lives due to exposure to fine particle pollution (PM2.5), including over 1,300 children under the age of five.

Behind these deaths lies a simple truth: polluters are poisoning our air and putting profits above people. Industrial giants, especially in the coal and energy sectors, continue to emit dangerous levels of toxic pollutants into the air we breathe, fully aware of the devastating health consequences.

The report shows that fine particle pollution (PM2.5 — a dangerous pollutant formed by burning coal and fuel and so small that it can enter the bloodstream through the lungs) cost South Africa over R960 billion in 2023, the equivalent of 14% of the GDP. These costs come in the form of premature deaths, respiratory illness, lost workplace productivity, and overburdened health systems.

Communities in the Highveld region and Gauteng and Mpumalanga provinces, which are home to the country’s largest coal-fired power plants and industrial zones, are hardest hit. The data makes it clear: coal is killing us.

‘Science is unequivocal. The air South Africans breathe is toxic, and the corporations driving this crisis must no longer be protected by silence or inaction,’ said Cynthia Moyo, Climate and Energy Campaigner at Greenpeace Africa.

Despite mounting evidence and repeated warnings from health experts, polluting industries continue to operate without accountability. Eskom’s coal fleet, for example, remains one of the world’s largest contributors to deadly air pollution, with some facilities continuing to apply for exemptions from pollution limits meant to protect public health.

The report also shows that aligning South Africa’s air quality standards with World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines could prevent up to 33,000 deaths per year. Even meeting existing national standards could save more than 9,000 lives annually.

“South Africa’s Constitution guarantees the right to a healthy environment but that right is being violated every day by polluters. Communities deserve clean air, not corporate impunity,” added Dr Jamie Kelly, Health Impact Assessment Team Lead at CREA.

Greenpeace Africa calls for:
- an immediate end to exemptions from air pollution limits for major emitters;
- the full enforcement of national air quality standards;
- a bold, just transition away from coal to renewable energy that centers communities;
- stronger transparency and access to real-time pollution data for the public.
This report, Unmasking the Toll of Fine Particle Pollution in South Africa, is not just a call to awareness, it’s a call to action. South Africans deserve clean air and a livable future. The time to hold polluters accountable is now.

-End-

Contacts

Ibrahima Ka Ndoye, International Communications Coordinator, Greenpeace Africa, +221 77 843 71 72, [email protected]

Ferdinand Omondi, Communications and Storytelling Manager, Greenpeace Africa, +254 722 505233, [email protected]

Notes to editors

Greanpeace Africa SA Air Pollution Report

Greenpeace Africa has published the report here.

CREA has published the report here.

Greenpeace Africa media assets are available here.

About Greenpeace Africa

Greenpeace Africa is a growing movement of people acting in protection of the environment. Our campaigns use peaceful, creative confrontation to expose environmental injustices around the world and develop solutions for a green and peaceful future.

About CREA

The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) is an independent research organisation focused on revealing the trends, causes, and health impacts, as well as the solutions, to air pollution. The organisation’s work is funded through philanthropic grants and revenue from commissioned research.

About the methodology

PM2.5 exposure

Human exposure to PM2.5 is estimated using the dataset of van Donkelaar et al. (2021) and Hammer et al. (2023), version V5.GL.05.02. The dataset provides estimates of annual ground-level PM2.5 by combining Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) retrievals, the GEOS-Chem chemical transport model (http://geos-chem.org), and global ground-based observations.

Health impact assessment

Based on the spatial distributions of the PM2.5 simulated exposure map, we then calculated the corresponding public health impacts between 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2023. CREA’s health impact assessment (HIA) framework builds on earlier work (Myllyvirta, 2020) but incorporates important methodological updates. Compared to the original approach, we now use integrated exposure response (IER) functions from the upcoming GBD 2023 study (IHME, 2025) instead of the Global Exposure Mortality Model (GEMM), and we have added dementia as a new health endpoint. The framework continues to include a comprehensive set of health outcomes, selected to avoid overlap and to enable robust economic valuation.

The full methodology is available in the report.
MIL OSI NGO –
June 4, 2025