Category: Asia Pacific

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese FM hopes new Austrian government will continue friendly policy toward China

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese FM hopes new Austrian government will continue friendly policy toward China

    BEIJING, April 22 — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on Tuesday expressed hope that the new Austrian government will continue to pursue a friendly policy toward China, promote bilateral relations to jointly address current global challenges, and play a constructive role in international peace and development.

    Wang, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, made the remarks when having a phone conversation with Austria’s Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger at the latter’s request.

    Noting that Austria has a profound historical heritage and a mature, stable foreign policy, Wang said China-Austria relations have maintained sound development, with both sides consistently upholding their partnership, prioritizing cooperation, adhering to mutual respect, and seeking common ground while shelving differences.

    China is ready to further deepen high-level exchanges with the EU, solidify the foundation of mutual trust, and properly manage differences, Wang said, calling on the two sides to take the 50th anniversary of China-EU diplomatic ties as an opportunity to draw useful experience and jointly open the next successful 50 years.

    He hopes that Austria will continue to play a positive role in this process.

    The United States has been arbitrarily imposing tariffs on other countries, severely undermining international trade rules and order, Wang said, calling these actions classic acts of unilateralism, protectionism and economic bullying.

    China, as a responsible major country, will continue to firmly uphold the international system with the United Nations at its core, safeguard the international order based on international law, and share development opportunities with the world through high-level opening-up, said Wang.

    As two major pillars and markets of the global economy, China and the EU should shoulder international responsibilities, jointly protect the multilateral trading system, and work together to build an open world economy, Wang added.

    For her part, Meinl-Reisinger said that China is an important partner for Austria in Asia, with fruitful and promising cooperation in areas such as the economy, trade and tourism.

    Noting the profound changes in the current international landscape, Meinl-Reisinger said that Austria values and looks forward to deepening its sound relations with China on the bilateral and multilateral levels. The new Austrian government adheres to the one-China policy and will maintain continuity in its China policy.

    As this year marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the EU and China, Meinl-Reisinger said that the EU looks forward to enhancing economic and trade cooperation with China, maintaining the stable and constructive development of EU-China relations, and jointly addressing global challenges.

    The EU will remain united in safeguarding its own interests and the multilateral trading system, she added.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Smith Statement on Progress in Trade Talks with India

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Adrian Smith (R-NE)

    Washington, DC — Today, Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Chairman Adrian Smith (R-NE) released the following statement after U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and India Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced Terms of Reference have been finalized for negotiation of a trade agreement.

    “With one of the world’s fastest growing economies and largest populations, improving our trading and strategic partnership with India is vital to the economic and security needs of both our nations. A bilateral trade agreement which will grow cooperation and reduce barriers to trade is important, and I appreciate the work of President Trump, Vice President Vance, and Prime Minister Modi in achieving this step forward. As the Trump administration continues its work, I will continue to insist on science-based standards and expanded markets for American agriculture, energy, digital services, and other products in India and around the world.

    “I would be remiss to not also recognize the tragedy in Kashmir which occurred today. My prayers are with the Indian people as they grieve those lost and as their authorities work to bring the perpetrators to justice.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Name release: Fatal crash, Clutha

    Source: New Zealand Police (National News)

    Police can now release the name of person who died following a crash in Owaka, Clutha on Sunday 23 March.

    He was 7-year-old Oziah Prasad, of Fairfield, Dunedin.

    Our thoughts are with his family and friends at this difficult time.

    The cause of the crash remains under investigation.

    ENDS

    Issued by Police Media Centre

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Scientists claim to have found evidence of alien life. But ‘biosignatures’ might hide more than they reveal

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Campbell Rider, PhD Candidate in Philosophy – Philosophy of Biology, University of Sydney

    Artist’s impression of the exoplanet K2-18b A. Smith/N. Madhusudhan (University of Cambridge)

    Whether or not we’re alone in the universe is one of the biggest questions in science.

    A recent study, led by astrophysicist Nikku Madhusudhan at the University of Cambridge, suggests the answer might be no. Based on observations from NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope, the study points to alien life on K2-18b, a distant exoplanet 124 light years from Earth.

    The researchers found strong evidence of a chemical called dimethyl sulfide (DMS) in the planet’s atmosphere. On Earth, DMS is produced only by living organisms, so it appears to be a compelling sign of life, or “biosignature”.

    While the new findings have made headlines, a look at the history of astrobiology shows similar discoveries have been inconclusive in the past. The issue is partly theoretical: scientists and philosophers still have no agreed-upon definition of exactly what life is.

    A closer look

    Unlike the older Hubble telescope, which orbited Earth, NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope is placed in orbit around the Sun. This gives it a better view of objects in deep space.

    When distant exoplanets pass in front of their host star, astronomers can deduce what chemicals are in their atmospheres from the tell-tale wavelengths they leave in the detected light. Since the precision of these readings can vary, scientists estimate a margin of error for their results, to rule out random chance. The recent study of K2-18b found only a 0.3% probability that the readings were a fluke, leaving researchers confident in their detection of DMS.

    On Earth, DMS is only produced by life, mostly aquatic phytoplankton. This makes it a persuasive biosignature.

    The findings line up with what scientists already conjecture about K2-18b. Considered a “Hycean” world (a portmanteau of “hydrogen” and “ocean”), K2-18b is thought to feature a hydrogen-rich atmosphere and a surface covered with liquid water. These conditions are favourable to life.

    So does this mean K2-18b’s oceans are crawling with extraterrestrial microbes?

    Some experts are less certain. Speaking to the New York Times, planetary scientist Christopher Glein expressed doubt that the study represents a “smoking gun”. And past experiences teach us that in astrobiology, inconclusive findings are the norm.

    Life as we don’t know it

    Astrobiology has its origins in efforts to explain how life began on our own planet.

    In the early 1950s, the Miller-Urey experiment showed that an electrical current could produce organic compounds from a best-guess reconstruction of the chemistry in Earth’s earliest oceans – sometimes called the “primordial soup”.

    Although it gave no real indication of how life in fact first evolved, the experiment left astrobiology with a framework for investigating the chemistry of alien worlds.

    In 1975, the first Mars landers – Viking 1 and 2 – conducted experiments with collected samples of Martian soil. In one experiment, nutrients added to soil samples appeared to produce carbon dioxide, suggesting microbes were digesting the nutrients.

    Initial excitement quickly dissipated, as other tests failed to pick up organic compounds in the soil. And later studies identified plausible non-biological explanations for the carbon dioxide. One explanation points to a mineral abundant on Mars called perchlorate. Interactions between perchlorate and cosmic rays may have led to chemical reactions similar to those observed by the Viking tests.

    Concerns the landers’ instruments had been contaminated on Earth also introduced uncertainty.

    In 1996, a NASA team announced a Martian meteorite discovered in Antarctica bore signs of past alien life. Specimen ALH84001 showed evidence of organic hydrocarbons, as well as magnetite crystals arranged in a distinctive pattern only produced biologically on Earth.

    More suggestive were the small, round structures in the rock resembling fossilised bacteria. Again, closer analysis led to disappointment. Non-biological explanations were found for the magnetite grains and hydrocarbons, while the fossil bacteria were deemed too small to plausibly support life.

    The most recent comparable discovery – claims of phosphine gas on Venus in 2020 – is also still controversial. Phosphine is considered a biosignature, since on Earth it’s produced by bacterial life in low-oxygen environments, particularly in the digestive tracts of animals. Some astronomers claim the detected phosphine signal is too weak, or attributable to inorganically produced sulfur compounds.

    Each time biosignatures are found, biologists confront the ambiguous distinction between life and non-life, and the difficulty of extrapolating characteristics of life on Earth to alien environments.

    Carol Cleland, a leading philosopher of science, has called this the problem of finding “life as we don’t know it”.

    On Earth, dimethyl sulfide is only produced by life, mostly aquatic phytoplankton (pictured here in the Barents Sea).
    BEST-BACKGROUNDS/Shutterstock

    Moving beyond chemistry

    We still know very little about how life first emerged on Earth. This makes it hard to know what to expect from the primitive lifeforms that might exist on Mars or K2-18b.

    It’s uncertain whether such lifeforms would resemble Earth life at all. Alien life might manifest in surprising and unrecognisable ways: while life on Earth is carbon-based, cellular, and reliant on self-replicating molecules such as DNA, an alien lifeform might fulfil the same functions with totally unfamiliar materials and structures.

    Our knowledge of the environmental conditions on K2-18b is also limited, so it’s hard to imagine the adaptations a Hycean organism might need to survive there.

    Chemical biosignatures derived from life on Earth, it seems, might be a misleading guide.

    Philosophers of biology argue that a general definition of life will need to go beyond chemistry. According to one view, life is defined by its organisation, not the list of chemicals making it up: living things embody a kind of self-organisation able to autonomously produce its own parts, sustain a metabolism, and maintain a boundary or membrane separating inside from outside.

    Some philosophers of science claim such a definition is too imprecise. In my own research, I’ve argued that this kind of generality is a strength: it helps keep our theories flexible, and applicable to new contexts.

    K2-18b may be a promising candidate for identifying extraterrestrial life. But excitement about biosignatures such as DMS disguises deeper, theoretical problems that also need to be resolved.

    Novel lifeforms in distant, unfamiliar environments might not be detectable in the ways we expect. Philosophers and scientists will have to work together on non-reductive descriptions of living processes, so that when we do stumble across alien life, we don’t miss it.

    Campbell Rider is the recipient of an Australian government RTP scholarship for his doctoral studies.

    ref. Scientists claim to have found evidence of alien life. But ‘biosignatures’ might hide more than they reveal – https://theconversation.com/scientists-claim-to-have-found-evidence-of-alien-life-but-biosignatures-might-hide-more-than-they-reveal-254801

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Somalia

    Source:

    We’ve reviewed our advice and continue to advise do not travel to Somalia. Terrorist attacks occur frequently. The UK and US Embassies in Somalia issue frequent security alerts about potential imminent terrorist attacks.

    If you’re in Somalia, leave as soon as possible. If, despite our advice you decide to stay, get professional security advice. There are no Australian officials in Somalia and our ability to provide consular assistance is severely limited.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: The road ahead: Northland Corridor Sections 2 and 3 taking shape

    Source: New Zealand Transport Agency

    NZ Transport Agency Waka Kotahi (NZTA) is progressing design investigations within the emerging preferred corridor for Section 2 and Section 3 of the Northland Corridor Roads of National Significance project announced by Transport Minister, Hon. Chris Bishop earlier today.

    The emerging preferred corridor for the 45km section between Te Hana and Port Marsden Highway (Section 2) and the 26km section between Port Marsden Highway and Whangārei (Section 3) allow further work to get underway to deliver benefits faster for Northland communities and businesses. 

    The individual sections within the emerging preferred corridor are: 

    Section 2: Te Hana to Port Marsden Highway  

    • Section 2A: A new route to the east of SH1 between Te Hana and Brynderwyn Hills​ 
    • Section 2B: A new route to the near east of SH1 at the Brynderwyn Hills​ 
    • Section 2C: A new route to the west of SH1 between Brynderwyn Hills and Port Marsden​ Highway 

    Section 3: Port Marsden Highway to Whangārei  

    • Section 3A: A new road near to SH1 between Port Marsden Highway and SH15 Loop Road
    • ​Section 3B: A widened existing SH1 corridor approaching urban Whangārei  

    NZTA Northland Corridor Programme Director, Derek Robertson, says NZTA is working at pace to deliver a safer, more resilient and more efficient road for Northland.

    “The Northland Corridor will address the critical resilience and safety issues facing the current road.”  

    Mr Robertson acknowledges that while this is a very exciting time for Northland, it’s an uncertain time for landowners in the emerging preferred corridor area. 

    “Now that we have identified the emerging preferred corridor, we will start contacting potentially impacted landowners who are within the area to let them know the next steps. Due to the size of the project, this will take time, but we are working hard to contact landowners as quickly as we can.  

    “The emerging preferred corridor is a larger area than will be required for the final route. Within the emerging preferred corridor there are still several different places the road may go.    

    “The next piece of work we do will be to refine this route further so we understand more about where the final road will go, and the land that may be required for it.  

    “We expect to narrow down the emerging preferred corridor to the preferred route for NZTA Board for endorsement in August/September this year. After that we will be able to confirm the preferred route and provide landowners with greater certainty about any impacts to their properties.” 

    Alongside this, NZTA is continuing work on Section 1 Ara Tūhono – Warkworth to Te Hana. The procurement process got underway last month and detailed design and construction for this section is expected to begin at the end of next year. A completion date for Ara Tūhono – Warkworth to Te Hana will be confirmed following procurement but is currently expected to be around 2034. 

    “The Northland Corridor will be a vital link between Northland and Auckland, unlocking economic growth and productivity, and allowing people and freight to move efficiently, quickly and safely across the region. It will bring the resilience Northland needs to thrive after years of significant road closures due to severe weather events,” Mr Robertson says.

    For more information about the Northland Corridor, please visit:

    Northland Corridor

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Financial Stability Report Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    GFSR PRESS BRIEFING

    Speakers:

    Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Jason Wu, Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF

    Moderator: Meera Louis, Communications Officer, IMF

    Ms. LOUIS: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the GFSR press conference. And thank you for joining us today. I am Meera Louis with the Communications Department at the IMF.

    Joining us here today is Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Also with us is Jason Wu, Assistant Director, and Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

    So, Tobias, before we turn the floor over for questions, I wanted to start by asking you, what were some of the challenges you and your team faced in preparing for this report? We are in uncharted territory now. So how did you come up with a strategy to shape this report?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thank you so much, Meera. And welcome, everybody, to the International Monetary Fund.

    We are launching the Global Financial Stability Report, and let me give you a couple of headline messages from the report.

    Our baseline assessment for global financial stability is that risks have been increasing, and there are really two main factors here: One is that the overall level of policy uncertainty has increased; and the second factor is that the forecast of economic activity going forward is slightly lower, as Pierre‑Olivier presented at the World Economic Outlook press conference just now. So, it’s a combination of a lower baseline and larger downside risks. Having said that, we do see both downside and upside risks, and we will certainly explain more about the two sides of uncertainty throughout the press conference.

    So let me highlight three vulnerabilities that are driving our assessment.

    The first one is the level of risky asset values. We have certainly seen some adjustment in risky asset values. It’s important to see that in the broader context of where we are coming from. And, in recent years, we saw quite a bit of appreciation—particularly in equity markets and in some sectors, such as technology. So valuations were quite stretched and credit spreads were very tight by historical standards. And we have certainly seen some decline in valuations; but by historical standards, price-earnings ratios in equity markets, for example, continue to be fairly elevated and credit spreads and sovereign spreads have widened to some degree, but they are still fairly contained by historical standards. The stretching of asset valuations continues to be a vulnerability we are watching closely.

    The second vulnerability is about leverage and maturity transformation in the financial system, particularly in the nonbank sector, where we are looking closely at how leverage is evolving. As market volatility has increased, we have seen some degree of deleveraging, but market functioning has been sound so far. With higher volatility, we would expect asset prices to come down, but the functioning of how those asset prices adjusted has been very orderly to date.

    The third vulnerability that we are watching is the overall level of debt globally. In the past decade, and particularly since the pandemic in 2020, sovereign debt levels have been increasing around the world. It’s the backdrop of higher debt that can interact with financial stability and that’s particularly true for emerging markets and frontier economies, where we have certainly seen some widening of sovereign spreads. Issuance year to date has been strong, but, of course, the tightening of financial conditions that we observed in the past three weeks has an outsized impact on those more vulnerable countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And now I will open up the floor to questions. If you could please identify yourself and your outlet. You also have the report online, if need be. And you can also join us online via the Webex link. Thank you.

    So, the lady here in the front.

    QUESTION: Hi. My name is Ray. I am with 21st Century Business Herald, Guangdong, China.

    So, my question is that, you’ve highlighted a series of vulnerabilities and risks. So how does the IMF assess the risk of these tensions triggering broader macro‑financial instability, especially in emerging markets with weaker buffers?

    My second question is that during times of global uncertainty, safe haven assets, such as gold and US treasuries, have been very volatile recently. So how does the IMF assess the volatility affecting currency stability? Thank you so much.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, starting with the second part of your question. We have seen a strong rally in gold prices, which is the sort of usual relationship we see in safe haven flows. When there is a high level of uncertainty, risky assets are selling off, oftentimes gold is viewed as a hedge asset and it has been appreciating.

    Of course, US treasuries remain the baseline reserve asset globally. It’s the largest and most liquid sovereign market. And  we have seen yields move. They have been increasing in the past two weeks, which is somewhat similar to the episode in 2020, when longer‑duration assets had yields increasing, as well. What is somewhat unusual is that the dollar has been falling, to some degree, but it’s important to keep that in the context of the strong dollar rally previously.

    Concerning the emerging markets and frontier economies, yes, the tightening of global financial conditions has an outsized the impact on weaker economies. We have seen a number of weaker emerging markets and frontier economies with high levels of debt. We have seen issuance throughout last year and earlier this year, but tighter financial conditions certainly adversely impact the financing conditions for those countries.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just to quickly add on emerging markets.

    I think it’s important to distinguish the major larger emerging markets versus the frontiers, as Tobias has mentioned. I think so far, we have seen currencies and capital flows being relatively muted in this episode. And I think this speaks to the ongoing theme that we have mentioned for several rounds now, that there’s resilienc among the emerging market economies for a whole host of reasons.

    However, as Tobias has pointed out, the external environment is not favorable and financial conditions are tightening globally. At this time, we need to worry about, countries where they are seeing sovereign spreads increasing, with large debt maturities forthcoming. Policy can be proactive to head off these risks by, for example, making sure that fiscal sustainability is being sent the right message.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Jason. The gentleman in the first row, at that end.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Rotus Oddiri with Arise News.

    So theoretically, if the dollar is weakening, isn’t that, to some degree, relatively good for countries with dollar debts?

    And secondly, how are you seeing fund flows to cash? If there’s a lot of volatility, are you seeing more movements to cash? And are there implications there in terms of [M&A] activity and so on and so forth?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So let me take this in three parts.

    The first question is about sort of like the strength of the dollar and the impact for emerging markets. When we look at exchange rates relative to emerging markets, there’s some heterogeneity. The dollar has appreciated against some emerging markets and depreciated against others. But it’s not the only impact on those financing conditions. We certainly have seen a notable widening of financing spreads. And that is probably the more important determinant for external financing conditions in emerging markets.

    Now, having said that, in some of the larger emerging markets with developed local government bond markets, we have seen some inflows into those local markets, but it’s very country‑specific.

    Turning to the question of investment decisions. We think that the first‑order impact here is the overall level of uncertainty. So, generally, investment decisions are easier in an environment with certainty. Given that some uncertainty remains about how policies are going to play out going forward, that can be a temporary headwind to investments or merger activity.

    Mr. WU: Just to quickly respond to your question about cash. I think during periods where markets are volatile, it’s reasonable that market participants and investors demand more liquidity, thereby moving in cash. We have not seen this happening en masse so far during this episode. So, we have seen bank deposits increase a little bit in the United States, but I think the magnitude is significantly smaller compared to previous episodes of stress.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason. So, the lady here in the second row, with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Hi. Szu Chan from the Telegraph.

    Do you see any parallels between recent moves in the bond market, particularly in US treasuries, with what happened in the wake of the Liz Truss mini budget? And do you think any lasting damage has been done?

    Mr. ADRIAN:

    Just for everybody’s recollection, in October 2022, there was some turbulence in UK gilt markets when the budget announcements were larger than expected and the Bank of England intervened to stabilize markets at that time. Clearly, we haven’t seen interventions by central banks, and the market conditions have been very orderly in recent weeks. There’s a repricing relative to the higher level of uncertainty but as I said at the beginning, there is both upside and downside risk. And we could certainly see upside risk if uncertainty is reduced going forward.

    And market conditions have been quite orderly. The moves are notable in treasuries, in equities, in exchange rates, but they are within movements we have seen in recent years and really reflect the higher level of volatility.

    Mr. Ferreira: I don’t think I have much to add to this, Tobias.

    I think that what we are seeing is some moves that have not been historically deserved in this kind of situation. But these mostly respond to these higher uncertainties and a repricing to the new macro scenario.

    Ms. LOUIS: So, before I go back to the floor, we do have a question on Webex, Pedro da Costa from Market News International. Pedro?

    QUESTION: Thank you so much, Meera. Thank you, guys, for doing this.

    My question is, given the market concerns about the threat to central bank independence, if the threat were exercised in a greater way, what would be the financial stability implications of a potential firing of either the Fed Chair or Fed Governors?

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Pedro. Are there any other questions on central bank independence? I don’t see any in the room. So over to you, Tobias 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, the International Monetary Fund has been advising central banks for many decades. Helping central banks in terms of governance and monetary policy frameworks is really one of the core missions of the IMF. And we have seen time and time again that central bank independence is an important foundation for central banks to achieve their goals, which are primarily price stability and financial stability. We do advise our membership to, have a degree of independence that is aimed at achieving those overarching goals for monetary policy and financial stability policies.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you so much. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa in Washington, DC.

    I want to ask you about AI. It seems that is the big thing now. First, are you worried about AI? And what type of safeguards is the IMF putting in place to make sure that advanced countries—that AI doesn’t increase risk?

    And maybe, finally, on tariffs. We know that President Trump is imposing tariffs today, removing them tomorrow. China is retaliating. How much will that affect the financial stability of the world? Thank you. 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much. Let me start with the question on artificial intelligence, and Jason can complement me.

    We have done quite a bit of work on that. In October, we actually had a chapter specifically focused on the impact of artificial intelligence on capital market activity, but, of course, the impact of AI is broader. And in our view, there are both risks and opportunities. I think the main opportunity is that it’s actually potentially quite inclusive, right?

    Everybody that has access to the internet via a smartphone or a computer or a tablet, in principle, can use those very powerful artificial intelligence tools. And we have seen examples in emerging markets and lower‑income economies where entrepreneurs are actually using these new tools to innovate. That can boost productivity around the world.

    In financial markets, we do quite a bit of outreach to market participants. And financial institutions—including banks and capital market institutions—are very actively exploring avenues to use artificial intelligence productively. There’s a lot of innovation going on. At the moment, we see a lot of that concentrated in back‑office kind of applications, so keeping your house in order in terms of getting processes done. But in trading and in credit decisions, these are also quite promising.

    In terms of risks, our primary concerns are cybersecurity risks. Many financial institutions are already under cyber attack., AI can be used to make defenses more efficient, but it can also be used for malicious purposes and making attacks more powerful. So, there’s really a bit of a power game on both sides. And we certainly advise many of our members to help them get to a more resilient financial system, relative to those cyber threats.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just quickly, to complement.

    I would encourage everybody to read Chapter 3 of the October 2024 GFSR, which addresses the issue of artificial intelligence in financial markets. Tobias is right, that there are benefits and risks on both sides.

    In addition to cybersecurity, I just wanted to highlight a couple more things, which is that, many of the financial institutions that we spoke to are still at their infancy in terms of deploying AI to make decisions—meaning, for trading or for investment allocation, they are at very early stages. But suppose that this trend rapidly gains? What would happen to risks?

    I think I will highlight two. One is concentration. Will it be a situation where the largest firms with the best models tend to win out and, therefore, dominate the marketplace? And then what are the implications for this? The second is that the speed of adjustment in financial markets might be much quicker if everything is based on high‑powered, artificial intelligence-type algorithms.

    With regard to these two risks, I think there’s great scope for supervisors to gather more information and understand who the key players are and what they are doing. International collaboration obviously is a crucial aspect of this. Market conduct needs to be taken into account, the future possibility that markets will be very much faster and more volatile, perhaps.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. The gentleman in the second row, please, in the middle here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Good morning. I am [Fabrice Nodé‑Langlois] from the French newspaper Le Figaro.

    I have a question on the US public debt. There is a widespread opinion that whatever the level of the public debt—because of the significant role of the dollar, because of the might of the American military and economic power—it’s not a big concern. But under what circumstances, under what financial conditions would the US public debt become a concern for you?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for the question. We are certainly watching sovereign debt around the world, including in the US. I do want to point out that there will be a briefing for the Western Hemisphere region that will specifically focus on the Americas, including the United States.

    When you look at our last Article IV for the United States, we certainly find that the debt situation is sustainable. You know, The U.S. has many ways to adjust its expenditures and revenues. And we think that this makes the debt levels manageable.

    Having said that, as I explained at the beginning, we have seen broadly around the world an increase in debt‑to‑GDP levels, particularly since the start of the pandemic in 2020. And it is an important backdrop in terms of pricing and financial stability. So, we are watching the nexus between sovereign debt and financial intermediaries very carefully.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe one issue related with that— I think that we flagged it in the GFSR—is that I think there is an anticipation that—not only in the US but in several countries—there will be a lot of issuance of new debt going forward. Particularly in a moment where several central banks are doing some quantitative tightening, this might bring some challenges in terms of the function of the financial sector.

    Everything that we are seeing now seems to be working very well, even when we have this kind of shock. This is not a major concern. But going forward, we feel that it’s important to continue monitoring market liquidity. There are some flags that have been raised, particularly in terms of broker‑dealers’ capacity to continue intermediating and providing liquidity to public debt. It’s important to keep monitoring this, as central banks keep going in the direction of quantitative tightening.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Caio.

    And just to add to Tobias’s point, we will have a lot of regional pressers this week. And the Western Hemisphere presser will be on Friday if you have any US‑specific questions. Thank you.

    The lady here in the front row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you for taking my question. My name is Nume Ekeghe from This Day newspaper, Nigeria.

    The report mentions Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets. And we know it was received positively by investors. So how does Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets signal renewed investor confidence? And what specific macroeconomic reforms or improvements contributed to the shift in sentiments? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: Thank you for that question. Let me make some remarks about Nigeria and then sub‑Saharan Africa, in general.

    In the case of Nigeria, macroeconomic performance has held up,  GDP growth has been fairly consistent, and inflation has been coming down. Earlier this year, we have seen Nigeria’s sovereign credit spreads lowering. I think the reforms that the authorities have done, including the liberalization of exchange rates, has helped in that regard.

    That said, I think I want to go back to the theme that Tobias has mentioned, which is that during a time where global financial markets are volatile and risk appetite, in particular, is wavering, this is when we might see increases in sovereign spreads that will challenge the external picture for Nigeria, as well as other frontier economies. So, for example, Nigeria’s sovereign spread has increased in recent weeks, as stock markets globally have declined.

    The other challenge, of course, is for large commodity exporters, like Nigeria. If trade tensions are going to lead to lower global demand for commodities, this will obviously weigh on the revenue that they will receive. So, I think both of those developments would counsel that authorities remain quite vigilant to these developments and take appropriate policies to counter them.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And just before I come back to the floor, we have another question online, from Lu Kang, Sina Finance. The question is, in light of the IMF’s recent GFSR warning about rising debt, volatile capital flows, and diverging monetary policy paths, how should countries, especially emerging markets, balance financial stability with the imperative to finance climate transitions and digital infrastructure?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    We do a lot of work on debt management with countries. We are providing technical assistance and we are doing a lot of policy work on debt market developments. I think the two main takeaways are, No. 1, the plumbing matters. Putting into place mechanisms such as primary dealers and clearing systems, and pricing mechanisms in government bond markets. It is important all over the world. That includes the most advanced economies, as well as emerging markets. And we have seen tremendous progress in many countries, particularly the major emerging markets in terms of developing those bond markets.

    The second key aspect, of course, is fiscal sustainability. Here again, we engage very actively with our membership to make sure that fiscal frameworks are in place that keep debt trajectories on a path that is commensurate with the economic prospects of the countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. A question here in the front row, please.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Kemi Osukoya with The Africa Bazaar magazine.

    I wanted to follow up on the question that my colleague from Nigeria mentioned, regarding sovereign debts. As you know, African nations, after a period of pause, are just right now returning back to the Eurobond. But at the same time, there is unsustainable high borrowing costs that many of these countries face. So, in your recommendation, what can governments do regarding their bond to use it strategically, as well as to make it sustainable?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for this question. And you know, we are working very closely with many sub‑Saharan African countries to support the countries either via programs or via policy advice and technical assistance to have a macro environment that is conducive for growth. So let me mention three things.

    I think the first one is to recognize that we have been through a period of extraordinarily adverse shocks. Particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, the pandemic had an outsized impact on many countries. The inflation that ensued was very costly for many countries, particularly for those that are importing commodities. So, the adverse economic shocks have been extraordinary. And I would just note that we have engaged more actively in programs with sub‑Saharan Africa in the past five years than we ever did previously.

    The second point is about the financing costs. And, of course, there are two main components. One is the overall level of financial conditions globally. All countries in the world are part of the global capital markets. And that really depends on overall financing conditions. But more specifically, of course, there are country‑specific conditions—the macroeconomic performance of each country, the buffers in the countries—and the mandate of the Fund is very much focused on macro‑financial stability. So, getting back to a place with buffers, which then can lead to lower financing costs is the main goal. Our work with those countries is very much focused on the kind of catalytic role of the Fund, where we are trying to get growth back and stability back. Let me stop here.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. And a question here in the front row, please. And then I will come back to the middle.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is [Shuichiro Takaoka]. I am working for Jiji Press.

    Just I would like to make clear the risk of a depreciation of the US dollar. And what are the implications of the recent depreciation of US dollar, especially regarding the global financial stability viewpoint?

    Mr. ADRIAN: As I mentioned earlier, we had seen quite a bit of an appreciation of the dollar earlier in the year and late [next] year. And now we have seen a depreciation that is roughly of commensurate magnitude. The volatility in the exchange rates is reflecting the broader volatility. There are some indications that the exchange rate movements are related to flows to investor reallocations, but the magnitudes of those flows are relatively small, relative to the run‑up of inflows into US assets in recent years. The cumulative inflows into bonds and stocks from around the world have been quite pronounced. So, to what extent these movements in the exchange rate and the associated flows are just a temporary or a more permanent impact remains to be seen. It really depends on how the current uncertainty is going to be resolved. As I said at the beginning, there are various scenarios. For the moment, it’s highly uncertain. As I said earlier, it is notable that the dollar declined, but I would not jump to conclusions in terms of how permanent that move may be.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement. I think when exchange rates are very volatile, one of the key channels for financial stability could be pressures in various funding markets. And this includes in cross currency markets, as well as in repo markets and other secure financing markets. I think this is something that we will be watching very closely. So far, we have not seen any major disruptions in those markets, despite the very volatile exchange rates.

    Mr. ADRIAN: So as a comparison, you can think of last August when there was a risk‑off moment. That was very short, but that did lead to dislocations in those cross‑currency funding markets. And we haven’t really seen that in recent weeks.

    Ms. LOUIS: So just on that line, I think you may have captured it, but I just wanted to get in this question that came in online from Greg Robb from MarketWatch. And it’s, have treasuries and the dollar lost their safe haven status? If not, what accounts for their recent performance?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So, again, it is somewhat unusual to see the dollar decline in the recent two weeks, really, when equity prices traded down with a negative tone and when longer‑term yields increased. But how lasting that is, is really too early to tell.

    US capital markets remain the largest and most liquid capital markets in the world. When you look at US dollars as a reserve asset, that remains over 60 percent among reserve managers. Global stock market capitalizations increased to 55 percent most recently, up from 30 percent in 2010. So, we have seen price movements that are notable; but in the big picture, the depth and size of the markets remain where they have been.

    Ms. LOUIS: And just on the same line, of capital markets. We have another question that came in online, [Anthony Rowley] from the South China Morning Post. And he says, both the EU and ASEAN are seeking more actively to promote capital market integration. Do you see this as reducing global dependence on US capital markets to any significant extent in the short to the medium term?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are generally of the view that deep capital markets are beneficial everywhere. So, we are helping countries around the world to get to solid regulations and market mechanisms in sovereign bond markets but also, more broadly, in capital markets. And, for emerging markets and advanced economies, deepening capital markets has been a key priority.

    We have seen many firms from around the world come to US markets to issue stocks and bonds. And we think that’s related to the depth of the market and the sophistication of the financial sector in the US markets. So, it does provide a service to corporations and financial institutions around the world. But there are certainly many other markets that are deep, that are developing, and that are providing opportunities for both corporations and governments to issue. So, we have seen that trend continue.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Caio?

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe just more broadly on the development of capital markets, as Tobias was saying, I think that it’s an important goal. And this has come hand‑in‑hand with the growth of non‑banking financial institutions that we are seeing across the globe. We see this as a potential positive development. You diversify the sources of funding and the credit to the real economy, diversify the risks across a broader set of institutions, this is good for the economy and financial stability.

    There are risks that need to be mitigated. We discuss some of them in the GFSR—leverage, interconnectedness between different kinds of institutions. But overall, there are policies created by the standard setters that, if implemented, can mitigate these risks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Caio and Tobias. 

    Going back to the room. There’s a lady in the second row.

    QUESTION: Hi. Riley Callanan from GZERO Media.

    The IMF downgraded the US, the most of all advanced economies. And I was wondering, is this a short‑term hit that in a year could lead to greater growth and investment in the US? Or is this a long‑term downgrade? Or is it too soon to tell, as you said, with capital markets?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are really looking more at the financial stability aspects. And I would just note that there has been a readjustment in expectations. Where the US and other economies are going to end up remains to be seen. But I think what is notable is that with the sharp adjustment in asset prices, the increase in uncertainty has been absorbed well in capital markets. And as Caio alluded to, it is the policy framework around the banking system and the non‑banks that is so important to create resilient and deep financial markets that are then facilitating adjustments, relative to new policy developments. And from that vantage point, I think even though we have seen the level of uncertainty increase, markets have been very orderly. And we think that the regulatory and policy framework is key for that achievement.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And if you would like to flesh out any more details on the growth ramifications, we have a conference on Friday. And I can send you the details.

    Another question here, in the second row. I will come back to you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Gabriela Viana from Galapagos Capital in Brazil.

    So, in Brazil, commodities prices play an important role for currency [and] international capital inflows, especially in the stock market. Do you see commodities prices as a main important constraint for markets or the economic policy’s uncertainties or maybe the monetary tightening? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: All these factors are related to each other, obviously. So, I think the commodity prices, if the WEO forecast were to play out, the global economy is going to be slowing. It’s certainly an impact on the revenue side.

    I think for many emerging markets, the silver lining here is that they do have policy room. Many of them do have monetary policy room. Some of them have fiscal room, although only a few of them. So, it seems like this is going to be a challenging period, and uncertainty [and] commodity channels are both going to weigh on economies for emerging markets.

    We have seen broad‑based resilience among emerging markets over the last few years compared to, let’s say, five years before the pandemic. So, I think this speaks to the institutional quality having improved in emerging markets. And hopefully this would continue to buffer emerging markets from these external shocks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And the lady in the middle. And then I will come back to Agence France‑Presse.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I am Stephanie Stacey from the Financial Times.

    I wanted to expand on the previous questions about the dollar and treasuries. And I know you mentioned it’s hard to assess at this point how lasting the impact will be. But I wanted to ask what risks and future factors you think could drive a real shift in their safe haven status.

    Ms. LOUIS: Before we continue, are there any other questions on the dollar and the safe haven status? Yes. There is a question here.

    QUESTION: Hi. Mehreen Khan from The Times. I’m sorry. I will stand up.

    You mentioned the importance of swap lines and central banks cooperating at times of market stress. I mean, how much are we taking this type of cooperation for granted? And how much is the idea of the Fed providing swap lines to other central banks now in question, given the nature of the scrutiny that the institution is under from the Trump administration?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me start with the swap lines.

    In previous episodes of distress, such as the COVID-19 shock in 2020 or the global financial crisis in 2008, we have seen that swap lines from the major central banks—including Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve—have played an important role in terms of stabilizing market liquidity. The way to think about that is that the central banks are providing funding to partner central banks in the currency of the foreign assets that those institutions own. So, it’s an important underpinning to provide market functioning and resilience to your own assets in the hands of foreign financial institutions.

    As we mentioned earlier central banks have not intervened for liquidity purposes in recent weeks. And, despite a heightened market volatility, the VIX, for example, went from below 20 to between 40 and 50, which is fairly elevated. We have seen a very, very smooth market functioning across the board.

    Concerning the role of treasuries we are looking at the pricing of longer duration treasuries very carefully. We particularly look at supply factors, demand factors, and technical factors. We have seen volatility in the price moves, but we think that those are within reasonable historical norms.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement, I think in the treasury market, we have seen market functioning held up—meaning that buyers can find sellers and transactions are going through. I think that’s a very important sign.

    One thing that I wanted to mention also is that a year ago in our report, we pointed out that there are leveraged trades in the treasury market. These are trades that have not very much to do with economic fundamentals in the US or elsewhere but, rather, are using leverage to capture arbitrage opportunities in markets. When these trades are unwound, there will be impact in the treasury market. And this is something that we have pointed out before. These include the so‑called treasury cash‑futures basis trade, as well as a swap spread trade, which we have documented before. And I think during this episode, given the very heightened volatility, we have seen evidence of some of these positions being unwound, potentially having an impact on treasury yields as well. So, I just wanted to put this into context. This is not about capital outflows, but it’s about unwinding these trades having amplified the recent price movements in treasury markets.

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are seeing some indication that there’s some lowering in terms of the leverage in these trades, but we haven’t heard of disorderly deleveraging at this point. So, of course, with market volatility increasing, financial institutions naturally reduce their leverage. But we haven’t seen the kind of adverse feedback loop that was common, say, in 2008 or even as recent as the COVID-19 shock initially.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And there’s a question from Agence France‑Presse, in the middle. And then I will come back to you, and you. We are running out of time. So, we will take very, very few questions left.

    QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. Just a quick question. In your report, you talk about geopolitical risk, including the risk of military conflicts. I just wonder how seriously you think people should take that and where you rate that when it comes to the global financial stability risks you have discussed already.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And I have just been told we are running out of time. So, we will just clump those questions, if you could be very quick. The gentleman over there and the lady there. And then we will wrap it up. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. [Rafia] from Nigeria. I work on [Arise TV].

    The IMF keeps talking about building resilience to face the global challenge of the state of the economy of the world. How do you build resilience in a world economic climate when one man’s decision can tip the scale? Just one man. He could wake up tomorrow and all our projections falter. One man.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And then the last question.

    QUESTION: Laura Noonan, Bloomberg News. Thanks for taking the question. It’s actually a related question.

    You spoke in the report about the need for policymakers to try to do what they can to guard against these future financial shocks. Do you have any practical suggestions on what those measures could be? And also, are you expecting people to take measures to make the financial system safer when the overall political mood, as you have seen, has very much been about trying to liberalize things, trying to deregulate, and trying to simplify? Thank you.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me address the three sets of questions and then turn to my colleagues as well.

    On geopolitical risk, we do have a chapter that was released last week that is looking at capital market performance relative to geopolitical risks. And the good news is that, generally, when adverse risks realize, there is an asset price adjustment. But on average, relative to recent decades, those risks are absorbed well by the financial system in general. Now, of course, when conflicts directly impact countries, that can have a pronounced impact on their financial systems, and it’s something that we are discussing in more detail in the chapter.

    Secondly, in terms of the exposure of countries to physical risk, we have certainly seen in some countries around the world, a heightened incidence of drought and floods, even those can be macro‑critical. To the extent that these developments impact macro stability, we are certainly there to support countries and help them, either via programs or policy frameworks.

    Thirdly, in terms of the regulation of financial institutions and financial markets. You know, I think the last couple of weeks are very good illustrations for the importance of resilience of financial institutions. I mean, we have seen a tremendous increase in the level of volatility, which reflects the higher level of uncertainty. Last October, our overarching message in the GFSR was that there was this wedge between policy uncertainty and financial market volatility, which at the time was very low. And we have seen financial market volatility catch up with the high level of policy uncertainty. But that has been orderly, and financial institutions have been resilient. That is really the main objective of financial sector regulation—to get to a place where the financial system can do its job in terms of adjusting to unexpected developments. And when you have resilience in banks and in non‑banks, these adjustments are smooth. And that is the point of finance, right? It’s a kind of an insurance mechanism for the global economy and for individual country macro economies. Good regulation leads to good stability. And we have a lot of detail on that in the GFSR.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe I could add a little bit on this about how to build resilience.

    I think that as Tobias was saying, trying to anticipate shocks is very hard. And it is very hard to do it. So, I think the way to build the resilience is focusing on vulnerabilities. In the GFSR, we have mentioned some vulnerabilities that we feel are important at this time. So, the valuations issues that makes the risk of repricing more likely, leveraging in some segments of the financial sector and in the interconnectedness with the banks, and also, of course, rising and high debt in several countries.

    How do you build the resilience in the face of these vulnerabilities? We do feel that banks in most countries are actually the cornerstone of the financial sector and so ensuring that they have appropriate levels of capital and liquidity is key. And the international standards do provide the basis for doing that. To address some of the other vulnerabilities, like leveraging an interconnection between different types of institutions, excessive [transformations], maybe.

    Finally, I think that on the issue of rising debt, one common theme that we have been talking about is about the need to credibly rebuild fiscal buffers.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know we have covered a lot of ground, and I apologize that we could not get to everybody. If you do have any follow‑ups or any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. You can find the report online, and we can also send it to you bilaterally.

    Again, thank you very much for coming and thank you for your time. Take care.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222024-gfsr-press-briefing

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: What would change your mind about climate change? We asked 5,000 Australians – here’s what they told us

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Kirkland, Research Fellow in Psychology, The University of Queensland

    LOOKSLIKEPHOTO/Shutterstock

    Australia just sweltered through one of its hottest summers on record, and heat has pushed well into autumn. Once-in-a-generation floods are now striking with alarming regularity. As disasters escalate, insurers are warning some properties may soon be uninsurable. Yet, despite these escalating disasters — and a federal election looming — conversation around climate change remains deeply polarising.

    But are people’s minds really made up? Or are they still open to change?

    In research out today, we asked more than 5,000 Australians a simple question: what would change your mind about climate change? Their answers reveal both a warning and an opportunity.

    On climate, Australians fall into six groups

    Almost two thirds (64%) of Australians are concerned about the impact of climate change, according to a recent survey.

    But drill deeper, and we quickly find Australians hold quite different views on climate. In fact, research in 2022 showed Australians can be sorted into six distinct groups based on how concerned and engaged they are with the issue.

    At one end was the Alarmed group – highly concerned people who are convinced of the science, and already taking action (25% of Australians). At the other end was the Dismissive group (7%) – strongly sceptical people who often view climate change as exaggerated or even a hoax. In between were the Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged and Doubtful – groups who varied in belief, awareness and willingness to engage.

    In our nationally representative survey, we asked every participant what might change their opinion about climate change? We then looked at how the answers differed between the six groups.

    For those already convinced climate change is real and human-caused, we wanted to know what might make them doubt it. For sceptical participants, we wanted to know what might persuade them otherwise. In short, we weren’t testing who was “right” or “wrong” – we were mapping how flexible their opinions were.

    Our views aren’t set in stone

    People at both extremes – Alarmed and Dismissive – were the most likely to say “nothing” would change their minds. Nearly half the Dismissive respondents flat-out rejected the premise. But these two groups together make up just one in three Australians.

    What about everyone in the middle ground? The rest – the Concerned (28%), Cautious (23%), Disengaged (3%) and Doubtful (14%) – showed much more openness. They matter most, because they’re the majority — and they’re still listening.

    People with dismissive views of climate science are a small minority.
    jon lyall/Shutterstock

    What information would change minds?

    What would it take for people to be convinced? We identified four major themes: evidence and information, trusted sources, action being undertaken, and nothing.

    The most common response was a desire for better evidence and information. But not just any facts would do. Participants said they wanted clear, plain-English explanations rather than jargon. They wanted statistics they could trust, and science that didn’t feel politicised or agenda-driven. Some said they’d be more convinced if they saw the impacts with their own eyes.

    Crucially, many in the Doubtful and Cautious groups didn’t outright reject climate change – they just didn’t feel confident enough to judge the evidence.

    The trust gap

    Many respondents didn’t know who to believe on climate change. Scientists and independent experts were the most commonly mentioned trusted sources – but trust in these sources wasn’t universal.

    Some Australians, especially in the more sceptical segments, expressed deep distrust toward the media, governments and the scientific community. Others said they’d be more receptive if information came from unbiased or apolitical sources. For some respondents, family, friends and everyday people were seen as more credible than institutions.

    In an age of widespread misinformation, this matters. If we want to build support for climate action, we need the right messengers as much as the right message.

    What about action?

    Many respondents said their views could shift if they saw real, meaningful action – especially from governments and big business. Some wanted proof that Australia is taking climate change seriously. Others said action would offer hope or reduce their anxiety.

    Even some sceptical respondents said coordinated, global action might persuade them – though they were often cynical about Australia’s impact compared to larger emitters. Others called for a more respectful, depoliticised conversation around climate.

    In other words, for many Australians, it’s not just what evidence and information is presented about climate change. It’s also how it’s said, who says it, and why it’s being said.

    Of course, the responses we gathered reflect what people say would change their minds. That’s not necessarily what would actually change their minds.

    What does concrete evidence of climate action look like?
    Piyaset/Shutterstock

    Why does this matter?

    As climate change intensifies, so does misinformation — especially online, where artificial intelligence and social media accelerate its spread.

    Misinformation has a corrosive effect. Spreading doubt, lies and uncertainty can erode public support for climate action.

    If we don’t understand what Australians actually need to hear about climate change – and who they need to hear it from – we risk losing ground to confusion and doubt.

    After years of growth from 2012 to 2019, Australian backing for climate action is fluctuating and even dropping, according to Lowy Institute polling.

    Climate change may not be the headline issue in this federal election campaign. But it’s on the ballot nonetheless, embedded in debates over how to power Australia, jobs and the cost of living. If we want public support for meaningful climate action, we can’t just shout louder. We have to speak smarter.

    Kelly Kirkland receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC).

    Samantha Stanley receives funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC).

    Abby Robinson, Amy S G Lee, and Zoe Leviston do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What would change your mind about climate change? We asked 5,000 Australians – here’s what they told us – https://theconversation.com/what-would-change-your-mind-about-climate-change-we-asked-5-000-australians-heres-what-they-told-us-254329

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Stats NZ information release: Research and development survey: 2024

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Research and development survey: 202423 April 2025 – Research and development (R&D) statistics report on research and development activity, including expenditure and related employment across the business, government, and higher education sectors in New Zealand.

    Every two years, including 2024, all three sectors are surveyed. In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the survey was conducted for the business sector only.

    R&D expenditure figures are in nominal terms and are not adjusted for inflation.

    This release focuses on data from 2024, with comparisons back to 2018. The survey design has remained comparable over this time.  Previous data, gathered under old survey designs, date back to 2006 and is available in Infoshare.

    Files:

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  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Stats NZ information release: Research and development survey: 2024

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Research and development survey: 2024 23 April 2025 – Research and development (R&D) statistics report on research and development activity, including expenditure and related employment across the business, government, and higher education sectors in New Zealand.

    Every two years, including 2024, all three sectors are surveyed. In 2019, 2021, and 2023, the survey was conducted for the business sector only.

    R&D expenditure figures are in nominal terms and are not adjusted for inflation.

    This release focuses on data from 2024, with comparisons back to 2018. The survey design has remained comparable over this time.  Previous data, gathered under old survey designs, date back to 2006 and is available in Infoshare.

    Files:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Employment – New Zealand workers embrace Gen AI and see AI skills as imperative to career success

    Source: Robert Half

    • 91% of Kiwi workers are using generative AI to assist them in their day-to-day tasks
    • 93% of workers are transparent with their manager/employer about using generative AI in their day-to-day work
    • 87% of workers believe developing generative AI skills is necessary for career success.
    Auckland, 23 April 2025 – Workers are openly using generative AI to complete day-to-day tasks and recognise that learning and enhancing AI skills related to their role is necessary for future career success. New independent research by specialised recruiter Robert Half finds artificial intelligence tools such as ChatGPT and Gemini are now a workplace staple, used (almost) every day by half (56%) of Kiwi workers.

    Workers embrace the benefits of using AI

    Most (91%) workers are using generative AI tools to some degree in their role, including almost half (56%) who do so regularly:

    • 26% of workers use it every day  
    • 30% of workers often, or almost every day, use it  
    • 22% of workers sometimes use it  
    • 13% of workers don’t often use it but do access them on occasion  
    • 9% of workers never use it to do their jobs.

    “Within a remarkably short timeframe, generative AI has become a daily tool for workers, moving from relative unknown to widespread adoption,” says Ronil Singh, Director at Robert Half. “Even with ongoing questions about AI’s future, a growing understanding of the benefits offered by Gen AI tools, such as ChatGPT and Gemini, is driving their adoption in daily work routines.

    “Progressive employers are championing Gen AI adoption, understanding its power to streamline operations and foster innovation. They see the value Gen AI can bring to everyday tasks, enabling workers to dedicate more time on more complicated, strategic or creative initiatives.”

    Most workers do not feel the need to hide their use of generative AI tools, as 93% of workers are transparent about their usage with their manager. The remaining 7% of employees are more covert about its use and are not transparent with their employer.

    “Widespread transparency in Gen AI usage reflects a rising confidence in this technology. While some are still defining optimal applications, most employers see Gen AI as a benefit, not a detriment,” says Singh.  

    Learning to use AI is essential to get ahead

    Going beyond generative AI and into broader AI applications in the workplace, employees agree that learning how to use AI tools is necessary for future success.

    When workers were asked how necessary they feel it is to learn and enhance AI skills related to their role, 87% of them agree. At 94%, tech/IT workers were the most likely to agree, followed by 80% of finance and accounting staff.

    “With workers across generations acknowledging the critical role of AI skills in career advancement, continuous learning and development becomes a necessity. Companies that prioritise AI adoption and invest in comprehensive training will gain a significant competitive edge in talent acquisition and retention, solidifying their future success,” concluded Singh.

    About the research

    The study is developed by Robert Half and was conducted online in November 2024 by an independent research company among 500 full-time office workers in finance, accounting, and IT and technology. Respondents are drawn from a sample of SMEs as well as large private, publicly-listed and public sector organisations across New Zealand. This survey is part of the international workplace survey, a questionnaire about job trends, talent management and trends in the workplace.    

    About Robert Half

    Robert Half is the global, specialised talent solutions provider that helps employers find their next great hire and jobseekers uncover their next opportunity. Robert Half offers both contract and permanent placement services, and is the parent company of Protiviti, a global consulting firm.  Robert Half New Zealand has an office in Auckland. More information on roberthalf.com/nz.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Grant manager sentenced to over two years in prison for embezzling funds intended to serve Native Alaskans

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    ALEXANDRIA, Va. – An Orange, Virginia, man was sentenced today to two years and four months in prison for wire fraud relating to his scheme to misappropriate grant funds through fraudulent invoices.

    According to court documents, from at least December 2021 to March 2024, Larry Todd Morgan, 57, was employed at a company, identified in court records as Company A, as President of Strategy and Innovation. Company A was an Alaska Native Corporation headquartered in Tongass, Alaska, with a contracting office in Manassas and later Chantilly.

    Company A sought and, on July 26, 2022, received a $1.9 million National Telecommunications and Information Administration grant to bring high-speed broadband and related computer software, services, and devices to Alaska Natives living in the villages of Saxman and Ketchikan who were negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Company A selected Morgan to administer and manage the NTIA Grant and only Morgan and one other employee had authority to make purchases using NTIA Grant funds.

    Between Oct. 31, 2023, and Nov. 2, 2023, Morgan submitted four expense reports containing six fraudulent invoices purportedly for the purchase of large quantities of electronics and showing that he paid for the electronics using his own personal credit card. Based on the false expense reports and fraudulent invoices, on Nov. 9, 2023, Company A sent a reimbursement payment for $82,815.20 via interstate wire to Morgan’s personal account.

    Over time, Morgan increased the quantity of the electronics he purported to purchase. On Feb. 6, 2024, Morgan submitted an expense report with three fraudulent invoices. On Feb 15, 2024, Company A sent $198,756.48 via ACH transaction to Morgan’s account. Every expense report and invoice Morgan submitted to Company A for reimbursement was false. In total, Morgan submitted at least eight falsified expense reports and at least 21 fraudulent invoices to Company A’s accounting personnel, falsely claiming to have purchased over 2,500 electronic items for the NTIA Tribal Broadband Connectivity Project such as monitors, keyboards, cell phones, tablets, and headsets. Morgan did not make any of the purchases he represented.

    In total, Morgan misappropriated at least $828,152.99 from the NTIA Grant, representing 43% of the total grant received by Company A. He then used the fraud proceeds to purchase luxury vehicles and expensive farming equipment.

    Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Sean Ryan, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office’s Criminal and Cyber Division; and Roderick Anderson, Acting Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Commerce, made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Zachary H. Ray and former Assistant U.S. Attorney Kenneth R. Simon, Jr. prosecuted the case.

    A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:24-cr-247.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Global Financial Stability Report Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 22, 2025

    GFSR PRESS BRIEFING

    Speakers:

    Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor and Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Jason Wu, Assistant Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF
    Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, IMF

    Moderator: Meera Louis, Communications Officer, IMF

    Ms. LOUIS: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the GFSR press conference. And thank you for joining us today. I am Meera Louis with the Communications Department at the IMF.

    Joining us here today is Tobias Adrian, Financial Counsellor of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department. Also with us is Jason Wu, Assistant Director, and Caio Ferreira, Deputy Division Chief of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

    So, Tobias, before we turn the floor over for questions, I wanted to start by asking you, what were some of the challenges you and your team faced in preparing for this report? We are in uncharted territory now. So how did you come up with a strategy to shape this report?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thank you so much, Meera. And welcome, everybody, to the International Monetary Fund.

    We are launching the Global Financial Stability Report, and let me give you a couple of headline messages from the report.

    Our baseline assessment for global financial stability is that risks have been increasing, and there are really two main factors here: One is that the overall level of policy uncertainty has increased; and the second factor is that the forecast of economic activity going forward is slightly lower, as Pierre‑Olivier presented at the World Economic Outlook press conference just now. So, it’s a combination of a lower baseline and larger downside risks. Having said that, we do see both downside and upside risks, and we will certainly explain more about the two sides of uncertainty throughout the press conference.

    So let me highlight three vulnerabilities that are driving our assessment.

    The first one is the level of risky asset values. We have certainly seen some adjustment in risky asset values. It’s important to see that in the broader context of where we are coming from. And, in recent years, we saw quite a bit of appreciation—particularly in equity markets and in some sectors, such as technology. So valuations were quite stretched and credit spreads were very tight by historical standards. And we have certainly seen some decline in valuations; but by historical standards, price-earnings ratios in equity markets, for example, continue to be fairly elevated and credit spreads and sovereign spreads have widened to some degree, but they are still fairly contained by historical standards. The stretching of asset valuations continues to be a vulnerability we are watching closely.

    The second vulnerability is about leverage and maturity transformation in the financial system, particularly in the nonbank sector, where we are looking closely at how leverage is evolving. As market volatility has increased, we have seen some degree of deleveraging, but market functioning has been sound so far. With higher volatility, we would expect asset prices to come down, but the functioning of how those asset prices adjusted has been very orderly to date.

    The third vulnerability that we are watching is the overall level of debt globally. In the past decade, and particularly since the pandemic in 2020, sovereign debt levels have been increasing around the world. It’s the backdrop of higher debt that can interact with financial stability and that’s particularly true for emerging markets and frontier economies, where we have certainly seen some widening of sovereign spreads. Issuance year to date has been strong, but, of course, the tightening of financial conditions that we observed in the past three weeks has an outsized impact on those more vulnerable countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And now I will open up the floor to questions. If you could please identify yourself and your outlet. You also have the report online, if need be. And you can also join us online via the Webex link. Thank you.

    So, the lady here in the front.

    QUESTION: Hi. My name is Ray. I am with 21st Century Business Herald, Guangdong, China.

    So, my question is that, you’ve highlighted a series of vulnerabilities and risks. So how does the IMF assess the risk of these tensions triggering broader macro‑financial instability, especially in emerging markets with weaker buffers?

    My second question is that during times of global uncertainty, safe haven assets, such as gold and US treasuries, have been very volatile recently. So how does the IMF assess the volatility affecting currency stability? Thank you so much.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, starting with the second part of your question. We have seen a strong rally in gold prices, which is the sort of usual relationship we see in safe haven flows. When there is a high level of uncertainty, risky assets are selling off, oftentimes gold is viewed as a hedge asset and it has been appreciating.

    Of course, US treasuries remain the baseline reserve asset globally. It’s the largest and most liquid sovereign market. And  we have seen yields move. They have been increasing in the past two weeks, which is somewhat similar to the episode in 2020, when longer‑duration assets had yields increasing, as well. What is somewhat unusual is that the dollar has been falling, to some degree, but it’s important to keep that in the context of the strong dollar rally previously.

    Concerning the emerging markets and frontier economies, yes, the tightening of global financial conditions has an outsized the impact on weaker economies. We have seen a number of weaker emerging markets and frontier economies with high levels of debt. We have seen issuance throughout last year and earlier this year, but tighter financial conditions certainly adversely impact the financing conditions for those countries.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just to quickly add on emerging markets.

    I think it’s important to distinguish the major larger emerging markets versus the frontiers, as Tobias has mentioned. I think so far, we have seen currencies and capital flows being relatively muted in this episode. And I think this speaks to the ongoing theme that we have mentioned for several rounds now, that there’s resilienc among the emerging market economies for a whole host of reasons.

    However, as Tobias has pointed out, the external environment is not favorable and financial conditions are tightening globally. At this time, we need to worry about, countries where they are seeing sovereign spreads increasing, with large debt maturities forthcoming. Policy can be proactive to head off these risks by, for example, making sure that fiscal sustainability is being sent the right message.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Jason. The gentleman in the first row, at that end.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Rotus Oddiri with Arise News.

    So theoretically, if the dollar is weakening, isn’t that, to some degree, relatively good for countries with dollar debts?

    And secondly, how are you seeing fund flows to cash? If there’s a lot of volatility, are you seeing more movements to cash? And are there implications there in terms of [M&A] activity and so on and so forth?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So let me take this in three parts.

    The first question is about sort of like the strength of the dollar and the impact for emerging markets. When we look at exchange rates relative to emerging markets, there’s some heterogeneity. The dollar has appreciated against some emerging markets and depreciated against others. But it’s not the only impact on those financing conditions. We certainly have seen a notable widening of financing spreads. And that is probably the more important determinant for external financing conditions in emerging markets.

    Now, having said that, in some of the larger emerging markets with developed local government bond markets, we have seen some inflows into those local markets, but it’s very country‑specific.

    Turning to the question of investment decisions. We think that the first‑order impact here is the overall level of uncertainty. So, generally, investment decisions are easier in an environment with certainty. Given that some uncertainty remains about how policies are going to play out going forward, that can be a temporary headwind to investments or merger activity.

    Mr. WU: Just to quickly respond to your question about cash. I think during periods where markets are volatile, it’s reasonable that market participants and investors demand more liquidity, thereby moving in cash. We have not seen this happening en masse so far during this episode. So, we have seen bank deposits increase a little bit in the United States, but I think the magnitude is significantly smaller compared to previous episodes of stress.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason. So, the lady here in the second row, with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Hi. Szu Chan from the Telegraph.

    Do you see any parallels between recent moves in the bond market, particularly in US treasuries, with what happened in the wake of the Liz Truss mini budget? And do you think any lasting damage has been done?

    Mr. ADRIAN:

    Just for everybody’s recollection, in October 2022, there was some turbulence in UK gilt markets when the budget announcements were larger than expected and the Bank of England intervened to stabilize markets at that time. Clearly, we haven’t seen interventions by central banks, and the market conditions have been very orderly in recent weeks. There’s a repricing relative to the higher level of uncertainty but as I said at the beginning, there is both upside and downside risk. And we could certainly see upside risk if uncertainty is reduced going forward.

    And market conditions have been quite orderly. The moves are notable in treasuries, in equities, in exchange rates, but they are within movements we have seen in recent years and really reflect the higher level of volatility.

    Mr. Ferreira: I don’t think I have much to add to this, Tobias.

    I think that what we are seeing is some moves that have not been historically deserved in this kind of situation. But these mostly respond to these higher uncertainties and a repricing to the new macro scenario.

    Ms. LOUIS: So, before I go back to the floor, we do have a question on Webex, Pedro da Costa from Market News International. Pedro?

    QUESTION: Thank you so much, Meera. Thank you, guys, for doing this.

    My question is, given the market concerns about the threat to central bank independence, if the threat were exercised in a greater way, what would be the financial stability implications of a potential firing of either the Fed Chair or Fed Governors?

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Pedro. Are there any other questions on central bank independence? I don’t see any in the room. So over to you, Tobias 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    So, the International Monetary Fund has been advising central banks for many decades. Helping central banks in terms of governance and monetary policy frameworks is really one of the core missions of the IMF. And we have seen time and time again that central bank independence is an important foundation for central banks to achieve their goals, which are primarily price stability and financial stability. We do advise our membership to, have a degree of independence that is aimed at achieving those overarching goals for monetary policy and financial stability policies.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you so much. My name is Simon Ateba. I am with Today News Africa in Washington, DC.

    I want to ask you about AI. It seems that is the big thing now. First, are you worried about AI? And what type of safeguards is the IMF putting in place to make sure that advanced countries—that AI doesn’t increase risk?

    And maybe, finally, on tariffs. We know that President Trump is imposing tariffs today, removing them tomorrow. China is retaliating. How much will that affect the financial stability of the world? Thank you. 

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much. Let me start with the question on artificial intelligence, and Jason can complement me.

    We have done quite a bit of work on that. In October, we actually had a chapter specifically focused on the impact of artificial intelligence on capital market activity, but, of course, the impact of AI is broader. And in our view, there are both risks and opportunities. I think the main opportunity is that it’s actually potentially quite inclusive, right?

    Everybody that has access to the internet via a smartphone or a computer or a tablet, in principle, can use those very powerful artificial intelligence tools. And we have seen examples in emerging markets and lower‑income economies where entrepreneurs are actually using these new tools to innovate. That can boost productivity around the world.

    In financial markets, we do quite a bit of outreach to market participants. And financial institutions—including banks and capital market institutions—are very actively exploring avenues to use artificial intelligence productively. There’s a lot of innovation going on. At the moment, we see a lot of that concentrated in back‑office kind of applications, so keeping your house in order in terms of getting processes done. But in trading and in credit decisions, these are also quite promising.

    In terms of risks, our primary concerns are cybersecurity risks. Many financial institutions are already under cyber attack., AI can be used to make defenses more efficient, but it can also be used for malicious purposes and making attacks more powerful. So, there’s really a bit of a power game on both sides. And we certainly advise many of our members to help them get to a more resilient financial system, relative to those cyber threats.

    Mr. WU: Maybe just quickly, to complement.

    I would encourage everybody to read Chapter 3 of the October 2024 GFSR, which addresses the issue of artificial intelligence in financial markets. Tobias is right, that there are benefits and risks on both sides.

    In addition to cybersecurity, I just wanted to highlight a couple more things, which is that, many of the financial institutions that we spoke to are still at their infancy in terms of deploying AI to make decisions—meaning, for trading or for investment allocation, they are at very early stages. But suppose that this trend rapidly gains? What would happen to risks?

    I think I will highlight two. One is concentration. Will it be a situation where the largest firms with the best models tend to win out and, therefore, dominate the marketplace? And then what are the implications for this? The second is that the speed of adjustment in financial markets might be much quicker if everything is based on high‑powered, artificial intelligence-type algorithms.

    With regard to these two risks, I think there’s great scope for supervisors to gather more information and understand who the key players are and what they are doing. International collaboration obviously is a crucial aspect of this. Market conduct needs to be taken into account, the future possibility that markets will be very much faster and more volatile, perhaps.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. The gentleman in the second row, please, in the middle here. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Good morning. I am [Fabrice Nodé‑Langlois] from the French newspaper Le Figaro.

    I have a question on the US public debt. There is a widespread opinion that whatever the level of the public debt—because of the significant role of the dollar, because of the might of the American military and economic power—it’s not a big concern. But under what circumstances, under what financial conditions would the US public debt become a concern for you?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for the question. We are certainly watching sovereign debt around the world, including in the US. I do want to point out that there will be a briefing for the Western Hemisphere region that will specifically focus on the Americas, including the United States.

    When you look at our last Article IV for the United States, we certainly find that the debt situation is sustainable. You know, The U.S. has many ways to adjust its expenditures and revenues. And we think that this makes the debt levels manageable.

    Having said that, as I explained at the beginning, we have seen broadly around the world an increase in debt‑to‑GDP levels, particularly since the start of the pandemic in 2020. And it is an important backdrop in terms of pricing and financial stability. So, we are watching the nexus between sovereign debt and financial intermediaries very carefully.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe one issue related with that— I think that we flagged it in the GFSR—is that I think there is an anticipation that—not only in the US but in several countries—there will be a lot of issuance of new debt going forward. Particularly in a moment where several central banks are doing some quantitative tightening, this might bring some challenges in terms of the function of the financial sector.

    Everything that we are seeing now seems to be working very well, even when we have this kind of shock. This is not a major concern. But going forward, we feel that it’s important to continue monitoring market liquidity. There are some flags that have been raised, particularly in terms of broker‑dealers’ capacity to continue intermediating and providing liquidity to public debt. It’s important to keep monitoring this, as central banks keep going in the direction of quantitative tightening.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Caio.

    And just to add to Tobias’s point, we will have a lot of regional pressers this week. And the Western Hemisphere presser will be on Friday if you have any US‑specific questions. Thank you.

    The lady here in the front row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you for taking my question. My name is Nume Ekeghe from This Day newspaper, Nigeria.

    The report mentions Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets. And we know it was received positively by investors. So how does Nigeria’s return to Eurobond markets signal renewed investor confidence? And what specific macroeconomic reforms or improvements contributed to the shift in sentiments? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: Thank you for that question. Let me make some remarks about Nigeria and then sub‑Saharan Africa, in general.

    In the case of Nigeria, macroeconomic performance has held up,  GDP growth has been fairly consistent, and inflation has been coming down. Earlier this year, we have seen Nigeria’s sovereign credit spreads lowering. I think the reforms that the authorities have done, including the liberalization of exchange rates, has helped in that regard.

    That said, I think I want to go back to the theme that Tobias has mentioned, which is that during a time where global financial markets are volatile and risk appetite, in particular, is wavering, this is when we might see increases in sovereign spreads that will challenge the external picture for Nigeria, as well as other frontier economies. So, for example, Nigeria’s sovereign spread has increased in recent weeks, as stock markets globally have declined.

    The other challenge, of course, is for large commodity exporters, like Nigeria. If trade tensions are going to lead to lower global demand for commodities, this will obviously weigh on the revenue that they will receive. So, I think both of those developments would counsel that authorities remain quite vigilant to these developments and take appropriate policies to counter them.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And just before I come back to the floor, we have another question online, from Lu Kang, Sina Finance. The question is, in light of the IMF’s recent GFSR warning about rising debt, volatile capital flows, and diverging monetary policy paths, how should countries, especially emerging markets, balance financial stability with the imperative to finance climate transitions and digital infrastructure?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much.

    We do a lot of work on debt management with countries. We are providing technical assistance and we are doing a lot of policy work on debt market developments. I think the two main takeaways are, No. 1, the plumbing matters. Putting into place mechanisms such as primary dealers and clearing systems, and pricing mechanisms in government bond markets. It is important all over the world. That includes the most advanced economies, as well as emerging markets. And we have seen tremendous progress in many countries, particularly the major emerging markets in terms of developing those bond markets.

    The second key aspect, of course, is fiscal sustainability. Here again, we engage very actively with our membership to make sure that fiscal frameworks are in place that keep debt trajectories on a path that is commensurate with the economic prospects of the countries.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. A question here in the front row, please.

    QUESTION: Thank you. Kemi Osukoya with The Africa Bazaar magazine.

    I wanted to follow up on the question that my colleague from Nigeria mentioned, regarding sovereign debts. As you know, African nations, after a period of pause, are just right now returning back to the Eurobond. But at the same time, there is unsustainable high borrowing costs that many of these countries face. So, in your recommendation, what can governments do regarding their bond to use it strategically, as well as to make it sustainable?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Thanks so much for this question. And you know, we are working very closely with many sub‑Saharan African countries to support the countries either via programs or via policy advice and technical assistance to have a macro environment that is conducive for growth. So let me mention three things.

    I think the first one is to recognize that we have been through a period of extraordinarily adverse shocks. Particularly in sub‑Saharan Africa, the pandemic had an outsized impact on many countries. The inflation that ensued was very costly for many countries, particularly for those that are importing commodities. So, the adverse economic shocks have been extraordinary. And I would just note that we have engaged more actively in programs with sub‑Saharan Africa in the past five years than we ever did previously.

    The second point is about the financing costs. And, of course, there are two main components. One is the overall level of financial conditions globally. All countries in the world are part of the global capital markets. And that really depends on overall financing conditions. But more specifically, of course, there are country‑specific conditions—the macroeconomic performance of each country, the buffers in the countries—and the mandate of the Fund is very much focused on macro‑financial stability. So, getting back to a place with buffers, which then can lead to lower financing costs is the main goal. Our work with those countries is very much focused on the kind of catalytic role of the Fund, where we are trying to get growth back and stability back. Let me stop here.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias. And a question here in the front row, please. And then I will come back to the middle.

    QUESTION: Thank you very much. My name is [Shuichiro Takaoka]. I am working for Jiji Press.

    Just I would like to make clear the risk of a depreciation of the US dollar. And what are the implications of the recent depreciation of US dollar, especially regarding the global financial stability viewpoint?

    Mr. ADRIAN: As I mentioned earlier, we had seen quite a bit of an appreciation of the dollar earlier in the year and late [next] year. And now we have seen a depreciation that is roughly of commensurate magnitude. The volatility in the exchange rates is reflecting the broader volatility. There are some indications that the exchange rate movements are related to flows to investor reallocations, but the magnitudes of those flows are relatively small, relative to the run‑up of inflows into US assets in recent years. The cumulative inflows into bonds and stocks from around the world have been quite pronounced. So, to what extent these movements in the exchange rate and the associated flows are just a temporary or a more permanent impact remains to be seen. It really depends on how the current uncertainty is going to be resolved. As I said at the beginning, there are various scenarios. For the moment, it’s highly uncertain. As I said earlier, it is notable that the dollar declined, but I would not jump to conclusions in terms of how permanent that move may be.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement. I think when exchange rates are very volatile, one of the key channels for financial stability could be pressures in various funding markets. And this includes in cross currency markets, as well as in repo markets and other secure financing markets. I think this is something that we will be watching very closely. So far, we have not seen any major disruptions in those markets, despite the very volatile exchange rates.

    Mr. ADRIAN: So as a comparison, you can think of last August when there was a risk‑off moment. That was very short, but that did lead to dislocations in those cross‑currency funding markets. And we haven’t really seen that in recent weeks.

    Ms. LOUIS: So just on that line, I think you may have captured it, but I just wanted to get in this question that came in online from Greg Robb from MarketWatch. And it’s, have treasuries and the dollar lost their safe haven status? If not, what accounts for their recent performance?

    Mr. ADRIAN: So, again, it is somewhat unusual to see the dollar decline in the recent two weeks, really, when equity prices traded down with a negative tone and when longer‑term yields increased. But how lasting that is, is really too early to tell.

    US capital markets remain the largest and most liquid capital markets in the world. When you look at US dollars as a reserve asset, that remains over 60 percent among reserve managers. Global stock market capitalizations increased to 55 percent most recently, up from 30 percent in 2010. So, we have seen price movements that are notable; but in the big picture, the depth and size of the markets remain where they have been.

    Ms. LOUIS: And just on the same line, of capital markets. We have another question that came in online, [Anthony Rowley] from the South China Morning Post. And he says, both the EU and ASEAN are seeking more actively to promote capital market integration. Do you see this as reducing global dependence on US capital markets to any significant extent in the short to the medium term?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are generally of the view that deep capital markets are beneficial everywhere. So, we are helping countries around the world to get to solid regulations and market mechanisms in sovereign bond markets but also, more broadly, in capital markets. And, for emerging markets and advanced economies, deepening capital markets has been a key priority.

    We have seen many firms from around the world come to US markets to issue stocks and bonds. And we think that’s related to the depth of the market and the sophistication of the financial sector in the US markets. So, it does provide a service to corporations and financial institutions around the world. But there are certainly many other markets that are deep, that are developing, and that are providing opportunities for both corporations and governments to issue. So, we have seen that trend continue.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Caio?

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe just more broadly on the development of capital markets, as Tobias was saying, I think that it’s an important goal. And this has come hand‑in‑hand with the growth of non‑banking financial institutions that we are seeing across the globe. We see this as a potential positive development. You diversify the sources of funding and the credit to the real economy, diversify the risks across a broader set of institutions, this is good for the economy and financial stability.

    There are risks that need to be mitigated. We discuss some of them in the GFSR—leverage, interconnectedness between different kinds of institutions. But overall, there are policies created by the standard setters that, if implemented, can mitigate these risks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you, Caio and Tobias. 

    Going back to the room. There’s a lady in the second row.

    QUESTION: Hi. Riley Callanan from GZERO Media.

    The IMF downgraded the US, the most of all advanced economies. And I was wondering, is this a short‑term hit that in a year could lead to greater growth and investment in the US? Or is this a long‑term downgrade? Or is it too soon to tell, as you said, with capital markets?

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are really looking more at the financial stability aspects. And I would just note that there has been a readjustment in expectations. Where the US and other economies are going to end up remains to be seen. But I think what is notable is that with the sharp adjustment in asset prices, the increase in uncertainty has been absorbed well in capital markets. And as Caio alluded to, it is the policy framework around the banking system and the non‑banks that is so important to create resilient and deep financial markets that are then facilitating adjustments, relative to new policy developments. And from that vantage point, I think even though we have seen the level of uncertainty increase, markets have been very orderly. And we think that the regulatory and policy framework is key for that achievement.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And if you would like to flesh out any more details on the growth ramifications, we have a conference on Friday. And I can send you the details.

    Another question here, in the second row. I will come back to you.

    QUESTION: Hi. Gabriela Viana from Galapagos Capital in Brazil.

    So, in Brazil, commodities prices play an important role for currency [and] international capital inflows, especially in the stock market. Do you see commodities prices as a main important constraint for markets or the economic policy’s uncertainties or maybe the monetary tightening? Thank you.

    Mr. WU: All these factors are related to each other, obviously. So, I think the commodity prices, if the WEO forecast were to play out, the global economy is going to be slowing. It’s certainly an impact on the revenue side.

    I think for many emerging markets, the silver lining here is that they do have policy room. Many of them do have monetary policy room. Some of them have fiscal room, although only a few of them. So, it seems like this is going to be a challenging period, and uncertainty [and] commodity channels are both going to weigh on economies for emerging markets.

    We have seen broad‑based resilience among emerging markets over the last few years compared to, let’s say, five years before the pandemic. So, I think this speaks to the institutional quality having improved in emerging markets. And hopefully this would continue to buffer emerging markets from these external shocks.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Jason.

    And the lady in the middle. And then I will come back to Agence France‑Presse.

    QUESTION: Hi. Thank you for taking my question. I am Stephanie Stacey from the Financial Times.

    I wanted to expand on the previous questions about the dollar and treasuries. And I know you mentioned it’s hard to assess at this point how lasting the impact will be. But I wanted to ask what risks and future factors you think could drive a real shift in their safe haven status.

    Ms. LOUIS: Before we continue, are there any other questions on the dollar and the safe haven status? Yes. There is a question here.

    QUESTION: Hi. Mehreen Khan from The Times. I’m sorry. I will stand up.

    You mentioned the importance of swap lines and central banks cooperating at times of market stress. I mean, how much are we taking this type of cooperation for granted? And how much is the idea of the Fed providing swap lines to other central banks now in question, given the nature of the scrutiny that the institution is under from the Trump administration?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me start with the swap lines.

    In previous episodes of distress, such as the COVID-19 shock in 2020 or the global financial crisis in 2008, we have seen that swap lines from the major central banks—including Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve—have played an important role in terms of stabilizing market liquidity. The way to think about that is that the central banks are providing funding to partner central banks in the currency of the foreign assets that those institutions own. So, it’s an important underpinning to provide market functioning and resilience to your own assets in the hands of foreign financial institutions.

    As we mentioned earlier central banks have not intervened for liquidity purposes in recent weeks. And, despite a heightened market volatility, the VIX, for example, went from below 20 to between 40 and 50, which is fairly elevated. We have seen a very, very smooth market functioning across the board.

    Concerning the role of treasuries we are looking at the pricing of longer duration treasuries very carefully. We particularly look at supply factors, demand factors, and technical factors. We have seen volatility in the price moves, but we think that those are within reasonable historical norms.

    Mr. WU: Just to complement, I think in the treasury market, we have seen market functioning held up—meaning that buyers can find sellers and transactions are going through. I think that’s a very important sign.

    One thing that I wanted to mention also is that a year ago in our report, we pointed out that there are leveraged trades in the treasury market. These are trades that have not very much to do with economic fundamentals in the US or elsewhere but, rather, are using leverage to capture arbitrage opportunities in markets. When these trades are unwound, there will be impact in the treasury market. And this is something that we have pointed out before. These include the so‑called treasury cash‑futures basis trade, as well as a swap spread trade, which we have documented before. And I think during this episode, given the very heightened volatility, we have seen evidence of some of these positions being unwound, potentially having an impact on treasury yields as well. So, I just wanted to put this into context. This is not about capital outflows, but it’s about unwinding these trades having amplified the recent price movements in treasury markets.

    Mr. ADRIAN: We are seeing some indication that there’s some lowering in terms of the leverage in these trades, but we haven’t heard of disorderly deleveraging at this point. So, of course, with market volatility increasing, financial institutions naturally reduce their leverage. But we haven’t seen the kind of adverse feedback loop that was common, say, in 2008 or even as recent as the COVID-19 shock initially.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you, Tobias.

    And there’s a question from Agence France‑Presse, in the middle. And then I will come back to you, and you. We are running out of time. So, we will take very, very few questions left.

    QUESTION: Thanks for taking my question. Just a quick question. In your report, you talk about geopolitical risk, including the risk of military conflicts. I just wonder how seriously you think people should take that and where you rate that when it comes to the global financial stability risks you have discussed already.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And I have just been told we are running out of time. So, we will just clump those questions, if you could be very quick. The gentleman over there and the lady there. And then we will wrap it up. Thank you.

    QUESTION: Hi. [Rafia] from Nigeria. I work on [Arise TV].

    The IMF keeps talking about building resilience to face the global challenge of the state of the economy of the world. How do you build resilience in a world economic climate when one man’s decision can tip the scale? Just one man. He could wake up tomorrow and all our projections falter. One man.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. And then the last question.

    QUESTION: Laura Noonan, Bloomberg News. Thanks for taking the question. It’s actually a related question.

    You spoke in the report about the need for policymakers to try to do what they can to guard against these future financial shocks. Do you have any practical suggestions on what those measures could be? And also, are you expecting people to take measures to make the financial system safer when the overall political mood, as you have seen, has very much been about trying to liberalize things, trying to deregulate, and trying to simplify? Thank you.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Tobias?

    Mr. ADRIAN: Let me address the three sets of questions and then turn to my colleagues as well.

    On geopolitical risk, we do have a chapter that was released last week that is looking at capital market performance relative to geopolitical risks. And the good news is that, generally, when adverse risks realize, there is an asset price adjustment. But on average, relative to recent decades, those risks are absorbed well by the financial system in general. Now, of course, when conflicts directly impact countries, that can have a pronounced impact on their financial systems, and it’s something that we are discussing in more detail in the chapter.

    Secondly, in terms of the exposure of countries to physical risk, we have certainly seen in some countries around the world, a heightened incidence of drought and floods, even those can be macro‑critical. To the extent that these developments impact macro stability, we are certainly there to support countries and help them, either via programs or policy frameworks.

    Thirdly, in terms of the regulation of financial institutions and financial markets. You know, I think the last couple of weeks are very good illustrations for the importance of resilience of financial institutions. I mean, we have seen a tremendous increase in the level of volatility, which reflects the higher level of uncertainty. Last October, our overarching message in the GFSR was that there was this wedge between policy uncertainty and financial market volatility, which at the time was very low. And we have seen financial market volatility catch up with the high level of policy uncertainty. But that has been orderly, and financial institutions have been resilient. That is really the main objective of financial sector regulation—to get to a place where the financial system can do its job in terms of adjusting to unexpected developments. And when you have resilience in banks and in non‑banks, these adjustments are smooth. And that is the point of finance, right? It’s a kind of an insurance mechanism for the global economy and for individual country macro economies. Good regulation leads to good stability. And we have a lot of detail on that in the GFSR.

    Mr. Ferreira: Maybe I could add a little bit on this about how to build resilience.

    I think that as Tobias was saying, trying to anticipate shocks is very hard. And it is very hard to do it. So, I think the way to build the resilience is focusing on vulnerabilities. In the GFSR, we have mentioned some vulnerabilities that we feel are important at this time. So, the valuations issues that makes the risk of repricing more likely, leveraging in some segments of the financial sector and in the interconnectedness with the banks, and also, of course, rising and high debt in several countries.

    How do you build the resilience in the face of these vulnerabilities? We do feel that banks in most countries are actually the cornerstone of the financial sector and so ensuring that they have appropriate levels of capital and liquidity is key. And the international standards do provide the basis for doing that. To address some of the other vulnerabilities, like leveraging an interconnection between different types of institutions, excessive [transformations], maybe.

    Finally, I think that on the issue of rising debt, one common theme that we have been talking about is about the need to credibly rebuild fiscal buffers.

    Ms. LOUIS: Thank you. Thank you very much. I know we have covered a lot of ground, and I apologize that we could not get to everybody. If you do have any follow‑ups or any questions, please feel free to reach out to me. You can find the report online, and we can also send it to you bilaterally.

    Again, thank you very much for coming and thank you for your time. Take care.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: On ya bike

    Source: New Zealand Police (National News)

    Sergeant Andrew Judson is sick of dealing with bike thieves.

    One offender stole seven bikes in four days from busy, public places in central Christchurch. Another was beaten by his own game and had his stolen bike stolen.

    Last week, Christchurch’s Community Beat Team set their sights on three prolific offenders. By the end of the week all three had been arrested and charged.

    “We are apprehending bike thieves regularly, but removing the opportunity would go a long way to removing the problem,” says Sergeant Judson.

    “Bike thieves take the easy option. If a bike has a decent lock on it, like a D lock, they’ll leave it alone.”

    “It’s that simple. If you like your bike, lock it up properly, don’t give these criminals the opportunity.”

    In last week’s crackdown, three men, aged 35, 36 and 52 years, were arrested on a variety of charges including theft and wilful damage. One has since pleaded guilty and been remanded in custody until sentencing.

    If you witness any suspicious behaviour report it to Police on 105 if it’s after the fact or 111 if it’s happening now.

    If you love your bike, register it with 529 Garage.
    If you recover a bike, check 529 Garage to see if it’s registered.

    ENDS

    Issued by the Police Media Centre.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Northland Expressway: Emerging preferred corridor from Te Hana to Whangārei announced

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Good progress continues to be made on the Northland Expressway, with the emerging preferred corridor for the Te Hana to Port Marsden Highway and the Port Marsden Highway to Whangārei Roads of National Significance now confirmed by NZTA, Transport Minister Chris Bishop and Regional Development Minister Shane Jones say.
    “The Waikato Expressway delivered by the last National-led Government has been a game changer for the Waikato region. The Northland Expressway is a genuinely transformational opportunity to boost jobs and growth in an area rich with potential and link Northland to New Zealand’s biggest city,” Mr Bishop says.
    The Northland Expressway has been divided into three sections:

    Warkworth to Te Hana
    Te Hana to Port Marsden Highway
    Port Marsden Highway to Whangārei

     
    The Warkworth to Te Hana section will be a 26km-long four-lane road, connected to the new Pūhoi to Warkworth motorway and is currently in procurement, following the announcements made at the NZ Infrastructure Investment Summit in March.
    “Today NZTA is announcing the emerging preferred corridor from Te Hana to Whangārei, which will deliver a new four-lane, mainly grade-separated route that bypasses key pressure points on the current State Highway 1 (SH1).
    “For Section 2, Te Hana to Port Marsden Highway, the emerging preferred corridor is a new route to the east of SH1 between Te Hana and the Brynderwyn Hills, near to the east of SH1 at the Brynderwyn Hills and to the west of SH1 between the Brynderwyn Hills and Port Marsden Highway.
    “The Brynderwyn Hills is a very challenging section due to the steepness of terrain and quality of the geology. Alternative options in this location looked at western routes but following further investigation, NZTA has reassessed and found a near east alignment close to SH1. This is a more direct route with more predictable geology that can be managed through engineering design.
    “For Section 3, Port Marsden Highway to Whangārei, the emerging preferred corridor is a new road near SH1 between Port Marsden Highway and State Highway 15 Loop Road and a widened SH1 corridor approaching urban Whangārei,” Mr Bishop says.
    Mr Jones says the recent bad weather, during which SH1 on the Brynderwyns was partly closed due to a slip, illustrated the urgency required to get work underway.
    “The new expressway, which will be designed to better withstand severe weather, will provide a more resilient transport network, keeping people and goods moving and reduce travel time.
    “This transport infrastructure is a key point in the New Zealand First-National Coalition Agreement. The Northland Corridor is a top priority for the Government and we are working quickly to deliver this vital connection to help Northland’s economy grow and its communities thrive.”
    NZTA will be doing further investigation and design refinements and Ministers expect to be able to confirm the preferred route in August or September this year.
    This will provide landowners with greater certainty around any impact the project will have on their properties. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Prime Minister to attend Pope Francis’ funeral

    Source: New Zealand Government

     
    The Prime Minister will represent New Zealand at the funeral for Pope Francis on Saturday, after attending Anzac Day services in Gallipoli the day prior.
     “I will join those at St Peter’s Basilica mourning the loss of Pope Francis, while celebrating his service to the more than one billion Catholics across the world, including almost 450,000 in New Zealand,” says Mr Luxon.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: ECE sector review changes begin

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Regulation Minister David Seymour has today provided an update on the implementation of the Early Childhood Education (ECE) regulatory review.
    “This review and the changes announced today show the power of a sector review. The Ministry for Regulation went in and listened to the people who actually run, work at, and use early childhood regulation. They found people encircled by multiple regulators enforcing out of date rules, and proposed solutions now being put into action,” Mr Seymour says.
    “By the end of next year ECE providers will be governed by a regulatory system which ensures regulations are focused on what matters, child safety. 
     
    Cabinet has agreed to 15 changes which modernise and simplify regulations across ECE. Services will be able to get on with what they do best – providing safe, high-quality care and education as the changes are rolled out over the coming year.
    “Part of the change will involve amending laws in Parliament. The Education and Training (Early Childhood Education Reform) Amendment Bill will action many of these changes. The bill will be introduced in July, and I expect it to be passed by the end of the year,” Mr Seymour says.
    “The biggest complaint arises from the calcified, high stakes licencing criteria – 98 of them – that can each have a centre shut down with little to no notice. New licensing criteria will be gazetted by the end of September, following the recommendation to change or merge approximately three-quarters of the licensing criteria. Consultation will begin shortly to test the precise changes.
    “By mid next year, graduated enforcement tools will be used to respond to breaches of the remaining licensing criteria. The only enforcement tools previously available were the granting or removal of ECE licenses, which is too blunt a tool for managing minor breaches and enabling early intervention. There will no longer be high-stakes open-or-shut rules that create anxiety and strained relationships for regulators and centre operators alike.” 
    Graduated enforcement will give the regulator a range of enforcement measures. They will be able to respond proportionately to breaches, changing the sector’s culture from a punitive approach to promoting quality.  
    “The implementation of the recommendations represents a major shakeup of the sector’s outdated system. It is a great result for children, parents and ECE service providers,” Mr Seymour says.  
    “The changes will reduce unnecessary compliance costs, remove duplication, and streamline operational requirements. ECE providers will no longer be burdened with 98 separate licensing criteria, many of which were arbitrary or outdated, such as requirements to: 

    ⁠maintain a constant indoor temperature of 18 degrees, when common sense says a minor deviation from 18 degrees won’t hurt anyone, and
    ⁠hold immunisation records for every child over 15 months, which the Ministry of Health already does.

    “This will encourage more providers into a thriving market with reduced operation costs and compliance headaches. For parents this will mean more safe and affordable ECE options for their children.  
    “As part of its comprehensive review, the Ministry for Regulation analysed over 2,300 submissions and written feedback, met with parents and caregivers, providers and workers, visited 16 ECE services, and conducted a series of structured interviews and workshops with other agencies that engage with or regulate the sector. Thank you to the thousands of people who contributed their views.
    “This is just the beginning. The Ministry is now helping the agriculture and horticulture sector implement sector review findings, and progressing sector reviews into the hairdressing and barbering, and the telecommunications sector. They’re also working closely with the industrial hemp industry and others who’ve come forward through our red tape tipline.
    “In a high-cost economy, regulation isn’t neutral. It’s a tax on growth. Every completed review makes it easier to do business, access services, and innovate in New Zealand. The ECE review is the first of many examples of what smarter regulation looks like in action.”
    Link to report: https://www.regulation.govt.nz/about-us/our-publications/regulatory-review-of-early-childhood-education-full-report/
    Link to report summary: https://www.regulation.govt.nz/about-us/our-publications/regulatory-review-of-early-childhood-education-summary/

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Open fire season for Tāmaki Makaurau

    Source: Auckland Council

    Fire and Emergency New Zealand is moving Auckland City, Waitematā and Counties-Manukau Districts back to an open fire season from 8am on Wednesday 23 April, until further notice.

    An open fire season means people planning to light fires outdoors no longer need to apply to Fire and Emergency for authorised permits.

    The exceptions are the Hauraki Gulf Islands – populated islands will move to a restricted fire season, with permits needed from Fire and Emergency before lighting outdoor fires, and Department of Conservation islands remain in a prohibited fire season, with all outdoor fires banned.

    Fire and Emergency New Zealand’s Te Hiku Region Manager Ron Devlin says a steady amount of rain across the Auckland region in the last few days and continued cooler forecasts have triggered the fire season changes.

    “The damper autumn conditions means there is now less of a fire risk throughout Tāmaki Makaurau,” he says.

    “However, we do still ask people to take care when lighting any fires, and to check the requirements for your location on checkitsalright.nz.

    “Make sure your fires are fully extinguished and keep checking for reignition in the following days and weeks.”

    Northland District changed to an open fire season last Friday. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Artist plans seascape series at Auckland regional park

    Source: Auckland Council

    An established writer with an affinity for the ocean is thrilled to have the opportunity to live at the idyllic seaside Barr Cottage in Huia, as Auckland Council’s regional parks’ artist in residence for 2025. 

    Michelle Elvy’s preoccupation with the sea and coastal places is clear in both her fiction and non-fiction writing. Author Witi Ihimaera considers her a “creature of the sea… a blue-water person” and indeed, her focus on exploring the sea, harbours and shorelines has taken her on long sailing journeys across oceans before landing in New Zealand by sailboat in 2008.  

    Michelle says the opportunity to live right on the southern coastline of the Waitākere Ranges Regional Park for the eight weeks of her residency aligns perfectly with her interests, instincts and goals.  

    “For me, the close view of nature afforded by this residency is a special opportunity. My project is focused on the intersection of what is naturally here, what we create from it, and how we preserve it,” she says. “I am grateful for the chance to work and produce new creative material about the park.”

    From October 2025, Michelle will move into Barr Cottage to start writing from a desk overlooking the everchanging seascape. She says she can’t wait to immerse herself in the Little Huia lifestyle and small coastal community. 

    Regional Parks Manager Scott De Silva says the residency programme gives Aucklanders the chance to view specific regional parks through a creative lens.

    “Our artists experience and reveal aspects of our parks that are unique. The works that have emerged from each park stay provide a rich and valued tapestry of perceptions on nature that visitors can enjoy for years to come. I look forward to reading Michelle’s wordsmithing once she’s completed her stay,” says Scott.

    Michelle has already written work about a sea-facing place in the South Island and hopes during this residency to write a companion story, showcasing the Waitākere Ranges Regional Park cottage and its outlook over the Manukau Harbour.  

    She’s particularly interested in the juxtaposition of a park as a wild place, yet a space which is managed and has maintained edges; ‘a place that holds nature at its centre, yet a place that is curated, a place for community’.

    Aucklanders will be able to read her poetry at Barr Cottage during the Waitākere Open Studios event in November 2025, and later at Arataki Visitor Centre.

    To celebrate the natural beauty of Auckland’s expansive regional parks, the council has been offering the Artist in Residence programme to one lucky artist each year since 2008.  

    If you would like to learn more…

    • See what previous artists in residence have created during their park stays
    • Read Michelle Elvy’s published books and poetry, like the other side of better, or the everrumble.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Economy – CoFR seeking feedback on access to basic transaction accounts – Reserve Bank

    Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand

    23 April 2025 – A basic transaction account should be available to anyone, irrespective of their circumstances, financial position or capability with technology, according to the Council of Financial Regulators (CoFR).  

    CoFR, which includes the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Financial Markets Authority, the Commerce Commission, the Treasury and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, has released a joint Issues Paper on Access to Basic Transaction Accounts.

    Following the release of the Issues Paper, a public consultation is now open. CoFR is seeking feedback on the proposed introduction of basic transaction accounts to better support customer groups that are currently excluded. The consultation will remain open for eight weeks and will close on 18 June 2025.

    “Having a transaction account means people can safely receive, store, spend and save money. Transaction accounts are a vital foundation for people to take part in the modern economy,” says Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Christian Hawkesby.

    Basic transaction accounts are different from bank accounts that are currently on offer, as they have additional controls in place (such as transaction limits) that make them unsuitable for money laundering and the financing of terrorism. These additional controls make basic transaction accounts a low-risk product, allowing simplified onboarding.

    This means that basic transaction accounts can provide people with access to banking services who might otherwise be turned away, such as an older person whose driver’s licence may have expired, someone who has recently been released from prison, or a young person who may not have a passport yet.

    The Issues Paper highlights different options that have been taken to introduce minimum standards for basic transaction accounts in other countries.

    FMA Chief Executive Samantha Barrass says, “In order for the financial system to work for people in New Zealand, they need to be able to readily access basic banking services if they need them.”

     “Overseas in places such as the UK, basic transaction accounts can be a lifeline for people to receive an income or make payments, and we want to see them available here,” she says.

    Mr Hawkesby says, “We see the benefits that basic transaction accounts could have for some New Zealanders and broader society, particularly for customers who may be in challenging circumstances and struggle to meet traditional onboarding requirements, such as providing ID.”

    Westpac NZ recently launched a pilot basic bank account with the objective of improving access to banking services. Westpac NZ’s new basic bank account will be a transactional bank account with simplified onboarding processes to support people who currently struggle to meet legal identification requirements.

    “Our final market study report into personal banking services recommended that the sector works together to make basic bank accounts widely available. It’s encouraging to see the issues paper published today and we encourage all stakeholders to have their say over the course of the next eight weeks,” Dr John Small, Chair of the Commerce Commission, says.  

    More information

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Property Market – Clearer signs of a market rebound as property activity lifts in early 2025 – CoreLogic

    Source: CoreLogic

    New Zealand’s housing market continues to show signs of recovery, with national sales activity and dwelling values both lifting in March, supported by easing mortgage rates and renewed buyer confidence, according to CoreLogic NZ’s April Housing Chart Pack. (ref. https://www.corelogic.co.nz/news-research/reports/housing-chart-pack )

    Sales volumes were 11% higher in March compared to the same time last year, more than offsetting February’s brief dip. This marks nearly two years of gradual growth in transaction activity.

    “Clearly confidence levels are growing, no doubt reflecting the falls in mortgage rates,” said CoreLogic NZ Chief Property Economist Kelvin Davidson.
    “The recovery in property values and activity levels is becoming clearer, but it remains measured. Higher stock levels are still giving buyers plenty of choice, which will keep a lid on price growth in the near term.”
    National home values edged up 0.5% in March, following a 0.4% increase in February and a flat result in January, based on CoreLogic NZ’s latest Home Value Index.
    The recovery is becoming more geographically widespread, extending beyond the main centres into key regional towns and cities.
     
    Investor activity rising

    While the supply of available listings continues to track at multi-year highs, reducing the urgency for buyers, improving conditions have nevertheless sparked renewed interest from a range of buyer groups.

    First home buyer activity as a share of the market has eased slightly from recent record highs, but investor activity is on the rise, driven by lower mortgage rates.
    “Mortgaged investors remain on the comeback trail. Lower interest rates are certainly helping investors by reducing the cashflow top-ups out of other income sources that are generally required on a rental property purchase.”
    “While the share of purchases going to mortgaged multiple property owners (MPOs, including investors) remains below historical levels, this group has certainly started to return. Indeed, at 23% in Q1 2025, they’re back to levels not seen since late 2021.”
    Mr Davidson said all buyer groups are expected to be more active through the rest of 2025.
    “If current momentum continues, we anticipate around 10,000 more residential sales this year compared to 2024. That means more opportunities for everyone—first home buyers, investors and upgraders alike.”

    Mixed economic outlook

    The economic backdrop remains mixed, with global uncertainty fuelled by recent tariff changes in the United States. While the inflationary impact in New Zealand is expected to be relatively neutral, a softer global growth outlook may support further downward pressure on interest rates.
    Despite these crosswinds, CoreLogic anticipates national home values to rise by approximately 5% throughout 2025.
    “The year ahead is likely to deliver a subdued but broad-based upturn,” Mr Davidson said.
    “Lower mortgage rates are doing much of the heavy lifting, but high listing volumes, ongoing labour market shifts and mortgage lending constraints such as debt-to-income ratio caps will temper the pace of growth.”
     
    Highlights from the April 2025 Housing Chart Pack include:

    New Zealand’s residential real estate market is worth a combined $1.62 trillion.
    The CoreLogic Home Value Index shows property values across New Zealand increased 0.5% in March. Over the three months to March, there was a 0.9% rise in median property values across NZ.

    The total sales count over the 12 months to March is 83,543.
    Total listings on the market were 30,524 in March – 23% up on the five-year average. Some major regions such as Waikato, Auckland, and Bay of Plenty are lower than last year in terms of total listings on the market, but Canterbury and Otago are slightly higher, and Wellington more so.
    Rental market conditions still favour tenants, as net migration (demand) eases down from its very high peak, and the stock of available rental listings (supply) on the market stays elevated.
    Gross rental yields now stand at 3.9%, which Is the highest level since mid-2015.
    Inflation is firmly back in the 1–3% target range, and after April’s 0.25% cut, further OCR reductions seem likely in the coming months.
    The Chart of the Month shows that investors are starting to return to the market. 
    While the share of purchases going to mortgaged multiple property owners (MPOs, including investors) remains below normal, this group has certainly started to return. At 23% in Q1 2025, they’re back to levels not seen since late 2021.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Real Estate – $63m drops out of the NZ property market in Q1 2025

    Source: RealEstate.co.nz

    Wednesday, 23 April 2025 – More than $63 million was trimmed from asking prices across New Zealand in the first quarter of 2025. New data from realestate.co.nz shows a total of $63,044,313 in price reductions – down slightly from $69,610,914 million in quarter one of 2024 – as vendors adjusted prices to meet the market.

    Vanessa Williams, spokesperson for realestate.co.nz, says vendors are pricing their properties to find the right buyer:

    “Nationally, the average asking price has been trending downward over the past year, and stock levels are at decade-highs. We’re starting to see sellers come to market with more realistic expectations from the outset, which reduces the need for major price cuts later on.”

    The data compares the original asking price of a property when it was first listed on realestate.co.nz with the price when it was sold or withdrawn. While it doesn’t reflect the final sale price, it indicates how much vendors were willing to adjust their expectations to align with market demand.

    Regionally, the biggest total price drops were in Auckland (down $9,823,100), Waikato (down $7,013,100), and Wellington (down $5,928,009).

    “All up, that’s millions of dollars no longer circulating in the market. Buyers aren’t paying it, and sellers aren’t receiving it.”

    Williams notes that slightly more listings were discounted this year than last. 1,686 properties had their asking prices reduced in Q1 2025, up from 1,624 in Q1 2024.

    Auckland leads with highest average drop per listing of nearly $60k

    Nationally, sellers who adjusted their asking prices reduced them on average by $37,393 per listing. But the biggest average price drops per listing were in Auckland (down $59,175), Coromandel (down $58,602), and Wellington (down $54,385).

    At the other end of the scale, the smallest average price drop per listing was in Wairarapa, where vendors reduced an average of $24,346 from their asking prices. This was closely followed by Otago (down $26,220) and Hawke’s Bay (down $26,490).

    Williams notes that these are helpful benchmarks for buyers and sellers:

    “For sellers, it offers a realistic view of how much they may need to negotiate. For buyers, it can give a sense of how much wriggle room might be available when making an offer.”

    She explains that high stock levels and a slower market give both parties time to negotiate and reach a fair deal.

    $600k off? The listings with the biggest price drops

    The five biggest price drops in Q1 2025 were all properties with premium price tags, shedding from $300,000 to more than $600,000 from their original asking prices.

    Taking out the top spot for the steepest price drop was a home in Auckland, which dropped by $604,500—from $4,899,500 to $4,295,000.

    A Queenstown property followed, down $400,000 (from $3,900,000 to $3,500,000). Meanwhile, a Northland property fell $360,000 – a drop of over one-third from its original $950,000 listing to $590,000.

    Properties in Mount Maunganui and Whitianga rounded out the top five, dropping by $346,000 and $300,000 respectively.

    “At the peak of the market in 2022, it wasn’t unusual for properties to sell above the asking price. What we’re seeing now is a very different phase—one where sellers are having to meet buyers where they are,” says Williams.

    About realestate.co.nz  

    We’ve been helping people buy, sell, or rent property since 1996. Established before Google, realestate.co.nz is New Zealand’s longest-standing property website and the official website of the real estate industry.  

    Dedicated only to property, our mission is to empower people with a property search tool they can use to find the life they want to live. With residential, lifestyle, rural and commercial property listings, realestate.co.nz is the place to start for those looking to buy or sell property.   

    Whatever life you’re searching for, it all starts here.  

    Want more property insights? 

    • Market insights: Search by suburb to see median sale prices, popular property types and trends over time. 
    • Sold properties: Switch your search to sold to see the last 12 months of sales and prices. 
    • Valuations: Get a gauge on property prices by browsing sold residential properties, with the latest sale prices and an estimated value in the current market.  

    Glossary of terms:  

    Asking price drop is the difference between a property’s original asking price when it was first listed on realestate.co.nz and the price when it was sold or withdrawn. This figure does not reflect the final sale price but indicates how much a vendor adjusted their price expectations to meet market demand.

    Total Price Drop is the combined dollar amount by which asking prices were reduced across all discounted listings in a region or nationally during the reporting period. 

    Average price drop per listing is calculated by dividing the total amount discounted in a region by the number of listings that reduced their asking price in that region. 

    Listings That Dropped Prices is the number of individual property listings that had their asking prices reduced at least once during the reporting period. This shows how widespread vendor discounting was in that timeframe.

    Total Listings is the total number of property listings that appeared on realestate.co.nz in the reporting period, whether they had price reductions or not. This gives context to the overall activity and supply in the market.

    Average asking price (AAP) is neither a valuation nor the sale price. It is an indication of current market sentiment. Statistically, asking prices tend to correlate closely with the sales prices recorded in future months when those properties are sold. As it looks at different data, average asking prices may differ from recorded sales data released simultaneously.  

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Northland News – Brynderwyns route announcement welcomed in Northland

    Source: Northland Regional Council

    The Government’s announcement of a preferred route for the Brynderwyn Hills is a critical step forward in transforming Northland’s route security and resilience, says the chair of the Northland Regional Transport Committee (RTC).
    Commenting today (subs: Weds 23 April) on the announcement by Transport Minister Chris Bishop and Regional Development Minister Shane Jones, RTC Chair Joe Carr says he and his fellow committee members are thrilled by the announcement as a crucial move to address long-standing issues with the current Brynderwyn Hills route.
    “Sorting out issues with the Brynderwyn Hills has been talked about for decades, and our Regional Transport Committee has been working for many years to support progress on a better corridor,” says RTC Chair Carr.
    “I want to acknowledge the coalition government for making the Brynderwyn Hills route a priority as part of the Northland Expressway,” says Chair Carr.
    “We don’t want to see any more money put into detour routes – we want to see money spent on long-term solutions, so we’re really pleased to see the government making real progress.”
    Today’s announcement of a preferred corridor for four-laning between Te Hana and Port Marsden Highway would see the Brynderwyn corridor shifted slightly to the east of its current route.
    “This is a green-fields route, which would minimise traffic disruption during its construction,” he says.
    “I want to also acknowledge the local engineers that have worked to help identify the new route through some really challenging terrain and variable geology, and who gave their time free of charge to help secure a more resilient transport network and help keep people and goods moving in Northland.
    “We’re looking forward to seeing the preferred route confirmed in a few months’ time and this work getting under way as a matter of urgency.” 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Terrorist Attack in Jammu and Pahalgam

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    04.22.25

    Cantwell Statement on Terrorist Attack in Jammu and Pahalgam

    EDMONDS, WA – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) released the following statement on the fatal terrorist attack in Jammu and Pahalgam:

    “I am deeply saddened by the senseless acts of violence and the loss of innocent lives caused by the terrorist attack in Jammu and Pahalgam. The victims, their families, and all those affected are in the thoughts and prayers of the American people. We stand united with India in condemning such acts of terror,” Sen. Cantwell said.



    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chinese Nationals Sentenced to Federal Prison for Participating in a Fraudulent Gift Card Conspiracy Involving the Purchase and Export of Apple Products to China

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CONCORD – Three Chinese nationals were sentenced in federal court for their roles in a sophisticated Chinese gift card fraud conspiracy, Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack announces.

    Naxin Wu, 26, a Chinese national unlawfully residing in Nashua, was sentenced by Chief Judge Landya B. McCafferty to 33 months in prison and one year of supervised release.  Mengying Jiang, 34, a Chinese national residing in Nashua, was sentenced by Chief Judge McCafferty to 60 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Mingdong Chen, 28, a Chinese national unlawfully residing in Brooklyn, New York, was sentenced by Judge Joseph N. Laplante to 24 months in prison and one year of supervised release.  Earlier this year, the defendants each pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud.  All three defendants face deportation to China after completing their sentences.

    “The defendants played a critical role in laundering proceeds of romance and other online scams by purchasing the stolen gift cards and using them to purchase Apple products,” said Acting U.S. Attorney McCormack. “While they may not have committed the initial fraud, the defendants’ actions helped convert stolen funds into tangible goods, enabling a large-scale financial crimes conspiracy. We remain committed to dismantling every link in the fraud supply chain.”

    “These individuals were part of a Chinese transnational criminal organization that used a complex scheme to steal and launder millions of dollars through gift card theft. After a sophisticated criminal investigation with our partners, their scheme was uncovered and their crimes brought to light. Now, they’ll serve federal prison sentences and face deportation back to China,” said Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations New England Michael J. Krol.

    “The sentences imposed in New Hampshire emphasize the expansive reach of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service when it comes to dismantling criminal organizations. Anytime a criminal uses the U.S. Mail to further their illegal activity, postal inspectors will be there to bring them to justice. I’d like to thank our law enforcement partners involved in this case who, together with postal inspectors, brought these defendants to justice. This collaboration and dedication from law enforcement professionals plays a vital role in protecting the integrity of our communities from those who seek to exploit vulnerable Americans for personal gain,” said Ketty Larco-Ward, Inspector in Charge, U.S. Postal Inspection Service – Boston Division.

    According to court documents, organized criminal elements in China acquired well over $100 million in gift cards through multiple fraudulent means. For example, gift card data is obtained by hacking U.S. companies, tampering with physical gift cards, and targeting U.S. citizens through romance and elder fraud schemes. The criminal elements then send the gift card data to multiple cells of Chinese nationals operating in the United States through a Chinese-based messaging platform in exchange for cryptocurrency.

    Once U.S.-based cells receive the gift card data, they then spend the gift cards to purchase high-value electronics, principally Apple products. After purchasing the Apple products, cell members consolidate the electronics in warehouses for shipment to China, Hong Kong, or countries in Southeast Asia. The cells primarily operate in states with no sales tax, such as New Hampshire, to maximize their profits.

    Wu, Jiang, and Chen were members of one cell in New Hampshire. Wu and Jiang purchased fraudulent gift cards at a discount from their face value. They then either personally used the cards or disseminated them to others, including Chen, to use. Wu was responsible for $1.4 million, Jiang for $3 million, and Chen for $400,000 of fraudulent gift cards.

    Homeland Security Investigations, Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigations, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Concord Police Department led the investigation.  The Merrimack County Attorney’s Office provided valuable assistance. Assistant U.S. Attorney Alexander S. Chen prosecuted the case.

    This effort is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: First Busey Corporation Announces 2025 First Quarter Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LEAWOOD, Kan., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) reports first quarter results.

    Busey completed the transformative acquisition of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. on March 1, 2025, significantly impacting first quarter results and resetting the baseline for financial performance for future quarters in a multitude of positive ways.

    Net Income (Loss) Diluted EPS Net Interest Margin1 ROAA1 ROATCE1
    $(30.0) million $(0.44) 3.16% (0.82)% (7.99)%
    $39.9 million (adj)2 $0.57 (adj)2 3.08% (adj)2 1.09% (adj)2 10.64% (adj)2
    MESSAGE FROM OUR CHAIRMAN & CEO

    The transformative partnership between Busey and CrossFirst takes our organization to new heights, combining our growing commercial bank with the power of Busey’s core deposit franchise, wealth management platform, and payment technology solutions at FirsTech, Inc. As we build upon Busey’s forward momentum, we are grateful for the opportunities to consistently earn the business of our customers, based on the contributions of our talented associates and the continued support of our loyal shareholders.

    Van A. Dukeman 
    Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 


    PARTNERSHIP WITH CROSSFIRST

    Effective March 1, 2025, First Busey Corporation (“Busey,” “Company,” “we,” “us,” or “our”), the holding company for Busey Bank, completed its previously announced acquisition (the “Merger”) of CrossFirst Bankshares, Inc. (“CrossFirst”) (NASDAQ: CFB), the holding company for CrossFirst Bank, pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated August 26, 2024, by and between Busey and CrossFirst (the “Merger Agreement”). This partnership creates a premier commercial bank in the Midwest, Southwest, and Florida, with 78 full-service locations across 10 states—Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The combined holding company will continue to operate under the First Busey Corporation name. Busey common stock will continue to trade on the Nasdaq under the “BUSE” stock ticker symbol.

    Upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst common stock converted to the right to receive 0.6675 of a share of Busey’s common stock, with the result that holders of Busey’s common stock owned approximately 63.5% of the combined company and holders of CrossFirst’s common stock owned approximately 36.5% of the combined company, on a fully-diluted basis. Further, upon completion of the acquisition, each share of CrossFirst preferred stock converted to the right to receive one share of Busey preferred stock.

    CrossFirst Bank’s results of operations were included in Busey’s consolidated results of operations beginning March 1, 2025. Busey will operate CrossFirst Bank as a separate banking subsidiary until it is merged with and into Busey Bank, which is expected to occur on June 20, 2025. At the time of the bank merger, CrossFirst Bank locations will become banking centers of Busey Bank.

    The acquisition was accretive to tangible book value, exceeding initial projections of a six-month earn back period.

    Further details are included with Busey’s Current Report on Form 8‑K announcing completion of the acquisition, which was filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 3, 2025.

    FINANCIAL RESULTS

    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME (unaudited)
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Provision for credit losses     42,452       1,273       5,038  
    Total noninterest income     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Total noninterest expense     115,171       78,167       70,769  
    Income (loss) before income taxes     (32,669 )     37,359       34,960  
    Income taxes     (2,679 )     9,254       8,735  
    Net income (loss)   $ (29,990 )   $ 28,105     $ 26,225  
                 
    Basic earnings (loss) per common share   $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.47  
    Diluted earnings (loss) per common share   $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.46  
    Effective income tax rate     8.20 %     24.77 %     24.99 %
     

    Busey’s results of operations for the first quarter of 2025 was a net loss of $(30.0) million, or $(0.44) per diluted common share, compared to net income of $28.1 million, or $0.49 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $26.2 million, or $0.46 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized return on average assets and annualized return on average tangible common equity2 were (0.82)% and (7.99)%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

    Busey views certain non-operating items, including acquisition-related expenses, restructuring charges, and one-time strategic events, as adjustments to net income reported under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). We also adjust for net securities gains and losses to align with industry and research analyst reporting. The objective of our presentation of adjusted earnings and adjusted earnings metrics is to allow investors and analysts to more clearly identify quarterly trends in core earnings performance. Non-operating pre-tax adjustments for acquisition and restructuring expenses2 in the first quarter of 2025 were $26.0 million. Further, $3.1 million other noninterest expense was recorded to establish an initial allowance for Unfunded Commitments2 and $42.4 million provision expense was recorded to establish an initial Allowance for Credit Losses for loans purchased without credit deterioration (“non-PCD” loans) immediately following the close of the acquisition in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 326-20-30-15. Additionally, net securities losses were $15.8 million, primarily related to the execution of a strategic balance sheet repositioning. Lastly, $4.6 million in one-time deferred tax valuation expense2 was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, which is expected to lower our effective blended state tax rate in future periods but created a negative adjustment to the carrying value of our deferred tax asset in the current period. For more information and a reconciliation of these non-GAAP measures (which are identified with the endnote labeled as 2) in tabular form, see Non-GAAP Financial Information.”

    Adjusted net income2, which excludes the impact of non-GAAP adjustments, was $39.9 million, or $0.57 per diluted common share, for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $30.9 million, or $0.53 per diluted common share, for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $25.7 million or $0.46 per diluted common share for the first quarter of 2024. Annualized adjusted return on average assets2 and annualized adjusted return on average tangible common equity2 were 1.09% and 10.64%, respectively, for the first quarter of 2025.

    Pre-Provision Net Revenue2

    Pre-provision net revenue2 was $25.6 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $38.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $46.4 million for the first quarter of 2024. Pre-provision net revenue to average assets2 was 0.70% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.28% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 1.55% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue2 was $54.7 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $42.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $38.6 million for the first quarter of 2024. Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average assets2 was 1.50% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 1.38% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 1.29% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin2

    Net interest income was $103.7 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $81.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $75.9 million in the first quarter of 2024.

    Net interest margin2 was 3.16% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.95% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.79% for the first quarter of 2024. Excluding purchase accounting accretion, adjusted net interest margin2 was 3.08% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.92% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.78% in the first quarter of 2024.

    Components of the 21 basis point increase in net interest margin2 during the first quarter of 2025, which includes approximately +12 basis points contributed by CrossFirst Bank, are as follows:

    • Increased loan portfolio and held for sale loan yields contributed +36 basis points
    • Increased purchase accounting accretion contributed +5 basis points
    • Decreased borrowing expense contributed +3 basis points
    • Decreased expense on rate swaps contributed +2 basis points
    • Increased non-maturity deposit funding costs contributed -17 basis points
    • Decreased cash and securities portfolio yield contributed -8 basis points

    Based on our most recent Asset Liability Management Committee (“ALCO”) model, a +100 basis point parallel rate shock is expected to increase net interest income by 1.8% over the subsequent twelve-month period. Busey continues to evaluate and execute off-balance sheet hedging and balance sheet repositioning strategies as well as embedding rate protection in our asset originations to provide stabilization to net interest income in lower rate environments. Time deposit and savings specials have provided funding flows, and we had excess earning cash during the first quarter of 2025. A portion of the acquired CrossFirst Bank securities portfolio was liquidated when the acquisition was finalized, providing additional excess cash that will allow us to unwind non-core funding. As brokered CDs mature, Busey will continue to deploy excess cash to reduce wholesale funding levels during subsequent quarters. Total deposit cost of funds increased from 1.75% during the fourth quarter of 2024 to 1.91% during the first quarter of 2025. Deposit betas increased with the higher mix of acquired indexed and wholesale deposits and a full quarter of the consolidated Company’s funding base is projected to increase total deposit cost of funds during the second quarter of 2025. With the expectation of Busey paying down non-core funding, the deposit beta will lessen during the year and is expected to normalize in the 45% to 50% beta range. Growth in higher yielding earning assets is expected to offset the increased cost of funds pressure and we project further net interest margin expansion during the second quarter of 2025.

    Noninterest Income

      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    NONINTEREST INCOME          
    Wealth management fees $ 17,364     $ 16,786     $ 15,549  
    Fees for customer services   8,128       7,911       7,056  
    Payment technology solutions   5,073       5,094       5,709  
    Mortgage revenue   329       496       746  
    Income on bank owned life insurance   1,446       1,080       1,419  
    Realized net gains (losses) on the sale of mortgage servicing rights               7,465  
    Net securities gains (losses)   (15,768 )     (196 )     (6,375 )
    Other noninterest income   4,651       4,050       3,344  
    Total noninterest income $ 21,223     $ 35,221     $ 34,913  
       

    Total noninterest income decreased by 39.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and decreased by 39.2% compared to the first quarter of 2024, primarily due to net securities losses that were recorded in connection with a strategic balance sheet repositioning.

    Excluding the impact of net securities gains and losses and the gains on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, adjusted noninterest income2 increased by 4.4% to $37.0 million, or 26.3% of operating revenue2, during the first quarter of 2025, compared to $35.4 million, or 30.3% of operating revenue2, for the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, adjusted noninterest income2 increased by 9.4% from $33.8 million, or 30.8% of operating revenue2.

    Our fee-based businesses continue to add revenue diversification. Wealth management fees, wealth management referral fees included in other noninterest income, and payment technology solutions contributed 61.1% of adjusted noninterest income2 for the first quarter of 2025.

    Noteworthy components of noninterest income are as follows:

    • Wealth management fees increased by 3.4% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024 wealth management fees increased by 11.7%. Busey’s Wealth Management division ended the first quarter of 2025 with $13.68 billion in assets under care, compared to $13.83 billion at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 and $12.76 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2024. Our portfolio management team continues to focus on long-term returns and managing risk in the face of volatile markets and has outperformed its blended benchmark3 over the last three and five years. The Wealth Management segment reported another quarter of record high revenue for the first quarter of 2025.
    • Payment technology solutions revenue decreased slightly compared the fourth quarter of 2024. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, payment technology solutions revenue decreased by 11.1% primarily due to decreases in income from electronic, online, and interactive voice response payments, partially offset by increases in lockbox and merchant services income.
    • Fees for customer services increased by 2.7% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to increases in income from analysis charges and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, fees for customer services increased by 15.2% primarily due to increases in analysis charges, automated teller machine fees, and interchange fees, offset by lower non-sufficient funds charges. Increases in fees for customer services are primarily attributable to the inclusion of one month of CrossFirst’s income in our first quarter results.
    • Other noninterest income increased by 14.8% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and by 39.1% compared to the first quarter of 2024. The increase for both periods was driven by increases in swap origination fee income, commercial loan sales gains, letter of credit fee income, and other real estate owned income, offset by decreases in venture capital income.

    Operating Efficiency

      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    NONINTEREST EXPENSE          
    Salaries, wages, and employee benefits $ 67,563   $ 45,458   $ 42,090
    Data processing expense   9,575     6,564     6,550
    Net occupancy expense of premises   5,799     4,794     4,720
    Furniture and equipment expense   1,744     1,650     1,813
    Professional fees   9,511     4,938     2,253
    Amortization of intangible assets   3,083     2,471     2,409
    Interchange expense   1,343     1,305     1,611
    FDIC insurance   2,167     1,330     1,400
    Other noninterest expense   14,386     9,657     7,923
    Total noninterest expense $ 115,171   $ 78,167   $ 70,769
     

    Total noninterest expense increased by 47.3% compared to the fourth quarter of 2024 and increased by 62.7% compared to the first quarter of 2024. Growth in noninterest expense was primarily attributable to one-time acquisition expenses related to the CrossFirst acquisition as well as added costs for operating expenses for two banks during one month of the quarter. Annual pre-tax expense synergy estimates resulting from the CrossFirst acquisition remain on track at $25.0 million. Busey anticipates a 50% rate of synergy realization in 2025 and 100% in 2026.

    Adjusted noninterest expense2, which excludes acquisition and restructuring expenses, amortization of intangible assets, and the provision for unfunded commitments, was $82.9 million in the first quarter of 2025, compared to $72.6 million in the fourth quarter of 2024 and $68.6 million in the first quarter of 2024. As our business grows, Busey remains focused on prudently managing our expense base and operating efficiency.

    Noteworthy components of noninterest expense are as follows:

    • Salaries, wages, and employee benefits expenses increased by $22.1 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $25.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $15.6 million and $15.8 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses, with additional severance, retention, and stock-based compensation. Busey has added 501 full time equivalent associates (“FTEs”) over the past year, mostly as a result of acquisitions, including 437 CrossFirst Bank FTEs added in March 2025 and 46 Merchants & Manufacturers Bank FTEs added in April 2024.
    • Data processing expense increased by $3.0 million compared to both the fourth quarter of 2024 and the first quarter of 2024, of which $2.3 million and $2.2 million, respectively, was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Busey has continued to make investments in technology enhancements and has also experienced inflation-driven price increases.
    • Professional fees increased by $4.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, of which $4.3 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses. Compared to the first quarter of 2024, professional fees increased by $7.3 million, of which $7.2 million was attributable to increases in non-operating expenses.
    • Amortization of intangible assets increased by $0.6 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $0.7 million compared to the first quarter of 2024. The CrossFirst acquisition added an estimated $81.8 million of finite-lived intangible assets, which will be amortized using an accelerated amortization methodology.
    • Other noninterest expense increased by $4.7 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and increased by $6.5 million compared to the first quarter of 2024, of which $0.3 million and $0.5 million, respectively, resulted from increases in non-operating expenses related to acquisition and restructuring expenses. Further, $3.1 million of non-operating expenses was recorded for the Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments. Multiple expense items contributed to the remaining fluctuations in this expense category, including marketing, business development, regulatory expenses, mortgage servicing rights valuation expenses, and other real estate owned.

    Busey’s efficiency ratio2 was 79.3% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 64.5% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 58.1% for the first quarter of 2024. Our adjusted efficiency2 ratio was 58.7% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 61.8% for the fourth quarter of 2024, and 62.3% for the first quarter of 2024.

    Busey’s annualized ratio of adjusted noninterest expense to average assets was 2.27% for the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.39% for the fourth quarter of 2024 and 2.30% for the first quarter of 2024.

    BALANCE SHEET STRENGTH

    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (unaudited)
               
      As of
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    ASSETS          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 1,200,292     $ 697,659     $ 591,071  
    Debt securities available for sale   2,273,874       1,810,221       1,898,072  
    Debt securities held to maturity   815,402       826,630       862,218  
    Equity securities   10,828       15,862       9,790  
    Loans held for sale   7,270       3,657       6,827  
    Portfolio loans   13,868,357       7,697,087       7,588,077  
    Allowance for credit losses   (195,210 )     (83,404 )     (91,562 )
    Restricted bank stock   53,518       49,930       6,000  
    Premises and equipment, net   182,003       118,820       121,506  
    Right of use assets   40,594       10,608       10,590  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net   496,118       365,975       351,455  
    Other assets   711,206       533,677       533,414  
    Total assets $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
               
    LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY          
    Liabilities          
    Total deposits $ 16,459,470     $ 9,982,490     $ 9,960,191  
    Securities sold under agreements to repurchase   137,340       155,610       147,175  
    Short-term borrowings   11,209              
    Long-term debt   306,509       227,723       223,100  
    Junior subordinated debt owed to unconsolidated trusts   77,117       74,815       72,040  
    Lease liabilities   41,111       11,040       10,896  
    Other liabilities   251,890       211,775       191,405  
    Total liabilities   17,284,646       10,663,453       10,604,807  
               
    Stockholders’ equity          
    Retained earnings   249,484       294,054       248,412  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)   (172,810 )     (207,039 )     (222,190 )
    Other stockholders’ equity1   2,102,932       1,296,254       1,256,429  
    Total stockholders’ equity   2,179,606       1,383,269       1,282,651  
    Total liabilities & stockholders’ equity $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
               
    SHARE AND PER SHARE AMOUNTS          
    Book value per common share2 $ 24.13     $ 24.31     $ 23.19  
    Tangible book value per common share2 $ 18.62     $ 17.88     $ 16.84  
    Ending number of common shares outstanding   90,008,178       56,895,981       55,300,008  

    ___________________________________________
    1. Net balance of preferred stock ($0.001 par value), common stock ($0.001 par value), additional paid-in capital, and treasury stock.
    2. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

    AVERAGE BALANCES (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    ASSETS          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 861,021   $ 776,572   $ 594,193
    Investment securities   2,782,435     2,597,309     2,907,144
    Loans held for sale   3,443     6,306     4,833
    Portfolio loans   9,838,337     7,738,772     7,599,316
    Interest-earning assets   13,363,594     11,048,350     11,005,903
    Total assets   14,831,298     12,085,993     12,024,208
               
    LIABILITIES & STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY          
    Noninterest-bearing deposits   3,036,127     2,724,344     2,708,586
    Interest-bearing deposits   9,142,781     7,325,662     7,330,105
    Total deposits   12,178,908     10,050,006     10,038,691
    Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase   144,838     135,728     178,659
    Interest-bearing liabilities   9,627,841     7,763,729     7,831,655
    Total liabilities   12,896,222     10,689,054     10,748,484
    Stockholders’ equity – preferred   2,669        
    Stockholders’ equity – common   1,932,407     1,396,939     1,275,724
    Tangible common equity1   1,521,387     1,029,539     922,710

    ___________________________________________
    1. See “Non-GAAP Financial Information” for reconciliation.

    Busey’s financial strength is built on a long-term conservative operating approach. That focus will not change now or in the future.

    Total assets were $19.46 billion as of March 31, 2025, compared to $12.05 billion as of December 31, 2024, and $11.89 billion as of March 31, 2024. Average interest-earning assets were $13.36 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $11.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024, and $11.01 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Portfolio Loans

    We remain steadfast in our conservative approach to underwriting and our disciplined approach to pricing, particularly given our outlook for the economy in the coming quarters. Portfolio loans totaled $13.87 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $7.70 billion at December 31, 2024, and $7.59 billion at March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s portfolio loans grew by $133.6 million during the first quarter of 2025, with growth centered in the commercial category. In addition, as of March 31, 2024, CrossFirst Bank added $6.04 billion in loans to Busey’s loan portfolio.

    Average portfolio loans were $9.84 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $7.74 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $7.60 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Asset Quality

    Asset quality continues to be strong. Busey Bank maintains a well-diversified loan portfolio and, as a matter of policy and practice, limits concentration exposure in any particular loan segment. CrossFirst Bank’s policies are similar in nature to Busey Bank’s policies and Busey is in the process of migrating the legacy CrossFirst portfolio toward Busey Bank’s policies.

    ASSET QUALITY (unaudited)
               
      As of
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total assets $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
    Portfolio loans   13,868,357       7,697,087       7,588,077  
    Loans 30 – 89 days past due   18,554       8,124       7,441  
    Non-performing loans:          
    Non-accrual loans   48,647       22,088       17,465  
    Loans 90+ days past due and still accruing   6,077       1,149       88  
    Non-performing loans   54,724       23,237       17,553  
    Other non-performing assets   4,757       63       65  
    Non-performing assets   59,481       23,300       17,618  
    Substandard (excludes 90+ days past due)   131,078       62,023       87,830  
    Classified assets $ 190,559     $ 85,323     $ 105,448  
               
    Allowance for credit losses $ 195,210     $ 83,404     $ 91,562  
               
    RATIOS          
    Non-performing loans to portfolio loans   0.39 %     0.30 %     0.23 %
    Non-performing assets to total assets   0.31 %     0.19 %     0.15 %
    Non-performing assets to portfolio loans and other non-performing assets   0.43 %     0.30 %     0.23 %
    Allowance for credit losses to portfolio loans   1.41 %     1.08 %     1.21 %
    Coverage ratio of the allowance for credit losses to non-performing loans 3.57 x   3.59 x   5.22 x
    Classified assets to Bank Tier 1 capital1and reserves   8.40 %     5.61 %     7.24 %

    ___________________________________________
    1. Capital amounts for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

    Loans 30-89 days past due increased by $10.4 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $11.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $6.1 million, a decrease of $2.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s loans 30-89 days past due were $12.5 million as of March 31, 2025.

    Non-performing loans increased by $31.5 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $37.2 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing loans were $6.8 million, a decrease of $16.4 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing loans were $47.9 million as of March 31, 2025. Continued disciplined credit management resulted in non-performing loans as a percentage of portfolio loans of 0.39% as of March 31, 2025, a 9 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

    Non-performing assets increased by $36.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $41.9 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s non-performing assets were $7.1 million, a decrease of $16.2 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s non-performing assets were $52.4 million as of March 31, 2025. Non-performing assets represented 0.31% of total assets as of March 31, 2025, a 12 basis point increase from December 31, 2024, and a 16 basis point increase from March 31, 2024.

    Classified assets increased by $105.2 million compared to December 31, 2024, and increased by $85.1 million compared to March 31, 2024. Busey Bank’s classified assets were $81.3 million, a decrease of $4.0 million compared to December 31, 2024. CrossFirst Bank’s classified assets were $109.3 million as of March 31, 2025.

    The allowance for credit losses was $195.2 million as of March 31, 2025, representing 1.41% of total portfolio loans outstanding, and providing coverage of 3.57 times our non-performing loans balance. In connection with the CrossFirst acquisition, the Day 1 allowance recorded for loans that were purchased with credit deterioration (“PCD” loans) was $100.8 million. The Day 1 PCD allowance was recorded as an adjustment to the fair value of the PCD loans.

    NET CHARGE-OFFS (RECOVERIES) AND PROVISION EXPENSE (RELEASE) (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands) March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net charge-offs (recoveries) $ 31,429   $ 2,850   $ 5,216
    Provision expense (release)   42,452     1,273     5,038
                     

    Net charge-offs increased by $28.6 million when compared to the fourth quarter of 2024, and by $26.2 million when compared with the first quarter of 2024. Net charge-offs include $29.6 million related to PCD loans acquired from CrossFirst Bank, which were fully reserved at acquisition and did not require recording additional provision expense.

    Busey’s results for the first quarter of 2025 include $42.5 million provision expense for credit losses, which includes $42.4 million that was recorded to establish an initial allowance for credit losses on non-PCD acquired loans.

    Deposits

    Total deposits were $16.46 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $9.98 billion at December 31, 2024, and $9.96 billion at March 31, 2024. Average deposits were $12.18 billion for the first quarter of 2025, compared to $10.05 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024 and $10.04 billion for the first quarter of 2024.

    Core deposits2 accounted for 89.7% of total deposits as of March 31, 2025. The quality of our core deposit franchise is a critical value driver of our institution. We estimated that 32% of our deposits were uninsured and uncollateralized4 as of March 31, 2025, and we have sufficient on- and off-balance sheet liquidity to manage deposit fluctuations and the liquidity needs of our customers.

    We have executed various deposit campaigns to attract term funding and savings accounts at a lower rate than our marginal cost of funds. New certificate of deposit production in the first quarter of 2025 had a weighted average term of 7.8 months at a rate of 3.58%, which was 96 basis points below our average marginal wholesale equivalent-term funding cost during the quarter.

    Borrowings

    As of March 31, 2025, Busey Bank held $16.7 million of long-term Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLB”) borrowings. In comparison, Busey Bank had no short-term or long-term FHLB borrowings as of December 31, 2024, or March 31, 2024. As of March 31, 2025, CrossFirst Bank held $11.2 million of short-term FHLB borrowings and $61.9 million of long-term FHLB borrowings.

    In addition, associated with the CrossFirst acquisition, Busey assumed trust preferred securities with a recorded balance of $2.2 million as of March 31, 2025.

    Liquidity

    As of March 31, 2025, our available sources of on- and off-balance sheet liquidity5 totaled $8.55 billion. Furthermore, our balance sheet liquidity profile continues to be aided by the cash flows we expect from our relatively short-duration securities portfolio. Those cash flows were approximately $119.7 million in the first quarter of 2025. Cash flows from maturing securities within our portfolio are expected to be approximately $302.3 million for the remainder of 2025, with a current book yield of 2.55%, and approximately $308.1 million for 2026, with a current book yield of 2.59%.

    Capital Strength

    The strength of our balance sheet is also reflected in our capital foundation. Although impacted by the strategic deployment of capital for the CrossFirst acquisition, our capital ratios remain strong, and as of March 31, 2025, our regulatory capital ratios continued to provide a buffer of more than $630 million above levels required to be designated well-capitalized. Busey’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio is estimated6 to be 11.99% at March 31, 2025, compared to 14.10% at December 31, 2024, and 13.45% at March 31, 2024. Our Total Capital to Risk Weighted Assets ratio is estimated6 to be 14.87% at March 31, 2025, compared to 18.53% at December 31, 2024, and 17.95% at March 31, 2024.

    Busey’s tangible common equity2 was $1.68 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $1.02 billion at December 31, 2024, and $931.2 million at March 31, 2024. Tangible common equity2 represented 8.83% of tangible assets at March 31, 2025, compared to 8.71% at December 31, 2024, and 8.07% at March 31, 2024.

    Busey’s tangible book value per common share2 was $18.62 at March 31, 2025, compared to $17.88 at December 31, 2024, and $16.84 at March 31, 2024, reflecting a 10.6% year-over-year increase. The ratios of tangible common equity to tangible assets2 and tangible book value per common share have been impacted by the fair market valuation adjustment of Busey’s securities portfolio as a result of the current rate environment, which is reflected in the accumulated other comprehensive income (loss) component of shareholder’s equity.

    Busey’s strong capital levels, coupled with its earnings, have allowed the Company to provide a steady return to its stockholders through dividends. During the first quarter of 2025, we paid a dividend of $0.25 per share on Busey’s common stock, which represents a 4.2% increase from the previous quarterly dividend of $0.24 per share. Busey has consistently paid dividends to its common stockholders since the bank holding company was organized in 1980.

    During the first quarter of 2025, Busey resumed making stock repurchases under its stock repurchase plan, purchasing 220,000 shares of its common stock at a weighted average price of $21.98 per share for a total of $4.8 million. As of March 31, 2025, Busey had 1,699,275 shares remaining on its stock repurchase plan available for repurchase.

    FIRST QUARTER EARNINGS INVESTOR PRESENTATION

    For additional information on Busey’s financial condition and operating results, please refer to our Q1 2025 Earnings Investor Presentation furnished via Form 8‑K on April 22, 2025, in connection with this earnings release.

    CORPORATE PROFILE

    As of March 31, 2025, First Busey Corporation (Nasdaq: BUSE) was a $19.46 billion financial holding company headquartered in Leawood, Kansas.

    Busey Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Champaign, Illinois, had total assets of $11.98 billion as of March 31, 2025. Busey Bank currently has 62 banking centers, with 21 in Central Illinois markets, 17 in suburban Chicago markets, 20 in the St. Louis Metropolitan Statistical Area, three in Southwest Florida, and one in Indianapolis. More information about Busey Bank can be found at busey.com.

    CrossFirst Bank, a wholly-owned bank subsidiary of First Busey Corporation headquartered in Leawood, Kansas, had total assets of $7.45 billion as of March 31, 2025. CrossFirst Bank currently has 16 banking centers located across Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. More information about CrossFirst Bank can be found at crossfirstbank.com. It is anticipated that CrossFirst Bank will be merged with and into Busey Bank on June 20, 2025.

    Through Busey’s Wealth Management division, the Company provides a full range of asset management, investment, brokerage, fiduciary, philanthropic advisory, tax preparation, and farm management services to individuals, businesses, and foundations. Assets under care totaled $13.68 billion as of March 31, 2025. More information about Busey’s Wealth Management services can be found at busey.com/wealth-management.

    Busey Bank’s wholly-owned subsidiary, FirsTech, specializes in the evolving financial technology needs of small and medium-sized businesses, highly regulated enterprise industries, and financial institutions. FirsTech provides comprehensive and innovative payment technology solutions, including online, mobile, and voice-recognition bill payments; money and data movement; merchant services; direct debit services; lockbox remittance processing for payments made by mail; and walk-in payments at retail agents. Additionally, FirsTech simplifies client workflows through integrations enabling support with billing, reconciliation, bill reminders, and treasury services. More information about FirsTech can be found at firstechpayments.com.

    For the fourth consecutive year, Busey was named among 2025’s America’s Best Banks by Forbes. Ranked 88th overall, Busey was one of seven banks headquartered in Illinois included on this year’s list. Busey was also named among the 2024 Best Banks to Work For by American Banker, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Money Management by Pensions and Investments, the 2024 Best Places to Work in Illinois by Daily Herald Business Ledger, the 2025 Best Places to Work in Indiana by the Indiana Chamber of Commerce, and the 2024 Best Companies to Work For in Florida by Florida Trend magazine. We are honored to be consistently recognized globally, nationally and locally for our engaged culture of integrity and commitment to community development.

    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL INFORMATION

    This earnings release contains certain financial information determined by methods other than GAAP. Management uses these non-GAAP measures, together with the related GAAP measures, in analysis of Busey’s performance and in making business decisions, as well as for comparison to Busey’s peers. Busey believes the adjusted measures are useful for investors and management to understand the effects of certain non-core and non-recurring items and provide additional perspective on Busey’s performance over time.

    The following tables present reconciliations between these non-GAAP measures and what management believes to be the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

    These non-GAAP disclosures have inherent limitations and are not audited. They should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for operating results reported in accordance with GAAP, nor are they necessarily comparable to non-GAAP performance measures that may be presented by other companies. Tax effected numbers included in these non-GAAP disclosures are based on estimated statutory rates, estimated federal income tax rates, or effective tax rates, as noted with the tables below.

    RECONCILIATION OF NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES (Unaudited)
     
    Pre-Provision Net Revenue and Related Measures
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Total noninterest income (GAAP)     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Net security (gains) losses (GAAP)     15,768       196       6,375  
    Total noninterest expense (GAAP)     (115,171 )     (78,167 )     (70,769 )
    Pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP) [a]   25,551       38,828       46,373  
    Acquisition and restructuring expenses     26,026       3,585       408  
    Provision for unfunded commitments1     3,141       (455 )     (678 )
    Realized (gain) loss on the sale of mortgage service rights                 (7,465 )
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 54,718     $ 41,958     $ 38,638  
                 
    Average total assets [c]   14,831,298       12,085,993       12,024,208  
                 
    Pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)2 [a÷c]   0.70 %     1.28 %     1.55 %
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average total assets (Non-GAAP)2 [b÷c]   1.50 %     1.38 %     1.29 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
    2. Annualized measure.
    Adjusted Net Income, Average Tangible Common Equity, and Related Ratios
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net income (loss) (GAAP) [a] $ (29,990 )   $ 28,105     $ 26,225  
    Acquisition expenses     26,026       2,469       285  
    Restructuring expenses           1,116       123  
    Day 2 provision for credit losses1     42,433              
    Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments2     3,139              
    Net securities (gains) losses     15,768       196       6,375  
    Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights                 (7,465 )
    Related tax (benefit) expense3     (22,069 )     (1,014 )     170  
    One-time deferred tax valuation adjustment4     4,591              
    Adjusted net income (Non-GAAP)5 [b] $ 39,898     $ 30,872     $ 25,713  
                 
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (GAAP) [c]   68,517,647       57,934,812       56,406,500  
    Diluted earnings (loss) per common share (GAAP) [a÷c] $ (0.44 )   $ 0.49     $ 0.46  
                 
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding, diluted (Non-GAAP)6 [d]   69,502,717       57,934,812       56,406,500  
    Adjusted diluted earnings per common share (Non-GAAP)5,6 [b÷d] $ 0.57     $ 0.53     $ 0.46  
                 
    Average total assets [e] $ 14,831,298     $ 12,085,993     $ 12,024,208  
    Return on average assets (Non-GAAP)7 [a÷e] (0.82 )%     0.93 %     0.88 %
    Adjusted return on average assets (Non-GAAP)5,7 [b÷e]   1.09 %     1.02 %     0.86 %
                 
    Average common equity   $ 1,932,407     $ 1,396,939     $ 1,275,724  
    Average goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (411,020 )     (367,400 )     (353,014 )
    Average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP) [f] $ 1,521,387     $ 1,029,539     $ 922,710  
                 
    Return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)7 [a÷f] (7.99 )%     10.86 %     11.43 %
    Adjusted return on average tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)5,7 [b÷f]   10.64 %     11.93 %     11.21 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. The Day 2 allowance for credit losses was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition to establish an allowance on non-PCD loans and is reflected within the provision for credit losses line on the Statement of Income.
    2. The Day 2 provision for unfunded commitments was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and is reflected within the other noninterest expense line, as a component of total noninterest expense, on the Statement of Income.
    3. Tax benefits were calculated using tax rates of 25.3%, 26.8%, and 24.9% for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively.
    4. The deferred tax valuation adjustment was recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition and relates to the expansion of Busey’s footprint into new states. The deferred tax valuation adjustment is reflected within the income taxes line on the Statement of Income.
    5. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted net income for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for net securities gains and losses, realized net gains and losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights, and one-time deferred tax valuation adjustments. In 2024, these adjusting items were previously presented as further adjustments to adjusted net income.
    6. Dilution includes shares that would have been dilutive if there had been net income during the period.
    7. Annualized measure.
    Tax-Equivalent Net Interest Income, Adjusted Net Interest Income, Net Interest Margin, and Adjusted Net Interest Margin
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP)   $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Tax-equivalent adjustment1     537       446       449  
    Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP) [a]   104,268       82,024       76,303  
    Purchase accounting accretion related to business combinations     (2,728 )     (812 )     (204 )
    Adjusted net interest income (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 101,540     $ 81,212     $ 76,099  
                 
    Average interest-earning assets (Non-GAAP) [c] $ 13,363,594     $ 11,048,350     $ 11,005,903  
                 
    Net interest margin (Non-GAAP)2 [a÷c]   3.16 %     2.95 %     2.79 %
    Adjusted net interest margin (Non-GAAP)2 [b÷c]   3.08 %     2.92 %     2.78 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
    2. Annualized measure.
    Adjusted Noninterest Income, Revenue Measures, Adjusted Noninterest Expense, Efficiency Ratios, and Adjusted Noninterest Expense to Average Assets
                 
        Three Months Ended
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Net interest income (GAAP) [a] $ 103,731     $ 81,578     $ 75,854  
    Tax-equivalent adjustment1     537       446       449  
    Tax-equivalent net interest income (Non-GAAP) [b]   104,268       82,024       76,303  
                 
    Total noninterest income (GAAP)     21,223       35,221       34,913  
    Net security (gains) losses     15,768       196       6,375  
    Noninterest income excluding net securities gains and losses (Non-GAAP) [c]   36,991       35,417       41,288  
    Realized net (gains) losses on the sale of mortgage servicing rights                 (7,465 )
    Adjusted noninterest income (Non-GAAP) [d] $ 36,991     $ 35,417     $ 33,823  
                 
    Tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP) [e = b+c] $ 141,259     $ 117,441     $ 117,591  
    Adjusted tax-equivalent revenue (Non-GAAP) [f = b+d] $ 141,259     $ 117,441     $ 110,126  
    Operating revenue (Non-GAAP) [g = a+d] $ 140,722     $ 116,995     $ 109,677  
                 
    Adjusted noninterest income to operating revenue (Non-GAAP) [d÷g]   26.29 %     30.27 %     30.84 %
                 
    Total noninterest expense (GAAP)   $ 115,171     $ 78,167     $ 70,769  
    Amortization of intangible assets     (3,083 )     (2,471 )     (2,409 )
    Noninterest expense excluding amortization of intangible assets (Non-GAAP) [h]   112,088       75,696       68,360  
    Acquisition and restructuring expenses     (26,026 )     (3,585 )     (408 )
    Provision for unfunded commitments2     (3,141 )     455       678  
    Adjusted noninterest expense (Non-GAAP)3 [i] $ 82,921     $ 72,566     $ 68,630  
                 
    Efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP) [h÷e]   79.35 %     64.45 %     58.13 %
    Adjusted efficiency ratio (Non-GAAP)3 [i÷f]   58.70 %     61.79 %     62.32 %
                 
    Average total assets [j] $ 14,831,298     $ 12,085,993     $ 12,024,208  
    Adjusted noninterest expense to average assets (Non-GAAP)4 [i÷j]   2.27 %     2.39 %     2.30 %

    ___________________________________________

    1. Tax-equivalent adjustments were calculated using an estimated federal income tax rate of 21%, applied to non-taxable interest income on investments and loans.
    2. For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the provision for unfunded commitments included Day 2 provision expense of $3.139 million recorded in connection with the CrossFirst acquisition.
    3. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of adjusted noninterest expense and the adjusted efficiency ratio for all periods presented to include, as applicable, adjustments for the provision for unfunded commitments. In 2024, these adjustments were previously presented as adjustments for adjusted core expense and the adjusted core efficiency ratio.
    4. Annualized measure.
    Tangible Assets, Tangible Common Equity, and Related Measures and Ratio
                 
        As of
    (dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total assets (GAAP)   $ 19,464,252     $ 12,046,722     $ 11,887,458  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (496,118 )     (365,975 )     (351,455 )
    Tangible assets (Non-GAAP)1 [a] $ 18,968,134     $ 11,680,747     $ 11,536,003  
                 
    Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP)   $ 2,179,606     $ 1,383,269     $ 1,282,651  
    Preferred stock and additional paid in capital on preferred stock     (7,750 )            
    Common equity [b]   2,171,856       1,383,269       1,282,651  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net     (496,118 )     (365,975 )     (351,455 )
    Tangible common equity (Non-GAAP)1 [c] $ 1,675,738     $ 1,017,294     $ 931,196  
                 
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (Non-GAAP)1 [c÷a]   8.83 %     8.71 %     8.07 %
                 
    Ending number of common shares outstanding (GAAP) [d]   90,008,178       56,895,981       55,300,008  
    Book value per common share (Non-GAAP) [b÷d] $ 24.13     $ 24.31     $ 23.19  
    Tangible book value per common share (Non-GAAP) [c÷d] $ 18.62     $ 17.88     $ 16.84  

    ___________________________________________

    1. Beginning in 2025, Busey revised its calculation of tangible assets and tangible common equity for all periods presented to exclude any tax adjustment.
    Core Deposits and Related Ratio
                 
        As of
    (dollars in thousands)   March 31,
    2025
      December 31,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
    Total deposits (GAAP) [a] $ 16,459,470     $ 9,982,490     $ 9,960,191  
    Brokered deposits, excluding brokered time deposits of $250,000 or more     (722,309 )     (13,090 )     (6,001 )
    Time deposits of $250,000 or more     (967,262 )     (334,503 )     (326,795 )
    Core deposits (Non-GAAP) [b] $ 14,769,899     $ 9,634,897     $ 9,627,395  
                 
    Core deposits to total deposits (Non-GAAP) [b÷a]   89.73 %     96.52 %     96.66 %
     

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

    This press release may contain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 with respect to Busey’s financial condition, results of operations, plans, objectives, future performance, and business. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of Busey’s management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “plan,” “intend,” “estimate,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could,” “should,” “position,” or other similar expressions. Additionally, all statements in this document, including forward-looking statements, speak only as of the date they are made, and Busey undertakes no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events.

    A number of factors, many of which are beyond Busey’s ability to control or predict, could cause actual results to differ materially from those in any forward-looking statements. These factors include, among others, the following: (1) the strength of the local, state, national, and international economies and financial markets (including effects of inflationary pressures and supply chain constraints); (2) changes in, and the interpretation and prioritization of, local, state, and federal laws, regulations, and governmental policies (including those concerning Busey’s general business); (3) the economic impact of any future terrorist threats or attacks, widespread disease or pandemics, or other adverse external events that could cause economic deterioration or instability in credit markets (including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East); (4) unexpected results of acquisitions, including the acquisition of CrossFirst, which may include the failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the acquisitions and the possibility that the transaction and integration costs may be greater than anticipated; (5) the imposition of tariffs or other governmental policies impacting the value of products produced by Busey’s commercial borrowers; (6) new or revised accounting policies and practices as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory banking agencies, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; (7) changes in interest rates and prepayment rates of Busey’s assets (including the impact of sustained elevated interest rates); (8) increased competition in the financial services sector (including from non-bank competitors such as credit unions and fintech companies) and the inability to attract new customers; (9) changes in technology and the ability to develop and maintain secure and reliable electronic systems; (10) the loss of key executives or associates, talent shortages, and employee turnover; (11) unexpected outcomes and costs of existing or new litigation, investigations, or other legal proceedings, inquiries, and regulatory actions involving Busey (including with respect to Busey’s Illinois franchise taxes); (12) fluctuations in the value of securities held in Busey’s securities portfolio, including as a result of changes in interest rates; (13) credit risk and risk from concentrations (by type of borrower, geographic area, collateral, and industry), within Busey’s loan portfolio and large loans to certain borrowers (including commercial real estate loans); (14) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients who have balances above current Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limits and may withdraw deposits to diversify their exposure; (15) the level of non-performing assets on Busey’s balance sheets; (16) interruptions involving information technology and communications systems or third-party servicers; (17) breaches or failures of information security controls or cybersecurity-related incidents; (18) the economic impact on Busey and its customers of climate change, natural disasters, and exceptional weather occurrences such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and droughts; (19) the ability to successfully manage liquidity risk, which may increase dependence on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits, and may negatively impact Busey’s cost of funds; (20) the ability to maintain an adequate level of allowance for credit losses on loans; (21) the effectiveness of Busey’s risk management framework; and (22) the ability of Busey to manage the risks associated with the foregoing. These risks and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating forward-looking statements and undue reliance should not be placed on such statements.

    Additional information concerning Busey and its business, including additional factors that could materially affect Busey’s financial results, is included in Busey’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    END NOTES

    1 Annualized measure.
    2 Represents a non-GAAP financial measure. For a reconciliation to the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), see “Non-GAAP Financial Information.”
    3 The blended benchmark consists of 60% MSCI All Country World Index and 40% Bloomberg Intermediate US Government/Credit Total Return Index.
    4 Estimated uninsured and uncollateralized deposits consist of account balances in excess of the $250 thousand Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance limit, less intercompany accounts, fully collateralized accounts (including preferred deposits), and pass-through accounts where clients have deposit insurance at the correspondent financial institution.
    5 On- and off-balance sheet liquidity is comprised of cash and cash equivalents, debt securities excluding those pledged as collateral, brokered deposits, and Busey’s borrowing capacity through its revolving credit facility, the FHLB, the Federal Reserve Bank, and federal funds purchased lines.
    6 Capital amounts and ratios for the first quarter of 2025 are not yet finalized and are subject to change.

    INVESTOR CONTACT: Scott A. Phillips, Interim Chief Financial Officer | 239-689-7167

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Baker Hughes Company Announces First-Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    First-quarter highlights

    • Orders of $6.5 billion, including $3.2 billion of IET orders.
    • RPO of $33.2 billion, including record IET RPO of $30.4 billion.
    • Revenue of $6.4 billion, consistent year-over-year.
    • Attributable net income of $402 million.
    • GAAP diluted EPS of $0.40 and adjusted diluted EPS* of $0.51.
    • Adjusted EBITDA* of $1,037 million, up 10% year-over-year.
    • Cash flows from operating activities of $709 million and free cash flow* of $454 million.
    • Returns to shareholders of $417 million, including $188 million of share repurchases.

    HOUSTON and LONDON, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Baker Hughes Company (Nasdaq: BKR) (“Baker Hughes” or the “Company”) announced results today for the first quarter of 2025.

    “Baker Hughes started the year strong, building on the positive momentum from 2024 and setting multiple first-quarter records. Our continued transformation initiatives and strong execution continue to drive structural margin improvement across both segments. The operational transformation and streamlining efforts have created a solid foundation to optimize margins and enhance returns, even in a challenging environment,” said Lorenzo Simonelli, Baker Hughes chairman and chief executive officer.

    “In our IET segment, we booked $3.2 billion of orders, including our first data center awards, totaling more than 350 MW of power solutions for this rapidly evolving market. In addition to expanding opportunities for data centers, we have a strong pipeline of LNG, FPSO and gas infrastructure projects that support our order outlook for this year.”

    “In OFSE, EBITDA remained resilient as our margins saw noticeable improvement compared to last year even while segment revenue fell. This is a testament to the team’s hard work in changing the way the business operates.”

    “Although our outlook is tempered by broader macro and trade policy uncertainty, we remain confident in our strategy and the resilience of our portfolio. We believe Baker Hughes is well positioned to navigate near-term challenges and deliver sustainable growth in shareholder value.”

    “I want to thank our employees, whose hard work, dedication and focus have been instrumental to the continued success of Baker Hughes. As we continue to execute our strategy amidst an uncertain macro backdrop, we remain committed to our customers, shareholders and employees,” concluded Simonelli.

    * Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

      Three Months Ended   Variance
    (in millions except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 6,459 $ 7,496 $ 6,542   (14 %) (1 %)
    Revenue   6,427   7,364   6,418   (13 %) %
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes   402   1,179   455   (66 %) (12 %)
    Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes*   509   694   429   (27 %) 19 %
    Adjusted EBITDA*   1,037   1,310   943   (21 %) 10 %
    Diluted earnings per share (EPS)   0.40   1.18   0.45   (66 %) (11 %)
    Adjusted diluted EPS*   0.51   0.70   0.43   (27 %) 19 %
    Cash flow from operating activities   709   1,189   784   (40 %) (10 %)
    Free cash flow*   454   894   502   (49 %) (10 %)

    * Non-GAAP measure. See reconciliations in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Certain columns and rows in our tables and financial statements may not sum up due to the use of rounded numbers.

    Quarter Highlights

    Baker Hughes expanded its leadership position in liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) in the first quarter, including a liquefaction train award from Bechtel for a project in North America, where the Company will provide four main refrigerant compressors driven by LM6000+ gas turbines and four expander-compressors. This award builds on the previously announced December 2024 award and further demonstrates the strength of the Company’s collaboration with Bechtel to support North America LNG development.

    During the quarter, Industrial & Energy Technology (“IET”) signed key strategic framework agreements with LNG operators. The Company agreed to provide gas turbines and refrigerant compressor technology, along with maintenance services, for Trains 4 to 8 of NextDecade’s Rio Grande LNG Facility. Baker Hughes also reached an agreement with Argent LNG to provide liquefaction and power solutions and related aftermarket services for its proposed 24 MTPA LNG export facility in Louisiana. The project will employ Baker Hughes’ NMBL™ modularized LNG solution, driven by the LM9000 gas turbine, while also utilizing the Company’s iCenter™ and Cordant™ digital solution, to enhance the plant’s operational efficiency.

    Baker Hughes also demonstrated its continuous commitment to critical gas infrastructure projects with a strategic win in the North America pipeline compression market. The award includes the provision of two gas compression stations for a total of 10 Frame 5/2E gas turbines and 10 centrifugal compressors, anti-surge valves and critical spare parts.

    In the first quarter, Baker Hughes made significant progress in reliable and sustainable power solutions deployment for data centers. In addition to being awarded over 350 MW of NovaLT™ turbines to power data centers with various other customers, the Company partnered with Frontier Infrastructure to accelerate the development of large-scale carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) and power solutions for data centers and industrial customers in the U.S. This partnership will leverage technologies and services across the Baker Hughes enterprise by providing CO₂ compression, NovaLT™ gas turbines, digital monitoring solutions, well construction and completion services.

    In continued demonstration of Gas Technology’s lifecycle offerings in IET, the Company received several aftermarket service awards during the quarter. In Algeria, the Gas Technology Services (“GTS”) team is partnering with SONATRACH to deliver an upgrade solution for the modernization of a key compressor station. In the Middle East, Gas Technology received multiple equipment and services awards to support one of the world’s largest gas processing plants. The scope includes rejuvenation of two existing gas turbines to drive new compressors and the supply of a third compression train to support production expansion.

    IET’s Industrial Solutions gained momentum with its Cordant™ Asset Performance Management (“APM”) solution, securing several contracts with customers across multiple regions. ADNOC Offshore will deploy the full APM suite to enhance production availability and efficiency. In the Americas, a large international oil company will conduct a proof of concept across multiple equipment trains, to support a shift from proactive to predictive maintenance. In Australia, the Company signed agreements to develop asset maintenance strategies for new mine sites supporting truck fleet maintenance.

    Oilfield Services & Equipment (“OFSE”) received a significant award from ExxonMobil Guyana to provide specialty chemicals and related services for its Uaru and Whiptail offshore greenfield developments in the country’s prolific Stabroek Block, highlighting the differentiated capabilities of our Production Solutions offering. For this multi-year contract, the scope will cover topsides, subsea, water injection and utility chemicals to help ExxonMobil Guyana achieve optimal production.

    OFSE continues to leverage the Company’s innovative solutions to help Petrobras unlock Brazil’s vast energy supply. In the quarter and following an open tender, Baker Hughes received a significant, multi-year fully integrated completions systems contract from Petrobras across multiple deepwater fields. A range of Baker Hughes’ technologies, including the new SureCONTROLTM Premium interval control valve, has been specifically tailored to meet the needs of the country’s offshore developments.

    OFSE secured a multi-year contract with Dubai Petroleum Establishment, for and on behalf of Dubai Supply Authority, to provide integrated coiled-tubing drilling services for the Company’s Margham Gas storage project. This follows a third-quarter 2024 IET award for integrated compressor line units for the same project, demonstrating growing commercial synergies across Baker Hughes’ diverse portfolio.

    The Company drove growth in Mature Assets Solutions, signing a multi-year framework agreement with Equinor to help establish a new Center of Excellence for Plug & Abandonment work in the North Sea. Based within OFSE’s operations in Bergen and Stavanger, Norway, this hub will ensure economical, reliable solutions are implemented to responsibly abandon each well, allowing Equinor to maximize value of their assets and allocate more resources to exploration and discovery.

    On the digital front, OFSE received an award from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (“SOCAR”) to expand deployment of Leucipa™ automated field production solution for all its wells, including those with non-Baker Hughes electric submersible pumps, in the Absheron and Gunseli fields. Leucipa also marked its first deployment in Sub-Saharan Africa through an agreement with the NNPC/FIRST E&P joint venture, which will utilize the platform across its offshore wells in the Niger Delta.

    Consolidated Financial Results

    Revenue for the quarter was $6,427 million, a decrease of 13% sequentially and up $9 million year-over-year. The increase in revenue year-over-year was driven by an increase in IET and partially offset by a decrease in OFSE.

    The Company’s total book-to-bill ratio in the first quarter of 2025 was 1.0; the IET book-to-bill ratio was 1.1.

    Net income as determined in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”), for the first quarter of 2025 was $402 million. Net income decreased $777 million sequentially and decreased $53 million year-over-year.

    Adjusted net income (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $509 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $108 million. A list of the adjusting items and associated reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted net income for the first quarter of 2025 was down 27% sequentially and up 19% year-over-year.

    Depreciation and amortization for the first quarter of 2025 was $285 million.

    Adjusted EBITDA (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the first quarter of 2025 was $1,037 million, which excludes adjustments totaling $140 million. See Table 1a in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.” Adjusted EBITDA for the first quarter was down 21% sequentially and up 10% year-over-year.

    The sequential decrease in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume in both segments, partially offset by productivity and structural cost-out initiatives. The year-over-year increase in adjusted net income and adjusted EBITDA was driven by increased volume in IET including higher proportionate growth in Gas Technology Equipment (“GTE”) and productivity, structural cost-out initiatives and higher pricing in both segments, partially offset by decreased volume and business mix in OFSE and cost inflation in both segments.

    Other Financial Items

    Remaining Performance Obligations (“RPO”) in the first quarter of 2025 ended at $33.2 billion, a decrease of $0.1 billion from the fourth quarter of 2024. OFSE RPO was $2.8 billion, down 7% sequentially, while IET RPO was $30.4 billion, up $300 million sequentially. Within IET RPO, GTE RPO was $11.9 billion and GTS RPO was $15.1 billion.

    Income tax expense in the first quarter of 2025 was $152 million.

    Other (income) expense, net in the first quarter of 2025 was $140 million, primarily related to changes in fair value for equity securities of $140 million.

    GAAP diluted earnings per share was $0.40. Adjusted diluted earnings per share (a non-GAAP financial measure) was $0.51. Excluded from adjusted diluted earnings per share were all items listed in Table 1b in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Cash flow from operating activities was $709 million for the first quarter of 2025. Free cash flow (a non-GAAP financial measure) for the quarter was $454 million. A reconciliation from GAAP has been provided in Table 1c in the section titled “Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures.”

    Capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets, were $255 million for the first quarter of 2025, of which $158 million was for OFSE and $83 million was for IET.

    Results by Reporting Segment

    The following segment discussions and variance explanations are intended to reflect management’s view of the relevant comparisons of financial results on a sequential or year-over-year basis, depending on the business dynamics of the reporting segments.

    Oilfield Services & Equipment

    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Segment results March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 3,281   $ 3,740   $ 3,624     (12 %) (9 %)
    Revenue $ 3,499   $ 3,871   $ 3,783     (10 %) (8 %)
    EBITDA $ 623   $ 755   $ 644     (18 %) (3 %)
    EBITDA margin   17.8 %   19.5 %   17.0 %   -1.7pts 0.8pts
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Well Construction $ 892 $ 943 $ 1,061   (5 %) (16 %)
    Completions, Intervention, and Measurements   925   1,022   1,006   (9 %) (8 %)
    Production Solutions   899   974   945   (8 %) (5 %)
    Subsea & Surface Pressure Systems   782   932   771   (16 %) 1 %
    Total Revenue $ 3,499 $ 3,871 $ 3,783   (10 %) (8 %)
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Geographic Region March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    North America $ 922 $ 971 $ 990   (5 %) (7 %)
    Latin America   568   661   637   (14 %) (11 %)
    Europe/CIS/Sub-Saharan Africa   580   740   750   (22 %) (23 %)
    Middle East/Asia   1,429   1,499   1,405   (5 %) 2 %
    Total Revenue $ 3,499 $ 3,871 $ 3,783   (10 %) (8 %)
                 
    North America $ 922 $ 971 $ 990   (5 %) (7 %)
    International $ 2,577 $ 2,900 $ 2,793   (11 %) (8 %)

    EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $226 million, $229 million, and $222 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

    OFSE orders of $3,281 million for the first quarter of 2025 decreased by 12% sequentially. Subsea and Surface Pressure Systems orders were $532 million, down 34% sequentially, and down 16% year-over-year.

    OFSE revenue of $3,499 million for the first quarter of 2025 was down 10% sequentially, and down 8% year-over-year.

    North America revenue was $922 million, down 5% sequentially. International revenue was $2,577 million, down 11% sequentially, with declines across all regions.

    Segment EBITDA for the first quarter of 2025 was $623 million, a decrease of $132 million, or 18% sequentially. The sequential decrease in EBITDA was primarily driven by lower volume, partially mitigated by productivity from structural cost-out initiatives.

    Industrial & Energy Technology

    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Segment results March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Orders $ 3,178   $ 3,756   $ 2,918     (15 %) 9 %
    Revenue $ 2,928   $ 3,492   $ 2,634     (16 %) 11 %
    EBITDA $ 501   $ 639   $ 386     (22 %) 30 %
    EBITDA margin   17.1 %   18.3 %   14.7 %   -1.2pts 2.4pts
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Orders by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Gas Technology Equipment $ 1,335 $ 1,865 $ 1,230   (28 %) 9 %
    Gas Technology Services   913   902   692   1 % 32 %
    Total Gas Technology   2,248   2,767   1,922   (19 %) 17 %
    Industrial Products   501   515   546   (3 %) (8 %)
    Industrial Solutions   281   320   257   (12 %) 10 %
    Total Industrial Technology   782   835   803   (6 %) (3 %)
    Climate Technology Solutions   148   154   193   (4 %) (23 %)
    Total Orders $ 3,178 $ 3,756 $ 2,918   (15 %) 9 %
    (in millions) Three Months Ended   Variance
    Revenue by Product Line March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
      Sequential Year-over-
    year
    Gas Technology Equipment $ 1,456 $ 1,663 $ 1,210   (12 %) 20 %
    Gas Technology Services   592   796   614   (26 %) (4 %)
    Total Gas Technology   2,047   2,459   1,824   (17 %) 12 %
    Industrial Products   445   548   462   (19 %) (4 %)
    Industrial Solutions   258   282   265   (8 %) (2 %)
    Total Industrial Technology   703   830   727   (15 %) (3 %)
    Climate Technology Solutions   178   204   83   (13 %) 114 %
    Total Revenue $ 2,928 $ 3,492 $ 2,634   (16 %) 11 %

    EBITDA excludes depreciation and amortization of $53 million, $56 million, and $56 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. EBITDA margin is defined as EBITDA divided by revenue.

    IET orders of $3,178 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased by $260 million, or 9% year-over-year. The increase was driven primarily by Gas Technology, up $326 million or 17% year-over-year.

    IET revenue of $2,928 million for the first quarter of 2025 increased $294 million, or 11% year-over-year. The increase was driven by Gas Technology Equipment, up $246 million or 20% year-over-year, and Climate Technology Solutions, up $95 million or 114% year-over-year.

    Segment EBITDA for the quarter was $501 million, an increase of $114 million, or 30% year-over-year. The year-over-year increase in segment EBITDA was driven by productivity, positive pricing and increased volume including higher proportionate growth in GTE, partially offset by cost inflation.

    Reconciliation of GAAP to non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Management provides non-GAAP financial measures because it believes such measures are widely accepted financial indicators used by investors and analysts to analyze and compare companies on the basis of operating performance (including adjusted EBITDA; adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes; and adjusted diluted earnings per share) and liquidity (free cash flow) and that these measures may be used by investors to make informed investment decisions. Management believes that the exclusion of certain identified items from several key operating performance measures enables us to evaluate our operations more effectively, to identify underlying trends in the business, and to establish operational goals for certain management compensation purposes. Management also believes that free cash flow is an important supplemental measure of our cash performance but should not be considered as a measure of residual cash flow available for discretionary purposes, or as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities presented in accordance with GAAP.

    Table 1a. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP) $ 402 $ 1,179   $ 455  
    Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests   7   11     8  
    Provision (benefit) for income taxes   152   (398 )   178  
    Interest expense, net   51   54     41  
    Depreciation & amortization   285   291     283  
    Restructuring     258      
    Inventory impairment(1)     73      
    Change in fair value of equity securities(2)   140   (196 )   (52 )
    Other charges and credits(2)     38     30  
    Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)   1,037   1,310     943  
    Corporate costs   85   84     88  
    Other income / (expense) not allocated to segments   1        
    Total Segment EBITDA (non-GAAP) $ 1,124 $ 1,394   $ 1,030  
    OFSE   623   755     644  
    IET   501   639     386  

    (1) Charges for inventory impairments are reported in “Cost of goods sold” in the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

    (2) Change in fair value of equity securities and other charges and credits are reported in “Other (income) expense, net” on the condensed consolidated statements of income (loss).

    Table 1a reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA. Adjusted EBITDA and Segment EBITDA exclude the impact of certain identified items.

    Table 1b. Reconciliation of Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes to Adjusted Net Income Attributable to Baker Hughes

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions, except per share amounts) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes (GAAP) $ 402   $ 1,179   $ 455  
    Restructuring       258      
    Inventory impairment       73      
    Change in fair value of equity securities   140     (196 )   (52 )
    Other adjustments       30     32  
    Tax adjustments(1)   (32 )   (650 )   (6 )
    Total adjustments, net of income tax   108     (485 )   (26 )
    Less: adjustments attributable to noncontrolling interests            
    Adjustments attributable to Baker Hughes   108     (485 )   (26 )
    Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes (non-GAAP) $ 509   $ 694   $ 429  
           
    Denominator:      
    Weighted-average shares of Class A common stock outstanding diluted   999     999     1,004  
    Adjusted earnings per share – diluted (non-GAAP) $ 0.51   $ 0.70   $ 0.43  

    (1) All periods reflect the tax associated with the other (income) loss adjustments.

    Table 1b reconciles net income attributable to Baker Hughes, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes. Adjusted net income attributable to Baker Hughes excludes the impact of certain identified items.

    Table 1c. Reconciliation of Net Cash Flows From Operating Activities to Free Cash Flow

      Three Months Ended
    (in millions) March 31,
    2025
    December 31,
    2024
    March 31,
    2024
    Net cash flows from operating activities (GAAP) $ 709   $ 1,189   $ 784  
    Add: cash used for capital expenditures, net of proceeds from disposal of assets   (255 )   (295 )   (282 )
    Free cash flow (non-GAAP) $ 454   $ 894   $ 502  

    Table 1c reconciles net cash flows from operating activities, which is the directly comparable financial result determined in accordance with GAAP, to free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as net cash flows from operating activities less expenditures for capital assets plus proceeds from disposal of assets.

     
    Financial Tables (GAAP)
     
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss)
     
    (Unaudited)
     
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (In millions, except per share amounts)   2025     2024  
    Revenue $ 6,427   $ 6,418  
    Costs and expenses:    
    Cost of revenue   4,952     4,976  
    Selling, general and administrative   577     618  
    Research and development costs   146     164  
    Other (income) expense, net   140     (22 )
    Interest expense, net   51     41  
    Income before income taxes   561     641  
    Provision for income taxes   (152 )   (178 )
    Net income   409     463  
    Less: Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests   7     8  
    Net income attributable to Baker Hughes Company $ 402   $ 455  
         
    Per share amounts:  
    Basic income per Class A common stock $ 0.41   $ 0.46  
    Diluted income per Class A common stock $ 0.40   $ 0.45  
         
    Weighted average shares:    
    Class A basic   992     998  
    Class A diluted   999     1,004  
         
    Cash dividend per Class A common stock $ 0.23   $ 0.21  
         
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position
     
    (Unaudited)
     
    (In millions) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
    ASSETS
    Current Assets:    
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 3,277 $ 3,364
    Current receivables, net   6,710   7,122
    Inventories, net   5,161   4,954
    All other current assets   1,693   1,771
    Total current assets   16,841   17,211
    Property, plant and equipment, less accumulated depreciation   5,168   5,127
    Goodwill   6,126   6,078
    Other intangible assets, net   3,927   3,951
    Contract and other deferred assets   1,680   1,730
    All other assets   4,368   4,266
    Total assets $ 38,110 $ 38,363
    LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
    Current Liabilities:    
    Accounts payable $ 4,465 $ 4,542
    Short-term debt   55   53
    Progress collections and deferred income   5,589   5,672
    All other current liabilities   2,485   2,724
    Total current liabilities   12,594   12,991
    Long-term debt   5,969   5,970
    Liabilities for pensions and other postretirement benefits   985   988
    All other liabilities   1,356   1,359
    Equity   17,206   17,055
    Total liabilities and equity $ 38,110 $ 38,363
         
    Outstanding Baker Hughes Company shares:    
    Class A common stock   990   990
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
     
    (Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended March 31,
    (In millions)   2025     2024  
    Cash flows from operating activities:    
    Net income $ 409   $ 463  
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash flows from operating activities:    
    Depreciation and amortization   285     283  
    Stock-based compensation cost   50     51  
    Change in fair value of equity securities   140     (52 )
    Benefit for deferred income taxes   (53 )   (24 )
    Working capital   218     209  
    Other operating items, net   (340 )   (146 )
    Net cash flows provided by operating activities   709     784  
    Cash flows from investing activities:    
    Expenditures for capital assets   (300 )   (333 )
    Proceeds from disposal of assets   45     51  
    Other investing items, net   (55 )   13  
    Net cash flows used in investing activities   (310 )   (269 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:    
    Dividends paid   (229 )   (210 )
    Repurchase of Class A common stock   (188 )   (158 )
    Other financing items, net   (85 )   (59 )
    Net cash flows used in financing activities   (502 )   (427 )
    Effect of currency exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   16     (17 )
    Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents   (87 )   71  
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period   3,364     2,646  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 3,277   $ 2,717  
    Supplemental cash flows disclosures:    
    Income taxes paid, net of refunds $ 207   $ 108  
    Interest paid $ 50   $ 48  

    Supplemental Financial Information

    Supplemental financial information can be found on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com in the Financial Information section under Quarterly Results.

    Conference Call and Webcast

    The Company has scheduled an investor conference call to discuss management’s outlook and the results reported in today’s earnings announcement. The call will begin at 9:30 a.m. Eastern time, 8:30 a.m. Central time on Wednesday, April 23, 2025, the content of which is not part of this earnings release. The conference call will be broadcast live via a webcast and can be accessed by visiting the Events and Presentations page on the Company’s website at: investors.bakerhughes.com. An archived version of the webcast will be available on the website for one month following the webcast.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This news release (and oral statements made regarding the subjects of this release) may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, (each a “forward-looking statement”). Forward-looking statements concern future circumstances and results and other statements that are not historical facts and are sometimes identified by the words “may,” “will,” “should,” “potential,” “intend,” “expect,” “would,” “seek,” “anticipate,” “estimate,” “overestimate,” “underestimate,” “believe,” “could,” “project,” “predict,” “continue,” “target,” “goal” or other similar words or expressions. There are many risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from our forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are also affected by the risk factors described in the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K for the annual period ended December 31, 2024 and those set forth from time to time in other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The documents are available through the Company’s website at: www.investors.bakerhughes.com or through the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and Analysis Retrieval system at: www.sec.gov. We undertake no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statement, except as required by law. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any of these forward-looking statements.

    Our expectations regarding our business outlook and business plans; the business plans of our customers; oil and natural gas market conditions; cost and availability of resources; economic, legal and regulatory conditions, and other matters are only our forecasts regarding these matters.

    These forward-looking statements, including forecasts, may be substantially different from actual results, which are affected by many risks, along with the following risk factors and the timing of any of these risk factors:

    • Economic and political conditions – the impact of worldwide economic conditions and rising inflation; the impact of tariffs and the potential for significant increases thereto; the impact of global trade policy and the potential for significant changes thereto; the effect that declines in credit availability may have on worldwide economic growth and demand for hydrocarbons; foreign currency exchange fluctuations and changes in the capital markets in locations where we operate; and the impact of government disruptions and sanctions.
    • Orders and RPO – our ability to execute on orders and RPO in accordance with agreed specifications, terms and conditions and convert those orders and RPO to revenue and cash.
    • Oil and gas market conditions – the level of petroleum industry exploration, development and production expenditures; the price of, volatility in pricing of, and the demand for crude oil and natural gas; drilling activity; drilling permits for and regulation of the shelf and the deepwater drilling; excess productive capacity; crude and product inventories; liquefied natural gas supply and demand; seasonal and other adverse weather conditions that affect the demand for energy; severe weather conditions, such as tornadoes and hurricanes, that affect exploration and production activities; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) policy and the adherence by OPEC nations to their OPEC production quotas.
    • Terrorism and geopolitical risks – war, military action, terrorist activities or extended periods of international conflict, particularly involving any petroleum-producing or consuming regions, including Russia and Ukraine; and the recent conflict in the Middle East; labor disruptions, civil unrest or security conditions where we operate; potentially burdensome taxation, expropriation of assets by governmental action; cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents or attacks; epidemic outbreaks.

    About Baker Hughes:

    Baker Hughes (Nasdaq: BKR) is an energy technology company that provides solutions to energy and industrial customers worldwide. Built on a century of experience and conducting business in over 120 countries, our innovative technologies and services are taking energy forward – making it safer, cleaner and more efficient for people and the planet. Visit us at bakerhughes.com.

    For more information, please contact:

    Investor Relations

    Chase Mulvehill
    +1 346-297-2561
    investor.relations@bakerhughes.com 

    Media Relations

    Adrienne Lynch
    +1 713-906-8407 
    adrienne.lynch@bakerhughes.com 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: These 3 climate misinformation campaigns are operating during the election run-up. Here’s how to spot them

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alfie Chadwick, PhD Candidate, Monash Climate Change Communication Research Hub, Monash University

    Australia’s climate and energy wars are at the forefront of the federal election campaign as the major parties outline vastly different plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and tackle soaring power prices.

    Meanwhile, misinformation about climate change has permeated public debate during the campaign, feeding false and misleading claims about renewable energy, gas and global warming.

    This is a dangerous situation. In Australia and globally, rampant misinformation has for decades slowed climate action – creating doubt, hindering decision-making and undermining public support for solutions.

    Here, we explain the history of climate misinformation in Australia and identify three prominent campaigns operating now. We also outline how Australians can protect themselves from misinformation as they head to the polls.

    Misinformation vs disinformation

    Misinformation is defined as false information spread unintentionally. It is distinct from disinformation, which is deliberately created to mislead.

    However, proving intent to mislead can be challenging. So, the term misinformation is often used as a general term to describe misleading content, while the term disinformation is reserved for cases where intent is proven.

    Disinformation is typically part of a coordinated
    campaign
    to influence public opinion. Such campaigns can be run by corporate interests, political groups, lobbying organisations or individuals.

    Once released, these false narratives may be picked up by others, who pass them on and create misinformation.

    Climate change misinformation in Australia

    In the 1980s and 1990s, Australia’s emissions-reduction targets were among the most ambitious in the world.

    At the time, about 60 companies were responsible for one-third of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. The government’s plan included measures to ensure these companies remained competitive while reducing their climate impact.

    Despite this, Australia’s resource industry began a concerted media campaign to oppose any binding emissions-reduction actions, claiming it would ruin the economy by making Australian businesses uncompetitive.

    This narrative persisted even when modelling repeatedly showed climate policies would have minimal economic impacts. The industry arguments eventually found their way into government policy.

    Momentum against climate action was also fuelled by a vocal group of climate change-denying individuals and organisations, often backed by multinational fossil fuel companies. These deniers variously claimed climate change wasn’t happening, it was caused by natural cycles, or wasn’t that a serious threat.

    These narratives were further exacerbated by false balance in media coverage, whereby news outlets, in an effort to appear neutral, often placed climate scientists alongside contrarians, giving the impression that the science was still unclear.

    Together, this created an environment in Australia where climate action was seen as either too economically damaging or simply unnecessary.

    What’s happening in the federal election campaign?

    Climate misinformation has been circulating in the following forms during this federal election campaign.

    1. Trumpet of Patriots

    Clive Palmer’s Trumpet of Patriots party ran an advertisement that claimed to expose “ the truth about climate change”. It featured a clip from a 2004 documentary, in which a scientist discusses data suggesting temperatures in Greenland were not rising. The scientist in the clip has since said his comments are now outdated.

    The type of misinformation is cherry-picking – presenting one scientific measurement at odds with the overwhelming scientific consensus.

    Google removed the ad after it was flagged as misleading, but only after it received 1.9 million views.

    2. Responsible Future Illawarra

    The Responsible Future campaign opposes wind turbines on various grounds, including cost, foreign ownership, power prices, effects on views and fishing, and potential ecological damage.

    Scientific evidence indicates offshore wind farms are relatively safe for marine life and cause less harm than boats and fishing gear. Some studies also suggest the infrastructure can create new habitat for marine life.

    However, a general lack of research into offshore wind and marine life has created uncertainty that groups such as Responsible Future Illawarra can exploit.

    It has cited statements by Sea Shepherd Australia to argue offshore wind farms damage marine life – however Sea Shepherd said its comments were misrepresented.

    The group also appears to have deliberately spread disinformation. This includes citing a purported research paper saying offshore wind turbines would kill up to 400 whales per year, when the paper does not exist.

    3. Australians for Natural Gas

    Australians for Natural Gas is a pro-gas group set up by the head of a gas company, which presents itself as a grassroots organisation. Its advertising campaign promotes natural gas as a necessary part of Australia’s fuel mix, and stresses its contribution to jobs and the economy.

    The ad campaign implicitly suggests climate action – in this case, a shift to renewable energy – is harmful to the economy, livelihoods and energy security. According to Meta’s Ad Library, these adds have already been seen more than 1.1 million times.

    Gas is needed in Australia’s current energy mix. But analysis shows it could be phased out almost entirely if renewable energy and storage was sufficiently increased and business and home electrification continues to rise.

    And of course, failing to tackle climate change will cause substantial harm across Australia’s economy.

    How to identify misinformation

    As the federal election approaches, climate misinformation and disinformation is likely to proliferate further. So how do we distinguish fact from fiction?

    One way is through “pre-bunking” – familiarising yourself with common claims made by climate change deniers to fortify yourself against misinformation

    Sources such as Skeptical Science offer in-depth analyses of specific claims.

    The SIFT method is another valuable tool. It comprises four steps:

    • Stop
    • Investigate the source
    • Find better coverage
    • Trace claims, quotes and media to their original sources.

    As the threat of climate change grows, a flow of accurate information is vital to garnering public and political support for vital policy change.

    Alfie Chadwick is a recipient of an Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.

    Libby Lester receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    ref. These 3 climate misinformation campaigns are operating during the election run-up. Here’s how to spot them – https://theconversation.com/these-3-climate-misinformation-campaigns-are-operating-during-the-election-run-up-heres-how-to-spot-them-253441

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian women are wary of AI being used in breast cancer screening – new research

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alison Pearce, Associate Professor, Health Economics, University of Sydney

    Okrasiuk/Shutterstock

    Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly relevant in many aspects of society, including health care. For example, it’s already used for robotic surgery and to provide virtual mental health support.

    In recent years, scientists have developed AI algorithms that can analyse mammograms for signs of breast cancer. These algorithms may be as good as or better at finding cancers than human radiologists, and save the health-care system money.

    At the same time, evidence for the accuracy of AI in breast cancer screening is still emerging. And we need to ensure the benefits would outweigh the risks, such as overdiagnosis. This is where small cancers are detected that wouldn’t cause harm, resulting in unnecessary treatment.

    In a new study, my colleagues and I wanted to understand how Australian women – who would be affected if AI were to be introduced into breast screening in the future – feel about the technology.

    AI and breast cancer screening

    Breast cancer screening programs reduce the number of women who die from breast cancer by finding cancer early.

    In Australia, as in many countries around the world, two specially trained health professionals, usually radiologists, review each screening mammogram for signs of cancer. If the two radiologists disagree, a third is consulted.

    This double reading approach improves cancer detection rates without recalling too many women for further testing unnecessarily. However, it’s resource intensive. And there’s currently a shortage of radiologists worldwide.

    AI has been investigated to support radiologists, replace a radiologist, or as a triage tool to identify the mammograms at highest risk so these can be reviewed by a radiologist. However, there’s no consensus yet as to how to best implement AI in breast cancer screening.

    Breast cancer screening programs reduce the number of women who die from breast cancer.
    YAKOBCHUK VIACHESLAV/Shutterstock

    Our study

    The success of cancer screening programs depends on high rates of participation. While people are generally receptive to AI, in previous research, many have reported being unwilling to trust AI with their health care.

    There are concerns introducing AI into breast cancer screening programs could jeopardise screening participation rates if people do not trust AI.

    We asked 802 women if and how they thought AI should be implemented in breast cancer screening. Our sample was generally representative of the population of women in Australia eligible for screening.

    We measured how their preferences were influenced by factors such as:

    • how the AI was used (whether it supplemented radiologists, replaced one or both radiologists, or was used for triage)

    • how accurate the AI algorithm was

    • who owned the AI algorithm (for example, the Australian government department of health, an Australian company or an international company)

    • how representative the algorithm was of the Australian population (for example, the algorithm may not work as well for people from some ethnic groups)

    • how privacy was managed

    • how long patients had to wait for the results of their mammogram.

    We used the responses to assess which factors were most important and how the introduction of AI might influence participation in breast cancer screening.

    Before the survey, we provided participants with information about AI and how it could be used in breast cancer screening. The information we provided may have changed participants’ beliefs and preferences around the use of AI in this context relative to the general population. This could be a limitation of our study.

    What we found

    Overall, we saw mixed reactions to the introduction of AI into breast cancer screening. Some 40% of respondents were open to using AI, on the condition it was more accurate than human radiologists. In contrast, 42% were strongly opposed to using AI, while 18% had reservations.

    In general, participants wanted AI to be accurate, Australian-owned, representative of Australian women, and faster than human radiologists before implementation.

    Notably, up to 22% of respondents reported they might be less likely to participate in breast cancer screening if AI was implemented in a way that made them uncomfortable.

    It’s possible attitudes to AI may differ in contexts with different social values or existing screening practices to Australia. But our findings were broadly consistent with what we see in other countries.

    Around the world, women are generally receptive to the benefits of AI in breast cancer screening. But they feel strongly that AI should supplement or support clinicians, rather than replace them.

    The success of breast cancer screening programs depends on high rates of participation.
    Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock

    We need to proceed carefully

    AI holds promise for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of breast cancer screening in the future.

    That said, these benefits may be offset if screening participation goes down. This is particularly concerning in Australia, where participation rates in BreastScreen are already relatively low (less than 50%).

    Implementing AI without addressing community concerns around the accuracy, ownership, privacy and implementation model could undermine trust in breast cancer screening programs.

    Policymakers should carefully consider community concerns about the implementation of AI technology in health care before proceeding. And breast cancer screening participants will need reliable information to understand the risks and benefits of AI in screening services.

    If this is not done properly, and screening participation falls lower as a result, this could lead to more breast cancers being diagnosed later and therefore being harder to treat.

    Alison Pearce received funding from Sydney Cancer Institute for this project.

    ref. Australian women are wary of AI being used in breast cancer screening – new research – https://theconversation.com/australian-women-are-wary-of-ai-being-used-in-breast-cancer-screening-new-research-253340

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Even experts disagree over whether social media is bad for kids. We examined why

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Simon Knight, Associate Professor, Transdisciplinary School, University of Technology Sydney

    A low relief sculpture depicting Plato and Aristotle arguing adorning the external wall of Florence Cathedral. Krikkiat/Shutterstock

    Disagreement and uncertainty are common features of everyday life. They’re also common and expected features of scientific research.

    Despite this, disagreement among experts has the potential to undermine people’s engagement with information. It can also lead to confusion and a rejection of scientific messaging in general, with a tendency to explain disagreement as relating to incompetence or nefarious motivations.

    To help, we recently developed a tool to help people navigate uncertainty and disagreement.

    To illustrate its usefulness, we applied it to a recent topic which has attracted much disagreement (including among experts): whether social media is harmful for kids, and whether they should be banned from it.

    A structured way to understand disagreement

    We research how people navigate disagreement and uncertainty. The tool we developed is a framework of disagreements. It provides a structured way to understand expert disagreement, to assess evidence and navigate the issues for decision making.

    It identifies ten types of disagreement, and groups them into three categories:

    1. Informant-related (who is making the claim?)
    2. Information-related (what evidence is available and what is it about?)
    3. Uncertainty-related (how does the evidence help us understand the issue?)
    The framework for disagreements identifies ten types of disagreement, and groups them into three categories.
    Kristine Deroover/Simon Knight/Paul Burke/Tamara Bucher, CC BY-NC-ND

    Mapping different viewpoints

    The social and policy debate about the impacts of social media is rapidly evolving. This can present a challenge, as we try to apply evidence created through research to the messy realities of policy and decision making.

    As a proxy for what experts think, we reviewed articles in The Conversation that mention words relating to the social media ban and expert disagreement. This approach excludes articles published elsewhere. It also only focuses on explicit discussion of disagreement.

    However, The Conversation provides a useful source because articles are written by researchers, for a broad audience, allowing us to focus on clearly explained areas of acknowledged disagreement among researchers.

    We then analysed a set of articles by annotating quotes and text fragments that reflect different arguments and causes of disagreement.

    Importantly, we did not assess the quality of the arguments or evidence, as we assume the authors are qualified in their respective fields. Instead, we focused on the disagreements they highlighted, using the framework to map out differing viewpoints.

    We focused on the Australian context. But similar social media bans have been explored elsewhere, including in the United States.

    Young people under 16 will soon be banned from some social media in Australia.
    Kaspars Grinvalds

    What did we find?

    Applying our framework to this example revealed only a small amount of disagreement is informant-related.

    Most of the disagreement is information-related. More specifically, it stems from input and outcome ambiguity. That is, in claims such as “X causes Y”, how we define “X” and “Y”.

    For example, there is disagreement about the groups for whom social media may present particular risks and benefits and what those risks and benefits are. There is also disagreement about what exactly constitutes “social media use” and its particular technologies or features.

    Harms discussed often refer to mental wellbeing, including loneliness, anxiety, depression and envy. But harms also refer to undesirable attitudes such as polarisation and behaviours such as cyberbullying and offline violence. Similarly, benefits are sometimes, but not always, considered.

    The ban itself presents a further ambiguity, with discussion regarding what a “ban” would involve, its feasibility, and possible efficacy as compared to other policy options.

    Two other information-related causes of disagreement involve data availability and the type of evidence. Researchers often lack full access to data from social media companies, and recruiting teens for large-scale studies is challenging. Additionally, there is a shortage of causal evidence, as well as long-term, high-quality research on the topic.

    This information-related issue can combine with issues related to the uncertainty and complexity of science and real-world problems. This is the third category in our framework.

    First, while a contribution may be from an expert, there may be questions about the pertinence of their background expertise to the debate. Complex issues such as a social media ban also require human judgement in weighing, integrating, and interpreting evidence.

    Second, research on reducing social media use often yields varied results, which could stem from inherent uncertainty or the constantly evolving social media landscape, making it difficult to compare findings and establish firm conclusions (tentative knowledge).

    Researchers often lack full access to data from social media companies, which can make it difficult to conduct comprehensive studies.
    UVL/Shutterstock

    Why is this important?

    Discussion regarding the social media ban is complex, with a range of issues at play.

    By mapping out some of these issues, we hope to help people understand more about them and their implications.

    Our taxonomy of disagreements provides a structured way to understand different views, assess evidence, and make more informed decisions. It also supports clearer communication about disagreements as researchers navigate communicating in complex debates.

    We hope this helps people to integrate claims made across different sources. We also hope it helps people hone in on the source of disagreements to support better discourse across contexts – and ultimately better decision making.

    Simon Knight receives funding from the Australian government through the Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Early Career Award (DECRA) Fellowship (DE230100065), and Discovery Project (DP240100602). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian government or Australian Research Council. He also receives funding from the James Martin Institute Policy Challenge Grant scheme.

    Kristine Deroover received funding from the Australian Research Training Program for her PhD at the University of Technology Sydney, during which the work referenced in this article was conducted.

    ref. Even experts disagree over whether social media is bad for kids. We examined why – https://theconversation.com/even-experts-disagree-over-whether-social-media-is-bad-for-kids-we-examined-why-252500

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz