MIL-OSI Europe: AFRICA/DR CONGO – Testimony of the forgotten conflict in eastern DRC: The “100 days of liberated Goma”

Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

Wednesday, 14 May 2025 wars

Kinshasa (Agenzia Fides) – “Goma, capital of the North Kivu region, two million inhabitants. An occupied city, on its knees. Stretched along the shores of Lake Kivu, caressed by the heat of the Nyiragongo volcano, its beauty and the peace of some thirty years are turning into tears of fear and death.” These are the words that highlight the dramatic testimony sent to Fides from Goma, a city in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that fell into the hands of the M23 rebels at the end of January. For security reasons, we are publishing it in full, omitting the author’s name: On January 28, after two days of intense fighting between the regular Congolese army, supported by the “Wazalendo” (patriotic militias), against the AFC (Congo River Alliance) and M23 (March 23, an invading rebel group supported by the Rwandan army), the city was once again declared “liberated.” A liberation that left a tragic toll of thousands of innocent civilians dead, many of them in their own homes, built with precarious materials, incapable of offering any shelter. Looting, rape, and abuse perpetrated by armed men from various factions have left deep scars. More than 100 days after the fighting, the wounds remain open, both on the body and in the collective memory of the population. Freedom of expression, human dignity, and the right to life and peace have been brutally violated. Today, the law of terror is imposed at gunpoint and with the blows of batons. The judicial system has collapsed. Instead of courts, detention centers have been set up that, in practice, function as places of torture. Prisons have been emptied—some 3,000 prisoners disappeared during the city’s capture—and trials, when they are held, are summary and improvised, even in the open air. The night has become a nightmare for the most vulnerable neighborhoods. Armed men break into homes to rob and sexually assault. These individuals include former prisoners, former military deserters, militia members, and others, operating anonymously under the cover of darkness. Sometimes, the attackers are captured by neighbors trying to defend the victims; their bodies often appear the next morning, abandoned or even burned. Fear, anger, and the absence of justice fuel a form of mob justice that is faceless and merciless. The search for alleged members of the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), accused of participating in the 1994 genocide and now hiding in the neighborhoods of Goma, often serves as a pretext for personal vendettas or ethnic clashes, exacerbating already existing tensions. Arbitrary arrests and disappearances are part of a policy of repression aimed at silencing any dissenting voice. The economic situation is equally critical. The financial system is paralyzed: banks remain closed, preventing the payment of salaries, including those of teachers in affiliated schools. Commerce is at a standstill, and the international airport, vital to the city’s economic life, was bombed during the fighting and is out of service. The promises to keep alive hope for a better future—occupation propaganda comparing the supposedly more effective new “liberation” regime with the corrupt and ineffective old regime in Kinshasa—are numerous; but they fade with each passing day. Many young people, disillusioned with life or desperate with rage, volunteer to enlist in the army of the new masters and fight the regular army of the central government. Solution or illusion? Dying for the sake of dying: it’s worth a try. But the struggle for life has not been broken. The population helps each other in a thousand ways. The tens of thousands of displaced people, whose camps have been dismantled by the new authorities, have found refuge in the homes of friends, relatives, or people of good will. They share the same fears, the same suffering, but also the same hopes. The number of crosses increases, sometimes even invisible, because there is no trace left of the missing. But among the black lava rocks of the Nyiragongo volcano, scattered along the neighborhood roads, flowers are sprouting. With difficulty, because the earth is still soaked with blood. They are flowers with thin stems, but fragrant and colorful: red flowers, the color of the painful tears shed every day; green flowers, of hope and resistance, so that life does not die; flowers that symbolize a new society: the new society of Congo that is being born from the ashes of war. Yes, because life is like the sun: no matter how long and stormy the night, at dawn the sun reappears. (Agenzia Fides, 14/5/2025)
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MIL OSI Europe News –

May 15, 2025

Operation Sindoor important example of India’s identity: Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw on Wednesday described Operation Sindoor as a defining expression of India’s national identity and a testament to the strength of the armed forces under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership.

Speaking to the media, Vaishnaw said the military response following the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 not only showcases India’s strategic capabilities but also reflects the new defence doctrine shaped by the Centre’s firm approach.

“Operation Sindoor is a powerful example of India’s ‘asmita’ (identity), the decisive role of our armed forces, and the strong leadership guiding them. It represents the new doctrine we have adopted and is a praiseworthy development for the country,” he said.

The Union Minister was addressing the press following the Union Cabinet’s approval for setting up India’s sixth semiconductor manufacturing facility, a joint venture between HCL and Foxconn, in Jewar, Uttar Pradesh. The facility, to be located near the upcoming Jewar airport within the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA), will commence production in 2027.

With an investment of ₹3,700 crore, the plant will have a capacity to process 20,000 wafers per month and manufacture 36 million chips monthly. These chips will cater to sectors including mobile phones, laptops, automobiles, and personal computers.

The semiconductor industry in India remains at a nascent stage, but the initiative is expected to enhance self-reliance and address vulnerabilities exposed during the global chip shortage amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Five other semiconductor plants are currently under construction in Gujarat and Assam.

(ANI)

May 15, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs seizes suspected dangerous drugs worth about $10.25 million (with photos)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Hong Kong Customs on May 12 and yesterday (May 13) seized about 21 kilograms of suspected ketamine and about 1.1kg of suspected cannabis buds with a total estimated market value of about $10.25 million at Hong Kong International Airport and in Sau Mau Ping.

Through risk assessment, Customs on May 12 inspected an air cargo consignment, declared as audio cable and arriving in Hong Kong from Belgium, at the airport. The consignee address was a residential address in Sau Mau Ping. Upon inspection, Customs officers found about 21kg of suspected ketamine, with an estimated market value of about $10 million, concealed in the consignment.

After a follow-up investigation, Customs officers conducted a controlled delivery operation yesterday (May 13) and arrested a male consignee, aged 24, in the aforesaid residential unit in Sau Mau Ping. Customs officers later searched the premises and further seized about 1.1kg of suspected cannabis buds with an estimated market value of about $250,000.

The arrested person has been charged with two counts of trafficking in a dangerous drug. He will appear at the Kwun Tong Magistrates’ Courts tomorrow (May 15).

Customs will continue to step up enforcement against drug trafficking activities through intelligence analysis. The department also reminds members of the public to stay alert and not to participate in drug trafficking activities for monetary return. They must not accept hiring or delegation from another party to carry controlled items into and out of Hong Kong. They are also reminded not to carry unknown items for other people, nor to release their personal data or home address to others for receiving parcels or goods.

Customs will continue to apply a risk assessment approach and focus on selecting passengers from high-risk regions for clearance to combat transnational drug trafficking activities.

Under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, trafficking in a dangerous drug is a serious offence. The maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of $5 million and life imprisonment.

Members of the public may report any suspected drug trafficking activities to Customs’ 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002).

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 15, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Fatal crash on Blackfeet Indian Reservation sends Browning man to prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

GREAT FALLS – A Browning man who admitted to driving while under the influence of drugs and alcohol when he crashed into another vehicle killing the driver was sentenced today to 16 months in prison to be followed by 3 years of supervised release, U.S. Attorney Kurt Alme said.

Chasen James Kipp, 25, pleaded guilty in December 2024 to involuntary manslaughter.

Chief U.S. District Judge Brian M. Morris presided.

The government alleged in court documents that on October 21, 2023, Kipp was driving his 2022 Dodge Charger near the Cut Bank airport when he crossed the center lane of traffic, collided with a sedan, and killed the driver, Jane Doe.

When law enforcement officers arrived at the scene, they saw Kipp trying to flee. An officer described Kipp staggering and could smell alcohol on him. The officers detained Kipp, who said he had consumed two mixed drinks at the Pioneer Bar in Cut Bank and was returning to his home in Birch Creek. Kipp was arrested and consented to a blood draw, where he told the medical provider he was too drunk to remember the crash and he “came to” when the airbags deployed. He estimated he was driving 60 mph at the time of the crash.

Paramedics pronounced Jane Doe dead at the scene. She died from blunt force trauma sustained from the crash. The Montana Highway Patrol conducted the crash investigation and determined Kipp was going 82 mph in a 65-mph zone when he crossed the center line and struck Doe’s vehicle. The toxicology report showed his blood alcohol content was .114 and he had cocaine in his system.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecuted the case. The investigation was conducted by the FBI, Blackfeet Law Enforcement Services, the Cut Bank Police Department, the Glacier County Sheriff’s Office, and the Montana Highway Patrol.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

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MIL Security OSI –

May 15, 2025

MIL-OSI: Mercury Introduces First Safety-Certifiable, SOSA-aligned Mission Computer for Aviation Platforms

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ANDOVER, Mass., May 14, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Mercury Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ: MRCY, www.mrcy.com), a technology company that delivers mission-critical processing power to the edge, today introduced the first safety-certifiable, SOSA-aligned aviation mission computer, which will allow government and commercial organizations to field and modernize aircraft that support next-generation applications such as those enabled by 5G communications and artificial intelligence.

Mercury’s new ROCK3 is a DAL-certifiable, 3U OpenVPX mission computer that features Intel Core i7 safety-certifiable processors and delivers up to 20 times the performance of PowerPC-based aircraft computers. ROCK3 is purpose-built to support advanced, safety-critical applications for military and urban mobility aircraft including mission management, sensor fusion and processing, and surveillance. ROCK3’s open architecture allows customers to break vendor lock and eliminate stovepiped systems to enable greater application interoperability and deploy new capabilities faster and more cost-effectively.

ROCK3 leverages lessons learned from Mercury’s participation in the U.S. Army’s Aviation Mission Common Server (AMCS) program, which was intended to develop a single mission computing architecture for the Army’s rotorcraft fleet that would allow them to store, process, and transport data and serve as application network nodes across the battlespace.

“With ROCK3, current and next-generation aircraft can increase safety and survivability by leveraging advanced sensors and data fusion applications to give pilots more accurate and timely information to make decisions, identify targets, and avoid hazards,” said Roya Montakhab, Mercury’s SVP of Integrated Processing Solutions. “ROCK3 represents a new path for aviation organizations to field more affordable, scalable, interoperable, and sustainable avionics solutions using open architectures.”

Mercury’s ROCK3 features:

11th Gen Intel^® Core i7™ quad core processors with integrated GPU
DO-254 and DO-178C artifacts, certifiable up to DAL-A
Rugged, SWaP optimized
Discrete, MIL-STD-1553, ARINC-429, RS-485, CAN avionics interfaces
Certifiable RTOS, CAST-32A compliant
32GB DDR4 with ECC
64 MB FLASH
80GB M.2 SSD storage

Mercury will be demonstrating a number of next-generation mission computing applications alongside industry partners at the Army Aviation Mission Solutions Summit 2025, May 14-16 in Nashville, Tenn. Demonstrations will be shown at Mercury (booth 779), Parry Labs (booth 2322), Elbit Systems (booth 978), Green Hills Software (booth 2621), and GTRI (booth 2911).

Mercury Systems – Innovation that matters^®
Mercury Systems is a technology company that delivers mission-critical processing power to the edge, making advanced technologies profoundly more accessible for today’s most challenging aerospace and defense missions. The Mercury Processing Platform allows customers to tap into innovative capabilities from silicon to system scale, turning data into decisions on timelines that matter. Mercury’s products and solutions are deployed in more than 300 programs and across 35 countries, enabling a broad range of applications in mission computing, sensor processing, command and control, and communications. Mercury is headquartered in Andover, Massachusetts, and has more than 20 locations worldwide. To learn more, visit mrcy.com. (Nasdaq: MRCY)

Forward-Looking Safe Harbor Statement
This press release contains certain forward-looking statements, as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including those relating to the Company’s focus on enhanced execution of the Company’s strategic plan. You can identify these statements by the words “may,” “will,” “could,” “should,” “would,” “plans,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “continue,” “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “likely,” “forecast,” “probable,” “potential,” and similar expressions. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those projected or anticipated. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, continued funding of defense programs, the timing and amounts of such funding, general economic and business conditions, including unforeseen weakness in the Company’s markets, effects of any U.S. federal government shutdown or extended continuing resolution, effects of geopolitical unrest and regional conflicts, competition, changes in technology and methods of marketing, delays in or cost increases related to completing development, engineering and manufacturing programs, changes in customer order patterns, changes in product mix, continued success in technological advances and delivering technological innovations, changes in, or in the U.S. government’s interpretation of, federal export control or procurement rules and regulations, including tariffs, changes in, or in the interpretation or enforcement of, environmental rules and regulations, market acceptance of the Company’s products, shortages in or delays in receiving components, supply chain delays or volatility for critical components, production delays or unanticipated expenses including due to quality issues or manufacturing execution issues, adherence to required manufacturing standards, capacity underutilization, increases in scrap or inventory write-offs, failure to achieve or maintain manufacturing quality certifications, such as AS9100, the impact of supply chain disruption, inflation and labor shortages, among other things, on program execution and the resulting effect on customer satisfaction, inability to fully realize the expected benefits from acquisitions, restructurings, and operational efficiency initiatives or delays in realizing such benefits, challenges in integrating acquired businesses and achieving anticipated synergies, effects of shareholder activism, increases in interest rates, changes to industrial security and cyber-security regulations and requirements and impacts from any cyber or insider threat events, changes in tax rates or tax regulations, such as the deductibility of internal research and development, changes to interest rate swaps or other cash flow hedging arrangements, changes to generally accepted accounting principles, difficulties in retaining key employees and customers, litigation, including the dispute arising with the former CEO over his resignation, unanticipated costs under fixed-price service and system integration engagements, and various other factors beyond our control. These risks and uncertainties also include such additional risk factors as are discussed in the Company’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 28, 2024 and subsequent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K. The Company cautions readers not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. The Company undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statement to reflect events or circumstances after the date on which such statement is made.

INVESTOR CONTACT
Tyler Hojo
Vice President, Investor Relations
Tyler.Hojo@mrcy.com

MEDIA CONTACT
Turner Brinton
Senior Director, Corporate Communications
Turner.Brinton@mrcy.com

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/0ff09fb6-764b-446f-8313-f3a16ad360bd

The MIL Network –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI China: Regular Press Briefing of the Ministry of National Defense on May 8th, 2025 2025-05-14 Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), answers recent media queries concerning the military on March 8th, 2025.

Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense 2

On the afternoon of May 8th, 2025, Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, Spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense (MND), answered recent media queries concerning the military.

Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), answers recent media queries concerning the military on May 8th, 2025. (mod.gov.cn/Photo by Zhang Zhicheng)

(The following English text is for reference. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the Chinese text shall prevail.)

Zhang Xiaogang: I have two pieces of information to announce on the top.

Firstly, in mid-to-late May, the Chinese and Cambodian militaries will hold the “Golden Dragon-2025” joint exercise in Cambodia. Focusing on joint counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, the exercise will be conducted both on land and at sea, as well as in relevant air spaces. Cultural and sports exchanges, and vessel open day activities will also be conducted. This exercise will be the 7th of its kind between the Chinese and Cambodian militaries. It will facilitate practical cooperation between the two sides and contribute to the building of a China-Cambodia all-weather community with a shared future for the new era.

Secondly, from May 13th to 14th, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense will host the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Military Medicine Seminar in Xi’an. Under the theme of “Building an SCO Community with a Shared Future: Contributions from Military Medicine”, leaders of military health departments and medical experts from countries including Russia, Cambodia and Sri Lanka will attend the event. As the rotating presidency of the SCO this year, China will host multiple events including the SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting and the Military Medicine Seminar, and actively contribute to building a closer SCO Community with a Shared Future.

Journalist: It is reported that the “Eagles of Civilization-2025” joint air force training between China and Egypt has recently concluded. Could you please review this joint training and brief us on its features?

Zhang Xiaogang: From April 17th to May 4th, the air forces of China and Egypt held the first “Eagles of Civilization-2025” joint training at an Egyptian air force base. The Chinese Air Force dispatched J-10C, KJ-500 and YY-20 aircraft to participate. This was the first time that China sent force packages to Africa for joint training, during which the two sides conducted drills on such subjects as air superiority operations, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), battlefield search and rescue, and mixed grouping. Discussions and exchanges on training models, air combat tactics and aerial refueling were also held. This joint training marks a new starting point for the cooperation between the Chinese and Egyptian militaries. It enhanced the technical and tactical competence of the participating troops, and deepened friendship, mutual trust, and practical cooperation between the two militaries. It is also an effective test of the Chinese Air Force’s capabilities in long-range force projection, agile deployment and systemic operations.

(Video by Yu Hongchun, Jia Chong and Li Kangxi)

Journalist: NATO recently released its annual report, labeling China as a “systemic challenge” and claiming that the country is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and that its policies pose a threat to the interests, security, and values of NATO member states. What’s your comment on that?

Zhang Xiaogang: The relevant report by NATO reflects nothing but the Cold War mentality. The hype-up of the so-called “China threat” is in blatant disregard of the facts and simply barking up the wrong tree. China never seeks to challenge or threaten anyone. China’s nuclear policy is highly stable, consistent, and predictable. China unswervingly follows a nuclear strategy of self-defense, with its nuclear forces always kept at the minimum level required for national security.

In contrast, NATO has been overreaching in recent years, expanding its remit, and interfering in the Asia-Pacific. These actions seriously undermine regional peace and stability. NATO possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal through its nuclear-sharing arrangements. Some member states are investing heavily in upgrading their strategic forces and there are plans to pursue nuclear submarine cooperation that would involve the large-scale transfer of weapon-grade nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon states. Relevant practices constitute a grave violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), severely undermine the international nuclear non-proliferation system, and deal a huge blow to global strategic security and stability. We urge NATO to take a hard look at its own actions instead of making groundless accusations and shifting blame onto others.

Journalist: It is reported that during the Philippine-U.S. “Balikatan” exercise, the Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong appeared in the waters north of the Philippines. Some analysts believe this might be a response to the Philippine-U.S. military exercise, or to the Philippine patrol vessel’s entering into the waters near Huangyan Dao. Furthermore, the Philippine Navy spokesperson claimed that the Philippine military and Taiwan troops are only one step away from holding joint exercises. What is your comment on this?

Zhang Xiaogang: The Shandong aircraft carrier task group was conducting its annual training mission in relevant waters to further test and enhance the integrated combat capabilities of the carrier task group. This is in accordance with international law and common practice, and is not directed at any specific country or target.

Certain individuals in the Philippines are colluding with external forces such as the U.S., to “stir up the sea” for selfish gains, undermining peace and stability in the South China Sea region. They even attempt to play with fire on the Taiwan question. We sternly warn the Philippine side to cease its infringements and provocations, and stop offending China’s core interest in any form. China will continue to take resolute and forceful measures to defend its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), answers recent media queries concerning the military on May 8th, 2025. (mod.gov.cn/Photo by Zhang Zhicheng)

Journalist: According to reports, the US Secretary of Defense has directed the development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS), with a particular focus on strengthening deterrence against China in the Indo-Pacific region. Besides, the US military also plans to establish a large storage facility in Subic Bay, the Philippines before 2026, to store weapons, equipment, and logistical supplies. What’s your comment?

Zhang Xiaogang: To maintain its hegemony and selfish gains, the US has repeatedly made an issue out of China in a vain attempt to turn the Asia-Pacific into a powder keg and reduce certain countries to pawns on the front line. Such actions seriously undermine the security and well-being of peoples across the region. Facts have repeatedly proved that being America’s enemy is dangerous, but being America’s friend can be fatal. We urge the countries concerned not to invite the wolf into the house or willingly become its pawns, and not to undermine the hard-won peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

MIL OSI China News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing Project 2025 Spring Review

Source: NASA

NASA and its partners in the Advanced Composites Consortium gathered at the agency’s Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, on April 29-May 1, 2025.
Team members from 22 organizations in the public-private partnership are collaborating to increase the production rate of composite aircraft, reduce costs, and improve performance.
The team discussed results from the Technology Development Phase of NASA’s Hi-Rate Composite Aircraft Manufacturing (HiCAM) project.
The project is evaluating concepts and competing approaches at the subcomponent scale to determine technologies with the greatest impact on manufacturing rate and cost. The most promising concepts will be demonstrated on full-scale wing and fuselage components during the next four years.
Through collaboration and shared investment, the team is increasing the likelihood of technologies being adopted for next-generation transports, ultimately lowering costs for operators and improving the U.S. competitive advantage in the commercial aircraft industry.
Want to Learn More About Composite Aircraft Research?

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Thales awarded ATC modernization contract in Brazil by CISCEA and installs new radar station at Presidente Prudente airport, reinforcing Brazilian airspace safety and security

Source: Thales Group

Headline: Thales awarded ATC modernization contract in Brazil by CISCEA and installs new radar station at Presidente Prudente airport, reinforcing Brazilian airspace safety and security

14 May 2025

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The Commission for the Implementation of the Brazilian Airspace Control System (CISCEA), an entity of the Brazilian Air Force Airspace Control Department (DECEA), awards a modernization contract for 9 Primary and Secondary Surveillance Radars to Omnisys, a Thales company.
The recent deployment of a co-mounted Primary TRAC NG and Secondary RSM NG radar, at Presidente Prudente airport (São Paulo), marks the 133^rd milestone of installed Thales ATC (Air Traffic Control) radars in Brazil, contributing to more than 80% of the country’s airspace security and safety.
Renowned for outstanding reliability, unmatched performance and the latest in digital innovations, Thales Primary and Secondary radars, play a vital role in air surveillance, maintaining constant awareness of aircraft position at all times.

Co-mounted Primary TRAC NG and Secondary RSM NG radar installed at Presidente Prudente airport Copyright Omnisys, a Thales company” id=”image-4ce97681-063e-4b93-9446-2298ef4b4412″ data-id=”4ce97681-063e-4b93-9446-2298ef4b4412″ data-original=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/4ce97681-063e-4b93-9446-2298ef4b4412/-/inline/no/345.jpg” data-mfp-src=”https://cdn.uc.assets.prezly.com/4ce97681-063e-4b93-9446-2298ef4b4412/-/format/auto/” alt=”Co-mounted Primary TRAC NG and Secondary RSM NG radar installed at Presidente Prudente airport Copyright Omnisys, a Thales company”/>

Co-mounted Primary TRAC NG and Secondary RSM NG radar installed at Presidente Prudente airport Copyright Omnisys, a Thales company

Thales announces the signature of a modernization contract for nine air traffic control radar systems awarded to Omnisys, a Thales company in Brazil and Strategic Defence Company (EED), as well as the delivery of a new radar station at Presidente Prudente (São Paulo State) which represents the milestone of 133 Thales air traffic control radars operating within Brazilian airspace.

The modernization of these nine radars includes upgrades with advanced technology capable of 3D detection of both low- and high-speed targets. It also features integration between Mode S¹ and the ADS-B system, enabling greater precision in identifying cooperative and non-cooperative aircrafts. The update includes electronic protection features to ensure effective operation, even in the presence of electromagnetic interference, guaranteeing continuous and reliable surveillance.

Certified by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, as a Strategic Defence Product (PED) and manufactured at Omnisys headquarters near São Paulo, the new co-mounted Primary TRAC NG and Secondary RSM NG Surveillance Radar is installed at Presidente Prudente airport (São Paulo), and provisioned for future IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) implementation. The launch of this radar station is part of the broader strategy to keep Brazilian skies increasingly secure.

The radar station will expand air traffic surveillance capabilities, significantly improving safety and operational efficiency at Presidente Prudente Airport — the third busiest airport in the interior of the state of São Paulo.

“This initiative represents a strategic step in renewing Brazil’s radar network, ensuring greater operational reliability and alignment with current air traffic control demands,” says Air Lieutenant Brigadier Maurício Augusto Silveira de Medeiros, General Director of DECEA. “DECEA is proud of the significant operational advancements and efficiency level achieved at the Brazilian airspace control system, recognized as a worldwide reference. Thales, thanks to its cutting-edge solutions and commitment to localization, is a major partner of the Brazilian Air Force. We highly value this partnership and look forward to continued collaboration to further enhance our capabilities.”

“With 133 radars for Air Traffic Control and Management produced and delivered in Brazil, Thales confirms its commitment to deliver the best in technology, contributing to the security of Brazilian airspace. Local production not only reinforces, but also highlights our dedication to innovate in order to meet the specific needs of our customers. The modernization contract is key to maintaining the installed base of radars at the highest level of technology, as well as ensuring high operational reliability. We are committed to developing technology that addresses both current and future challenges of national airspace and security”, adds Eric HUBER, Vice President Surface Radars, Thales.

¹^{a secondary surveillance and communication standard which supports Air Traffic Control (ATC)}

MIL OSI Economics –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ4: VIP lounge services at Hong Kong International Airport

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

â€‹Following is a question by the Hon Gary Zhang and a reply by the Secretary for Transport and Logistics, Ms Mable Chan, in the Legislative Council today (May 14):

Question:

It has been reported that the passenger throughput at Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) reached 5.28 million in January this year, with an average daily passenger throughput of over 170 000. However, there are views pointing out that the existing VIP lounge services set up by airlines or enterprises at HKIA are unable to meet the demand, resulting in chronic queues. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council whether it knows:

(1) the current number of VIP lounges at HKIA, as well as the respective average daily number of passengers served and maximum capacity, floor area and year of opening; whether the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) will consider allowing enterprises to re-establish VIP lounges on the Arrivals Level in response to the increased passenger throughput due to the expansion of HKIA; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(2) the number of additional VIP lounges planned to be provided in HKIA’s Terminal 1 in the next five years, together with their respective area, target average daily number of passengers to be served and maximum capacity; the eligibility criteria, approval standards, procedures and time required for applications to establish or expand VIP lounges; and

(3) the number of VIP lounges planned to be established after the expansion of HKIA’s Terminal 2; the respective location, area, target average daily number of passengers to be served and maximum capacity of these VIP lounges and their opening dates?

Reply:

President,

Hong Kong is an international aviation hub. This positioning is recognised in the National 14th Five-Year Plan and the Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area. To this end, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Airport Authority Hong Kong (AAHK) have been taking measures to continuously enhance the strengths and competitiveness of Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA).

With regard to passenger services, the efficiency of airport operations and the passenger experience are our keys to success. Taking into account the large number of passengers, who are of different backgrounds and with different travel purposes, received by the airport every day, the AAHK has been providing a wide range of facilities and services at HKIA, and has been continuously reviewing and striving to improve the facilities to cater for the needs of different groups of passengers. In particular, to cater for the needs of high-end and business travellers, the AAHK has reserved locations in the Passenger Terminal Building of HKIA for airlines or other corporations to set up and operate lounges in accordance with the market demand and commercial modes, with a view to providing travellers with a more superior and comfortable travel experience.

With regard to the matters relating to the lounges in the question, having consulted the AAHK, my reply is as follows:

(1) At present, there are 17 lounges at HKIA, including nine lounges operated by airlines for use by designated passengers of the airlines and their alliances, and eight other lounges operated by other non-airline corporations, which are open to passengers on a pay-per-visit basis or on other prescribed modes.

These lounges, which first started operation in 1998, range in size from less than 200 square metres to over 6 000 square metres. The location, size and establishment year of each lounge are set out at the Annex. As regards the service capacity, the 17 lounges mentioned above can receive a total of about 22 000 visitors per day on average, and are currently receiving about 16 000 visitors per day. As the numbers of visitors received by each individual lounge involve commercially sensitive information of the operators, the AAHK is not positioned to provide such information.

Taking into account the fact that departing or transfer passengers generally stay in the restricted area of the airport for a longer period of time to wait for boarding and departure, and that most arriving passengers leave the airport for the urban area expeditiously upon their arrival in Hong Kong, the AAHK has mainly reserved spaces for lounges on the Departures Level of the restricted area to cater for the needs of passengers waiting for their flights. At present, all the 17 lounges at HKIA are located on the Departures Level of the restricted area of Terminal 1 for use by departing or transit passengers. That said, in view of the demand of some arriving passengers for lounge services, there were previously two lounges in the original Terminal 2. The AAHK has reserved spaces for re-establishing two lounges in the Arrivals Hall of the expanded Terminal 2. The proposed lounges will be located outside the restricted area and adjacent to Terminal 1, which will facilitate the reception of passengers arriving via either terminals.

(2) and (3) With the increasing number of high-end passengers, the AAHK has been maintaining communication with airlines and other related corporations, and negotiating with airlines and other corporations interested in setting up, expanding and refurbishing lounges on the leasing arrangements as well as the related operational details, so as to ensure that the facilities of the airport lounges can meet the demand of passengers.

With regard to Terminal 1, the AAHK has already received and approved expansion plans for two lounges currently operated by airlines, with their areas be increased by about 4 200 square metres. One of the lounges will be refurbished and expanded within this year and will reopen in 2027, while the other will commence expansion works in 2028 and reopen in 2030. Meanwhile, the AAHK has reserved another three locations on the Departures Level for the operation of new lounges and is in discussion with a number of airlines with a view to bringing the lounges into operation progressively from this year onwards. The total area of the three lounges is about 2 300 square metres.

For the expanded Terminal 2 and the Terminal 2 Concourse (T2C), the AAHK is now working with its business partners on the preparatory work and will commission the facilities in phases in accordance with passenger demand. Of them, the abovementioned two lounges at the Arrivals Hall, with a total area of about 1 000 square metres, are expected to come into service in phases to tie in with the phased opening of Terminal 2 from end of this year. The AAHK has also reserved spaces on the Departures Level for seven lounges, with a total area of about 6 000 square metres, which will come into operation gradually to tie in with the opening of T2C.
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President, overall speaking, apart from continuously improving and upgrading airport facilities (e.g. lounges), we have also adopted a multi-pronged approach to enhance the passenger experience at the airport, which includes adopting a number of measures such as increasing efficiency through the use of innovative technology, enhancing the customer service standard of airport staff, and increasing the variety of shopping and dining options at the airport, with a view to providing passengers with more comfortable and convenient services.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: “BACK IN THE SKIES AND BETTER THAN EVER” – SAMOA AIRWAYS’ TWIN OTTER 5W-FAW TAKES FLIGHT AFTER MAJOR OVERHAUL

Source:

MIL-OSI USA: Sánchez on Republican tax bill: Don’t buy the bullshit

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Linda Sanchez (38th District of CA)

WASHINGTON – Congresswoman Linda T. Sánchez (D-Calif.) delivered an opening statement during the Ways and Means Committee’s markup of the Republican tax bill.

Video of her opening statement is available HERE and the text follows:

“Well, here we go again.

Republicans are once again choosing billionaires and big corporations over working families. This bill that we are marking up today is an insult to every hardworking American. It sends a very clear message: that you’ll pay more, and you’ll receive fewer services – just so that billionaires can pocket another tax cut that they really don’t need.

American families, in case you have noticed, are struggling. Under President Trump and Republican leadership, they have seen nothing but chaos. They’ve watched Elon Musk gleefully take a chainsaw to vital programs that they rely on, like Social Security, Medicare, and the VA. Travel is less safe at airports because they are left in disarray due to the cuts to our air traffic control systems.

Prices for everyday necessities – like food, clothing, diapers, and formula – keep rising because of Trump’s tariffs. Premiums for health insurance, car insurance, and housing are going up, making it harder and harder for families to make ends meet.

And now, rather than providing real relief, Republicans want to look at this chaos, put it into law, and call it ‘one beautiful bill.’ All to pay for more tax cuts for the rich while adding [trillions] to our national debt.

Nearly $20 trillion in debt over the next ten years by Republicans’ own members’ own estimates. Not our estimates – their estimates. Americans are worried about their future. Consumer confidence is at a record low. People are afraid of losing their jobs, their health care, student aid, and food assistance.

And this bill today compounds that pain. 14 million people will lose health care coverage under this plan. And for what? Again, so billionaires can get even richer while we all drown in debt. This is outrageous. Billionaires already have more money than they could ever spend. They can afford to pay their fair share.

What’s equally disturbing is you’re not being honest about the fact that you are meting out crumbs to the most needy while you are helping the most wealthy. And don’t buy the bullshit that tax cuts for the rich create more jobs or better wages. It’s been the excuse under every Republican administration in the last half-century to pass more and more tax cuts to the rich.

And it has failed to deliver on that promise each and every single time. The wealthy just got richer while the working families got harmed. All while piling on more debt that families will have to pay off.

I’m outraged that this committee is focused on doing more for the richest in this country while destroying the means of survival for the poorest. And this bill doubles down on that assault on those seeking the American Dream by stealing tax benefits and services to working people who are paying taxes!

It would deny the Child Tax Credit to 2 million U.S. citizen children. Even worse, it would deny Medicare coverage to those who’ve worked and paid into the system. How dare Republicans say they are for the working class when they’re making it harder for those struggling to get by?

Enough is enough. My constituents are fed up. They’re sick and tired of Republican tax cuts that only benefit the ultra-wealthy. Our tax code needs to be about fairness. It needs to be about balance. It should support families, not the rich. But this bill does the exact opposite.

To my Republican colleagues, I say: please just stop this insanity. You have to lie about what is in this bill; otherwise, probably, your constituents would be rioting in the streets. Here is an idea: how about you think about putting your constituents first for once, rather than the people who donate to your campaigns?

But I guess that is asking a little too much from people who have completely lost their moral compass. I will be voting ‘no’ on this bill. I hope some on that side of the aisle see the light and do the same.”

###

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Moscow Aviation Center specialists complete preparations for the summer season

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

The Moscow Aviation Center is completing its annual preparation of flight and engineering personnel, equipment and infrastructure facilities for the summer season. This was reported by the capital’s municipal services complex.

The crews of the Moscow Aviation Center completed theoretical training, which ended with a traditional conference, and began practical training with passing tests for admission to the operation of helicopters in the warm period. Aircraft engineers and technicians refreshed their knowledge and are now conducting routine maintenance of the aircraft. The motorcade specialists switched the transport to summer mode, and the airfield service workers prepared the landing sites.

“As climate conditions change, so do piloting methods. All crew members must understand many things. For example, they must be able to read a weather map to avoid dangerous weather conditions in the air, and know the habits of migratory birds to react correctly when meeting them in the sky. All pilots have good knowledge of mathematics and physics. Both during training and during the flight, we constantly make calculations: how much weight can be lifted depending on the air temperature, how to adjust the course taking into account the direction and strength of the wind, and much more,” said Alexey Didenko, commander of the Moscow Aviation Center flight squadron.

According to the pilots of the aviation center, the probability of thunderstorms, heavy rain and squalls increases in spring and summer. In dry, warm weather, there is a risk of losing ground when landing a helicopter. This is a situation when air currents from the machine’s propeller raise dust from the surface of the site, causing visibility to drop to almost zero. Such factors significantly complicate helicopter control even for the most experienced pilots.

“Often such situations occur during independent air-to-air landings, when crews have to land as close as possible to the scene of the incident, and the sides of roads, city courtyards, and even football fields can become landing sites. In such cases, the pilot hovers above the ground, “blowing up” everything beneath him, and watches carefully: when it becomes clear, he descends. In the summer, this is one of the most indispensable piloting techniques,” said Vyacheslav Kalenov, deputy commander of the second aviation squadron of the Moscow Aviation Center.

All complex and possible abnormal situations are analyzed by the crews at the final stage of theoretical spring-summer training – the conference. At it, specialists exchange experiences, analyze various aviation incidents, develop scenarios for their prevention and summarize the information received.

Now the flight crew has reported on the theoretical part of the seasonal program and has begun training flights. They will last until the end of May. As a result, the crews will receive permission to carry out aviation work in the warm season.

Preparations are also being completed in other divisions of the Moscow Aviation Center. Employees of the aviation technical base conduct special maintenance of helicopters. They inspect the systems and units of all aircraft, the landing gear wheels of firefighting aircraft and the skis of medical aircraft, navigation equipment and communications equipment, and replace winter covers to protect the aircraft from exposure to subzero temperatures and snow with lightweight ones. The engines of rotary-wing aircraft are switched to a special summer operating mode.

According to Yegor Zhigarev, head of the aviation and technical base of the Moscow Aviation Center, specialists always check the fire extinguishing system sensors and replace the lubricant. For example, in warm weather, more viscous compounds are used. If necessary, anti-corrosion treatment of helicopter fuselages is carried out. Specialists also analyze the specifics of operating equipment in the warm season and the impact of weather conditions on aircraft wear.

The employees of the engineering and airfield service inspect 28 helicopter pads managed by the aviation center after winter. As its head Vladimir Makarov said, with the onset of spring, much attention is paid to the serviceability of the lighting systems and the condition of the road surface. When a stable positive temperature is established, the markings are updated, the paintwork of the fire-fighting equipment is refreshed, the facades are washed and the fences are repaired.

Briefings were held in the air center’s motorcade: the drivers discussed the specifics of working in the warm season, and the mechanics discussed preparing the equipment for the summer season. The service is responsible for seasonal maintenance of vehicles, changing tires to summer tires, and replacing equipment. For example, instead of winter brushes, watering systems were installed on the airfield municipal cleaning vehicle.

More than 530 people were saved by the crews of the Moscow Aviation Center in 2024

Timely maintenance of helicopters, airfield equipment, equipment and communications equipment allows specialists of the Moscow Aviation Center to be ready for any whims of nature. And constant training of flight personnel maintains the professionalism of the crews at a high level.

Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153764073/

MIL OSI Russia News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: EPA Grants Davids’ Request, Issues Emergency Fuel Waiver to Lower Gas Prices

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sharice Davids (KS-3)

Sale of E15 fuel lowers costs at the gas pump and supports Kansas’ agricultural professionals

This week, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fulfilled Representative Sharice Davids’ request by issuing a national emergency fuel waiver to allow the sale of E15 – fuel blended with 10.5 to 15 percent ethanol – during the 2025 summer season in Kansas.

Ethanol, made from locally grown crops, is a more affordable alternative to unblended gasoline. This waiver, which has been granted multiple times in recent years, will help lower gas prices for Kansans, support local farmers, and strengthen domestic supply chains.

“I’m glad the EPA responded to my call to help lower costs for Kansans at the pump,” said Davids. “This emergency waiver will provide some immediate relief, support our local ag producers, and reduce reliance on foreign oil. It’s the right step for now — and I’ll keep working on long-term solutions to bring costs down.”

For multiple years, Davids has urged the EPA — and sponsored federal legislation — to guarantee the sale of this E15 not only during the summer but also year-round. This would reduce our reliance on foreign oil, build U.S. energy security, and support Kansas agriculture and manufacturing.

Davids previously visited East Kansas Agri-Energy (EKAE), a Garnett-based renewable ethanol producer, as part of her Farm Bill listening tour. EKAE, which received federal funding to assist with business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, has around 40 full-time employees and relies heavily on Kansas corn producers to supply the crops needed to make the biofuel.

Davids has taken additional actions to lower gas prices for Kansans by:

Voting for the Year-Round Fuel Choice Act, which allows retailers the ability to sell higher ethanol-blended fuels year-round,
Leading the Nationwide Consumer and Fuel Retailer Choice Act, a bipartisan, bicameral bill that expands access to lower-cost, homegrown fuel,
Helping to pass legislation that promotes sustainable aviation fuel, a liquid fuel that achieves significant emissions reduction compared to fossil-based jet fuel,
Supporting legislation that expands biofuels infrastructure, opening up new market opportunities for sustainable fuel sources and lowering energy costs for Kansas families,
Pushing the President to suspend the federal gas tax, providing immediate relief to Kansans at the gas pump.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: WATCH: Davids Speaks with Plane Collision Victims’ Families, Addresses Work to Improve Air Safety

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sharice Davids (KS-3)

WICHITA, KS – Yesterday, Representative Sharice Davids traveled to Wichita, KS to speak with families of the recent air collision of Flight 5342 from ICT to DCA with a military helicopter. Davids, a member of the U.S. House Aviation Subcommittee, listened to their stories, heard their concerns, and shared her work to help make flying safer. Afterward, she spoke with KWCH on the importance of acting quickly to ensure our skies remain the safest in the world.

Following the tragic collision, Davids and her Kansas colleagues expressed their steadfast solidarity with the families and communities affected by the tragedy. Also, after the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its preliminary report on the collision, Davids said “the FAA must act to implement the NTSB’s initial recommendations to prevent future disasters.”

Davids also condemned the President’s recent decision to fire hundreds of FAA employees and urged U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy to immediately implement key aviation safety reforms included in the bipartisan FAA Reauthorization, which Congress passed last year. That includes hiring more air traffic controllers and updating aging air traffic control technology and systems.

Key Quotes in KWCH: Congresswoman visits Wichita to speak with families of people killed in Flight 5342 crash, address next steps

KWCH: What was your reaction when the FAA admitted an Army helicopter took a scenic route, forcing two flights to abort landings just weeks after the January 29th collision?

DAVIDS: “The simple answer is outrage. As a committee, we need to either come up with new legislation to address issues if there are things falling through the cracks, or do what we can to hold the FAA accountable. I know that… the Secretaries of Transportation, the Acting Administrator of the FAA, and the Secretary of the Department of Defense — they all need to be having those tough conversations. I have concerns about whether, you know, whether and how they’re doing that. But I think that folks are valid and right to be frustrated when they’re seeing news like that come out.”

KWCH: Given the NTSB included recommendations in their preliminary report, what more can Congress do before the final report is released next year?

DAVIDS: “I really do think that that is a demonstration of just how seriously everyone is taking this. Because these reports… sometimes… take longer than anyone could think that they possibly should. But it’s because of how technical they get in their investigations. In the meantime, I do think that taking those preliminary recommendations, [and] figuring out what, if any, updates to legislation need to happen.”

KWCH: Do you think there’s enough support in Congress to fund air safety improvements and modernize outdated technology in response to NTSB recommendations?

DAVIDS: “My hope is that we’ll be able to continue some of the bipartisan support we’ve seen in previous Congresses. I think that the FAA reauthorization — I wish that it had been on the news more, actually, because of the type of bipartisan support we saw. And in that was support for funding to upgrade our systems — both the airspace, the air traffic control systems, as well as our landing systems and those technologies. [And] funding to really ramp up air traffic control hiring.”

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Defense Officials to Fischer: If DOD is Forced to Vacate Spectrum Frequencies, U.S. Would Assume High Level of Risk for Homeland Defense

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Nebraska Deb Fischer
Today, during a hearing on the Senate Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, U.S. Senator Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) questioned Commander of United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Gen. Gregory Guillot and Director of Missile Defense Agency Lt. Gen. Heath Collins, who confirmed that if the Department of Defense (DOD) were forced to vacate frequencies in the lower 3 or key portions of the 7/8 GHz spectrum bands, the United States would assume an extraordinarily high level of risk for homeland defense.
Click the image above to watch a video of Fischer’s questioning
Click here to download audio
Click here to download video
TRANSCRIPT:Fischer: General Guillot, I’ve appreciated our past conversations about the need for increased domain awareness, for we cannot shoot what we cannot see. As we look towards Golden Dome and the future of missile defense, what additional improvements need to be made with respect to domain awareness?
General Guillot: Madam Chair, I think that what I call the domain awareness layer of Golden Dome is the most critical that we need to have first, for the reasons that you just mentioned. Any chance of using advanced interceptors or defeat capabilities would not be possible if we can’t detect and track these threats. I think that it’s a seabed-to-space approach. We need to have undersea sensors to detect submarines that can now get closer to North America than they could before, based on improved stealthiness of those ships. And then a ground layer that can see much further out because of the advanced standoff weapons that our adversaries can now employ. We need an air layer, like the E-7, to close the kill chain with fighter aircrafts or surface-to-air systems, and then a space layer. The space layer would both track airborne moving targets or aircrafts, but also systems like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) that could track hypersonics, as well as the warning capability that we need to detect the launches to begin with.
Fischer: Is there anything you can tell us in this setting about Golden Dome and the options that may be available on the sensors and the radar systems that would be used?General Guillot: Madam Chair, I don’t know what the Golden Dome will look like, but I suspect that it would be able to use a lot of the systems that are already in place and currently in development, which would give us a full capability in probably something closer to zero to five years, as opposed to something, you know, a decade out into the future. A couple of those systems would be the HBTSS that I just mentioned for the hypersonics, space-based AMTI, which we have a number of prototype systems on orbit now, over-the-horizon radars which are also operational in, not in the United States, but elsewhere. And then for instance, the E-7 which many other countries operate.
Fischer: So given that, how much risk would Golden Dome incur if the department was forced to vacate the lower 3GHz or a portion of the 7-8GHz spectrum that it now has?
General Guillot: Madam Chair, it’s my assessment that we would assume an extraordinarily high level of risk if we lose control of those portions of the spectrum. Many of the systems that we rely on every day today, much less in the future, for Homeland Defense, reside in that spectrum range.
Fischer: Thank you. General Collins, can you provide us with an update on the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor, or the HBTSS system?
Lt. Gen. Collins: Yes, Madam Chair, thank you. So, the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor is a prototype program that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) pursued to prove out the technology such that from space we could close the kill chain on a hypersonic weapon. And the focus of that was to prove out that the space system could have the accuracy, the track quality, and get that data into the command-and-control system fast enough to be able to close that fire control loop. Those two systems, launched in February of last year, have gone through two test bed launches where we had a test bed target launch fly a hypersonic profile, and we have collected data from the sensors during that. So far, we have proven out the timeliness, latency of the fire control loop with those systems, as well as the sensitivity of those systems to close the loop. We’re going back with some algorithm updates into the payload to improve on the track quality. But we see that closing as well. It’s been a very successful prototype program, and all along, we’ve worked in parallel with the Space Force and Space Development Agency. They now have our HBTSS-like requirements as part of their proliferated warfighting space architecture. And in the tranches to come in the following years, they will slowly be building up an operational hypersonic tracking layer for us.
Fischer: Thank you. Perhaps in another setting we can talk about a more definitive timeline when that would be available. Thank you.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Electronics Acquires Leading Global HVAC Solutions Provider FläktGroup

Source: Samsung

Samsung Electronics today announced that it has signed an agreement to acquire all shares of FläktGroup, a leading global HVAC solutions provider, for €1.5 billion from European investment firm Triton. With the global applied HVAC market experiencing rapid growth, the acquisition reinforces Samsung’s commitment to expanding and strengthening its HVAC business.

“Through the acquisition of FläktGroup, an applied HVAC specialist, Samsung Electronics has laid the foundation to become a leader in the global HVAC business, offering a full range of solutions to our customers,” said TM Roh, Acting Head of the Device eXperience (DX) Division at Samsung Electronics. “Our commitment is to continue investing in and developing the high-growth HVAC business as a key future growth engine.”

FläktGroup, based in Herne, Germany, has over a century of accumulated technological expertise and design capabilities, offering diverse products and solutions tailored to each customer. FläktGroup supplies high-reliability and high-efficiency HVAC systems to a wide range of buildings and facilities, including data centers that require stable cooling, museums and libraries managing sensitive historical artifacts, airports and terminals with high foot traffic, and large hospitals where hygiene, temperature and humidity control are critically important.

In the large-scale data center market globally, FläktGroup has secured high customer satisfaction through its product performance, reliability and service support, achieving substantial revenue growth over the past three years. FläktGroup’s data center solutions include its industry-leading liquid cooling and air cooling products, which have enabled customers to reduce energy consumption, contributing to achieving lower carbon footprint goals.

Last year, FläktGroup won the DCS Cooling Innovation of the Year Award at the DCS Cooling Awards, in recognition of its innovative and advanced technologies.

“We are extremely pleased that FläktGroup has become a part of Samsung Electronics. FläktGroup, as a global top-tier HVAC specialist with over a century of expertise, has been relied on by global large clients for its technological and product innovations,” said Trevor Young, CEO of FläktGroup. “Now, with Samsung Electronics’ global business foundation and investment, we expect to further accelerate our growth.”

In addition to data centers, FläktGroup has secured a diverse portfolio of over 60 large customers, including leading pharmaceutical companies, biotech and food and beverage firms, and gigafactories.

Samsung Investing in HVAC Business as Key Growth Engine
The HVAC industry is expected to continue growing with demand for innovative and energy-efficient solutions that improve air quality and control temperature and humidity to provide comfort and safety. Samsung will continue to invest in the HVAC business and has recently made acquisitions and investments across robotics, medical technology and the consumer audio sectors as part of its commitment to expand into new growth businesses.

According to some market research forecasts, the applied HVAC market is projected to grow from $61 billion in 2024 to $99 billion by 2030, at an annual growth rate of 8%, while the data center cooling market is expected to grow at a faster pace at an annual growth rate of 18%. The data center segment in particular has high entry barriers, requiring global supply experience and the ability to present optimal designs and solutions for customers.

In its acquisition of FläktGroup, Samsung anticipates sustained growth in data center demand due to the proliferation of generative AI, robotics, autonomous driving, XR and other technologies.

In addition, Samsung’s building integration control solution (b.IoT) and FläktGroup’s HVAC control solution (FläktEdge) will offer a full suite of HVAC and building energy control systems, through which the company expects an expansion of its service and maintenance business.

Samsung has been expanding its HVAC business with a focus on ductless systems, which supply general and system air conditioners to residential and commercial buildings. In May 2024, Samsung formed a joint venture with Lennox International Inc. to strengthen its position in the North America HVAC market and added Lennox’s distribution channels to the company’s own sales channels.

The transaction is expected to close within 2025.

MIL OSI Economics –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Sen. Cramer: FAA Announces $5.8 Million for Projects at North Dakota Airports

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced an award of$5,844,554 through the Airport Infrastructure Grant (AIG) program for projects at several airports across North Dakota. The funding will be distributed to the following:

$2,491,667 for the Bismarck Municipal Airport to expand the existing General Aviation Apron by adding 5,340 square yards to meet FAA standards and to reconstruct 8,090 square yards of the existing General Aviation Apron pavement.
$2,200,000 to the Jamestown Regional Airport Authority to expand an existing 9,450 square foot snow removal equipment and sand storage building by 1,500 square feet to bring the airport into conformity with current standards.
$552,962 to the Mercer County Regional Airport Authority to reseal 1,420 feet of the existing Taxiway A and B pavement and joints, reseal 13,708 square yards of the existing North and South Apron pavement and joints, and reseal 5,000 feet of existing Runway 15/33 pavement and joints, and reseal 530 feet of the existing Taxilane pavement and joints.
$171,000 to the Bottineau Municipal Airport Authority to rehabilitate one existing airport rotating beacon.
$137,000 to the Mandan Airport Authority to construct new airport underdrains for drainage and erosion control.
$120,000 to the Crosby Municipal Airport Authority to construct a new 4,800 square foot sponsor-owned hangar for aircraft storage and maintenance which will assist the airport in being self-sustaining.
$86,925 to the Glen Ullin Regional Airport Authority to reseal 2,985 square yards of the existing General Aviation Apron pavement and joints, to reseal 3,800 feet of existing Runway 11/29 pavement and joints, to reseal 488 feet of the existing Taxilane East, West, and South pavement and joints, and to reseal 550 feet of the existing Taxiway A pavement and joints.
$85,000 to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to rehabilitate 3,700 feet of existing paved Runway 14/32 to maintain the structural integrity and minimize foreign object debris, rehabilitate 4,700 square yards of the existing General Aviation Apron pavement to maintain the structural integrity of the pavement and to minimize foreign object debris, and rehabilitate 550 feet of the existing paved Taxiway A to maintain the structural integrity of the pavement and to minimize foreign object debris.

The AIG Program was established by the fully-paid-for Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to provide airports with funding for modernization and safety projects. Since its creation, airports in North Dakota have received over $49 million in program funding.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI China: China’s listed firms log solid Q1 earnings on thriving consumption, tech innovation

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Despite global economic uncertainties, China’s listed companies posted solid first-quarter performance in 2025, driven by robust consumer spending and steady advances in technological innovation.

Among the 5,400 listed companies that have released financial reports for the first quarter (Q1), more than 70 percent were in the black, according to financial information provider Wind.

The combined net profit attributable to shareholders of all listed firms came in at 1.49 trillion yuan (about 207 billion U.S. dollars), up 3.64 percent from a year ago, the data showed.

According to analysts, the Q1 reports reflect a surge in emerging consumption trends and booming technological innovation among China’s listed companies, underscoring the country’s ongoing shift toward high-quality development.

The consumer sector emerged as a bright spot in first-quarter earnings, with listed consumer companies reporting a 4.7 percent year-on-year rise in revenue and a 14.7 percent increase in net profit attributable to shareholders, both outpacing the average growth rate of non-financial firms.

Appliance makers were among the top gainers, supported by the government-backed trade-in scheme. During the period, the household appliance and consumer electronics segments posted year-on-year growth of 22.8 percent and 107.5 percent, respectively, in net profit attributable to shareholders.

Last year, China’s consumer goods trade-in program boosted product sales by more than 1.3 trillion yuan, according the Ministry of Commerce. Building on the achievements, the country’s central authorities have recently issued approximately 81 billion yuan in ultra-long special treasury bonds, aiming to increase support for the program this year.

New consumption models have been reshaping the market. According to Founder Securities, Chinese consumers have been spending more on holidays, ice and snow sports, and buying “guzi”– a homonym for “goods” that refers to various merchandise featuring elements of animation, comics and games (ACG) culture.

In the first quarter, profits of firms in ice and snow tourism rose 25.8 percent year on year, while companies in the pet industry and those related to “guzi” economy saw earnings jump 58.2 percent and 93.6 percent, respectively.

Spending on culture, entertainment and tourism also gained momentum among Chinese consumers, fueling business growth across sectors such as aviation, hospitality and film.

Take the movie industry, for example. As of April 30, 16 film and television production companies had released their first-quarter financial reports, with six of them reporting a year-on-year doubling of net profit attributable to shareholders.

Yan Xiang, chief economist at Founder Securities, said that the simultaneous rise in profits and revenue among consumer-related firms highlights the immense potential of China’s vast consumer market. As consumption continues to expand steadily, consumer spending is expected to play an increasingly significant role in boosting growth in the country, he added.

Another key theme emerging from the quarterly reports was tech-driven innovation, with listed Chinese companies emphasizing advancements in smart manufacturing, digital operations and supply chain optimization as part of a broader push to spur growth through technology.

In line with the trend, China’s listed firms have funneled more funds for research and development (R&D), with data from Wind showing that nearly half of all listed firms increased R&D investments in Q1.

Breakthroughs in core technologies have also facilitated industrial upgrades. Companies in emerging industries accounted for 40 percent of all firms listed on the Shanghai main board, overtaking traditional sectors like finance to become the market’s leading sectors by market capitalization.

Zheng Hongda, an analyst with Western Securities, stressed the importance of strong internal momentum among China’s technology firms in the face of a complex external environment.

For technology companies, their investment plans for the next period should center on key areas such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, which will galvanize the internal driving forces along the industrial chain, Zheng said.

MIL OSI China News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI China: Airfreight boom drives new opening-up momentum in inland China

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Xi’an, an ancient capital of China and the starting point of the historic Silk Road, is writing a new chapter in global trade as it strives to develop an airfreight-driven economy, with its international air cargo and mail volume doubling in the first four months of 2024.

From January to April, the inland metropolis handled 17,200 tonnes of cross-border shipments — primarily e-commerce goods — marking a 102.4 percent year-on-year increase.

The growth was driven by Xi’an’s expanded Eurasian cargo network this year, with more cargo flights to Budapest and the launch of four new freight routes linking Tbilisi, Milan, Debrecen, and Madrid, thereby strengthening the city’s connections with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, according to Xi’an Xianyang International Airport.

In February, the airport’s Terminal 5, a 705,500-square-meter “super terminal” larger than the combined area of the previous three terminals, officially opened, adding 115 aircraft parking stands while boosting the city’s air logistics capacity.

Amid global economic uncertainties, China has continued to advance high-level openness. The country’s total goods imports and exports in yuan-denominated terms expanded 1.3 percent year on year in the first quarter of 2025, demonstrating stable growth and strong resilience, according to the General Administration of Customs.

Xi’an’s booming airfreight economy is part of China’s broader opening-up drive, contributing to the country’s overall trade expansion.

In the Airport New City (ANC) of Xixian New Area, where the airport is located, bonded warehouses are stocked with imported daily necessities and cosmetics as workers at a cross-border logistics company busily load orders for delivery.

“Compared with coastal cities like Hangzhou, Xi’an offers a cost advantage for air cargo to Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, with flight times shortened by around two hours,” said Lan Yibo, the general manager of the company, adding that they have begun exporting Chinese-made light industrial products to Europe starting this year.

The airport’s high customs clearance efficiency and convenience have attracted a growing number of businesses.

“By making prior reservations, companies can cut customs clearance times from three or four days to just seven hours,” said Dang Liming, an official of the ANC.

Benefiting from the airport-oriented economy, the ANC now hosts 13 logistics parks and over 200 leading logistics firms.

The thriving air logistics has boosted the express delivery and cross-border e-commerce businesses.

Last year, the Xi’an airport handled over 7.3 million international express shipments, ranking second in China.

Located within the ANC, the northwest China regional hub of delivery giant YTO Express handled 1 billion parcels last year, up 33.3 percent year on year.

Shao Xing, a manager at the company, said the Xi’an regional hub has ranked among the top five nationwide in terms of scale.

“The company will launch a new Silk Road international port project by the end of next year, aiming to expand multimodal transport capabilities and enhance connectivity in Central Asia through integrated logistics networks,” Shao said.

MIL OSI China News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Australia: Reappointment as Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government

Source: Workplace Gender Equality Agency

I am honoured to be reappointed the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government in the second term Albanese Labor Government, and I thank the Prime Minister for his continued support.

In our first three years, we embarked on a transformative agenda to reform commonwealth infrastructure investment and return discipline to investment decisions.

This included reforming the infrastructure pipeline so Australians can have confidence projects can be delivered when they are promised, and securing new five-year funding agreements with the jurisdictions that require infrastructure investments to be properly planned and costed.

In transport, we embarked on significant reform to Australia’s aviation industry including reforms to the slot system at Sydney Airport for the first time in 25 years, and landed a record number of bilateral air agreements.

We restored integrity to the federal grants process, increased funding for local roads, and legislated a national fuel efficiency standard.

With the foundations set in the first term, it is time to harness the opportunity to build a better and stronger future, with infrastructure that connects people and businesses and makes our communities not just liveable, but desirable.

We have a significant agenda for our second term, including: establishing a robust consumer aviation protection regime, preserving regional aviation and driving competition in the sector; driving productivity in construction and across our supply chains; getting on with Melbourne Airport Rail, fixing Queensland’s Bruce Highway, finishing Western Sydney International, and much more.

I look forward to continuing to work with an impressive team of Ministers to progress this important work.

The Australian people have put their trust in us and we look forward to delivering on our commitments.

MIL OSI News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: Schatz: No President Should Take $400 Million Gift From A Foreign Country

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Hawaii Brian Schatz

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawai‘i), a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today took to the Senate floor to condemn a luxury airplane gift, valued at $400 million, that President Donald Trump announced he will receive from the government of Qatar. According to reports, Trump intends to designate the plane as Air Force One while in office and then transfer it to a foundation for personal use following the end of his term. Schatz also announced he will be asking for a vote in the Senate to condemn this action.

“I cannot believe I have to say this, but a president should not take a $400 million gift from a foreign country,” said Senator Schatz. “The Emoluments Clause. It’s a fancy phrase, but a simple idea: No foreign gifts.”

“Air Force One is not just a random luxury airplane,” continued Senator Schatz. “It is a symbol of — and a projection of — American power… It represents not just the weight of the presidency, but America itself — generations of history and international leadership. But in one fell swoop, Donald Trump is selling out one of the most iconic symbols of American power that we have.”

“This week, several of my colleagues and I will be asking the Senate to vote to condemn this action,” concluded Senator Schatz. “There should be 100 of us that agree on this fundamental principle: No president should take free stuff from a foreign government. And certainly nothing worth $400 million.”

The full text of his remarks can be found below. Video is available here.

I cannot believe I have to say this, but a president should not take a $400 million gift from a foreign country.

It doesn’t matter which president, what party. It doesn’t matter which foreign country. It doesn’t matter if there is or is not a legal justification. No president should take a $400 million gift from a foreign country.

I shouldn’t have to explain why — but it is a high principle literally enshrined in the Constitution because people who we have representing us should know, not think, but know, that their representatives are focused on them and this country only, that our loyalties not be divided, that our minds are not wandering elsewhere.

The Emoluments Clause. It’s a fancy phrase, but a simple idea: No foreign gifts.

If a foreign government offers you anything — but especially something close to half a billion dollars—the answer is, ‘No, thank you.’ End of story. Very simple. End of story. ‘I cannot take that.’

First of all, because I cannot take that because I cannot have divided loyalties. I’m going into the region; I cannot take a $400 million gift before I begin negotiations with you. But it is explicitly prohibited by the United States Constitution. And the gift in is that the country of Qatar is going to literally provide a luxury aircraft — not just any luxury aircraft to the President of the United States, but Air Force One.

And why does this matter? Air Force One is not just a random luxury airplane. It is a symbol of — and a projection of — American power. It has flown 15 different presidents. It carried President John F. Kennedy’s body after his assassination, and saw President Johnson be sworn in under unprecedented circumstances, it rushed President George W. Bush back to Washington after the Twin Towers were struck, and just two years ago, it flew President Joe Biden for a secret trip to Ukraine during the war.

When people see Air Force One on TV, when they see it land in other countries— whether in London, or Tokyo, or Brazil — they immediately know that America has arrived. It represents not just the weight of the presidency, but America itself — generations of history and international leadership.

But in one fell swoop, Donald Trump is selling out one of the most iconic symbols of American power that we have, and what people will now see is the most powerful man on Earth flying around in a plane paid for by a foreign government. It is disgusting. It is wildly corrupt. And just because they are doing the corruption in plain sight does not make it any less damning or sad or gross.

This week, several of my colleagues and I will be asking the Senate to vote to condemn this action. There should be 100 of us that agree on this fundamental principle: No president should take free stuff from a foreign government. And certainly nothing worth $400 million.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI New Zealand: New bait to control feral cats shows promise

Source: Police investigating after shots fired at Hastings house

Date: 14 May 2025

Feral cats are widespread in New Zealand and have a major impact on our unique native wildlife (such as birds, lizards and bats), as well as spreading diseases like toxoplasmosis. Currently there are limited methods to control feral cats over the large areas where they roam.

As part of the Predator Free 2050 programme, the Department of Conservation (DOC) has been working in partnership with pest control solutions manufacturer, Orillion, to develop a meat sausage bait for application by aircraft for more widespread control of feral cats. DOC is running field trials to test the bait’s effectiveness.

In the first aerial trial last spring, DOC researchers sowed the baits by helicopter over 5000 ha in the St James Conservation Area in North Canterbury. Just one 18 gm sausage was used per hectare or rugby field-sized area.

The results of this field trial are looking promising, says DOC National Eradication Team Manager Stephen Horn.

“We monitored a sample of feral cats fitted with GPS-VHF collars and nine out of ten cats in the trial area quickly found the baits and were killed.

“We also used a grid of 50 cameras to monitor the presence of feral cats before and after the baiting. We detected cats 63 times before the operation and just once after.”

Monitoring through the St James trial also showed stoat and ferret activity declined to very low levels after the operation, most likely from eating baits.

A second trial at Macraes Flat in Otago, which was recently completed, has shown similar results with 100 per cent (11 out of 11) of monitored cats dying, Stephen says.

“It’s exciting – after several years of bait development these trials take us a step closer to being able to register the new bait for wider use.

“A new tool to target feral cats will be a game changer for protecting our vulnerable wildlife, which is found nowhere else in the world.”

The trials involved two applications of bait – the first without toxin to cue feral cats to the sausages and the second using sausages containing small amounts of 1080 (sodium fluoroacetate). They build on earlier research showing the sausage baits are highly attractive to feral cats and not attractive to most native species such as kiwi or to deer.

DOC will carry out a further trial in forested habitat this year. The risk of baits to taonga species like tuna/eel and kea will also be assessed. The results of this work will inform DOC’s application to the Ministry for Primary Industries and Environmental Protection Authority to register the meat bait.

Once registered, DOC plans to use the bait to help remove feral cats from Auckland Island as part of an ambitious plan to eradicate all pests, including feral pigs and mice from this large subantarctic nature reserve. These pests threaten hundreds of native species and have decimated albatross and other seabird populations on the island.

DOC is also working on a second sausage bait using the registered toxin PAPP (para-aminopropiophenone) to directly control stoats. Initial hand-laid field trials show this bait is highly effective. Aerial trials will be carried out this year.

The sausage baits are part of broader work to research and develop new tools and techniques to help achieve New Zealand’s ambitious goal of becoming predator free by 2050.

Background information

Feral cats are found throughout New Zealand in a range of habitats from the coast to alpine areas. They are opportunistic and skilled hunters and prey on native birds, bats and lizards. They have a significant impact on some threatened species such as kea, kakī/black stilt and pukunui/southern New Zealand dotterel.

Contact

For media enquiries contact:

Email: media@doc.govt.nz

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Boost for British green aviation fuel production to support jobs and lift off emerging industry

Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Press release

Boost for British green aviation fuel production to support jobs and lift off emerging industry

New sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) measures will support aviation expansion and meet decarbonisation goals.

new laws introduced today will increase homegrown sustainable aviation fuel, positioning the UK as a world leading destination for the new emerging market
UK revenue certainty for green fuel producers will boost jobs across the country and enable the UK to go further and faster with expansion plans
passengers will be a step closer to more eco-friendly flights, as £400,000 announced to get new fuels to market quicker, delivering on the UK’s clean energy ambitions and powering up economic growth as part of the Plan for Change

New measures to help the UK take off as a world leader in sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), supporting the growth in the industry and jobs across the country, were introduced today in Parliament (14 May 2025).

With decarbonisation key to accelerating expansion plans, the government has also announced an additional £400,000 of funding for producers so that new clean fuels can get to market quicker, speeding up the UK’s path to green flying.

SAF is an alternative to fossil jet fuel, which reduces greenhouse gas emissions on average by 70% on a lifecycle basis. While the fuel is more costly to produce than jet fuel, the government’s SAF measures protect industry and consumers from excessive costs.

In addition, the revenue certainty mechanism (RCM) will keep ticket price changes minimal – keeping fluctuations to £1.50 a year on average – and will be industry funded through a levy on aviation fuel suppliers. The Department for Transport (DfT) will continue to engage with industry on the details of the RCM, including pricing.

A new round of government funding is also being announced, to offer fuel producers a share of £400,000 to support the testing and qualification of green fuels, helping to get them to market quicker. This support for producers follows £63 million of funding made available through the Advanced Fuels Fund this year.

Taken together, the government’s commitments on green fuels will help deliver on its missions to kickstart economic growth via job creation, become a clean energy superpower and will allow the UK to go further and faster with expansion plans, giving a boon to the tourism industry.

Aviation Minister, Mike Kane, said:

I want to see a golden age for green aviation and today sees take off for sustainable flights.

Aviation continues to be one of the fastest growing and most integral parts of the UK’s economy, offering more jobs across engineering, tourism and hospitality – and as we support aviation expansion, we need to move at full throttle towards decarbonisation.

We are making the UK one of the best places in the world to produce sustainable aviation fuel, putting the pedal down on growth and boosting job opportunities across the country as part of the Plan for Change.

The new legislation will help industry meet its requirements under the SAF Mandate, introduced in January this year, which specifies that at least 10% of all jet fuel used in flights taking off from the UK from 2030, be made with sustainable fuel, rising to 22% by 2040.

The new financial mechanism is another display that the UK is rock solid in its commitment to building a prosperous hub for homegrown sustainable fuel production. Furthermore, this vital update provides SAF producers and the industry at large the confidence and stability to plough investment into clean energy.

The government’s approach on low carbon fuels could add up to £5 billion to the economy by 2050 and position the UK as a global hub for SAF production.

Tim Alderslade, Chief Executive of Airlines UK, said:

This is a welcome announcement given the importance of the RCM to commercialising and scaling-up SAF production in the UK, a technology key to decarbonising aviation by 2050. A UK SAF industry, kick-started by the RCM and SAF Mandate, can create tens of thousands of jobs across the country whilst supporting our world-class aviation sector to deliver economic growth.

We look forward to working with government on scheme design and how contracts are allocated, so that we balance the need to deliver the SAF required to support mandate compliance, whilst keeping costs as low as possible through a competitive and transparent bidding process that places the consumer at its heart.

Duncan McCourt, Chief Executive of Sustainable Aviation, said:

We hugely welcome the publication of this important legislation. SAF is a crucial element in the plan to decarbonise aviation as it can be used in existing aircraft with existing infrastructure.

The challenge now is to scale the industry, ensuring we have enough SAF to meet the mandate whilst keeping costs low and create thousands of jobs in the process. This legislation will help to do that.

Aviation, Europe and technology media enquiries

Media enquiries 0300 7777 878

Switchboard 0300 330 3000

Published 14 May 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: May 9th, 2025 Heinrich, Colleagues Urge Trump to Press for Immediate Resumption of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza, Return to Israel-Gaza Hostage & Ceasefire Negotiations

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich

WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, sent a letter to President Trump in advance of the president’s upcoming travel to the Middle East next week, urging him to take an active role in pressing for humanitarian aid and a return to ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas in order to ensure Israel’s security and end more than 15 months of devastating conflict in Gaza.
When Trump took office, the January 15 ceasefire deal negotiated under the presidential transition of the Biden administration was in effect — 30 Israeli hostages were reunited with their families, Hamas’ military capacity had been effectively obliterated, and humanitarian aid was reaching Gaza. In the months since Trump’s inauguration, however, negotiations towards long-term regional security have collapsed, and dozens of hostages remain imprisoned by Hamas.
Before next week’s visit, the senators wrote to President Trump that, “The United States is not providing much needed leadership to drive peace forward in the region.” President Trump’s planned visit to the region does not include a stop in Israel. He has chosen to conclude a truce with Houthi terrorists even as they pledge to continue striking Israel. He also appears to be turning a blind eye towards the core task of ensuring Israel’s security for today and for the long term.
In the letter, the senators described Gaza’s catastrophic humanitarian crisis under a months-long blockade of aid. More than 116,000 metric tons of food assistance have been stuck outside Gaza, and an estimated 90 percent of Gaza’s population face high levels of acute food and water insecurity. According to the United Nations, most civilians face emergency or crisis levels of hunger.
This week, Israel also announced its intent to expand military operations and pursue a long-term occupation of Gaza. “The announcement has already escalated tensions in the Middle East, once again threatening to engulf the volatile region in conflict,” the senators wrote. “The Houthis struck Israel’s Ben Gurion airport on May 4 and have vowed to further retaliate against the proposed occupation. Jordan, one of our most important regional security partners, is facing intensifying pressure amid continued public anger over Gaza. Saudi Arabia has made it clear there can be no progress towards normalization with Israel without a pathway toward Palestinian statehood.”
“Israel’s proposed occupation plans take us further away from permanently ending the Israel-Gaza war and upholding Israel’s security, both goals that you have promised to achieve under your administration,” the senators added.
Specifically, the senators asked Trump to press all parties to agree to a deal that:

Secures the immediate release of all remaining hostages;

Ushers in a ceasefire;

Works towards the creation of a security force backed by Arab partners to administer Gaza without Hamas; and

Creates a path toward a lasting solution that will allow the Israeli and Palestinian people to live in security, dignity, and prosperity.

The senators ended the letter by reaffirming their unequivocal commitment to Israel’s security and its right to defend itself.
“It has been nearly 20 months since Hamas murdered more than 1,200 people and took about 250 hostages, including American citizens,” the senators concluded. “This period has also been marked by severe humanitarian suffering of civilians in Gaza, where more than 52,000 Palestinians have been killed and millions displaced. All of us are longstanding advocates of the U.S.-Israel security partnership, and we will continue to fight for the defense of the Israeli people. That is why, today, we stand with the nearly three-quarters of the Israeli public who are fighting for the release of the remaining hostages in Gaza in exchange for a ceasefire.”
The letter was is by U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Mark Warner (D-Va.), and Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii). Alongside Heinrich, the letter is signed by U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-Del.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), Angus King (I-Maine), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.).
The full text of the letter is here and below:
Dear President Trump:

When you took office in January 2025, we were on a path to peace in the Israel-Gaza conflict, thanks in part to your team’s efforts during the Presidential transition. A ceasefire was in effect and 30 hostages were reunited with their families. Hamas’s military capacity had been effectively obliterated, with the IDF calling it a “guerilla terror group” that could no longer mount a sustained military operation against the people of Israel – a testament to both Israel’s military prowess and the United States’ unflinching support. But today, the United States is not providing critically needed leadership to drive peace forward, which is why we write to express our deep concern in advance of your upcoming travel to the Middle East.
Since March of this year, the situation on the ground has deteriorated dramatically. Fighting in Gaza has resumed, negotiations towards long-term regional security have collapsed, and dozens of hostages remain imprisoned by Hamas. In fact, we have not had a single hostage return home since February 26. In addition, we are witnessing a humanitarian catastrophe in the third month of Israel’s full blockade of food, water, and medicine into Gaza. This is the longest closure Gaza has ever faced. While the World Food Program ran out of food stocks inside Gaza on April 25, they report that more than 116,000 metric tons of food assistance – enough to feed one million people for up to four months – has been positioned outside Gaza at aid corridors, unable to enter. According to the United Nations, an estimated 90 percent of Gaza’s population faces high levels of acute food and water insecurity, with most civilians facing emergency or crisis levels of hunger. Against this backdrop, the Israeli government’s new aid proposal is simply not viable. It would limit aid distribution to just a few sites in southern Gaza secured by private U.S. contractors, and nearly all aid groups operating in the region note this would only increase insecurity and displacement. Roughly half of Gaza’s 2.1 million people are children; a generation of starving children today would prevent a secure and peaceful Israel tomorrow.
This week, the Israeli government announced a plan to expand military operations and pursue a sustained, long-term occupation of Gaza. This is a dangerous inflection point for Israel and the region, and while we support ongoing efforts to eliminate Hamas, a full-scale reoccupation of Gaza would be a critical strategic mistake. The announcement has already escalated tensions in the Middle East, once again threatening to engulf the volatile region in conflict. The Houthis struck Israel’s Ben Gurion airport on May 4 and have vowed to further retaliate against the proposed occupation. Jordan, one of our most important regional security partners, is facing intensifying pressure amid continued public anger over Gaza. Saudi Arabia has made it clear there can be no progress towards normalization with Israel without a pathway toward Palestinian statehood. In this context, Israel’s planned actions would severely undermine Jerusalem’s path to a more secure, stable and regionally integrated future, which you championed in your first term through the Abraham Accords.
Israel’s proposed occupation plans take us further away from permanently ending the Israel-Gaza war and upholding Israel’s security, both goals that you have promised to achieve under your administration. As such, in advance of your upcoming visit, we urge you to oppose a permanent reoccupation of Gaza and to press for the immediate resumption of neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance, access, and distribution that fully meets the needs of innocent Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
You also have a unique opportunity to press the parties to agree to a deal that:
(1) secures the immediate release of all remaining hostages;
(2) ushers in a ceasefire;
(3) works towards the creation of a security force backed by Arab partners to administer Gaza without Hamas; and
(4) creates a path towards a lasting solution that will allow the Israeli and Palestinian people to live in security, dignity, and prosperity.
Mr. President, like you, we are unequivocal in our commitment to Israel’s right to defend itself. It has been nearly 20 months since Hamas murdered more than 1,200 people and took about 250 hostages, including American citizens. This period has also been marked by severe humanitarian suffering in Gaza, where more than 52,000 Palestinians have been killed and millions displaced. All of us are longstanding advocates of the U.S.-Israel security partnership, and we will continue to fight for the defense of the Israeli people. That is why, today, we stand with the nearly threequarters of the Israeli public who are fighting for the release of the remaining hostages in Gaza in exchange for a ceasefire.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

– having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

– having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

– having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

– having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

– having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

– having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

– having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

– having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

– having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

– having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

– having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

– having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

– having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

– having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

– having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

– having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

– having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

– having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

– having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

R. whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

S. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

T. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

U. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

16. Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

17. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

18. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

19. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

20. Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

21. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

22. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

23. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

24. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

25. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

26. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

27. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

28. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

29. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

30. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

31. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

32. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

33. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

34. Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

35. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

36. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

37. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

38. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

39. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

40. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

41. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

42. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

43. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

44. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

45. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

46. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

47. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

48. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

49. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

50. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

51. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

Wider EU-Türkiye relations

52. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

53. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

54. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

55. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

56. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

57. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

58. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

59. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

60. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

61. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

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62. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

(1)	OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
(2)	OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
(3)	OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
(4)	OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
(5)	OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
(6)	OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
(7)	OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
(8)	OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
(9)	Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 14, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: Joint Undertakings – P10_TA(2025)0089 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

Texts adopted

296k

91k

Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Discharge 2023: Joint Undertakings

1. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the final annual accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on the EU Joint Undertakings for the financial year 2023, together with the Joint Undertakings’ replies(1),

– having regard to the statement of assurance(2) as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the Joint Undertaking in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05757/2025 – C10‑0025/2025),

– having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012(3), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(4), and in particular Article 71 thereof,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014(5), and in particular Article 26 thereof,

– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/887 of 13 March 2019 on the model financial regulation for public-private partnership bodies referred to in Article 71 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6),

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0056/2025),

1. Grants the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking discharge in respect of the implementation of the Joint Undertaking’s budget for the financial year 2023;

2. Sets out its observations in the resolution below;

3. Instructs its President to forward this decision and the resolution forming an integral part of it to the Executive Director of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

(1)	OJ C, C/2024/6841, 13.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6841/oj.
(2)	OJ C, C/2024/6041, 10.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6041/oj.
(3)	OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1046/oj.
(4)	OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
(5)	OJ L 427, 30.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2085/oj.
(6)	OJ L 142, 29.5.2019, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/887/oj.

2. European Parliament decision of 7 May 2025 on the closure of the accounts of the Clean Aviation Joint Undertaking for the financial year 2023 (2024/2031(DEC))