NewzIntel.com

    • Checkout Page
    • Contact Us
    • Default Redirect Page
    • Frontpage
    • Home-2
    • Home-3
    • Lost Password
    • Member Login
    • Member LogOut
    • Member TOS Page
    • My Account
    • NewzIntel Alert Control-Panel
    • NewzIntel Latest Reports
    • Post Views Counter
    • Privacy Policy
    • Public Individual Page
    • Register
    • Subscription Plan
    • Thank You Page

Category: Baltics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Stein Announces 13 Grants to Rural Communities to Attract 371 New Jobs and over $165 Million of Investment

    Source: US State of North Carolina

    Headline: Governor Stein Announces 13 Grants to Rural Communities to Attract 371 New Jobs and over $165 Million of Investment

    Governor Stein Announces 13 Grants to Rural Communities to Attract 371 New Jobs and over $165 Million of Investment
    lsaito
    Fri, 02/21/2025 – 15:15

    Raleigh, NC

    Governor Josh Stein today announced that the Rural Infrastructure Authority (RIA) has approved 13 grant requests to local governments totaling $9,627,500. The grants include commitments creating a total of 785 jobs, 414 of which were previously announced. The public investment in these projects will attract more than $165.9 million in public and private investment. 

    “North Carolina’s success is rooted in our rural communities,” said Governor Stein. “When we look for and create opportunities in every corner of North Carolina, we are creating more jobs, more investments, and more economic prosperity.”

    The RIA is supported by the rural economic development team at the North Carolina Department of Commerce. RIA members review and approve funding requests from local communities. Funding comes from a variety of specialized grant and loan programs offered and managed by N.C. Commerce’s Rural Economic Development Division, led by Assistant Secretary for Rural Development Kenny Flowers. Grants support a variety of activities, including infrastructure development, building renovation, expansion and demolition, and site improvements.

    “Our economic competitiveness is greatest when all of North Carolina benefits,” said N.C. Commerce Secretary Lee Lilley. “This funding will help rural communities be more resilient and better prepared as they compete for economic development opportunities.”

    The RIA approved three grant requests under the state’s Building Reuse Program in three categories: 

    Vacant Building Category 

    • Town of Edenton (Chowan County): A $275,000 grant will support the reuse of a 22,000-square-foot vacant building in Edenton. An IT outsourcing firm, Provalus, will make a Center of Excellence dedicated to training and developing technology talent in downtown communities. Overall, this project is expected to create 61 jobs with an investment of $6 million, while 37 jobs and a private investment of $5,986,355 are tied to this grant.
    • Columbus County: A $450,000 grant will help support the reuse of a 220,000-square-foot building in Chadbourn. The building will be occupied by Barrier Fencing Supply Company, a distributor and wholesaler of fencing material, gates, hardware, and accessories. While this company will create 91 jobs with an investment of $14 million overall, 57 jobs and a private investment of $985,986 being tied to this grant.
    • City of Whiteville (Columbus County): A $390,000 grant will help reuse a 19,000-square-foot building in Whiteville for Provalus, as it opens another office for IT outsourcing and talent development. The company will create 60 new jobs with a private investment of $1,724,000.

    The Building Reuse Program provides grants to local governments to renovate vacant buildings, renovate and/or expand buildings occupied by existing North Carolina companies, and renovate, expand or construct health care facilities that will lead to the creation of new jobs in Tier 1 and Tier 2 counties, as well as rural census tracts of Tier 3 counties.

    The RIA approved one grant request under the state’s federally-funded Community Development Block Grant – Economic Development program:

    • Town of Mocksville (Davie County): A $750,000 grant will upfit a 500,000-square-foot shell building in Mocksville. The new site will be the first North American manufacturing facility for SBA Home, a Lithuanian company that supplies furniture to IKEA. This project will create 250 jobs and $50,800,000 in private investment, with 76 jobs tied to this grant.

    The Community Development Block Grant program is a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) program administered in part by N.C. Commerce. CDBG’s economic development funds provide grants to local governments for creating and retaining jobs. Project funding is based on the number of jobs to be created and the level of economic distress of applicant communities.

    The RIA approved five grant requests under the state’s Industrial Development Fund – Utility Account program:

    • Town of Aurora (Beaufort County): A $200,000 grant will enable the Town of Aurora to complete infrastructure improvements and pay increased electrical service expenses for the development of the Town’s 30-acre industrial park.
    • City of Claremont (Catawba County): A $1,000,000 grant will enable the City of Claremont to improve sewer infrastructure for more than 450 industrial acres to help the expansion of Prysmian Cables and Systems.
    • Hoke County: A $1,400,000 grant will help extend sewer infrastructure at the Hoke County Regional Industrial Park that will be developed by Pennsylvania Transformer Technology LLC. The company is expected to create 181 jobs, with an accompanying private investment of $95,168,572 tied to this grant.
    • Lenoir County: A $1,900,000 grant will support sewer infrastructure improvements at the NC Global TransPark where the U.S. Department of Navy will build a Fleet Readiness Center. The Navy will provide aircraft maintenance and repair for the C-130 military aircraft. The project is expected to create 311 jobs.
    • City of Lumberton (Robeson County): A $825,000 grant will allow the City to relocate electrical circuits in the Southeast Crossroad Industrial Park, where Cold-Link Logistics will build a cold storage facility. For this project, 63 jobs and an investment of $10,000,000 are tied to this grant.

    The Industrial Development Fund – Utility Account provides grants to local governments located in the 80 most economically distressed counties of the state, which are classified as either Tier 1 or Tier 2. Funds may be used for publicly owned infrastructure projects that are reasonably expected to result in new job creation. The IDF – Utility Account is funded through a process tied to the state’s signature Job Development Investment Grant (JDIG) program. When JDIG-awarded companies choose to locate or expand in a Tier 2 or Tier 3 county, a portion of that JDIG award is channeled into the Utility Account.

    The RIA approved four grant requests under the state’s Rural Downtown Economic Development program in two categories:

    Public Infrastructure Category

    • Town of Troy (Montgomery County): An $850,000 grant will assist the Town in its Main Street Revitalization and Connectivity Project, which includes improvements to the sidewalk, concrete, drainage, gutters and curbs, as well as lighting enhancements, power line relocations, brick repairs, and ADA compliance. The project is expected to leverage an investment of $197,700.

    Public Buildings Category 

    • City of Goldsboro (Wayne County): A $612,500 grant will support the City’s Saving Union Station project to preserve the historic building in downtown Goldsboro. The project will restore the concrete, masonry, wood, plastics, and finishes for the two-story, 12,000-square-foot building. The project is expected to leverage $787,500 of investments.
    • Watauga County: A $125,000 grant will assist the County with its Public Library Renovation Project to include renovations that will expand resources and improve functionality of the space. The project will add two conference rooms, more digital access and emerging technologies, and provide improvements to the youth programs and outdoor patio entrance. The library renovation will leverage $236,250 in private investments.
    • City of Wilson (Wilson County): An $850,000 grant will support the Barnes Street Properties Rehabilitation Project in downtown Wilson. This project will rehabilitate two buildings to create a Downtown and Whirligig Park Visitors Center that includes spaces for makers, offices, and Whirligig maintenance and repairs. Leveraging $42,500 of investments, the project will improve the building exteriors, reconstruct the roof, repair the floors, and add ramp access and new electrical and HVAC systems.

    The Rural Downtown Economic Development Grants program provides grants to local governments to support downtown revitalization and economic development initiatives that are intended to help local governments grow and leverage downtown districts as assets for economic growth, economic development, and prosperity by providing public improvements to help retain businesses and leverage main street assets for community-wide use.

    In addition to reviewing and approving funding requests, the N.C. Rural Infrastructure Authority formulates policies and priorities for grant and loan programs administered by N.C. Commerce’s Rural Economic Development team. Its 17 voting members are appointed by the Governor, Speaker of the House, and Senate President Pro Tem. The North Carolina Secretary of Commerce serves as a member of the authority, ex officio.

    Visit the Rural Economic Development Division webpage for more information. 

    Feb 21, 2025

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 22, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: European farmers to get over €98 million in EU financial support

    Source: European Union 2

    EU farmers who have lost income due to adverse climatic events or natural disasters are set to receive over €98 million from the EU’s agricultural reserve. The funds will be shared among farmers in Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary who have all suffered due to extreme weather conditions.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Gofaizen & Sherle Launches Full-Cycle CASP Licensing Service in Lithuania, Poland and Spain

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TALLINN, Estonia, Feb. 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Gofaizen & Sherle, a leading fintech and crypto consultancy, has introduced a full-cycle service for obtaining a CASP license under MICA regulation in Lithuania, Poland and Spain. This new service is designed to simplify the licensing process, ensuring companies achieve compliance efficiently and on time.

    Comprehensive Support for a Seamless Licensing Process

    Gofaizen & Sherle provides a full range of services to ensure a smooth licensing process:

    • Business analysis and strategy – Assessment of regulatory requirements in line with the company’s business model.
    • Documentation management – Compilation, preparation, and verification of all required documents.
    • Staffing support – Evaluation of personnel qualifications and assistance in recruiting necessary specialists.
    • Regulatory communication – Coordination with the Bank of Lithuania to facilitate the application process.

    “The process of obtaining a CASP license might take around 6 months in average, covering key stages such as document preparation, submission, potential hiring of required staff, and regulatory review. For example, in Lithuania, VASPs already operating in the country need to start the CASP license application as soon as possible. If they do not obtain the license by May 31, they may be required to suspend their activities from July 1st and until it is approved. However, if you are launching a new crypto project, you simply need to apply for a CASP license. Once it is approved, you can start operating in Lithuania’s crypto sector,” explained Maxim Gasanbekov, Head of Sales and Associated Partner at Gofaizen & Sherle.

    About Gofaizen & Sherle
    Gofaizen & Sherle is a leading fintech and crypto consultancy firm based in Tallinn, Estonia. The company specializes in regulatory compliance, licensing, and business structuring, supporting crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) in navigating the evolving European regulatory landscape.
    For further information on CASP license in Lithuania, Poland and Spain, and expert consultation, please contact:
    info@gofaizen-sherle.com

    Media Contact:
    Gofaizen & Sherle
    pr@gofaizen-sherle.com
    https://gofaizen-sherle.com/

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Gofaizen & Sherle. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the sponsor and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered as financial, investment, or trading advice. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before investing in or trading cryptocurrency and securities. Please conduct your own research and invest at your own risk.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/ce443d23-08f2-4b5e-b791-1193ebd18db7

    The MIL Network –

    February 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Establishment of a subsidiary and purchase of the property at Hiiu 42 in Tallinn for the construction of the Südamekodu nursing home

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Establishment of a subsidiary and purchase of the property at Hiiu 42 in Tallinn for the construction of the Südamekodu nursing home.
    A 100% subsidiary of EfTEN Real Estate Fund AS has entered into a contract under the law of obligations, with the aim of establishing a nursing home there together with Südamekodud AS. 
    The fund’s 100% subsidiary EfTEN Hiiu OÜ has entered into a contract under the law of obligations with Südamekodud AS for the acquisition of the property located at Hiiu 42 in the Nõmme district of Tallinn. The fund plans to partially rebuild the property into a general nursing home “Nõmme Südamekodu”, which could accommodate up to 170 Südamekodu clients in the future.
    The sale price of the property is four million euros, which will be paid upon conclusion of the real rights agreement, and the buyer will additionally invest up to two point five million euros in the reconstruction of the building. Currently, the design of the building’s reconstruction has begun. The expected return of the investment excluding bank leverage is 8%.
    The North Estonia Medical Centre will continue to use the property under a valid lease agreement. After the conclusion of the real rights agreement, the property will also be rented under a long-term lease agreement to Südamekodud AS, whose vision is to be the best local care service provider in Estonia. Südamekodud AS offers its services in nursing homes located across Estonia, including the Valkla Südamekodu, Tartu Südamekodu and Pirita Südamekodu properties owned by other subsidiaries of the fund. The purchase of the property and investments will be financed from the fund’s equity capital raised from the SPO and a bank loan. The prerequisite for completing the transaction is the consent of the Estonian Competition Authority, after which a real rights agreement will be concluded for the transfer of ownership of the property.
    EfTEN Hiiu OÜ is a 100% subsidiary of the fund established in the Republic of Estonia, with a share capital of 2,500 euros. The members of the management board of the limited liability company are Viljar Arakas and Tõnu Uustalu. The limited liability company does not have a supervisory board. The establishment of a subsidiary is not considered an acquisition of a qualifying holding within the meaning of the rules and regulations of the Tallinn Stock Exchange. The members of the Fund’s supervisory board and management board have no other personal interest in the transaction.

    Viljar Arakas
    Member of the Management Board
    Tel 655 9515
    E-post: viljar.arakas@eften.ee

    The MIL Network –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Parliament and member states agree on new support plan for Moldova

    Source: European Parliament 3

    EU member states and MEPs have agreed on essential improvements to a new support facility for Moldova, focusing on better financing and democratic oversight.

    Negotiators from the European Parliament and the Council of the EU have reached a provisional agreement on Wednesday on the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova. The Facility aims to support Moldova in facing significant challenges, notably to mitigate the profound impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on Moldova’s security, economy, and citizens’ livelihoods and to strengthen its resilience against the ongoing and unprecedented hybrid attacks and foreign malign interference targeting the country and democratic processes and institutions.

    Key improvements:

    Increased grant-based support: Negotiators agreed to allocate €520 million in grants – a €100 million increase compared to initial proposals – alongside €1.5 billion in low-interest loans. This adjustment ensures Moldova can implement reforms without unsustainable debt accumulation.

    Accelerated funding access: The Facility provides 18% pre-financing, up from 7% originally, of total support, enabling rapid deployment of resources to address energy security, anti-corruption infrastructure, and public service modernisation.

    Administrative capacity building: A dedicated 20% of grant funds will strengthen Moldova’s institutions through digital governance systems, civil service training, and judicial reforms – prerequisites for effective EU fund management.

    Reinforced oversight framework: To ensure full parliamentary scrutiny the agreement establishes a Dialogue between Parliament and the Commission to review implementation progress regularly.

    Also agreed was to make available additional voluntary contributions in the form of external assigned revenue from other donors such as international financing organisations for further financial support to Moldova, and that the Facility shall not support activities or measures which undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova.

    Quotes

    Siegfried Mureșan (EPP, Romania), co-rapporteur for the Committee on Budgets: “With a €200 million increase in pre-financing and €100 million in total allocations, we are mobilizing enhanced immediate support to assist Moldova in advancing reforms, accelerating its European integration, and countering the economic and energy repercussions of Russian aggression. This ambitious agreement underscores Europe’s capacity to respond decisively to escalating geopolitical challenges.”

    Sven Mikser (S&D, Estonia), co-rapporteur for the Committee on Foreign Affairs: “This Facility underscores our commitment to Moldova’s EU accession journey and supports the country in undertaking necessary reforms to strengthen democratic institutions, enhance energy security, boost economic growth, and improve the lives of its citizens. Raising the grant component to 20.5% and the pre-financing rate to 18% secures €520 million in non-repayable support for Moldova and ensures rapid access to funding.”

    Next steps

    The provisional agreement will be submitted to Parliament’s plenary (March) and the Council for final approval.

    Background

    Between 2025 and 2027, the maximum resources to be made available to Moldova through the Facility will amount to €1.785 billion (in current prices). This includes up to €1.5 billion in concessional loans and €385 million in non-repayable financial support. Additionally, €135 million will be set aside to provision the loans.

    The Reform and Growth Facility is part of a broader EU Growth Plan for Moldova aimed at doubling its economy within a decade while fostering socio-economic stability. The facility is modelled after similar initiatives in other EU candidate regions, such as the Western Balkans Facility, representing a significant step forward in Moldova’s path toward EU membership.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Calviño’s interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung

    Source: European Investment Bank

    Interview by Matthias Kolb and Alexander Mühlauer (Süddeutschen Zeitung)

    Nadia Calviño is President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the largest promotional bank in the world. On behalf of the EU Member States, it is tasked with ensuring stability through investments within and beyond the European Union. So it’s little wonder that the former Deputy Prime Minister of Spain would attend the 61st Munich Security Conference. Shortly before the event, Calviño visited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv, signing investment agreements totalling around  €1 billion. Before beginning her interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the 56-year-old wanted to get one thing straight, right from the start: Europe must realise that we are at a turning point in history.

    Something seems to have ruptured between the United States and the European Union. Trump is talking with Putin about the future of Ukraine, without the EU at the table. The US Secretary of Defense says that America will no longer guarantee security in Europe. And US Vice President J.D. Vance says the greatest risk for Europe is not Russia or China, but the alleged internal threat to freedom of expression. How shocked are you by this?

    Calviño: I’m not shocked, or even surprised. I was certain we would see a fundamental change in transatlantic relations. We Europeans need to remember where our strengths lie, stand up for our interests and defend the rules-based world order from which we have benefited so richly over the past 80 years. And the Americans even more so.

    Isn’t the new US government threatening to destroy this world order?

    I am convinced that good transatlantic relations are strategically important for both sides. We must work to create a new foundation for them. In such turbulent times, it is more important than ever for Europe to stand for stability and reliability – not just within our own borders, but also for the rest of the world. That Europe should do even more to uphold a rules-based world order is something I hear often from our partners across the globe.

    But again, do the United States pose a risk to the global order?

    It is in their interest to preserve the things that have made America great. Institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, which we founded together. That’s one reason the US dollar is a global reserve currency. There are many win-win situations to be had from working together, and with Europe. But the most important thing is for us to accept that the world of tomorrow is very different from the world of yesterday.

    “We are at a turning point in history.”

    The European Investment Bank is the world’s largest promotional bank. As its president, what can you do to help Europe stand the test of time in this new world?

    We are at a crucial moment in history. And at a turning point in the geopolitical order. The future will depend on the decisions we make today, and every decision counts.

    What does that mean exactly?

    Since I joined the EIB as president in 2024, I have held talks with all 27 EU Member States and our European and international partners, but also with civil society and industry. For the first time, we have set out a clear Strategic Roadmap. 2024 was a record year for us, in which the EIB signed €89 billion in financing to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and security. These funds will go, for example, to energy infrastructure and renewable projects, to new technologies like artificial intelligence or quantum computers, and to supporting the transport and automotive industries. In 2024, we invested a record amount in energy networks. We also doubled our support for security and defence – to €1 billion – and we expect to double it again in 2025.

    At the Munich Security Conference, we kept hearing the question of where Member States could get the many billions of euros they would need to invest in their armies, including under pressure from Trump. Are they all coming to you now?

    Ursula von der Leyen has already proposed relaxing the rules under the Stability Pact so that EU countries can finance their defence spending. Olaf Scholz has similar ideas. The EIB is not a defence ministry, but there is a lot we can do to help in this area. For example, if Member States want to renovate their roads and bridges to improve military mobility, we can fund that, just like we can fund protection of critical infrastructure like submarine cables, or investments in cybersecurity. We are doing this, and are exchanging with Europe’s finance and defence ministries and with industry.

    What is the EIB financing in Germany in this domain?

    We are currently looking into 14 specific projects across Europe. In 2021, for example, we granted the Munich-based drone startup Quantum Systems a loan of €10 million. Their products are now used by the Ukrainian military, and have both civilian and military applications, so they can be supported by the EIB. The Lithuanian government has just applied to us with a proposal that we are now evaluating. It seeks financial assistance to build the base for the new German army brigade in Rūdninkai, near the border with Belarus.

    Soon 5 000 German soldiers will be permanently stationed in Lithuania, as a deterrent to Russia. Cost projections by the German Defence Ministry for this brigade are over €10 billion. Lithuania would like to invest around €1 billion in the new base. How much money could come from the EIB?

    This is a very important and demanding project, and we’ve only just started looking into the details. Another good example is the EIB support for the expansion of the Danish port in Esbjerg. Going forward, it will be better able to accommodate NATO vessels and the transport of materials for offshore wind farms.

    You just came from a visit to Ukraine. How is the EIB supporting that country?

    The trip to Ukraine was my first one outside the EU as EIB President. We are probably Ukraine’s most important investment partner, and our role is one that our partners value greatly. During my visit, we signed agreements for investment totalling around €1 billion. They will allow major Ukrainian banks to grant more loans to medium-sized companies. And with the country’s government, we have signed packages to finance infrastructure for energy, transport, water and district heating, as well as the construction of bunkers in schools and nurseries. So we are actively investing in all of the important areas for the Ukrainian people to lead normal lives, as far as possible. And, of course, we aim to strengthen the country’s resilience.

    Are you also supporting Ukraine’s defence industry?

    We support the European security and defence industry, which also helps Ukraine. In 2024 we expanded the dual-use approach, so that we can now support a wide range of projects, such as border security, cybersecurity, satellites and drones, and mine clearance.

    The CEO of the Italian arms company Leonardo recently told our reporters that Europe has one main problem: Member States spend more and more money on defence, but don’t work together enough. Is he right?

    It is clear that a common European procurement system would make us stronger and more efficient, especially when it comes to our flagship projects. And yes, I think the European Investment Bank can contribute by acting as an independent appraiser for projects. In 2024, to bring in top expertise, we signed agreements with the NATO Innovation Fund and the European Defence Agency so that we can draw on their technical knowledge in this regard.

    Is there any dispute at the EIB due to differing positions on Ukraine, with member countries like Hungary or Slovakia that have pro-Moscow governments?

    No, not at all.

    “I would never presume to tell a Member State what to do.”

    So you are president of one of the only EU institutions that aren’t divided?

    I told you that I visited the 27 Member States, and listened very carefully to them. On that basis, we drew up our strategy, which was unanimously supported. We are therefore well aligned with the EU priorities and the expectations of the Member States. There is strong support for what we are doing. Including in Ukraine.

    When it comes to Europe’s future, one word always comes up: competitiveness. What does Europe need to do to avoid falling even further behind the US and China economically?

    The different reports, for example by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi, are quite unanimous: We need market integration, streamlining and investment. So what we need to do is clear. And I think the new Commission is willing to go in that direction. On streamlining, for example, we have teamed up with the Commission to adapt environmental reporting standards so that we can pursue the Paris Agreement and our green transformation objectives in a way that promotes the competitiveness of European industry, as well as green finance and green investment.

    How optimistic are you that Europe will finally begin to react more quickly and actually make decisions? With the capital markets union, we’ve been waiting ten years for things to finally happen. And that’s just one example of many.

    As Spain’s Minister of Finance and its Deputy Prime Minister, I saw lots of things. The euro area crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. And I have seen how Europe can succeed: Together, we developed the vaccines, and we dealt with the crisis. With the NextGenerationEU package, Spain has made some very far-reaching reforms and, thanks to mobilising investment, it is now the best-performing economy in Europe and a driver of growth and prosperity on the continent. We succeed when we unite, act decisively, truly focus and bring all our energy together.

    In contrast to Spain and other countries, Germany’s economy has been hit hard. Many experts see the debt brake as an obstacle to further growth. What does Germany have to do for things to start looking up again?

    I would never presume to tell a Member State what to do. I simply wish for a strong Germany with a stable, pro-Europe government – because we need a strong Germany at the centre of our union.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Coop Pank AS establishes an EUR 750,000,000 Covered Bond Programme

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Coop Pank AS (Bank) has established an EUR 750,000,000 Covered Bond Programme (Programme). The Central Bank of Ireland has approved the base prospectus (Base Prospectus) for the Programme on 19 February 2025. The Base Prospectus will be available on the website of Euronext Dublin at www.ise.ie and on the Bank’s website at https://www.cooppank.ee/en/investor.

    Establishment of the Programme is one of the preparatory steps in the commencement of issuance of covered bonds by the Bank. According to initial forecasts, the first issuance is expected to take place in the first half of 2025. The Bank will notify the market with a separate stock exchange announcement once the exact timing and conditions of the issuance are determined. The covered bonds to be issued under the Programme are expected to be rated (P)Aa2 by Moody’s Investors Service Ltd.

    Coop Pank, based on Estonian capital, is one of the five universal banks operating in Estonia. The number of clients using Coop Pank for their daily banking reached 209,500. Coop Pank aims to put the synergy generated by the interaction of retail business and banking to good use and to bring everyday banking services closer to people’s homes. The strategic shareholder of the bank is the domestic retail chain Coop Eesti, comprising of 320 stores. 

    Additional information:
    Paavo Truu
    CFO
    Phone: +372 5160 231
    E-mail: paavo.truu@cooppank.ee

    The MIL Network –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • EIB Group’s fresh financing in Greece last year amounted to €2.2 billion
    • Focus last year on energy supply, business growth and disaster management
    • Latest annual results bring EIB Group support in Greece over past five years to €14.5 billion

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s new financing in Greece amounted to €2.2 billion last year, with major support to bolster energy supplies, strengthen businesses and protect against environmental disasters in the country.

    The total for 2024 included €2.03 billion from the EIB and portfolio guarantees of €152 million from the European Investment Fund (EIF), which focuses on innovative and technology-driven small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as well as Small Mid-Caps in Europe.

    Top operations included loans of €390 million to natural-gas supplier DEPA Commercial to build solar parks, €150 million to power provider HEDNO to upgrade the grid, loans and guarantees of €550 million to domestic banks to expand financing for SMEs and Mid-Caps and €220 million to the government to bolster disaster management.

    Kostis Hatzidakis, Minister of Finance of the Hellenic Republic noted: “Greece’s relationship with the European Investment Bank is long-standing and strong. This was reaffirmed in 2024, with new financing reaching €2.2 billion. These funds will be used for investments in renewable energy sources, upgrades to the electricity grid, support for SMEs, and the purchase of firefighting aircraft and rescue equipment. The EIB was a valuable ally when Greece was cut off from the markets. It will remain a partner, but with a new approach. Going forward, priorities will focus on energy interconnections, research and technology, climate adaptation, and defense investments, as outlined in the EIB’s Strategic Roadmap”.

    “Our work in Greece is a testament to the transformative power of strategic financing,” said EIB Vice-President Yannis Tsakiris. “In 2024, we reinforced our commitment to the country by supporting clean energy, climate resilience and critical infrastructure while strengthening SMEs, innovation, job creation and social cohesion.”

    The latest annual results bring total EIB Group financing in Greece over the past five years to €14.5 billion. The yearly average in the country since 2000 is almost €2.9 billion, which reflects an unusually high sum of almost €5 billion in 2021 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.

    The EIB Group’s support last year was almost 1% of Greece’s gross domestic product (GDP), the third-highest level among European Union countries behind only Croatia and Estonia. That means that EIB Group financing in Greece last year averaged €631 per inhabitant, making the country one of the biggest beneficiaries based on the size of the population and the economy. The funding is projected to catalyse investments in Greece of up to €6.6 billion – about 2.5% of its GDP.

    Energy supply

    The €390 million EIB loan to DEPA Commercial is for new photovoltaic (PV) parks in the regions of western Macedonia, Thessaly and central Greece. The sites will add approximately 800 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy – enough to power 278,000 households for a year.

    Also in the area of clean energy, the EIB last year provided a €195 million loan to supplier PPC Renewables to develop 580 MW of solar plants and 175 MW of battery storage. The moves will boost renewables capacity, grid stability and energy security.

    The €150 million EIB credit to HEDNO covers upgrades to Greece’s electricity-distribution network, improving grid reliability and facilitating integration of renewables.

    The EIB last year also took part in the creation of an EU “Decarbonisation Fund” for Greece that will channel €1.6 billion in revenue from the European emissions-trading system into sustainable energy and development projects on Greek islands. These include grid interconnections with the mainland and the phase-out of local power plants.

    Business boost

    The EIB last year allocated a total €702 million to strengthen SMEs and Mid-Caps in Greece. The support – 28% of the total – took the form of intermediated loans and guarantees.

    Top operations included €300 million guarantees to Eurobank and National Bank of Greece covering €600 million new loans to Mid-Caps. In addition, the EIB provided a €250 million loan to the National Bank of Greece to bolster green investments by Greek SMEs and Mid-Caps. The credit raised total EIB support for such investments in Greece to €1 billion.

    The EIF also showed its agility in supporting vital investments for both debt and equity. It signed €152m with several of Greece’s financial institutions for capped portfolio guarantees. They are expected to mobilise up to €1,8bn in financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, while making the Greek economy greener, and supporting innovation and the country’s digital transition.

    The EIF also signed a new €200 million equity mandate to support innovative companies in Life Sciences & Healthcare and Sustainability & Social Impact by improving their access to vital financing. Funded by Cohesion policy and national resources of the Hellenic Republic, the mandate will cover a financing gap in these sectors, supporting investments from pre-seed to growth stages based on market needs.

    Disaster protection

    The €220 million EIB loan last year to the Greek government is to buy fire trucks, rescue vehicles and aircraft needed to fight to natural disasters such as wildfires and floods, both of which have caused extensive damage in Greece in recent years. The credit also covers upgrades to essential disaster-management services.

    The financing forms part of a European climate-adaptation plan by the EIB Group and brings its total support for Greek civil protection and disaster preparedness to €595 million.

    EIB Advisory

    There were also key technical assistance projects delivered from EIB Advisory, a highlight being an agreement with the Athens Water Supply and Sewerage Company (EYDAP) to back its €2 billion, 10-year investment programme to ensure the Greek capital has a more resilient water supply and supporting investments in lignite-dependent regions such as Western Macedonia and Megalopolis in the Peloponnese, facilitating their transition to a future of clean energy.

    In December 2024, the continuation of advisory support by EIB advisors from the PASSA team to the Greek administration was approved. This support aims to ensure the smooth implementation of sustainable development and Just Transition projects financed by the EU.

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, , we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, important investments outside the EU, and the Capital Markets Union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers

    Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    Greece financing from EIB Group totals €2.2 billion in 2024 with focus on energy supply, business growth and disaster preparedness
    ©EIB
    Download original

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Commission allocates €99 million in emergency support to farmers in Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 19 Feb 2025 Today, Member States gave a positive opinion to the Commission proposal to mobilise €98,6 million from the agricultural reserve to directly support farmers in Spain, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary who have been impacted by exceptional adverse climatic events and natural disasters since spring 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 20, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: University takes leading role in boosting UK hydrogen distribution network A project that will help establish a sustainable distribution network of hydrogen in Scotland and across the UK has got underway at the University of Aberdeen.

    Source: University of Aberdeen

    New Materials and Methods for Hydrogen Transportation and Storage: Repurposing the Economic Future of the North Sea (MHYSTIC) will see existing energy asset and skills used to develop a suite of innovations that will boost the UK’s hydrogen distribution network.A project that will help establish a sustainable distribution network of hydrogen in Scotland and across the UK has got underway at the University of Aberdeen.
    Led by a team of researchers at the University of Aberdeen with expertise in chemical, mechanical and materials engineering along with economic analysis for field applications in geological settings, the MHYSTIC project is one of 10 selected by the UK-HyRES Flexible Fund to advance hydrogen and alternative liquid fuels technologies.
    The projects represent a broad spectrum of groundbreaking research, each aligned with the mission to accelerate the UK’s hydrogen transition and drive impactful scientific innovation. Collectively, nearly £3 million in funding has been awarded, enabling pioneering studies across multiple institutions and disciplines.
    New Materials and Methods for Hydrogen Transportation and Storage: Repurposing the Economic Future of the North Sea (MHYSTIC) will see existing energy asset and skills used to develop a suite of innovations that will boost the UK’s hydrogen distribution network.
    With support from international collaborators at the Lithuanian Energy Institute, industry partners including Aberdeen Renewable Energy Group, ABL Group, the European Marine Energy Centre, the Net Zero Technology Centre, John Lawrie Group, Statera Energy and  Dräger Ltd will also play a crucial role in developing and disseminating outputs from the project.

    The characterisation methods and models will reveal detailed mechanisms of H2 adsorption and material failure at a granular level, which will result in stepwise advances in knowledge with high academic impact and will help implement hydrogen economies in Scotland and the UK.” Project lead Dr Alfonso Martinez-Felipe

    “MHYSTIC is one of the only 10 projects funded in this first round of applications and will have research, commercial and societal impacts by transferring its innovations to productive actors involved in the project,” explained project lead Dr Alfonso Martinez-Felipe from the University’s School of Engineering.
    “The characterisation methods and models will reveal detailed mechanisms of H2 adsorption and material failure at a granular level, which will result in stepwise advances in knowledge with high academic impact and will help implement hydrogen economies in Scotland and the UK.”
    Dr Martinez-Felipe is joined by colleagues Dr Amin Sharifi, Dr M. Amir Siddiq, Dr Marcin Kapitaniak and Dr Mehmet Kartal, all from the School of Engineering; and Professor John Underhill, Director of the Interdisciplinary Center for Energy Transition at the University of Aberdeen.
    “Being the smallest molecule, hydrogen is prone to leakage. It also embrittles steel,” said Professor Underhill. “Consequently, it’s essential to find new materials for hydrogen’s safe and secure storage and transportation if it is to play a role in the energy transition, something this research will address.”
    UK-HyRES aims to define and tackle the research challenges blocking the wider use of low carbon fuels in the UK – funded by UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) through the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). The project is expected to run for 2.5 years.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Korea-Malaysia summit (November 2024)

    Source: Government of the Republic of Korea

    Korea-Latvia summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 28 hosted a summit at his office for visiting Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics on raising bilateral cooperation and analyzing regional and international situations.

    Both leaders agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in sectors such as bio and pharmaceuticals, national security and the defense industry.

    Korea-Malaysia summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 25 hosted summit talks in Seoul with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who was on an official visit to Korea, and adopted a joint statement on their newly formed strategic partnership.

    Both leaders welcomed the resumption of negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement this year and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude the deal next year. They also pledged to raise cooperation in infrastructure and supply chains for core minerals.

    Korea-Peru summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol and Peruvian President Dina Boluarte on Nov. 16 held a bilateral summit at the Presidential Palace in Lima, Peru, and agreed to bolster cooperation in the defense sector and infrastructure.
    The two countries concluded memorandums of understanding on joint production of KF-21 fighter jet parts, development of naval ships (submarines) and cooperation in army ground equipment. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visits to Peru, Brazil for APEC, G20

    Korea-ASEAN summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Oct. 10 attended the 25th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit at the National Convention Centre in Vientiane, Laos, where he and ASEAN leaders agreed to form a comprehensive strategic partnership and launch joint projects in a range of sectors.

    They also agreed to stimulate trade and investment through a bilateral free trade agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, while creating a “conducive and favourable environment” for ASEAN and Korean business such as the ASEAN-ROK (Republic of Korea) Business Council.

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Japan summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Oct. 10 held a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at a hotel in Vientiane, Laos, their first talks since the prime minister assumed office on Sept. 1. 

    Both leaders agreed on the growing need to raise bilateral cooperation in regional and global issues and expand the horizons for such collaboration on the global stage.

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Philippines summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol, on a state visit to the Philippines, on Oct. 7 agreed with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to form a bilateral strategic partnership at their summit held at the presidential Malacanang Palace in Manila.

    Both leaders also adopted a joint declaration on higher cooperation in all sectors including national security and economy like nuclear power plants. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Czechia summit (September 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Sept. 19 discussed with Czech President Petr Pavel in Prague cooperation in strategic sectors including nuclear power plants. Both leaders also shared opinions on developing their bilateral strategic partnership.

    Korea-New Zealand summit (September 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on Sept. 4 at their bilateral summit adopted a joint statement on stronger bilateral relations in trade, economy, science, human exchange, national security and international cooperation.

    Both leaders also agreed to elevate their Partnership for the 21st Century concluded in 2006 to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

    Korea-Germany summit (July 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on July 10 in Washington held bilateral talks with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on the sidelines of the NATO Summit.
    President Yoon said he hopes to work more closely with Germany on global issues such as support for Ukraine, supply chain disruptions and the climate crisis. He also hailed Germany’s application to join the United Nations Command. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s US visit for NATO Summit

    Korea-Japan summit (July 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on July 10 in Washington held bilateral talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO Summit.
    President Yoon said, “The recent signing by Russia and North Korea of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty and their accelerated closeness in military and economic ties are raising serious concern over global security as well as that of East Asia.”

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s US visit for NATO Summit

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Korea-Latvia summit (November 2024)

    Source: Government of the Republic of Korea

    Korea-Latvia summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 28 hosted a summit at his office for visiting Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics on raising bilateral cooperation and analyzing regional and international situations.

    Both leaders agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in sectors such as bio and pharmaceuticals, national security and the defense industry.

    Korea-Malaysia summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 25 hosted summit talks in Seoul with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who was on an official visit to Korea, and adopted a joint statement on their newly formed strategic partnership.

    Both leaders welcomed the resumption of negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement this year and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude the deal next year. They also pledged to raise cooperation in infrastructure and supply chains for core minerals.

    Korea-Peru summit (November 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol and Peruvian President Dina Boluarte on Nov. 16 held a bilateral summit at the Presidential Palace in Lima, Peru, and agreed to bolster cooperation in the defense sector and infrastructure.
    The two countries concluded memorandums of understanding on joint production of KF-21 fighter jet parts, development of naval ships (submarines) and cooperation in army ground equipment. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visits to Peru, Brazil for APEC, G20

    Korea-ASEAN summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Oct. 10 attended the 25th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit at the National Convention Centre in Vientiane, Laos, where he and ASEAN leaders agreed to form a comprehensive strategic partnership and launch joint projects in a range of sectors.

    They also agreed to stimulate trade and investment through a bilateral free trade agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, while creating a “conducive and favourable environment” for ASEAN and Korean business such as the ASEAN-ROK (Republic of Korea) Business Council.

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Japan summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Oct. 10 held a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at a hotel in Vientiane, Laos, their first talks since the prime minister assumed office on Sept. 1. 

    Both leaders agreed on the growing need to raise bilateral cooperation in regional and global issues and expand the horizons for such collaboration on the global stage.

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Philippines summit (October 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol, on a state visit to the Philippines, on Oct. 7 agreed with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to form a bilateral strategic partnership at their summit held at the presidential Malacanang Palace in Manila.

    Both leaders also adopted a joint declaration on higher cooperation in all sectors including national security and economy like nuclear power plants. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s visit to 3 Asian nations

    Korea-Czechia summit (September 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on Sept. 19 discussed with Czech President Petr Pavel in Prague cooperation in strategic sectors including nuclear power plants. Both leaders also shared opinions on developing their bilateral strategic partnership.

    Korea-New Zealand summit (September 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon on Sept. 4 at their bilateral summit adopted a joint statement on stronger bilateral relations in trade, economy, science, human exchange, national security and international cooperation.

    Both leaders also agreed to elevate their Partnership for the 21st Century concluded in 2006 to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

    Korea-Germany summit (July 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on July 10 in Washington held bilateral talks with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on the sidelines of the NATO Summit.
    President Yoon said he hopes to work more closely with Germany on global issues such as support for Ukraine, supply chain disruptions and the climate crisis. He also hailed Germany’s application to join the United Nations Command. 

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s US visit for NATO Summit

    Korea-Japan summit (July 2024)

    President Yoon Suk Yeol on July 10 in Washington held bilateral talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the NATO Summit.
    President Yoon said, “The recent signing by Russia and North Korea of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty and their accelerated closeness in military and economic ties are raising serious concern over global security as well as that of East Asia.”

    • Current Affairs President Yoon’s US visit for NATO Summit

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EUROPE/LITHUANIA – National Director of the Pontifical Mission Societies awarded the Cross of Officer of the Order of Merit Pro Lithuania

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Vilnius (Agenzia Fides) – Last Sunday, February 16, Lithuania celebrated the National Day commemorating the proclamation of the Republic of Lithuania in 1918. Following the Act of Restoration of the Lithuanian State, adopted on March 11, 1990 by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania to declare its independence from the Soviet Union, the Baltic State has resumed the celebrations of its National Day. Traditionally, on this day the President of the Republic awards honors to people who have distinguished themselves and have made a contribution to the welfare of society in various fields.This year, during the official celebrations, the President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, awarded the Order of Merit “Pro Lithuania” with the rank of officer to the National Director of the Pontifical Mission Societies in Lithuania, Fr. Alessandro Barelli of the Salesians of Don Bosco. Father Alessandro, an Italian missionary born in Turin in 1969, has been working in the Baltic country for 27 years and was awarded for his significant contribution to Lithuanian society.The award was given in recognition of his work as parish priest of the parish of St. John Bosco in Vilnius, as editor of the Salesian Bulletin in Lithuanian for 25 years and as National Director of the Pontifical Mission Societies, and for his numerous initiatives in favor of local youth, with particular attention to missionary work and inculturation. (EG) (Agenzia Fides, 18/2/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Coop Pank extends authorities of Margus Rink as a Member of the Supervisory Board of Coop Liising AS

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Today, on January 18th, 2025, the Coop Pank AS decided to extend the term of office of Mr. Margus Rink, a Member of the Supervisory Board of Coop Liising AS a subsidiaries of Coop Pank AS, for a another 3-years term effective as of the end of his previous term.

    Margus Rink has been the Chairman of the Management Board of Coop Pank AS since 2017. He is also a member of the Supervisory Board of bank’s subsidiaries Coop Liising AS and Coop Kindlustusmaakler AS. Margus Rink is a member of the Council of the Estonian Banking Association and member of the management board of Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Margus Rink obtained a master’s degree in business administration from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Tartu in 2000 and a bachelor’s degree in financial accounting and analysis from the same university in 1994.
    Margus Rink currently owns 806 000 shares in Coop Pank and 7 subordinated bonds of Coop Pank.

    Coop Pank, based on Estonian capital, is one of the five universal banks operating in Estonia. The bank has 209 500 everyday banking customers. Coop Pank uses the synergies between retail and banking and brings everyday banking services close to people’s homes. The majority shareholder of the bank is the domestic retail chain Coop Eesti, whose sales network includes 320 stores.

    Additional information:
    Katre Tatrik
    Communication Manager
    Tel: +372 5151 859
    E-mail: katre.tatrik@cooppank.ee

    The MIL Network –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Young innovators shine: Meet the finalists of the Verizon Unloc Young Entrepreneurs Challenge

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Young innovators shine: Meet the finalists of the Verizon Unloc Young Entrepreneurs Challenge

    LONDON, U.K. – Five young entrepreneurs have been named as finalists in the latest Young Entrepreneurs Challenge (YEC), an initiative launched by Verizon and Unloc.

    The challenge, now in its seventh year, aims to discover the business leaders of tomorrow by tasking young European entrepreneurs between the ages of 16 and 25 to devise a tech-led business idea that addresses a key industry or societal issue.

    This year’s challenge has brought to light a number of business models that tackle current sustainability and healthcare challenges including water restoration robots, biodegradable textiles from kombucha by-products, reforestation hexapod robots, a floating solar solution and a robotic glove for stroke rehabilitation. The team received over 100 competitive and innovative business ideas from a wide range of countries across Europe including the UK, Ireland, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Slovakia, Turkey, Portugal, Austria, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland.

    “Throughout the past seven years, the Young Entrepreneurs Challenge has been a brilliant opportunity to discover young and promising talent across Europe. There is nothing like the imagination and innovation of a young mind. The YEC serves as a platform to help bring their ideas to life,” said Sanjiv Gossain, General Manager and Head of EMEA for Verizon Business.

    “Young entrepreneurs in Europe often face hurdles and scepticism in accessing funding and mentorship. Verizon Business is proud to play a small role in helping this next generation of tech leaders stay a step ahead in the industry, as they work to make a positive impact around the world.”

    “We are in an era where technological innovation is crucial for tackling complex challenges in sustainability, climate change, and health. Investing in the next generation of leaders and their ideas is essential to addressing these issues,” said Hayden Taylor, Co-Founder and Chief Executive of Unloc. “Each year, we are amazed by the ingenuity of young entrepreneurs and are impressed to see the innovative ideas submitted for the Young Entrepreneurs Challenge.”

    The five finalists will now compete head-to-head in a grand finale held in March 2025, pitching their business concept live to a panel of expert judges and invited guests representing both the worlds of business and education.

    The winner receives £10,000 (€11,750*), mentorship and a technology support package to help kickstart their business. In addition, the winner will also receive a ticket to attend the Global One Young World 2025 Munich Summit.

    Each runner-up will receive £977 (€1175) to fund their start-up business, a personalised development plan that focuses on key priorities, and access to a series of masterclasses over the next year that will pair the finalists with various industry experts.

    Here are the 2025 finalists:

    Aleksandra Daniljuk – AquaRenew

    Aleksandra aims to address the global environmental crisis of water pollution caused by excess nitrogen and phosphorus in water bodies. Her solution involves small, solar-powered robots that use wire meshes to collect harmful algae blooms, release oxygen through air stones to combat oxygen depletion, and utilise zeolite biofilters to absorb excess nutrients, thereby preventing further eutrophication.

    The key selling point is its self-sustaining business model. The collected algae will be sold to businesses that convert them into biofuels and other sustainable products, creating a revenue stream to fund more robots. This approach not only restores aquatic ecosystems but also fosters sustainability and generates economic value.

    Aleksandra’s solution also aligns with the UN SDG 14: Life Below Water, promoting ecological restoration and sustainability.

    Luisanny Martinez – Skomby by Tex

    Skomby by Tex is a solution to modern challenges in fashion and sustainability that offers a sustainable, biodegradable material made from kombucha fermentation by-products. The eco-friendly alternative to traditional leather and textiles is crafted from bacterial cellulose, offering a lightweight, durable, and unique texture. 

    The material is 100% biodegradable and compostable, and can even be reused as planting capsules. To further enhance the sustainable model of the business, the team uses natural dyes like turmeric, spirulina, and saffron, ensuring no toxic chemicals are involved.

    Skomby by Tex collaborates with local kombucha producers in order to reduce waste and emissions. Luisanny’s long-term vision is to scale production while maintaining low-impact manufacturing practices, such as sun drying and ambient-temperature fermentation.

    Marta Bernardino – Trovador

    The precision reforestation market is projected to reach $9.77 billion by 2033, growing at a 5.74% CAGR, with high demand from the private sector. Recognising a billion-dollar opportunity, Marta developed Trovador, a reforestation robotics company that combats climate change by planting trees in hard-to-reach areas. Unlike drones, which have a low survival rate for seeds, Trovador’s hexapod robots plant saplings with a 90% survival rate. These AI-driven robots navigate challenging terrains like cliffs and slopes, ensuring effective reforestation.

    Trovador’s unique hexapod design preserves essential soil conditions for sapling survival and operates autonomously, overcoming obstacles in real-time. This innovative approach supports sustainability by providing rural communities with a safe, efficient reforestation solution, aligning with several UN Sustainable Development Goals.

    The service is quite simple and self-explanatory: clients select the planting site, the robot is deployed, and reforestation is monitored remotely. With just £2.5 (€3) per tree, Trovador is 30% more affordable than traditional methods, while excelling in speed, safety, and sustainability.

    Sebastiaan Schalkwijk – Solar Sub

    Solar Sub’s floating solar solution revolutionises renewable energy by placing solar panels on water bodies, maximising land use and harnessing natural cooling. This approach enhances system efficiency, increasing energy yield by up to 27% compared to traditional solar systems.

    Solar Sub’s advanced cooling technology and optimal panel positioning improve efficiency and durability, reducing operational costs and extending the lifespan of solar installations. This innovation sets Solar Sub apart from competitors facing issues with panel overheating and degradation.

    Sebastiaan adopts a licensing business model which allows rapid scaling without significant capital investment. This reduces upfront costs and risks, enabling us to focus on strategic partnerships. His model has gained traction with support from key industry players, confirming market interest and feasibility.

    Zain Sumdani – Exoheal

    Exoheal addresses the global shortage of physiotherapists and the inaccessibility of effective therapy with a robotic glove and a machine-learning-powered app. This solution delivers personalised, real-time therapy, enabling stroke recovery from home. Early trials show a 50% improvement in recovery time compared to traditional methods.

    Exoheal app connects patients with hospitals and clinics, allowing remote monitoring and real-time feedback. Its modular design and scalable production ensure affordability and the ability to meet global demand.

    By 2028, Zain and his team aim to transform 100,000 lives, saving governments $178 million in healthcare costs and enabling $16 million in inpatient earnings.

    For more information on the Young Entrepreneurs Challenge visit: youngentrepereneurschallenge.com


    About Unloc

    Unloc was founded in 2013 by award-winning young leaders and advocates Hayden Taylor and Ben Dowling. Our mission is to empower young people to be innovative changemakers who seek to build stronger communities and sustainable businesses. We develop young people’s skills, enhance their potential and boost their determination to succeed. This is encapsulated in our ‘Developing Young Potential’ tagline. We work towards our mission by delivering inspiring educational programmes in our growing network of schools and colleges, our physical Changemaker Studios spaces in Portsmouth and London, and work with business leaders to deliver a range of programmes that help us achieve our mission. For more information about Unloc visit www.unloc.org.uk

    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Aktsiaselts Infortar Investor Webinar introducing the results of the Q4 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Infortar will organize a webinar for investors on 25 February 2025 at 12:00 (EET) in Estonian and at 14:00 (EET) in English to introduce the fourth quarter 2024 results. The webinar will be attended by the Chairman of the Board of Infortar Ain Hanschmidt, the Managing Director of Infortar Martti Talgre and Investor Relations Manager Kadri Laanvee.

    The webinar will be hosted on the Microsoft Teams platform. Please note that to participate, no prior registration is required, and no reminder of the webinar will be sent. You can either participate by joining from your web browser or via Microsoft Teams application. When using a smart device to join the webinar, you first need to download the Microsoft Teams application from either Play Store or App Store.

    Please join the webinar via the following links:

    25 February 2025 at 12:00 (EET) Estonian webinar

    25 February 2025 at 14:00 (EET) English webinar

    Questions can be sent to investor@infortar.ee before the webinar and via Teams Q/A during the event. The webinar will be recorded and will be available online for everyone on the company’s website at https://infortar.ee/en/reports.

    Infortar operates in seven countries, the company’s main fields of activity are maritime transport, energy and real estate. Infortar owns a 68.47% stake in Tallink Grupp, a 100% stake in Elenger Grupp and a versatile and modern real estate portfolio of approx. 141,000 m2. In addition to the three main areas of activity, Infortar also operates in construction and mineral resources, agriculture, printing, and other areas. A total of 110 companies belong to the Infortar group: 101 subsidiaries, 4 affiliated companies and 5 subsidiaries of affiliated companies. Excluding affiliates, Infortar employs 6,228 people.

    Additional information:

    Kadri Laanvee
    Investor Relations Manager
    Phone: +372 5156662
    e-mail: kadri.laanvee@infortar.ee
    www.infortar.ee/en/investor

    The MIL Network –

    February 19, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: LHV Group results in January 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    After a strong end to year, January’s results, as is customary for the season, were more modest in terms of results for LHV. The consolidated loan portfolio of LHV Group decreased by EUR 8 million in January, and the total volume of clients’ deposits decreased by EUR 15 million. The volume of the funds managed by LHV decreased by EUR 10 million. A total of 6.6 million payments related to financial intermediaries were made over the month.

    In January, AS LHV Group earned EUR 9 million in consolidated net profit. Among the subsidiaries, the net profit of AS LHV Pank was EUR 6.9 million, while LHV Bank Ltd earned EUR 1.4 million in net profit, AS LHV Varahaldus EUR 363 thousand, and AS LHV Kindlustus EUR 249 thousand. The financial plan, which was disclosed in February, remains.

    The loan portfolio of LHV Pank decreased by EUR 23 million, with retail loans increasing by EUR 27 million; however, corporate loans decreased by EUR 50 million due to the planned loan repayment of one client. Although credit quality generally remained strong, the result for the month was affected this time by a short-term increase in write-downs due to a decrease in the rating of one client. The decline in the total volume of deposits of EUR 11 million was due to a decrease in the deposits of regular clients by EUR 78 million, as the deposits of financial intermediaries increased.

    LHV Pank added 4,000 clients to its ranks in January. At the beginning of the year, the research company Dive declared LHV Pank the bank with the best service in Estonia for the ninth time, both in terms of phone calls and visits to a bank branch.

    The volume of loans from LHV Bank, which operates in the United Kingdom, continued to rise, as the portfolio grew by EUR 16 million in January, while the amount of approved but not yet issued loans rose to EUR 186 million. Additional deposits in the amount of EUR 25 million were raised from deposit platforms. By the end of January, the first 100 retail clients had opened an account with LHV Bank, and work continues to supplement the offer intended for retail customers. The net income of the Bank was higher than planned in January, due to the increased revenues from the financial intermediaries business line.

    For LHV Varahaldus, the year started with good results. Pension funds M, L, and XL increased by 1.8%, 2.6%, and 3.7%, respectively, over the month. Indeks increased by 3.7% and Roheline 1.3%. Conservative funds S and XS increased by 1.2% and 0.7%, respectively. In January, LHV Varahaldus launched a new LHV Euro Bond Fund available to all retail investors, the units of which were subscribed for in the initial public offering by more than 1,000 investors worth EUR 9.6 million.

    In January, clients entered into 17,500 new insurance agreements with LHV Kindlustus in the volume of EUR 6.6 million. Sales results were excellent in vehicle insurance products, home insurance, and travel insurance. Losses were compensated in the amount of EUR 2 million. All in all, the first month of the year was profitable for LHV Kindlustus.

    To access the reports of AS LHV Group, please visit the website at https://investor.lhv.ee/en/reports.

    LHV Group is the largest domestic financial group and capital provider in Estonia. LHV Group’s key subsidiaries are LHV Pank, LHV Varahaldus, LHV Kindlustus, and LHV Bank Limited. The Group employs over 1,200 people. As at the end of January, LHV’s banking services are being used by 460,000 clients, the pension funds managed by LHV have 112,000 active clients, and LHV Kindlustus protects a total of 172,000 clients. LHV Bank Limited, a subsidiary of the Group, holds a banking licence in the United Kingdom and provides banking services to international financial technology companies, as well as loans to small and medium-sized enterprises.

    Priit Rum
    Communications Manager
    Phone: +372 502 0786
    Email: priit.rum@lhv.ee 

    Attachment

    • LHV Group 2025-01-EN

    The MIL Network –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Baltic Horizon Fund consolidated unaudited results for Q1-Q4 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Management Board of Northern Horizon Capital AS has approved the unaudited financial results of Baltic Horizon Fund (the Fund) for the twelve months of 2024.

    Our strategic ambitions
    In 2024, the Fund’s management team made the strategic decision to implement key performance indicators (KPIs) as a means to effectively measure and track performance. This decision stems from the recognition that clear and measurable benchmarks are essential for evaluating progress towards the Fund’s objectives. By defining specific KPIs, the team aims to enhance transparency, accountability, and facilitate decision-making processes.

    The focus of the Fund management team is and will be on these major objectives:

    • Portfolio occupancy of at least 95% by end of June 2025;
    • Loan-to-Value target at 50% or lower;
    • To consider disposing of non-strategic assets over the next 18 months;
    • Clear ESG and refurbishment strategy for the next 1-2 years with an aim to reach the portfolio’s NOI potential of EUR 18 million by 2027;
    • Maintaining 100% BREEAM or LEED certified portfolio;
    • Achieving not less than 4 stars from GRESB assessment.

    As we recap our goals for 2024, we can report the following achievements:

    We have successfully achieved 100% portfolio certification.

    Despite receiving a 3-star GRESB rating in 2024, we have thoroughly analysed the assessment results and developed an action plan to secure a 4-star GRESB rating in 2025.

    Although we did not reach our target of 90% portfolio occupancy by the end of 2024, we made significant progress, achieving an 86.5% occupancy rate based on lease signing date.

    We have recently announced our disposal strategy to reduce LTV level to the target level. Several disposal processes have already commenced as of February 2025, with the closing of transactions planned for later in the year.

    Looking ahead to 2025, we will continue with the same solid strategy and goals that will stabilize the Fund’s financial position and maximize the potential of its portfolio.

    Leasing performance

    In a challenging environment characterized by increasing real estate market vacancies across all Baltic states in recent periods, the Fund also faced outflows of some tenants, however it has demonstrated its adaptability and the attractiveness of its properties by renewing a significant amount of existing leases and signing a substantial number of new leases in 2024. This success was primarily attributable to significant deals with prominent anchor tenants such as Narbutas in Meraki (3,200 sq. m) and Apollo Group in Coca-Cola Plaza (2,200 sq. m), International School of Riga in S27 (3,680 sq. m) and significant leases in Galerija Centrs  signed with My Fitness (2,000 sq. m) and Expo GROUP (2,000 sq. m).

    The Fund team has been diligently negotiating with current tenants to extend lease agreements, while also actively engaging with new tenants to fill the vacancies.  These efforts have resulted in lease renewals of approximately 23,800 sq. m and a net lease inflow of approximately 4,800 sq. m

    During 2024, the Fund signed new leases for 22,743 sq. m, securing an annual rental income of EUR 2,945 thousand for future periods. Furthermore, 61 new tenants have been attracted to our buildings, while 69 existing tenants have decided to continue their cooperation with us.

    By the end of December 2024, the occupancy of the portfolio increased to 82.1%. Calculating based on the lease signing date, the occupancy already exceeds 86%. Signed premises will be handed over to tenants in 2025.

    Notably, less than 20% of the leases are set to expire during 2025, while the vast majority expire in 2026 and later. We aim to spread our lease terms evenly so that no more than 20% of our leases expire each year.  Recent successful leasing activity is reflected in the increase in the weighted average unexpired lease term until the first break option, which was 3.3 years as of 31 December 2024 (compared to 2.9 years as of 31 December 2023).

    Outlook
    In 2025 the Fund will focus on flexible and sustainable solutions to meet tenant demands and market conditions.

    Our key goals are increasing the occupancy of the portfolio and decreasing the LTV by way of repaying part of the bonds.

    In 2025, the Baltic commercial real estate market is anticipated to navigate both considerable challenges and emerging opportunities. Persisting economic uncertainty is expected to keep demand for commercial spaces subdued. Key factors influencing this trend include evolving consumer preferences, the continued expansion of e-commerce, and the sustained shift toward remote work, all of which are reshaping the need for office and retail properties.

    While economic forecasts cautiously suggest potential market stabilization in the coming year, a rapid recovery remains unlikely due to geopolitical uncertainties and evolving tenant and consumer needs. Recognizing these challenges, the Fund’s management strives to enhance financial stability by reducing leverage through partial bond repayment. This strategy aims to alleviate financial pressure, positioning the Fund for more sustainable financial performance.

    As part of this initiative, the Fund has announced a strategic plan to divest select assets, with the objective of reducing the LTV ratio to below 50% and fostering a more stable recovery. Up to three assets have been identified for potential disposal based on their life cycle, optimization potential, and alignment with the Fund’s long-term strategy. Among these, the Postimaja and CC Plaza complex in Tallinn has been introduced to the market, following the Fund’s successful achievement of 100% occupancy and WALT exceeding five years. Given limited opportunities for further value enhancement beyond its development potential—an avenue the Fund does not intend to pursue in the short term—the asset has been prioritized for sale. To facilitate the divestment process, the Fund has engaged Newsec Advisers UAB and Redgate Capital AS as financial advisors. The sales process was commenced in February, with the aim of closing later in the year.

    As of the date of release of this report, the Fund has a Letter of Intent (LOI) with a potential buyer and DD is in progress with Meraki property. According to LOI, the transaction would be finalized in spring 2025. At the end of 2024, the property had an occupancy of 86% and WAULT of 4.3 years. Due to anticipated vacancies in the office sector and an increasing supply, the Fund has decided not to proceed with the development of a second tower, for which the permit remains valid. The current market conditions, characterized by recovering investor activity, present an improved opportunity to sell the property. Potential buyers have also shown preliminary interest in Lincona and Pirita Center.

    If the divestment plan proceeds as anticipated, the Fund will be positioned to repay a significant portion of its bonds while continuing to invest in its remaining property portfolio. This will enable the Fund to concentrate on its core assets in alignment with its strategic objectives, providing a solid foundation for future growth.

    To achieve our goal of increasing portfolio occupancy, we are adapting to the evolving needs of our tenants and customers. The rise of e-commerce and online shopping has transformed the traditional concept of shopping centres. Visitors now seek not only to try on and purchase goods but also to enjoy entertainment and experiences.

    This trend is evident in the success of our food courts, such as Burzma and Dialogai, as well as the interactive exhibition Kosmopark, which attracted a significant number of visitors in Europa and now operates in Galerija Centrs. Following this success, we have signed a new 3-year lease with an entertainment operator to open a Danger Park on the second floor of Europa shopping centre in May 2025. We are also considering various entertainment concepts for Galerija Centrs. Additionally, we will continue to offer the community a variety of events and temporary pop-ups in both shopping centres.

    In line with our strategic goal to increase occupancy, we are reviewing the concept in Europa and seeking the best tenant mix. We are currently negotiating a lease with a 700 sq m. anchor fashion leader and have advanced discussions with several coworking operators who find the shopping centre and its location ideal for their concept, one of them has already signed a LOI for 1,300 sq m. We believe that the combination of entertainment and a wide range of catering options, which will expand from the food court to a newly planned restaurant zone on the first floor facing Konstitucijos Avenue, along with strategic changes to the tenant mix on the second and third floors, will maximize visitor flow and fully exploit the potential of the shopping centre.

    While the traditional shopping centre concept remains effective for Galerija, as evidenced by increasing foot flow and turnover, we are exploring additional concepts for currently vacant premises to complement our existing tenants and expand the range of services offered to visitors.

    Office tenants are currently looking not just for a place to work during the day, but rather for hybrid working spaces or built-to-suit solutions with increased expectation over ESG, workplace wellbeing features and easily reachable services, which become increasingly important. During the last year, we witnessed a higher demand for mixed-use projects that combine commercial spaces with services, including catering, medical clinics and fitness centres. We believe, that in the upcoming years demand for such concepts will grow further and will add value to the properties.

    We continue to adapt to market demands by diversifying our office tenant mix beyond traditional occupiers, integrating catering operators, medical clinics, and even kindergartens into our office buildings. This approach not only enhances tenant diversification but also meets the needs of both our customers and the surrounding communities.

    In the office sector, our primary challenge and focus in 2025 will be addressing the remaining vacancies in S27 and Upmalas. A significant milestone in 2024 was securing a lease agreement for approximately 3,680 sq. m. in S27 with the International School of Riga, a leading provider of international education serving students from preschool through high school, set to open at the end of 2025. Even in the current market conditions we are confident that the International School of Riga coming into the building together with the renovation and improvements that are being done will enable us to attract new tenant segments that recognise the value of synergy.

    Our commitment to supporting existing and prospective tenants, along with our ability to tailor office spaces to individual requirements, positions us well to lease the remaining areas in North Star and Meraki in the coming quarters.

     Our investments in green energy projects remain a key priority, and from Q1 2025, all our properties in Latvia and Lithuania will transition to using energy from remote solar panels. In Estonia, we are actively exploring solutions in our properties to reduce the reliance to gas. Additionally, we are evaluating new technologies and sustainability initiatives that align with our ESG strategy while enhancing energy efficiency, optimizing property performance, and reducing operational costs.

    Simultaneously, to reinforce its financial position, the Fund is committed to improving its debt service ratio and reducing loan-to-value levels. By focusing on increasing occupancy rates and optimizing property concepts, we aim to enhance asset performance and maximize net operating income. Adaptive leasing strategies, property repositioning, and targeted investments in high-demand segments will remain key priorities. These initiatives are designed to create long-term value for investors while ensuring the Fund remains resilient in a dynamic market environment.

    Baltic Horizon achieves a 100% BREEAM certified portfolio
    In 2025, we will continue advancing our social and environmental commitments. All our assets have been BREEAM-certified, and by the end of 2024, we achieved 98% green leases across our portfolio, with a target to further increase this share in the coming year.

    GRESB benchmarking
    Recently, we announced a 3-star GRESB rating of 80 points, falling 1.5 points short of the 4-star threshold. This decline, compared to previous years, reflects increasing industry-wide commitments, heightened requirements, and evolving best practices. The management team has conducted a thorough analysis of the assessment results and developed an action plan aimed at restoring the Fund’s 4-star rating in 2025.

    Net result and net rental income
    In 2024, the Group recorded a net loss of EUR 16.8 million compared with a net loss of EUR 23.0 million for 2023. The result was mainly driven by the property valuation loss. Earnings per unit for 2024 were negative at EUR 0.13 (2023: negative at EUR 0.19).

    The Group earned consolidated net rental income of EUR 11.6 million in 2024 (2023: 14.6 million). The results for 2023 include two months’ net rental income of the Domus Pro Retail and Office property (EUR 0.3 million) and five months’ net rental income of the Duetto properties (EUR 1.2 million), which were sold in February and May 2023, respectively.

    On an EPRA like-for-like basis, the portfolio net rental income in 2024 was 11.8% lower than in 2023, mainly due to vacancies in office properties in Latvia due to the expiry of the agreement with the main tenant in Upmalas Biroji BC and 100% vacancy of S27, as well as lower rental income in Europa due to the new anchor tenant IKI equipping the premises and opening in March.

    Portfolio properties in the retail segment contributed 53.3% (like-for-like 2023: 43.6%) of net rental income in 2024, followed by the office segment with 41.7% (like-for-like 2023: 50.9%) and the leisure segment with 5.0% (2023: 5.5%). 
    Retail assets located in the central business districts (Postimaja, Europa and Galerija Centrs) accounted for 42.2% of total portfolio net rental income in 2024. Total net rental income attributable to neighbourhood shopping centres was 11.1% in 2024.

    In 2024, investment properties in Latvia and Lithuania contributed 44.4% (like-for-like 2023: 41.8%) and 22.8% (like-for-like 2023: 31.1%) of net rental income, respectively, while investment properties in Estonia contributed 32.8% (like-for-like 2023: 27.1%).

    Investment properties
    At the end of Q4 2024, the Baltic Horizon Fund portfolio consisted of 12 cash flow generating investment properties in the Baltic capitals. The fair value of the Fund’s portfolio was EUR 241.2 million at the end of December 2024 (31 December 2023: EUR 250.4 million) and incorporated a total net leasable area of 118.3 thousand sq. m. The change in portfolio value was mainly driven by the changes in exit yields and upward adjustments of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). During 2024 the Group invested approximately EUR 6.0 million in tenant fit-outs.

    Gross Asset Value (GAV)
    As of 31 December 2024, the Fund’s GAV was EUR 256.0 million (31 December 2023: EUR 261.1 million). The decrease compared to the prior year was mainly related to the negative revaluation of the Fund’s investment properties of approx. EUR 9.5 million and was partly offset by the private placement of new units which took place in September and resulted in a cash increase of approx. EUR 6.29 million.

    Net Asset Value (NAV)
    As of 31 December 2024, the Fund’s NAV was EUR 98.1 million (31 December 2023: EUR 109.5 million). The NAV decrease was mainly due to the revaluation of investment properties. At the end of September 2024 new units were issued resulting in approx. EUR 6.29 million of new equity. As of 31 December 2024, IFRS NAV per unit amounted to EUR 0.6833 (31 December 2023: EUR 0.9156), while EPRA net tangible assets and EPRA net reinstatement value were EUR 0.7267 per unit (31 December 2023: EUR 0.9546). EPRA net disposal value was EUR 0.6797 per unit (31 December 2023: EUR 0.9122).

    Interest-bearing loans and bonds
    As of 31 December 2024, interest-bearing loans and bonds (excluding lease liabilities) were EUR 149.0 million (31 December 2023: EUR 143.5 million). Annual loan amortisation accounted for 1.5% of total debt outstanding. In July 2024, the Fund successfully signed the Meraki loan with Bigbank for a total amount of EUR 10.3 million. A major part of the loan was used to repay short term bonds in the amount of EUR 8.0 million maturing in July 2024.

    As of 31 December 2024, the Fund’s consolidated cash and cash equivalents amounted to EUR 10.1 million (31 December 2023: EUR 6.2 million).

    Cash flow
    Cash inflow from core operating activities in 2024 amounted to EUR 9.9 million (2023: cash inflow of EUR 11.4 million).  Cash inflow from core operating activities decreased mainly due to the sale of Duetto and Domus Pro properties in H1 2023 and higher vacancies, mostly in S27 and Upmalas Biroji. Cash outflow from investing activities was EUR 7.0 million due to investments in existing properties and transaction costs (2023: cash inflow of EUR 19.9 million due to sales of assets). Cash inflow from financing activities was EUR 1.0 million (2023: cash outflow of EUR 30.5 million). In Q4 2024, the Fund prepaid loans in the amount of EUR 2.7 million and paid regular amortisation and interest on bank loans and bonds.

    Key earnings figures 

    EUR ‘000 Q1-Q4 2024 Q1-Q4 2023 Change (%)
    Net rental income 11,588 14,617 (20.7%)
    Administrative expenses (2,373) (2,617) (9.3%)
    Net other operating income 18 44 (59.1%)
    Losses on disposal of investment properties (863) (4,047) (78.7%)
    Valuation gains (losses) on investment properties (15,581) (21,876) (28.8%)
    Operating profit (loss) (7,211) (13,879) (48.0%)
    Net financial expenses (10,344) (9,750) 6.1%
    Profit (loss) before tax (17,555) (23,629) (25.7%)
    Income tax 774 656 18.0%
    Net profit (loss) for the period (16,781) (22,973) (27.0%)
           
    Weighted average number of units outstanding (units) 143,562,514 119,635,429 20.0%
    Earnings per unit (EUR) (0.12) (0.19) (39.1%)

    Key financial position figures

    EUR ‘000 31.12.2024 31.12.2023 Change (%)
    Investment properties 241,158 250,385 (3.7%)
    Gross asset value (GAV) 256,048 261,138 (1.9%)
           
    Interest-bearing loans and bonds 148,989 143,487 3.8%
    Total liabilities 157,953 151,606 4.2%
           
    IFRS NAV 98,095 109,532 (10.4%)
    EPRA NRV 104,333 114,205 (8.6%)
           
    Number of units outstanding (units) 143,562,514 119,635,429 20.0%
    IFRS NAV per unit (EUR) 0.6833 0.9156 (25.4%)
    EPRA NRV per unit (EUR) 0.7267 0.9546 (23.9%)
           
    Loan-to-Value ratio (%) 61.8% 57.3% –
    Average effective interest rate (%) 6.7% 5.2% –

    During Q4 2024, the average actual occupancy of the portfolio was 81.0% (Q3 2024: 80.1%). The occupancy rate increased to 82.1% as of 31 December 2024 (30 September 2024: 80.5%).

    Overview of the Fund’s investment properties as of 31 December 2024

    Property name Sector Fair value1 NLA Direct property yield Net initial yield Occupancy rate
    (EUR ‘000) (sq. m) 20242 20243
    Vilnius, Lithuania            
    Europa SC Retail 35,946 17,092 2.3% 2.8% 80.6%
    North Star Office 19,548 10,734 6.5% 7.0% 91.8%
    Meraki Office 16,3804 7,833 1.2% 1.5% 86.3%
    Total Vilnius   71,874 35,659 3.0% 3.6% 85.2%
    Riga, Latvia            
    Upmalas Biroji BC Office 19,224 11,203 3.7% 4.2% 64.1%
    Vainodes I Office 15,900 8,128 8.8% 8.8% 100.0%
    S27 Office 11,360 7,303 (0.6%) (0.9%) –
    Sky SC Retail 4,900 3,260 8.6% 8.5% 100.0%
    Galerija Centrs Retail 60,020 19,423 3.2% 4.1% 84.7%
    Total Riga   111,404 49,317 3.7% 4.5% 71.0%
    Tallinn, Estonia            
    Postimaja & CC Plaza complex Retail 21,800 9,232 3.7% 6.7% 100.0%
    Postimaja & CC Plaza complex Leisure 13,190 7,869 4.8% 4.3% 97.7%
    Lincona Office 13,100 10,767 6.4% 7.4% 88.5%
    Pirita SC Retail 9,790 5,425 6.7% 9.2% 97.1%
    Total Tallinn   57,880 33,293 4.9% 6.7% 95.3%
    Total active portfolio   241,158 118,269 3.8% 4.7% 82.1%
    1. Based on the latest valuation as of 31 December 2024 and recognised right-of-use assets.  
    2. Direct property yield (DPY) is calculated by dividing annualized NOI by the acquisition value and subsequent capital expenditure of the property.
    3. The net initial yield (NIY) is calculated by dividing annualized NOI by the market value of the property.
    4. Meraki value measured at disposal price. Market value according to independent property valuators Newsec is EUR 17,490,000.

    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF PROFIT OR LOSS AND OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME

    EUR ‘000 01.10.2024 01.10.2023 01.01.2024 01.01.2023
    – 31.12.2024 – 31.12.2023 – 31.12.2024 – 31.12.2023
    Rental income 3,779 3,755 15,136 17,743
    Service charge income 1,145 1,487 4,744 6,008
    Cost of rental activities (2,205) (2,348) (8,292) (9,134)
    Net rental income 2,719 2,894 11,588 14,617
             
    Administrative expenses (644) (631) (2,373) (2,617)
    Other operating income (expenses) 3 29 18 44
    Losses on disposal of investment properties (245) (237) (863) (4,047)
     Valuation losses on investment properties (3,052) (7,250) (15,581) (21,876)
    Operating profit (loss) (1,219) (5,195) (7,211) (13,879)
             
    Financial income 169 29 196 104
    Financial expenses (2,789) (2,538) (10,540) (9,854)
    Net financial expenses (2,620) (2,509) (10,344) (9,750)
             
    Profit (loss) before tax (3,839) (7,704) (17,555) (23,629)
    Income tax charge 457 (53) 774 656
    Profit (loss) for the period (3,382) (7,757) (16,781) (22,973)
           
    Other comprehensive income that is or may be reclassified to profit or loss in subsequent periods
    Net gain (loss) on cash flow hedges (446) (759) (1,003) (1,273)
    Income tax relating to net gain (loss) on cash flow hedges 1 64 52 123
    Other comprehensive income (expense), net of tax, that is or may be reclassified to profit or loss in subsequent periods (445) (695) (951) (1,150)
             
    Total comprehensive income (expense) for the period, net of tax (3,827) (8,452) (17,732) (24,123)
             
    Basic earnings per unit (EUR) (0.02) (0.06) (0.13) (0.19)
    Diluted earnings per unit (EUR) – – (0.12) –
                 

    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL POSITION

    EUR ‘000 31.12.2024 31.12.2023
    Non-current assets    
    Investment properties 241,158 250,385
    Intangible assets 4 11
    Property, plant and equipment 5 4
    Derivative financial instruments 1 295
    Other non-current assets 1,225 647
    Total non-current assets 242,393 251,342
         
    Current assets    
    Trade and other receivables 2,800 2,591
    Prepayments 802 402
    Derivative financial instruments – 621
    Cash and cash equivalents 10,053 6,182
    Total current assets 13,655 9,796
    Total assets 256,048 261,138
         
    Equity    
    Paid in capital 151,495 145,200
    Cash flow hedge reserve (420) 531
    Retained earnings (52,980) (36,199)
    Total equity 98,095 109,532
         
    Non-current liabilities    
    Interest-bearing loans and borrowings 98,491 64,158
    Deferred tax liabilities 1,898 2,774
    Other non-current liabilities 1,446 1,079
    Total non-current liabilities 101,835 68,011
         
    Current liabilities    
    Interest-bearing loans and borrowings 50,736 79,584
    Trade and other payables 4,473 3,343
    Income tax payable 14 6
    Other current liabilities 895 662
    Total current liabilities 56,118 83,595
    Total liabilities 157,953 151,606
    Total equity and liabilities 256,048 261,138

    For additional information, please contact:

    Tarmo Karotam
    Baltic Horizon Fund manager
    E-mail tarmo.karotam@nh-cap.com
    www.baltichorizon.com

    The Fund is a registered contractual public closed-end real estate fund that is managed by Alternative Investment Fund Manager license holder Northern Horizon Capital AS. 

    Distribution: GlobeNewswire, Nasdaq Tallinn, Nasdaq Stockholm, www.baltichorizon.com

    To receive Nasdaq announcements and news from Baltic Horizon Fund about its projects, plans and more, register on www.baltichorizon.com. You can also follow Baltic Horizon Fund on www.baltichorizon.com and on LinkedIn, Facebook, X and YouTube.

    This announcement contains information that the Management Company is obliged to disclose pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation. The information was submitted for publication, through the agency of the above distributors, at 19:30 EET on 17 February 2024.

    Attachment

    • 2024 Q4 report EN

    The MIL Network –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Cost of living and the environment are top concerns of young people, survey finds

    Source: European Union 2

    An EP survey of EU citizens aged 16-30 shows social media is their main information source, and that the majority are also aware of the risks of online disinformation.

    Rising prices and the cost of living are a concern for 40% of the 16-30 year-olds who took part in the latest Eurobarometer Youth Survey published on Monday. One third of respondents said they believed the EU should focus its attention on the environment and climate change over the next five years, while 31% believe the economic situation and job creation should be a priority.

    Almost three in ten (29%) want the EU to prioritise social protection, welfare and access to healthcare. More than one in five respondents highlighted education and training (27%), housing (23%) and the EU’s defence and security (21%) as important priorities for the EU. European defence is of particular concern for young people in Czechia (36%), Poland (33%), and Estonia (32%).

    Roberta Metsola said: “Listening to young Europeans and their concerns is vital for politicians, policy-makers and European democracy. Young people today are worried about rising prices, climate change, security and their chances of finding a good job. These are concerns that we must address in every decision we take and every law that we pass. Otherwise, we risk losing a generation to disillusionment.”


    Social media outrun TV as main source of information

    Social media is the top source of information on political and social issues for 42% of respondents aged 16-30, with television being the second most-popular source (39%). The preference for TV is particularly noticeable among those aged 25-30. This age bracket is also more likely to use online news platforms and radio than 16-18 year-olds. Younger participants (16-18) rely more on social media (45%) than 25-30 year-olds (39%), and trust friends, family or colleagues for information (29% compared to 23%).

    “The information landscape is rapidly changing. With most young people predominantly getting their news from social media, politicians and social media platforms have a particular responsibility to fight increasing disinformation,” President Metsola added.

    TV also remains the leading source of information for young people in Portugal (53%), Italy (52%), Slovenia (45%), and France (43%). Online press and/or news platforms and radio are sources of information for 26% of the younger participants and 16% of their older counterparts. In the 2021 edition of the survey, the main sources of news were social media and news websites (each of which was mentioned by 41% of respondents).


    Instagram and TikTok are the most used social media for news

    Instagram is the top platform for obtaining political and social news among young people (47%), followed by TikTok (39%). X (formerly Twitter) is only used by 21% of young people, the survey shows.


    Young people are aware of their exposure to disinformation

    A significant majority (76%) of young people believed they had previously been exposed to disinformation and fake news.

    In nine EU countries, more than half of respondents report having been exposed to disinformation ‘often’ or ‘very often’, with the highest proportions from Malta (59%), Hungary (58%), Greece (57%), Luxembourg (55%), and Belgium (54%). By contrast, the share of those who believe they have never been exposed to disinformation and fake news is the highest in Romania (19%) followed by Bulgaria (11%).

    70% of the participants in the survey were confident they could recognise disinformation. Respondents from Malta and Croatia were the most confident in their ability to recognise disinformation, while those from Austria, Germany and Slovenia felt the least confident.

    Background

    The Eurobarometer Youth Survey was carried out by Ipsos between 25 September and 3 October 2024 in all 27 EU member states. A total of 25,863 young people aged 16-30 were surveyed via Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) using online panels. The results were weighted according to the proportion of this age group within each EU country.

    The full results can be found here.


    Young people discuss EU action at EYE2025

    Insights from the Eurobarometer Youth Survey provide a detailed understanding of the political participation of young Europeans and their needs and concerns. These findings will help ensure that Parliament’s flagship youth event,EYE2025, addresses topics that matter most to the EU’s young generation.

    Registration for EYE2025 is open until 21 February. From 13-14 June 2025, the EYE will bring together thousands of young people from across the EU and beyond to debate, exchange views, and contribute to shaping Europe’s future in Parliament’s Strasbourg premises.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 18, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Cost of living and environment are the main concerns of young people in the EU

    Source: European Parliament 3

    An EP survey of EU citizens aged 16-30 shows social media is their main information source, and that the majority are also aware of the risks of online disinformation.

    Rising prices and the cost of living are a concern for 40% of the 16-30 year-olds who took part in the latest Eurobarometer Youth Survey published on Monday. One third of respondents said they believed the EU should focus its attention on the environment and climate change over the next five years, while 31% believe the economic situation and job creation should be a priority.

    Almost three in ten (29%) want the EU to prioritise social protection, welfare and access to healthcare. More than one in five respondents highlighted education and training (27%), housing (23%) and the EU’s defence and security (21%) as important priorities for the EU. European defence is of particular concern for young people in Czechia (36%), Poland (33%), and Estonia (32%).

    Roberta Metsola said: “Listening to young Europeans and their concerns is vital for politicians, policy-makers and European democracy. Young people today are worried about rising prices, climate change, security and their chances of finding a good job. These are concerns that we must address in every decision we take and every law that we pass. Otherwise, we risk losing a generation to disillusionment.”


    Social media outrun TV as main source of information

    Social media is the top source of information on political and social issues for 42% of respondents aged 16-30, with television being the second most-popular source (39%). The preference for TV is particularly noticeable among those aged 25-30. This age bracket is also more likely to use online news platforms and radio than 16-18 year-olds. Younger participants (16-18) rely more on social media (45%) than 25-30 year-olds (39%), and trust friends, family or colleagues for information (29% compared to 23%).

    “The information landscape is rapidly changing. With most young people predominantly getting their news from social media, politicians and social media platforms have a particular responsibility to fight increasing disinformation,” President Metsola added.

    TV also remains the leading source of information for young people in Portugal (53%), Italy (52%), Slovenia (45%), and France (43%). Online press and/or news platforms and radio are sources of information for 26% of the younger participants and 16% of their older counterparts. In the 2021 edition of the survey, the main sources of news were social media and news websites (each of which was mentioned by 41% of respondents).


    Instagram and TikTok are the most used social media for news

    Instagram is the top platform for obtaining political and social news among young people (47%), followed by TikTok (39%). X (formerly Twitter) is only used by 21% of young people, the survey shows.


    Young people are aware of their exposure to disinformation

    A significant majority (76%) of young people believed they had previously been exposed to disinformation and fake news.

    In nine EU countries, more than half of respondents report having been exposed to disinformation ‘often’ or ‘very often’, with the highest proportions from Malta (59%), Hungary (58%), Greece (57%), Luxembourg (55%), and Belgium (54%). By contrast, the share of those who believe they have never been exposed to disinformation and fake news is the highest in Romania (19%) followed by Bulgaria (11%).

    70% of the participants in the survey were confident they could recognise disinformation. Respondents from Malta and Croatia were the most confident in their ability to recognise disinformation, while those from Austria, Germany and Slovenia felt the least confident.

    Background

    The Eurobarometer Youth Survey was carried out by Ipsos between 25 September and 3 October 2024 in all 27 EU member states. A total of 25,863 young people aged 16-30 were surveyed via Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI) using online panels. The results were weighted according to the proportion of this age group within each EU country.

    The full results can be found here.


    Young people discuss EU action at EYE2025

    Insights from the Eurobarometer Youth Survey provide a detailed understanding of the political participation of young Europeans and their needs and concerns. These findings will help ensure that Parliament’s flagship youth event,EYE2025, addresses topics that matter most to the EU’s young generation.

    Registration for EYE2025 is open until 21 February. From 13-14 June 2025, the EYE will bring together thousands of young people from across the EU and beyond to debate, exchange views, and contribute to shaping Europe’s future in Parliament’s Strasbourg premises.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What is Navalny’s legacy for Russia?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ben Noble, Associate Professor of Russian Politics, UCL

    A spontaneous memorial of flowers in St Petersburg, Russia, on the day of Alexei Navalny’s death, February 16 2024. Aleksey Dushutin/Shutterstock

    This is the best day of the past five months for me … This is my home … I am not afraid of anything and I urge you not to be afraid of anything either.

    These were Alexei Navalny’s words after landing at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport on January 17 2021. Russia’s leading opposition figure had spent the past months recovering in Germany from an attempt on his life by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Minutes after making his comments, Navalny was detained at border control. And he would remain behind bars until his death on February 16 2024, in the remote “Polar Wolf” penal colony within the Arctic Circle.

    “Why did he return to Russia?” That’s the question I’m asked about Navalny most frequently. Wasn’t it a mistake to return to certain imprisonment, when he could have maintained his opposition to Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, from abroad?

    But Navalny’s decision to return didn’t surprise me. I’ve researched and written about him extensively, including co-authoring Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future?, the first English-language, book-length account of his life and political activities. Defying the Kremlin by returning was a signature move, reflecting both his obstinacy and bravery. He wanted to make sure his supporters and activists in Russia did not feel abandoned, risking their lives while he lived a cushy life in exile.


    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.


    Besides, Navalny wasn’t returning to certain imprisonment. A close ally of his, Vladimir Ashurkov, told me in May 2022 that his “incarceration in Russia was not a certainty. It was a probability, a scenario – but it wasn’t like he was walking into a certain long-term prison term.”

    Also, Navalny hadn’t chosen to leave Russia in the first place. He was unconscious when taken by plane from Omsk to Berlin for treatment following his poisoning with the nerve agent Novichok in August 2020. Navalny had been consistent in saying he was a Russian politician who needed to remain in Russia to be effective.

    In a subsequent interview, conducted in a forest on the outskirts of the German capital as he slowly recovered, Navalny said: “In people’s minds, if you leave the country, that means you’ve surrendered.”

    Video: ACF.

    Outrage, detention and death

    Two days after Navalny’s final return to Russia, the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) – the organisation he established in 2011 – published its biggest ever investigation. The YouTube video exploring “Putin’s palace” on the Black Sea coast achieved an extraordinary 100 million views within ten days. By the start of February 2021, polling suggested it had been watched by more than a quarter of all adults in Russia.

    Outrage at Navalny’s detention, combined with this Putin investigation, got people on to the streets. On January 23 2021, 160,000 people turned out across Russia in events that did not have prior approval from the authorities. More than 40% of the participants said they were taking part in a protest for the first time.

    But the Russian authorities were determined to also make it their last time. Law enforcement mounted an awesome display of strength, detaining protesters and sometimes beating them. The number of participants at protests on January 31 and February 2 declined sharply as a result.

    Between Navalny’s return to Russia in January 2021 and his death in February 2024, aged 47, he faced criminal case after criminal case, adding years and years to his time in prison and increasing the severity of his detention. By the time of his death, he was in the harshest type of prison in the Russian penitentiary system – a “special regime” colony – and was frequently sent to a punishment cell.

    The obvious intent was to demoralise Navalny, his team and supporters – making an example of him to spread fear among anyone else who might consider mounting a challenge to the Kremlin. But Navalny fought back, as described in his posthumously published memoir, Patriot. He made legal challenges against his jailers. He went on hunger strike. And he formed a union for his fellow prisoners.

    He also used his court appearances to make clear his political views, including following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, declaring: “I am against this war. I consider it immoral, fratricidal, and criminal.”

    Navalny’s final public appearance was via video link. He was in good spirits, with his trademark optimism and humour still on display. Tongue firmly in cheek, he asked the judge for financial help:

    Your Honour, I will send you my personal account number so that you can use your huge salary as a federal judge to ‘warm up’ my personal account, because I am running out of money.

    Navalny died the following day. According to the prison authorities, he collapsed after a short walk and lost consciousness. Although the Russian authorities claimed he had died of natural causes, documents published in September 2024 by The Insider – a Russia-focused, Latvia-based independent investigative website – suggest Navalny may have been poisoned.

    A mourner adds her tribute to Alexei Navalny’s grave in Moscow after his burial on March 1 2024.
    Aleksey Dushutin/Shutterstock

    Whether or not Putin directly ordered his death, Russia’s president bears responsibility – for leading a system that tried to assassinate Navalny in August 2020, and for allowing his imprisonment following Navalny’s return to Russia in conditions designed to crush him.

    Commenting in March 2024, Putin stated that, just days before Navalny’s death, he had agreed for his most vocal opponent to be included in a prisoner swap – on condition the opposition figure never returned to Russia. “But, unfortunately,” Putin added, “what happened, happened.”

    ‘No one will forget’

    Putin is afraid of Alexei, even after he killed him.

    Yulia Navalnaya, Navalny’s wife, wrote these words on January 10 2025 after reading a curious letter. His mother, Lyudmila Navalnaya, had written to Rosfinmonitoring – a Russian state body – with a request for her son’s name to be removed from their list of “extremists and terrorists” now he was no longer alive.

    The official response was straight from Kafka. Navalny’s name could not be removed as it had been added following the initiation of a criminal case against him. Even though he was dead, Rosfinmonitoring had not been informed about a termination of the case “in accordance with the procedure established by law”, so his name would have to remain.

    This appears to be yet another instance of the Russian state exercising cruelty behind the veil of bureaucratic legality – such as when the prison authorities initially refused to release Navalny’s body to his mother after his death.

    “Putin is doing this to scare you,” Yulia continued. “He wants you to be afraid to even mention Alexei, and gradually to forget his name. But no one will forget.”

    Alexei Navalny and his wife, Yulia Navalnaya, at a protest rally in Moscow, May 2012.
    Dmitry Laudin/Shutterstock

    Today, Navalny’s family and team continue his work outside of Russia – and are fighting to keep his name alive back home. But the odds are against them. Polling suggests the share of Russians who say they know nothing about Navalny or his activities roughly doubled to 30% between his return in January 2021 and his death three years later.

    Navalny fought against an autocratic system – and paid the price with his life. Given the very real fears Russians may have of voicing support for a man still labelled an extremist by the Putin regime, it’s not easy to assess what people there really think of him and his legacy. But we will also never know how popular Navalny would have been in the “normal” political system he fought for.

    What made Navalny the force he was?

    Navalny didn’t mean for the humble yellow rubber duck to become such a potent symbol of resistance.

    In March 2017, the ACF published its latest investigation into elite corruption, this time focusing on then-prime minister (and former president), Dmitry Medvedev. Navalny’s team members had become masters of producing slick videos that enabled their message to reach a broad audience. A week after posting, the film had racked up over 7 million views on YouTube – an extraordinary number at that time.

    The film included shocking details of Medvedev’s alleged avarice, including yachts and luxury properties. In the centre of a large pond in one of these properties was a duck house, footage of which was captured by the ACF using a drone.

    Video: ACF.

    Such luxuries jarred with many people’s view of Medvedev as being a bit different to Putin and his cronies. As Navalny wrote in his memoir, Medvedev had previously seemed “harmless and incongruous”. (At the time, Medvedev’s spokeswoman said it was “pointless” to comment on the ACF investigation, suggesting the report was a “propaganda attack from an opposition figure and a convict”.)

    But people were angry, and the report triggered mass street protests across Russia. They carried yellow ducks and trainers, a second unintended symbol from the film given Medvedev’s penchant for them.

    Another reason why so many people came out to protest on March 26 2017 was the organising work carried out by Navalny’s movement.

    The previous December, Navalny had announced his intention to run in the 2018 presidential election. As part of the campaign, he and his team created a network of regional headquarters to bring together supporters and train activists across Russia. Although the authorities had rejected Navalny’s efforts to register an official political party, this regional network functioned in much the same way, gathering like-minded people in support of an electoral candidate. And this infrastructure helped get people out on the streets.

    The Kremlin saw this as a clear threat. According to a December 2020 investigation by Bellingcat, CNN, Der Spiegel and The Insider, the FSB assassination squad implicated in the Novichok poisoning of Navalny had started trailing him in January 2017 – one month after he announced his run for the presidency.

    Alexei Navalny on a Moscow street after having zelyonka dye thrown in his face, April 2017.
    Evgeny Feldman via Wikimedia, CC BY-NC-SA

    At the protests against Medvedev, the authorities’ growing intolerance of Navalny was also on display – he was detained, fined and sentenced to 15 days’ imprisonment.

    The Medvedev investigation was far from the beginning of Navalny’s story as a thorn in the Kremlin’s side. But this episode brings together all of the elements that made Navalny the force he was: anti-corruption activism, protest mobilisation, attempts to run as a “normal” politician in a system rigged against him, and savvy use of social media to raise his profile in all of these domains.

    Courting controversy

    In Patriot, Navalny writes that he always “felt sure a broad coalition was needed to fight Putin”. Yet over the years, his attempts to form that coalition led to some of the most controversial points of his political career.

    In a 2007 video, Navalny referred to himself as a “certified nationalist”, advocating for the deportation of illegal immigrants, albeit without using violence and distancing himself from neo-Nazism. In the video, he says: “We have the right to be Russians in Russia, and we’ll defend that right.”

    Although alienating some, Navalny was attempting to present a more acceptable face of nationalism, and he hoped to build a bridge between nationalists and liberals in taking on the Kremlin’s burgeoning authoritarianism.

    But the prominence of nationalism in Navalny’s political identity varied markedly over time, probably reflecting his shifting estimations of which platform could attract the largest support within Russia. By the time of his thwarted run in the 2018 presidential election, nationalist talking points were all but absent from his rhetoric.

    However, some of these former comments and positions continue to influence how people view him. For example, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Navalny tried to take a pragmatic stance. While acknowledging Russia’s flouting of international law, he said that Crimea was “now part of the Russian Federation” and would “never become part of Ukraine in the foreseeable future”.

    Many Ukrainians take this as clear evidence that Navalny was a Russian imperialist. Though he later revised his position, saying Crimea should be returned to Ukraine, some saw this as too little, too late. But others were willing to look past the more controversial parts of his biography, recognising that Navalny represented the most effective domestic challenge to Putin.

    Another key attempt to build a broad political coalition was Navalny’s Smart Voting initiative. This was a tactical voting project in which Navalny’s team encouraged voters to back the individual thought best-placed to defeat the ruling United Russia candidate, regardless of the challenger’s ideological position.

    The project wasn’t met with universal approval. Some opposition figures and voters baulked at, or flatly refused to consider, the idea of voting for people whose ideological positions they found repugnant – or whom they viewed as being “fake” opposition figures, entirely in bed with the authorities. (This makes clear that Navalny was never the leader of the political opposition in Russia; he was, rather, the leading figure of a fractious constellation of individuals and groups.)

    But others relished the opportunity to make rigged elections work in their favour. And there is evidence that Smart Voting did sometimes work, including in the September 2020 regional and local elections, for which Navalny had been campaigning when he was poisoned with Novichok.

    In an astonishing moment captured on film during his recovery in Germany, Navalny speaks to an alleged member of the FSB squad sent to kill him. Pretending to be the aide to a senior FSB official, Navalny finds out that the nerve agent had been placed in his underpants.

    How do Russians feel about Navalny now?

    It’s like a member of the family has died.

    This is what one Russian friend told me after hearing of Navalny’s death a year ago. Soon afterwards, the Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organisation – conducted a nationally representative survey to gauge the public’s reaction to the news.

    The poll found that Navalny’s death was the second-most mentioned event by Russian people that month, after the capture of the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka by Russian troops. But when asked how they felt about his death, 69% of respondents said they had “no particular feelings” either way – while only 17% said they felt “sympathy” or “pity”.

    And that broadly fits with Navalny’s approval ratings in Russia. After his poisoning in 2020, 20% of Russians said they approved of his activities – but this was down to 11% by February 2024.

    Video: BBC.

    Of course, these numbers must be taken for what they are: polling in an authoritarian state regarding a figure vilified and imprisoned by the regime, during a time of war and amid draconian restrictions on free speech. To what extent the drop in support for Navalny was real, rather than reflecting the increased fear people had in voicing their approval for an anti-regime figure, is hard to say with certainty.

    When asked why they liked Navalny, 31% of those who approved of his activities said he spoke “the truth”, “honestly” or “directly”. For those who did not approve of his activities, 22% said he was “paid by the west”, “represented” the west’s interests, that he was a “foreign agent”, a “traitor” or a “puppet”.

    The Kremlin had long tried to discredit Navalny as a western-backed traitor. After Navalny’s 2020 poisoning, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that “experts from the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency are working with him”. The Russian state claimed that, rather than a patriot exposing official malfeasance with a view to strengthening his country, Navalny was a CIA stooge intent on destroying Russia.

    Peskov provided no evidence to back up this claim – and the official propaganda wasn’t believed by all. Thousands of Russians defied the authorities by coming out to pay their respects at Navalny’s funeral on March 1 2024. Many, if not all, knew this was a significant risk. Police employed video footage to track down members of the funeral crowd, including by using facial recognition technology.

    The first person to be detained was a Muscovite the police claimed they heard shouting “Glory to the heroes!” – a traditional Ukrainian response to the declaration “Glory to Ukraine!”, but this time referencing Navalny. She spent a night in a police station before being fined for “displaying a banned symbol”.

    Putin always avoided mentioning Navalny’s name in public while he was alive – instead referring to him as “this gentleman”, “the character you mentioned”, or the “Berlin patient”. (The only recorded instance of Putin using Navalny’s name in public when he was alive was in 2013.)

    However, having been re-elected president in 2024 and with Navalny dead, Putin finally broke his long-held practice, saying: “As for Navalny, yes he passed away – this is always a sad event.” It was as if the death of his nemesis diminished the potency of his name – and the challenge that Navalny had long presented to Putin.

    Nobody can become another Navalny

    Someone else will rise up and take my place. I haven’t done anything unique or difficult. Anyone could do what I’ve done.

    So wrote Navalny in the memoir published after his death. But that hasn’t happened: no Navalny 2.0 has yet emerged. And it’s no real surprise. The Kremlin has taken clear steps to ensure nobody can become another Navalny within Russia.

    In 2021, the authorities made a clear decision to destroy Navalny’s organisations within Russia, including the ACF and his regional network. Without the organisational infrastructure and legal ability to function in Russia, no figure has been able to take his place directly.

    More broadly, the fate of Navalny and his movement has had a chilling effect on the opposition landscape. So too have other steps taken by the authorities.

    Russia has become markedly more repressive since the start of its war on Ukraine. The human rights NGO First Department looked into the number of cases relating to “treason”, “espionage” and “confidential cooperation with a foreign state” since Russia introduced the current version of its criminal code in 1997. Of the more than 1,000 cases, 792 – the vast majority – were initiated following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

    Russian law enforcement has also used nebulous anti-extremism and anti-terrorism legislation to crack down on dissenting voices. Three of Navalny’s lawyers were sentenced in January 2025 for participating in an “extremist organisation”, as the ACF was designated by a Moscow court in June 2021. The Russian legislature has also passed a barrage of legislation relating to so-called “foreign agents”, to tarnish the work of those the regime regards as foreign-backed “fifth columnists”.

    Mass street protests are largely a thing of the past in Russia. Restrictions were placed on public gatherings during the COVID pandemic – but these rules were applied selectively, with opposition individuals and groups being targeted. And opportunities for collective action were further reduced following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

    Freedom of speech has also come under assault. Article 29, point five of the Russian constitution states: “Censorship shall be prohibited.” But in September 2024, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov said: “In the state of war that we are in, restrictions are justified, and censorship is justified.”

    Legislation passed very soon after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine made it illegal to comment on the Russian military’s activities truthfully – and even to call the war a war.

    YouTube – the platform so central to Navalny’s ability to spread his message – has been targeted. Without banning it outright – perhaps afraid of the public backlash this might cause – the Russian state media regulator, Roskomnadzor, has slowed down internet traffic to the site within Russia. The result has been a move of users to other websites supporting video content, including VKontakte – a Russian social media platform.

    In short, conditions in Russia are very different now compared to when Navalny first emerged. The relative freedom of the 2000s and 2010s gave him the space to challenge the corruption and authoritarianism of an evolving system headed by Putin. But this space has shrunk over time, to the point where no room remains for a figure like him within Russia.

    In 2019, Navalny told Ivan Zhdanov, who is now director of the ACF: “We changed the regime, but not in the way we wanted.” So, did Navalny and his team push the Kremlin to become more authoritarian – making it not only intolerant of him but also any possible successor?

    There may be some truth in this. And yet, the drastic steps taken by the regime following the start of the war on Ukraine suggest there were other, even more significant factors that have laid bare the violent nature of Putin’s personal autocracy – and the president’s disdain for dissenters.

    Plenty for Russians to be angry about

    How can we win the war when dedushka [grandpa] is a moron?

    In June 2023, Evgeny Prigozhin – a long-time associate of Putin and head of the private military Wagner Group – staged an armed rebellion, marching his forces on the Russian capital. This was not a full-blown political movement against Putin. But the target of Prigozhin’s invective against Russia’s military leadership had become increasingly blurry, testing the taboo of direct criticism of the president – who is sometimes referred to, disparagingly, as “grandpa” in Russia.

    And Prigozhin paid the price. In August 2023, he was killed when the private jet he was flying in crashed after an explosion on board. Afterwards, Putin referred to Prigozhin as a “talented person” who “made serious mistakes in life”.

    In the west, opposition to the Kremlin is often associated with more liberal figures like Navalny. Yet the most consequential domestic challenge to Putin’s rule came from a very different part of the ideological spectrum – a figure in Prigozhin leading a segment of Russian society that wanted the Kremlin to prosecute its war on Ukraine even more aggressively.

    Video: BBC.

    Today, there is plenty for Russians to be angry about, and Putin knows it. He recently acknowledged an “overheating of the economy”. This has resulted in high inflation, in part due to all the resources being channelled into supporting the war effort. Such cost-of-living concerns weigh more heavily than the war on the minds of most Russians.

    A favourite talking point of the Kremlin is how Putin imposed order in Russia following the “wild 1990s” – characterised by economic turbulence and symbolised by then-president Boris Yeltsin’s public drunkenness. Many Russians attribute the stability and rise in living standards they experienced in the 2000s with Putin’s rule – and thank him for it by providing support for his continued leadership.

    The current economic problems are an acute worry for the Kremlin because they jeopardise this basic social contract struck with the Russian people. In fact, one way the Kremlin tried to discredit Navalny was by comparing him with Yeltsin, suggesting he posed the same threats as a failed reformer. In his memoir, Navalny concedes that “few things get under my skin more”.

    Although originally a fan of Yeltsin, Navalny became an ardent critic. His argument was that Yeltsin and those around him squandered the opportunity to make Russia a “normal” European country.

    Navalny also wanted Russians to feel entitled to more. Rather than be content with their relative living standards compared with the early post-Soviet period, he encouraged them to imagine the level of wealth citizens could enjoy based on Russia’s extraordinary resources – but with the rule of law, less corruption, and real democratic processes.

    ‘Think of other possible Russias’

    When looking at forms of criticism and dissent in Russia today, we need to distinguish between anti-war, anti-government, and anti-Putin activities.

    Despite the risk of harsh consequences, there are daily forms of anti-war resistance, including arson attacks on military enlistment offices. Some are orchestrated from Ukraine, with Russians blackmailed into acting. But other cases are likely to be forms of domestic resistance.

    Criticism of the government is still sometimes possible, largely because Russia has a “dual executive” system, consisting of a prime minister and presidency. This allows the much more powerful presidency to deflect blame to the government when things go wrong.

    There are nominal opposition parties in Russia – sometimes referred to as the “systemic opposition”, because they are loyal to the Kremlin and therefore tolerated by the system. Within the State Duma, these parties often criticise particular government ministries for apparent failings. But they rarely, if ever, now dare criticise Putin directly.

    Nothing anywhere close to the challenge presented by Navalny appears on the horizon in Russia – at either end of the political spectrum. But the presence of clear popular grievances, and the existence of organisations (albeit not Navalny’s) that could channel this anger should the Kremlin’s grip loosen, mean we cannot write off all opposition in Russia.

    Navalny’s wife, Yulia, has vowed to continue her husband’s work. And his team in exile maintain focus on elite corruption in Russia, now from their base in Vilnius, Lithuania. The ACF’s most recent investigation is on Igor Sechin, CEO of the oil company Rosneft.

    But some have argued this work is no longer as relevant as it was. Sam Greene, professor in Russian politics at King’s College London, captured this doubt in a recent Substack post:

    [T]here is a palpable sense that these sorts of investigations may not be relevant to as many people as they used to be, given everything that has transpired since the mid-2010s, when they were the bread and butter of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Some … have gone as far as to suggest that they have become effectively meaningless … and thus that Team Navalny should move on.

    Navalny’s team are understandably irritated by suggestions they’re no longer as effective as they once were. But it’s important to note that this criticism has often been sharpest within Russia’s liberal opposition. The ACF has been rocked, for example, by recent accusations from Maxim Katz, one such liberal opposition figure, that the organisation helped “launder the reputations” of two former bank owners. In their response, posted on YouTube, the ACF referred to Katz’s accusations as “lies” – but this continued squabbling has left some Russians feeling “disillusioned and unrepresented”.

    So, what will Navalny’s long-term legacy be? Patriot includes a revealing section on Mikhail Gorbachev – the last leader of the Soviet Union, whom Navalny describes as “unpopular in Russia, and also in our family”. He continues:

    Usually, when you tell foreigners this, they are very surprised, because Gorbachev is thought of as the person who gave Eastern Europe back its freedom and thanks to whom Germany was reunited. Of course, that is true … but within Russia and the USSR he was not particularly liked.

    At the moment, there is a similar split in perceptions of Navalny. Internationally, he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded the Sakharov Prize by the European Parliament, and a documentary about him won an Oscar.

    But there are also those outside of Russia who remain critical: “Navalny’s life has brought no benefit to the Ukrainian victory; instead, he has caused considerable harm,” wrote one Ukrainian academic. “He fuelled the illusion in the west that democracy in Russia is possible.”

    Trailer for the Oscar-winning documentary Navalny.

    Inside Russia, according to Levada Center polling shortly after his death, 53% of Russians thought Navalny played “no special role” in the history of the country, while 19% said he played a “rather negative” role. Revealingly, when commenting on Navalny’s death, one man in Moscow told RFE/RL’s Russian Service: “I think that everyone who is against Russia is guilty, even if they are right.”

    But, for a small minority in Russia, Navalny will go down as a messiah-like figure who miraculously cheated death in 2020, then made the ultimate sacrifice in his battle of good and evil with the Kremlin. This view may have been reinforced by Navalny’s increasing openness about his Christian faith.

    Ultimately, Navalny’s long-term status in Russia will depend on the nature of the political system after Putin has gone. Since it seems likely that authoritarianism will outlast Putin, a more favourable official story about Navalny is unlikely to emerge any time soon. However, how any post-Putin regime tries to make sense of Navalny’s legacy will tell us a lot about that regime.

    While he was alive, Navalny stood for the freer Russia in which he had emerged as a leading opposition figure – and also what he called the “Beautiful Russia of the Future”. Perhaps, after his death, his lasting legacy in Russia remains the ability for some to think – if only in private – of other possible Russias.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    • I investigated millions of tweets from the Kremlin’s ‘troll factory’ and discovered classic propaganda techniques reimagined for the social media age

    • How the world’s first open-source digital map of mass graves could help bring justice to victims in Ukraine and other war zones

    • The Trump revolution: where it came from and where it’s going

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Ben Noble has previously received funding from the British Academy and the Leverhulme Trust. He is an Associate Fellow of Chatham House.

    – ref. What is Navalny’s legacy for Russia? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-navalnys-legacy-for-russia-249692

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Invalda INVL Group raises the largest PE fund in the Baltics exceeding target at first close reaching EUR 305 million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Invalda INVL Group today announces that it has successfully completed a first closing of its second-generation private equity fund (“INVL Private Equity Fund II”), reaching EUR 305 million and exceeding its target of EUR 250 million.

    The INVL Private Equity Fund II has received strong backing from both existing and new investors, forming an exceptional investor base. This includes some of the most successful entrepreneurs from across the Baltics, family offices and institutional investors such as the European Investment Fund, pensions funds managed by Luminor asset management companies, SB Asset Management and IPAS INVL Asset Management in Latvia, as well as life insurance company UAB SB Draudimas. Fundraising will continue to reach a hard cap of EUR 400 million.

    The minimum investment in the INVL Private Equity Fund II was EUR 10 million. However, investors could invest in the fund via INVL Private Equity Capital Fund II with a ticket as low as EUR 125,000 which subsequently reached a total size of EUR 116 million.

    To fully align interests with the INVL Private Equity Fund II investors, Invalda INVL and the fund’s management team have also invested EUR 32.7 million, currently representing 11% of the total fund size.

    Darius Šulnis, CEO at Invalda INVL, commented: “This highly successful fundraising reflects investors’ trust in our work, as well as a pragmatic view on the region’s perspectives and potential. It also signals opportunities for companies and countries in the region seeking investment.

    INVL Private Equity Fund II will invest in businesses across Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania and the broader EU – backing those with the potential to become leaders in their competitive fields and drive value creation, along with the talented and determined people behind their success. In a rapidly changing environment, we see an increasing number of attractive investment opportunities. Having successfully built and developed multiple businesses, we understand the dedication, ambition and challenges that come with seizing new opportunities and driving growth. We take an active role in companies’ development, believing that this is the key to delivering strong returns for our investors – whose support, capital and high standards empower us to act.”

    Deimantė Korsakaitė, Managing Partner at INVL Private Equity Fund II and INVL Baltic Sea Growth Fund, added: ”This is a historic milestone for the Baltics, as we have announced the largest private equity fund ever raised in the region. We are extremely grateful to our investors for their trust. It is both an honour and a great responsibility to uphold this confidence in us. We will continue the successful strategy of our predecessor, the INVL Baltic Sea Growth Fund and remain fully committed to work hand-in-hand with management teams to drive transformative growth and create long-term value for companies, our investors as well as contributing to the growth of the economy. We strongly believe that our experience and network bolster our capabilities as a value-add partner to companies.”

    Asta Jovaišienė, Head of INVL Family Office, said: “We are delighted to be part of this record alongside our clients. At the same time, it demonstrates that our family office offers exceptional solutions that meet investors’ needs for sustainable and long-term results.“

    The new fund will build on the strategy of the INVL Baltic Sea Growth Fund, seizing attractive opportunities across the Baltics, Poland, Romania and the broader EU. The INVL Private Equity Fund II is sector-agnostic and will invest in companies with the potential to become regional leaders in their respective industries, focusing on acquiring majority or significant minority stakes. Through active investment management, the fund aims to drive long-term value creation.

    The strategy includes forming a diversified portfolio of 10–12 investments, providing late-stage growth capital to target companies and executing both buyout and buy-and-build strategies. Investment size will typically be in the region of EUR 10 million to EUR 40 million, with a preferred equity ticket of around EUR 25-30 million. However, the fund will also pursue larger deals together with co-investors.

    Deimantė Korsakaitė continued: “The predecessor INVL Baltic Sea Growth Fund which raised EUR 165 million closed the year in 2024 with a 25% net internal rate of return (Net IRR), total value to paid-in capital (TVPI) exceeding 2x and having announced the first agreed exit from its portfolio company InMedica that is to become one of the largest investments in healthcare services in the Baltics to date.”

    About INVL Private Equity Fund II

    The EUR 305 million INVL Private Equity Fund II is the largest private equity fund in the Baltics. It aims to build a diversified portfolio by acquiring majority or significant minority stakes in high-growth companies, with investment sizes ranging from EUR 10 million to EUR 40 million. The fund focuses on businesses with strong potential to grow and compete amid intensifying global competition, targeting opportunities in the Baltic countries, Poland, Romania and the broader Europe Union.

    The fund is managed by INVL Asset Management, the leading Baltic alternative asset manager, which is a part of the Invalda INVL Group with over 30 years of experience. The group’s companies manage or have under supervision more than EUR 1.6 billion in assets across various investment strategies, including private equity, forests and agricultural land, renewable energy, real estate, and private debt. Additionally, the group provides family office services in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, manages pension funds in Latvia and invests in global third-party funds.

    Additional information:
    Darius Šulnis
    CEO of Invalda INVL
    darius.sulnis@invl.com

    The MIL Network –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Moody’s assigned Coop Pank mortgage covered bonds a provisional rating of (P)Aa2

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Moody’s Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Aa2 long-term rating to the mortgage covered bonds issued by Coop Pank AS (Coop Pank).

    The international credit ratings agency Moody’s has analysed the planned issue of covered bonds by Coop Pank and considered, inter alia, the high credit quality of the assets backing the covered bonds, the support provided by the Estonian legal framework, which provides for the issuer’s regulation and supervision, but also exposure to market risks and the increased uncertainty of the current economic environment. The long-term rating (P)Aa2 indicates high quality obligations that are subject to low credit risk.

    According to Paavo Truu, CFO of Coop Pank, obtaining a credit rating is an important step to continue the preparations for the bond issue as planned and although the final date is subject to the market situation, we plan to issue the covered bonds in the first half of 2025. According to Paavo Truu the covered bonds offer an opportunity to further diversify funding and reduce costs.

    Coop Pank is planning to offer covered bonds to European institutional investors. Covered bonds are expected to provide a new resilient source of funding for Coop Pank.

    Coop Pank, based on Estonian capital, is one of the five universal banks operating in Estonia. The number of clients using Coop Pank for their daily banking reached 209,500. Coop Pank aims to put the synergy generated by the interaction of retail business and banking to good use and to bring everyday banking services closer to people’s homes. The strategic shareholder of the bank is the domestic retail chain Coop Eesti, comprising of 320 stores. 

    Additional information:
    Paavo Truu
    CFO
    Phone: +372 5160 231
    E-mail: paavo.truu@cooppank.ee

    The MIL Network –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Summary of the 10th DSCOVR EPIC and NISTAR Science Team Meeting

    Source: NASA

    Introduction
    The 10th Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) Earth Polychromatic Camera (EPIC) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Advanced Radiometer [NISTAR] Science Team Meeting (STM) was held October 16–18, 2024. Over 50 scientists attended, most of whom were from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), with several participating from other NASA centers, U.S. universities, and U.S. Department of Energy laboratories. There was one international participant – from Estonia. A full overview of DSCOVR’s Earth-observing instruments was published in a previous article in The Earth Observer and will not be repeated here. This article provides the highlights of the 2024 meeting. The meeting agenda and full presentations can be downloaded from GSFC’s Aura Validation Data Center.
    Opening Presentations
    The opening session of the 10th DSCOVR STM was special. Former U.S., Vice President Al Gore attended the opening session and gave a presentation at the panel discussion “Remote Sensing and the Future of Earth Observations” – see Photo. Gore was involved in the early days of planning the DSCOVR mission, which at that time was known as Triana. He reminisced about his involvement and praised the team for the work they’ve done over the past decade to launch and maintain the DSCOVR mission. Following the STM Opening Session, Gore spoke at a GSFC Engage session in Building 3 later that afternoon on the same topic, but before a wider audience. [Link forthcoming.]
    Following Gore’s remarks, the remainder of the opening session consisted of a series of presentations from DSCOVR mission leaders and representatives from GSFC and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Thomas Neumann [GSFC, Earth Sciences Division (ESD)—Deputy Director] opened the meeting and welcomed Vice President Gore and the STM participants on behalf of the ESD. Adam Szabo [GSFC—DSCOVR Project Scientist] briefly reported that the spacecraft was still in “good health.” The EPIC and NISTAR instruments on DSCOVR continue to return their full science observations. He also gave an update on DSCOVR Space Weather research. Alexander Marshak [GSFC—DSCOVR Deputy Project Scientist] briefly described DSCOVR mission history and the science results based on DSCOVR observations from the first Sun–Earth Lagrange point (hereinafter, the L1 point). He also summarized the major EPIC and NISTAR results to date. At this time, more than 125 papers related to DSCOVR are listed on the EPIC website. Elsayed Talaat [NOAA, Office of Space Weather observations—Director] discussed the future of Earth and space science studies from the L1 point.

    Updates on DSCOVR Operations
    The DSCOVR mission components continue to function nominally. The meeting was an opportunity to update participants on progress over the past year on several fronts, including data acquisition, processing, and archiving, and release of new versions of several data products. The number of people using DSCOVR data continues to increase, with a new Science Outreach Team having been put in place to aid users in several aspects of data discovery, access, and user friendliness.
    Amanda Raab [NOAA, DSCOVR Mission Operations and Systems] reported on the current status of the DSCOVR mission. She also discussed spacecraft risks and issues such as memory fragmentation and data storage task anomalies but indicated that both these issues have been resolved.
    Hazem Mahmoud [NASA’s Langley Research Center (LaRC)] discussed the work of the Atmospheric Science Data Center (ASDC), which is based at LaRC. He showed DSCOVR mission metrics since 2015, focusing on data downloads and the global outreach of the mission. He noted that there has been a significant rise in the number of downloads and an increasing diversity of countries accessing ozone (O3), aerosol, and cloud data products. Mahmoud also announced that the ASDC is transitioning to the Amazon Web Services cloud, which will further enhance global access and streamline DSCOVR data processing.
    Karin Blank [GSFC] covered the discovery of a new type of mirage that can only be seen in deep space from EPIC. The discussion included the use of a ray tracer in determining the origin of the phenomenon, and under what conditions it can be seen.
    Alexander Cede [SciGlob] and Ragi Rajagopalan [LiftBlick OG] gave an overview of the stability of the EPIC Level-1A (L1A) data over the first decade of operation. They explained that the only observable changes in the EPIC calibration are to the dark count and flat field can – and that these changes can be entirely attributed to the temperature change of the system in orbit compared to prelaunch conditions. No additional hot or warm pixels have emerged since launch and no significant sensitivity drifts have been observed. The results that Cede and Rajagopalan showed that EPIC continues to be a remarkably stable instrument, which is attributed to a large extent to its orbit around the L1 point, which is located outside the Earth’s radiation belts and thus an extremely stable temperature environment. Consequently, in terms of stability, the L1 point is far superior to other Earth observation points, e.g., ground-based, low-Earth orbit (LEO), polar orbit, or geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).
    Marshall Sutton [GSFC] discussed the state of the DSCOVR Science Operation Center (DSOC). He also talked about processing EPIC Level-1 (L1) data into L2 science products, daily images available on the EPIC website, and special imaging opportunities, e.g., volcanic eruptions.
    EPIC Calibration
    After 10 years of operation in space, the EPIC instrument on DSCOVR continues to be a remarkably stable instrument. The three presentations describe different ways that are used to verify the EPIC measurements remain reliable.
    Conor Haney [LaRC] reported on anomalous outliers during February and March 2023 from the broadband shortwave (SW) flux using EPIC L1B channel radiances. To ensure that these outliers were not a result of fluctuations in the EPIC L1B channel radiances, both the EPIC radiance measurements and coincident, ray-matched radiance measurements from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), on the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (Suomi NPP) platform, were processed using the same deep convective cloud invariant target (DCC-IT) algorithm. This analysis confirmed that the anomalous behavior was due to the DCC-IT algorithm – and not because of fluctuations in the EPIC L1B channel radiances. The improved DCC-IT methodology was also applied to the EPIC L1B radiances. The results indicate that the EPIC record is quite stable with a lower uncertainty than when processed using the previous DCC-IT methodology.
    Igor Geogdzhaev [NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS)/Columbia University] reported that EPIC Visible–Near Infrared (VIS-NIR) calibration based on VIIRS (on Suomi NPP) data has showed excellent stability, while VIIRS (on NOAA-20 and -21) derived gains agree to within 1–2%. Preliminary analysis showed continuity in the gains derived from Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI) data. (ABI flies on NOAA’s two operational Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite–Series R satellites – GOES-17 and GOES-18.
    Liang–Kang Huang [Science Systems and Applications, Inc. (SSAI)] reported on updates to the EPIC ultraviolet (UV) channel sensitivity time dependences using Sun-normalized radiance comparisons between EPIC and measurements from the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Nadir Mapper (NM) on Suomi NPP, with coinciding footprints and solar/satellite angles. Huang’s team determined vignetting factors in the sensitivity calibration between 2021–2024, as a function of charge coupled device (CCD) pixel radius and pixel polar angles, using special lunar measurement sequences.
    NISTAR Status and Science with Its Observations
    The NISTAR instrument remains fully functional and continues its uninterrupted data record. The NISTAR-related presentations during this meeting included more details on specific topics related to NISTAR as well as on efforts to combine information from both EPIC and NISTAR.
    Steven Lorentz [L-1 Standards and Technology, Inc.] reported that the NISTAR on DSCOVR has been measuring the irradiance from the sunlit Earth in three bands for more than nine years. The three bands measure the outgoing total and reflected-solar radiation from Earth at a limited range of solar angles. To compare the long-term stability of EPIC and NISTAR responses, researchers developed a narrowband to wideband conversion model to allow the direct comparison of the EPIC multiband imagery and NISTAR SW – see Figure 1 – and silicon photodiode channels. Lorentz presented daily results spanning several years. The comparison employed different detectors from the same spacecraft – but with the same vantage point – thereby avoiding any model dependent orbital artifacts.

    Clark Weaver [University of Maryland, College Park (UMD)] used spectral information from the SCanning Imaging Absorption spectroMeter for Atmospheric CartograpHY (SCIAMACHY), which flew on the European Space Agency’s (ESA) Envisat satellite from 2002–2012, to fill EPIC spectral gaps. He reported on construction of a composite height resolution spectrum that was spectrally integrated to produce SW energy. Weaver explained that he compared the EPIC reflected SW with four-hour averages from Band 4 on NISTAR. He used spectral information from SCIAMACHY to fill in gaps. Weaver also discussed results of a comparison of area integrated EPIC SW energy with observations from NISTAR . 
    Andrew Lacis [GISS] reported on results of analysis of seven years of EPIC-derived planetary albedo for Earth, which reveal global-scale longitudinal variability occurring over a wide range of frequencies – with strong correlation between nearby longitudes and strong anticorrelation between diametrically opposed longitudes. This behavior in the Earth’s global-scale energy budget variability is fully corroborated by seven years of NISTAR silicon photodiode measurements, which view the Earth with 1º longitudinal resolution. This analysis establishes the DSCOVR mission EPIC/NISTAR measurements as a new and unmatched observational data source for evaluating global climate model performance– e.g., see Figure 2.

    Wenying Su [LaRC] discussed global daytime mean SW fluxes within the EPIC field of view produced from January 2016–June 2024. These quasi-hourly SW fluxes agree very well with the Synoptic data product from the Clouds and the Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES) instruments (currently flying on the Terra and Aqua, Suomi NPP, and NOAA-20 platforms) with the root mean square errors (rmse) less than 3 W/m2. This SW flux processing framework will be used to calculate NISTAR SW flux when Version 4 (V4) of the NISTAR radiance becomes available. Su noted that SW fluxes from EPIC are not suitable to study interannual variability as the magnitude of EPIC flux is sensitive to the percentage of daytime area visible to EPIC.
    Update on EPIC Products and Science Results
    EPIC has a suite of data products available. The following subsections summarize content during the DSCOVR STM related to these products. The updates focus on several data products and the related algorithm improvements. 
    Total Column Ozone
    Jerry Ziemke [Morgan State University (MSU), Goddard Earth Sciences Technology and Research–II (GESTAR II)] and Natalya Kramarova [GSFC] reported that tropospheric O3 from DSCOVR EPIC shows anomalous reductions of ~10% throughout the Northern Hemisphere (NH) starting in Spring 2020 that continues to the present. The EPIC data, along with other satellite-based (e.g., Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) on NASA’s Aura platform) and ground-based (e.g., Pandora) data, indicate that the observed NH reductions in O3 are due to combined effects from meteorology and reduced pollution, including reduced shipping pollution in early 2020 (during COVID) – see Figure 3. EPIC 1–2 hourly data are also used to evaluate hourly total O3 and derived tropospheric O3 from NASA’s Tropospheric Emissions: Monitoring of Pollution (TEMPO) geostationary instrument. Ziemke explained that comparison of TEMPO data with EPIC data has helped the researchers characterize a persistent latitude-dependent offset in TEMPO total O3 data of ~10–15% from south to north over the North American continent.

    Algorithm Improvement for Ozone and Sulfur Dioxide Products
    Kai Yang [UMD] presented a comprehensive evaluation of total and tropospheric O3 retrievals, highlighting the long-term stability and high accuracy of EPIC measurements. He also validated EPIC’s volcanic sulfur dioxide (SO2) retrievals by comparing them with ground-based Brewer spectrophotometer measurements and summarized EPIC’s observations of SO2 from recent volcanic eruptions.
    Simon Carn [University of Michigan] showed the first comparisons between the EPIC L2 volcanic SO2 product and SO2 retrievals from the Geostationary Environment Monitoring Spectrometer (GEMS) on the Korean GEO-Kompsat-2B satellite. GEMS observes East Asia as part of the new geostationary UV air quality (GEO-AQ) satellite constellation (which also includes TEMPO that observes North America and will include the Ultraviolet–Visible–Near Infrared (UVN) instrument on the European Copernicus Sentinel-4 mission, that will be launched in 2025 to observe Europe and surrounding areas) – but is not optimized for measurements of high SO2 columns during volcanic eruptions. EPIC SO2 data for the 2024 eruption of Ruang volcano in Indonesia are being used to validate a new GEMS volcanic SO2 product. Initial comparisons show good agreement between EPIC and GEMS before volcanic cloud dispersal and confirm the greater sensitivity of the hyperspectral GEMS instrument to low SO2 column amounts.
    Aerosols
    Alexei Lyapustin [GSFC] reported that the latest EPIC aerosols algorithm (V3) simultaneously retrieves aerosol optical depth, aerosol spectral absorption, and aerosol layer height (ALH) – achieving high accuracy. He showed that global validation of the single scattering albedo in the blue and red shows 66% and 81–95% agreement respectively, with Aerosol Robotic Network (AERONET) observations – which is within the expected error of 0.03 for smoke and dust aerosols. Lyapustin also reported on a comparison of EPIC aerosol data collected from 2015–2023 by the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar with Orthogonal Polarization (CALIOP), which flew on the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations (CALIPSO) mission. The results show that ALH is retrieved with rmse ~1.1 km (0.7 mi). ALH is unbiased over the ocean and is underestimated by 450 m (1470 ft) for the smoke and by 750 m (2460 ft) for the dust aerosols over land. 
    Myungje Choi and Sujung Go [both from University of Maryland, Baltimore County’s (UMBC), GESTAR II] presented results from a global smoke and dust characterization using Multi-Angle Implementation of Atmospheric Correction (MAIAC) algorithm. This study characterized smoke and dust aerosol properties derived from MAIAC EPIC processing, examining spectral absorption, ALH, and chemical composition (e.g., black and brown carbon). Regions with smoldering wildfires, e.g., North America and Siberia, exhibited high ALH and a significant fraction of brown carbon, while Central Africa showed lower ALH with higher black carbon emissions.
    Omar Torres [GSFC] discussed how L1 DSCOVR-EPIC observations are being used to study air quality (i.e., tropospheric O3 and aerosols) globally. Torres noted that this application of EPIC-L1 observations is of particular interest in the Southern Hemisphere (SH) where, unlike over the NH, there are currently no space GEO-based air quality measurements – and no plans for them in the foreseeable future.
    Hiren Jethva [MSU, GESTAR II] presented the new results of the aerosol optical centroid height retrieved from the EPIC Oxygen-B band observations. He described the algorithm details, showed retrieval maps, and reviewed the comparative analysis against CALIOP backscatter-weighted measurements. The analysis showed a good level of agreement with more than 70% of matchup data within 1–1.5 km (0.6–0.9 mi) difference.
    Jun Wang [University of Iowa] presented his team’s work on advancing the second generation of the aerosol optical centroid height (AOCH) algorithm for EPIC. Key advancements included: constraining surface reflectance in aerosol retrieval using an EPIC-based climatology of surface reflectance ratios between 442–680 nm; incorporating a dynamic aerosol model to characterize aged smoke particles; and employing a spectral slope technique to distinguish thick smoke plumes from clouds. Results show that both atmospheric optical depth (AOD) and AOCH retrievals are improved in the second generation of AOCH algorithm.
    Olga Kalashnikova [NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)] reported on improving brown carbon evolution processes in the Weather Research and Forecasting model coupled with Chemistry (WRF-Chem) model with EPIC products. She indicated that DSCOVR product evaluation, using lidar aerosol height measurements from CALIOP, led to an improved operational brown carbon product. To better resolve the temporal evolution of brown carbon, chemical transport models need to include more information about near-source fires.
    Mike Garay [NASA/Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)] discussed constraining near-source brown carbon emissions from 2024 Canadian ‘zombie’ fires with EPIC products. He reported that fires in British Columbia, Canada showed differences in brown carbon emission near the sources.  Garay explained that their investigation has revealed that these differences were related to fire intensity and variations in vegetation/soil content.
    Yuekui Yang [GSFC] presented work that examined the impact of Earth’s curvature consideration on EPIC cloud height retrievals. Biases under the Plane Parallel (PPL) assumption is studied by comparing results using the improved pseudo-spherical shell approximation. PPL retrievals in general bias high and for a cloud with height of 5 km (3 mi), the bias is about 6%.
    Alfonso Delgado Bonal [UMBC] stated that the EPIC vantage point offers a unique opportunity to observe not only the current state of the Earth but also its temporal evolution. By capturing multiple observations of the planet throughout the day, EPIC enables statistical reconstruction of diurnal patterns in clouds and other atmospheric parameters. Bonal’s team focused their research on O3 (primarily tropospheric) over the U.S. to demonstrate the presence of a diurnal cycle in the western regions of the continental U.S. However, ground-based data from PANDORA for specific locations do not support these diurnal variations – underscoring the critical role of space-based O3 retrievals. The proposed methodology is not limited to clouds or O3 but is broadly applicable to other EPIC measurements for the dynamic nature of our planet.
    Elizabeth Berry [Atmospheric and Environmental Research (AER)] presented results from a coincident DSCOVR–CloudSat dataset [covering 2015–2020]. Cloud properties (e.g., cloud height and optical depth) from DSCOVR and CloudSat are moderately correlated and show quite good agreement given differences in the instruments sensitivities and footprints. Berry explained that a machine-learning model trained on the coincident data demonstrates high accuracy at predicting the presence of vertical cloud layers. However, precision and recall metrics highlight the challenge of predicting the precise location of cloud boundaries.
    Anthony Davis [JPL] presented a pathway toward accurate estimation of the cloud optical thickness (COT) of opaque clouds and cloud systems, e.g., supercells, mesoscale convective complexes, and tropical cyclones (TCs). He described the approach, which uses differential oxygen absorption spectroscopy (DOAS) that has resolving power greater than 104 – which is comparable to that of the high-resolution spectrometers on NASA’s Orbiting Carbon Observatory–2 (OCO-2) – but is based upon the cloud information content of EPIC’s O2 A- and B-band radiances. Unlike the current operational retrieval of COT – which uses data from the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) on Terra and Aqua – the DOAS-based technique does not saturate at COT exceeding ~60. According to a popular TC model with two-moment microphysics, COT in a tropical storm or hurricane can reach well into the hundreds, sometimes exceeding 1000. Davis said that once the new COT estimates become available, they will provide new observational constraints on process and forecast models for TCs.
    Ocean
    Robert Frouin [Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California] discussed ocean surface radiation products derived from EPIC data. He explained that significant advancements have been achieved in processing and evaluating ocean biology and biogeochemistry products derived from EPIC imagery. V1 updates enhanced accuracy by integrating Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for Research and Applications V2 (MERRA-2) ancillary data and refining calculations for atmospheric and surface parameters. Frouin introduced several diurnal products, including hourly photosynthetically active radiation (PAR) fluxes, spectral water reflectance, and chlorophyll-a concentrations. He said that these new MODIS-derived products have been validated through comparisons with data from the Advanced Himawari Imager on the Japanese Himawar–8 and –9 satellites. In order to address the gaps in these diurnal products, Frouin explained that the team developed a convolutional neural network that has been used effectively to reconstruct missing PAR values with high accuracy.
    Vegetation
    Yuri Knyazikhin [Boston University] reported on the status of the Vegetation Earth System Data Record (VESDR) that provides a variety of parameters including: Leaf Area Index (LAI), diurnal courses of Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI), Sunlit LAI (SLAI), Fraction of incident Photosynthetically Active Radiation (FPAR) absorbed by the vegetation, Directional Area Scattering Function (DASF), Earth Reflector Type Index (ERTI), and Canopy Scattering Coefficient (CSC). Knyazikhin discussed analysis of the diurnal and seasonal variations of these quantities. EPIC LAI and FPAR are consistent with MODIS-derived measurements of the same parameters.
    Jan Pisek [University of Tartu/Tartu Observatory, Estonia] discussed efforts to derive leaf inclination information from EPIC data. The very first evaluation over Tumbarumba site (in New South Wales, Australia) showed that the angular variation in parameters obtained from EPIC reflects the expected variations due to the erectophile vegetation present at the site.
    Sun Glint
    Tamás Várnai [UMBC, JCET] discussed EPIC observations of Sun glint from ice clouds. The cloud glints come mostly from horizontally oriented ice crystals and have strong impact in EPIC cloud retrievals. Várnai reported that the EPIC glint product is available from the ASDC – see Figure 4. Glint data can help reduce the uncertainties related to horizontally oriented ice crystals and yield additional new insights about the microphysical and radiative properties of ice clouds.

    Alexander Kostinski [Michigan Technology University] explained that because they detected climatic signals (i.e., longer-term changes and semi-permanent features, e.g., ocean glitter), they developed a technique to suppress geographic “noise” in EPIC images that involves introducing temporally (monthly) and conditionally (classifying by surface/cover type, e.g., land, ocean, clouds) averaged reflectance images – see Figure 5. The resulting images display seasonal dependence in a striking manner. Additionally, cloud-free, ocean-only images highlight prominent regions of ocean glitter.

    Jiani Yang [Caltech] reported that spatially resolving light curves from DSCOVR is crucial for evaluating time-varying surface features and the presence of an atmosphere. Both of these features are essential for sustaining life on Earth – and thus can be used to assess the potential habitability of exoplanets. Using epsilon machine reconstruction, the statistical complexity from the time series data of these light curves can be calculated. The results show that statistical complexity serves as a reliable metric for quantifying the intricacy of planetary features. Higher levels of planetary complexity qualitatively correspond to increased statistical complexity and Shannon entropy, illustrating the effectiveness of this approach in identifying planets with the most dynamic characteristics.
    Other EPIC Science Results
    Guoyong Wen [MSU, GESTAR II] analyzed the variability of global spectral reflectance from EPIC and the integrated broadband reflectance on different timescales. He reported that on a diurnal timescale, the global reflectance variations in UV and blue bands are statistically similar – and drastically different from those observed in longer wavelength bands (i.e., green to NIR). The researchers also did an analysis of monthly average results and found that temporal averaging of the global reflectance reduces the variability across the wavelength and that the variability of broadband reflectance is similar to that for the red band on both timescales. These results are mainly due to the rotation of the Earth on diurnal timescale and the change of the Earth’s tilt angle. 
    Nick Gorkavyi [Science Systems and Applications, Inc. (SSAI)] reported that EPIC – located at the L1 point, 1.5 million km (0.9 million mi) away from Earth – can capture images of the far side of the Moon in multiple wavelengths. These images, taken under full solar illumination, can be used to calibrate photographs obtained by lunar artificial satellites. Additionally, he discussed the impact of lunar libration – the changing view of the Moon from Earth, or it’s apparent “wobble” – on Earth observations from the Moon. 
    Jay Herman [UMBC] discussed a comparison of EPIC O3 with TEMPO satellite and Pandora ground-based measurement. The results show that total column O3 does not have a significant photochemical diurnal variation. Instead, the daily observed diurnal variation is caused by weather changes in atmospheric pressure. This measurement result agrees with model calculations.
    Conclusion
    Alexander Marshak, Jay Herman, and Adam Szabo led a closing discussion with ST participants on how to make the EPIC and NISTAR instruments more visible in the community. It was noted that the EPIC website now allows visitors to observe daily fluctuations of aerosol index, cloud fraction, cloud height, and the ocean surface – as observed from the L1 point. More daily products, (e.g., aerosol height and sunlit leaf area index) will be added soon, which should attract more users to the website.
    Overall, the 2023 DSCOVR EPIC and NISTAR STM was successful. It provided an opportunity for participants to learn the status of DSCOVR’s Earth-observing instruments, EPIC and NISTAR, the status of recently released L2 data products, and the science results being achieved from the L1 point. As more people use DSCOVR data worldwide, the ST hopes to hear from users and team members at its next meeting. The latest updates from the mission can be found on the EPIC website. 
    Alexander MarshakNASA’s Goddard Space Flight Centeralexander.marshak@nasa.gov
    Adam SzaboNASA’s Goddard Space Flight Centeradam.szabo@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – P10_TA(2025)0019 – Thursday, 13 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud(1),

    –  having regard to Georgia’s status as an EU candidate country, granted by the European Council at its summit of 14 and 15 December 2023,

    –  having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which demands the implementation of all possible measures to guarantee Georgia’s complete integration into the EU and NATO,

    –  having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,

    –  having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas the democratic backsliding in Georgia has dramatically accelerated since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which were deeply flawed and marked by grave irregularities, and failed to meet international democratic standards and Georgia’s OSCE commitments; whereas these elections violated the democratic norms and standards set for free and fair elections, failing to reflect the will of the people and rendering the resulting ‘parliament’, and subsequently the ‘president’, devoid of any democratic legitimacy; whereas from the very beginning of its activity, the current Georgian parliament has operated as a one-party (Georgian Dream) organ, which is incompatible with the essence of pluralistic parliamentary democracy;

    B.  whereas Article 2 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement(2) concerns the general principles of the agreement, which include democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms;

    C.  whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

    D.  whereas the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, publicly condemned the parliamentary elections as rigged, declared that she would not recognise them and called for an international investigation; whereas the current Georgian regime, led by the Georgian Dream party and its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has orchestrated an unconstitutional usurpation of power, systematically dismantling democratic institutions, undermining judicial independence and eroding fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, thereby deepening Georgia’s political and constitutional crisis;

    E.  whereas Georgia has officially held the status of EU candidate country since December 2023; whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

    F.  whereas on 28 November 2024, peaceful mass anti-government protests began across the country, demanding new, free and fair elections, an end to political violence and repression, and the return of the country to its European path; whereas the protests have been taking place without interruption for over 75 days;

    G.  whereas on 14 December 2024, the de facto parliament held a ‘presidential election’ with a single candidate from the Georgian Dream party, former footballer Mikheil Kavelashvili, elected with 224 out of 225 votes cast;

    H.  whereas Georgia’s self-appointed authorities have plunged the country into a fully fledged constitutional and political crisis, as well as a human rights and democracy crisis; whereas this has been marked by the brutal repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives, with judges, prosecutors and police officers actively fabricating politically motivated administrative and criminal charges against protesters, journalists and opposition figures detained during peaceful anti-government demonstrations; whereas, as of December 2024, more than 460 people have been arrested or punished since the protests began, with this number growing by the day;

    I.  whereas riot police deliberately lacking force identification numbers have forcefully dispersed protesters with tear gas and water cannons; whereas numerous journalists have reported being targeted and beaten, and having their equipment destroyed and personal items stolen; whereas dozens of protesters have been brutally assaulted, and several hundred people have been arrested; whereas Georgia’s Public Defender has revealed that 80 % of those detained reported experiencing violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers; whereas despite international condemnation, the illegitimate Georgian Government has awarded medals to officials involved in the crackdown;

    J.  whereas independent media outlets, including TV Formula, TV Mtavari and TV Pirveli, face severe operational and financial constraints due to the regime’s interference, while dozens of media representatives are being subjected to various forms of intense physical and psychological pressure; whereas numerous violent attacks on journalists have been documented, including the severe beatings of Aleksandre Keshelashvili, Maka Chikhladze and Giorgi Shetsiruli, and the harassment of detained journalist Saba Kevkhishvili; whereas on 12 January 2025, the Georgian authorities arrested journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been in pre-trial detention since then and is on hunger strike in solidarity with all political prisoners in Georgia; whereas she faces between four and seven years in prison;

    K.  whereas, on the night of 14 January 2025, Giorgi Gakharia, opposition leader of the For Georgia party and former Prime Minister, and Zviad Koridze, journalist and Transparency International activist, were physically assaulted by Georgian Dream officials in separate incidents at the same venue in Batumi;

    L.  whereas on 2 February 2025, Nika Melia, a leader of the pro-European Akhali party, and Gigi Ugulava, the former mayor of Tbilisi, were arrested during the anti-government protests and subjected to physical violence in detention; whereas on 12 January 2025, Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa political movement, was detained in Batumi;

    M.  whereas the de facto Georgian authorities have used disproportionate force and excessive violence against peaceful protesters and resorted to arbitrary mass arrests to thwart dissent; whereas independent human rights organisations have reported the systemic mistreatment of detainees, including torture; whereas to date, not a single law enforcement official involved in the brutal crackdowns, arbitrary arrests and mistreatment has been brought to justice;

    N.  whereas the self-appointed authorities introduced new draconian legislation that came into force on 30 December 2024 and amended the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations, imposing further arbitrary restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, introducing, among other things, hefty fines for putting up protest slogans and posters, and granting police the power to detain individuals ‘preventively’ for 48 hours on suspicion of planning to violate the rules governing public assembly; whereas on 3 February 2025, the Georgian Dream party unveiled further draft legislation designed to tighten control, ramping up penalties for a variety of offences directly targeting protestors, critics and political dissent, such as harsher punishments for ‘insulting officials’, the criminalisation of road blocks and an increase in the duration of administrative detention from 15 to 60 days;

    O.  whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement for Georgian diplomats and officials, but failed to impose individual sanctions in response to the continued crackdown; whereas the Hungarian and Slovak Governments have been consistently blocking impactful EU-wide sanctions, preventing the remaining 25 Member States (EU-25) from effectively introducing sanctions against the self-appointed Georgian authorities;

    P.  whereas several Member States, including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Czechia, have imposed bilateral sanctions on some Georgian politicians, judges and other officials responsible for the brutal crackdown on protesters, violations of human rights and abuse of the rule of law; whereas in December 2024, the United States sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, alongside Georgia’s ‘Minister of Internal Affairs’ Vakhtang Gomelauri and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mirza Kezevadze, for their involvement in brutal crackdowns on media representatives, opposition figures and protesters; whereas the UK and Ukraine have imposed similar sanctions on high-level Georgian officials; whereas Ivanishvili, through hastily adopted laws tailored to his personal situation, is moving his offshore assets to Georgia in anticipation of further sanctions;

    Q.  whereas on 29 January 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it would withdraw its delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) after it demanded new, genuinely democratic parliamentary elections, the release of political prisoners and accountability for perpetrators of violence; whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the OSCE has called this suppression a serious breach of the right to freedom of assembly;

    R.  whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, the self-appointed ‘parliament’ voted to approve the early termination of the mandates of 49 out of 61 members of parliament, representing the Coalition for Change, Strong Georgia and the United National Movement, in order to strip them of their immunity and facilitate their arrest and prosecution; whereas the same ‘parliament’ established a commission to punish former ruling party United National Movement;

    S.  whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU accession process; whereas Georgian Dream has amended laws on public service, simplifying procedures to dismiss public servants, several of whom have been dismissed for participating in protests, in a clear attempt to silence critical voices;

    1.  Condemns the Georgian Dream ‘authorities’ and urges them to immediately cease the violent repression of peaceful protesters, political opponents and media representatives; underlines that Georgia’s self-appointed authorities are currently violating fundamental freedoms, basic human rights and the core international obligations of the country, thereby undermining decades of democratic reforms driven by the country’s political class and civil society; considers Georgia as a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party has abandoned its path towards European integration and NATO membership; recalls that the ongoing democratic backsliding and adoption of anti-democratic laws has effectively suspended Georgia’s EU integration process; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country;

    2.  Does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities of the Georgian Dream party established following the rigged election of 26 October 2024, which was neither free nor fair, was held in violation of democratic norms and standards, and did not reflect the will of the people of Georgia; underlines that the extensive electoral fraud has undermined the integrity of the election process, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the result and eroded public trust, both domestically and internationally, in any new government;

    3.  Calls for the EU and its Member States, as well as national parliaments and interparliamentary institutions, not to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian Dream one-party parliament and their appointed president; calls, therefore, on the international community to join the boycott of the self-proclaimed Georgian authorities;

    4.  Continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development; calls on the President of the European Council to invite President Zourabichvili to represent Georgia at an upcoming European Council meeting and at the next European Political Community summit;

    5.  Underlines that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections; demands that new elections take place in Georgia within the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process; encourages the Member States and EU officials to firmly demand new elections and to make any future engagement explicitly conditional on setting a new date for parliamentary elections and establishing a mechanism to ensure they are free and fair;

    6.  Calls on the Council and the Member States, particularly the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family and his companies, and to freeze all his assets within the EU for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia, enabling democratic backsliding and acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls on the French Government to strip Bidzina Ivanishvili of the Legion of Honour and impose individual sanctions on him; welcomes, in this regard, the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechia, as well as those already imposed by the US and the UK;

    7.  Calls for the EU and its Member States, in particular the EU-25 on a bilateral and coordinated basis, to impose personal sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, and Chair of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili; calls for them to extend these sanctions to judges, including those of the Constitutional Court of Georgia who are passing politically motivated sentences, and representatives of the law enforcement services, as well as to financial enablers tacitly or openly supporting the regime and the owners of regime-aligned media outlets, including TV Imedi, Pos TV and Rustavi 2 TV, for their role in spreading disinformation and seeking to manipulate public discourse in order to sustain the current ruling party’s authoritarian rule;

    8.  Calls on the Council and the Member States to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network of enablers, elite entourage, corrupt financial operatives, propagandists and those facilitating the repressive state apparatus, including, among others, Ekaterine Khvedelidze, Uta Ivanishvili, Tsotne Ivanishvili, Bera Ivanishvili, Gvantsa Ivanishvili, Alexander Ivanishvili, Shmagi Kobakhidze, Ucha Mamatsashvili, Natia Turnava, Ivane Chkhartishvili, Sulkhan Papashvili, Giorgi Kapanadze, Tornike Rizhvadze, Ilia Tsulaia, Kakha Bekauri, Lasha Natsvlishvili, Vasil Maglaperidze, Grigol Liluashvili, Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Rukhadze, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, Tamaz Gaiashvili, Anton Obolashvili and Gocha Enukidze;

    9.  Maintains the view that the measures taken so far by the EU in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments does not yet fully reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and the latest developments; welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials, but considers it as only a first step, which must be followed by tougher measures; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on introducing sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia;

    10.  Emphasises that respect for fundamental rights is vital to the EU’s visa liberalisation benchmarks; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspension if it is considered that EU standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not being upheld;

    11.  Strongly condemns the brutal violence and repression used by Georgia’s ruling regime against peaceful protesters since 28 November 2024; calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; demands the release of journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, who has been on hunger strike for over four weeks now because of her unjust detention and risks facing critical, irreversible and life-threatening consequences; denounces the assault and beating of former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia, resulting in his hospitalisation, followed by the arrest on 2 February 2025 of political leaders including Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava, as a shocking escalation of state-orchestrated violence by Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful demonstrators and political opponents; reminds of the detention of Elene Khoshtaria on 12 January 2025 in Batumi;

    12.  Reiterates its solidarity with the people of Georgia and its vibrant civil society in fighting for their legitimate democratic rights and for a European future for their country; urges the Georgian Government to reverse its current political course and return to implementing the will of the Georgian people for continued democratic reforms that would reopen the prospect of future EU membership;

    13.   Strongly condemns the enactment of draconian legislation that imposes unjustified restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and demands the annulment of such recently adopted repressive legislation; urges the Georgian authorities to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals detained for peacefully exercising their fundamental rights to freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and to ensure prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into all allegations of unlawful and disproportionate use of force by the law enforcement agencies; considers that the Georgian justice system has been weaponised to stifle dissent, instil fear and silence free speech;

    14.  Calls for the ‘Georgian authorities’ to take immediate action to ensure the safety and freedom of journalists and to investigate all instances of violence and misconduct by law enforcement agencies; emphasises the importance of fostering a democratic environment where media, civil society and the opposition can operate freely without fear of retaliation or censorship;

    15.  Demands an independent, transparent and impartial investigation into police brutality and the excessive use of force against peaceful demonstrators; calls for those responsible for human rights violations, including law enforcement and government officials ordering acts of repression, to be held fully accountable before the law;

    16.  Denounces the launch of an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office on 8 February 2025 into non-governmental organisations accused of aggravated sabotage, attempted sabotage and assisting foreign and foreign-controlled organisations in hostile activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia, for which they could receive multiple-year sentences; views this action as further escalation of repression by the regime, misuse of the judicial system and accelerated democratic backsliding;

    17.  Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia;

    18.  Denounces the termination by Georgian Dream of the mandates of 49 opposition members of parliament as a sign of further democratic backsliding, and considers this the latest move in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country;

    19.   Welcomes PACE’s decision to challenge the credentials of Georgia’s parliamentary delegation due to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses; supports PACE’s call for Georgia to immediately initiate an inclusive process involving all political and social actors, including the ruling party, the opposition and civil society, to urgently address the deficiencies and shortcomings noted during the recent parliamentary elections and to create an electoral environment conducive to new, genuinely democratic elections to be announced in the coming months;

    20.  Notes that Georgia, once a front runner for Euro-Atlantic integration, is undergoing an accelerated process of democratic backsliding, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future, which could result in the country taking the Belarussian path of political development, transitioning from the current authoritarian state to a dictatorial regime;

    21.  Deplores the decision of Irakli Kobakhidze to suspend accession talks and reject EU funding until the end of 2028; recalls that all polls consistently show the overwhelming support of the Georgian population for a Euro-Atlantic future; expresses strong support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the Georgian people;

    22.  Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia due to the democratic backsliding; calls on the Commission to review the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the self-declared Georgian authorities’ breach of the general principles, as laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms; points out that non-fulfilment of obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    23.  Welcomes the Commission’s decision to cease all budgetary support to the Georgian authorities and to suspend the initiation of any future investment projects; encourages the Commission to terminate all financial support for ongoing projects; calls for a moratorium on all investment projects in the field of connectivity; calls on the Commission to start identifying economic sectors of relevance to the oligarchic interests that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule, with a view to a potential future decision about restrictive measures or economic sanctions; calls on the Commission to start identifying connectivity projects that support and sustain the current authoritarian rule and to consider their suspension until a rerun of the parliamentary elections;

    24.  Condemns the climate of intimidation and polarisation fuelled by statements by Georgian Government representatives and political leaders, as well as by attacks against political pluralism, including through disturbing cases of intimidation and violence against the Georgian democratic political forces and repeated threats to ban opposition parties, to arrest their leaders and even ordinary supporters, and to silence dissent; underlines that anything but the full restoration of Georgia’s democratic standards will entail a further deterioration of EU-Georgia relations, make any move towards EU accession impossible and result in additional sanctions;

    25.  Calls on the Commission to swiftly redirect the frozen EUR 120 million originally intended as support for the Georgian authorities to enhance the EU’s support for Georgia’s civil society, in particular the non-governmental sector and independent media, which are increasingly coming under undue pressure from the ruling political party and the authorities, as well as to support programmes supporting democratic resilience and electoral integrity; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; highlights the urgency of the need to support civil society in the light of growing repression and the suspension of activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore urges the Commission to ramp up support without delay;

    26.  Expresses deep concern about the increasing Russian influence in the country and about the Georgian Dream government’s actions in pursuing a policy of rapprochement and collaboration with Russia, in spite of its creeping occupation of Georgian territory; deplores, in this regard, the growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric of the Georgian Dream party’s representatives towards Georgia’s strategic Western partners, including the EU, and its MEPs and officials, and Georgian Dream’s promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation;

    27.  Strongly reiterates its urgent demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds, specifically for the purpose of seeking medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the self-appointed authorities bear full and undeniable responsibility for the life, health, safety and well-being of former President Mikheil Saakashvili and must be held fully accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

    28.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Joint statement on the first anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s death

    Source: Government of Iceland

    On the anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s death, which followed years of persecution by the Kremlin, we again extend our condolences to his family. We reiterate that the ultimate responsibility for his death lies with the Russian authorities. One year on, Russia’s dire human rights record continues to deteriorate. The Kremlin crushes peaceful dissent, maintains a climate of fear and undermines the rule of law. All to serve its own interests. As we reflect on Navalny’s enduring legacy, we continue to stand with civil society and human rights defenders working tirelessly to build a better future for Russia in the face of immense personal risk. 

    There are over 800 political prisoners in Russia, including many imprisoned for speaking out against the Kremlin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality shown towards the Ukrainian people. The UN Special Rapporteur’s reports illustrate how many political prisoners are tortured, denied adequate medical treatment and placed in forced psychiatric detention. We are clear: the Russian authorities must uphold their international obligations and release all political prisoners. 

    Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Iceland, Bulgaria and the United Kingdom.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 17, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Joint statement on the first anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s death

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    • English
    • Русский язык

    The UK and partners pay tribute to Alexei Navalny

    On the anniversary of Alexei Navalny’s death, which followed years of persecution by the Kremlin, we again extend our condolences to his family. We reiterate that the ultimate responsibility for his death lies with the Russian authorities. One year on, Russia’s dire human rights record continues to deteriorate. The Kremlin crushes peaceful dissent, maintains a climate of fear and undermines the rule of law. All to serve its own interests. As we reflect on Navalny’s enduring legacy, we continue to stand with civil society and human rights defenders working tirelessly to build a better future for Russia in the face of immense personal risk. 

    There are over 800 political prisoners in Russia, including many imprisoned for speaking out against the Kremlin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality shown towards the Ukrainian people. The UN Special Rapporteur’s reports illustrate how many political prisoners are tortured, denied adequate medical treatment and placed in forced psychiatric detention. We are clear: the Russian authorities must uphold their international obligations and release all political prisoners. 

    Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom

    Share this page

    The following links open in a new tab

    • Share on Facebook (opens in new tab)
    • Share on Twitter (opens in new tab)

    Updates to this page

    Published 16 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    February 16, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 13 February 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

    Source: European Parliament

    Verbatim report of proceedings
     491k  822k
    Thursday, 13 February 2025 – Strasbourg
    1. Opening of the sitting
      2. Proposal for a Union act
      3. EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement (debate)
      4. Threats to EU sovereignty through strategic dependencies in communication infrastructure (debate)
      5. Resumption of the sitting
      6. Voting time
        6.1. Recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye (RC-B10-0100/2025, B10-0100/2025, B10-0103/2025, B10-0110/2025, B10-0115/2025, B10-0119/2025, B10-0121/2025, B10-0124/2025) (vote)
        6.2. Repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (RC-B10-0126/2025, B10-0126/2025, B10-0128/2025, B10-0130/2025, B10-0131/2025, B10-0132/2025, B10-0134/2025, B10-0135/2025) (vote)
        6.3. Continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (RC-B10-0101/2025, B10-0101/2025, B10-0104/2025, B10-0111/2025, B10-0113/2025, B10-0117/2025, B10-0120/2025, B10-0122/2025, B10-0123/2025) (vote)
        6.4. Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (RC-B10-0106/2025, B10-0106/2025, B10-0107/2025, B10-0108/2025, B10-0112/2025, B10-0114/2025, B10-0116/2025, B10-0118/2025) (vote)
        6.5. Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0102/2025, B10-0102/2025, B10-0105/2025, B10-0109/2025, B10-0125/2025, B10-0127/2025, B10-0129/2025, B10-0133/2025) (vote)
      7. Resumption of the sitting
      8. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
      9. Cross-border recognition of civil status documents of same-sex couples and their children within the territory of the EU (debate)
      10. Explanations of votes
        10.1. Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (RC-B10-0106/2025)
        10.2. Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0102/2025)
      11. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
      12. Dates of forthcoming sittings
      13. Closure of the sitting
      14. Adjournment of the session

       

    PRESIDENZA: ANTONELLA SBERNA
    Vicepresidente

     
    1. Opening of the sitting

       

    (La seduta è aperta alle 9:01)

     

    2. Proposal for a Union act

     

      President. – I would like to announce that, pursuant to Rule 47(2), the President has declared admissible a proposal for a Union act on the need to amend the Council Regulation on fixing the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks applicable in the Mediterranean and Black Seas for 2025, and to protect the trawling sector.

    The proposal is referred to the Committee on Fisheries (PECH) as the committee responsible, and to the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs and the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety for opinion.

     

    3. EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement (debate)


     

      Maroš Šefčovič, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, good morning to all honourable Members in this House. It is a pleasure to be here this morning to discuss the EU-Mercosur partnership agreement with you. As you know, this has been a busy plenary week and it has been my honour to address the House from this podium several times.

    On each occasion, it has been necessary to frame our dialogue in terms of the world that Europe finds itself in today: a world of increased global competition, a rise in unfair economic practices, and a more complex and uncertain geopolitical reality.

    In the face of this, the European Union’s network of free trade agreements – the world’s largest – is a vital asset in ensuring we can maintain our economic edge. I’ve heard the same messages from many of you, honourable Members, in a plenary debate on Tuesday, when a new trade era was discussed, as well as yesterday when we discussed the Commission work programme for this year.

    Free trade agreements open up markets around the world to our companies. They provide drivers for growth and innovation, and they are helping our industry retain and regain its competitiveness. And these agreements are mutually beneficial, with the EU being a trusted trading partner in a rules-based system. We only need to look to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada to see the real-world benefit.

    At a time when the old-world order in global trade is being shaken up, it is more important than ever to grow this free trade agreement network. This growth can contribute to our overarching efforts to de-risk via trade diversification and ensure our long-term industrial competitiveness. The EU-Mercosur partnership agreement is a vital element of this effort and a sign of our commitment to the Latin American region.

    The conclusion of negotiations strengthens our political and economic ties, giving EU companies a first-mover advantage in a region where trade with China is dominant. For instance, China is the main exporter to and importer from Brazil. The agreement will provide additional continuity, stability and predictability in our trade relations, and it highlights that regional blocs can commit to shared values and deliver concrete results for the mutual benefits of our citizens.

    Above all, the agreement is an economic win-win for the European Union. It offers export opportunities to the fifth biggest global economic bloc outside the European Union, with 273 million potential consumers. Our exports to Mercosur already amount to EUR 84 billion, with EU investment in the region of some EUR 340 billion.

    But with this agreement, we can now strengthen this trade and investment relationship even further. For example, this agreement would help us to save, and especially for EU exporters, over EUR 4 billion in customs duties every year – EUR 4 billion a year. It would eliminate tariffs on key commodities, like, if we take as an example cars, which are currently at the level of 35 %. If I’m talking about machinery, I’m talking about 20 %. If you look at chemicals, it’s 18 %. And if you look at pharmaceuticals, it’s 14 %. So, you see that these duties are very, very high and we are going to completely eliminate them.

    Mercosur countries can become one of our best sources of critical raw materials, thereby increasing our resilience by diversifying our supply chains. And I can assure you that the deal reached in Montevideo in December is not only a good deal, but it’s also a new deal – different and better than the one agreed in 2019.

    We have secured several negotiated outcomes that respond to our sustainability concerns while preserving the EU’s sensitivities. By including the Paris Agreement on Climate Change as an essential element of the EU Mercosur Partnership agreement, this sends a strong message in support of multilateral cooperation on climate change and this allows for partial or total suspension if a party leaves the Paris Agreement or if it undermines it from within.

    The agreement also contains legally binding commitments to take measures to halt deforestation as of 2030. Importantly, the agreement provides a critical platform of cooperation with Mercosur countries on our common sustainability ambitions, with strong commitments on labour and the environment.

    In addition, we have reached a balanced outcome on agrifood trade, considerably improving market access for many EU agrifood products, while striking a cautious balance in sectors where our interests are more sensitive and negotiated clear and well-calibrated tariff quotas amounting to a very small percentage of EU consumption, for example, not more than 1.5 % of beef, as well as a gradual implementation to market opening over several years.

    The Commission will monitor market developments closely after the agreement is implemented, particularly with regard to the agricultural sector, to ensure that the partnership with Mercosur does not negatively affect the competitiveness of the European farmers. In case of an imbalance, we will impose safeguards to protect our sensitive sectors and to ensure that agricultural producers are fully protected. President von der Leyen has announced that at least EUR 1 billion will be available to address any unforeseen circumstances.

    As a last point on Mercosur, we know that EU consumers care about the quality and safety of their food and health and consumer protection was never and will never be up for negotiations. Already today, agricultural products imported from Mercosur countries and from any other third country, with or without trade agreements, must comply with the EU’s strict sanitary and phytosanitary standards.

    Honourable Members, I know how important openness and cooperation on trade issues is to this House. Indeed, it came up in our debate on trade and preparedness on Tuesday to which I was referring earlier on. So, I want to underline that I have already engaged on Mercosur with the INTA Committee and with the AGRI Committee, together with Commissioner Hansen, responsible for agriculture, as well as with different working groups. And I see this as an ongoing dialogue, and I want to assure you that we will continue to listen to your concerns and provide you with factual answers and ensure your views are taken into account moving forward.

    So, I will stop here, Madam President, and I look forward to our exchanges and the debate.

     
       

       

    VORSITZ: KATARINA BARLEY
    Vizepräsidentin

     
       

     

      Jörgen Warborn, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Madam President, Commissioner, I would like to use the beginning of my speech to paint a picture of the EU reality on the global stage. Because five years ago, the UK left the European Union. A month later – COVID‑19 – the pandemic broke out in Europe. And three years ago, Russia launched a full‑scale illegal invasion of Ukraine. And at the same time, European energy prices reached record levels, and this also, of course, created inflation for European citizens. A month ago, Trump was inaugurated in the US administration. All this at the same time when China is systematically disregarding the multilateral trade order, and the BRICs is growing.

    Never before has the EU and its citizens and businesses been faced with so much uncertainty and unpredictability as now, most evidently seen last Monday, when Trump increased the tariffs on steel and aluminium to 25 %. I have stood at this podium more times than I can remember to talk about the importance of the Mercosur deal. If there would ever be a moment to conclude the deal that would create the biggest free trade zone in the world, it would be now.

    We need it now because it will provide opportunities for businesses and citizens. It will enhance our energy security. It will create a channel of diplomatic and economic relationships with one of the biggest players in the world, and it will demonstrate that the EU is a global, relevant player that stands for an open, rules‑based geopolitical order. Let’s do it. Let’s conclude. Let’s finalise the negotiation. It is beneficial for all.

     
       

     

      Kathleen Van Brempt, on behalf of the S&D Group. – Madam President, colleagues, let me thank M Warborn for his short history lesson. Of course, we agree very much with the fact that geopolitics has changed dramatically in the last five-to-ten years and the EU-Mercosur agreement is, in that light, important.

    For the S&D, it is important also that, in the next coming months, we will fully scrutinise this deal up to the very detail. We need to make sure that this deal works not just for our economy, but for the environment and for the workers on both sides of the world. We hear the sincere concerns, Commissioner, from the unions, from the environmental NGOs and from the farmers.

    It is important, as you mentioned, that the Paris Agreement is now an essential element. But many questions, Commissioner, on deforestation, remain. And we need answers on these. Let it be clear: this Mercosur agreement cannot water down the EU Deforestation Regulation. So we need answers.

    The S&D will be a fair partner in this process, but we need answers to make sure that the impact of the agreement on climate, workers’ rights and European farmers is clear.

     
       

     

      Jean-Paul Garraud, au nom du groupe PfE. – Madame la Présidente, il est encore temps de désamorcer la bombe agricole. Il est encore temps pour la Commission de renoncer à l’accord de libre-échange entre les pays du Mercosur et l’Union européenne, contre lequel nos agriculteurs protestent depuis des mois. Mais vous ne voulez pas renoncer, Monsieur le Commissaire, je viens de vous entendre.

    Cet accord est pourtant un contresens, un archaïsme et une faute. Un contresens, puisqu’il remet en cause notre autonomie alimentaire au moment où toutes les autres puissances cherchent à la garantir face aux désordres du monde. Un archaïsme, car il contrevient à la raison écologique et multiplie les échanges avec des produits du bout du monde, produits qui, par ailleurs, ne respectent même pas les normes environnementales qui sont les nôtres. Enfin, cet accord est une faute: à travers un obscur mécanisme de règlement des différends, vous offrez à des pays tiers, à des concurrents, la possibilité de remettre en cause les décisions des États membres, donc leur souveraineté et les libres choix des peuples.

    En promettant aux agriculteurs un fonds de compensation, vous reconnaissez d’ailleurs implicitement que cet accord va provoquer des ravages au sein de nos filières agricoles. Or, nos agriculteurs ne veulent pas qu’on subventionne leur déclin ou, pire, leur disparition. Ils veulent être protégés et promus. Ils veulent vivre dignement et librement de leur travail, de cette noble mission: nourrir l’Europe.

     
       

     

      Carlo Fidanza, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, l’Unione europea ha colpevolmente lasciato il Sud America in balia della penetrazione cinese e di regimi, governi o movimenti che lo hanno spesso allontanato dall’Europa e dall’Occidente. L’accordo con il Mercosur ha quindi evidenti motivazioni geopolitiche e presenta anche altrettanto evidenti opportunità di crescita per alcuni comparti.

    Eppure, questo accordo ha generato una immediata reazione da parte degli agricoltori europei. E sapete perché? Perché nel recente passato è stata proprio l’agricoltura a pagare il prezzo più alto in molti accordi di libero scambio. Ma anche perché in questi anni le scelte ideologiche dell’Unione europea hanno colpito duramente la competitività degli agricoltori europei, con le follie green, con una burocrazia asfissiante, con una ripartizione non equilibrata della redditività lungo le filiere.

    È certamente vero che alcuni settori agroalimentari – penso a quello del vino o dei formaggi – potrebbero avere dei benefici dall’accordo. Ed è vero che il numero di denominazioni di origine formalmente protette è il più alto mai inserito in un accordo di libero scambio, sia pure con qualche evidente falla.

    Ma è altrettanto vero che la mancanza di reciprocità, la possibilità garantita ai produttori sudamericani di continuare ad utilizzare agrofarmaci da noi vietati da tempo, la mancanza di controlli affidabili in loco sugli standard sanitari e contro la contraffazione, così come nelle procedure doganali europee, in molti nostri porti europei, sulle importazioni, fanno pendere la bilancia verso una legittima e fondata preoccupazione da parte del mondo agricolo. E non basteranno a tranquillizzare i nostri produttori una clausola di salvaguardia di difficile attivazione o quel solo miliardo di euro previsto per le compensazioni, una goccia nel mare e addirittura meno di quel miliardo e ottocento milioni previsti dall’Unione europea per gli agricoltori del Mercosur.

    Oggi questo accordo si presenta ancora troppo sbilanciato e troppo penalizzante per la nostra agricoltura e noi, a queste condizioni, non possiamo sostenerlo.

     
       

     

      Svenja Hahn, im Namen der Renew-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Liebe Kollegen! Ich finde es ehrlich gesagt unverantwortlich, wie faktenbefreit und populistisch einige in diesem Parlament Ängste schüren, Ängste vor Freihandel.

    Natürlich müssen wir Sorgen wie die von unseren Landwirten ernst nehmen. Deshalb gibt es auch in sensiblen Bereichen sehr niedrige Einfuhrquoten, wie zum Beispiel bei Rindfleisch, wo es anderthalb Prozent des gesamten EU-Konsums sind. Das ist ungefähr ein 200-Gramm-Steak pro Person. Das ist keine Marktverzerrung, und sollte es doch welche geben, plant die Kommission sogar Hilfszahlungen.

    Das eigentliche Problem ist doch die EU-gemachte Bürokratie – nicht der Handel –, die die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit unserer Landwirte behindert. Protektionismus wird dieses Problem nicht lösen. Auch der Klimaschutz wird nicht geschwächt; er wird sogar gestärkt. Denn die Einhaltung des Pariser Klimaschutzabkommens ist eine essentielle Grundlage dieses Abkommens.

    Deshalb: Gucken wir doch mal auf die Zahlen! Dann sehen wir, dass alleine in der EU 800 000 Jobs am Handel mit den Mercosur-Ländern hängen. Allein aus meinem Heimatland Deutschland exportieren über 12 000 Unternehmen in den Mercosur, und 70 % davon sind kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen. Wir haben gerade gehört von Kommissar Šefčovič: Alleine die reduzierten Zölle bedeuten Einsparungen von 4 Mrd. EUR bei unseren Unternehmen. Die echten Chancen erwachsen doch erst durch diese Marktöffnung, wie zum Beispiel der Zugang zu kritischen Rohstoffen. Das hilft unserer Wirtschaft, unseren Klimazielen und vor allen Dingen reduziert es unsere Abhängigkeit von Autokratien wie China.

    Ich sage Ihnen ganz ehrlich: Ich bin nicht bereit, zuzusehen, wie die Autokraten dieser Welt Schulter an Schulter stehen – und wir in der Europäischen Union sollen nicht mal Handel mit anderen Demokratien hinbekommen? Ich bin nicht bereit, das zu akzeptieren, denn in Zeiten von drohenden Zollspiralen und Handelskriegen brauchen wir mehr Handel mit mehr Partnern, allen voran den Handel mit Mercosur. Wir brauchen keine Deglobalisierungs- und Degrowth-Fantasien. Wir brauchen das Mercosur-Abkommen für unsere Arbeitsplätze in der Europäischen Union, für Wirtschaftswachstum und vor allen Dingen auch für internationale Zusammenarbeit.

     
       

     

      Saskia Bricmont, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Madame la Présidente, quand, en Europe comme dans les pays du Mercosur, les agriculteurs, le monde associatif, les associations de protection des consommateurs, les syndicats, les académiques, les citoyens s’opposent au traité commercial entre l’Union européenne et le Mercosur, ce sont des millions de personnes qui dénoncent ces impacts économiques, sociaux, environnementaux, climatiques, humains.

    C’est un accord qui date du siècle dernier, Monsieur le Commissaire, ce n’est pas un new deal. Ces millions de personnes pèsent peu face aux intérêts économiques de quelques industriels et des plus grosses exploitations agricoles pour – attention! – un bénéfice attendu de + 0,1 % du PIB. Peu glorieux, n’est-ce pas? Ah oui, il faut quand même aussi en déduire les millions du fonds de compensation agricole promis pour pallier les effets négatifs de cet accord sur le monde agricole, sans en régler les problèmes pour autant.

    Il faut aussi tenir compte des effets du mécanisme de rééquilibrage: rééquilibrage pour les États des pays du Mercosur qui va permettre au gouvernement, ou plutôt à l’agrobusiness, brésilien de contester nos lois si elles affectent leurs intérêts économiques et commerciaux. Exemples: mécanisme d’ajustement carbone aux frontières, lois anti-déforestation, contre le travail forcé, le devoir de vigilance de nos entreprises.

    Alors là, c’est la sidération totale, une atteinte insupportable à notre souveraineté stratégique et même à notre sécurité économique. Nous refusons de brader notre agriculture en la soumettant à une concurrence totalement déloyale. Nous refusons d’exporter nos produits chimiques et pesticides interdits en Europe, de brader davantage nos normes et de consommer des citrons verts au glyphosate, du bœuf aux hormones ou de la volaille à la grippe aviaire. D’encourager aussi la déforestation.

    Il est impossible de faire l’inventaire de tous les problèmes. Mais une chose est certaine, vous nous présentez un texte qui est pire qu’en 2019, quand le Parlement a dit qu’il lui était impossible de ratifier l’accord du Mercosur en l’état. C’est en défendant la démocratie, les valeurs, les normes sociales et environnementales qui protègent nos citoyens et assurent la prospérité de nos économies que l’Union européenne fera la différence.

    Chers amis du Mercosur, nous voulons des partenariats avec vous, mais des partenariats réellement équitables.

     
       

     

      Manon Aubry, au nom du groupe The Left. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, comment osez-vous venir défendre ici l’accord avec le Mercosur, le plus grand et le pire accord de libre-échange jamais signé par l’Union européenne? Comment osez-vous dire aux agriculteurs, qui peinent déjà à joindre les deux bouts, qu’importer des centaines de milliers de tonnes supplémentaires de bœuf, de poulet ou de fromage n’aura aucun impact sur eux? Comment osez-vous exposer délibérément la population à des OGM et des pesticides interdits en Europe? Car non, il n’y aura aucune réciprocité des normes. Comment est-il possible, à l’heure de l’urgence écologique, de soutenir un accord qui va contribuer à accélérer le réchauffement climatique et la déforestation?

    Oui, Monsieur le Commissaire, vous devriez avoir honte. Honte, parce que la réalité, c’est que personne ne veut de cet accord. Et vous vous retrouvez ici à devoir passer en force, en piétinant les règles de consultation du Parlement européen. Hier, le vote d’un de mes amendements l’a montré très clairement: les inquiétudes sur cet accord sont extrêmement vives et il n’y a pas de réelle majorité en sa faveur.

    Le dogme du libre-échange étouffe les peuples et dévaste la planète. Il est déjà en train de vaciller. La bataille n’est pas terminée. Comptez sur nous pour le faire tomber.

     
       

     

      Станислав Стоянов, от името на групата ESN. – Г-жо Председател, г-н Комисар, търговското споразумение между Европейския съюз и Меркосур предоставя възможности за европейската индустрия, както чухме и от Вас, но може да има катастрофални последици за селскостопанския сектор и европейските фермери не бива да плащат цената на това споразумение.

    Липсва прозрачност относно процеса по ратификация на споразумението, както и относно предпазните мерки, предвидени от Европейската комисия. Беше споменат фонд от един милиард евро, без да е ясно нито откъде ще дойде финансирането му, нито пък дали то би било достатъчно. Няма никаква яснота и дали този потенциален фонд ще се създаде предварително или едва при смущения на пазара. Компенсаторните мерки няма да защитят нашето земеделие. На тях често им липсват ясни дефиниции, не достигат до истински ощетените, а докато влязат в сила, щетите вече ще бъдат нанесени. Освен това доказването на, цитирам, „сериозна вреда“, нанесена на производителите поради споразумението, е сложен и бюрократичен процес. Нека не предадем европейските фермери и този път.

     
       

     

      Gabriel Mato (PPE). – Señora presidenta, el Acuerdo Unión Europea-Mercosur no es un tratado comercial más. Se trata de hablar de futuro. Nos jugamos nuestra capacidad de seguir siendo un actor relevante en el comercio global, de generar crecimiento y empleo y de abrir las puertas a un mercado de setecientos cincuenta millones de consumidores. Es indudable que tiene claros beneficios, entre otros, la eliminación de cuatro mil millones de euros en aranceles, el acceso a mercados estratégicos, la mayor presencia de nuestras industrias y pymes y la protección de más de trescientas indicaciones geográficas.

    Dicho esto, entiendo y comparto, comparto claramente, las preocupaciones del sector agrario. No podemos ignorarlas. Pero seamos claros: el problema de nuestro sector agrario no es el Mercosur, es la política agraria europea diseñada sin tener en cuenta la realidad del campo. Si nuestros productores se sienten amenazados por este Acuerdo es porque la política agraria no les ofrece las herramientas necesarias para competir y esto es lo que debe cambiar. Por eso, más que bloquear el Acuerdo, lo que debemos hacer es reformar nuestra política agraria para que no penalice a nuestros productores con normas asfixiantes, asegurar salvaguardas eficaces que protejan a los sectores vulnerables de manera rápida y efectiva y garantizar un fondo de compensación justo y ampliable que realmente funcione y que se adapte cuando sea necesario. No se trata de elegir entre comercio y agricultura, se trata de hacer las cosas bien y de analizar con datos actualizados dónde está el origen del problema y buscar soluciones al mismo.

    Negarnos a ratificar este Acuerdo no resolverá los problemas del sector agrario y mandará un mensaje de que Europa renuncia a ser líder y prefiere dejar que otros aprovechen nuestras oportunidades.

     
       

     

      Bernd Lange (S&D). – Frau Präsidentin! Herr Kommissar! Meine lieben Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich finde es unredlich, wenn man sich hier mit einem Zeigefinger hinstellt und sagt, am europäischen Wesen soll die Welt genesen, ohne dass man vernünftige Abkommen mit anderen Partnern auf Augenhöhe schließt. Und das machen wir genau so, dass wir die gleichen Ziele zusammen mit den Regierungen von Uruguay, Paraguay, Brasilien und Argentinien umsetzen wollen, was den Klimaschutz, was den Schutz der Artenvielfalt und was den Schutz der Arbeitnehmerrechte anbetrifft.

    Das können wir nur gemeinsam machen und nicht mit einem erhobenen Zeigefinger nur hier aus Europa. Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, lassen Sie uns doch nicht so defensiv sein! Natürlich, wie Lenny Kravitz sagt: It Ain’t Over ‘Til It´s Over.

    Wir haben jetzt bis nächstes Jahr Zeit, zu gucken, wie die Entwicklung weitergeht. Wie wir es gemeinsam hinkriegen können, falls es Änderungswünsche, Ergänzungswünsche gibt, das umzusetzen. Wir haben das doch in anderen Handelsabkommen auch gemacht. Wir sind die Kraft, die letztendlich dafür sorgt, dass ein Abkommen ein gutes Abkommen wird.

    Und wir brauchen stabile Abkommen in einer globalen Welt, die von Konflikten gekennzeichnet ist. Ohne stabile Bedingungen in unserer wirtschaftlichen Situation, gerade wenn 40 % unseres BIP vom internationalen Handel abhängig sind, können wir nicht weiter existieren. Wir geben unsere Wohlfahrtssituation auf. Deswegen brauchen wir stabile Verhältnisse. Wir wollen uns nicht Autokraten dieser Welt anheimgeben. Deswegen lassen Sie uns Abkommen diskutieren, gegebenenfalls verbessern, aber gestalten!

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf mehrere Fragen nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       





     

      Raffaele Stancanelli (PfE). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, è economicamente comprovato come il libero mercato porti sviluppo e benessere economico ed è per questo che, in linea di principio, noi siamo favorevoli allo stesso. Tuttavia, è fondamentale che gli accordi siano proficui per entrambe le parti. Questo non è il caso per il Mercosur.

    Gli agricoltori e gli allevatori stanno disperatamente cercando di farci capire la gravità dell’impatto che questo accordo potrebbe avere per le loro attività. I nostri agricoltori si troverebbero in una posizione di svantaggio economico e non potrebbero competere con i grandi latifondisti sudamericani. A questo squilibrio si aggiunga la grande contraddizione green della Commissione: da un lato impone norme sempre più rigide ai nostri agricoltori, dall’altro permette che il nostro mercato venga invaso da prodotti esteri che non rispettano gli stessi standard imposti in Europa, specie sotto il profilo fitosanitario e quello della sostenibilità ambientale e sociale.

    È un fatto ideologico dire che questo non è un accordo equo? No, noi pensiamo di no. Perché se è vero che gli accordi di libero scambio portano benefici, è altresì vero che il Mercosur, così come è strutturato, danneggia e svende i nostri agricoltori, produttori, allevatori e consumatori. Forse sarebbe il caso di non restare chiusi nei palazzi, ma ascoltare con umiltà chi lavora la terra e produce ricchezza.

     
       

     

      Rihards Kols (ECR). – Madam President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, trade agreements aren’t just about tariffs and paperwork; they create real opportunities. For our SMEs this means access to a market of 260 million consumers. So far, all EU trade agreements have delivered benefits while maintaining high standards. It’s a fact. This deal does the same: lowering tariffs, cutting red tape and ensuring fair competition.

    Yes, concerns exist. That’s why the Commission has announced a EUR 1 billion fund to support affected farmers. But if we can fund compensation, we should also fund opportunity. A one-stop EU platform should be established for Mercosur markets that will help our businesses expand without excessive costs, because access should not be a privilege but a policy priority.

    Commissioner, you must ensure a structured engagement similar to the CFSP and CSDP. We should have a CTP conference during every presidency, where civil society and national parliamentarians can engage with the European Parliament and with the Commission. This is a chance to expand, compete and lead – and we should take it.

     
       

     

      Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, voitures allemandes contre agriculture française: certains voudraient réduire l’accord de commerce entre le Mercosur et l’Union européenne à ce clivage. À mes collègues, notamment allemands, je vous le dis, je ne me ferai pas complice de cette instrumentalisation.

    C’est une hérésie, une faiblesse politique abyssale que de nourrir un protectionnisme exacerbé qui ne fait que creuser des divisions et empêche toute évolution. Ce n’est pas un combat entre États européens que nous devons amplifier, mais notre crédibilité à construire des partenariats durables et équitables avec des États tiers avec qui nous dialoguons et commerçons déjà. Ce n’est pas une opposition entre secteurs qui est en débat, mais notre engagement à transformer des chaînes de valeur pour qu’elles soient durables, résilientes et sûres.

    Alors, au-delà des postures, de nombreuses questions demeurent, dont celle-ci: avons-nous, nous Européens, la capacité de contrôler les produits qui rentrent sur notre marché, accords de commerce ou non? Alors soyons à la hauteur de tous les enjeux. Ne laissons pas la souveraineté, la durabilité, la compétitivité devenir de vagues concepts déconnectés des réalités, de la vie de nos industries, de nos agricultures, de nos concitoyens.

     
       

     

      Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE). – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, no se pueden hacer trampas al solitario. No puede usted decir que es bueno para el sector agrícola europeo y, al mismo tiempo, decir que hay que aumentar las compensaciones al sector agrícola europeo. ¿En qué quedamos? Si es bueno, no se debe compensar. Si hay que aumentar las compensaciones, no puede ser bueno para el sector agrícola.

    Segunda cuestión: ustedes han conseguido en este Acuerdo con el Mercosur dos unanimidades que son absolutamente increíbles. La primera, unanimidad de todos los sectores agrícolas y sus representantes de Europa, pero también de los países del Mercosur. También han conseguido ustedes la unanimidad en contra de todos los sindicatos europeos y de los sindicatos del Mercosur.

    ¿A quién beneficia este Acuerdo con el Mercosur si tiene en contra a todos los sindicatos agrarios europeos y del Mercosur y a todos los sindicatos de trabajadores europeos y del Mercosur? ¿A quién beneficia? Clarísimamente, a los europeos y a las europeas no, porque nos hace más dependientes. ¿De quién? De las grandes multinacionales, que son a los únicos a los que va a beneficiar.

    Por eso, nosotros estamos en contra, de forma clara y contundente. Necesitamos más apuesta de verdad por los trabajadores y las trabajadoras, más inversión en Europa para hacer una Europa mucho más fuerte, más inversión en la agricultura europea y no más vulnerabilidad y dependencia de terceros y, especialmente, de las grandes multinacionales.

     
       

     

      Luke Ming Flanagan (The Left). – Madam President, in order to properly debate the impact of this proposed agreement – proposed agreement; the title doesn’t say proposed, but we haven’t agreed to it yet – the proposed agreement on beef farmers in the EU, we need to compare like with like. In other words, you cannot compare carcass waste to processed premium beef waste. But that’s what your spin doctors are doing. The reality is that this deal will guarantee that at least 9 % of high-value cuts sold in the EU will come from Mercosur: 209 000 tonnes in a market of 2.3 million.

    I hear people talk of opportunities. If you’re a suckler farmer in the west of Ireland on a 30-hectare farm, where are the opportunities? If it’s a win-win, as you say, why then the need for a compensation package?

    And if there’s money, and EUR 1 billion for a compensation package, how come there’s no money to increase the farmers’ money that they get from the CAP, from what it was in 1991? Farmers in Ireland are facing a 60 % cut in CAP payments since that year.

    You’re talking about a EUR 1 billion compensation package for something that’s a win-win deal. There is no win-win – no win-win in science. You cannot destroy or create energy. It’s rubbish.

     
       

     

      Arno Bausemer (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren! Sehr geehrter Herr Kommissar! Es ist ein großer Fehler, gegen die Bürger Europas Politik zu machen. Es ist ein noch größerer Fehler, Politik gegen diejenigen zu machen, die diese Bürger Europas ernähren, nämlich unsere Landwirte.

    Die hohe Qualität der Produkte, die unsere Landwirte produzieren, ist weltweit einmalig. Wenn man sich anschaut oder anhört, was hier teilweise gesagt wird, dann ist es eben falsch. Es ist kein Wettbewerb, wenn man andere Standards – viel niedrigere Standards, etwa in den Mercosur-Staaten – mit den Standards vergleicht, die wir hier in Sachen Qualität haben. Nun habe ich mich natürlich mit dem Thema beschäftigt. Ich selbst bin kleiner Landwirt im Nebenerwerb und war auch bei den Landwirten bei den Protesten im Oktober in Brüssel; im Dezember auch hier in Straßburg. Wo waren Sie? Wo war die Kommission?

    Sie schicken Polizisten heraus, weil Sie Angst vor den Landwirten haben. Sie sprechen nicht mit den Landwirten. Mein Kollege von der ESN hat gerade den deutschen Bauernpräsidenten zitiert, der ganz klar gesagt hat: Dieser Weg ist falsch! Wir können mit diesen Produkten nicht konkurrieren, weil sie eben viel schlechter sind und weil sie unseren Markt mit geringer Qualität schwemmen. Das ist der Holzweg.

    Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, es ist unsere Aufgabe, dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass die Landwirte ihre hohe Qualität auch in ihren Produkten an den Markt bringen. Nun gibt es Vertreter in diesem Hause – ich denke da besonders an die Grüne Partei –, die der Meinung sind, man könnte die Versorgung mit hochwertigen Proteinen, Vitaminen, Zink, Eisen damit herstellen, dass man den Bürgern getrocknete gelbe Mehlwürmer vorsetzt und nicht hochwertiges Fleisch. Das ist der Fehler. Ich rufe gerade die Kollegen – sind ja auch welche da – von der Europäischen Volkspartei dazu auf: Lassen Sie die Grünen bitte links liegen, im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes. Lassen Sie diese Politik auf den Scheiterhaufen der Geschichte verschwinden. Machen Sie Politik für die Bürger Europas!

    Ich sage Ihnen noch eines zum Abschluss: Die AfD in Deutschland als Teil einer Regierung wird dieses Mercosur-Abkommen niemals unterstützen. Wenn Sie in der Kommission auf die Idee kommen sollten, das mit irgendwelchen rechtlichen Tricksereien zu umgehen – wir stehen an der Seite der Landwirte in der ersten Reihe bei den Protesten und werden dieses Abkommen verhindern.

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       





     

      Katarína Roth Neveďalová (NI). – Vážená pani predsedajúca, ideálna dohoda neexistuje. Dohoda je kompromis a umenie možného a ja si myslím, že aj vy to tak rozprávate o farmároch. Neviem, kde ste boli, keď sme hovorili o slovenských a východoeurópskych farmároch a o zaplavení produktmi z Ukrajiny poľnohospodárskeho pôvodu. Ale myslím si, že v tomto prípade by sme mali byť pragmatickí. Farmárom pomôžeme znížením záťaže a nezmyselnej byrokracie, podporou spotreby domácich produktov a potravín, zvyšovaním platov, udržaním pracovných miest. A práve udržanie pracovných miest je podpora priemyslu a konkurencieschopnosti, ktorú ponúka práve dohoda Mercosur. A ja ju vidím ako príležitosť pre európsku ekonomiku, pretože sme orientovaní exportne. Príležitosť pre otvorenie ďalších trhov a presne, ako aj komisár Šefčovič hovoril, zníženie záťaže, čo sa týka ciel a daní alebo taríf na naše napríklad automobily, ktoré pre Slovensko sú veľmi dôležité, je určite príležitosťou a, myslím si, že pozitívom dohody Mercosur. Vyjednávalo sa to viac ako 20 rokov. Veľa sa o tom rozprávalo, snažili sa byť naozaj pragmatickí a vidieť, aká je príležitosť v tom všetkom, čo môžeme s touto dohodou dosiahnuť.

    A rada by som upozornila aj na to, čo pán komisár hovoril: my sa tu rozprávame o nejakej kvalite potravín a o tom, že nechceme dovážať a chceme naše fytosanitárne štandardy. Komisia nám jasne povedala, že naše fytosanitárne štandardy budú dodržiavané a že to súčasťou tejto dohody je. Tak tu neklamme našich voličov a občanov Európskej únie.

     
       

     

      Davor Ivo Stier (PPE). – Poštovana predsjedavajuća, kolegice i kolege, u trenutku kada se svjetska trgovina fragmentira, za Europu je strateški važno osigurati trgovinske partnere s kojima ima ugovorom uređene odnose. U takvim okolnostima sporazum s MERCOSUR dobiva novu geopolitičku težinu za naše odnose s Latinskom Amerikom. Iako nas povezuju povijest i kultura, bez ovog sporazuma Europa neće moći se nositi sa sve jačom konkurencijom globalnih igrača. Prisutnih u Latinskoj Americi. I ne samo prisutnih. Kina je već danas prvi trgovinski partner za veliki broj zemalja ove regije. Stoga nema dvojbe da je ovaj sporazum potreban, da, za europsku industriju, ali i općenito za europsku ekonomiju. No, isto tako je točno da postoji potreba za dijalogom s poljoprivrednicima. Za Hrvatsku poljoprivrednu komoru, tri su sektora osjetljiva. Govedarstvo, peradarstvo i šećerna industrija. I zato je važno komunicirati da su sporazumom dogovorene kvote za uvoz tih proizvoda od svega 1,2 % do 1,5 % ukupne potrošnje na europskom tržištu. I uz to, te male kvote uvodit će se postupno. Dakle, europsko tržište neće biti poplavljeno poljoprivrednim proizvodima iz Južne Amerike, ali, da, Komisija mora pripremiti paket kompenzacijskih mjera koji bi se mogao aktivirati u slučaju potrebe. Dakle, MERCOSUR nije prijetnja, ali jest prilika da Europa bude konkurentna na svjetskom tržištu.

     
       


     

      Valérie Deloge (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, ce traité de libre-échange entre l’Union européenne et l’Amérique du Sud est en réalité une menace pour notre agriculture, notre environnement et notre souveraineté économique. Cet accord met en concurrence directe nos agriculteurs avec des productions dont les normes environnementales et sanitaires sont bien moins strictes.

    Vous sacrifiez nos filières européennes, déjà en crise, pour vendre vos voitures allemandes. Le Mercosur favorise un modèle économique basé sur l’exportation intensive et la destruction des écosystèmes. Il affaiblit notre souveraineté en inondant nos marchés de produits à bas coûts, il détruit les filières locales et fragilise nos producteurs au profit des multinationales. L’accord avec le Mercosur n’est pas un progrès, c’est une régression économique et environnementale. Il est urgent de le refuser et de défendre une agriculture juste, durable et locale.

    Sachez qu’un agriculteur se suicide tous les deux jours en France. Je pense que, en signant cet accord, les commissaires, Mme von der Leyen et les députés qui le signeront seront le dernier clou qui fermeront leur cercueil.

    (L’oratrice refuse des questions carton bleu de Marie-Pierre Vedrenne et Manon Aubry.)

     
       

     

      Patryk Jaki (ECR). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Panie Komisarzu! Wszystko, co mówicie w sprawie umowy z Mercosurem, przypomina dokładnie sytuację z Nord Streamem. Wiele osób w tej Izbie mówiło wam, że pozbywanie się własnych strategicznych zasobów energetycznych na rzecz importu gazu z zewnątrz da krótkotrwałe zyski niewielu, a w dłuższej perspektywie skończy się tragedią.

    No i co? I dzisiaj mamy dokładnie to samo. Chcecie zniszczyć europejskie rolnictwo, żeby sprzedawać samochody, które przestały być konkurencyjne między innymi przez was, przez Zielony Ład. Problem tylko polega na tym, że rolnictwo to nie tylko żywność, miejsca pracy, ale przede wszystkim bezpieczeństwo. I przestańcie kłamać, że to nie ma żadnego wpływu na rolnictwo. Gdyby tak było, to nie przedstawialibyście żadnych pakietów rekompensacyjnych. Po co takie pakiety?

    Zakładacie, że żywność do Europy zawsze będzie można ściągnąć. Tak samo myśleliście z gazem. No i co, pytam. Chyba, że zakładacie, że Europejczycy zawsze sobie jakoś poradzą, bo dopuściliście do jedzenia robaki. Ale tak naprawdę to was trzeba wykopać, a nie rolników. Im trzeba dziękować, bo mamy najlepszą żywność na świecie, i nie pozwolimy wam tego zniszczyć.

    (Mówca zgodził się na pytanie zasygnalizowane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki)

     
       

     

      Jörgen Warborn (PPE), blue-card question. – You said that the agreement will destroy the farmers. That is absolutely not true. Look back and see the agreement, which was actually beneficial for the farmers, even though a lot of people said that it would destroy the farmers.

    The Commission has, on the other side, done a very good job. They have TRQs, they have safeguards, and they have a compensation package. How can you say that it will destroy farmers? We recognise that there are sensitive products, but that’s why the Commission has worked with us. This will help the farmers. It is beneficial for the wine sector, for cheese, for a lot of businesses.

     
       

     

      Patryk Jaki (ECR), odpowiedź na pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – Jeżeli to jest tak, jak Pan mówi, że rolnicy na tym zyskają, to pytanie jest kluczowe, to dlaczego protestują? Pan myśli, że oni są głupkami, że nie wiedzą, co robią? Pan się lepiej zna na ich działalności niż oni sami? Ja uważam wprost przeciwnie. Poza tym, uważam, jest błąd logiczny w Pana pytaniu, bo skoro Pan twierdzi, że oni na tym zyskają, to po co pakiety rekompensacyjne? No po co? To szkoda pieniędzy. Lepiej przeznaczyć je na innowacje. Więc przykro mi.

    Dokładnie to samo na tej sali słyszałem w sprawie Nord Streamu. Jeszcze raz to powtórzę – twierdziliście, że nie będzie żadnego problemu. I co? Rolnictwo to jest nasze bezpieczeństwo.

     
       


     

      Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE), question «carton bleu». – Madame Karlsbro, merci. Vous dites que vous ne comprenez pas pourquoi certains et certaines s’opposent à l’accord avec le Mercosur que, très manifestement, vous soutenez.

    Or, signer cet accord avec le Mercosur, le mettre en œuvre, c’est dire aux agriculteurs, qui souffrent déjà, qui crèvent déjà, de la faible rémunération liée à la vente de leurs produits, que nous allons les soumettre à une concurrence plus dure encore sur les produits les plus rémunérateurs.

    Signer et ratifier cet accord avec le Mercosur, c’est dire aux parents qui voient déjà leurs enfants souffrir, voire mourir, de cancers liés à l’exposition aux produits toxiques que nous allons continuer, voire même aggraver, cette exposition.

    Signer et ratifier l’accord du Mercosur, c’est dire aux citoyennes et aux citoyens européens que Javier Milei, la tronçonneuse à la main, qui sort de l’Organisation mondiale de la santé et terrorise ses citoyens, est un partenaire fiable pour l’Union européenne. Voilà pourquoi nous nous opposons à cet accord du Mercosur. Et je vous en prie…

    (La Présidente retire la parole à l’oratrice)

     
       



     

      Alexander Bernhuber (PPE), Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielleicht möchte ich schon etwas Nachhilfe in Ackerbau und Viehzucht geben, was Landwirtschaft betrifft, weil Sie ja sagen, die Landwirtschaft profitiert. Die Landwirtschaft ist aber sehr vielseitig, und ein Bauer, der vielleicht gerade einen Stall gebaut hat, kann keinen Wein pflanzen und jetzt in Mercosur-Ländern Wein verkaufen.

    Also, man muss hier genau schauen, welche landwirtschaftlichen Sektoren durch dieses Handelsabkommen benachteiligt werden. Ich verstehe nicht, warum nicht einfach die Landwirtschaft von diesem Abkommen ausgenommen worden ist – wo man genau weiß, das ist der kritische Sektor, da gibt es die größten Bedenken.

     
       


     

      Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE). – Madam President, Commissioner, has the Commissioner been listening to the family farmers on both sides of the Atlantic that urge us not to sign this trade agreement? Or have you been listening to the big land‑owning oligarchs that are teaming up with the agrochemical multinationals that run thousands of hectares‑big farms, spreading pesticides that are banned in Europe with aeroplanes?

    Have you been listening to the indigenous communities and Quilombo communities that came all the way to Brussels to report about their poisoned rivers, their poisoned wells, their burned‑down forests, the deforestation and the attacks on them. Have you been listening to the labour organisation that reports about child labour, about forced labour, but in very high numbers?

    Yes, we need to increase our cooperation with Mercosur. Yes, we need to increase our cooperation with democracies. But as it stands, this trade agreement, in my point of view, is not fit for purpose. We still need to work on that and need to improve it. As it stands, this trade deal is toxic for the planet and the people.

     
       


     

      Francisco José Millán Mon (PPE). – Señora presidenta, la comunidad internacional se encuentra en una situación de fragmentación, creciente polarización, abundancia de conflictos y auge del proteccionismo. En este contexto es oportuno para la Unión Europea reforzar las relaciones políticas y económicas con los países del Mercosur, con los que tantos vínculos compartimos. Son aliados naturales nuestros.

    No disponemos todavía de la versión final de la parte del diálogo político y cooperación del Acuerdo, señor comisario, pero entiendo que establece mecanismos institucionales que permitirán reforzar nuestras relaciones políticas y abordar de forma más coordinada los retos comunes y los retos globales, desde la lucha contra el narcotráfico hasta el cambio climático.

    El Acuerdo con el Mercosur nos ayudará también a contener la importante presencia de China en la región. La dimensión económica y comercial del Acuerdo ofrece muchas oportunidades para las empresas europeas. En efecto, el Acuerdo supone el fin de la tradicional política proteccionista de economías tan grandes como la de Brasil y la de Argentina y facilitará así el acceso de los productos europeos y de nuestras compañías al Mercosur.

    Necesitamos un diálogo permanente con los sectores que temen verse perjudicados, particularmente ganaderos y muchos agricultores. Hay que explicar el alcance real del Acuerdo, las cuotas, las cláusulas de salvaguarda, las posibles medidas compensatorias, y avanzar también, internamente en la Unión, en reformas que reduzcan la burocracia y simplifiquen la legislación, y facilitar así la labor y asegurar la competitividad de unos sectores víctimas estos años de una auténtica sobrerregulación.

    Espero que la Brújula para la Competitividad, señor comisario, contribuya también a ello. Queda trabajo por hacer.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       



     

      Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l’accordo con il Mercosur è un’intesa di grande rilevanza geopolitica e potrebbe ridefinire gli equilibri globali. Per l’Unione europea rappresenta un’opportunità strategica per rafforzare la propria presenza in America latina e contrastare l’influenza di altre superpotenze.

    Tuttavia, per decidere se possiamo votarlo, è essenziale valutarne l’impatto su lavoratori, imprese, agricoltura e ambiente, assicurando che siano rispettate regole chiare e condivise. L’inserimento dell’accordo di Parigi e del capitolo su commercio e sviluppo sostenibile sono passi positivi, ma permangono nodi irrisolti che vanno approfonditi: il meccanismo di riequilibrio, la risoluzione delle controversie, l’efficacia delle misure contro la deforestazione, ma anche la necessità di rafforzare il sistema doganale per garantire la sicurezza del mercato interno e dei consumatori.

    Come Socialisti e Democratici abbiamo avviato un dialogo con la Commissione, le parti sociali e le ONG per valutare ogni aspetto dell’accordo. Mi rivolgo in particolare alla Commissione: abbiamo un anno per dare risposte, come istituzioni, alle questioni sollevate dagli europei, per agire sulle criticità in modo convincente, con provvedimenti e azioni e poter quindi convincere anche questo Parlamento della bontà dell’accordo. Dobbiamo lavorare insieme e poi potremo decidere cosa fare.

     
       

     

      Tiago Moreira de Sá (PfE). – Senhora Presidente, Senhor Comissário, apoiamos firmemente o comércio livre, reconhecendo os seus benefícios para o crescimento económico e a prosperidade das nações. Conhecemos bem a história dos anos 20 e 30 do século passado e não queremos repeti‑la. Acreditamos também que o Acordo da União Europeia‑Mercosul tem vantagens geopolíticas, como a contenção da influência crescente da China na América do Sul e o fortalecimento do eixo Atlântico da Europa. Mas, como sempre, definiremos as nossas posições em função dos nossos interesses nacionais, especialmente os dos nossos agricultores, pescadores, industriais e pequenos e médios comerciantes, que constituem a espinha dorsal da nossa economia. Estamos em contacto constante com os empresários e trabalhadores dos setores abrangidos pelo Acordo, pois ninguém conhece melhor a realidade do que eles. As suas preocupações são legítimas, especialmente face à concorrência de produtos de países terceiros que não cumprem os mesmos padrões de qualidade e segurança que exigimos aos nossos produtores. Temos a obrigação de garantir uma concorrência leal e justa, e de assegurar que os nossos setores produtivos são devidamente salvaguardados. Assim o faremos.

     
       

     

      Kris Van Dijck (ECR). – Voorzitter, commissaris, ik verwelkom het akkoord met Mercosur met open armen, want het is niet alleen het grootste handelsakkoord dat de EU ooit gesloten heeft, maar is ook belangrijk om drie redenen.

    Op een moment dat de Amerikaanse president Trump tarieven oplegt aan ons staal en ons aluminium, is het de hoogste tijd om nieuwe markten aan te boren en bovendien dat terrein niet alleen over te laten aan China. Ten tweede bevestigt het ons geloof in vrije, op regels gebaseerde handel en geeft het zuurstof aan onze bedrijven. Ten slotte biedt het akkoord wel degelijk kansen op een verbetering van de arbeidsomstandigheden en wat betreft de strijd tegen de klimaatverandering.

    Maar ik begrijp ook de bezorgdheid van onze landbouwers wanneer het gaat over mogelijke toenemende concurrentie. Voor ons is het dan ook helder dat er daarvoor afspraken moeten zijn, dat er een voortdurende monitoring moet zijn, dat de Europese veiligheids- en gezondheidsnormen ook voor hun producten van tel moeten zijn en, finaal, dat er een steunpakket kan zijn indien dat nodig is. Op die manier geloven wij in dit akkoord met Mercosur.

     
       

     

      Benoit Cassart (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, à plusieurs reprises, nous avons tiré la sonnette d’alarme sur l’impact de l’accord avec le Mercosur à propos de la déforestation, de la perte de biodiversité et du risque sanitaire. Regardons maintenant l’impact de cet accord sur notre autonomie stratégique.

    Le rapport Draghi a souligné l’efficacité de la Chine et des États-Unis par rapport à l’Europe. Pourtant, ces deux puissances ont toutes les deux décidé de protéger leurs marchés et leurs agriculteurs pour favoriser leur autonomie alimentaire. Pour rappel, la population mondiale a augmenté de 82 millions de bouches à nourrir en 2024. Être en mesure de produire son alimentation est un pilier fondamental de l’autonomie stratégique. Or, seulement 6 % des agriculteurs ont moins de 35 ans dans l’Union européenne.

    Monsieur le Commissaire, est-il vraiment raisonnable d’ouvrir les portes aux produits moins durables d’Amérique du Sud, alors que rien ne motive déjà les jeunes Européens à reprendre nos fermes?

    Cet accord n’a rien à voir avec le CETA, qui était un bon accord.

     
       



     

      Herbert Dorfmann (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin! Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Mit dem Mercosur-Abkommen plant die EU zum ersten Mal ein Handelsabkommen mit einem Partner, dessen primäres Interesse natürlich der Export von Agrargütern ist.

    Nicht, dass wir dort heute nicht einkaufen würden: Aus Brasilien kaufen wir im Jahr um 17 Mrd. EUR Lebensmittel, aus Argentinien um 5 Mrd. EUR – es sind also bereits wichtige Handelspartner. Aber, und das wurde heute auch gesagt, das Abkommen könnte natürlich einige Sektoren der Landwirtschaft treffen: Rindfleisch, Geflügelfleisch, Zucker, Bioethanol, Reis oder Zitrusfrüchte, um nur einige zu nennen.

    Natürlich gibt es auch Chancen für andere Bereiche in der Landwirtschaft, das steht außer Zweifel. Und natürlich gibt es ein geopolitisches Interesse an diesem Abkommen, das unterstütze ich ausdrücklich. Die Europäische Union verliert derzeit schnell – und in den letzten Stunden noch schneller – Partner und Freunde in der gesamten Welt, und unsere fehlende Entscheidungsfreude – und 25 Jahre Abkommen und Reden über Mercosur sind vielleicht ein Symbol dafür – zeigt, dass wir es uns nicht erlauben können, Partnern, möglichen Partnern die Tür vor der Nase zuzuschlagen.

    Aber wir brauchen eine Strategie für die Landwirtschaft, und die Strategie kann nicht nur einfach das Versprechen auf 1 Mrd. EUR sein. Wir brauchen ein Konzept, Sicherheiten für die Bäuerinnen und Bauern, Maßnahmen, um neue Märkte in der Welt zu erschließen. Und dann brauchen wir eine Finanzierung für dieses Konzept. Aber zuerst brauchen wir ein Konzept, und dann brauchen wir das notwendige Geld dazu.

    Ich bitte Sie, Herr Kommissar, sich zügig auf den Weg zu machen, um ein solches Konzept vorzulegen und die Bedenken, die es in der Landwirtschaft gibt, aus dem Weg zu räumen.

     
       

     

      Francisco Assis (S&D). – Senhora Presidente, Senhor Comissário, este acordo é bom para a União Europeia sob o ponto de vista político, sob o ponto de vista económico e sob o ponto de vista comercial. A União Europeia tem todo o interesse em reforçar as suas ligações com os países do Mercosul. Nós temos profundas afinidades históricas, culturais e políticas com essa região. Estamos a falar de um conjunto de democracias. Devemos aprofundar essas relações e nada melhor do que avançar com o tratado. Num tempo em que regressa em força o protecionismo e o mercantilismo, nós temos de manifestar sinais de abertura, um acordo de livre comércio e um acordo que visa regular de forma adequada as relações com outra região do mundo. Nós não queremos uma Europa fechada sobre si própria. Nós queremos uma Europa aberta. A Europa precisa de se relacionar com outras regiões do mundo. Precisamos de obter matérias‑primas que nós não temos no nosso continente. Precisamos de estabelecer relações comerciais que vão dinamizar as nossas economias e, por isso mesmo, é fundamental garantir finalmente a concretização deste acordo.

    Mas há uma coisa que aqui quero dizer. É legítimo, naturalmente, estar contra este acordo, mas o que eu tenho verificado, infelizmente, acho que em alguma esquerda e muita direita, é que há um verdadeiro discurso trumpista contra este acordo, porque é um discurso assente na falsificação da realidade e um discurso assente na tentativa de produzir o medo junto das populações. Façamos um debate sério, um debate na base dos factos, um debate na base daquilo que efetivamente está no acordo e não naquilo que alguns querem fazer crer que está no acordo, mas efetivamente não está lá. Este acordo é um acordo que deve, pode e deve ser discutido. Nós estamos aqui a iniciar essa discussão democrática. Somos um espaço aberto e democrático, mas temos a obrigação de o fazer com rigor.

    (O orador aceita responder a várias perguntas «cartão azul»)

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado Francisco Assis, se este acordo é assim tão bom, porque é que a Comissão está a querer impedir os Estados‑Membros de fazerem o seu escrutínio nacional? Porque é que a Comissão está a querer dividir o acordo em dois, para impedir o escrutínio nacional pelos Estados-Membros que eventualmente possam impedir a entrada em vigor deste acordo? Não acha que isto é a confirmação dos prejuízos que podem resultar deste acordo em termos ambientais, em termos económicos, em termos sociais? As preocupações que têm sido colocadas pelos agricultores, relativamente à destruição da sua atividade económica por uma competição desleal, com produções a custos mais baixos, mas com riscos para os consumidores, são preocupações objetivas, Senhor Deputado. Não as ignore.

     
       

     

      Francisco Assis (S&D), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado João Oliveira, não desvalorize a importância democrática deste Parlamento Europeu. O acordo vai ser discutido e vai ser votado aqui no Parlamento Europeu; e este Parlamento é a expressão também da vontade dos vários países, dos vários povos, dos vários Estados europeus. O acordo é, do meu ponto de vista, um acordo bom, é um acordo que protege, no essencial, os interesses europeus. Haverá alguns setores que podem perder. Em todos os acordos há sempre esse risco. Então aí temos de encontrar mecanismos, cláusulas de salvaguarda, fundos de apoio e é isso que está previsto. Portanto, esse discurso, que é um discurso que visa criar medo na sociedade europeia, junto de determinados setores da sociedade europeia, é um discurso que não serve os interesses daqueles que supostamente os senhores estão a representar e a defender.

     
       


     

      Francisco Assis (S&D), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Muito obrigado pela pergunta. O acordo, no essencial, como já tive oportunidade de dizer, é um acordo que garante e protege os vários setores económicos europeus. Nomeadamente no campo da agricultura, nós temos de fazer esse debate. Vamos ver quem ganha e, eventualmente, quem perde. Se houver alguns setores agrícolas europeus que venham a perder, evidentemente que nós temos, a nível europeu, de encontrar mecanismos de compensação, e é isso que temos feito ao longo dos anos. Se há um setor na União Europeia que tem beneficiado bastante dos apoios europeus é precisamente o setor da agricultura. É provavelmente o setor económico que mais tem beneficiado do apoio ao longo dos anos, ao longo das várias décadas de existência da União Europeia. Agora, o que também não é aceitável é o discurso que se faz em relação ao estado da agricultura naqueles países. Eu conheço esses países todos, visitei‑os várias vezes. Nesses países não vigora a lei da selva. São democracias, são democracias com Estados de direito e são democracias cada vez mais preocupadas em acompanhar as grandes agendas nas questões do combate às alterações climáticas, à desflorestação, etc. Também não façamos tão mau juízo dos países …

    (a Presidente retira a palavra ao orador)

     
       

     

      Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, vamos a decirles la verdad a los europeos. Ustedes no quieren agricultura, ustedes no quieren ganadería, ustedes no quieren pesca. Por eso, primero asfixian al sector primario con su tiranía verde y ahora vienen a rematarles con este Acuerdo con el Mercosur, un pacto que inundará Europa con carne hormonada, soja transgénica y otros productos que no estarán sometidos a ninguno de los estándares sanitarios y medioambientales que exigen a nuestros productores europeos.

    ¿Y cómo compite, señor comisario, un ganadero europeo que soporta el 15 % de costes regulatorios frente a una carne hormonada de Brasil que no cumple con ninguno de estos requisitos? Pues no compite, señor comisario, se arruina, y eso es precisamente lo que ustedes quieren. España ha perdido más de 70 000 explotaciones agrarias en la última década. Europa, más de cinco millones. Veo que no les parece suficiente. ¿Y saben qué es lo más indignante? Que vengan aquí a hablarnos de sostenibilidad, mientras destruyen el medio rural de los europeos; que nos hablen de competitividad, mientras condenan a nuestro sector primario a la ruina.

    Este Acuerdo es un chollo para las grandes multinacionales y una sentencia de muerte para la producción familiar, para el medio ambiente y, sobre todo, para la seguridad alimentaria de los europeos. Mientras el Partido Popular y el Partido Socialista lo aplauden, nosotros decimos alto y claro que no vamos a ser el vertedero agrícola de sus intereses globalistas.

    (La oradora acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       



     

      Veronika Vrecionová (ECR). – Paní předsedající, pane komisaři, já rozumím obavám zemědělců ze snížení cel, které přinese obchodní dohoda s Mercosurem, a proto s nimi musíme intenzivně jednat a hledat pro ně přijatelná řešení.

    Jsem ale hluboce přesvědčena, že volný obchod přináší zdravou konkurenci, snižuje ceny pro spotřebitele, vede k inovacím a investicím. Evropským firmám i zemědělcům nabízí dohoda nová stabilní odbytiště, přístup ke strategickým surovinám i levnější dovoz komodit, které neumíme sami vypěstovat. Dohoda navíc obsahuje evropské standardy pro bezpečnost potravin i kontrolní mechanismy. Dohoda s Mercosurem je také šancí pro evropské firmy v době, kdy hrozí obchodní válka s USA, kdy Putin svou agresí zablokoval obchod s Ruskem a Čína je bezpečnostně problematickým partnerem. Proto má dohoda mou podporu.

     
       

     

      Barry Cowen (Renew). – Madam President, Commissioner, colleagues, we face a new global reality today, with countries retreating from trade and turning to protectionism. Amidst this shift, it’s natural for the EU to seek new trading partners. In doing so, however, we must continue to uphold our principles by ensuring a level playing field.

    As it stands, the Mercosur deal lacks key guarantees and imposes demands on Europe’s farmers not matched by Mercosur nations. On the whole, for example, Ireland’s agricultural industry has three strategic goals, all with EU competences: extending the nitrates derogation, an increased CAP budget and stopping a Mercosur deal that farmers believe threatens beef exports.

    If the Commission were to provide meaningful assurances around the Mercosur deal and firm commitments on the derogations in the next CAP, I believe farmers’ views could shift. Our country, for example, presently enjoys an EUR 800 million trade surplus with Mercosur nations.

    This deal has the potential to bring about further opportunities, but good politics is ultimately about compromise. Good politics! And the question now is whether the Commission will prove its political astuteness by strengthening the deal and providing strategic assurances on the CAP and the derogation – or not!

     
       




     

      Lídia Pereira (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, tarifas é o assunto do momento. Fiat, Volkswagen, Renault estão entre as dez marcas mais vendidas no Mercosul. Pagam taxas de 35 %, tanto quanto a nossa indústria da moda, e os nossos vinhos, mundialmente reconhecidos, 27 %. Reduzir ou eliminar tarifas não será uma boa notícia. As terras raras que estes países têm e que nós precisamos para a transição energética? Devem ter reparado que o sistema elétrico do Báltico foi integrado na rede europeia há três dias. O investimento na nossa indústria de defesa? Queremos lançar satélites de baixa órbita, queremos usar caças Eurofighter ou Super Rafale em vez dos F-35 americanos? Queremos que o sistema de defesa SAMP/T Mamba seja uma alternativa ao Patriot? Pois é, mas o Brasil processa 89 % do nióbio a nível mundial e a Argentina, 11 % do lítio. Será que podemos mesmo deitar fora um acordo com o Mercosul? Não, não podemos.

    (A oradora aceita responder a várias perguntas «cartão azul»)

     
       

     

      Isabella Tovaglieri (PfE), domanda “cartellino blu”. – Onorevole Pereira, Lei ha citato delle case automobilistiche europee che, grazie a questo trattato, potrebbero finalmente vendere le loro auto in Sudamerica. Ma a Lei sfugge che oggi, grazie alle miopi politiche europee, queste aziende non vendono più un’auto in Europa. Stellantis nel 2024 ha registrato il -36 % di vendite di auto in Europa; 300 000 auto vendute: numeri da anni ’50. E questo perché, se nel 2025 non vengono eliminate le sanzioni, queste case automobilistiche, per rispettare i target, sa che cosa stanno già facendo? Stanno diminuendo la produzione di auto tradizionali. L’alternativa è acquistare certificati verdi da case che producono auto fuori dall’Europa. Quindi forse questi dazi anziché metterli, anzi…

    (La Presidente toglie la parola all’oratrice)

     
       



     

      Lídia Pereira (PPE), Resposta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhora Deputada, agradeço a pergunta, apesar de ter vindo mesmo à última hora. Como deve saber, ou pelo menos eu espero que saiba, porque de facto há muita desinformação que vem da sua bancada, há quotas previstas para a importação de produtos agrícolas, há mecanismos de controlo sanitário. E, contas feitas, a quantidade de carne a importar corresponde a cerca de um bife de vaca e a um peito de frango por cada europeu. Portanto, eu não estaria tão preocupada, porque já falámos e já ouvimos o Senhor Comissário relativamente às garantias e às salvaguardas que estão previstas no acordo para o setor agrícola. Temos de perceber que estamos a falar de geopolítica, e estarmos completamente cerrados nas nossas fronteiras vai ter consequências para o crescimento económico da União Europeia.

     
       



     

      Eric Sargiacomo (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, beaucoup de choses ont été dites. Je vais me concentrer sur les conditions de la réciprocité et, question centrale, d’un juste échange, tant pour un aspect de concurrence déloyale que sur le plan de la santé publique, de la sauvegarde environnementale ou encore des droits sociaux.

    En matière de sécurité sanitaire, si nous interdisons des produits sanitaires en Europe parce qu’ils sont CMR – cancérigènes, mutagènes, reprotoxiques – avérés par la science, alors il est de notre devoir de faire de cette interdiction une obligation absolue. Car la garantie de la santé est d’ordre public, ici et là-bas. Elle doit s’imposer à tout décideur, à tout traité, à tout accord. Cette exigence doit entraîner l’obligation de conformité des produits que nous importons, au-delà des contrôles douaniers aléatoires ou de limites maximales de résidus de pesticides, dont nous connaissons tous les failles.

    Ces produits doivent faire l’objet d’un véritable certificat de conformité délivré de façon indépendante, selon un cahier des charges établi par l’Union européenne. En l’absence d’une telle garantie, l’Europe engagera sa responsabilité pour mise en danger de la vie d’autrui, ici et là-bas. La confiance n’exclut pas le contrôle. Pour l’instant, les conditions de la confiance ne sont pas là, même pour un milliard hypothétique.

     
       

       

    PRESIDE: ESTEBAN GONZÁLEZ PONS
    Vicepresidente

     
       

     

      Gilles Pennelle (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, je voudrais vous parler d’un éleveur de poulets breton qui s’appelle Patrick.

    Il travaille longuement toute la journée et, le soir, il consacre de nombreuses heures sur son ordinateur à gérer le tsunami de vos normes: les 160 pages de règles que l’Union européenne a imposées à la filière volaille. Il a vu ses coûts de production augmenter, ses revenus s’effondrer.

    Il apprend un jour que Pedro, éleveur de poulets brésilien, va pouvoir vendre ses poulets chez lui, à des prix bradés. Il apprend que Pedro, lui, n’a pas de normes, ne respecte pas le bien-être animal, utilise même des produits phytosanitaires pour son maïs, alors que Patrick ne le peut pas, et que Pedro utilise des antibiotiques de croissance. Il n’a pas été écouté par la Commission.

    Alors, Patrick m’a demandé de vous poser une question, Monsieur le Commissaire: «Quels intérêts servez-vous pour m’imposer une telle injustice?» Il a même ajouté: «Vous direz au commissaire européen que je ne crois plus en son Europe.»

     
       



     

      Marta Wcisło (PPE). – Panie Przewodniczący! Panie Komisarzu! Umowa handlowa między Unią Europejską a Mercosurem przygotowana w tajemnicy przed rolnikami to nie szansa – mówię to z bólem – a wyrok na europejskie rolnictwo. Mercosur to czarna gradowa chmura, która zniszczy mikro, małe rodzinne gospodarstwa rolne już dziś z trudem stawiające czoła nieuczciwemu handlowi z krajów spoza Unii Europejskiej.

    Polski rynek za poprzedniej władzy zalały już produkty rolne niskiej jakości spoza Unii, takie jak zboże techniczne. Taki mamy wschodni Mercosur, Szanowni Państwo. Dodatkowo polscy rolnicy są obłożeni najbardziej rygorystycznymi restrykcjami. Wprowadzanie zatem na nasze rynki takich produktów jak zboże, mięso, tytoń i cukier z krajów Mercosur o niskiej jakości i cenie zabije polskie i europejskie rolnictwo, zagraża bezpieczeństwu żywnościowemu i zdrowotnemu.

    Szanowni Państwo, apeluję i proszę w imieniu polskich i europejskich rolników o solidarność całej wspólnoty w ochronie rynku rolnego, zdrowia konsumentów i bezpieczeństwa żywnościowego. Mówimy stanowcze „Nie!” produktom niskiej jakości, mówimy stanowcze „Nie!” niebezpiecznej umowie …

    (Przewodniczący odebrał mówczyni głos)

     
       

     

      Javier Moreno Sánchez (S&D). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, señorías, tras la patada que ha dado Trump al tablero comercial mundial es aún más evidente que tenemos que reforzar los lazos económicos y políticos con los países del Mercosur, con los que compartimos, además, valores, principios, intereses y cultura. Son y deben seguir siendo nuestros aliados y nunca el chivo expiatorio de las contradicciones de los populistas, como fue en su día el CETA.

    Este Acuerdo ofrece inmensas oportunidades a los agricultores y responde a sus preocupaciones con largos períodos transitorios, con seguridad y con ayudas a los sectores y productos sensibles. Abre un mercado de doscientos sesenta millones de consumidores a nuestras empresas y, especialmente, a nuestras pymes. Diversifica nuestro acceso a las materias primas críticas y abre los mercados públicos a nuestras empresas. Por último, ofrece garantías medioambientales, sociales y sanitarias que ahora no existen en el comercio entre los dos bloques.

    Por todo ello, los socialistas españoles creemos que es imprescindible aprobar este Acuerdo.

     
       


     

      Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez (Renew). – Señor presidente, señor comisario, Europa lleva más de veinte años negociando este Acuerdo y eso deja en evidencia la complejidad y el esfuerzo extra que necesita en materia de transparencia y de trabajo con los sectores. Parece que vamos a tener beneficios para automoción, maquinaría, herramientas, aeronáutica, servicios avanzados a la industria, productores de vino, lácteos, quesos. Pero también tenemos a parte de una sociedad que está preocupada y a un sector primario que arrastra, además, problemas derivados de la última reforma de la PAC.

    Hablemos claro: uso de hormonas, fitosanitarios y cumplimiento del Acuerdo de París, para garantizar un mercado justo, tienen que estar encima de la mesa. Y necesitamos claridad en torno a productos protegidos, productos cuya apertura va a ser gradual en cuanto al mercado y seguimiento que se va a hacer del impacto e incumplimientos que supondrían el fin del Acuerdo, así como medidas compensatorias y salvaguardas.

    Hay que trabajar todos estos meses que tenemos por delante, con mesas mixtas de trabajo y con el sector, para que, cuando ese Acuerdo llegue a este Parlamento y toque votarlo, podamos hacerlo en consecuencia y esto no sea una guerra entre sectores, sino un espacio de oportunidades colectivas y sociales equilibradas.

     
       

     

      Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez (PPE). – Señor presidente, en los Estados Unidos, aranceles; en China, competencia desleal; y, en Rusia, sencillamente la guerra. Este es el balance de las relaciones comerciales a las que nos enfrentamos actualmente. Para Europa el comercio siempre ha sido una herramienta económica, pero Trump, Xi Jinping y Putin lo han convertido en un arma política y con ello están poniendo en riesgo nuestra competitividad, nuestra prosperidad e, incluso, nuestra seguridad.

    Por eso, necesitamos alternativas, necesitamos urgentemente nuevos mercados y el Mercosur supone una oportunidad para impulsar a nuestros exportadores y diversificar nuestras cadenas de suministro.

    Pero no podemos cometer los mismos errores del pasado e ignorar las necesidades de nuestros agricultores y nuestros ganaderos. Tenemos la responsabilidad de darles garantías. Por eso, me parece buena noticia que el Acuerdo cuente con salvaguardas y medidas de reciprocidad sólida para proteger nuestro sector primario. Y todavía más importante es que la Comisión apueste esta legislatura por la reducción de la burocracia verde. Comercio, sí; simplificación, también.

     
       

     

      Dario Nardella (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, è indubbio che il nuovo quadro geopolitico che nasce dalle elezioni americane e l’influenza sempre crescente cinese sul Sud America impongono all’Europa un cambio di schema.

    Dobbiamo rafforzare il nostro impegno su tutti i mercati internazionali, giocare una leadership commerciale. L’Europa vive di export: il 30 % del GDP del nostro continente è legato all’esportazione, e questo vale ancor di più per un paese come l’Italia, il mio paese.

    Per questo il Mercosur, in linea di principio, è uno strumento utile, soprattutto per i settori industriali, come la chimica, le auto, le macchine. Tuttavia, Commissario, possono esserci problemi seri per l’agricoltura.

    Allora ci sono condizioni che la Commissione deve seguire. Primo: la reciprocità. Secondo: controlli con una dogana europea. Terzo: risorse per la promozione, perché non si può tagliare la PAC e poi promuovere il Mercosur. Quarto: questa compensazione di un miliardo di euro ci sarà o no? Quinto: il rispetto degli standard ambientali.

    Un accordo importante deve diventare un buon accordo.

     
       

     

      Ton Diepeveen (PfE). – Voorzitter, de overeenkomst tussen de EU en Mercosur biedt kansen, maar brengt ook vooral risico’s met zich mee. Onze boeren worden uitgeknepen en geconfronteerd met strenge regels, terwijl goedkope import uit Zuid-Amerika zonder problemen binnenkomt.

    Wat de voedselveiligheid betreft, blijkt uit het rapport van de Commissie dat Brazilië gebruik maakt van verboden groeihormonen. Toch blijft de Commissie beweren dat alles onder controle is. Dit vormt een gevaar voor de consument en is een dolksteek in de rug van onze boeren. Wat krijgen wij hiervoor terug? In Nederland een schamele 0,03 % economische groei, terwijl onze veehouders voor de bus worden gegooid.

    Als klap op de vuurpijl pompt Brussel ook 1,8 miljard EUR belastinggeld in Mercosur, waarvan een deel naar boeren in Brazilië gaat, terwijl onze eigen boeren in de kou staan. Er is geen gelijk speelveld, geen eerlijke handel, maar wel nog meer bureaucratie en import uit landen die lak hebben aan onze regels. Dit is waanzin. Schrap dit akkoord. Schroef de Green Deal terug, zodat onze boeren eindelijk uit dit moeras van klimaatwaanzin kunnen ontsnappen.

     
       

     

      Ana Vasconcelos (Renew). – Mr President, dear Commissioner, dear colleagues, let us be clear about what’s really at stake with the Mercosur agreement. It’s not just Europe’s economic future. It’s our international credibility after stalling this deal for more than 20 years. It’s about where we stand in a world where the global balance of powers is shifting and Europe is struggling to defend its interests.

    Some warn of threats to our industry and farmers. They’re missing the crucial point. Our economy doesn’t struggle because of international competition. It struggles under the weight of excessive regulatory burdens.

    This agreement cuts tariffs on key European exports while maintaining environmental standards. It gives small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of our economy, access to new opportunities in a market of nearly 300 million consumers. Yet some prefer to walk away because of fair competition. Here’s a real threat: not competition, but risk aversion; not trade, but excessive bureaucracy. We burden our businesses with excessive regulations, and then we wonder why we struggle globally.

    While we hesitate, China is acting fast. It has already replaced Europe as South America’s primary trading partner. The path to European competitiveness isn’t through isolation, it’s through strategic engagement.

     
       

     

      Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, l’accordo commerciale Mercosur con i paesi dell’America latina, pur rappresentando un’opportunità strategica, perché mira a rafforzare la competitività europea, diversificando le catene di approvvigionamento e riducendo la dipendenza da altri mercati, presenta però alcuni rischi e criticità che, soprattutto per il settore agroalimentare, meritano la nostra attenzione prima di procedere alla sua definitiva approvazione.

    Le nostre aziende agricole rispettano standard elevatissimi in termini di sicurezza, qualità, sostenibilità ambientale e benessere animale, a differenza di quelle dei paesi Mercosur. A fronte di ciò, dobbiamo prevedere controlli rigorosi per assicurare reciprocità nelle importazioni, prevenire concorrenza sleale a garanzia dei nostri agricoltori e dei nostri consumatori, così come dobbiamo rafforzare gli strumenti di tutela dei prodotti europei di indicazione geografica.

    Un’Europa competitiva non si costruisce solo con l’apertura dei mercati, ma anche con la tutela delle proprie aziende e delle proprie eccellenze. Questo accordo potrà definirsi equo se saremo in grado di garantire nuove opportunità, senza però sacrificare la nostra sicurezza e la nostra identità alimentare e soprattutto il futuro delle nostre imprese.

     
       

     

      Leire Pajín (S&D). – Señor presidente, se ha dicho que el Acuerdo con el Mercosur es muy relevante en términos comerciales, pero es sobre todo muy relevante en términos geopolíticos. Llevamos meses hablando de la necesidad de una autonomía estratégica de la Unión Europea. ¿Y con quién nos vamos a aliar si no es con una región como América Latina, con la que compartimos valores, con la que hemos defendido en el ámbito multilateral el Acuerdo de París o la Agenda 2030?

    Y, por supuesto, es importante que en este debate hablemos de lo que realmente contiene este Acuerdo, porque claro que somos sensibles a los elementos ambientales. Por eso, conviene decir que este Acuerdo incluye compromisos vinculantes para la protección de los bosques y de la naturaleza, que son fundamentales.

    También somos sensibles —como no puede ser de otra manera— a los elementos sociales. Por eso, es importante dejar bien claro que este Acuerdo también recuerda de forma muy clara los derechos laborales, la igualdad de género o los derechos de los pueblos indígenas y de los pequeños productores de aquí y de allí.

    Y somos también sensibles a los sectores agrícolas —los cítricos, por ejemplo—, pero queremos decirles que este Acuerdo recoge cláusulas y tenemos herramientas como el observatorio europeo o, por supuesto, las cláusulas de salvaguardia, que vamos a utilizar para defender un buen Acuerdo para los intereses de nuestros agricultores aquí y allí.

     
       




       

    Solicitudes incidentales de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»)

     
       


     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Mr President, dear Commissioner, colleagues, I heard a lot of misinformation and lies when we were speaking about sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Colleagues, European sanitary and phytosanitary standards are not negotiable!

    The EU has very stringent standards to protect human, animal and plant health, and any product sold in the EU must comply with the European Union standards. I have been Commissioner for food safety and health, I know very well that it is to remain unrelated and unaltered regardless of a trade agreement.

    EU animal, plant and health and food safety import controls are very strict, and we can control all third countries. It doesn’t matter which agreement it is.

    I welcome this Mercosur agreement because I was involved in 2019, of course Paris Agreement and trade and sustainable development inclusion is very well done, and we need to go forward and see it.

     
       


     

      Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE). – Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, Monsieur le Commissaire, connaissez-vous l’œstradiol 17? C’est une hormone stéroïdienne produite par les follicules ovariens et le placenta. Elle a été synthétisée pour devenir une hormone de croissance, dans l’élevage, pour faire grossir et grandir les animaux. En 2013, il a été reconnu que les résidus de cette hormone de synthèse sont retrouvés dans notre corps, dans nos eaux de surface. C’est donc pour cela que, dans sa grande sagesse, notre institution a interdit son utilisation et l’importation de la viande en contenant.

    L’œstradiol 17 favorise les cancers, en particulier le cancer du sein. C’est même la première cause de cancers chez les non-fumeuses. Le mois dernier, la Commission européenne nous a présenté un rapport indiquant que, premièrement, les pays du Mercosur utilisaient massivement l’œstradiol et, deuxièmement, les contrôles pharmacologiques y étaient défaillants.

    Alors comment, en important 90 000 tonnes de viande du Mercosur, allez-vous nous garantir notre santé? Allez-vous aussi proposer un fonds de compensation? Mes chers collègues, Monsieur le Commissaire, il n’existe pas, pour les femmes, de solution de remplacement. Il n’existe pas de solution de remplacement pour les enfants des mères endeuillées.

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, o acordo do Mercosul é bom e mau. É um acordo bom para as multinacionais do agronegócio, mas é um acordo mau para os pequenos e médios agricultores e para os consumidores. É um acordo bom para os grandes grupos industriais das potências da União Europeia que têm agora abertos os mercados da América Latina, mas é mau para os restantes países, que continuarão a não ter condições de desenvolver a sua produção industrial. O acordo do Mercosul é bom para os grandes grupos do setor dos serviços que têm agora aberto o mercado da contratação pública na América Latina. Mas é mau, em geral, para as micro, pequenas e médias empresas, para os pequenos e médios agricultores, para todos aqueles que, produzindo de acordo com regras e práticas tradicionais, se verão confrontados com uma concorrência desfavorável com a inundação dos mercados de produtos a mais baixo custos, porque produzidos em condições diferentes daquelas que lhes são impostas. Se este acordo é bom e mau, é óbvio que é bom para uma minoria e mau para uma imensa maioria. E é por isso que a Comissão não quer que os Estados façam o seu escrutínio nacional e está a procurar dividir o acordo em dois para impedir esse escrutínio. Essa é uma opção com a qual não concordamos e que não aceitaremos.

     
       


     

      Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, o acordo com o Mercosul é um acordo justo, um acordo equilibrado e um bom acordo do ponto de vista geopolítico, económico e social. Não restam dúvidas que para a indústria é um bom acordo e que temos de incluir garantias do ponto de vista do setor agrícola. Estão previstas garantias adicionais, nesta última versão do acordo, que passam por: fases graduais de implementação, quotas, máximas e salvaguardas, em especial para a carne bovina, subvenções e apoio financeiro aos eventuais agricultores afetados, proteção para mais de 350 produtos europeus, condicionamento à entrada de produtos do Mercosul que não cumpram as regras ambientais e sanitárias, e respeito pelo Acordo de Paris e pelo combate ao desmatamento ilegal. Excelente trabalho feito pela Comissão Europeia. Já demorámos 20 anos a chegar aqui. Parem de mentiras, parem e vamos acelerar e assinar este acordo.

     
       

     

      Cristina Maestre (S&D). – Señor presidente, las preguntas que nos tenemos que hacer son: ¿queremos ser una potencia fuerte o aislarnos en un mundo competitivo? ¿Queremos fortalecer nuestra industria —que invierte más de 340 000 millones de euros— o regalarle el mercado a China, a la India o a los Estados Unidos? ¿Queremos que nuestros agricultores sigan pagando tasas del 28 %, del 35 %, o incluso más, o abrir un mercado libre de aranceles?

    La ultraderecha está en un laberinto nocivo para la Unión Europea: apoya los aranceles de Trump, pero a la vez no quiere apoyar un comercio abierto con Latinoamérica. Yo creo que esto es un sindiós y tendrán que explicarlo también al tejido productivo.

    Dicho esto, claro que tenemos que ser exigentes y garantistas con los sectores más sensibles, claro que sí. Por eso, yo le pido a la Comisión Europea que dé certidumbres y también transparencia por el bien de nuestros agricultores. Hay que fortalecer las medidas de salvaguardia para los sectores sensibles. Pedimos más controles en fronteras, para que se cumplan los contingentes establecidos, proteger la liberación parcial de esos productos sensibles, claro que sí, y, por supuesto, que nos diga de dónde va a salir ese fondo de compensación y si va a ser lo suficientemente fuerte, por si hubiera que hacer uso de ello.

     
       


     

      Λευτέρης Νικολάου-Αλαβάνος (NI). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, αυτές τις μέρες οι αγρότες στην Ελλάδα δίνουν διαρκή και δίκαιο αγώνα για την παραμονή στη γη τους, που γίνεται αφόρητη από την ευρωενωσιακή ΚΓΠ, το τσάκισμα του εισοδήματος από την κυβέρνηση, τις εξευτελιστικές τιμές στους μεγαλέμπορους, την ανύπαρκτη προστασία από καταστροφές, την υποστελέχωση κρατικών υπηρεσιών που είναι αποτέλεσμα της δημοσιονομικής σταθερότητας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης.

    Επιπλέον, δυσκολεύουν περαιτέρω την κατάσταση οι διακρατικές συμφωνίες τύπου Mercosur που θα αυξήσουν τις αθρόες εισαγωγές αγροτικών προϊόντων, τις ελληνοποιήσεις που πλήττουν το εισόδημα των παραγωγών. Κόντρα στην κυβερνητική πολιτική, κόντρα στις μειωμένες απαιτήσεις που καλλιεργεί η συμπολιτευόμενη αντιπολίτευση, οι βιοπαλαιστές αγρότες παλεύουν για την επιβίωσή τους διεκδικώντας μείωση του κόστους παραγωγής με κρατική παρέμβαση, αφορολόγητο πετρέλαιο στην αντλία, μείωση της τιμής του ρεύματος στα 7 λεπτά, 100% αποζημιώσεις, εγγυημένες τιμές πώλησης των προϊόντων τους που να εξασφαλίζουν το εισόδημά τους, πλήρη στελέχωση κρατικών, γεωπονικών και κτηνιατρικών υπηρεσιών.

     
       


     

      Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, stimați colegi, dezbaterea privind acordul Mercosur stârnește multe emoții și ridică întrebări la care încă nu s-au oferit răspunsuri clare. Realitatea este însă că, în timp ce fermierii europeni sunt supuși celor mai stricte norme de mediu, în alte părți ale lumii aceste reguli pur și simplu nu există. Europa are datoria să-și protejeze fermierii și să le ofere garanții solide pentru a-și putea continua activitatea. Aceștia nu trebuie să fie sacrificați pe altarul neputinței noastre de a le oferi certitudini într-o lume atât de incertă, generată de inflație, secetă, inundații sau războiul din Ucraina.

    Ei nu cer privilegii sau tratament preferențial. Cer doar dreptul de a concura în mod corect. Compensațiile provizionate a fi acordate fermierilor trebuie să fie dublate de relaxarea condițiilor de producție în agricultură, domnule comisar, iar acordul trebuie să fie echitabil, să creeze oportunități reale de comerț și să nu distrugă agricultura europeană. Este datoria noastră de a găsi cele mai bune soluții atât pentru fermierii europeni, dar și pentru consumatori.

     
       

     

      Jean-Marc Germain (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, les dernières négociations ont-elles permis d’améliorer le projet d’accord commercial entre l’Europe et le Mercosur? La réponse est oui, mais aucun des efforts que nous pourrions faire pour continuer à l’améliorer ne changera ce fait: un accord de libre-échange, c’est parfois un mieux pour le consommateur, des secteurs gagnants, mais c’est toujours une kyrielle de perdants, dont aucun fonds de compensation ne répare jamais les vies brisées et les territoires déstabilisés.

    Un accord de libre-échange, c’est une perte de souveraineté, comme viennent de nous le rappeler les décisions de Trump. Quand le temps des avantages réciproques s’estompe, vient le temps du chantage, auquel il est bien difficile de résister quand la dépendance à l’autre s’est installée. Le doux commerce, en réalité, n’existe pas.

    Le libre-échange, c’est certes plus de liberté individuelle de commercer, mais moins de liberté collective, cette liberté de choisir, en Europe, d’être un continent qui met l’humain d’abord et pose la préservation du vivant comme un impératif. Alors oui pour un partenariat avec les pays du Mercosur, mais il existe 1 000 autres voies de coopération.

     
       



     

      Marko Vešligaj (S&D). – Poštovani predsjedavajući, kad raspravljamo o ovome sporazumu o MERCOSUR-u trebamo uzeti u obzir i specifičnosti manjih zemalja, kao što je Hrvatska, u kojoj kostur poljoprivrede čine zapravo mali poljoprivrednici i oni će biti najviše pogođeni ovim sporazumom – razni sektori, od stočarstva, ratarstva, peradarstva, pa i vinarstva, gdje sam svjestan toga da se otvara jedno veliko tržište, prvenstveno za vinarsku industriju velikih zemalja, dakle tržište MERCOSUR-a. Međutim, ono što mene brine jest mogućnost da ćemo biti preplavljeni jeftinim vinima upitne kvalitete iz Južne Amerike i na taj način – i u kombinaciji s onim s čime se suočava danas vinarski sektor, a to su, podsjetit ću vas, bolesti vinove loze, da Europska komisija opet najavljuje sheme grubbing up-a, odnosno krčenja vinograda – može stvoriti brojne opasnosti za vinarski sektor u manjim zemljama kao što je Hrvatska, ponavljam, koja nema problema s prekomjernom proizvodnjom, gdje mali vinari čine temelj te proizvodnje i koja želi štititi i razvijati svoje autohtone sorte.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin, míle buíochas as ucht an t-urlár a thabhairt dúinn uilig. Mar a dúirt tú, tá an díospóireacht seo an-tábhachtach.

    There are those who are against Mercosur, but they are against everything. But there are also many speakers here this morning who are pro-trade but say they cannot support Mercosur in its current form. That would reflect the position of the new Irish Government – made up of a coalition of Renew and EPP – and I think it needs to be addressed very strongly by the Commission.

    There are issues like deforestation, sustainability, production standards – especially in Brazil – and then the effect, especially on beef farmers, who feel that they will be decimated if Mercosur goes ahead. So the Commission has a job to do to convince them otherwise, give them proper compensation, if that is needed, and also look at a package that might include other issues that they are concerned about, especially the reform of the CAP, etcetera.

    Commissioner Šefčovič, you did a great job in relation to Brexit. Now is the chance for you to step up here. I am very confident you will!

     
       

       

    (Fin de las intervenciones con arreglo al procedimiento de solicitud incidental de uso de la palabra («catch the eye»))

     
       

     

      Maroš Šefčovič, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members of the European Parliament, I was privileged to attend three very politically charged, very politically dynamic debates this week. And I want to thank many of you for highlighting that, in this geopolitical era, the free trade agreement with Mercosur, as Mr Lange has underlined, will greatly contribute to our social welfare state, it will create new jobs and open new opportunities for all sectors of our economy, including for our farmers and for our agri‑food sectors. Moreover, it’s also good for the environment and sustainability.

    Let me underline that, in all aspects, we are much better off with the agreement than without it. This agreement binds the Mercosur countries to strong commitments on the fight against deforestation, and it gives us an important platform for cooperation on our climate ambition.

    On top of this, the overall benefit of this agreement is also good for our farmers and agricultural community. As some of you know, I consulted widely with farmers, with small farmers, family farmers, organic farmers and also big farmers as well. And two weeks ago, I was with many of you, together with the Commissioner for Agriculture, Mr Hansen, in the discussion on this precise issue in the Agriculture Committee of this House.

    I do all this because I have the utmost respect for our farmers, and I have the utmost respect for the debate we have in this House. And I know how crucial a role our farmers are playing in the area of our food security and our food sovereignty and, of course, for the welfare of our society.

    Honourable Members, I was surprised that Ms Aubry asked me how did I dare to come here to defend this agreement? I came because you invited me. And I will always be here when you invite me, because I respect this House, I respect democratic debate and, despite all the charged debate we had here today, I am proud of this agreement. And I believe that, through discussion, through explaining, through presenting facts and figures, we can convince the majority, most of you, that we indeed are doing the right job.

    In this debate, we unfortunately didn’t cover the fact that this agreement is actually the biggest free trade agreement the EU ever concluded. Just for your information, this FTA is four times bigger than our free trade agreement with Japan. We also overlooked the important signal we are sending out in this difficult time where the trade barriers are being erected again – and we discussed it on Tuesday – and also in the time where we are losing our privileged relationship with countries so close to us historically, culturally, economically, like the countries of Mercosur, to China.

    Unfortunately, we didn’t mention, at all, the strategic importance of the supply of critical raw materials and opportunities these deals open for our businesses and the need to diversify our economic relations. The debate almost completely focused on agriculture, so let’s look at this again.

    As you know, the EU is an agri‑food export superpower. Last year, our farmers exported products of the value of EUR 228 billion, and our farmers and our agri‑food exports have a trade surplus of EUR 70 billion. EUR 70 billion! Can you imagine how our farmers would do without these export opportunities? Do you believe that we would be able to be so strong in exports if the large network of our FTAs would not open these new markets for all of them, big farmers, small farmers, our agri‑food sector?

    Into Mercosur itself, our farmers are already now exporting more than EUR 3.2 billion of products, and they managed to do it with import duties which are up to 35 % more than they should be and without any protection for our GIs. And this agreement is going to eliminate these import duties. It’s going to protect our GIs, so there will be no imitation of our famous cheeses, our wines and spirits. And I believe that this would greatly improve export opportunities for our farmers.

    Mr Cowen and Mr Kelly have been asking and highlighting the importance of strategic discussion on agriculture, and the Commission is absolutely prepared for this. Commissioner Hansen is working on the new strategic vision on agriculture, and I can tell you that we do our utmost to look into all possible ways how to lower reporting obligations for our farmers, how to cut the red tape for our farmers, so the farmer whom one of the honourable Members was referring to as ‘Patrick’ would have an easier life.

    But I’m also convinced that this debate we have right now, for the benefit of Patrick and all other farmers, should be based on true facts and figures. And I want to be very clear that the food products in the European Union being domestically produced or imported must comply with the EU sanitary and phytosanitary rules, including the EU’s strict policies on GMOs, and the Commission conducts regular audits in third countries and works closely with the Member States’ authorities that perform official controls and enforcement activities on imported food to ensure that non-compliant products cannot enter the EU market.

    The Member States, of course, are looking in great detail into this agreement and are also carrying out their own audits and their own studies. And there were quite a few honourable Members from Ireland who intervened in this debate, and therefore I think that they should also look at the study which was commissioned by the Irish Government. It was done by the Independent Economic and Sustainability Impact Assessment on Ireland and the Mercosur agreement. This independent study forecast an increase in Ireland’s exports to Mercosur by 17 % and an increase of imports of 12 %. It will increase manufacturing export of Ireland by 1.4 billion and agri‑food exports by 10 to 20 million.

    We will be very happy from the Commission’s side to have this discussion with every single Member State, because we have the figures, we have a convincing argument and we are open for this open, frank debate which would truly be based on the facts.

    I would also kindly ask you not to spread information which is simply not true. And I totally agree with Ms Pereira who was calling for this. No import of hormone beef. No chlorinated chicken will ever be imported to the European Union. Mr Andriukaitis was working on that for five years and he was absolutely crystal clear on that. The problem Ms Sbai was referring to was spotted and immediately resolved. This type of beef has never entered the EU market and never will. We do inspections regularly and we also control at the import.

    On the so-called non‑violation complaint instrument – which I explained many times, but I’m happy to do again – it’s not new. It’s fully compatible on the WTO framework. And this instrument is only forward‑looking and addresses effects that could not be foreseeable at the time of the conclusion. So it doesn’t concern the CBAM. It doesn’t concern any of the any of the laws, any of the acquis which are valid right now, which already entered into force. And I’m sure that Ms Bricmont knows about it. So under no circumstances is our regulatory freedom affected, nor will it be. So let’s not use this argument any more.

    To conclude, Mr President, honourable Members, I would like to thank you for this debate, and I’m ready to continue the discussion with you, with the farmers and with all stakeholders. At the same time, I believe that we would advance our debate and do better service to our citizens, to our farmers if we respect true facts, if we speak about real figures, and if we stay true to what was really agreed and not repeat in every debate the things which are simply not true.

     
       

     

      President. – Thank you, Commissioner. I am sorry for being so strict with time, and I insist that this debate should have had much more time.

    The debate is closed.

     

    4. Threats to EU sovereignty through strategic dependencies in communication infrastructure (debate)


     

      Glenn Micallef, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members of the European Parliament, dear colleagues, I want to first and foremost welcome this exchange today. Our mission is to improve Europe’s tech sovereignty, security and democracy in an increasingly volatile geopolitical situation.

    A short glance at the news from Europe and beyond is enough to show how significant a task this is. Our own backyard, the Baltic Sea, experiences security challenges and hybrid attacks, including to the security and resilience of critical submarine infrastructures. This kind of threat offers an example of the pressing need to improve our preparedness.

    Europe has put in place a robust legal framework to protect its critical infrastructure against physical and hybrid security threats. But today, the transposition and implementation of the critical entities’ resilience and the network and information security tool directives are still slow. We continue to support Member States and call on them to transpose both directives as soon as possible.

    Moreover, the 2024 recommendation on secure and resilient submarine cable infrastructures provides a set of recommended actions at national and EU level aimed at improving submarine cable security and resilience. The European Union is also making substantial investments in cable infrastructures through the Connecting Europe Facility. Since 2021, over EUR 420 million has been allocated to 50 projects and more.

    Looking ahead, we also earmarked another EUR 542 million, for a total investment of nearly EUR 1 billion, and the Commission is considering further measures not only to boost investment, but also to increase the security and resilience of these infrastructures.

    The security of 5G and next-generation networks, the backbone of our economy, remains very high on the European Union’s agenda, but the current implementation by Member States of the 5G cybersecurity toolbox is still not satisfactory. New capacities have to be provided by existing or new actors to fill gaps left by high-risk vendors in the supply chains. The Commission will urgently explore ways to speed up its enforcement and implementation.

    A particularly sensitive domain is that of critical communications used by public security and safety authorities, civil protection or medical emergency responders. We need to ensure that they cannot be interfered with, disrupted or compromised via components and devices from non-trusted third country suppliers. This is why increasing our strategic autonomy is one of the key objectives of the European critical communication system, which will connect the communication networks of first responders in all Member States and Schengen countries by 2030.

    But the challenge is even broader than that. Europe must remain competitive and must have the technologies it needs in order to secure its digital infrastructure. We must close our innovation gap with global partners. Future applications, such as automated driving or telemedicine will run on advanced networks that look increasingly like a computing continuum, ranging from chips and high-speed processors to connectivity, cloud, edge, software, quantum technologies and AI. This is why we need to enhance and better coordinate research efforts and multidisciplinary cooperation, as well as why we need to improve access to finance by EU actors, including by coordinating public and private investments.

    To reach this goal, the 2024 white paper on digital infrastructure needs envisaged the creation of a connected collaborative computing network to set up end-to-end integrated infrastructures and platforms for telco cloud and edge.

    Colleagues, this debate is also an excellent opportunity to update you on the IRIS2 satellite constellation, a beacon of the EU’s commitment to deliver secure, resilient and sovereign connectivity, demonstrating the recent but high ambition of the European Union in the field of secure satellite connectivity with precursor governmental services provided by the GOVSATCOM programme.

    IRIS2 was launched in 2023, paving the way for an operational state-of-the-art connectivity system. Thanks to this EU-owned infrastructure capability, enabling also commercial services based on private sector investments, the European Union will be able to maintain its competitive edge and shield its sovereignty.

    Work has been ongoing on this since last December, with the signing of the concession contract with industry to develop the constellation and start the industrial supply chain in view of a timely delivery of the system. Full IRIS2 operational services are expected by 2030. This means that Member States, close partners and EU institutions will benefit from a broad set of reliable and secure applications, such as border and maritime surveillance, crisis management, critical infrastructure protection, and various security and defence operations.

    There are, of course, competing non-EU solutions in the market. We remain, however, convinced that Europeans prefer guaranteed access to reliable connectivity without critical third-party dependencies, and as IRIS2 comes onto the scene, this will be a crucial selling point to all Member States as well as businesses.

    The incidents that have become an all too frequent reality of heightened geopolitical tensions highlight the importance of such sovereign solutions. IRIS2 will also integrate the European quantum communication infrastructure. This pan-European initiative will help to strengthen the protection of our governmental institutions, their data centres, hospitals, energy grids and more.

    Moreover, we are also supporting the development of quantum technologies to ensure that critical components use EU technologies. EuroQCI will help to counter the threat that quantum computers will pose to current encryption methods, but it will not be enough on its own. It will be complemented by our initiatives to advance and deploy post-quantum cryptography in the European Union. Last year, we issued the recommendation to coordinate the transition to PQC for public administrations and other critical infrastructures in the European Union.

    Finally, let me stress that Europe can only respond to today’s challenges by acting together with our partners, especially with NATO. In a hybrid threat environment, close civilian and military cooperation is and remains essential. I can assure you that the European Commission is steadfast in its commitment to foster a secure, resilient, but also innovative digital environment, and we continue to count on your support in building this future together.

     
       

     

      Jörgen Warborn, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, the strength of our Union is in its openness, the ability to trade, to innovate and to compete globally. However, in today’s reality, Europe’s communication infrastructure is heavily reliant on global actors, and Europe must be in a position where no country or individual company can dictate our digital future.

    I believe in a strong and resilient Europe, one that competes globally without excessive state interventions, but through strategic interventions, free markets and international cooperation. By that way, individuals and businesses can choose between multiple actors and alternatives.

    To go forward in this situation, I think the Union must do a lot of things, but let me mention three of them.

    Firstly, we need to encourage private investments in new communication infrastructure, not through subsidies or state control, but through reducing red tape and creating smart incentives.

    Secondly, we need to deepen our partnership with trusted partners to ensure openness works in Europe’s favour rather than making us dependent.

    Lastly, as the Commissioner started his intervention with, we need to safeguard Europe’s connectivity by taking coordinated action to protect submarine cables. This state terrorism has to end and we have to work together, coordinatedly, to make that sure – we have to reinforce our cable security, our repair capabilities, but also invest in the expansion of new submarine cables to enhance our redundancy and ensure resilience in our communication infrastructure.

     
       


     

      Csaba Dömötör, a PfE képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Európa lemaradása a digitális iparágak terén egyre látványosabb és hozzáteszem egyre zavaróbb. Ez szuverenitási kérdés és stratégiai cél, hogy ezt a lemaradást leküzdjük.

    A digitális színtérnek azonban van egy másik fontos terepe, ez pedig a véleményszabadság. Miközben Amerikában elzavarják a Facebookos cenzorokat, az uniós intézmények azon törik a fejüket, hogy tovább erősítsék a cinikus módon tényellenőrzésnek nevezett rendszert. Mindezt a DSA-rendelet köntösében. Növelik az ezen ügyködő bürokráciát, és a Facebook után most már az X-et és a TikTokot is célba vették.

    Tudjuk, hogy miért van ez. Egyre nagyobb a szakadék az itteni politikai elit szándékai és a választók akarata között. Erre az itteni többség és a Bizottság nem irányváltással válaszol, hanem azzal, hogy el akarja hallgattatni a kritikus hangokat.

    Ez nem fog menni. A digitális szuverenitás nem csupán technológiák kérdése, hanem a szabadságé is. Nincsen szuverenitás szabad véleménynyilvánítás nélkül. Legyenek benne biztosak, hogy a patrióták minden eszközzel küzdenek majd a cenzúra ellen.

     
       

     

      Piotr Müller, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo! Do budowania niezależności infrastrukturalnej, w tym niezależności technologicznej, potrzebne są środki finansowe. Unia Europejska powinna zdecydować, na co te środki z własnego budżetu chce przeznaczać. Są trzy takie duże polityki, które w tym samym czasie prowadzimy: jest to polityka bezpieczeństwa, w tym bezpieczeństwa technologicznego, polityka społeczna, która pozwala żyć obywatelom na odpowiednio wysokim poziomie, i niestety polityka Zielonego Ładu, która powoduje, że te koszty życia się zwiększają oraz że generowane są różnego rodzaju wydatki w tej polityce.

    Jeżeli chcemy być faktycznie niezależni technologicznie, to powinniśmy przeznaczać dodatkowe środki finansowe na ten obszar. Ale żeby to było możliwe, musimy zrezygnować z jednej z tych trzech polityk, które wymieniłem, i powinniśmy zrezygnować z polityki Zielonego Ładu, która w tej chwili ogranicza rozwój i niezależność Europy. Druga rzecz, powinniśmy przestać obrażać się na swoich partnerów technologicznych z różnych kontynentów na świecie i z nimi współpracować po to, aby również w Europie powstawały odpowiednie technologie.

     
       

     

      Michał Kobosko, on behalf of the Renew Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, let me start with thanking you, on behalf of the Renew Europe Group, for the Commission’s immediate reaction to the security threats related to the Baltic submarine cables and the ongoing work to increase security of our critical infrastructure. We also need to look for more synergies between digital and energy networks, while working on detection, prevention and repairing of the undersea infrastructure that is nowadays, especially in the Baltic Sea, under constant and real threat.

    Going above sea level, I can strongly encourage the Commission to do the utmost to invest in the European critical communication infrastructure. Europe cannot allow itself to be dependent on third countries when it comes to comes to strategic elements of communication infrastructure.

    So I welcome the IRIS2 planned constellation, with its 290 satellites. It is a huge step forward for Europe and we should appreciate it. But we should also keep in mind that it won’t be enough. We will need to do much more beyond 2030.

    In order to achieve Europe’s tech sovereignty, we need to have everyone on board. All Member States need to join the efforts, instead of making constant deals to secure military and government communications with third-country providers, which can put EU security in jeopardy.

    Prime Minister Meloni, please join us, and let’s keep Europe great and secure together. Do not waste the money of Italian taxpayers on senseless deals with global oligarchs.

     
       



     

      Sergey Lagodinsky (Verts/ALE). – Thank you very much. As every morning during the past weeks, we are waking up to a new reality. Now, it’s the biggest push against Europe’s security interests by Trump. But frankly, we had known it all along. In this marriage, we have over-relied on one partner. In strategic communications, it’s not even a country: it’s one unelected, unaccountable man, driven by personal whims. Today, Musk can decide if, at a time of war, we can continue talking to each other, or not.

    Our biggest strategic risk on this side of a potential frontline of a future war is communication failure. Low-Earth orbit satellites revolutionise global communication in times of crisis, but their infrastructure is in the hands of a few private non-Europeans: Starlink today, Amazon or OneWeb tomorrow. So this is not the way to go.

    IRIS² will only be valid and will be functioning in 2030. It is good that the US Space Act is part of a Commission working programme. We have seen this. But we need clear strategic goals: equitable division of use of space; common standards for compatibility of systems; enforced cybersecurity, which closes the gaps of NIS 2; massive investment in efficient launchers, in reusable satellites, in an independent space supply chain. It is not about science fiction; it is about our survival!

     
       

     

      Pernando Barrena Arza, en nombre del Grupo The Left. – Señor presidente, señor comisario, reducir la dependencia estratégica en el ámbito de las infraestructuras críticas de comunicación es crucial para avanzar con paso decidido en el concepto de soberanía europea. Un sistema de telecomunicaciones tecnológicamente soberano y seguro y de obediencia europea es una herramienta imprescindible no solo en el ámbito de las infraestructuras críticas de comunicación, sino en todas las infraestructuras de comunicación en general. Europa no puede estar a merced de grandes compañías que representan intereses geopolíticos ajenos a los europeos.

    En estos momentos otras potencias y particularmente los Estados Unidos están utilizando su posición avanzada en este tema como herramienta de hard power, que, como todos sabemos, no se limita únicamente a la amenaza del poder militar, sino también a la presión económica y tecnológica.

    Que los Estados europeos sean dependientes de Starlink, como acaba de hacer Italia, es un desastre porque deja un ámbito tan delicado como es el de las comunicaciones críticas en manos de una visión del mundo que solo piensa en cómo segar la hierba bajo los pies a Europa y dejarla sin opciones en el concierto internacional.

    Apostar por la soberanía de Europa exige disponer de medios soberanos y asegurarnos de que el despliegue de tecnología necesario compense su huella de carbono y permita también el acceso del público a las redes de forma universal.

     
       

     

      Sarah Knafo, au nom du groupe ESN. – Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, nous sommes devant deux grands mouvements historiques: l’un est technologique, l’intelligence artificielle, l’autre est politique, le vent de liberté qui souffle sur l’Occident. Or, nos règlements, comme le règlement sur les services numériques, le règlement sur les marchés numériques et le règlement MiCA contre le bitcoin, sont à contretemps de ces mouvements. Vous renvoyez au monde une image à la fois technosceptique et liberticide de notre continent.

    Si vous ne voyez le progrès technique que comme une menace, alors l’innovation se fera sans l’Europe et même contre l’Europe. Faisons les choses dans l’ordre. L’innovation doit précéder sa régulation. Sans innovation, nous n’aurons ni prospérité ni souveraineté. Sans innovation, nous aurons toujours des Emmanuel Macron pour offrir nos données de santé sur un plateau à Microsoft.

    Nous ne voulons plus d’un système absurde où la puissance publique saupoudre nos entreprises de subventions tout en les accablant des taxes les plus élevées du monde et tout en offrant nos marchés publics les plus stratégiques à des entreprises américaines.

    Montrons à notre jeunesse qu’elle n’a pas besoin de partir aux États-Unis ou en Asie pour écrire l’histoire. Nous voulons de la liberté, de l’énergie, des marchés, moins d’impôts, des capitaux et des cerveaux. Osons la liberté! Ayons confiance dans le génie des nations européennes.

     
       

     

      Lena Düpont (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Herr Kommissar! Kommunikation ist nicht nur ein zutiefst menschliches Bedürfnis mit gesellschaftlicher Wirkung. Kommunikationsfähigkeit in Krisenzeiten ist wesentlich für die Aufrechterhaltung staatlicher und gesellschaftlicher Ordnung. Dafür braucht es verlässliche Strukturen und Mittel. Das gilt im Kontext nationaler Sicherheit ebenso wie im europäischen. Informations- und Kommunikationsflüsse gewährleisten zu können, Lagebilder herzustellen und Führungsfähigkeit bereitstellen zu können, hat entscheidenden Einfluss auf den Verlauf unterschiedlicher Szenarien und auf unsere Fähigkeit, sie zu bewältigen.

    Der Niinistö-Bericht zur Preparedness Union schreibt uns nicht ohne Grund viele Dinge ins Stammbuch, unter anderem auch den beschleunigten Roll-out eines sicheren, autonomen, interoperablen Systems für Kommunikation und Informationsaustausch; die Beschleunigung und den Ausbau des European Critical Communication System auf der zivilen und der militärischen Seite; die Abhängigkeiten in Lieferketten zu vermeiden; Forschung, Entwicklung, Produktion sicherheitsrelevanter Produkte in Europa; Komponenten und Dienstleistungen so attraktiv zu machen, dass wir sie nutzen können.

    Preparedness, liebe Kollegen, braucht einen umfassenden Ansatz, der aus den üblichen Silos auch ein Stück weit rausgeht. Deswegen werden ITRE, SEDE, LIBE, IMCO, TRAN, INTA, SANT – wir alle werden unseren Beitrag leisten müssen. Und deswegen schließe ich vielleicht mit der, neben der Priorisierung von Haushaltsmitteln, wichtigsten Forderung von Niinistö: Sicherheitsvorbehalte und Auswirkungsüberprüfung in allen Gesetzgebungsverfahren, die wir hier im Haus haben.

     
       

     

      Alex Agius Saliba (S&D). – Sur President, l-infrastruttura diġitali saret importanti daqs l-infrastruttura tradizzjonali bħall-pontijiet u t-toroq tagħna. U jiena li ġej minn Malta, Stat Membru żgħir, gżira, nagħraf aktar l-importanza ta’ din l-infrastruttura, speċjalment għall-cables tal-internet taħt il-baħar, li huma daqstant kruċjali għall-funzjonament tal-ħajja taċ-ċittadini tagħna u tal-infrastruttura kritika f’kull Stat Membru.

    U allura naħseb wasal iż-żmien sabiex l-esperiment li għamilna bit-twaqqif tal-aġenzija ENISA, li tara li jkollna koordinament fejn tidħol iċ-ċibersigurtà, cybersecurity, tkun estiża wkoll għal din l-infrastruttura kritika billi jew titwaqqaf aġenzija separata, jew inkella l-ENISA tingħata aktar u aktar kompetenza sabiex naraw li jkollna aktar koordinazzjoni, aktar protezzjoni, fejn tidħol din l-infrastruttura.

    Barra minn hekk, għandna bżonn inkomplu nsaħħu r-reżiljenza u għalhekk, li hu Digital Sovereignty Fund għandu jitwaqqaf mill-aktar fis possibbli.

     
       


     

      Ondřej Krutílek (ECR). – Vážený pane předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, bez infrastruktury, která bude bezpečná, nebudou fungovat digitální technologie, na kterých závisí naše ekonomika a společnost. Jsem rád, že Česká republika je v této oblasti průkopníkem. Tzv. Pražské návrhy na budování 5G sítí z roku 2019 předcházely souboru 5G Toolbox v následujícím roce.

    5G Toolbox je třeba důsledně aplikovat napříč celou Evropskou unií, ale musíme také dále snižovat strategickou závislost na zemích, které nejsou našimi důvěryhodnými partnery. Potřebujeme mít v EU regulatorní prostředí, které bude usnadňovat život našim firmám. Musíme více podpořit výzkum a vývoj a taky nám chybí funkční systém certifikace kybernetické bezpečnosti. A v téhle souvislosti, pane komisaři, ptal jsem se na to i na výboru, stále ještě od vás nemáme hodnotící zprávu týkající se aktu o kybernetické bezpečnosti. Tak ji prosím dodejte.

     
       

     

      Bart Groothuis (Renew). – Mr President, dear Commissioner, the main takeaway from Georgia Meloni’s close manoeuvres with Elon Musk and his company, Starlink, is that it sends a clear signal to Europe. The European alternative to Starlink – ‘IRIS square’, not ‘IRIS two’, Commissioner – must be accelerated. Europe should work harder and faster.

    Sure, like many colleagues have said, for Italy there are clear and imminent dangers if Elon Musk encrypts and handles government communications. Italy can easily become a signals intelligence colony of the United States. It’s true that Italy is not supporting Europe’s commitment to technological leadership, to security and to self-determination, as you said, Commissioner, and I agree. But the biggest problem is, of course, our own lack of ambition with the IRIS2 programme.

    If Europe does not rally behind IRIS2 and the GOVSATCOM programme and accelerate its own progress, the future of European sovereignty in space communication will be decided by Elon Musk. So feel the heat: finish IRIS2 four years earlier than planned, move fast and build things!

     
       

     

      David Cormand (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs, mes chers collègues, l’Europe est pieds et poings liés: 92 % de nos données sont stockées à l’étranger, nos infrastructures livrées aux GAFAM et aux fournisseurs chinois. Et que fait l’Europe? Elle parle de souveraineté, mais en réalité elle se soumet. L’extrême droite se dit patriote, mais laisse l’Europe devenir un territoire vassalisé, incapable de protéger ses citoyens et ses entreprises face aux lois extraterritoriales américaines et à la dépendance à l’égard des fournisseurs chinois.

    Pendant ce temps, le numérique avale 10 % de l’électricité mondiale et la tendance explose. Et que fait-on? On laisse les GAFAM dicter leurs règles pendant que Bruxelles dérégule, retire des lois et plie face aux lobbys. À force de reculer, elle abandonne la bataille sans même l’avoir livrée.

    Il est temps de dire stop! L’Europe doit investir dans ses propres réseaux, développer un cloud souverain, sécuriser ses infrastructures et imposer des règles strictes, à l’image de nos valeurs démocratiques. Car une Europe qui dépend, c’est une Europe qui subit, et une Europe qui subit, c’est une Europe qui s’efface. Nous devons reprendre le contrôle. Pas demain, pas plus tard, maintenant.

     
       




     

      Bruno Gonçalves (S&D). – Senhor Presidente, Caros Colegas, há cinco anos, com a pandemia, ficou claro que não podemos depender da China para bens de saúde. Dissemos que aprenderíamos com o erro. Depois, há três anos, foi a vez de perceber que depender da Rússia para energia barata era também um erro. Voltámos a dizer que aprenderíamos. E hoje, apesar de Trump nos ameaçar quase diariamente, há quem queira depender mais dos Estados Unidos da América, seja para armamento, energia ou plataformas digitais. Se a Europa quer menos vulnerabilidade, é agora que devemos evitá‑la. A nova infraestrutura de comunicações, desde cabos submarinos à rede 5G, é fundamental para a nossa autonomia e deve ser construída pelos europeus. A criação de novas redes sociais e de informação é também crucial para a nossa soberania. Por isso, em vez de aprendermos com os velhos erros, evitemos cometê‑los.

     
       

     

      Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, on l’a vu à Mayotte, où la France s’est tournée vers le réseau américain Starlink de Musk. L’accès à Internet par satellite est un véritable enjeu de souveraineté. En ce sens, Iris2 est un pas dans la bonne direction, mais ce n’est qu’un petit pas, au moment où les Américains font des bonds de géant.

    D’abord sur le nombre de satellites déployés: 290 prévus côté européen, contre 7 000 prévus côté américain. Ensuite, concernant le calendrier, nous prévoyons au mieux un lancement en 2030, alors que la constellation Starlink compte déjà 6 300 satellites en orbite basse.

    Ce n’est pas un problème de budget: 10,6 milliards d’euros prévus, cela nous permet de rivaliser avec les budgets quasi équivalents de SpaceX et d’Amazon. Mais il faut voir comment on l’utilise, ce budget. Lancer un satellite européen coûterait 35 millions d’euros. Pour ce prix, les Américains peuvent en lancer 200. Et, pendant que nous blablatons, eux le font.

    Pour résumer, nos satellites, aussi technologiques soient-ils, seront lancés trop tard et pour trop cher. Nous avons les cerveaux, les technologies et les budgets. Finalement, le problème c’est vous. Vivement qu’on vous remplace!

     
       

     

      Elena Donazzan (ECR). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, abbiamo un tema, riguarda i bisogni e il tempo. I bisogni sono evidenti, è un bisogno di sicurezza ora, immediato. E quello del tempo è che non abbiamo tempo.

    IRIS2 resta un programma di grande rilevanza e va sostenuto in ogni condizione, ma non è pronto. Sarà pronto nel 2030, secondo le previsioni, ma sappiamo che le previsioni spesso vanno oltre.

    Ma il tema del bisogno è evidente e in tante occasioni qui ne abbiamo trattato. La preoccupazione – e rispondo ai colleghi di Renew, che sembrano essere così interessati a ciò che accade in Italia – è esattamente questa: l’Italia e il governo Meloni hanno ben chiaro che cosa significa avere bisogni di sicurezza per l’Italia, per l’Europa, per le imprese italiane ed europee.

    E, dall’altra, quello che accade rispetto alla tempistica: noi siamo aperti a ogni confronto, con al centro sempre la sovranità e l’indipendenza, in questo tema così delicato che è quello della sicurezza delle comunicazioni.

     
       


     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – A Uachtaráin, a Choimisnéir agus a chairde, the security and resilience of our digital networks are more vital now than ever, and the European Union’s ability to reduce these dependencies is under close scrutiny. I have raised the issue of Ireland’s vital role in global communication infrastructure before. Ireland’s waters serve as the gateway for over 75 % of the northern hemispheres undersea cables, making us a strategic hub for transatlantic data traffic. This makes us uniquely vulnerable to disruptions in this infrastructure.

    We cannot underestimate the importance of safeguarding these undersea cables, which are essential not just for Ireland’s connectivity, but for the economic stability and security of the entire EU. The protection of our communication infrastructure is not just a national issue; it is a European one. We cannot afford to be over-reliant on external providers, particularly in such an uncertain geopolitical climate. We need a coordinated EU approach to ensure the security of our undersea cables and to invest in the resilience of our satellite infrastructure.

    I welcome the Commission’s commitment to investing EUR 865 million to improve digital connectivity, including quantum communication networks and undersea cables. But as we implement the Commission’s work plan for 2025, we must prioritise the protection of these strategic assets.

    Bímis ar an airdeall, níl aon am le cailliúint, go raibh maith agat a Uachtaráin.

     
       

     

      Giorgio Gori (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, tra i ritardi tecnologici accumulati dall’Europa spicca quello delle infrastrutture di comunicazione satellitare.

    Se tutto va bene, i 290 satelliti della costellazione IRIS2 saranno disponibili nel 2030. Nel frattempo, gli oltre 6 000 satelliti Starlink già in orbita e altri 30 000 in via di autorizzazione sono un dato di fatto. Il gap competitivo è macroscopico e va colmato.

    Si possono immaginare nel frattempo soluzioni ponte, però con due chiare condizioni. La prima è relativa alla protezione e sicurezza dei dati di comunicazione, che devono rimanere in capo agli Stati membri. La seconda è che ogni accordo industriale sia iscritto in una cornice istituzionale, che coinvolga la dimensione europea.

    È urgente un piano di investimento europeo che combini politiche industriali, di difesa, investimenti in ricerca, oltre che un maggiore coordinamento della spesa pubblica. La debolezza strutturale in questo settore ci rende vulnerabili e dipendenti e mette a rischio la sovranità tecnologica e democratica dell’Unione europea.

     
       

     

      Ивайло Вълчев (ECR). – Г-н Председател, г-н Комисар, години наред отсъстваше стратегическият поглед за технологическото развитие на Съюза. И едва сега, когато глобалната политика се промени и конкурентите ни започнаха да предприемат радикални политики в областта на търговията, Европейската комисия се сети, че съществуват такива стратегически зависимости, които застрашават сигурността и конкурентоспособността на европейските икономики. Комисар Виркунен го каза — 42% от 5G комуникациите минават през т. нар. високорискови доставчици, разбирайте през Китай, защото основните оператори са китайски — Huawei и ZTE. В същото време изостава Европейският съюз и в сателитната свързаност. Там водещи са САЩ и Starlink. Разбирам, че отговорът на Комисията за всички предизвикателства и проблеми е създаването на нови регулации. Обаче аз смятам, че за да гарантираме сигурността, конкурентоспособността и суверенитета на Европейския съюз, е нужно да изграждаме инфраструктура, капацитет, диверсификация на доставчиците и търсене на надеждни партньори.

     
       

     

      Tomáš Zdechovský (PPE). – Pane předsedající, když jde o naší bezpečnost, Evropa nemůže být závislá na cizí zemi. Je přeci naprosto hloupé, pokud některé členské státy chtějí používat pro utajenou vládní komunikaci Starlink. Přitom Evropa má řešení. Máme tady náš GOVSATCOM a IRIS2, což jsou spolehlivé platformy, které nejsou ohrožovány cizími zájmy a máme skrze ně nezávislost a autonomii, která nebude ohrožovat nás uvnitř členských států.

    Dámy a pánové, je naprosto nezbytné, aby Evropská unie urychlila nasazení GOVSATCOM a IRIS2 a nabídla členským státům bezpečnou alternativu. Všechny evropské bezpečnostní složky, včetně agentury Frontex, musí povinně využívat Galileo a GOVSATCOM pro šifrovanou komunikaci.

    A za třetí, masivně musíme podpořit členské státy, aby investovaly do evropské infrastruktury místo spoléhání na neevropské dodavatele. Naše bezpečnost nesmí být v rukou cizích firem, které nám mohou jediným tlačítkem naši komunikaci vypnout.

     
       

     

      Lina Gálvez (S&D). – Señor presidente, estamos debatiendo mucho esta semana sobre la reordenación del orden mundial y la necesidad de garantizar la autonomía estratégica tecnológica para la Unión Europea, para la supervivencia de nuestras democracias y, en definitiva, del propio proyecto europeo y debemos conseguirla para garantizar realmente el desarrollo de nuestra propia inteligencia artificial, la resiliencia económica y, como digo, el propio proyecto europeo.

    El potencial acuerdo del Gobierno de Italia con Starlink —el servicio de comunicaciones por satélite de Elon Musk— es paradigmático y debemos saber que la conexión entre la política, los negocios y las amistades no es inocua y tiene implicaciones muy directas en sectores estratégicos de nuestra economía y en nuestra seguridad, en nuestras libertades de toda Europa, no solo de Italia.

    Por eso, debemos acelerar y financiar proyectos como el Iris2, porque, frente a actores divisorios, lo que necesitamos es más Europa y más democracia.

     
       


     

      Paulius Saudargas (PPE). – Mr President, dear colleagues, it is a textbook reality that when an unfriendly state prepares for military aggression, it begins with disinformation, cyber‑attacks and disruption of communication infrastructure. This strategy has been evident for decades and we have witnessed it when Russia attacked Ukraine.

    The same tactics to disrupt communication networks are being observed in various parts of the European Union itself – for example, the recent undersea cable sabotage in the Baltic Sea. Our sovereignty is only as strong as our resilience, including the resilience of our strategic infrastructure.

    Information is power, and the ability to control and protect our communication networks is a fundamental pillar of security. Yet the EU remains dangerously exposed to external dependencies in this domain.

    Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia recently disconnected from the BRELL electricity grid. For years, the Baltic states relied on an energy system that could be manipulated externally. For years, we invested in infrastructure to finally break free.

    This example must serve as a broader lesson for the EU. We must extend this thinking to our communication networks, ensuring that they remain secure, autonomous and resilient against external threats.

    A Europe that cannot safeguard its own communications infrastructure is a Europe at risk.

     
       

     

      Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D). – Mr President, dear colleagues, recent events have proven once again that technology is power. The digital infrastructure, such as submarine cables, 5G networks, satellites and AI, are critical for our economy, security, health care and daily lives. And yet, almost 50 % of 5G communications rely on foreign communication infrastructure. Dependency on non-EU providers limits our autonomy and exposes us to risks that are beyond our control.

    We must increase the investment in EU technology. Prioritising secure and EU home-grown technology will safeguard us, strengthen our cybersecurity, drive innovation and guarantee long-term competitiveness. The time to act is now. True sovereignty can only be achieved by investing and ensuring that the EU tech sector can survive and remain competitive in this global digital race.

     
       

     

      Eszter Lakos (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A kommunikációs infrastruktúráink rendszere biztosítja a modern társadalom működéséhez szükséges feltételeket, ezért ellenőrzése és védelme stratégiai jelentőségű.

    A kommunikációs infrastruktúrák jó része külső szereplőktől függ, ami súlyos biztonsági és gazdasági kockázatokat rejt magában. Gondoljunk csak bele. Az 5G-hálózataink, a felhőszolgáltatásaink jelentős része nem európai kézben van. Ez nem csupán technológiai függőség, hanem egyben biztonsági kérdés is.

    Amikor kritikus adataink külső szervereken utaznak, amikor stratégiai döntéseink más hatalmak infrastruktúráján keresztül születnek, valójában feladjuk a szuverenitásunk egy részét. Éppen ezért a külső befolyás csökkentésére van szükség.

    Az EU-nak sürgősen cselekednie kell. Be kell fektetnünk saját technológiai megoldásainkba. Fejlesztenünk kell az európai alternatívákat, és meg kell erősítenünk a kibervédelmünket. Csak így biztosíthatjuk, hogy Európa továbbra is független, erős és versenyképes szereplő maradjon a világpolitika színpadán. Kezünkbe kell vennünk a digitális jövőnk irányítását, vagy elfogadjuk, hogy mások írják számunkra a szabályokat. Az idő pedig sürget.

     
       

     

      José Cepeda (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, Europa ¿está o no está en guerra? Yo creo que estamos en guerra. Estamos en una guerra híbrida y, por primera vez en muchísimas décadas, no somos lo suficientemente conscientes de la situación que estamos atravesando. Tenemos que invertir en nuestra seguridad y en nuestra defensa, en nuestras infraestructuras críticas de telecomunicaciones.

    Y para ser realmente soberanos solamente tenemos que hacer dos cosas: invertir de una forma importante en tecnología, pero no en cualquier tecnología, en nuestro desarrollo tecnológico, e invertir también en una mayor cooperación de nuestros sistemas de inteligencia, para precisamente proteger de una forma eficiente todas las infraestructuras críticas de telecomunicaciones. En este caso hay numerosísimos trabajos que desarrollan institutos de investigación, como por ejemplo Max Planck; tenemos que esforzarnos para que se visualicen mucho más. Y tenemos que generar nuestros propios recursos si realmente queremos ser soberanos y protegernos de lo que nos está hoy invadiendo de una forma directa.

     
       


     

      Brando Benifei (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, il dibattito su Starlink in Italia ci ha posto un doppio interrogativo: possiamo affidarci per comunicazioni del governo e degli apparati di intelligence e di difesa ad aziende fondate e guidate da chi oggi pubblicamente supporta forze filo-Putin e anti-UE, con l’uso di potenti mezzi di comunicazione e di risorse illimitate? E, qualora adottassimo sistemi come Starlink, possiamo rischiare che il governo americano ne interrompa le funzionalità, come è accaduto in una occasione in Ucraina?

    Io credo serva equilibrio e approfondimento. Vale per l’Italia, che ho usato come esempio, e vale per l’Europa. Non possiamo precluderci nessuna soluzione tecnologica, ma quando si tratta della sicurezza nazionale ed europea dobbiamo essere certi di mantenere il controllo e la riservatezza necessaria.

    In ogni caso, dobbiamo portare avanti i nostri progetti. L’Unione ha già lanciato il progetto IRIS2 per una connettività satellitare sicura. È in ritardo questo progetto. La Commissione deve impegnarsi a realizzarlo più velocemente insieme agli Stati membri.

    E poi le crescenti tensioni geopolitiche. La dipendenza da fornitori esterni per infrastrutture cruciali è un tema non solo rispetto ai satelliti, ma anche per i cavi sottomarini, le tecnologie mobili. Si mette a rischio, se non si lavora su questo, l’autonomia strategica dell’Europa.

    Dobbiamo fare di più, adesso e insieme. Non perdiamo altro tempo, perché ne va della nostra libertà.

     
       



       

    (Se suspende la sesión durante unos instantes)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: VICTOR NEGRESCU
    Vice-President

     

    5. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 12:30)

     
       


     

      Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, l’article 10 de notre règlement intérieur exige des députés qu’ils préservent la dignité du Parlement, et l’article 17 dispose que les députés sont responsables des actes de leurs assistants.

    Ces règles ont été piétinées hier soir. Sous la direction et en présence de Mme Manon Aubry, présidente de groupe, un attroupement de députés et d’assistants français d’extrême gauche ont tenté d’empêcher la tenue d’une conférence ici même, au Parlement européen, en vociférant des injures et des slogans diffamatoires à l’entrée de la salle de conférence.

    Nous demandons que des sanctions soient prises. Ce sont des violations inacceptables de notre règlement intérieur. Nous n’allons pas nous laisser intimider par des apprentis révolutionnaires islamo-gauchistes et antisémites.

    Ces actes sont graves. Il vous faut, Monsieur le Président, Madame la Présidente Metsola, prendre des sanctions et éviter ainsi les prochaines actions que ces gens-là préparent. C’est votre responsabilité, Madame la Présidente du Parlement européen. Nous attendons les mesures que vous prendrez pour préserver l’exercice de la démocratie.

     
       

     

      Manon Aubry (The Left). – Monsieur le Président, l’événement qui était organisé hier par le groupe ESN portait sur la remigration. La remigration, c’est la déportation de personnes qui sont européennes en dehors de l’Union européenne.

    Monsieur Garraud, en prenant la défense de cet événement, vous montrez le vrai visage de l’extrême droite, qui est celui aujourd’hui d’un projet raciste et xénophobe.

    Alors oui, Monsieur Garraud, nous avons protesté pacifiquement. Oui, Monsieur Garraud, vous nous trouverez à chaque fois – à chaque fois! – sur votre chemin. À chaque fois que vous organiserez des événements racistes dans les locaux de notre Parlement européen, vous nous trouverez ici pour protester, parce que le racisme n’a pas sa place, ni ici au sein du Parlement européen, ni à l’extérieur.

     
       


     

      Thijs Reuten (S&D). – Mr President, thank you for your patience, and thank you, colleagues. On behalf of my group – and I hope many more – I would like to ask our President to convey our deepest concerns about yesterday’s statements by President Trump and his government. We all want peace for Ukraine, but the terms and conditions emerging are bad for Ukraine, bad for Europe and bad for the rules-based order. Just good for Putin!

    The EU and other European allies are not part of the discussion. That is unacceptable and risky. An emergency Council meeting before the weekend should be on the table, ensuring a united message to our US friends that we are not going to do it like this.

    Not about Ukraine, without Ukraine; not about Europe, without Europe!

    (Applause)

     

    6. Voting time

     

      President. – This being said, based on the recommendations of the services we will move directly to the vote.

     

     

      President. – The next vote is on the repression by the Ortega‑Murillo regime in Nicaragua, targeting human rights defenders, political opponents and religious communities in particular (see minutes, item 6.2).

     

     

      President. – The next vote is on the continuing detention and risk of the death penalty for individuals in Nigeria charged with blasphemy, notably the case of Yahaya Sharif-Aminu (see minutes, item 6.3).

     

     

      President. – The next vote is on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (see minutes, item 6.4).

     


       

    (The vote closed)

     
       

       

    (The sitting was suspended at 12:47)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: CHRISTEL SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

     

    7. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 15:01)

     

    8. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

     

      President. – The minutes of yesterday’s sitting and the texts adopted are available. Are there any comments? No. The minutes are approved.

     

    9. Cross-border recognition of civil status documents of same-sex couples and their children within the territory of the EU (debate)


     

      Glenn Micallef, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, I would like to thank you for proposing a debate on the recognition of civil status documents of same‑sex couples and their children within the Union.

    Families, in particular rainbow families, can currently face difficulties in having their marriage or partnership or the parenthood of their children recognised in another Member State, for example, when they move to another Member State or returned to their Member State of origin. The recognition in a Member State of civil status documents on marriage, partnerships and parenthood issued in another Member State is at the basis of the right to free movement and an essential element of the construction of a Union of equality.

    The Court of Justice ruled in its 2018 judgment in the Coman case that already today Union law on free movement requires Member States to recognise, for certain purposes, civil status documents on marriage or partnerships issued in another Member State, irrespective of the sex of the spouses or partners.

    This recognition obligation aims to enable Union citizens and their spouses or partners, including same‑sex couples, to benefit from rights under Union law, such as the right to travel to or take up residence in another Member State, or to be treated equally in a host Member State in respect of all matters within the scope of the Treaty, even if that host Member State does not provide for same‑sex marriage or same‑sex partnerships. But let me be clear: this does not require Member States to provide, in their national law, for the institution of same‑sex marriage.

    Similarly, the Court of Justice confirmed in its 2021 judgment in the VMA case that the Member States are already required under Union law free movement to recognise a civil status document on the parenthood of a child issued in another Member State. This recognition obligation aims to enable all children and their parents, including children with same‑sex parents, to benefit from their rights under Union law, such as the right to travel to or take up residence in another Member State, and in their right to travel documentation even if the host Member State does not allow parenthood by same‑sex couples.

    The Commission considered that the protection of children’s rights in cross‑border situations should be extended, and in 2022, it adopted a proposal for a regulation that would require Member States to recognise civil status documents on parenthood issued in another Member State for all purposes.

    The regulation would require Member States to recognise parenthood to enable all children to also benefit from their rights under national law, such as the right to inherit from either parent in another Member State, the right to receive financial support from either parent in another Member State, or the right to be represented by either parent in another Member State on matters such as their schooling and health. This recognition obligation would apply irrespective of how that child was conceived or born, and irrespective of the child’s type of family, therefore also applying to children with same‑sex parents.

    The proposal would facilitate the recognition of parenthood by harmonising the Member States’ rules on private international law, that is, rules that determine which Member State’s court would be competent to establish parenthood in cross‑border cases, which national law would apply to establish parenthood in cross‑border cases, and how judgments and public documents on parenthood issued in one Member State should be recognised in another Member State.

    The proposal also provides for the creation of a European certificate on parenthood – a certificate that children or their parents could use to prove children’s parenthood in another Member State.

    As the proposal concerns rights going beyond rights for which recognition is already granted under Union law, the proposal had to be adopted under the Union’s competence to adopt measures on family law with cross‑border implications, pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Such measures must be adopted by the Council by a unanimous vote, after having consulted Parliament. Parliament gave a large support to the proposal in December 2023. In the Council, the Member States are discussing the proposal’s provisions constructively, and progress is gradually being made.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly, thar ceann an Ghrúpa PPE. – Go raibh maith agat a Uachtaráin agus go raibh maith agat a Choimisinéir, aontaím leat sa mhéid a dúirt tú.

    We are faced with a very important question. Should same sex couples and their children receive the same recognition and protection of their civil status across all EU Member States? The answer is clear: yes.

    This is about ensuring equality and fairness for all families across Europe. This is not a question of ideology, but simply a question of fundamental human rights.

    The European Union is founded on the principles of equality, dignity and freedom. When a same-sex couple legally marries in one Member State, or when their child is legally recognised as theirs, that legal status should not dissolve at a border. A family is a family, whether they live in Dublin, Warsaw, Madrid or Budapest.

    Yet today, many same-sex couples and their children find themselves in legal limbo simply because they move between Member States. A child recognised as the legal offspring of two parents in one country may suddenly find themselves without legal guardianship in another. This is not just an inconvenience. It is a violation of their rights, creating insecurity, fear and unnecessary suffering. Worse still, this legal uncertainty directly infringes on one of the fundamental pillars of the EU: the right to free movement.

    What freedom is there if crossing a border can strip away a person’s legal relationship with their child? No EU citizen should have to choose between their right to live and work anywhere in the Union and the legal security of their family. Yet that is precisely the choice some families are forced to make.

    This Parliament has a duty to defend all families. EU law must guarantee that civil status documents – marriages, partnerships, birth certificates – are recognised across borders, regardless of the gender of the parents or spouses.

    The European Court of Justice has already affirmed that all EU citizens, including same sex families, must be able to move freely without discrimination. Now we need our legislation to reflect this. We must ensure that legal rights are already granted by one country, are not stripped away by another. This is about legal certainty, respect for human dignity and the freedom of movement that is the heart of the of the European project.

    Families should not have to fear crossing a border. Children should not lose their legal parents overnight. We have a responsibility to ensure that love, commitment and parental care are recognised and respected no matter where in the EU they exist. Let us choose the path of equality, dignity and fundamental rights.

    Tugaimis, agus seasaimis suas dár gclann i ngach áit san Aontas agus aitheantas a thabhairt dóibh i ngach aon Bhallstát.

     
       

     

      Krzysztof Śmiszek, w imieniu grupy S&D. – Pani Przewodnicząca! Zasada wzajemnego uznawania dokumentów między państwami członkowskimi. Zasada wzajemnego zaufania. Zasada równości bez względu na orientację seksualną. Zasada swobodnego przepływu osób. Zasada zakazu dyskryminacji. To są podstawy funkcjonowania Unii Europejskiej.

    Dzisiaj powiem Państwu o sytuacjach, prawdziwych sytuacjach, w których te zasady w Unii Europejskiej nie obowiązują. Prawo Unii Europejskiej nie obowiązuje, jeżeli po spędzeniu 15 pięknych lat ze swoim partnerem w Polsce, umiera on we Włoszech i musisz sprowadzić jego ciało do kraju, jak w przypadku Polaków – Krzysztofa i Łukasza. Te zasady nie istnieją kiedy zawierasz związek małżeński z miłością swojego życia w Danii albo w Portugalii. W Polsce ten związek nie ma żadnego znaczenia. Twoja miłość w świetle prawa nie istnieje, tak jak miłość polskiej pisarki Renaty i jej partnerki. Tak jak miłość aktywistów Dawida i Jakuba. Tysiące polskich, słowackich czy rumuńskich par jednopłciowych zawiera związki małżeńskie i wychowuje dzieci w Niemczech, w Portugalii, Holandii, Szwecji czy Hiszpanii. Kiedy podróżują do Polski, Bułgarii czy Słowacji, ich związki małżeńskie już nie istnieją i ich rodzicielstwo w świetle prawa zostaje odrzucone. Ich życia są unieważnione. Stają się niewidzialni. Stają się dla siebie obcymi osobami.

    Podstawą Unii Europejskiej jest wolność poruszania się po jej terytorium. W jaki sposób ta wolność jest respektowana, jeżeli w jednym kraju jestem mężem i ojcem, a w drugim nikim. Jeżeli odbiera się mi moją tożsamość, moją miłość i moją rodzinę w momencie, kiedy wsiadam do pociągu w Berlinie, a wysiadam we Wrocławiu czy Warszawie. Artykuł 21 Karty Praw Podstawowych zakazuje dyskryminacji ze względu na orientację seksualną. Czy na pewno tak jest w Unii Europejskiej? Panie Komisarzu, czas zakończyć tę jawną dyskryminację. Czas na działanie Unii Europejskiej i Komisji Europejskiej.

     
       

     

      Paolo Inselvini, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, signor Commissario, i bambini, la parte più fragile, coloro che hanno bisogno di protezione più di tutti, devono avere la priorità. Questo in generale, ma anche e soprattutto per il dibattito odierno. Siamo tutti d’accordo, credo e spero, su questo aspetto.

    E allora perché qualcuno vuole sacrificare i diritti dei più piccoli sull’altare dell’ideologia? Perché si vuole esaudire a tutti i costi i desideri, più o meno legittimi, degli adulti? I bambini hanno il diritto ad avere un padre e una madre. Non perché lo decidiamo noi, brutti e cattivi, non perché lo decide uno Stato, ma perché così è, senza alcuna possibilità di smentita.

    Avere dei bambini, invece, non è un diritto. Avere dei figli non è un diritto che può essere esaudito a tutti i costi. Questo semplicemente, perché le persone non sono delle cose.

    Ecco perché mi sorge un dubbio. Evidentemente, la discussione di oggi è fatta per ingannare. È un inganno: un inganno da parte di chi vuole legittimare la barbara pratica dell’utero in affitto, ossia la mercificazione della donna, dei bambini e della vita.

    E se questo è il vostro obiettivo, bene, sappiate che ci troverete pronti alle barricate. Saremo l’argine che fermerà la vostra furiosa marea ideologica. Non smetteremo mai di ribadirlo: i bambini possono nascere solo da un padre e una madre, solo da un uomo e da una donna. Ed è assurdo dover sempre ricordare ciò che è ovvio. Ma se ci costringerete, noi lo riaffermeremo ogni giorno con coraggio. Non arretreremo un centimetro nella difesa della famiglia, della donna e dei bambini.

     
       

     

      Fabienne Keller, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire Micallef, chers collègues, la montée de l’extrême droite en Europe représente une menace grandissante pour tout le monde, et plus particulièrement pour la communauté LGBTI. En témoigne la récente mesure du gouvernement Meloni, qui vise à annuler les enregistrements des actes d’état civil des enfants des couples de même sexe. En Italie, plus de 20 000 enfants élevés par des couples de même sexe sont ainsi menacés par la remise en cause de leur filiation légale.

    Aujourd’hui, dans l’Union européenne, ce sont plus de 2 millions d’enfants qui pourraient faire face à une situation dans laquelle ce lien avec leurs parents n’est pas reconnu. Il est donc urgent d’agir maintenant, d’autant plus que, Monsieur le Commissaire, la solution, nous l’avons déjà trouvée, vous l’avez rappelé.

    La Commission européenne a proposé, il y a deux ans déjà, un règlement pour harmoniser cette reconnaissance et introduire un certificat européen. Cette reconnaissance ne permettrait pas simplement de mettre fin à l’incertitude, mais elle offrirait également une garantie réelle de protection des droits et l’égalité pour les familles.

    Alors, chers collègues, qu’attendons-nous pour la mettre en œuvre? Avec mon groupe Renew Europe, nous portons haut et fort les valeurs européennes d’égalité. J’appelle donc les États membres à faire avancer cette proposition, essentielle pour la sécurité juridique pour tous, pour l’égalité, pour la protection des enfants dans l’Union européenne. Nous devons cela à tous les enfants européens.

     
       

     

      Kim Van Sparrentak, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group. – Madam President, dear colleagues, this summer I am getting married and I honestly can’t wait to call my beautiful fiancée my wife. I can’t wait to celebrate with all our friends and family and use our legal rights to be recognised as partners for life.

    And two weeks later, one of my best friends is also getting married and I know he is as excited as me to tie the knot with his girlfriend. But the sad reality is that within our union of equality, my friend and I aren’t equal, because there are still Member States that disavow a marriage between me and my girlfriend. They are allowed to prevent us from accessing our social security or our claims to residency and they can disregard the other if we have to make unthinkable medical choices. They are still allowed to hinder us in our right to free movement. Some marriage certificates are apparently more meaningful than others.

    And this is definitely not about me. It is about baby Sara, who is a toddler by now, and her mums, who have been fighting for their child not to grow up stateless. This is about Adrian Coman, whose partner was prevented from living with him in his home country of Romania. It is about Arian Mirzarafie-Ahi not having to fight for the legal gender recognition he already obtained, especially when the possibilities are limited and dehumanising.

    The courts are clear: freedom of movement means that if you are a parent in one country, you are a parent in every country. If you are a spouse in one country, you are a spouse in every country. If you obtain legal gender recognition in one country, you obtain legal gender recognition in every country.

    Commission, I’m looking forward to you putting this into law and I’m especially looking forward to seeing that happen within the new LGBTIQ equality strategy.

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Verehrte Kollegen! Ich wundere mich schon, dass wir heute die Tagesordnung nicht geändert haben. Sie haben es wahrscheinlich mitbekommen: Ein Weltereignis von Weltrang hat sich gestern ereignet. Die Präsidenten Trump und Putin werden einen Friedensprozess in Gang setzen, was die Ukraine betrifft. Die Kommission, das Parlament, die EU spielen dabei keine Rolle. Da hätte ich mir ehrlich gesagt gewünscht, dass wir heute über dieses Thema reden. Nun ist es so. Wir reden jetzt heute über das Problem gleichgeschlechtlicher Paare.

    Die Kommission propagiert jeden Tag pausenlos ihre EU-Werte und will sie möglichst global durchsetzen. Was für eine Vermessenheit! Dass dadurch Abkommen verhindert werden, oft die Wirtschaft der EU Schaden nimmt, ist der Kommission dabei vollkommen egal. Dabei scheint die Kommission nicht zu interessieren, dass die Mehrheit der Länder auf der Welt andere Werte als diese EU hat. Dies gilt insbesondere für den Bereich Familie. Sechs Länder haben nicht der Idee von gleichgeschlechtlichen Ehen zugestimmt, darunter Bulgarien, Rumänien und Polen. Diese Länder haben andere Traditionen. Warum kann man das nicht respektieren? Diese EU macht doch immer Reklame für Einheit in Vielfalt. Gilt das normale und traditionelle Familienbild aus Mutter, Vater, Kindern, das in Europa seit Anbeginn der Zeit herrscht, nicht als schützenswerter Teil einer Vielfalt? Warum werden hier Länder wie Rumänien bedroht, die ihre Verfassung verändern müssen? Das finden wir übergriffig, das ist widerlich, das ist abzulehnen.

    Um es klar zu sagen: Niemand soll diskriminiert werden. Es soll aber auch niemand bevorzugt werden. Gleichbehandlung für jedermann. Diese EU will nun grenzüberschreitend, dass alle privaten Lebensformen überall in der EU anerkannt werden. Nein, das soll jedes Land selbst entscheiden. Das ist eine nationale Aufgabe der Mitgliedsländer. Diese EU, solange sie noch besteht, soll sich auf ihre Kernkompetenzen, wenn sie die denn hat, konzentrieren und sich nicht in das Privatleben der Bürger einmischen. Wir respektieren das Privatleben aller Bürger. Wir stehen aber auch für Familie aus Mutter, Vater, Kindern.

    Die Souveränität einer Nation heißt auch Souveränität in den Familienfragen und Respekt vor Privatangelegenheiten seiner Bürger. Und von dieser Stelle aus möchte ich meinen Landsleuten zurufen: Wenn Sie Freiheit, Frieden und Souveränität große Beachtung schenken, haben Sie nächste Woche am Sonntag die Gelegenheit. Wir sagen dazu: Von den Alpen bis zur See wählen alle AfD. Oder in einfacher Sprache: Sei schlau, wähl blau!

     
       


     

      Lucia Yar (Renew). – Dnes tu stojím s víziou Európy, ktorá je spravodlivá, láskavá a verná svojim spoločným hodnotám, pán predrečník. Európy postavenej na tolerancii, kde o vzťahu dvoch dospelých ľudí rozhodujú ich city, ich vzájomné city, a nie povolenia politikov, kde každé dieťa, bez ohľadu na orientáciu alebo pohlavie svojich rodičov, má právo na stabilitu, bezpečie a rodinu. Verím v Európsku úniu, ktorá spája, nie rozdeľuje. Takú, ktorá nedovolí, aby prekročenie hranice znamenalo stratu rodiča. Aj Európsky súdny dvor, už sme o tom počuli, tvrdí, že ak je právny vzťah uznaný v jednej krajine, musí ho rešpektovať aj iná krajina. Kvôli princípu spravodlivosti a ochrany tých najzraniteľnejších, to je ten dôvod. A predsa, napríklad u nás na Slovensku, vidíme opak. Populistické vlády predkladajú návrhy, ktoré práva rodín nerozširujú, ale ich obmedzujú, zraňujú ich. My ale máme naviac. Vyberme si cestu, ktorá je cestou rešpektu. A skúsme aj v tejto dobe povedať jasné áno spravodlivosti. Postavme sa za Európu, v ktorej každé dieťa, každá rodina a každý človek má svoje bezpečné miesto.

     
       

     

      Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich möchte, dass alle Europäerinnen und Europäer die gleichen Rechte haben, unabhängig davon, wo sie leben und wen sie lieben.

    Niemand hat Hass und Hetze verdient; alle haben Respekt und gleiche Rechte verdient. Es ist doch absurd, dass Menschen sich in der EU zwar frei bewegen können, aber sie selbst und ihre Familien nicht überall anerkannt werden. Es hat in der Vergangenheit mehrere Fälle gegeben, wo gleichgeschlechtliche Paare ihre Rechte vor Gericht einklagen mussten. Zwei polnische Frauen, die in Wien ein Kind bekommen haben, aber zu Hause damit nicht anerkannt wurden. Homosexuelle Männer, die nach ihrem Umzug in einen anderen EU-Mitgliedstaat ihre Ehe nicht anerkannt bekommen haben.

    Es ist untragbar, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Paare in der Europäischen Union 2025 immer noch diskriminiert werden. Es ist unsere Pflicht, die Grundrechte von allen EU-Bürgerinnen und -Bürgern zu schützen. Dafür brauchen wir europäische Gesetze, mit denen die Freiheit der Menschen geschützt und Regenbogenfamilien EU-weit anerkannt werden. Gegen Staaten wie Rumänien, die das systematisch untergraben, muss die EU-Kommission mit Sanktionen vorgehen.

    Ich möchte Sie auch ganz herzlich auffordern, hier nicht nachzulassen, sondern nachzulegen, auch wenn die politische Stimmung in einigen Mitgliedstaaten vielleicht kompliziert ist. Aber Sie haben hier gemeinsam mit uns eine Verantwortung. Der müssen Sie gerecht werden.

     
       

     

      Robert Biedroń (S&D). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Jutro Walentynki, 14 lutego. Niestety nie wszyscy w tej Unii Równości będą mogli świętować to święto. Nadal mamy w Unii Europejskiej obywateli lepszego i gorszego sortu. Nadal mamy w Unii Europejskiej rodziny, które nie mają równych praw. Nadal mamy 2 miliony dzieci w Unii Europejskiej, które nie są objęte ochroną. Europejski certyfikat rodzicielstwa chce to zmienić, to dobry kierunek i dlatego dziwię się, naprawdę dziwię się prawicy, że z taką nienawiścią podchodzi do czegoś, co Wy zawsze popieraliście – ochrony rodziny i ochrony dzieci. Przecież tu chodzi o bezpieczeństwo tego dziecka. Chodzi o to, że kiedy jego rodzice znajdują się w sytuacji, która nie jest uregulowana prawnie, to by dziecko po prostu najnormalniej w świecie było bezpieczne. Nic więcej i nic mniej.

    (Mówca zgodził się na pytanie zasygnalizowane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki)

     
       

     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR), pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – Mam pytanie do Pana Posła. Nie rozumiem tego lamentu, który tutaj Pan Poseł przedstawia wraz ze swoim partnerem. Od ponad roku rządzicie państwo w Polsce – Pana formacja z Donaldem Tuskiem. Rządzicie w Polsce od 14 miesięcy. Macie większość, możecie tak zmienić prawo w Polsce, jak chcecie i nie umiecie tego zrobić. No i powiedzcie dlaczego?

    Poza tym, Panie Pośle, Unia Europejska jest organizacją prawną – artykuł 5 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej mówi bardzo wyraźnie, że kompetencje nieprzyznane innym są kompetencjami krajowymi. Więc także tu macie większość w tym Parlamencie, możecie robić, co chcecie i nie robicie tego. Więc krótko mówiąc, ja jestem za prawem naturalnym, mam trochę inne zdanie niz Pan, ale niech Pan nie ma pretensji do Kaczyńskiego, do Prawicy o to, że jesteście mniejszością, bo jesteście …

    (Przewodnicząca odebrała mówcy głos)

     
       

     

      Robert Biedroń (S&D), odpowiedź na pytanie zadane przez podniesienie niebieskiej kartki. – Ja chciałem podziękować panu posłowi, że on tak pełen emocji podchodzi do tej sprawy i tutaj podpowiada, jak to zmienić. Proszę się przyłączyć. Ja myślę, że tutaj warto, żebyśmy wszyscy ponad podziałami chronili każdego obywatela i każdą obywatelkę. Jeśli chodzi o prawo unijne, Panie Pośle, to warto doczytać – Europejski Trybunał Sprawiedliwości wydawał wyroki w tej sprawie. Brak takiej regulacji to nie tylko jest pogwałcenie traktatów, ale pogwałcenie także podstawowych praw człowieka. Dlatego, Panie Komisarzu, dziękuję za tę inicjatywę, którą, jak rozumiem, pan Rzońca będzie popierał.

     
       

     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, of course, no child should be discriminated against because of the way they were born or the type of family they were born into. It is crucial. It is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, Article 2. Please read this article. We are all obliged to fulfil the requirements of human rights. All.

    It’s not a question of religion. Those who are mentioning Christianity, please read the Bible. Abraham and his first son and, of course, Saint Mary’s story. It would be good to listen and to understand about what you are speaking. Of course, you know that all families, including rainbow families, should have the same rights in the EU. This includes, for instance, the right to maintenance and schooling, education and others.

    But it is a pity we see that such a trend is growing, especially in those countries where the far right are trying to violate human rights. Of course, the parenthood regulation is still blocked in the Council. It is also a shame that the Council still, until now, has no chance to solve this problem. It is our duty to implement all human rights.

     
       

       

    Catch-the-eye procedure

     
       

     

      Margarita de la Pisa Carrión (PfE). – Señora presidente, señorías, el Derecho de familia es competencia de los Estados miembros. La Declaración de los Derechos del Niño es clara: todo niño tiene un padre y una madre y tiene derecho a conocerlos y a ser cuidado por ellos en la medida de lo posible. Los vínculos naturales entre padres e hijos deben ser respetados, pues trascienden la propia existencia: ¿quién soy?; ¿de dónde vengo?; el inicio de nuestra vida en el vientre materno; el vínculo con nuestros padres… Otras formas de paternidad interfieren en esta realidad y exponen al niño y a las personas implicadas no solo a graves dilemas éticos y legales, sino también a situaciones donde se agrede su propia dignidad.

    Garantizar la seguridad jurídica de las familias es legítimo; sin embargo, vemos cómo este principio está siendo instrumentalizado para dar una nueva forma a las relaciones entre padres e hijos transformándolas en contractuales, a veces incluso en mercantiles, como es la gestación subrogada. El ser humano deja de ser tratado como un sujeto de derechos y pasa a considerarse un objeto de transacción, un bien de consumo, a través de la explotación de las mujeres, causando un doloroso desgarro con el hijo y normalizando la ruptura de los lazos naturales.

    La difícil situación en la que se puedan encontrar estos niños debe ser resuelta caso a caso a nivel nacional, no por un mecanismo general europeo como es el certificado de filiación: esto alentaría estas prácticas exponiendo a más personas a esta…

    (la presidenta retira la palabra a la oradora)

     
       

       

    (End of catch-the-eye procedure)

     
       

     

      Glenn Micallef, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, the gender-neutral right to free movement is a cornerstone of our citizens’ Union. The gender-neutral Union family law, the right to love and the right to be loved is an essential block to build a union of equality.

    By requiring or facilitating the recognition of civil status documents, including for same sex couples, Union law on free movement and Union family law aim to protect the rights of couples and also of children in cross-border situations, without leaving behind any spouse or partner due to their sexual orientation and without leaving behind any child because of the way in which he was conceived or born, or because she has the same sex parents.

    In facilitating the recognition of civil status documents also for same sex families, Union law does not interfere with the Member States’ substantive family law, such as their rules on the definition of family or their rules on surrogacy, which fall within the competence of Member States.

    However, with the recognition of civil status documents for all spouses or partners and for all children, Union law will ensure that same sex couples and their children can benefit from all their rights in any Member State.

     
       

     

      President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner. The debate is closed.

     

    10. Explanations of votes

     

      President. – The next item is the explanation of votes.

     

    10.1. Further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia (RC-B10-0106/2025)



     

      Ondřej Dostál (NI). – Paní předsedající, vážení voliči, mám čtyři důvody, proč jsem dnes hlasoval proti rezoluci o Gruzii. Důvod první, Evropský parlament by se měl věnovat potížím Evropy, ne usnesením o cizích zemích. Je to neuctivé a neužitečné. Oni mají své problémy, my máme dost vlastních. Důvod druhý, kritika gruzínských voleb je dezinformace. Zásadní výhrady proti nim neměla ani mise OSCE, ani mise Evropského parlamentu. Gruzínci si jasně zvolili Gruzínský sen. Evropský parlament nemá žádnou pravomoc určovat, kdo bude v Gruzii premiérem či prezidentem. Důvod třetí, rezoluce vyzývá k puči a k financování nepokojů z peněz evropských občanů. Vyzývá, abychom se dopustili stejného zahraničního vměšování, které tady soustavně kritizujeme. Exprezidentce Zurabišviliové skončil mandát. Nechť odejde. Exprezident Saakašvili byl v řádném procesu trestně odsouzen za zneužití moci. Nechť svůj trest vykoná. Důvod čtvrtý, politika, kterou rezoluce Gruzii vnucuje, by jí připravila podobný osud, jaký stihl Ukrajinu. Gruzie tu není proto, aby dělala pěšáka Západu v boji s Ruskem. Tímto se Gruzii omlouvám za pokus o destabilizaci ze strany Parlamentu. Přeji jí rozumnou vládu, mír a prosperitu.

     

    10.2. Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0102/2025)


     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – Maith thú a Uachtaráin arís, bhí mé an-sásta, cosúil le mo ghrúpa an EPP, vótáil ar son na tuarascála seo.

    The ongoing violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is both heartbreaking and unjustifiable. The escalation of conflict, including the occupation of Goma by M23 forces, has led to severe violations of human rights, including the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and recruitment of child soldiers. These actions are not only a violation of international law, but are also catastrophic for innocent civilians caught in the crossfire.

    The resolution calls for concrete actions to bring peace to the region, including imposing sanctions, halting arms transfers and demanding that Rwanda ceases its support for M23.

    I believe this resolution sends a clear message that we will not tolerate further human suffering and that we stand in solidarity with the people of the DRC in their fight for peace and justice.

    Sin a bhfuil uaimse a Uachtaráin, míle buíochas agus go dté tú slán abhaile.

     

    11. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

     

      President. – The minutes of this sitting will be submitted to Parliament for its approval at the beginning of the next sitting. If there are no objections, I will forward the resolutions adopted at today’s sitting to the persons and bodies named in the resolutions.

     

    12. Dates of forthcoming sittings

     

      President. – The next part‑session will take place from 10 to 13 March 2025, in Strasbourg.

     

    13. Closure of the sitting

       

    (The sitting closed at 15:40)

     

    14. Adjournment of the session

     

      President. – The session of the European Parliament is adjourned.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    February 15, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung Galaxy S25 Series Arrives Locally

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. has announced the local availability of the new Galaxy S25 series. Together with One UI 7, Gemini is officially available at launch in 46 languages,1 making it easier than ever to perform seamless interactions across Samsung and Google apps.

    “The Galaxy S25 series is a fundamental shift in how we interact with our phones,” said TM Roh, President and Head of Mobile eXperience Business at Samsung Electronics. “We are thrilled to see how our users will enjoy this true AI companion that offers seamless and intuitive solutions in their daily lives.”
     
    On the Galaxy S25 series, AI agents with multimodal capabilities are integrated within the One UI 72 platform to perform complex tasks seamlessly across apps and enable natural user interactions through speech, text, videos and images. Now Brief3 provides tailored suggestions to guide through the day and Now Bar4 offers a new hub for ongoing activities. From enhanced productivity with Writing Assist to limitless creativity unleashed by Drawing Assist,5 the expanded capabilities of  Galaxy AI6 continue to empower users in every aspect of their daily lives.
     
    Interactions with the Galaxy S25 series are also more intuitive. With just a single command, Gemini7 can effortlessly find a user’s favourite sports team’s schedule and add it to Samsung Calendar. Additionally, Google’s enhanced Circle to Search8 now gives users more helpful information with AI Overviews and one-tap actions.

    The Galaxy S25 series further refines and enhances the core capabilities that define the Galaxy experience. Powering the Galaxy S25 series globally, the Snapdragon® 8 Elite Mobile Platform for Galaxy fuels on-device processing for more responsive AI experiences. With unique customisations for Galaxy, including ProScaler9 and Samsung’s mobile Digital Natural Image engine (mDNIe), the Galaxy S25 series boasts enhanced AI image processing and display power efficiency. The newly introduced 50MP ultrawide camera sensor for the Galaxy S25 Ultra delivers epic shots from every range in exceptional clarity, while professional grade controls like Virtual Aperture and Samsung Log turn any photo or video into the ultimate visual experience.
     
    The Galaxy S25 series is the industry’s first smartphone lineup to support Content Credentials, based on the open technical standard from the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). Samsung has also joined the C2PA as a member, alongside industry leaders including Adobe, Microsoft, OpenAI, Google, Publicis Groupe and more, all collaborating to establish Content Credentials as the universal standard for digital content provenance. In line with its commitment to responsible mobile AI innovation, Samsung adopted this standard to enhance transparency for content created and edited with generative AI.
     
    Starting February 14, the Galaxy S25 series will be widely available through carriers and retailers and on Samsung websites. Galaxy S25 Ultra is available in Titanium Silverblue, Titanium Black, Titanium Whitesilver and Titanium Gray. Galaxy S25 and Galaxy S25+ come in Navy, Silver Shadow, Icyblue and Mint.
     
    All Galaxy S25 devices will come with six months of Gemini Advanced and 2TB of cloud storage at no extra cost. Gemini Advanced comes with Samsung’s most capable AI models and priority access to the newest features like Gems, custom AI experts for any topic, and Deep Research, which acts as a personal AI research assistant.
     
    1 Supported languages include Arabic, Bengali, Bulgarian, Chinese (Simplified / Traditional), Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Farsi, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hebrew, Hindi, Hungarian, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Kannada, Korean, Latvian, Lithuanian, Malayalam, Marathi, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, Tamil, Telugu, Thai, Turkish, Ukrainian, Urdu and Vietnamese.
    2The official One UI 7 release will commence with the latest Galaxy S series devices. The update is expected to gradually roll out to other Galaxy devices.
    3 Now Brief feature requires Samsung Account login. Service availability may vary by country, language, device model, or apps. Some features may require a network connection.
    4 Availability of functions supported within the apps may vary by country. Some functional widgets may require a network connection and/or Samsung Account login.
    5 Drawing Assist feature requires a network connection and Samsung Account login. A visible watermark is overlaid on the image output upon saving in order to indicate that the image is generated by AI. The accuracy and reliability of the generated output is not guaranteed.
    6 Samsung Account login may be required to use certain Samsung AI features. Samsung does not make any promises, assurances or guarantees as to the accuracy, completeness or reliability of the output provided by AI features. Availability of Galaxy AI features may vary depending on the region/country, OS/One UI version, device model and phone carrier. Some function availability may vary by device model. Galaxy AI service may be limited for minors in certain regions with age restrictions over AI usage. Galaxy AI features will be provided for free until the end of 2025 on supported Samsung Galaxy devices. Different terms may apply for AI features provided by third parties.
    7 Gemini Extensions feature availability varies based on content. Internet connection, Android device, and set up required. Language availability varies. Results for illustrative purposes and may vary. Check responses for accuracy.
    8 Sequences shortened and simulated. Results for illustrative purposes only. Service availability may vary by country, language, or device model. Requires internet connection. Users may need to update Android and Google app to the latest version. Results may vary depending on visual or audio matches. Accuracy of results is not guaranteed. Works on compatible apps and surfaces, and with ambient music only. Will not identify music coming through headphones or if phone volume is off.
    9 ProScaler feature is supported on Galaxy S25+ and Ultra models. Image quality can be enhanced up to QHD+, depending on the screen resolution setting of the device.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    February 15, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Two Estonian Nationals Plead Guilty in $577 Million Cryptocurrency Fraud Scheme

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

    Scheme Victimized Hundreds of Thousands of People in United States and Abroad 

    Two Estonian nationals pleaded guilty yesterday for their operation of a massive, multi-faceted cryptocurrency Ponzi scheme that victimized hundreds of thousands of people from across the world, including in the United States. As part of the defendants’ guilty pleas, they agreed to forfeit assets valued over $400 million obtained during the conspiracy.

    According to court documents, Sergei Potapenko and Ivan Turõgin, both 40, sold contracts to customers entitling them to a share of cryptocurrency mined by the defendants’ purported cryptocurrency mining service, HashFlare. Cryptocurrency mining is the process of using computers to generate cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, for profit.

    Between 2015 and 2019, Hashflare’s sales totaled more than $577 million, but HashFlare did not possess the requisite computing capacity to perform the vast majority of the mining the defendants told HashFlare customers it performed. HashFlare’s web-based dashboard, which purported to show customers their mining profits, instead reflected falsified data. Potapenko and Turõgin used the proceeds of the fraud conspiracy to purchase real estate and luxury vehicles and maintained investment and cryptocurrency accounts. Potapenko and Turõgin have agreed to forfeit assets worth, as of the date of the plea, more than $400 million. The forfeited assets will be available for a remission process to compensate victims of the crime. Details about the remission process will be announced at a later date.

    Potapenko and Turõgin each pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. They are scheduled to be sentenced on May 8 and each face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The Justice Department thanks the Cybercrime Bureau of the Estonian Police and Border Guard for its support with this investigation. The Estonian Prosecutor General and Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs provided substantial assistance with the extradition. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided extensive assistance to the investigation and the extradition of the defendants.

    Supervisory Official Antoinette T. Bacon of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Acting U.S. Attorney Teal Luthy Miller for the Western District of Washington, Assistant Director Chad Yarbrough of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, and Special Agent in Charge W. Mike Herrington of the FBI Seattle Field Office made the announcement.

    The FBI Seattle Field Office investigated the case.

    Trial Attorneys Adrienne E. Rosen and David Ginensky of the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrew Friedman and Sok Jiang for the Western District of Washington are prosecuting the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Jehiel Baer for the Western District of Washington is handling asset forfeiture aspects of the case.

    Individuals who believe they may have been a victim in this case should visit www.fbi.gov/hashflare.

    MIL Security OSI –

    February 15, 2025
←Previous Page
1 … 23 24 25 26 27 … 34
Next Page→
NewzIntel.com

NewzIntel.com

MIL Open Source Intelligence

  • Blog
  • About
  • FAQs
  • Authors
  • Events
  • Shop
  • Patterns
  • Themes

Twenty Twenty-Five

Designed with WordPress