NEWARK, N.J. –U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations Newark and multiple federal, state and local partners made 18 arrests of alleged co-conspirators for roles in a drug trafficking organization July 1 in Newark, New Jersey.
The arrests are a result of a 14-month HSI Newark investigation with the Newark Police Department and the U.S. District Attorney for the District of New Jersey.
“In addition to the 18 arrests, HSI’s investigation led to federal charges filed against 24 individuals and we executed seven federal search warrants in and around Essex County, New Jersey,” said HSI Newark Special Agent in Charge Ricky J. Patel during a press conference following the operation. “Law enforcement partnership and teamwork were essential in our success. I am proud to say these alleged conspirators operating the sale of narcotics primarily from the Bradley Court Public Housing Complex have been stopped thanks to thousands of hours of police work. The livelihood of the tenants throughout 10 three-story apartment buildings who have been plagued by this dangerous enterprise for far too long can now feel a sense of safety and security.”
On July 2, two additional defendants were arrested. Four remain at large.
HSI Newark’s investigation uncovered a complex criminal enterprise with ties to transnational organized crime, that distributed more than 400 grams of fentanyl and a kilo of heroin. During the takedown operation, approximately $113,000 dollars in bulk cash/drug proceeds, illicit firearms, ammunition, narcotics, including 28 bricks of fentanyl and heroin, and vehicles were seized.
According to the investigation, the defendants are members or associates of Sex, Money, Murder—a Blood affiliated criminal street gang that controls the drug trade in Bradley Court Housing Complex located near North Munn Avenue and Tremont Avenue in Newark. The enterprise is also known as Munn Block, M-Blok, and Tombstone Gang. Munn Block are closely aligned with another Blood affiliated gang known as Voorhees, who operate around Voorhees Street—members and associates of the enterprise refer to the collective union as “MunnHees”.
“It is critical for the public to understand that these individuals engaged in the most dangerous of action, were armed and were involved in shootings,” said Patel. “They peddled narcotics to include fentanyl, heroin, and crack cocaine, all while risking the lives of those around them for power and money. Surveillance, undercover activity and electronic monitoring were just some of the necessary steps needed to bring these individuals to justice.”
For over a year, law enforcement conducted extensive surveillance of the area, conducted numerous controlled purchases of narcotics, seized narcotics through enforcement action, and analyzed telephone records, all of which demonstrated extensive interactions between and among the charged defendants. Members and associates of the enterprise are known to use social media on a variety of platforms and mobile applications, including Instagram, YouTube, X (formerly Twitter), Signal, Telegram, and WhatsApp to conduct the business of the enterprise, communicate with one another, promote the Enterprise through sharing photographs and videos, and further the enterprise’s goals. Specifically, the enterprise uses the release and promotion of drill rap songs and music videos on social media to intimidate rival gang members, witnesses, and other members of the community, and to promote the enterprise.
“For far too long, the Bloods have overtaken the Bradley Court Housing Complex — turning its courtyards and residential buildings into a hub for pumping deadly fentanyl into the city of Newark, while endangering the lives of the citizens who call this community home.” said U.S. Attorney Alina Habba. “This poison has ripped families apart and stolen countless lives. That stops today. These arrests affirm my office’s commitment to taking guns and drugs off the streets and serves as a clear warning to anyone who considers engaging in violent activity. The defendants in this case, as in all criminal cases, are presumed innocent unless, and until proven guilty. However, everyone should understand that if you spread this poison or engage in this violent activity, we will use every resource necessary to find you, dismantle your operation, and prosecute you.”
Other agencies who supported HSI Newark’s investigation and operations included U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals Service, Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, the New Jersey State Police, Newark Police Department, East Orange Police Department and the Newark Housing Authority Security Department.
The following Essex County residents were each charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl, heroin and cocaine:
Shamon Freshley aka Hitta, 26.
Orlando Pizzaro aka Lando, 26.
Zakir Jefferson aka Gu, aka Tank 26.
Quayyon Johnson aka Weeze, 22.
Melvin Faines, aka Spaz, 34.
Afrika Islam, aka Sexx, 29.
Shaheem Webb, aka YC, 23.
Eustace Weeks, aka Juxx, 26.
Ali Baker, aka Surf, 34.
Jose Ward aka Hec, 22.
Brandon Sneed aka Pops, 31.
Eric Banks aka Lil Maneskii, 19.
Tauheed Carney aka Bmunn, 21.
Tykee Stokes aka Big, 32.
Shafeek Barker aka Sha, 28.
Ibn Perry aka Loop, 38.
Alvin Jones aka Lucky, 41.
Kirk Mansook aka Crow, 39.
Tyjanique Green aka Ski, 24.
Jubar Hughes aka Dudu, 27.
Daisean Williams aka Khaos, 22.
Jason Wardlaw aka Jayr, 30.
Rana James aka Pooh, 28.
Sebastian Pierrecent aka Sosa, 21, Quayyan Johnson, and Tauheed Carney are also each charged with possession of a machine gun. In addition, Pierrecent is charged with possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon.
Pierrecent, Johnson, and Carney, are also charged with possession of a machine gun that was used in the June 17 shooting in rival gang territory near Mapes Avenue in Newark.
The defendants charged in the drug conspiracy face a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years in prison, with potential penalty of life in prison, and a $10 million fine. Pierrecent, Johnson, and Carney each face up to 10 years in prison for possession of the machinegun. Pierrecent faces up to 15 years in prison for possession of firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon.
Mr. Babacar Sedikh Faye has been appointed as the World Bank Group (WBG) Country Manager for Burundi, effective July 1, 2025. His appointment is part of a global initiative by the World Bank Group aimed at unifying and strengthening its representation at the country level. Mr. Faye will be responsible for the operations of all the institutions in Burundi, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
“It is an honor to represent the World Bank Group in Burundi and to continue strengthening our partnership with the country. The World Bank Group’s interventions have seen significant growth and notable impact in recent years. Our goal is to continue this growth, with more efficiency and innovation, to better support the country in its efforts to improve the living conditions of Burundians and reduce inequalities,” said Babacar Sedikh Faye, World Bank Group Country Manager for Burundi.
Mr. Faye arrives at a time when the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) is being prepared with Burundi for the next six years. The new CPF is the strategic framework that allows the WBG to better align its interventions with Burundi’s development priorities. “The CPF is an opportunity for the World Bank Group to better integrate the interventions of all its institutions to support the government in achieving the ambitions defined in its plan titled ‘Vision Burundi: Emerging Country by 2040 and Developed Country by 2060’. The WBG is also convinced that this will require sustained support for the emergence of a dynamic private sector that drives inclusive and sustainable growth,” noted Mr. Faye.
A Senegalese national, Mr. Faye joined the World Bank Group in 2006 as a legal advisor, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. He has since worked in a dozen countries and held various positions of responsibility within the IFC, which focuses on the private sector in emerging countries. Mr. Faye has notably been the Resident Representative of the IFC in Nepal, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of The World Bank Group.
Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council
Following are UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ remarks at the BRICS [Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa] Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, today:
Prezado Presidente Lula, muito obrigado pelo seu amável convite e pela sua hospitalidade tão amiga.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping economies and societies. The fundamental test is how wisely we will guide this transformation. How we minimize the risks and maximize the potential for good.
I am particularly concerned with the weaponization of AI, in a world where peace is more necessary than ever.
Peace in Palestine, based on building the two-State solution, starting by an immediate, permanent ceasefire in Gaza, the immediate and unconditional release of hostages, free and unimpeded humanitarian aid delivery, and the ending of the crippling annexation and violence in the West Bank.
A just and sustainable peace in Ukraine, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and relevant UN resolutions.
Silencing the guns in Sudan, where civilians have also suffered too much. And the list goes on, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Somalia, from the Sahel to Myanmar.
Artificial intelligence needs a multilateral response grounded in equity and human rights.
The Pact for the Future, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, calls for a new architecture of trust and cooperation — starting with the establishment by the UN of an independent international scientific panel on artificial intelligence.
This panel should provide impartial, evidence-based guidance available to all Member States.
The Pact also calls for a periodic global dialogue on AI within the UN, with all the Member States and relevant stakeholders.
AI can’t be a club of the few, but must benefit all, and in particular developing countries, which must have a real voice in global AI governance.
I will also soon present a report outlining innovative voluntary financing options to support AI capacity-building in developing countries, and I urge the BRICS’ support and your support for these efforts.
But we cannot govern AI effectively — and fairly — without confronting deeper, structural imbalances in our global system.
We are in a multipolar era. Power relations are shifting.
A multipolar world requires multilateral governance — with global institutions tuned for the times, in particular the Security Council and the international financial architecture. They were designed for a bygone age, a bygone world, with a bygone system of power relations. The reform of the Security Council is crucial.
The message from the Financing for Development Conference last week in Sevilla was clear: Ensuring that developing countries have a greater participation in global economic governance and its institutions; putting into place an effective debt restructuring mechanism; and tripling the lending capacity of multilateral development banks, in particular, with concessional funding and in local currencies.
All this is crucial for countries, especially in the Global South — to bridge the digital divide and fully harness artificial intelligence’s potential, making AI a powerful driver for inclusive growth and sustainable development.
At a time when multilateralism is being undermined, let us remind the world that cooperation is humanity’s greatest innovation. That begins with trust, and trust begins with all countries respecting international law without exceptions.
Let us rise to this moment — and reform and modernize multilateralism, including the UN and all the systems and institutions to make it work for everyone, everywhere.
Headline: ICC champions multilateralism at BRICS Business Forum
Speaking on behalf of more than 45 million companies worldwide, Mr Denton took part in a high-level panel looking at sustainable financial strategies for the BRICS Development Agenda, underscoring the urgent need for cooperative solutions to global challenges.
During his visit to Brazil, on 4 July, Mr Denton contributed to the closing sessions of the BRICS Business Council’s Working Groups, including an intervention in the Trade and Investment Working Group. He also took part in the 10th Annual Meeting of the New Development Bank (NDB)’s Board of Governors.
ICC’s first time participation in the BRICS Forum comes at a pivotal moment for the Group. A new ICC report conducted in partnership with Oxford Economics presents a sobering assessment of the risks posed by the erosion of the multilateral trading system – particularly for BRICS economies.
Projected impacts include:
Sharp export losses: Non-fuel goods exports could fall by 45% in Brazil, 41% in India, 36% in China, 34% in South Africa, 26% in Indonesia, and 21% in Egypt.
Economic contraction: GDP losses ranging from 3.5% to 6% across these economies.
Decline in foreign investment: FDI reductions of up to 6% in the most exposed markets.
This underscores the imperative for BRICS and other economies to take action and revitalise the multilateral trading system, something Mr Denton underscored throughout his engagements in Brazil.
Mr Denton said:
“ICC’s engagement with the BRICS business community reinforces its role as the voice of the real economy, ensuring business drives solutions for peace, prosperity and opportunity across emerging markets.”
4 ways ICC hasengaged in the BRICS process in 2025
Participation inBRICS Business Council Working Groups
Several ICC leaders contributed to BRICS Business Council Working Groups, shaping policy recommendations in areas including trade and investment, manufacturing, energy and climate, financial services and infrastructure, transport, and logistics.
BRICS Business Council Secretariat policy support
ICC provided business insights for the 2025 BRICS Business Council Annual Report, which aligns with ICC’s international policy priorities, particularly regarding the revitalisation of the multilateral trading system.
Joint BRICS-ICC Initiative on SME Trade Integration
ICC and BRICS Business Council Trade and Investment Working Gorup collaboration resulted in the launch of a joint initiative aimed at enhancing the integration of BRICS SMEs in international trade, leveraging the ICC Centre of Entrepreneurship and ICC One Click gateway for trade tools, solutions and guides for SMEs to export and grow globally.
Supporting the BRICS Solutions Awards
ICC promoted the BRICS Solutions Awards through its global network of national committees and chambers of commerce. These Awards recognise innovative projects advancing climate change mitigation, environmental sustainability, and the responsible use of natural resources across BRICS countries.
The average New Zealand residential property value has decreased slightly with values in the main centres easing due to high stock levels and cautious buyer sentiment, while some regions saw significant gains.
The latest QV House Price Index shows the average national home value fell 0.3% over the June quarter to $910,479, leaving values 0.6% lower than a year ago and around 14.5% below the market’s peak in late 2021.
Values rose in Queenstown and Invercargill, while creeping up a little in Whangarei, Hamilton, Tauranga and Christchurch, while Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin recorded further declines, highlighting ongoing variability across the main urban areas.
QV National Spokesperson Andrea Rush said buyers were taking advantage of increased choice and easing interest rates, with first-home buyers and owner-occupiers remaining the most active, particularly in lower to mid-value areas where affordability is within reach.
“Regional divergence is becoming more evident, with more affordable markets recording notable quarterly gains such as Wairoa (12.6%), Gore (8.8%), Buller (6.2%), the Far North (5.8%) and Waitomo (5.2%), while others continue to track lower due to economic uncertainty and a cautious buyer pool,” Ms Rush said.
She noted that falling interest rates are easing affordability pressures. The Reserve Bank reviews the OCR this week, with some expecting a 0.25% cut, though many predict it will hold at 3.25%.
“Some buyers may be anticipating lower rates, with bank activity back to mid-2022 levels after the market peak,” she said. “However, it’s unclear how much of this reflects new purchases versus refinancing.”
“Ongoing global conflict, economic uncertainty, and rising living costs are likely to limit any significant upswing in the near term.”
Northland
The upswing in the Northland market continues with values rising 2.1% in the three months to June. The average value across the region is $741,628. Values are now just 0.6% lower year on year.
In the three months to June, values in the Far North rose a massive 5.83% and the average property value jumped nearly $10,000 from $705,192 in the June quarter to $714,029. In Whangarei, the average value is $736,179 after a slight quarterly rise of 0.3%. While Kaipara’s average value is $841,032, after a slight 0.7% lift over the quarter.
Auckland
The Auckland property market saw values edge down overall in June as high stock levels and cautious buyer sentiment continued to weigh on prices, with some localised pockets of resilience emerging across the Super City. The average home value across the Auckland Region dropped 1.0% in the June quarter and is now $1,232,340, which is 1.4% lower than in June 2024 and 18.8% lower than the market’s nationwide peak of late 2021.
In the June quarter the only area to see values increase was the local council areas previously known as Auckland City (0.1%). While other areas of the region saw a decline in values over the quarter; Manukau (-1.2%); North Shore (-1.7%), Waitakere (-1.0%), Rodney (-0.04%), Papakura (-0.1%); and Franklin (-0.6%).
QV Auckland Registered Valuer, Hugh Robson said the Auckland housing market is much the same as last month, with high levels of stock on the market across most suburbs helping to keep prices fairly stable.
“For now, buyers have the upper hand, with many agents continuing to report low attendance numbers at open homes. Some buyers are making cheeky offers to see what might be accepted in the current market,” Mr Robson said.
Despite these conditions, he noted steady activity from first-home buyers, particularly in the city’s low to medium value suburbs, where affordability remains within reach.
“New multi-townhouse developments also continue to be built across the city, adding to the options available for buyers and renters alike. Interest rates remain relatively low, providing some comfort for those entering the market, while rental levels are fairly stable at the moment,” he said.
Waikato
The latest QV House Price Index shows Hamilton’s average home is now worth $791,707, with values continuing a slight upward trend from last month, rising 0.5% over the June quarter. Values are now 1.2% higher than this time last year and 13.4% lower than the nationwide peak of late 2021.
QV Hamilton Registered Valuer Marshall Wu said the Waikato market was continuing to show a ‘generally positive trend’ this year, with Hamilton City and several major districts recording modest value growth so far in 2025.
“There’s been some renewed confidence among buyers and sellers as the OCR has remained lower for a sustained period, helping to support market activity and making housing a bit more accessible for first-home buyers. However, with inflation on the rise, the market now expects only limited further cuts in the months ahead,” he said.
“A soft economy, lower population growth, and global uncertainty are still constraining housing demand across the region. Real estate agents are telling us there’s still plenty of stock on the market, and sellers are having to adjust expectations on price. Buyers, meanwhile, are being cautious in light of a looser labour market and persistently high unemployment.
“Overall, we’re still expecting values to post a modest rise in 2025, but it’s likely to be at a slower pace.”
The Waikato Region demonstrated strengthening market activity in June with a 1-month increase of 0.1% and a 3-month gain of 0.5%. The average home value now stands at $818,230, up from $791,909.
The Waitomo District surged 4.9% over 3 months and 5.2% annually, while the Taupo District recorded a -6.6% half yearly drop. Hauraki values also rose 1.1% over the June quarter and are 4.1% higher year on year; while Thames/Coromandel inched up by 0.1% in the June quarter and 1.4% year on year, while the Waikato District was up 2.1% over the past three months and 1.6% year on year. Ōtorohanga and Waipa districts, also recorded quarterly gains of 0.2% and 1.8% respectively. While South Waikato values decreased 2.5% over the quarter.
Bay of Plenty
Home values in Tauranga are essentially flat, rising just 0.1% over the past three months to an average of $1,024,609. This is 0.3% lower than a year ago and 12.2% below the nationwide peak of late 2021.
Across the Bay of Plenty, the average value is also flat, dipping 0.3% this quarter to $887,954 and 0.3% annually.
QV North Island Revaluation Manager Sophie Treder said, “In Tauranga, values have held steady, with only a slight lift over the past quarter, while across the wider region, average values have seen a marginal decline.”
She noted owner-occupiers and first-home buyers continue to be the main drivers of activity, with an uptick in investor interest adding to market dynamics. “Most sellers are setting prices that align with market conditions, although some are entering the market with higher expectations before adjusting to meet buyer sentiment,” she said.
Rotorua and Gisborne recorded quarterly declines of 0.5% and 0.9% respectively, while Whakatane fell 1.4%. Opotiki District saw the largest drop in the region, down 6.6% for the quarter. Kawerau District was the only area to record growth, with values up 3.0% in the three months to June.
Hawkes Bay
Napier City home values were flat, up just 0.1% over the past three months to a new average value of $755,772 which is 0.7% lower year on year and 15.3% lower than the previous peak of January 2022. Hastings values rose 0.7% over the past three months to a new average of $774,602 which is 1.8% lower than the same time last year and 15.8% below the nationwide peak of late 2021.
Meanwhile, Wairoa saw values one of the highest increases in the country rising 12.6% in the three months to June and 27.2% year on year to a new average value of $483,244. While Central Hawke’s Bay District increased 0.9% over the quarter and values are 3.2% lower year on year with a new average value of $553,179.
Taranaki
The Taranaki region has seen a recent positive trend with home values up 0.4% over the past three months and 1.7% in the year to June. In New Plymouth, values rose 0.2% in the June quarter and are 1.4% higher year on year with the average home now worth $725,326 which is 2.8% lower than the peak. Values continued to rise in South Taranaki, up 2.6% over the quarter to June, and 3.7% year on year to $448,875; while Stratford dropped 2.4% over the quarter to an average value of $487,455 which is 1.6% higher year on year.
QV New Plymouth Registered Valuer Danny Grace said the Taranaki market was maintaining steady momentum, with values holding firm across much of the region.
“In New Plymouth, activity has picked up, and there’s more confidence among buyers and sellers, particularly in the lower end of the market where demand remains healthy,” he said.
Mr Grace noted that while interest in well-located, modern homes was steady, the higher end of the market was seeing less buyer interest, with longer selling times and fewer active purchasers.
“While the region isn’t experiencing rapid growth, the market is holding its ground, supported by a consistent level of demand, particularly from buyers focused on more affordable segments,” he said.
Palmerston North
Home values in Palmerston North dipped 0.5% over the June quarter and homes there are now worth on average $632,536, which is 0.8% lower than this time last year and 13.5% below the nationwide market peak in late 2021.
QV Palmerston North Registered Valuer Olivia Betts said the Palmerston North property market was showing signs of softening, with prices edging down slightly in recent months.
“It’s not a dramatic drop, but this easing reflects broader market conditions and seasonal tr
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Charlotte Milne, PhD Candidate, Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia
In British Columbia, erosion is primarily managed by “hardening” riverbanks with large rocks called riprap. These rocks are so prevalent along B.C. rivers that you might think they are part of the natural environment, but they are not.
Hardened riverbanks offer temporary protection from river movement, but riprap can lead to degraded rivers. Erosion is a natural process that helps maintain healthy and diverse river habitat. However, as societies expand, there is more demand to control river movement and prevent erosion.
Through my work as a river scientist and flood risk researcher in New Zealand and Canada, I have witnessed the sometimes devastating impacts of river erosion and have also seen just how lifeless rivers can become when overly restricted.
Of course we need to protect people, property and infrastructure from riverbank erosion. But current erosion management is hurting B.C. rivers.
The problem with riprap
Riprap is essential for stabilizing riverbanks when infrastructure and property are at immediate risk. The rocks are often laid down as “temporary” erosion prevention before or during floods.
The exact impact that riprap is having on B.C. waterways requires more research, but professionals working in the province’s rivers are already seeing the damage.
The good news is that there are bank-stabilizing alternatives to riprap.
Bioengineering involves using vegetation to create or support engineered structures. For example, live tree cuttings can be woven together to create wattles or brush mattresses. This process creates living tree walls and coverings that grow and strengthen over time.
Revegetation is another approach, using riparian planting to strengthen riverbanks with root systems. In some cases, this can be as simple as laying down seeds at the right time of year, often with other erosion control options like mulch terraces.
The key to the success of bioengineering and revegetation efforts is that they need to be done proactively. Unlike riprap, which can be installed as an emergency response measure, vegetation needs time to grow.
Next steps for B.C.
Riprap along part of Vancouver’s False Creek in July 2020. Given the potential for environmental harm, there have been calls to limit riprap use in British Columbia. (Shutterstock)
Is it possible to move on from our over-reliance on riprap in B.C.?
During our workshop, experts discussed what needs to happen to support environmentally friendly bank stabilization options.
First off, we need to be talking about the overuse of riprap more. Currently, decision-makers and property-owners are often unaware of the potential harm that riprap can have on our rivers, or that alternatives exist. While many alternatives won’t be appropriate in extreme erosion cases, for the province’s smaller and healthier rivers, they would be ideal.
For this to happen, the bank-stabilization regulation process in B.C. needs to change. Currently it is hard to receive consent or funding to undertake bank strengthening activities outside of emergency riprap installation.
The B.C. government needs to adapt local guidelines and regulations to allow wider use of alternative methods, prioritizing proactive bank strengthening. They can draw on findings from elsewhere in Canada where alternative bank-stabilization options are already being tested.
Shifting away from a dependence on riprap won’t be easy, but in a province that relies on healthy rivers and fish, it should be a priority.
Charlotte Milne receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Public Scholars Initiative at UBC. The research mentioned in this article received funding from UBC’s Sustainability Scholars Program and support from Resilient Waters and the Watershed Watch Salmon Society.
Across much of Europe, the engines of economic growth are sputtering. In its latest global outlook, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sharply downgraded its forecasts for the UK and Europe, warning that the continent faces persistent economic bumps in the road.
Globally, the World Bank recently said this decade is likely to be the weakest for growth since the 1960s. “Outside of Asia, the developing world is becoming a development-free zone,” the bank’s chief economist warned.
The UK economy went into reverse in April 2025, shrinking by 0.3%. The announcement came a day after the UK chancellor, Rachel Reeves, delivered her spending review to the House of Commons with a speech that mentioned the word “growth” nine times – including promising “a Growth Mission Fund to expedite local projects that are important for growth”:
I said that we wanted growth in all parts of Britain – and, Mr Speaker, I meant it.
Across Europe, a long-term economic forecast to 2040 predicted annual growth of just 0.9% over the next 15 years – down from 1.3% in the decade before COVID. And this forecast was in December 2024, before Donald Trump’s aggressive tariff policies had reignited trade tensions between the US and Europe (and pretty much everywhere else in the world).
Even before Trump’s tariffs, the reality was clear to many economic experts. “Europe’s tragedy”, as one columnist put it, is that it is “deeply uncompetitive, with poor productivity, lagging in technology and AI, and suffering from regulatory overload”. In his 2024 report on European (un)competitiveness, Mario Draghi – former president of the European Central Bank (and then, briefly, Italy’s prime minister) – warned that without radical policy overhauls and investment, Europe faces “a slow agony” of relative decline.
To date, the typical response of electorates has been to blame the policymakers and replace their governments at the first opportunity. Meanwhile, politicians of all shades whisper sweet nothings about how they alone know how to find new sources of growth – most commonly, from the magic AI tree. Because growth, with its widely accepted power to deliver greater productivity and prosperity, remains a key pillar in European politics, upheld by all parties as the benchmark of credibility, progress and control.
But what if the sobering truth is that growth is no longer reliably attainable – across Europe at least? Not just this year or this decade but, in any meaningful sense, ever?
The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.
For a continent like Europe – with limited land and no more empires to exploit, ageing populations, major climate concerns and electorates demanding ever-stricter barriers to immigration – the conditions that once underpinned steady economic expansion may no longer exist. And in the UK more than most European countries, these issues are compounded by high levels of long-term sickness, early retirement and economic inactivity among working-age adults.
As the European Parliament suggested back in 2023, the time may be coming when we are forced to look “beyond growth” – not because we want to, but because there is no other realistic option for many European nations.
But will the public ever accept this new reality? As an expert in how public policy can be used to transform economies and societies, my question is not whether a world without growth is morally superior or more sustainable (though it may be both). Rather, I’m exploring if it’s ever possible for political parties to be honest about a “post-growth world” and still get elected – or will voters simply turn to the next leader who promises they know the secret of perpetual growth, however sketchy the evidence?
To understand why Europe in particular is having such a hard time generating economic growth, first we need to understand what drives it – and why some countries are better placed than others in terms of productivity (the ability to keep their economy growing).
Economists have a relatively straightforward answer. At its core, growth comes from two factors: labour and capital (machinery, technology and the like). So, for your economy to grow, you either need more people working (to make more stuff), or the same amount of workers need to become more productive – by using better machines, tools and technologies.
Historically, population growth has gone hand-in-hand with economic expansion. In the postwar years, countries such as France, Germany and the UK experienced booming birth rates and major waves of immigration. That expanding labour force fuelled industrial production, consumer demand and economic growth.
Why does economic growth matter? Video: Bank of England.
Ageing populations not only reduce the size of the active labour force, they place more pressure on health and other public services, as well as pension systems. Some regions have attempted to compensate with more liberal migration policies, but public resistance to immigration is strong – reflected in increased support for rightwing and populist parties that advocate for stricter immigration controls.
While the UK’s median age is now over 40, it has a birthrate advantage over countries such as Germany and Italy, thanks largely to the influx of immigrants from its former colonies in the second half of the 20th century. But whether this translates into meaningful and sustainable growth depends heavily on labour market participation and the quality of investment – particularly in productivity-enhancing sectors like green technology, infrastructure and education – all of which remain uncertain.
If Europe can’t rely on more workers, then to achieve growth, its existing workers must become more productive. And here, we arrive at the second half of the equation: capital. The usual hope is that investments in new technologies – particularly AI as it drives a new wave of automation – will make up the difference.
In January, the UK’s prime minister, Keir Starmer, called AI “the defining opportunity of our generation” while announcing he had agreed to take forward all 50 recommendations set out in an independent AI action plan. Not to be outdone, the European Commission unveiled its AI continent action plan in April.
Keir Starmer announces the UK’s AI action plan. Video: BBC.
Despite the EU’s concerted efforts to enhance its digital competitiveness, a 2024 McKinsey report found that US corporations invested around €700 billion more in capital expenditure and R&D, in 2022 alone than their European counterparts, underscoring the continent’s investment gap. And where AI is adopted, it tends to concentrate gains in a few superstar companies or cities.
In fact, this disconnect between firm-level innovation and national growth is one of the defining features of the current era. Tech clusters in cities like Paris, Amsterdam and Stockholm may generate unicorn startups and record-breaking valuations, but they’re not enough to move the needle on GDP growth across Europe as a whole. The gains are often too narrow, the spillovers too weak and the social returns too uneven.
Yet admitting this publicly remains politically taboo. Can any European leader look their citizens in the eye and say: “We’re living in a post-growth world”? Or rather, can they say it and still hope to win another election?
The human need for growth
To be human is to grow – physically, psychologically, financially; in the richness of our relationships, imagination and ambitions. Few people would be happy with the prospect of being consigned to do the same job for the same money for the rest of their lives – as the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated. Which makes the prospect of selling a post-growth future to people sound almost inhuman.
Even those who care little about money and success usually strive to create better futures for themselves, their families and communities. When that sense of opportunity and forward motion is absent or frustrated, it can lead to malaise, disillusionment and in extreme cases, despair.
The health consequences of long-term economic decline are increasingly described as “diseases of despair” – rising rates of suicide, substance abuse and alcohol-related deaths concentrated in struggling communities. Recessions reliably fuel psychological distress and demand for mental healthcare, as seen during the eurozone crisis when Greece experienced surging levels of depression and declining self-rated health, particularly among the unemployed – with job loss, insecurity and austerity all contributing to emotional suffering and social fragmentation.
These trends don’t just affect the vulnerable; even those who appear relatively secure often experience “anticipatory anxiety” – a persistent fear of losing their foothold and slipping into instability. In communities, both rural and urban, that are wrestling with long-term decline, “left-behind” residents often describe a deep sense of abandonment by governments and society more generally – prompting calls for recovery strategies that address despair not merely as a mental health issue, but as a wider economic and social condition.
The belief in opportunity and upward mobility – long embodied in US culture by “the American dream” – has historically served as a powerful psychological buffer, fostering resilience and purpose even amid systemic barriers. However, as inequality widens and while career opportunities for many appear to narrow, research shows the gap between aspiration and reality can lead to disillusionment, chronic stress and increased psychological distress – particularly among marginalised groups. These feelings are only intensified in the age of social media, where constant exposure to curated success stories fuels social comparison and deepens the sense of falling behind.
For younger people in the UK and many parts of Europe, the fact that so much capital is tied up in housing means opportunity depends less on effort or merit and more on whether their parents own property – meaning they could pass some of its value down to their children.
‘Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism’, a discussion hosted by LSE Online.
Stagnation also manifests in more subtle but no less damaging ways. Take infrastructure. In many countries, the true cost of flatlining growth has been absorbed not through dramatic collapse but quiet decay.
Across the UK, more than 1.5 million children are learning in crumbling school buildings, with some forced into makeshift classrooms for years after being evacuated due to safety concerns. In healthcare, the total NHS repair backlog has reached £13.8 billion, leading to hundreds of critical incidents – from leaking roofs to collapsing ceilings – and the loss of vital clinical time.
Meanwhile, neglected government buildings across the country are affecting everything from prison safety to courtroom access, with thousands of cases disrupted due to structural failures and fire safety risks. These are not headlines but lived realities – the hidden toll of underinvestment, quietly hollowing out the state behind a veneer of functionality.
Without economic growth, governments face a stark dilemma: to raise revenues through higher taxes, or make further rounds of spending cuts. Either path has deep social and political implications – especially for inequality. The question becomes not just how to balance the books but how to do so fairly – and whether the public might support a post-growth agenda framed explicitly around reducing inequality, even if it also means paying more taxes.
In fact, public attitudes suggest there is already widespread support for reducing inequality. According to the Equality Trust, 76% of UK adults agree that large wealth gaps give some people too much political power.
Research by the Sutton Trust finds younger people especially attuned to these disparities: only 21% of 18 to 24-year-olds believe everyone has the same chance to succeed and 57% say it’s harder for their generation to get ahead. Most believe that coming from a wealthy family (75%) and knowing the right people (84%) are key to getting on in life.
In a post-growth world, higher taxes would not only mean wealthier individuals and corporations contributing a relatively greater share, but the wider public shifting consumption patterns, spending less on private goods and more collectively through the state. But the recent example of France shows how challenging this tightope is to walk.
In September 2024, its former prime minister, Michel Barnier, signalled plans for targeted tax increases on the wealthy, arguing these were essential to stabilise the country’s strained public finances. While politically sensitive, his proposals for tax increases on wealthy individuals and large firms initially passed without widespread public unrest or protests.
However, his broader austerity package – encompassing €40 billion (£34.5 billion) in spending cuts alongside €20 billion in tax hikes – drew vocal opposition from both left‑wing lawmakers and the far right, and contributed to parliament toppling his minority government in December 2024.
Such measures surely mark the early signs of a deeper financial reckoning that post-growth realities will force into the open: how to sustain public services when traditional assumptions about economic expansion can no longer be relied upon.
For the traditional parties, the political heat is on. Regions most left behind by structural economic shifts are increasingly drawn to populist and anti-establishment movements. Electoral outcomes have shown a significant shift, with far-right parties such as France’s National Rally and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) making substantial gains in the 2024 European parliament elections, reflecting a broader trend of rising support for populist and anti-establishment parties across the continent.
Voters are expressing growing dissatisfaction not only with the economy, but democracy itself. This sentiment has manifested through declining trust in political institutions, as evidenced by a Forsa survey in Germany where only 16% of respondents expressed confidence in their government and 54% indicated they didn’t trust any party to solve the country’s problems.
This brings us to the central dilemma: can any European politician successfully lead a national conversation which admits the economic assumptions of the past no longer hold? Or is attempting such honesty in politics inevitably a path to self-destruction, no matter how urgently the conversation is needed?
Facing up to a new economic reality
For much of the postwar era, economic life in advanced democracies has rested on a set of familiar expectations: that hard work would translate into rising incomes, that home ownership would be broadly attainable and that each generation would surpass the prosperity of the one before it.
However, a growing body of evidence suggests these pillars of economic life are eroding. Younger generations are already struggling to match their parents’ earnings, with lower rates of home ownership and greater financial precarity becoming the norm in many parts of Europe.
Incomes for millennials and generation Z have largely stagnated relative to previous cohorts, even as their living costs – particularly for housing, education and healthcare – have risen sharply. Rates of intergenerational income mobility have slowed significantly across much of Europe and North America since the 1970s. Many young people now face the prospect not just of static living standards, but of downward mobility.
Effectively communicating the realities of a post-growth economy – including the need to account for future generations’ growing sense of alienation and declining faith in democracy – requires more than just sound policy. It demands a serious political effort to reframe expectations and rebuild trust.
History shows this is sometimes possible. When the National Health Service was founded in 1948, the UK government faced fierce resistance from parts of the medical profession and concerns among the public about cost and state control. Yet Clement Attlee’s Labour government persisted, linking the creation of the NHS to the shared sacrifices of the war and a compelling moral vision of universal care.
While taxes did rise to fund the service, the promise of a fairer, healthier society helped secure enduring public support – but admittedly, in the wake of the massive shock to the system that was the second world war.
In 1946, Prime Minister Clement Attlee asked the UK public to help ‘renew Britain’. Video: British Pathé.
Psychological research offers further insight into how such messages can be received. People are more receptive to change when it is framed not as loss but as contribution – to fairness, to community, to shared resilience. This underlines why the immediate postwar period was such a politically fruitful time to launch the NHS. The COVID pandemic briefly offered a sense of unifying purpose and the chance to rethink the status quo – but that window quickly closed, leaving most of the old structures intact and largely unquestioned.
A society’s ability to flourish without meaningful national growth – and its citizens’ capacity to remain content or even hopeful in the absence of economic expansion – ultimately depends on whether any political party can credibly redefine success without relying on promises of ever-increasing wealth and prosperity. And instead, offer a plausible narrative about ways to satisfy our very human needs for personal development and social enrichment in this new economic reality.
The challenge will be not only to find new economic models, but to build new sources of collective meaning. This moment demands not just economic adaptation but a political and cultural reckoning.
If the idea of building this new consensus seems overly optimistic, studies of the “spiral of silence” suggest that people often underestimate how widely their views are shared. A recent report on climate action found that while most people supported stronger green policies, they wrongly assumed they were in the minority. Making shared values visible – and naming them – can be key to unlocking political momentum.
So far, no mainstream European party has dared articulate a vision of prosperity that doesn’t rely on reviving growth. But with democratic trust eroding, authoritarian populism on the rise and the climate crisis accelerating, now may be the moment to begin that long-overdue conversation – if anyone is willing to listen.
Welcome to Europe’s first ‘post-growth’ nation
I’m imagining a European country in a decade’s time. One that no longer positions itself as a global tech powerhouse or financial centre, but the first major country to declare itself a “post-growth nation”.
This shift didn’t come from idealism or ecological fervour, but from the hard reality that after years of economic stagnation, demographic change and mounting environmental stress, the pursuit of economic growth no longer offered a credible path forward.
What followed wasn’t a revolution, but a reckoning – a response to political chaos, collapsing public services and widening inequality that sparked a broad coalition of younger voters, climate activists, disillusioned centrists and exhausted frontline workers to rally around a new, pragmatic vision for the future.
At the heart of this movement was a shift in language and priorities, as the government moved away from promises of endless economic expansion and instead committed to wellbeing, resilience and equality – aligning itself with a growing international conversation about moving beyond GDP, already gaining traction in European policy circles and initiatives such as the EU-funded “post-growth deal”.
But this transformation was also the result of years of political drift and public disillusionment, ultimately catalysed by electoral reform that broke the two-party hold and enabled a new alliance, shaped by grassroots organisers, policy innovators and a generation ready to reimagine what national success could mean.
Taxes were higher, particularly on land, wealth and carbon. But in return, public services were transformed. Healthcare, education, transport, broadband and energy were guaranteed as universal rights, not privatised commodities. Work changed: the standard week was shortened to 30 hours and the state incentivised jobs in care, education, maintenance and ecological restoration. People had less disposable income – but fewer costs, too.
Consumption patterns shifted. Hyper-consumption declined. Repair shops and sharing platforms flourished. The housing market was restructured around long-term security rather than speculative returns. A large-scale public housing programme replaced buy-to-let investment as the dominant model. Wealth inequality narrowed and cities began to densify as car use fell and public space was reclaimed.
For the younger generation, post-growth life was less about climbing the income ladder and more about stability, time and relationships. For older generations, there were guarantees: pensions remained, care systems were rebuilt and housing protections were strengthened. A new sense of intergenerational reciprocity emerged – not perfectly, but more visibly than before.
Politically, the transition had its risks. There was backlash – some of the wealthy left. But many stayed. And over time, the narrative shifted. This European country began to be seen not as a laggard but as a laboratory for 21st-century governance – a place where ecological realism and social solidarity shaped policy, not just quarterly targets.
The transition was uneven and not without pain. Jobs were lost in sectors no longer considered sustainable. Supply chains were restructured. International competitiveness suffered in some areas. But the political narrative – carefully crafted and widely debated – made the case that resilience and equity were more important than temporary growth.
While some countries mocked it, others quietly began to study it. Some cities – especially in the Nordics, Iberia and Benelux – followed suit, drawing from the growing body of research on post-growth urban planning and non-GDP-based prosperity metrics.
This was not a retreat from ambition but a redefinition of it. The shift was rooted in a growing body of academic and policy work arguing that a planned, democratic transition away from growth-centric models is not only compatible with social progress but essential to preventing environmental and societal collapse.
The country’s post-growth transition helped it sidestep deeper political fragmentation by replacing austerity with heavy investment in community resilience, care infrastructure and participatory democracy – from local budgeting to citizen-led planning. A new civic culture took root: slower and more deliberative but less polarised, as politics shifted from abstract promises of growth to open debates about real-world trade-offs.
Internationally, the country traded some geopolitical power for moral authority, focusing less on economic competition and more on global cooperation around climate, tax justice and digital governance – earning new relevance among smaller nations pursuing their own post-growth paths.
So is this all just a social and economic fantasy? Arguably, the real fantasy is believing that countries in Europe – and the parties that compete to run them – can continue with their current insistence on “growth at all costs” (whether or not they actually believe it).
The alternative – embracing a post-growth reality – would offer the world something we haven’t seen in a long time: honesty in politics, a commitment to reducing inequality and a belief that a fairer, more sustainable future is still possible. Not because it was easy, but because it was the only option left.
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Peter Bloom does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. His latest book is Capitalism Reloaded: The Rise of the Authoritarian-Financial Complex (Bristol University Press).
BNP PARIBAS ADAPTS ITS GOVERNANCEAHEAD OF ITS FUTURE STRATEGIC PLAN
PRESS RELEASE
Paris, 7th July 2025
As the European leader in investment banking, corporate financing and the management of long-term savings, BNP Paribas has all the necessary expertise, industrial and technological platforms and strong client franchises to launch a new stage of development.
In this context, BNP Paribas is adapting its governance in order to strengthen its integrated model and the cross-functionality between its businesses in the perspective of its future strategic plan.
The Group will be perfectly positioned to seize the opportunity of the Savings and Investment Union (SIU), as well as technological transformations, most notably artificial intelligence.
As a result, CPBS (the Commercial, Personal Banking & Services division of BNP Paribas) is creating a new unit within its organisation encompassing the Commercial & Personal Banking businesses in the euro zone, including Commercial & Personal Banking in France (CPBF), BNL banca commerciale in Italy, BNP Paribas Fortis (CPBB) in Belgium and BGL BNP Paribas (CPBL) in Luxembourg.
Yannick Jung, current Head of CIB Global Banking, will lead this new unit. Appointed Deputy Chief Operating Officer of the Group, he will report to Thierry Laborde, Group Chief Operating Officer in charge of CPBS.
This new unit will accelerate mutualised investments, industrialisation and technological assets to enhance the quality of customer experience. It will accelerate cross-selling with CIB and IPS businesses, as well as the distribution of CPBS-originated assets.
By uniting the Group’s Commercial & Personal banking and several specialised businesses, CPBS is consolidating leading positions in Europe both for its Corporate and Private franchises and for its specialised businesses. As the leader in financing for European SMEs and mid-caps, in particular innovative companies, and the leader of private banking in Europe, CPBS supports the European economy and its customers in managing their financial savings.
Furthermore, Corporate & Institutional Banking (CIB) is adapting its governance, which will now consist of an Executive Chairman and a Chief Executive Officer. Consequently, Yann Gérardin, Group Chief Operating Officer will also become Executive Chairman of CIB. Reporting to Yann Gérardin, Olivier Osty, current Head of CIB Global Markets, will become Deputy Chief Operating Officer of the Group and Chief Executive Officer of CIB.
Going forward, the CIB organisation will now consist of two Coverage activities (Institutional coverage & Corporate coverage, including sectors and advisory), 5 Business Lines – Transaction Banking, Capital Markets, Equities,Fixed Income Currencies and Commodities (FICC), Securities Services –, and 3 geographies EMEA*, APAC and Americas, whose managers will report directly to the Chief Executive Officer of CIB, Olivier Osty.
Over the past ten years, with an exceptional track record, CIB has doubled its revenues to become the n°1 European CIB. CIB is now a leading European bank for the largest global institutional and corporate clients. Benefiting from the power of the Group’s integrated model, this success is the result of investment and deployment of cutting-edge platforms at the service of clients, as well as the execution of an effective “Originate & Distribute” strategy making the bridge between institutional and corporate clients, which will be at the heart of financing the European economy in coming years.
Lastly, the Investment & Protection Services (IPS) division, under the responsibility of Renaud Dumora, Deputy Chief Operating Officer of BNP Paribas, will continue to accelerate its development. Following transformative external growth operations, primarily the acquisition of AXA IM which will create the European leader in long-term savings management, as well as in life insurance in France and Italy, and wealth management in Germany, IPS will have a unique range of products and services. The division will benefit from an increasingly broad and privileged access to individual, corporate and institutional clients, in close collaboration with CIB and CPBS. IPS will also continue to deploy powerful platforms for its businesses, strengthening its capacity to meet client needs and grow the business. This new dynamic will enable IPS to boost its contribution to pre-tax income by more than half, targeting it at more than 20% of Group’s pre-tax income.
These appointments will take place from 1st September 2025.
“Thesechanges and appointments represent a major step in preparing BNP Paribas for the next phase of its growth. They aim at consolidating the Group’s integrated model by accelerating the market share growth of our CIB based on its “Originate & Distribute” approach, strengthening the cross-functionality of our commercial banks in the eurozone and preparing their future by focusing in particular on common technological investments. With the acquisition of AXA IM, one of our largest external growth moves, we are consolidating the Group’s asset management businesses and accelerating the development of our IPS division in line with its insurance and wealth management businesses” announced Jean-Laurent Bonnafé, Director and Chief Executive Officer of BNP Paribas
*EMEA CIB Countries
About BNP Paribas Leader in banking and financial services in Europe, BNP Paribas operates in 64 countries and has nearly 178,000 employees, including more than 144,000 in Europe. The Group has key positions in its three main fields of activity: Commercial, Personal Banking & Services for the Group’s commercial & personal banking and several specialised businesses including BNP Paribas Personal Finance and Arval; Investment & Protection Services for savings, investment and protection solutions; and Corporate & Institutional Banking, focused on corporate and institutional clients. Based on its strong diversified and integrated model, the Group helps all its clients (individuals, community associations, entrepreneurs, SMEs, corporates and institutional clients) to realise their projects through solutions spanning financing, investment, savings and protection insurance. In Europe, BNP Paribas has four domestic markets: Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg. The Group is rolling out its integrated commercial & personal banking model across several Mediterranean countries, Türkiye, and Eastern Europe. As a key player in international banking, the Group has leading platforms and business lines in Europe, a strong presence in the Americas as well as a solid and fast-growing business in Asia-Pacific. BNP Paribas has implemented a Corporate Social Responsibility approach in all its activities, enabling it to contribute to the construction of a sustainable future, while ensuring the Group’s performance and stability.
BNP PARIBAS ADAPTS ITS GOVERNANCEAHEAD OF ITS FUTURE STRATEGIC PLAN
PRESS RELEASE
Paris, 7th July 2025
As the European leader in investment banking, corporate financing and the management of long-term savings, BNP Paribas has all the necessary expertise, industrial and technological platforms and strong client franchises to launch a new stage of development.
In this context, BNP Paribas is adapting its governance in order to strengthen its integrated model and the cross-functionality between its businesses in the perspective of its future strategic plan.
The Group will be perfectly positioned to seize the opportunity of the Savings and Investment Union (SIU), as well as technological transformations, most notably artificial intelligence.
As a result, CPBS (the Commercial, Personal Banking & Services division of BNP Paribas) is creating a new unit within its organisation encompassing the Commercial & Personal Banking businesses in the euro zone, including Commercial & Personal Banking in France (CPBF), BNL banca commerciale in Italy, BNP Paribas Fortis (CPBB) in Belgium and BGL BNP Paribas (CPBL) in Luxembourg.
Yannick Jung, current Head of CIB Global Banking, will lead this new unit. Appointed Deputy Chief Operating Officer of the Group, he will report to Thierry Laborde, Group Chief Operating Officer in charge of CPBS.
This new unit will accelerate mutualised investments, industrialisation and technological assets to enhance the quality of customer experience. It will accelerate cross-selling with CIB and IPS businesses, as well as the distribution of CPBS-originated assets.
By uniting the Group’s Commercial & Personal banking and several specialised businesses, CPBS is consolidating leading positions in Europe both for its Corporate and Private franchises and for its specialised businesses. As the leader in financing for European SMEs and mid-caps, in particular innovative companies, and the leader of private banking in Europe, CPBS supports the European economy and its customers in managing their financial savings.
Furthermore, Corporate & Institutional Banking (CIB) is adapting its governance, which will now consist of an Executive Chairman and a Chief Executive Officer. Consequently, Yann Gérardin, Group Chief Operating Officer will also become Executive Chairman of CIB. Reporting to Yann Gérardin, Olivier Osty, current Head of CIB Global Markets, will become Deputy Chief Operating Officer of the Group and Chief Executive Officer of CIB.
Going forward, the CIB organisation will now consist of two Coverage activities (Institutional coverage & Corporate coverage, including sectors and advisory), 5 Business Lines – Transaction Banking, Capital Markets, Equities,Fixed Income Currencies and Commodities (FICC), Securities Services –, and 3 geographies EMEA*, APAC and Americas, whose managers will report directly to the Chief Executive Officer of CIB, Olivier Osty.
Over the past ten years, with an exceptional track record, CIB has doubled its revenues to become the n°1 European CIB. CIB is now a leading European bank for the largest global institutional and corporate clients. Benefiting from the power of the Group’s integrated model, this success is the result of investment and deployment of cutting-edge platforms at the service of clients, as well as the execution of an effective “Originate & Distribute” strategy making the bridge between institutional and corporate clients, which will be at the heart of financing the European economy in coming years.
Lastly, the Investment & Protection Services (IPS) division, under the responsibility of Renaud Dumora, Deputy Chief Operating Officer of BNP Paribas, will continue to accelerate its development. Following transformative external growth operations, primarily the acquisition of AXA IM which will create the European leader in long-term savings management, as well as in life insurance in France and Italy, and wealth management in Germany, IPS will have a unique range of products and services. The division will benefit from an increasingly broad and privileged access to individual, corporate and institutional clients, in close collaboration with CIB and CPBS. IPS will also continue to deploy powerful platforms for its businesses, strengthening its capacity to meet client needs and grow the business. This new dynamic will enable IPS to boost its contribution to pre-tax income by more than half, targeting it at more than 20% of Group’s pre-tax income.
These appointments will take place from 1st September 2025.
“Thesechanges and appointments represent a major step in preparing BNP Paribas for the next phase of its growth. They aim at consolidating the Group’s integrated model by accelerating the market share growth of our CIB based on its “Originate & Distribute” approach, strengthening the cross-functionality of our commercial banks in the eurozone and preparing their future by focusing in particular on common technological investments. With the acquisition of AXA IM, one of our largest external growth moves, we are consolidating the Group’s asset management businesses and accelerating the development of our IPS division in line with its insurance and wealth management businesses” announced Jean-Laurent Bonnafé, Director and Chief Executive Officer of BNP Paribas
*EMEA CIB Countries
About BNP Paribas Leader in banking and financial services in Europe, BNP Paribas operates in 64 countries and has nearly 178,000 employees, including more than 144,000 in Europe. The Group has key positions in its three main fields of activity: Commercial, Personal Banking & Services for the Group’s commercial & personal banking and several specialised businesses including BNP Paribas Personal Finance and Arval; Investment & Protection Services for savings, investment and protection solutions; and Corporate & Institutional Banking, focused on corporate and institutional clients. Based on its strong diversified and integrated model, the Group helps all its clients (individuals, community associations, entrepreneurs, SMEs, corporates and institutional clients) to realise their projects through solutions spanning financing, investment, savings and protection insurance. In Europe, BNP Paribas has four domestic markets: Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg. The Group is rolling out its integrated commercial & personal banking model across several Mediterranean countries, Türkiye, and Eastern Europe. As a key player in international banking, the Group has leading platforms and business lines in Europe, a strong presence in the Americas as well as a solid and fast-growing business in Asia-Pacific. BNP Paribas has implemented a Corporate Social Responsibility approach in all its activities, enabling it to contribute to the construction of a sustainable future, while ensuring the Group’s performance and stability.
Building on the successful rollout of its groundbreaking continental payment infrastructure, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), in strategic collaboration with Interstellar, a leading African deep-tech company, have announced the launch of the PAPSS African Currency Marketplace (PACM). The launch was announced on the sidelines of the 2025 Afreximbank (www.Afreximbank.com) Annual Meeting (AAM2025) held in Abuja from June 25 – 28.
This next-generation Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) represents a bold evolution of the PAPSS mission, addressing Africa’s longstanding challenge of currency inconvertibility and enabling seamless, sovereign currency exchange for intra-African trade.
For decades, Africa’s economic momentum has been hindered by a fragmented financial landscape. The continent’s 41 currencies, diverse regulatory environments, and lack of convertibility have created significant friction. To trade with neighbouring countries, African businesses have often relied on external (hard) foreign currencies for foreign exchange, creating what experts call the “hard and costly currency bottleneck.” This workaround drains an estimated $5 billion annually in fees, delays, and opportunity costs, undermining the competitiveness of African enterprises and slowing progress toward realising the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
“PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is fully transparent, order book-driven, and operates with trusted counterparties, strictly adhering to local regulatory frameworks and global best practices,” affirmed Mike Ogbalu III, CEO of PAPSS. “By creating a single, continent-wide liquidity pool, PACM serves as a powerful liquidity engine for intra-African commerce.” This launch marks a major strategic evolution in the PAPSS journey. According to Mr Ogbalu, since its official launch in 2022, PAPSS has enabled real-time cross-border payments across 17 countries, connecting 14 national switches and over 150 commercial banks. Initially piloted in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), PAPSS rapidly expanded to become the core settlement layer of the AfCFTA’s financial infrastructure. But while payment rails were laid, a deeper issue remained.
“We soon realised that solving for payments alone was not enough,” explained Mike Ogbalu. “Corporations, airlines, reinsurance firms, and multinationals operating across Africa still faced a persistent hurdle: trapped capital, arising from limited currency convertibility and overreliance on hard currencies.” For example, he explained, over $2 billion is currently ‘trapped’ in African countries where airlines operate, unable to repatriate their funds due to exchange restrictions or depreciation of local currencies. “The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is the answer to that problem — an extension of our commitment to building sovereign, frictionless financial infrastructure for Africa.” He added.
The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace jointly developed by PAPSS and Interstellar, enables the direct exchange of African currencies without passing through hard currencies. As a transparent, continent-wide, peer-to-peer platform, it allows businesses to trade directly in local currencies in near real-time while remaining compliant with national regulations. It unlocks liquidity, releases trapped capital, eliminates excessive foreign exchange costs, and supports the continent’s long-term goal of financial sovereignty. In partnership with PAPSS, the PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is built on Interstellar’s enterprise-grade, blockchain-agnostic infrastructure, which enables the use of permissioned blockchain technology while ensuring institutional grade-security, scalability, and near instant settlement.
“This is not just about technology, it is about fulfilling a continental vision,” said Ernest Mbenkum, Founder and CEO of Interstellar during a fireside chat at the launch. “PAPSS African Currency Marketplace was built from the ground up to serve Africa’s specific needs. PAPSS and Interstellar are not just collaborators, we are co-architects of a new financial future, aligned in purpose and committed to transformation.”
Ernest Mbenkum further emphasised, “African currencies deserve a better place in the world. With this marketplace, your local currency is no longer just a medium of exchange, it becomes a vehicle of opportunity.” He also highlighted that this is only the beginning of Interstellar’s vision, stating, “We’re building a future where Africa no longer needs to wait for foreign rails to move value. Our infrastructure will power Africa’s financial renaissance.”
Haytham El Maayergi, Executive Vice President of Afreximbank, noted: “The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace gives us the power to transform trade dramatically, bringing us to trade with each other with a major benefit that we can now accept each other’s currency.”
The impact is already being felt. During its pilot phase, more than 80 African corporates transacted across 12 currency pairs, with all transactions settled in local currencies. For example, a company like Kenya Airways, which earns Nigerian Naira from ticket sales, can now use PACM to directly exchange Naira for Kenyan Shillings—without converting through a third currency. Early adopters include ZEP-RE (PTA Reinsurance Company) and Access View Africa, which called the platform “a dream come true.”
PAPSS African Currency Marketplace liberates trapped capital, eliminates excessive FX costs, and transforms multi-week settlement delays into near real-time execution. PAPSS CEO Mr. Ogbalu noted that following positive experiences of some early adopters, PAPSS had received interest from institutions outside Africa seeking to join the ecosystem. “This demand proves the value of what we’ve built,” he said.
With over 150 banks already connected through PAPSS and growing demand across the continent, PAPSS African Currency Marketplace stands as a game-changing financial tool for a more unified, sovereign, and efficient Africa.
Concluding his opening keynote, Mr. Haytham El Maayergi, Executive Vice President – Global Trade Bank at Afreximbank reiterated: “Africa will not rise by ideas. Africa will rise by actions. “
The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is now open to eligible corporations, financial institutions, and other market participants across the continent.
– on behalf of Afreximbank.
Media Contact: Papa Thiongane communications@papss.com
Website: marketplace@papss.com
About PAPSS: The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System – PAPSS is a centralised Financial Market Infrastructure that enables the efficient flow of money securely across African borders, minimising risk and contributing to financial integration across the regions. PAPSS collaborates with African central banks to offer payment and settlement solutions that commercial banks and licensed payment service providers (switches, fintechs, aggregators, etc.) across the continent can connect to, making these services accessible to the public. To date, PAPSS has developed and launched 3 payment solutions: PAPSS Instant Payment System (IPS), PAPSS African Currency Marketplace (PACM), and the PAPSSCARD.
Afreximbank and the African Union (“AU”) first announced PAPSS at the Twelfth Extraordinary Summit of the African Union held on July 7, 2019, in Niamey, Niger Republic, therefore adopting PAPSS as a key instrument for the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Further, in its thirteenth (13th) extraordinary session, held on December 5, 2020, the assembly of the African Union directed Afreximbank and the AfCFTA secretariat to finalise, among others, work on the Pan-African Payments and Settlements System (PAPSS). The 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU further directed the AfCFTA and Afreximbank to deploy the system to cover the entire continent. PAPSS was officially launched in Accra, Ghana, on January 13, 2022, thus making it available for use by the public.
About Interstellar: Interstellar Inc. is Africa’s leading enterprise blockchain infrastructure company —enabling secure cross-border transactions, stablecoin integration, and next-generation financial solutions across the continent. Its core platform, STARGATE, is a critical blockchain-agnostic, enterprise-grade infrastructure that empowers major institutions to build and scale secure, high-performance financial applications, including tokenization platforms and payments solutions.
International Monetary Fund. African Dept. “Guinea-Bissau: 2025 Article IV Consultation, Eighth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, Requests for Rephasing of Access, Extension of the Arrangement, Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Guinea-Bissau”, IMF Staff Country Reports 2025, 167 (2025), accessed July 7, 2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229016094.002
International Monetary Fund. African Dept. “Guinea-Bissau: 2025 Article IV Consultation, Eighth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility, Requests for Rephasing of Access, Extension of the Arrangement, Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Guinea-Bissau”, IMF Staff Country Reports 2025, 167 (2025), accessed July 7, 2025, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229016094.002
Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen
(Portsmouth, NH) – Today, U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Maggie Hassan (D-NH) and U.S. Congressman Chris Pappas (NH-01) attended and delivered remarks congratulating new citizens from over 40 different countries at a U.S. Naturalization ceremony at the Strawbery Banke Museum. Photos from today’s event can be found here.
“At every point in our history, America has been shaped by immigrants from every corner of the world and every sector of society,” said Senator Shaheen. “I was honored to be a part of today’s naturalization ceremony in Portsmouth, and I congratulate each and every new citizen on this momentous event in their lives.”
“It was a privilege to join today’s naturalization ceremony at Strawbery Banke and to welcome and celebrate America’s newest citizens,” said Senator Hassan. “Ceremonies like the one held today are an opportunity for American citizens, new and old, to recommit ourselves to supporting and defending the ideals of freedom, self-government, and the rule of law as embodied by our Constitution.”
“At today’s naturalization ceremony we welcomed our newest American citizens and reflected on the profound impact that immigrants have on New Hampshire and in our country. Immigrants come to work hard and seek freedom, opportunity, and security, and immigration renews the spirit of our nation,” said Congressman Pappas. “I was honored to join these patriotic Americans and congratulate them on taking the oath of citizenship.”
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
The United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Road Safety, Jean Todt, will visit Mexico, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia and Brazil (23-27 June), to launch the UN global campaign #MakeASafetyStatement, in partnership with JCDecaux. During his visit, he will meet with key government officials, representatives of the international community, private and public sector leaders, and representatives of civil society to promote road safety initiatives and advocate for enhanced measures.
This mission aligns with the Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2021-2030, which aims to halve road fatalities by 2030. It follows the adoption of a new UN resolution on road safety at the 4th Global Ministerial Conference on Road Safety in Marrakech, Morocco, earlier this year (18-19February).
A Silent Pandemic
Road traffic crashes claimed more than 145,000 lives across the Americas in 2021, according to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), representing 12% of global road fatalities that year. Road crashes remain the leading cause of death for children and young people aged 5 to 29 years old globally imposing a significant social and economic burden. According to the World Bank, the cost of road crashes represents between 3% and 6% of GDP in the region.
Across the Americas, deaths on the road have registered a 9.37% drop in the decade to 2021. The region’s progress is above the 5% global drop in deaths in the period but is nowhere near fast enough to meet the global goal of halving road deaths by 2030.
Latin America is one of the most urbanized regions in the world, making road safety a crucial component of city development strategies. This underscores the urgent need to rethink mobility and invest in road safety.
Solutions exist
The good news is that solutions exist. Strengthening law enforcement, investing in education and public transport, enhancing road infrastructure and vehicle safety, developing bicycle lanes and pedestrian pathways — especially around schools —and improving post-crash care are all part of a safe and efficient mobility system. Additionally, mobilizing political leadership is crucial to increase funding and action.
A 2019 report commissioned by Bloomberg Philanthropies revealed that more than 25,000 lives could be saved and over 170,000 serious injuries prevented by 2030 if United Nations (UN) vehicle safety regulations were applied by four key countries in the region—Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Brazil.
“Every year we lose 1.19 million lives on the world’s roads, this is equivalent to the entire population of cities like Monterrey (Mexico), Guatemala or Campinas (Brazil). This is madness, because we know how to stop this carnage. With this campaign we call for urgent action to ensure safe roads for all, everywhere on the continent,” said Jean Todt, UN Special Envoy for Road Safety.
Jean-Charles Decaux, Co-CEO of JCDecaux said: “At JCDecaux, we are committed to improving the quality of life for people wherever they live, work and travel, offering innovative, sustainable street furniture and services that meet cities and citizens’ expectations. This is the core of our mission and that is why we are proud to partner with the United Nations and Jean Todt, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Road Safety, to display this road safety campaign across our global media network. Following its successful rollout in over 50 countries since September 2023, the campaign’s launch in Latin America marks a key milestone, amplifying local road safety efforts and reinforcing public awareness. With our powerful and service-driven media, we are able to relay these vital prevention messages in high-impact locations, promote safe behaviour, and engage all our stakeholders around this major cause. The campaign’s positive tone, supported by international celebrities, helps inspire a new vision for public space: one that is safer, more inclusive, and more harmonious for all.”
#MakeASafetyStatement campaign
The global #MakeASafetyStatement campaign aims to promote road safety and create secure, inclusive, and sustainable streets worldwide.
Celebrities fronting the campaign in Latin America include football icon Ousmane Dembélé, F1 driver Charles Leclerc, tennis legend Novak Djokovic, singer and musician Kylie Minogue, motorcycle racer Marc Marquez, supermodel Naomi Campbell, and actors Patrick Dempsey and Michael Fassbender.
Thanks to the support of the International Olympic Committee, Latin American 2024 Olympic champions such as Juan-Manuel Celaya (Mexico, silver medal, diving), Adriana Ruano (Guatemala, gold medal, shooting women’s trap), Atheyna Bylon (Panama, silver medal, boxing), Angel Barajas (Colombia, silver medal, gymnastics), Rebecca Andrade (Brazil, gold medal, artistic gymnastics) have joined the initiative.
National focus
Mexico
In Mexico, 15 to 16,000 people die each year in road accidents. This puts the fatality rate at 12.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, below the average for the Americas, and for countries such as the USA, Colombia or Brazil, but above Chile or Argentina. The economic cost of road accidents is estimated at approximately 1.4% of GDP.
The National Law of Mobility and Road Safety of 2022 called for the adoption of the life-saving ‘safe systems’ approach that makes safety priority in all road-related policies and planning and is laid out in the Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety. An exemplary amendment to Mexico’s constitution underpinned the law, making ‘mobility under the conditions of safety, accessibility, efficiency, sustainability, quality, inclusion and equality,’ a universal right for all Mexicans.
Although the law mandated the use of certified helmets at the federal level, most Mexican states have not yet legislated mandatory use, resulting in low compliance rates.
Guatemala
Road crashes remain a significant public health issue in Guatemala, with some 2,352 deaths registered in 2024 on the country’s roads. This brings the death rate at 12.6 per 100,000 population, as per WHO estimates.
Motorcycles are involved in half of the crashes and riders represent some 60% of the victims. Road crashes happen predominantly in urban areas and among vulnerable road users.
In the recent period, Guatemala has made some progress in addressing road safety, both through institutional strengthening and the improvement of monitoring systems, legislative response, and intersectoral coordination.
Guatemala is currently a party to only 1 of the 7 core UN Road Safety legals instruments and legislation on pedestrian protection and child restraint systems remains fragmented. Helmet use is mandatory, but technical standards are not fully aligned with international best practices (e.g., UN-certified helmet standards ECE 22.05). Enforcement also remains a key challenge.
Guatemala currently participates in a project of the UN Road Safety Fund (UN RSF) Safe School Zones, which supports infrastructure improvements and awareness campaigns to protect children around schools.
However, it records a very high level of people with serious injuries after a crash, with about 21 cases per death.
Panama is currently implementing 2 projects under the UN Road Safety Fund: Safe School Zones, aimed at reducing child fatalities near schools, and Strengthening Road Safety Legislation, aiming at aligning national laws with global best practices. Two legislative improvements are currently under discussion, on pedestrian protection and child restraints.
Colombia
Some 8,146 people died on Colombia’s in 2022, a 24% increase compared to the average from 2017 to 2019, driven by the rise in the number of motorcycles (+ over 100%) and cars (+58%) registered between 2010 and 2022Motorcyclists represented 60% of the victims, and pedestrians 21%. The death rate is at 16 per 100,000 population (WHO), for an economic toll estimated at some 3% of GDP.
In recent years, through ANSV (Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Vial), the government has worked with cities such as Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali to implement urban safety plans, including developing public transport (express buses and cable cars); upgrading pedestrian infrastructure; developing safer intersections and introducing speed control zones.
The new Road Safety strategy (2022-2031) adopted in 2022 officially adopted the Safe System approach.
Colombia implements three projects financed by the UNRS, focusing on: institutional strengthening and better crash data systems; Safe and Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning; and an Awareness Campaign for Road Safety and Behavior Change addressing National media and school-based outreach initiatives.
Brazil
In Brazil, the mortality rate is 15.7 per 100,000 inhabitants. Pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists—compose around 61% of all crash fatalities. The notable rise in motorcycle-related deaths observed over recent years calls for accrued efforts to enforce the use of proper helmets – aligned with UN regulations (e.g., ECE-22.05).
Road safety remains a key challenges with the economic toll of road crashes estimated at some 5% of GDP. This is one powerful reason to rethink mobility and invest in road safety.
The adoption of the National Road Safety Plan (2019–2028) , aiming for a 50% reduction in fatalities by 2028, marks a strong direction, and laws exist on helmet usage, child restraints, speed, drink & drug driving, mobile phone ban, etc. However, enforcement gaps remain—especially in speed and seatbelt compliance among rear passengers.
Mandatory inspections of vehicles exist, but several modern safety requirements (ABS, Electronic Stability Control, pedestrian protection, etc.) have not yet been made mandatory.
The UN RSF Project Improving Crash Prevention on Federal Highways in Brazil develops an interoperable system for road data collection and analysis, enabling effective countermeasures.
AUSTIN, Texas, July 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ambiq Micro, Inc. (“Ambiq”), a technology leader in ultra-low-power semiconductor solutions for edge AI, today announced that it has filed a registration statement on Form S-1 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) relating to the proposed initial public offering of its common stock. The proposed offering is subject to market and other conditions and there can be no assurance as to whether or when the proposed offering may be completed. The number of shares of common stock to be offered and the price range for the proposed offering have not yet been determined. Ambiq intends to apply to have its common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol “AMBQ.”
BofA Securities and UBS Investment Bank will act as joint lead book-running managers for the proposed offering. Needham & Company and Stifel will act as joint book-running managers for the proposed offering.
The proposed offering will be made only by means of a prospectus. When available, copies of the preliminary prospectus relating to the proposed offering may be obtained by contacting: BofA Securities, NC1-022-02-25, 201 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, North Carolina 28255-0001, Attention: Prospectus Department, or by email at dg.prospectus_requests@bofa.com or UBS Securities LLC, Attention: Prospectus Department, 1285 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10019, by telephone at (888) 827-7275 or by emailing ol-prospectus-request@ubs.com.
A registration statement relating to these securities has been filed with the SEC but has not yet become effective. These securities may not be sold, nor may offers to buy be accepted, prior to the time the registration statement becomes effective. This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy these securities, nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state or jurisdiction.
About Ambiq
Ambiq’s mission is to enable intelligence (artificial intelligence (AI) and beyond) everywhere by delivering the lowest power semiconductor solutions. Ambiq enables its customers to deliver AI compute at the edge where power consumption challenges are the most profound. Ambiq’s technology innovations, built on the patented and proprietary subthreshold power optimized technology (SPOT®), fundamentally deliver a multi-fold improvement in power consumption over traditional semiconductor designs. Ambiq has powered over 270 million devices to date.
Contact:
Charlene Wan VP of Corporate Marketing and Investor Relations cwan@ambiq.com
Nearly $1 Billion in Shareholder Value Destroyed Under Engine Led Board Since December 2024
Governance Failures: Four CEOs and Two CFOs in Six Months, an Entrenched Board Ignoring Credible Bids, Insiders Granted ~5% of the Company in Egregious $10 Stock Options, and Investors Actively Directing Management
If the Current Board and its Misguided Strategy Remain in Place, Shareholders Risk Further Losses – It is Time to Immediately Initiate a Sale Process and Unlock a Change of Control Premium for Shareholders
Today, a Financial Services Sale for ~$590 million or ~11x EBITDA Still Leaves Leverage at ~4.5x, with No Path to Sub-3x Until 2031
ST. HELIER, Jersey, July 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Plantro Ltd. (“Plantro” or the “Concerned Shareholder”) one of the largest shareholders of Dye & Durham Limited (“Dye & Durham” or the “Company”) (DND: TSX) which owns approximately 11% of the Company, today announced that it has requisitioned a special meeting of Dye & Durham shareholders (the “Special Meeting”) and nominated three highly qualified individuals for the Company’s board of directors (the “Board”): Brian J. Bidulka, David Danziger, and Martha Vallance. The requisition also calls for the removal of Board Chair Arnaud Ajdler, and directors Tracey E. Keates, and Ritu Khanna, from the Board.
The value destruction at Dye & Durham since December of 2024 has reached crisis proportions and threatens the Company’s future. The current Board, steered by Engine Capital (“Engine”), EdgePoint Wealth Management Inc. (“EdgePoint”) and OneMove Capital Ltd. (“OneMove”) (together, the “Engine Activist Group”) has presided over the destruction of nearly $1 billion in shareholder value.
The Engine Activist Group and the Board have pursued a misguided and haphazard strategy of customer price cuts and overspending. This has led to sharp declines in Adjusted EBITDA, cash flow, and rising debt, as evidenced by the Company’s recent quarterly results and a new debt covenant being imposed. As global real estate markets recently weakened, the Board doubled down on its strategy instead of adjusting course. This has caused a liquidity crisis, forcing the Company to aggressively draw on its revolving credit facility to make its April 2025 interest payment. With no clear or credible plan in place, leverage is expected to approach 6.0x Adjusted EBITDA by September 30, 20251.
Remaining public is no longer a viable option. If the current Board remains unchanged, the Company will continue down the same failed path, resulting in further shareholder losses. A full sale of the Company is the only way to realize a control premium for current shareholders and restore stability in the business.
Unfortunately, the current Board and the Engine Activist Group have fought for the past nine months against the sale of the Company or even presenting an offer to shareholders to consider. Before taking control, the Engine Activist Group publicly rejected multiple all-cash offers obtained by the prior board of approximately $25 per share. After the 2024 annual general meeting, as the stock declined significantly, Plantro submitted an offer to acquire the Company for $20 a share in February 2025. This offer was similarly rejected, and Plantro was threatened with litigation for privately submitting it. Furthermore, in April 2025, according to media reports, the Board refused to engage with Advent International, a credible well-funded buyer, who formally submitted offers of approximately $20 per share. The Board has also continued to deny basic due diligence access, actively undermining the possibility of negotiating higher bids.
As outlined below, and in a presentation available at www.SellDnD.com, a sale of Dye & Durham is the only viable risk-adjusted path, free from execution risk, remaining for shareholders to preserve and maximize their value. Plantro invites its fellow shareholders to join in the push for urgent change. If elected, the Plantro nominees intend to immediately pursue a well-governed and thoughtful process to sell the Company without delay TO THE BUYER WILLING TO PAY THE HIGHEST PRICE.
Stopgap Solutions Won’t Protect Shareholders: Dye & Durham Cannot Afford to Wait Any Longer and the Company Should Be Sold.
The Engine Activist Group will try to sell you a half-baked plan — an asset sale and a plea for more time; but they are wrong. Just months ago, a sale of the Financial Services business may have been a viable path to reduce leverage, however, their misguided strategy and poor execution has damaged the business to the point where a sale of the Financial Services business would do little to reduce debt. Even if the Company sells additional assets, there are no realistic paths to reduce leverage below 4.0x any time soon.
The Engine Activist Group and Engine-led Board have no plan to deliver anywhere near a $20 per share price on a risk- or time-adjusted basis. All they will do is sell you vague and hypothetical outcomes. Shareholders need to immediately realize a sale of the entire Company for the large control premium available for the following reasons:
It is Too RiskyNotto Sell: A misguided and haphazard strategy, coupled with poor execution has led to significantly declining financial performance and excessive borrowing over the last six months. This has resulted in a new 5.8x debt covenant being imposed on the business, which sell-side analysts estimate the Company will be precariously close to breaching in the coming quarters2, putting shareholder equity at real risk of further erosion.
Divesting Financial Services Doesn’t Solve the Problem: Today, a sale of the Financial Services business at ~11x Adjusted EBITDA still leaves leverage at ~4.5x, with no path to sub-3x until 20313. Further, speculative claims of multiple expansion following a sale of the Financial Services business are unfounded as the Company will be a smaller, declining business, with leverage too high for public market investors to tolerate.
Generous Assumptions Point to a Lower Share Price: Waiting is not an option. Assuming the Company maintains its current 7.9x trading multiple the implied share price in Q3 FY2026 will be between $4.77 and $7.444, with the low-end of the range assuming the Company misses revenue estimates by only 5%.
There Are Still Credible Interested Buyers at the Table Right Now: Given the current negative trajectory, shareholders should pursue a full sale to capture an attractive all-cash change-of-control premium. Credible private equity buyers with the right expertise, risk appetite, and who bring the appropriate capital structure, are interested in acquiring the Company right now.
The Engine Activist Group Has Usurped the Board and Now Dye & Durham is Not Suited to Operate as a Public Company.
A revolving door of executives has destabilized the business and eradicated irreplaceable institutional memory at the worst possible time. The Company is now on its fourth CEO in six months, and its second CFO. Numerous other executives and employees at all levels have left or been terminated, with employee turnover now reportedly reaching 25%, compared to low single digits previously, creating paralysis and leaving the business rudderless. Retaining even a portion of this critical institutional knowledge would have informed better decision making and helped avoid multiple strategic blunders.
In what appears to be an act of desperation, the Board delegated the recruitment of a new CEO and CFO to the principal of OneMove and a representative of EdgePoint, and in doing so appointed an unproven first-time CEO, with no public company or capital allocation experience, and a new CFO. They then granted the pair nearly 5% of the Company in options priced at just $10 per share. The pair stand to pocket over $30 million simply for getting shareholders back to where they were in December 2024.
Plantro understands there is also ongoing infighting at the Board level that has a created a situation where management cannot operate effectively, and established governance structures are breaking down. Plantro has learned the Company was recently forced to engage an independent third party mediator to help navigate basic internal operations as a result of repeated shareholder-level interference with management. This kind of shareholder “skip-level” behaviour, where investors directly bypass a board of directors and provide instruction directly to management, is confusing and creates potential for further executive attrition. It is also virtually unheard of in a public company and raises serious concerns about accountability and proper oversight.
Plantro’s Highly Qualified Nominees Are Committed to Leading a Process to Sell Dye & Durham.
The Plantro nominees collectively bring experience in M&A, capital allocation, operations, technology, governance, public and private board service, and direct senior experience at Dye & Durham (which is necessary given excessive executive turnover under the Engine Activist Group). Together they have the right mix of skills, experience, expertise, and shareholder-centric perspective to stabilize Dye & Durham, and immediately commence a well-governed and thoughtful process to sell the Company for the highest price possible.
Each of Plantro’s highly qualified individuals is independent of Plantro and each other, and will act as true fiduciaries with a mandate to preserve and maximize shareholder value:
Brian J. Bidulka, CPA, CA, is a corporate director and chartered accountant with extensive experience in technology, finance, and business analytics. Brian is the former Chief Financial Officer of Research in Motion. He has also served in senior executive roles at major Canadian companies including Porter Airlines, Postmedia, George Weston Limited, and Molson Coors. Currently, he is a member of the board at Andrew Peller Limited, and is also a board member and treasurer of Canada Basketball.
David Danziger, CPA, CA, is an experienced finance leader and corporate director with an extensive background in audit, accounting, and management consulting. Previously, he was the Senior Vice President, Assurance, and the National Leader of Public Companies at MNP LLP, Canada’s fifth largest accounting firm. David continues to serve as a Senior Advisor for MNP LLP working on special projects and supporting the Public Company Audit Team nationally. David has served as a director for a range of technology, mining, and life sciences companies listed on the TSX, TSXV, CSE, and NYSE.
Martha Vallance is a corporate director with significant experience in M&A, capital markets and technology. Most recently, Martha was the Chief Operating Officer of Dye & Durham after previously establishing and leading the company’s Corporate Development function and has deep knowledge of the company’s strategy and operations. Prior to this, Martha spent over 12 years in Investment & Corporate Banking at BMO Capital Markets, most recently holding a series of senior roles within both the Mergers & Acquisitions and Equity Capital Markets teams. In addition, Martha served as a Director on the Board of TSX-listed TMAC Resources and was also a member of the Special Committee during the sale of the company which concluded in January 2021.
Plantro proposes that shareholders support incumbent directors Hans T. Gieskes, the recently deposed independent chairman of the Board, Anthony P. Kinnear, Sid Singh, and Eric Shahinian to maintain continuity on the Board. Both Gieskes and Singh served as interim CEOs of the Company, and collectively, these individuals have relevant C-Suite, public company, and capital markets experience at other companies.
Plantro remains supportive of management and believes stability is required to execute a successful sales process and restore value to shareholders.
Shareholders Need to Make their Voices Heard
There is no debate – Dye & Durham does not have a viable long-term path as a public company and must be sold. The Board and management will claim they need more time, but the status quo for shareholders is simply intolerable. While the business drifts and headwinds build, the risks to Dye & Durham and its shareholders continue to accumulate. The time for decisive action has arrived.
Plantro has heard from many shareholders who share its contention that the Company must run a formal sale process to preserve and maximize shareholder value. Now is the time to speak up. It is imperative that shareholders communicate their views directly to the Board and urge them to call and hold the Special Meeting without delay so the Company can be sold. Alternatively, the Board can spare shareholders the cost and distraction of a proxy contest, appoint the Plantro nominees to the Board, and commence a formal sale process immediately.
Please visit www.SellDnd.com to view Plantro’s presentation to fellow shareholders and other important materials.
Other Information Concerning the Plantro Nominees
To the knowledge of Plantro, no Plantro nominee is, at the date hereof, or has been, within ten (10) years before the date hereof: (a) a director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer of any company that (i) was subject to a cease trade order, an order similar to a cease trade order or an order that denied the relevant company access to any exemption under securities legislation that was in effect for a period of more than thirty (30) consecutive days (each, an “order”), in each case that was issued while the Plantro nominee was acting in the capacity as director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer, or (ii) was subject to an order that was issued after the Plantro nominee ceased to be a director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer and which resulted from an event that occurred while that person was acting in the capacity as director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer; (b) a director or executive officer of any company that, while such Plantro nominee was acting in that capacity, or within one (1) year of such Plantro nominee ceasing to act in that capacity, became bankrupt, made a proposal under any legislation relating to bankruptcy or insolvency or was subject to or instituted any proceedings, arrangement or compromise with creditors or had a receiver, receiver manager or trustee appointed to hold its assets; or (c) someone who became bankrupt, made a proposal under any legislation relating to bankruptcy or insolvency, or became subject to or instituted any proceedings, arrangement or compromise with creditors, or had a receiver, receiver manager or trustee appointed to hold the assets of such Plantro nominee.
To the knowledge of Plantro, as at the date hereof, no Plantro nominee has been subject to: (a) any penalties or sanctions imposed by a court relating to securities legislation, or by a securities regulatory authority, or has entered into a settlement agreement with a securities regulatory authority; or (b) any other penalties or sanctions imposed by a court or regulatory body that would likely be considered important to a reasonable securityholder in deciding whether to vote for a Plantro nominee.
To the knowledge of Plantro, none of the directors or officers of Plantro, or any associates or affiliates of the foregoing, or any of the Plantro nominees or their respective associates or affiliates, has: (a) any material interest, direct or indirect, in any transaction since the commencement of the Company’s most recently completed financial year or in any proposed transaction which has materially affected or will materially affect the Company or any of its subsidiaries; or (b) any material interest, direct or indirect, by way of beneficial ownership of securities or otherwise, in any matter proposed to be acted on at the Special Meeting, other than the re-constitution of the Board.
Plantro beneficially owns and controls 7,374,510 common shares representing approximately 11% of the outstanding shares of the Company. Martha Vallance beneficially owns and controls 38,600 common shares, representing approximately 0.06% of the outstanding shares of the Company. She also holds options to acquire an additional 425,433 common shares. Assuming full exercise of these options, she would beneficially own and control 464,033 common shares, representing approximately 0.69% of the then-outstanding shares of the Company, on a partially diluted basis. While the other Concerned Shareholder Nominees may purchase shares in the future, not of the other Concerned Shareholder Nominees currently hold any units of the Company.
Additional Information
The information contained in this news release does not and is not meant to constitute a solicitation of a proxy within the meaning of applicable corporate and securities laws. Although Plantro has requisitioned the Special Meeting, there is currently no record or meeting date and shareholders are not being asked at this time to execute a proxy in favour of the Plantro nominees or any other matter to be acted upon at the Special Meeting. In connection with the Special Meeting, Plantro may file a dissident information circular (the “Information Circular”) in due course in compliance with applicable corporate and securities laws.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plantro is voluntarily providing the disclosure required under section 9.2(4) of National Instrument 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations (“NI 51-102”) and has filed this news release containing disclosure prescribed by applicable corporate law and disclosure required under section 9.2(6) of NI 51-102 in respect of Engine’s director nominees, in accordance with corporate and securities laws applicable to public broadcast solicitations. This news release is available under the Company’s profile on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
This news release and any solicitation made by Plantro in advance of the Special Meeting is, or will be, as applicable, made by Plantro and not by or on behalf of the management of the Company. All costs incurred for any solicitation will be borne by Plantro, provided that, subject to applicable law, Plantro may seek reimbursement from the Company of Plantro’s out-of-pocket expenses, including proxy solicitation expenses and legal fees, incurred in connection with a successful reconstitution of the Board.
Plantro is not soliciting proxies in connection with the Special Meeting at this time, and shareholders are not being asked at this time to execute proxies in favour of the Plantro nominees (in respect of the Special Meeting) or any matter to be acted upon at the Special Meeting. Proxies may be solicited by Plantro pursuant to an Information Circular sent to shareholders after which solicitations may be made by or on behalf of Plantro, by mail, telephone, fax, email or other electronic means as well as by newspaper or other media advertising, and in person by directors, officers and employees of Plantro, who will not be specifically remunerated therefor. Plantro may also solicit proxies in reliance upon the public broadcast exemption to the solicitation requirements under applicable Canadian corporate and securities laws, conveyed by way of public broadcast, including through press releases, speeches or publications, and by any other manner permitted under applicable corporate and securities laws. Plantro may engage the services of one or more agents and authorize other persons to assist in soliciting proxies on behalf of Plantro.
Plantro has retained Morrow Sodali (Canada) Ltd. (“Sodali”) as its proxy advisor to assist Plantro in soliciting shareholders should Plantro commence a formal solicitation of proxies, for which Sodali will receive a fee not to exceed $200,000 plus a per call fee and certain success fees, together with reimbursement for reasonable and out-of-pocket expenses, and will be indemnified against certain liabilities and expenses, including certain liabilities under securities laws. Sodali’s responsibilities will principally include advising Plantro on governance best practices, where applicable, liaising with proxy advisory firms, developing and implementing shareholder engagement strategies, and advising with respect to meeting and proxy protocol.
Plantro is not requesting that Dye & Durham shareholders submit a proxy at this time. Once Plantro has commenced a formal solicitation of proxies in connection with the Special Meeting, proxies may be revoked by instrument in writing by the shareholder giving the proxy or by its duly authorized officer or attorney, or in any other manner permitted by law (including subsection 110(4) of the Business Corporations Act (Ontario)). None of Plantro or, to its knowledge, any of its associates or affiliates, has any material interest, direct or indirect, (i) in any transaction since the beginning of Dye & Durham’s most recently completed financial year or in any proposed transaction that has materially affected or would materially affect Dye & Durham or any of its subsidiaries; or (ii) by way of beneficial ownership of securities or otherwise, in any matter proposed to be acted on at the Special Meeting, other than the election of directors to the Board.
Dye & Durham’s principal office address is 25 York St., Suite 1100, Toronto, Ontario, M5J 2V5. A copy of this news release may be obtained on Dye & Durham’s SEDAR profile at www.sedar.com.
Disclaimer for Forward-Looking Information
Certain information in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities legislation. Forward-looking statements and information generally can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “may,” “will,” “expect,” “intend,” “estimate,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “should,” “plans,” “continue,” or similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information in this news release may include, but is not limited to, statements of Plantro regarding (i) how Plantro intends to exercise its legal rights as a shareholder of the Company, and (ii) its plans to make changes at the Board of the Company.
Although Plantro believes that the expectations reflected in any such forward-looking information are reasonable, there can be no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. Such forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results, performance or developments to differ materially from those contained in the statements including, without limitation, the risks that (i) the Company may use tactics to thwart the rights of Plantro as a shareholder and (ii) the actions being proposed and the changes being demanded by Plantro, may not take place for any reason whatsoever. Except as required by law, Plantro does not intend to update these forward-looking statements.
About Plantro
Plantro is a privately held company, with an established track record of making successful investments in undervalued and high quality legal, financial, and information services businesses.
____________________________________ 1Source: CapIQ: basedoffofanalyst consensusadjustedEBITDA estimatesand Plantro’scalculations which are available within the investor presentation on www.SellDnD.com 2The Company’s Consolidated First Lien Net Leverage Ratio will be materially higher in two quarters from now when it loses the ability to offset $185 million in restricted cash it holds to repay its 2026 convertible debentures, against its senior debt. Based on sell-side consensus estimates, the Company will be much closer to breaching its Consolidated First Lien Net Leverage Ratio covenant, should it remain in place. 3Assumes 0.5% annual Adjusted EBITDA growth after the sale of financial services based off trailing 9-month results as at Q3 FY25; Further details on Plantro’s assumptions and calculations are available within the investor presentation onwww.SellDnD.com 4Future share price applies current EV / LTM EBITDA multiple to LTM EBITDA ending March 31, 2026 based on research consensus estimates and adjusting for net debt forecasted as at March 31, 2026 with cash flow assumptions as further detailed in the presentation available at www.SellDnD.com.
Nearly $1 Billion in Shareholder Value Destroyed Under Engine Led Board Since December 2024
Governance Failures: Four CEOs and Two CFOs in Six Months, an Entrenched Board Ignoring Credible Bids, Insiders Granted ~5% of the Company in Egregious $10 Stock Options, and Investors Actively Directing Management
If the Current Board and its Misguided Strategy Remain in Place, Shareholders Risk Further Losses – It is Time to Immediately Initiate a Sale Process and Unlock a Change of Control Premium for Shareholders
Today, a Financial Services Sale for ~$590 million or ~11x EBITDA Still Leaves Leverage at ~4.5x, with No Path to Sub-3x Until 2031
ST. HELIER, Jersey, July 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Plantro Ltd. (“Plantro” or the “Concerned Shareholder”) one of the largest shareholders of Dye & Durham Limited (“Dye & Durham” or the “Company”) (DND: TSX) which owns approximately 11% of the Company, today announced that it has requisitioned a special meeting of Dye & Durham shareholders (the “Special Meeting”) and nominated three highly qualified individuals for the Company’s board of directors (the “Board”): Brian J. Bidulka, David Danziger, and Martha Vallance. The requisition also calls for the removal of Board Chair Arnaud Ajdler, and directors Tracey E. Keates, and Ritu Khanna, from the Board.
The value destruction at Dye & Durham since December of 2024 has reached crisis proportions and threatens the Company’s future. The current Board, steered by Engine Capital (“Engine”), EdgePoint Wealth Management Inc. (“EdgePoint”) and OneMove Capital Ltd. (“OneMove”) (together, the “Engine Activist Group”) has presided over the destruction of nearly $1 billion in shareholder value.
The Engine Activist Group and the Board have pursued a misguided and haphazard strategy of customer price cuts and overspending. This has led to sharp declines in Adjusted EBITDA, cash flow, and rising debt, as evidenced by the Company’s recent quarterly results and a new debt covenant being imposed. As global real estate markets recently weakened, the Board doubled down on its strategy instead of adjusting course. This has caused a liquidity crisis, forcing the Company to aggressively draw on its revolving credit facility to make its April 2025 interest payment. With no clear or credible plan in place, leverage is expected to approach 6.0x Adjusted EBITDA by September 30, 20251.
Remaining public is no longer a viable option. If the current Board remains unchanged, the Company will continue down the same failed path, resulting in further shareholder losses. A full sale of the Company is the only way to realize a control premium for current shareholders and restore stability in the business.
Unfortunately, the current Board and the Engine Activist Group have fought for the past nine months against the sale of the Company or even presenting an offer to shareholders to consider. Before taking control, the Engine Activist Group publicly rejected multiple all-cash offers obtained by the prior board of approximately $25 per share. After the 2024 annual general meeting, as the stock declined significantly, Plantro submitted an offer to acquire the Company for $20 a share in February 2025. This offer was similarly rejected, and Plantro was threatened with litigation for privately submitting it. Furthermore, in April 2025, according to media reports, the Board refused to engage with Advent International, a credible well-funded buyer, who formally submitted offers of approximately $20 per share. The Board has also continued to deny basic due diligence access, actively undermining the possibility of negotiating higher bids.
As outlined below, and in a presentation available at www.SellDnD.com, a sale of Dye & Durham is the only viable risk-adjusted path, free from execution risk, remaining for shareholders to preserve and maximize their value. Plantro invites its fellow shareholders to join in the push for urgent change. If elected, the Plantro nominees intend to immediately pursue a well-governed and thoughtful process to sell the Company without delay TO THE BUYER WILLING TO PAY THE HIGHEST PRICE.
Stopgap Solutions Won’t Protect Shareholders: Dye & Durham Cannot Afford to Wait Any Longer and the Company Should Be Sold.
The Engine Activist Group will try to sell you a half-baked plan — an asset sale and a plea for more time; but they are wrong. Just months ago, a sale of the Financial Services business may have been a viable path to reduce leverage, however, their misguided strategy and poor execution has damaged the business to the point where a sale of the Financial Services business would do little to reduce debt. Even if the Company sells additional assets, there are no realistic paths to reduce leverage below 4.0x any time soon.
The Engine Activist Group and Engine-led Board have no plan to deliver anywhere near a $20 per share price on a risk- or time-adjusted basis. All they will do is sell you vague and hypothetical outcomes. Shareholders need to immediately realize a sale of the entire Company for the large control premium available for the following reasons:
It is Too RiskyNotto Sell: A misguided and haphazard strategy, coupled with poor execution has led to significantly declining financial performance and excessive borrowing over the last six months. This has resulted in a new 5.8x debt covenant being imposed on the business, which sell-side analysts estimate the Company will be precariously close to breaching in the coming quarters2, putting shareholder equity at real risk of further erosion.
Divesting Financial Services Doesn’t Solve the Problem: Today, a sale of the Financial Services business at ~11x Adjusted EBITDA still leaves leverage at ~4.5x, with no path to sub-3x until 20313. Further, speculative claims of multiple expansion following a sale of the Financial Services business are unfounded as the Company will be a smaller, declining business, with leverage too high for public market investors to tolerate.
Generous Assumptions Point to a Lower Share Price: Waiting is not an option. Assuming the Company maintains its current 7.9x trading multiple the implied share price in Q3 FY2026 will be between $4.77 and $7.444, with the low-end of the range assuming the Company misses revenue estimates by only 5%.
There Are Still Credible Interested Buyers at the Table Right Now: Given the current negative trajectory, shareholders should pursue a full sale to capture an attractive all-cash change-of-control premium. Credible private equity buyers with the right expertise, risk appetite, and who bring the appropriate capital structure, are interested in acquiring the Company right now.
The Engine Activist Group Has Usurped the Board and Now Dye & Durham is Not Suited to Operate as a Public Company.
A revolving door of executives has destabilized the business and eradicated irreplaceable institutional memory at the worst possible time. The Company is now on its fourth CEO in six months, and its second CFO. Numerous other executives and employees at all levels have left or been terminated, with employee turnover now reportedly reaching 25%, compared to low single digits previously, creating paralysis and leaving the business rudderless. Retaining even a portion of this critical institutional knowledge would have informed better decision making and helped avoid multiple strategic blunders.
In what appears to be an act of desperation, the Board delegated the recruitment of a new CEO and CFO to the principal of OneMove and a representative of EdgePoint, and in doing so appointed an unproven first-time CEO, with no public company or capital allocation experience, and a new CFO. They then granted the pair nearly 5% of the Company in options priced at just $10 per share. The pair stand to pocket over $30 million simply for getting shareholders back to where they were in December 2024.
Plantro understands there is also ongoing infighting at the Board level that has a created a situation where management cannot operate effectively, and established governance structures are breaking down. Plantro has learned the Company was recently forced to engage an independent third party mediator to help navigate basic internal operations as a result of repeated shareholder-level interference with management. This kind of shareholder “skip-level” behaviour, where investors directly bypass a board of directors and provide instruction directly to management, is confusing and creates potential for further executive attrition. It is also virtually unheard of in a public company and raises serious concerns about accountability and proper oversight.
Plantro’s Highly Qualified Nominees Are Committed to Leading a Process to Sell Dye & Durham.
The Plantro nominees collectively bring experience in M&A, capital allocation, operations, technology, governance, public and private board service, and direct senior experience at Dye & Durham (which is necessary given excessive executive turnover under the Engine Activist Group). Together they have the right mix of skills, experience, expertise, and shareholder-centric perspective to stabilize Dye & Durham, and immediately commence a well-governed and thoughtful process to sell the Company for the highest price possible.
Each of Plantro’s highly qualified individuals is independent of Plantro and each other, and will act as true fiduciaries with a mandate to preserve and maximize shareholder value:
Brian J. Bidulka, CPA, CA, is a corporate director and chartered accountant with extensive experience in technology, finance, and business analytics. Brian is the former Chief Financial Officer of Research in Motion. He has also served in senior executive roles at major Canadian companies including Porter Airlines, Postmedia, George Weston Limited, and Molson Coors. Currently, he is a member of the board at Andrew Peller Limited, and is also a board member and treasurer of Canada Basketball.
David Danziger, CPA, CA, is an experienced finance leader and corporate director with an extensive background in audit, accounting, and management consulting. Previously, he was the Senior Vice President, Assurance, and the National Leader of Public Companies at MNP LLP, Canada’s fifth largest accounting firm. David continues to serve as a Senior Advisor for MNP LLP working on special projects and supporting the Public Company Audit Team nationally. David has served as a director for a range of technology, mining, and life sciences companies listed on the TSX, TSXV, CSE, and NYSE.
Martha Vallance is a corporate director with significant experience in M&A, capital markets and technology. Most recently, Martha was the Chief Operating Officer of Dye & Durham after previously establishing and leading the company’s Corporate Development function and has deep knowledge of the company’s strategy and operations. Prior to this, Martha spent over 12 years in Investment & Corporate Banking at BMO Capital Markets, most recently holding a series of senior roles within both the Mergers & Acquisitions and Equity Capital Markets teams. In addition, Martha served as a Director on the Board of TSX-listed TMAC Resources and was also a member of the Special Committee during the sale of the company which concluded in January 2021.
Plantro proposes that shareholders support incumbent directors Hans T. Gieskes, the recently deposed independent chairman of the Board, Anthony P. Kinnear, Sid Singh, and Eric Shahinian to maintain continuity on the Board. Both Gieskes and Singh served as interim CEOs of the Company, and collectively, these individuals have relevant C-Suite, public company, and capital markets experience at other companies.
Plantro remains supportive of management and believes stability is required to execute a successful sales process and restore value to shareholders.
Shareholders Need to Make their Voices Heard
There is no debate – Dye & Durham does not have a viable long-term path as a public company and must be sold. The Board and management will claim they need more time, but the status quo for shareholders is simply intolerable. While the business drifts and headwinds build, the risks to Dye & Durham and its shareholders continue to accumulate. The time for decisive action has arrived.
Plantro has heard from many shareholders who share its contention that the Company must run a formal sale process to preserve and maximize shareholder value. Now is the time to speak up. It is imperative that shareholders communicate their views directly to the Board and urge them to call and hold the Special Meeting without delay so the Company can be sold. Alternatively, the Board can spare shareholders the cost and distraction of a proxy contest, appoint the Plantro nominees to the Board, and commence a formal sale process immediately.
Please visit www.SellDnd.com to view Plantro’s presentation to fellow shareholders and other important materials.
Other Information Concerning the Plantro Nominees
To the knowledge of Plantro, no Plantro nominee is, at the date hereof, or has been, within ten (10) years before the date hereof: (a) a director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer of any company that (i) was subject to a cease trade order, an order similar to a cease trade order or an order that denied the relevant company access to any exemption under securities legislation that was in effect for a period of more than thirty (30) consecutive days (each, an “order”), in each case that was issued while the Plantro nominee was acting in the capacity as director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer, or (ii) was subject to an order that was issued after the Plantro nominee ceased to be a director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer and which resulted from an event that occurred while that person was acting in the capacity as director, chief executive officer or chief financial officer; (b) a director or executive officer of any company that, while such Plantro nominee was acting in that capacity, or within one (1) year of such Plantro nominee ceasing to act in that capacity, became bankrupt, made a proposal under any legislation relating to bankruptcy or insolvency or was subject to or instituted any proceedings, arrangement or compromise with creditors or had a receiver, receiver manager or trustee appointed to hold its assets; or (c) someone who became bankrupt, made a proposal under any legislation relating to bankruptcy or insolvency, or became subject to or instituted any proceedings, arrangement or compromise with creditors, or had a receiver, receiver manager or trustee appointed to hold the assets of such Plantro nominee.
To the knowledge of Plantro, as at the date hereof, no Plantro nominee has been subject to: (a) any penalties or sanctions imposed by a court relating to securities legislation, or by a securities regulatory authority, or has entered into a settlement agreement with a securities regulatory authority; or (b) any other penalties or sanctions imposed by a court or regulatory body that would likely be considered important to a reasonable securityholder in deciding whether to vote for a Plantro nominee.
To the knowledge of Plantro, none of the directors or officers of Plantro, or any associates or affiliates of the foregoing, or any of the Plantro nominees or their respective associates or affiliates, has: (a) any material interest, direct or indirect, in any transaction since the commencement of the Company’s most recently completed financial year or in any proposed transaction which has materially affected or will materially affect the Company or any of its subsidiaries; or (b) any material interest, direct or indirect, by way of beneficial ownership of securities or otherwise, in any matter proposed to be acted on at the Special Meeting, other than the re-constitution of the Board.
Plantro beneficially owns and controls 7,374,510 common shares representing approximately 11% of the outstanding shares of the Company. Martha Vallance beneficially owns and controls 38,600 common shares, representing approximately 0.06% of the outstanding shares of the Company. She also holds options to acquire an additional 425,433 common shares. Assuming full exercise of these options, she would beneficially own and control 464,033 common shares, representing approximately 0.69% of the then-outstanding shares of the Company, on a partially diluted basis. While the other Concerned Shareholder Nominees may purchase shares in the future, not of the other Concerned Shareholder Nominees currently hold any units of the Company.
Additional Information
The information contained in this news release does not and is not meant to constitute a solicitation of a proxy within the meaning of applicable corporate and securities laws. Although Plantro has requisitioned the Special Meeting, there is currently no record or meeting date and shareholders are not being asked at this time to execute a proxy in favour of the Plantro nominees or any other matter to be acted upon at the Special Meeting. In connection with the Special Meeting, Plantro may file a dissident information circular (the “Information Circular”) in due course in compliance with applicable corporate and securities laws.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plantro is voluntarily providing the disclosure required under section 9.2(4) of National Instrument 51-102 – Continuous Disclosure Obligations (“NI 51-102”) and has filed this news release containing disclosure prescribed by applicable corporate law and disclosure required under section 9.2(6) of NI 51-102 in respect of Engine’s director nominees, in accordance with corporate and securities laws applicable to public broadcast solicitations. This news release is available under the Company’s profile on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
This news release and any solicitation made by Plantro in advance of the Special Meeting is, or will be, as applicable, made by Plantro and not by or on behalf of the management of the Company. All costs incurred for any solicitation will be borne by Plantro, provided that, subject to applicable law, Plantro may seek reimbursement from the Company of Plantro’s out-of-pocket expenses, including proxy solicitation expenses and legal fees, incurred in connection with a successful reconstitution of the Board.
Plantro is not soliciting proxies in connection with the Special Meeting at this time, and shareholders are not being asked at this time to execute proxies in favour of the Plantro nominees (in respect of the Special Meeting) or any matter to be acted upon at the Special Meeting. Proxies may be solicited by Plantro pursuant to an Information Circular sent to shareholders after which solicitations may be made by or on behalf of Plantro, by mail, telephone, fax, email or other electronic means as well as by newspaper or other media advertising, and in person by directors, officers and employees of Plantro, who will not be specifically remunerated therefor. Plantro may also solicit proxies in reliance upon the public broadcast exemption to the solicitation requirements under applicable Canadian corporate and securities laws, conveyed by way of public broadcast, including through press releases, speeches or publications, and by any other manner permitted under applicable corporate and securities laws. Plantro may engage the services of one or more agents and authorize other persons to assist in soliciting proxies on behalf of Plantro.
Plantro has retained Morrow Sodali (Canada) Ltd. (“Sodali”) as its proxy advisor to assist Plantro in soliciting shareholders should Plantro commence a formal solicitation of proxies, for which Sodali will receive a fee not to exceed $200,000 plus a per call fee and certain success fees, together with reimbursement for reasonable and out-of-pocket expenses, and will be indemnified against certain liabilities and expenses, including certain liabilities under securities laws. Sodali’s responsibilities will principally include advising Plantro on governance best practices, where applicable, liaising with proxy advisory firms, developing and implementing shareholder engagement strategies, and advising with respect to meeting and proxy protocol.
Plantro is not requesting that Dye & Durham shareholders submit a proxy at this time. Once Plantro has commenced a formal solicitation of proxies in connection with the Special Meeting, proxies may be revoked by instrument in writing by the shareholder giving the proxy or by its duly authorized officer or attorney, or in any other manner permitted by law (including subsection 110(4) of the Business Corporations Act (Ontario)). None of Plantro or, to its knowledge, any of its associates or affiliates, has any material interest, direct or indirect, (i) in any transaction since the beginning of Dye & Durham’s most recently completed financial year or in any proposed transaction that has materially affected or would materially affect Dye & Durham or any of its subsidiaries; or (ii) by way of beneficial ownership of securities or otherwise, in any matter proposed to be acted on at the Special Meeting, other than the election of directors to the Board.
Dye & Durham’s principal office address is 25 York St., Suite 1100, Toronto, Ontario, M5J 2V5. A copy of this news release may be obtained on Dye & Durham’s SEDAR profile at www.sedar.com.
Disclaimer for Forward-Looking Information
Certain information in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities legislation. Forward-looking statements and information generally can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as “may,” “will,” “expect,” “intend,” “estimate,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “should,” “plans,” “continue,” or similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information in this news release may include, but is not limited to, statements of Plantro regarding (i) how Plantro intends to exercise its legal rights as a shareholder of the Company, and (ii) its plans to make changes at the Board of the Company.
Although Plantro believes that the expectations reflected in any such forward-looking information are reasonable, there can be no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. Such forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that may cause actual results, performance or developments to differ materially from those contained in the statements including, without limitation, the risks that (i) the Company may use tactics to thwart the rights of Plantro as a shareholder and (ii) the actions being proposed and the changes being demanded by Plantro, may not take place for any reason whatsoever. Except as required by law, Plantro does not intend to update these forward-looking statements.
About Plantro
Plantro is a privately held company, with an established track record of making successful investments in undervalued and high quality legal, financial, and information services businesses.
____________________________________ 1Source: CapIQ: basedoffofanalyst consensusadjustedEBITDA estimatesand Plantro’scalculations which are available within the investor presentation on www.SellDnD.com 2The Company’s Consolidated First Lien Net Leverage Ratio will be materially higher in two quarters from now when it loses the ability to offset $185 million in restricted cash it holds to repay its 2026 convertible debentures, against its senior debt. Based on sell-side consensus estimates, the Company will be much closer to breaching its Consolidated First Lien Net Leverage Ratio covenant, should it remain in place. 3Assumes 0.5% annual Adjusted EBITDA growth after the sale of financial services based off trailing 9-month results as at Q3 FY25; Further details on Plantro’s assumptions and calculations are available within the investor presentation onwww.SellDnD.com 4Future share price applies current EV / LTM EBITDA multiple to LTM EBITDA ending March 31, 2026 based on research consensus estimates and adjusting for net debt forecasted as at March 31, 2026 with cash flow assumptions as further detailed in the presentation available at www.SellDnD.com.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nathalie Seddon, Professor of Biodiversity, Smith School of Enterprise and Environment and Department of Biology, University of Oxford
Skylarks are a red-listed species, which means they are of high conservation concern in the UK.WildlifeWorld/Shutterstock
Nature in the UK appeared to receive a rare funding boost in the June spending review, with the government setting a spending target of up to £2 billion a year for England’s environmental land management (ELM) scheme by 2028-29.
By steering public funds toward farmers who restore hedgerows, soils and wetlands, England’s ELM programme is meant to renew landscapes that absorb carbon, support pollinators and keep water clean while helping rural businesses stay viable in a changing climate.
If delivered in full, the package would elevate the UK’s post-Brexit model of investing public money in shared ecological care (rather than payments based on acreage) to one of the most generously funded in the world.
Yet, scrutinise the details and a more complicated story emerges.
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The review has trimmed the day-to-day budget of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in real terms. Defra now faces the unenviable task of signing and monitoring thousands of new ELM agreements with fewer staff and shrinking data resources. Without the capacity to check whether fields really have become richer in skylarks or streams clearer of fertiliser, large sums could be delayed or misdirected.
Scale is another challenge. An independent analysis published in 2024 estimated that roughly £6 billion every year across the UK is needed to bring agriculture in line with the Environment Act targets for habitat restoration and net zero commitments.
Even the full £2 billion promised for England would meet only about half of that evidence-based need. And the “up to” £400 million for trees and peatlands is not new money: it is funding that was first promised in 2024 and the payment schedule has still not been confirmed.
Money could be paid to farmers for allowing woodlands to regenerate. Richard Hepworth, CC BY
While the review earmarked £4.2 billion for flood and coastal defence, it does not specify how much of that will support nature-based measures such as floodplain restoration, or the creation of saltmarshes or riparian woodlands. The Environment Agency is consulting on a funding model that could embed such solutions, but the Treasury papers are silent on who will pay for that shift.
Tech spending dwarfs habitat investment
Contrast this with the sums heading to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.
Roughly £30 billion is earmarked for nuclear fission, fusion research and carbon-capture hubs. These projects are heavy on concrete and steel (materials with a hefty carbon cost) but have no immediate ecological benefit.
While new low-carbon technologies are crucial, thriving and resilient soils, wetlands and woodlands nourish food systems, safeguard water and hold vast stores of carbon – benefits that deepen and become more cost-effective over time.
Nature-based solutions can also revitalise local economies. The Office for National Statistics estimates that replacing the benefits flowing from the UK’s forests, rivers and soils – flood buffering, crop pollination, cleaner air, recreation and more – would cost about £1.8 trillion, a figure that only hints at their deeper, immeasurable value.
Yet the review sets out no plan to safeguard these life-support systems, or to factor their decline into the Treasury’s green book (the rule book used to appraise public investments) or the Bank of England’s stress tests, which check how shocks could ripple through the financial system.
This is also a matter of fairness and public health. Growing evidence shows that regular contact with nature lowers the risks of heart disease and anxiety, while improving children’s cognitive development. These are benefits with a value that defies any price tag.
Yet the places with the fewest trees and parks tend to be the same post-industrial towns ministers want to “level up”. The review is silent on biodiversity net gain (the flagship policy meant to channel private finance into local habitats) and on a proposed national nature wealth fund that could blend public and private capital for large-scale restoration.
Housing money could repeat past mistakes
One line in the spending review could still shift the balance.
The chancellor has earmarked £39 billion for building social and affordable housing over the next decade. If every development delivers at least a 10% net gain for biodiversity onsite, and if schemes build in climate-smart design (living roofs, shade-giving street trees, permeable surfaces) with local residents, Britain could pioneer the world’s first large-scale, nature-positive, net-zero housing programme.
Without those safeguards, “levelling up” risks repeating old mistakes: sealing green space under concrete today and paying tomorrow to retrofit drainage, shade and parks.
Green space is scarce on this new housing estate near Cardiff, Wales. Shutterstock
That risk is heightened by the government’s planning and infrastructure bill, now before parliament. In an open letter to MPs, economists and ecologists warn that the bill would let developers “pay cash to trash” irreplaceable habitats by swapping onsite protection for a levy, a move they describe as a “licence to kill nature”.
At the next UN climate summit, Cop30 in Brazil in November 2025, the UK will have to show the world that its domestic spending matches its international rhetoric.
More than 150 UK researchers made that point in an open letter to the prime minister, urging him to put nature at the centre of the UK’s Cop30 stance. Converting the Treasury’s headline figures into habitat gains and locking robust rules into both the planning bill and the housing drive would give ministers credible proof of progress when they update the UK’s climate and nature pledges on the Cop30 stage.
The spending review may have nudged farm policy in the right direction and set a new higher water mark for nature-positive agriculture. Yet amid the squeeze on Defra, the recycling rather than expansion of tree and peat budgets and the continued dominance of technology over habitat, nature still comes a distant second to hard infrastructure in the UK growth model.
There is still time to change course. Guaranteeing Defra’s capacity, publishing a timetable for the tree-and-peat fund, reserving part of the flood budget for community-led nature-based solutions and hardwiring strong biodiversity net gain rules into housing and planning reforms would turn headline promises into projects that enrich daily life while stewarding public money wisely.
Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?
Nathalie Seddon receives funding from UKRI and the Leverhulme Trust and sits on the UK Climate Change Committee. She is also a trustee of the Circular Bioeconomy Alliance and is a non-executive director of the social venture, Nature-based Insights.
On 30 June 2025 in Ouagadougou, representatives from six member countries of the Desert to Power Initiative (https://apo-opa.co/3GlwfrL) approved key strategic documents to boost independent power production in the Sahel, at the fifth ministerial meeting of the project, spearheaded by the African Development Bank (www.AfDB.org).
This crucial meeting provided an opportunity to take stock of progress made in implementing the Desert to Power Initiative, and to approve two key strategic documents: the Joint Protocol for Independent Power Producers (IPP) and the Strategy for the Promotion of Green Mini-Grids.
The IPP Joint Protocol, developed in close collaboration with the Desert to Power Taskforce and the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF), establishes standardised principles and documents to facilitate the development of large-scale solar power plants under public-private partnerships (PPPs). The aim of the mini-grid strategy is to determine a framework to accelerate implementation and encourage participation.
The meeting was chaired by Yacouba Zabré Gouba, Burkina Faso’s Minister of Energy, Mines and Quarries, and attended by the energy ministers of Djibouti, Niger and Chad, as well as representatives of their counterparts from Mali and Mauritania.
The ministers welcomed the project’s significant progress, particularly the implementation of over 15 projects, the first few of which are already operational. They also stressed the importance of capacity-building efforts.
Discussions continued at a technical workshop on financial modelling, aimed at strengthening financial analysis tools for the viability of Sahelian national utilities. There was active participation by the general managers and financial directors of the national utilities at this meeting.
Thanking the African Development Bank for supporting participating countries through the Desert to Power Initiative, Gouba said the meeting had given them a fresh start. “We must double our efforts and work in synergy to achieve the set objectives,” he declared.
Dr. Kevin Kariuki, Vice President for f Electricity, Energy, Climate and Green Growth at the African Development Bank, congratulated the ministers, observing that the validated Common Protocol constitutes an important lever for accelerating the development of privately financed solar projects for the benefit of the Sahelian people.
He also called on countries to take advantage of Mission 300 (https://apo-opa.co/3TVVxzJ), a bold effort between the African Development Bank and the World Bank that seeks to provide electricity access to an additional 300 million people in Africa by 2030.
“Mission 300 is a movement based on coordinated action, committed political leadership, and focused delivery from which we cannot afford to leave any country, ”Kariuki said.
On the sidelines of the gathering, participants visited the Gonsin photovoltaic power plant, located to the northwest of Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou. The 42 MWp plant, built as part of the Desert to Power Initiative, boasts a 10-megawatt storage system, providing a clear illustration of the tangible results and impact of the Initiative in Burkina Faso.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Development Bank Group (AfDB).
Media contact: Communication and External Relations Department, media@afdb.org
Opinions, analyses, estimates, forecasts, beliefs, and other views of Fannie Mae’s Economic and Strategic Research (ESR) Group or survey respondents included in these materials should not be construed as indicating Fannie Mae’s business prospects or expected results, are based on a number of assumptions, and are subject to change without notice. How this information affects Fannie Mae will depend on many factors. Although the ESR Group bases its opinions, analyses, estimates, forecasts, beliefs, and other views on information it considers reliable, it does not guarantee that the information provided in these materials is accurate, current, or suitable for any particular purpose. Changes in the assumptions or the information underlying these views could produce materially different results. The analyses, opinions, estimates, forecasts, beliefs, and other views published by the ESR Group represent the views of that group or survey respondents as of the date indicated and do not necessarily represent the views of Fannie Mae or its management.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. today announced a new set of security and privacy updates rolling out with its upcoming Samsung Galaxy smartphones with One UI 8. These updates reinforce Samsung’s commitment to delivering powerful, trusted mobile technology in a rapidly evolving digital world by introducing new protections for on-device AI, expanding cross-device threat detection and enhancing network security with quantum-resistant encryption.
Next -Generation Mobile Security For AI Personalisation
Samsung is introducing Knox Enhanced Encrypted Protection, [1] a new architecture designed to safeguard the next generation of personalised, AI-powered features, as its latest innovation in mobile security. KEEP creates encrypted, app-specific storage environments within the device’s secure storage area, ensuring that each app can access only its own sensitive information and nothing more.
Supporting Galaxy’s Personal Data Engine (PDE),[2] KEEP helps secure a user’s deeply personal insights – such as routines and preferences – that enable features like Now Brief and Smart Gallery search. These insights stay entirely on-device, protected by KEEP and further secured by Knox Vault, Samsung’s tamper-resistant hardware security environment. The result is a seamless foundation for Galaxy AI that delivers personalised intelligence while keeping data tightly contained and under the user’s control.
KEEP’s system-level structure allows it to scale across Galaxy AI innovations. In addition to PDE, it now protects Now Brief, Smart Suggestions and other on-device features that rely on user-specific inputs – enabling more advanced AI experiences without compromising privacy. With KEEP, Samsung is redefining how mobile devices safeguard data in the background to elevate privacy from a setting to an embedded design principle.
Smarter, More Connected Threat Response with Knox Matrix
As AI becomes more integrated across the ecosystem, Samsung is advancing protections that offer not just stronger security, but greater transparency and control for users, with Knox Matrix leading the way. Through One UI 8, Samsung is evolving Knox Matrix to deliver more proactive and user-friendly protection for connected Galaxy devices. When a device is flagged for serious risk – such as system manipulation or identity forgery – it is designed to automatically sign out of the Samsung Account, cutting off access to cloud-connected services to prevent threats from spreading.[3]
Users are notified across their connected Galaxy devices and guided to the ‘Security status of your devices’ page, where they can review the issue and take action. Even devices without the latest security status updates trigger a yellow-level warning, helping users respond before vulnerabilities grow.
Together, these updates make Samsung Galaxy’s ecosystem-level protection more dynamic, intuitive and visible, empowering users to maintain trust across all their devices with more confidence and clarity.
Secure Wi-Fi Strengthened with Quantum-Resistant Encryption
In continuation of its commitment to quantum-safe security, Samsung is bringing post-quantum cryptography to Secure Wi-Fi,[4]extending the trusted approach first introduced on the Galaxy S25 series through Post-Quantum Enhanced Data Protection (EDP). Secure Wi-Fi is now being upgraded with a new cryptographic framework[5] designed to strengthen network protection against emerging threats, particularly those anticipated in the era of quantum computing. This enhancement secures the key exchange process at the core of encrypted connections, helping ensure robust privacy even over public networks.
Quantum computing, once fully realised, could undermine many of today’s data protection methods. By integrating post-quantum cryptography, Secure Wi-Fi is built to withstand future attacks that capture encrypted data with the intent to break it once quantum technology matures – a tactic known as “harvest now, decrypt later.” This upgrade fortifies the secure tunnel between Galaxy devices and Samsung servers, reinforcing the integrity of data transmissions in high-risk environments like public Wi-Fi.
In addition to this future-ready foundation, Secure Wi-Fi offers a suite of advanced privacy features:
Auto Protect: Automatically activates in public places like cafés, airports or hotels, securing Wi-Fi connections without requiring user action.
Enhanced Privacy Protection (EPP): Encrypts internet traffic and routes it through multiple layers, combining packet encryption and relay to anonymise device information and help prevent tracking.
Protection Activity: Provides visibility into protection history by showing which apps and networks were secured and how much data was encrypted over time.
A Trusted Platform with Built-In Safeguards
In addition to its latest innovations, Samsung continues to strengthen the core protections that underpin the Galaxy experience. These features reflect a multi-layered security approach that protects across hardware and software, while giving users greater visibility and control:
Knox Vault secures sensitive credentials such as passwords, PINs and biometrics in a physically isolated environment, helping to keep them protected even if the main operating system is compromised.
Auto Blocker helps provide defense by default, blocking unauthorised app installs, restricting command-based attacks and mitigating risks from potential zero-click threats.
Advanced Intelligence Settings gives users the option to turn off online data processing for AI features, so personal information can stay on-device, fully under their control.
Enhanced Theft Protection helps protect personal data even in high-risk situations such as robbery, using safeguards like Identity Check and Security Delay to prevent unauthorised access.
This latest set of updates reinforces Samsung’s long-standing commitment to mobile security that evolves with innovation. It strengthens on-device privacy for personalised AI with KEEP, expands transparency and user control through Knox Matrix, and introduces quantum-resistant protection to Secure Wi-Fi for a more future-ready Galaxy experience. As new security challenges emerge, Samsung remains focused on delivering safeguards that are built in, always on and ready for what’s next.
[1]Available on Galaxy smartphones and tablets with One UI 8 or later.
[2]The Personal Data Engine functions when the Personal Data Intelligence menu is on. Analysed data will be deleted once the Personal Data Intelligence menu is turned off.
[3]Available on Galaxy smartphones and tablets with One UI 8 or later. Availability may vary by model and/or market.
[4]Secure Wi-Fi offers free protection of up to 1024MB per month for Android OS 13 or later, and 250MB per month for Android OS 12 or earlier versions. Availability details may vary by market or network provider and connectivity is subject to applicable network environments.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
NABLUUS, July 7 (Xinhua) — Two Palestinians were killed Sunday by Israeli soldiers after they surrounded a house in the village of Salem, east of the northern West Bank city of Nablus, a Palestinian official and eyewitnesses said.
Nablus Governor Ghassan Daglas identified the victims as Wissam Ishtaie, 37, and Qusay Nasser, 23.
Israeli forces surrounded a house in Salem for several hours, during which there was a shootout and clashes with Palestinian youths, local witnesses said.
The Israeli military has not yet commented on the incident. –0–
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Good morning, and welcome to Danmarks Nationalbank.
It is a great pleasure to host this conference and to welcome so many of you here today, colleagues, partners, and stakeholders, to share perspectives on the evolving risks that climate change poses to the financial sector.
Climate agenda competing for attention in a complex global risk environment
Let me begin by acknowledging the broader context in which we meet. The global economy and financial system face multiple challenges and high uncertainty, stemming from geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation to cyber risks and structural shifts.
These pressing concerns rightly command our full attention. But for that reason, they also risk overshadowing challenges such as climate change which are perceived as longer-term. This happens at a time when climate policies face stronger headwinds in some parts of the world. This may slow the global energy transition and speed up climate change and the associated risks.
Good morning, and welcome to Danmarks Nationalbank.
It is a great pleasure to host this conference and to welcome so many of you here today, colleagues, partners, and stakeholders, to share perspectives on the evolving risks that climate change poses to the financial sector.
Climate agenda competing for attention in a complex global risk environment
Let me begin by acknowledging the broader context in which we meet. The global economy and financial system face multiple challenges and high uncertainty, stemming from geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation to cyber risks and structural shifts.
These pressing concerns rightly command our full attention. But for that reason, they also risk overshadowing challenges such as climate change which are perceived as longer-term. This happens at a time when climate policies face stronger headwinds in some parts of the world. This may slow the global energy transition and speed up climate change and the associated risks.
Good morning, and welcome to Danmarks Nationalbank.
It is a great pleasure to host this conference and to welcome so many of you here today, colleagues, partners, and stakeholders, to share perspectives on the evolving risks that climate change poses to the financial sector.
Climate agenda competing for attention in a complex global risk environment
Let me begin by acknowledging the broader context in which we meet. The global economy and financial system face multiple challenges and high uncertainty, stemming from geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation to cyber risks and structural shifts.
These pressing concerns rightly command our full attention. But for that reason, they also risk overshadowing challenges such as climate change which are perceived as longer-term. This happens at a time when climate policies face stronger headwinds in some parts of the world. This may slow the global energy transition and speed up climate change and the associated risks.
Good morning, and welcome to Danmarks Nationalbank.
It is a great pleasure to host this conference and to welcome so many of you here today, colleagues, partners, and stakeholders, to share perspectives on the evolving risks that climate change poses to the financial sector.
Climate agenda competing for attention in a complex global risk environment
Let me begin by acknowledging the broader context in which we meet. The global economy and financial system face multiple challenges and high uncertainty, stemming from geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation to cyber risks and structural shifts.
These pressing concerns rightly command our full attention. But for that reason, they also risk overshadowing challenges such as climate change which are perceived as longer-term. This happens at a time when climate policies face stronger headwinds in some parts of the world. This may slow the global energy transition and speed up climate change and the associated risks.
Good morning, and welcome to Danmarks Nationalbank.
It is a great pleasure to host this conference and to welcome so many of you here today, colleagues, partners, and stakeholders, to share perspectives on the evolving risks that climate change poses to the financial sector.
Climate agenda competing for attention in a complex global risk environment
Let me begin by acknowledging the broader context in which we meet. The global economy and financial system face multiple challenges and high uncertainty, stemming from geopolitical tensions and trade fragmentation to cyber risks and structural shifts.
These pressing concerns rightly command our full attention. But for that reason, they also risk overshadowing challenges such as climate change which are perceived as longer-term. This happens at a time when climate policies face stronger headwinds in some parts of the world. This may slow the global energy transition and speed up climate change and the associated risks.
Good afternoon, ECB Chief Economist Philip Lane and I welcome you to this press conference, on the occasion of the conclusion of the 2025 assessment of our monetary policy strategy.
The Governing Council recently agreed on an updated monetary policy strategy statement. You can findthis statementon our website, together with anexplanatory overview noteand thetwo occasional paperspresenting the underlying analyses.
I will start by putting this strategy assessment into the broader context. Philip Lane will then go through the updated strategy statement and explain what has changed and why, as well as what has remained unchanged.
Following the strategy review we carried out in 2020-21, the Governing Council committed to “assess periodically the appropriateness of its monetary policy strategy, with the next assessment expected in 2025”. Such regular assessments ensure that our framework, toolkit and approach remain fit for purpose in a changing world.
And the world has changed significantly over the last four years. Some of the issues we were most concerned about back in 2021 – including inflation being too low for too long – have taken a rather different turn.
Not only did we see inflation surge, but some fundamental structural features of our economy and the inflation environment are changing: geopolitics, digitalisation, the increasing use of artificial intelligence, demographics, the threat to environmental sustainability and the evolution of the international financial system.
All of those suggest that the environment in which we operate will remain highly uncertain and potentially more volatile. This will make it more challenging to conduct our monetary policy and fulfil our mandate to keep prices stable.
During the strategy assessment, we asked: what do these changes mean for the way we assess the economy, conduct our policy, use our toolkit, take our decisions and communicate them? In seeking to answer this question, our mindset was forward-looking.
On the whole, we concluded that our monetary policy strategy remains well suited to addressing the challenges that lie ahead.
But our strategy also needs to be updated and adjusted in certain areas, so that the ECB can remain fit for purpose in the years to come. The next assessment is expected in 2030.
With our updated strategy statement, we are taking a comprehensive perspective on the challenges facing our monetary policy, so that the ECB can remain an anchor of stability in this more uncertain world.
This is our core message to the euro area citizens we serve: the new environment gives many reasons to worry, but one thing they do not need to worry about is our commitment to price stability.
The ECB is committed to its mandate and will keep itself and its tools updated to be able to respond to new challenges.
Let me conclude by thanking, on behalf of the Governing Council, all the colleagues across the Eurosystem who have contributed to this assessment in a great team effort.
I now hand over to our Chief Economist Philip Lane and, following his remarks, we will be ready to take your questions.
* * *
Philip R. Lane: I’m going to focus on the 12 paragraphs ofThe ECB’s monetary policy strategy statement. What’s important is that behind these paragraphs is a lot of work. The base layer is the two occasional papers. I’m sure you’ve already read the 400 pages in those two occasional papers. There’s a lot of rich new analysis of many dimensions in those two occasional papers. Then we have the overview note, which the Governing Council worked on collectively and which basically provides the elaboration behind these 12 paragraphs. And I would say that in these 12 paragraphs, in this review, we essentially tried to review the economic assessment: where are we and where are we likely to be? That was one of the two work streams. That essentially primarily shows up in paragraph 1.
So paragraph 1, you might say, is one paragraph, but it’s a very important paragraph because it essentially outlines the challenges that we may face. We had a similar paragraph last time, but last time the focus was essentially on a lot of factors that can give rise to a low-inflation world and a low interest rate world. Whereas the assessment this time of the Eurosystem staff behind this is that when we look where we are now in the structural changes facing the world economy, we have geopolitics, and a lot of this is in the direction of rolling back globalisation. Last time we were looking at globalisation as a force which did contribute to low inflation before the pandemic. There are many dimensions to geopolitics, but we are of course already living it and this is something we do think is going to shape the next five years. We already mentioned digitalisation the last time, but this time we’re calling that as a separate and important element: artificial intelligence. Because, of course, I think for a long time it has been understood that the world economy automates and digitalises. That’s been around for a while. That’s mature. What’s not mature and where there’s really a wide range of possibilities is: what does it mean as the business sector and the public sector incorporate artificial intelligence? I think we had already called out demography and the threat to environmental sustainability, and I think we’re very correct to have done so five years ago. We’ve seen a lot on these fronts in these five years. Let me remind you: without immigration, the European labour force would be shrinking. So demography is not just a future trend, it’s a year-by-year reality for us. And then this week, last week, this year, last year, all the time we see the impact of weather shocks and the impact of the green transition. By the way, investment in Europe in recent years would have been a lot lower without the green transition. It’s the one solid driver of investment for many sectors at the moment. We call out all of these elements, but what’s critical for our conclusion for monetary policy is that it creates uncertainty, it creates volatility, and we think what we may be faced with is larger deviations from our 2% target in both directions. So we have this two-sided risk assessment. And as I go through these paragraphs, essentially once we’ve identified this economic assessment, the natural question to ask is: how do we manage it? How does monetary policy manage this two-sided risk? And essentially in what follows, we will turn to the monetary policy implications. But the other thing to note about paragraph 1 is that there is a new sentence. That’s the final sentence. It is that we don’t live in a bubble. We don’t say monetary policy is the only game in town. And we do highlight here that a more resilient financial architecture – supported by progress on the savings and investments union, the completion of banking union and the introduction of a digital euro – would also support the effectiveness of monetary policy in this evolving environment. So, in other words, all of these structural changes are much more easily handled if we have a more resilient euro, European and euro-denominated financial system. And I think that’s also important and maybe helps you to understand why we as Board members, and more generally the Governing Council, spend a lot of time talking about these wider issues. It’s not a distraction from monetary policy. It’s an important underpinning for monetary policy.
Paragraph 2 is unchanged because paragraph 2 is setting the legal context. We have a mandate given by the Treaty, and so to make the strategy statement self-contained, it’s a reminder to you of the legal and Treaty constraints we live under. And that essentially remains the same as last time.
The third paragraph, because remember in the European Treaty there’s not a super detailed definition of price stability, so it’s important and this is something that evolved over the years: that in terms of measurement, we’re focused on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). And again, this is stable from last time. Last time we highlighted that we did think a reform of the HICP to include owner-occupied housing would be desirable. We continue to hold that view. But in the end it’s for the European Statistical System to make progress on that. So what we say is that in the meantime we do take into account inflation measures that include estimates of the cost of owner-occupied housing. So, in other words, we create supplementary indicators. These are not official data, but we do take a look. And these would be relevant in scenarios where house prices were rising far more quickly or far more slowly than the overall inflation rate. By the way, this has not been particularly the issue in recent years. It would not have made a big difference in recent years, but of course in principle we could be in a situation in the future where it made a difference.
Paragraph 4 is again largely stable from last time. It’s explaining why we target 2%, not zero, and that’s a fairly mature topic: why you want to have a safety margin. We do, and I think correctly this time, in the final sentence of paragraph 4 include intersectoral adjustment. In the last five years we’ve seen this massive change between goods prices and services prices. And actually it turns out that that’s a very important consideration. It’s a lot easier to handle an under 2% inflation target than if you’re trying to hit zero. Essentially if you’re trying to hit zero and the price of energy compared with goods rose, implicitly you need to drive down the price of goods. And we know for many reasons that deflation, even at the sectoral level, is difficult. So having a 2% target is reinforced by including intersectoral adjustment in that list. So, paragraph 4 says you need a safety margin.
Paragraph 5 says 2% is the best way to maintain price stability and that our commitment is symmetric. So what this symmetry means is that we consider negative and positive deviations from the target as equally undesirable. The last sentence, I think, has been critical in these years: having a clear target. You may have heard us all many times say 2%. It’s not somewhere in the region of 2%. It’s 2%. And having that clarity is very important for anchoring expectations, so I think it turned out that that choice we made to be precise about what our orientation is in the medium term is very important.
Let me turn to a paragraph where I think there has been an important change, a sensible change – something that you might say sounds so sensible, why are you talking about it? But it’s worth highlighting the update. Last time, in 2021, we felt we needed to point out that the symmetry of the target doesn’t mean that how we set monetary policy looks identical whether we’re above the target or below the target. And so we pointed out that if we have a lower bound issue, we need to be appropriately forceful or persistent. What have we learnt from these five years? That remains true for below-target inflation, but actually it’s equally true for above-target inflation. And what we actually did was we had a phase of being forceful. So from July 2022 to September 2023, we hiked a lot. And then we went into a persistent phase. So from September 2023 to June 2024, we had 4%. The overview note goes into more detail about why you need the blend of forceful and persistent. But when we reviewed this, peers said these were important concepts in relation to the lower bound, but they’re equally appropriate concepts in relation to being above target. It’s not, of course, in relation to blips. What we talk about here is in response to large, sustained deviations. So you have to first of all make the call. What we see in front of us is something that’s materially away from 2% and that would remain away from 2% unless we responded. And this is why we say “appropriately forceful or persistent”, because what exactly is appropriate depends on whether you are dealing with an upside shock, a downside shock and a wider set of issues. So that, I think, is important. Let me come back to this issue that we have a symmetric commitment and we’re two-sided, but the headache is different on both sides. On the downside, the lower bound is the main headache. On the upside – and this reflects so much of the last number of years and reflects a lot of the work in the occasional papers – is possible non-linearities in price and wage-setting. What we learnt is that once inflation starts to build, it can take off and it can accelerate. You can get this non-linear dynamic. And that’s why you need to be forceful on the upside. That’s not really true for downside shocks. They tend not to accelerate, but downside shocks tend to get embedded because your ability to respond on monetary policy is different.
Going back to this point that it’s not about smoothing out every deviation from 2% and it’s large, sustained deviations: this is very much in the spirit of the medium-term orientation. And that’s paragraph 7. So paragraph 7 is stable. We already had a medium-term orientation, I think, throughout the whole history of the ECB. And I think that’s been very wise. Our commitment, in line with the opening remarks from the President, is that people should be able to count on our commitment to price stability. If we see a deviation, we will bring it back to 2%. And that’s our medium-term orientation. There’s one enrichment here, which I think makes sense. People often ask: how long is the medium term? And I think a very important discipline on that is in the final sentence now: “subject to maintaining anchored inflation expectations”. That really defines the medium term. As you know, in recent years we mapped that into “we will make sure inflation returns to target in a timely manner”. You need to impose some discipline on yourself as opposed to saying the medium term is always just over the projection horizon. The medium term means not so long that the anchoring of expectations is put at risk. So again, I think that’s always been true, but it’s better to be explicit about it. And maybe now, as journalists, if you ask Governing Council members in the future how long the medium term is, the medium term is how long it takes without putting into question the anchoring of expectations.
Paragraph 8 is our toolbox paragraph. We already said in 2021 that our primary instrument is the set of ECB policy rates. I do wonder, for those of you who were involved in looking at the ECB in 2021, how many of you fully believed that as we moved away from the lower bound, we would stop quantitative easing (QE) and we would stop forward guidance? But that was in our strategy and that’s what we did. These are tools that make sense at the lower bound. They are not tools from a stance point of view that have the same role away from the lower bound. So one basic message is: already in 2021 we told you a lot about how the toolbox works, but we did obviously come back and look at this. It’s an important topic. Let me highlight a couple of revisions here, or amplifications. One is that I think we are more articulate now about when these tools come into play. One is to steer the monetary policy stance when the rates are close to the lower bound. That’s what we said last time. That’s definitely a big category. But the second category is “or to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission”. March 2020 is one example. When the world’s financial market was hit by the pandemic shock, central banks in general did a lot of asset purchasing, refinancing operations and other elements to stabilise the transmission of monetary policy. So again, what I would say is either it’s because we’re near the lower bound or there’s some big drama causing an interruption to the transmission of monetary policy. But otherwise these instruments remain in the toolbox. They’re available, but they’re not used on a continuous basis. And so we list out these tools just as a reminder. Longer-term refinancing and asset purchases: those two would possibly be used either way. For the stance or for smoothing the transmission of policy. Whereas of course negative rates and forward guidance are more particular to the lower bound. So there is a differentiation within that category. We also said last time that we will respond flexibly to new challenges as they arise and we can consider new instruments. And of course we told you that we considered new instruments and we actually did it, because we did introduce the Transmission Protection Instrument in 2022. And then the last sentence is important because this is where a lot of the discussion in the last year has been. It is to look back at these this set of instruments and on a forward basis say, in the future, if we ever came to these situations, how would we use these instruments? So we say in this important sentence: the choice of which one we use or which combination we use, the design – because on day zero, we usually have a press release or a legal act saying here’s the design of our instrument – and the implementation. So in other words, month by month, how we adjust it and how we bring it to an end in terms of exit. All of these, number one, will enable an agile response to new shocks. So let’s not get locked into rigid programmes that would inhibit our ability to respond to new shocks. They will reflect the intended purpose. So there can be differences between a stance-orientated intervention and a transmission-smoothing-type intervention. And then, of course, all of these will be subject to a comprehensive proportionality assessment. So in considering the choice of tools, the design and the implementation, we need the checklist of whether this is proportional to the challenge we face. So that’s, as I say, the toolbox.
Then paragraph 9 is explaining how we make decisions. A lot of this is similar to last time. Last time we basically had to tell you that we’ve decided, rather than having a two-pillar strategy where we have an economic pillar and a monetary pillar, we make an integrated assessment. And in that integrated assessment, for example, we take into account macro-financial linkages, financial stability and so on. So a lot of that remains, but maybe you might find this new sentence interesting. The second sentence is that in how we make decisions, we take into account not only the most likely path for inflation in the economy, i.e. in a projection for the baseline, we don’t just look at the baseline, but also the surrounding risks and uncertainty. How do we do that? Including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analysis. This is something we have done forever, but it’s probably true that it’s not always visible in how we communicate. And also internally, of course, the science of how you should do scenarios and the science of how you should make sure your decisions are robust is always evolving. So we do want to make this clear. And in fairness for you and for others watching us, you can say “I think I understand this decision in the context of the baseline, but I have a natural question: is it also robust to the risk assessment of the ECB?” And I think that will be a step forward in the conversation about monetary policy. By the way, this is already reflected, importantly, because, as you may have noticed, what we’ve said in the last couple of years is that we make our decisions not only based on the inflation outlook, but also in relation to underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission. Because those two dimensions capture a lot of risk. Underlying inflation captured a lot of risk when we were bringing inflation down from 10% to 2%. The strength of monetary transmission captured a lot of risk as we moved interest rates, first of all, steeply upwards and then as we’ve been reversing. So the logic behind the three-pronged reaction function that we’ve been using reflects these principles.
Paragraph 10 reaffirms, and I think everything we’ve learnt from the last four years validates the assessment that, in terms of price stability, climate change has profound implications in terms of the structure of the economy, the rise and fall of particular sectors, the cycle, including through the impact of weather shocks, and also in terms of how the financial system is adjusting. This is also a policy priority for the European Union and a global challenge. So we are committed to ensuring the Eurosystem fully takes into account, in line with the EU’s goals and objectives, the implications of climate change and nature degradation for monetary policy and central banking. We added – because we’ve already added it elsewhere – “and nature degradation” because essentially it’s the same headache. And in terms of our economic analysis, you’ve also seen it in our publications. The same underlying failure to incorporate the global public good of a sustainable environment permeates that.
Paragraph 11 reaffirms that clear communication is centre stage of our policymaking. We want effective communication at all levels. And this is why we think the layered and visualised approach to monetary policy communication is essential. Also, we want to adapt in this rapidly changing communication landscape. There’s more on that in the overview note. And, as you know, the ECB has been rolling out new types of communication, including Espresso Economics on YouTube in recent times.
And then maybe in line with the idea that it’s good housekeeping to have a regular calendar-based commitment, the next assessment of the appropriateness of the strategy will be in 2030.
Good afternoon, ECB Chief Economist Philip Lane and I welcome you to this press conference, on the occasion of the conclusion of the 2025 assessment of our monetary policy strategy.
The Governing Council recently agreed on an updated monetary policy strategy statement. You can findthis statementon our website, together with anexplanatory overview noteand thetwo occasional paperspresenting the underlying analyses.
I will start by putting this strategy assessment into the broader context. Philip Lane will then go through the updated strategy statement and explain what has changed and why, as well as what has remained unchanged.
Following the strategy review we carried out in 2020-21, the Governing Council committed to “assess periodically the appropriateness of its monetary policy strategy, with the next assessment expected in 2025”. Such regular assessments ensure that our framework, toolkit and approach remain fit for purpose in a changing world.
And the world has changed significantly over the last four years. Some of the issues we were most concerned about back in 2021 – including inflation being too low for too long – have taken a rather different turn.
Not only did we see inflation surge, but some fundamental structural features of our economy and the inflation environment are changing: geopolitics, digitalisation, the increasing use of artificial intelligence, demographics, the threat to environmental sustainability and the evolution of the international financial system.
All of those suggest that the environment in which we operate will remain highly uncertain and potentially more volatile. This will make it more challenging to conduct our monetary policy and fulfil our mandate to keep prices stable.
During the strategy assessment, we asked: what do these changes mean for the way we assess the economy, conduct our policy, use our toolkit, take our decisions and communicate them? In seeking to answer this question, our mindset was forward-looking.
On the whole, we concluded that our monetary policy strategy remains well suited to addressing the challenges that lie ahead.
But our strategy also needs to be updated and adjusted in certain areas, so that the ECB can remain fit for purpose in the years to come. The next assessment is expected in 2030.
With our updated strategy statement, we are taking a comprehensive perspective on the challenges facing our monetary policy, so that the ECB can remain an anchor of stability in this more uncertain world.
This is our core message to the euro area citizens we serve: the new environment gives many reasons to worry, but one thing they do not need to worry about is our commitment to price stability.
The ECB is committed to its mandate and will keep itself and its tools updated to be able to respond to new challenges.
Let me conclude by thanking, on behalf of the Governing Council, all the colleagues across the Eurosystem who have contributed to this assessment in a great team effort.
I now hand over to our Chief Economist Philip Lane and, following his remarks, we will be ready to take your questions.
* * *
Philip R. Lane: I’m going to focus on the 12 paragraphs ofThe ECB’s monetary policy strategy statement. What’s important is that behind these paragraphs is a lot of work. The base layer is the two occasional papers. I’m sure you’ve already read the 400 pages in those two occasional papers. There’s a lot of rich new analysis of many dimensions in those two occasional papers. Then we have the overview note, which the Governing Council worked on collectively and which basically provides the elaboration behind these 12 paragraphs. And I would say that in these 12 paragraphs, in this review, we essentially tried to review the economic assessment: where are we and where are we likely to be? That was one of the two work streams. That essentially primarily shows up in paragraph 1.
So paragraph 1, you might say, is one paragraph, but it’s a very important paragraph because it essentially outlines the challenges that we may face. We had a similar paragraph last time, but last time the focus was essentially on a lot of factors that can give rise to a low-inflation world and a low interest rate world. Whereas the assessment this time of the Eurosystem staff behind this is that when we look where we are now in the structural changes facing the world economy, we have geopolitics, and a lot of this is in the direction of rolling back globalisation. Last time we were looking at globalisation as a force which did contribute to low inflation before the pandemic. There are many dimensions to geopolitics, but we are of course already living it and this is something we do think is going to shape the next five years. We already mentioned digitalisation the last time, but this time we’re calling that as a separate and important element: artificial intelligence. Because, of course, I think for a long time it has been understood that the world economy automates and digitalises. That’s been around for a while. That’s mature. What’s not mature and where there’s really a wide range of possibilities is: what does it mean as the business sector and the public sector incorporate artificial intelligence? I think we had already called out demography and the threat to environmental sustainability, and I think we’re very correct to have done so five years ago. We’ve seen a lot on these fronts in these five years. Let me remind you: without immigration, the European labour force would be shrinking. So demography is not just a future trend, it’s a year-by-year reality for us. And then this week, last week, this year, last year, all the time we see the impact of weather shocks and the impact of the green transition. By the way, investment in Europe in recent years would have been a lot lower without the green transition. It’s the one solid driver of investment for many sectors at the moment. We call out all of these elements, but what’s critical for our conclusion for monetary policy is that it creates uncertainty, it creates volatility, and we think what we may be faced with is larger deviations from our 2% target in both directions. So we have this two-sided risk assessment. And as I go through these paragraphs, essentially once we’ve identified this economic assessment, the natural question to ask is: how do we manage it? How does monetary policy manage this two-sided risk? And essentially in what follows, we will turn to the monetary policy implications. But the other thing to note about paragraph 1 is that there is a new sentence. That’s the final sentence. It is that we don’t live in a bubble. We don’t say monetary policy is the only game in town. And we do highlight here that a more resilient financial architecture – supported by progress on the savings and investments union, the completion of banking union and the introduction of a digital euro – would also support the effectiveness of monetary policy in this evolving environment. So, in other words, all of these structural changes are much more easily handled if we have a more resilient euro, European and euro-denominated financial system. And I think that’s also important and maybe helps you to understand why we as Board members, and more generally the Governing Council, spend a lot of time talking about these wider issues. It’s not a distraction from monetary policy. It’s an important underpinning for monetary policy.
Paragraph 2 is unchanged because paragraph 2 is setting the legal context. We have a mandate given by the Treaty, and so to make the strategy statement self-contained, it’s a reminder to you of the legal and Treaty constraints we live under. And that essentially remains the same as last time.
The third paragraph, because remember in the European Treaty there’s not a super detailed definition of price stability, so it’s important and this is something that evolved over the years: that in terms of measurement, we’re focused on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). And again, this is stable from last time. Last time we highlighted that we did think a reform of the HICP to include owner-occupied housing would be desirable. We continue to hold that view. But in the end it’s for the European Statistical System to make progress on that. So what we say is that in the meantime we do take into account inflation measures that include estimates of the cost of owner-occupied housing. So, in other words, we create supplementary indicators. These are not official data, but we do take a look. And these would be relevant in scenarios where house prices were rising far more quickly or far more slowly than the overall inflation rate. By the way, this has not been particularly the issue in recent years. It would not have made a big difference in recent years, but of course in principle we could be in a situation in the future where it made a difference.
Paragraph 4 is again largely stable from last time. It’s explaining why we target 2%, not zero, and that’s a fairly mature topic: why you want to have a safety margin. We do, and I think correctly this time, in the final sentence of paragraph 4 include intersectoral adjustment. In the last five years we’ve seen this massive change between goods prices and services prices. And actually it turns out that that’s a very important consideration. It’s a lot easier to handle an under 2% inflation target than if you’re trying to hit zero. Essentially if you’re trying to hit zero and the price of energy compared with goods rose, implicitly you need to drive down the price of goods. And we know for many reasons that deflation, even at the sectoral level, is difficult. So having a 2% target is reinforced by including intersectoral adjustment in that list. So, paragraph 4 says you need a safety margin.
Paragraph 5 says 2% is the best way to maintain price stability and that our commitment is symmetric. So what this symmetry means is that we consider negative and positive deviations from the target as equally undesirable. The last sentence, I think, has been critical in these years: having a clear target. You may have heard us all many times say 2%. It’s not somewhere in the region of 2%. It’s 2%. And having that clarity is very important for anchoring expectations, so I think it turned out that that choice we made to be precise about what our orientation is in the medium term is very important.
Let me turn to a paragraph where I think there has been an important change, a sensible change – something that you might say sounds so sensible, why are you talking about it? But it’s worth highlighting the update. Last time, in 2021, we felt we needed to point out that the symmetry of the target doesn’t mean that how we set monetary policy looks identical whether we’re above the target or below the target. And so we pointed out that if we have a lower bound issue, we need to be appropriately forceful or persistent. What have we learnt from these five years? That remains true for below-target inflation, but actually it’s equally true for above-target inflation. And what we actually did was we had a phase of being forceful. So from July 2022 to September 2023, we hiked a lot. And then we went into a persistent phase. So from September 2023 to June 2024, we had 4%. The overview note goes into more detail about why you need the blend of forceful and persistent. But when we reviewed this, peers said these were important concepts in relation to the lower bound, but they’re equally appropriate concepts in relation to being above target. It’s not, of course, in relation to blips. What we talk about here is in response to large, sustained deviations. So you have to first of all make the call. What we see in front of us is something that’s materially away from 2% and that would remain away from 2% unless we responded. And this is why we say “appropriately forceful or persistent”, because what exactly is appropriate depends on whether you are dealing with an upside shock, a downside shock and a wider set of issues. So that, I think, is important. Let me come back to this issue that we have a symmetric commitment and we’re two-sided, but the headache is different on both sides. On the downside, the lower bound is the main headache. On the upside – and this reflects so much of the last number of years and reflects a lot of the work in the occasional papers – is possible non-linearities in price and wage-setting. What we learnt is that once inflation starts to build, it can take off and it can accelerate. You can get this non-linear dynamic. And that’s why you need to be forceful on the upside. That’s not really true for downside shocks. They tend not to accelerate, but downside shocks tend to get embedded because your ability to respond on monetary policy is different.
Going back to this point that it’s not about smoothing out every deviation from 2% and it’s large, sustained deviations: this is very much in the spirit of the medium-term orientation. And that’s paragraph 7. So paragraph 7 is stable. We already had a medium-term orientation, I think, throughout the whole history of the ECB. And I think that’s been very wise. Our commitment, in line with the opening remarks from the President, is that people should be able to count on our commitment to price stability. If we see a deviation, we will bring it back to 2%. And that’s our medium-term orientation. There’s one enrichment here, which I think makes sense. People often ask: how long is the medium term? And I think a very important discipline on that is in the final sentence now: “subject to maintaining anchored inflation expectations”. That really defines the medium term. As you know, in recent years we mapped that into “we will make sure inflation returns to target in a timely manner”. You need to impose some discipline on yourself as opposed to saying the medium term is always just over the projection horizon. The medium term means not so long that the anchoring of expectations is put at risk. So again, I think that’s always been true, but it’s better to be explicit about it. And maybe now, as journalists, if you ask Governing Council members in the future how long the medium term is, the medium term is how long it takes without putting into question the anchoring of expectations.
Paragraph 8 is our toolbox paragraph. We already said in 2021 that our primary instrument is the set of ECB policy rates. I do wonder, for those of you who were involved in looking at the ECB in 2021, how many of you fully believed that as we moved away from the lower bound, we would stop quantitative easing (QE) and we would stop forward guidance? But that was in our strategy and that’s what we did. These are tools that make sense at the lower bound. They are not tools from a stance point of view that have the same role away from the lower bound. So one basic message is: already in 2021 we told you a lot about how the toolbox works, but we did obviously come back and look at this. It’s an important topic. Let me highlight a couple of revisions here, or amplifications. One is that I think we are more articulate now about when these tools come into play. One is to steer the monetary policy stance when the rates are close to the lower bound. That’s what we said last time. That’s definitely a big category. But the second category is “or to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission”. March 2020 is one example. When the world’s financial market was hit by the pandemic shock, central banks in general did a lot of asset purchasing, refinancing operations and other elements to stabilise the transmission of monetary policy. So again, what I would say is either it’s because we’re near the lower bound or there’s some big drama causing an interruption to the transmission of monetary policy. But otherwise these instruments remain in the toolbox. They’re available, but they’re not used on a continuous basis. And so we list out these tools just as a reminder. Longer-term refinancing and asset purchases: those two would possibly be used either way. For the stance or for smoothing the transmission of policy. Whereas of course negative rates and forward guidance are more particular to the lower bound. So there is a differentiation within that category. We also said last time that we will respond flexibly to new challenges as they arise and we can consider new instruments. And of course we told you that we considered new instruments and we actually did it, because we did introduce the Transmission Protection Instrument in 2022. And then the last sentence is important because this is where a lot of the discussion in the last year has been. It is to look back at these this set of instruments and on a forward basis say, in the future, if we ever came to these situations, how would we use these instruments? So we say in this important sentence: the choice of which one we use or which combination we use, the design – because on day zero, we usually have a press release or a legal act saying here’s the design of our instrument – and the implementation. So in other words, month by month, how we adjust it and how we bring it to an end in terms of exit. All of these, number one, will enable an agile response to new shocks. So let’s not get locked into rigid programmes that would inhibit our ability to respond to new shocks. They will reflect the intended purpose. So there can be differences between a stance-orientated intervention and a transmission-smoothing-type intervention. And then, of course, all of these will be subject to a comprehensive proportionality assessment. So in considering the choice of tools, the design and the implementation, we need the checklist of whether this is proportional to the challenge we face. So that’s, as I say, the toolbox.
Then paragraph 9 is explaining how we make decisions. A lot of this is similar to last time. Last time we basically had to tell you that we’ve decided, rather than having a two-pillar strategy where we have an economic pillar and a monetary pillar, we make an integrated assessment. And in that integrated assessment, for example, we take into account macro-financial linkages, financial stability and so on. So a lot of that remains, but maybe you might find this new sentence interesting. The second sentence is that in how we make decisions, we take into account not only the most likely path for inflation in the economy, i.e. in a projection for the baseline, we don’t just look at the baseline, but also the surrounding risks and uncertainty. How do we do that? Including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analysis. This is something we have done forever, but it’s probably true that it’s not always visible in how we communicate. And also internally, of course, the science of how you should do scenarios and the science of how you should make sure your decisions are robust is always evolving. So we do want to make this clear. And in fairness for you and for others watching us, you can say “I think I understand this decision in the context of the baseline, but I have a natural question: is it also robust to the risk assessment of the ECB?” And I think that will be a step forward in the conversation about monetary policy. By the way, this is already reflected, importantly, because, as you may have noticed, what we’ve said in the last couple of years is that we make our decisions not only based on the inflation outlook, but also in relation to underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission. Because those two dimensions capture a lot of risk. Underlying inflation captured a lot of risk when we were bringing inflation down from 10% to 2%. The strength of monetary transmission captured a lot of risk as we moved interest rates, first of all, steeply upwards and then as we’ve been reversing. So the logic behind the three-pronged reaction function that we’ve been using reflects these principles.
Paragraph 10 reaffirms, and I think everything we’ve learnt from the last four years validates the assessment that, in terms of price stability, climate change has profound implications in terms of the structure of the economy, the rise and fall of particular sectors, the cycle, including through the impact of weather shocks, and also in terms of how the financial system is adjusting. This is also a policy priority for the European Union and a global challenge. So we are committed to ensuring the Eurosystem fully takes into account, in line with the EU’s goals and objectives, the implications of climate change and nature degradation for monetary policy and central banking. We added – because we’ve already added it elsewhere – “and nature degradation” because essentially it’s the same headache. And in terms of our economic analysis, you’ve also seen it in our publications. The same underlying failure to incorporate the global public good of a sustainable environment permeates that.
Paragraph 11 reaffirms that clear communication is centre stage of our policymaking. We want effective communication at all levels. And this is why we think the layered and visualised approach to monetary policy communication is essential. Also, we want to adapt in this rapidly changing communication landscape. There’s more on that in the overview note. And, as you know, the ECB has been rolling out new types of communication, including Espresso Economics on YouTube in recent times.
And then maybe in line with the idea that it’s good housekeeping to have a regular calendar-based commitment, the next assessment of the appropriateness of the strategy will be in 2030.
Good afternoon, ECB Chief Economist Philip Lane and I welcome you to this press conference, on the occasion of the conclusion of the 2025 assessment of our monetary policy strategy.
The Governing Council recently agreed on an updated monetary policy strategy statement. You can findthis statementon our website, together with anexplanatory overview noteand thetwo occasional paperspresenting the underlying analyses.
I will start by putting this strategy assessment into the broader context. Philip Lane will then go through the updated strategy statement and explain what has changed and why, as well as what has remained unchanged.
Following the strategy review we carried out in 2020-21, the Governing Council committed to “assess periodically the appropriateness of its monetary policy strategy, with the next assessment expected in 2025”. Such regular assessments ensure that our framework, toolkit and approach remain fit for purpose in a changing world.
And the world has changed significantly over the last four years. Some of the issues we were most concerned about back in 2021 – including inflation being too low for too long – have taken a rather different turn.
Not only did we see inflation surge, but some fundamental structural features of our economy and the inflation environment are changing: geopolitics, digitalisation, the increasing use of artificial intelligence, demographics, the threat to environmental sustainability and the evolution of the international financial system.
All of those suggest that the environment in which we operate will remain highly uncertain and potentially more volatile. This will make it more challenging to conduct our monetary policy and fulfil our mandate to keep prices stable.
During the strategy assessment, we asked: what do these changes mean for the way we assess the economy, conduct our policy, use our toolkit, take our decisions and communicate them? In seeking to answer this question, our mindset was forward-looking.
On the whole, we concluded that our monetary policy strategy remains well suited to addressing the challenges that lie ahead.
But our strategy also needs to be updated and adjusted in certain areas, so that the ECB can remain fit for purpose in the years to come. The next assessment is expected in 2030.
With our updated strategy statement, we are taking a comprehensive perspective on the challenges facing our monetary policy, so that the ECB can remain an anchor of stability in this more uncertain world.
This is our core message to the euro area citizens we serve: the new environment gives many reasons to worry, but one thing they do not need to worry about is our commitment to price stability.
The ECB is committed to its mandate and will keep itself and its tools updated to be able to respond to new challenges.
Let me conclude by thanking, on behalf of the Governing Council, all the colleagues across the Eurosystem who have contributed to this assessment in a great team effort.
I now hand over to our Chief Economist Philip Lane and, following his remarks, we will be ready to take your questions.
* * *
Philip R. Lane: I’m going to focus on the 12 paragraphs ofThe ECB’s monetary policy strategy statement. What’s important is that behind these paragraphs is a lot of work. The base layer is the two occasional papers. I’m sure you’ve already read the 400 pages in those two occasional papers. There’s a lot of rich new analysis of many dimensions in those two occasional papers. Then we have the overview note, which the Governing Council worked on collectively and which basically provides the elaboration behind these 12 paragraphs. And I would say that in these 12 paragraphs, in this review, we essentially tried to review the economic assessment: where are we and where are we likely to be? That was one of the two work streams. That essentially primarily shows up in paragraph 1.
So paragraph 1, you might say, is one paragraph, but it’s a very important paragraph because it essentially outlines the challenges that we may face. We had a similar paragraph last time, but last time the focus was essentially on a lot of factors that can give rise to a low-inflation world and a low interest rate world. Whereas the assessment this time of the Eurosystem staff behind this is that when we look where we are now in the structural changes facing the world economy, we have geopolitics, and a lot of this is in the direction of rolling back globalisation. Last time we were looking at globalisation as a force which did contribute to low inflation before the pandemic. There are many dimensions to geopolitics, but we are of course already living it and this is something we do think is going to shape the next five years. We already mentioned digitalisation the last time, but this time we’re calling that as a separate and important element: artificial intelligence. Because, of course, I think for a long time it has been understood that the world economy automates and digitalises. That’s been around for a while. That’s mature. What’s not mature and where there’s really a wide range of possibilities is: what does it mean as the business sector and the public sector incorporate artificial intelligence? I think we had already called out demography and the threat to environmental sustainability, and I think we’re very correct to have done so five years ago. We’ve seen a lot on these fronts in these five years. Let me remind you: without immigration, the European labour force would be shrinking. So demography is not just a future trend, it’s a year-by-year reality for us. And then this week, last week, this year, last year, all the time we see the impact of weather shocks and the impact of the green transition. By the way, investment in Europe in recent years would have been a lot lower without the green transition. It’s the one solid driver of investment for many sectors at the moment. We call out all of these elements, but what’s critical for our conclusion for monetary policy is that it creates uncertainty, it creates volatility, and we think what we may be faced with is larger deviations from our 2% target in both directions. So we have this two-sided risk assessment. And as I go through these paragraphs, essentially once we’ve identified this economic assessment, the natural question to ask is: how do we manage it? How does monetary policy manage this two-sided risk? And essentially in what follows, we will turn to the monetary policy implications. But the other thing to note about paragraph 1 is that there is a new sentence. That’s the final sentence. It is that we don’t live in a bubble. We don’t say monetary policy is the only game in town. And we do highlight here that a more resilient financial architecture – supported by progress on the savings and investments union, the completion of banking union and the introduction of a digital euro – would also support the effectiveness of monetary policy in this evolving environment. So, in other words, all of these structural changes are much more easily handled if we have a more resilient euro, European and euro-denominated financial system. And I think that’s also important and maybe helps you to understand why we as Board members, and more generally the Governing Council, spend a lot of time talking about these wider issues. It’s not a distraction from monetary policy. It’s an important underpinning for monetary policy.
Paragraph 2 is unchanged because paragraph 2 is setting the legal context. We have a mandate given by the Treaty, and so to make the strategy statement self-contained, it’s a reminder to you of the legal and Treaty constraints we live under. And that essentially remains the same as last time.
The third paragraph, because remember in the European Treaty there’s not a super detailed definition of price stability, so it’s important and this is something that evolved over the years: that in terms of measurement, we’re focused on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). And again, this is stable from last time. Last time we highlighted that we did think a reform of the HICP to include owner-occupied housing would be desirable. We continue to hold that view. But in the end it’s for the European Statistical System to make progress on that. So what we say is that in the meantime we do take into account inflation measures that include estimates of the cost of owner-occupied housing. So, in other words, we create supplementary indicators. These are not official data, but we do take a look. And these would be relevant in scenarios where house prices were rising far more quickly or far more slowly than the overall inflation rate. By the way, this has not been particularly the issue in recent years. It would not have made a big difference in recent years, but of course in principle we could be in a situation in the future where it made a difference.
Paragraph 4 is again largely stable from last time. It’s explaining why we target 2%, not zero, and that’s a fairly mature topic: why you want to have a safety margin. We do, and I think correctly this time, in the final sentence of paragraph 4 include intersectoral adjustment. In the last five years we’ve seen this massive change between goods prices and services prices. And actually it turns out that that’s a very important consideration. It’s a lot easier to handle an under 2% inflation target than if you’re trying to hit zero. Essentially if you’re trying to hit zero and the price of energy compared with goods rose, implicitly you need to drive down the price of goods. And we know for many reasons that deflation, even at the sectoral level, is difficult. So having a 2% target is reinforced by including intersectoral adjustment in that list. So, paragraph 4 says you need a safety margin.
Paragraph 5 says 2% is the best way to maintain price stability and that our commitment is symmetric. So what this symmetry means is that we consider negative and positive deviations from the target as equally undesirable. The last sentence, I think, has been critical in these years: having a clear target. You may have heard us all many times say 2%. It’s not somewhere in the region of 2%. It’s 2%. And having that clarity is very important for anchoring expectations, so I think it turned out that that choice we made to be precise about what our orientation is in the medium term is very important.
Let me turn to a paragraph where I think there has been an important change, a sensible change – something that you might say sounds so sensible, why are you talking about it? But it’s worth highlighting the update. Last time, in 2021, we felt we needed to point out that the symmetry of the target doesn’t mean that how we set monetary policy looks identical whether we’re above the target or below the target. And so we pointed out that if we have a lower bound issue, we need to be appropriately forceful or persistent. What have we learnt from these five years? That remains true for below-target inflation, but actually it’s equally true for above-target inflation. And what we actually did was we had a phase of being forceful. So from July 2022 to September 2023, we hiked a lot. And then we went into a persistent phase. So from September 2023 to June 2024, we had 4%. The overview note goes into more detail about why you need the blend of forceful and persistent. But when we reviewed this, peers said these were important concepts in relation to the lower bound, but they’re equally appropriate concepts in relation to being above target. It’s not, of course, in relation to blips. What we talk about here is in response to large, sustained deviations. So you have to first of all make the call. What we see in front of us is something that’s materially away from 2% and that would remain away from 2% unless we responded. And this is why we say “appropriately forceful or persistent”, because what exactly is appropriate depends on whether you are dealing with an upside shock, a downside shock and a wider set of issues. So that, I think, is important. Let me come back to this issue that we have a symmetric commitment and we’re two-sided, but the headache is different on both sides. On the downside, the lower bound is the main headache. On the upside – and this reflects so much of the last number of years and reflects a lot of the work in the occasional papers – is possible non-linearities in price and wage-setting. What we learnt is that once inflation starts to build, it can take off and it can accelerate. You can get this non-linear dynamic. And that’s why you need to be forceful on the upside. That’s not really true for downside shocks. They tend not to accelerate, but downside shocks tend to get embedded because your ability to respond on monetary policy is different.
Going back to this point that it’s not about smoothing out every deviation from 2% and it’s large, sustained deviations: this is very much in the spirit of the medium-term orientation. And that’s paragraph 7. So paragraph 7 is stable. We already had a medium-term orientation, I think, throughout the whole history of the ECB. And I think that’s been very wise. Our commitment, in line with the opening remarks from the President, is that people should be able to count on our commitment to price stability. If we see a deviation, we will bring it back to 2%. And that’s our medium-term orientation. There’s one enrichment here, which I think makes sense. People often ask: how long is the medium term? And I think a very important discipline on that is in the final sentence now: “subject to maintaining anchored inflation expectations”. That really defines the medium term. As you know, in recent years we mapped that into “we will make sure inflation returns to target in a timely manner”. You need to impose some discipline on yourself as opposed to saying the medium term is always just over the projection horizon. The medium term means not so long that the anchoring of expectations is put at risk. So again, I think that’s always been true, but it’s better to be explicit about it. And maybe now, as journalists, if you ask Governing Council members in the future how long the medium term is, the medium term is how long it takes without putting into question the anchoring of expectations.
Paragraph 8 is our toolbox paragraph. We already said in 2021 that our primary instrument is the set of ECB policy rates. I do wonder, for those of you who were involved in looking at the ECB in 2021, how many of you fully believed that as we moved away from the lower bound, we would stop quantitative easing (QE) and we would stop forward guidance? But that was in our strategy and that’s what we did. These are tools that make sense at the lower bound. They are not tools from a stance point of view that have the same role away from the lower bound. So one basic message is: already in 2021 we told you a lot about how the toolbox works, but we did obviously come back and look at this. It’s an important topic. Let me highlight a couple of revisions here, or amplifications. One is that I think we are more articulate now about when these tools come into play. One is to steer the monetary policy stance when the rates are close to the lower bound. That’s what we said last time. That’s definitely a big category. But the second category is “or to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission”. March 2020 is one example. When the world’s financial market was hit by the pandemic shock, central banks in general did a lot of asset purchasing, refinancing operations and other elements to stabilise the transmission of monetary policy. So again, what I would say is either it’s because we’re near the lower bound or there’s some big drama causing an interruption to the transmission of monetary policy. But otherwise these instruments remain in the toolbox. They’re available, but they’re not used on a continuous basis. And so we list out these tools just as a reminder. Longer-term refinancing and asset purchases: those two would possibly be used either way. For the stance or for smoothing the transmission of policy. Whereas of course negative rates and forward guidance are more particular to the lower bound. So there is a differentiation within that category. We also said last time that we will respond flexibly to new challenges as they arise and we can consider new instruments. And of course we told you that we considered new instruments and we actually did it, because we did introduce the Transmission Protection Instrument in 2022. And then the last sentence is important because this is where a lot of the discussion in the last year has been. It is to look back at these this set of instruments and on a forward basis say, in the future, if we ever came to these situations, how would we use these instruments? So we say in this important sentence: the choice of which one we use or which combination we use, the design – because on day zero, we usually have a press release or a legal act saying here’s the design of our instrument – and the implementation. So in other words, month by month, how we adjust it and how we bring it to an end in terms of exit. All of these, number one, will enable an agile response to new shocks. So let’s not get locked into rigid programmes that would inhibit our ability to respond to new shocks. They will reflect the intended purpose. So there can be differences between a stance-orientated intervention and a transmission-smoothing-type intervention. And then, of course, all of these will be subject to a comprehensive proportionality assessment. So in considering the choice of tools, the design and the implementation, we need the checklist of whether this is proportional to the challenge we face. So that’s, as I say, the toolbox.
Then paragraph 9 is explaining how we make decisions. A lot of this is similar to last time. Last time we basically had to tell you that we’ve decided, rather than having a two-pillar strategy where we have an economic pillar and a monetary pillar, we make an integrated assessment. And in that integrated assessment, for example, we take into account macro-financial linkages, financial stability and so on. So a lot of that remains, but maybe you might find this new sentence interesting. The second sentence is that in how we make decisions, we take into account not only the most likely path for inflation in the economy, i.e. in a projection for the baseline, we don’t just look at the baseline, but also the surrounding risks and uncertainty. How do we do that? Including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analysis. This is something we have done forever, but it’s probably true that it’s not always visible in how we communicate. And also internally, of course, the science of how you should do scenarios and the science of how you should make sure your decisions are robust is always evolving. So we do want to make this clear. And in fairness for you and for others watching us, you can say “I think I understand this decision in the context of the baseline, but I have a natural question: is it also robust to the risk assessment of the ECB?” And I think that will be a step forward in the conversation about monetary policy. By the way, this is already reflected, importantly, because, as you may have noticed, what we’ve said in the last couple of years is that we make our decisions not only based on the inflation outlook, but also in relation to underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission. Because those two dimensions capture a lot of risk. Underlying inflation captured a lot of risk when we were bringing inflation down from 10% to 2%. The strength of monetary transmission captured a lot of risk as we moved interest rates, first of all, steeply upwards and then as we’ve been reversing. So the logic behind the three-pronged reaction function that we’ve been using reflects these principles.
Paragraph 10 reaffirms, and I think everything we’ve learnt from the last four years validates the assessment that, in terms of price stability, climate change has profound implications in terms of the structure of the economy, the rise and fall of particular sectors, the cycle, including through the impact of weather shocks, and also in terms of how the financial system is adjusting. This is also a policy priority for the European Union and a global challenge. So we are committed to ensuring the Eurosystem fully takes into account, in line with the EU’s goals and objectives, the implications of climate change and nature degradation for monetary policy and central banking. We added – because we’ve already added it elsewhere – “and nature degradation” because essentially it’s the same headache. And in terms of our economic analysis, you’ve also seen it in our publications. The same underlying failure to incorporate the global public good of a sustainable environment permeates that.
Paragraph 11 reaffirms that clear communication is centre stage of our policymaking. We want effective communication at all levels. And this is why we think the layered and visualised approach to monetary policy communication is essential. Also, we want to adapt in this rapidly changing communication landscape. There’s more on that in the overview note. And, as you know, the ECB has been rolling out new types of communication, including Espresso Economics on YouTube in recent times.
And then maybe in line with the idea that it’s good housekeeping to have a regular calendar-based commitment, the next assessment of the appropriateness of the strategy will be in 2030.
