Source: International Monetary Fund
April 24, 2025
Speaker: Mr.Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF
Moderator: Ms. Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF
MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Thank you for joining us in this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. My name is Angham Al Shami, from the Communications Department here at the IMF.
If you’re joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations that you can access on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook webpage and the IMF Press Center as well. And for those of you in the room, you also have equipment to access that.
Today I’m joined by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the outlook of the region, and then we will open the floor for your questions. With that, over to you, Jihad.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF 2025 Spring Meetings. Before answering your questions, I will briefly outline the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia. Let me first start with a few words on the recent developments.
The global economy stands at a delicate crossroads. The global recovery of recent years faces new risks as governments reorder their policy priorities. The recent escalation in trade tensions has already damaged global growth prospects while triggering intense financial volatility. More broadly, the extraordinary increase in global uncertainty associated with trade policy and increased geopolitical fragmentation will continue to erode confidence for quite some time and represents a serious downside risk to global growth.
For MENA and CCA economies, these developments are adding to existing regional source of uncertainty, including ongoing conflicts, pockets of political instability and climate vulnerability. We continue to assess the impact of recently announced U.S. tariffs on MENA and CCA economies. While the direct effects are expected to be modest, giving limited trade exposure and exemptions for energy products, the indirect effects could be more pronounced. Slower growth will weaken external demand and remittances, while tighter financial conditions may challenge countries with elevated public debts. Oil exporting economies could also see fiscal and external positions deteriorate due to the lower oil prices. Some countries may benefit from trade diversion, but such gains could be short lived in a broader environment of trade contraction.
Let me now turn to the Middle East and North Africa. Last year was particularly challenging for the region. Conflict caused severe human and economic costs. Regional growth in 2024 reached 1.8 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.2 percentage point from the October World Economic Outlook forecast. Conflicts weigh on growth in some oil importing countries and extended OPEC+ voluntary production cuts continue to dampen activity in oil exporting economies. For GCC countries, strong non-oil growth and diversification efforts were largely offset by oil production cuts.
Despite these challenges and high uncertainty, growth is projected to pick up in 2025 and 2026, assuming oil output rebounds, conflict related impacts stabilize, progress is made on structural reform and implementation. However, expectations have been revised down compared to the October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook, reflecting weaker global growth and more modest effect of these drivers. We now project growth at 2.6 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026, a downward revision of 1.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively. Inflation is projected to continue declining across MENA economies, remaining elevated only in few cases.
Let me now turn to the outlook for the Caucuses and Central Asia. In contrast, economic activity in the CCA exceeded expectations in 2024, growing by 5.4 percent, driven by spillover effects from the war in Ukraine, which boosted domestic demand. However, as these temporary effects normalize over the next few years, growth is expected to moderate due to weaker external demand, plateauing growth of hydrocarbon production, and reduced fiscal stimulus. Despite the moderation in overall growth, inflation is expected to increase somewhat across the region and remain elevated in a few cases, reflecting still strong domestic demand.
Let me now turn to the risks to the outlook. These projections are subject to extraordinary uncertainty and the risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside. Four key risks stand out. First, trade tension as a further escalation could dampen global demand, delay in oil production recovery, and tighten financial conditions. Our analysis shows that persistence spikes in uncertainty triggered by global shocks are associated with large output losses both in MENA and CCA. The second risk is geopolitical conflict. The third one is climate shocks. And the last one is the reduction in official development assistance. This could further exacerbate food insecurity and humanitarian conditions in low-income and conflict-affected economies. However, upside risks also exist. The swift resolution of conflict and accelerated implementation of structural reforms could substantially improve regional growth prospects. The implications of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the CCA region also remain uncertain.
Now the question is what are the policies that we recommend for countries and how they should prioritize them. In the face of extraordinary uncertainty, MENA and CCA economies should respond along two key dimensions, manage short term instability, and use the opportunity to advance structural reforms for long-term growth. The first priority is adapt to the new environment. Countries must take steps to shield their economies from the impact of worst-case scenarios and prioritize safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability. The appropriate policy response will vary depending on each country’s initial conditions and vulnerability to risk.
Turning to more the long-term, countries should transform their economies. Recent developments underscore the urgent need to accelerate the long-discussed structural reforms agenda across the region. To reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and seize opportunities arising from the evolving global trade and financial landscape, it is essential to enhance governance, invest in human capital, advance digitalization, and foster a dynamic private sector. Establishing strategic trade and investment corridors with other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as within the region, including between GCC and Central Asia or GCC and North Africa, can help mitigate exposure to external uncertainty, enable greater risk sharing, and drive sustainable economic development.
We will delve into these policy priorities at the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook in Dubai next week and in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, where on May 3 we are organizing jointly with the Uzbek government a GCC-CCA Economic Conference where Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks from both regions, as well as representatives of IFIs and private sectors, will discuss deepening economic ties between these two regions. We also invite you to join us tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. at the Atrium for a public panel discussion on the economic consequences of the high uncertainty in the MENA and CCA regions.
Before I open the floor to questions, I want to underscore the IMF’s deep commitment to supporting countries throughout the region with policy advice, technical assistance, and, in many cases, financial support. Since early 2020, we have approved almost $50 billion in financing to countries across the MENA region, Pakistan, and the CCA, of which 14.8 have been approved since early 2024.
In closing, I want to highlight our engagement to post-conflict economies. Strengthening economic fundamentals and rebuilding institutions will be essential to successful recovery. The IMF, in coordination with the World Bank and regional partners, has established an informal coordination group to support recovery in conflict-affected states in the Middle East. Our focus will be on capacity building, policy guidance, and financial assistance. We are also working closely with authorities to help stabilize their economies, restore confidence, and lay foundations for sustainable growth.
Again, thank you very much for joining us this morning, and now I would like to welcome your questions.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad, and now we will take your questions. And let’s start with the gentleman here in the first row, please.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham and Jihad. I’m Amir Goumaa from Asharq Bloomberg. IMF raised the gross forecasting for Egypt dispIte the regional downgrade. Why is that? And how can the MENA region turn the country trade disputes into opportunities?
MR. AZOUR: Excuse me?
QUESTIONER: How can the MENA region turn the current trade disputes and tariffs into opportunities? Like how can they make the best use of it?
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much for your question.
MS. AL SHAMI: Should we take more questions on Egypt? Perhaps should we take more questions on Egypt. We’ll start with this gentleman and then the gentleman in the back. This one first.
QUESTIONER: Hello everyone. My name is Ahmad Yaqub. I’m the managing editor of Al Youm Al-Sabah Egyptian Newspaper. I have two questions about Egypt. The first one is about the expected exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar by the end of 2026, the next year, and the expected inflation rate and the economic growth rate of Egypt. The second question is the next trench of the program, current program with the Egyptian authorities. What is the timing of the next trench and the total amount of it? Thank you so much.
MS. AL SHAMI: And then the gentleman here.
QUESTIONER: Ramy Gabr from Al-Qahera News. The global economic outlook carries good news. Maybe for Egypt in terms of the economic growth in 2025. How do you see that and what’s the facts and numbers led to this outlook? Thank you.
MS. AL SHAMI: Over to you.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, please.
QUESTIONER: I’m Lauren Holtmeier from S&P Global. I wanted to ask about the fiscal break-even prices for oil production, specifically for the countries with high fiscal break-even prices like Saudi Arabia and Iraq. And how will the lowered expectations for oil prices over the next couple of years affect their ability and their economic outlook? And I recognize that the answer for those two countries might be very different.
MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. I had three sets of questions. One on trade and the impact of the recent trade developments on the region and how those could be turned into an opportunity. The second set of questions were on Egypt, and the third one was on the GCC and the oil market. Let me start with the first one.
Countries of the region have limited trade dependence on the U.S., and therefore the recent trade and tariff decisions will have limited direct impact on those economies. Yet it’s important also to highlight that there would be indirect impact. And also those indirect impact may take different channels. One impact is the impact that this could have on financial stability and capital flows. We saw widening of spreads over the last few years, which is an issue that could affect the capacity of emerging economies and middle-income countries who have high levels of debt. The second potential impact is impact on oil market. We saw some softening in the oil price, as well as the forwards of oil price are showing a certain extension of those softening over the year. And the third type of effect is the second-round impact due to trade diversion.
I will maybe go into more details about what are the policies that we recommend for countries to address those challenges. Few countries have more exposure to the U.S. trade like Pakistan or Jordan, and those are specific cases. I can address those. Opportunities, of course, in any change there are opportunities, and over the last few years we saw successive shocks and transformation on the geopolitical front and the geoeconomic front, and those have affected the region. The region stands at the crossroads between East and West, and therefore trade routes, connectivity, as well as also opportunities go through this region. This would require, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, for countries in the region to seek new opportunities in terms of strengthening their economic relationships and trade ties with regions close to them, as well as also within countries in the region, which will call for new way of increasing connectivity and cooperation in the region.
The second set of questions is on Egypt. Over the last year, growth in Egypt has improved, and we expect growth for the fiscal year 2025 to reach 3.8 percent. For comparison, in 2024 it was 2.4 percent, and we expect that the growth will keep improving in 2026 and reach 4.3 percent. Also, inflation went down from 33 percent on average for fiscal year 2024 to 19.7 percent in 2025, and we expect it to reach 12 percent in 2026, despite the various shocks. Those positive developments reflect the implementation of the reform program that was supported by the IMF and was augmented back in March last year in order also to help Egypt address some of the external shocks, in particular the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal.
As you remember, the program is based on four pillars. One, macroeconomic stability by addressing inflation that constitutes the main issue for economic stability through tightening the monetary policy. The second is to address the debt issue by improving the primary surplus and also through an active debt management strategy and strengthening debt management organization to reduce gradually the debt and the weight of the debt through the debt service on the economy. The third important pillar is to preserve the economy from external shocks, and this is the role of the flexibility in the exchange rate. Flexibility in the exchange rate in a time of high level of uncertainty plays an important way to protect the Egyptian economy from external shocks, and its flexibility has proven to be beneficial to the stability of the Egyptian economy. The fourth pillar is growing the economy and give a bigger weight to the private sector, and we encourage the authorities to strengthen and accelerate the reinvestment strategy that would allow more investment to come to the Egyptian economy, would give more space to the private sector, and will help the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian people get better opportunities in a time where those international changes would require an acceleration of economic transformation. The review has been completed in March, and as you know, we had also another facility that was provided to Egypt to help Egypt deal with climate issues, and our engagement with the authorities remain very active. Shall I move to GCC?
MS. AL SHAMI: Yes.
MR. AZOUR: The next trench will be with the next review. On the GCC, well, of course the direct impact of the trade shock on the region has been limited except that with the prospect of the decline in oil price, it comes at a time where we see a resumption of increase of oil production with the implementation of what has been agreed, though at a slower pace, of the December decision of the OPEC+ agreement.
As you know, countries of the GCC have different fundamentals and different level of buffers, and therefore there is no one break-even point for all countries. Our estimates are showing, though, that a decline in oil price of $10 would weaken the fiscal situation by somewhat between 2.3 to 2.7 percent of GDP, and it also, it has similar impact on the external account between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of GDP.
I would like to highlight two additional points that some countries have used the opportunity of their diversification strategy to both reduce their dependence on oil as a source of income, but also to diversify fiscally and reduce the impact of oil revenues, which we encourage other countries to follow suit.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. So we’ll take another round of questions from the room, and then we will turn to online. The lady in the first row, please.
QUESTIONER: Dr. Jihad, thank you for taking my question. Nour Amache from Asharq Bloomberg. I wanted to ask about Lebanon and Syria and to follow up on what my colleagues here asked about Egypt. They were asking about the next review, if it’s in June, and the next tranche in June, if we can elaborate on that. Now, regarding Lebanon, today the parliament passed the law of lifting bank secrecy. Will this make or will this make the program with the IMF faster? Will this increase the prospects of a program with Lebanon anytime soon, especially since I know the Lebanese authorities represented by the Finance Minister, the Economy Minister, and the Central Bank Governor are all here in Washington, and a lot of meetings have been undergoing? That’s regarding Lebanon. And regarding Syria, also a big Syrian delegation is here. What has been reached so far with the Syrian counterparts? Thank you.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. One more question. Maybe we’ll go to the gentleman in the front here.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Mohammad Al-Lubani from Jordan Al-Mamlaka TV. I’d like to ask in Arabic. In light of our dependence on American exports, [ESQUAH] said that 25 percent of the exports go to the United States. How would the tariffs affect Jordan, and are there any estimates of these losses by the Fund? And what are the recommendations of the Fund in order to face these challenges?
MR. AZOUR: The discussions are, you know, continuing, and the engagement with the authorities is taking place during the Spring Meetings. As I mentioned earlier, we look forward to the next review to see an acceleration of the divestment strategy that is one of the key priorities because of its critical impact on sustaining growth in Egypt, providing opportunities to the private sector, and also helping in the effort that Egypt is pursuing in reducing the debt. In the context of high interest rate, it’s very important to address debt service issue, and this would be accelerated by reducing the debt. Therefore, we look forward to see progress on the authorities’ plan in terms of divestment.
On Lebanon, the Fund has been supportive of Lebanon, and a staff-level agreement has been reached in 2022. Lebanon staff, Lebanon team, is and remained actively engaged with the authorities, providing technical assistance. And recently, we had two staff visits to Lebanon and the authorities have engaged with our team in order to reactivate a potential program. They have expressed their interest for that. The Lebanese economic and financial situation has been made
more challenging with the recent implications of the war and the massive destruction that in addition to the need to address the financial and economic situation, Lebanon is also facing the need to deal with the reconstruction.
The pillars of the program will remain valid as they were negotiated. Macroeconomic stability, based on addressing the legacy of the financial sector. The legacy of debt, address the debt issue. Second pillar is to deal with the macroeconomic stability through fiscal consolidation. Third pillar is to strengthen governance by reforming SOEs and also increasing and improving the confidence factor. And third is to address social issues, especially now with issues related to the reconstructions. Discussions are taking place and staff is on active dialogue with the Lebanese authorities.
We are in discussion and therefore I think the discussions that we are having during the Spring Meetings are giving the opportunity for us to understand what are the reform priorities of the Lebanese government. As you know, staff had a couple of visits in the last few weeks, and we will keep our active engagement with the Lebanese authorities.
On Syria. Of course, Syria has been absent for the last 15 years due to the war, and their engagement with the institution has been fairly limited since 2011. The last Article IV consultation with Syria took place in 2009. The international community and the regional community has been actively engaged in order to see how we could help Syria recover from a long period of war.
We had a preparatory meeting preparatory meeting in AlUla back in February where regional institutions and the international community have agreed to have another follow-up coordination meeting that took place last Tuesday where representatives from international institutions, bilaterals, have convened in order to assess the needs of Syria and also to develop a framework of coordination. The Fund is engaged to support the international community in its engagement with Syria. We have already started our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, the institutional capacity, and we look forward to continue our engagement with the Syrian authorities.
MS. AL SHAMI: Then you have one more question on Jordan.
MR. AZOUR: Yes, Jordan. In Arabic? Okay. Jordan is one of the countries that have been affected by the tariffs, but this is still limited because of the kind of exports or the relationship between Jordan and the United States. And Jordan managed to overcome, in the recent years, to overcome several shocks, including shocks related to the variability and volatility and the effect of the Gaza issues on the economy of Jordan. And the latest reviews emphasized the need for Jordan to keep stability and also, despite the external shocks, to take the needed measures in order to improve the macroeconomic situation and to reinforce the economy. And there has been discussions about supporting Jordan through a new mechanism, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, in order to help Jordan in the measures that would help it improve adaptation with the climate change and other shocks and other pandemics. There is actually progress in this regard. And there will be a review next month by the Executive Board of the Fund about Jordan.
MS. AL SHAMI: We’ll turn to Dania, who’s on Webex online. Dania, please go ahead.
QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me?
MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, you can hear you.
QUESTIONER: Hi. Hello Dr. Jihad, I just have a follow-up question on the break-even oil prices for the Gulf. In the October report, countries like Saudi Arabia had a very high break-even price of around 90. I think it was the second biggest highest in the GCC after Bahrain. I just wanted to see, this figure is likely to increase given the high expenditures, the lower oil prices. How will the lower oil prices — you mentioned about the impact on GDP, but the prices, I think, since the beginning of the year have dropped by more than $10.00. So, the impact has it been considered in the Regional Economic Report? And especially because I don’t know the report, did it include the impact of the tariffs and the impact of the increase in OPEC production from May, which is accelerated? And just one clarification, with regards to Saudi break-even, some analysts include the expenditure of the Public Investment Fund. Is that part of the IMF estimates for the break-even? What’s included in the break-even? Thank you very much.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any additional questions on GCC? Okay, let’s take the gentleman in the middle.
QUESTIONER: Hello Mr. Azour, Madame Al Shami, thank you for the opportunity. Philippe Hage Boutros from L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon. How does the IMF assess the potential impact of declining oil revenues stemming from a possible drop in prices amid the tariff crisis on the capacity and willingness of the Gulf countries to fund international aid, particularly for countries like Lebanon and Syria that urgently need reconstruction financing? Does it anticipate a significant or relatively limited effect? Thank you.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we had one more question on Saudi that we received online. In light of the global trade repercussions, what is the effect on the Saudi market, especially on inflation and growth? This question comes from Mohammed Al Sulami from Al Akhbariyah in Saudi Arabia.
MR. AZOUR: Let me start with Dania’s question. Dania, let me start by saying that over the last few years from a fiscal perspective, Saudi has made a significant improvement through various reforms in order to diversify revenues outside oil and also reduce certain expenditures, including on the subsidy side. And this effort to diversify revenues has led to an increase of non-oil revenues in the GDP for Saudi. Of course, the last couple of years have been beneficial in terms of providing Saudi and other GCC countries with surplus in the fiscal as well as also in the current account, which have led to increase in buffers. Of course, still the oil sector represent an important source of revenue and it’s still also an important source of foreign currencies.
Coming to the fiscal strategy, Saudi has established a medium-term fiscal framework that anchors policies and also help them deal with the volatility in oil price and become less pro cyclicals. Of course, the increase in oil price, sorry, the decline in oil price will have impact on the fiscal and will lead to a potential additional drop in fiscal situation.
As I mentioned earlier, a decline of $10.00 per barrel or a decline of $1 million of production will have an impact on the fiscal between 2 to 3 percent. The decline in oil price is accompanied with a recovery in oil production and Saudi was one of the largest, I would say, contributor to the voluntary drop in oil export.
When it comes to the link between fiscal and the investment strategy, the investment strategy has been also put in the medium-term framework in the context of the Vision 2030 and regularly there are updates, recalibration and also phasing, based on the capacity to implement and the priorities.
In our projections, although developments were taking place almost at the time when we were releasing our outlook, we took into consideration the new assumptions on the oil price for this year as well as also on the growth projections.
The second question related to Saudi. The impact of the latest developments on the Saudi economy. Undoubtedly, the trade relations regarding the non-oil sector is limited with the United States and therefore the impact will also be limited on trade related to tariffs, especially as oil and gas are exempt from the increase in tariffs. But there will be an indirect impact, as we’ve said. Saudi Arabia also has a dollarized economy, whether on the side of exports or imports, and therefore the impact will be limited.
On the other hand, the reduction or the depreciation of the dollar will affect services, especially tourism. And this is a sector that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop by establishing new expansion for tourism in Saudi Arabia.
The other related question on support to the reconstruction in the region. Let me first say two things. One, ODA has declined over the last few years, and more recently with the decisions to stop some of the international assistance by USAID and others. This will have an important impact, especially on countries in fragility who depend heavily on aid. Countries like Somalia, Sudan, countries like Yemen. And this represents a risk not only on the fiscal side, but also on the humanitarian side on food security. This is the first point.
The second point is the region is, we’re talking here about the Levant, is going through an important prospect of post-conflict recovery. Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and hopefully, Yemen, and Sudan. This would require strong international and financial assistance. Of course, this also would require to accelerate certain number of reforms that will allow the private sector to provide financing. Those countries have strong diasporas, and the recovery could also be co-led by international assistance, also by private sector support. And some of the reforms, be it in Lebanon or in Syria, are very important to regain confidence and will allow private sector to play its key role in recovering those economies.
The region has been very supportive. And when we look at the official assistance and the interest that is being shown by several countries in the region, be it in the recent meeting that took place in Saudi Arabia, in Al Ula, where ministers of finance from the GCC and regional institutions convened in order to explore opportunities to provide more assistance to those countries.
Again, I think it’s very important also to highlight that assistance has to accompany reform programs that will lay the ground to strong institutions will provide confidence for both citizens and also international, private and public community, in order to accelerate the recovery.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We’ll take one more round of questions. The lady on the second row here, please.
QUESTIONER: Hello, I’m Mariam Ali from Dawn News Pakistan. My question is how will the global tariff war uniquely impact Pakistan? Any need of buffers in place to mitigate risks to the country? Thank you.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Let’s take maybe one more question. The gentleman here sitting in the front.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, , Director Azour. My question is on Yemen. Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, D.C. Bureau. So, last week U.S. struck Ras Isa fuel part in Yemen. I would like to ask you to outline what repercussions this strike will have on energy security and economic situation in Yemen and broadly in region? And if you could, provide any details how the IMF — what is the IMF view on longer-term risks for the region as U.S. operation on Yemen continues to unfold? Thank you.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We’ll take one more question from the gentleman here in the –.
QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Magnus Sherman. I wanted to return to Lebanon. The new Prime Minister has pledged to not touch the hard currency deposits. Does the IMF support that position?
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we have an online question from Camille Faris Abu Rafael. How can low- and middle-income countries in MENA balance urgent social needs with long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising debt and global uncertainty and persistently high interest rates? We’ll take these questions, and we’ll take another round. Thank you.
MR. AZOUR: On Pakistan. Pakistan made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over the last 18 months and the numbers are, for Pakistan, are showing improvement both in terms of growth as well as also in inflation that dropped from 12.6 percent last year in 2024 fiscal year to 6.5 percent this year, expected to stay at this level for next year. Debt is also stabilizing in the case of Pakistan, and recently Pakistan has been upgraded by rating agencies.
Of course, trade tensions will affect relatively Pakistan maybe more than the average in the region. But I would say the impact on Pakistan directly can be offset by other measures that would allow the Pakistani economy to reposition itself in a world that is in the midst of one of the largest transformation in terms of trade, economic opportunities, and to reposition itself in order to address any risks, but also to potentially benefit from change in the trade routes.
The question on Yemen the situation on Yemen is extremely preoccupying at the humanitarian level, both in terms of food security as well as also in terms of human suffering. And this situation has been inflicting heavy toll on the Yemeni people for a long period of time. Of course, broadly speaking, instability has been one of the main issues that the region is dealing with. Instability is one of the key sources of uncertainty for the region. Addressing this instability is key in providing security for people to improve their living conditions, providing stability for the trade routes, and also provide opportunities for people to rebuild and reconstruct. The Fund is engaged to (A) keep a very strong contacts with Yemen, provide technical assistance at a time where we cannot provide because of the security situation, financial assistance. Therefore, we are actively supporting through technical assistance. And we are also in regular engagement with the authorities.
Our next plan is to reengage through Article IV in order to assess the economic situation in Yemen, help the internationally recognized government assess the overall debt situation and the debt liabilities in order, later on, to help Yemen deal with the debt situation, and provide right assessment for the donor community to provide assistance.
Political stabilization security is very important to preserve human and social conditions, and the Fund stands ready to help Yemen as well as also other countries facing fragility and conflicts in the region. And this is something that we are increasing our resources to provide support to those countries.
Lebanon. Lebanon problems are complex in terms of how to address the overall financial challenge. The solution has to deal through a comprehensive approach with all the financial issues that Lebanon is facing. A piecemeal approach is not what Lebanon needs today. A reform package that restores confidence, addresses the legacy of the past, provides opportunities for the economy to recover, by also promoting the capacity of the financial system to finance the recovery, mobilize international assistance to help Lebanon dealing with the reconstruction needs, and also support the reforms are priorities that our team is currently discussing with the Lebanese authorities.
The question related to balancing short-term and medium-term. I think it’s a very important question. We live currently in a world of high uncertainty and in our outlook this spring we have — and I would encourage you to read it, it’s very interesting piece — we have tried to assess the impact of uncertainty on the region and the uncertainty is of multiple layers. A global uncertainty, regional, geopolitical and conflict situation, but also internal or local uncertainties. Those are important issues for countries to address.
In very brief, countries need to in the short term to preserve stability and that would require to increase their buffers. And for those who have limited buffers to accelerate fiscal consolidations to reduce the risk, address some of their financing issues, especially countries who have high level of debt and for those who have buffers, preserve those and use them when they need. But I think what is really important, especially given the lasting negative impact of uncertainties on countries, is to address the medium-term issues. And addressing the medium-term issues will help unlock growth, accelerating structural reforms, improving economic conditions, provide stronger social protection framework by moving from untargeted subsidies to something that is more meaningful in terms of social support would be extremely beneficial for countries in the region.
MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad and I’m afraid we have run out of time. Thank you all for participating with us today and as always, we will be posting the transcript online. But just a reminder that we will be launching our report next week on May 1 so stay tuned for that. And as Jihad mentioned, please join us tomorrow at 2:30 for the seminar on how countries can navigate uncertainties. Jihad, any last words?
MR. AZOUR: Only to say thank you. And thanks to our friends here, the journalists. We look forward to provide you with more details in Dubai next week with all the details, as well as also country-specific information on our Regional Economic Outlook. And two days after that, in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, on the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia. Thank you very much.
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