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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Second India-France AI Policy Roundtable held on the sidelines of AI Action Summit 2025 in Paris, France

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 12:27AM by PIB Delhi

    The Office of the Principal Scientific Adviser (PSA) to the Government of India in partnership with Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, IndiaAI Mission and Sciences Po Paris organised an official side-event to the AI Action Summit 2025, titled ‘2nd India-France AI Policy Roundtable’ on 10th February 2025 at the Sciences Po Paris university campus.

    The roundtable discussion started with opening remarks by PSA Prof. Ajay Kumar Sood where he highlighted India’s priorities in global AI policy and governance, including responsible AI development and deployment, equitable benefit sharing, adoption of a techno-legal framework for AI governance, interoperable data flows, and collaboration on AI safety, research, and innovation. Prof. Sood also stressed upon the potential for India and France to synergize on various policy positions and technological initiatives, fostering benefits not only at the bilateral level but also on a global scale by leveraging complementary knowledge and skill sets.

    Shri Amit A. Shukla, Joint Secretary, Cyber Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India and H.E. Henri Verdier, Ambassador for Digital Affairs, French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs gave co-chairs remarks highlighting (a) DPI for AI; (b) AI foundation models; (c) global AI governance and (d) Priority areas, such as integrating AI in addressing global challenges. They also mentioned cross-border data flows lacking arbitration mechanisms and the importance of aligned views on data sovereignty.

    Following the co-chair remarks, interventions were made by Dr. Preeti Banzal (Adviser/Scientist G, Office of the Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India);  Smt. Kavita Bhatia (Scientist ‘G’ & Group Coordinator, AI & Emerging Technology and Bhashini, MeitY, Government of India); Mr. Clément Bacchi (International Digital Policy Lead, Directorate General of Enterprises, Ministry of the Economy and Finance); Ms. Hélène Costa (Project Director, French ministry for the ecological transition); Mr. Sharad Sharma (Co-Founder, iSPIRT Foundation); Mr. Francis Rousseaux (International Technical Expert on AI, iSPIRT Foundation); Dr. Sarayu Natarajan (Founder, Aapti Institute); Mr. Charbel-Raphaël Segerie (Executive Director, Centre pour la Sécurité de l’IA); Mr. Saurabh Singh (Head, Digital and AI Policy, AWS India & South Asia); Mr. Alexandre Mariani (International Affairs Manager, Sciences Po Paris); Kapil Vaswani (Principal Researcher, Microsoft Research); Sunu Engineer (Entrepreneur, Co-Founder, Transforming.Legal); Vivek Raghavan (Co-Founder, Sarvam AI).

    The interventions emphasized the need for democratized access to AI resources, and capacity building while recognizing the importance of techno-legal frameworks. The participants highlighted the significance of sovereign AI models, ethical AI deployment and the need to define globally accepted terminologies and standards. Speakers also aligned on multilingual LLMs, federated AI compute infrastructure, and interoperable access to AI research, datasets, and high-performance computing resources. The meeting also covered key discussions on collaboration between India and France. Opportunities mentioned included creating indigenous foundation models and adopting a balanced governance approach to minimize risks while fostering innovation. Sustainable AI and energy-efficient computing was highlighted, alongside the importance of cross-border cooperation in AI research, datasets, and startups. The conversation also touched on AI’s societal impact, data governance, and the role of global institutions in shaping AI safety frameworks.

    The Second Roundtable built upon key objectives from the First Roundtable organised in IISc, Bengaluru during Technology Dialogue 2025 on 25th January 2025. The First Roundtable discussion focussed on inclusive AI frameworks, diverse datasets, infrastructure and skills, and foundational models. It also addressed governance and innovation, public-private partnerships, sustainability and health, and academic and data collaboration. Both discussions highlighted ethical and responsible AI, along with sector-specific and long-term goals.

    For more information, visit: https://technologydialogue.in/ai-rt-feb.html

     

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    MJPS/ST

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0127/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michael Gahler, Lukas Mandl, Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0127/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes Region,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2023 entitled ‘A renewed EU Great Lakes Strategy: Supporting the transformation of the root causes of instability into shared opportunities’,

    – having regard to the statement of 25 January 2025 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

    – having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 26 October 2023 on sustainable raw materials between the EU and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 19 February 2023 on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains between the EU and Rwanda,

    – having regard to the letter of 27 December 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the President of the UN Security Council,

    – having regard to the press statement by the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo,

    – having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) of 12 March 2004,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas for decades the resource-rich and multi-ethnic eastern region of the DRC has been plagued by violence, war and unimaginable human suffering; whereas the long-term consequences of the terrible 1994 Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi are still fuelling violence, hatred and forced displacements today;

    B. whereas on 27 January 2025 the roughly 2 000-soldier-strong rebel group M23 gained control of Goma, the capital of the DRC region of North Kivu and a central hub with two million inhabitants; whereas numerous UN reports have confirmed the presence of 3 000-4 000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC who are cooperating with the M23 and are taking part in combat operations; whereas on 6 February 2025 the M23 reiterated that it wanted to ‘liberate all of the Congo’ in its first public meeting as its fighters advanced towards South Kivu;

    C. whereas there have been numerous UN reports about the illegal smuggling of minerals from the DRC to Rwanda, which then sells these minerals on the international market, claiming that they originate from Rwanda; whereas Rwandan exports of gold and coltan have risen sharply in recent years;

    D. whereas numerous UN Group of Experts reports have documented that Rwanda is supporting the M23 rebel military group; whereas Rwanda has even sent numerous soldiers into the DRC; whereas in 2012 the M23 briefly captured Goma, but Rwanda ended its support for the rebel force due to international pressure and a cut in development funding;

    E. whereas, since the resurgence of the M23, the already very dire humanitarian situation has further deteriorated, with a total lack of humanitarian assistance, forced evictions from camps for internally displaced people and increased violence against innocent civilians, including a large increase in sexual violence against girls and women;

    F. whereas after a ceasefire that lasted several years, the M23 fighters took up arms again at the end of 2021; whereas martial law has been in force since 2021 in eastern DRC and the civilian government has been replaced by the military;

    G. whereas, before this latest episode in the crisis, 800 000 internally displaced people were already in overcrowded sites for displaced people around Goma; whereas over 6.4 million people were already displaced throughout the country before the current escalation (of which 2.9 million were new displacements in 2024 alone);

    H. whereas for decades the central DRC Government has not been able to ensure complete control over the vast territory of the DRC, particularly in eastern DRC; whereas more than 100 rebel groups have exploited this vacuum and are often supported by neighbouring countries to ensure access to the many natural resources in eastern DRC, among other reasons; whereas the rebel groups often recruit child soldiers in a blatant violation of international law and assault on humanity;

    I. whereas the conflict is fuelled by the smuggling of minerals, such as tin, tungsten, coltan (tantalum), gold and diamonds, which are often mined in inhumane conditions; whereas armed groups control mining areas and smuggling routes, whereas gold and coltan, in particular, are transported across the border to Rwanda (and Uganda) and from there sold on as ‘conflict-free’ raw materials; whereas the DRC Government estimates that it loses USD 1 billion a year in revenue from raw materials illegally taken out of the country; whereas in addition to state and rebel actors from outside the DRC, many Congolese actors from the security sector are also part of these complex interdependencies;

    J. whereas on 8 February 2025 at a joint summit in Tanzania’s capital Dar es Salaam, the regional blocs of southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and eastern Africa, the East African Community (EAC), called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, demanded the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC territory, urged all warring parties to hold peace talks within five days, and demanded the reopening of Goma airport and other key routes to facilitate humanitarian aid; whereas the African Union is set to address the matter at a meeting in Addis Ababa on 14 February 2025; whereas other mediation efforts are ongoing, notably by France, which aims to bring all actors to the negotiation table;

    K. whereas the EU and Rwanda Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains is focused on the advancement of due diligence and traceability, cooperation in fighting against the illegal trafficking of raw materials and alignment with international environmental, social and governance standards; whereas the EU has a similar memorandum of understanding with the DRC and other countries in the region;

    L. whereas Rwanda has repeatedly claimed that the DRC is supporting rebels from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an extremist group who aim to overthrow the government in Rwanda; whereas the FDLR is also accused of guerrilla attacks and assaults on civilians, such as the assassination of the late Italian Ambassador Luca Attanasio in 2021; whereas the government in Kinshasa published a declaration at the end of 2023 stating that all soldiers cooperating with the FDLR would be arrested; whereas Rwanda claims that the DRC Government is not militarily capable of providing full security in the east of its country;

    M. whereas Uganda and the DRC have been cooperating in many ways, including in their efforts to fight terrorism in the region; whereas this has led to an increased Ugandan presence in eastern DRC, which has also resulted in increased illegal transfers of minerals from eastern DRC to Uganda;

    N. whereas a private Romanian security company and a small number of independent military trainers had been active on the side of the DRC Government from the beginning of 2023, but largely withdrew in the midst of intensified fighting in late January 2025;

    O. whereas the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Monusco) has been trying to stabilise eastern DRC since 1999; whereas the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been deployed since December 2023, with 2 100 soldiers from Tanzania and Malawi and 2 900 soldiers from South Africa;

    P. whereas public sentiment in Kinshasa against perceived inaction by the international community led to attacks on and the looting of the diplomatic missions of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United States, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and the United Nations, as well as civil society organisations;

    Q. whereas the EU is trying to intensify its presence in the region, including through its recent support for the ‘Green Corridor Kivu-Kinshasa’ programme via a Global Gateway initiative, which aims to help establish a sustainable 2 600 km corridor connecting eastern DRC to Kinshasa and the Atlantic Coast, covering 540 000 km2;

    R. whereas the Commission announced new humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; whereas the EU is a major donor to the humanitarian response in the DRC and has provided over EUR 272 million in humanitarian assistance since early 2023;

    S. whereas the DRC has been a clear critic of Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and has supported numerous resolutions at the UN and other international forums condemning the Russian war of aggression and expansion;

    T. whereas the Council appointed Johan Borgstam as the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region on 1 September 2024;

    1. Strongly condemns the breaches of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of eastern DRC by the rebels of the M23 and Rwanda;

    2. Urges the Rwandan Government to withdraw its troops from DRC territory, the presence of whom is a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter, and cease cooperation with the M23 rebels; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected;

    3. Calls on all regional actors to cease their support to the numerous rebel groups; demands therefore that both the M23 and FDLR groups, among others, be dissolved; underlines that, as well as Rwanda and the DRC, all regional actors have a special responsibility in this regard;

    4. Recalls that only an inclusive and regional approach will be able to address and tackle the multifaceted long-standing problems in the region; strongly welcomes the joint SADC and EAC peace summit in Dar es Salaam on 8 February 2025; reiterates in this regard its full support to the Luanda and Nairobi processes and calls on all Great Lake countries, in particular the DRC and Rwanda, to urgently pursue negotiations in these frameworks; emphasises that any solution must also address the root causes of the conflict, including, but not limited to, the illicit trafficking of natural resources; underlines that regional organisations, such as the African Union, the SADC and the EAC, must play a central role in all of these efforts; underlines as well that a lasting solution requires a reform of the DRC security sector, with a better organised DRC army and administration;

    5. Expresses concern over the lack of coherence in the EU response to the Great Lakes Region’s crises and calls on the Council to reassess the implementation of its renewed EU Great Lakes strategy; recalls that the EU and its special representative for the region are ready to assist all mediation efforts; urges the EU to cooperate with other actors on the ground, in particular Monusco, to ensure the protection of civilians in eastern DRC;

    6. Is appalled by the shocking use of sexual violence as a tool of repression and weapon of war in eastern DRC, as well as the unacceptable recruitment of child soldiers by the various rebel groups; demands that these matters be addressed by the international community without delay; strongly reiterates that any attack against UN-mandated forces is inexcusable and might be considered a war crime;

    7. Is outraged by the humanitarian catastrophe and lack of humanitarian assistance and expresses its concern that the crisis will further deteriorate unless immediate action is taken, including improved humanitarian access and improvements to the sanitary situation; is deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of displaced people in eastern DRC and in the DRC as a whole; underlines that all countries in the region have a legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety of international aid workers on their territories; underlines that Rwanda has a special responsibility to facilitate humanitarian access to the region;

    8. Expresses its condolences to all the victims of the recent violence and expresses its gratitude to the numerous aid workers who, despite the very difficult and challenging conditions, continue to provide much-needed support to the population;

    9. Reiterates its condemnation of hate speech and xenophobia, as well as ethnic-based politics; underlines that all those responsible for sustaining armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC must be held accountable;

    10. Calls for an urgent increase in the overall EU support budget for the region, in particular given the unknown future engagement of the US Government;

    11. Expresses its strong concern about the increasing presence of disinformation campaigns; condemns in particular efforts by Russia to foster anti-Western sentiments through the dissemination of fake news about Western players on social media;

    12. Calls on the Commission to urgently review its engagement with Rwanda and prepare a set of possible measures with clear pathways towards implementation in case the Rwandan Government does not swiftly reverse its policies, including, among others, a possible suspension of bilateral assistance and a halt of the Memorandum of Understanding on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains;

    13. Calls on the Member States to consider the adoption of additional restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that sustain, support or benefit from the armed conflict, instability or insecurity in the DRC, as well as those responsible for inciting violence, or exploiting the armed conflict, instability and insecurity in the DRC, including through the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources;

    14. Urges the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to immediately cease military assistance to the Rwandan armed forces via the European Peace Facility;

    15. Expresses its concern about the increasing presence of Chinese actors in the mining sector of the DRC and the region acting without respect for economic and social responsibilities; recalls that European industries and companies in the region will only have long-term security of supply if a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict is found;

    16. Strongly condemns the attack on diplomatic institutions of the EU, its Member States and civil society organisations, such as political foundations in Kinshasa, and underlines that the protection of civilians and diplomatic staff must be guaranteed; demands that those responsible be brought to justice;

    17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa, as well as the secretariats of Monusco, the SADC and the EAC.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Addressing the impact of mass tourism in Spain – E-000445/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000445/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE), Estrella Galán (The Left)

    • 1.Does the Commission acknowledge the significant impact of mass tourism in Spain, particularly as a key factor in the housing crisis the country is facing?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to suggest concrete measures to support sustainable tourism and minimise the negative effects of tourism in the most affected areas of Spain?
    • 3.How much funding does the Commission plan to allocate to promote tourism, especially in coastal regions, given that overcrowding is pushing these areas to the brink of collapse?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Suspected tax fraud in Moroccan tomato imports to the EU in recent years – E-000444/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000444/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Carmen Crespo Díaz (PPE)

    Spanish farmers are facing a serious problem due to Morocco’s alleged breaches of the import limit for duty-free tomatoes, while the Spanish Government stands idly by.

    Since 2019, Morocco has allegedly repeatedly exceeded duty-free export quotas, which could amount to EUR 71.7 million of tax evasion, or around EUR 14 million each year. This lost revenue is directly undermining the sustainability of EU policies, as is evident in the tomato sector, where our producers’ profit margins have been squeezed by pressure from imported products sold at artificially low prices.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Will the Commission investigate Morocco’s failure to comply with the terms of the trade agreement and the Spanish Government’s neglect of its duties?
    • 2.Will the Commission demand appropriate economic compensation if tax evasion has taken place?
    • 3.Will European farmers be protected by strengthening import monitoring mechanisms and reviewing the current trade framework with Morocco?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU response to the rise in animal disease outbreaks – E-000446/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000446/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Susana Solís Pérez (PPE), Carmen Crespo Díaz (PPE)

    In recent months, the EU has experienced a worrying upswing in outbreaks of animal diseases such as bluetongue, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, tuberculosis, African swine fever, avian influenza and foot-and-mouth disease. Although the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease is in check, the cases of bovine tuberculosis in Asturias are proof of the vulnerability of the livestock sector to those health threats.

    The growing number of tuberculosis cases is a source of concern among farmers, with regard not only to its impact on animal health and food safety but also to the serious economic consequences of restrictions and compulsory slaughter. The causes of this trend must be identified and assessments carried out to establish whether there are structural, environmental or other factors conducive to the spread of diseases in European livestock.

    Against that backdrop, prevention and control must be stepped up, as must funds for epidemiological surveillance, vaccination and fair compensation for lost profits.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to carry out an analysis of the causes of the increase in animal disease outbreaks in the EU?
    • 2.What further steps is it considering taking to bolster prevention, improve health responses and ensure that affected farmers receive proper support?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Denouncing Trump’s unacceptable proposal for mass expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip – E-000449/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000449/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI), Kostas Papadakis (NI)

    US President Donald Trump made an unacceptable statement about the Palestinians of Gaza, claiming that he would prefer that certain Arab countries get involved and build housing in a different area where they can perhaps live peacefully. He bluntly confessed to the plan of the occupying state of Israel and the USA — after the genocide — to displace the Palestinians from their land permanently. He even proposed the expulsion of Palestinians to Jordan and Egypt, which would mean the final displacement and occupation-colonisation of the Palestinian territories by Israel.

    Despite thousands of murders and Israel’s criminal policy marked by the genocide of the Palestinians, the EU and governments, including the New Democracy government in Greece, still today maintain commercial, military and political relations with Israel, and the EU-Israel Association Agreement remains in force.

    In view of the above, can the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy answer the following:

    • 1.What is her position on Trump’s unacceptable proposal to displace Palestinians from the territories and transfer them to other countries so that Israel can continue its occupation of Palestinian territories, which is part of Israel’s broader plan for the genocide and displacement of Palestinians?
    • 2.What is her position on the request to cease here and now the EU-Israel Association Agreement and all economic, military and political cooperation with the occupying state of Israel that contributes to the suffering experienced by the people of Palestine?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Follow-up on State aid for airports, commercial aviation and rail in Portugal – E-000450/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000450/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Adrian-George Axinia (ECR)

    The Commission’s answer to our question E-001390/2024 on State aid for the new Alcochete airport in Portugal basically stated that it was unaware of any State aid having been granted[1].

    Portuguese media recently reported on large tax benefits to state-owned airline TAP Air Portugal, which is soon due to be privatised. This follows EUR 3.28 million in State aid during the COVID-19 pandemic, which has not yet been reimbursed.

    In August the Portuguese Government announced a subsidised EUR 20 per month national rail pass. This seems to infringe every competition rule, undermining the economics of private railway operators.

    The Portuguese Government may be grossly distorting competition in the European airport, commercial aviation and railway sectors, setting bad precedents and potentially impacting the large neighbouring Spanish market, in particular.

    The mission letter to the new Executive Vice-President responsible for the competition portfolio clearly states that she ‘should preserve the level playing field while pursuing further simplification of State Aid, prioritising work on the most distortive aids.’

    State aid cannot be overlooked. It is the Commission’s duty to proactively scrutinise and enforce EU policies.

    Therefore:

    Given the many worrying signs, what scrutiny is being exercised over State aid for Lisbon’s new airport in Alcochete, for the privatisation of TAP Air Portugal and for Portuguese railways?

    Submitted: 3.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-001390-ASW_EN.html.
    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Exacerbation of industrial relocation driven by EU policy through US tariffs – P-000555/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000555/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petra Steger (PfE)

    On 1 February 2025, US President Donald Trump signed a decree imposing tariffs of 25 % on imports from Canada and Mexico and 10 % on imports from China. In exchange for border security measures and measures against Mexican drug cartels, Trump’s punitive tariffs were temporarily suspended a few hours before entry into force for Canada and Mexico. However, shortly thereafter Trump let it be known that he would also ‘definitively’ impose import duties on EU products and do so ‘pretty soon’. This would constitute an economic disaster of gigantic proportions for the Union, as our industry is already suffering from the political and bureaucratic excesses of the failed EU Green Deal and is also burdened by the high energy costs in the Union resulting from the failed EU sanctions regime. As Commission President von der Leyen has already announced a strong response to potential US tariffs, industry fears premature knee-jerk measures that could escalate the situation.

    • 1.What measures, concessions or talks has the Commission initiated to prevent an imminent trade war with the US?
    • 2.Is the Commission planning any other countermeasures in addition to tariffs?
    • 3.What measures is the Commission planning to restore the Union to international competitiveness?

    Submitted: 6.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Press conference: Call for EU support for the International Criminal Court (ICC)

    Source: European Parliament

    Today, the Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights will hold a press conference in Strasbourg, after President Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC.

    When: Tuesday 11 February 15.00 CET

    Where: European Parliament, Strasbourg, Daphne Caruana Galizia press conference room (WEISS N -1/201)

    Participants:

    – Chair of the Subcommittee on Human rights (DROI) Mounir Satouri (Greens/EFA, France);
    – Mama Bea, member of the NGO “Association des mamans Anti-Bwaki” (AMAB), implementing partner of the ICC Trust Fund for Victims in DRC;
    – David Yambio, victim of Almasri in Libya, President and spokesperson for Refugees in Libya Association.

    Interpretation will be provided in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish.

    Accredited media representatives may attend the press conference in person. Journalists wishing to ask questions remotely can connect via Interactio. The press conference will also be web streamed live and recorded on the Parliament’s Multimedia Centre.

    Background

    On 6 February 2025, US President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court, including suspending the entry of ICC officials, employees, and agents, as well as their immediate family members into the United States.

    A delegation of MEPs of the Subcommittee on Human rights travelled to The Hague on 29-30 October 2024 to meet with members of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court (ICC), EUROJUST and other key partners. After the mission, DROI Chair said he was concerned about the serious threats these institutions face, underlining the crucial role of the ICC to support the victims and declared that  International Criminal Court decisions were binding on all EU member states.

    In their annual report 2023 on Human rights and democracy in the world and the EU’s policy on the matter, MEPs condemned attempts to undermine the work of the ICC and its legitimacy, and called for the EU and its member states to encourage their partners to ratify the Rome Statute and its amendments, expanding the Court’s jurisdiction.

    Information for the media – Use Interactio to ask questions

    To ask questions remotely during the press conference, please connect via Interactio using this link: https://ep.interactio.eu/s871-h7gf-91mi

    Interactio is only supported on iPad (with the Safari browser) and Mac/Windows (with the Google Chrome browser). When connecting, enter your name and the media you are representing in the first name / last name fields. For better sound quality, use headphones and a microphone. Interpretation is only possible for interventions with video.

    Journalists who have never used Interactio before are asked to connect 30 minutes before the start of the press event to perform a connection test. IT assistance can be provided if necessary. When connected, open the chat window (upper right corner) to be able to see the service messages.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on Foreign Policy Issues – Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting – 19 February 2025 © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 19 February, Committee on Foreign Affairs will host its first Interparliamentary Committee Meeting of the new legislative term. Over 40 members of national parliaments will be present to exchange views with AFET members. There will be two sessions, focusing on transatlantic relations in challenging times and the role of the European Union in an increasingly multipolar world. Rosa Balfour (Carnegie Europe) and Jim Cloos (TEPSA) will be the keynote speakers in the respective sessions.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Discharge 2023 (Commission and EU Agencies): Consideration of Draft Reports – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    European Parliament © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 17-18 February 2025, CONT Members will consider the draft reports on the financial year 2023 discharge to the European Commission and EU Agencies. The draft reports will be presented by the respective Rapporteurs, emphasising what they consider to be the main points for the 2023 discharge cycle.

    The discharge procedure is the Parliament’s final approval of how the EU budget for a specific year has been implemented. In the draft reports presented during the meeting, the CONT Committee scrutinises how the Commission and EU Agencies are implementing the EU budget and prepares the Parliament’s discharge decisions. Parliament considers the reports prepared by the Budgetary Control Committee, taking into account the Council’s recommendations, and decides to grant, postpone or refuse a discharge.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-Israel Association Council meeting 2025 – P-000539/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000539/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Marc Botenga (The Left), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Ilaria Salis (The Left), Lynn Boylan (The Left), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Giorgos Georgiou (The Left), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left), Danilo Della Valle (The Left), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Irene Montero (The Left)

    The EU plans to hold an Association Council meeting with Israel in February 2025. Due to Israel’s disregard for human rights and international law, including through illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, no such meetings took place between 2012 and 2022. Similar concerns impeded the meetings in 2023 and 2024.

    Indeed, Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which constitutes the framework for these meetings, states that ‘relations between the Parties … shall be based on respect for human rights’, underscoring that this ‘constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’.

    Since the 2022 meeting of the Association Council, the International Court of Justice has confirmed the illegal character of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. The International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for the Israeli prime minister for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

    • 1.Does the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy recognise that war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide violate Article 2?
    • 2.Will the meeting of the Association Council be made conditional upon Israel’s compliance with Article 2? If not, why not?
    • 3.If the meeting does take place, what measures will the European side put on the table to make Israel comply with Article 2?

    Submitted: 5.2.2025

    Last updated: 11 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Consideration of draft opinion on the revamped EU Budget – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 17 February 2025, CONT Members will consider the draft opinion for BUDG on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world.

    The draft opinion amends the draft Report of the BUDG Rapporteurs by putting more emphasis on the need for increased transparency, improved performance and the importance of protection of the financial interests of the Union.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Presentation of study on performance-based instruments – Committee on Budgetary Control

    Source: European Parliament

    Study on performance-based instruments © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 18 February 2025, the study “Performance-based instruments – possible improvements in their design” will be presented to CONT Members by the authors. It will be followed by an exchange of views.

    With the adoption and implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the first large-scale performance based instrument (PBI) was established. PBIs require a different way of working from the Commission, and a different way of exercising scrutiny by the Parliament. The study provides an overview of experience so far and draws lessons for the future.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Two new fish species discovered in Swiss waters

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    The public can take part in a survey to decide on the names of two fish species discovered by researchers from the University of Bern, the Natural History Museum of Bern and the Aquatic Research Institute Eawag. In this interview, biologist Bárbara Calegari explains where they live and how to make the diversity of our waters visible.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Erik Marquardt, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Villy Søvndal
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0106/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to the statement of 1 December 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos on Georgia,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

    – having regard to the Association Agreement of July 2016 between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, and its establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas mass grass-roots protests have been taking place in Georgia since the October 2024 parliamentary election; whereas civil society, opposition parties and international and local observers did not accept the reported election results and continue to demand a new election; whereas the protests have been marred by the police’s use of excessive and disproportionate violence, countless arrests and the ill treatment of detainees while in custody;

    B. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented a worrying trend of police brutality, stating that hundreds of protesters, dispersed and arrested by police, have faced violence that, in some cases, amounts to torture; whereas Georgia’s police forces are operating under a veil of apparent impunity, using sporadic acts of violence by protesters, often provoked by their own actions, as a pretext for repression; whereas no officials responsible for abuses have been held accountable;

    C. whereas hundreds of anti-government protesters and activists are still being detained, of whom more than 300 are alleging that they suffer beatings, torture and other ill treatment in detention; whereas detainees face swift court hearings resulting in fines or detention for alleged administrative offences, while dozens of people have been arrested on criminal charges in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests;

    D. whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has called this suppression a serious breach of the right of freedom of assembly;

    E. whereas prominent journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of Georgian independent news outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was detained in Batumi on 12 January 2025 for posting a protest poster and then detained again after she suffered ill treatment while in detention, which allegedly resulted in her slapping a Batumi police officer who had insulted her; whereas the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office then charged her with ‘attacking a police officer,’ a criminal offence that carries a prison sentence of four to seven years; whereas on 20 January, it became known that Amaghlobeli had begun a hunger strike; whereas international and local human rights organisations, foreign and Georgian politicians, 14 embassies and more than 300 Georgian journalists, editors and media managers have expressed deep concern about her medical condition and called for her immediate release;

    F. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, Georgian Dream members of parliament (MPs) voted to strip 49 opposition MPs of their mandates; whereas Georgian authorities have arrested several opposition figures, including politicians Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava;

    G. whereas Georgian Dream has adopted new legislation that came into effect on 30 December 2024, which imposes further arbitrary restrictions on the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, along with hefty fines for the use of protest slogans or posters, and enables preventive detentions of anyone suspected of planning to violate these rules governing public assembly or other laws, for up to 48 hours; whereas the authorities are routinely abusing administrative and criminal proceedings by the Georgian authorities as part of the worsening crackdown on protest and peaceful dissent;

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities continue to ignore the numerous local and international calls to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; whereas Georgian Dream has, however, announced plans to replace the so-called foreign agent legislation with a tougher law it describes as a ‘direct copy of the current US Foreign Agents Registration Act’; whereas Georgian Dream has also announced plans for a new draft law on media control which would reportedly restrict media funding from foreign sources, establish ‘standards for media objectivity and journalistic ethics’ and define institutional mechanisms for monitoring and safeguarding these standards;

    I. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU membership process, with Prime Minster Kobakhidze stating that the country’s civil service was going through a ‘process of self-cleansing’;

    J. whereas Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the For Georgia party and former prime minister, and Zviad Koridze, a journalist and a member of Transparency International Georgia, were physically assaulted in two separate incidents on 15 January;

    K. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

    L. whereas the EU has firmly halted Georgia’s EU accession process, redirected EU funding from Georgia’s government to civil society and suspended visa-free travel to the EU for Georgian diplomats and officials; whereas, at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council, Hungary and Slovakia blocked broadly demanded targeted sanctions against leading Georgian officials, including Bidzina Ivanishvili;

    M. whereas Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have bilaterally imposed targeted sanctions against Ivanishvili and 10 government officials, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri; whereas, in December 2024, the US imposed individual sanctions against Ivanishvili, while the UK imposed individual sanctions against Mr Gomelauri, Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandre Darakhvelidze, Tbilisi Police Department Director Sulkhan Tamazashvili, Chief of the Special Tasks Department Zviad Kharazishvili, and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mileri Lagazauri; whereas on 13 January 2025, UK MP James MacCleary put forward a motion to sanction Ivanishvili in the House of Commons;

    N. whereas Ivanishvili and his family members have reportedly begun transferring their business assets, worth dozens of millions of euros, from offshore entities to Georgia-registered companies following the imposition of the US targeted sanctions;

    O. whereas a significant incentive for Georgian Dream and Ivanishvili in particular to remain on their confrontational path with democracy at home and against European integration is their confidence in cultivating alternative economic development opportunities with Russia, and the continued and growing geo-economic leverage of Georgia in respect of the West; whereas Georgia is a key partner country of the ‘Middle Corridor’ in terms of connectivity, energy and trade relations;

    1. Stands in solidarity with all people in Georgia who, for over three months, have been protesting for their country’s democracy and constitution, human rights and EU values; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society, independent media and free and fair elections;

    2. Reconfirms its position that the reported extensive electoral fraud during the October 2024 parliamentary election undermined the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in any new government, and that the results therefore do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people; calls for a new election within a year, and for the process to be conducted in an improved electoral environment by an independent and impartial election administration, under diligent international observation, in order to ensure a genuinely fair and transparent electoral process;

    3. Considers that the actions of the Georgian Dream party, both in parliament and on the streets against its own citizens, are rapidly steering the country towards authoritarianism, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future;

    4. Condemns all violence against protesters and the ill treatment of detainees by Georgia’s police forces, especially the growing reports of torture; strongly urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using unwarranted force against them; demands that all officials responsible for unlawful use of force, including acts of torture and other ill treatment, must be held fully accountable;

    5. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; expresses its deep concern about the medical condition of Mzia Amaghlobeli and denounces Georgian Dream for her unlawful detention and criminal prosecution, which was intended to instil fear among independent media representatives, activists and civil society at large;

    6. Condemns the termination of the mandates of 49 opposition MPs by Georgian Dream; considers this the latest step in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country; warns the Georgian authorities that any attempts to turn its threats of a ban on established political parties into a reality would alienate Georgia from the EU and make any move towards EU accession impossible;

    7. Condemns the attacks on Giorgi Gakharia and Zviad Korids; demands an independent investigation into the incidents and for those responsible to be held accountable;

    8. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; expresses concern about recently announced and introduced laws limiting freedom of expression and assembly, increasing state control of the media and further tightening of the so-called foreign agent legislation; underlines that the law and policies implemented by Georgian Dream are unconstitutional and incompatible with Georgia’s EU integration;

    9. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia; notes in this regard attempts by Georgian Dream officials to align themselves on these issues with US President Donald Trump and Elon Musk;

    10. Deplores efforts by Hungary and Slovakia to block EU targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council; reiterates its call on the Council to impose, without delay, individual sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, violations of electoral laws and standards, brutality by police and their proxies and the ill treatment of detainees, administrative abuses and misuse of state institutions, such as Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, and Chairman of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili, and to extend these sanctions to judges passing politically motivated sentences; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners, in particular the UK, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and to freeze all his assets for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and for acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;

    11. Welcomes in this regard the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; encourages other Member States, especially those hosting relevant assets, to similarly impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials, in particular Mr Ivanishvili, in a coordinated fashion, if EU level sanctions fail to be adopted in the Council; calls on France to revoke Ivanishvili’s Légion d’honneur;

    12. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to adjust and accelerate the EU funding mechanisms for Georgian civil society and independent media to help make them resilient against efforts by the Georgian Government to cut off their financial lifeline; calls for the focus of that funding to reflect adjusted project needs in the context of a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; stresses that both fresh EU funding for Georgian civil society and the effective allocation of funding is more important than ever now that President Trump has frozen all such funding from the US; stresses that in Georgia’s increasingly repressive climate there is a rapidly growing need for EU and Member State emergency support for Georgian civil society and media, including core operational support, as well as support in countering disinformation;

    13. Calls for targeted sanctions on the financial sector of Georgia, as well as political and financial divestment away from planned connectivity projects, in order to disincentive Georgian Dream’s efforts to become a thriving hub for (illicit) Russian financial markets, and a key ‘partner of necessity’ for the West in the Caucasus in the Middle Corridor; stresses that there can be no deep political and economic relations between Georgia and the EU without Georgia upholding fundamental rights and the Georgian Constitution;

    14. Calls on VP/HR Kallas and Commissioner Kos, along with Magdalena Grono as the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, to travel to Georgia at their earliest convenience in order to meet with civil society and democratic/pro-European opposition leaders, express support for political prisoners, and more broadly show that the EU has not forgotten those in Georgia protesting for democracy and human rights; expresses its continued support for the efforts of Georgia’s fifth President, Salome Zourabichvili, who continues to represent Georgia’s democratic ambitions;

    15. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia in the context of the halt in the country’s EU accession process; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to conduct a review of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, in particular Georgia’s adherence to the requirements of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and its general principles;

    16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0129/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Sara Matthieu, Marie Toussaint, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Saskia Bricmont, Majdouline Sbai, David Cormand, Ville Niinistö, Catarina Vieira, Erik Marquardt, Ignazio Roberto Marino
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0129/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

    – having regard to the UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, of August 2010,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (Conflict Minerals Regulation)[1],

    – having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (the Samoa Agreement),

    – having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

    – having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    – having regard to the UN Charter,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group captured the towns of Minova on 21 January 2025, Sake on 23 January 2025 and Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region in the DRC, on 27 January 2025; whereas this constitutes a brutal violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC; whereas indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons have increased in recent weeks in densely populated areas of North Kivu, including displacement camps and other highly populated areas near Goma; whereas unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, as well as forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices have reportedly been committed by M23 with the support of the Rwandan military;

    B. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established estimates, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), that between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan army troops are on the ground in the DRC, and considers that the deployment of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that Rwanda’s de facto control and direction of M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23;

    C. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC concluded that M23 and other armed groups are involved in illegal mineral exploitation and smuggling in the eastern DRC, and that ‘at least 150 tons of coltan’ have been fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date;

    D. whereas the resurgence of M23 relates to the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC over the past year, with other armed groups, and at times government soldiers, committing widespread violence, unlawful killings and other grave abuses, putting civilians at greater risk;

    E. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault or sexual exploitation; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances, such as Bunia, are also targets of attack by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population; whereas there is a reported high risk of the spread of Mpox in Goma, due to the dire humanitarian situation;

    F. whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the widespread rape and killing of women inmates in Goma’s Munzenze prison, and the DRC’s Minister for Human Rights Chantal Chambu Mwavit estimates that 163 women were burned alive in the prison; whereas the UN Human Rights Office reported that only between 9 and 13 female inmates, ‘all of whom had also been raped’, survived the blaze;

    G. whereas the security situation in the eastern DRC has dramatically deteriorated in recent weeks and humanitarian access is blocked in the territories illegally occupied since January 2025 by M23;

    H. whereas the Luanda Process, which was relaunched in July 2024 and is being facilitated by Angola, aims to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in the eastern DRC;

    I. whereas the UN and the DRC agreed on the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in mid-2024, leading to a degradation of the security situation and affecting civilians, who were left exposed to human rights abuses by state security forces and armed actors;

    J. whereas the M23 and Rwandan forces have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

    K. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning allegations of crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

    L. whereas the coltan extraction zone in Rubaya in the DRC, controlled by M23, accounts for 15 % of the global supply of tantalum and, as a result, Rwanda recorded a 50 % increase in its coltan exports in 2023, becoming the world’s leading exporter – far exceeding its national production capacity;

    M. whereas the Commission and the Rwandan Government signed on 19 February 2024 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains, which anticipates the adoption of an implementation roadmap, opening the door to the EU financing of strategic projects;

    N. whereas this MoU clearly anticipates the risk of importing conflict minerals from the DRC into the EU market by requiring Rwanda to enforce ‘measures to intercept smuggled minerals entering the country and to repatriate them to the country of origin’;

    O. whereas the EU has not made its cooperation with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional on the country joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), while the DRC is a member of the initiative, thereby creating disparities between transparency requirements on minerals from both countries;

    P. whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate an MoU with Rwanda, or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

    Q. whereas on 18 December 2024, the DRC filed criminal complaints against Apple subsidiaries in France and Belgium, accusing the tech firm of using conflict minerals in its supply chain;

    R. whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwege briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025 on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people; whereas women are particularly at risk, in these circumstances, of being victims of sexual abuse and rape; whereas the hospitals in Goma lack sufficient sanitary equipment and hundreds of patients are waiting to undergo life-saving surgery;

    S. whereas a joint summit of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community took place on 8 February 2025 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, calling for the disengagement of Rwanda’s forces from the DRC and for the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern DRC; whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

    1. Is concerned by findings in the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, and fully supports their recommendations;

    2. Condemns the fact that the RDF has deployed troops to the eastern DRC and has provided direct military support to M23, helping it to expand control in the eastern DRC; condemns the fact that Congolese army units have supported armed groups implicated in serious abuses in the fighting with M23;

    3. Calls for a quick resumption of negotiations within the Luanda Process in order to find a lasting, peaceful and political solution, and urges all sides to fully honour their engagements within the Luanda Process, specifically the ceasefire agreed on 30 July 2024, the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the M23 rebel groups, as well as the withdrawal of the RDF from the territory of the DRC; calls for the EU to have an active role in the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, advocating for an immediate ceasefire and a renewed commitment to dialogue, with the protection of civilians at the core of negotiations, in particular women and children;

    4. Deplores the fact that fighting and the shelling of medical infrastructure in and around Goma has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need; calls on all neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda, to facilitate access of humanitarian equipment and personnel to all areas occupied by the rebel groups in the eastern DRC, including through the reopening of Goma airport and of borders; highlights the precarious situation that women and girls face and calls on M23 to lift all restrictions on humanitarian interventions aimed at addressing and preventing gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence;

    5. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate to investigate abuses by all parties to the current conflict as soon as possible;

    6. Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; is highly concerned about the fragile situation of the ICC, which is already undermining its crucial work in bringing justice to victims of the most serious crimes worldwide; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and the Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

    7. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

    8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to impose targeted sanctions against relevant senior M23 and other armed group commanders, army leaders and senior officials, particularly the individuals identified by the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC as responsible for, or complicit in, recent serious human rights abuses by their forces, or those for which they have command responsibility, such as Rwanda’s major generals Eugene Nkubito, Ruki Karusisi and Emmy Ruvusha;

    9. Exhorts the Commission and the Member States to take measures to ensure that support through the European Peace Facility for the deployment of Rwandan troops in northern Mozambique remains exclusively dedicated to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique and does not, directly or indirectly, support the abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

    10. Expresses regret that the Commission did not present the draft or seek feedback from Parliament in the preparation process of the MoU with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains; regrets that the Council and Parliament were not treated equally in the drafting process of the MoU; highlights the importance of improving the early engagement of the Commission with Parliament in the drafting process of future MoUs;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to suspend the application of the MoU between the Commission and Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains, and freeze any decision to select any project in Rwanda as a strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act[2], and to temporarily halt cooperation with Rwanda in the context of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative; calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional upon Rwanda joining the EITI, which the DRC is already part of;

    12. Calls for the EU, Rwanda’s neighbouring countries and Rwanda’s main trading partners to put in place a trade embargo for all minerals, including processed minerals, exported from Rwanda, until a definitive withdrawal of the RDF and rebel group supported by Rwanda from the territory of the DRC;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly adopt an export ban of weapons from the EU to Rwanda and for the immediate suspension of any further military and security assistance to Rwanda until the territorial integrity of the DRC is restored;

    14. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a strong enforcement of the current Conflict Minerals Regulation, and for the Commission to swiftly propose a revision to the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring that the highest standards of traceability and transparency are met for each and every mineral imported into the EU, in particular from the DRC and Rwanda, to review accordingly the current import thresholds currently anticipated in the Regulation, and to enhance anti-circumvention and enforcement provisions regarding sanctions;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Rwanda.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0105/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Thierry Mariani, Jordan Bardella, Pierre‑Romain Thionnet, Matthieu Valet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    B10‑0105/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), notably those of 18 January 2018[1] and 24 November 2022[2], which address ongoing conflicts and humanitarian concerns in the region,

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2008 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and rape as a war crime[3] and to its previous resolutions on human rights abuses in the DRC,

    – having regard to the declaration of 25 January 2025 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, on behalf of the EU on the security situation in the Kivu,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 December 2019 on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which outline the EU’s strategic approach to the DRC,

    – having regard to UN Security Council resolutions on the DRC, notably Resolution 2765 (2024) adopted on 20 December 2024, which extended the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 20 December 2025, and Resolution 2688 (2023) of 27 June 2023, which renewed the DRC sanctions regime until 1 July 2024,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas[4],

    – having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[5] (the Samoa Agreement),

    – having regard to the Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, signed on 24 February 2013 under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations, which aimed to address the root causes of instability in the DRC by promoting regional cooperation, respecting state sovereignty and ending external support to armed groups,

    – having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

    – having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, which was adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000,

    – having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations,

    – having regard to Report S/2024/432 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

    – having regard to Report S/2024/969 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

    – having regard to the UN Security Council press statement of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaffirming the international community’s commitment to the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,

    – having regard to the memorandum of understanding signed on 19 February 2024 between the European Union and Rwanda concerning sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the DRC has faced decades of ongoing armed conflicts, particularly in the eastern regions of North and South Kivu, fuelled by local, regional and international actors;

    B. whereas since 1998, the conflict in the DRC has resulted in the deaths of more than 5.4 million people, predominantly civilians, making it the most protracted and deadly conflict since World War II;

    C. whereas a significant proportion of these fatalities have been children, who have endured violence and suffered from malnutrition and preventable diseases exacerbated by the ongoing instability;

    D. whereas to this day, the DRC continues to suffer violence, attacks, killings and widespread human rights violations perpetrated by domestic and foreign armed groups, notably in the east of the country;

    E. whereas the Congo River Alliance and its principal member, the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, with documented support from Rwanda, has recently escalated hostilities in North Kivu, culminating in the recent seizure of Goma, the capital city of North Kivu, in direct violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

    F. whereas numerous UN reports, including findings from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, have repeatedly documented Rwanda’s military, logistical and financial support to M23, despite official denials from the Rwandan Government;

    G. whereas the ongoing conflict has resulted in widespread human rights violations, including mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement and the forced recruitment of soldiers, creating one of Africa’s worst protracted humanitarian crises;

    H. whereas rape and sexual violence are systematically used as a weapon of war by the M23 rebel group, as documented by numerous human rights organisations and UN reports;

    I. whereas over 700 000 people have been forcibly displaced as a result of the escalating violence in the Kivu regions, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in refugee camps and informal settlements;

    J. whereas the recent escalation of violence in the eastern DRC has resulted in the tragic deaths of over 3 000 civilians and the loss of 13 MONUSCO peacekeepers;

    K. whereas armed groups, including M23, continue to illegally exploit the DRC’s vast mineral resources, including coltan, cobalt and gold, fuelling conflict financing and depriving the Congolese people of their national wealth;

    L. whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda in February 2024 regarding sustainable value chains for critical raw materials, despite growing concerns over Rwanda’s role in the illicit exploitation of DRC minerals; whereas this MoU cannot ensure supply chain due diligence as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

    M. whereas Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, was re-elected on 15 July 2024 with 99.18 % of the vote, extending his 24-year rule by another five years, amid widespread concerns over the absence of political freedom in Rwanda;

    N. whereas MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, has been in the country for over two decades, yet continues to struggle to prevent large-scale violence and human rights violations;

    O. whereas the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have the potential to play a greater role in peacekeeping and regional stabilisation, complementing MONUSCO and other diplomatic efforts, provided that such initiatives align with the sovereignty and wishes of the DRC;

    P. whereas regional efforts, including the Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço, have sought to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda, though continued hostilities have undermined diplomatic progress;

    Q. whereas the Great Lakes region remains highly fragile, and a full-scale war between the DRC and Rwanda would not only inflict immense suffering on Congolese civilians, but also destabilise the broader east and central African region;

    R. whereas, at the initiative of Kenyan President William Ruto, a joint SADC-EAC summit was held on 7 and 8 February 2025, providing an opportunity for political dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda;

    1. Unequivocally condemns the seizure of Goma by the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, as a grave violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and a threat to regional stability; denounces Rwanda’s documented support for M23 and demands its immediate cessation;

    2. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the stability of the region and calls for full respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC; emphasises the importance of respecting international borders and the sovereignty of nations; condemns any actions that seek to undermine these principles;

    3. Strongly condemns the grave human rights violations committed in Kivu, including pillaging, mass rapes and forced displacement, which have triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, displacing over 230 000 more people; notes that the North and South Kivu provinces are already home to over 4.6 million internally displaced people, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

    4. Expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the 13 MONUSCO soldiers who lost their lives while carrying out their peacekeeping mission, and to the families of the 3 000 civilians killed in the ongoing violence;

    5. Denounces the systematic exploitation and illegal extraction of the DRC’s natural resources, particularly ores and critical raw materials, by armed groups; notes that this plundering not only deprives the Congolese people of their national wealth, but also fuels the conflict, as revenues from these resources are used to finance rebel activities;

    6. Condemns the perpetuation of modern slavery within the mining sectors of the region, especially in artisanal mines; notes that miners, including children, are subjected to inhumane working conditions, forced labour and severe exploitation;

    7. Expresses deep concern over M23’s recent offensive in South Kivu and the inflammatory rhetoric propagated by the Rwanda-backed rebel alliance; worries about the potential for such actions to further destabilise the region, incite ethnic tensions and undermine efforts toward peace;

    8. Notes the unilateral ceasefire declared by M23; points out that while this development may offer a temporary respite from active hostilities, the Congolese Government has described this ceasefire as a ‘false communication’ amid reports of ongoing violence;

    9. Expresses profound concern over Rwanda’s escalating militarisation and the potential escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war, which could destabilise the entire Great Lakes region; underscores the importance of diplomacy and calls on all regional actors to engage constructively to avert spillover effects that could lead to a broader crisis;

    10. Highlights the opaque roles of some neighbouring countries in the conflict, particularly Uganda; calls for transparency and accountability from all external parties involved;

    11. Takes note of the Commission’s announcement of humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; calls for further improvements in humanitarian aid, including food, clean water, medical assistance and shelter, with a focus on protecting women and children;

    12. Notes that humanitarian assistance must be delivered in full respect of humanitarian principles; calls on the Commission to ensure that EU funding is effectively implemented, directly benefiting local communities and delivering real value to them;

    13. Emphasises the severe environmental threats posed by the conflict, particularly to the Virunga National Park, a UNESCO world heritage site; recalls that its unique wildlife has been historically plagued by poaching, deforestation and habitat destruction, exacerbated by local instability; calls for immediate measures to safeguard these natural treasures by all parties on the ground;

    14. Urges the Commission to immediately suspend and review the EU-Rwanda MoU on critical raw materials in a transparent manner, given Rwanda’s role in destabilising the DRC; notes that the MoU, signed in February 2024, is under scrutiny amid allegations that Rwanda is exploiting DRC resources to fuel the conflict; highlights that Pillar 3 of the MoU, which claims to strengthen due diligence and traceability through Rwanda’s engagement with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, mine-level data publication and scientific verification of mineral origins, lacks credibility as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

    15. Urges the Commission to immediately freeze and review financial assistance, development and security cooperation programmes with Rwanda in response to its ongoing destabilisation of the DRC; underlines that, according to Article 101(7) of the Samoa Agreement, funding from the EU could be resumed and modulated based on the conclusions of the Commission’s review;

    16. Expresses its dismay at the Commission’s passivity towards ongoing atrocities in Kivu, which have persisted for years; calls for a thorough investigation into Rwanda’s mineral supply chains to ensure that the EU’s prerogatives in the region – as per the obligations of each party in the agreements signed thus far – are respected;

    17. Demands the establishment of a common security and defence policy training mission for the DRC’s army to enhance its capacity to protect civilians, counter armed groups and stabilise the conflict zone, tailored to its actual operational needs on the ground;

    18. Acknowledges the need to reassess MONUSCO’s effectiveness, given its prolonged presence and limited impact in preventing large-scale atrocities despite its mandate and resources; calls on the UN to evaluate its strategy and peacekeeping capacity;

    19. Welcomes the regional efforts towards reconciliation, such as the Luanda Process, chaired by Angolan President João Lourenço, and the joint SADC-EAC summit in Tanzania; encourages the DRC and Rwanda to engage in political dialogue and promote reconciliation in this context;

    20. Welcomes the recent efforts of the AU, the EAC and the SADC and invites them to play a greater role in stabilisation through African-led initiatives that complement MONUSCO, while respecting the DRC’s wishes and sovereignty;

    21. Renews its endorsement of an African-led peace process to resolve the conflict in the eastern DRC; calls for the return of all parties to the negotiating table; urges all parties to engage constructively in dialogue to achieve a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the war, in line with the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the AU at its 1256th Emergency Ministerial meeting;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UN Security Council, the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parliaments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and the African Union and its institutions.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU launches InvestAI initiative to mobilise €200 billion of investment in artificial intelligence

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Paris, 11 Feb 2025 Today, at the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit in Paris, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has launched InvestAI, an initiative to mobilise €200 billion for investment in AI, including a new European fund of €20 billion for AI gigafactories.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Meetings with National Parliaments – AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on Foreign Policy Issues – 19-02-2025 – Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting – 19 February 2025 © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

    On 19 February, Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will host its first inter-parliamentary committee meeting of the new legislative term. Over 40 members of national parliaments will be present to exchange views with AFET members. There will be two sessions, focusing on transatlantic relations in challenging times and the role of the European Union in an increasingly multipolar world. Rosa Balfour (Carnegie Europe) and Jim Cloos (TEPSA) will be the keynote speakers in the respective sessions.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0107/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0107/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud[1],

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023 and of 27 June 2024,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Commission staff working document of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),

    – having regard to the joint statement of 8 November 2023 by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia on the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 on the EU membership application of Georgia,

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[2], which entered into force on 1 July 2016,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 215(2) thereof, and to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 29 thereof,

    – having regard to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia and to its September 2009 report,

    – having regard to the final conclusions of the international election observation mission relating to the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental right enshrined in the Georgian constitution;

    B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

    C. whereas Russia has illegally occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the August 2008 conflict that followed Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008;

    D. whereas in June 2014, the EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement that entered into force on 1 July 2016;

    E. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia the status of EU candidate country;

    F. whereas in March 2017, the EU visa facilitation agreement with Georgia came into effect, following Georgia’s successful implementation of all the benchmarks set in its visa liberalisation action plan;

    G. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement, specifically affecting diplomats and officials, who may now be required to apply for a visa when travelling to the EU;

    H. whereas on 28 November 2024, in response to the European Parliament’s November 2024 resolution on Georgia, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would suspend accession talks until the end of 2028 and refuse all EU budget support; whereas he also stated that by 2028, Georgia would be ‘more prepared than any other candidate country to open accession talks with Brussels and become a Member State in 2030’;

    I. whereas the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 were the first to take place in Georgia under a fully proportional electoral system and were also the first elections to be held since Georgia was granted the status of EU candidate country in December 2023;

    J. whereas the legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, but several long-standing recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission remain unaddressed, despite numerous reforms;

    K. whereas on 16 November 2024, the Georgian electoral authority announced the official results of the country’s parliamentary elections, confirming that the ruling Georgian Dream party had won 89 seats in the 150-seat parliament after receiving 53.93 % of the vote, while four opposition parties had passed the 5 % threshold and had received a combined 37.44 % share of the vote;

    L. whereas the international election observation mission on the parliamentary elections in Georgia comprised 529 observers from 42 countries, including 380 expert observers deployed by the ODIHR, 60 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 39 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 38 from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and 12 from the European Parliament;

    M. whereas the election campaign in Georgia was competitive and generally allowed contestants to campaign freely, but was marred by the use of highly divisive rhetoric and imagery, as well as isolated incidents of violence, event disruptions, verbal abuse and the destruction of campaign materials, as reported by both ruling and opposition parties;

    N. whereas the administration of the elections was generally orderly, but they took place in a tense environment, with overcrowding in many polling stations and several incidents of physical altercations and intimidation;

    O. whereas President Salome Zourabichvili publicly accused the Georgian Government of electoral fraud and irregularities in the recent parliamentary elections; whereas President Zourabichvili subsequently refused to testify before the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office regarding these allegations;

    P. whereas Mikheil Kavelashvili was sworn in as President of Georgia on 29 December 2024; whereas the outgoing President, Salome Zourabichvili, refused to step down despite the official end of her term of office; whereas opposition parties boycotted the Georgian Parliament in protest;

    Q. whereas Georgia has over 26 000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – 1 for every 142 citizens, which is greater than the EU average;

    R. whereas following the 2020 parliamentary elections, the NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, which received external funding, challenged the official election results and questioned their legitimacy, but later admitted that it had made a significant error in its calculations;

    S. whereas the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law, which was signed into law on 3 June 2024 despite the President’s veto; whereas the law was met with protest from parts of Georgian civil society; whereas the law requires organisations receiving more than 20 % of their funding from overseas to register as ‘agents of foreign influence’;

    T. whereas on 17 September 2024, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, which bans gender transition, prohibits adoption by gay and transgender people, nullifies, on Georgian territory, same-sex marriages performed abroad, and provides a legal basis for the authorities to outlaw Pride events and public displays of the LGBTQI+ rainbow flag and to impose the censorship of films and books;

    U. whereas the Venice Commission stresses that, in accordance with international standards, the state has a positive obligation to ensure gender equality; whereas on 4 April 2024, the Parliament of Georgia repealed the 2020 amendments introducing gender quotas for candidate lists in parliamentary and local elections, and abolished the associated financial incentives for political parties;

    V. whereas the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been operating in Georgia since 1992; whereas Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed that USAID funding was not directed toward genuine humanitarian objectives but was instead being used to ‘stage revolutions, sow disorder and destabilise countries, including Georgia’; whereas US President Donald Trump implemented a 90-day freeze on US foreign assistance to reassess its alignment with national interests;

    1. Recalls that the EU accession process is based on objective criteria; regrets the European Council’s decision to suspend financial assistance to Georgia; underlines the benefits of the visa facilitation agreement and the need to maintain it; emphasises the need for a constructive dialogue between the Government of Georgia and the EU; calls on the Government of Georgia to uphold its commitments to reform and continue implementing the necessary measures for its EU accession process;

    2. Stresses that Georgia’s future must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Georgia’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Georgia’s democratic institutions;

    3. Takes note of the final report of the international election observation mission, which stated that the overall legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, that voters were offered a wide choice of 18 candidate lists, that contestants could generally campaign freely and that the administration of the elections was generally orderly; is alarmed that these elections took place in a polarised environment and on an uneven playing field, and that there were reports of pressure on voters and cases where ballot secrecy was potentially compromised;

    4. Takes note of the results of the parliamentary elections that took place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; calls on all sides to work together constructively and peacefully and observe the rule of law, and to address the long-standing recommendations of the ODIHR and the Venice Commission with regard to elections and the increasing polarisation of Georgian society; calls for the EU to enter into a holistic and purposeful dialogue with the new Government of Georgia; calls on all foreign actors to respect the outcome of the elections;

    5. Rejects, with deep concern, the adoption of the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, and considers it an attack on the LGBTQI+ community and a threat to civil liberties as a whole; rejects, furthermore, the law’s implications for the media, given that it imposes censorship by banning broadcasters from reporting freely on LGBTQI+ issues; reiterates that media freedom and tolerance towards sexual minorities are key features of a functioning democracy;

    6. Notes that the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law entails the risk that NGOs, civil society organisations, opposition media outlets and other organisations that receive funds from other countries will be labelled ‘foreign agents’;

    7. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected in all circumstances; expresses concern over reports of the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force against demonstrators; highlights the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, that ‘[a]ny restrictions to these rights must abide by principles of legality, necessity and proportionality’ and that ‘[t]he use of force during protests should always be exceptional and a measure of last resort when facing an imminent threat’;

    8. Emphasises that foreign assistance for humanitarian and development purposes must be allocated on the basis of need and human dignity, not geopolitical interests; stresses that such aid should remain impartial, transparent and focused on social and economic well-being, rather than serving as a tool for political leverage or interference;

    9. Regrets the Georgian Parliament’s decision to abolish mandatory gender quotas; reiterates the need for balanced gender representation in political participation; regrets the under-representation of women in the electoral process; calls on the Government of Georgia to undertake initiatives in this regard;

    10. Takes note of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements at a press conference at the UN General Assembly in New York and the corresponding willingness of Georgian officials to resolve outstanding issues in a peaceful, diplomatic way; encourages both sides to undertake solid initiatives to this end;

    11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: Royalty Pharma Reports Q4 and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • Portfolio Receipts of $742 million in Q4 2024 and $2,801 million for FY 2024
    • Royalty Receipts growth of 12% in Q4 2024 and 13% for FY 2024
    • Net cash provided by operating activities of $743 million in Q4 2024 and $2,769 million for FY 2024
    • Full year 2025 guidance: Portfolio Receipts expected to be $2,900 to $3,050 million excluding future transactions

    NEW YORK, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Royalty Pharma plc (Nasdaq: RPRX) today reported financial results for the fourth quarter and full year 2024 and introduced full year 2025 guidance for Portfolio Receipts.

    “We had an incredibly successful 2024, delivering double-digit growth in Royalty Receipts, which was significantly above our initial guidance, and deploying $2.8 billion of capital on value-enhancing royalties” said Pablo Legorreta, Royalty Pharma’s founder and Chief Executive Officer. “We are very excited for the opportunities ahead as the fundamentals of our business have never been stronger. Additionally, we have already taken two major steps at the start of 2025 to enhance shareholder value, announcing the acquisition of our external manager, which is expected to result in multiple financial and strategic benefits, and a new $3 billion share repurchase program, which highlights the confidence we have in our business and the attractive value we see in our shares. With a robust transaction pipeline and significant financial flexibility, I am confident that Royalty Pharma is well positioned to deliver attractive, compounding growth over the long term.”

    Strong Royalty Receipts growth; Portfolio Receipts growth impacted by a high base of comparison

    • Royalty Receipts grew 12% to $729 million in the fourth quarter and 13% to $2,771 million for full year 2024, driven by strong performance from Evrysdi, the CF franchise, Trelegy, Tremfya and new royalty acquisitions.
    • Portfolio Receipts increased 1% to $742 million in the fourth quarter of 2024; Portfolio Receipts decreased 8% from $3,049 million to $2,801 million for full year 2024, largely reflecting $525 million in Biohaven-related milestone payments received in 2023.

    Capital Deployment of $2.8 billion in 2024 with royalties on eight new therapies added to the portfolio

    • Record year for synthetic royalty transactions for Royalty Pharma with $925 million announced in 2024.
    • Significantly expanded development-stage portfolio by acquiring royalties on four potential new therapies.

    Exciting new product launches expected across the royalty portfolio in 2025

    • Royalty Pharma to benefit in 2025 from new product launches, including Servier’s Voranigo, Bristol Myers Squibb’s Cobenfy, Ascendis’ Yorvipath, Syndax and Incyte’s Niktimvo and Geron’s Rytelo.

    Financial guidance for full year 2025 (excludes contribution from future transactions)

    • Royalty Pharma expects 2025 Portfolio Receipts to be between $2,900 million and $3,050 million, representing expected growth of 4% to 9%.

    Financial & Liquidity Summary

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
      (unaudited)
    ($ and shares in millions) 2024 2023 Change 2024 2023 Change
    Portfolio Receipts 742 736 1% 2,801 3,049 (8)%
    Net cash provided by operating activities 743 773 (4)% 2,769 2,988 (7)%
    Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)* 669 682 (2)% 2,565 2,806 (9)%
    Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP)* 678 687 (1)% 2,452 2,708 (9)%
    Weighted average Class A ordinary shares outstanding – diluted 589 598 (1)% 594 603 (1)%

    *See “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section. Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are non-GAAP liquidity measures calculated in accordance with the credit agreement.

    Portfolio Receipts Highlights

          Three Months Ended December 31,
          (unaudited)
    ($ in millions)     2024 2023 Change
    Products: Marketers: Therapeutic Area:      
    Cystic fibrosis franchise Vertex Rare disease 237 207 14%
    Trelegy GSK Respiratory 74 60 23%
    Tysabri Biogen Neuroscience 61 68 (11)%
    Evrysdi Roche Rare disease 56 20 182%
    Xtandi Pfizer, Astellas Cancer 46 38 20%
    Imbruvica AbbVie, J&J Cancer 46 50 (10)%
    Promacta Novartis Hematology 44 44 (1)%
    Tremfya Johnson & Johnson Immunology 39 35 11%
    Cabometyx/Cometriq Exelixis, Ipsen, Takeda Cancer 20 18 11%
    Spinraza Biogen Rare disease 15 17 (13)%
    Orladeyo BioCryst Rare disease 11 8 36%
    Trodelvy Gilead Cancer 11 10 10%
    Erleada Johnson & Johnson Cancer 11 9 25%
    Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret Pfizer Neuroscience 7 5 49%
    Other products(5) 54 63 (14)%
    Royalty Receipts 729 651 12%
    Milestones and other contractual receipts 13 84 (85)%
    Portfolio Receipts 742 736 1%

    Results for full year 2024 and 2023 are shown in Table 5. Amounts shown in the table may not add due to rounding.

    Royalty Receipts was $729 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 12% as compared to $651 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase was primarily driven by strong growth from Evrysdi, the cystic fibrosis franchise, Trelegy, Xtandi and Tremfya. Royalty receipts from Evrysdi included the benefit of the additional royalties acquired in October 2023 and June 2024.

    Portfolio Receipts was $742 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 1% as compared to $736 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase was primarily driven by the same Royalty Receipts increases noted above, offset by a decrease in milestones and other contractual receipts, which reflected a $50 million payment related to the oral formulation of zavegepant in the prior period.

    Liquidity and Capital Resources

    Royalty Pharma’s liquidity and capital resources are summarized below:

    As of December 31, 2024, Royalty Pharma had cash and cash equivalents of $929 million and total debt with principal value of $7.8 billion.

    During the fourth quarter of 2024, Royalty Pharma repurchased approximately two million Class A ordinary shares for $50 million. For full year 2024, Royalty Pharma repurchased approximately eight million Class A ordinary shares for $230 million. The weighted-average number of diluted Class A ordinary shares outstanding for the fourth quarter of 2024 was 589 million as compared to 598 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. The weighted-average number of diluted Class A ordinary shares outstanding for full year 2024 was 594 million as compared to 603 million for full year 2023.

    In January 2025, Royalty Pharma’s Board of Directors authorized a new share repurchase program under which Royalty Pharma may repurchase up to $3.0 billion of its Class A ordinary shares. Royalty Pharma intends to repurchase $2.0 billion of its shares in 2025, subject to market conditions. The total value of shares repurchased will depend on the discount to the intrinsic value at which its Class A ordinary shares are trading. This new share repurchase program replaces the unused $465 million of the company’s original $1.0 billion share repurchase program that was announced in March 2023.

    Liquidity Summary

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
      (unaudited)
    ($ in millions) 2024   2023   2024   2023  
    Portfolio Receipts 742   736   2,801   3,049  
    Payments for operating and professional costs (72)   (54)   (236)   (243)  
    Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) 669   682   2,565   2,806  
    Interest received/(paid), net 8   5   (113)   (98)  
    Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP) 678   687   2,452   2,708  

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

    • Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) was $669 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Adjusted EBITDA is calculated as Portfolio Receipts minus payments for operating and professional costs.
    • Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP) was $678 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Portfolio Cash Flow is calculated as Adjusted EBITDA minus interest paid or received, net. This measure reflects the cash generated by Royalty Pharma’s business that can be redeployed into value-enhancing royalty acquisitions, used to repay debt, returned to shareholders through dividends or share purchases, or utilized for other discretionary investments.

    Refer to Table 4 for Royalty Pharma’s reconciliation of each non-GAAP measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, net cash provided by operating activities.

    Capital Deployment was $522 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, consisting primarily of the acquisitions of royalties on Niktimvo and Rytelo. Capital Deployment reflects cash payments during the period for new and previously announced transactions. Capital Deployment was $2.8 billion for full year 2024.

    The table below details Capital Deployment by category:

    Capital Deployment

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
      (unaudited)
    ($ in millions) 2024   2023   2024   2023  
    Acquisitions of financial royalty assets (496)   (1,002)   (2,506)   (2,116)  
    Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone —   —   —   (50)  
    Development-stage funding payments – ongoing (1)   (1)   (2)   (2)  
    Purchases of available for sale debt securities —   —   (150)   —  
    Milestone payments (25)   —   (75)   (12)  
    Investments in equity method investees —   (2)   (11)   (13)  
    Acquisitions of other financial assets —   —   (18)   —  
    Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D 0   0   1   1  
    Capital Deployment (522)   (1,005)   (2,761)   (2,192)  

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

    In January 2025, Royalty Pharma announced the sale of the MorphoSys Development Funding Bonds for $511 million in upfront cash (press release). This payment, combined with payments previously received, results in total cash proceeds of $530 million on the $300 million investment that was made in September 2022. The proceeds strengthen Royalty Pharma’s balance sheet and provide added flexibility to pursue its disciplined capital allocation strategy.

    Royalty Transactions

    For full year 2024, Royalty Pharma announced new transactions of up to approximately $2.8 billion. The announced transactions amount reflects the entire amount of capital committed for new transactions during the year, including potential future milestones.

    Recent transactions include:

    • In November 2024, Royalty Pharma acquired a synthetic royalty on Rytelo from Geron Corporation for an upfront payment of $125 million (press release). Rytelo is approved for the treatment of certain adult patients with low- to intermediate-1 risk myelodysplastic syndromes with transfusion-dependent anemia. Following the acquisition, Royalty Pharma is entitled to receive tiered royalties on U.S. net sales on Rytelo.
    • In November 2024, Royalty Pharma acquired a synthetic royalty on Niktimvo from Syndax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for an upfront payment of $350 million (press release). Niktimvo is approved for the treatment of chronic graft-versus-host disease and will be co-commercialized by Incyte. Following the acquisition, Royalty Pharma is entitled to receive royalties on U.S. net sales on Niktimvo.

    The information in this section should be read together with Royalty Pharma’s reports and documents filed with the SEC at www.sec.gov and the reader is also encouraged to review all other press releases and information available in the Investors section of Royalty Pharma’s website at www.royaltypharma.com.

    Internalization Transaction

    In January 2025, Royalty Pharma agreed to acquire its external manager, RP Management, LLC (the “Manager”) (press release). This transaction to simplify Royalty Pharma’s corporate structure is expected to result in multiple benefits for shareholders. On a financial basis, the acquisition is expected to reduce costs and enhance economic returns on investments. Specifically, the acquisition will generate cash savings of greater than $100 million in 2026, rising to greater than $175 million in 2030 and driving cumulative savings of greater than $1.6 billion over ten years. The acquisition also increases shareholder alignment, enhances corporate governance, ensures management continuity and simplifies Royalty Pharma’s corporate structure.

    The total transaction value of approximately $1.1 billion(7) consists of approximately 24.5 million shares of Royalty Pharma equity that will vest over five to nine years, approximately $100 million in cash(8), and the assumption of $380 million of the Manager’s existing debt.

    The closing of the internalization transaction is subject to shareholders’ approval of the issuance of the share consideration and other customary closing conditions, including required regulatory approvals. The transaction is estimated to close during the second quarter of 2025.

    Key Developments Relating to the Portfolio

    The key developments related to Royalty Pharma’s royalty interests are discussed below based on disclosures from the marketers of the products.

    TEV-‘749 In January 2025, Teva announced that TEV-‘749 (olanzapine LAI) achieved Phase 3 targeted injections without PDSS (post-injection delirium/sedation syndrome), and the full safety presentation is expected in the second quarter of 2025.
    Cystic fibrosis franchise In December 2024, Vertex announced the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the new triple-combination modulator Alyftrek (vanzacaftor triple) for the treatment of cystic fibrosis in people ages 6 and older with at least one responsive mutation.

    In November 2024, Vertex announced that it had completed regulatory submissions for the vanzacaftor triple in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland, and reviews are underway.
    Skytrofa In December 2024, Ascendis announced the U.S. FDA accepted for review its supplemental Biologics License Application (sBLA) in adult growth hormone deficiency for Skytrofa. The FDA set a Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) goal date of July 27, 2025.
    aficamten In December 2024, Cytokinetics announced that the FDA accepted its New Drug Application (NDA) for aficamten for the treatment of Obstructive Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy. The FDA has assigned the NDA a Prescription Drug User Fee Act date of September 26, 2025. Additionally, the European Medicines Agency validated the Marketing Authorization Application for aficamten, and it will now be reviewed by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP).
    Trodelvy In November 2024, Gilead announced plans to voluntarily withdraw the U.S. accelerated approval of Trodelvy for use in pre-treated adult patients with locally advanced or metastatic urothelial cancer, following the results of the Phase 3 TROPiCS-04 trial.
    Airsupra In October 2024, AstraZeneca announced that positive high-level results from the BATURA Phase 3b trial showed Airsupra met the primary endpoint, demonstrating a statistically significant and clinically meaningful reduction in the risk of a severe exacerbation when used as an as-needed rescue medication in response to symptoms compared to as-needed albuterol. These positive results triggered a milestone payment from AstraZeneca, of which Royalty Pharma received its pro rata portion of $27 million in January 2025.
    MK-8189 In October 2024, Merck updated its public disclosures to remove MK-8189 from its pipeline chart and Royalty Pharma does not anticipate making a further investment in this program.
    pelabresib In October 2024, Novartis announced that based on its review of 48-week data from the Phase 3 MANIFEST-2 study, longer follow-up time is needed to determine the regulatory path for pelabresib in myelofibrosis. Novartis will continue to follow patients in MANIFEST-2 and evaluate the potential for additional studies to support registration.
    trontinemab In October 2024, Roche presented its latest Phase 1b/2a interim results for trontinemab at the Clinical Trials on Alzheimer’s Disease (CTAD) conference, which demonstrated rapid and robust amyloid plaque depletion after 12 to 28 weeks of treatment and an overall favorable safety profile with very limited amyloid related imaging abnormalities (ARIA-E) observed.


    2025 Financial Outlook

    Royalty Pharma has provided guidance for full-year 2025, excluding new transactions and borrowings announced after the date of this release, as follows:

      Provided February 11, 2025
    Portfolio Receipts $2,900 million to $3,050 million
    (Growth of ~+4% to 9% year/year)
    Payments for operating and professional costs Approximately 10% of Portfolio Receipts(1)
    Interest paid $260 million

    The above Portfolio Receipts guidance represents expected growth of 4% to 9% in 2025. Royalty Pharma’s full-year 2025 guidance reflects a negligible estimated foreign exchange impact to Portfolio Receipts, assuming current foreign exchange rates prevail for the rest of 2025.

    2025 guidance for payments for operating and professional costs and interest paid does not reflect the impact of the internalization transaction announced on January 10, 2025 and will be updated following the closing of the internalization transaction, which is expected to be in the second quarter of 2025.

    Total interest paid is based on the semi-annual interest payment schedule of Royalty Pharma’s existing notes and is anticipated to be approximately $260 million in 2025. Interest paid is anticipated to be approximately $138 million in the first quarter of 2025, which includes the first interest payment on the $1.5 billion notes issued in June 2024. Interest paid in the third quarter of 2025 is anticipated to be $119 million. De minimis amounts are anticipated in the second and fourth quarter of 2025. These projections assume no additional debt financing in 2025, including no drawdown on the revolving credit facility. In 2024, Royalty Pharma collected interest of $46 million on its cash and cash equivalents.

    Royalty Pharma today provides this guidance based on its most up-to-date view of its prospects. This guidance assumes no major unforeseen adverse events or changes in foreign exchange rates and excludes the contributions from transactions announced subsequent to the date of this press release.

    Financial Results Call

    Royalty Pharma will host a conference call and simultaneous webcast to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 results today at 8:30 a.m., Eastern Time. Please visit the “Investors” page of the company’s website at https://www.royaltypharma.com/investors/events to obtain conference call information and to view the live webcast. A replay of the conference call and webcast will be archived on the company’s website for at least 30 days.

    About Royalty Pharma plc

    Founded in 1996, Royalty Pharma is the largest buyer of biopharmaceutical royalties and a leading funder of innovation across the biopharmaceutical industry, collaborating with innovators from academic institutions, research hospitals and non-profits through small and mid-cap biotechnology companies to leading global pharmaceutical companies. Royalty Pharma has assembled a portfolio of royalties which entitles it to payments based directly on the top-line sales of many of the industry’s leading therapies. Royalty Pharma funds innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry both directly and indirectly – directly when it partners with companies to co-fund late-stage clinical trials and new product launches in exchange for future royalties, and indirectly when it acquires existing royalties from the original innovators. Royalty Pharma’s current portfolio includes royalties on more than 35 commercial products, including Vertex’s Trikafta, GSK’s Trelegy, Roche’s Evrysdi, Johnson & Johnson’s Tremfya, Biogen’s Tysabri and Spinraza, AbbVie and Johnson & Johnson’s Imbruvica, Astellas and Pfizer’s Xtandi, Novartis’ Promacta, Pfizer’s Nurtec ODT and Gilead’s Trodelvy, and 14 development-stage product candidates.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    The information set forth herein does not purport to be complete or to contain all of the information you may desire. Statements contained herein are made as of the date of this document unless stated otherwise, and neither the delivery of this document at any time, nor any sale of securities, shall under any circumstances create an implication that the information contained herein is correct as of any time after such date or that information will be updated or revised to reflect information that subsequently becomes available or changes occurring after the date hereof.

    This document contains statements that constitute “forward-looking statements” as that term is defined in the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including statements that express the company’s opinions, expectations, beliefs, plans, objectives, assumptions or projections regarding future events or future results, in contrast with statements that reflect historical facts. Examples include discussion of Royalty Pharma’s strategies, financing plans, growth opportunities, market growth and plans for capital deployment, plus the benefits of the benefits of the internalization transaction, including expected accretion, enhanced alignment with shareholders, increased investment returns, expectations regarding management continuity, transparency and governance, and the benefits of simplification to its structure. In some cases, you can identify such forward-looking statements by terminology such as “anticipate,” “intend,” “believe,” “estimate,” “plan,” “seek,” “project,” “expect,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could” or “should,” the negative of these terms or similar expressions. Forward-looking statements are based on management’s current beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to the company. However, these forward-looking statements are not a guarantee of Royalty Pharma’s performance, and you should not place undue reliance on such statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to many risks, uncertainties and other variable circumstances, and other factors. Such risks and uncertainties may cause the statements to be inaccurate and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements. Many of these risks are outside of the company’s control and could cause its actual results to differ materially from those it thought would occur. The forward-looking statements included in this document are made only as of the date hereof. The company does not undertake, and specifically declines, any obligation to update any such statements or to publicly announce the results of any revisions to any such statements to reflect future events or developments, except as required by law.

    Certain information contained in this document relates to or is based on studies, publications, surveys and other data obtained from third-party sources and the company’s own internal estimates and research. While the company believes these third-party sources to be reliable as of the date of this document, it has not independently verified, and makes no representation as to the adequacy, fairness, accuracy or completeness of, any information obtained from third-party sources. In addition, all of the market data included in this document involves a number of assumptions and limitations, and there can be no guarantee as to the accuracy or reliability of such assumptions. Finally, while the company believes its own internal research is reliable, such research has not been verified by any independent source.

    For further information, please reference Royalty Pharma’s reports and documents filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) by visiting EDGAR on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

    Portfolio Receipts

    Portfolio Receipts is a key performance metric that represents Royalty Pharma’s ability to generate cash from Royalty Pharma’s portfolio investments, the primary source of capital that is deployed to make new portfolio investments. Portfolio Receipts is defined as the sum of Royalty Receipts and Milestones and other contractual receipts. Royalty Receipts includes variable payments based on sales of products, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma.

    Milestones and other contractual receipts include sales-based or regulatory milestone payments and other fixed contractual receipts, net of contractual payments to legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma. Portfolio Receipts does not include proceeds from equity securities or proceeds from purchases and sales of marketable securities, both of which are not central to Royalty Pharma’s fundamental business strategy.

    Portfolio Receipts is calculated as the sum of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Cash collections from financial royalty assets, Cash collections from intangible royalty assets, Other royalty cash collections, Proceeds from available for sale debt securities and Distributions from equity method investees less Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts, which represent contractual distributions of Royalty Receipts, milestones and other contractual receipts to RPSFT and the Legacy Investors Partnerships. Distributions to RPSFT substantially ended in December 2023 when Royalty Pharma acquired the remaining interest in RPCT held by RPSFT.

    Use of Non-GAAP Measures

    Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are non-GAAP liquidity measures that exclude the impact of certain items and therefore have not been calculated in accordance with GAAP.

    Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are important non-GAAP measures used to analyze liquidity because they are key components of certain material covenants contained within Royalty Pharma’s credit agreement. Royalty Pharma cautions readers that amounts presented in accordance with the definitions of Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow may not be the same as similar measures used by other companies or analysts. These non-GAAP liquidity measures have limitations as analytical tools, and you should not consider them in isolation or as a substitute for the analysis of Royalty Pharma’s results as reported under GAAP.

    The definitions of Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow used by Royalty Pharma are the same as the definitions in the credit agreement. Noncompliance with the interest coverage ratio, leverage ratio and Portfolio Cash Flow ratio covenants under the credit agreement could result in lenders requiring the company to immediately repay all amounts borrowed. If Royalty Pharma cannot satisfy these covenants, it would be prohibited under the credit agreement from engaging in certain activities, such as incurring additional indebtedness, paying dividends, making certain payments, and acquiring and disposing of assets. Consequently, Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are critical to the assessment of Royalty Pharma’s liquidity.

    Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are used by management as key liquidity measures in the evaluation of the company’s ability to generate cash from operations. Management uses Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow when considering available cash, including for decision-making purposes related to funding of acquisitions, debt repayments, dividends and other discretionary investments. Further, these non-GAAP liquidity measures help management, the audit committee and investors evaluate the company’s ability to generate liquidity from operating activities.

    The company has provided reconciliations of these non-GAAP liquidity measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, being net cash provided by operating activities in Table 4.

    Royalty Pharma Investor Relations and Communications

    +1 (212) 883-6772
    ir@royaltypharma.com

     
    Royalty Pharma plc
    Condensed Consolidated Operations (unaudited)
    Table 1
     
      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
    ($ in millions) 2024   2023   2024   2023  
    Income and other revenues        
    Income from financial royalty assets 562   523   2,149   2,198  
    Other royalty income and revenues 32   73   114   157  
    Total income and other revenues 594   596   2,264   2,355  
    Operating expense/(income)        
    Provision for changes in expected cash flows from financial royalty assets 164   (77)   732   561  
    Research and development funding expense 1   1   2   52  
    General and administrative expenses 68   59   237   250  
    Total operating expense/(income), net 232   (17)   971   862  
    Operating income 362   613   1,292   1,492  
    Other (income)/expense        
    Equity in earnings of equity method investees (32)   (0)   (30)   (29)  
    Interest expense 66   47   226   187  
    Other income, net (7)   (152)   (234)   (366)  
    Total other expense/(income), net 27   (105)   (38)   (208)  
    Consolidated net income before tax 334   718   1,331   1,700  
    Income tax expense —   —   —   —  
    Consolidated net income 334   718   1,331   1,700  
    Net income attributable to non-controlling interests 126   223   472   565  
    Net income attributable to Royalty Pharma plc 208   494   859   1,135  

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

     
    Royalty Pharma plc
    Selected Balance Sheet Data (unaudited)
    Table 2
     
    ($ in millions) As of December 31, 2024 As of December 31, 2023
    Cash and cash equivalents 929 477
    Total current and non-current financial royalty assets, net 15,911 14,827
    Total assets 18,223 16,382
    Current portion of long-term debt 998 —
    Long-term debt, net of current portion 6,615 6,135
    Total liabilities 7,880 6,298
    Total shareholders’ equity 10,342 10,084
     
    Royalty Pharma plc
    Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (unaudited)
    Table 3
     
      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
    ($ in millions) 2024   2023   2024   2023  
    Cash flows from operating activities:        
    Cash collections from financial royalty assets 777   747   2,983   3,201  
    Cash collections from intangible royalty assets 0   0   15   1  
    Other royalty cash collections 30   75   109   159  
    Distributions from equity method investees —   —   13   19  
    Interest received 9   8   46   72  
    Development-stage funding payments – ongoing (1)   (1)   (2)   (2)  
    Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone —   —   —   (50)  
    Payments for operating and professional costs (72)   (54)   (236)   (243)  
    Interest paid (1)   (3)   (160)   (169)  
    Net cash provided by operating activities 743   773   2,769   2,988  
    Cash flows from investing activities:        
    Distributions from equity method investees 3   5   24   44  
    Investments in equity method investees —   (2)   (11)   (13)  
    Purchases of equity securities —   —   (63)   —  
    Proceeds from equity securities —   —   99   —  
    Purchases of available for sale debt securities —   —   (150)   —  
    Proceeds from available for sale debt securities 13   1   20   1  
    Proceeds from sales and maturities of marketable securities —   —   —   24  
    Acquisitions of financial royalty assets (496)   (1,002)   (2,506)   (2,116)  
    Acquisitions of other financial assets —   —   (18)   —  
    Milestone payments (25)   —   (75)   (12)  
    Other —   (2)   2   (2)  
    Net cash used in investing activities (506)   (1,000)   (2,678)   (2,073)  
    Cash flows from financing activities:        
    Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts (81)   (92)   (362)   (377)  
    Distributions to continuing non-controlling interests (31)   (24)   (125)   (120)  
    Dividends to shareholders (94)   (89)   (376)   (358)  
    Repurchases of Class A ordinary shares (53)   (30)   (230)   (305)  
    Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D 0   0   1   1  
    Contributions from non-controlling interests – other 1   1   4   7  
    Cash acquired in connection with purchase of non-controlling interest —   5   —   5  
    Proceeds from revolving credit facility —   350   —   350  
    Repayment of revolving credit facility —   (350)   —   (350)  
    Repayment of long-term debt —   —   —   (1,000)  
    Proceeds from issuance of long-term debt, net of discount —   —   1,471   —  
    Debt issuance costs and other 0   (2)   (13)   (2)  
    Other 0   —   (9)   —  
    Net cash (used in)/provided by financing activities (258)   (232)   361   (2,149)  
    Net change in cash and cash equivalents (21)   (459)   452   (1,234)  
    Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period 950   936   477   1,711  
    Cash and cash equivalents, end of period 929   477   929   477  

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

     
    Royalty Pharma plc
    GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliation (unaudited)
    Table 4
     
      Three Months Ended
    December 31,    		 Twelve Months Ended
    December 31,
    ($ in millions) 2024   2023   2024   2023  
    Net cash provided by operating activities (GAAP) 743   773   2,769   2,988  
    Adjustments:        
    Proceeds from available for sale debt securities(6) 13   1   20   1  
    Distributions from equity method investees(6) 3   5   24   44  
    Interest (received)/paid, net(6) (8)   (5)   113   98  
    Development-stage funding payments – ongoing 1   1   2   2  
    Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone —   —   —   50  
    Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts(6) (81)   (92)   (362)   (377)  
    Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) 669   682   2,565   2,806  
    Interest received/(paid), net(6) 8   5   (113)   (98)  
    Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP) 678   687   2,452   2,708  

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

     
    Royalty Pharma plc
    Fourth Quarter and Full Year Portfolio Receipts Highlights (unaudited)
    Table 5
     
      Three Months Ended December 31, Twelve Months Ended December 31,
    ($ in millions) 2024 2023 Change 2024 2023 Change
    Products:            
    Cystic fibrosis franchise 237 207 14% 857 771 11%
    Trelegy 74 60 23% 284 203 40%
    Tysabri 61 68 (11)% 262 279 (6)%
    Imbruvica 46 50 (10)% 191 210 (9)%
    Evrysdi 56 20 182% 174 66 163%
    Xtandi 46 38 20% 169 146 15%
    Promacta 44 44 (1)% 158 161 (2)%
    Tremfya 39 35 11% 140 116 20%
    Cabometyx/Cometriq 20 18 11% 73 66 10%
    Spinraza 15 17 (13)% 45 45 1%
    Trodelvy 11 10 10% 43 33 30%
    Erleada 11 9 25% 39 27 42%
    Orladeyo 11 8 36% 39 29 32%
    Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret 7 5 49% 26 18 39%
    Other products(5) 54 63 (14)% 273 277 (1)%
    Royalty Receipts 729 651 12% 2,771 2,449 13%
    Milestones and other contractual receipts 13 84 (85)% 31 599 (95)%
    Portfolio Receipts 742 736 1% 2,801 3,049 (8)%

    Amounts may not add due to rounding.

    Royalty Pharma plc
    Description of Approved Indications for Select Portfolio Therapies
    Table 6

    Cystic fibrosis franchise Cystic fibrosis
    Trelegy Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma
    Tysabri Relapsing forms of multiple sclerosis
    Evrysdi Spinal muscular atrophy
    Xtandi Prostate cancer
    Imbruvica Hematological malignancies and chronic graft versus host disease
    Promacta Chronic immune thrombocytopenia purpura and aplastic anemia
    Tremfya Plaque psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis and ulcerative colitis
    Cabometyx / Cometriq Kidney, liver and thyroid cancer
    Spinraza Spinal muscular atrophy
    Orladeyo Hereditary angioedema
    Trodelvy Breast and bladder cancer
    Erleada Prostate cancer
    Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret Acute and preventative treatment of migraine


    Notes

    (1)  Portfolio Receipts is a key performance metric that represents Royalty Pharma’s ability to generate cash from Royalty Pharma’s portfolio investments, the primary source of capital that Royalty Pharma can deploy to make new portfolio investments. Portfolio Receipts is defined as the sum of Royalty Receipts and Milestones and other contractual receipts. Royalty Receipts include variable payments based on sales of products, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma (“Royalty Receipts”). Milestones and other contractual receipts include sales-based or regulatory milestone payments and other fixed contractual receipts, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma. Portfolio Receipts does not include proceeds from equity securities or proceeds from purchases and sales of marketable securities, both of which are not central to Royalty Pharma’s fundamental business strategy.

    Portfolio Receipts is calculated as the sum of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Cash collections from financial royalty assets, Cash collections from intangible royalty assets, Other royalty cash collections, Proceeds from available for sale debt securities and Distributions from equity method investees less Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts, which represent contractual distributions of Royalty Receipts and milestones and other contractual receipts to RPSFT and the Legacy Investors Partnerships. Distributions to RPSFT substantially ended in December 2023 when Royalty Pharma acquired the remaining interest in RPCT held by RPSFT.

    (2) Adjusted EBITDA is defined under the credit agreement as Portfolio Receipts minus payments for operating and professional costs. Operating and professional costs reflect Payments for operating and professional costs from the GAAP statements of cash flows. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliation in Table 4.

    (3) Portfolio Cash Flow is defined under the credit agreement as Adjusted EBITDA minus interest paid or received, net. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliation in Table 4. Portfolio Cash Flow reflects the cash generated by Royalty Pharma’s business that can be redeployed into value-enhancing royalty acquisitions, used to repay debt, returned to shareholders through dividends or share purchases or utilized for other discretionary investments.

    (4) Capital Deployment is calculated as the summation of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Investments in equity method investees, Purchases of available for sale debt securities, Acquisitions of financial royalty assets, Acquisitions of other financial assets, Milestone payments, Development-stage funding payments – ongoing, Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone less Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D.

    (5) Other products primarily include Royalty Receipts on the following products: Cimzia, Crysvita, Emgality, Entyvio, Farxiga/Onglyza, IDHIFA, Lexiscan, Nesina, Prevymis, Soliqua and distributions from the Legacy SLP Interest, which is presented as Distributions from equity method investees on the GAAP statements of cash flows.

    (6) The table below shows the line item for each adjustment and the direct location for such line item on the GAAP statements of cash flows.

    Reconciling Adjustment Statements of Cash Flows Classification
    Interest received/paid, net Operating activities (Interest paid less Interest received)
    Distributions from equity method investees Investing activities
    Proceeds from available for sale debt securities Investing activities
    Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts Financing activities

    (7) The total transaction value of approximately $1.1 billion is based on the closing price of Royalty Pharma plc common stock of $26.20 on January 8, 2025.

    (8) Consists of $200 million in cash less the amount of the management fees paid to the Manager from January 1, 2025 through the closing of the transaction.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0133/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Adam Bielan, Carlo Fidanza, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Cristian Terheş, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0133/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the security situation, including the human rights situation, is deteriorating even further in the DRC, especially in the eastern parts of the country and specifically in the provinces of North and South Kivu; whereas North and South Kivu have endured long-lasting conflicts for over two decades; whereas severe human rights violations have been committed in the region;

    B. whereas the Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebel group M23 launched a military operation on 18 January 2025 to expand its territory in North and South Kivu; whereas this attack violates a ceasefire agreement concluded between Rwanda and the DRC as part of the Luanda Peace Process; whereas on 21 January 2025, M23 claimed to have captured several towns, including the strategically important trading town Minova;

    C. whereas on 24 January 2025, intense fighting occurred near Sake, where the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), supported by the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), UN forces (MONUSCO) and a coalition of militia groups, attempted to prevent M23 from advancing towards and capturing Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu; whereas FARDC Major General Peter Cirimwami, who was also the military governor of North Kivu, was fatally shot on the same day; whereas several South African and Malawian soldiers have reportedly been killed in the recent conflict while serving with SAMIDRC; whereas numerous UN peacekeepers have been killed in the DRC and many more have been injured;

    D. whereas on 30 January 2025, Goma fell under M23 control after several days of fighting in the city; whereas M23 has vowed to ‘march all the way to Kinshasa’; whereas M23 is advancing towards Bukavu in South Kivu; whereas on 3 February 2025, M23 declared a ceasefire for ‘humanitarian reasons’; whereas Goma Airport remains closed, leaving no entry point for humanitarian aid; whereas Goma is experiencing a total blackout, with no access to running water, electricity or the internet; whereas M23 is illegally occupying Goma; whereas M23 is deliberately destroying vital infrastructure;

    E. whereas M23’s occupation of Goma will have severe humanitarian consequences for civilians; whereas the Congolese authorities have reported a high risk of a cholera outbreak; whereas bombs and artillery are being used in densely populated areas; whereas statements by Congolese officials indicate that the streets of Goma are filled with rotting bodies; whereas doctors in Goma are overwhelmed and unable to provide adequate care; whereas M23 has already carried out multiple summary executions, used forced labour and forcibly recruited civilians to join it and commit atrocities on its behalf; whereas both M23 and the FARDC have used rape as a weapon of war; whereas the UN reports that more than 100 female prisoners were raped and burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma; whereas this conflict has significantly increased gender-based violence; whereas M23 is deliberately targeting refugee camps full of displaced civilians, including women and children, which constitutes a war crime; whereas the exact number of displaced people in North Kivu is unconfirmed, but is estimated to be at least 2.4 million;

    F. whereas it is widely known that M23 is backed by Rwanda and its forces; whereas this conflict has its roots in the Rwandan civil war; whereas medical staff can only access Goma through Rwanda; whereas Rwanda has never sent medical experts to Goma; whereas Rwanda is benefiting from this conflict, particularly economically;

    G. whereas the DRC is rich in various minerals and other natural resources; whereas M23 is illegally mining these resources and exporting them to Rwanda; whereas M23 is exploiting forced and child labour in the process; whereas this conflict can also be viewed as an economic war driven by these resources; whereas, in the current geopolitical climate, a number of actors are seeking access to resources in other countries; whereas the potential escalation of the conflict in the DRC could pose a serious threat to the entire African continent, given the current geopolitical situation in the region;

    H. whereas in February 2024, the EU and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains; whereas critics say that the deal facilitates the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC, further fuels the conflict and helps to finance armed groups in the eastern DRC;

    1. Expresses deep concern about the escalation of violence and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the DRC, caused by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group; strongly condemns the brutal atrocities committed by M23 in the DRC and Rwanda’s support for the group; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23; demands that M23 withdraw from the territories it has unlawfully gained and return them to the DRC; reminds all parties that territorial integrity must be upheld; demands that M23 immediately stop illegally mining Congolese minerals and resources and sending them to Rwanda; demands the disarmament and dismantling of M23; urges all state parties involved to ensure that any political settlement does not include pardons for individuals who are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

    2. Deplores the fact that millions of civilians have been affected by this conflict, leaving them displaced and in need of humanitarian aid; expresses deep concern over the number of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC;

    3. Demands that the safety of civilians be ensured; demands that medical staff be granted full access to Goma; emphasises the need for a thorough investigation into the crimes committed by M23 and its supporters;

    4. Underlines its support for the DRC in its legitimate fight against M23 and other armed groups, and calls on the international community to increase pressure on Rwanda and M23;

    5. Insists that all EU-funded humanitarian aid must be directed towards helping the most vulnerable people in the eastern DRC, such as women and children, who have suffered the most; stresses that North and South Kivu should be given higher priority for the allocation of EU-funded development aid;

    6. Urges the EU and its Member States to adopt sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against all the Rwandan officials and authorities responsible for supporting M23; calls for the sanctions against M23 commanders to be maintained and extended further to include those newly found responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

    7. Calls for the EU, its Member States and other democratic Western countries to increase their diplomatic visibility and strengthen their economic and strategic influence in the region, which has large quantities of crucial minerals and other vital resources, to ensure that other authoritarian actors cannot further destabilise the area; calls for the EU to guarantee the traceability of minerals imported from Rwanda and to ensure that there is no trade in conflict minerals from the eastern DRC;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the Joint Council of Ministers and Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the governments and parliaments of Rwanda, the DRC and the other countries of the East African Community.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Petar Volgin, Stanislav Stoyanov
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    B10‑0114/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

    (2025/2522(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its resolution of 25 April 2024 on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society[1],

    – having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell with the European Commission of 15 May 2024 on the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

    – having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia[2],

    – having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the international election observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights on the Georgian parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024,

    – having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and the European Commission of 27 October 2024 on the parliamentary elections,

    – having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell of 29 October 2024 on the latest developments following the parliamentary elections,

    – having regard to Georgia’s sovereignty as recognised in international law,

    – having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Georgia is a sovereign state under international law, with full authority to determine its political system, conduct elections and govern itself without interference from foreign actors or international organisations;

    B. whereas the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 were conducted in broad compliance with national and international legal standards and the Georgian people have made a clear and democratic choice regarding the composition of their new government;

    C. whereas the new Georgian Government remains committed to European integration, continuing its aspiration for EU membership while ensuring respect for national sovereignty and democratic processes;

    D. whereas according to Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), a Sweden-based political science research institute, Georgia is among the top performers across Europe and worldwide in the field of freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom from governmental attacks on judicial justice, and equal protection across societal groups; notes that Georgia has attained a historic high ranking in the Index of Public Integrity of the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building;

    E. whereas the Georgian Parliament has signalled its willingness to engage in dialogue with the EU on legislative matters and to negotiate solutions to contested legal provisions in a constructive manner;

    F. whereas Georgia is of significant strategic value to the EU, particularly in areas such as energy cooperation, logistics, security and economic development, which should be recognised and supported rather than undermined by political disputes;

    G. whereas the EU’s continued interference in Georgia’s internal affairs – including its refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian elections and its continued support for opposition movements – risks damaging trust and weakening the EU’s credibility in the region;

    H. whereas the principle of non-intervention in sovereign states’ affairs is enshrined in Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the EU’s failure to respect Georgia’s democratic choices constitutes a breach of international law;

    I. whereas the Georgian Government has expressed its readiness to engage in constructive negotiations with the EU, yet certain EU institutions have refused to acknowledge this openness, preferring instead to impose unilateral demands on the country;

    J. whereas the EU’s insistence on disregarding regional and cultural considerations – such as the Georgian Parliament’s decision on laws related to foreign influence and public morality – ignores the will of the majority of Georgian citizens and undermines political pluralism;

    K. whereas continued EU pressure on Georgia, including threats of sanctions and the potential suspension of financial aid, constitutes an unjustified punitive approach that alienates a key strategic partner in the region;

    1. Deplores the EU’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections in Georgia and its ongoing interference in Georgia’s domestic political affairs;

    2. Reaffirms that the choice of political leadership and governance in Georgia is solely a matter for the Georgian people, and should be made free from external coercion or pressure;

    3. Calls for the EU institutions to respect the Georgian Parliament’s willingness to engage in open dialogue, rather than imposing unilateral demands that disregard Georgia’s political realities;

    4. Urges the EU to engage in constructive dialogue with the new Georgian Government and to recognise that continued political pressure will only serve to push Georgia away from European cooperation rather than fostering integration;

    5. Calls for the EU to take a pragmatic and strategic approach towards Georgia, emphasising mutual benefits in key sectors such as energy security, trade and regional stability rather than focusing on ideological disagreements;

    6. Warns that the EU’s policy of intervention and political pressure in Georgia risks weakening the EU’s standing in the wider Caucasus region, harming its ability to build sustainable partnerships based on mutual respect;

    7. Warns that the EU’s constant interference in Georgia’s internal affairs could fuel strong anti-EU sentiment within Georgian society;

    8. Demands that the EU stop supporting opposition movements that do not represent the will of the majority of Georgian citizens, and instead focus on fostering institutional dialogue with the legitimately elected government;

    9. Reiterates that sovereignty and democracy cannot be applied selectively, and that international law requires all states and organisations – including the EU – to respect the principles of self-determination and non-intervention;

    10. Calls for the EU to adopt a forward-looking policy towards Georgia, recognising the country’s strategic importance and its legitimate democratic processes rather than pursuing a confrontational approach;

    11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government, and Parliament of Georgia.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – EP Conference of Presidents’ statement on EU support for Ukraine

    Source: European Parliament

    Statement of the Conference of Presidents on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression.

    Three years have passed since the Russian Federation launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, violating international law, the United Nations Charter, and undermining European and global security. The European Parliament Conference of Presidents again strongly condemns Russia’s ongoing war of aggression with deliberate targeting of civilian and critical infrastructure, and the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population, all serious violations of international law and international humanitarian law.

    We reaffirm our steadfast solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience and courage in defending their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

    The European Union must remain united in its commitment to support Ukraine that includes political, military, economic, humanitarian and financial assistance. We commend the efforts of Member States, institutions, civil society organisations, companies and citizens who have mobilised resources and provided refuge to millions of displaced Ukrainians. At the same time, we call on the EU and its Member States to increase and speed up the delivery of its support, in particular of its military support and establish a legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian-owned assets frozen by the EU.

    We continue to call for accountability for all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during this war of aggression. We welcome the recent steps made towards the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

    We call for continued and enhanced military support to Ukraine, including the provision of defence equipment, training, and strategic assistance necessary to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

    We reaffirm the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery, and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure.

    We call for the full implementation and a significant expansion of sanctions, including effective measures to prevent circumvention, against Russia and its accomplices, aimed at definitively undermining its capacity to wage war and holding accountable those responsible for aggression and human rights violations.

    We express full support for Ukraine’s European integration aspirations. The European Parliament remains committed to advancing Ukraine’s path towards EU membership, recognising its significant progress in reforms under the most challenging circumstances.

    In a challenging international and geopolitical environment, we stress the importance of maintaining transatlantic and global solidarity with Ukraine and countering Russian disinformation. We also highlight the need to ensure the international community’s continued focus on the consequences of this war and on supporting Ukraine in achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace based on the Ukrainian peace formula

    As we mark three years of this brutal aggression, the European Parliament Conference of Presidents honours the resilience of the Ukrainian people and pays tribute to all those who have sacrificed their lives for freedom and democracy. We stand firm with Ukraine, reaffirming that peace, security, and justice will prevail.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0109/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0109/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

    (2025/2553(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

    – having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 25 January 2025 on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

    – having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 2 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the press statement of the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

    – having regard to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 28 January 2025 on the recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

    – having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 18 December 1979,

    – having regard to the Partnership Agreement of 15 November 2023 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas in January 2025, the armed rebel group M23, backed by Rwandan forces, further advanced in the eastern DRC and seized the regional capital city of Goma; whereas violence between rebel groups and the Congolese army increased sharply, causing a high number of civilian casualties; whereas an estimated 3 000 deaths occurred during the offensive on Goma;

    B. whereas M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to begin on 4 February 2025; whereas fighting has continued nonetheless; whereas there are reports that the mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu has been captured by M23; whereas M23 leaders have declared their intention to continue advancing in the DRC;

    C. whereas the latest advances of M23 mark an alarming escalation of the devastating conflict in the eastern DRC and have further destabilised the country; whereas the region has been plagued by decades of cyclical violence, causing a security and humanitarian crisis; whereas a ceasefire brokered in 2024 did not hold;

    D. whereas there are estimated to be around 100 separate armed groups operating in eastern DRC; whereas the largest of the foreign armed groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR);

    E. whereas the seizing of Goma has led to significant displacement of civilians; whereas an estimated 700 000 people have been displaced since early January 2025; whereas thousands of Congolese people had previously fled to the city to escape violence and have been further driven from camps for internally displaced people into makeshift tents or forced to sleep out in the open; whereas the safety of internally displaced people is now seriously threatened, with women and girls suffering disproportionately;

    F. whereas eastern DRC was already the centre of one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world; whereas thousands of people are facing shortages of food, medicine and drinking water; whereas hospitals are overwhelmed and there is limited electricity and running water in Goma; whereas there are rapidly growing levels of malnutrition, particularly among children; whereas access for humanitarian assistance is restricted and Goma airport remains closed;

    G. whereas sanitary conditions, notably in camps for internally displaced people, are extremely concerning; whereas experts are warning of the risks of widespread outbreaks of diseases, including cholera and mpox; whereas in January 2025 the Commission announced an increase of EUR 60 million in EU humanitarian assistance to the DRC;

    H. whereas instances of gender-based and sexual violence, including the use of rape as a weapon of war, are staggeringly high; whereas the UN reported that more than 165 women were raped and that most were later burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma following the M23 advance on the city; whereas the current spike in rape and assault in eastern DRC follows decades of widespread sexual violence perpetuated against generations of Congolese women;

    I. whereas the seizure of Goma triggered violent protests in Kinshasa, with dozens of protesters attacking embassies and calling on the international community to halt the advancement of M23;

    J. whereas the UN mission Monusco has been deployed in the DRC since 2010; whereas President Tshisekedi announced a deadline of December 2024 for all Monusco peacekeeping troops to leave the DRC; whereas this withdrawal was put on hold and the mandate of the mission extended to December 2025;

    K. whereas the conflict in the DRC is at risk of regional spillover; whereas a peacekeeping deployment from the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF) withdrew in 2023; whereas the Southern African Development Community deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in December 2023 with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi; whereas at least 20 peacekeepers were killed during the M23 advance on Goma; whereas on 6 February 2025, Malawi announced the withdrawal of its troops from this mission;

    L. whereas it is widely acknowledged that Rwanda is active in the conflict in eastern DRC, including through its de-facto control of M23, to which it supplies weapons, logistical support and troops; whereas UN experts estimate there are between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan troops operating with M23;

    M. whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transition; whereas Goma is a major transport and trading hub for the export of minerals; whereas the UN estimates that around 120 tonnes of coltan is being moved by M23 to Rwanda each month; whereas UN experts further estimate that M23 is financed by around EUR 288 000 per month generated through its control of the mineral trade in the DRC;

    N. whereas the EU has formed raw materials partnerships with several countries, including the DRC and Rwanda; whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains with Rwanda on 19 February 2024 to promote sustainable and responsible production of critical minerals; whereas the MoU is underpinned with a roadmap for joint action; whereas the Rwanda-EU roadmap has not yet been developed, and roadmaps are not made public; whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the development and implementation of the MoU is lacking;

    O. whereas the MoU commits Rwanda to aligning with international standards by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; whereas Rwanda has not done so to date; whereas under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, the Commission is currently assessing applications for strategic projects with partner countries to increase EU capacity and supply;

    1. Expresses deep concern at the alarming escalation of violence and the seizure of Goma; deplores the loss of life and the sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls; expresses its sympathy with the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

    2. Underlines the urgent need for the stabilisation of the country and the implementation of an immediate ceasefire; calls on M23 to halt its territorial advances, notably to refrain from any further advancement into South Kivu and to withdraw from the territory of the DRC, and for all parties to observe a cessation of violence;

    3. Calls on all state actors, including the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, to cease any cooperation with armed groups, including M23 and FDLR;

    4. Is extremely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation in the country; calls for the creation of a humanitarian corridor and for all parties, including armed groups operating in eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate humanitarian access; emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account;

    5. Welcomes the increased humanitarian support pledged by the EU, but notes that this still falls far short of satisfying the basic needs for food, water, medical assistance and shelter in eastern DRC, especially in the light of the recent termination of support from the United States Agency for International Development; calls on the Commission and the international community to significantly step up financial support for urgent and life-saving assistance;

    6. Urges the Government of the DRC to work with the international community to address the displacement crisis and provide shelter, sanitation and support for internally displaced people, including increased protection for the safety of all displaced people, notably women and girls;

    7. Deplores the endemic sexual and gender-based violence committed against women and girls in the region; underlines that abuse of women and girls escalates into conflict, and that sexual violence is used as a weapon of war; reiterates that sexual violence is a war crime, and those responsible must be held accountable; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States and the Government of the DRC to take immediate action to prevent sexual violence and improve care for survivors, including by adapting the national legal framework to guarantee access to medical abortion care;

    8. Draws attention to the health needs of pregnant women, notably those who are displaced and out of reach of medical support; calls on the EEAS and Member States to further prioritise the disbursement of humanitarian support for women and girls in the region;

    9. Calls on M23 to allow the immediate reopening of Goma International Airport; underlines that this is essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of injured people;

    10. Recognises the contribution made by peacekeeping forces from Monusco and the Southern African Development Community mission, as well as the past contribution by the EACRF; offers its condolences for the peacekeepers who have lost their lives; reiterates its support for the continuation of Monusco’s mandate;

    11. Underlines that a lasting peace must be found through a return to political processes and cooperation; calls on the Government of the DRC and all armed groups to commit to the Nairobi Process for resumed national dialogue;

    12. Regrets that there has long been a lack of accountability for human rights violations in eastern DRC; urges the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate for the investigation of human rights abuses in the region; considers that this should contribute to efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account;

    13. Calls on the President and Government of Rwanda to respond to calls from the international community to withdraw their support for M23 and prevent any further destabilisation in the DRC; urges Rwanda to ensure that the advance of M23 is halted and that all M23 and Rwandan troops are withdrawn from eastern DRC; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the Member States to raise these urgent concerns with Rwanda at the highest levels;

    14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the MoU on sustainable raw materials and value chains; further calls on the Commission to undertake an immediate assessment of the feasibility of implementing the MoU in the light of the widespread evidence of illegal mineral smuggling and financing of M23; calls for the conclusions of such an assessment to be presented to Parliament as soon as possible; notes that parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement in the signing and implementation of raw material MoUs and roadmaps is essential for an inclusive process with adequate scrutiny, and must become part of the MoU;

    15. Stresses that effective implementation of the MoU with Rwanda can only be made in good faith if both parties commit to increasing due diligence and traceability, and tackling illegal trafficking; stresses that this is currently not the case; urges Rwanda to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as an essential first step towards implementing the commitments outlined in the MoU;

    16. Calls on the Commission to suspend any proposals for strategic projects with Rwanda that are currently under consideration in the framework of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway initiative; notes that strategic projects must be implemented sustainably and in compliance with human rights and due diligence standards, something which cannot be guaranteed currently;

    17. Stresses the importance of a return to regional dialogue to deescalate the conflict; urges the authorities of the DRC and Rwanda to resume the Luanda peace process;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, the President, Government and Parliament of Rwanda, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – European Parliamentary Week 2025 – 17-18.02.25 – Committee on Budgets

    Source: European Parliament

    On the occasion of the European Parliamentary Week 2025, organised by the European Parliament and the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, the Committee on Budgets will hold an Inter-Committee Meeting on Monday 17 February at 16.20-19.20.

    The first session will focus on EU competitiveness and a debate on how to increase the synergies between the EU and national financial support. Piotr Serafin, Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration will give a keynote speech.

    The second session will focus on European public goods in particular how to identify and finance them. On this matter, the audience will have the opportunity to hear from Professor Armin Steinbach, Jean Monnet Professor of Law and Economics at HEC Paris, non-resident fellow at Bruegel and Research Affiliate at the Max Planck Institute for Research and Collective Goods.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB and Banco Santander join forces to boost Europe’s wind energy manufacturers

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The EIB provides a €500 million counter-guarantee enabling Santander to create a portfolio of bank guarantees of up to €1 billion, expected to unlock €8 billion of investment to support wind energy manufacturers in Europe.
    • The agreement is part of the EIB’s €5 billion wind power package to boost Europe’s wind power manufacturing sector and accelerate the energy transition.
    • The operation is backed by InvestEU, the EU programme aiming to mobilise investment of more than €372 billion by 2027.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) and Santander have signed a €500 million counter-guarantee agreement that Santander will use to create a portfolio of bank guarantees of up to €1 billion, expected to unlock €8 billion of investment to support wind energy equipment manufacturing companies in Europe.

    The guarantees will back investment by companies manufacturing wind energy and grid interconnection equipment, as well as key components for the wind sector. This will enable the manufacturers to receive advance payments as well as to provide performance guarantees when taking on new wind projects. The guarantees scheme also enables manufacturers to pay their suppliers in advance for the supply of wind farms and the related wind value chain components, which include turbines, grid connection infrastructure, cables and transformer stations.  

    The leverage effect of the EIB counter-guarantee is expected to mobilise additional funding from other investors to support increasing production and accelerate wind energy development, helping to stimulate investment in the real economy.

    The deal forms part of the EIB’s €5 billion wind power package launched in 2023, a dedicated package of counter-guarantees to improve access to finance for wind power sector and support increasing newly installed wind energy generation capacity by 32GW. This EIB financing scheme is being activated through agreements with the sector’s main lenders like Santander. It is a key component of the  European Wind Power Package launched by the European Commission, and is designed to further accelerate a just and swift transition to net zero, while boosting home-grown industrial innovation.

    “Wind energy will play a significant role in achieving the EU’s renewable-energy target. To unveil its full potential, the EIB together with Santander is putting in place de-risking instruments that will allow manufacturers to overcome some of the challenges impacting the sector such as supply chain disruptions, high costs or intense international competition,” said EIB Director of Financial Institutions Gemma Feliciani. “This new framework sponsored by the EIB wind package will accelerate the energy transition in Europe while strengthening its industrial competitiveness and strategic autonomy.”

    Ricardo Gamazo, Santander Global Trade Finance team added: “The program has been very welcome by our clients in the wind equipment industry which face a large backlog of orders to meet the energy transition demand. This in turn creates large guarantee issuance requirements and this extra capacity goes a long way in securing credit lines in the market. We believe this agreement is another decisive step in buttressing energy security for the EU in a sustainable fashion”

    Background information

    About the EIB

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute towards EU policy goals. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

    About Banco Santander

    Banco Santander (SAN SM) is a leading commercial bank, founded in 1857 and headquartered in Spain and one of the largest banks in the world by market capitalization. The group’s activities are consolidated into five global businesses: Retail & Commercial Banking, Digital Consumer Bank, Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB), Wealth Management & Insurance and Payments (PagoNxt and Cards). This operating model allows the bank to better leverage its unique combination of global scale and local leadership. Santander aims to be the best open financial services platform providing services to individuals, SMEs, corporates, financial institutions and governments. The bank’s purpose is to help people and businesses prosper in a simple, personal and fair way. Santander is building a more responsible bank and has made a number of commitments to support this objective, including raising €220 billion in green financing between 2019 and 2030. At the end of 2024, Banco Santander had €1.3 trillion in total funds, 173 million customers, 8,000 branches and 207,000 employees.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland files indictment on charges of insider dealing involving millions of francs

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) has indicted a Swiss citizen in the Federal Criminal Court on charges of insider dealing in transactions worth millions of francs. The indictment alleges that in five cases in the period from 2018 to 2020, the accused exploited confidential and price sensitive information about ongoing or planned takeovers. By doing so, he is believed to have made an unlawful profit of around CHF 10.6 million. He is alleged to have obtained the confidential information from an acquaintance of many years standing who worked for an investment bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: DPG Media signs new loan agreement with EIB

    Source: European Investment Bank

    DPG Media Group has signed a new lending agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Built around financing eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that support EU policy goals, including digitalisation. After a first loan signed in 2022 to support the Group’s digitalisation of media platforms, DPG has now signed a further €120 million in the framework of further digitalisation and innovation of its media.

    DPG Media plans to spend a total of €392 million in this regard over the period 2024-2026, of which 30% will be financed with an EIB loan. This financing will allow DPG Media to accelerate its digital transformation and continue to play a leading role in digital innovation as a local player. As part of the project, DPG Media expects to increase its knowledge and expertise in artificial intelligence and content distribution, in alignment with the objectives of the Digital Europe Programme.

    EIB vice-president Robert de Groot: “Digitalisation and the development of advanced technologies play a key role in Europe’s competitiveness. These technologies must be an intrinsic part of the broad support for European entrepreneurs and companies. DPG’s investments to digitise its offering and services are in line with European ambitions. EIB loans are meant to foster this type of development.”

    Erik Roddenhof, CEO of DPG Media: “We are delighted with this new long-term loan from the European Investment Bank for our investments in our further digital transformation. We deem this necessary to be able to successfully offer independent and strong media as a local media player in a rapidly changing market that is increasingly dominated by global players. With this loan, the group diversifies its debt financing, both in terms of creditors and tenors. We regard the support of the European Investment Bank primarily as a quality stamp, not only for the creditworthiness of DPG Media, but especially for our digital efforts.”

    Looking ahead, DPG will invest to further develop its digital platform for end-users and advertisers, including with AI and text-to-speech applications.

    In recent years the investments in DPG’s advertising platform ‘Trusted Web’ marked a crucial and unique step to reduce dependence on big tech: advertisers no longer need to use third-party big tech purchasing platforms and tools to buy advertising campaigns at DPG Media.

    Furthermore, DPG invested heavily in audio technology, the digitalisation of its magazines and improvement of its streaming platforms on smart TVs, and the platform now also serves multiple users (besides VTM GO, Streamz and RTL Play also use the same platform). DPG Media has also implemented a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy to ensure its platforms remain resistant to emerging threats.

    Background information

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the EU, and the Capital Markets Union.   

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.   

    DPG Media Group’s mission is to inform, entertain and inspire people. The headquarters of the international media group, which is active in the Belgian, Dutch and Danish markets, are in Antwerp. DPG Media Group has a workforce of 5,396 employees and a portfolio of 90 strong publishing, broadcasting and services brands. Every day, the DPG Media Group brands reach a total of 15 million media users, both online and offline.

    MIL OSI Europe News –