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Category: Europe

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Ahmet Ismaili: Opening speech – 22nd Meeting of the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European – European Insurance Supervision Initiative 

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Dear Mr. Peter Braumüller, Managing Director of Insurance and Pension Supervision at the Austrian Financial Market Authority,

    Dear Deputy Governor Cakaj,

    Distinguished representatives of Insurance Regulatory Authorities,

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to Prishtina at the 22nd Meeting of the CESEE – European Insurance Supervision Initiative – ISI (Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European).

    Before I continue with my opening remarks, I would like to extend a special thank you to Mr. Peter Braumüller and to all the team involved to the organisation of this event.

    Mr. Braumüller, your leadership continue to be crucial in keeping this initiative a success. Your commitment to fostering collaboration and knowledge-sharing among our diverse community is truly admirable, and we are grateful for your efforts!

    This event marks a significant milestone, not only for Kosovo, but also for the Central Eastern and South-Eastern European region, as we unite under the common goal of enhancing insurance supervision and cross-border cooperation. Since its inception in 2011, the meeting has proven to be an invaluable platform for insurance regulators where they are able to exchange insights, share experiences, and discuss pressing issues on insurance supervision.

    Today, as we meet in Kosovo for the first time, we continue to honour this wonderful tradition of cooperation, knowledge-sharing, but also collegiality. It is a privilege to host such a diverse group of dedicated professionals committed to enhancing supervision and strengthening our regulatory frameworks and ensuring the integrity of our insurance markets.

    This year is particularly special for us; as the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo proudly celebrates its 25th anniversary. Hosting the forum aligns perfectly with our anniversary events and we believe that this occasion resonates with the spirit of our meeting – a celebration of growth, resilience, and commitment to mutual as well as shared values.

    I would like to briefly highlight the significant progress we have made in our insurance sector, particularly through specific reforms which we have successfully implemented with the aim of restoring the financial position of our insurance sector. CBK as regulator and supervisor has successfully addressed serval challenges while implementing prudent measures to resolve those issues and make sure that the sector perform according to the rules and protect the policyholders or beneficiaries and victims.

    Taking into consideration all the important measures we have undertaken, including the strengthening of our regulatory framework, these efforts have paved the way for further growth and sustainability, and an increase of the consumer confidence.

    We are committed to advancing the regulatory and supervisory framework of the Insurance Industry in line with EU standards and best practices.

    We have received the Roadmap for Solvency II from the World Bank, which is an ambitious, challenging, and demanding project. This means we are gradually transitioning from purely compliance-based supervision to prudential risk-based supervision. This transition also involves the introduction of a risk-based supervision manual, with support from the IMF.

    We have received also the roadmap for the IFRS 17. The implementation of the Solvency II and the IFRS 17 in our regional countries can certainly be a significant challenge, for which we will have the support of the World Bank.

    We are working on enhancing the supervision of market conduct among our financial institutions by ensuring the CBK has adequate powers and resources to implement effective oversight. Recently, we established the Consumer Protection Department to improve support for financial consumers. Within this department, we have created a dedicated division focused on market conduct.

    In our sector and in the most jurisdictions in the region, Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) continues to play a dominant role in the insurance market. While MTPL is essential to provide basic cover and protect consumers from liabilities arising from the use of vehicles, as regulators we recognise the importance of diversifying the insurance portfolio to enhance overall financial stability. We are therefore committed to increasing the share of voluntary non-life and life insurance products.

    Currently, Kosovo is the only European country not a member of the Green Card system, despite our ongoing efforts to gain membership. Therefore, our insurers cannot issue Green Cards and vehicles from most European countries entering Kosovo must purchase border MTPL at the frontier for their stay. Although Kosovo officially applied to join the Green Card system, this application was unsuccessful. While progress has been made in meeting many criteria for membership, Council of Bureaux membership remains the step to be achieved. Addressing this issue is important for improving cross-border insurance coverage, support free move of people and capital and aligning Kosovo with regional insurance standards. Here, dear participants and guest, the support of your institutions and followed countries is needed.

    Our team will provide you with more detailed insights on these developments later today, and I strongly encourage you to engage with them on this important topic.

    As a Central Bank we recognize the importance of strong collaboration with other financial regulators and supervisors. Working together allows us to ensure the stability and security of our financial systems. By coordinating efforts, sharing information, and aligning policies we can better manage risks and support sustainable growth in our economies.   

    And lastly, as we embark on this journey together, let us embrace the opportunities ahead of us. There is an intensive agenda ahead of us, filled with discussions on current challenges in insurance supervision and a vision for our joint future. I encourage each of you to actively engage, share your insights, and build connections that will extend beyond this meeting.

    By working together, we can strengthen our commitment to advance the insurance regulatory and supervisory framework towards a more integrated and resilient financial sector in our region.

    Once again, thank you for being here, and let us make this meeting a success!

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI: Bybit Card Opens up Pre-registration in New Regions Offering Sign-up Bonus

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bybit, the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, expands the global footprint of Bybit Card in collaboration with S1LKPAY, an international payment solution provider. Pre-registration is now open with a $10 bonus in addition to the multiple benefits of the Bybit Card for the first 1,000 applicants. 

    The go-to option for crypto spending for crypto-native users across the world, the Bybit Card has been on an expansion streak. Now spanning across markets including Argentina, Brazil, and the Netherlands, it is trusted for its robust security, excellent customer support, user-friendly and rewarding experience, and ease of access to the Mastercard network. 

    The latest development is led by Bybit Limited, the entity regulated by the Astana Financial Services Authority (AFSA), and marks the first branded card issuance by Bybit Limited (AFSA) in collaboration with S1LKPAY, a certified principal member of Mastercard’s payment network and a provider of Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS) and Card-as-a-Service (CaaS), to support the issuance and integration of in-app payment functions for the Bybit Mastercard prepaid card.

    “The past year has seen tremendous growth of the Bybit Card and we are pleased to be able to serve more regions and users from the EEA to South America, bridging their crypto wealth and their payment needs. Spending and growing your crypto has never been so easy with Bybit, and now it comes with a bonus until the official launch,” said Joan Han, Sales and Marketing Director at Bybit. 

    “We are thrilled to announce the launch of the first crypto prepaid card in the region and to partner with Bybit in offering this long-waited solution in its next chapter of card expansion. The partnership provides crypto holders with frictionless access to the Mastercard network anytime, anywhere,” said Gani Uzbekov, Founder and CEO of S1LKPAY.

    Offering a smooth experience for users with digital wealth in their portfolios, the Bybit Card is instrumental in making crypto spending and daily consumption more seamless. It also boasts clear and low fees, generous rewards with up to 10% cashback and 8% APY, and a wide array of tokens supported. The mainstreaming of crypto includes not only crypto as an investment asset class, but also retail use and merchant acceptance. Bybit is committed to refining its products to encourage the adoption of digital assets among everyday users.

    Bybit invites users to get a Bybit Card and enjoy its full benefits: Pre-register for the Bybit Card 

    #Bybit / #TheCryptoArk 

    About Bybit

    Bybit is the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, serving over 50 million users. Established in 2018, Bybit provides a professional platform where crypto investors and traders can find an ultra-fast matching engine, 24/7 customer service, and multilingual community support. Bybit is a proud partner of Formula One’s reigning Constructors’ and Drivers’ champions: the Oracle Red Bull Racing team.

    For more details about Bybit, users can visit: Bybit Press 

    For media inquiries, users can contact: media@bybit.com

    For more information, users can visit: https://www.bybit.com

    For updates, users can follow: Bybit’s Communities and Social Media

    Discord | Facebook | Instagram | LinkedIn | Reddit | Telegram | TikTok | X | Youtube

    About Mastercard

    Mastercard is a global technology company in the payments industry. Our mission is to connect and power an inclusive, digital economy that benefits everyone, everywhere by making transactions safe, simple, smart and accessible. Using secure data and networks, partnerships and passion, our innovations and solutions help individuals, financial institutions, governments and businesses realize their greatest potential. Our decency quotient, or DQ, drives our culture and everything we do inside and outside of our company. With connections across more than 210 countries and territories, we are building a sustainable world that unlocks priceless possibilities for all.

    Mastercard press office in Kazakhstan

    mastercard@pressclub.kz

    Contact

    Head of PR
    Tony Au
    Bybit
    tony.au@bybit.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Empowering women, energizing the future: Central Asian women explore innovation, leadership and the energy transition during visit to Vienna

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: Empowering women, energizing the future: Central Asian women explore innovation, leadership and the energy transition during visit to Vienna

    Empowering women, energizing the future: Central Asian women explore innovation, leadership and the energy transition during visit to Vienna | OSCE
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    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0131/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    B10‑0131/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration,

    – having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

    – having regard to the 1972 World Heritage Convention,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas since 1991, the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been characterised by violent conflict and war; whereas on 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive on the remaining parts of Nagorno-Karabakh not already under its control; whereas more than 100 000 Armenians were forced to flee their home territory;

    B. whereas Azerbaijan still occupies between 50 and 215 square kilometres of internationally recognised Armenian territory;

    C. whereas the region of Nagorno-Karabakh has approximately 500 cultural sites with around 6 000 relics of Armenian heritage; whereas between November 2020 and September 2023, many Armenian Christian heritage sites in Nagorno-Karabakh were destroyed, damaged or closed to the public; whereas Armenia’s cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh is endangered; whereas the International Court of Justice indicated in its Order of 7 December 2021 that Azerbaijan must take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration of Armenian cultural heritage;

    1. Notes that in September 2024 Azerbaijan refused to sign a framework peace treaty; encourages both parties to continue their peace talks, to remain committed to a lasting and peaceful settlement, through dialogue, of all long-standing issues, and to refrain from aggressive statements and unrealistic demands; considers that all long-standing issues should be dealt with in the peace treaty;

    2. Condemns all cases of destruction, vandalism and desecration of cultural sites in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls on Azerbaijan to allow foreign observers to monitor Nagorno-Karabakh’s cultural sites;

    3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the President, Government and Parliament of Azerbaijan, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0139/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0139/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

    –  having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

    –  having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

    –  having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

    –  having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment;

    B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov and Akif Gurbanov; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

    C. whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

    D. whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities;

    E. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

    F. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

    G. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship;

    H. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

    I. whereas in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

    J. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

    K. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons, including eight former leaders of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

    L. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas Azerbaijan occupies territories internationally recognised as Armenian;

    M. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani President indicate that Baku is not eager to conclude the negotiations;

    N. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

    O. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia; whereas there are worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

    P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

    1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges, and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan;

    2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    3. Expresses deep concern about the choice of Baku as the host city for COP29, given Azerbaijan’s flagrant violations of fundamental rights, democracy and international law; considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges the EU to use COP29 as an opportunity for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities;

    4. Demands that the organisers of COP29 ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change Conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

    5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent non-governmental organisations and media to the margins of the law; reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment;

    6. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations;

    7. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms, and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country;

    8. Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

    9. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity;

    10. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

    11. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to promptly sign a peace treaty – before COP29 – in order to resolve their long-lasting disputes; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU;

    12. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including the 17 November 2023 order indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the abovementioned ICJ order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

    13. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

    14. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious, or historical heritage in the region;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0136/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Udo Bullmann, Raphaël Glucksmann, Francisco Assis
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    B10‑0136/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2980(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular those of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan[1], of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh[2], of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh[3], of 14 September 2023 on the case of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, imprisoned in Azerbaijan[4], of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia[5], and of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev[6],

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part,

    – having regard to the joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 7 December 2023,

    – having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas from 11 to 22 November 2024 Azerbaijan will host the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29); whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights;

    B. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives;

    C. whereas since the announcement that Azerbaijan would host COP29, control of critical voices has increased, resulting in the arrest, arbitrary detention and prosecution of civil society activists, journalists and media workers, including foreign journalists;

    D. whereas an estimated 300 people are currently being detained on politically motivated charges, including human rights defenders, journalists, academics, peaceful protesters, lawyers and political and other activists; whereas they are being held in conditions that do not meet international human rights standards and they are often denied access to their family members, lawyers and adequate medical care;

    E. whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the PACE noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

    F. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

    G. whereas Azerbaijan has been actively involved in destabilisation campaigns against the national politics of Member States, as recently observed and well-documented in New Caledonia, where it has conducted disinformation operations and provided support for rioters;

    H. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’,

    I. whereas Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, a renowned political economist, anti-corruption activist and chairperson of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, who is due to start his visiting scholarship at Technische Universität in Dresden, was arbitrarily detained on 23 July 2023, kept in prison on dubious charges with limited contact with his family and lawyer and reportedly subjected to inhumane treatment; whereas since Parliament’s resolutions of 14 September 2023 and 25 April 2024, his health has further deteriorated due to the inadequate treatment of his serious medical condition, poor detention conditions and inhumane treatment; whereas on 22 April 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest, where he is being kept under constant police surveillance without being allowed to communicate with doctors, while his health condition still gives rise to serious concerns for his life; whereas on 17 October 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was shortlisted for the 2024 Sakharov Prize;

    J. whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to AbzasMedia about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

    K. whereas charges have been brought against numerous independent journalists who remain in prison or in pre-trial detention, while independent media outlets such as AbzasMedia, Kanal 13, Toplum TV and others have been shut down after key members of their staff were arrested on politically motivated charges;

    L. whereas Dr Ibadoghlu’s research found that Azerbaijan was highly unlikely to be able to increase its natural gas production sufficiently in order to fulfil its promise to provide gas to the EU as set out in the strategic partnership for energy; whereas Azerbaijan’s increased Russian gas imports are a cause for concern as to whether Azerbaijan can replace Russia as a gas supplier, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;

    M. whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched an unjustified attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in several hundred casualties, the death of civilians, and the majority of the population fleeing from their homes; whereas this forced displacement of the population and offensive against the civilian population represent a de facto ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and gross violations of international law and human rights, which may amount to crimes against humanity;

    N. whereas in December 2023 a joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan brought about the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war, expressed the commitment of both countries to continue their discussions regarding the implementation of more confidence-building measures, and called on the international community to support their efforts that would contribute to building mutual trust between the two countries and positively impact the entire South Caucasus region;

    1. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to address the deteriorating human rights situation in the country ahead of COP29 and to show its commitment to fundamental rights and to fundamental principles of democracy, justice, the rule of law and human dignity;

    2. Denounces the reported violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, the reprisals against human rights defenders and journalists, the widespread violations of the right to a fair trial, and the abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes;

    3. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all human rights defenders, activists, journalists and government critics imprisoned in retaliation for their human rights work and dissenting views; demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for AbzasMedia, including Ulvi Hasanli and Sevinj Vagifqizi, and Alasgar Mammadli who works for Toplum TV;

    4. Deplores the crackdown on civil society, as documented by Amnesty International, around major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the 2015 European Games;

    5. Takes note of the statements of the electoral observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which Azerbaijan’s presidential and early parliamentary elections of February and September 2024 did not offer voters genuine political alternatives and took place within a legal framework that overly restricted fundamental freedoms and the media;

    6. Reiterates its grave concern over the detention of anti-corruption activist and academic Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, who was held in pre-trial detention for almost one year despite his deteriorating health, moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 and continues to be deprived of liberty, and who is not allowed to leave Azerbaijan to receive the medical care he requires; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and on the Member States to actively call for the release of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against him, release him immediately from house arrest and allow him to leave the country on humanitarian grounds to receive urgently needed medical treatment abroad;

    7. Expresses its concern over the case of Anar Mammadli, a prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, who was arrested on 29 April 2024 and placed in pre-trial detention, and who faces charges of conspiracy in apparent retaliation for his criticism of the government and his activism; calls for his release from prison;

    8. Deplores the arbitrary detention of human rights defender Ilhamiz Guliyev and opposition leader Tofig Yagublu and calls for their immediate and unconditional release;

    9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations and systematic repression against civil society in Azerbaijan, as well as on Azerbaijani officials responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh;

    10. Reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh that could amount to war crimes; calls, further, on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid promises regarding the protection of their rights and protection from intimidation and discrimination, guaranteed and monitored by an international presence;

    11. Highlights the importance of providing continuous support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who were displaced in September 2023 and beforehand through direct humanitarian aid and budget support for the Armenian Government; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees;

    12. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to immediately and unconditionally release all remaining Armenian prisoners of war, hostages and captives, and to ensure transparency regarding the situation of detainees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

    13. Strongly condemns the destruction of Armenian cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls on Azerbaijan to refrain from destroying this heritage in the region and calls for the protection of this heritage in line with UNESCO standards, including through the authorisation of a UNESCO mission to the area;

    14. Calls for thorough investigations into serious risks of Russian gas laundering through Azerbaijan and into the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions, which would severely contradict EU foreign policy objectives; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;

    15. Insists that any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations, in particular on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia; calls on the Commission, consequently, to urgently assess and review the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and to act accordingly;

    16. Calls on the VP/HR to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

    17. Confirms its full and strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes the assistance measures under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    18. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to advance towards full normalisation of their relations on all pending issues and to promptly conclude a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end and invites the VP/HR to continue to support efforts towards a comprehensive peace treaty;

    19. Welcomes the joint Armenia-Azerbaijan statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; firmly believes that such measures can benefit the overall peace process and pave the way for increased trust between the two sides; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections;

    20. Calls on EU and Member State officials and elected representatives taking part in COP29 in Baku not to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the country and to use the momentum of the conference to increase diplomatic pressure on the Azerbaijani regime to respect fundamental rights and freedoms, release all political prisoners and return Armenian hostages;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At COP16, EIB to announce new partnerships to strengthen environmental protection

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB and WWF set for financing initiative.
    • Bank deepens cooperation with European Environment Agency.
    • Findings to be released from EIB-backed survey of public development banks’ support for green transition in Latin America and Caribbean.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) will announce a series of steps to bolster global environmental protection during the United Nations Biodiversity Conference in Cali, Colombia from 21 October to 1 November 2024.  

    At the event, which marks the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16), the EIB will publish an agreement with WWF on developing natural ways to protect biodiversity and enhance climate resilience. In addition, the EIB and the European Environment Agency are strengthening cooperation to support environmental sustainability and climate action. Furthermore, in partnership with the Association of Public Development Banks of Latin America and the Caribbean (ALIDE), the EIB will release the findings of a survey on the role of public development banks in supporting the two regions’ green transition.

    “The role of finance will be front and centre of the COP16 discussions on how to meet the world’s goals in supporting biodiversity,” said EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “We must act with urgency to reduce financial flows to activities that harm nature and scale up financing to projects that have a positive impact on the environment. Doing so is central to overcoming the triple planetary crisis of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss. The EIB is working closely with countries, the European Commission, fellow multilateral development banks, national promotional banks and the private sector to scale up nature-positive finance.”

    EIB at COP16

    The EIB delegation will be led by Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. For interview requests with members of the EIB delegation, please get in touch with the press contact below. Find out more about the EIB at the United Nations Biodiversity Conference here.

    On 28 October, Vice-President Fayolle will address the COP16 plenary to speak about unlocking opportunities to align and enhance responses to nature-related risks. On 30 October representatives from multilateral development banks will discuss progress on the joint MDB statement on supporting nature, people and the planet. A special focus will be MDBs’ role in defining and tracking nature finance as outlined in the MDB Common Principles for Tracking Nature Positive Finance that were announced at the United Nations Climate Conference COP28 in Dubai.

    Background information

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It is active in more than 160 countries and makes long-term finance available for sound investment in order to contribute towards EU policy goals.

    EIB Global is the EIB Group’s specialised arm dedicated to increasing the impact of international partnerships and development finance.  EIB Global is designed to foster strong, focused partnership within Team Europe, alongside fellow development finance institutions, and civil society. EIB Global brings the Group closer to local people, companies and institutions through our offices across the world. 

    The EIB has been providing economic support for projects in Latin America since 1993, facilitating long-term investment with favourable conditions and providing the technical support needed to ensure that these projects deliver positive social, economic and environmental results. Since the EIB began operating in Latin America, it has provided total financing of around €14 billion to support more than 160 projects in 15 countries in the region.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Housing crisis in the EU – urgent need to repeal Directive 2024/1275 on the energy performance of buildings – E-002029/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    11.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002029/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik (ESN), Waldemar Tomaszewski (ECR), Tomasz Buczek (PfE), Branko Grims (PPE), Kosma Złotowski (ECR), Georgiana Teodorescu (ECR), Klara Dostalova (PfE), Kateřina Konečná (NI), Mary Khan (ESN), Ondřej Knotek (PfE), Adrian-George Axinia (ECR), Ivan David (ESN), Jacek Ozdoba (ECR), Zsuzsanna Borvendég (ESN), Marcin Sypniewski (ESN), Nikola Bartůšek (PfE), Petar Volgin (ESN), Tobiasz Bocheński (ECR), Barbara Bonte (PfE), Grzegorz Braun (NI), Filip Turek (PfE), Bogdan Rzońca (ECR), Alexander Jungbluth (ESN), Irmhild Boßdorf (ESN), Milan Uhrík (ESN), Anna Zalewska (ECR), Dominik Tarczyński (ECR), Jadwiga Wiśniewska (ECR), Daniel Obajtek (ECR), Tom Vandendriessche (PfE), Tomasz Froelich (ESN), Christine Anderson (ESN), Arkadiusz Mularczyk (ECR), Isabella Tovaglieri (PfE), Marc Jongen (ESN), Margarita de la Pisa Carrión (PfE), Jorge Buxadé Villalba (PfE), Petr Bystron (ESN), Adam Bielan (ECR), Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE), Laurence Trochu (ECR), Hans Neuhoff (ESN), Anja Arndt (ESN), Jorge Martín Frías (PfE), Hermann Tertsch (PfE), Ondřej Krutílek (ECR), Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová (PfE), Fernand Kartheiser (ECR), Sarah Knafo (ESN), Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN), Tomáš Kubín (PfE), Anna Bryłka (PfE), Stanislav Stoyanov (ESN), Marion Maréchal (ECR), Nils Ušakovs (S&D)

    Between 2010 and 2022, rental prices in the EU increased by an average of 18 %, and residential property prices by 47 %. During this period, 10.6 % of people living in EU cities spent more than 40 % of their income on housing.

    Directive 2024/1275 of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings[1] introduces measures that significantly increase the cost of building new properties and maintaining existing ones.

    According to the directive, from 1 January 2030, all new buildings must be zero-emission. In practice, this means a ban on installing gas boilers, which the EU had previously encouraged people to use. Additionally, there is a target to completely phase out boilers powered by fossil fuels by 2040.

    The directive imposes an unrealistic schedule of mandatory renovations for existing buildings, which infringes on the right to property – a cornerstone of family and private life.

    A significant portion of the costs of implementing this directive will fall on ordinary people, leading to a substantial increase in property prices, further deepening the housing crisis in the EU.

    When does the Commission plan to submit a proposal to repeal Directive 2024/1275, due to its unrealistic assumptions and the worsening housing crisis in the EU?

    Submitted: 11.10.2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: A facility for fairness

    Source: European Investment Bank

    In the Western Balkans, women face unfair treatment in the job market. Over half the productive potential of women aged between 15 and 64 remains untapped, according to a report by the Regional Cooperation Council.

    This is mostly due to social norms, lack of childcare facilities, and the traditional distribution of household roles. Women’s employment rates in the region are consistently below those of the European Union, with high informal employment. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, men are on average paid 37.8% more than women, and 15.8% more in North Macedonia.

    Difficulties women face on the labour market vary depending on the industry, but the construction sector  is particularly challenging due to long working hours and physically demanding conditions. With over 150 employees, the Belgrade company RAS Inžinjering is looking to address these issues with its inclusivity practices.

    “In our company,” says Executive Director Vuk Vujović, “we have been traditionally employing women in administration, bookkeeping, and financial departments, as well as for warehouse and human resources operations. They primarily held office-based positions.”

    “However, since some five to six years ago, we began hiring female construction engineers. And now, when bringing on new engineers, we strive to maintain a balanced ratio of men and women.”

    The construction sector is also unique for its highly flexible payment-due dates, often extending up to four months. Additionally, the prices of construction materials can fluctuate significantly in the market, impacting the cost of projects that may take two to three years to complete. Without access to bank credit lines or sufficient internal resources, a company may struggle to complete a project.

    “Since we are already fostering inclusivity practices, our motivation for applying for this loan was to further develop these efforts, while reducing costs, effectively aligning value with purpose.”

    For each new employee, the company assigns an experienced mentor to guide them through processes and oversee their career development. It also promotes open-door communication between staff and management at all levels, ensuring efficient problem-solving.

    “Owing to our reputation, extensive portfolio of projects and employee relations practices, people are eager to work for our company and apply to our job postings,” Vujović says.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Mercosur – E-002035/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    11.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002035/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    Negotiators of the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur countries held another round of meetings in Brasilia from 7 to 9 October 2024. According to press reports, an agreement is expected to be ready for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in mid-November in Rio de Janeiro. In January, Mercosur negotiations were nearing the finish line, but were pushed back due to mass protests by farmers ahead of the European Parliament elections.

    The EU’s trade agreement with Mercosur is being heavily criticised by all European agricultural associations and unions. The agreement will open up the EU market, with its heavily regulated industry and agriculture, to economies not bound in any way by those regulations.

    In light of the above:

    Does the agreement contain any obligations for Mercosur countries in terms of agricultural regulation, e.g. in relation to tackling deforestation, and if so, what are they?

    Submitted: 11.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Critical assessment of the vaccination campaigns and claims of a ‘pandemic of the unvaccinated’ in view of RKI minutes from during the COVID-19 pandemic – E-002005/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002005/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Anderson (ESN)

    Statements setting out measures under the vaccination campaigns made much of the effectiveness of the vaccines and the notion of a ‘pandemic of the unvaccinated’. However, internal minutes from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) show that the virus was problematic for the unvaccinated too and that the effectiveness of the vaccine varied depending on the variant.

    • 1.How was information on the vaccination campaign exchanged between the Commission and Member States, and did the RKI and the Commission come to an agreement?
    • 2.Is the Commission aware of the content of the RKI minutes and were these minutes critically scrutinised and reviewed after they were published?
    • 3.What steps are being taken to retrospectively evaluate the effectiveness of the vaccination campaigns, and how is the Commission planning on fully restoring the good name of campaign critics who faced punishments such as career setbacks and social ostracism?

    Submitted: 9.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next meetings – Subcommittee on Tax Matters

    Source: European Parliament

    The next meetings of the FISC Subcommittee are scheduled for:

    • 21 November 2024, from 9.00 to 12.30

    • 3 December 2024, from 14.30 to 18.30



    Source : © European Union, 2024 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cambodian Ministry of Interior’s investigation into the Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL) – E-001984/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001984/2024
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE)

    On 4 June 2024, the Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL) released its report ‘Barriers to Representation: Freedom of Association in Cambodia’[1]. The report concluded that there were widespread obstacles to freedom of association in Cambodian workplaces, including verbal intimidation, threats, harassment and blacklisting, which severely affected their ability to function. Shortly after the report was published, the Ministry of Interior, among other organisations, began to take action against CENTRAL in what Human Rights Watch has described as a ‘smear campaign’[2]. This action takes place in the context of an ongoing government crackdown on independent media, civil society organisations and political opposition, which was the subject of a European Parliament resolution in March 2023[3].

    • 1.How does the Vice-President / High Representative respond to the measures taken against CENTRAL by the Cambodian Government and how are the organisation’s basic freedoms and rights being protected?
    • 2.Will the EU’s ambassador to Cambodia put pressure on the Cambodian Government to act in response to the drastically shrinking space for civil society in the country?
    • 3.Is the Vice-President / High Representative following up on the partial withdrawal of the Everything But Arms scheme from Cambodia by making sure that the scheme’s provisions on human and workers’ rights are respected?

    Submitted: 8.10.2024

    • [1] https://central-cambodia.org/archives/6989.
    • [2] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/02/cambodia-smear-campaign-against-labor-group.
    • [3] European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2023 on Cambodia: the case of opposition leader Kem Sokha,OJ C, C/2023/408, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/408/oj.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Second report on the application of the GDPR – 22-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force in 2018, the European Commission has published two reports on its application. The second report stresses the need for consistent interpretation and enforcement of the GDPR, highlighting ongoing challenges such as divergent national interpretations, difficulties in cooperation among regulatory bodies, and obstacles faced by organisations in achieving compliance.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB and Banca March sign guarantee agreement to provide up to €300 million in financing to Spanish companies with 250 to 3 000 employees

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The agreement seeks to promote private sector investment and support the financing needs of a key segment of the Spanish economy in terms of growth, competitiveness and job creation.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) and Banca March have signed a new agreement under which Banca March will provide up to €300 million of additional financing to Spanish companies with 250 to 3 000 employees. The EIB will offer an institutional guarantee covering 50% of the total amount.

    The goal of this agreement is to promote and accelerate private sector investment and offer working capital and liquidity solutions to Spanish mid-caps – many of which are family businesses, the strategic focus area of Banca March – making it easier for them to access finance with attractive terms in a high-interest rate environment.

    At least 35% of investments are expected to be made in regions with a per capita income below the EU average, helping to improve competitiveness and cohesion between regions, which is among the EIB Group’s strategic priorities.

    “The EIB is once again joining forces with Banca March to take another step forward in developing attractive lending solutions tailored to the needs of Spanish mid-caps,” said EIB Director of Financial Institutions Gemma Feliciani. “This agreement is yet another example of cooperation between the public and private sectors to boost the competitiveness of a key business segment for economic growth and job creation in Spain.”

    The agreement is part of the EIB’s efforts to finance small and medium companies (SMEs) and mid-caps and Banca March’s commitment to provide its financing capacity, all of which is in line with EU priorities and the goal of both institutions to help improve industrial competitiveness in the European Union.

    Banca March CEO José Luis Acea added: “As a bank specialising in advising businesses, business-owning families and family businesses, this agreement reflects our ongoing commitment to make it easier for Spanish companies to access finance from top-tier European institutions, enabling them to play their role as key motors of economic and social development in their domains.”

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances sound investments that further EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

    The European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group), consisting of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF), reported total financing signatures in Spain of €11.4 billion in 2023, approximately €6.8 billion of which went to climate action and environmental sustainability projects. Overall, the EIB Group signed €88 billion in new financing in 2023.

    Banca March

    Banca March is one of Spain’s leading specialised private and corporate banking institutions. It is also the only bank to be fully family-owned since it was founded in 1926. In line with its prudent and long-term management philosophy, Banca March’s business model is supported by strong financial and capital ratios. It maintains the highest CET 1 solvency ratio in the Spanish banking sector (20.93%), one of the lowest default rates in the sector in Spain (1.81% as of June 2024, compared to 3.43% on average in the sector) and liquidity ratios – liquidity coverage ratio (287.8%) and direct taxation liability (182.4%) – and coverage of non-performing risks (51.89%) among the highest in the sector. The strength of Banca March’s value proposition has been supported by the Moody’s rating agency, which has raised Banca March’s long-term rating to A2 with a positive outlook, meaning it remains one of the best-rated entities in the Spanish financial system, ahead of the government itself (which currently has a Baa1 rating). Banca March is one of the main shareholders of Corporación Financiera Alba, with major stakes in Naturgy (indirect), Acerinox, Profand, Ebro Foods, BME, Viscofan, Atlantic and Parques Reunidos, among others.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Are our future trade relations with China dependent on its ties to Russia? – E-001983/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001983/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    Beijing has lodged a complaint with the World Trade Organization against the EU’s customs duties for Chinese car manufacturers following an anti-subsidy investigation.

    By way of appeasement, the Commission announced on 20 August 2024 that the duties could be lowered[1]. The Commission is also concerned about the threat of countermeasures on EU brandy[2], and China’s anti-dumping investigations into EU pork and dairy exports, which it ‘will challenge vigorously in all available venues’[3].

    On 13 September 2024, Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, explained that ‘the Union is determined to continue to trade with China’ and to ‘avoid a trade war’, but that ‘future relations with China will also depend on how it behaves with regard to the Ukrainian conflict’, as ‘our greatest concern and geopolitical threat is Russia’[4].

    In the Commission’s view, will the scope and volume of our trade with China, and the activation of mechanisms to protect our industries, depend in future on Beijing hypothetically distancing itself from Moscow?

    Submitted: 8.10.2024

    • [1] ‘EU lowers tariffs on China-made EVs, signals softening trade stance’, Thomas Moller‑Nielsen, Euractiv, 21 August 2024.
    • [2] ‘China holds off on EU brandy tariffs but alleges dumping and damage’, Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, Euractiv, 29 August 2024.
    • [3] ‘L’UE saisit l’OMC contre une enquête chinoise visant ses produits laitiers’ (L’Opinion with AFP), 23 September 2024.
    • [4] ‘Borrell: riformare l’Unione è difficile ma inevitabile’, Euractiv Italia, 13 September 2024, https://euractiv.it/section/mondo/interview/borrell-riformare-lunione-e-difficile-ma-inevitabile/.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Deep-sea mining and the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness – E-002038/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002038/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Carola Rackete (The Left)

    In June 2022, the Commission published the EU agenda on international ocean governance, announcing its intention to ‘prohibit deep-sea mining until scientific gaps are properly filled, no harmful effects arise from mining and the marine environment is effectively protected’. In total, 11 Member States support a similar stance in relation to deep-sea mining. Recent findings emphasise the irreversible damage deep-sea mining could cause to biodiversity, the disruption of marine ecosystems, and the threat to the ocean’s role in regulating the climate, so the Commission’s 2022 position is welcome.

    However, the recently published Draghi report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ identifies deep-sea mining as a potential growth opportunity, despite increasing scientific evidence that it poses significant environmental and financial risks.

    What effect, if any, has the Draghi report had on the Commission’s position on deep-sea mining, as stated in the 2022 EU agenda on international ocean governance?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Liability of online marketplaces – E-002042/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002042/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

    Online marketplaces brokering products between sellers and producers in third countries and EU consumers are not classified as economic operators and thus are not responsible for ensuring that products from third countries comply with EU legislation before they are marketed and sold to EU consumers. Has the Commission considered the implications of that fact for consumer protection and for the effectiveness of the Green Deal legislation that has been adopted, harmonised legislation under the New Legislative Framework and the General Product Safety Regulation in general?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – New report on the alarming loss of wildlife – E-002040/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002040/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    According to a recent WWF report[1], wildlife populations have declined by an average of 73% over the last fifty years due to human activities that destroy their habitats, this being exacerbated by climate change. The report warns that we are close to irreversible global tipping points, such as the collapse of the Amazon and the melting of polar caps, posing serious threats to humanity and biodiversity. It urgently calls for the transformation of food, financial and energy systems to avoid these catastrophes, stressing the importance of protecting nature and ecosystems.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.How does the Commission justify recent decisions weakening the protection of species such as wolves, in contradiction with the objectives of the Green Deal and international conservation commitments?
    • 2.What immediate action will the Commission take to align its species conservation policy with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the commitments of the Global Biodiversity Framework?
    • 3.Given the crucial role of biodiversity in climate regulation, how does the Commission plan to integrate species conservation into its strategy to achieve the 2030 climate targets?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1njCUoCPsSV8DNhtq-DiXrhY2keCrNdeZ/view.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protection of classified information within the EU – E-001838/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001838/2024/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marieke Ehlers (PfE)

    We MEPs were informed that access to the report from the Commission to the Council on the assessment of third countries’ level of cooperation on readmission in 2023 (COM(2024) 340 final) was restricted – as is clearly stated on the document itself.

    Nevertheless, we were able to find the document on the internet, on the Statewatch website. The following questions thus arise:

    • 1.Why do MEPs have to go to a special reading room, without their mobile phones, when the document is openly available online?
    • 2.What safeguards and processes does the Commission use to ensure that restricted documents are not leaked?
    • 3.Is the Commission considering taking action against the Statewatch website and does it strive to ensure that restricted-access EU documents are not published online, whether that be by Statewatch or any other organisation, person or entity?

    Submitted: 26.9.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Iran’s use of criminal networks as terrorist proxies in Europe – E-002059/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002059/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tomas Tobé (PPE)

    The Iranian regime’s use of criminal networks as terrorist proxies in Europe poses a grave threat to our internal security.

    The Swedish Security Service confirmed earlier this year that the Iranian regime has been using criminal networks in Sweden to carry out violent acts against other states, groups, or individuals in Sweden that Iran regards as threats[1]. Similar reports have been made in several other European countries[2].

    Iran’s hostile activities abroad are not a new phenomenon. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the EU to take action against the Iranian regime, including by adding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to the EU terrorist list[3].

    However, it is clear that further measures are needed at EU level to target the links between the Iranian regime and criminal networks that operate across borders in Europe.

    In view of the above:

    What action does the Commission intend to take to help Member States prevent, avert, and reduce the possibility of Iran and other hostile state actors carrying out security-threatening activities in the EU?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    • [1] https://sakerhetspolisen.se/ovriga-sidor/other-languages/english-engelska/press-room/news/news/2024-05-30-iran-is-using-criminal-networks-in-sweden.html
    • [2] https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/psa-iran-using-organized-criminal-gangs-in-sweden-as-proxies-to-attack-israeli-and-jewish-targets-p
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0382_EN.html
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – B10-0140/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0140/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of the UN resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

    – having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

    – having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

    – having regard to the statement of 23 September 2024 by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,

    – having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

    – having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

    – having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

    – having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October  1971,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC);

    B. whereas since then, most countries have shifted recognition from Taiwan to the PRC; whereas today, Taiwan, while not being a member of the UN, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 UN member states, and with the Holy See;

    C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its right to participate in multilateral forums, such as the World Health Organization;

    D. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024, the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

    E. whereas in recent years, the PRC has deliberately distorted UN Resolution 2758, persistently claiming that the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle allegedly has international endorsement through this resolution, which would entail that Taiwan is part of the PRC;

    F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy position, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

    G. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC was established in 1949;

    H. whereas over the past decade, the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

    I. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share common values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    J. whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

    K. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party; whereas the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is the military of the Chinese Communist Party and not an army of the PRC’s Government;

    L. whereas on 14 October 2024, the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise, a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

    M. whereas on 23 May 2024, the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, coming just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

    N. whereas over the past years, the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022, the PRC also fired missiles into the exclusive economic zone of Japan;

    O. whereas on top of military pressure, the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference, including hybrid and cyber attacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    P. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan; whereas the PRC is engaging in a historically unprecedented military build-up that is continuously shifting the power balance in the Indo-Pacific; whereas this is negatively affecting cross-Strait stability;

    Q. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the exportation of dual-use goods to Russia, and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

    R. whereas in a speech on 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s national day, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

    S. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas the PRC has for many years promoted an alternative narrative, challenging democratic values, open markets and the rules-based international order; whereas the PRC’s growing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in international institutions;

    T. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including a higher military presence and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

    U. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022, Taiwan was the EU’s 12th biggest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

    V. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC, and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic ally in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

    2. Strongly condemns the PRC’s military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up that is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to ensure, through clear and consistent signalling, that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted;

    3. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;

    4. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

    5. Strongly underlines that the EU’s ‘One China’ policy corresponds to UN Resolution 2758, while the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle is not endorsed by it;

    6. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification contradicts international law; recalls that neither Taiwan nor the PRC is subordinate to the other; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

    7. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further in order to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference;

    8. Reiterates its call on the Member States to increase the frequency of freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait and to deepen security dialogues with Taiwan to deter Chinese aggression against the democratic island;

    9. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

    10. Reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan in the field of whole-of-society defence;

    11. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

    12. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement with Taiwan;

    13. Condemns all forms of pressure and threats of reprisals, including economic coercion, regarding the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan, in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights, without foreign interference;

    14. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges between its Members and Taiwan and encourages further visits by official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; also encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters; encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Poland’s announcement of the suspension of the right to asylum – P-002141/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Priority question for written answer  P-002141/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Erik Marquardt (Verts/ALE), Damian Boeselager (Verts/ALE), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Leoluca Orlando (Verts/ALE)

    Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently announced the temporary territorial suspension of the right to asylum in Poland as part of a new migration strategy[1].

    • 1.How does the Commission view the legality of the territorial suspension of the right to asylum announced by Poland in light of the EU acquis relating to asylum and the Schengen area, which requires Member States to grant access to asylum procedures, including at the border, and in light of the right to asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the principle of non-refoulement?
    • 2.Can the Commission confirm that the suspension announced by Poland violates the above-mentioned provisions and that it will take firm action to prevent the suspension from going through, including, if needed, through an infringement action with an application for interim measures?
    • 3.Given the current political debates on migration in some Member States, does the Commission agree that not taking action to address this violation of the right to asylum carries a real risk that other Member States will follow suit, leading to a further deterioration in respect for the EU acquis?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    • [1] https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-donald-tusk-asylum-right-border-migration-belarus-russia-hybrid-war-eu/.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Liability of online marketplaces – E-002044/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002044/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

    Temu is classified as a very large online platform under the Digital Services Act. What checks has the Commission carried out to make sure that Temu is genuinely an online marketplace (such marketplaces being ‘providers of online platforms allowing consumers to conclude distance contracts with producers’) and does not itself buy and resell the products sold on the platform?

    It is important to clarify this question, given that Temu, which is established in Ireland, would be regarded as an economic operator (importer or producer) under product and environmental legislation if it actually bought, owned and resold the products ‘intermediated’ via its own website.

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Enquiry into the feasibility of building a new express road as part of the TEN-T network – E-002066/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002066/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Piotr Müller (ECR), Kosma Złotowski (ECR)

    The Pomorskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie provinces have growing economic potential, but their continued development requires modern road infrastructure.

    The construction of a new express road linking Słupsk, Bytów, Chojnice and Bydgoszcz, with a variant starting in Ustka, would bring a number of benefits: reduced travel time, improved safety and increased comfort of travel. The investment would have a positive impact on economic development, tourism and traffic management, especially in terms of environmentally friendly solutions. Preparations for the construction of the new road should start now so that construction can begin in the next few years. The S6 expressway is currently nearing completion. There is therefore a real opportunity to get a new project under way now.

    Therefore, it is of crucial importance to examine the possibility of including the project in the TEN-T network and to apply for EU support. In this connection:

    • 1.Could this project be included in the TEN-T network as part of the Baltic-Adriatic Corridor, given the importance of such a road for improving regional cohesion and economic development in the Pomorskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie provinces and for strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion between the north and south of the EU?
    • 2.In the Commission’s view, is this project eligible to receive EU funds?
    • 3.Would the carrying out of a ‘corridor study’ be useful in helping the Commission reach a decision in this matter?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the urgent need to revise the Medical Devices Regulation – RC-B10-0123/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Peter Liese
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Tiemo Wölken
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Ondřej Knotek
    on behalf of the PfE Group
    Ruggero Razza
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Andreas Glück
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Ignazio Roberto Marino
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the urgent need to revise the Medical Devices Regulation

    (2024/2849(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 168 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC[1] (MDR),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU[2] (IVDR),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/607 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards the transitional provisions for certain medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices[3],

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/561[4], Regulation (EU) 2022/112[5], Regulation (EU) 2023/607[6] and Regulation (EU) 2024/1860[7] extending the implementation periods of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and Regulation (EU) 2017/746,

    – having regard to the Commission’s proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2017/745 and (EU) 2017/746 as regards the transitional provisions for certain medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices (COM(2023)0010),

    – having regard to the European Medicines Agency’s 2023 Annual Report and its review on market access and safety concerns for medical devices,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices play a crucial role in high-quality healthcare, directly affecting the health, safety and well-being of millions of patients across the EU;

    B. whereas approximately 500 000 different medical devices are available on the EU market, covering a broad range of technologies, from contact lenses to pacemakers, and serving different purposes, including diagnosis, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and improving the quality of life of patients and the work of healthcare professionals and carers;

    C. whereas disparities in access to medical devices persist across Member States, affecting patient care and leading to health inequalities; whereas such disparities underscore the need for improved availability and affordability of crucial devices;

    D. whereas the MDR and IVDR were adopted to strengthen the regulatory framework for medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, as a response to several high-profile scandals with unsafe medical equipment, with the purpose of ensuring higher standards of safety, transparency and clinical performance while also fostering innovation in the sector;

    E. whereas the MDR and IVDR introduced more robust requirements for clinical evaluations, post-market surveillance and vigilance reporting, promoting transparency in the approval and monitoring processes;

    F. whereas despite these aims, significant challenges have been encountered in implementing the MDR and the IVDR, not only leading to delays but also resulting in failures to achieve certification and approval of medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, particularly impacting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as resulting in shortages of medical devices and in vitro diagnostic medical devices, thus restricting patient access to innovative and life-saving therapeutic and diagnostic technologies;

    G. whereas many stakeholders, in particular small and medium-sized manufacturers, notified bodies and healthcare providers, have reported difficulties in navigating the complex regulatory procedures under the current MDR and IVDR framework, with potential risks posed to the continuous availability of life-saving medical devices and critical in vitro diagnostic tests in the EU;

    H. whereas the transitional periods for the implementation of the MDR and IVDR have been extended on numerous occasions to address issues including the capacity of notified bodies and to allow industry more time to adapt to new rules in order to prevent devices being withdrawn from the EU market;

    I. whereas due to a lack of harmonised procedures across notified bodies in the EU, among other things, manufacturers can in some instances face unpredictable timelines for certification and market access, which creates unpredictability, alongside inconsistency in decisions and a lack of transparency in relation to the work of the notified bodies;

    J. whereas there is a need for the regulatory frameworks to better accommodate innovative devices that address unmet medical needs and provide better prioritisation and fast-track pathways;

    K. whereas the Commission initiated non-legislative actions to support the transition to the MDR and IVDR, focusing in particular on the availability of medical devices on the market, the preparedness of notified bodies, the development of orphan and paediatric devices, SME support and the waiving of fees for scientific advice in critical areas where, despite these measures, financial and administrative challenges persist, particularly in the orphan and paediatric sectors;

    L. whereas the deadlines for implementing the MDR and IVDR have been extended multiple times to help the industry adapt to new regulations, to prevent market withdrawals and to ensure the continuous supply of devices; whereas these extensions were critical in maintaining public health protection during the COVID-19 pandemic;

    M. whereas since the adoption of the MDR and IVDR, the Commission has also introduced new provisions regarding the European Database on Medical Devices (EUDAMED) and a notification system for market interruptions or supply discontinuation;

    N. whereas it is important to ensure that patients and healthcare professionals have access to all relevant documents and decisions taken by the notified bodies;

    1. Calls on the Commission to propose, by the end of Q1 2025, delegated and implementing acts to the MDR and the IVDR to address the most pressing challenges and bottlenecks in the implementation of the legislative frameworks and to propose the systematic revision of all relevant articles of these regulations, accompanied by an impact assessment, to be conducted as soon as possible;

    2. Calls on the Commission to make full use of legislative and non-legislative tools to resolve issues of divergent interpretation and of practical application to streamline the regulatory process, improve transparency, and eliminate unnecessary administrative work for notified bodies and manufacturers, particularly SMEs, without compromising patient safety;

    3. Deplores the risk of shortages of medical devices and the lack of access to certain medical devices and in vitro diagnostics in parts of the EU; stresses that access to and quality of healthcare, including medical devices and in vitro diagnostics, should not depend on where in the EU a patient is located;

    4. Encourages the notified bodies to ensure that there are sufficient resources to meet the market demand in a timely manner; in this regard, calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance support and cooperation to ensure that the notified bodies have the optimal capacities and capabilities to fully implement the regulatory framework;

    5. Advocates the creation of transparent and binding timelines, including clock stops for procedural steps in conformity assessment by notified bodies, thus creating predictability and certainty for manufacturers regarding the market access procedure and its duration within the EU;

    6. Calls for transparency in notified bodies’ fees and fee structures, to allow economic operators to compare notified bodies and make informed choices, ensuring that fees remain a fair compensation for the public service provided;

    7. Stresses the need to eliminate the unnecessary re-certification of products, and underlines that certain product updates or adjustments should not necessarily lead to an entire re-certification of the product; stresses the need to harmonise such provisions and ensure consistency across the EU; calls for cooperation between the competent authorities and advisory bodies responsible for other regulatory frameworks, and stresses the need for products to be classified correctly and consistently;

    8. Strongly calls on the Commission to consider fast-track and prioritisation pathways for the approval of innovative technologies in areas of unmet medical need and for devices linked to health emergencies;

    9. Highlights the need to establish a clear working definition of ‘orphan device’, as determined by the Medical Device Coordination Group in the MDR and IVDR, to facilitate the adoption of harmonised measures across the EU; additionally calls for a robust system to prevent misuse through artificial ‘orphanisation’;

    10.  Calls for the introduction of adapted rules for orphan and paediatric medical devices, without compromising patient safety, and emphasises the need for more efficient conformity assessment procedures tailored to medical devices and in vitro diagnostics serving relatively small markets, such as products for the treatment of children or rare diseases;

    11. Calls on the Commission to facilitate the collection of clinical data from existing national registries for small patient groups treated or diagnosed with orphan and paediatric devices, in compliance with the protection of personal data; recognises the challenges faced by various SMEs in adapting to the legal frameworks; invites the Member States and the Commission to develop specific measures to support SMEs, including the provision of model application documents and forms, regulatory guidance and other assistance to reduce the costs and complexity of the regulatory frameworks;

    12. Calls on the Commission to continuously monitor the availability of devices, particularly the last remaining devices of particular types, and to take appropriate action to keep them available in the EU market; in this regard, calls for an urgent full implementation of EUDAMED, which will enable information about medical devices and manufacturers to be processed to enhance transparency, provide better access to information for the public and healthcare professionals, and enhance coordination between Member States;

    13. Emphasises that any new rules or changes to existing rules must come with an appropriate transition period to allow all stakeholders sufficient time to adjust to the changes;

    14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Dame Diana Johnson speech on tackling anti-social behaviour

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The Crime and Policing Minister spoke at the Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour Conference on 22 October 2024.

    Location:
    Online
    Delivered on:
    (Transcript of the speech, exactly as it was delivered)

    Good morning, it is a real privilege to be speaking at this event and to be amongst a group so incredibly passionate about addressing anti-social behaviour at a national and local level.  

    I can see we have a variety of professionals on the call and wanted to take this opportunity, firstly, to express my sincere gratitude for your continued efforts to tackle and prevent anti-social behaviour. Each and every one of you is equally important to this government’s mission to crack down on anti-social behaviour and to take back our streets.  

    Having spent a lot of time asking the department challenging questions on how the government is tackling ASB as Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee, it is an honour to have the opportunity of working with you now to deliver real change across the country and ensure that communities feel safe, secure and are able to thrive.  

    Anti-social behaviour is not merely a low-level nuisance. It hits the poorest and most vulnerable communities hardest and, if left unchecked, leads to more serious offending – and I know this very well as a constituency MP in Hull. 

    Everyone involved in this conference has a wealth of knowledge, insight and expertise that will help us deliver this mission. 

    I’d now like to set out how I envisage this approach, the strategies we will be implementing and the importance of restoring public trust in both policing and local partners to create real, impactful change.  

    Cracking down on anti-social behaviour is a top priority for this government, and a key part of our Safer Streets Mission.    

    Too many town centres and high streets across the country have been gripped by an epidemic of anti-social behaviour, theft and shoplifting, which is corroding our communities and cannot be allowed to continue. 

    Currently, the powers in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 do not go far enough to tackle anti-social behaviour. We will crack down on those causing havoc on our high streets by legislating to ensure that anti-social behaviour powers are as effective as possible to tackle repeat offending, in addition to tackling the plague of shoplifting that blights so many areas.  

    This is why we will be introducing Respect Orders to tackle the worst ASB offenders and stamp out issues such as public drinking and drug use to ensure that our communities are free from harm and nuisance.  

    The Respect Order will help ensure that persistent adult offenders of ASB are banned from public areas where they are causing harm to our communities. 

    It is, of course, for local areas to decide how best to deploy these powers depending on the specific circumstances. They are best placed to understand what is driving the behaviour in question, the impact that it is having, and to determine the most appropriate response.  

    Shoplifting is at a record high and continues to increase at an unacceptable level – and I saw this for myself when visiting my local Co-op in Hull, while I was in store shoplifting took place, with a holdall being filled with meat and the thief then walking out. 

    More and more offenders are using violence and abuse against shopworkers to do this. It’s damaging business and hurting our communities. It’s vital people feel safe out in their local shops and on their high streets.  

    And I welcome operational commitments that police made in the Retail Crime Action Plan last October, and there are positive outcomes already. But there is much more to do.    

    So we are going to bring back neighbourhood policing, ensuring thousands of additional officers are out patrolling towns and communities as part of our mission to make streets safer.  

    We will also end the effective immunity, introduced by the previous government, granted to low level shoplifting of goods under £200 to remove the perception that those committing low value shop theft will escape punishment. We will introduce a new offence of assaulting a retail worker to protect the hardworking and dedicated staff that work in stores. This is long overdue.   

    Now turning to anti-social behaviour involving vehicles such as off-road bikes, motorbikes and e-scooters – they cause untold nuisance and misery for communities. We want to make it easier for the police to take illegal, dangerous and vehicle-related ASB off the streets for good, and quickly destroy vehicles that they seize from offenders.   

    I want to just turn to recent trends in anti-social behaviour. 

    In the year ending March 2024, the Crime Survey of England and Wales showed that around 35% of respondents personally witnessed or experienced anti-social behaviour in their local area.  

    Groups hanging around on the streets, vehicle-related ASB and people using or dealing drugs were the most common types of anti-social behaviour reported.  

    Now this is a statistic that we must aim to significantly reduce through consistent join up of police and local partners.  

    ​We also know that ASB is under reported to the police and other agencies. Either because people don’t know how to report it or because they feel it will not be taken seriously or addressed.  

    A survey conducted in 2023 by YouGov on behalf of Resolve found that over 58% of victims or witnesses don’t report anti-social behaviour.   

    The most common reasons for not reporting an incident was a feeling it was too trivial, not worth reporting and not thinking that it would be taken seriously, and I know, because my constituents have told me, that they often don’t report incidents because they feel that nobody cares and nothing is done. 

    We need to change that. No victim of anti-social behaviour should feel that their issues will not be taken seriously or isn’t worth reporting.  

    And I look forward to the annual ASB Awareness Week run by Resolve that is taking place from 18-24 November. The theme is ‘Making Communities Safer’. This will be a brilliant opportunity to raise awareness of what anti-social behaviour is and to promote the ASB Case Review, a mechanism which gives victims of repeated ASB the ability to request a formal case review where a locally defined threshold is met.  

    It is vitally important that we place focus on helping the victims of ASB. 

    ASB often affects the most vulnerable in our society, and we will work to ensure that the police, local authorities and local agencies, in addition to the tools and powers available to them to tackle ASB, are also aware of the support available to victims of ASB.   

    I now want to turn to national strategies to invest in communities and prevent ASB from occurring in the long-term. 

    The Home Secretary and I have been clear that we see neighbourhood policing as the bedrock of restoring public confidence in policing. The Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee will be a crucial part of that. 

    Neighbourhood police officers are at the forefront of the fight against anti-social behaviour and for many years neighbourhood policing stood as the bedrock of that traditional British model of policing by consent.  

    However, the last decade has seen the decline of neighbourhood policing to such an extent that many of the bonds of trust and respect between the police and local communities have been lost.  

    And that’s why we will implement a new Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee, restoring patrols to town centres, recruiting thousands of additional police personnel, and ensuring every community has a named local police officer to turn to.  

    As part of this we have agreed funding to support the College of Policing to roll out a specialist new training programme for neighbourhood officers across the country.   

    The training will help equip neighbourhood officers with the knowledge they need to tackle anti-social behaviour, problem solve and engage effectively with the communities they serve. It is essential that our neighbourhood officers have the skills, knowledge and confidence to build local relationships and to tackle the issues that damage communities the most.  

    Every community deserves local officers who understand what is needed to keep them safe. With this new training, and our Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee, we will deliver the change our towns and villages are desperate for.  

    I understand that no single agency holds all the levers to tackle anti-social behaviour. Effective multi-agency working is crucial to reducing ASB and ensuring safer communities. 

    That is why the strategies we are implementing are going to focus on preventing ASB in the long term and we are committed to intervening earlier to stop young people being drawn into crime.  

    An essential part of achieving this will be the Young Futures programme.  

    This will consist of the creation of prevention partnerships across England and Wales to map existing youth provision and at-risk individuals. These partnerships will work to ensure children and young people receive the support they need to stop them being pulled into a life of crime.  

    These will be accompanied by a network of Young Future Hubs, which will bring together local services to deliver additional interventions for young people, including mental health support. 

    And, during the election campaign, we committed to cracking down in particular on vehicle-related ASB to deal with the associated noise, nuisance and dangers which communities experience.  Our proposals will make it easier for the police to seize and dispose of vehicles, including e-scooters and e-bikes, that are used anti-socially. 

    And in addition, we are working on progressing research and development on a novel technology solution to safely stop e-scooters and e-bikes and enhance the ability of the police to prevent them from being used to commit criminal acts. 

    Now I will finish by saying how grateful I am to everyone at this conference for the work that you do. It really matters.   

    And I look forward to working together as we tackle anti-social behaviour and make communities up and down the country safer.  

    Thank you very much for your time, and I very much hope you enjoy the conference.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic University scientists take another step toward creating a cure for Alzheimer’s disease

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    Researchers from Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University have published the results of a study of a potential pharmacological agent for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. Scientific Reports, the fifth most popular scientific journal in the world, has published an article by a team of scientists from the Polytechnic University and the Russian-Armenian University, dedicated to the study of Alzheimer’s disease.

    This disease is characterized by progressive memory loss and requires new approaches to create effective drug therapy. The transmission of nerve impulses from one cell to another occurs in synapses. Synapse loss is an important indicator of cognitive dysfunction in patients with Alzheimer’s disease. Restoring or limiting synapse loss is a promising strategy for pharmacotherapy of the disease.

    Derivatives of such a substance as piperazine are used for the drug treatment of various diseases, including a number of diseases of the central nervous system. Scientists have synthesized a new piperazine derivative cmp2, which has synaptoprotective properties. In vivo research has shown that cmp2 (10 mg/kg intraperitoneally) eliminates the deficit of synaptic plasticity in mice and it can be argued that cmp2 is a new promising compound for drug development. The mechanism of action of cmp2 is based on selective stimulation of the TRPC6 channel, and it is expected that activation of this channel will compensate for synaptic insufficiency in hippocampal neurons.

    This work was financially supported by the grant of the Russian Science Foundation No. 20-75-10026 and the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia within the framework of the state assignment on the topic “Scientific, methodological and resource support for the implementation of measures to improve the efficiency of the Russian-Armenian (Slavic) and Belarusian-Russian universities in training personnel for the digital economy, including using modern distance technologies” (Additional agreement dated 05/15/2024

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government commits to addressing housebuilding recommendations

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The UK Government has today published its response to the Competition and Market’s Authority’s (CMA) housebuilding study.

    The government has today published its response to the Competition and Market’s Authority’s (CMA) housebuilding study.

    This includes bringing forward a new consumer code for housebuilders and a New Homes Ombudsman service which will empower homeowners to rightly challenge developers for any quality issues they face in their home. 

    In response to the CMA’s recommendations, Housing and Planning Minister, Matthew Pennycook said:  

    “The Government has committed to delivering 1.5 million homes in this Parliament, including the biggest increase in social and affordable housing in a generation.

    “The CMA was right to highlight areas for improvement in the housebuilding market. That is why we will empower homeowners to challenge developers over poor quality new homes and bad service, and we will consider the best way to address the injustice of ‘fleecehold’ private estates to bring unfair costs to an end.

    “Alongside this, our updated National Planning Policy Framework and the reinstatement of mandatory housing targets for councils will ensure communities have the homes and necessary infrastructure to thrive.”

    Sarah Cardell, CEO of the CMA said:

    “We welcome the government’s response to our recommendations on housebuilding, which we put forward to get people better protections and open the door to delivering more good quality homes.

    “Housing is an essential area for consumers and driving economic growth, so we will assist government as they take forward our solutions, alongside progressing our wider housing work.”

    Background information:

    • Earlier this year the CMA made 11 recommendations highlighting ongoing issues in the housebuilding market which the government is working at pace to address. 

    • We have accepted the recommendations to bring forward a new consumer code for housebuilders and a New Homes Ombudsman service which will empower homeowners to rightly challenge developers for any quality issues they face in their home.  

    • Other recommendations accepted in principle include greater protections for households living under private management arrangements. This would see homeowners receiving more information about what they are paying for as well as allowing them to challenge unfair costs at a tribunal.
    • We will implement measures to improve transparency as part of the Leasehold and Freehold Act 2024 and will also consult on further options to make sure estate managers can be properly challenged for the money they spend.
    • This government is also committing to provide robust guidance for residents’ management companies, so they have the support to effectively manage amenities on their housing estates, such as drainages and open spaces. This can include appointing a managing agent to oversee services.
    • Several of the other recommendations will require further work and consultation to ensure the best policy solutions can be identified and enacted. This includes consulting on the best way to address the injustice of ‘fleecehold’ private estates.

    • The CMA also proposed 11 additional options that include wider planning reforms. Many of these options are already being considered as part of the revised National Planning Policy Framework which will see mandatory housing targets for councils and low quality ‘grey belt’ released.

    • This is on top of our Planning and Infrastructure Bill to modernise the planning system which will turbocharge housebuilding and accelerate the delivery of major infrastructure projects.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Departure Statement for Prime Minister’s visit to Russia for BRICS Summit

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 22 OCT 2024 7:32AM by PIB Delhi

    I am departing today on a two day visit to Kazan at the invitation of H.E. Mr. Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, to attend the 16th BRICS Summit.

    India values the close cooperation within BRICS which has emerged as an important platform for dialogue and discussion on issues concerning the global developmental agenda, reformed multilateralism, climate change, economic cooperation, building resilient supply chains, promoting cultural and people to people connect, among others. The expansion of BRICS with the addition of new members last year has added to its inclusivity and agenda for the global good.

    Building upon the Annual Summit held in July 2024 in Moscow, my visit to Kazan will further reinforce the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.

    I look forward to meeting other leaders from BRICS as well.

     

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    MJPS/SR

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –