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Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The dangers of romanticising Britain’s 1976 heatwave

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephanie Brown, Lecturer in Criminology, University of Hull

    As I scrolled through social media on a hot afternoon in late June, a meme caught my attention. A black and white photo. A smiling young woman with water up to her knees. She appeared to be in a fountain, with many others dipping their legs in the water.

    The caption read “On this day in 1976, the British heatwave started. It would last until the 27th August, during which time Britain would experience extreme temperatures and widespread droughts. And we all had a wonderful summer and survived.”

    This immediately struck me: it was a boiling hot day. As I sat at my office desk keeping hydrated with a fan pointed directly at my face, I felt the rage burning inside me. How could people be so irresponsible? Heat can be dangerous. But the implication of the meme was clear: if people managed back then, surely today’s warnings about heatwaves, climate change, and public health are exaggerated. These rose-tinted memories obscure a darker truth.

    I am a historical criminologist. This meme had the rare effect of deeply troubling both of my areas of expertise.

    As a historian, this meme concerns me because it perpetuates the myth of the “good old days”. A selective, nostalgic vision of the past that smooths over complexity and hardship in favour of a comforting, idealised narrative. Flattening history into feelgood folklore, erasing the social inequalities and governmental failures.

    It echoes a broader cultural tendency: from “Make America great again” to the “Blitz spirit”, representing Britain’s nostalgia for wartime resilience, a romanticised past is often used by politicians to legitimise political ideas in the present. But history is not a comfort blanket. It is a critical tool.

    My work explores how institutions respond to crisis and how narratives of success or failure are constructed. In 1976, advice for dealing with the water shortage was to share a bath with the wife and drive a dirty car. Areas without domestic tap water had to use communal street pipes.

    The government did not appoint a minister for drought until the end of August, despite mounting evidence from meteorologists and public health officials. Emergency measures were piecemeal and unevenly applied.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The suggestion that “we all had a wonderful summer and survived” is misleading. It was reported that “200 people a day were apparently dying who would not have died if the weather had been normal”. During the peak of the heatwave, deaths increased by 28% in the southeast England and 33% in Greater London.

    As a criminologist, I know that it is not only natural deaths that can increase during a hot weather. The number of violent deaths also increased in 1976 as well as in other heatwaves. Thermic law is the concept that violent crime is higher in hotter seasons. These patterns might be explained by temperature-aggression theory: that hot weather can cause an increase in aggressive behaviours.

    For other criminologists, it is not the temperature itself that causes increased violence, but how people’s behaviour changes due to the heat. For example, people are taking time off work or school, socialising, and drinking. Unstructured time and spaces, combined with alcohol and a holiday feel all lead to increases in violence.

    Misrepresenting risk

    By sentimentalising the summer of 1976, we strip away its lessons. Worse, we risk repeating its mistakes. One Conservative MP described people concerned about the 2022 heatwave as “snowflakes” and “cowards”. Quite an odd response after the British public was asked to “protect the NHS” during the COVID-19 pandemic.

    This protection apparently did not extend to looking after each other in a heatwave. In fact, heatwaves are largely an invisible risk. We are told not to fuss, but there is often little communication on how to keep safe.

    A lack of policy and examples of political scepticism connect with a key theme in the comments under that meme: climate change denial. If we had a heatwave in 1976 then what we are experiencing now is nothing new, right? Wrong.

    The heatwave in 1976 was bad: thousands died, fires raged, and water ran dry. But it was also an anomaly; a hot summer in a relatively cool decade. Heatwaves are now more frequent, more intense and longer lasting. Temperatures reached over 40°C in 2022, while the maximum in 1976 was 4°C-5°C cooler.

    Still, each time a weather warning is issued, it is met with a wave of derision. There is the same online discourse as is expressed in this meme. This attitude is not just flippant, it is dangerous. It undermines vital public messaging, discourages precautionary action, and fuels complacency among those least at risk, while leaving the most vulnerable even more exposed.

    History can offer crucial perspective. But only if we treat it honestly. That means moving beyond memeified memories of the past and reckoning with the complexity of what really happened. It means challenging the stories we tell ourselves. Many did live through the 1976 heatwave. But many also died: quietly, invisibly and avoidably. Their stories are not part of the nostalgia. They should be.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Stephanie Brown does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The dangers of romanticising Britain’s 1976 heatwave – https://theconversation.com/the-dangers-of-romanticising-britains-1976-heatwave-260046

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: From resilient economy to wider opening up, China’s 14th five-year plan delivers remarkable results

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    From resilient economy to wider opening up, China’s 14th five-year plan delivers remarkable results

    BEIJING, July 9 (Xinhua) — With the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025) nearing conclusion, China has clocked up a series of landmark achievements, including a resilient economy, solid steps in green transition and unwavering opening up.

    At a press conference on Wednesday, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), described the five years as a period of “pioneering progress, transformative breakthroughs, and historic achievements.”

    “China has become the most stable, reliable, and dynamic force in global development,” he said.

    RESILIENCE

    According to Zheng, China’s economic increment is projected to exceed 35 trillion yuan (4.89 trillion U.S. dollars) in the five-year period, contributing about 30 percent annually to global economic growth.

    Over the first four years of the period, the economy expanded at an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent, Zheng said, noting that despite the shocks of the pandemic and trade bullying, the growth of China, given its vast economic scale, is an unprecedented achievement.

    The steady economic performance has also translated into tangible livelihood improvements. Urban job creation stood at more than 12 million each year, reflecting the populous country’s stable labor market.

    The growth has especially been driven by deepening economic transformation. Domestic demand accounted for 86.4 percent of the GDP increase on average, with final consumption contributing 56.2 percent — an 8.6 percentage point increase over the previous planning period.

    Innovation played a key role in driving development. The country’s total R&D expenditure surged nearly 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, from 2020 to 2024, and its R&D intensity reached 2.68 percent, approaching the average of OECD economies.

    China’s national strength has been significantly enhanced during the five-year period, which will also offer opportunities for global development, Zheng said, adding that no matter how the international landscape evolves, the country will manage its own affairs well and push forward Chinese modernization.

    GREEN TRANSITION

    The five-year period also marked a leap forward in China’s ecological transformation, with more efficient energy utilization and a better natural environment.

    China has fulfilled its green promises and shouldered the responsibility of a major country. From 2021 to 2024, energy consumption per unit of GDP fell 11.6 percent, cutting carbon emissions by around 1.1 billion tonnes, nearly half the European Union’s total emissions in 2024.

    As a global leader in renewable energy, China’s installed renewable energy capacity reached 2.09 billion kilowatts by May 2025, more than doubling that in 2020. One in three kilowatt-hour of electricity nationwide is now from green sources.

    The adoption of green lifestyles has surged, with new energy vehicle ownership soaring to 31.4 million in 2024, up significantly from 4.92 million in 2020.

    Looking ahead, Zhou Haibing, a deputy head of the NDRC, said the next five-year period from 2026 to 2030 will be critical for achieving China’s 2030 target to peak carbon emissions.

    “We will redouble efforts and implement more pragmatic measures to promote the green transition in economic and social development and accelerate the modernization of harmony between humanity and nature,” he said.

    WIDER OPENING UP

    According to the press conference, foreign direct investment into China totaled 4.7 trillion yuan from 2021 through May 2025. Foreign-invested enterprises now account for one-third of China’s imports and exports, one-quarter of its industrial output, and one-seventh of its tax revenue, while creating more than 30 million jobs.

    Zhou hailed the success of foreign firms as a vivid testament to China’s improving business environment, which is becoming more market-oriented, law-based and internationalized.

    China has twice reduced its negative list for foreign investment since 2021. All restrictions on foreign access to the manufacturing sector have been lifted, and further liberalization has occurred in agriculture and services. Pilot initiatives in healthcare and value-added telecommunications have opened new opportunities for foreign businesses.

    Solid efforts have been made to ensure foreign firms receive national treatment and enjoy strong intellectual property protection.

    “China’s policies on attracting and utilizing foreign investment are consistent,” Zhou said, noting that China will continue to ease market access and expand openness in an orderly way, ensuring foreign companies have equal access to policy benefits, from public procurement to standard-setting.

    China remains and will continue to be an ideal, safe and promising destination for global investors, he said.

    MIL OSI China News –

    July 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Willis Aviation Services Limited Announces Long-Term Base Maintenance Partnership with Jet2.com

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    COCONUT CREEK, Fla., July 09, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Willis Lease Finance Corporation (NASDAQ: WLFC) (“WLFC” or the “Company”), the leading lessor of commercial aircraft engines and global provider of aviation services, announced today that its subsidiary, Willis Aviation Services Limited (“WASL”), a premier provider of aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (“MRO”) services, has secured a commitment from leading leisure airline Jet2.com (“Jet2”) for two base maintenance lines for the upcoming season.

    This announcement follows the successful completion of a single maintenance line for Jet2 this year, highlighting the strong performance and capabilities of the WASL delivery team in Teesside. Building on that success, Jet2 has expanded its commitment by adding a second maintenance line. Both lines will be carried out at WASL’s new state-of-the-art facility located at Teesside International Airport in Northeast England.

    As aircraft maintenance services remain in high demand across the UK and Europe, WASL’s recently announced expansion plans at Teesside add essential capacity to the UK MRO sector to perform heavy maintenance checks, transitional activity and paint for airlines and lessors globally. Further, the new Teesside facility is expected to create a significant number of new highly skilled jobs and contribute to the pipeline of talent that supports both immediate operational needs and long-term skill development in the region.

    “We are thrilled to continue our work supporting Jet2’s fleet at our expanding Teesside facility,” said Austin C. Willis, WLFC’s Chief Executive Officer. “Our investment in Teesside enables WASL to deliver essential services for airlines including Jet2 and reflects our commitment to driving local economic growth and creating skilled jobs in the UK aerospace industry.”

    “We are pleased with WASL’s engagement and performance with its base maintenance services for our fleet as we uphold the highest standards of safety, operational excellence and reliability for our customers,” said Chris Hubbard, Director of Engineering & Maintenance at Jet2.com. “We look forward to continuing our partnership with WASL in the 2025 and 2026 season.”

    Willis Lease Finance Corporation

    Willis Lease Finance Corporation (“WLFC”) leases large and regional spare commercial aircraft engines, auxiliary power units and aircraft to airlines, aircraft engine manufacturers and maintenance, repair, and overhaul providers worldwide. These leasing activities are integrated with engine and aircraft trading, engine lease pools and asset management services through Willis Asset Management Limited, as well as various end-of-life solutions for engines and aviation materials provided through Willis Aeronautical Services, Inc. Through Willis Engine Repair Center®, Jet Centre by Willis, and Willis Aviation Services Limited, the Company’s service offerings include Part 145 engine maintenance, aircraft line and base maintenance, aircraft disassembly, parking and storage, airport FBO and ground and cargo handling services. Willis Sustainable Fuels intends to develop, build and operate projects to help decarbonize aviation.

    Except for historical information, the matters discussed in this press release contain forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. Do not unduly rely on forward-looking statements, which give only expectations about the future and are not guarantees. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and we undertake no obligation to update them to reflect any change in the Company’s expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which the forward-looking statement is based, except as required by law. Our actual results may differ materially from the results discussed in forward-looking statements. Factors that might cause such a difference include, but are not limited to: the effects on the airline industry and the global economy of events such as war, terrorist activity and the COVID-19 pandemic; changes in oil prices, rising inflation and other disruptions to world markets; trends in the airline industry and our ability to capitalize on those trends, including growth rates of markets and other economic factors; risks associated with owning and leasing jet engines and aircraft; our ability to successfully negotiate equipment purchases, sales and leases, to collect outstanding amounts due and to control costs and expenses; changes in interest rates and availability of capital, both to us and our customers; our ability to continue to meet changing customer demands; regulatory changes affecting airline operations, aircraft maintenance, accounting standards and taxes; the market value of engines and other assets in our portfolio; and risks detailed in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K and other continuing  and current reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is advisable, however, to consult any further disclosures the Company makes on related subjects in such filings. These statements constitute the Company’s cautionary statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

     CONTACT: Lynn Mailliard Kohler
      Director, Global Corporate Communications
      (415) 328-4798

    The MIL Network –

    July 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Speech by FS at Korea-Hong Kong Business Luncheon (English only) (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4

         Following is the speech by the Financial Secretary, Mr Paul Chan, at the Korea–Hong Kong Business Luncheon held in Seoul, Korea, today (July 9): 
     
    Mr Joo Yong-tae (Deputy Mayor for Economy, Seoul), Mr Kevin Lee (Director of the International Trade Division of the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

         Annyeonghaseyo. Good afternoon. It is both a pleasure and honour to be here with you today in Seoul.
     
         Let me begin by extending my warmest greetings and heartfelt appreciation to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry and our ETO (Economic and Trade Office) colleagues for organising this luncheon.
     
    Hong Kong: good for business
     
         Allow me to start by offering a brief snapshot of where Hong Kong stands today.
     
         Hong Kong has been back on a path of growth following the global challenges of the pandemic.  In 2024, we recorded a GDP growth of 2.5 per cent. This year, despite continued global uncertainties from tariff war to geopolitical tensions, our economy recorded a 3.1 per cent growth in the first quarter. Our merchandise exports continued to register strong double-digit growth.
     
         Foreign businesses continue to cast a vote of confidence in our city. In 2024, the number of overseas and Mainland companies operating in Hong Kong reached an all-time high at nearly 10 000.  American and European companies rose by around 10 per cent, while Korean companies rose by 9 per cent year on year.  
     
         Hong Kong continues to shine in international rankings. We are among the world’s top three global financial centres. The latest IMD (International Institute for Management Development) World Competitiveness Ranking places us as the third most competitive economy worldwide. Last October, the Fraser Institute reaffirmed our position as the world’s freest economy. These accolades are no coincidence. They are the result of persistent hard work to drive our competitiveness forward, backed by transparent, consistent and predictable policies, market openness and global connectivity.
     
         A critical foundation of our success is a stable and secure environment. This year marks the fifth anniversary of the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law. It restores law and order in Hong Kong and provides confidence to the international business community. Indeed, a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce (in Hong Kong) in January this year showed that (more than) 80 per cent of its members expressed confidence in Hong Kong’s rule of law.  And 70 per cent reported that the National Security Law had no impact on their business operations.
     
         Under the “one country, two systems” framework, Hong Kong continues to be an open, diverse and international city. We are a free port, uphold a freely convertible currency pegged to the US dollar, ensure the free flow of capital, goods, information and talent, and practise the common law system.
     
         President Xi Jinping and the Central Government of China have made clear that the “one country, two systems” framework is here to stay for the long term. 
     
         Investor confidence is reflected in hard data. Our stock market, for example, rose by 18 per cent last year, and has gained another 20 per cent this year. Initial public offerings (IPOs) on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange have raised about US$16 billion so far this year, making Hong Kong the top IPO venue globally to date. The total bank deposits grew by 7 per cent last year and another 7 per cent this year, now exceeding US$2.3 trillion, six times our GDP.
     
    The Greater Bay Area
     
         Meanwhile, Hong Kong is the international gateway to the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, or GBA, which is an economic powerhouse with 87 million people and a combined GDP of US$2 trillion. With a per capita GDP of US$23,000, or US$40,000 on a purchasing power parity basis, the GBA is not just a manufacturing base, but also a sophisticated, high-growth consumer market.
     
         The region is deeply interconnected. High-speed rail puts us just 15 minutes from Shenzhen and 45 minutes from Guangzhou. With seven international airports and a combined annual passenger throughput of over 200 million, the GBA sits within a five-hour flight radius of half the world’s population. Hong Kong International Airport, the world’s busiest cargo airport, now operates with a third runway and is gearing up to handle 120 million passengers and 10 million tonnes of cargo annually by 2035.
     
         The GBA is also a cradle of innovation. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou science and technology cluster ranks second globally in innovation, and has done so for five consecutive years. Hong Kong excels in basic research, anchored by five universities ranked among the world’s top 100. Three of them are in the global top 20 for data science and AI; our two medical schools are ranked among the top 40. Meanwhile, Shenzhen and Guangzhou lead in commercialisation and advanced manufacturing. Together, the GBA is like fusing the financial power of New York with the innovation energy of Silicon Valley.
     
    Opportunities for Korean businesses
     
         So, what does this mean for Korean businesses?
     
         First, Hong Kong’s financial markets offer unparalleled connectivity and liquidity. We serve as a two-way platform, connecting international capital with Mainland markets and vice versa. Through our Connect Schemes, including Stock Connect, Bond Connect, and ETF (Exchange-traded Fund) Connect, and more, Mainland investors can access Hong Kong’s markets, while global investors can access the Mainland through Hong Kong.
     
         The recent surge in our stock market reflects two important trends. First, the rebalancing act of international investors to diversify risks out of global economic uncertainty, particularly in the US; and second, optimism about China’s technology prowess demonstrated by DeepSeek and others. Korean investors have already taken note. And they are apt in taking actions. In February this year, we saw the highest level of Korean investment into our stock market in over three years.
     
         Beyond the stock market, asset and wealth management is another area where we are seeing rapid growth. Hong Kong now manages over US$4 trillion in assets. With a growing ecosystem of related financial services, we are on track to become the world’s largest cross-border wealth management hub by 2028. For Korean firms in private banking and asset management, the opportunities are significant. Indeed, many American and European asset and wealth managers have been expanding their hiring and office accommodation in the city.
     
         Hong Kong also serves as a powerful springboard for Korean goods, not just into the GBA or the Chinese Mainland, but across the entire ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region. As a duty-free port with seamless customs clearance and unmatched connectivity, Hong Kong offers Korean exporters a fast, cost-effective and reliable route to high-growth markets. From electronics and cosmetics to food products and fashion, Hong Kong is your launchpad.
     
         In innovation and technology, Hong Kong is making strategic and forward-looking moves. We are placing particular emphasis on the development of key sectors such as artificial intelligence and biotech. In addition to our world-class research capabilities, Hong Kong is where Mainland and international data converge. This is a distinct competitive advantage for data-intensive industries.  
     
         Our close collaboration with other cities in the GBA is further accelerating this momentum.  Along our boundary with neighbouring Shenzhen, we are developing a joint innovation and technology park, where we are piloting innovative policies to facilitate the seamless flow of data, talent, capital and even biosamples. We have also established joint clinical trial centres to expedite drug development and streamline cross-boundary regulatory approvals. For Korean tech and pharmaceutical firms seeking expansion and collaboration opportunities, Hong Kong is your ideal location. 
     
    The pleasures of life
     
         Beyond business, Hong Kong is a city alive with culture, diversity, and global connectivity. We are a true melting pot of East and West.  Korean culture, from K-pop to kimchi, has found a warm and enthusiastic following in Hong Kong.  And we are glad that more and more Korean visitors are coming to our city to see for themselves our vibrancy. In the first half of this year, Hong Kong welcomes more than half a million of Korean visitors, a 25 per cent increase year on year.
     
         The pleasures of life are part of our fabric. With more than 200 Michelin-recognised restaurants, hiking trails minutes from the city, and a coastline that rivals the best in the region, Hong Kong offers not only opportunity, but quality of life. Above all, Hong Kong remains one of the safest cities in the world, a place you can walk freely, day or night.
     
         And we are just getting started. The newly opened Kai Tak Sports Park offers a world-class, multipurpose venue for sport and entertainment events. In January next year, we’re excited to welcome BLACKPINK to our stage. And who knows, NewJeans and aespa may not be far behind!
     
         Ladies and gentlemen, I hope I’ve been able to offer you a fresh perspective on Hong Kong, not just as a financial centre or trade hub, but as a dynamic, welcoming city filled with opportunity, energy and creativity. A city where Korean businesses, investors and talents can thrive.
     
         If I may, let me now share a short video that captures the vibrancy, openness and possibilities of Hong Kong today.
     
         That is Hong Kong – dynamic and welcoming. A city that means business, and a city that celebrates life. We look forward to welcoming you soon, to Hong Kong.
     
         Kamsahamnida. Thank you very much.

                  

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Stockpiling and Medical Countermeasures Strategies to strengthen crisis readiness and health security

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Strasbourg, 09 Jul 2025 The European Commission launches today two initiatives under its Preparedness Union agenda: an EU Stockpiling Strategy and a Medical Countermeasures Strategy. Both are designed to improve access to essential goods for European citizens and societies, businesses and economies – ensuring continuity of essential goods and lifesaving medical supplies at all times, in particular during crises such as major energy blackouts, natural disasters, conflicts or pandemics.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: High-level Chinese delegation in historic visit to Parliament

    Source: APO


    .

    Uganda’s Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Thomas Tayebwa, has praised China’s growing partnership with Uganda, hailing it as historic and transformative.

    Parliament on Tuesday 08, July 2025 welcomed the high-level Chinese delegation led by H.E. Jiang Zuojun, the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and Chairman of the Central Committee of the China Zhi Gong Party, in a move expected to bolster legislative cooperation and economic collaboration between the two countries.

    While delivering his welcoming remarks, Deputy Speaker Thomas Tayebwa flanked by several Members of Parliament commended President Xi Jinping and President Yoweri Museveni for strengthening ties between Kampala and Beijing.

    “I want to appreciate H.E. Xi Jinping, the President of the People’s Republic of China, for the great friendship he has exhibited towards Uganda in particular and Africa at large. His good working relationship with H.E. President Museveni has ensured steady development of our country and our relations are at a level never seen before,” he said.

    Tayebwa also acknowledged China’s support in several critical sectors, including infrastructure, health, and trade. He specifically noted China’s contribution of anti-malaria drugs worth 8 million Yuan, 50,000 COVID-19 testing kits, and 600,000 vaccine doses at the height of the pandemic.

    “Indeed, China proved the old saying ‘a friend in need is a friend indeed’. This helped us to save our people,” Tayebwa noted.

    In the trade sector, the Deputy Speaker highlighted Uganda’s growing exports to China but expressed concern over the trade imbalance, with Uganda exporting goods worth US$54 million in 2024 compared to US$1.1 billion in imports.

    “I request for technical support so that we can meet the required standards in the short term,” he appealed.

    On behalf of the Chinese delegation, H.E. Jiang Zuojun reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to Africa and Uganda, describing current China-Africa relations as the strongest in history.

    “Just as President Xi Jinping of China notes, the friendship of China and Africa transcends time and space and is passed down through generations. Now China-Africa friendship is at its best, elevating to a China-Africa community with a shared future for a new era,” Jiang said.

    He noted that Uganda is a key partner on the continent and that the partnership was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership following the 2023 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

    Speaking during the engagement, Hon. Nathan Nandala-Mafabi, MP for Budadiri County West, urged both sides to revisit previously abandoned trade partnerships, especially in Uganda’s top export coffee.

    “There was a company called China Uganda, which was formed to deal in coffee, and I would imagine that company should be revived if it is dead, for purpose of allowing coffee, which is our leading export, to enter the China market,” Nandala-Mafabi said, citing barriers in accessing the Chinese market.

    This meeting marks the first official visit by a delegation from the Central Committee of the China Zhi Gong Party to the Ugandan Parliament, and both sides pledged to deepen bilateral and legislative ties for mutual development.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: China’s 2021-2025 economic increment projected to exceed 35 trillion yuan: Official

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China’s State Council Information Office holds a press conference on the country’s high-quality fulfillment of targets set for the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025), in Beijing, capital of China, July 9, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    China’s economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025), with its economic increment projected to exceed 35 trillion yuan (4.89 trillion U.S. dollars).

    Over the first four years of the period, the economy expanded at an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said Wednesday at a press conference.

    Despite the shocks of the pandemic and trade bullying, China’s growth is an unprecedented achievement given its vast economic scale, Zheng said.

    Highlighting the great economic dynamism, Zheng said the country’s total R&D expenditure surged nearly 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, from 2020 to 2024, and the number of registered private enterprises surpassed 58 million at the end of May 2025, over 40 percent higher than 2020. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: China’s 2021-2025 economic increment projected to exceed 35 trillion yuan: Official

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China’s State Council Information Office holds a press conference on the country’s high-quality fulfillment of targets set for the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025), in Beijing, capital of China, July 9, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    China’s economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025), with its economic increment projected to exceed 35 trillion yuan (4.89 trillion U.S. dollars).

    Over the first four years of the period, the economy expanded at an average annual growth rate of 5.5 percent, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said Wednesday at a press conference.

    Despite the shocks of the pandemic and trade bullying, China’s growth is an unprecedented achievement given its vast economic scale, Zheng said.

    Highlighting the great economic dynamism, Zheng said the country’s total R&D expenditure surged nearly 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, from 2020 to 2024, and the number of registered private enterprises surpassed 58 million at the end of May 2025, over 40 percent higher than 2020. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    July 9, 2025
  • PM Modi shares highlights of meetings with Chile President, UN Chief and Rousseff at BRICS

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday shared glimpses of his meetings with key international figures — including Chilean President Gabriel Boric Font, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff — held on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

    Sharing details about his meeting with Chilean President Gabriel Boric Font, PM Modi highlighted the growing friendship between the two nations.

    “Delighted to have met President Gabriel Boric Font of Chile during the Rio BRICS Summit. India-Chile friendship is getting stronger and stronger!” PM Modi said in a post on X.

    https://x.com/narendramodi/status/1942569161743556985

    In April, the Chilean President paid a state visit to India accompanied by a high-level delegation, including ministers, Members of Parliament, senior officials, business associations, media and prominent Chileans involved in the India-Chile cultural connect.

    During that visit, which marked 76 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries, both leaders discussed in detail the historic diplomatic ties established in 1949, growing trade linkages, people-to-people connections, cultural exchanges and the warm and cordial bilateral relations. They also expressed their desire to further expand and deepen the multifaceted relationship in all areas of mutual interest.

    PM Modi also met United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in Rio de Janeiro on Monday.

    Taking to X, PM Modi said, “Interacted with Mr. António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro yesterday.”

    https://x.com/narendramodi/status/1942568681692893508

    India’s deepening engagement with the UN is based on its steadfast commitment to multilateralism and dialogue as the keys to achieving shared goals and addressing common global challenges, including peacebuilding and peacekeeping, sustainable development, poverty eradication, environment, climate change, terrorism, disarmament, human rights, health and pandemics, migration, cyber security, space and frontier technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, and comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including reform of the Security Council.

    PM Modi also shared details about his productive conversation with former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who now heads the New Development Bank (NDB).

    Rousseff was in Rio de Janeiro to celebrate the progress made by the ‘BRICS Bank’ and discuss reforms of global financial institutions within the BRICS framework.

    “Productive interaction with Dilma Rousseff, President of the New Development Bank and former President of Brazil,” the Prime Minister said on X.

    https://x.com/narendramodi/status/1942569414353703136

    Earlier in the day, Lula welcomed PM Modi at the Alvorada Palace in Brasilia, where he was given a ceremonial reception featuring a 114-horse escort for his car. The two leaders then held a restricted-format meeting, followed by delegation-level discussions and the signing of agreements.

    —IANS

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Orezone Reports Q2-2025 Production and Hard Rock Expansion Update

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, July 08, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Orezone Gold Corporation (TSX: ORE, OTCQX: ORZCF) (the “Company” or “Orezone”) is pleased to announce its Q2-2025 gold production results and stage 1 hard rock expansion construction update at its Bomboré Gold Mine. All dollar amounts are in USD unless otherwise indicated and abbreviation “M” means million.   

    Q2-2025 Production Results

    • Gold production of 27,548 ounces
    • Gold sales of 28,265 ounces at a realized price of $3,338 per ounce for revenue of $94.3M
    • Cash balance of $72.6M with available liquidity (cash and undrawn debt) of $103.9M at June 30, 2025. Senior debt at June 30, 2025 of $65.3M after principal repayments of $5.2M and foreign exchange movements in the quarter

    Stage 1 Hard Rock Construction Update

    • Construction of the stage 1 hard rock expansion remains on schedule and on budget with mill commissioning and first gold pour slated for Q4-2025
    • Engineering and procurement now complete
    • Dump pocket and jaw crusher foundation significantly advanced
    • SAG mill foundation complete, with SAG mill installation commenced
    • CIL tank installation complete, with structural steel installation now underway
    • Several mining areas for hard rock mining have now been readied in preparation for commencement of hard rock mining later this year
    • Construction of explosives magazine, in support of future hard rock blasting, now complete

    Patrick Downey, President & CEO stated, “Q2 was another solid operating quarter at Bomboré, with gold production in line with plan. The Company remains well-positioned to achieve its 2025 production guidance of 115,000-130,000 ounces, with Q4 expected as the strongest quarter.

    During Q2, the Company made material progress advancing the stage 1 hard rock expansion and upon its nearby completion, will mark a material transformation in the Bomboré operation, with forecasted gold production set to increase by approximately 45% to 170,000-185,000 ounces in 2026.

    Further positioning the Company for a significant transformation, Orezone has advanced (1) its application for a secondary listing on the Australian Securities Exchange (“ASX”), with official listing expected in mid-August, and (2) its plans to accelerate the stage 2 hard rock expansion to an upsized 5.5 million tonnes per annum (“Mtpa”) operation two years ahead of schedule (see February 23, 2025 news release). While subject to final Board approval, the stage 2 expansion is projected to increase the overall gold production at Bomboré to 220,000-250,000 ounces per year.”

    Bomboré Q2-2025 Production Results (100% Basis)

      Unit Q2-2025   Q1-2025   Six Months Ended
    June 30, 2025
     
    Ore processed Tonnes 1,565,022   1,511,303   3,076,325  
    Ore grade Au g/t 0.62   0.67   0.65  
    Plant recovery % 87.8   87.9   87.8  
    Gold produced Au oz 27,548   28,688   56,236  
                   

    Hard Rock Plant Expansion Overview

    The 2.5Mtpa stage 1 hard rock expansion is designed to process higher-grade hard rock ore. The expansion is independent of the adjacent 6.0Mtpa oxide plant but will utilize a number of shared services and infrastructure including the tailings storage facility, warehouses, administration complex, and technical services. The concentrated scope of the brownfield expansion significantly reduces schedule and budget risk in comparison to a new build, with the ramp-up to benefit from the well-established mining, processing, and maintenance teams onsite.

    This stage 1 expansion is scheduled for commissioning in Q4-2025 and as with the oxide plant, which had a nameplate capacity of 5.2Mtpa, the Company views the potential to achieve significantly better throughput rates than that of the 2.5Mtpa stage 1 design.

    With the strong price of gold, the Company continues to evaluate the timing of the stage 2 hard rock expansion, which will increase the nameplate throughput to 5.5Mtpa, yielding a forecasted overall production profile of 225,000-250,000 ounces per year. With a 5.5Mtpa jaw crusher currently being installed in stage 1, the stage 2 expansion will primarily consist of a ball mill, pebble crusher, thickener, four additional CIL tanks and a gold room upgrade. The stage 1 design and layout were made to easily accommodate these stage 2 additions.

    Figure 1: Bomboré Processing Complex – Hard Rock Plant Layout (blue labels) Relative to Oxide Plant and Other Established Infrastructure (white labels)

    Figure 2: Stage 1 Hard Rock Expansion – Major Plant Component Construction

    Contact Information

    Patrick Downey
    President and Chief Executive Officer

    Kevin MacKenzie
    Vice President, Corporate Development and Investor Relations

    Tel: 1 778 945 8977
    info@orezone.com / www.orezone.com

    For further information please contact Orezone at +1 (778) 945-8977 or visit the Company’s website at www.orezone.com.

    The Toronto Stock Exchange neither approves nor disapproves the information contained in this news release.

    Qualified Persons

    The scientific and technical information in this news release was reviewed and approved by Mr. Rob Henderson, P. Eng, Vice-President of Technical Services and Mr. Dale Tweed, P. Eng., Vice-President of Engineering, both of whom are Qualified Persons as defined under NI 43-101 – Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains certain information that may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable Canadian Securities laws and “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of applicable U.S. securities laws (together, “forward-looking statements”).  Forward-looking statements are frequently characterized by words such as “plan”, “expect”, “project”, “intend”, “believe”, “anticipate”, “estimate”, “potential”, “possible” and other similar words, or statements that certain events or conditions “may”, “will”, “could”, or “should” occur.  Forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to, statements that Orezone is positioned for a transformational 2025, the Company is positioned well to achieve its 2025 production guidance of 115,000-130,000 ounces, the target of listing on the ASX in mid-August 2025, the construction of the stage 1 hard rock expansion is well advanced with completion and commissioning set for Q4-2025 and once commissioned, will increase annual production by approximately 45%, the potential greater capacity than the 2.5Mtpa design of the hard rock plant, and statements with respect to the stage 2 hard rock expansion.

    All such forward-looking statements are based on certain assumptions and analyses made by management in light of their experience and perception of historical trends, current conditions and expected future developments, as well as other factors management and the qualified persons believe are appropriate in the circumstances.

    All forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual events or results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, delays caused by pandemics, terrorist or other violent attacks (including cyber security attacks), the failure of parties to contracts to honour contractual commitments, unexpected changes in laws, rules or regulations, or their enforcement by applicable authorities; social or labour unrest; changes in commodity prices; unexpected failure or inadequacy of infrastructure, the possibility of unanticipated costs and expenses, accidents and equipment breakdowns, political risk, unanticipated changes in key management personnel and general economic, market or business conditions, the failure of exploration programs, including drilling programs, to deliver anticipated results and the failure of ongoing and uncertainties relating to the availability and costs of financing needed in the future, and other factors described in the Company’s most recent annual information form and management discussion and analysis filed on SEDAR+. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.

    Although the forward-looking statements contained in this press release are based upon what management of the Company believes are reasonable assumptions, the Company cannot assure investors that actual results will be consistent with these forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. Subject to applicable securities laws, the Company does not assume any obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of this press release.

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at:
    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/000f28d2-5832-4801-aea9-c0d28d9e71d1

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/c5ac3b77-7344-42d6-b2fe-ce36c3f88117

    The MIL Network –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Building Resilient Food Systems in Sierra Leone: Sustainable Agriculture, Community Empowerment, and Strategic Partnerships for Long-Term Food Security

    Source: APO

    The Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), through the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS) working with its development partners, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank, is implementing a Food Systems Resilience Programme.

    This programme seeks to reduce food and nutrition insecurity and enhance the resilience of food systems for vulnerable communities in Sierra Leone. It focuses on rehabilitating Inland Valley Swamps (IVS) and on restocking livestock.

    Global Context: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on Food Supply Chains and the Lasting Effects of COVID-19

    The Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly disrupted production and supply chains, impacting much of Africa and beyond as the two countries are major global producers of commodities such as oil, gas, cereals, oil grains, and fertilizer. Commodity prices for fuel, wheat, oil palm, and fertilizer have soared. This comes on the back of increases in shipping costs and disruption in the global food supply chain due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which has kept global food prices higher than pre-pandemic levels.

    The government developed a Quick Action Food Security Response Plan (QA-FSRP) outlining the much-needed interventions to support the government’s ability to respond to potential food security threats from the Russia-Ukraine crisis. It focuses on short-term measures, as well as lays the foundation for medium to long-term investment to boost agriculture productivity. This plan outlines both immediate interventions and lays the foundation for medium- to long-term investments to boost agricultural productivity.

    Empowering Farmers through Critical Support and Capacity Building

    The primary objective of this component is to strengthen the legacy Inland Valley Swamps developed by sister projects that are not being properly utilized to intensify rice and vegetable production by rehabilitation.

    One of the key achievements is the provision of critical agricultural inputs coupled with capacity building to all beneficiaries with technical support from the MAFS Agricultural Engineering division to actualize the rehabilitation and cultivation of 850 ha of Inland Valley Swamp across the six districts in Sierra Leone. This approach warranted the timely completion of cultivation across all the beneficiary farming groups with a huge prospect of high yield during harvest.

    Another key success story is the introduction of cash-based support to for targeted farmers based on measured work. This approach has empowered farmers to make choices based on their priorities, needs, and preferences, to exercise greater control over their own lives.  

    Lessons learned and Solutions

    One of the programme’s key achievements is the provision of critical agricultural inputs, paired with capacity-building support for all beneficiaries, facilitated by technical assistance from the Agricultural Engineering division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. This support enabled the successful rehabilitation and cultivation of 850 hectares of Inland Valley Swamp across six districts in Sierra Leone. The intervention has resulted in timely planting across all beneficiary groups, with promising high yields anticipated during harvest. Additionally, the IVS intervention in peri-urban areas like Bo has mitigated the effects of flooding, thanks to reconstructed waterways and drainage canals. 

    Empowering Farmers with Cash-Based Support

    A key component of the programme is the conditional cash transfer model, which gave farmers the freedom to buy what they needed most, whether it is medicine, food, schoolbooks, clothes, or many other things. For instance, in one of the IVS sites in the Daru community after the disbursement of cash to farmers, qualitative evidence showed that farmers who successfully received their cash support used some of it to purchase food, pay school fees, buy mobile phones, and pay hospital bills for their children.

    Community Involvement and Stakeholder Engagement for Sustainable Impact

    The active involvement of community and chiefdom stakeholders makes it easier to organize and establish any structure and create ownership and sustainability. When community members are given the space to act and are involved in the design of the activity, they bring innovative ideas and demonstrate willingness and commitment to see it through. This is visible in this project through the involvement of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, local community members, and district stakeholders in the formal handing over of agricultural inputs, collaboration in project implementation, and involvement in key decision-making platforms such as the project stakeholder engagement and inception workshops. Women and youth have also demonstrated a strong willingness to learn skills and accept changes.

    Recommendations to Peers

    Providing training alongside inputs can promote the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices, leading to long-term environmental benefits. Additionally, the involvement of government technical staff in monitoring and training beneficiaries during the IVS rehabilitation and cultivation exercise proved highly valuable. These staff members are expected to maintain a consistent presence in the communities for ongoing monitoring after the project concludes, ensuring continuity.

    Furthermore, the use of a community-based model, in which beneficiary farming groups were actively involved in the rehabilitation and cultivation of IVS paddy fields is a clear testament to the sustainability of the project.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO): Regional Office for Africa.

    Media files

    .

    MIL OSI Africa –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: How Philadelphia’s current sanitation strike differs from past labor disputes in the city

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Francis Ryan, Associate Professor of Labor Studies and Employment Relations, Rutgers University

    Curbside trash collection has been on pause in Philadelphia since July 1, 2025. AP Photo/Matt Slocum

    As the Philadelphia municipal worker strike enters its second week, so-called “Parker piles” – large collections of garbage that some residents blame on Mayor Cherelle Parker – continue to build up in neighborhoods across the city.

    The AFSCME District Council 33 union on strike represents about 9,000 blue-collar workers in the city, including sanitation workers, 911 dispatchers, city mechanics and water department staff.

    The Conversation U.S. asked Francis Ryan, a professor of labor studies at Rutgers University and author of “AFSCME’s Philadelphia Story: Municipal Workers and Urban Power in Philadelphia in the Twentieth Century,” about the history of sanitation strikes in Philly and what makes this one unique.

    Has anything surprised you about this strike?

    This strike marks the first time in the history of labor relations between the City of Philadelphia and the AFSCME District Council 33 union where social media is playing a significant role in how the struggle is unfolding.

    The union is getting their side of the story out on Instagram and other social media platforms, and citizens are taking up or expressing sympathy with their cause.

    Some city residents are referring to the garbage build-up sites as ‘Parker piles.’
    AP Photo/Tassanee Vejpongsa

    How successful are trash strikes in Philly or other U.S. cities?

    As I describe in my book, Philadelphia has a long history of sanitation strikes that goes back to March 1937. At that time, a brief work stoppage brought about discussions between the city administration and an early version of the current union.

    When over 200 city workers were laid off in September 1938, city workers called a weeklong sanitation strike. Street battles raged in West Philadelphia when strikers blocked police-escorted trash wagons that were aiming to collect trash with workers hired to replace the strikers.

    Philadelphia residents, many of whom were union members who worked in textile, steel, food and other industries rallied behind the strikers. The strikers’ demands were met, and a new union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, or AFSCME, was formally recognized by the city.

    This strike was a major event because it showed how damaging a garbage strike could be. The fact that strikers were willing to fight in the streets to stop trash services showed that such events had the potential for violence, not to mention the health concerns from having tons of trash on the streets.

    There was another two-week trash strike in Philadelphia in 1944, but there wouldn’t be another for more than 20 years.

    However, a growing number of sanitation strikes popped up around the country in the 1960s, the most infamous being the 1968 Memphis Sanitation Strike.

    Black sanitation workers peacefully march wearing placards reading ‘I Am A Man’ during the Memphis sanitation strike in 1968.
    Bettmann via Getty Images

    In Memphis, a majority African American sanitation workforce demanded higher wages, basic safety procedures and recognition of their union. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. rallied to support the Memphis workers and their families as part of his Poor Peoples’ Campaign, which sought to organize working people from across the nation into a new coalition to demand full economic and political rights.

    On April 4, 1968, Dr. King was assassinated. His death put pressure on Memphis officials to settle the strike, and on April 16 the the strikers secured their demands.

    Following the Memphis strike, AFSCME began organizing public workers around the country and through the coming years into the 1970s, there were sanitation strikes and slowdowns across the nation including in New York City, Atlanta, Cleveland and Washington, D.C. Often, these workers, who were predominantly African American, gained the support of significant sections of the communities they served and secured modest wage boosts.

    By the 1980s, such labor actions were becoming fewer. In 1986, Philadelphia witnessed a three-week sanitation strike that ended with the union gaining some of its wage demands, but losing on key areas related to health care benefits.

    Workers begin removing mounds of trash after returning to work after the 18-day strike in Philadelphia in July 1986.
    Bettmann via Getty Images

    How do wages and benefits for DC33 workers compare to other U.S. cities?

    DC 33 president Greg Boulware has said that the union’s members make an average salary of $46,000 per year. According to MIT’s Living Wage Calculator, that is $2,000 less than what a single adult with no kids needs to reasonably support themselves living in Philadelphia.

    Sanitation workers who collect curbside trash earn a salary of $42,500 to $46,200, or $18-$20 an hour. NBC Philadelphia reports that those wages are the lowest of any of the major cities they looked at. Hourly wages in the other cities they looked at ranged from $21 an hour in Dallas to $25-$30 an hour in Chicago.

    Unlike other eras, the fact that social media makes public these personal narratives and perspectives – like from former sanitation worker Terrill Haigler, aka “Ya Fav Trashman” – is shaping the way many citizens respond to these disruptions. I see a level of support for the strikers that I believe is unprecedented going back as far as 1938.

    What do you think is behind this support?

    The pandemic made people more aware of the role of essential workers in society. If the men and women who do these jobs can’t afford their basic needs, something isn’t right. This may explain why so many people are seeing things from the perspective of striking workers.

    At the same time, money is being cut from important services at the federal, state and local levels. The proposed gutting of the city’s mass transit system by state lawmakers is a case in point. Social media allows people to make these broader connections and start conversations.

    If the strike continues much longer, I think it will gain more national and international attention, and bring discussions about how workers should be treated to the forefront.

    Francis Ryan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How Philadelphia’s current sanitation strike differs from past labor disputes in the city – https://theconversation.com/how-philadelphias-current-sanitation-strike-differs-from-past-labor-disputes-in-the-city-260676

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Viet Nam, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Strengthened Human Rights Framework, Raise Issues Concerning Discrimination and Reports of Media Repression

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, and raised issues concerning discrimination in various areas of public life and reports of a repressive media landscape.

    A Committee Expert praised the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, saying they reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform. They welcomed the recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    However, Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, another Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination.

    The Committee also expressed concern about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence.  One Expert asked for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Thanh Tịnh Nguyễn, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation, in response to these questions and others, said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and the State’s legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life, the delegation said.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, the delegation said, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations or harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but needed to be in line with international law.  Viet Nam strictly dealt with efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, in line with international agreements.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Nguyễn said the protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people. Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and had worked to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and domestic violence was positive, but there were several remaining concerns requiring attention, including regarding severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, he concluded.

    The delegation of Viet Nam was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Office of the Government; the Supreme People’s Procuracy; the Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Supreme People’s Court; the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism; the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities and Religions; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 10 a.m., Thursday 10 July to hold an informal meeting with States.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam (CCPR/C/VNM/4).

    Presentation of the Report

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said, guided by the principle of placing people at the centre — as both the goal and the driving force of development, Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach, whereby the people were regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the system.  These efforts aimed to implement effective measures to protect and ensure human rights and citizens’ rights in accordance with the law.  Immediately following the constructive dialogue with the Committee in 2019, the Government of Viet Nam adopted a national action plan to implement the Covenant and the Committee’s recommendations, with the aim of clearly identifying areas in need of improvement and undertaking necessary institutional and practical measures to ensure substantive progress.

    With regard to institutional and legal reform, since the submission of the fourth national report, Viet Nam had amended, supplemented, or enacted over 150 laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, many of which were directly related to the lives of the people and aimed at advancing civil and political rights.  Most recently, Viet Nam adopted the amended Criminal Code, which narrowed the scope of application of the death penalty by abolishing capital punishment for eight offences, and had recently adopted Resolution 66 on reforming the legislative process.  Viet Nam was also vigorously advancing a comprehensive reform of the State administrative apparatus.

    Viet Nam had undertaken a range of measures to enhance transparency, openness, and efficiency in the implementation of laws and policies.  Human rights education had been integrated into the national curriculum.  Viet Nam had issued and effectively implemented a range of policies that directly promoted and protected civil and political rights.  In the area of social security policy, Viet Nam remained firmly committed to ensuring social welfare, public safety, and the well-being of its people, under the guiding principle of “leaving no one behind.”  Viet Nam had also taken proactive measures to respond to climate change and to support the people in the context of disaster relief efforts. It had further placed strong emphasis on investing in infrastructure and enabling conditions to ensure public access to information, and was currently recognised as one of the countries with the most affordable internet access.  Rapid developments had significantly contributed to the realisation of the rights to freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and access to information.

    In the process of ensuring, protecting, and promoting the realisation of human rights, Viet Nam continued to face various difficulties and challenges arising from multiple factors that affect the implementation of the Covenant. These included limited resources; instances where the enforcement of laws had not met expectations; and the growing impact of global issues and non-traditional security threats in the context of Viet Nam’s  international integration.

    Viet Nam was in the process of building and perfecting a socialist rule-of-law State for the people, in order to build a high-quality legal system that effectively ensured and protected human rights and citizens’ rights, in a manner consistent with national realities and international standards.  In this process, Viet Nam would continue to seriously fulfil its international human rights commitments, and further promote dialogue and cooperation in this important area.  At the same time, Viet Nam would implement comprehensive measures to better promote, protect, and ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and to improve resilience to climate change — particularly for vulnerable groups — through appropriate steps in the time to come.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights.  These developments reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform.  The Committee commended Viet Nam for its recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, which marked a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    Given reports that Directive 24 broadly defined international integration as a national security threat, leading to systemic restrictions on freedoms of expression, association, and movement, how did Viet Nam reconcile this directive with the Covenant’s articles 19, 21, and 22, an Expert asked.  Regarding disaster response and recovery efforts, as well as campaigns to eliminate temporary housing, the report did not address the adoption of a precautionary approach or specific measures to protect the most vulnerable from the negative impacts of climate change and natural disasters, and the Expert asked what specific measures Viet Nam had adopted to implement a precautionary approach to environmental and climate risks, and how vulnerable groups were identified and protected in these policies.

    Regarding the death penalty, an Expert asked about the criteria used to select offences to be removed from the scope of the death penalty; the reasons that led Viet Nam to stop short of full abolition; and considerations that had prevented the country from following the path toward complete abolition of the death penalty.  What measures were in place to ensure full respect for due process guarantees in death penalty cases, and to prevent the imposition of the death penalty as a result of forced confessions?  On enforced disappearances, the Expert asked whether Vietnamese law defined and criminalised all acts of enforced disappearance in accordance with international standards, and about measures in place to ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into allegations of enforced disappearance and transnational repression.

    Another Expert asked for an update on progress made towards the establishment of the national human rights institution, and for more detailed and concrete information on the status of the legislative review and the reasons for the continued delays in establishing the body.  What measures did the State party plan to take to ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, solitary confinement, incommunicado detention and forced commitment to psychiatric facilities were promptly and thoroughly investigated by an independent body and that perpetrators were prosecuted and sanctioned with appropriate penalties, and to investigate all reported instances of deaths of prisoners while detained?  What measures would the State party take to ensure that national legislation protecting the rights of detainees was implemented in practice, in particular the right to medical care?

    An Expert commended the State party for its continued efforts to combat corruption, but noted that further efforts were needed to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives.  He expressed particular concern relating to allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, and asked for information on any actions taken in response to such cases.  He noted reports indicating persistent concerns that the enforcement of anti-corruption laws was perceived as selective and politically driven.  The Expert asked for further details on the mandates, composition, appointment procedures, and safeguards in place to ensure the independence of the three types of agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts.  He also asked whether the draft Law on the State of Emergency was fully compatible with article four of the Covenant, including its substantive and procedural requirements.

    Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, an Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination, and on investigations, sanctions and reparations for victims; about employees with disabilities in the public and private sectors; and on the existence of other protection mechanisms.  Regarding women’s rights, the Expert asked about progress that had been made over the last ten years, including regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, noting that women’s rights had been violated by these forms of discrimination.  Was the State going to work towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage or civil partnership?  Had measures been taken to address the issue of stigmatisation, harassment, violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    An Expert expressed concern for the realities of Khmer Krom women, who were highly vulnerable to various human rights violations due to their gender, facing a high risk of systematic inequalities and abuse.  Other areas of concern included the wide salary gap between men and women, as well as continuing differentiation of retirement ages between men and women, the participation of women in political life, and that there still needed to be evidence of a minimum degree of physical injury for an act to be legally recognised as rape.  In view of these, the Expert asked what measures had been taken to increase women’s participation, specifically ethnic minority women and women in rural areas, in all private and public sectors, as well as high-level decision-making positions and political life.

    The Expert also expressed concern about the situation of drug users confined to drug rehabilitation centres, asking for more information on measures taken to ensure that all legislation concerning drug detoxification and rehabilitation centres, particularly the provisions retaining compulsory drug treatment, including for children between 12 and 18, were in line with the Covenant.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and its legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.  There was a separate chapter in the Constitution on human rights that was in line with the Covenant.  Human rights could only be suspended for reasons of national security, public safety, and public health.  Only the National Assembly could suspend human rights, in line with the Constitution. As part of the law-making process in Viet Nam, there needed to be a consultation with stakeholders, including those affected by the law.  Human rights topics were now included in the national educational curriculum.  The State conducted many campaigns on human rights, and information on human rights was translated into various national minority languages and made available, including online.  Viet Nam had adopted various national measures to ensure national security and the safe and productive life of its people.

    Viet Nam was implementing the Covenant in various ways, including through its law and education.  According to the law, the Covenant needed to be prioritised if there were differences between it and the law.  If any discrepancies were identified, the Covenant took precedence.  There were training courses for judges and lawyers and other legal professionals on the provisions of the Covenant.

    Viet Nam was one of the countries seriously affected by climate change, which caused many socio-economic challenges.  The Government attached great importance to those whose rights had been affected by the phenomenon, and ensured that sustainable and green development and the climate change strategy of Viet Nam were prioritised in all policies.  Many important activities had been adopted for ethnic minorities, including access to adequate, clean water, and the development of a medical network that focused on climate change-related diseases.  The Government had also developed a plan to review infrastructure in climate change-prone areas, including water infrastructure.  The climate change strategy had many implications on the enjoyment of the human rights of the people.  Viet Nam promoted international cooperation to ensure that all could fight climate change issues, whilst cooperating with all international agencies.

    On discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, anti-discrimination was a part of the legal framework, and over the past years Viet Nam had taken many steps to better protect the members of the community, to ensure that none would be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexual identity.  The provision in the law criminalising same-sex marriage had been removed more than 10 years ago, although there was no law legalising same-sex marriage.  The new Criminal Code, since 2015, contained provisions regarding sexual offences which protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  In 2022, the Ministry of Health introduced a guideline giving direction to local authorities, which ensured that these persons could not be subject to discrimination. On oversight of activities in the medical sector, so far, no complaints had been received, meaning that there were no violations of the guidelines.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons had access to services to support them, and could change their legal identity, ensuring that they were not discriminated against.

    On anti-corruption efforts, Viet Nam had implemented many activities aiming to perfect the legal framework, including the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Law within the Criminal Code and related preventive measures.  It had also strengthened its monitoring activities, streamlined the administrative apparatus to better support the functions of the State, and was working to enhance efficiency.  Anti-corruption courses were available for legal practitioners, including at the local level.  Capacity building was one of the strongest commitments made by the Government.  There were specialised agencies working to prevent corruption, including a department on police in the Ministry of Security, and a department specialised on investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases within the Ministry of Justice.  Viet Nam had made significant efforts over the last few years to combat corruption and had recently made significant achievements, which it would strive to continue.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.  The law provided a significant number of sanctions to reduce gender inequality.  Efforts had been strengthened to ensure the equal representation of women in political life — women were provided with more opportunities for leadership positions and were given training to gain the necessary skills to participate in political life.  There was an action plan in the Ministry of Labour to ensure equal access of men and women to business, investment capital, and health services.  The gap between retirement age between men and women was being reviewed by the Government; the current discrepancy was not discriminatory but reflected the situation of the population.  Many different policies and programmes were being implemented for persons with disabilities, including those providing employment opportunities.

    On the establishment of the national human rights institution, much work had been done in this regard.  This was an important long-term goal that required serious consideration to ensure that the institution would be in line with international commitments and Viet Nam’s needs and specificities.  There were currently other mechanisms in place, including the equivalent of an Ombudsman, and a National Committee on Women and Children, which fulfilled the same role, promoting the rights of the people of Viet Nam.  Viet Nam was still reviewing the situation in order to be able to establish a model national human rights institution.

    According to Vietnamese law, prisoners had the right to access medical care, including medical check-ups and access to hospital services for regular treatment if their care could not be provided in the prison.  On transfers to psychiatric facilities, if a person showed any signs of psychiatric illness, they would be sent for forensic examination, and if the examination indicated it was required, they would be transferred to psychiatric facilities, where they were entitled to medical treatment.

    Human rights, including the right to life, could only be restricted in certain circumstances provided for in the Constitution.  Depriving others of their right to life was a criminal affair which needed to be prosecuted.  Viet Nam implemented various measures recommended by international bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic to lower the rate of transmission in accordance with the law, on the basis of public health and in order to safeguard the health of the people. There was a free vaccination campaign, with no discrimination.  At the end of the pandemic, Viet Nam brought the restrictions to an end.

    Juveniles were not subject to the death penalty, the delegation said, and Viet Nam was getting closer to international standards, moving forward to a phase in which it would review the Criminal Code.  It also had a road map to move forward in making it ever more difficult to condemn a person to death.  Work had also been done to ensure that there was no overlap with torture in the application of the death penalty.  There was an oversight mechanism and strong and stringent sanctions to be applied to the perpetrators of torture.

    One law included specific regulation of detention conditions, including the minimum space per detainee, access to food and drinkable water, and women-specific products.  All prisoners were entitled to medical support and treatment.  There was compulsory drug rehabilitation and detoxification, aiming to help persons end their addiction.  There was a strict procedure for this, which included a passage in front of a court.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the situation of women still raised questions.  Misconceptions about sexual violence, the wish to preserve the harmony of the family, mediation according to the law of 2022, and the fear of rehabilitation were all obstacles before women, making them reluctant to report acts of violence committed against them in different spheres, including domestic violence and harassment in the workplace.  The legal definition of rape remained of concern to the Committee.  What were the activities carried out under the national communication programme on gender equality and the National Strategy on Gender Equality?  What measures were taken to identify the factors that prevented women victims from reporting abuse, and to align the legal definition of rape with the Covenant and other international standards?  What remedies had been offered to victims and what was the number of cases that had been referred to alternative dispute resolution processes?

    Another Expert asked about the oversight mechanisms that existed to examine cases of torture and their findings.  Had there been any cases of torture, and if there were any, had the perpetrators been prosecuted?  One Expert said the results of corruption investigations could vary depending on who initiated and drove the process.  In certain cases, political manoeuvring could influence investigations; statistical data would help clarify the nature of the cases.  Viet Nam had not submitted any notification under article four, paragraph three of the Covenant — did this mean it did not consider itself to ever have been under a situation of public emergency?

    Another Expert raised the issue of a comprehensive law on non-discrimination and the potential detention of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in separate facilities apart from the general population, asking if this was being done according to human rights principles.  According to the Adoption Law of 2010, adoption could only be done by people with opposite-sex partners, or by a single person.  The Expert asked about the extent to which a homosexual person could adopt.  On discrimination against persons with disabilities in the world of work, he asked for specific, concrete data regarding the number of persons employed under programmes to end discrimination in the labour market.

    An Expert asked whether there was a legal procedure that enabled individuals sentenced to death to seek a review of their convictions based on newly discovered evidence of their innocence, and what remedies were provided for persons who were shown to have been wrongly convicted?  Again on the death penalty, another Expert asked how many executions had taken place, and how many persons were on death row?  Was there an offence related to kidnapping for financial gain, as this could be assimilated to enforced disappearance?

    In Viet Nam, the international human rights treaties did hold precedence, and nothing stopped the courts from applying them.  Why, to date, had no court invoked the Covenant with regard to the rights and provisions enshrined within it?

    Regarding the plan of action against climate change, the Expert was pleased to recognise that minorities in occupied territories who were particularly vulnerable to climate change were included; he asked whether these minorities were consulted during the drafting of the plans and whether they were respecting traditional farming methods and techniques?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law of Viet Nam mentioned the hierarchy of international legislation and domestic law; priority was given to the international commitments and agreements.  The definition of rape in the Criminal Code was divided into two categories, including one for those over 13 and one for those under 13, for whom the law did not require any evidence of force or circumstances such as alcoholic consumption to elicit sexual activities.  The law did not distinguish between married and unmarried rape.

    On domestic violence, the delegation said even though much effort had been made to combat this violence, the detection and handling of such cases had not yet been satisfactory.  The Government had issued a decree on domestic violence.  Data would be provided more comprehensively later. There were opportunities for the victim to express themselves.  There were also local supportive networks for the victims of violence, and there were psychological and medical services provided for such victims.  There were media and communication events held on domestic violence, and campaigns to raise awareness, providing information for victims so that they would be more willing to raise their voice.

    Regarding torture and the death penalty, there were eight crimes which could be punished by the penalty, including treason, murder, rape, terrorism, crimes against humanity, crimes of war, illegal production of narcotics, and drug trafficking. Keeping the data regarding executions private was often due to national security and defence reasons, and also for the protection of the privacy of the family and victims of the perpetrator.  There was a procedure for review of judgements — at any point, a complaint could be made and an appeal made on the basis of wrongful conviction.  In the case of a wrongful conviction, there was a law on State compensation.  If there was any violation or wrongful conviction identified, then the State would provide compensation, including a public apology.  The law was very comprehensive when it came to illegal detention of others.  There was a hierarchy of oversight mechanisms which applied to cases of torture.

    Regarding detention, Viet Nam did not use the method of transferring prisoners away from their residential addresses as a punishment.  Prisoners were kept close to their families.  Pregnant women, foreigners and juveniles were given particular consideration.  However, very violent or dangerous criminals were kept separate from other members of the same criminal network in prison, for reasons of security.  Viet Nam was making great efforts to improve conditions for prisoners, and was amending the law on custody and detention to ensure there could be no violation of human rights.

    Only certain persons were subject to compulsory detoxification and addiction treatment, and such decisions needed to be made by the local authority and reviewed by the court to ensure that they were valid.  There were no cases of forced labour at the compulsory detoxification centres, but there was therapeutic labour, which aimed to help inmates to learn to take care of themselves.  Inmates were allowed to enjoy sports and other leisure activities.

    There were several pilot programmes to respond to climate change, with engagement from the local to the central level, and communication campaigns for the ethnic and mountain areas.  There were a wide range of collaborative events, including with non-governmental organizations, and inputs from partners were carefully considered by the authorities when they developed strategies to mitigate climate change.

    There was fertile ground for the growth of a national human rights institution, but to achieve this, legal amendments, including of the Constitution, were needed, making it a time-consuming process.  Viet Nam was paying more attention to streamlining the governmental structure.  In the future, it would carefully consider the Paris Principles when establishing such an institution.  However, great efforts were being made to safeguard, protect and promote human rights already.  There was a mechanism already in place to deal with corruption, which dealt with reports and allegations of corruption from individuals.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Criminal Procedure Code provided that Government prosecutors could hold suspects accused of national security crimes in detention for an unlimited period without trial or judicial review.  Prosecutors could restrict access to legal counsel in cases related to suspects accused of “national security” crimes until the conclusion of the investigation and with no time limits.  What concrete measures would be taken to ensure that any deprivation of liberty was lawful and that detained persons were afforded legal safeguards from the outset of their detention?  How would the State ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period, following a proper, individualised assessment and for reasons expressly provided by law and in line with international human rights standard and the Covenant?

    Reports before the Committee indicated that trafficking in persons continued to be a serious concern.  There was a lack of a clear framework for the protection of non-Vietnamese nationals trafficked to Viet Nam, or transited through Viet Nam to a third country.  There had been no substantive changes in Government policies and efforts to combat labour trafficking in the State-run labour export programme.  What measures were being taken to strengthen international legal cooperation and national law enforcement capacities to investigate and respond to the linkages between cybercrime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and to strengthen international cooperation to ensure cross-border access to supporting services?

    Another Expert said the Committee remained concerned about directives on international travel that closely managed officials, party members and Vietnamese citizens who went abroad, and by the fact that the law allowed authorities to postpone the departure of any person on various broad grounds.  What new measures had been taken to guarantee freedom of movement, and what were the legal grounds for decisions to restrict international travel on Vietnamese citizens and legal grounds for such bans?  The Expert also asked for comment on reports asserting that members of ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous people had been prevented from leaving Viet Nam to seek asylum; and that human rights defenders and religious activists were routinely subject to discriminatory restrictions on their freedom of movement.

    Significant progress had been made in juvenile justice, thanks to an increased awareness of the importance of legal institutional reforms.  However, these improvements were reportedly neither systematic nor comprehensive, and detention of children in conflict with the law was still common.  What efforts had been made to amend the legislation to address the protection gaps for children aged 16 and 17 years and the definition of a child to cover persons up to 18 years of age?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the juvenile justice system by setting up additional specialised courts with trained judges, improving community-based diversion, and ensuring children were not deprived of liberty?

    The Committee was concerned about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence, another Expert said, asking for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Regarding judicial independence, another Expert asked what specific measures were in place to guarantee the presumption of innocence, access to a lawyer of one’s choice, and a trial within a reasonable time for journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, and individuals accused of national security crimes.  What concrete steps had the State party taken to prevent and punish threats, intimidation, or harassment against lawyers for their work on sensitive cases?  Had any independent mechanisms for judicial oversight over legislative and executive actions been established or implemented? On participation in public affairs, the same Expert asked what measures had been taken to encourage and promote political pluralism.  What steps had been taken to eliminate proxy voting in practice, and had an independent electoral monitoring body been established?

    On the freedom of association, despite the constitutional proclamation of the right of association, an Expert expressed concern that there was no framework law regulating this right in a coherent and protective manner.  There had also been reports of systematic repression of religious minorities practising their faith outside the control of State-recognised religious organisations.  What measures had Viet Nam taken to ensure that the right of association, including the right to establish and register independent religious or social associations, could be exercised without interference?  What guarantees existed to prevent the use of the Penal Code against minority religious communities that did not wish to integrate into State-controlled structures?  Further, he asked for detailed information on the rules applicable to associations receiving foreign funding and on the differences in legal treatment between national associations, foreign associations and those receiving international funding.  What steps had Viet Nam taken to ensure that tax and criminal laws were not used in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner against human rights defenders?

    The Committee welcomed the programmes implemented by the State party for the economic and social development of minorities.  However, there had been multiple reports of persistent discrimination against these minority groups, in particular against the Khmer Krom and Montagnards.  What concrete actions had Viet Nam taken to eradicate systematic discrimination against these communities in education, employment and public services?

    On freedom of conscience and religious belief, what was the procedure for registration or recognition for religious groups, an Expert asked, inquiring how long the process typically took from initiation to decision?  Was the applicant allowed an opportunity to respond or appeal during the review process? What were the reasons for denying registration to certain organizations?  How did the State party justify the non-registration of relatively large religious groups such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao?  What measures were in place to ensure that individuals were free to choose their religion without coercion?

    Regarding freedom of expression, what amendments was the State party considering to the Press Law, the Expert asked.  What legal safeguards existed to ensure that measures affecting online freedom of expression were strictly necessary and proportionate, and in compliance with the Covenant?  What mechanisms were in place to prevent and address harassment and intimidation of individuals, including journalists and online activists, who expressed views critical of the Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said ethnic minorities in Viet Nam were entitled to all human rights and citizen rights, and equal access to public services.  Many regulations prohibited discrimination on ethnic grounds.  The Government was implementing a socio-economic plan to ensure development of ethnic affairs.  Ethnic minorities were given the full opportunity to participate in economic and social life, and to stand for election: 70 per cent of the National Assembly were members of ethnic minorities.  Ethnic minorities could participate in many political activities. There were policies encouraging their equal participation in public service and their culture and cultural identity.  Ethnic minority groups had the right to equality of employment, including equal pay. There was vocational training for ethnic minorities, which was regulated by the law.

    Authorities ensured the freedom of religion by citizens.  The State checked the implementation of the law on freedom of religion and belief.  There were favourable conditions that ensured detainees or persons in custody could exercise their religion.  The State did not require registration for religious collectives and religious activities could take place without registration if they were not against the law.

    There had been changes to the law on the People’s Court, regarding the appointment of judges, to further guarantee their independence.  There was a stringent procedure for their appointment.  Interference with judicial activities was prohibited by law, and there was a mechanism to oversee the activities of judges to ensure that they complied with the law.  Regarding corruption, several cases had been prosecuted against high-ranking persons, and the results of these were publicised.  The victims of corruption were protected, as provided for in the Criminal Code.  Activities that hindered the judicial procedure could also be punished according to the law.

    On juvenile justice, there was a new Juvenile Justice Law since November 2024, which entered into effect in 2025, which was consistent with international standards on juvenile justice and provided new regulations to better protect juvenile perpetrators and victims, with diverse measures that could be applied to offenders.  The law also introduced family-friendly measures to ensure that the procedure would be more victim-friendly.  Penalties against juvenile offenders could include non-custodial punishments, and juvenile offenders below a certain age who were detained were kept separately, under the oversight of trained officers.  There were 38 juvenile courts at the provincial level.  Much attention was paid to training and capacity-building of the judges of these courts.

    A high percentage of Viet Nam’s population had access to the Internet, with good technology and infrastructure, the delegation said, but there was a need for a better mechanism to ensure confidentiality and privacy.  The State had issued a decree to strengthen cyber security to ensure that information was only collected in line with international standards and with the commitments Viet Nam had made, without hindering data flow.  The National Assembly of Viet Nam had adopted a law on protection of personal data, which was a strong commitment to the protection of privacy in line with international standards.  It also guaranteed the right to complain if such privacy was violated. Viet Nam’s efforts had been recognised by the international community.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, however, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations and did not harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but this needed to be in line with international law.  Cyber security in Viet Nam was not against these commitments and principles, which restrictions were aligned with.

    On the freedom of association, the delegation said this right was one of the most basic rights and was clearly provided for by the law and several Government decrees.  Viet Nam had more than 70,000 associations, many of which operated nationwide.  There were an increasing number of associations, operating in various sectors in order to cover the needs of the people, and operating in a way that contributed to the socio-economic development of the country.  The requirement of registration and reporting on financial resources was a popular regulation adopted to prevent any violation of the law by an association, such as conducting terrorism or money laundering. These regulations aimed at administrative management only, and were not based on discrimination.  The freedom of religion and belief was safeguarded through the Constitution and other legislation.

    To ensure transparency in elections, the National Assembly had established the National Election Council, which would make decisions on dismissing any false elections and rehosting them, and applying a penalty on those who had perpetrated fraud.  The 2021 election had the greatest number of electors ever.  There were no cases of serious violation of electoral regulations.  Viet Nam encouraged voters to select the candidates that satisfied the requirements for the position.  Elections were well-organised in Viet Nam.  Many regulations and provisions had been introduced on standing for election for members of the National Assembly to ensure the right of freedom to stand for election.

    On prevention of human trafficking in the labour sector, the law introduced a number of provisions to better protect Vietnamese workers working abroad.  The employment fee had been eliminated; only a brokerage fee could be charged. After a worker finalised a contract, they currently paid a limited fee, but Viet Nam was moving towards a model where the employer would pay this fee.  Campaigns were being held to ensure workers were aware of the risks of being trafficked when working abroad, and to give them more information about reliable channels for migrating, and of the risks of migrating outside of these channels.

    On civic space in Viet Nam, civil society organizations had the freedom to operate and could make contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, as long as they acted in line with the law.  Members of civil society organisations, including human rights defenders, would only be arrested if they violated the law, and the organisations needed to comply with the law and fulfil their obligations, including regarding tax regulations.  Arrests, detention and prosecution of such persons were only done in line with the law.

    Viet Nam adopted a revised version of its anti-trafficking law in January 2025 that was consistent with international standards and included a revised definition of human trafficking. The Criminal Code would be revised to ensure that it complied with the anti-trafficking law.  Anyone who reported to the authorities complaining of being a victim of trafficking would be protected and supported.  The law also contained provisions on rescue and identification of victims.  Viet Nam worked with the border and police of neighbouring countries to fight against human trafficking and to protect and defend victims, providing them with shelter and medical attention to cover their needs.

    Regarding freedom of movement, Viet Nam respected this fully with regard to its citizens, ensuring that they were protected and promoting their freedom of residence.  The law contained a list of prohibited activities.  Anybody leaving or entering the country needed to respect the relevant laws.  Freedom of movement could be restricted based on national security, public health, and public defence.  There was no single case of restriction of freedom of movement in Viet Nam for ethnic or religious reasons; all cases were because laws had been violated.

    Viet Nam supported the right of freedom of expression, but strictly dealt with violations of those rights, particularly in efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, and this was in line with international agreements. 

    The Penal Code provided for detention only under clear and specific conditions, and also provided for other forms of detention.  Detention was only imposed if it was deemed necessary.  Detainees had the full right to family visits and to communicate with others, with the right to access legal counsel.  Limitations to legal counsel were in line with international standards, and only applied in severe cases of necessity, including those affecting national security.  Suspects could also be detained in these cases to ensure that the investigation would be sufficient.  Since 2019 to date, there had been no cases of abuse of this power.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said he was not fully satisfied with responses on a few issues, including regarding who was responsible for the disciplinary procedure for judges, and how their independence from the Government was ensured. How was the presumption of innocence and access to a lawyer guaranteed, and how were lawyers protected in sensitive cases from facing threats of reprisal?  How was the independence of the National Electoral Council ensured?

    On the freedom of expression, an Expert noted that this was not an absolute right but said that concerns lay in the breadth of the restrictions allowed for by the State party.  Restrictions needed to be as narrowly defined as possible.  The Committee did not take exception to detention for violation of laws, but it took exception to excessive lengths of detention and forms of harassment perpetrated on the accused.  The State party recognised the importance of religious freedom, but at the same time referred to a need for registration, which was a limitation of this freedom.

    Another Expert addressed the situation of those arrested for national security reasons, noting that this was a broad concept, and that sometimes national security laws were applied to prisoners of conscience and persons with certain religious beliefs.  The Expert said he was unsure how this was relevant to national security.  The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had found cases of arbitrary detention where there had been restriction of freedom of religion, restrictions on access to legal counsel, and other inappropriate restrictions, and he asked for a comment on this.

    Regarding the right to freedom of association, an Expert asked whether any of the restrictions to this right could be removed, and whether the Government was envisaging any law on the freedom of association.  According to information received, persons who spoke minority languages and other minorities were not allowed to participate in international fora, which was a matter of concern.  On the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities, had any of the rights that had been developed globally been recognised in Viet Nam, where there appeared to be a resistance to recognising indigenous peoples.  Did they benefit from the core rights existing in international law? 

    Further clarification was requested on the conditions under which the Government interfered with the right to privacy by cutting telephone lines, interrupting cell phones and Internet services for political activists and their families.  Did the Government consider abolishing or amending relevant legislation, or providing more solid grounds for the registering of media users using real names and phone numbers, including those outside Viet Nam?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Criminal Code included a provision on the presumption of innocence, so defendants were considered to be innocent until found guilty by a legal decision by a court of Viet Nam.  Only the courts had the authority to declare somebody guilty, and there needed to be sufficient access to legal counsel.  If there was lack of evidence, then the court needed to declare a person innocent.  There were many mechanisms to oversee and monitor judges’ performance, and there were inspections of local and central courts, investigations of denunciations or allegations of violations, and disciplinary actions provided for in case these were substantiated.

    Regarding elections, independent candidates needed to prepare a dossier and send their application to the local authorities, who would review it to make sure that it respected the law, after which they would send the dossier to the standing committee and the provincial election committee, as well as the National Election Council.  There was a stringent procedure for considering the application for election by independent candidates.  On restriction of the freedom of association, a recent decree had been enacted that created favourable conditions for associations without discrimination. There were no plans to introduce any other new laws, as the current legislation satisfied requirements.

    On privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression and speech, Viet Nam’s policy was to have a healthy cyberspace that did not infringe upon the enjoyment of rights.  The cybersecurity of Viet Nam aimed to promote the use of the Internet whilst striking a balance between the rise of the country and the needs of the people, and had been developed on the basis of learning from experiences of other countries, in consultation with public and private bodies.  The cybersecurity law provided precise conditions in which there could be restrictions of access to the Internet, but this law did not hinder human rights and only related to cases where individuals violated the law. Cybersecurity did not hinder the use of the Internet unless it was to defend the Government.

    The freedom of expression and of the press was not an absolute right and needed to be exercised in line with the law.  Registration was used to this end to protect the legitimate rights of all people and to develop a healthy Internet space.  The right to freedom and belief had been effectively supported over previous years, thanks to the implementation of a new law from 2018, the delegation said.

    Given the characteristics of the people in question, Viet Nam did not use the term “indigenous people”, using instead the terms “ethnic minority” or “small minority”, the delegation said.  The guarantee of rights for ethnic minorities was a significant achievement, given the geographical structure of Viet Nam.  These people were facilitated in their access to their human and citizenship rights.

    On arbitrary detention, the right to access to defence counsel was never limited for detainees.  Only the Prosecutor General had the power to make the decision to limit such access, but no cases of this were recorded.  On tax evasion, there were regulations on this all over the world, and penalties were imposed, and this could not be considered a punitive measure.

    Closing Statements

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam appreciated the dialogue.  The delegation had engaged openly and sincerely, and aimed to provide all answers. Protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people.  Human rights were a universal and global value, and their protection was a goal for all countries, but each country had a different mechanism to ensure these rights for citizens in line with its socio-economic situation.  Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and it had worked to this end to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.  Viet Nam remained steadfast in its aim to build a democratic, equitable and harmonious society, implementing sustainable social policies based on human rights for the people, who were placed at the heart of State policies.  Good laws also needed to be enforced and implemented to ensure positive results, and this was also the policy of the Government.  Viet Nam’s Government was committed to implementing the Covenant.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who had contributed to the dialogue.  Over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and to combat domestic violence was positive, but there were a number of remaining concerns requiring attention, including severe restriction on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, including women and children, ethnic minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.

    ___________

    This document is produced by the United Nations Information Service at Geneva and is intended for public information; it is not an official document.
    The English and French versions of our news releases are different because they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CCPR25.016E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Viet Nam, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Strengthened Human Rights Framework, Raise Issues Concerning Discrimination and Reports of Media Repression

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts commended steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, and raised issues concerning discrimination in various areas of public life and reports of a repressive media landscape.

    A Committee Expert praised the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights, saying they reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform. They welcomed the recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    However, Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, another Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination.

    The Committee also expressed concern about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence.  One Expert asked for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Thanh Tịnh Nguyễn, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation, in response to these questions and others, said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and the State’s legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life, the delegation said.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, the delegation said, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations or harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but needed to be in line with international law.  Viet Nam strictly dealt with efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, in line with international agreements.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Nguyễn said the protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people. Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and had worked to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, said the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and domestic violence was positive, but there were several remaining concerns requiring attention, including regarding severe restrictions on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, he concluded.

    The delegation of Viet Nam was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Office of the Government; the Supreme People’s Procuracy; the Ministry of Public Security; the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Supreme People’s Court; the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism; the Ministry of Ethnic Minorities and Religions; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 10 a.m., Thursday 10 July to hold an informal meeting with States.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Viet Nam (CCPR/C/VNM/4).

    Presentation of the Report

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said, guided by the principle of placing people at the centre — as both the goal and the driving force of development, Viet Nam had consistently devoted special attention, strong efforts, and firm commitment to promoting and ensuring the effective implementation of human rights and citizens’ rights, including civil and political rights.  Legal, administrative, and judicial reforms in Viet Nam, as well as law enforcement practices, were all anchored in a people-centred approach, whereby the people were regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the system.  These efforts aimed to implement effective measures to protect and ensure human rights and citizens’ rights in accordance with the law.  Immediately following the constructive dialogue with the Committee in 2019, the Government of Viet Nam adopted a national action plan to implement the Covenant and the Committee’s recommendations, with the aim of clearly identifying areas in need of improvement and undertaking necessary institutional and practical measures to ensure substantive progress.

    With regard to institutional and legal reform, since the submission of the fourth national report, Viet Nam had amended, supplemented, or enacted over 150 laws and resolutions of the National Assembly, many of which were directly related to the lives of the people and aimed at advancing civil and political rights.  Most recently, Viet Nam adopted the amended Criminal Code, which narrowed the scope of application of the death penalty by abolishing capital punishment for eight offences, and had recently adopted Resolution 66 on reforming the legislative process.  Viet Nam was also vigorously advancing a comprehensive reform of the State administrative apparatus.

    Viet Nam had undertaken a range of measures to enhance transparency, openness, and efficiency in the implementation of laws and policies.  Human rights education had been integrated into the national curriculum.  Viet Nam had issued and effectively implemented a range of policies that directly promoted and protected civil and political rights.  In the area of social security policy, Viet Nam remained firmly committed to ensuring social welfare, public safety, and the well-being of its people, under the guiding principle of “leaving no one behind.”  Viet Nam had also taken proactive measures to respond to climate change and to support the people in the context of disaster relief efforts. It had further placed strong emphasis on investing in infrastructure and enabling conditions to ensure public access to information, and was currently recognised as one of the countries with the most affordable internet access.  Rapid developments had significantly contributed to the realisation of the rights to freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and access to information.

    In the process of ensuring, protecting, and promoting the realisation of human rights, Viet Nam continued to face various difficulties and challenges arising from multiple factors that affect the implementation of the Covenant. These included limited resources; instances where the enforcement of laws had not met expectations; and the growing impact of global issues and non-traditional security threats in the context of Viet Nam’s  international integration.

    Viet Nam was in the process of building and perfecting a socialist rule-of-law State for the people, in order to build a high-quality legal system that effectively ensured and protected human rights and citizens’ rights, in a manner consistent with national realities and international standards.  In this process, Viet Nam would continue to seriously fulfil its international human rights commitments, and further promote dialogue and cooperation in this important area.  At the same time, Viet Nam would implement comprehensive measures to better promote, protect, and ensure the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and to improve resilience to climate change — particularly for vulnerable groups — through appropriate steps in the time to come.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee acknowledged the important steps Viet Nam had taken to strengthen its legal and institutional framework for human rights.  These developments reflected a clear commitment to international cooperation and legal reform.  The Committee commended Viet Nam for its recent decision to reduce the number of capital offenses from 18 to 10, which marked a significant step toward limiting the scope of application of the death penalty.

    Given reports that Directive 24 broadly defined international integration as a national security threat, leading to systemic restrictions on freedoms of expression, association, and movement, how did Viet Nam reconcile this directive with the Covenant’s articles 19, 21, and 22, an Expert asked.  Regarding disaster response and recovery efforts, as well as campaigns to eliminate temporary housing, the report did not address the adoption of a precautionary approach or specific measures to protect the most vulnerable from the negative impacts of climate change and natural disasters, and the Expert asked what specific measures Viet Nam had adopted to implement a precautionary approach to environmental and climate risks, and how vulnerable groups were identified and protected in these policies.

    Regarding the death penalty, an Expert asked about the criteria used to select offences to be removed from the scope of the death penalty; the reasons that led Viet Nam to stop short of full abolition; and considerations that had prevented the country from following the path toward complete abolition of the death penalty.  What measures were in place to ensure full respect for due process guarantees in death penalty cases, and to prevent the imposition of the death penalty as a result of forced confessions?  On enforced disappearances, the Expert asked whether Vietnamese law defined and criminalised all acts of enforced disappearance in accordance with international standards, and about measures in place to ensure prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into allegations of enforced disappearance and transnational repression.

    Another Expert asked for an update on progress made towards the establishment of the national human rights institution, and for more detailed and concrete information on the status of the legislative review and the reasons for the continued delays in establishing the body.  What measures did the State party plan to take to ensure that all allegations of torture and ill-treatment, solitary confinement, incommunicado detention and forced commitment to psychiatric facilities were promptly and thoroughly investigated by an independent body and that perpetrators were prosecuted and sanctioned with appropriate penalties, and to investigate all reported instances of deaths of prisoners while detained?  What measures would the State party take to ensure that national legislation protecting the rights of detainees was implemented in practice, in particular the right to medical care?

    An Expert commended the State party for its continued efforts to combat corruption, but noted that further efforts were needed to strengthen anti-corruption initiatives.  He expressed particular concern relating to allegations of corruption involving high-level public officials, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers, and asked for information on any actions taken in response to such cases.  He noted reports indicating persistent concerns that the enforcement of anti-corruption laws was perceived as selective and politically driven.  The Expert asked for further details on the mandates, composition, appointment procedures, and safeguards in place to ensure the independence of the three types of agencies involved in anti-corruption efforts.  He also asked whether the draft Law on the State of Emergency was fully compatible with article four of the Covenant, including its substantive and procedural requirements.

    Viet Nam lacked a law developing the principle of non-discrimination in areas such as employment, health, education, politics and justice, an Expert noted, asking for further information on the number of complaints of acts of discrimination, and on investigations, sanctions and reparations for victims; about employees with disabilities in the public and private sectors; and on the existence of other protection mechanisms.  Regarding women’s rights, the Expert asked about progress that had been made over the last ten years, including regarding non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender, noting that women’s rights had been violated by these forms of discrimination.  Was the State going to work towards the legalisation of same-sex marriage or civil partnership?  Had measures been taken to address the issue of stigmatisation, harassment, violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    An Expert expressed concern for the realities of Khmer Krom women, who were highly vulnerable to various human rights violations due to their gender, facing a high risk of systematic inequalities and abuse.  Other areas of concern included the wide salary gap between men and women, as well as continuing differentiation of retirement ages between men and women, the participation of women in political life, and that there still needed to be evidence of a minimum degree of physical injury for an act to be legally recognised as rape.  In view of these, the Expert asked what measures had been taken to increase women’s participation, specifically ethnic minority women and women in rural areas, in all private and public sectors, as well as high-level decision-making positions and political life.

    The Expert also expressed concern about the situation of drug users confined to drug rehabilitation centres, asking for more information on measures taken to ensure that all legislation concerning drug detoxification and rehabilitation centres, particularly the provisions retaining compulsory drug treatment, including for children between 12 and 18, were in line with the Covenant.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said human rights had been upheld and promoted in Viet Nam over the past forty years and its legal system was sufficiently comprehensive to fully implement the Covenant.  There was a separate chapter in the Constitution on human rights that was in line with the Covenant.  Human rights could only be suspended for reasons of national security, public safety, and public health.  Only the National Assembly could suspend human rights, in line with the Constitution. As part of the law-making process in Viet Nam, there needed to be a consultation with stakeholders, including those affected by the law.  Human rights topics were now included in the national educational curriculum.  The State conducted many campaigns on human rights, and information on human rights was translated into various national minority languages and made available, including online.  Viet Nam had adopted various national measures to ensure national security and the safe and productive life of its people.

    Viet Nam was implementing the Covenant in various ways, including through its law and education.  According to the law, the Covenant needed to be prioritised if there were differences between it and the law.  If any discrepancies were identified, the Covenant took precedence.  There were training courses for judges and lawyers and other legal professionals on the provisions of the Covenant.

    Viet Nam was one of the countries seriously affected by climate change, which caused many socio-economic challenges.  The Government attached great importance to those whose rights had been affected by the phenomenon, and ensured that sustainable and green development and the climate change strategy of Viet Nam were prioritised in all policies.  Many important activities had been adopted for ethnic minorities, including access to adequate, clean water, and the development of a medical network that focused on climate change-related diseases.  The Government had also developed a plan to review infrastructure in climate change-prone areas, including water infrastructure.  The climate change strategy had many implications on the enjoyment of the human rights of the people.  Viet Nam promoted international cooperation to ensure that all could fight climate change issues, whilst cooperating with all international agencies.

    On discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community, anti-discrimination was a part of the legal framework, and over the past years Viet Nam had taken many steps to better protect the members of the community, to ensure that none would be discriminated against on the basis of their gender or sexual identity.  The provision in the law criminalising same-sex marriage had been removed more than 10 years ago, although there was no law legalising same-sex marriage.  The new Criminal Code, since 2015, contained provisions regarding sexual offences which protected lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  In 2022, the Ministry of Health introduced a guideline giving direction to local authorities, which ensured that these persons could not be subject to discrimination. On oversight of activities in the medical sector, so far, no complaints had been received, meaning that there were no violations of the guidelines.  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons had access to services to support them, and could change their legal identity, ensuring that they were not discriminated against.

    On anti-corruption efforts, Viet Nam had implemented many activities aiming to perfect the legal framework, including the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Law within the Criminal Code and related preventive measures.  It had also strengthened its monitoring activities, streamlined the administrative apparatus to better support the functions of the State, and was working to enhance efficiency.  Anti-corruption courses were available for legal practitioners, including at the local level.  Capacity building was one of the strongest commitments made by the Government.  There were specialised agencies working to prevent corruption, including a department on police in the Ministry of Security, and a department specialised on investigations and prosecutions of corruption cases within the Ministry of Justice.  Viet Nam had made significant efforts over the last few years to combat corruption and had recently made significant achievements, which it would strive to continue.

    The law was very comprehensive to prevent any discrimination in civil and personal life.  Everybody was equal before the law, including in the labour sector, where the law prohibited discrimination, including salary discrimination between men and women and against guest workers.  Discrimination was also forbidden in education.  The law provided a significant number of sanctions to reduce gender inequality.  Efforts had been strengthened to ensure the equal representation of women in political life — women were provided with more opportunities for leadership positions and were given training to gain the necessary skills to participate in political life.  There was an action plan in the Ministry of Labour to ensure equal access of men and women to business, investment capital, and health services.  The gap between retirement age between men and women was being reviewed by the Government; the current discrepancy was not discriminatory but reflected the situation of the population.  Many different policies and programmes were being implemented for persons with disabilities, including those providing employment opportunities.

    On the establishment of the national human rights institution, much work had been done in this regard.  This was an important long-term goal that required serious consideration to ensure that the institution would be in line with international commitments and Viet Nam’s needs and specificities.  There were currently other mechanisms in place, including the equivalent of an Ombudsman, and a National Committee on Women and Children, which fulfilled the same role, promoting the rights of the people of Viet Nam.  Viet Nam was still reviewing the situation in order to be able to establish a model national human rights institution.

    According to Vietnamese law, prisoners had the right to access medical care, including medical check-ups and access to hospital services for regular treatment if their care could not be provided in the prison.  On transfers to psychiatric facilities, if a person showed any signs of psychiatric illness, they would be sent for forensic examination, and if the examination indicated it was required, they would be transferred to psychiatric facilities, where they were entitled to medical treatment.

    Human rights, including the right to life, could only be restricted in certain circumstances provided for in the Constitution.  Depriving others of their right to life was a criminal affair which needed to be prosecuted.  Viet Nam implemented various measures recommended by international bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic to lower the rate of transmission in accordance with the law, on the basis of public health and in order to safeguard the health of the people. There was a free vaccination campaign, with no discrimination.  At the end of the pandemic, Viet Nam brought the restrictions to an end.

    Juveniles were not subject to the death penalty, the delegation said, and Viet Nam was getting closer to international standards, moving forward to a phase in which it would review the Criminal Code.  It also had a road map to move forward in making it ever more difficult to condemn a person to death.  Work had also been done to ensure that there was no overlap with torture in the application of the death penalty.  There was an oversight mechanism and strong and stringent sanctions to be applied to the perpetrators of torture.

    One law included specific regulation of detention conditions, including the minimum space per detainee, access to food and drinkable water, and women-specific products.  All prisoners were entitled to medical support and treatment.  There was compulsory drug rehabilitation and detoxification, aiming to help persons end their addiction.  There was a strict procedure for this, which included a passage in front of a court.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the situation of women still raised questions.  Misconceptions about sexual violence, the wish to preserve the harmony of the family, mediation according to the law of 2022, and the fear of rehabilitation were all obstacles before women, making them reluctant to report acts of violence committed against them in different spheres, including domestic violence and harassment in the workplace.  The legal definition of rape remained of concern to the Committee.  What were the activities carried out under the national communication programme on gender equality and the National Strategy on Gender Equality?  What measures were taken to identify the factors that prevented women victims from reporting abuse, and to align the legal definition of rape with the Covenant and other international standards?  What remedies had been offered to victims and what was the number of cases that had been referred to alternative dispute resolution processes?

    Another Expert asked about the oversight mechanisms that existed to examine cases of torture and their findings.  Had there been any cases of torture, and if there were any, had the perpetrators been prosecuted?  One Expert said the results of corruption investigations could vary depending on who initiated and drove the process.  In certain cases, political manoeuvring could influence investigations; statistical data would help clarify the nature of the cases.  Viet Nam had not submitted any notification under article four, paragraph three of the Covenant — did this mean it did not consider itself to ever have been under a situation of public emergency?

    Another Expert raised the issue of a comprehensive law on non-discrimination and the potential detention of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in separate facilities apart from the general population, asking if this was being done according to human rights principles.  According to the Adoption Law of 2010, adoption could only be done by people with opposite-sex partners, or by a single person.  The Expert asked about the extent to which a homosexual person could adopt.  On discrimination against persons with disabilities in the world of work, he asked for specific, concrete data regarding the number of persons employed under programmes to end discrimination in the labour market.

    An Expert asked whether there was a legal procedure that enabled individuals sentenced to death to seek a review of their convictions based on newly discovered evidence of their innocence, and what remedies were provided for persons who were shown to have been wrongly convicted?  Again on the death penalty, another Expert asked how many executions had taken place, and how many persons were on death row?  Was there an offence related to kidnapping for financial gain, as this could be assimilated to enforced disappearance?

    In Viet Nam, the international human rights treaties did hold precedence, and nothing stopped the courts from applying them.  Why, to date, had no court invoked the Covenant with regard to the rights and provisions enshrined within it?

    Regarding the plan of action against climate change, the Expert was pleased to recognise that minorities in occupied territories who were particularly vulnerable to climate change were included; he asked whether these minorities were consulted during the drafting of the plans and whether they were respecting traditional farming methods and techniques?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law of Viet Nam mentioned the hierarchy of international legislation and domestic law; priority was given to the international commitments and agreements.  The definition of rape in the Criminal Code was divided into two categories, including one for those over 13 and one for those under 13, for whom the law did not require any evidence of force or circumstances such as alcoholic consumption to elicit sexual activities.  The law did not distinguish between married and unmarried rape.

    On domestic violence, the delegation said even though much effort had been made to combat this violence, the detection and handling of such cases had not yet been satisfactory.  The Government had issued a decree on domestic violence.  Data would be provided more comprehensively later. There were opportunities for the victim to express themselves.  There were also local supportive networks for the victims of violence, and there were psychological and medical services provided for such victims.  There were media and communication events held on domestic violence, and campaigns to raise awareness, providing information for victims so that they would be more willing to raise their voice.

    Regarding torture and the death penalty, there were eight crimes which could be punished by the penalty, including treason, murder, rape, terrorism, crimes against humanity, crimes of war, illegal production of narcotics, and drug trafficking. Keeping the data regarding executions private was often due to national security and defence reasons, and also for the protection of the privacy of the family and victims of the perpetrator.  There was a procedure for review of judgements — at any point, a complaint could be made and an appeal made on the basis of wrongful conviction.  In the case of a wrongful conviction, there was a law on State compensation.  If there was any violation or wrongful conviction identified, then the State would provide compensation, including a public apology.  The law was very comprehensive when it came to illegal detention of others.  There was a hierarchy of oversight mechanisms which applied to cases of torture.

    Regarding detention, Viet Nam did not use the method of transferring prisoners away from their residential addresses as a punishment.  Prisoners were kept close to their families.  Pregnant women, foreigners and juveniles were given particular consideration.  However, very violent or dangerous criminals were kept separate from other members of the same criminal network in prison, for reasons of security.  Viet Nam was making great efforts to improve conditions for prisoners, and was amending the law on custody and detention to ensure there could be no violation of human rights.

    Only certain persons were subject to compulsory detoxification and addiction treatment, and such decisions needed to be made by the local authority and reviewed by the court to ensure that they were valid.  There were no cases of forced labour at the compulsory detoxification centres, but there was therapeutic labour, which aimed to help inmates to learn to take care of themselves.  Inmates were allowed to enjoy sports and other leisure activities.

    There were several pilot programmes to respond to climate change, with engagement from the local to the central level, and communication campaigns for the ethnic and mountain areas.  There were a wide range of collaborative events, including with non-governmental organizations, and inputs from partners were carefully considered by the authorities when they developed strategies to mitigate climate change.

    There was fertile ground for the growth of a national human rights institution, but to achieve this, legal amendments, including of the Constitution, were needed, making it a time-consuming process.  Viet Nam was paying more attention to streamlining the governmental structure.  In the future, it would carefully consider the Paris Principles when establishing such an institution.  However, great efforts were being made to safeguard, protect and promote human rights already.  There was a mechanism already in place to deal with corruption, which dealt with reports and allegations of corruption from individuals.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Criminal Procedure Code provided that Government prosecutors could hold suspects accused of national security crimes in detention for an unlimited period without trial or judicial review.  Prosecutors could restrict access to legal counsel in cases related to suspects accused of “national security” crimes until the conclusion of the investigation and with no time limits.  What concrete measures would be taken to ensure that any deprivation of liberty was lawful and that detained persons were afforded legal safeguards from the outset of their detention?  How would the State ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest period, following a proper, individualised assessment and for reasons expressly provided by law and in line with international human rights standard and the Covenant?

    Reports before the Committee indicated that trafficking in persons continued to be a serious concern.  There was a lack of a clear framework for the protection of non-Vietnamese nationals trafficked to Viet Nam, or transited through Viet Nam to a third country.  There had been no substantive changes in Government policies and efforts to combat labour trafficking in the State-run labour export programme.  What measures were being taken to strengthen international legal cooperation and national law enforcement capacities to investigate and respond to the linkages between cybercrime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and to strengthen international cooperation to ensure cross-border access to supporting services?

    Another Expert said the Committee remained concerned about directives on international travel that closely managed officials, party members and Vietnamese citizens who went abroad, and by the fact that the law allowed authorities to postpone the departure of any person on various broad grounds.  What new measures had been taken to guarantee freedom of movement, and what were the legal grounds for decisions to restrict international travel on Vietnamese citizens and legal grounds for such bans?  The Expert also asked for comment on reports asserting that members of ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous people had been prevented from leaving Viet Nam to seek asylum; and that human rights defenders and religious activists were routinely subject to discriminatory restrictions on their freedom of movement.

    Significant progress had been made in juvenile justice, thanks to an increased awareness of the importance of legal institutional reforms.  However, these improvements were reportedly neither systematic nor comprehensive, and detention of children in conflict with the law was still common.  What efforts had been made to amend the legislation to address the protection gaps for children aged 16 and 17 years and the definition of a child to cover persons up to 18 years of age?  What measures had been taken to strengthen the juvenile justice system by setting up additional specialised courts with trained judges, improving community-based diversion, and ensuring children were not deprived of liberty?

    The Committee was concerned about reports of a repressive media landscape in Viet Nam, where journalists, bloggers and human rights activists were often intimidated into silence, another Expert said, asking for comments on allegations of targeted surveillance arbitrarily conducted on political activists, journalists, and human rights defenders.

    Regarding judicial independence, another Expert asked what specific measures were in place to guarantee the presumption of innocence, access to a lawyer of one’s choice, and a trial within a reasonable time for journalists, human rights defenders, political activists, and individuals accused of national security crimes.  What concrete steps had the State party taken to prevent and punish threats, intimidation, or harassment against lawyers for their work on sensitive cases?  Had any independent mechanisms for judicial oversight over legislative and executive actions been established or implemented? On participation in public affairs, the same Expert asked what measures had been taken to encourage and promote political pluralism.  What steps had been taken to eliminate proxy voting in practice, and had an independent electoral monitoring body been established?

    On the freedom of association, despite the constitutional proclamation of the right of association, an Expert expressed concern that there was no framework law regulating this right in a coherent and protective manner.  There had also been reports of systematic repression of religious minorities practising their faith outside the control of State-recognised religious organisations.  What measures had Viet Nam taken to ensure that the right of association, including the right to establish and register independent religious or social associations, could be exercised without interference?  What guarantees existed to prevent the use of the Penal Code against minority religious communities that did not wish to integrate into State-controlled structures?  Further, he asked for detailed information on the rules applicable to associations receiving foreign funding and on the differences in legal treatment between national associations, foreign associations and those receiving international funding.  What steps had Viet Nam taken to ensure that tax and criminal laws were not used in a disproportionate or discriminatory manner against human rights defenders?

    The Committee welcomed the programmes implemented by the State party for the economic and social development of minorities.  However, there had been multiple reports of persistent discrimination against these minority groups, in particular against the Khmer Krom and Montagnards.  What concrete actions had Viet Nam taken to eradicate systematic discrimination against these communities in education, employment and public services?

    On freedom of conscience and religious belief, what was the procedure for registration or recognition for religious groups, an Expert asked, inquiring how long the process typically took from initiation to decision?  Was the applicant allowed an opportunity to respond or appeal during the review process? What were the reasons for denying registration to certain organizations?  How did the State party justify the non-registration of relatively large religious groups such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao?  What measures were in place to ensure that individuals were free to choose their religion without coercion?

    Regarding freedom of expression, what amendments was the State party considering to the Press Law, the Expert asked.  What legal safeguards existed to ensure that measures affecting online freedom of expression were strictly necessary and proportionate, and in compliance with the Covenant?  What mechanisms were in place to prevent and address harassment and intimidation of individuals, including journalists and online activists, who expressed views critical of the Government?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said ethnic minorities in Viet Nam were entitled to all human rights and citizen rights, and equal access to public services.  Many regulations prohibited discrimination on ethnic grounds.  The Government was implementing a socio-economic plan to ensure development of ethnic affairs.  Ethnic minorities were given the full opportunity to participate in economic and social life, and to stand for election: 70 per cent of the National Assembly were members of ethnic minorities.  Ethnic minorities could participate in many political activities. There were policies encouraging their equal participation in public service and their culture and cultural identity.  Ethnic minority groups had the right to equality of employment, including equal pay. There was vocational training for ethnic minorities, which was regulated by the law.

    Authorities ensured the freedom of religion by citizens.  The State checked the implementation of the law on freedom of religion and belief.  There were favourable conditions that ensured detainees or persons in custody could exercise their religion.  The State did not require registration for religious collectives and religious activities could take place without registration if they were not against the law.

    There had been changes to the law on the People’s Court, regarding the appointment of judges, to further guarantee their independence.  There was a stringent procedure for their appointment.  Interference with judicial activities was prohibited by law, and there was a mechanism to oversee the activities of judges to ensure that they complied with the law.  Regarding corruption, several cases had been prosecuted against high-ranking persons, and the results of these were publicised.  The victims of corruption were protected, as provided for in the Criminal Code.  Activities that hindered the judicial procedure could also be punished according to the law.

    On juvenile justice, there was a new Juvenile Justice Law since November 2024, which entered into effect in 2025, which was consistent with international standards on juvenile justice and provided new regulations to better protect juvenile perpetrators and victims, with diverse measures that could be applied to offenders.  The law also introduced family-friendly measures to ensure that the procedure would be more victim-friendly.  Penalties against juvenile offenders could include non-custodial punishments, and juvenile offenders below a certain age who were detained were kept separately, under the oversight of trained officers.  There were 38 juvenile courts at the provincial level.  Much attention was paid to training and capacity-building of the judges of these courts.

    A high percentage of Viet Nam’s population had access to the Internet, with good technology and infrastructure, the delegation said, but there was a need for a better mechanism to ensure confidentiality and privacy.  The State had issued a decree to strengthen cyber security to ensure that information was only collected in line with international standards and with the commitments Viet Nam had made, without hindering data flow.  The National Assembly of Viet Nam had adopted a law on protection of personal data, which was a strong commitment to the protection of privacy in line with international standards.  It also guaranteed the right to complain if such privacy was violated. Viet Nam’s efforts had been recognised by the international community.

    The right of freedom of expression could not, however, be used to violate the rights of others or of organisations and did not harm social order.  The policy of Viet Nam safeguarded the freedom of expression and of the press, but this needed to be in line with international law.  Cyber security in Viet Nam was not against these commitments and principles, which restrictions were aligned with.

    On the freedom of association, the delegation said this right was one of the most basic rights and was clearly provided for by the law and several Government decrees.  Viet Nam had more than 70,000 associations, many of which operated nationwide.  There were an increasing number of associations, operating in various sectors in order to cover the needs of the people, and operating in a way that contributed to the socio-economic development of the country.  The requirement of registration and reporting on financial resources was a popular regulation adopted to prevent any violation of the law by an association, such as conducting terrorism or money laundering. These regulations aimed at administrative management only, and were not based on discrimination.  The freedom of religion and belief was safeguarded through the Constitution and other legislation.

    To ensure transparency in elections, the National Assembly had established the National Election Council, which would make decisions on dismissing any false elections and rehosting them, and applying a penalty on those who had perpetrated fraud.  The 2021 election had the greatest number of electors ever.  There were no cases of serious violation of electoral regulations.  Viet Nam encouraged voters to select the candidates that satisfied the requirements for the position.  Elections were well-organised in Viet Nam.  Many regulations and provisions had been introduced on standing for election for members of the National Assembly to ensure the right of freedom to stand for election.

    On prevention of human trafficking in the labour sector, the law introduced a number of provisions to better protect Vietnamese workers working abroad.  The employment fee had been eliminated; only a brokerage fee could be charged. After a worker finalised a contract, they currently paid a limited fee, but Viet Nam was moving towards a model where the employer would pay this fee.  Campaigns were being held to ensure workers were aware of the risks of being trafficked when working abroad, and to give them more information about reliable channels for migrating, and of the risks of migrating outside of these channels.

    On civic space in Viet Nam, civil society organizations had the freedom to operate and could make contributions to the socio-economic development of the country, as long as they acted in line with the law.  Members of civil society organisations, including human rights defenders, would only be arrested if they violated the law, and the organisations needed to comply with the law and fulfil their obligations, including regarding tax regulations.  Arrests, detention and prosecution of such persons were only done in line with the law.

    Viet Nam adopted a revised version of its anti-trafficking law in January 2025 that was consistent with international standards and included a revised definition of human trafficking. The Criminal Code would be revised to ensure that it complied with the anti-trafficking law.  Anyone who reported to the authorities complaining of being a victim of trafficking would be protected and supported.  The law also contained provisions on rescue and identification of victims.  Viet Nam worked with the border and police of neighbouring countries to fight against human trafficking and to protect and defend victims, providing them with shelter and medical attention to cover their needs.

    Regarding freedom of movement, Viet Nam respected this fully with regard to its citizens, ensuring that they were protected and promoting their freedom of residence.  The law contained a list of prohibited activities.  Anybody leaving or entering the country needed to respect the relevant laws.  Freedom of movement could be restricted based on national security, public health, and public defence.  There was no single case of restriction of freedom of movement in Viet Nam for ethnic or religious reasons; all cases were because laws had been violated.

    Viet Nam supported the right of freedom of expression, but strictly dealt with violations of those rights, particularly in efforts to defame the State and cause division among the different parts of society, and this was in line with international agreements. 

    The Penal Code provided for detention only under clear and specific conditions, and also provided for other forms of detention.  Detention was only imposed if it was deemed necessary.  Detainees had the full right to family visits and to communicate with others, with the right to access legal counsel.  Limitations to legal counsel were in line with international standards, and only applied in severe cases of necessity, including those affecting national security.  Suspects could also be detained in these cases to ensure that the investigation would be sufficient.  Since 2019 to date, there had been no cases of abuse of this power.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said he was not fully satisfied with responses on a few issues, including regarding who was responsible for the disciplinary procedure for judges, and how their independence from the Government was ensured. How was the presumption of innocence and access to a lawyer guaranteed, and how were lawyers protected in sensitive cases from facing threats of reprisal?  How was the independence of the National Electoral Council ensured?

    On the freedom of expression, an Expert noted that this was not an absolute right but said that concerns lay in the breadth of the restrictions allowed for by the State party.  Restrictions needed to be as narrowly defined as possible.  The Committee did not take exception to detention for violation of laws, but it took exception to excessive lengths of detention and forms of harassment perpetrated on the accused.  The State party recognised the importance of religious freedom, but at the same time referred to a need for registration, which was a limitation of this freedom.

    Another Expert addressed the situation of those arrested for national security reasons, noting that this was a broad concept, and that sometimes national security laws were applied to prisoners of conscience and persons with certain religious beliefs.  The Expert said he was unsure how this was relevant to national security.  The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had found cases of arbitrary detention where there had been restriction of freedom of religion, restrictions on access to legal counsel, and other inappropriate restrictions, and he asked for a comment on this.

    Regarding the right to freedom of association, an Expert asked whether any of the restrictions to this right could be removed, and whether the Government was envisaging any law on the freedom of association.  According to information received, persons who spoke minority languages and other minorities were not allowed to participate in international fora, which was a matter of concern.  On the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities, had any of the rights that had been developed globally been recognised in Viet Nam, where there appeared to be a resistance to recognising indigenous peoples.  Did they benefit from the core rights existing in international law? 

    Further clarification was requested on the conditions under which the Government interfered with the right to privacy by cutting telephone lines, interrupting cell phones and Internet services for political activists and their families.  Did the Government consider abolishing or amending relevant legislation, or providing more solid grounds for the registering of media users using real names and phone numbers, including those outside Viet Nam?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Criminal Code included a provision on the presumption of innocence, so defendants were considered to be innocent until found guilty by a legal decision by a court of Viet Nam.  Only the courts had the authority to declare somebody guilty, and there needed to be sufficient access to legal counsel.  If there was lack of evidence, then the court needed to declare a person innocent.  There were many mechanisms to oversee and monitor judges’ performance, and there were inspections of local and central courts, investigations of denunciations or allegations of violations, and disciplinary actions provided for in case these were substantiated.

    Regarding elections, independent candidates needed to prepare a dossier and send their application to the local authorities, who would review it to make sure that it respected the law, after which they would send the dossier to the standing committee and the provincial election committee, as well as the National Election Council.  There was a stringent procedure for considering the application for election by independent candidates.  On restriction of the freedom of association, a recent decree had been enacted that created favourable conditions for associations without discrimination. There were no plans to introduce any other new laws, as the current legislation satisfied requirements.

    On privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression and speech, Viet Nam’s policy was to have a healthy cyberspace that did not infringe upon the enjoyment of rights.  The cybersecurity of Viet Nam aimed to promote the use of the Internet whilst striking a balance between the rise of the country and the needs of the people, and had been developed on the basis of learning from experiences of other countries, in consultation with public and private bodies.  The cybersecurity law provided precise conditions in which there could be restrictions of access to the Internet, but this law did not hinder human rights and only related to cases where individuals violated the law. Cybersecurity did not hinder the use of the Internet unless it was to defend the Government.

    The freedom of expression and of the press was not an absolute right and needed to be exercised in line with the law.  Registration was used to this end to protect the legitimate rights of all people and to develop a healthy Internet space.  The right to freedom and belief had been effectively supported over previous years, thanks to the implementation of a new law from 2018, the delegation said.

    Given the characteristics of the people in question, Viet Nam did not use the term “indigenous people”, using instead the terms “ethnic minority” or “small minority”, the delegation said.  The guarantee of rights for ethnic minorities was a significant achievement, given the geographical structure of Viet Nam.  These people were facilitated in their access to their human and citizenship rights.

    On arbitrary detention, the right to access to defence counsel was never limited for detainees.  Only the Prosecutor General had the power to make the decision to limit such access, but no cases of this were recorded.  On tax evasion, there were regulations on this all over the world, and penalties were imposed, and this could not be considered a punitive measure.

    Closing Statements

    THANH TỊNH NGUYỄN, Deputy Minister of Justice and head of the delegation, said Viet Nam appreciated the dialogue.  The delegation had engaged openly and sincerely, and aimed to provide all answers. Protection and promotion of human rights were the objective and result of a long struggle by many generations of Vietnamese people.  Human rights were a universal and global value, and their protection was a goal for all countries, but each country had a different mechanism to ensure these rights for citizens in line with its socio-economic situation.  Viet Nam worked to ensure the happiness of the people, which was the ultimate goal of its policies, and it had worked to this end to improve its legal system to ensure that people would be the beneficiaries of its policies.  Viet Nam remained steadfast in its aim to build a democratic, equitable and harmonious society, implementing sustainable social policies based on human rights for the people, who were placed at the heart of State policies.  Good laws also needed to be enforced and implemented to ensure positive results, and this was also the policy of the Government.  Viet Nam’s Government was committed to implementing the Covenant.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who had contributed to the dialogue.  Over the past two days, the dialogue had addressed key elements of the implementation of the Covenant.  The adoption of certain institutional safeguards to combat discrimination and to combat domestic violence was positive, but there were a number of remaining concerns requiring attention, including severe restriction on fundamental freedoms related to assembly, speech, and religion.  There were also credible allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and persistent challenges for vulnerable groups, including women and children, ethnic minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.

    ___________

    This document is produced by the United Nations Information Service at Geneva and is intended for public information; it is not an official document.
    The English and French versions of our news releases are different because they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CCPR25.016E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Justice Department Announces Arrest of Prolific Chinese State-Sponsored Contract Hacker

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    China’s Ministry of State Security Directed the Theft of COVID-19 Research and the Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities, Known Publicly as the Indiscriminate ‘HAFNIUM’ Intrusion Campaign

    The Justice Department announced today that Xu Zewei (徐泽伟), 33, of the People’s Republic of China was arrested on July 3 in Italy at the request of the United States. Xu and his co-defendant, PRC national Zhang Yu (张宇), 44, are charged in a nine-count indictment, unsealed today in the Southern District of Texas, for their involvement in computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021, including the indiscriminate HAFNIUM computer intrusion campaign that compromised thousands of computers worldwide, including in the United States. Xu was arrested in Milan, Italy, and will face extradition proceedings.

    According to court documents, officers of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) directed Xu to conduct this hacking. The MSS and SSSB are PRC intelligence services responsible for PRC’s domestic counterintelligence, non-military foreign intelligence, and aspects of the PRC’s political and domestic security. When conducting the computer intrusions, Xu worked for a company named Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd. (Powerock). Powerock was one of many “enabling” companies in the PRC that conducted hacking for the PRC government.

    “This arrest underscores the United States’ patient and tireless commitment to pursuing hackers who seek to steal information belonging to U.S. companies and universities,” said John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division. “The Justice Department will find you and hold you accountable for threatening our cybersecurity and harming our people and institutions.”

    “The indictment alleges that Xu was hacking and stealing crucial COVID-19 research at the behest of the Chinese government while that same government was simultaneously withholding information about the virus and its origins,” said Nicholas Ganjei, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas. “The Southern District of Texas has been waiting years to bring Xu to justice and that day is nearly at hand. As this case shows, even if it takes years, we will track hackers down and make them answer for their crimes. The United States does not forget.”

    “In February 2020, as the world entered a pandemic, Xu Zewei and other cyber actors working on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) targeted American universities to steal groundbreaking COVID-19 research. The following year, these same actors, operating as a group publicly known as HAFNIUM, exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in U.S. systems to steal additional research,” said Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of FBI’s Cyber Division. “Through HAFNIUM, the CCP targeted over 60,000 U.S. entities, successfully victimizing more than 12,700 in order to steal sensitive information. This arrest, carried out with our Italian law enforcement partners, demonstrates the FBI’s relentless commitment to holding CCP-sponsored hackers accountable for their crimes.” 

    According to court documents, in early 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators hacked and otherwise targeted U.S.-based universities, immunologists, and virologists conducting research into COVID‑19 vaccines, treatment, and testing. Xu and others reported their activities to officers in the SSSB who were supervising and directing the hacking activities. For example, on or about Feb. 19, 2020, Xu provided an SSSB officer with confirmation that he had compromised the network of a research university located in the Southern District of Texas. On or about Feb. 22, 2020, the SSSB officer directed Xu to target and access specific email accounts (mailboxes) belonging to virologists and immunologists engaged in COVID-19 research for the university. Xu later confirmed for the SSSB officer that he acquired the contents of the researchers’ mailboxes.

    Beginning in late 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators exploited certain vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server, a widely-used Microsoft product for sending, receiving, and storing email messages. Their exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server was at the forefront of a massive campaign targeting thousands of computers worldwide and known publicly as “HAFNIUM.” In March 2021, Microsoft publicly disclosed the intrusion campaign by state-sponsored hackers operating out of China. Throughout March 2021, Microsoft and other industry partners released detection tools, patches, and other information to assist victim entities in identifying and mitigating this cyber incident. Additionally, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a Joint Advisory on Compromise of Microsoft Exchange Server on March 10, 2021. However, by the end of March 2021, hundreds of web shells remained on certain U.S.-based computers running Microsoft Exchange Server software. In April 2021, the Justice Department announced a court-authorized operation to remediate hundreds of computers in the United States made vulnerable by HAFNIUM actors. In July 2021, the United States and foreign partners attributed the HAFNIUM campaign to the PRC’s MSS.

    Among the victims of Xu’s exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server were another university located in the Southern District of Texas and a law firm with offices worldwide, including in Washington, D.C. After exploiting computers running Microsoft Exchange Server, Xu and his co-conspirators installed web shells on them to enable their remote administration. These web shells were specific to HAFNIUM actors at the time. As with the earlier COVID-19 research intrusions, Xu and Zhang worked together on the HAFNIUM intrusions, under the supervision and direction of SSSB officers. For example, on or about Jan. 30, 2021, Xu confirmed to Zhang that he had compromised the other university’s network. Later, on or about Feb. 28, 2021, Xu updated a SSSB officer on his successful intrusions. This SSSB officer then directed Xu to obtain a list of other, successful intrusions from a second SSSB officer. Unauthorized access to the law firm’s network allowed Xu and his co-conspirators to steal information from mailboxes and search them for information regarding specific U.S. policy makers and government agencies. Their search terms included “Chinese sources,” “MSS,” and “HongKong.”

    The announcement of charges against Xu is the latest describing the PRC’s use of an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s involvement. Operating from their safe haven and motivated by profit, this network of private companies and contractors in China cast a wide net to identify vulnerable computers, exploit those computers, and then identify information that it could sell directly or indirectly to the PRC government. This largely indiscriminate approach results in more victims in the United States and elsewhere, more systems worldwide left vulnerable to future exploitation by third parties, and more stolen information, often of no interest to the PRC government and, therefore, sold to other third parties.

    Xu is charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count; conspiracy to cause damage to and obtain information by unauthorized access to protected computers, to commit wire fraud, and to commit identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of obtaining information by unauthorized access to protected computers, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of intentional damage to a protected computer, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison; and aggravated identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of two years in prison. Zhang Yu, remains at large. Anyone with information about his whereabouts is asked to contact the FBI at 1-800-CALL-FBI (1-800-225-5324).

    The FBI’s Houston Field Office is investigating the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided valuable assistance in securing the defendant’s arrest.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark McIntyre and John Marck for the Southern District of Texas and Deputy Chief Matthew Anzaldi of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs is handling the extradition.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Announces Arrest of Prolific Chinese State-Sponsored Contract Hacker

    Source: United States Attorneys General 2

    China’s Ministry of State Security Directed the Theft of COVID-19 Research and the Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities, Known Publicly as the Indiscriminate ‘HAFNIUM’ Intrusion Campaign

    The Justice Department announced today that Xu Zewei (徐泽伟), 33, of the People’s Republic of China was arrested on July 3 in Italy at the request of the United States. Xu and his co-defendant, PRC national Zhang Yu (张宇), 44, are charged in a nine-count indictment, unsealed today in the Southern District of Texas, for their involvement in computer intrusions between February 2020 and June 2021, including the indiscriminate HAFNIUM computer intrusion campaign that compromised thousands of computers worldwide, including in the United States. Xu was arrested in Milan, Italy, and will face extradition proceedings.

    According to court documents, officers of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) directed Xu to conduct this hacking. The MSS and SSSB are PRC intelligence services responsible for PRC’s domestic counterintelligence, non-military foreign intelligence, and aspects of the PRC’s political and domestic security. When conducting the computer intrusions, Xu worked for a company named Shanghai Powerock Network Co. Ltd. (Powerock). Powerock was one of many “enabling” companies in the PRC that conducted hacking for the PRC government.

    “This arrest underscores the United States’ patient and tireless commitment to pursuing hackers who seek to steal information belonging to U.S. companies and universities,” said John A. Eisenberg, Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division. “The Justice Department will find you and hold you accountable for threatening our cybersecurity and harming our people and institutions.”

    “The indictment alleges that Xu was hacking and stealing crucial COVID-19 research at the behest of the Chinese government while that same government was simultaneously withholding information about the virus and its origins,” said Nicholas Ganjei, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas. “The Southern District of Texas has been waiting years to bring Xu to justice and that day is nearly at hand. As this case shows, even if it takes years, we will track hackers down and make them answer for their crimes. The United States does not forget.”

    “In February 2020, as the world entered a pandemic, Xu Zewei and other cyber actors working on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) targeted American universities to steal groundbreaking COVID-19 research. The following year, these same actors, operating as a group publicly known as HAFNIUM, exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in U.S. systems to steal additional research,” said Assistant Director Brett Leatherman of FBI’s Cyber Division. “Through HAFNIUM, the CCP targeted over 60,000 U.S. entities, successfully victimizing more than 12,700 in order to steal sensitive information. This arrest, carried out with our Italian law enforcement partners, demonstrates the FBI’s relentless commitment to holding CCP-sponsored hackers accountable for their crimes.” 

    According to court documents, in early 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators hacked and otherwise targeted U.S.-based universities, immunologists, and virologists conducting research into COVID‑19 vaccines, treatment, and testing. Xu and others reported their activities to officers in the SSSB who were supervising and directing the hacking activities. For example, on or about Feb. 19, 2020, Xu provided an SSSB officer with confirmation that he had compromised the network of a research university located in the Southern District of Texas. On or about Feb. 22, 2020, the SSSB officer directed Xu to target and access specific email accounts (mailboxes) belonging to virologists and immunologists engaged in COVID-19 research for the university. Xu later confirmed for the SSSB officer that he acquired the contents of the researchers’ mailboxes.

    Beginning in late 2020, Xu and his co-conspirators exploited certain vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server, a widely-used Microsoft product for sending, receiving, and storing email messages. Their exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server was at the forefront of a massive campaign targeting thousands of computers worldwide and known publicly as “HAFNIUM.” In March 2021, Microsoft publicly disclosed the intrusion campaign by state-sponsored hackers operating out of China. Throughout March 2021, Microsoft and other industry partners released detection tools, patches, and other information to assist victim entities in identifying and mitigating this cyber incident. Additionally, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released a Joint Advisory on Compromise of Microsoft Exchange Server on March 10, 2021. However, by the end of March 2021, hundreds of web shells remained on certain U.S.-based computers running Microsoft Exchange Server software. In April 2021, the Justice Department announced a court-authorized operation to remediate hundreds of computers in the United States made vulnerable by HAFNIUM actors. In July 2021, the United States and foreign partners attributed the HAFNIUM campaign to the PRC’s MSS.

    Among the victims of Xu’s exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server were another university located in the Southern District of Texas and a law firm with offices worldwide, including in Washington, D.C. After exploiting computers running Microsoft Exchange Server, Xu and his co-conspirators installed web shells on them to enable their remote administration. These web shells were specific to HAFNIUM actors at the time. As with the earlier COVID-19 research intrusions, Xu and Zhang worked together on the HAFNIUM intrusions, under the supervision and direction of SSSB officers. For example, on or about Jan. 30, 2021, Xu confirmed to Zhang that he had compromised the other university’s network. Later, on or about Feb. 28, 2021, Xu updated a SSSB officer on his successful intrusions. This SSSB officer then directed Xu to obtain a list of other, successful intrusions from a second SSSB officer. Unauthorized access to the law firm’s network allowed Xu and his co-conspirators to steal information from mailboxes and search them for information regarding specific U.S. policy makers and government agencies. Their search terms included “Chinese sources,” “MSS,” and “HongKong.”

    The announcement of charges against Xu is the latest describing the PRC’s use of an extensive network of private companies and contractors in China to hack and steal information in a manner that obscured the PRC government’s involvement. Operating from their safe haven and motivated by profit, this network of private companies and contractors in China cast a wide net to identify vulnerable computers, exploit those computers, and then identify information that it could sell directly or indirectly to the PRC government. This largely indiscriminate approach results in more victims in the United States and elsewhere, more systems worldwide left vulnerable to future exploitation by third parties, and more stolen information, often of no interest to the PRC government and, therefore, sold to other third parties.

    Xu is charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and two counts of wire fraud, which carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count; conspiracy to cause damage to and obtain information by unauthorized access to protected computers, to commit wire fraud, and to commit identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of obtaining information by unauthorized access to protected computers, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison; two counts of intentional damage to a protected computer, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison; and aggravated identity theft, which carries a maximum penalty of two years in prison. Zhang Yu, remains at large. Anyone with information about his whereabouts is asked to contact the FBI at 1-800-CALL-FBI (1-800-225-5324).

    The FBI’s Houston Field Office is investigating the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided valuable assistance in securing the defendant’s arrest.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mark McIntyre and John Marck for the Southern District of Texas and Deputy Chief Matthew Anzaldi of the National Security Division’s National Security Cyber Section are prosecuting the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs is handling the extradition.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Faulkner, Senior Lecturer in Exercise Physiology, Nottingham Trent University

    The Tour de France is often called the world’s biggest annual sporting event. Each July up to 12 million people line the roadside, while the cumulative TV audience tops 3 billion viewers across 190 countries.

    In 2025, 184 riders will compete in teams of eight, racing a punishing 3,500 km route with nearly 50,000 metres of climbing – roughly the height of Mount Everest six times over. Across 21 stages riders tackle time trials, flat sprints and brutal mountain passes through the Alps, Pyrenees and Massif Central.

    Professional cyclists possess extraordinary endurance and are capable of generating high power outputs day after day. Yet, despite having far less training and support, in recent years a number of amateur cyclists have begun riding the Tour route just days before the pros. The Tour 21 is one such effort and offers cyclists a chance to follow in the tyre tracks of the elite while raising money for a good cause.

    In 2021 I joined 19 others to ride the full route in support of Cure Leukaemia, with a shared goal of raising £1 million for blood cancer research. As a blood cancer survivor diagnosed at 16, this challenge combined my love of cycling, my background in science and my deep desire to give back to the community that helped save my life. It was also a unique opportunity to study how amateur cyclists cope with one of the most demanding endurance events in the world.

    The research findings were published in the Journal of Science and Cycling, to coincide with 2025’s Grand Départ (the official start of the race) in Lille.

    Training for the impossible

    Originally, the study planned to include lab-based physiological assessments of the amateur cyclists undertaking the Tour de France route, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced us to adapt and rely instead on data from training diaries. These gave us insight into how much (or little) training had been done leading up to the ride, and how riders managed the physical and mental strain during the event itself.

    While professional cyclists typically train 20–25 hours a week – often at altitude, with tailored coaching and racing schedules – our group of amateurs had full-time jobs, were typically 15–20 years older than the pros and trained around seven to ten hours a week.

    Our preparation was far from ideal, averaging just 47km per ride and 350 metres of climbing; a fraction of what the Tour demands. In fact, this amounted to less than 10% of the required climbing during the mountain stages.

    Once the ride began, the contrast between training and reality was stark. The group averaged nearly seven hours of riding a day, a 300% increase from their usual routine. Within four days signs of overtraining began to emerge: riders were no longer able to elevate their heart rates, a classic marker of central nervous system fatigue and excessive physical stress.

    As the days progressed, performance metrics continued to decline: heart rates dropped, power outputs fell and mood scores deteriorated. The cumulative fatigue was undeniable.

    Surprisingly, when we compared our amateur data to metrics from professional riders, we found that although pros ride at much higher power outputs, amateurs were subject to greater relative stress. On some days they spent almost double the time in the saddle, which meant they operated closer to their physical limits, with far less time for recovery – and often suboptimal sleep and nutrition.

    By the final week many of the riders could no longer produce the same power they had in the first few days. In some cases, heart rates wouldn’t rise above 100 beats per minute – a clear sign of accumulated fatigue and physiological overload.

    How to prepare for an ultra-endurance challenge

    If you’re planning to take on a major endurance event – whether it’s cycling, running, or hiking – here are some lessons from the road:

    1. Train specifically for the event

    Your training should mirror the challenge ahead. For the Tour, this meant preparing for long, back-to-back days with significant climbing. Mimic the intensity, volume and terrain as closely as possible.

    2. Understand how quickly fatigue builds

    Over multiple days, fatigue doesn’t just accumulate – it compounds. Listen to your body, adapt your plan and include plenty of recovery time.

    3. Prioritise nutrition and recovery

    These two factors can make or break your performance. You’ll need to consume enough energy to fuel the effort, but avoid excessive intake that leads to unnecessary weight gain. Recovery – through sleep, rest and refuelling – is equally vital.

    4. Work with an experienced coach

    More than fancy bikes or high-tech gear, a good coach is your best investment. They can help tailor your training plan, track your progress and adapt strategies as needed. Don’t underestimate this support.

    A ride to remember

    Completing the Tour de France route is a monumental achievement for any cyclist — amateur or pro. In 2021, our team not only rode the full route, but also raised over £1 million for Cure Leukaemia. For me, it marked a deeply personal milestone in my cancer journey.

    Throughout those 21 days, I thought often of the physical and emotional battles I faced during treatment; moments when I didn’t know if I’d survive, let alone ride across France. That experience gave me the resilience to keep going, even when my body was screaming to stop.

    Riding the Tour taught me that we’re capable of far more than we realise, especially when we ride with purpose.

    Steve Faulkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned – https://theconversation.com/i-rode-the-tour-de-france-to-study-its-impact-on-the-human-body-heres-what-i-learned-260524

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Faulkner, Senior Lecturer in Exercise Physiology, Nottingham Trent University

    The Tour de France is often called the world’s biggest annual sporting event. Each July up to 12 million people line the roadside, while the cumulative TV audience tops 3 billion viewers across 190 countries.

    In 2025, 184 riders will compete in teams of eight, racing a punishing 3,500 km route with nearly 50,000 metres of climbing – roughly the height of Mount Everest six times over. Across 21 stages riders tackle time trials, flat sprints and brutal mountain passes through the Alps, Pyrenees and Massif Central.

    Professional cyclists possess extraordinary endurance and are capable of generating high power outputs day after day. Yet, despite having far less training and support, in recent years a number of amateur cyclists have begun riding the Tour route just days before the pros. The Tour 21 is one such effort and offers cyclists a chance to follow in the tyre tracks of the elite while raising money for a good cause.

    In 2021 I joined 19 others to ride the full route in support of Cure Leukaemia, with a shared goal of raising £1 million for blood cancer research. As a blood cancer survivor diagnosed at 16, this challenge combined my love of cycling, my background in science and my deep desire to give back to the community that helped save my life. It was also a unique opportunity to study how amateur cyclists cope with one of the most demanding endurance events in the world.

    The research findings were published in the Journal of Science and Cycling, to coincide with 2025’s Grand Départ (the official start of the race) in Lille.

    Training for the impossible

    Originally, the study planned to include lab-based physiological assessments of the amateur cyclists undertaking the Tour de France route, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced us to adapt and rely instead on data from training diaries. These gave us insight into how much (or little) training had been done leading up to the ride, and how riders managed the physical and mental strain during the event itself.

    While professional cyclists typically train 20–25 hours a week – often at altitude, with tailored coaching and racing schedules – our group of amateurs had full-time jobs, were typically 15–20 years older than the pros and trained around seven to ten hours a week.

    Our preparation was far from ideal, averaging just 47km per ride and 350 metres of climbing; a fraction of what the Tour demands. In fact, this amounted to less than 10% of the required climbing during the mountain stages.

    Once the ride began, the contrast between training and reality was stark. The group averaged nearly seven hours of riding a day, a 300% increase from their usual routine. Within four days signs of overtraining began to emerge: riders were no longer able to elevate their heart rates, a classic marker of central nervous system fatigue and excessive physical stress.

    As the days progressed, performance metrics continued to decline: heart rates dropped, power outputs fell and mood scores deteriorated. The cumulative fatigue was undeniable.

    Surprisingly, when we compared our amateur data to metrics from professional riders, we found that although pros ride at much higher power outputs, amateurs were subject to greater relative stress. On some days they spent almost double the time in the saddle, which meant they operated closer to their physical limits, with far less time for recovery – and often suboptimal sleep and nutrition.

    By the final week many of the riders could no longer produce the same power they had in the first few days. In some cases, heart rates wouldn’t rise above 100 beats per minute – a clear sign of accumulated fatigue and physiological overload.

    How to prepare for an ultra-endurance challenge

    If you’re planning to take on a major endurance event – whether it’s cycling, running, or hiking – here are some lessons from the road:

    1. Train specifically for the event

    Your training should mirror the challenge ahead. For the Tour, this meant preparing for long, back-to-back days with significant climbing. Mimic the intensity, volume and terrain as closely as possible.

    2. Understand how quickly fatigue builds

    Over multiple days, fatigue doesn’t just accumulate – it compounds. Listen to your body, adapt your plan and include plenty of recovery time.

    3. Prioritise nutrition and recovery

    These two factors can make or break your performance. You’ll need to consume enough energy to fuel the effort, but avoid excessive intake that leads to unnecessary weight gain. Recovery – through sleep, rest and refuelling – is equally vital.

    4. Work with an experienced coach

    More than fancy bikes or high-tech gear, a good coach is your best investment. They can help tailor your training plan, track your progress and adapt strategies as needed. Don’t underestimate this support.

    A ride to remember

    Completing the Tour de France route is a monumental achievement for any cyclist — amateur or pro. In 2021, our team not only rode the full route, but also raised over £1 million for Cure Leukaemia. For me, it marked a deeply personal milestone in my cancer journey.

    Throughout those 21 days, I thought often of the physical and emotional battles I faced during treatment; moments when I didn’t know if I’d survive, let alone ride across France. That experience gave me the resilience to keep going, even when my body was screaming to stop.

    Riding the Tour taught me that we’re capable of far more than we realise, especially when we ride with purpose.

    Steve Faulkner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. I rode the Tour de France to study its impact on the human body – here’s what I learned – https://theconversation.com/i-rode-the-tour-de-france-to-study-its-impact-on-the-human-body-heres-what-i-learned-260524

    MIL OSI –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Cahal Moran, Visiting Fellow in the Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science

    During my adult life, I have never experienced what it’s like to live in a “good” economy. Starting with the global financial crash in 2008, which hit just as I began studying economics, the world seems to have lurched from crisis to crisis and the UK economy even more so.

    Some of those crises, like the crash and COVID, are sudden shocks. Others have been more gradual, such as increasingly unaffordable housing or the rising dominance of the world’s ultra rich.

    As I explore in my new book, Why We’re Getting Poorer, the result of these crises is an economic system which works for some much more than it does for others. Here are four reasons why you may be feeling let down.

    1. Grasping for growth

    Like many of his fellow leaders across the world, the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, is aiming to make economic growth the primary mission of his government. And understandably so.

    A growing economy puts more money in people’s pockets and brings other benefits such as low unemployment. But economic growth is not easy (in the UK it has been poor for a long time).

    That’s because there’s no GDP dial that a prime minister or president can simply turn up. Research shows that economic growth is an amorphous and difficult goal which depends on many factors – geopolitical, demographic, technological – outside any single country’s control.

    One option is to focus on achievable goals around investment, like the public investments of £113 billion on homes, transport and energy planned in the UK. But big projects can take a long time to build and develop, so even if they do boost growth, it can take a while for households to feel the benefits.

    2. Inherent inequality

    Against the backdrop of low growth in the UK has been high inequality, under Conservative and Labour governments. And again, inequality is an international issue.

    The wealth of the richest people in the world skyrocketed over COVID, buoyed in many cases by the increased importance of the tech sector during lockdowns. Even before the pandemic, wealth inequality was a problem across the globe.

    This imbalance has given the very richest opportunities to buy up commercial competitors, indulge in space travel and control large parts of the media, exerting extreme economic, social and political power. Needless to say, their economic priorities are not the same as everyone else’s.

    Meanwhile, communities and regions may be left behind, with declining physical and social infrastructure. People living in hollowed out areas where incomes and opportunities are limited are unlikely to feel that the economic system is working for them.

    3. Globalisation

    Globalisation has made a lot of people – in places like China, India and Brazil – better off. But it is not a system which ensures economic benefits for everyone.

    With global competition, big businesses are often under pressure to reduce costs. Free trade deals have often failed to enforce labour standards or redistribute gains to poorly paid workers, and in many cases simply made the rich richer.

    Such a distorted form of economic governance, where large sections of society end up feeling left behind was bound to provoke a response. Some would link it to recent political events like Brexit and the presidencies of Donald Trump, whose international tariffs are a clear attempt to reverse the rise of globalisation.

    Sporadic supply chains.
    Corona Borealis Studio/Shutterstock

    Since the pandemic, more fault-lines have been exposed. The global economy has become too dependent on certain regions, epitomised by Taiwanese dominance in the manufacturing of semiconductors, or European reliance on Russia for gas and oil.

    Recent years have also seen supply chain bottlenecks, leading to shortages of goods including cars, phones and even salad ingredients. Inflexible global systems have been ineffective, and internationally agreed fixes are hard to achieve.

    4. Climate change

    World news at the start of 2020 was dominated by the massive wildfires raging across Australia. At the start of 2025, Los Angeles burned.

    As the global climate shifts and lurches, extreme weather events are becoming more common. Floods, hurricanes and extreme temperatures look to be the likely outcome.

    When sea levels rise, countless coastal cities will experience flooding, and many Pacific islands may disappear altogether. The UN’s climate science advisory group, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that humanity will struggle with food production, disease and massive migration.

    This will all result in huge economic costs, impeding growth and disrupting livelihoods across the world. According to the IPCC, the impacts could range from extreme weather events disrupting infrastructure to changing weather reducing yields in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

    Yet many countries appear to be backtracking on their commitment to reducing emissions. It seems they would prefer to deal with the fallout of climate change rather than invest in potential solutions like carbon taxes, walkable cities or alternative fuels. But such acts of self-harm are not a sound basis for a prosperous economy, society or planet.

    Cahal Moran does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Four reasons why many of us feel the global economy is not on our side – https://theconversation.com/four-reasons-why-many-of-us-feel-the-global-economy-is-not-on-our-side-252220

    MIL OSI –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to study looking at underlying mechanisms of the known, rare side effect, vaccine-induced immune thrombosis and thrombocytopenia (VITT), associated with adenoviral Covid vaccines

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    July 8, 2025

    A study published in the NIHR’s Efficacy and Mechanism Evaluation journal looks at the mechanisms of a known rare side effect, vaccine-induced immune thrombosis (VITT) and thrombocytopenia, associated with adenoviral Covid vaccines.

    Prof Adam Finn, Professor of Paediatrics, University of Bristol, said:

    “This is a summary of the findings to date of several distinct pieces of research intended to increase our understanding of VITT.  The work was extensive, took a number of different approaches, and provided some additional evidence around the potential pathogenetic mechanisms.  However, a complete understanding of the genetic and environmental factors which drive these rare reactions remains elusive, partly because of the relatively small number of individuals affected who could be studied.”

    ‘Understanding mechanisms of thrombosis and thrombocytopenia with adenoviral SARS-CoV-2 vaccines: a comprehensive synopsis’ by Phillip LR Nicolson et al. was published in the NIHR’s Efficacy and Mechanism Evaluation journal.

    DOI: 10.3310/FFSS9010

    Declared interests

    Prof Adam Finn: “Adam Finn is a member of JCVI subcommittees relating to varicella-zoster, pneumococcal and respiratory syncytial virus vaccines and of the WHO working group on COVID19 vaccines.  He leads epidemiological research for the University of Bristol funded by Pfizer.  He undertakes paid consultancy for multiple vaccine development and manufacturing companies.  He was an investigator in trials of the Oxford-AstraZeneca COVID19 vaccine during the pandemic.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Hunting a fugitive in a pandemic

    Source: Interpol (news and events)

    In January 2020, Brazilian Federal Police officers arrived at the home of Gonzalo Sanchez in the coastal municipality of Angra dos Reis to find the former Argentine Navy officer had once again disappeared.

    Under house arrest after he was first tracked down and arrested in 2013, Sanchez, aged 69, was wanted by his home country for crimes against humanity and the Brazilian Supreme Court had recently authorized his extradition.

    Death flights

    As part of the notorious Task Group 3.3 charged with combating ‘subversives’, Sanchez allegedly participated in dozens of ‘forced disappearances’ during Argentina’s 1976-1983 military regime, including the killing of journalist and writer Rodolfo Walsh.  

    Victims were routinely kidnapped and brought to the Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada – a Navy school which doubled as a secret detention centre – where they were interrogated, tortured and, ultimately, murdered. Many were drugged and thrown from planes into the Atlantic Ocean in so-called ‘death flights’.

    In 2009, an INTERPOL Red Notice was issued at Argentina’s request against Sanchez, who had by that point been on the run for several years. On his arrest in 2013, he was found living under a false name and providing nautical engineering services in Agra dos Reis – a reminder of his Navy past.

    INTERPOL’s Fugitive Investigative Support unit had been following the case closely since 2016 as part of Project BASIC – a coordinated effort to crack down on outstanding war criminals.

    Ideal place for a fugitive

    As soon as Brazilian Federal police discovered Sanchez was once again a fugitive, it was clear that finding him would take considerable time and effort.

    “At this moment, we realized that it would be a difficult and possibly time-consuming job, since the region of Angra dos Reis, in Rio de Janeiro state, is full of islands, hills, communities and farms. It’s an ideal place for a fugitive from justice,” said a representative from Brazil’s INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) in Brasilia.

    “We realized it would be a difficult and time-consuming job. […] It’s an ideal place for a fugitive from justice.”

    A specialized team of Brazilian Federal Police officers from the INTERPOL satellite office in Rio de Janeiro was assigned exclusively to the case and sent to Angra dos Reis. A task force was established with local Federal Police officers and a 24/7 investigation began.

    The task force started with what they knew about the fugitive: he had fathered a Brazilian child and belonged to a local religious community. Being on the run and out of work also likely meant that the same family and friends who facilitated Sanchez’s escape were continuing to support him financially. Officers began a three-month surveillance and monitoring mission of Sanchez’s inner circle in of Paraty – a historic colonial municipality on the Southern border of Rio de Janeiro state.

    Family reunion

    Complicating the surveillance effort, however, was the arrival of the global COVID-19 pandemic to Brazil’s shores. The pandemic meant street circulation was down, making the presence of police harder to disguise, and restrictions on public gatherings meant that Sanchez would not be attending religious gatherings any time soon.

    On the day after Mother’s day in Brazil (10 May), the police task force received intelligence indicating that a core group of people close to Sanchez, including his seven-year-old son, were travelling up the coast to the “Taquari hinterland”. Bordering a vast mountainous nature reserve, the area was exposed with few houses, meaning a discreet police approach would be practically impossible. When the team arrived as close as they could without raising suspicion, they conferred with locals who indicated that Sanchez was hiding in a house on the outskirts of the village, closest to the nature reserve.

    Police entered the house to find Gonzalo Sanchez with his family and close friends, confirming the thesis of a family reunion. None of those present offered any resistance and Sanchez was taken into custody.

    Homecoming

    As soon as Sanchez was captured, the police reports were forwarded to NCB Brasilia, which coordinated his extradition. The INTERPOL NCBs in Brasilia and Buenos Aires had worked together closely beforehand to ensure that nothing would impede the process, including the pandemic. Due to the lack of commercial flights between the two countries in the context of COVID-19, a Brazilian Federal Police aircraft transported Sanchez to the border in Foz do Iguaçu, where he was handed over to Argentine authorities.

    “In our view, the most important part of this case was the good coordination between Brazil and Argentina that allowed the fugitive to be arrested in Rio de Janeiro on 11 May and surrendered to Argentina at the border of Foz do Iguaçu-Puerto Iguazu on 14 May – a distance of almost 1500 kilometers,” said Commissioner Bruno Samezima, Head of NCB Brasilia. “COVID-19 did not prevent police from effectively carrying out their duties.”

    “The most important part of this case was the coordination between Brazil and Argentina […]. COVID-19 did not prevent police from carrying out their duties.”

    “In the face of such a serious pandemic situation, the arrest of Sanchez truly represents the professionalism and service of law enforcement officers,” said Commissioner Edgardo Martin Moses, Head of NCB Buenos Aires. “His extradition involved a great effort and coordination between both countries to ensure he could be successfully brought before justice, while ensuring the safety and health of Argentine and Brazilian officials.”

    For Stephen Kavanagh, INTERPOL’s Executive Director of Police Services, the case is a prime example of how COVID-19 has both changed and reaffirmed the vital role of police work in a challenging context.

    “The horrific crimes which Gonzalo Sanchez is accused of occurred more than 40 years ago. And yet, when the Brazilian police received the go-ahead to locate and extradite him – in the middle of a global pandemic – they wasted no time and succeeded in a matter of months,” the INTERPOL official said.

    “It may not be ‘business as usual’ but the dedication of law enforcement to bring fugitives to justice remains the same.”

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Michael J. Armstrong, Associate Professor, Operations Research, Brock University

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization? (Unsplash+)

    Before Canada legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, it was unclear how the change might affect beverage alcohol consumption. Would consumers drink less or more after cannabis became legal?

    Drinking might decrease, for example, if people used cannabis in place of alcohol. That switch potentially could reduce alcohol-related harms. But economically, it would mean any gains in the cannabis industry would likely come at the expense of alcohol producers.

    Conversely, drinking might increase if people used alcohol along with cannabis. That could boost alcohol industry profits and government tax revenues, but at the cost of increased health risks of both substances.

    In response to this uncertainty, some businesses diversified. One alcohol producer bought a cannabis grower, while a cannabis firm took took over several beer brewers.

    Research from the United States into the relationship between alcohol and cannabis use is inconclusive. Some studies report that alcohol use decreased in states that allowed cannabis, while others said usage increased or didn’t significantly change. Those conflicting conclusions might reflect the complex legal situation in the United States, where cannabis remains illegal under federal law, even in states that allow its use.

    In Canada, some studies indicate alcohol consumption declined slightly as medical cannabis use became more common. Did similar decreases follow recreational legalization?

    To investigate this question, I first collaborated with health science researchers Daniel Myran, Robert Talarico, Jennifer Xiao and Rachael MacDonald-Spracklin to study Canada’s overall alcohol sales.

    Total sales looked stable

    We started our research by examining annual alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022. During that period, beer sales gradually fell, while the sale of coolers and other drinks steadily rose. That left total sales basically unchanged.

    So consumers were apparently switching from beer to other beverages. But there were no obvious effects from 2018’s cannabis legalization.

    Annual Canadian beverage alcohol sales from 2004 to 2022, in litres of ethanol content per capita. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Statistics Canada), CC BY-ND

    We also compared monthly sales during the 12 months before legalization versus the 12 after. This included national average sales by liquor retailers and beer producers. In both cases, sales trends showed no significant changes in October 2018.

    However, this research on Canada-wide sales was mainly designed to detect large changes. To find subtler ones, I focused on the province of Nova Scotia.

    Some liquor stores sold cannabis

    When Canada legalized cannabis, most provinces banned liquor stores from selling it to avoid tempting alcohol drinkers into trying cannabis.

    Nova Scotia did the opposite. Its government-owned liquor corporation became the main cannabis retailer. After legalization in October 2018, most provincial liquor stores kept selling only alcohol, but some began selling cannabis as well.

    This unique situation prompted me to study the province’s sales. I focused on the 17 months before and 17 months after legalization.

    The corporation’s total alcohol sales initially fell in October 2018, then slowly regrew. As a result, monthly sales after legalization averaged about $500,000 below their earlier levels.

    More interestingly, the changes differed between the cannabis-selling stores and the alcohol-only ones. At the alcohol-only stores, sales immediately fell. They averaged $800,000 below previous levels.

    But at cannabis-sellers, alcohol sales began growing. Total monthly sales from October 2018 to February 2020 averaged $300,000 above earlier levels.

    Seasonally adjusted Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation retail sales of beverage alcohol in Canadian dollars, from May 2017 to February 2020. The vertical gray bar marks cannabis legalization.
    (Nova Scotia Liquor Corporation), CC BY-ND

    The divergence in sales was larger for beers than for spirits or wines.

    Interestingly, alcohol-only stores located near cannabis-selling stores had changes similar to those located farther away, suggesting that cannabis-seller proximity didn’t matter.

    Switching substances or stores?

    My data can’t say why the sales split occurred, but I can speculate.

    Consider the immediate sales drop at alcohol-only stores — this could suggest some consumers switched from alcohol to cannabis right after legalization.

    Meanwhile, the lack of a drop at cannabis sellers might mean some consumers simply changed where they shopped. Instead of visiting their local alcohol-only retailer, they went to cannabis sellers to shop for alcohol and cannabis together.

    The cannabis sellers’ ongoing growth might reflect people increasingly buying cannabis from licensed stores instead of illegal dealers. They went to those stores to buy weed, but picked up some extra booze while they were there.

    Looking ahead

    My research so far has focused on the initial post-legalization period, from October 2018 to February 2020.

    I plan to study later periods next, when cannabis retailing was more widespread and perhaps more influential.

    That will be more challenging, however, because COVID-19 arrived in March 2020. The pandemic disrupted sales of alcohol, though not of cannabis. It will be tricky to separate cannabis effects from pandemic ones, or from Canadian consumers’ evolving drinking habits in general.

    My guess is that cannabis legalization had little short-term impact on existing drinkers overall. Most Canadians didn’t suddenly consume cannabis with their cabernet or replace vodka with vapes.

    Instead, we might see gradual long-term shifts. Young Canadians now reach legal age in a context where cannabis and alcohol are both allowed. Some folks who previously would have started drinking alcohol might now choose cannabis instead, or in addition.

    For now, alcohol drinking is still three times more common than cannabis use. Whether that continues, only time will tell.

    Michael J. Armstrong does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Alcohol sales changed subtly after Canada legalized cannabis – https://theconversation.com/alcohol-sales-changed-subtly-after-canada-legalized-cannabis-260375

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New phonics-inspired framework to boost standards for children

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    New phonics-inspired framework to boost standards for children

    New writing framework published to build a nation of confident writers as part of the government’s Plan for Change.

    A focus on handwriting, encouraging children to speak out loud and a renewed focus on reception are part of a first-of-its-kind writing framework, as the Education Secretary says the next generation should be as good at putting pen to paper as they are posting on TikTok.

    The new framework, published today (8 July), will give teachers practical tools and guidance to plan high quality lessons and teach writing from reception and throughout primary school, so that thousands more pupils can build strong foundations in language, spelling and handwriting.

    This includes integrating writing tasks across all subjects, as well as encouraging children to speak out loud words and sentences before writing them down, and similarly using dictation where children write down words, phrases and sentences a teacher has said out loud.

    Even in a digital age, strong writing skills are a vital tool for everyday life and work, helping children explore their thoughts, share their ideas, and make sense of the world around them. Evidence also shows good writing skills can unlock future success and are directly linked to progress in education as well as future earnings.

    Building on the success of the government’s reading framework and its focus on phonics teaching, which has seen 100,000 more children every year build strong foundations in reading, the new writing framework is a first step towards transforming how writing is taught, with those with lower attainment set to benefit most, so no child is left behind.

    The launch comes as Key Stage 2 assessment (SATs) results were published this morning (Tuesday) showing the percentage of children meeting the expected standard in writing remains below pre-pandemic levels.

    In 2024, just over half (55%) of white working-class children left primary school meeting the expected standard in writing, compared to 78% among non-disadvantaged children.

    Similarly, only 30% of children with special educational needs met the expected standard in writing, compared to 83% of children without. 

    The scale of these divides is why, alongside support like the writing framework, the government will in the autumn publish an ambitious schools white paper to reform the SEND system and raise outcomes for disadvantaged children – supporting the Plan for Change to give every child the best start in life. 

    Education Secretary, Bridget Phillipson said:

    Far too many children are leaving school unable to write well, holding them back from future success.

    Writing remains a crucial skill for young people to achieve and thrive in school and later in life. We want them to be as confident putting pen to paper as they are posting on TikTok.

    Our new writing framework is a first step towards transforming how writing is taught in primary schools, as we work to boost outcomes for disadvantaged children and those with SEND, and deliver on our Plan for Change.

    This forms part of the government’s mission to break the link between a child’s background and success, building on plans to ensure every child gets the best possible start in life including by boosting early literacy skills through the expansion of the government’s network of English Hubs. 

    The framework has been drafted with expert guidance from a range of sector experts including academics, leading practitioners and organisations.

    STEP Academy Trust, Executive Director of Primary Education, Dr Tim Mills MBE said:

    Writing is notoriously difficult: the cognitive equivalent of ‘digging ditches’ according to psychologist Ronald Kellogg.  Learning to write is one of the most challenging undertakings facing children, and so one of the most difficult to teach. 

    However, it is extremely susceptible to teaching.  As with the reading framework, we have sought to distil the growing research and evidence around learning to write into useful knowledge, guidance and practical advice.  The aim is to support primary schools teach this vital academic, social and creative life skill by providing them with a coherent understanding of the demanding, sometimes messy progression to becoming a competent and motivated writer.

    Deputy Headteacher, Stanley Road Primary School, Andrew Percival, said:

    As writing is one of the most cognitively demanding tasks that we expect children to master, it is essential that teachers have the support they need to ensure all pupils can flourish as writers.

    The writing framework provides schools with evidence-informed guidance that will help them set pupils on the path to becoming confident and proficient writers.

    Headteacher and Director St Matthew’s Research School, Sonia Thompson, said: 

    The Writing Framework is designed to provide teachers and leaders with evidence informed tools and reflection points. It is not a checklist but a guide for improving confidence and practice, which will lead to improved pupil writing outcomes.

    The announcement today builds on the action already underway to drive high and rising standards in literacy including a National Year of Reading, investing £27.7 million to support the teaching of reading and writing in primary school as well as the ongoing Curriculum and Assessment Review.

    The English Hubs programme provides expert advice and support to schools to improve the teaching of reading driving high and rising standards in English across the country.

    The National Year of Reading, set to start in January 2026, will unite parents, schools, libraries and businesses to get people reading and help reverse the decline in reading for pleasure and boost children’s literacy skills.

    DfE media enquiries

    Central newsdesk – for journalists 020 7783 8300

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    Updates to this page

    Published 8 July 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    July 9, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Denver Man Charged with 27 Counts in Connection with CARES Act Fraud

    Source: US FBI

    DENVER – An indictment was unsealed on Wednesday in Denver charging Steve Randall Howe with twenty counts of bank fraud and seven counts of money laundering in connection with a scheme to defraud the United States Small Business Administration (SBA).

    According to the indictment, between April 2020 and January 2022, Howe obtained more than $1.2 million in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans on behalf of six businesses he owned.  To obtain the loans, Howe submitted false information and fabricated documents to lenders to make it appear that those companies were eligible for PPP loans when they were not.  Howe then used the loan money for ineligible expenses, like purchases of residential properties, retail purchases, travel expenses, and transfers of money to China.  The indictment alleges that Howe then applied for, and received, forgiveness on each loan, never making a single payment on them.

    The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was enacted in March 2020 and was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to Americans dealing with the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The CARES Act created the PPP, a program administered by the SBA that provided loans to small businesses to retain workers, maintain payroll, and pay for certain other expenses consistent with PPP rules.  Small businesses could subsequently request forgiveness of the loan after certifying the loan was used to pay for eligible costs.    

    The defendant made his initial appearance on July 2, 2025, in Denver in front of United States Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter.

    The charges contained in the indictment are allegations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

    This case is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation.  The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Taylor Glogiewicz and Craig Fansler.

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    Case Number:                    25-cr-00197-NYW             

    MIL Security OSI –

    July 9, 2025
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